



# Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence

Ronald A. Francisco

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ISBN 978-1-4419-1475-0 e-ISBN 978-1-4419-1476-7  
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4419-1476-7  
Springer New York Dordrecht Heidelberg London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2010920999

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*For Deborah*

# Acknowledgments

This project has been underway for some time. Through the course of the work, a number of people and institutions have helped me. Let us start with institutions. The data set we coded from the grant of the National Science Foundation (SBR-9631229) is a major component of the underlying evidence in the book. In addition to NSF support, the Department of Political Science and the General Research Fund at the University of Kansas have been important contributors to the completion of the data project.

I thank also people who have aided me in this work. Paul Johnson has been stalwart in the methodology and computer work. He is also an expert in collective action theory. I have learned a lot from Paul. Kathy Graves, head of the reference collection in the University of Kansas libraries, helped me to research many of the historical and cultural events included in the volume. Christian Davenport, now at the University of Notre Dame, aided me greatly on the subject of the Black Panthers. Most of all, I appreciate the support and active assistance of my wife Deborah, who has helped this project along and has been a wonderful companion for four decades.

# List of Acronyms

AARP	American Association for Retired People
CARP	Collective Action Research Program
ETA	Easkadi Tu Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)
GSC-9	Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (Border Protection Group 9)
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka)
M-19	Cuban 19th of April Revolutionary Movement
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NSF	National Science Foundation
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
RAID	Recherche Assistance Intervention Dissuasion (French anti-terror Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence)
SAS	Special Air Service (British anti-terror unit)
SDS	Students for a Democratic Society
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
STV	Single Transferable Vote
SWAT	Special Weapons Attack Team
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Testing Collective Action Theory</b> .....	1
1.1	Introduction .....	1
1.2	Three Sources for Tests .....	4
1.3	Varieties of Empirical Evidence .....	5
1.4	A Retreat to the Mundane .....	6
1.5	The Plan of the Book .....	7
	Bibliography .....	8
<b>2</b>	<b>Leadership and Mobilization</b> .....	11
2.1	Introduction .....	11
2.2	The Role of Leadership in Mobilization .....	13
2.3	Events as Catalysts in Mobilization .....	16
2.4	Does the Form of Government Matter? .....	19
2.5	Resources .....	20
2.6	Clandestine Mobilization .....	22
2.7	Mass Mobilization .....	23
2.8	When Leaders Have Incomplete Knowledge .....	24
2.9	Coordination Power .....	25
2.10	When Leaders are Replenished .....	26
2.11	Competing Leaders .....	27
2.12	Recruiting Violent Dissidents .....	28
2.13	Civil War .....	29
2.14	Pecuniary Incentives .....	30
2.15	After the Massacre .....	32
2.16	Leadership and Mobilization .....	32
	Bibliography .....	33
<b>3</b>	<b>Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest</b> .....	37
3.1	Introduction .....	37
3.2	Definitions and the Challenge of Analysis .....	38
3.3	Adaptation and Symbolic Protest in Autocratic States .....	41
3.4	Symbolic Protest in Repressive Systems .....	45



3.5	Adaptation, Innovation, and Diffusion in Democratic States .....	47
3.5.1	The Challenge of Publicity and Media Attention .....	47
3.5.2	Clothing or its Absence .....	47
3.5.3	Music .....	48
3.5.4	Bricks, Mortar, and Cement.....	49
3.5.5	Symbolic Action.....	49
3.5.6	Fake Signs .....	50
3.5.7	Two-sided Adaptation and Coevolution .....	51
3.6	Adaptation and Symbolic Protest: A Research Agenda .....	53
	Bibliography.....	54
<b>4</b>	<b>Dimensions of Space and Time in Protest and Repression .....</b>	<b>57</b>
4.1	Introduction .....	57
4.2	Space in Theory and Evidence .....	58
4.2.1	Dissident Entrepreneurs Select and Use Space Based on Their Tactics .....	58
4.2.2	Dissident Entrepreneurs Seek to Shift Protesters into a Space that Reduces the Probability of Coercion and Maximizes Mobilization.....	61
4.2.3	Protester Site Selection.....	62
4.2.4	Tacit Coordination and Site Selection .....	63
4.2.5	Dissidents Adapt Not Only Tactically But Also Spatially When Faced with Large Coercion Forces .....	64
4.2.6	The State's Dilemma Grows Larger as Dissident Mobilization Diffuses and Concentration Increases .....	65
4.2.7	Space in Protest and Repression .....	70
4.3	Time .....	71
4.3.1	Dictatorships and Rapid Collapse .....	72
4.3.2	The Special Case of Riots .....	74
4.3.3	Duration of Protest Under Heavy Repression .....	75
4.3.4	The Duration and Timing of Protest Events.....	78
4.3.5	Stability Over Time .....	80
4.3.6	Specification Problems and the Duration of Protest and Repression .....	80
	Bibliography.....	81
<b>5</b>	<b>Terror.....</b>	<b>83</b>
5.1	Introduction .....	83
5.2	Why Do Terror Groups Form? .....	84
5.3	Necessary Supports of a Terror Group.....	86
5.3.1	Financing Terror.....	86
5.3.2	Recruitment.....	90
5.3.3	Safe Areas, Safe Houses, and Protective Support.....	92
5.3.4	Leadership .....	93

- 5.4 Methods of Combating a Terror Group ..... 94
  - 5.4.1 Arrests, Killings, and Forces Against Terror ..... 95
  - 5.4.2 “Critical Mass” in the Context of Terror ..... 98
  - 5.4.3 Political Arms, Negotiations, Cease-Fires, and Splintering ... 99
  - 5.4.4 Loss of Popular Support .....100
  - 5.4.5 Extinct and Zombie Terror Organizations .....101
  - 5.4.6 The Possibility of Eliminating an International  
Terror Organization .....101
- Bibliography .....102
  
- 6 Evidence for Collective Action Theory .....105**
  - 6.1 Introduction .....105
  - 6.2 Evaluation .....106
    - 6.2.1 Wintrobe .....106
    - 6.2.2 DeNardo .....106
    - 6.2.3 Lichbach .....108
  - 6.3 Theory in the Light of Empirical Evidence.....108
    - 6.3.1 Leadership and Mobilization .....109
    - 6.3.2 Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest .....110
    - 6.3.3 Dimensions of Space and Time .....110
    - 6.3.4 Terror.....111
  - 6.4 Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence .....112
  - Bibliography .....112
  
- Index .....113**

# Chapter 1

## Testing Collective Action Theory

### 1.1 Introduction

The goal of this book is to attempt to extend, expand and test empirically the implications of the Collective Action Research Program. This set of rational theories began with Mancur Olson (Olson 1965). It broke with the prevailing theory of pluralism, which posited that groups would form around the interests of citizens. Yet, empirical research showed that, instead of knitting, bird-watching, and classic auto clubs, 90% of the organizations comprised only labor and management. Clearly, pluralism was wrong. Olson put his creative thinking toward the process of mobilization. In other words, how would one recruit members of an interest group to lobby Congress? Olson thought through the problem systematically: first, it would be necessary to have a public good, that is, some goal that could not diminish with use and would be available to everyone in a region. Economists call these non-rival or noncompetitive goods. Examples of such objectives are clean air, defense, clean water, lower taxes, or more tax subsidies. Given that this is the case, a second conclusion is necessary: no particular person would have to participate to receive the public good. Thus, he reasoned, most people would not participate. And indeed, 95% of people do not participate (Lichbach 1995). These non-participants are called free-riders. They gain the benefit of a new public policy, but do nothing toward its implementation. This conclusion created yet another problem: how would one be able to recruit members to lobby? Given that success would benefit everyone in a class, the incentive to participate would necessarily be larger for active members. Olson (Olson 1965) called these selective incentives, special payments in favors, goods or money to active members that were unavailable to free-riders. Suddenly the empirical world of labor and management groups and the absence of bird-watching groups made sense: pluralism was wrong, but collective action theory worked. And this theory differed from its predecessors in a fundamental way: it assumed that people think. Structural models force people to act by conditions, but Olson focused on individuals.

What was paramount for Olson (Olson 1965) were interest groups, lobbying organizations or just clubs. He did not consider violence or risk. After all, if it were difficult to get anyone to act, how could one cause people to act when there was risk of arrest, injury, or even torture or death? And who might pay for selective

incentives in these instances? Olson believed his theory would not function in these contexts. Mark Lichbach, in contrast, thought it would. Lichbach (Lichbach 1995, 1996) read voraciously every memoir, relevant paper, and descriptive book of conflict he could find for a decade, always looking for a set of patterns that might work under risk. He read journals, encyclopedias, manuscripts, and he read fervidly. He even cataloged all the mathematical models created and then recreated for conflict (Lichbach 1992). He was convinced that Olson's (Olson 1965) approach would work as a basis in protest and repression, but would have to be modified and extended. His reading led him to four kinds of measures to mobilize under risk. The first, market solutions to the collective action problem generally lowered costs and raised benefits – essentially an Olsonian solution group. The second stressed community, that is, common values and common knowledge. A good example of community is a language group, for example, the Basques, or a religious group, for example, Hassidic Jews. It is interesting that the community solutions are the only way to avoid monetary payments to active members. A third and less-used group is contract, which presumes pre-existing organizations. These groups might use a swapping method of resources or skills to aid each other, but would not act together. The final group is hierarchy, where there is a clear structure to the pre-existing or nascent group that involves a leader, one who is almost always better educated and from a higher social class than the followers in the group. Lichbach (Lichbach 1995, 1996) found another requirement: one cannot mobilize with one of these groups; it is necessary to employ at least two, for example, market and community, market and contract, or hierarchy and community.

We are fortunate that Mancur Olson was alive and active when Lichbach finished his manuscript. Olson read it and was amazed. He offered effusive praise (see the book jacket). Olson died shortly thereafter, but the imprimatur he gave raised the profile of Lichbach's (Lichbach 1995, 1996) books when they were published among economists, rational choice scholars and those who used Olson's (Olson 1965) theories.

To this point, the research program primarily includes only micro-level theoretical work, with little published empirical analysis. Empirical analysis of the theoretical implications of existing formal theories is the main goal of this volume. Only in this way can we begin to know whether the theories are correct or might need modification. Empirical analysis of the implications of micro-theories is just one of the suggestions of Snyder (Snyder 1978), but it is the only one that has yet to be satisfied.

More than 30 years ago David Snyder challenged the research community in social movements and protest and repression to modify research in four ways: (1) develop more fine-grained longitudinal data; (2) link levels of analysis; (3) develop logically complete theory; and (4) model and test theories in disaggregated methods. The field has come a long way in three decades. Within the last two decades Mark Lichbach (Lichbach 1995, 1996) has created the best extension of the collective action research program – a series of theories that are logically complete and consistent. On the data front, a number of advances were realized, including interval data dense enough for weekly and now even daily aggregation – a significant

shift and dramatic improvement from the yearly data of the 1970s. For several years now, disaggregated methods (i.e., single-case comparisons) have been used to test theories (Davenport and Eads 2001; Rasler 1996; Francisco 1993, 1995, 1996).

The single area of Snyder's (Snyder 1978) demands that has faltered is in linking levels of analysis in the field of protest and repression. James DeNardo's (DeNardo 1985) and Lichbach's (Lichbach 1996) formal models have for the most part not been tested empirically, nor have Ronald Wintrobe's (Wintrobe 1998) models of dictators' strategic behavior. The difficulty stems from the disjuncture between game theory or micro models and macro, aggregate data. Green and Shapiro (Green and Shapiro 1994) took an extreme position on this problem: little empirical evidence from rational choice and game theory exists. To the extent that empirical evidence comprises our understanding of politics, rational choice and game theory have arguably contributed as much or more than any other approach. Think of interest group theory before Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action*, of electoral theory before Cox's (Cox 1997) *Making Votes Count*, or of coalition theory before Riker's (Riker 1963) *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. There are few social scientists who would not judge these books as great for economics and political science. Cox's book alone has won every major book prize appropriate in political science.

On the normative side, too few political scientists researching democratization are aware of the theory of social choice. Its findings challenge the foundations of democratic theory (Riker 1982). For example, while most political scientists view wasted votes and distortion of votes as the biggest problem of electoral laws, social choice theorists cite an even greater problem: no rational outcome and in seven of ten elections, no majority. For them, only plurality and majority electoral systems guarantee governability.

Nonetheless, there is an acknowledged need to have empirical evidence support of rational choice and game theory. If there is too little empirical evidence, it is because there is no direct method that can test a micromodel with aggregate data. Is it hopeless? No, but it is not easy; that is the reason it is done rarely. The only way to test a micromodel is to first infer its theoretical implications, then operationalize these implications and finally test them with aggregate data. That, in fact, is what this book attempts to do. The approach used here is not novel. Laver and Shepsle (Laver and Shepsle 1996) pioneered the method in comparative politics: creating a micro theory, inferring the theoretical implications, testing the implications with data and finally revising the micromodel, all in a single volume. Cox (Cox 1999) presents many more instances of estimating formal models using empirical data.

My aim in this volume is to test the theory of collective action against the reality of protest and repression. Necessarily, collective action theory must be tested in parts. If all the component implications of the theory bear out in empirical investigation, then the theory has firm empirical support. This effort faces fewer obstacles than it would if elections or interest groups were used. Preferences about elections or interest groups might be held firmly, but neither generally threatens life and limb. In contrast, protest and repression at minimum take time and they raise the risk of arrest or injury. At maximum, protest under conditions of harsh repression involves a risk of torture and death. Protest and repression have deeper and more salient

preferences than almost any other arena of politics. One might debate how strongly a citizen might support a group or political party, but that same citizen is likely to have definite views about being arrested, injured or killed.

Risk-aversion, desire for free time and indifference to politics explain well the reason that no more than 5% of any population ever protests (Lichbach 1995). The vast majority of citizens never strike, march, occupy, obstruct or demonstrate against the state. This volume is concerned with those who do choose to confront the state or some other structural or institutional target. Although protesters constitute a minority, they can wreak havoc on a state, weakening it or even bringing it down with stunning swiftness. All states are attuned to the dangers of protest. Some deter it, others repress it, some actually ignore it and still others preclude it altogether. Nonetheless, it persists in all contexts and may arise suddenly in response to events. It is these events that we coded and that are the basis of evaluation.

## 1.2 Three Sources for Tests

To evaluate the theory of collective action for protest and repression, I choose three sources as the fundamental base for the empirical tests. These sources move dissidents precisely the way we need them moved: from quiescence to action, to strategy, and then to confrontation with the state. First, Lichbach's (Lichbach 1995,1996) great accomplishment is to set dissidents in motion. He formalizes a solution set for dissident mobilization. Then DeNardo (DeNardo 1985) uses formal models to form the strategy of rational, active dissidents. Finally, while both Lichbach and DeNardo provide context, mobilization and strategy in their models, Wintrobe (1998) presents formal models of dictators' optimal strategies to repress dissidents. These three sources form a triangle of sorts for the rebel's dilemma: action, protest strategy, and the state's responses to repress or deter protest. Theoretical implications of these sources singly and in combination provide the foundation for designing empirical evaluations.

Lichbach (Lichbach 1995,1996) solves the rebel's dilemma. His not-too-formal solutions mobilize dissidents and reduce the free-rider problem for dissident entrepreneurs. In contrast, dictators rely heavily on the twin pillars of free-ridership and risk aversion. It helps them reduce the cost of maintaining a dictatorship (Wintrobe 1998). Still, dictators face an array of perils: (1) a cabal of associates, (2) loss of support by bureaucrats and the army, (3) a revolt of the mob, and (4) foreign intervention (Wintrobe 1998, 106). DeNardo (1985) shows how a resolute strategy against the dictator can force concessions and create greater peril for the dictator.

Let us illustrate by example how empirical knowledge can be used to validate and even advance a theory. Radical groups can disrupt regimes without large mobilization through the strategic use of violence (DeNardo 1985). The regime is then much more likely to respond with violence, and all three authors conjecture that mobilization would be low in these contexts. In fact, it is low, but how do dissident leaders find violent protesters? This has been a puzzle for decades. Recently, coded empirical data show us that the puzzle is easily solved on the street. European

dissident violent leaders mobilize young zealous protesters who are typically diffused within a common nonviolent demonstration. The more zealous demonstrators grow impatient at nonviolent tactics. Typically they move toward the front with their barely concealed alacrity and ambition. As the demonstration ebbs, restive leaders summon zealots to cluster and use violence against the police or to attack their targets. This mobilization method is fully consistent with the collective action theory. In fact, it completely minimizes the costs of violent mobilization. Usually, no extra effort is needed to mobilize dissidents who are willing to use violence. Nonetheless, this minimal cost method cannot be inferred from collective action theory alone. The simple example above demonstrates the reason that empirical observation is vital for a research program. Without it, one has abstract theories and stories, but with empirical evidence, one can confirm or invalidate hypotheses and continue the progress of the research program (Lakatos 1970).

### 1.3 Varieties of Empirical Evidence

What kind of empirical evidence advances a research program? Virtually all game theorists base their models on a real story. Game theory then shows the consequences resulting from all possible player decisions. Even game theorists, however, have acknowledged that rational choice needs more than anecdotes or stories (Cox 1999). We must move beyond anecdotes, then, but toward what sort of evidence? As Lakatos (Lakatos 1970, 119) points out, “no experiment, experimental report, observation statement or well-corroborated low-level falsifying hypothesis alone can lead to falsification” of a theory. One counter-example cannot bring down collective action theory as it can a mathematical conjecture. Indeed, collective action theory is well established. The intent of this volume is to move the collective action research program forward. What is the best way to accomplish this objective?

Experiments do exist for game theory and rational choice (e.g., Palfrey 1991), but these usually involve undergraduates and do not necessarily add empirical content to the collective action theory. Statistical tests of aggregate data are impossible for a micro-level theory. Even logical tests of game theory present challenges because we do not know the preferences of individuals.

Perhaps the key to an answer for the optimum empirical test of a micro-theory is Lakatos’s (Lakatos 1970, 132) statement of “Popper’s supreme heuristic rule: ‘devise conjectures which have more empirical content than their predecessors’.” This is the intention of this volume. It uses the theoretical implications of DeNardo (DeNardo 1985), Lichbach (Lichbach 1995, 1996) and Wintrobe (Wintrobe 1998) for logical empirical tests, data estimation, statistical tests, and reforming conjectures. How much empirical content can be added with aggregate data? The answer to this question depends to a great degree on the space and time of the data. If, on the one hand, we have a single country and one time period, then little empirical content can be added to the collective action theory. If, on the other hand, we have multi-country data over long time periods, empirical results might add a great deal of empirical content simply by the data’s breadth and time. In this latter case, the

data should have daily aggregation. If aggregation is monthly or yearly, it usually means that the data lack sufficient density, possibly leading to validity and reliability problems for tests on the theoretical implications. Aggregation per day fits collective action implications closely. We are, after all, interested in the process of mobilization and the interaction of dissidents and state forces. These are not typically things that occur per month of year. In addition, space of the data should be wide. If it is limited to one region, readers might well argue that the conclusions matter only for that region, not adding general empirical content to a micro-theory.

The principal data that will be used for the volume tests will come from 28 countries in Europe, aggregated daily with an interval level. The data were coded from 500 sources and extend for 16 years, from 1980 through 1995 (<http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>). The data extend from Portugal, Iceland and Ireland in the west to Poland and Bulgaria in the east. For the east central European countries, the data cover the communist period, the regime transition and the democratization era. West European data include countries before they were admitted into the European Union, and members of the European Union, as well as countries such as Iceland or Norway that are not members of the EU.

These data come from at most two regions – some would argue increasingly one region. How then can they add empirical content to the collective action theory? I would counter that 28 different countries, ranging from Iceland to Romania, involve a good deal of variance. This variance is increased by their different forms of government. Nonetheless, data will be brought in from the remainder of the world as well. Other regions do not compare with the availability of European data, but historical data from many regions exist. Extending data in this way always allows us to move research well before 1980 and past 1995. Space and time, then, will be varied highly to add as much empirical content to the collective action theory as possible.

Another way to advance a scientific research program is to test it in its harshest possible context. For the collective action research program, that means two opposite environments: (1) when the context is at its optimum level, that is, low opposition to the government, high-level of human rights, economic growth, and low unemployment; and (2) during harsh state repression, for example, after a massacre or during a state genocide era. If one can mobilize in these circumstances, then is the collective action theory correct for events and tactics of mobilization in either of these extreme contexts? Are those mobilized risk-averse? Does each individual really feel that he or she can make a difference of obtaining a public good? As Lichbach (Lichbach 1995) notes, 95% of any population never acts. These are Mancur Olson's people – they remain passive. The theory, then, concerns how many of the residual 5% of the population will act in any given context.

## 1.4 A Retreat to the Mundane

The history of protest and repression research is almost completely on the high-level of macro explanations. Crane Brinton (Brinton 1938) attempted to tease the causes of revolution from a set of major regime collapses. Decades later, Moore



(Moore 1966) focused on large-scale class-based explanations of dictatorship, revolution and the transition to the modern world. Gurr (Gurr 1970) used a microlevel theory of relative deprivation, but tested it with macrovariables. Tilly Tilly 1978 developed the resource mobilization theory of leadership and contention, but it is also completely at the macro level with structural explanations. Finally, Theda Skocpol (1979) created a structural theory of social revolution. All these studies use independent variables that might cause mobilization and contention, but aside from Gurr, few have been tested on time-series data. Indeed, as DeNardo (1985, 17) points out, most of the theories are based on the history preceding a revolution or rebellion. If we array all putative causes of revolution across the broad span of history, we would be disappointed: few revolutions arise when those variables occur. It is this reason that a sweeping verbal explanation of rebellion and revolution has little prospect for a research program.

The collective action research program seems mundane in comparison with the aforementioned theories. Focused on mobilization of the individual, tactics and strategy, no historical narrative emerges that clarifies an explanation of mobilization and strategy. Thus we involve in our study concepts such as time and space – not in their most provocative sense, but in their basic meanings: When and where do dissident leaders mobilize? When and where do protesters act? How long do they act? How do they react to repression? These are questions traditional theorists neglect. I pursue them in order to add empirical content to the collective action research program. This research program is a micro-theory. It is a theoretical foundation that allows development. Answers to the questions above can lead to greater understanding of the dynamic process of political contention.

## 1.5 The Plan of the Book

The purpose of this book is to collect and report tests of theoretical implications of the collective action theory with empirical data. Chapter 2 ventures immediately into the world of mobilization and leadership. Leadership was established as an important variable of mobilization by Tilly (1978) and Lichbach (1995, 1996). The chapter investigates many of the varied claims about the nature of mobilization and leadership in varying contexts: Are leaders really better educated and from a higher social echelon than are their followers, as Lichbach (1995, 1996) claims? Are leaders really self-interested? Do they mobilize because they lack equal or better opportunities in the country's economy?

Tactical adaptation and symbolic protest, the focus of Chap. 3, can occur on behalf of the protesters or the state. Adaptation helps to elude and reduce repression, mobilize more dissidents, and squeeze more productive results from action. It occurs almost all the time, but it has been little noticed by broad macro theorists. In fact it explains a great deal: (1) why protest and revolution remains, stable, that is, in equilibrium almost all the time; (2) why casualties are usually low on the dissident side; and (3) the importance of leaders both in finding adaptive tactics as well as in replacing leaders who are lost. The gritty day-to-day examination of protest allows

a view of adaptation in its full form of action. The chapter also investigates coevolution, the tragic dual adaptation over time of dissidents and the state over time that can lead to civil war.

The fourth chapter investigates the spatial and temporal components of mobilization, strategy, and contention. “Space” here means physical space, that is, Euclidean distance (and its taxicab counterpart). How do dissident entrepreneurs choose a place for mobilization and action? How do dissidents use space to elude repression? Why do rational rioters always confine action to a well-defined city space? How do regimes attempt to move contention to the space they desire? How does the state respond to spatial diffusion of protest when dissidents spread out deliberately to thwart repression?

Time, that is both duration and when during the day and week mobilization and contention occurs, is also the subject of Chap. 4. Why do protesters act if they guard leisure time? How much time does protest really take from an activist’s (not a leader’s) life? How can resolute dissidents use time as a strategy against a regime? How long does it take for determined state repression to stop stalwart public protest?

Chapter 5 investigates terror and the valiant attempts to deter and halt terror. Terrorists typically maintain a zealous dedication to a public good that is so radical that they have virtually no mass mobilization ability. They substitute resources for mobilization. They hire fighters and pay them a salary each month. As organizations, they closely resemble organized crime. Attempts to deter or stop terror generally have failed because terrorists have complete information while states have incomplete information at best. After all, terrorists know when, where, and how they will commit terror. The state is unlikely to know any of these three critical information concepts. Terrorists adapt easily to state deterrence. Generally the only people terrorists listen to are those they claim to represent. It is these individuals, in many cases, who can dampen terror by large-scale public protests against violence, but even this is uncertain to last. States that believe they have conquered terror are typically the most vulnerable to new attacks and embarrassment.

Our final chapter attempts to summarize empirical findings. Specifically it provides confirmation or an extension or alternation of the collective action research program’s theoretical implications. It suggests questions for which more empirical work is required. It also notes where we have established sufficient empirical tests to demonstrate that a conjecture is correct in nearly all settings and times. Finally, adding more empirical content to the collective action research program moves it forward by noting revisions for the theory and specifying need additional theory Lakatos 1970.

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# Chapter 2

## Leadership and Mobilization

*The basic problem has always been getting other people to die for you.*

—Thomas Pynchon, *Gravity's Rainbow*

### 2.1 Introduction

What causes revolution? Historians and social scientists have alike put forward a myriad causes, but there is really only one: mobilization. Should a regime fall without mass mobilization, it is defined as a victim of a coup d'état, usually by a military cabal. Mobilization – not revolution – then is the concept that foremost requires explanation. How is it that on one particular occasion, a gathering of one hundred people or even hundreds of thousands act against their government? From a theoretical point of view, this question is the same as asking why 30 workers act against their firm. The puzzle of mobilization focuses on why anyone acts at all. Most do not, as Mancur Olson (1965) pointed out. About few to 5% of the local population might act under risk, and exactly why they do so has remained mysterious. We have stories, anecdotes, and examples on mobilization, but until recently there was no theoretical explanation about how mobilization actually arises. Mark Lichbach (1995, 1996) spent the better part of a decade grappling with this problem. His work clarifies how dissident mobilization occurs. In this chapter, we examine the theoretical implications of his and other formal theorists' work in terms of real-world mobilization.

Our first task, as always, is to draw the theoretical implications from formal micro-theories. DeNardo's (1985) concept of mobilization is spatial and straightforward: the amount of mobilization is based on the dimensional point of the state's policies. If the state moves far from the median citizen's preferences, then mobilization goes higher. DeNardo does not entertain the mechanics of mobilization, and so it is difficult to draw inferences that can be analyzed empirically. The theorist most concerned with the actual methods of mobilization is Lichbach (1995, 1996). It is his micro-theories that can be tested best empirically.

Once we have distilled these expectations, we can match them against an array of real-world mobilizations and failures to mobilize. Lichbach (1995, 1996) created four sets of solutions to the collective action problem. These solutions are grouped as market, community, contract, and hierarchy. None of these solution sets alone

can mobilize people. A dissident entrepreneur must combine at least two of the categories to be able to move into collective action (Lichbach 1995, 323). Lichbach also points out that the outbreak of mobilization is unpredictable at the macrolevel (Lichbach 1995, 323). We have confirmed this with empirical spectral analysis tests. The daily protest coded in interval level for almost all countries in Europe is white-noise random, that is, at the aggregate level there is no pattern, no periodicity, and there are no identifiable cycles in the mobilization of protest. This finding is fully consistent with Lichbach's rationality theories. Rationality at the microlevel may easily lead to white-noise randomness at the aggregate level, particularly if different groups' protest is aggregated on a daily basis.

The present chapter is titled "Leadership and Mobilization." The reason for the emphasis on the former is that leadership is a major factor in almost all mobilization. Consider the role of leaders in Lichbach's (1995, 1996) four groups of solutions: In Market, dissident entrepreneurs decrease costs and increase benefits; under Community, it is leaders who overcome mutual ignorance and build bandwagons; the Contract solution presupposes preexisting organizations that have leaders; and Hierarchy is driven by leaders, who, among other duties, seek to recruit patrons for mobilization support. In the real world, it is apparent that not much happens in the absence of leadership. This was Tilly's key insight (Tilly 1978) when he criticized relative deprivation theory (see Gurr 1970). Leadership in dissent, however, is far from selfless. Dissident entrepreneurs work for themselves as much (or more) as for their followers. Often successful leaders become famous and even wealthy, usually at the expense of their followers. This is known as the pathology of mobilization (Lichbach 1995).

Lichbach (1995, 292) enumerates four tenets to guide research for anyone studying collective dissent: (1) recognize that at most 5% of any community protests; protest is the exception; (2) identify which solutions were used for mobilization? (3) study competing interests and how they shaped contexts, structures, and institutions; and (4) investigate the unintended consequences that flow from the collective action. The 5% rule is confirmed in all cases except for bandwagon mobilization. But this finding does not disconfirm the rule, since bandwagon mobilization has little or no cost and might well benefit each active individual in the immediate future. Identifying the solutions requires inference, but that is not difficult given an historical background of an event. We are less interested in how competing interests shaped contexts, structures, and institutions, or what consequences occurred, since mobilization itself is the topic at hand. We begin with the neglected role of two factors of often necessary conditions for mobilization: leadership and events.

This chapter is a tour through different contexts of leadership and mobilization. We start with the general role of leadership for mobilization, stressing the major differences between leaders and followers. Events as catalysts for mobilization are a neglected topic that we explore with logic and examples. Next we investigate the form of government and the amount of mobilization associated with it. In general, the more citizens' access to government is restricted, the greater the mobilization. Resources are necessary for most mobilization contexts, and we consider those next. Their importance depends on the situation, but in general they are vital

for collective action. After considering these topics, we explore special types of mobilization and contexts: (1) clandestine mobilization under severely repressive conditions: this is a critical test of collective action theory in its most difficult setting; (2) mass mobilization under democratic conditions: if conditions are good for most citizens, this can also be problematic; (3) leaders who labor under incomplete information: leaders create mobilization but they endanger followers if contexts are misunderstood; (4) coordination power, the optimal mobilization magic wand: this is an unusual situation in which mobilization is almost automatic; (5) the replenishment of leaders when they are lost, arrested, or killed: if the movement is to continue, new leadership must be found; rarely is this a problem; (6) leaders compete against one another, even when that competition makes achievement of a public good less probable (this follows directly from Lichbach's theory (1995, 1996)); (7) how violence-prone leaders find violent dissidents easily (this has been an enduring and significant puzzle, but we find that it has a simple solution); (8) the special case of civil war mobilization through coevolution; (9) dissidents as employees – it is more common than most scholars think; and finally (10) mobilization in another severe context: after a massacre. With the exception of pecuniary incentives, these topics account for collective action theory's most challenging contexts. If the theory can explain them, within the realm of leadership and mobilization, then it is valid.

## 2.2 The Role of Leadership in Mobilization

Mobilization without leadership is extremely difficult. As noted earlier, Lichbach (1995, 1996) stresses leadership in most of his solutions. Events by nature are haphazard, mostly random and dependent on context. These characteristics render them useless for formal theorists. But in the empirical world, a great deal of mobilization depends on events. Riots alone among protest events do not seem to have leaders (although leaders generally establish the cues that signal for riots to begin). All other types have established leaders, some obvious, some behind the scene. Our two principal mobilization theorists and pioneer Mancur Olson stress on leadership. Lichbach (1995, 1996) involves dissident entrepreneurs in most of his solutions. DeNardo (1985) considers leadership in strategy; otherwise, he assumes that mobilization will occur if the government's policy position moves too far from that of a large group of potential dissidents. Olson (1965) too, with his emphasis on selective incentives, cites the need for a leader to organize the provision of incentives. But Olson focuses on labor unions and clubs where leaders are implicit. Lichbach (1995, 1996) tells us most about what to expect from the leadership in the context of actual mobilization.

Trotsky (1970, 176) notes that in Lenin's absence, Bolshevik leaders had no idea what to do either in 1905 or in the summer of 1917. Lenin was the sort of leader who commands complete respect of other leaders and of rank-and-file members. As long as Lenin was in charge, the Bolsheviks worked well. Without him, things tended to fall apart. This is more typical than one might expect. In the Nicaraguan revolution,

Sandinista forces often lost control of peasants during periods of harsh repression. In some ways, the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland ran into similar problems; Catholic support waned when terror cells were given autonomy. Inevitably, individual cells (especially those made up of teenage “lilly whites,” those with no criminal records) began to bomb dubious sites or kill Catholics and children. As these problems mounted, Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, and Sinn Fein began to lose Catholic support to John Hume and the Social Democratic Labor Party. Had the PIRA Army Council in Dublin kept all cells under tight control, cease fire negotiations and the agreement to halt terror might have taken much longer.

Lichbach (1995, 1996) notes that dissident leaders almost always stem from a higher social class and are better educated than are the rank-and-file members of a protest group. Examples are easy to find. Huey Newton and Bobby Seale developed the Black Panther Party concept while they were students at Howard University. The literary quality of the Black Panther newspaper was widely recognized and highly praised (Hirsch 1987). Bobby Seale, one of the Black Panther founders, was also one of the original Chicago Eight, but he was separated from the trial by a declaration of mistrial in 1969. Much of other Panthers’ education was informal. As Eldridge Cleaver (1992, 30), Minister of Information, wrote, “I’m perfectly aware that I’m in prison, that I’m a Negro, that I’ve been a rapist, and that I have a Higher Uneducation.”

Of the other Chicago Seven defendants stemming from the 1968 Chicago Democratic convention protests, David Dellinger (Yale University), Rennie Davis (University of Michigan), John Froines (Ph.D. in chemistry and a position at the University of Oregon), Tom Hayden (University of Michigan), Abbie Hoffman (Brandeis University), Jerry Rubin (University of California, Berkeley), and Lee Weiner (Northwestern University graduate student) were all highly educated. Saul Alinsky, perhaps the best mobilizer of the twentieth century, was a lawyer and a graduate of the University of Chicago. Ralph Nader, another great mobilizer, is an attorney. And, of course, there was Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The same is true beyond the United States. Fidel Castro is a lawyer, as was Mahatma Gandhi, who received his legal education in London. Nelson Mandela was one of the only two native attorneys in South Africa in the early 1960s. Subcommander Marcos was educated at the University of Mexico in Mexico City before he went south to Chiapas in 1984 to mobilize indigenous Mayans. Revolutionary factotum Che Guevara finished 4 years of medical school in Argentina before he set out to overthrow military regimes. Rosa Luxemburg (University of Zurich) and Karl Liebknecht (Humboldt University in Berlin and son of journalist and writer Wilhelm Liebknecht [Wohlgemuth 1973]) were leaders of the Spartakus communist league in Berlin after World War I.

Irish nationalist leader Michael Collins garnered a university scholarship, but too few personal funds precluded him from accepting it. He became a stockbroker before leading Ireland into its battle for an independent Irish republic. Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, did not attend university. He was a bartender in Ballymurphy (part of Belfast) with a strong Republican genealogy when he was appointed president. His father joined the IRA at age 14 and most of his uncles were deeply involved in the “official” IRA as well (Bell 1993).

Aside from Irish nationalists, all the other well-known leaders attained a high level of education. What, though, can be said about the second part of Lichbach's (1995) conjecture that followers are less well educated and are from a lower social class than are the leaders? Without significant exception, the list below supports Lichbach's (1995) contention.

1. Luxemburg/Liebkecht: Spartakus followers were almost all industrial workers (Ettinger 1986).
2. African National Congress followers were systematically deprived of education by the Apartheid authorities.
3. Gandhi's followers in India were workers, peasants, and lower-caste individuals.
4. Cuban M-19 supporters during the late-1950s were peasants.
5. Civil rights followers were mostly students and workers.
6. The majority of Black Panthers were uneducated and many had criminal records.
7. The Yippies had no following per se.
8. Members recruited by the Provisional Irish Republican Army were teenagers (Toolis 1995).
9. Anti-Vietnam war protesters were college and high school students, mostly led by college graduates.
10. Subcommander Marcos pretended not to command Mayan Indian peasants in Chiapas.

Why would such a diverse group of educated people spanning more than a century aspire to be dissident entrepreneurs? Risk is high, both in the sense of death and physical danger, and also in the complexity or inability to mobilize and achieve the public good. Why would Subcommander Marcos leave assured middle-class life in Mexico City to mobilize tribes of reluctant Mayan Indians in the jungles of Chiapas? Why would Mahatma Gandhi sacrifice a brilliant law career to drive the British out of India? Think, too, of Fidel Castro. He enjoyed both a promising legal and baseball career and being a candidate for the Cuban legislature when Batista precluded his first opportunity for election. Che Guevara might still be alive as a physician in Argentina had he not chosen the life of a dissident entrepreneur and guerrilla fighter. In all these cases, opportunities in mainstream life were not nearly as enticing as the lure of fame, adventure, and even potential wealth. Collins, Gandhi, Guevara, and Martin Luther King took real risks, to be sure, long before each was killed. Nonetheless, most dissident entrepreneurs take few risks and have a fairly easy career as long as they are able to continue mobilizing.

Is Gerry Adams' life better or worse than if he had remained a bartender? His house received repeated bombings during the "Troubles," strife that was imposed mainly by his own Provisional IRA. During this period he subsisted on welfare. Yet he met the US presidents, represented Sinn Fein in international negotiations, was feted in Boston, received awards, and generally lived a high-profile life. Similarly, Subcommander Marcos faced a middle-class life in a firm or even in the PRI party or one of its competitors, but in the 1990s he was famous with posters of his



baklava-covered face adorning many college rooms. But another reason to become a dissident entrepreneur is what Lichbach (1995) calls pathology. Former struggling, nascent movements became institutionalized, sanctioned by government, and as formal as the Red Cross, NAACP, or the AARP. The leader and staff receive salaries from dues-paying members as well as contributing supporters. They can be televised, interviewed, and invited to the legislature for consulting. To take a small social movement to these heights is an achievement – but it mostly benefits the leader and the staff. Salary levels approach those of CEOs, health insurance, official cars, pensions, and many special incentives accrue. This is precisely why Lichbach (1995) calls the achievement of an institution through collective action the “pathology of mobilization.”

In general, leadership qualities and the nature of followers meet the theoretical requirements of collective action theory. Now we explore events, something the theory does not consider directly.

### 2.3 Events as Catalysts in Mobilization

Where were the vaunted Russian revolutionaries when the 1917 Russian revolution dawned? Where were Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Joseph Stalin? On 22 January 1917, Lenin said: “We old timers perhaps shall not live to see the decisive battles of the looming revolution” (Pipes 1995, 112). The regime fell 7 weeks later. Lenin arrived 2 months after the revolution, on 16 April (Vokogonov 1994). Trotsky also missed the revolution. He traveled from the United States to Canada and then sailed in 3 months after the revolution occurred (Trotsky 1970). Stalin, exiled in Siberia, arrived well after the abdication of the Czar (Hingley 1974). For decades these leaders plotted revolution, but all of them arrived too late for it. The Russian revolution used neither their plot nor even much of their supporters. In fact, women factory workers who were seeking more food initiated the Czar’s overthrow. On international women’s day, spurned by male labor leaders, the women marched to the Winter palace, received audience, and then returned to their factories. Amazed at the lack of repression against the women, male labor leaders organized worker marches that very day as well as the next. Three days later, Czarist rule vanished (see Trotsky (1959)). Extracting a lesson from this, Rosa Luxemburg maintained: “if the Russian revolution teaches us anything, it is above all that a mass strike cannot be artificially ‘produced,’ ‘decided’ at random or ‘propagated’ . . .” (Ettinger 1986, 138). Luxemburg believed that the right social and historical forces had formed in February 1917. A more fundamental problem exists: getting dissidents out onto the street, whether or not the social and historical forces are correlated.

The story of the Russian revolution illustrates several points about dissident mobilization. First, it is difficult to generate. In 1917, no one planned and no one organized the first revolution in St. Petersburg. Far more than the Bolsheviks, the war or impoverished citizens, the revolution was a consequence of the initiative of several women, labor leaders, and one army regiment in the city. Second, events

are important for mobilization. Depending on the event, it can be a great deal easier – or harder – to mobilize after a relevant event or action. This is not to say that events explain mobilization. Rather, events are catalysts that render mobilization solutions more or less powerful. Imagine the US activists trying to mobilize against terror in United States on 10 September 2001 compared with two days later, 12 September 2001. Now consider mobilizing against President George W. Bush on 10 September 2001 or alternatively on 12 September. As a general rule, we might say that in the absence of events favoring a specific public good, mobilization is not easy. In fact, without a catalytic event, mobilization under Lichbach's solution sets is more difficult (Lichbach 1995, 1996). For example, if a government announces an austerity program, it will face the brunt of mobilization from trade unions, government workers, and a range of others dependent on government funding. That same mobilization is far more difficult without the precipitating state announcement.

This view of events as catalysts for mobilization was a key hypothesis drawn from the work of Marwell and Oliver (1993, 179):

If threshold effects or pronounced gyrations in the outcomes of actual collective action campaigns occur at all, they will occur immediately after some event significantly changes the size, resourcefulness, or mean interest level of the collective.

Empirical confirmation of this hypothesis is visible in most collective action. Dissident entrepreneurs regularly mobilize on the basis of a previous event, usually on a symbolic anniversary. In Northern Ireland, Sinn Fin leaders always organized marches on the anniversaries of internment, Bobby Sands's hunger strike death, or Derry's Bloody Sunday. On the Protestant side, marches occurred on the anniversary of the Battle of Boyne. Poland saw actions on Solidarity's August 1980 birth date as well as on 13 December, the day martial law was imposed in 1981. Massive mobilization appeared on Vienna's Black Friday (27 July 1927); its cause was a verdict of innocence for police who shot and killed workers (Botz 1987). Greek Cypriots mobilize the greatest number of people on the anniversaries of the Turkish invasion, 20 July 1974, and the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence, 15 November 1983. In Athens, students usually engage in violent protest on 17th November, the anniversary of a 1973 student protest against the military junta in Greece.

Events can evolve if one does not erupt at a propitious moment. Dissidents create events by provoking police, using terror or tricks or even more standard tactics, but by far the most popular method is the hunger strike. This is especially true among prisoners, with few other possible tactics. It was the primary weapon Provisional IRA prisoners used in the early 1980s. Internment policy rounded up the usual suspects and imprisoned them without trial or alternative legal recourse. Bobby Sands pioneered and even won election to the House of Commons while on a hunger strike in prison.

Another highly successful mobilizer is Greenpeace. This organization is a clever creator of events that can generate mobilization through enough publicity and fun. In Belgium, Greenpeace first used legal tactics to stop a company from polluting a river in 1987. But the firm had good attorneys and ultimately won in court. In response,

Greenpeace sent two activists on Friday night (18 September) to the end of the company's effluent pipe that opened into the river with a bag of instant cement that created concrete when mixed with water; they sealed the end of the waste pipe with their concrete and then left. On Monday morning, workers found the firm awash in its own effluent. Greenpeace notified the press, which printed the story. Ecologists mobilized and only then did the firm stop polluting (see the Belgian data at <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>).

The importance of events as catalysts implies that leaders must react rapidly. Mobilization makes sense only when a public good as well as a provider of the public good exist. If a government deficit creates austerity, strikes and protests against job cuts or lack of pay raises can erupt. In these circumstances parliamentary systems can be fragile. Numerous strikes and protests with high mobilization can easily tip a parliamentary government into resignation. Ironically, it is at that point that mobilization halts: no one can supply the sought-after public good. In the case of an autocracy, such weakness generates bandwagon mobilization against the regime; this does not happen in a democracy.

When a democratic government resigns, no one has the power to grant a demand from the state. When a public good cannot be granted, mobilization stops. In February 1990, for example, daily life in Athens became miserable; the city was clogged with garbage and traffic jams as a result of mass strikes. Suddenly the Greek government resigned and strikes stopped immediately. Olson might have predicted that strikes would have continued; however, it is the leaders who largely determine when strikes stop, and they were the ones who terminated mobilization (Olson 1965). The same sudden shut down of the labor strike process occurred in Ireland as well as in the UK during the Falklands/Malvinas war with Argentina. Margaret Thatcher was completely engrossed with the war effort and largely ignored labor protests (see <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>).

Contextual events matter as well. How successful would Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) have been in the United States during the 1960s with the civil rights movement but no Vietnam war? When compulsory conscription gave way to a draft lottery in 1970 in the US, mobilization plummeted. Individual risk suddenly went from probability odds to completely random (the 1970 lottery was not, in fact, random). Similarly when Ireland's economic growth increased rapidly in the late 1980s and 1990s, labor unions had increased difficulties mobilizing strikes. To paraphrase the leader of the Swedish communist party in the 1970, it is hard to get members to party meetings when they arrive in their own Volvos.

The point of this emphasis on events and context is that mobilization becomes either easier or much more difficult depending on the situation a dissident entrepreneur confronts. DeNardo's (1985) spatial policy theory is general. If one inserts differing contexts and intervening events, the theory's predictive ability shifts according to the variables that lurk beyond the dissidents' policy, the state's policy, and its level of repression (Davenport 2004). The real world is messy, but not inscrutable. Sarah Soule and Christian Davenport showed that a nuanced view of protest and repression indicates that different dissident tactics generate varied repression responses (Soule and Davenport 2009).

## 2.4 Does the Form of Government Matter?

We probe the level of mobilization in differing empirical contexts to discover what happens given the general formal theory on mobilization. One means to do this is an examination of different levels of events that simultaneously occur in each country. The United Kingdom has by the far the largest number of contentious events in Europe – more than twice as many as in France and more than four times the level in Germany. What is unique about UK? The most important difference is that, while Germany and Italy have parliamentary governments, the United Kingdom’s pioneering parliamentary government has no constitution. All others are bounded by a set of constitutional constraints on the executive. The United Kingdom parliament is, in contrast, weak and the executive unbounded. Davenport found that constitutional factors matter greatly in protest and repression, especially veto players, of which the UK has but one (Davenport 2004).

Note in Table 2.1 that France and South Korea claim the second and third highest total number of events. Although France’s 1958 constitution invented semi-presidential government, De Gaulle’s novel institutional design closed most points of access to workers, interest groups, and social movements. The parliament is weak; the president hires and fires both the prime minister and the cabinet. One would expect more protest in France, and that protest certainly occurs, more even than that Poland experienced during the turbulent years of the 1980s and early 1990s. Table 2.1 shows, however, that Poland, a semi-presidential government since 1990, ranks third in terms of total events in the 16 years between 1980 through 1995. Of course, before late 1989, Poland was a communist dictatorship with no open points of contact. It is interesting that South Korea, also a semi-presidential government, ranks first with the greatest number of contentious events in the world, well over 11,000 events during 1990 and 1991 alone (see <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>).

These data show that it is easier to mobilize in a country that lacks a constitution or in one with a semi-presidential government; citizens have no other pathway to obtain a public good than the street itself. When dissidents realize that it is useless to talk to a legislator or to beseech bureaucrats, they are easier to mobilize. This holds true as long as there are resources available. Grouping France and Poland together

**Table 2.1** Number of Conflict Events from 1980 through 1995

Country	Number of events
Belgium	2,615
France	14,626
Germany	7,786
Ireland	5,240
Italy	3,727
Poland	10,521
Spain	8,240
S. Korea (1990–1991)	11,145
United Kingdom	32,531

against all other cases (except the UK) with a two-sample  $t$ -test with unequal variances creates a  $t$ -statistic of 5.005 ( $p(t) = 0.001$ , two-tailed). We see a statistically significant difference in mobilization between semi-presidential/dictatorships and parliamentary governments. T. Nam coded 2 years of South Korean protest and repression. The number of events multiplied by 8 (for a 16-year level) is 89,160, far exceeding even the United Kingdom's protest events. The lesson here is clear: if a government creates a constitution that includes several veto players (Tsebelis 2002) and a legislature that is responsible, comparatively little street protest will occur.

## 2.5 Resources

Events are significant catalysts for mobilization, but resources are critically necessary (Tilly 1978; Marwell and Oliver 1993). There is a good probability that mobilization will dissolve in the absence of resources. Often, groups form without resources other than a public good in mind and supporters willing to protest. These beginnings, if successful, generate patron support or even state accessions. Without resources, dissident leaders lack the means to provide selective benefits or even to offer their protesters transportation fare to come for demonstrations. Thus it is not surprising that Marwell and Oliver determined that in collective action resources are essential (Marwell and Oliver 1993). They argue that entrepreneurs may be unable to amass a threshold level of protesters due to a lack of resources needed to pay the recruitment costs (Marwell and Oliver 1993, 174). For Marwell and Oliver, if interest exists but resources are absent, recruitment will not be successful. In fact, resources are so important to mobilization that Marwell and Oliver (1993, 184) contend that any organizer will devote efforts to recruit the greatest number of potential contributors, rather than the largest number of dissidents. Lichbach stresses the importance of patrons, not only to secure monetary resources, but also to widen the scope of the public good itself (Lichbach 1995, 1996). A terror organization that needs technical people who can create bombs, firebombs, suicide-belt, and time-triggered bombs, is the cleanest example of just how important resources are. Such engineering skill is fundamental and worth 10 or more non-technical members.

Generally, when the cost of protest is low, mobilization is high. For example, when the communist government of Poland legalized Solidarity in August 1980, the union expanded exponentially from a base of 100 to 20 million in a matter of months. After 13 December 1981, when martial law was imposed and Solidarity proscribed, Underground Solidarity specifically sought high-level technical members with engineering ability for sabotage, and literally, electronic satire. At that intense stage, ordinary Solidarity members provided too little value.

Another perennial high-level resource is soldiers. These people have salutary talents: they are skilled users of guns, bayonets, and mortars – even shoulder-fired missiles – and they know how to fight with minimized risk. Central to Lichbach's "Rebel's Dilemma" is the corollary: the "State's Dilemma" or the problem of maintaining loyalty among the state repressive force (Lichbach 1995, 1996). A hallmark of revolutions has been the coaxing of conscripted soldiers, often by women, to

defect to the dissidents. Cossacks were a key to the Russian March 1917 revolution's success, as were defecting soldiers and officers in the Cuban and Philippine revolutions. Even in protest that does not result in revolution, soldiers are critical. Consider this quotation from an African-American soldier just back in Chicago from World War I (Tuttle 1970):

I went to war, served eight months in France. . . . I'm glad I went. I done my part and I'm going to fight right here till Uncle Sam does his. I can shoot just as well as the next one. I ain't looking for trouble, but if it comes my way I ain't dodging.

Many of these African-American veterans of World War I did go on to battle Irish immigrants in the Chicago race riot of 1919. This is precisely the sort of dissident that leaders love to mobilize: resolute, battle-hardened, and skillful with weapons of combat. It is obvious to anyone in a serious conflict that if the state's troops defect to the dissidents, the government will collapse. During the Iranian revolution, both fundamental Shia Islamic clerics and middle-class citizens talked freely with soldiers trying to convince them to defect; thousands actually did in late 1978, forcing the Shah to abdicate and flee.

One critical reason that the 1989 East European revolutions were peaceful is that key communist party officials, so-called *battle-cell* members, refused to fight, and in the end many police also refused to fire on unarmed dissidents. The 1958 Cuban revolution was successful and relatively peaceful because most of the military defected to Castro against Batista's dictatorship.

Other types of dissidents that are highly valued resources are workers in a critical industry. In 1905, metal workers refused to work in Russia in response to the atrocities of Bloody Sunday. Iranian oil workers began a strike in protest against the Shah's regime in the summer of 1978. Soldiers were dispatched to quell the strike to force the resumption of oil production. They failed. In 1986, most companies allowed their workers to protest against Marcos's fraudulent election in the Philippines. In view of these large demonstrations, aides began to advise Marcos to resign. But critical in this peaceful revolution was June Keithly, an American TV host, who fired up Radio Bandido after the regime crushed the Catholic radio station. Resources, financial as well as technical skills, matter.

We move now to different forms and contexts of mobilization and leadership. We begin with mobilization under severe repression and then we shift to the opposite level: mass mobilization. Leaders themselves are the focus. First, what happens when leaders have incomplete information? Second, how does coordination power increase the ease of mobilization? Sometimes leaders are killed, captured, or lost. We explain what happens in such cases, including how the replenishment of leaders occurs. Then we discuss why competing leaders may preclude achieving a public good. We also consider different forms of mobilization techniques and contexts. Nonviolent protest that transforms into violent confrontation is difficult to explain theoretically, but easy to see empirically. Civil war, the worst form of domestic conflict, arises in a coevolutionary process. Pecuniary or financial incentives are far more common than most realize, and we show how they provide complete explanation of mobilization. Finally, we investigate the most difficult context of all for mobilization: what happens after a massacre.

## 2.6 Clandestine Mobilization

Mobilization occurs even in the harshest known environments. Wintrobe claims that this is one thing a dictator must prevent at all costs (Wintrobe 1998). But even during Hitler's regime, many groups fought against Nazism (Hoffman 1977; Gill 1994). It was in fact in Nazi-occupied Austria that clandestine mobilization found its most articulate expression. Otto Bauer (1939), an Austrian social democrat, published a manual for dissidents who sought to maintain their organizations during the harsh repression of Hitler's ideological dictatorship. The key points that Bauer (1939) made are (1) a cadre (cell-based) structure; (2) anonymous leaders; and (3) exclusion of (a) probable spies, (b) people who have families or other affective connections, and (c) those who are not fully committed to the cause. In other words, a successful clandestine organization is an invisible one. Recruits tend to be loners, unattached people with few family members; the group becomes their family. In 1972, I asked members of the East Berlin Social Democratic party why they stayed in the party; after all, they had experienced severe repression after the Berlin wall was built. The answers invariably involved testimonials of the party's assistance at critical junctures of their lives. I posed the same question to West Berlin communist party members and I received the same answers: the party helped them procure jobs, the meetings fostered friendships, and the membership card itself became special – neither group, the social democrats in a communist country, nor the communists in a democratic city cited ideology. These findings are consistent historically (Almond 1954; Kornhauser 1959) as well as in the more contemporary period, for example, the Provisional IRA (Toolis 1995).

A clandestine, cell-based organization cannot mobilize many people and by definition cannot act publicly – terror is possible, but members cannot otherwise reveal themselves. Organizations of this type are first and foremost maintenance groups – they attempt to preserve themselves through the dictatorship in power. DeNardo (1985, 43) argues that the style of mobilization determines the strategy of action and the number of actors. Certainly that is true in clandestine recruitment. The nature of protected, exclusion mobilization requires few people and concealed acts. The remarkable fact is that clandestine organizations do arise in most dictatorships. They remain small, but they can mobilize.

With protected leadership and a body of unattached people, the organization can maintain a stable membership base during a dictatorship. What happens, however, when the dictatorship falls – especially if it does not fall to the clandestine organization? Many historical examples of this exist. The clearest is that an exile group reasonably equal to the former clandestine organization develops. Then a contest begins between the exiled and the internal leaders, with the latter battling powerfully for leadership, after all they were the ones who survived repression. If they do win, however, they face difficult mobilization challenges. Their organization has non-family, unattached members. Who wants to listen to or follow a lonely, extremely shy, and perhaps strange person? This was the very problem that confronted the Social Democratic party (SPD) in Germany after World War II. Internal leaders, Kurt Schumacher and Erich Ollenhauer, won the leadership largely based on their

success in surviving in Hitler's concentration camps, while the exiled leaders lived in relative comfort. Thereafter, they overwhelmingly lost three national elections. SPD's support never grew much beyond 30%, and the opposition won a majority in 1957. Two years later, in 1959, exile leaders (e.g., Willy Brandt) finally took over the party at a dramatic party convention. In contrast, when the exiled leadership takes over immediately, mobilization is easier. Consider, for example, the Bolshevik military coup. When the Bolshevik exile leadership took over after the Russian revolution in 1917 (Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin), history shows that mobilizing large numbers was not difficult at all.

## 2.7 Mass Mobilization

How does one mobilize people when all one can offer is a public good that is difficult to obtain and there are few resources for selective incentives? Olson (1965) contends that for large groups the public good is rather unimportant, but selective incentives are critical. A second clue comes from one of Marwell and Oliver's concluding hypotheses: "Complex recruitment strategies, which combine attention to numbers, interest levels, and resource levels, will tend to promote more successful collective action campaigns" (Marwell and Oliver 1993, 179).

How can an impoverished dissident leader assemble sufficient resources to mobilize large number of people? Sometimes, the selective incentives lie wholly in the eyes of the beholder. Where the police see few possible protesters, dissidents see many. Consider the following examples. In 1968, Sandy Darlington, one of the indicted Oakland Seven, seemed to be a serious dissident. Yet this is how he explained his presence at protest events: ". . . At an open mike rally, where usually all is confusion, repetition, ego trips, leadership fantasies, and dull rhetoric. But you go there almost by reflex, hang around, look around, dig the chicks, gossip, meet friends, deplore the speakers, go have coffee . . . Anybody who really pays attention must be either a fool or a police spy" (Koning 1988, 100–101).

Another dissident, James Kunen, one of the 1968 Columbia University occupiers, said: "I wonder if the Paris Commune was this boring. It's possible I'm here to be cool or to meet people or meet girls . . . or to get out of crew or to be arrested. Of course the possibility exists that I am here to precipitate some change at the university." (Anderson 1995, 196). Many of the occupiers created entertainment – snake dances, strobe-light shows among other events (Anderson 1995). Finally, Jerry Rubin, the late Yippee leader, did in fact mostly have fun: "Demonstrations were fun; riots were fun. Going home at night and seeing yourself on TV was fun" (Chepesiuk 1995).

Perhaps the most impressive mass mobilization in the modern era occurred in Poland. In August 1980, the weakening communist regime in Warsaw made a critical concession in the face of new dissident tactics. Gdansk (formerly Danzig) shipyard workers struck against rising prices, but they stayed at their machines. The regime, as Marx stressed, controlled the means of production. Destroying the



shipyard meant destroying those means. Instead, the communist leadership capitulated and – for 16 months – allowed the first free trade union in the Soviet bloc. Solidarity, as it was called, began with a few hundred workers. Within 2 months of its life, it exploded across the country and swelled to twenty million citizens, including Rural Solidarity (farmers), Mining Solidarity, Fashion Solidarity, and under subsequent martial law, Underground Solidarity and Fighting Solidarity. How did this happen? It is probable that it would have occurred in any Soviet bloc country. Citizens could instantly recognize state weakness and an opportunity for freedom. They had an incentive (consider Lichbach's [1995, 1996] community solutions) to belong to a new and democratic group. With its rapid growth and completely diffuse nature, it was hard to repress. Solidarity truly was an example of DeNardo's (1985) power in numbers. One and one-half years later, the regime's ultimate solution to this mass mobilization was martial law imposed brutally with a military coup. Eight years after that the military regime itself capitulated to Solidarity, then-proscribed, but nonetheless the only effective national political organization.

Mass mobilization requires that leaders help members elude repression but still generate benefits. It is clear that in many cases benefits need not be substantive or material. Fun or entertainment can be powerful incentives. In the 1980s, German youth occupied a planned airport runway for many years. Their protest evolved into a commune, replete with music, drugs, romance, and individualized entertainment.

## 2.8 When Leaders Have Incomplete Knowledge

When leaders arise from within an organization, they usually lack a broad contextual understanding of the administration of the state. Consequently, Lichbach (1995, 1996) points out that leaders mislead their group about the probability of success. For example, some 600 miles south of Moscow, a locomotive factory workers believed that the Soviet leaders' objectives were to increase the employees' standard of living. They protested that communist officials were not aiding workers; rather they were raising food prices and rationing meat. Strikes, obstructions, and occupations ensued on 1 and 2 June 1962 in Novocherkassk, USSR. At the end of 2 June, 24 lay dead, 69 injured, 114 tried, and later 7 executed. Around 6,500 workers had marched with a portrait of Lenin and had sung USSR revolutionary songs. Their goals were as follows: lower food prices, more meat, and higher pay. One hundred-twenty KGB agents infiltrated the strikers and two hundred police came on the afternoon of 1 June. When these were ineffective, soldiers were deployed to no avail. They abruptly left as the crowd obstructed and taunted them. Workers took the leading local communist administrator as a hostage, and at 1:00 am workers bicycled to a university dormitory to mobilize students. On 2 June, the military finally occupied the factory with more soldiers posted at the railroad station. Workers boarded a train and were able to stop it while 8,500 marched 5 km from the factory toward the city. At a narrow passage along the way, troops clashed with marching workers and shot dead 24 while injuring 69. After this massacre, authorities imposed and

harshly enforced a curfew in which 146 were arrested (Baron 2001). The leaders of this protest were smart to display portraits of Lenin and present of Bolshevism such as revolutionary songs. Yet they miscalculated badly in assessing the nature of the regime's objectives. They took propaganda at face value and they – especially their worker followers – paid dearly for this mistake. Contrast this episode with the Polish street theater events during the 1980s in Chap. 3.

The Novochoerkassk workers were unaware that the Soviet regime's objective was to stay in power; it was not to help workers achieve a higher standard of living. Earlier in Russian history, Father Gapon had led 5,000 workers toward the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to seek higher wages and more food. They found not sympathy but the Russian army firing at them and a fleeing Father Gapon (see Francisco 2004). More recently in Iran, a continuing puzzle questions whether the leaders of the 8 September 1978 rally in Tehran knew that martial law had just been announced the previous day. The result was that hundreds of protesters were shot dead. One wonders how many have died unnecessarily because leaders did not fully comprehend the regime's goals. Many more examples of this kind of failure exist, all emphasizing that dissident entrepreneurs everywhere do not always make the best choices.

Furthermore, the leaders who organized these events remained ignorant of the what we know as the 5% rule (Lichbach 1995): In the late 1960s, only 2–3% of the US students considered themselves to be activists; in the Berkeley free speech movement it was only 4% (Anderson 1995). Even revolutions are usually committed by only one or 2% of the population; this is one reason that revolutions often end badly for the population as a whole. Because very few participate, relative radicals are able to win and then impose their policies on the whole country. Plato was wiser than most of us think when he wrote in *The Republic* that the ideal rulers are those who have no desire to govern.

## 2.9 Coordination Power

Call it “power without force” (Jackman 1993) or coordination power (Hardin 1995), and any leader possessing it can mobilize people easily. One sure prerequisite of coordination power is leadership and clear communication. Lech Wałęsa's leadership of Polish Solidarity, Bobby Sands's prison hunger strike, and Mahatma Gandhi's leadership in India against United Kingdom occupation are clear examples of power without force. The Clamshell Alliance in New Hampshire, which fought against construction of the Seabrook nuclear energy plant, provides a picture of how this power works. In the early days, more than 1,000 were arrested while occupying the site of the potential plant. They spent two weeks in captivity together in an armory-proved fertile ground for the birth of coordination power. For a later occupation on 24 June 1978, the Clamshell Alliance wrote coordination power rules for all their members (Epstein 1991). These rules were mandatory and were obeyed by all the members engaged in occupation.

Perhaps the best example of coordination power occurred immediately after the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry, Northern Ireland, 30 January 1972: A hastily called pub meeting of both flavors, old (Official) and new (Provisional) IRA leaders and a Social Democratic-Labor leader, a call for a general strike. Somehow everyone in the Catholic community got the message. Grocery stores opened for 1 h and then closed. Whereupon, banks opened for 1 h and closed. British authorities were stunned that all Catholic citizens seemed to know precisely which businesses would open and when they would do so (McCann 1992).

After the Soviet massacre of Lithuanian dissidents in 1991, protest leaders gained control over the central radio station. They played patriotic music and then gave detailed instructions to the population: remain in all occupied buildings; go to Kannas for a night vigil; erect a barricade at the library (BBC 1991).

Consider another example from the early twentieth century. Tilly (1986, 37) cites these marching orders at a 20 July 1914 Digion anti-war demonstration:

Calm. Don't resist the police, disperse. In case of break-up, reform at the corner of Le Miroir. If broken up again, reform in front of Le Progrès, then in front of Le Bien Public. No shouts, no singing. In front of Le Progrès, only one shout: Vive la paix!

Coordination power is rare. It correlates with (1) realization of danger; (2) community values; and (3) leaders who enjoy the unquestioned support of their followers. These three conditions arise infrequently, but when they do, leaders can claim more power than even those with high levels of resources. One obvious example of coordination power arose after 11 September 2001, when the US drivers began to put American flags in their car windows. United States had experienced a brutal assault, support for the president was strong, and patriotism flowed freely.

## 2.10 When Leaders are Replenished

It has been proven empirically that without a leader a dissident organization will fall or dissolve rapidly. The key factor is a leader; of course, individuals make large differences. But rarely are leaders irreplaceable. After Father Gapon led workers to the Czar in January 1905, shooting commenced. When Father Gapon fled, union leaders immediately took over the workers' movement (Suhr 1989). Russian workers fared better with union officials than a priest at the helm. Similarly, after the 1919 British and Indian Amristar massacre of Sikhs in the Punjab, Mahatma Gandhi supplanted local Sikh and union leaders. Gandhi, of course, then went on to lead the rebellion against the British occupation (Payne 1969).

The Western world has learned from experience that leaders can be replenished even in terror groups. Records seized in 2004 show that middle-level leaders of Al Qaeda shift often with death, capture, or simple replacement. While the top Al Qaeda leadership remains the same, the middle level is the ever-changing functional and planning sector. As we see in the terror chapter, most violent groups allow their cell groups freedom. Certainly that is the way both the PIRA in Northern Ireland and

the ETA in Spain and France operated. Tactical autonomy and changing of middle-level leaders makes it difficult to shut down a terror group (see [Johnston and Sanger 2004](#)). We discuss this topic in detail in Chap. 5.

## 2.11 Competing Leaders

The pathology of mobilization in Lichbach's (1995, 1996) terms, as noted above, is the development of a successful institution via mobilization. Generally, pathological institutions arise through the competition of leaders, who, in Lichbach's schema, have little incentive to cooperate. For example, would not all Palestinians benefit from unified leadership to negotiate with Israel? Why does such unified organization not exist? There are, after all, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Syrian entry al-Sa'iqa (Lightning), and the former Iraq-sponsored Arab Liberation Front ([Creveld 1996](#)). Why don't these organizations merge? Because their leaders and patrons want to continue to be leaders and patrons and they want to compete with other groups.

One sees this not only in Palestine, but also in other sectors as well. In the US civil rights arena, we have the NAACP, the Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition, as well as the former Black Panthers and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee – all distinct and competing groups. In Bolivia we find two indigenous dissident groups that speak the same Aymara language. The two leaders (Evo Morales, the current president of Bolivia, and Filipe Quispe) compete against one another, in spite of the fact that cooperation might lead to a majority in the legislature. In addition, there are several smaller Aymara groups that could unify for economic or political goals. Those public goods for Aymara speakers is sacrificed so that each leader can retain his power. Similarly, American Indian chiefs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries refused to combine their tribes to create better strength against Union forces.

Competing leaders disable the ability of groups to achieve their goals. From the regime's perspective, competing leaders are desirable: they help maintain status quo policies. Considering that the real limit on activism is 5% of the population, it is clear that with leader's cooperation a great many more public goods might be achieved and that they are not usually assumed to be insufficient mobilization. I argue that in many, if not most, cases the public good is impossible to achieve because of self-interested, competing leaders. This is certainly true of organizations dealing with a state that demonstrates unified government. From the dissident entrepreneur's perspective, competition with another group helps is advantageous; leaders form exclusionary requirements for membership and then they mobilize ([Lichbach 1995, 1996](#)). Typically, it is only the rank-and-file members, to say nothing of median citizens, who lose.

## 2.12 Recruiting Violent Dissidents

How is it that violence occurs? DeNardo (1985) devotes an entire chapter to the generation of violence. In his terms, violence is a tactical choice that the movement's leaders make to force the state more quickly to concede. DeNardo's formal world recognizes two disadvantages of violent actions: (1) the costs of generating violence; and (2) the costs of participating in violence (DeNardo 1985, 190). The former requires resources such as weapons procurement and the twin costs of time and training. The latter invite state repression, which in turn endangers the violent demonstrators. Lichbach (1995) shows that violence is more likely when (1) the regime uses it; (2) dissident demands are more radical; (3) protest campaigns are durable; (4) violence is part of the contextual norm, and (5) dissident numbers are a particular strength.

These are excellent insights, but they do not guide a dissident entrepreneur who wants to use violent action. First, where are the violent actors found? Second, when and where should violence be used and not be considered terror? Finally, how does one signal demands for a public good in a violent confrontation with state forces? The real-world solution to these problems is at once simple and elegant. Whenever a large demonstration occurs, the demands for a public good are clear. Large demonstrations generally last between 90 min and 3 h. Towards the end of demonstration, one can usually find milling groups of young people who are dissatisfied and eager for more action. The "young Turks" of the movement – not the current leaders – seek out these willing youths, bringing them together at the front line for battle: throwing objects at police, burning, breaking windows, and forming barricades. These violent outgrowths of demonstrations often last till night – sometimes until dawn. Now consider the value of this behavior. The demand for a specific public good carries over from the demonstration. The movement declares that it has impatient, youthful members who have already behaved in a violent manner and are eager to do so again. Mobilization costs are virtually nil. The sponsoring organization suffers little by disavowing violence while showing that its radical supporters are quite willing to use violent tactics anyway.

Lech Wałęsa (1992, 190), founding leader of the Polish Solidarity, recognized that violence arises out of demonstrations:

Poles could express themselves only in churches or during street demonstrations, but street demonstrations always threatened violence. There were plenty of young people whose specialty was provoking confrontations with the police, and they could do so with great skill.

There are myriad examples of this sort of event. Consider just one clear case: In 1988, Greek students and anarchists marched to the American embassy on the fifteenth anniversary of a student movement that began to topple the Greek junta in 1973. Seventeen thousand demonstrators turned out; when they felt they had made their point, all but 500 anarchists left. That is, when clashes with police began, windows shattered, CS gas flowed, and violence occurred only after the 16,500 peaceful demonstrators left (*Reuters*, 17 November 1988). The next year 10,000 people participated in a communist demonstration. And once again, at the conclusion of the march, 300 anarchists emerged to clash with police (*Reuters*, 17 November 1989).

Rioters in the United States are also violent; however, they are not mobilized in the same way as in the rest of the world. More typically, the US riots are spontaneous and mobilized by cues that leaders spread within a community. Essentially these cues are triggers to violence. Police brutality is the frequently used cue, at least in African-American communities. We can apply the common values solution set within Lichbach's (1995, 1996) community solution group, and see that rioters with power in numbers generate sufficient violence to drive off police. Once the police flee, the municipal code disappears, resulting in robbery (looting), assault, and battery. Even looting proceeds along rational lines: first high value goods, then goods from non-community owned stores, but not in shops owned by community members (Berk and Aldrich 1972). On West Madison street in Chicago is Edna's Soul Food restaurant. Festooned on the wall inside the restaurant is a picture taken on 5 April 1968, the day after Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination. In the ensuing riot, Edna's father sat outside the restaurant with a shotgun across his lap. The photo caption thanks him for saving the restaurant. In reality, however, Edna's Soul Food restaurant was owned by Edna's African-American family and the site of civil rights groups' meetings. It would not have been touched, even without Edna's stalwart father with his shotgun.

We know now how violence arises, especially in Europe; it develops easily and efficiently. This is one solution to the violence creation problem, but not the only one. More empirical work is necessary. Yet for at least one part of the world we understand it well.

## 2.13 Civil War

Domestic conflict is the focus of this book, so war should be a minor topic. But civil war is a major domestic event. It is the worst form of war or conflict in terms of casualties, structural destruction, genocide, rape, and soldiers' deaths and injuries. Although Pipes contends that Lenin sought a civil war to establish a fully communist state, virtually no one does (Pipes 1995). The number of civil wars plaguing the world is therefore a puzzle. If no one seeks civil war, no one mobilizes them, how do they emerge? Garrison found an answer (Garrison 2008): coevolution (see also Oliver and Myers 2003). Development proceeds this way: a domestic conflict emerges; the state attempts to repress it, but the dissidents find more resources and adapt their tactics. Alarmed, the state does likewise. As long as this process continues and the ratio of capabilities remains relatively near one, we have a recipe for civil war. Garrison (2008) used Roughgarden's (1983) coevolution model to test Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and the US civil war. Only Peru did not fit the model because of weekly aggregated event data. Peru, of course, experienced a more terror-related conflict, but the others were true civil wars.

Although we lack the data, it certainly seems that Afghanistan's long-term civil war, albeit with varied actors, was coevolution. This seems true even with the Soviet Union's invasion and the formation of an organized opposition force beyond

the war-lord oriented militia forces. Other contemporary conflicts (e.g., Sudan, Sri Lanka, Liberia, and central Africa) are not necessarily civil wars, but Africa's fighting fueled by diamond resources used to pay soldiers displays characteristics of coevolution. Fortunately, for innocent citizens, usually one side of the conflict gathers sufficient resources in a short time to win. Only when there is relative balance between contenders does civil war emerge, and this has a low probability.

If coevolution occurs when a roughly one-to-one capability and resource level is maintained, what is the ratio when conflict ends, should end? Empirically, the threshold seems to be three-to-one when civil war ends with a military victory. But if the more capable side does not want the conflict to end, it doesn't. Similarly, some opponents accept a 3-to-1 or even 5-to-1 killing ratio and continue to fight, generally with the "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1985). The first Palestinian Intifada, for example, showed a three-to-one ratio of Palestinian-to-Israeli deaths. The ratio in the second Intifada is 3.6 to one. Shouldn't the conflict end? It can reasonably end only with the Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. The Palestinians, suffering more greatly than their opponents, will fight until they achieve their public good. But the Israeli leadership regards withdrawal from the West Bank of the Jordan river as politically impossible. So the killing continues. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE (Tamil Tigers) had fewer deaths, at least until their demise in 2009. The ratio in the Sri Lanka conflict was 3.7, of 68,000 deaths the terrorists lost only 18,262 (<http://global.factive.com/en/arch/display.asp>). This situation is a reverse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the state would not back down. Finally in 2002 the LTTE agreed to a cease-fire, although this too subsequently broke down and led to a military victory by Sri Lankan forces.

Coevolution usually ends at a three-to-one ratio of deaths or resources, but the conflict does not necessarily end if the opponents is truly resolute. This is a tragic outcome of domestic conflict, one that is far more probable under a military occupation. The United Kingdom's occupation of Ireland and India, France's military presence of the Ruhr after World War I, Portugal's occupation of Guinea-Bissau, and even the United States' post-2003 occupation of Iraq are examples of coevolution in a military context – conflicts that endure beyond normal expectations.

## 2.14 Pecuniary Incentives

Increasing resources works well for mobilization. Lichbach notes this in his Market solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma (Lichbach 1995, 1996). Pecuniary incentives, that is, direct payment to dissidents occurs much more often in the real world than has been recorded in journals and books. Terrorists and even many demonstrators are on retainers, and a steady income is definitely a selective incentive. Protesters as paid employees explain mobilization easily and completely; see an illustrative list of employed protesters below. To the extent that this is standard practice for several types of protest, mobilization is fully explained by Olson (1965) and Lichbach

(1995, 1996). This fact also explains why terror and other dissident groups that must mobilize have a fundamental need to raise funds legally or otherwise through extortion, robberies, or kidnapping for ransom money.

### Instances of Payment to Protesters

1. Luddites in Great Britain solicited funds in their region and were in effect paid to riot (Sale 1996).
2. The CIA paid weight-lifters and movie stuntmen in Iran in 1953 to start a demonstration to overthrow the prime minister.
3. The Philippine “people power” movement of 1986 was funded and fueled by corporations that wanted to oust President Marcos (Johnson 1987, 83).
4. The AFL-CIO paid 1,500 workers to protest against the IMF in Washington D.C.
5. The Boeing Corporation paid 800 workers to go to Seattle to protest against the World Trade Organization.
6. Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) fighters in Peru were paid \$250–500 per month, 2.5–5 times of median per capita income in Peru (Garrison 2002, 151).
7. Tort lawyers paid Survivors Network of those Abused by Priests \$80,000 to protest against the Catholic church (Lyons 2003).
8. The Italian Red Brigades paid their terrorists the median wage of skilled metalworkers in factories and gave them free housing (Christian Science Monitor, 11 May 1982).
9. The Basque ETA group paid its terrorists through a “revolutionary tax” that it demanded companies to pay as protection from bombing (Reuters 20 June 1994).
10. Al Qaeda pays its terrorists well (Robinson 2002)
11. The Abu Nidal, PLO, PFLP, and other Palestinian groups competed for willing terrorists by offering higher salaries per month (Seale 1992).
12. Che Guevara paid his fighters in the Bolivian mobilization (Guevara 1968).
13. George Soros funded the Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia (Gimen 2003).
14. Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda paid Ahmed Ressaym from Algeria \$12,000 to mobilize terror against the United States (New York Times, 4 July 2001).
15. In 1989, NALGO, the local government civil workers union in the United Kingdom, used a 20 million pound strike fund to pay critical workers to strike for higher pay (Financial Times 7/22/1989 and 8/9/1989).
16. Chechen rebels were paid 100 rubles to demonstrate against the USSR (Evangelista 2002, 17).

Payrolls represent a significant challenge to dissident leaders. Pirated tapes, CDs, DVDs, and protection rackets all contribute to meeting the insatiable appetite for revenue needed for fighters’ salaries. This is a particular burden for three types of groups: (1) terrorists, (2) civil war militias, and (3) labor unions. Terrorists seldom



act, but must still pay rent and provide meals and funds to retain fighters. Labor unions can tax their members, but there are real limits on the amount that might be extracted.

## 2.15 After the Massacre

What happens after a massacre – is there mobilization in the wake of harsh repression? If so, does it result from a tipping point or from the more cautious Bayesian updating? Why would anyone venture onto the street the day after a bloody massacre? Logically, this must be one of the toughest challenges to mobilizers. What exhortation would work to draw protesters out onto the street after the state showed its full force against opposition?

It is surprising, but there is in fact large-scale mobilization after harsh repression – and after most urban massacres (Francisco 2004). One reason for this is leaders-directed adaptation. Most dissidents do not go onto the street; in fact, they usually stay home when they are supposed to be working. These people are diffused and most difficult for regimes to repress. Almost all the injuries and deaths from protest after the massacre occurred in the events that had no leaders. This was especially true in the 1980s Soweto riots in South Africa. When repression emerges, mobilization shuts down immediately, almost always at the direction of leaders. DeNardo's (1985) concept of power in numbers usually works to protect dissidents, but this is not true in a highly repressive country. In Managua, Nicaragua, for example, 60,000 citizens protested in 1978 against the assassination of a newspaper editor. Police stood resolute against the massive protest and shot 600 dead. Following this massacre mobilization increased, but almost always with adaptive tactics. Mobilization in the wake of harsh repression is not easy, even for clever leaders. In virtually every case of 31 twentieth-century massacres, mobilization required not two, but all four of Lichbach's (1995, 1996) mobilization solution groups (Francisco 2004).

## 2.16 Leadership and Mobilization

It is clear that leadership facilitates mobilization. What is less apparent is that leaders are self-interested. Moreover mobilization driven by leadership is more effective under conditions of (1) democracy inaccessible to citizens, (2) weak autocracy, (3) plentiful resources, and (4) in an event context that causes potential followers to consider acting. They create mobilization, even under harsh dictatorships. Leaders are not wholly honest with their followers, as Lichbach (1995, 1996) predicts. Many leaders compete against one another to the detriment of achieving the public good. It is certainly underestimated how many protesters are actually paid to protest. Almost all terrorists are paid, as are civil war soldiers, but even labor leaders pay workers to

protest. As Lichbach (1995) pointed out, the community solution group can replace pecuniary motives in generating mobilization. But in those situations in which the community solution group is not used, it is not unusual and may even be common for dissidents to function as employees.

We have established with evidence the fact that leaders tend to be better educated and of a higher social class than most of their followers. Most well-known dissident leaders chose dissent because it offered more attractive personal benefits than a general career in a contextual situation. The most altruistic leaders seem to emerge in the wake of harsh repression, for example, a massacre. This is the time when mobilization becomes especially difficult and all four solution groups that Lichbach created usually come into play (Lichbach 1995). Leaders also face challenges when they lack complete information, especially about state capability. Many leaders have doomed their causes by choosing a path that was fraught with danger.

When leaders vanish either by choice or through repression, they are usually easily replaced, often with a better and more stalwart command. Mahatma Gandhi was certainly a more noble figure than provincial Indian elders. Russian labor leaders who replaced Father Gapon after Bloody Sunday in St. Petersburg were also more capable. Repression appears always to have a counterproductive risk for states. Perhaps the most dangerous consequence is that of the unknown: a heretofore unproven leaders may emerge and issue potentially more dangerous challenges. We know that the repression of dissidents' main tactic increases protest, possibly to levels that a state cannot easily control (see Lichbach 1987). Adaptation to more productive tactics is common and is the focus of the next chapter.

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# Chapter 3

## Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest

*The movements which work revolutions in the world are born out of the dreams and visions of a peasant's heart on a hillside.*  
—James Joyce, *Ulysses*

### 3.1 Introduction

Protesters adapt and act symbolically. The persistence of annually aggregated data has hidden this fact. In fact, we have paid much attention to the correlates of protest without enabling protesters – or at least their leaders – to think (Jasper 1997). The potential importance of adaptation and symbolic protest for research problems is high: (1) it explains why domestic conflicts remain stable (Francisco 2000, 2009); (2) it explains mobilization is easier if risk is lowered; (3) it helps to understand why most conflicts are short – one side wins with relative ease in one-sided adaptation; (4) it aids in understanding why the relationship between protest and repression is complex; (5) it clarifies how dissidents can create political opportunities; and (6) two-sided adaptation explains how civil wars emerge.

The chapter ventures into several different contexts to show how dissident entrepreneurs creatively use adaptive and symbolic tactics. After establishing the definition of adaptation in the context of research programs, we turn to different milieus. The most challenging of these contexts is severe repression, in which adaptation and symbolic protest can elude coercion and generate mobilization. After this we consider the challenge of publicity and media attention in democratic countries, the reason most innovative protest takes place. The final section of this chapter deals with two-sided adaptation between the dissidents and the state – a process that can lead to coevolution and explain how civil wars begin.

Adaptation requires thought. Of the active research programs in the field of protest mobilization is the only one that focuses on the thinking of protest leaders: Mark Lichbach's (1995, 1996) Collective Action Research Program. Adaptation and symbolism are inherent components of the collective action theory. Using game theory Lichbach (1987) showed that when the state represses the dissidents' main tactic, they will use a secondary tactic. Lichbach also showed in the solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma that increasing the productivity of tactics plays an important role. Effectively, this is what adaptation and symbolic protest accomplish (Lichbach 1995). We use Lichbach's (1995) solutions to the Rebel's Dilemma, with adaptation

and symbolic protest innovations that were revealed primarily from an NSF grant project that coded protest and repression data in Europe from 1980 through 1995. At the outset we consider what happens when mobilization becomes difficult (under repression, apathy, or an unpopular public good). In this circumstance, dissident entrepreneurs must think creatively to mobilize, and solutions must arise in many contexts, several of which we analyze in this chapter.

Anyone familiar with the best-known manuals for mobilization (e.g., [Alinsky \(1971\)](#) or [Shaw \(1996\)](#)) will hardly be surprised that dissident entrepreneurs adapt and act symbolically. [Enders and Sandler \(Enders 1993\)](#) show that terrorists adapt readily when countries attempt to stop them in airports or other travel venues. [I \(Francisco 1996\)](#) show empirically that adaptation occurs in democratic countries in Europe. Although [Wilson \(2000\)](#) finds structured behavior of terrorists within the same organizations, she does not study adaptation. When the Provisional IRA could not get close to Northern Ireland police stations because the British army increased fortification, the IRA bombed a British military music school in remote Wales. Then it began to bomb targets in London; after this it bombed British military bases in Germany and the Netherlands where meaningful fortifications did not exist. The bombs and behavior may be similar, but clearly there is at minimum spatial adaptation. Under heavy repression, groups go underground and/or abroad and engage in clandestine mobilization and action (see [Chap. 2](#) and [Bauer \(1939\)](#) or [Zwergman \(2000\)](#)). It is less readily known that in democratic countries protesters adapt frequently and use symbolic protest tactics. Adaptation and symbolic protest are almost always advantageous for dissident entrepreneurs' key goals: mobilization and publicity.

### 3.2 Definitions and the Challenge of Analysis

What do we mean by adaptation and symbolic action? The most familiar adaptation in protest is evident in guerrilla warfare. Here circumstance prescribes adaptation: attack only when there is cover, engage the enemy at night, or in a situation when our forces have numerical superiority, and when there is residual support in the community surrounding the site of attack ([Guevara 1961](#)). The focus of adaptation in this chapter is not usually prescribed, but rather is a product of the creativity of protesters and their leaders. For example, in the Cuban revolution, a stalemate developed between Fidel Castro's troops and the Cuban army troops. So Castro radioed the Cuban air force that rebels had taken over the military base: Bomb and strafe it! In due course, attack planes bombed the base and the troops surrendered to Castro ([Anderson 1997](#)). This is the type of adaptation we examine. It can happen anywhere or at any time, even in a guerrilla war.

Symbolic action uses the icons of a culture to indicate protest. For example, huge number of Poles attached electrical resistors to their lapels to protest the detention of electrician Lech Wałęsa in 1982: every Pole was aware that the Solidarity leader was detained, everyone knew he was an electrician, and almost everyone sought to "resist" without violating codified norms of the state.

In evolutionary biology, the technical definition of adaptation is variation + heredity + selection (Frame 1998); see also (Holland 1992). We can safely drop the requirement of heredity for protest and repression, but what about variation and selection? Variation implies that environments change for protesters as well as for regimes. Cold winters, thunderstorms, and blizzards can be more effective than harsh repression in deterring protest – or repression if protest occurs under challenging conditions. Consider this: one of the reasons the first Russian revolution of 1917 succeeded is that for the five days of protest, the weather was above freezing in St. Petersburg. The biological imperative of selection implies the examination of tactics in a search space to optimize the tactic used given the variable situation. Both variation and selection are relevant factors then for protest adaptation, as we have seen in these examples.

Recent experience is an important factor for dissident entrepreneurs considering adaptation: What did the state do the last time we demonstrated at place X? Have we ever protested at place Y? Holland (1992, 18) generalizes this factor and the importance of history from genetic robustness:

- (1) The adaptive plan must retain advances already made along with portions of the history of previous plan–environment interactions. (2) The plan must use the retained history to increase the proportion of fit structures generated as the overall history lengthens

Biologists, of course, pioneered research on adaptation. Several biological adaptation concepts help to explain the reasons dissidents adapt. Environmental stress is a key factor in most biological accounts (see Bijlsma 1997). Animals do not stray from a successful path unless they encounter stress. In the same way, protesters generally use conventional methods until they encounter resistance. What yields the optimum adaptation when obstacles arise? In general, the best strategy is called “minimum-distance adaptation” (Staddon 1983). This notion too fits our knowledge of adaptive protest. For example, the single most effective adaptive tactic in Poland during the 1980s was occupation of factories, ship yards, and mines. The “distance” measured from a strike outside the factory to simple occupation of the factory is a minimal-distance alteration: it is easy, involves no travel, learning, or any other difficulty of mobilization. One stressor that blocks biological adaptation is a foreign environment, usually defined as a location or context that appears rarely in an individual’s life (Bijlsma 1997). To deal successfully in such an environment requires experience and learning, and this makes it extremely difficult to adapt. Repressive regimes send dissidents into exile, to islands, or to political prisons with adverse climates and dangerous conditions to limit their ability to adapt and renew protest, for example, Siberia in the USSR or Robben Island in South Africa. Finally, Kauffman (1993) shows that adaptation does not necessarily lead to instability. A change in one parameter does not generally alter the stability of the environment. It is possible that we have not noticed adaptation for precisely this reason: for most adaptation tactics we do not see a basic change in the macroenvironment.

Not all approaches to protest and repression view adaptation the same way. From the perspective of Lichbach and Zuckerman (Lichbach 1997), rationalists, culturalists, and structuralists differ on the concept of tactical adaptation.

Lichbach (1995, 1996) represents the rationalist view as noted earlier. A good example of the culturalist view is Jasper (1997), who criticizes structuralists for assuming that protesters must be familiar with the process of any tactic. For structuralists (e.g., Tilly (1978), Skocpol (1979), Tarrow (1998)), tactical choice is constrained by the state and its political opportunity structure. Tilly (1978, 155) distinguished between flexible repertoires of tactics and innovation, which he argued is rare and hard to explain. In the culturalist approach, “tactics represent important routines, emotionally and morally salient in (protesters’) lives” (Jasper (1997), 237). Jasper notes that protesters innovate tactics, but do so within their routines and life practices. Rationalists put no such limits on adaptation. If current tactics of mobilization and protest does not work, it is rational to adapt (Lichbach 1995).

Even in the rational choice approach, adaptation frustrates analysis. Consider a typical game theoretic model with a payoff matrix. The adaptor rejects the available payoffs, preferring a more creative or appropriate contextual tactic than the payoff matrix allows. Other models of adaptation exist, but almost all are similarly restricted in number of alternatives. For example, Lave and March (1975) present an adaptive learning model – but it has only two alternatives, fewer than most game theory payoff matrices. Even biological models (e.g., Staddon (1983)) are limited to two or three alternatives. Analyzing creativity is also difficult. Researchers cannot know all possible alternatives in a stressful situation, at least not before action occurs. The problem then is the wide and virtually inexhaustible limit of tactic alternatives. Since we cannot examine all available tactics, we begin our analysis at a more basic level. Below in Sect. 3 we present a paired two-sample *t*-test on two samples of Polish arrest and injuries that occurred when protesters used adaptation and conventional tactics. It is a simple hypothesis test, but the creativity of dissidents and their leaders precludes more sophisticated analysis.

Tactical adaptation generally improves the productivity of tactics, that is, the principle of adaptation in one of the solutions that Lichbach developed (Lichbach 1995). Adaptation frequently widens the spectrum of communication in a society, whereas the repressive state seeks a narrow band of communication, generally one that it controls (see Frank (1998)). Shifts in tactics that result in lower costs, lower probability of repression, and higher probability of mobilization certainly increase productivity. For example, during the difficult days in France in May 1968, activists leading nightly clashes with police advised their charges to wear padded hats – but they found that helmets seemed to draw police clubbings (Fisera 1978).

Technology, as Lichbach (1995) notes and we see below, plays an important role. The rise of the Internet has yielded new adaptation tactics. Hackers attacked the PRC’s web pages for repression (e.g., the Tienanmen Square massacre in 1989) and denial of human rights. Japan’s government web sites have also been compromised in an effort to expose Japanese actions during World War II, particularly the rape of Nanjing in December 1937. Still easier is the creation of any web site on any protest subject – almost every existing protest group has a site (e.g., [www.destroyIMF.org](http://www.destroyIMF.org)) – but like any other protest tactic, it must generate publicity if it seeks to obtain its public good.



### 3.3 Adaptation and Symbolic Protest in Autocratic States

Lichbach (1995, 258–259) notes that autocratic states can more easily solve the State’s Dilemma than rebels can solve the Rebel’s Dilemma. Dissidents must be able to protest and to elude coercion if they seek to mobilize. Autocratic states organize to impede protest and mobilization. They repress protest and cut off communication abilities, and this, of course, affects mobilization. A successful social movement must then adapt and innovate in order to survive. Inability to do this implies a static situation that allows dictatorship and severe repression to persist (see Wintrobe (1998)). Under these conditions, clandestine mobilization must have an exclusion policy. As we noted in Chap. 2, Bauer’s (1939) manual for the illegal party requires that one has to exclude spies, those with firm attachments (e.g., a family) and those who might easily be compromised. Mobilization is dangerous and challenging under these circumstances, and all protest action must be cautiously conceived and implemented as well as anonymous. Therefore, adaptation is critical in the context of severe repression.

Meanwhile, autocratic state leaders can and do adapt easily, as long as they have sufficient deployable resources. Consider the adaptation and advantages when Stalin’s secret police began arresting during the dead of night instead of during the day (Solzhenitsyn (1974), 6–7):

- (1) Security has more people than the arrested.
- (2) The arrested is dragged from sleep with reduced judgment and devoid of power.
- (3) There is a minimal probability that a crowd of supporters will impair the security detail.
- (4) Neighbors cannot see how many are taken away.

Not all forms of dissident adaptation can elude repression as well as generate increased mobilization. For example, in 1900, Georgian communists organized many rallies near a monastery 8 miles from Tbilisi. They always met late at night, sang Marxist songs, unfurled banners with portraits of Marx and Engels, and made speeches to one another (McNeal 1988). This is where Stalin became a communist, but clandestine activity of this sort has limited mobilization ability at best.

Lichbach (1995) notes that newly available technology, even of a basic sort, can be effective in improving tactics. Before attending a 1944 rally in Crdoba, Argentina, 17-year-old Ernesto Che Guevara stuffed metal ball bearings into his pockets. He planned to throw them onto the street, thereby bringing horse-mounted police to the ground (Anderson 1997).

We see something different when Rosa Luxemburg arrived in Warsaw in December, 1905, where Poles were protesting against the Czar in Russia. As Ettinger (1986, 131) notes: “The leadership met frequently, for strategy had to be adapted hour by hour to the unpredictable and uncoordinated developments. Not a day passed without a mishap.” Under intense, virtually continuous repression, adaptation is necessary for a social movement to survive, but it usually does not lead to mobilization. Similarly, as Mandela (1994) notes, if the state represses peaceful protest with violence, then violence should be used against the state. This kind of iterated tit-for-tat tactical adaptation does not generate mobilization.

After Nat Turner's 1831 slave rebellion in Virginia, US slaves were precluded from learning how to read. Southern participants of the underground railroad therefore adapted. They sang songs with coded messages and sewed graphic quilts that showed the pathway to freedom. This is a basic type of adaptation under a repressive government: the public good of escaping slavery continued and repression was eluded.

In 1916, Robert Abbott, editor and publisher of the nationally circulated African-American newspaper *Chicago Defender*, faced a serious problem in the Jim Crow south. Mayors, legislatures, and even the federal government banned his newspaper on the grounds that it mobilized southern African-Americans to travel north for freedom and opportunity – leaving the south with labor shortages. New restrictions precluded the paper from being sold at news stands, train stations, or stores in many areas of the South (Kornweibel 1994). Abbott accepted this challenge; he went to Chicago's Union station and talked to the African-American Pullman porters who worked on the north-south trains (Grossman 1989). Abbott explained that he did not need sales, only large circulation. Of course more circulation brought more advertising revenue. But he did not care if the paper were given away in the south, as long as it could be available to African-Americans. The porters suggested an innovative way to circulate the newspapers. They offered to hide bundles of the *Chicago Defender* under their bunks and throw the papers out of the moving trains in designated rural areas of the south. Farm laborers would then pick up the bundles and distribute them in each community. This adaptation was enormously successful.

When considering adaptation under repression, it is worthwhile underscoring not only Lichbach's (1995) mobilization solutions, but Alinsky's (1971) rules of power tactics. Alinsky distilled his vast mobilization experience into simple tactical rules, the first six of which are as follows: (1) power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have; (2) never go outside the experience of your people; (3) whenever possible, go outside the experience of the enemy; (4) make the enemy live up to his own book of rules; (5) ridicule is the most important weapon; and (6) a good tactic is one that your people enjoy. We turn now to the adaptive tactics used in Czechoslovakia and in Poland's decade-long struggle against its communist government.

A difficult obstacle confronted Czechoslovak dissidents in the mid-1970s. The 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion ended Prague Spring freedom and left a legacy of severe repression. A series of ill-fated and repressed protest events finally led to an innovation funded by George Soros, the Charter 77 petition movement. Spurning traditional clandestine activity, dissidents signed the charter openly (Ramet 1991). Using Alinsky's fourth rule, to make the enemy live up to his own activities, the Charter 77 movement leveraged its petition against the state's signing of the Helsinki human rights agreement. It overtly challenged the state to live up to its word. In time intellectuals, then workers, and students signed the petition for human rights. Each time a new signature was affixed, Charter 77 sent the petition through diplomatic channels to the West with instructions to publicize the names. In doing so the dissidents were generally inoculated from more serious repression than frequent interrogation and detention (see Kriseova (1993)). Bulgarian dissidents learned from

the Czechs. In October 1989, Bulgarians also sent their names and locations abroad: “We have to make contact with as many foreign people as possible to make it harder for the government to harass or jail us” (Reuters 10/18/1989).

Poland’s successful challenge to communist authority began in August 1980. Years of pummeling by riot police caused dissidents to reconsider how to protest price increases – the typical generator of previous riots. Their reasoning again sought to leverage the state’s ostensible commitment to Marxism–Leninism. Since Poland’s means of production were factories, mines, and shipyards, dissident leaders decided to occupy those work sites. This completely bewildered Polish state authorities: they could not repress the rebellion without endangering the plant and equipment upon which the economy depended. At the end of August, the state broke through its accession limits and agreed to a free Solidarity trade union. Once the papers were signed, however, the state realized what it had done (probably reminded by the USSR) and sought to limit Solidarity’s freedom. A continual Solidarity–government conflict ensued; it endured until 13 December 1981, when the military grabbed power and imposed martial law. It took 2 weeks to dampen protest completely. Underground Solidarity emerged as a nonviolent clandestine movement from which a great deal of adaptive and symbolic protest developed.

In one of the earliest collective challenges to the military state, Polish students coordinated night-time dormitory lights to spell out: “Poland Fights” (3/5/1982). Five days later, a theater performance was precluded when a creative audience in Warsaw applauded indefinitely for a communist actor as he came onto the stage. And, as noted earlier, tens of thousands of Poles pinned electrical resistors to their lapels to display their opposition to the continuing internment of the electrician and Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa (Reuters 6/2/1982). On the last day of 1982, Cracow students saw secret police and began throwing snowballs at them (Walesa 1992).

From the time martial law was imposed, women constructed floral crosses daily in a central Warsaw square. Police demolished these symbols nightly only to see them reappear the next morning. Eventually police blocked off the square for “construction,” but the women walked to the next square and began again to build their floral crosses. Police smashed these as well. Then, on 1 September 1982, defiant women built a cross from expended tear gas canisters near a floral cross. Although these tactics arose either spontaneously or simply through contagion, during the remainder of martial law, Solidarity protest activity showed ingenuity and careful planning.

Solidarity leaders focused on tactics that would (1) show that Solidarity remained both in control of dissent and active under martial law; (2) embarrass the government; (3) use nonviolent tactics; and (4) elude repression. Perhaps the most audacious and successful adaptive protest during martial law was Radio Solidarity. Most Polish intellectuals fiercely opposed both martial law and the state. Electrical engineers aided Underground Solidarity by constructing cheap radio transmitters and connecting each to a tape recorder and an alarm clock. They tuned the transmitter to the state radio news frequency, then put each in a remote location in Warsaw. When the state’s 8:00 evening news aired, one selected device began working, resulting in true Solidarity news broadcasting that actually replaced state propaganda.

Radio Solidarity aired this way 19 times in Warsaw alone during martial law. These random broadcasts severely undermined the military government's credibility.

From a Polish dissident's perspective, the time following martial law embraced few real changes. Legislation passed during martial law continued the period's repressive policies even after its official withdrawal in July 1983. The standard protest-deterrent tactical kit of a repressive regime includes preemptive arrest, massive shows of force, infiltrators, and an active intelligence network against dissidents. The Polish state added two new tactics. First, it turned the tables on Solidarity and simulated a Radio Solidarity broadcast advising underground dissidents to give themselves up. Second, on the fifth anniversary of the Solidarity accords (8/30/1985), riot police used loudspeakers to play recordings of exploding artillery shells in hopes of dissuading local dissidents from protesting.

In one of its most daring moves (2/20/1985), Solidarity members stole mortars from the military, adapted the shells to carry leaflets, and carried the mortar and shells to the roof of a downtown Warsaw building. When a preset timer went off at noon, thousands of shoppers found Solidarity leaflets floating down from the sky. Elsewhere on the fifth anniversary of the Solidarity accords (8/30/1985), protesters in Wroclaw activated a loudspeaker connected to a well-hidden tape recorder, mounted high on a utility post. Every 60 s the recorder blasted criticism of the state. It was also in Wroclaw that one of the most creative protest groups arose. The Orange Alternative student street theater group specialized in ridiculing the state. The group name suggested that political humor might substitute for the oranges the socialist state was incapable of providing its citizens. In a typical Orange Alternative event on 7 October 1988, students dressed as Vladimir Lenin carried banners that praised the secret police and shouted "Hooray for the Secret Police" as they marched in military precision down the street. Police were baffled while passers-by laughed at the performance – and at the police. Orange Alternative very effectively combined Alinsky's tactical rules of ridicule and fun. Earlier, on 7 December 1987, 31 Orange Alternative students dressed as Santa Claus and paraded in the streets of Wroclaw yelling that price rises would result in fewer holiday toys for Polish children. Police arrested 20 students, which prompted 2,000 citizens led by eight Santas to converge on the police station, shouting "Free Santa!" Orange Alternative's street theater tactics spread to other cities, but only after repression of street theater was reduced to a few arrests. In Lodz students dressed as janitors toting mops and buckets as they skipped down the street "cleaning up the Party's enemies" (3/21/1989). A similar group in Rzeszow, the Tomato Alternative, dressed as Stalin and satirized the USSR and its revolution anniversary on 10 November 1989.

While Radio Solidarity functioned mainly in Warsaw, most other adaptive protests occurred in smaller cities. Because repressive states have only a limited staff of police, riot police, militias, or army troops, the Orange Alternative and its mimics were able to take advantage of smaller police deployments in those cities. Optimum deployment is challenging to solve since the state does not know where or when protests will emerge. The state cannot enforce its rules everywhere at the same level. Dissidents, of course, make sure that they know exactly where the most concentrated security troops are stationed.

Adaptive protest in Poland was effective. It boosted citizen morale, allowed Poles to ridicule the state, and reveal the government as repressive. Yet a boost in morale does not aid the individual protester. Therefore, the high level of adaptive tactics means that dissident entrepreneurs must employ incentives for mobilization. The most obvious advantage of adaptive protest is lower risk of arrest and injury, thereby minimizing the costs of actions – one of Lichbach's (1995) mobilization solutions. In 47 adaptive protests, the mean number of arrests per event was 6.28, while the mean for conventional protests (e.g., demonstrations) in the same week as each adaptive event was 17.7. The event mean for injury in adaptive protest was only 0.06, while the conventional event mean was 9.745. Paired two-sample *t*-tests for arrest and injuries, controlling for the number of protesters in each event, show that the lower risk for injury is statistically significant ( $t = 1.82$ ,  $p(t) = 0.0375$ , one-tailed). The risk for arrest is not statistically significant, but it is substantially lower, as noted earlier. Dissident entrepreneurs in Poland could have proclaimed accurately that using adaptive tactics lowers the risk of arrest and injury – reducing the cost of protest and therefore increasing the potential for mobilization.

A much more serious and dangerous adaptation occurred in Bosnia from 1992 through 1995 during the siege of Sarajevo. Serb militias shelled the city daily and even sent sniper teams in to kill Muslims. But in the fall of 1992, the Serbs found themselves constrained by the arrival of UN peacekeepers. The United Nations insisted on supervising all heavy weapons, including the Serb artillery. So the Serb militia adapted. They cut all electricity, gas, and water to the city and subsequently bombed the flour mill and bakery that made 95% of Sarajevo's bread (see AP and UPI in 1992).

The types of adaptation in repressive countries noted above are not unique. Radio systems in particular are important adaptations – they allow publicity, ridicule of the state, and communication to dissidents. Radio Venceremos (Radio “We will be Victorious”), for example, of the leftist guerrillas in the El Salvador civil war frustrated the state's army as well as the US embassy (Danner 1994). This tension led in part to the brutal killings at El Mozote in December 1981, one of the worst civilian massacres in recent history.

Post-massacre (the state kills at least three and minimum of 30 injured in an unarmed protest) yields more use of adaptive tactics than at any other time. The safest and most popular device is a general strike, or in India, a hartal, a combined general strike and religious action. These country or region-wide strikes inhibit repression by diffusing protest such that state agents cannot repress very many dissidents. After a massacre shielding protesters from harm becomes a dissident leader's top priority (Francisco 2004).

### 3.4 Symbolic Protest in Repressive Systems

From highly repressive states to developing countries' villages, symbolic protest is common. It is generally immune from harsh repression and it signals the discontent of a large segment of the community. In Scott's (1985) terms, symbolic

protest is a fundamental component of the struggle for authority in contentious systems. Symbolic protest is readily available and has enormous potential power. As Scott (1985, 196) argues, “So long as the elite treat . . . assaults on their dignity as tantamount to open rebellion, symbolic defiance and rebellion do amount to the same thing.” Tolerated symbolic assaults on elites have the potential to rise incrementally to the level of open ridicule and public protest. For example, cabaret is a frequently accepted form of entertainment in a repressive state. However, performers can stretch their parodies of government to such extremes that the state feels compelled to intervene. Indeed, dissident leaders historically have monitored cabarets and other satirical venues to find soft openings in the state. Consider the experience of Prague’s ABC theater under communism (Kriseova (1993), 32):

During each performance, the ABC’s employees waited for Werich’s dialog with fellow actor Miroslav Horníček in front of the curtain during intermissions . . . The audience understood every signal, every gesture. Werich and Horníček could draw the link between the stage and the audience masterfully, even though there was practically nothing they were allowed to talk about. Mysteriously, without words, a conspiracy between actors and public was created every time. A sort of peculiar magnetic field arose.

Subtle gestures, noise, and artwork are additional symbolic signs that dissidents use in coercive countries. Poland’s Solidarity’s signal was two fingers held up in the form of the letter V. This gesture diffused widely in Eastern Europe and now it is used in Palestine as a symbol of unity and nationalism. Jangling keys became an important and noisy symbol of the Czechoslovak “velvet revolution” in late 1989 (Kriseova 1993). In other instances, artists have created visually stunning and strident calls for protest. Consider the Solidarity poster overlaid with an image of Gary Cooper in *High Noon*; dissidents signaled their readiness for a showdown with the state (see Sylvestrova (1992)).

Even across national borders dissidents can help one another symbolically. For example, after Solidarity won a modicum of freedom in Poland, Solidarity theater leaders staged two Vaclv Havel plays in Warsaw on 25 February 1989. Lest the message be lost, a recently freed Solidarity leader announced to the audience that the performance was dedicated to the author currently imprisoned in Prague.

Even in post-communist Ukraine, before the Orange revolution’s success, authoritarianism presented real danger for many dissent tactics. When the 2004 presidential election displayed open fraud, dissidents camped in the main square of Kiev for weeks, using the power in numbers tactic developed by DeNardo (1985). In further insult, the television sign language interpreter tied an orange ribbon inside her sleeve (orange is the symbol of the opposition candidate) and during election coverage she signed the state news was all lies (Trofimov 2004).

Finally, in Kosovo in former Yugoslavia, Serbs fired 29,000 ethnic Albanian teachers in a province that was 90% ethnic Albanian. Almost immediately, 43,000 students boycotted school and began to receive instruction in private homes. A home-schooling system organized rapidly and stayed intact throughout Serbian domination of Kosovo (see AP, 1/5/1994).

### **3.5 Adaptation, Innovation, and Diffusion in Democratic States**

Protest leaders adapt in repressive countries to elude repression and to maintain their organization through the era of autocracy. The challenge of protest in democratic states differs almost completely. A democracy experiences little repression and most protest organizations are legal. Terror groups, of course, are proscribed, but most other policy-oriented dissident organizations are able to protest without repression.

#### ***3.5.1 The Challenge of Publicity and Media Attention***

Nelson Mandela (1994) points out that hunger strikes matter only if the outside world is aware of them. The pursuit of any public good then requires public awareness through media attention. Ironically, this is more difficult in democracies than in repressive countries. Solidarity's rise in Poland was a stunning event that generated tremendous national and international publicity. In contrast, imagine the creation of a new trade union in the United States or Western Europe. It would have to fight fiercely for media attention. Publicity is then the core of mobilization's challenge in democracies.

Terrorists gain attention by virtue of their bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and arsons. In fact, terror generates so much publicity that it alters citizen behavior in affected countries (Slone 2000), and it gives dissidents an incentive to at least consider using terror, particularly since most terrorists escape punishment.

Dissident entrepreneurs in democracies face the question of how to publicize both their actions and the public good they seek (Lichbach 1995). Standard demonstrations may not attract media, even in urban areas. Many protest organizations notify news services of an impending action, that is reported, yet the demonstration itself usually is not. We know that hunger strikes fail without media attention, and occupations must occur in highly secure or well-trafficked areas. Obstructions and confrontations generate rapid police response, usually well before cameras and microphones arrive to broadcast the activity. Dissidents must adapt in creative – or audacious – ways to subvert these constraints. Below are categories of adaptive tactics that have successfully generated publicity in democratic countries.

#### ***3.5.2 Clothing or its Absence***

Perhaps the least creative and most audacious adaptation is nude public protest. This captures immediate media attention and almost always brings quick police response. As Olson (2000) writes, protests that offend a significant portion of the public make diverting news – just the type that is broadcast and published in newspapers. In a defiant challenge to local law, 36 nudists from Puerto del Sol, Spain, captured headlines when they publicly opposed anti-nudity laws (8/20/1983). Paris also

witnessed nude protest on 31 May 1992 when five members of the French Naked Earth society marched without clothing to protest damage to the Earth's ozone layer; they were promptly arrested. Yet twice in the space of 2 months, Germans used this tactic: 200 Germans – once through Hanover against a defense technology exhibition (5/19/82) and again through West Berlin for housing rights (7/31/82). Naked protest is severely restricted; it is limited to warm months. It almost never achieves its sought-for public good because the attention it generates tends to be sensational rather than policy-oriented. Reuters is the only source (from 500 sources) that recorded these naked protest events; non-tabloid local newspapers often reject this kind of coverage.

A more productive tactic than protesting without clothing is wearing costumes that attract attention for the time or context of protest. For example, “Pajamas in Action” formed in the suburbs of Madrid, Spain. This group hoped to stop expansion of the Madrid airport and it sought to ban flights from 11:00 pm to 7:00 am. Pajamas in Action consisted of suburban families who marched through neighborhoods in the evenings wearing pajamas and carrying banners that proclaimed: “Dreams are for everyone. Don't steal them from us.” Another symbolic change of attire shows up in a famous 1969 Richard Avedon poster against the Vietnam war. Avedon's picture is of a soldier wearing a formal US Army uniform colored bright red (symbolic for blood) instead of the normal olive drab and holding a white dove over the caption, “Who has a better right to oppose the war?” Commissioned by the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the poster became an effective mobilization device (Heyman 1998).

### 3.5.3 *Music*

Music is a deceptively simple tactical adaptation. Parodies, folk songs with deep cultural meanings, or popular songs with politically altered lyrics all serve dissident goals of mobilization and publicity. A dramatic instance of musical protest was “Strange Fruit,” a song composed by Abel Meeropol under the pen name Lewis Allen. After rejections from major record companies, Billie Holiday recorded this stark anti-lynching song on Commodore Records. It was not played until a Chicago disk jockey broke the ban on the song after a racial incident erupted in the city. Instantly, the African-American community adopted “Strange Fruit” as a symbolic protest anthem (see Margolick (2001)).

In Berkeley, California, the Communist Dupes from the Livermore Action Group led a musically leveraged ridicule adaptation against the Alameda County Board of Supervisors. When Board members criticized the Berkeley city council for failure to say the Pledge of Allegiance at every meeting, the Communist Dupes sprang into action. They donned middle class clothes, went to the Board of Supervisors meeting, participated in the Pledge of Allegiance, then burst into patriotic song. They sang the national anthem, “My Country, 'Tis of Thee,” “America, the Beautiful,” and “It's a Grand Old Flag” before returning to the national anthem. At first, the Board was



delighted at, but then they realized this was meant as ridicule and they adjourned the meeting. At this the Communist Dupes filed out singing the national anthem. One of the supervisors denounced this action as “patriotic coercion” (Epstein 1991).

At the symbolic level, folk songs serve as musical triggers for shared values and solidarity. “We Shall Overcome” is universally recognized as a symbol of civil rights. Similarly, Bob Dylan’s “Blowin’ in the Wind” and Pete Seeger’s “Where Have all the Flowers Gone?” functioned as clear symbols of anti-war attitudes during the Vietnam war protests. Joan Baez even performed Seeger’s ballad in German to a German audience for still deeper symbolism in the mid-1960s.

### ***3.5.4 Bricks, Mortar, and Cement***

One of the most audacious adaptive tactics is obstructing entrances to government or corporate buildings, erecting symbolic walls, or even blocking pollution. The technique’s high visibility draws a great deal of publicity. When French farmers used the obstruction tactic on 2 November 1991, they first locked police in their barracks and then proceeded to demonstrate. In 1992, French farmers protested the low price of crops by bricking up the entrance to a local government office. Germans are also fond of sealing entrances. In August 1981, anti-Soviet protesters in Berlin used brick and mortar to build a model of the Berlin wall; then two days later they blocked the USSR’s Aeroflot office in Hamburg. A decade later (15 July 1991) disaffected workers bricked up the German Treuhand (privatization) office in Rostock. As the communist government collapsed in Poland in late 1989, Crakow protesters built a 1-m high “Berlin wall” in front of the German Democratic Republic consulate (Walesa 1992).

Greenpeace is also a creative obstruction adapter. When Belgian Greenpeace used standard methods to oppose the dumping of raw industrial waste into a local river, politicians took no action. So one Friday evening (9/18/1987) under the cover of darkness, Greenpeace activists took a bag of instant concrete to the end of the effluent pipe, mixed it with river water, and filled the end of the pipe with cement. On Monday morning, the factory was awash with raw chemical effluent. This event drew a great deal of publicity and interest.

### ***3.5.5 Symbolic Action***

Many creative adaptation acts are also symbolic. Imagine Catholic church bells ringing out in Bremen, Germany, during tests of the civil defense system. This obvious juxtaposition of church bells and civil defense sirens symbolizes anti-war efforts.

French farmers are probably the most adept at both generating publicity and using adaptive symbolic tactics. Consider this action. In February 1988, the EU ordered its farmers to leave a percentage of their fields fallow in the coming growing

season. In protest French farmers took a tractor and plow to the Eiffel tower, where they proceeded to turn over the ground of the Champ de Mars park (under the Eiffel tower). Eventually authorities stopped the plowing, but could not arrest anyone, in part because there was no law against plowing public parks in Paris.

In retaliation for the 1990 EU-mandated reduction of fishing net size, French fisherman dumped 20 tons of raw fish in front of EU headquarters in Brussels. In a similar visceral event, to protest profiting from the Gulf war in January 1991, young Germans dumped pig's blood and entrails on the floor of the Frankfurt stock exchange.

French farmers, however, adapted most often in the 1990s. They

1. Hurlled live sheep at police (5/20/1990)
2. Piled animal feces in front of the agricultural office (10/12/1991)
3. Placed a dead cow in front of the agricultural office (10/18/1991)
4. Delivered breakfast in bed to all MPs before a vote on EU farm reform (6/15/1992)
5. Sprayed pig dung over papers in government offices to protest falling prices (2/19/1993)
6. Dumped manure on the doorsteps of MPs after the EU-US farm accord (6/9/1993)

French farmers are not the only symbolic adapters. Consider Belgian prisoners living under filthy conditions. When no one responded to their pleas for cleaner cells, they adapted. They gathered as many live cockroaches as they could, put 300 in a box, and on 9 January 1985 mailed the live insects to the Justice Minister. This action resulted in prompt cleaning of jails and generated publicity about prison conditions.

In contemporary Mexico City, a housing organization found a creative way to prevent the eviction of poor apartment dwellers. When police arrive for an eviction, the affected resident calls the neighborhood association. The association in turn ignites three rocket fireworks, signaling hundreds of sympathizers to pour into the area and thus prevent the eviction process (Beasley 2000).

### 3.5.6 *Fake Signs*

Belgian Greenpeace wanted to increase ridership on public transportation in Brussels. Because most citizens drove private cars and shunned buses and trams, members decided to attack traffic control. At dawn on 16 April 1991, Greenpeace erected official-looking "no entry" signs on several main roads. This halted travel on principal work routes, resulted in tremendous chaos – and increased public transportation use on that day.

The fake-sign tactic is a popular adaptation with other organizations and in other countries as well. Robin Wood, an ecological group, planted fake highway speed limit signs in Hamburg, Germany, to protest noise and pollution (3/14/1985).

And in the United States the Communist Dupes section of the Livermore Action Group printed government-style posters on terrorism and nuclear attacks and slipped the placards into advertising slots in BART trains in the San Francisco area. The protesters were careful to display the CIA's secret local telephone number on the posters (Epstein 1991).

Adaptive tactics diffuse quickly in democratic regimes if the tactics work and achieve their public good, but slowly if they do not; they generally do not diffuse under repression and failure. Rapid diffusion occurred recently in Europe as a response to globally escalating fuel prices in the late summer and fall of 2000. French truck drivers, seeking lower fuel taxes, mounted blockades of key highways. When the French government acceded, similar blockades quickly appeared in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Norway, and Spain. In contrast, hashish dealers in Christiana, a Copenhagen squatter area, stopped business for 5 days, trying to force legalization of hashish (Reuters 4/11/1994). This adaptive tactic neither worked nor diffused.

### ***3.5.7 Two-sided Adaptation and Coevolution***

What happens when protesters do adapt? Three possibilities exist: (1) nothing – the state represses or deters protest; (2) success – protest leaders mobilize and protest without repression; or (3) the state (or protest target) adapts as well. In a sequence of two-sided adaptation, particularly with the infusion of greater resources to each side, coevolution emerges and can lead to prolonged conflict and ultimately to civil war (Oliver and Daniel 2003). Biologists call this the Red Queen problem. As Tilly (1978, 148) notes, “collective competition is usually symmetrical: when one party jockeys for a visible position in a public ceremony, so does another.”

The 1967 capture of Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Bolivia is an example of coevolution. Guevara (Guevara (1961)) had written a textbook on guerrilla warfare that was published and distributed widely. Although Guevara intended it as a text for communist guerrillas in non-communist countries, anyone could read it. Among the most assiduous readers were the American CIA and the army officers of Latin American countries. In Bolivia army generals immediately put it to use. The regime courted peasants: it granted expanded land rights and gave village schools equipment and supplies. In addition, the government spread anti-guerrilla propaganda throughout the rural areas. These activities led to strong campesino support of the state and virtually no support of the guerrillas, who eventually were all captured or killed (Anderson 1997).

Current warfare in Colombia and recently in Sierra Leone are examples of coevolution adaptation with infusing resources. Coevolution in El Salvador documents a civil war that began with 8,000 state troops and ended with more than 20,000 (Enzensberger 1994). When resource flows are of equal value and adaptation rates keep pace, civil war is highly probable. After all, no one deliberately seeks a civil

war (except, perhaps Lenin (Pipes 1995, 233)). This type of conflict claims the highest casualty rate of all types of domestic strife and most of the deaths are nonparticipating citizens. Although researchers have published a great deal of excellent research work on how civil wars end (e.g., Licklider (1995)), we have no explanation of how civil wars emerge. However, ecological research offers one approach. Jonathan Roughgarden (1983) created a simultaneous two-equation model for coevolution that is estimable with interval data. Garrison (2008) applied the model to the Peruvian conflict (Sendero Luminoso vs. the state) and the civil wars in Colombia, El Salvador, and the US. His results show that there was coevolution, in Colombia, El Salvador, and the US, although not in the terror-based conflict in Peru.

In a democratic country with no anti-regime protest, adaptation usually means more publicity or fewer arrests. Even a democracy, however, experiences two-sided adaptations. During the tumultuous late-1960s, many urban police forces adapted to civil rights and anti-war protesters. For example, when 300 Harvard SDS members occupied University Hall and began to rifle through university files, authorities bided their time. Then suddenly at 4:58 a.m., 400 police arrived and easily rousted the students, most of whom were sleeping at the time (Rosenblatt 1997). Police forces in democratic countries can use some of Stalin's adaptive tactics too.

In a repressive country such as Poland, the state collapses when it is unable to deter or repress protest. One can see this in the declining repression rates of 1989 when many communist regimes fell. But in an authoritarian country with ethnic conflict or large-scale dissident groups, coevolution is a distinct possibility. Let us explore whether coevolution occurs in a transition from autocracy to democracy. We investigate Polish data from 1980 through 1995. So we have 1.5 years of a free trade union, then autocracy and martial law, and finally transition to democracy. Poland never approached civil war, but there was, as we have shown, huge levels of adaptation by the dissidents and the state. The model we test is the Roughgarden coevolution model (Roughgarden 1983):

$$\begin{aligned} W_v &= 1 + r - \left(\frac{r}{K}\right) - aP \\ W_p &= 1 - \mu + abV \end{aligned}$$

where,  $W$  indicates the fitness of the prey (rebels) and predator (the state);  $V$  the size of the prey group;  $P$  the size of the predator group;  $\mu$  the density-independent death rate of the predators;  $r$  the growth rate of the prey;  $a$  the slope of the predator's functional response; and  $b$  the numerical response to the predator to its functional response.  $K$  is the carrying capacity, which is not relevant for most protest and repression. This is all a bit strange in protest and repression, but the right side of the equal sign is straightforward: we model the protesters minus repression and then state forces plus the effect of protest. But the difficulty lies in the common biological function of fitness. Most of the time it refers to evolutionary or reproductive fitness, that is, the ability to foster offspring. We interpret the equivalent in our

**Table 3.1** Polish coevolution test, 1980–1995, daily data aggregation

Parameter	Estimate	<i>t</i> -value	<i>p</i> ( <i>t</i> )
<b>r</b>	−0.97452*	56.49	0.0001
<b>a</b>	−11.7746	0.48	0.6310
<b>m</b>	−30.37914*	26.33	0.0001
<b>b</b>	−0.003	0.37	0.7092
Eigenvalues	$\lambda_1 = -19.4081$ $\lambda_2 = 18.43058$		
N = 5,884			

\* Statistically significant

circumstance to the first difference of protesters and state forces. So we have today minus yesterday on the left side of the equation, and yesterday only on the right side:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \text{Protesters} &= 1 + r \times \text{Protesters}_{(t-1)} - a \times \text{Repression}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon \\ \Delta \text{Stateforces} &= 1 - m \times \text{Repression}_{(t-1)} + b \times \text{Protesters}_{(t-1)} + \epsilon\end{aligned}$$

Table 3.1 contains the results of the daily data in Poland from 1980 through 1995. It is apparent that Poland in its autocratic repressive period through transition was significant at least in the first parameter in both equations of the coevolution process. This implies that both sides adapted and readapted until finally the democratic forces broke through to tentative victory, at which time adaptation entered a new phase. Coevolution, as Oliver and Myers (2003) argued, is not limited to civil wars. When both sides adapt, conflict lengthens, but unless resources increase greatly fewer people get hurt.

### 3.6 Adaptation and Symbolic Protest: A Research Agenda

This chapter makes clear that adaptation and symbolic protest are common phenomena and that both protesters and the state deliberate about their options. We have overlooked adaptation, for example, as we have tested the relationship between protest and repression and have found stability. One reason conflicts remain in equilibrium is that fewer arrests and injuries result from adaptation. This suggests that we should view protest and repression with a sharper focus to discover the real dynamics between dissidents and the state. It makes sense for risk-averse protesters to adapt or act symbolically, but what happens when they do? What are the consequences of microlevel adaptation and symbolic protest as reflected in state response, macrolevel structures, public good acceptance, and macrolevel reform?

A serious impediment to this research arena is the challenge of an analytic method. A prior basic question, though, is what do we really want to know? If we seek to understand if adaptation tactics create a higher probability of public good accession, then analysis is inherently easier than if we demand a more general model. Since an accepted biological model of coevolution already exists, the analytic problem is less troublesome than it might seem. Now that we are generating

daily and sub-daily interval data on protest and repression, analysis can probe more deeply and more carefully than ever before and our understanding of protest and mobilization can be more complete.

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# Chapter 4

## Dimensions of Space and Time in Protest and Repression

*All in good time. Just waiting for the revolution and my dacha.*  
—V.S. Naipaul, *A House for Mr. Biswas*

### 4.1 Introduction

Until Charles Tilly's (2000) paper, virtually no one addressed the concept of space in protest and repression. The same can be said of time. Perhaps both subjects are too mundane. After all, it is obvious that space is a prerequisite in virtually any dissent event; and protest occurs in time. The fact that the protesters were forced out of Chicago's Lincoln Park (as opposed to the more spatially advantaged Grant park) at 11:00 pm during the 1968 Democratic convention has always been a matter for journalists, not scholars. In this chapter I follow Tilly (2000) in trying to make space as well as time scholarly matters. We deal first with space, then time, and finally attempt to integrate both. Starting from first principles of attitudes of dissidents and the state, I attempt to link Mark Lichbach's (1995, 1996) Collective Action research program (CARP) through the spatial dimension.

At the outset, the first principles are the following:

1. Dissident entrepreneurs select and use space based on their tactics.
2. Dissident entrepreneurs seek to shift protesters into a space that reduces the probability of coercion and maximizes mobilization.
3. Dissidents adapt not only tactically but also spatially when faced with large coercion forces.
4. The state unwillingly surrenders control of any space to dissidents.
5. The state's dilemma (Lichbach 1995) grows larger as dissident mobilization diffuses and as concentration increases.

Unlike other forms of political mobilization, for example, interest groups, protest and repression almost always require physical space. It is a resource for dissidents as well as for the state. As we seek to understand protest and repression, space and time are critical components. Yet space is perhaps the most theoretically neglected aspect of domestic conflict. Physical space is assumed in almost all work on domestic conflict. It is an everyday, street-level problem. This chapter explores space to discover whether it is a deeper and more important problem than most research



suggests. Why do dissidents protest where they do? How do states decide where to deploy their police or soldiers in order to deter protest or to repress it? What determines the boundaries of a riot? How does the size of mobilization affect the spatial policies of dissent and repression? These are a small sample of the questions as yet not investigated, which I will analyze in this chapter.

## 4.2 Space in Theory and Evidence

Both dissidents and states put a premium on the control of space (Lichbach 1995, 77–79). While physical space plays a role in many descriptions and histories of conflict (e.g., Capeci (1991) and Handy (1994)), we have little knowledge about the spatial dimension of conflict. Most theorists of protest and revolution focus on matters that seem more salient. Gurr (1970) was concerned with value mobility than more conventional mobility. Tilly's (1978) adaptation of Trotsky's concept of dual sovereignty bears almost no relation to space – only to the level of public support for various groups. Neither do structural theorists (Skocpol 1979; Foran 1997) address the reality of space and distance. Kimmel (1990) explicitly addresses space, but just as an analysis of social structure, not land and area. Even mathematical models of conflict (e.g., the Lanchester square law) do not consider terrain or distance (see Neild's paper in Bennett (1987)). Only at the microlevel of protest theory does space emerge as important: diffusion, the effect of concentration, the effect of dispersion and contagion (Lichbach 1995).

Note too that we deal here with real geographic space. Most spatial work in political science is applied to voting and party distances (e.g., Enelow 1984). DeNardo (1985) uses this formal version of spatial theory to derive models of political strategy and mobilization. Real space is only considered intensely by Lichbach (1995) in his general exploration of the solutions to the Rebel's and State's Dilemmas.

As in military conflict, space is a practical factor that matters to protesters and to the state. Dissidents choose protest locations to maximize mobilization and minimize the probability of repression. Dissident mobilizers in large cities choose demonstration sites to minimize coercion, a strategy that itself affects mobilization levels. The state's deployment of police and military forces is generally based on a spatial control policy. Yet the spatial factor has not been tested empirically, principally because data have never before included the location of protest and repression.

### 4.2.1 *Dissident Entrepreneurs Select and Use Space Based on Their Tactics*

How much and what kind of space dissident entrepreneurs want is governed by their tactics. Guerrillas want defended territory, terrorists want none or all, rioters want a defined place for a defined time. Spatial choice also depends on knowledge.

**Table 4.1** Space choices of dissident entrepreneurs based on tactics

Tactic	Space	Minimized or maximize?
Guerrilla	Defensible territory	Maximize
Terror	Hidden or none	Minimize
Occupation	Existing space	Neither
Riot	Well defined, controllable	Neither
March	Whole route	Maximize
Symbolic	Random or public	Maximize

For example, terrorists put a high premium on location knowledge. Most travel to conduct terror, but never to a place that is totally unknown to them or where they have no support. They wish to blend into the population; this limits the distance they can travel. The optimum target for terrorists is one that will create great publicity but allow easy anonymity and escape. Table 4.1 summarizes the effect of various protest tactics on the choice and size of space.

Guerrillas seek territorial control. They do not assert control unless they know they can defend the area and secure support from the population. At that point, they often become rent seekers. In Peru, the Shining Path extracted tolls and tribute from passers-by for decades. This behavior is common throughout the world and in history. Guerrillas also seek to occupy government buildings or buildings near government's building as staging areas. During the Irish 1916 Rising, rebels attacked the Dublin Castle, citadel of British power in Ireland, but put its new Irish headquarters in the less-defended post office building (Caulfield 1995). Planning is critical in guerrilla tactics. The 1968 North Vietnamese/Viet Cong Tet assault in Saigon failed in part because Viet Cong guerrillas had to stop to ask directions to their targets.

Terrorists seek publicity by bombing, shooting, kidnapping, or sabotage. They differ from other dissidents in the sense that they want no constant public space. Their tactics dictate hidden locations and careful planning of destructive and illegal actions. The principal space they need consists of safe houses and escape routes (or in the terms of the Provisional Irish Republican Army [IRA], "runbacks" (Feldman 1991)). These space resources reduce the probability of repression. Like other dissidents, terrorists adapt to state actions. Enders and Sandler (1993) showed that state actions lead to tactical adaptations. Terrorists also adapt spatially, particularly in their choice of targets. They adapt to continue terror actions and create publicity by eluding arrest and coercion. For example, when the British government fortified security in Northern Ireland, the IRA hit targets in England. When sites were secured there, the IRA hit a military music school in Wales. When minor sites such as this were also fortified, the IRA bombed British military bases in Germany.

Leaders of demonstrations know (1) that mobilization is easier when the site is well-known and near most dissidents and (2) the probability of coercion can be minimized. Demonstration organizers generally choose a public place to which most dissidents can come easily. I discuss the criteria of size in another section below, but note that the chosen public space needs to be an area where coercion to most activists is in low probability. Generally this means that police vehicles can be blocked and that a dense crowd is protected from most repressive tactics.

Occupations make use of the space they already control. In this sense, occupation is the least challenging protest tactic with regard to space. If occupiers seek a larger policy impact, though, they need to augment occupation with an effective means of general communication. For example, the Polish occupation strategy that Solidarity used in 1980 and 1981 diffused nationally because the government press publicized it around the country. Solidarity's strategy worked well since the workers occupied the factories and mines that the government controlled. This spatial decision precluded the brutal coercion faced by predecessors who protested in the streets in previous decades. Similarly, in the 1989 Czechoslovakian revolution, word spread quickly through the population that elementary and high school students should stay home. Hundreds of thousands remained in their houses, a tactic that presented an impossible coercion problem for the state. The students were dispersed in their houses and flats. Would the police begin to search each house? Given its resources this is not possible even for the most draconian state.

Rioters seek a confined space with two characteristics. First, it is a space they know well; second, it is one that can either block or deter police intervention. Lichbach (1995, 113) argues that the central location of a riot (an intersection or a major store) is known to the entire community. The spatial key to a successful riot is to confine it to a space that is controllable, at least for several hours through several days. Several hours allow most members of the community to take any action they desire, for example, looting or property destruction, without fear of police intervention. In large riots, risk-averse police usually do not intervene until a large force can be assembled. The intervention often comes after the greatest destruction and looting has occurred. Lichbach (1995) notes that an area without a well-known central meeting place will have fewer riots and more aborted riots; that may be, but the principal spatial feature of a riot is its community boundaries. From the urban American riots in the 1960s through the Los Angeles riot in 1992, the hallmark was usually the ethnicity boundaries (see, e.g., Morrison and Lowry (1994)). The Detroit riot of 1943 was defined by urban jurisdictional lines, that is, the boundaries of the city of Detroit (Capeci 1991). Rioters were careful not to cross the line of another police jurisdiction. In 1964, the Harvey-Dixmoor race riot just south of Chicago found police (and myself accidentally) backed up to a railroad embankment, pinned down by snipers supporting rioters while looting and burning progressed in the ethnic core area. The Los Angeles riot of 1992 was both a destructive looting event as well as an inter-ethnic conflict between Koreans and African-Americans. Lichbach (1995) categorizes riots in his set of Community solutions, which is fully consistent with the spatial dimension of the history of urban riots.

Marches are the riskiest of all forms of public protest. Therefore, marches are among the least-used tactical events. Why the risk? None of the spatial defense advantages of other tactics is available to marchers. The path almost inevitably involves dangerous sites, for example, bridges and narrow passages, and police know where to stop the march easily. In the Russian revolution of March 1917, police placed snipers on all the bridges across the river Neva. Their tactic would have worked safe for the season. Since the Neva was frozen, marchers simply scampered between the bridges over the ice and regrouped on the north side of the river. Many

more marches, however, have been stopped with repression. In fact, many of them carry the common name of massacres: Sharpeville in South Africa (1960), Bachelor's Walk in Ireland (1914), and Bloody Sunday in Derry (1972).

It is not surprising that marches are the most avoided tactics in authoritarian countries. They imply too much spatial uncertainty to allow large-scale mobilization. In Czechoslovakia's protests from 1980 through 1988, not a single march was reported. Similarly, no marches occurred in Poland from 1980 through 1985. In democratic countries marches are far more common. Many target sensitive areas, however, and are protected by police, for example, US civil rights marches in the 1960s, funeral marches in Northern Ireland, and in central Europe anti-skinhead violence marches to areas where minorities were killed or buried.

On the state side, a tactic similar to a march is an armored train full of soldiers. This was used both in the Russian civil war in the 1920s and in the Chinese revolution beginning in the early 1930s. Why is it no longer used? Because trains travel on tracks. It was simple for dissidents to blow up or otherwise disable railroad tracks so that the armored train would have to stop wherever the protesters wanted. Soldiers could shoot only in a perpendicular from the train, while dissidents could sabotage by placing bombs before, after, under, and even on top of the train. What finally killed armored trains resolutely, though, was air power.

Symbolic protest is the most adaptable tactic when considering space. It comprises street-theater, posters, symbolic parades, symbols worn on clothing (e.g., electrical resistors in Poland after martial law), and full symbolic costumes. Street theater can be planned or spontaneous on a street or plaza. Sometimes it is prelude to another action and is used as a mobilization device. For example, Czech anti-nuclear protesters performed a theater action at a nuclear reactor construction site in 1995. After the performance the group mobilized volunteers to blockade entrances to the site.

#### ***4.2.2 Dissident Entrepreneurs Seek to Shift Protesters into a Space that Reduces the Probability of Coercion and Maximizes Mobilization***

Mobilization of protesters is easier if coercion can be deterred. Demonstrations, rallies, and occupations in authoritarian regimes are especially prone to risk. They typically take place in urban centers with large concentrations of people – and police. Dissident entrepreneurs can limit the effectiveness of coercion by maximizing police queuing time, that is, blocking police from access to the protest for the duration of the event. Examples abound. On 1 December 1981, streetcar drivers, alerted to a pending demonstration in a Warsaw square, put 20 streetcars across adjacent intersecting streets to the square. Neither could police move in with vehicles, nor could the fire department use water cannon. Helicopters were brought in, but pilots found the buildings too tall and flights too perilous. This was one of the protests that was so successful, and it led to martial law. To maximize queuing, one simply

reverses the traffic science norm of optimizing the flow of traffic (see [Gazis \(1974\)](#)). This means blocking the security forces, but sometimes allowing dissidents through other passages. How does one stop police if streetcars are not handy? With people.

An alternative method of blocking spontaneous coercion in a space is to surround the police with dissidents and simply stop them from any action. During the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, on 1 October 1964, a police car drove onto Sproul Plaza to arrest Jack Weinberg for handing out civil rights flyers. By the time the police reached Weinberg, 3,000 students had moved in to sit around the car preventing it from moving. Leaders even mounted the car to make speeches. After 30 h, the administration acquiesced and agreed to meet the protest leaders ([Anderson \(1995\)](#), 101–102). A similar event happened at the Sorbonne in May 1968 when police tricked students and arrested them; a large crowd surrounded the police van and prevented it from leaving.

### ***4.2.3 Protester Site Selection***

Dissident leaders generally decide where to protest. They seek maximum mobilization and minimum repression. Terrorists also want to maximize publicity ([Lichbach 1995](#)). Since dissidents can easily determine where state forces are deployed, they select a site where state forces are so few that they can be blocked. Dissident entrepreneurs, especially terrorists, select sites with care. They plan escape routes in the event for which police arrive in large numbers.

How do protest entrepreneurs select sites for demonstrations, rallies, or occupation? Again, the aim is to maximize mobilization and minimize coercion. There is rarely a perfect site that optimizes both these goals, but it can happen. Perhaps the best example of this was the Polish Solidarity's decision in 1980 to occupy factories and mines. Mobilization was no problem, since the workers and miners were already on site. Coercion was effectively minimized because the factories and mines were state-owned. Furthermore, the police had no way to storm the factories and mines without destroying them. Workers and miners simply stayed at the worksite, but did no work, effectively bringing the state to compromise. Occupations and attendant slowdowns/strikes were accounted for 77% of the tactics used in 1980 and 53% in 1981, of the 2,039 protest events in 1980–1981. Occupation was so effective that the regime decided full communist rule could be restored by the imposition of martial law and then proceeded to do that. The following year saw occupation use only 2% of the tactics. And in 1983, no occupations occurred. Occupations have many advantages, but generally are not available to protest leaders. Occupying one's factory is one thing, but occupying university or government buildings invites coercion. Police can invade or take the more patient approach of cutting utilities and depriving protesters from food, effectively setting up a siege.

It is far more difficult to select sites for rallies and demonstrations. The more people being mobilized, the higher the probability they will attract official attention. Yet protest leaders want to maximize the number of people protesting. The basic

challenge in an authoritarian state therefore is to find or fashion a site that will hold the maximum number of protesters and still deter coercion. With a small number of protesters risks are high; as numbers go up, coercion risk does not diminish proportionally. How many protesters does it take to deter coercion? This depends on context. Yet there is much anecdotal evidence that 10,000 protesters are the threshold to gain a public good and elude coercion. First, Gamson (1975) reported that groups with 10,000 members had a substantially higher probability of receiving its public good. Second, several authors (Anderson 1995; Koning 1988) make much of the fact that at the Chicago Democratic convention in 1968 there were just under 10,000 protesters. Arrayed against them were 12,000 city and state police and 6,000 National Guard (Anderson (1995), 215). Chicago had an unusually high number of police and National Guard available. Most cities across the globe can muster no more than 6,000–7,000 police in total (Kurian 1989). With 10,000 protesters, then, dissident groups begin to have power in numbers. They are more likely to protest publicly and more able to deter coercion.

How do large number of protesters deter coercion? First, they show the state that the protest has considerable public support. Second, they take up a large amount of space, especially in a confined urban area. How much space? At minimum, each protester needs at least 49 cm side-to-side and 35 cm back-to-back (determined from photographic evidence of mass protests (the Hulton Getty Picture Collection; see Yapp (1996)) and by measuring several annoyed undergraduates). This is minimal space for the average size of people all facing the same way. Generally much more space is required and certainly desired, but these minimums allow us to assess the spatial dimension of the 10,000 figure. With 10,000 dissidents of average size all facing the same way, an absolute minimum rectangle area of 4,900 m by 3,500 m would be needed. Normally, then dissidents would need a large space for 10,000 protesters.

Large numbers perform a third service for dissidents. They can effectively block intersections in urban protest, deterring police from moving into the center of activity and into the bulk of the crowd. Dissident entrepreneurs place sentinels (usually zealous young men) on the outskirts of these crowds both as protection and early warning. If anyone is repressed, it is likely to be these people, with coercion minimized for the rest of the protesters. These points matter less in democratic countries, but were certainly relevant in the United States and Western Europe during the late 1960s and in more recent anti-nuclear demonstrations.

#### ***4.2.4 Tacit Coordination and Site Selection***

There are documented instances in which dissidents learn of an event that leads to mobilization. But where should they go? Schelling (1960) noted that tacit coordination happens frequently. There is a site that attracts people without explicit communication. For example, after martial law was imposed in Poland, elderly religious women placed a shrine honoring fallen (dissident) martyrs in a certain square

in Warsaw. Whenever an anniversary or a new event led to mobilization, people gravitated to that square. The police finally demolished the shrine and closed the square. The women then moved to a new square, and the whole process began again.

Sometimes there is nonspecific communication of a potential protest site. Consider the Philippine revolution of 1986. A report was issued that military forces were traveling to Camp Crampe where two high officials defected from Marcos. This motivated thousands of people to move toward Camp Crampe, where they met and effectively stopped repression.

Both Schelling (1960) and Lichbach (1995) note that specific places are common gathering areas in cities. It would be interesting to investigate the spatial aspects of mobilization and deterrence of coercion of, for example, the National Uprising Square in Bratislava, Unter den Linden in Berlin, Tienanmen Square in Beijing, the Mall in Washington D.C., Montparnasse in Paris, the Piazza of the Basilica of San Giovanni in Rome, Wencelas Square in Prague, Independence Square in Kiev, or Trafalgar and Grosvenor Squares in London. These are places where many protests occurred in the twentieth and nascent twenty-first centuries. Some like Tienanmen Square are famous principally for the coercion that actually occurred. In fact, though few students were killed there in 1989, most of those killed were workers on the periphery of the square.

#### ***4.2.5 Dissidents Adapt Not Only Tactically But Also Spatially When Faced with Large Coercion Forces***

Protest slides underground when coercion rises to dangerous levels. Once away from public view, protest moves to a contentious terrain. The state's success in stopping public protest sometimes leads to the more frustrating problem of rooting out underground dissidents. After the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, the African National Congress went underground and began to use terror in raids on government buildings – almost always the least defended, for example, post offices. The IRA, always actively hunted, adapted by organizing itself as cells in spatial distance. Not a hierarchical organization, it was rather a collection of autonomous cells (Hardin 1995). Actions were created at the local cell level, which is one reason IRA cease-fires were hard to control. After martial law was declared in Poland, Solidarity moved underground and formed two separate, spatially different organizations. The first organization's activities were known to the police, but their location was not. The second's location was known, but not its activities. The bulk of the two organizations' work was protected by the Catholic church, which of course was a force in every village, town, and city.

Spatial adaptation is the hallmark of guerrillas. Strategic retreat to remote areas occurred in the Communist Chinese revolution, the 1958 Cuban revolution, the Afghan Muslim challenge to the USSR, and in most Central and Latin American domestic conflicts (Landau 1993). Chiapas rebels in Mexico successfully protested on 1 January 1994 and then melted back into the jungles of Chiapas. Waves of

Mexican army patrols afterward failed to eradicate the challenge. Gurr (1970) noted the importance of geographic inaccessibility for rebels in areas with rugged landscapes and poor transportation networks. Remote spatial protection allows guerrillas to regroup, amass more resources, and prepare to challenge the state once more.

The state, through informers, knows not only who but also where the usual suspects are. But a state facing a general underground protest supported by almost the entire population has a significant problem. This is a situation of spatial diffusion that most often ends in a revolution. It was a central feature of the Iranian revolution (Rasler 1996). When it occurred in Poland it was repressed by martial law that eventually gave way to the collapse of the communist state. Let us set forth two propositions and then investigate their validity.

1. Dissident entrepreneurs attempt to spread state forces to the point of weakness.
2. The state unwillingly surrenders control of any space to dissidents.

Modern states require territoriality and sovereignty. Buffeted by international organizations' increasing challenges to sovereignty, states need to protect their territory. The quest for disputed territory between Israel and Palestine is the best-known conflict, but there are many others in the world. Many involve squatters, others secessionist movements, and still others are resource conflicts. Aside from the special and minor cases in the Netherlands (Lewis 1987), no state grants space willingly to dissidents.

Most alarming to governments are the challenges from guerrillas controlling or attempting to control rural areas. States know that guerrillas need support from the local population. Most prominently, states in Central America have taken draconian measures to prevent support in outlying areas. Since mostly indigenous populations inhabit these places, governments have been willing to commit genocide in order to deny land to the guerrillas (Landau 1993; Danner 1994). This is the spatial part of the concept of dual sovereignty – states like Guatemala, and in South America, Peru and Colombia asserted control of all the country's territory, even if they could not in fact control much of the land.

#### ***4.2.6 The State's Dilemma Grows Larger as Dissident Mobilization Diffuses and Concentration Increases***

Parallel to the rebel's dilemma in Lichbach's (1995) work is the state's dilemma: how does a state effectively mobilize its forces in times of need? The state faces a most difficult decision about where to deploy its police and other forces. First, its deployment sites are almost always known to the public. In game theoretic terms, the state faces a Blotto game (in which it must deploy its forces before it knows where the dissidents will be), while the dissidents have full information (Luce 1957). One means of reacting to this problem is to shore up every main target area – police stations, military bases, and government centers. Yet the state is still in a Blotto game. It has better defenses, but the dissidents know this too. Dissidents adapt.



Committed terrorists exploit almost any opportunity area, as the IRA did (noted above). Other dissidents go underground, retreat to remote areas, but remain prepared to inflict harm or protest when an area is not defended. Most of all, dissidents diffuse spatially, sometimes as a direct tactic, but usually because the public good they seek is followed by other dissidents in other areas (Lichbach (1995), 118–120). Spatial diffusion of the conflict makes more arduous the state's dilemma. Forces are almost certainly weakened by spatial diffusion.

States often react to their inherent disadvantage by creating mobile forces such as SWAT teams and riot police. Yet these troops create a second spatial problem for the state. If riot police must patrol several sites, how can they select the most effective and efficient route to deter or repress protests? Kauffman (1995) cites the traveling salesman problem that relates to the strategic planning required by state forces in multi-site conflicts. It is a basic combinatorial problem: if the number of sites is  $N$ , then the number of possible routes is  $\frac{N!}{2}$ . If there are only four sites, there are but 12 routes – an easy decision for anyone who knows the region well. However, if the number of sites doubles to eight, the number of routes increases to 20,160. A city or a country with eight sites of current protest faces daunting challenges when deciding where to send its policing agents.

Poland's martial law period is a prime example of this spatial route problem, which is relevant when there is diffused and general protest in a country. Protests erupted in 46 different cities when Poland implemented martial law on 13 December 1981. The state had approximately 30,000 police, militia, and riot squads. They were deployed throughout the country on the first day of martial law. Yet there were too few police to repress all the protest. So the state reverted to regional teams of mobile riot police (see Fig. 4.1 and Table 4.2).

With 12 factory or city sites of protests in the southeast region, the head of the team of riot police was forced to select an efficient path from 239,500,800 possible routes. The northeast regional force faced a mere but still confusing 2,520 choices. The northwest had to choose among 20,160 routes and had to subdue both Gdansk and Szczecin, two of Solidarity's strongholds. It was the southwest industrial and mining districts, though, that presented the greatest problem to the government. With 17 cities and one general region protesting, there were over three quadrillion discrete routes available to the riot police. The result was that riot police had no way to cover effectively the factory occupations and urban protests that continued. The fewest problems lay in the northeast, but every other region plagued the state's attempt to impose martial law. Dissident leaders received early warning when riot police approached so that they could defend themselves or disguise their activity. Protest remained fully robust for 3 days, until police shot dead nine miners in Wujek – in the southwest. Even then, several factory and mine occupations continued. Open protest was not fully contained for 2 weeks.

Another real world diffusion problem for the state is that its police must use the taxicab metric, not the Euclidean metric (Krause 1986). This is necessary since neither the protesters nor most of the state vehicles can fly over buildings, lakes, and mountains. Consider a right triangle. The Euclidean metric is the hypotenuse while the taxicab metric is the sum of the other two sides (Krause (1986), 4):



Fig. 4.1 Map of Poland (University of Texas Library)

$$d_T = |a - b| + |a - b|,$$

$$d_E = \sqrt{(a_1 - b_1)^2 + (a_2 - b_2)^2}$$

For example, the very real need to travel from Gdansk to Szczecin requires just 233 km in Euclidean distance, but 350 km in taxicab distance. Control problems are exacerbated in countries with few and poor roads. In the Iranian revolution, for example, spatial diffusion was a huge problem for the Shah (Rasler 1996).

Spatial concentration of dissidents also creates difficulties for the state. Lichbach (1995) notes that concentration facilitates mobilization. Recruiting is easier for dissident entrepreneurs: transaction costs are low, social contracts are concluded more readily, and the work of mobilizing on a university campus, in a large factory, or

**Table 4.2** Cities/regions of protest after martial law in Poland (12/13–31/1981)

Cities/region	Protests
<i>Northwest</i>	
Bialogard	3
Bydgoszcz	2
Gdansk	14
Kornik	1
Plock	10
Poznan	2
Szczecin	19
Stomil	2
<i>Southwest</i>	
Aleksanderro Lodski	1
Bielsko-Biala	1
Cracow	9
Czestochowa	1
Gorzow	2
Katowice	17
Lodz	9
Nowa Huta	9
Nowa Sol	1
Piekary Slaskie	3
Rybnik	1
Silesia	19
Tarnowski Gory	1
Tychy	21
Walbrzych	1
Wodzislaw Slas	4
Wroclaw	8
Zory	2
<i>Northeast</i>	
Bialystok	1
Glinnik	1
Gdynia	1
Krosno	1
Olszyn	1
Ponar Bielsk	2
Warsaw	38
<i>Northwest</i>	
Bochnia	2
Kielce	1
Lublin	1
Nowa Ruda	2
Nowy Sack	1
Ostrowiec	1
Pionki	1
Pulawy	1
Radom	1
Swidnick	6
Szydłowska	1
Tarnow	2

in a small area with large numbers of farm workers allows for greater efficiency in contrast to a normal spatial area, such as a residential neighborhood.

Police have long been forced to deal with the spatial concentration of dissidents, and they grow wary when a large number of people assembles. The fear generated by urban assembly goes back to antiquity. Aristotle feared mob rule. Hobbes sought a government that could protect against the vagaries of mobs and highway robbers. Mobs were also on the minds of eighteenth century political institutional designers. When Brazil's new capital Brasilia was created, the designers deliberately excluded any space in which large assemblies could dissent (Scott 1998). So there is fear on the part of political authorities. But how could one protect the right of assembly without engendering mobs?

Lichbach (1995, 159) notes that geographic concentration allows dissident entrepreneurs to impose, monitor, and enforce agreements. At the same time, he argues that crowds and bandwagons arise more easily in dense population areas. The Israeli Defense Forces tactic of bulldozing Palestinian houses forces families into refugee camps, which are in reality concentrated sites of mobilization. In Algeria, police arrested many innocent men and put them in prison. There they became hardened fighters against the regime (Horne 1987). Police have learned this and fear particularly the possibility of a crowd or bandwagon turning into a mob. But what exactly is a mob? Let us begin with a description by Elias Canetti of a mob in Vienna on 15 July 1927 (Canetti (1982), 245):

The workers, usually well disciplined, trusting their Social Democratic leaders and satisfied that Vienna was administered by these leaders in an exemplary manner, were acting without their leaders on this day. When they set fire to the Palace of Justice, Mayor Seitz mounted a fire engine and raised his hand high, trying to block their way. His gesture had no effect: the Palace of Justice was burning. The police were ordered to shoot; there were 90 deaths.

This kind of mob action, particularly in a confined space, challenges rational explanations. A recent development in natural science helps to explain how this kind of occurrence can work rationally – and why it confronts police with uncertainty. The development is called complexity. It concerns what happens when individuals or single items combine to act or work on a macrolevel (Bar-Yam 1997). We know, for example, that aggregated individual preferences do not simply sum together on the macrolevel. The dynamics of generated actions based on preferences take on unpredictable ability in complexity. Computer simulations show that fully unexpected attitudes can form on the macrolevel. Surges in the size of the crowd also become unpredictable when individuals are in a concentrated space. One of now many model programming codes called SWARM, developed initially by Chris Langton at the Santa Fe Institute, has become an important research vehicle in this poorly understood area. It is fully consistent with the collective action research program. Complexity and SWARM and its competitors are tools that can enrich the study of protest and repression generally.

When police face concentrations of individuals, they confront uncertainty. It is not surprising that state agents often display an attitude of the worst probable scenario. The resultant coercion challenges the ability of dissident entrepreneurs to

sustain protest. Some protest leaders have dealt with this problem head on. One example is the American protest group called the Clamshell Alliance. This was a dissident group that fought against the Seabrook nuclear power plant in New Hampshire. They had bad experiences in confrontations with police. Leaders then developed a set of policies for all protesters in any subsequent actions in Seabrook. The spatially relevant ones are as follows (Epstein (1991), 70):

1. No running at any time
2. No strategic or tactical movement after dark
3. No breaking through police lines
4. In case of confrontation, sit down
5. Do not block workers' personal access to the site

These rules reduced significantly future violent confrontations between police and the Clamshell Alliance.

While diffusion weakens the ability of the state to repress dissent, concentration often sharpens it. Much of the coercion that has historically occurred in urban areas has been tragic. Whether repressing strikes, opposing demonstrations in the streets of large cities, or in military action against rural villages, police and military forces often act violently with unauthorized coercion. These actions themselves become political matters that may incite backlash, more repression, or public martyrdom.

#### ***4.2.7 Space in Protest and Repression***

I have attempted to show in this section of the chapter that space matters more deeply in protest and repression than in most mundane attitudes of scholars. There are no highly significant results, in part, because of the problems even geographers have in analyzing spatial situations. Nonetheless, for theories of protest and coercion several inferences in the chapter do matter.

First, tactics dictate spatial needs and actions. Dissent tactics matter more than might be thought, both for action and space.

Second, dissident entrepreneurs can use space not only to mobilize, but also to deter and prevent coercion – lowering risk and therefore costs of protest. Some sites are better than others for demonstrations and rallies; this probably explains why certain ones traditionally have been used throughout history.

Third, dissidents adapt spatially, perhaps even more readily than they do tactically. Underground protest is not limited to terror. Spatial adaptation works best when it is directed by dissident entrepreneurs. As Lichbach (1995) points out, communication is critical in these kinds of adaptations.

Fourth, states take space seriously. They have no desire for compromises that involve lost space. States are under other increasing pressures. Territoriality is one hallmark of the nation-state that they can defend.

Finally, the inability of states to repress protest increases far more as dissent diffuses spatially. To the extent that protest is distributed generally in the country,

the state's fixed force levels impede its ability to travel everywhere. The more cities and areas that protest, the more confusing the routing decision becomes.

Concentration allows a state to focus its coercive forces at one place, at least in the region. Concentration of dissent is feared by states for the manifestations it can assume. States fear especially the development of mob action. Preemptive repression is more probable in concentration protest.

### 4.3 Time

Time is fundamental to protest and repression. Action takes leisure time from dissidents, time costs money for the state, and timing aids sequences of action as well as mobilization. Anniversaries of previous massacres are an often-used method for mobilization. Most demonstrations do not linger, nor surprisingly do most revolutions. Urban riots are the most protracted form of protest except for civil war, which is the longest lasting as well as the most brutal form of contention.

Despite the importance of time, it is apparently too mundane a concept to have interested most researchers on protest and repression. Khawaja (1993) used event history analysis to find the results of arrests without trial in the Palestine–Israeli conflict, and Rasler (1996) used Poisson regression in the Iran revolution. Olzak (1992) specifically addressed time as a concept in ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, the paucity of data limits even these pioneering efforts. Data on time is rare in protest and repression. This chapter attempts to address directly the problem of time in protest and coercion with recently coded data that includes time when it is reported during a day, but include all durations for conflict events that last at least a day. There are also tests of short historical conflicts with especially harsh coercion. The reference to time applies to duration, although the problem of timing an event so as to maximize mobilization plays a role.

Almost all protest events are short – measured in hours rather than days, months, or years. This is a major fact in protest that must be explained. There are, of course, exceptions. In 1993, Lina Accurso mobilized 100 women to protest the opening of a strip club in her Port Chester, New York neighborhood. By late 1998, all but eight had abandoned the protest. Ms. Accurso abandoned family holiday dinners to face rain, sleet, and jeering strip joint patrons to maintain her vigil. Julia Butterfly spent more than 2 years in a tree in the Headwaters Forest in northern California. She refused to budge until necessary protections of the forest were imposed. More recently, 17 campus activists in Berkeley, CA, lived in trees that the University of California wished to cut down for a new football stadium (*Economist*, 24 May 2008). These are extraordinary commitments, exceptions that prove the rule. Most protests last a short time because normal life is disrupted (see Lichbach (1995)). Ms. Accurso, Ms. Butterfly, and the Berkeley campus activists made protest their lives, but few are willing to take on such a commitment. As Russell Hardin (1995, 18) notes, “how many people want to be ardently political all the time?”

Different types of domestic conflict provide the framework for my exploration of duration. We begin with the remarkably rapid demise of dictatorial regimes and the explanation called self-organized criticality. Revolutions and rebellions follow a similar pattern of short duration. Riots actually last longer than many revolutions and rebellions. They can last from 2 to 6 days and are a special type of domestic conflict that represents neighborhood sovereignty. From riots we turn to the effect of harsh state violence toward protesters. We code and test with time-series analysis three historical repression events. Finally, we examine information from a recent data set that yields evidence for duration of strikes, occupations, and demonstrations.

### 4.3.1 *Dictatorships and Rapid Collapse*

Dictatorial or coercive composite regimes do not accept input from citizens, but do organize themselves to a level of complexity. These regimes are much more vulnerable to collapse than are democratic countries. This rapid decay, however, is not strictly chaotic. Unlike chaos or catastrophe theories, a salutary feature of self-organized criticality is the ability to predict the rate of collapse once it commences. For example, Table 4.3 presents the outcomes of a test of the collapse of the regimes of eastern Europe, linked through the Soviet bloc. The rate of collapse was remarkably close to the same speed as of a mountain avalanche (where the unit (f) is days in eastern Europe and seconds in an avalanche). A paired two-sample *t*-test indicates no significant difference between the actual and predicted time of collapse.

Most revolutions do not linger. Unless they devolve to civil war, they tend in fact to be remarkably short, especially when the regime is self-organized. Blalock (1989, 204) argues that sustained conflicts confront the twin problems of continual reassessments and poor estimation of resources. There is little point in continuing if losses are greater in each interaction.

The active conflict interaction of almost all revolutions is measured in days, not weeks or months (Table 4.4). Even in the case of guerrilla warfare, revolutions do

**Table 4.3** Days from the start of protest until the surrender of the communist party in 1989

Country	Duration of revolution	Predicted duration from $f^{0.8}$
Poland	148	148
GDR	61	55
Bulgaria	43	25
Czechoslovakia	12	13
Romania	11	8

Note: The initiation of the active phase of revolution was coded as Poland, July 4; GDR, October 1; Bulgaria, October 30; Czechoslovakia, November 17; and Romania, December 15. A paired-two sample *t*-test = 1.518;  $p(t)$  two-tailed = 0.204. Reproduced from Ronald A. Francisco. "Why are collective conflicts stable?" in [Davenport \(2000\)](#), p. 153.

**Table 4.4** Duration of revolutions

Revolution	Date	Days to fall of regime
France	7/1789	3
France	2/1848	3
Milan	3/1848	5
Philippines	2/1986	4
Russia	3/1917	5
Russia	11/1917	16

**Table 4.5** Duration of rebellions

Rebellion	Date	Duration in days
Chiapas	1/1994	12
Columbia University	4/1968	8
Dresden	5/1848	7
France	5–6/1968	31
GDR	6/1953	12
Hungary	10–11/1956	15
Ireland	4/1916	7
Turner slave rising	8/1831	4
Paris Commune	4–5/1871	47
Russia	1/1905	16
Taos	1–2/1847	12
Warsaw rising	8–9/1944	8

not endure. The Cuban (real, continual conflict) revolution lasted just a bit more than one and one-half years (1957–1959); the Mexican revolution of 1910–1911 was active just for 186 days.

The same is true of rebellions. The time between initiation of the rebellion and defeat or cease-fire agreements is usually short (Table 4.5). Consider the set of planned rebellions (not just demonstrations or riots) where dual (or multiple)-sovereignty was attained – still duration is quite short, even when the planning is long, for example, 10 years in the case of the Chiapas rebellion.

As Tables 4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate, rebellions and revolutions are usually short because when the state has great coercive power, few dissidents want to be killed, arrested, or injured – dissidents retreat or the groups dissolve. Similarly, if the state cannot control the population that protests or strikes, its days are numbered, and either the military or another part of the government defects to quicken the process. A memoir (Koning (1988), 83–84) of the May events in France shows still another reason for the short duration of rebellions – protesters get tired:

It did not last. It was surprising that it lasted as long as it did, once the government had gone back on the offensive. People get tired. Even 20-year-old radicals get tired when they debate, write pamphlets, and run around all day and half the night and then sleep on college benches.

Not all rebellions and revolutions are short. Some are lengthy, particularly when they change to civil war or terror (see Mason (1996)). Given the fact that civil wars have the highest casualties, virtually no one ever starts with the goal of a civil war. To explain this behavior, it is helpful to note the obvious fact that protesters think. If they



are about to be coerced, why protest? Alternatively, why not adapt to elude coercion and continue to protest in relative safety? If both the rebels and the state adapt, and if neither side is able to defeat the other resolutely, then we have the recipe for a civil war.

Biologists call this phenomenon the “Red Queen.” It signals continual adaptation that allows the ratio of capability to remain the same between rebels and the state. No one is on record for desiring a civil war; consider that civil wars have far heavier deaths and injuries than international wars and that more civilians die than do soldiers. Red Queen coevolution shows how rebels and the state might adapt their way into a lengthy and costly civil war. The adaptation of Northern Irish protesters and the police is an example. The first Catholic marches in October 1968 were met with coercion. Marches became less formal, more spontaneous, and more ready for coercion. Police turned to water cannon, then decided to dye the water blue so that they would be able to identify the front-line rebels after the clash ended. The Catholics devolved to terror, while the police and their supplementary British troops created concrete barriers. The strife in Colombia has a similar flavor. Garrison (2008) has tested and shown that coevolution is happening in Colombia and has evolved continually since 1946. Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and other sites of civil wars display the same kind of simultaneous adaptation occurring on a military scale. We have good explanations of the end of civil wars (e.g., Mason (1996); Licklider (1995)). However, we have yet to show how they begin. Garrison’s work on coevolution constitutes a promising start to show how dissidents and states essentially stumble into civil wars.

### 4.3.2 *The Special Case of Riots*

Riots can last longer than revolutions, but rarely do they last a week. Riots have a different procedural dynamic than do other kinds of protest tactics. First, they are generally triggered from an unexpected event – especially police brutality, political assassination, violence against neighborhood residents, or more recently jury decisions. Riots always are in the community solution of protest (Lichbach 1995). Almost invariably riots begin in the afternoon and evening. Initial violence is generally high enough to deter police from remaining or penetrating the riot. In these cases, outside help is secured, but that takes time. In the US, National Guard troops generally are brought in (see National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). The New York City draft riot in 1863 was put down by the Union troops, who fought the Battle of Gettysburg and won, and were then dispatched to New York (Bernstein 1990).

Table 4.6 displays the dates and duration of 25 riots in the US. Most are from 1967; these were obtained from the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968). The mean duration of these riots is 4.28 days, the median 4 days, and the standard deviation 1.37 days. While a riot progresses, municipal law ceases to exist in the riot

**Table 4.6** Riot duration

Site	Start	End	Duration
Atlanta	6/17/1967	6/21/1967	5
Cambridge, MD	7/24/1967	7/27/1967	4
Cincinnati	6/12/1967	6/17/1967	6
Dayton	9/19/1967	9/20/1967	2
Detroit	6/20/1943	6/22/1943	3
Detroit	7/23/1967	7/28/1967	6
Elizabeth, NJ	7/25/1967	7/28/1967	4
Englewood, NJ	7/21/1967	7/26/1967	6
Grand Rapids, MI	7/21/1967	7/27/1967	4
Houston	5/16/1967	5/17/1967	2
Jackson, MS	5/10/1967	5/12/1967	3
Jersey City, NJ	7/17/1967	7/19/1967	3
Los Angeles	4/29/1992	5/1/1992	3
Milwaukee	7/30/1967	8/3/1967	5
Nashville	4/8/1967	4/11/1967	4
Newark	7/12/1967	7/17/1967	6
New Brunswick, NJ	7/17/1967	7/18/1967	2
New Haven, CT	8/19/1967	8/24/1967	6
New York	7/13/1863	7/17/1863	5
Patterson, NJ	7/15/1967	7/19/1967	5
Plainfield, NJ	7/14/1967	7/18/1967	5
Phoenix	7/25/1967	7/29/1967	5
Rockford, IL	7/28/1967	7/31/1967	4
Tampa	6/11/1967	6/15/1967	5
Tucson	7/23/1967	7/25/1967	3
York, PA	7/17/1967	7/21/1967	5

Sources: Adapted from data in Baldassare (1994), Bernstein (1990), Capeci (1991), and National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968)

area. In its place arises a new order governed by neighborhood attitudes. Looting proceeds rationally (see Berk (1972)). The highest valued goods are grabbed and the stores that have non-neighborhood owners are attacked and looted; yet during this time neighborhood icons are protected.

### 4.3.3 Duration of Protest Under Heavy Repression

Protest events that build rapidly in coercive regimes end quickly under heavy coercion. Arrests of leaders is a favored tactic of police and repressive country leaders. But are arrests as effective in the rapid shutdown of dissent as good old-fashioned shooting and killing? Consider the case of the general strike that paralyzed St. Petersburg, Russia, in January 1905. Table 4.7 shows the buildup of participation over 5 days and then stability and decline. The decline was created when troops shot

**Table 4.7** Strikers and arrests in St. Petersburg, Russia, January 1905

Day	Strikers	Arrests	Day	Strikers	Arrests
1/3/1905	12,600	0	1/11/1905	125,000	31
1/4/1905	19,300	0	1/12/1905	125,000	36
1/5/1905	26,000	0	1/13/1905	62,500	10
1/6/1905	65,500	0	1/14/1905	25,000	34
1/7/1905	105,000	31	1/15/1905	10,000	26
1/8/1905	111,000	58	1/16/1905	0	11
1/9/1905	118,000	157	1/17/1905	0	10
1/10/1905	125,000	138	1/18/1905	0	7

street protesters dead through seven volleys on January 9 (Suhr 1989). The strike continued for a few days, but then lost momentum when police intervened. Arrests persisted as zealots continued to strike or protest. Eventually, of course, the strikes reemerged and led to accommodation for the demand of a parliament and reduced the weekly hours of working.

Table 4.7 has only arrests as repression. The arrests mask really harsh coercion, which was killing the street strikers. The idea that arrest alone is a way to halt protest is based on the idea that leaders can mobilize dissenters. When Peruvian police arrested Abimael Guzmán, leader of *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path), President Fujimori hoped that the terror and conflict associated with the Shining Path might end. It declined eventually, but did not end. To assess empirically the role of police tactics to end public dissent, we turn to three cases of intense harsh repression: Poland's imposition of martial law in 1981; the USSR's repression of the East German (GDR) rebellion in June 1953; and the January 1905 Bloody Sunday repression of Father Gapon's march for workers in Russia.

On 13 December 1981, Poland imposed martial law and proscribed the Solidarity trade union. Lech Walesa was put under house arrest; other leaders were arrested and put into prison. Workers erupted in anger, but riot police faced them down with tear gas, water cannon, and live ammunition. The protest died down within 20 days. Table 4.8 shows the repressive factors that led to reduced levels of protest. There are only two. Arrests do show the sign of decline, but the variable is not statistically significant. Police injuries certainly did curtail protest, probably because of the fear of reprisal.

A production norm increase in mid-June triggered the 1953 East German rebellion. Workers had endured many such increases; this one they refused to tolerate. They massed on the streets and struck their factories. On the afternoon of 17th June, Soviet tanks appeared; martial law and curfews were imposed. Soviet military courts quickly convicted and executed ten rebel leaders. The parameter estimates for the East German case are remarkably crisp. The only apparent dampening variable is again police injuries. All other factors boost mobilization.

The Russian rebellion of 1905 arose when a St. Petersburg priest, Father Georgii Gapon, sought to address the Tsar on behalf of workers' grievances. Workers had struck local factories for several days in early January (see Table 4.8). Over 100,000

**Table 4.8** Autoregressive analysis of the effect of repression on protest

Case	Variable	Estimate	t-value	p(t)
Poland after martial law, 12/13/1981	Constant	8756.1	0.489	0.6326
	Arrests	-86.1	0.803	0.4255
	Protest injuries	421.8 <sup>a</sup>	2.27	0.0397
	Protest deaths	46388 <sup>a</sup>	4.919	0.0002
Duration: 19 days R <sup>2</sup> = 0.7; DW = 2.08	Police injuries	-229592 <sup>a</sup>	4.083	0.0011
	Police deaths	6182847 <sup>a</sup>	4.062	0.0012
GDR 1953 Rising 6/12-6/23/1953	Constant	516.86	0.164	0.8755
	Arrests	15.5275 <sup>a</sup>	7.242	0.0004
	Protest injuries	3716.78 <sup>a</sup>	42.042	0.0001
	Police injuries	-9817.04 <sup>a</sup>	3.55	0.0121
Duration: 12 days R <sup>2</sup> = 0.995 DW = 1.758	Police deaths	10962 <sup>a</sup>	3.527	0.0124
	Constant	40634	0.757	0.468
1905 Russia Duration: 16 days R <sup>2</sup> = 0.665 DW (AR2) = 1.3	Arrests	116.25	0.241	0.815
	Protest injuries	-47107	0.852	0.416
	Protest deaths	11254	0.884	0.399
	State force	6.253 <sup>a</sup>	3.212	0.01

<sup>a</sup>Statistically significant

Sources: Poland data from NSF grant (SBR-961229); see <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>; GDR data from Hagen (1992) and Diedrich (1991); Russian data coded from Ascher (1988) and Suhr (1989)

were on strike by 10 June when Gapon and about 75,000 followers marched to the palace. As they approached, the Tsar's troops opened fire, killing 130 and wounding 299. This action became known as Russia's Bloody Sunday and in the days that followed generated immediate protest across the empire. This action's parameter estimates (Yule-Walker second-order autoregressive coefficients) are inconclusive. The only significant independent variable is the size of the state force – and it is positive. What do these results mean?

Table 4.8 is more instructive for what it does not show than for its array of statistical results. I admit freely that it has an important specification problem. The table does not show the protesters' growing disinterest and weariness. Nor does it show the opportunity costs they faced, including substantial lost wages. Suhr (1989, 186–7) cites a petition from Russian factory workers to their plant manager that claims the workers returned to their jobs on 14 January 1905, and that they would like their pay pro-rated to that time. As justification, they claimed that zealots had forced them to strike in the wake of Bloody Sunday's brutality. Loss of income was a serious matter to these workers. In a different case, Arnulf Baring (1997) reports that on 17 June 1953 once the East German government acceded to the workers' principal demand of reducing the production norms, the protesters seemed to have no other greater goal. When the Soviet tanks appeared, they disappeared – back home. But in Poland, fierce opposition to martial law arose immediately. And protest even increased after nine coal miners were shot and killed 3 days later. As deployed riot police stayed in place, Christmas and New Year's beckoned, more

strikes ended, fewer arrests were made and everyone finally decided to adapt. With the dawn of 1982, thousands appeared on the streets with electrical resistors on their lapels. These provided the perfect symbol of resistance and Solidarity; Lech Walesa was after all an electrician. Because strikes, occupations, and demonstrations ended quickly, the resistors were perfect continuing protest symbols too.

If the regime provides no concession and increases its repression, there is little likelihood that active public protest will endure. Lichbach (1995, 118) recognizes the validity of the “successful dissent-breeds-dissent proposition.” However, he doubts its inverse, that is, that unsuccessful dissent does not necessarily lead to more dissent. Trotsky (1959, 106) goes further:

A revolutionary uprising that spreads over a number of days can develop victoriously only in case it ascends step by step, and scores one success after another. A pause in its growth is dangerous; a prolonged marking of time, fatal. But even successes themselves are not enough; the masses must know about them in time, and have time to understand their value.

Trotsky’s view helps to explain stability in rebellions and revolutions: If an insurrection lasts more than 1 day, successes must increase incrementally, or mobilization levels drop dramatically.

The collapse of most rebellions could be explained partially by this idea. Few dissident organizations ever evolve to the level of a complex adaptive system. Those that do are able to provide a consistent stream of effective selective benefits. In protest, to do so implies consistent success, something improbable in most real protests. Perhaps the only modern revolution that seems to contradict Trotsky’s hypothesis is the Iranian revolution of 1979. There, Ayatollah Khomeini invoked the Shia Islamic rule that martyrs must be mourned for 40 days after their deaths. Thus, each early stage of the Iranian revolution was thus separated by at least 40 days after a rebel died at the hands of the state. Yet not only was this mourning period widely accepted by Iranians, but it also allowed better planning and more complete mobilization than could have been possible on a daily basis. The regime was aware of all this, but could not solve the State’s Dilemma (see [Rasler \(1996\)](#)).

#### ***4.3.4 The Duration and Timing of Protest Events***

When do protesters act, and how long do they remain active? Lichbach (1995) notes that lost opportunity is an important concept for mobilization and leisure is one of the most significant. When, then, is the best time to mobilize protesters? Table 4.9 shows on which days of the week dissent occurred. Demonstrations generally need to be planned and mobilized. Leaders want to mobilize in optimum time. As Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show, there is no clear sense of which time is best. In France, Thursday is the favorite day, while in Belgium it is Sunday. In Albania the favorite days are Wednesday and Thursday, probably reflecting enduring Islamic culture after a half-century of harsh communism. Germany is the only country in which Saturday and Sunday are the most popular days for demonstrations; even so, they are widely distributed throughout the week. Anyone who records all German

**Table 4.9** The percentage of demonstrations on each day of the week

Day	Albania	Belgium	France	Germany	UK
Sunday	8.33	20.13	8.48	14.45	22.33
Monday	7.14	19.48	11.01	13.44	9.76
Tuesday	10.71	11.36	16.47	9.71	12.76
Wednesday	23.81	9.42	14.98	10.68	12.57
Thursday	21.43	13.64	18.25	14.24	11.63
Friday	15.48	14.29	13.49	8.9	18.39
Saturday	13.1	11.69	17.31	28.57	25.14

Source: See <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>. Albania (N = 84); Belgium (N = 308); France (N = 2,016) and Germany (N = 2,359); and UK (N = 533); demonstrations range from 1980 through 1995

**Table 4.10** Frequency order of demonstrations on days

Albania	Belgium	France	Germany	UK
Wednesday	Sunday	Thursday	Saturday	Saturday
Thursday	Monday	Saturday	Sunday	Sunday
Friday	Friday	Tuesday	Thursday	Friday
Saturday	Thursday	Friday	Monday	Tuesday
Tuesday	Saturday	Wednesday	Wednesday	Wednesday
Monday	Tuesday	Monday	Tuesday	Thursday
Monday	Wednesday	Sunday	Friday	Monday

demonstrations on the weekend still misses 72%. We find a strong negative correlation ( $r = -0.7$ ) between the Albanian and Belgium data; France and Albania have a positive correlation ( $r = 0.592$ ). There is a strong negative correlation between Belgium and France ( $r = -0.82$ ), and a positive correlation between Germany and the United Kingdom ( $r = 0.482$ ). The UK correlates negatively or weakly with all sample countries. It is clear that countries differ on favored days of protest. Context, religion, and public policy are all important to the population involved.

Timing is important, but we are interested primarily in duration. How long do conflict events last? Data we have collected point to preliminary answers. The overwhelming majority of strikes last from 1 h to 1 day. Longer strikes certainly exist, but they are unusual in the total sample of strikes. Occupations of factories and institutions rarely last longer than 3–5 days, principally because of a lack of access to food and the state's ability to shut down utilities. The 1969 Columbia University student occupation of the administrative building lasted 8 days – long by occupation standards. Hunger strikes are highly variable. True hunger strikes (in which the participants eat nothing and drink only water) become medically dangerous after 10 days. But many hunger strikers cheat; they eat small quantities of food, but they eat. States in turn also cheat: they force feed hunger strikers.

Demonstrations are generally short. Journalists rarely report the time or duration of demonstrations. But coding multiple sources, however, sometimes allowed us to identify time and duration. Reporting bias was not an issue; pinpointing time parameters often was facilitated by a connection with other events on the same day (e.g.,

Catholic mass in Poland) or the need to establish an event chronology. In a sample of 36 duration reports in Poland and Belgium, the mean of all demonstrations is 100 min or 1 h and 40 min; the median is 2 h, and almost all occur in the early afternoon or evening. The four longest demonstrations in the data set all were 3 h, and two of these were in democratic Belgium. Demonstrations confronted by police are even shorter. Their mean is 34 min, but the median is 15 min and the mode is ten. People tend not to linger when confronted with tear gas, water cannon, or police dogs.

#### ***4.3.5 Stability Over Time***

In a multitude of tests in cases of protest and repression, stability (i.e., mathematical equilibrium) was maintained over time (Francisco 2009). Recently using the Roughgarden coevolution model Garrison even found that the Colombian civil war remains in equilibrium (Garrison 2008). Stability was an unexpected finding in protest and repression. After all, these are abnormal events that reflect anything but the usual concept of stability. Yet no one has found a domestic conflict that oscillates or grows steeply and continually. Instead, even highly contentious events reflect spikes over time that rapidly return to zero or near zero. These spikes are included in mathematical tests of stability, and at least until now they have not generated oscillation or instability. Normal mathematical equilibrium and stability (Merkin 2001) are sufficient for all test cases.

#### ***4.3.6 Specification Problems and the Duration of Protest and Repression***

Throughout the coding and cleaning of our data sets, I have found nothing that violates Lichbach's (1995, 1996) collective action theory. This chapter too shows that protesters are rational after considering risk-averse action. Almost all protests, save civil war, are short.

Nonetheless, these are inferences that we make from a macrolevel. Ideally, we should be able to model an individual's decision to strike, demonstrate, occupy, riot, petition, or commit acts of terror. The field of ecology presently faces a similar methodological and level-of-analysis dilemma. It uses macromodels, but takes into account that animals make individual decisions. Ecology has long tested time with differential equation models. Currently it faces the twin obstacles of incorporating space and micro decisions (Tilman 1997). We now have the possibility of creating more knowledge than ecology has. The research program inaugurated by Lichbach (1995, 1996) has a formal, technical foundation (Lichbach 1996). Elsewhere in comparative politics pioneering formal theorists have designed game theoretic models, coded data, and empirically tested the model from their logical inferences (e.g., Laver (1996)).

We now embark on a new era of having sufficient data for almost any sort of mathematical test. As we use these data and code even more, it is useful to consider how, for example, we could apply the Laver–Shepsle approach to protest (Laver 1996). Lichbach's (1996) game theory book has not been used by protest scholars. It is a deep guide to the problem of grappling with the individual decision maker.

This chapter examines the mundane. Although early social conflict pioneers established a profound knowledge base (e.g., Moore (1966) or Tilly (1978)), we know too little about the most basic aspects of protest.

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# Chapter 5

## Terror

*How many crimes are committed simply because their authors could not endure being wrong?*

—Albert Camus, *The Fall*

### 5.1 Introduction

We posit at the outset that terror groups are selfish, violent, and mostly hurt civilians instead of the people they truly oppose. William R. Polk contends that terror is the beginning of insurgency in history (Polk 2007). Terror is even used to disrupt and change electoral outcomes, as we saw in Afghanistan in 2009 (see also Berrebi (2006)). In Chap. 2 we covered clandestine mobilization, that is, the way terror groups mobilize. Chapter 4 examined the spatial needs of terrorists, which it turns out are extremely small. So we focus on rational and utilitarian topics in this chapter: (1) why terror groups form, (2) what these groups need to sustain themselves, and more importantly, (3) can they be eradicated by state forces?

On 20 September 2001, the US President Bush vowed: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated” (Alexander 2002b). Even before the events of 2001, the threat of transnational terror was increasing (Enders 2000). And today the Western world confronts an unprecedented and unknown threat. Al Qaeda’s terror on 11 September 2001 constituted a new phenomenon in terms of scale and coordination of willful murder and destruction. It underscores the fact that terror is essentially a macabre form of theater. Terrorists seek to maximize publicity and to send shudders throughout a population (Juergensmeyer 2000). These events highlight the central problem that this chapter investigates: we do not know how to eradicate a terror group, especially an internationally networked terror group such as Al Qaeda.

From a collective action theory perspective, terror is a challenge. Certainly the theory accounts for formation and mobilization, as well as strategy, but it is difficult to model strategy. From a game theoretic perspective, terror becomes a “guarding-a-territory” game of survival (Friedman 1971). But even this is a stretch, because terrorists have complete information about space, time, and their opponents, but the state generally does not, especially with regard to international terror groups. States generally have only an uncertain idea where, when, or how a terror group might

attack. So it is an uneven game at best. If the state knows that a terror group exists as a threat, it can assign probabilities to airports, large buildings, and so forth, but terrorists know which targets the state is defending. If the state is unaware of a terror group, that group is unimpeded. Game theory is powerless. The cards are stacked in favor of terror.

This chapter explores the reason for terror, its basic requirements, and the principal difficulties of eliminating an international terror group. Almost all previous work has focused on fighting and eliminating a domestic terror group (e.g., [Wilkinson \(2001\)](#)). But the internationally networked structure of Al Qaeda is a new kind of problem. We depart from previous analyses first by looking at the biological literature of extinction and the Allee Effect, that is, the threshold of extinction. Then, to determine whether the biological model relates to terror, we have to explore those things that terror groups need for survival. The published findings on terror indicate that four requirements are paramount: (1) finance; (2) replacement of imprisoned or deceased activists; (3) safe grounds and safe houses; and (4) leadership.

How much funding is necessary for a terror group? Is there a critical mass below which terror groups cannot survive? What about safe grounds and a threshold of popular support? Does it help or hurt a terror group to have a political arm, that is, a political party? Can a terror group continue to function if its leadership is arrested or otherwise removed? How do domestic forces work to eradicate terror groups? Would their actions transfer well for Al Qaeda or a similar international threat? Is the battle won with an agreement to cease fire? We will discuss these questions to assess the probability of totally eradicating a terror group, especially an international organization.

## 5.2 Why Do Terror Groups Form?

To explore these questions at their base, though, it is first helpful to consider the reason terror groups arise. Why does Osama bin Laden not form a political party of fundamental Sunni Islamists and campaign for election in Pakistan, Egypt, or any other Sunni Islamic country with elections? Why is violence necessary? Gandhi did not need it in India, nor did those revolutionary dissidents in Eastern Europe (except in Romania) in 1989. The Provisional IRA has agreed to an indefinite cease fire, as have the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Even the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka abandoned violence for a time for political negotiations before their military defeat in 2009. Could Al Qaeda, and for that matter Hamas, Hizballah (Party of God), or any other continuing terror group, not simply dissolve into a political party that campaigns only for elections? It is, alas, unlikely.

Terrorists form secretive violent groups because the public goods they seek are too radical to mobilize many people for public protest (see [DeNardo \(1985\)](#), [Lichbach \(1995\)](#)). They choose violence as the tactic that best achieves their intermediate quest for power and the final public good. Al Qaeda's public good is a fundamental Sunni Islamic caliphate from Indonesia to Morocco, with Osama

bin Laden as caliph or dictator. The provisional IRA's objective was a socialist united Ireland, and the ETA of course seeks a fully independent and socialist Basque country. These latter two demands are not wholly unreasonable, but the socialist character limits their popularity. Al Qaeda's would be quite unpopular, even with most Sunni Muslims, to say nothing of the Shia Muslims in Iran and Iraq. One wonders why western leaders do not make more of Al Qaeda's public good.

Many contemporary terror groups mimic the Black Panthers by offering social services. One reason is that it is precisely these services that (1) mask the radicalism of their public good and (2) engender good will among the people they say they represent. Palestinians support Hamas because it alone provides for the most needy families. Hizballah grew hugely popular in Lebanon during 2006 after its month-long skirmish with Israel. How? It distributed large sums of money to rebuild bombed houses.

Strategic violence is the alternative to large-scale mobilization for securing political power and attention. Terrorists are the antithesis of representational democracy. In fact, Wilkinson (2001) argues that terror occurs in a liberal democracy only if popular support is withdrawn from government. Terrorists shun elections because they are always a minority (one exception is when terror is used in a dictatorship that precludes mobilization). Democratic society has an interest in dissolving or eliminating terror. But is this feasible?

How did previous terror groups dissolve? Some of them faded away naturally but most anti-terror successes stem from police work and especially intelligence. Informers and undercover police work stopped the Italian Red Brigades (see below in the finance section on costs). In the US, police killed Symbionese Liberation Army leader Donald De Freeze along with five other members, effectively eradicating the organization (Wilkinson 2001). And in Germany, the Red Army Faction's leaders were arrested, convicted, and incarcerated, but then committed suicide while imprisoned. This so disoriented the group, and it disbanded in March 1998 (Wilkinson 2001).

Why do democratic states have difficulty disrupting and dissolving terror groups? To combat a terror group, one must know how they sustain themselves. As noted earlier, terror sustainability requires four disparate resources: (1) financial resources to pay wages and inevitable costs that arise in daily living as well as in action; (2) recruitment of fresh activists over time – not only to replace lost or imprisoned fighters, but to increase membership to the necessary level of action; (3) safe land areas, safe houses, and related popular support; and (4) leadership. Terror groups especially need sufficient funds, safe houses, vehicles, and a safe geographical base. Look, for instance, at the PIRA. If the Provisional IRA leaders had not established headquarters in Dublin as well as bases in the Republic of Ireland, they would have experienced many more challenges in the 30-year period leading up to the 1998 Good Friday agreement.

In biology, we find that parasites must choose hosts and work in specific contexts (Ridley 1993). Terrorists, like biological parasites, seek a safe, clandestine, and nourishing location.

An interesting and confusing ingredient in the formation of terror groups is religion. Most religious doctrine prohibits violence, but many also have certain clauses

that allow war or even murder. Before 1980, the US State Department had no religious terror groups on its roster. By 1998 half the groups on the list were religious (Juergensmeyer 2000).

If we seek to eliminate the threat of terror, then an analogous concept of interest is the biological notion of the Allee effect (Murray 1993). This concept holds that within any population there is a critical threshold below which a species will decrease to zero, or extinction, regardless of the reproduction or replacement rate. It may be that terror groups can continue to function with only one or two operatives. However, it is plausible that modern terror organizations must depend on a larger network and that they are vulnerable to the Allee effect. In biology, the Allee effect results most often from predation (Murray 1993). We can extend this notion to the life of terror groups and consider the state as a predator. It would follow that the state could successfully eliminate unwanted groups, reducing the vital requirements below the critical threshold:  $f(N_t) < N_c$ , where  $N_t$  = the population at time  $t$ , and  $N_c$  are the threshold of continued existence in terms of finance, activist replacement, safe grounds and support, and leadership (Murray 1993; May 2001). Biologists call this the “predation pit.” When a species, or by analogy terror group, falls into this pit, it will dissolve or become extinct. The question raised here is whether such a critical mass threshold exist for an international terror group. If it does, it is probably very low. After all, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols caused a great deal of damage by themselves in their 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building. In this case two individuals with low resources killed 169 and injured even more citizens. Presumably, effective international terror demands a much higher threshold.

Most collapsed terror groups have lost at least one of their four necessary requirements. Arrests of leaders confound resource collection, recruitment, and mobilizing popular support. Mass arrests deplete the active terrorist population, and the few remaining loyalists usually go deep underground and remain quiescent, at least for a short term. Informants not only break up activities and yield arrests; they often expose safe houses. Finally, disrupting the financial network of a terror group makes it more desperate. Most groups turn to robbery. This, in turn, translates into a higher probability of arrest by standard urban police – not intelligence agents. How then can terror groups maintain their resources while under state “predation”? We turn now to an investigation of what such groups require to construct and support their on-going activities.

## 5.3 Necessary Supports of a Terror Group

### 5.3.1 *Financing Terror*

Finance presents a challenge for terror groups. Terror actions require technical skills to, for example, fashion bombs and detonators, but generally not knowledge of finance. Terror actions, unlike business actions, may not lead to monetary profits.

Yet every terror group has an active finance base – in fact, it is usually the best developed sector of the organization. Squerian and Sandler note in their game theoretic analysis of terror and state interaction that sponsorship (additional resources) increases the level of terror, especially when the terror group has strong public support (Siqueira 2006).

Terror groups must hire activist workers to sustain activity. Unlike peace demonstrators and environmental dissidents, terror activists usually cannot work in a factory or office. So, at minimum they need funds for daily living expenses. Most groups find that they must pay activists a “salary” close to the local factory wages for semi-skilled laborers. Without this funding, activists can transfer to another terror group that pays an even higher “salary.” This financial resource requirement can become onerous even in a moderate-sized organization.

Therefore, reducing funds is one reasonably effective method of disrupting or interfering with a terror organization. Given the way terror groups receive their money, however, it is not easy. Most of Al Qaeda’s funds come from extorting Middle East firm’s. The deal is simple: you pay us and we will not bomb you. Arguably more care and thought among leaders of terror goes into finance than into terror actions. State police fighting against terror are often stunned by the financial acumen of terror groups, even though most rank and file members are not well educated.

Terrorists use many methods to secure funds for action and continuation: they set up protection rackets in businesses from accounting to taxis; steal and then market goods such as art and antiques; deal in black market goods, for example, illegal bovine growth drugs, designer jeans and computer games; run black market postal systems; kidnap the wealthy or government workers for ransom; rob banks; launder money using diamonds from African civil wars. They also obtain aid from sympathizers abroad; from supporting states; donations from partisans in their own country; profits from producing and selling drugs, drinking clubs, and bars; tax fraud; intra-organization wire transfers; illegally copying video tapes (PIRA); and legitimate occupations using wages from sleeping terror cells. Consider the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). It bought 37 pubs in Ireland to launder money from bank robberies and bomb-extortion funds (Times of London 9/27/1992). But the principal continuous source of PIRA funding was levies – essentially dues willingly given, although always supplemented by forced extortion (Coogan 1994).

In Spain most of the ETA’s funding stems from the “revolutionary tax,” a levy it imposes on the Basque population that it supposedly represents. Anyone who outright refuses to pay the tax is dispensed with – outright murdered. Similarly, corporations are assessed a revolutionary tax. Those that do not pay are bombed; those that do are spared. The ETA therefore runs an old-fashioned organized-crime protection racket – and it works. Since the ETA is family based, it taxes and punishes locally.<sup>1</sup> As far as financing is concerned it is one of the most difficult types of financing for the state to combat. Terrorists are unlike normal protesters in many ways, but primarily they work on terror – they do not generally have other

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<sup>1</sup> See Spain data at <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>

occupations, unless they represent sleeper cells. Consequently, they need financing and are sometimes willing to be brazen and engage in risky tactics to get it.

Colombia's guerrilla terrorists principally received funds from kidnappings and the protection of export of cocaine. This was a rational implementation of Lichbach's contract solution group (Lichbach 1995). Because the cocaine cartels needed protection, they paid the guerrillas and thus helped to sustain them. Since this yielded insufficient funds, the guerrillas also acted on their own. Some 3,000 kidnappings per year generated \$700 million. Six percent of those kidnap victims were murdered; the rest paid willingly to save their lives, and in doing so sustained terror, as did cocaine addicts in North America and Europe. Terrorists protect the drug cartels and are handsomely rewarded. By the early 1990s, Colombian drug cartels' profits were estimated to be between \$2 and \$5 billion per year (Clawson 1998). This alone explains why the Colombian state had little success until recently against dual sovereignty of guerrilla terrorists (Garrison 2002).

Two billion dollars or more per year will finance a great deal of terror. But the Colombian situation is an exception; it has developed a unique combination of drug cartels and guerrilla terrorists. When Osama bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan after being forced out of Sudan, he suggested growing poppies and exporting heroin to the West (Robinson 2002). The justification: providing drugs to the decadent West will generate money for the Taliban and al Qaeda. So-called "narcoterror" is now a deep and growing problem for the West. The challenge is to stop citizens' addiction and thereby avoid filling terrorists' coffers.

How much money is necessary to support a more standard terror group? In 2000, there were estimated to be around 700 Al Qaeda operatives (Scheiber 2003). The Provisional IRA also had approximately 600 activists, 500–600 of whom were usually on "active service" (Toolis (1995); *Reuters* 9/12/1991). Consider the expense of 700 operatives each one of whom earns an average of \$2,000 per month: \$1,400,000 per month or \$16,800,000 per year. In developing countries the labor costs are half of those in industrialized countries, wages average about \$1,000 per month, but even that is a great continuous expense. And these are merely labor costs. They do not include the cost of rents, weapons, travel, vehicles, sleeper cells, and ammunition.

The Provisional IRA was enormously successful in fund raising. It brought in an estimated \$30–\$50 million per year, \$1 million alone from Irish Americans (The Herald (Glasgow) 7/12/1992). Even when the PIRA agreed to a cease-fire in 1994 and 1995, and the shootings and bombings were at their lowest levels, the armed robbery activity of both Republican and Loyalist groups stayed at standard levels: 50 shootings, only 2 bombings, but 421 armed robberies (see Taylor in Alexander (2002a)).

Also accomplished fundraisers were the LTTE (the Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers). They received at least \$3,700,000 per month from Tamils in foreign countries. These donors were willing to fund the terrorists, but of course, were unwilling to be fighters (Lakshman Kadirgamar, address to the 55th session of the UN General Assembly, 2000). Patrons like this are critically important in many terror-based situations. A steady infusion of funds remained an LTTE priority even when they were forced to conscript Tamil teenagers as fighters.

A state can contact banks, financial organizations, and of course its own tax department in an attempt to ferret out a group's funds. Beginning in 1988, for example, the UK's Inland Revenue department began sharing its Provisional IRA/Sinn Fein accounts with the police. But it is far more difficult to interrupt the flow of financial resources across national boundaries. The UK eventually discovered that most of the PIRA's funds were in the Republic of Ireland. In the United States, officials have been especially frustrated with Saudi Arabia's involvement with terror funds and contributions to Al Qaeda. Even with global cooperation, it is extremely difficult to trace an international terror group's finance transactions. In fact, bin Laden himself was tapped to rescue Islamic terror finance after the Bank of Credit and Commerce International collapsed in 1991 (Robinson 2002). In response, he created an alternative financial arrangement called the "Brotherhood Group," a worldwide network of 134 wealthy Arab businessmen who were positively disposed toward funding Islamic terror activities.

State patronage of terror groups generates the most difficult problems in finding and eliminating funds. Historically, states such as Afghanistan, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria have either financed foreign terror groups or have at least tolerated training facilities and safe houses for them within their borders. When Sudan allowed bin Laden to operate independently, he developed a construction firm (Al-Hijra for Construction and Development Ltd.) similar to his father's that secured large state contracts. Once the firm was functioning, bin Laden used \$50 million of his personal funds to create the Al-Shamal Islamic Bank, which has supported many terror operations. It exceeds even Saudi Arabia's ability to find or control those monies (Robinson 2002). Such an arrangement demonstrates the reason that foreign state patronage creates the greatest single obstacle to choking off the financial support of terrorists. Several of these states also keep suspected terrorists beyond the reach of international police and law enforcement. Bin Laden spread much of his personal money widely around the world in banks in the early 1990s. But since he was setting the agenda, he knew when to move the money as well as how to conceal its true ownership (Robinson 2002).

Al Qaeda is often presented as a new type of international terror organization, but it functions much like its predecessors. Al Qaeda receives funds from Middle East corporations through a protection agreement, that is, if the firms provide funds to Al Qaeda, they will not be bombed or otherwise hurt. This scheme is extortion, but it works much like insurance and it is a mafia tactic many terror groups use. Al Qaeda also gained large sums of money from the heroin trade. Most of those funds dried up with the initial defeat of the Taliban in 2003. Nonetheless, there is much continuing support from Islamic centers in Western Europe and North America. A mosque in Brooklyn, New York, is alleged to have sent \$20 million to Osama bin Laden (*New York Times*, March 5, 2003). In an ironic turnabout in state sponsorship of terror, even rogue states sometimes bow to foreign terror groups. In 2000, Libya publicly paid millions of dollars in ransom to the Abu Sayyaf Group for release of tourists kidnapped in Malaysia (Alexander 2002b). Siqueira and Sandler argue



that “if governments do not pay heed to how terrorism may be financed by outside agents, the counterterrorism efforts . . . may be insufficient to maintain terrorism within tolerable limits” (Siqueira 2006).

### 5.3.2 *Recruitment*

By mid-1993, 600 Provisional IRA members were imprisoned in Northern Ireland, Great Britain, Ireland, and on the European continent. Even during capture and imprisonment, however, the PIRA never suffered a significant loss of active-service membership. As fighters died or went to jail, new recruits always appeared. This constant recruitment and replacement is vital to a terror group’s ability to sustain itself over time; continued recruitment assumes a fresh source of activists. The PIRA, forced to recruit clandestinely, sent observers to funerals of PIRA fighters. There the recruiters noted which teenagers were mourning, contacted them secretly, and then invited them into the group (Toolis 1995). Other members, wandering into Sinn Fin offices, were brought into back rooms for interviews and investigation.

Al Qaeda’s original main source of activists was the group of Islamic troops who fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet Union’s occupation (Robinson 2002). A large but aging supply of Afghanistan fighters exists. Now Al Qaeda’s franchise network of other terror groups in Asia and the Middle East is comprised mostly of those recruited since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Using the Italian Red Brigades to provide a standard mean of terrorists’ ages, only 6% of all activists are age 39 and over (Weinberg 1987). Al Qaeda needs younger activists, and, in fact, it has them. Many of the madrasas (Islamic schools) in Pakistan and other Islamic countries yield a steady supply of young recruits in addition to those whose enlistment is in response to US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Israel, the United States, Spain, and Russia all have difficulties with terror. And all maintain a “war on terror.” Yet terror remains a problem for each state. Why? Government actions and missteps inflamed already tense situations. Ariel Sharon’s government in Israel became a symbol of repression for Palestinians, most of whom regarded Sharon as the “butcher of Beirut.” He had earned that name for his leadership role during the Christian Falangist incident, a massacre of 3,000 women and children in West Beirut on 16 September 1982. Sharon’s harsh repression of Palestinians accelerated terror. Now that he is out power, terror has subsided. Suicide bombing (“self-chosen martyrdom” in Hamas terms) is a desperate act. It is the only effective tactic against repression. No standard weapons could dent the Israeli Defense Force, and Hamas had no ability to attack frontally. However, they had in abundance a deeply seeded will to inflict damage and they still have terrorists lined up for suicide missions.

In some cases state actions and pressure after unintended bonuses to insurgents. The US provides one such example. Its invasion of Iraq in 2003 angered even moderate Muslims. And the US demanded that Pakistan scour tribal areas to flush out and arrest terrorists, and it delivered a gift to Al Qaeda mobilization efforts. This

was a bonus that could not have accomplished on its own, and it jubilantly watched as terrorist cells emerged in heretofore stable, middle class Pakistani neighborhoods and the US demand for Pakistan to venture into tribal areas to arrest terrorists was a greater bonus to Al Qaeda mobilization than it could have accomplished alone (Wall Street Journal 8/19/2004). Mobilization was also high in the Iraq conflict, where Muslims from other Middle East countries converged and attempted to kill US soldiers. Cooperation among terror groups advanced after the active battle against the Hussein Iraqi regime formally ended. The original US goal here was simply to shut down terror using military personnel. But this invasion is a good example of the kind of miscalculation that actually leads to greater terror mobilization. It is analogous to the role events play in standard mobilization (Chap. 2).

In January 2004, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the late and most-hunted terrorist leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, wrote a letter to Osama bin Laden, in which he pleaded for replacement fighters from Al Qaeda. The letter carried a worried tone: "Our backs are exposed and our movements compromised. Eyes are everywhere. The enemy is before us and the sea is behind us" (New York Times 10/10/2004). This was a surprise to the US and UK governments. Terror, including suicide bombing abounded in Iraq at that time, and his note of desperation seemed strange. Perhaps he was prescient. Not long after begging for financial aid and additional fighters, Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in a precision bombing in 2006.

In another area of instability, Russia faced troubles of its own. Chechen opposition began with non-terror tactics in a campaign for independence. Russia responded with a heavy hand. Harsh repression and even occupation left few choices for Chechens beyond terror citizen support for dissidents increased. At the outset Chechen terror was independent and focused more on Che Guevara tactics than on Islam. However, continued repression led to cooperation with Islamic terror groups. The Chechen terror leader, Shamil Basayev, took an Arab name, declared himself the leader of the Gardens for the Righteous Islamic Brigade of Martyrs and then shouted "God is great!" in Arabic (Wall Street Journal 9/16/2004). This was certainly not what Russia sought, but nonetheless what it wrought.

When faced with continuing terror, the US and Russia have few choices available. The US chooses bombing cities that its army does not control. Russia also uses blunt instruments against the Chechen people, as does Israel against its Arab citizens and neighbors. Strategic bombing surveys tell us that bombing principally kills civilians and does not seriously affect the ability of counter-conflict forces. These tactics more likely accelerate rather than dampen terror. State action against terror groups can easily backfire, and it can accelerate replacement of terrorists, energize mobilization, and strengthen citizens' support, or tolerance of terrorist methods. Long-term experience with terror has allowed Western Europe to avoid most of these problems, and yet few terror groups there have dissolved.

In Spain (and France), ETA incarceration numbers are an order of magnitude higher than the PIRA's in the United Kingdom: from 1977 through 1999 almost 8,300 ETA suspects were arrested and imprisoned (see Brotns and Espsito in [Alexander \(2002a\)](#)). Even that number of arrests and incarcerations did not prevent the ETA from recruiting and continuing violence. The Basque ETA is now family

based; it is similar in structure to the mafia's and it is as difficult as ever for Spain to quash. Yet the conservative Spanish justice minister's goal was precisely that: eradicate ETA. In a bold move of defiance Al Qaeda bombed the Madrid subway system in March 2004. A backlash against apparently ineffective national security saw the justice minister and his party voted out of office. They left an ETA that not only survived, but was strong enough to continue its struggle.

### ***5.3.3 Safe Areas, Safe Houses, and Protective Support***

Terror groups need space to operate, train, plan, act – and simply live. But their training and maintenance work sometimes alerts frightened neighbors. Consequently, terror leaders seek safe areas, safe houses, and a population that provides protective support. For the Provisional IRA, the Republic of Ireland was a nearly perfect base from which to operate in Ulster. Not only was it contiguous, but it also enjoyed tacit support from the population and the Irish government, which basically ignored the fact that the PIRA army council lived in Dublin. To preserve this sanctuary, the PIRA maintained a strict, organization-wide policy never to fight Ireland's police or military. If a confrontation should occur, PIRA members were to lay down their weapons and surrender (Irish Times 5/1/1993).

As a safe haven, Cuba is a popular choice; it has provided refuge to many Basque ETA activists as well as terrorists sought by the United States. Iran, the former-Iraq regime, and even Sudan actively protected and provided safe grounds for a variety of Palestinian terrorists. Sudan shelters Egyptian terrorists as well. Although Syria no longer protects the Kurdish PKK, it too harbors Palestinian groups (Alexander 2001).

Al Qaeda finally lost its high level of popular and governmental support in Sudan. It then rallied in its familiar Afghanistan, where it enjoyed complete Taliban backing. Now limited to the Pakistan tribal border region, Al Qaeda survives in a fundamentalist Sunni Islam area where the domestic government finds action difficult. Now, however, it is clear that Al Qaeda cells have safe havens, usually without government knowledge and support, in a number of Islamic countries. Cooperative Spanish and French policing efforts erased much of the ETA's bases in France. But ETA still found protection in the Basque area and in the full Pyrenees mountain area (see the Spain and France files at <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>).

Terror groups need support of the population. When that is strong, terror is accelerated (Siqueira 2006). When Al Qaeda acted on 11th September 2001, international television showed Palestinians dancing in celebration. Certainly not all Muslims supported the 9/11/2001 terrorists, but a sufficient number did to ensure continued support for Al Qaeda. Population support is one of the most compelling factors that inhibits eradication of terror groups. In the 1993 local Ulster elections, Sinn Fin, the political arm of the PIRA, won almost 78,000 first-preference votes in STV (single-transferable voting law) voting – in fact, the most first-preference votes of any party in Ulster. At nearly the same time, 40%

of Belfast Telegraph's readers supported the killing of six Roman Catholics in Castlerock and Belfast by the Ulster Freedom Fighters the previous week (Reuters 4/1/1993 (see <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>)). Similarly, until 2000 approximately 40% of the Basques in Spain supported ETA violence.

### 5.3.4 Leadership

Both Tilly (1978) and Lichbach (1995 1996) stress on the importance of leadership in mobilization. Enders and Sandler (1993) emphasize the roll of leaders in devising and implementing adaptive tactics. Research shows that a charismatic leader initiated and mobilized almost all non-nationalist terror groups. Even so, it took Subcommander Marcos and his intellectual friends from Mexico City 10 years to mobilize the Chiapas Mayan Indians to commit sabotage on 1 January 1994 (Ross 1995). Abimael Guzmán left his post as professor of philosophy at the University of Peru in Lima to start *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path). Strong leadership is critical to mobilizing and sustaining terror action. When the top leader is arrested, sometimes all activity ceases. But is this always the case? Are there instances of leadership transfer?

We have a detailed record of many terror leaders who have been captured, arrested, or killed. For example, Michael McKevitt, head of the Real IRA, a radical offshoot of the PIRA, was arrested in 2001 by Irish authorities (Alexander 2001); the group remains, but has not engaged in much activity since McKevitt's arrest. We can cite other instances of changing leadership across the globe. Turkish authorities captured Adbullah Ocelan, leader of PKK, in Kenya in February 1999. Afterward, Ocelan announced a peace initiative from prison; he demanded a cease-fire and removal of PKK fighters from Turkish territory. When Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna) died in Iraq in 2002, his organization apparently became defunct. In the Philippines in late 1998, police killed Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, head of Abu Sayyaf Group. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, simply replaced him as head and the group continued. An arrest in Tokyo in May 1995 brought Shoko Asahara, leader of Japan's Aum Shinrikyo (who committed the sarin gas attack in Tokyo's subway), to jail. The group has not been active since then. And in the West Bank, Binyamin Kahane, son of assassinated Meir Kahane, leader of Kahane Chai (Kach) was himself killed in December 2000 (Alexander 2002b). Kach was banned in Israel and has disbanded.

The arrest of Abimael Guzmán brought 5,000 middle- and lower-class Peruvians out into the street shouting "Here. There. We have no more fear!" (Reuters 9/20/1992). They, at least, inferred that if Guzmán were arrested, peace would be restored. Is this true? For several cases we have pre- and post-arrest data. Imprisonment of a charismatic leader certainly in these cases (the Kurdish PKK and Peru's Shining Path) cuts substantially the level of terror activity, but does not eliminate it. In the Shining Path case, one should note that police reinforced their efforts and arrested dozens more Shining Path suspects in the days after Guzmán's arrest (Reuters, 16 September 1992). This of course reduced the possibility of additional terror.

**Table 5.1** Pre- and post-arrest/death terror leader activity

Group	Leader	Event	Pre-event frequency	Post-event frequency
PKK	Abdullah Ocelan	Arrest, 2/15/1999	3,001	45
Sendero Luminoso	Abimael Guzmán	Arrest, 9/20/1992	254	161
Al-Zulfikar	Murtaza Bhutto	Killed, 9/20/1992	6	0
ETA	Whole leadership	Arrest, 3/29/1992	48	163
JVP	Three leaders	Killed, 11/1989	151	0

Note: SL pre- and post-events are regime deaths and injuries added; PKK are event counts; Al-Zulfikar events are from February 1981 to July 1984; ETA 1992, 1 year before and after events from <http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/index.html>; JVP is People's Liberation Front, Sri Lanka. Sources: Alexander (2002b), Garrison (2002), Anwar (1997), Europa Yearbook 1995

The ETA's leader, Mikel Albizu Iriate, was arrested along with his girlfriend and 15 other ETA members on 3 October 2004. After this the entire ETA leadership was arrested in 1992. The group regenerated easily and swiftly. As Table 5.1 shows, there was more terror after the arrests of ETA leaders than before. While no one knows for certain what will happen to ETA in the long term, the arrested leaders released a letter encouraging other ETA members to lay down their arms (Financial Times 11/3/2004). And that is precisely what ETA has done.

Letters from prison, including Ocelan's noted earlier, always raise suspicion of state coercion. But they might actually represent a changed perspective. In the last decade the ETA has received a pummeling in Basque public opinion polls (Funes 1998). It was upstaged embarrassingly by Al-Qaeda in March 2004. Since then recruitment has apparently become more difficult. In the fall of 2004, the imprisoned ETA leaders issued a open letter calling for ETA to abandon violence. Once again, we do not know if that forced this plea. We do know that ETA is again active.

Reducing the scale of terror actions by arresting or killing leaders, reducing finance, eliminating safe grounds, and prohibiting recruitment and replacement of fighters is difficult for any state. International terror raises the challenge. What methods can states employ against such terror groups? Is eradication of an international terror group such as Al Qaeda possible?

## 5.4 Methods of Combating a Terror Group

Government's principal interest is in the complete elimination of a terror group. Clearly, the four requirements mentioned above are necessary, but what happens if one or two are eliminated? Can we then assume that a terror group collapses? Can a group survive a period of no funding, no new members, no safe space, or no leadership? We have some knowledge about the effects of these lost requirements. Leadership loss causes definite problems, as we noted earlier, but replacement is not impossible, as we saw in Chap. 2. In fact, sometimes a new leader can provide more powerful or creative direction (Lichbach 1995, 1996; Francisco 2004). But most of

the anti-terror forces assume that arrest or death of a leader will cause a greater negative impact than any other tactic. This is the reason states often arrest protest leaders in advance of mobilization anniversaries.

It is more difficult to assess a group's store of resources, but Overgaard (1994) provides assistance; he writes that the scale of a terrorist attack is an indication of its resources. Overgaard's (1994) argument is game theoretic. Government rarely has complete information about terror groups and their intentions; therefore, we can assume that the scale of attack is related to its resources. Since the 11th September attacks represented the largest scale in the history of terror, Al Qaeda must have had a very great reservoir. Additional military action reduced that, but by how much?

The problem is complicated by Al Qaeda's "franchise" structure. This group's central leadership reaches out to enterprising Islamic terror groups and decides whether to assist in the planning and financing of their activities. Essentially, Al Qaeda acts as a patron or "investor." Since the smaller groups compete for Al Qaeda's funds, it is difficult to determine who has what level of resources. Subsequent attacks have hit Kuwait, Kenya, Thailand, a night club in Indonesia, in which mostly young Australians were killed, Iraq and Madrid subway bombings that killed 200 and injured 1,400. More recently, a Pakistani group attacked the Indian city of Mumbai and home-grown, but Al Qaeda sympathizing Islamic terrorists, bombed the London subway. The scale of these attacks is far more traditional – more reminiscent of ETA or the Provisional IRA rather than Al Qaeda. All these actions occurred far from North America and all the targets were "soft" – that is, in countries without extensive anti-terror institutions, except in Spain. From a cursory look, then, it appears that state activities such as arrests, killings, removal of finance, and narrowing of safe bases have diminished Al Qaeda's resources. There is always a chance, of course, that Al Qaeda might again unleash large-scale action in the United States; it maintains sleeper cells that might awaken at any time to devise and execute a plan of terror. The role and impact each of the anti-terror methods has on reducing resources and debilitating terror groups bears further investigation.

#### ***5.4.1 Arrests, Killings, and Forces Against Terror***

One of the main tactics governments use against terror groups is a special force that works principally against terror. Similar to a SWAT police team, it has an intelligence division. Examples abound, but among the best known are the MI-5, MI-6, and SAS in the UK, the German GSG-9 (*Grenzschutzgruppe 9*, Border Protection Group 9), the French RAID, and the Italian UCIGOS (*Ufficio Central per le Investigazione e le Operazioni Speciali*, Central Bureau of Investigation and Special Operations). These forces also can access the international EUROPOL and INTERPOL data on terror (Wilkinson 2001).

In a game-theoretic analysis, Jacobson and Kaplan find that absent infiltration, hitting a terror group directly, is most effective. It also minimizes civilian casualties, although it might accelerate support and mobilization for the terror group later on (Jacobson 2007).

It is especially useful for anti-terror groups to offer prisoners incentives to become informants about their group, its leaders, safe areas, finance work, and other elements. Italy's UCIOS maintained special funds used to encourage prisoners to talk. Then UCIOS offered protection, new identities, and resettlement in foreign countries with income for the rest of their lives. The Red Brigades could not match these offers: they could pay only a steel-worker's wage to their activists. As a direct consequence, Italy was able to capture and bring to trial almost all of the important Red Brigades' leaders.

Wolf (1989) criticizes legislatures for curtailing intelligence agencies' surveillance of terror groups. Arguably, though, this is not the most important limitation of a state's power. Far more crucial is the fact that terror groups have complete information, while the state has incomplete information. Terrorists know where state forces are, when the state forces are outside and vulnerable, where its weakest links are, and when members can be active without detection and arrest. Consequently, terrorists can plan easily when, where, and how to act. Without a high degree of intelligence the state remains ignorant; in fact, it cannot know any of these things unless it is able to penetrate the terror group.

There is another anti-terror technique that works if one can find and arrest terrorists. The Sri Lankan army provided an example of this when it reversed roles and used terror to fight terror. LTTE (Tamil Tigers), if suspects in bombing incident, were brought before an army intelligence officer who warned them that they would be killed if they refused to cooperate. When no one answered the officer's questions, he took his gun and shot one man in the head. This prompted quick responses from the others. Similarly, terror suspects who refuse to talk face a terror of their own. Interrogation officers place a few drops of gasoline into a plastic bag, put the bag over prisoners' heads, and clinch it tightly around their necks; they soon break. These are harsh techniques, but they can be justified in a political context by the brutality of terror tactics. The problem, of course, is that few insurgents are caught and arrested when they are actively engaged in terror (see Hoffman in Howard (2003)).

Al Qaeda is a newer type of terror organization. Like its predecessors, it uses cells, but as noted earlier, Al Qaeda also uses networking and franchises. Networking allows it to occupy a far larger spatial territory than previous groups. Both networking and franchising also lead to ties with other terror groups. Two models of Al Qaeda franchising exist: (1) a widely spread fast-food type of operation working in different areas. The center evaluates the goal and ability to achieve success and then makes a decision about investing the money necessary to accomplish the goal; and (2) a baseball-type of minor league, teaching and training to build major league members of Al Qaeda itself. Completely eradicating such a group is highly improbable, largely because of the reach of its many tentacles and the scope of its operations.

Al Qaeda is different too in its ultimate objective to defeat – or at least humiliate – the United States and Israel to achieve its public good. Most terror groups are domestic in orientation. Many Palestinian groups focused upon Israel, and many leftist groups oppose the US, but none attempts to “defeat” either country. In addition, Al Qaeda claims that God guides its actions and its victories come only from Allah.

No other international terror group has relied on religion much as Al Qaeda as to unite other groups. It draws from fundamentalist Wahhabi Sunni Islam to encourage the cooperation of other Islamic groups in furthering its public good. The group's view of Islam does not go unchallenged. When Osama bin Laden appeared on television in the fall of 2004, he admitted ordering the 9/11 atrocities. He had previously denied responsibility, so in effect, he admitted lying. Moderate clerics have long objected to Al Qaeda's killing, but their voices have been drowned by US, UK, and Israeli actions in the Middle East. One of the more disturbing facts revealed about Al Qaeda is that it intensively plans terror but then waits to act, sometimes for years.

Terror operations are very similar to organized crime. Both use clandestine mobilization (Bauer 1939), secret funding, and violence. Most organized crime is domestic, however. National campaigns to eradicate mafia organizations in the US have been largely successful, yet less so in Italy itself. There was certainly an international dimension of the mob up to the middle of the twentieth century. Nonetheless, as organized crime became more domestic, it was easier to find and finally to root out. The problem with organizations like al Qaeda is that they are far more international in nature than any previous organized crime unit has been (including the South American cocaine cartels). Moreover, the international dimension extends to parts of the globe to which the US and the West generally has little legal access.

Perhaps eradication could be accomplished step by step, group by group, always working to get to the core of the international body. If this incremental approach is used, it could be employed domestically in every country. How has it worked so far? Sometimes those around the terror group's safe sanctuary are most valuable for intelligence and subsequent arrests. For example, the Peruvian *Sendero Luminoso* conscripted peasants and forced them to surrender their crops to the terror group. But many peasants escaped and went to priests with their tales; the priests in turn told the state. When police interviewed the peasants, the officers were able to gather a large amount of intelligence that the state itself could never collect. In this way the state was able to defeat the central group of the Shining Path (Bolívar in Alexander (2002b)). Italians and Germans worked with incarcerated members of terror groups, as did the UK with "supergrass," informative imprisoned PIRAs and their paramilitary opponents, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Ulster Freedom Fighters.

However, once again, these were principally domestic groups. International problems are far more complicated for a single state to control. In 1989, the Dutch government feared a large influx of Provisional IRA fighters entering the Netherlands with the intent to kill British soldiers in neighboring Belgium and Germany. The BVD (Dutch security agency) hired a 22-year-old Irish cleaning woman and sent her to Northern Ireland to infiltrate the PIRA and send intelligence back to Amsterdam (Guardian 9/18/1993). Public disclosure of this case embarrassed the Dutch, Irish, and British governments, but it emphasizes the intricacies involved in fighting effectively against international terror.

In all cases, however, it is again important to underscore the problems associated with effecting the arrest of a terror activist. Terrorists have complete information. They know when they will strike, where they will strike, and how they will strike.



States have incomplete information. Only with particularly skillful intelligence can the police or military find terrorists and arrest them. Since a clandestine cell structure of terror almost always exists, any rank-and-file member is literally unable to provide much information about the leadership or the organization as a whole, even when under torture or drugs. Therefore, it is impossible to gather complete information that will lead to the elimination of terror. Even Tom Ridge, first secretary of the incipient Homeland Security department, admitted that an open and democratic country is vulnerable to terror. Given this reality, many of a group's activists can continue engaging in terror activities. Does the biologists' "predation pit" exist with respect to terror?

#### 5.4.2 *"Critical Mass" in the Context of Terror*

Is there a threshold of terror group membership that determines life or death of the organization? Or is there a "predation pit" for terror groups? Units with extremely low numbers have been able to act: The *Primea Linea* (First Line) terror group in Italy had only 5–6 members; Baader-Meinhoff terror group in Germany boasted 23–33; and the RAF (Rote Armee Faktion, Red Army Faction) in Germany claimed 10–20 (MacDonald 1991). These groups were active, and this makes sense in terms of Marwell and Oliver's findings. As long as the activists are high resource contributors, small terror groups can continue its actions with vigor (Marwell 1993). Marwell and Oliver note that "when a 'social' solution to the collective dilemma is required, what matters is the pattern of relations among the possible contributors in the critical mass, not the relations among everyone in the . . . group" (Marwell (1993), 52). Who contributes resources in the context of terror? Anyone with leadership or terror skills, for example, sniper shooting, bomb creation, electronic triggering and remote control, stealing cars and vans, as well as driving and concealment. When arrests or deaths occur in a terror group, it matters highly who disappears from the rank and file as much as it does in the leadership hierarchy.

The Provisional IRA maintained a special class of membership called "Lilly Whites." These were teenagers and new members largely from the UK who met the no-arrest record requirement. In this sense they could move about Northern Ireland or even England and Scotland without suspicion. Generally they were taught only how to bomb. If they were arrested, they represented minimal resource sacrifices. In addition, the "Lilly Whites" usually received light sentences for first offenses, unless their bombing killed children and/or many citizens. The creation of this new membership category preserved the most critical resources of the PIRA – its leadership, sharpshooters, bomb makers, and quartermasters.

In another case, the Japanese Red Army suffered several leadership arrests. When its membership declined to six, it dissolved the JRA. Whether any of those six members will defect and create another terror group is one of the great risks of arrests and cease fire, as noted below. In Pakistan, Murtaza Bhutto, brother of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, led the *Al-Zulfikar* terror group. Murtaza Bhutto and six of

his security guards and assistant leaders were shot dead by police in Karachi in September 1996 (Anwar 1997). Thereafter, the group never acted again. It is possible, however, that its remaining members simply melted away to join the Taliban in the tribal areas and neighboring Afghanistan.

### 5.4.3 *Political Arms, Negotiations, Cease-Fires, and Splintering*

The PIRA in Northern Ireland suspended action for 2 weeks before any election; then afterward began to bomb and assassinate again with impunity. “The gloves are off and now that the elections are over, the IRA will resume its bombing campaign in Britain,” one PIRA leader told *Reuters* (5/20/1993).

Is it better or worse for a government if a terror group has a political arm? The Spanish government would answer emphatically “better.” Accordingly, the conservative government proscribed *Herri Batasuna* (People’s Unity), the political arm of the ETA. The British government would be more ambivalent, however. As noted earlier, in 1993 Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Provisional IRA, won the most first preferences of parties in local councils of Northern Ireland. It was much easier when negotiations begin simply to talk to Gerry Adams than to try to locate the PIRA army council. Allied parties such as these demonstrate the amount of popular support a terror group commands in each election. If support is high, states can more easily employ incremental reforms to reduce support rather than engage in wholesale arrest of terrorists. But political arms risk public backlash when the terror group kills children or innocent women.

Frequently governments are content with a cease-fire agreement and negotiated accessions from a terror group. The nature of terror makes this transition time one of the most dangerous for both citizens and the state. By definition, almost all terrorists are zealots and hardliners – why else would they choose terror? Even if terror groups commence negotiations and agree to cease fire, the most radical members frequently separate and create a new terror group. This splintering or unraveling has occurred often in Northern Ireland with mostly tragic results (see Johnson (1996)). The Official IRA consists of older terrorists who were active intermittently from the 1920s through the 1960s. In contrast, the Provisional IRA represents younger radicals who split away from the official branch. Finally, the Real IRA is a group of approximately 150 activists who separated from the PIRA. In 1998, the Provisional IRA came to terms and concluded the Good Friday agreement. But the “Real IRA” broke away and committed the Omagh shopping center bombing that killed 29 and injured 220. Yet another Republican unraveled terror force is the Continuity Irish Republican Army; this group split away from the PIRA and Sinn Fein; it has fewer than 50 members and recruits actively among disillusioned PIRA members.

Many other instances of splintering are abound. The Basque terror group that haunts the Spanish government was not the original ETA, but rather its more violent and radical offshoot, the ETA-M or ETA-Militar. Similarly, Abu Nidal’s terrorists separated from the main body of the PLO and fought against it more fiercely than it

did against Israel. Another splintering occurred when the Loyalist Volunteer Force unraveled from the Ulster Volunteer Force when hardliners who opposed settlements with Ireland or Sinn Fein broke free. Other such groups are the Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders, each a cadre of 20 or fewer members that split from the UFF and UVF after these Loyalist organizations agreed to cease fire in 1998 and 1999 (Alexander 2002b).

The overall roster of similar defecting militant groups is long and not confined to Europe. One example of a splintering, non-European terror group is the Alex Boncayao Brigade, breakaways from the Philippines's New People's Army. Its objective: assassinations of politicians, military and security figures in urban areas. A second prominent non-European organization is the now defunct Japanese Red Army. The JRA unraveled from the Japanese Communist League – Red Army Faction in 1970, became international in focus and began operating in Asia and the Middle East.

Palestinian groups have many competing patrons. They too have splintered far beyond the Abu Nidal group. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) was a hardline offshoot of George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine group. PFLP-GC defected after complaining that Habash's group haggled too much over politics and did not engage in enough fighting.

The point of these examples is that agreements and cease fires do not necessarily end terror. In fact, they can and do accelerate terror actions by an even more radical faction. Few governments seem to realize that they must be even more vigilant after a cease fire or negotiation agreement is concluded than they were before the opportunity for talks even began.

#### ***5.4.4 Loss of Popular Support***

The only people who have a reasonable chance of reducing terror voluntarily are those that the terror group supposedly "represents" (Funes 1998). Funes (1998) explored the efforts of Basque peace movements to banish ETA's violence and to embrace nonviolence. She shows that mobilization of Basque groups that were against violence encouraged strong attitudinal shifts against ETA methods. It took tremendous effort to break through what Elizabeth Noelle Neumann (1984) calls the "spiral of silence." Most Basques assumed that their compatriots supported any action the ETA chose to use. But mobilization and surveying by pacifist groups helped people to recognize that the majority of Basques actually opposed ETA's violence and forced a cease-fire; however, that ended in June 2007.

Other pacifist organizations could certainly engage in similar work. After all, the most probable victims of terror are citizens, not state forces, and not leaders. On 28 August 1992, the conflict in Northern Ireland reached its 3,000th death. Of that number, 2,082 were civilian or paramilitary, that is, Provisional IRA, Irish Population Liberation Organization, Irish National Liberation Army, Real IRA, UFF,

Ulster Defense Association, and UVF. In addition there were 436 UK soldiers, 197 members of the Ulster Defense Regiment, 188 members of the police (Royal Ulster Constabulary, RUC), and 97 members of the RUC reserve (Evening Standard 8/28/1992). Terror is most dangerous for normal citizens.

Terror also costs citizens and the state enormous sums of money. Northern Ireland terror totaled \$655 million per year in the late 1980s (Reuters 5/23/1990). In 1992-1993, PIRA terror bombing of London buildings caused major problems for UK insurance firms. Firms refused to write insurance policies covering buildings against PIRA terror incidents. In the end, the state had to step in as final re-insurer (Evening Standard (London) 12/10/1992). In New York, the attack on the World Trade Center costs \$50 billion in insurance (New York Times 9/1/2002). Insurers were commonly European companies; Lloyd's represented the UK and other re-insurers were mostly German. After 11 September 2001, companies balked at providing terror insurance to all. As economists predict, in this situation only the government will insure. Today the federal US government picks up 90% of terror insurance liability, up to \$100 billion per event (New York Times 11/27/2002). In other words, taxpayers are now liable for terror attacks on private buildings. The cost of terror thus shifts inexorably to citizens: injuries, deaths, and now finances as well.

#### ***5.4.5 Extinct and Zombie Terror Organizations***

Many terror groups have dissolved resolutely. Others seem to end, but then at least the name of the group arises with new leaders and new activists. The German Red Army Faction is extinct. The Italian Red Brigades seem to be, but occasionally new individuals resurrect the group. However, they are neither as active nor as destructive as they were in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Red Brigades' decline stemmed from a lack of funds. They began to rob Italian banks, were caught, and under pressure they began to inform on comrades, thus severely reducing membership (MacDonald 1991). France's Direct Action and Belgium's Fighting Communist Cells were more easily eradicated by domestic police (Wilkinson 2001). The Weather Underground in the United States is certainly extinct, but recurring terror in Italy, Palestine, and Northern Ireland cause one to consider the reality of complete eradication.

#### ***5.4.6 The Possibility of Eliminating an International Terror Organization***

This chapter examines a number of factors associated with terror groups and state-sponsored work against them. It suggests that in the campaign against terror several inferences may be important. First, it is crucial that states cooperate to eliminate the four requirements of any domestic or international terror organization. As much

as possible, states should reduce finance, safe havens, and recruitment, and should try to arrest leaders. Yet in fighting terrorists, states can inadvertently accelerate terror funding, the development of safe areas, and especially membership in that (1) state actions accelerate mobilization and (2) violent splinter groups may form. States should demand that political parties associated with terrorists reveal in detail (mainly through elections) how much support they receive from the terror group.

The two most vexing problems associated with fighting against terror are critical mass and radical splintering. Certainly terror can be carried out by a small number of activists, even if the scale of actions is low. However, there seems to be no sort of “predation pit” for terror organizations related to the biological concept of extinction. After all, one or two people acting in secrecy can inflict enormous damage. The second more serious concern is the splintering that often accompanies compromise, cease fire, and negotiation. There is absolutely no guarantee that still more radical groups will not arise after these agreements. The problem of an extinct group resurfacing is less serious. However, it too underscores the major challenges terror represents to a state, and the even greater difficulties that international terror groups represent to the world.

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## Chapter 6

# Evidence for Collective Action Theory

*There were marches, of course, a lot of women and some men. But they were smaller than you would have thought. And when it was known that the police, or the army, or whoever they were, would open fire as soon as any of the marches even started, the marches stopped.*

—Margaret Atwood, *The Handmaid's Tale*

### 6.1 Introduction

We have surveyed an array of action from leadership and mobilization, adaptation and symbolic protest, space and time, as well as terror. If nothing else emerges from these previous chapters, it is difficult to argue that protesters and their state opponents do not think. Clearly they are risk-averse, given the information at hand. They make choices that are optimal from their point of view. This is the value of collective action theory in contrast to structural theory. Collective action theory assumes that individuals think and it expects them to act in ways that generate benefits. Structural theory assumes that macrovariables are sufficient to bring masses out onto the street. One advantage of our conflict perspective is that collective action theory does embrace risk. It is one thing to argue the necessity of selective incentives. It is quite another to get Jane out into the street when there is a possibility of arrest or injury. Because people hope to avoid arrest (in most instances), injury, or death, collective action theory is easier to test in the context of protest and repression.

Mark Lichbach has done more than any other theorist to bring collective action theory into the realm of risk (Lichbach 1995, 1996). We have seen how dissident entrepreneurs have used his four solution groups (market, community, contract, and hierarchy) to mobilize protesters. Although most others have not taken the steps necessary to render their theories complete, Lichbach's theory is logically complete. So it is to Lichbach whom we have most often turned in this volume. Other collective action theorists are less relevant, either because of the assumption of no risk in the pioneer Mancur Olson (1965), or because one assumes that mobilization has no limit (DeNardo 1985). Ronald Wintrobe's subject was dictatorship; therefore, his work is relegated almost exclusively to the state side in an autocratic regime (Wintrobe 1998).

## 6.2 Evaluation

How has collective action theory performed in the world of risk? Generally well, but let us delve more deeply into the claims of the theory to investigate how empirical evidence matches theory-based conclusions. Once again, Lichbach makes this easier than do other theorists.

### 6.2.1 *Wintrobe*

Because Wintrobe's context is necessarily narrow, we start with dictatorship, which can be broken down into four different types (Wintrobe 1998): (1) tinpots: low repression, high loyalty; (2) tyrants: high repression, low loyalty; (3) totalitarians: high repression, high loyalty; (4) timocrats: low repression, high loyalty (Wintrobe 1998, 337). Wintrobe determined that the equilibrium of power is determined by three factors (Wintrobe 1998):

1. Dictator's preferences for power and consumption.
2. The capacity to turn money into power as determined by the regime's political organization.
3. Effects of the dictator's power on the economy as determined by the workings of central economic institutions.

A dictator's ability to stay in power then depends on the ability to control the economy and to translate money into power. Clearly, dictators must moderate their consumption to generate credible protest-deterrent power. Some do this better than others. The military dictators of Burma were very efficient. They moved the capital away from population centers and possibly dangerous mobilization. When a typhoon greatly hit Burma's population, military leaders took credit of the international aid flowing into the country. Mancur Olson claimed that the main reason communism failed in Europe was that all the countries were broke (Olson 2000). The military–communist dictatorship in Poland failed during the 1980s. Strikes beset the country and the regime was forced to ask its principal dissident to help get workers back on the job. The most dangerous time for dictators is when mobilization against the regime is easiest. That occurs mostly during economic downturns and in the wake of large-scale natural disasters. It was an economic recession in Hungary that prompted its institutional reform away from communism. And, as Olson pointed out, the same can be said for all the countries in east central Europe as well as for the Soviet Union.

### 6.2.2 *DeNardo*

DeNardo focuses on power in numbers, that is, the larger the mobilization, the larger the effect on the state (DeNardo 1985). He makes two critical points:



(1) nondemands must yield to demands of dissent; (2) only demands that differ from the state can mobilize. DeNardo is especially useful with the problem of a steadfast strategy of dissent (DeNardo 1985, 42–43). A stubborn or steadfast strategy is always best, he contends (DeNardo 1985, 63). Like Olson, DeNardo contends that ideology is unimportant with respect to mobilization (DeNardo 1985, 45). Nonetheless, the core of DeNardo's theory is spatial in the one-dimensional policy sense. So, dissidents do care about the spatial location of state policy. It is just that their actions are designed primarily to move that policy closer to their own viewpoint. The closer the state moves to the median voter, or perhaps more accurately, the median dissident position, the fewer the people mobilized. It makes sense, then, for a challenged state to make concessions, but doing so also signals weakness. As we have noted in other chapters, the most troublesome aspect of DeNardo's theory is that he does not consider a limit to mobilization except in the spatial sense. We know from Lichbach (1995) and from empirical evidence that the real limit of mobilization is 5% of the population, local or national as the context may be. This is the reason most revolutions result in worse governments than the previous one. One percent or fewer people can join together to overthrow a government, but they are not likely to represent the median voter's preferences. The median voter has a low probability of protesting. Thus the French, Russian, Iranian, Chinese, Mexican, and arguably many more revolutions actually made life worse for most citizens than did the previous regime. Even DeNardo recognizes the possible disadvantages of mass mobilization: "The fact that there is power in numbers does not always imply that more mobilization is better than less" (DeNardo 1985, 66–67).

The optimal peaceful strategy for DeNardo is the most radical of the successful, minimalist strategies (DeNardo 1985, 79). In other words, ask the state for the least acceptable change in policy that translates to meaningful results. The more people one has, the greater the chance that public good can be achieved. DeNardo states that people should act if mobilization goes to infinity and repression goes to zero (DeNardo 1985, 195). Since neither of these conditions normally obtains, however, he suggests of acting if the personal utility of action is greater than the disutility of repression. One suspects that most of the mobilization is carried out by leaders or dissident entrepreneurs. In addition, usually leaders deploy at least a bit of deception when formulating public goods, for example, claiming a greater mobilization than that exists, and De Nardo claims that sincere strategies bring small rewards (see DeNardo 1985, 51).

Dissidents who cannot mobilize a large group can still pursue public goods by shifting tactics to violence (DeNardo 1985, 189). But a violent strategy is perilous in the sense that it makes mobilization much more difficult and narrow and invites the state to retaliate with violence. In this situation, dissidents are advised to consider the size of the core mobilization to help them decide whether to act: is there safety in numbers? If so, then deciding to act is personal. From the state's perspective, dissidents using extreme violence allow the state to respond with lesser violence because core mobilization always shrinks in these circumstances (DeNardo 1985, 196). If the state escalates violence against dissent, then backlash occurs and mobilization rises higher than that might have been expected. While extremely violent

repression reduces mobilization, DeNardo's point works empirically. Backlash is certainly a common phenomenon (see Francisco 1996, 2004). This was visible in Iran in the summer of 2009 as protest against perceived electoral fraud escalated after police shot and killed dissidents in the street.

### 6.2.3 Lichbach

Mark Lichbach is our central theorist in large measure because he extended collective action theory to the realm of risk and formed it as a logically complete body of thought (Lichbach 1995, 1996). Lichbach acknowledges the 5% rule, that is, only 5% of any population can be mobilized and confirms the futility of mobilizing beyond that number. We have cited his four mobilization solution groups many times in this volume. Beyond solutions, Lichbach asks researchers to investigate the ways politics enter a conflict: "How did competing interests try to shape their contexts, structures, and institutions?" (Lichbach 1995, 293). He further urges that one consider the unintended consequences of mobilization, especially the pathologies that result from group success. As groups succeed, activists attempt to become salaried workers and they try to develop a bureaucratic structure. Over time, successful associations become oligarchical in the sense that the leaders gather in most of the benefits formed (Lichbach 1995, 295).

Lichbach takes us from initial mobilization to either defeat by the state or other dissidents or the pathology of success. Can we find evidence of pathology in the cases we have considered? Indeed: (1) Poland's Solidarity grew from workers in one shipyard to about 20 million citizens in a remarkably short time. The union was banned after the imposition of martial law, and finally in 1989 and 1990, it captured the government from the military-communist regime. Within a few years, however, it was awkward, unpopular, and no longer in control. (2) Long-standing support charities in the United States show pathologies. For example, the Red Cross long ago solved its problem of funding by assessing annual dues and cultivating local community support. Nonetheless, it provides much less help than the Salvation Army because it has been bureaucratized. Regional leaders claim high salaries and benefits; consequently, fewer funds and resources are available for the local community. (3) The Bolshevik *coup de e'tat* in 1917 led to civil war and the imposition of a "dictatorship of the proletariat;" this was in fact a dictatorship of party leaders.

## 6.3 Theory in the Light of Empirical Evidence

At this point we turn to an evaluation of our theorists and their theories in light of the evidence we have raised in this volume. We chose our chapter topics to test the implications of collective action theory most directly. Space and time may appear to seem significant aspects of protest and repression, but it is important to examine

them within the framework of collective action theory. Terror seems too a strange topic to investigate, but it challenges collective action theory at its margins. We now move from chapter to chapter to evaluate the evidence and theory.

### ***6.3.1 Leadership and Mobilization***

Leadership plays an overwhelming role in mobilization. All our theorists agree on this point. But can we say the same for expectations about the nature of leaders? We showed that leaders are more educated and from a higher social stratum than their followers. Even if we consider leaders beyond that section of Chap. 2, we reach at a similar conclusion. The Bolshevik leaders certainly were better educated than the rank and file. Leon Trotsky even studied mathematics at the university. We also demonstrated that events can impede or augment mobilization, and that clever dissident entrepreneurs can turn events into a mobilization vehicle.

It is also clear that resources are a critical component of mobilization success and that leaders know how to secure necessary skills and money for their groups. Sometimes this is as simple as recruiting a patron whose wishes are aligned with those of the movement. Patrons see dissident groups as their action teams (see [Lichbach 1995](#)). Leaders know where to find military veterans who are skilled with weapons. Recently, dissident entrepreneurs have become interested in computer programmers as more mobilization migrates to the Internet.

The form of macro-government also matters. This is less a concern of our formal theorists than of other comparative theorists, such as George Tsebelis (2002). As Chap. 2 shows, the more veto players in a political system, the less extra-parliamentary mobilization occurs. When citizens have the ability to contact a member of government meaningfully, then fewer people are likely to be interested in street protest. The evidence of the number of protest events in various types of political systems is an indirect verification of this conjecture.

If leaders are necessary for almost all cases of mobilization, it does not follow that they are omniscient. Often they have limited and incomplete information. From a collective action theory perspective, the best they can do is mobilize on the basis of their limited information. This is often disadvantageous for the group, but unavoidable given the circumstances. Leaders also compete with one another. For this reason, Lichbach's contract set of solutions (especially the tit-for-tat and mutual exchange solutions) are almost certainly the least used group. And leaders are replaceable. When a leader falls in conflict, from active repression or simple arrest, others rise to accept responsibility for the group.

Perhaps the most direct verification of collective action theory is the fact that about 10% of all people mobilized are employees or are paid for their dissident acts. We suspect that this number may be conservative, given that much dissent historically has been in labor-management disputes. Mark Lichbach noted that using community solutions to the rebel's dilemma precluded the need for pecuniary incentives ([Lichbach 1995](#)). This is a helpful insight, but for a sizable percentage of mobilization, it is unnecessary because protesters are employees.

### ***6.3.2 Tactical Adaptation and Symbolic Protest***

We showed in the chapter on adaptation and the use of symbols that protesters certainly think. That alone should show that structural theories are incomplete and that collective action theory is valid. We grappled with measurement and definitional difficulties in the chapter, but demonstrated conclusively that dissidents are largely and creatively risk averse. Tactical adaptation is generally more important in autocratic and repressive regimes where dissidents enjoy much less freedom of action. Symbolic protest shows how a public good might matter to potential recruits. This type of protest is widespread, but again it is more important in dictatorial settings.

Adaptation occurs in democratic states as well, but it is used mostly to generate media coverage and general attention. Mass mobilization is difficult to achieve with a standard street demonstration. Greenpeace understood this implicitly. They maintained a camp to teach activists the skills they needed to work with media and how to generate television coverage. One tends to see more audacious protests in democratic countries, precisely because they become meaningful only if they are publicized. It is rational to shed clothes, to wear animal costumes, and to wear inappropriate clothing to make a political point. Often the combination of tactical adaptation and symbolic protest is most effective in the sense that it is most likely to draw publicity. For the most part, then, adaptation and symbolic protest tend to be amusing and yet effective. States learn and adapt as well. However, when both the dissidents and the state adapt, danger lurks. If the ratio of capabilities between the two sides remains at approximately one, then coevolution develops as does the real danger of escalation to a civil war. This is a good example of how adaptation can degenerate to great harm.

### ***6.3.3 Dimensions of Space and Time***

We focused on space and time because each must be deliberately chosen. Collective action theory assumes that individuals think, and so space and time must be considered. We showed that dissidents chose space on the basis of their tactics; for example rioters loot is well known, but that they are extremely careful about jurisdictional lines is less observed. Dissident entrepreneurs organize marches in democratic states, but shun them in autocratic, repressive states where such actions are too dangerous. We also showed how carefully spaces are selected to minimize the potential of repression. Leaders often choose to reverse traffic engineering queuing models and establish obstacles to block police. Generally mobilizing at least 10,000 will occupy enough space to accomplish these goals: that many dissidents can easily spill out of most urban squares and block the side streets leading to the public place. There is also good evidence of tacit site selection, such as those suggested by Schelling (1960). We presented evidence that once repression appears, dissidents head for a covert site. Sometimes this simply means going home, especially if the mobilization level is high. One of the hallmarks of the 1989 Velvet revolution in

Czechoslovakia is that high school and university students simply stayed home. The regime faced the famous mathematical traveling salesman problem ( $\frac{N!}{2}$ ). Once  $N$  (the number of dissident places) rises to just 50 sites, the number of possible routes climbs to  $1.5207 \times 10^{64}$ . Dissidents also force police, militias, and armies to take a taxicab route rather than a Euclidean metric, resulting in a longer, more time consuming travel.

Chapter 4 also focused on time. Most protest events last for a short time. The activities of normal, daily life compete fiercely with protest actions. As we pointed out, most rebellions and revolutions last only for days, unless of course the conflict develops into a civil war. Riots last longer in the US than in the Europe, simply because Europeans repress them and the US police do not. Only when there are no goods left to loot does the US riots usually terminate. People in different countries chose different days and times to dissent. Religion plays a role here, wherein mostly Muslim Albania, for example, protesting often on Wednesday and Thursday, while Germans and the British active on Saturday and Sunday. Perhaps the most telling observation from our data, however, is that the most popular protest hour is lunchtime on Monday through Friday! Once again, people are unwilling to spend their free time on political action.

#### **6.3.4 Terror**

Terror may seem an odd theme for collective action, but (1) terrorists must mobilize and (2) must have a public good. Terrorists, because of the covert nature of their actions, use clandestine mobilization. Generally organized in a cell-based structure, they plan actions against their opponents (usually a state) with complete information, while states almost always possess incomplete information. Terror groups form because their public goods are too radical for conventional mobilization. For example, Al Qaeda's desire for an Islamic caliphate extending from Indonesia to Morocco with Osama bin Laden as caliph would not be popular in most places from Indonesia to Morocco. To mobilize in a clandestine fashion, terror groups have special requirements that normal dissident groups do not face: (1) revenue to pay fighters, (2) replacement of dead fighters, (3) safe grounds to train and safe houses for dwellings, and (4) leadership. Of these four, normal groups need only leadership. So terror places an extra burden on the collective action problem. Much of Chap. 5 dealt with the challenges of combating and ending a terror group. Because terror leaders have complete information, because all groups, even terror groups unravel, and because even extinct terror groups resurrect themselves, this is a significant obstacle. Today even one person can commit terror rather easily. The US Unabomber lived undetected for years. Thus, the world remains a dangerous place where dissent can arise violently and for reasons most people would not expect. It is heartening to learn that supposed supporters of terror groups can protest against the group and obtain a cease-fire, as happened with the ETA in the Basque land. Unfortunately, as long as terrorists maintain extreme views, even this kind of dissent against terror cannot prevent violence forever.

## 6.4 Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence

If nothing else is apparent in this volume, we show that protesters think. Thus, structural theories of dissident must consider this fact, and collective action theory already assumes it. In examining leadership and mobilization, tactical adaptation and symbolic protest, space and time, as well as terror, it is apparent that nothing interferes with collective action theory. We refer not to collective action theory of interest groups, but to collective action theory in the context of personal risk. While DeNardo's theory works spatially, the order of magnitude problem does not. For that dimension, Lichbach's rebel's dilemma theory is best; it recognizes that at least 95% of every population is Olson's group: they do not act. Those that do fall in line with Lichbach's theory and solution groups quite closely. Sometimes empirical observation opens up new avenues of awareness that can broaden a theory. But Lichbach's rebel's dilemma theory is based on purely empirical observation. With few exceptions there is not much to add. We have been able to show how violence develops from nonviolent action, how space is an important albeit inert actor in dissent, how time must be considered to mobilize most effectively, and that terror has such a radical public good that it must use a special form of collective action theory, clandestine mobilization.

We hope we have provided sufficient evidence that collective action theory operating under risk is valid. Olson's collective action theory, without personal risk, has long been heralded as a theory of rational behavior. It is important for structural theorists to recognize that dissidents think independently and therefore cannot be mobilized by a set of external variables. There should be some recognition of this fact in structural mobilization theory. This might even entail an attempt to integrate the two levels, clearly a daunting challenge.

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# Index

## A

Abbott, Robert, 42  
    *Chicago Defender*, 42  
Adams, Gerry, 14, 15, 99  
Adaptation, 7, 8, 32, 33, 37–54, 58, 59, 64, 70,  
    74, 105, 110, 112  
Afghanistan, 29, 74, 83, 88–90, 92, 99  
African National Congress, 15  
Albania, 78, 79, 111  
Alinsky, Saul, 14  
Allee effect, 84, 86  
Al-Zulfikar, 94, 98  
Anderson, Jon Lee, 38, 41, 51  
Anderson, Terry, 23, 25, 62, 63  
Argentina, 14, 15, 18, 41  
Ascher, Abraham, 77  
Atwood, Margaret, 105–112  
Avedon, Richard, 48

## B

Baldassare, Mark, 75  
Baring, Arnulf, 77  
Bar-Yam, Yanee, 69  
Bauer, Otto, 22  
Beasley, Jeffrey, 50  
Belgium, 17, 51, 78–80, 97, 101  
Bennett, P.G., 58  
Berk, Richard A., 29, 75  
Bernstein, Iver, 74, 75  
Bijlsma, R., 39  
Black Panthers, 14, 15, 27, 85  
Blalock, Hubert M., 72  
Bloody Sunday, Derry, 17, 26, 61  
Bloody Sunday, St. Petersburg (1905), 33, 76,  
    77  
Blotto game, 65  
Bolivia, 27, 51  
Bosnia, 45

Sarajevo, siege of, 45  
Boyne, Battle of, 17  
Brinton, C., 6  
Bulgaria, 6, 72  
Bush, George W., 17

## C

Camus, Albert, 83–102  
Canetti, Elias, 69  
Capeci, Dominic J., 58, 60, 75  
Castro, Fidel, 14, 15, 38  
Caulfield, Max, 59  
Chicago, 14, 21, 29, 42, 48, 57, 60, 63  
    Democratic convention, 1968, 14, 57, 63  
    race riot, 21, 60  
    Seven, 14  
China, 61, 107  
    Rape of Nanjing, 40  
    Tiananmen Square massacre, 40, 64  
Civil war, 8, 13, 21, 29–32, 37, 45, 51–53, 61,  
    71–74, 80, 87, 108, 110, 111  
Cleaver, Eldridge, 14  
Coevolution, 13, 21, 29, 30, 37, 51–53, 74, 80,  
    110  
Collective action research program (CARP), 1,  
    6–8, 37, 57  
Collective action theory, 1–8, 11, 13, 16, 37,  
    57, 80, 83, 105–112  
Collins, Michael, 14  
Columbia, 29, 51, 52, 65, 74, 80, 88  
Cox, Gary W., 3, 5, 46  
Cyprus or Cypriots, 17  
Czechoslovakia, 31, 42, 60, 61, 72, 111  
    ABC Theater, 46  
    Charter 77, 31, 42  
    Prague Spring, 42  
    velvet revolution, 46, 110

**D**

- Danner, Mark, 45, 65  
 Davenport, Christian, 3, 18, 19, 72  
 Democracy, 18, 32, 47, 52, 85  
 DeNardo, James, 3–5, 7, 11, 13, 18, 22, 24, 28,  
 32, 46, 58, 84, 105–108, 112  
 Denmark  
   Christiana, 51  
   Copenhagen, 51  
 Detroit, 60  
 Dictatorship, 4, 7, 20–22, 32, 41, 72–74, 85,  
 105, 106, 108  
   timocrats, 106  
   tinpots, 106  
   totalitarians, 106  
   tyrants, 106  
 Diedrich, Torsten, 77  
 Duration. *See* Time

**E**

- El Salvador, 29, 45, 51, 52  
   El Mozote massacre, 45  
   Radio Venceremos, 45  
 Enders, Walter, 38, 59, 83, 93  
 Enelow, James, 58  
 Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, 51  
 Epstein, Barbara, 25, 49, 51, 70  
 Ettinger, Elzbieta, 15, 16, 41

**F**

- Feldman, Allen, 59  
 Fisera, Vladimir, 40  
 Foran, John, 58  
 Frame, Gary, 39  
 France, 19, 21, 27, 30, 40, 73, 78, 79, 91, 92,  
 101  
   events of May 1968, 40, 62  
   farmers, 24, 49, 50  
   Paris commune, 23  
   Sorbonne, 62  
 Francisco, Ronald, 1, 3, 11, 25, 32, 37, 38, 45,  
 51, 57, 72, 80, 83, 94, 105, 108  
 Frank, Steven A., 40  
 Free riders, 1

**G**

- Gamson, William A., 63  
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 14, 15, 25, 26, 33  
 Gapon, Father, 25, 26, 33, 76, 77  
 Garrison, Steven, 29, 31, 52, 74, 80, 88, 94  
 Gazis, Denos C., 62

- Georgia, Tbilisi, 41  
 German Democratic Republic, 49  
   1953 rising, 77  
 Germany, 19, 22, 38, 49–51, 59, 78, 79, 85, 97,  
 98  
 Greece, 17  
 Green, Donald, 3  
 Greenpeace, 17, 18, 49, 50, 110  
 Grossman, James R., 42  
 Guerrilla war, 38, 51, 72  
 Guevara, Ernesto Che, 14, 15, 31, 38, 41, 51,  
 91  
 Gurr, Ted Robert, 7, 12, 58, 65  
 Guzmn, Abimael, 76, 93

**H**

- Hagen, Manfred, 77  
 Hamas, 27, 84, 85, 90  
 Handy, Jim, 58  
 Hardin, Russell, 25, 64, 71  
 Havel, Vaclav, 46  
 Helsinki human rights agreement, 42  
 Herri Batasuna, 99  
 Heyman, Therese Thau, 48  
 Hizballah, 84, 85  
 Holiday, Billie, 48  
 Holland, John H., 39  
 Horne, Alistair, 69  
 Hunger strike, 17, 25, 47, 79

**I**

- Iceland, 6  
 Indonesia, 84, 95, 111  
 Iran, 25, 31, 71, 85, 89, 92, 108  
 Iraq, 27, 30, 85, 89–93, 95  
 Ireland, 6, 14, 17, 18, 26, 30, 38, 59, 61, 85,  
 87, 89, 90, 92, 97–101  
   Bachelor's Walk, 61  
   Dublin, 14, 59, 85, 92  
   1916 rising, 59  
 Israel, 27, 65, 85, 90, 91, 93, 96, 100

**J**

- Jackman, Robert, 25  
 Japan, 40, 93  
 Jasper, James, 37, 40  
 Joyce, James, 37–54



**K**

Kauffman, Stuart, 39, 66  
 Keithly, June, 21  
 Kenya, 93, 95  
 Khawaja, Marwan, 71  
 Kimmel, Michael S., 58  
 King, Dr. Martin Luther, Jr., 14, 15, 29  
 Koning, Hans, 23, 63, 73  
 Korea, South, 19  
 Kornweibel, Theodore, Jr., 42  
 Kosovo, 46  
 Krause, Eugene F., 66  
 Kriseova, Eda, 42, 46  
 Kuwait, 95

**L**

Lakatos, Imre, 5, 8  
 Landau, Saul, 64, 65  
 Lave, Charles H., 40  
 Laver, Michael, 3, 80, 81  
 Leaders, competing, 13, 21, 27, 32  
 Lenin, Vladimir, 13, 16, 23–25, 29, 44, 52  
 Lewis, Flora, 48, 65  
     Lichbach, Mark I. solution sets, 4,  
     11, 17  
 Licklider, Roy A., 52, 74  
 Liebknecht, Karl, 14, 15  
 Livermore Action Group, Communist  
     Dupes, 51  
 Luce, R. Duncan, 65  
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 14–16, 41

**M**

Mandela, Nelson, 14, 41, 47  
 March, James G., 76  
 Marcos, Subcommander, 14, 15, 93  
 Margolick, David, 48  
 Mason, T. David, 73, 74  
 McNeal, Robert H., 41  
 Media attention, 37, 47  
 Merkin, David R., 80  
 Mexico  
     Chiapas rebellion, 93  
     revolution, 73  
 Mobilization  
     clandestine, 13, 22, 23, 38, 41, 83, 97, 111,  
     270  
     coordination power, 13, 21  
     mass, 8, 11, 13, 21, 23, 24, 107, 110  
 Moore, Barrington, Jr., 6, 7, 81  
 Myers, Daniel J., 53

**N**

Naipul, V.S., 57  
 National Advisory Committee on Civil  
     Disorders, 74  
 Newton, Huey, 14  
 Nidal, Abu, 31, 93, 100  
 Northern Ireland, 14, 17, 26, 38, 59, 61, 90,  
     97–101

**O**

Ocelan, Abdullah, 93, 94  
 Oliver, Pamela, 17, 20, 29, 51, 53, 98  
 Ollenhauer, Erich, 22  
 Olson, Mancur, 1, 2, 11, 13, 18, 23, 30, 47,  
     105–107  
 Olzak, Susan, 71

**P**

Palestine  
     Palestine–Israeli conflict, 71  
 Palfrey, Thomas, 5  
 Pathology of mobilization, 12, 27  
 Patrons, 12, 20, 27, 71, 88, 100, 109  
 Pipes, Richard, 16, 29, 52  
 Poland  
     map, 67  
     Orange Alternative, 44  
     Radio Solidarity, 43, 44  
     Solidarity, 46, 64  
     Warsaw, 23, 41–44, 46, 61, 64  
 Popper, Karl, 5  
 Predation pit, 98, 102  
 Public good, 1, 6, 8, 15, 17–20, 23, 27, 28, 32,  
     38, 40, 42, 47, 48, 51, 53, 56, 84,  
     85, 96, 97, 107, 110–112  
 Pullman porters, 42

**R**

Ramet, Sabrina, 42  
 Rasler, Karen, 3, 65, 67, 71, 78  
 Red Cross, 16, 108  
 Red Queen. *See* Coevolution  
 Resolute strategy, 4  
 Resources, 2, 8, 12, 19–21, 23, 26, 28–30, 32,  
     41, 51, 53, 59, 60, 65, 72, 85–87,  
     89, 95, 98, 108, 109  
 Riker, William H., 3  
 Riots, 13, 17, 23, 29, 32, 43, 60, 71–74, 100,  
     111  
 Risk, 1–4, 6, 11, 15, 18, 20, 33, 37, 45, 53, 60,  
     61, 63, 70, 80, 88, 98, 99, 105, 106,  
     108, 110, 112

Romania, 6, 72, 84, 93  
 Rosenblatt, Roger, 52  
 Roughgarden, Jonathon, 29, 52  
 Russia, 16, 21, 23, 25, 26, 33, 39, 41, 60, 61,  
 75–77, 90, 91, 107

## S

Sandler, Todd, 38, 59, 87, 89, 93  
 Sands, Bobby, 17, 23, 25  
 Schelling, Thomas, 63, 64, 110  
 Schumacher, Kurt, 22  
 Scott, James C., 30, 45, 46, 69  
 Seale, Bobby, 14, 18  
 Self-organized criticality, 72  
 Sendaro Luminoso. *See* Shining path  
 Serbs or Serbian militias, 45, 46  
 Shapiro, Ian, 3  
 Shaw, Randy, 38  
 Shepsle, Kenneth A., 3, 81  
 Shining Path, 31, 59, 76, 93, 97  
 Sierra Leone, 51  
 Sinn Fein, 14, 15, 89, 99, 100  
 Skocpol, Theda, 7, 40, 58  
 Slone, Michelle, 47  
 Snyder, David, 2, 3  
 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 41  
 Soros, George, 31, 42  
 Soule, Sarah, 18  
 South Africa, Robben Island, 39  
 Space  
   Euclidean, 8, 67  
   taxicab, 8, 66, 67, 111  
 Spain  
   ETA, 27, 87, 91–95, 99, 100  
   Puerto del sol, 47  
 Spartakus, 14, 15  
 Sri Lanka, 30, 84, 88, 94, 96  
 Staddon, J.E.R., 39, 40  
 Stalin, Joseph, 16, 23, 41, 44, 52  
 Suhr, Gerald D., 26, 76, 77  
 Sylvestrova, Marta, 46  
 Symbionese Liberation Army, 85

## T

Tamil Tigers, 30, 84, 8896  
 Tarrow, Sidney, 40

Technology, 40, 41, 48  
 Terror  
   formation, 8, 14, 66, 83, 85, 95–98, 105,  
   109, 111  
   requirements, 27, 84, 86, 94, 101  
   unraveling, 99  
 Thailand, 95  
 Thatcher, Margaret, 18  
 Tilly, Charles, 7, 12, 20, 26, 40, 51, 57, 58, 81,  
 93  
 Time, 3–8, 16, 19–21, 23, 28, 30, 31, 33, 38,  
 39, 42–46, 48, 52, 53, 57, 58, 61,  
 62, 64–66, 69–75, 77–81, 83–87,  
 89–92, 94, 95, 99, 101, 105, 106,  
 108–112  
 Trofimov, Yaroslav, 46  
 Trotsky, Leon, 13, 16, 23, 58, 78, 109  
 Tsebelis, George, 20, 109  
 Turner, Nat, 42

## U

Ukraine, Orange revolution, 46  
 United Kingdom, 19, 20, 25, 30, 79, 91  
 United States, 14, 16–18, 26, 29–31, 47,  
 51, 63, 89, 90, 92, 95, 96,  
 102, 108  
 USSR, Noverkassk, 24

## W

Walesa, Lech, 43, 49, 76, 78  
 Warsaw Pact, 42  
 Wilson, Margaret A., 38  
 Wintrobe, Ronald, 3–5, 22, 41, 105, 106

## Y

Yapp, Nick, 63  
 Yuppies, 15  
 Yugoslavia, 46

## Z

Zuckerman, Alan, 39  
 Zwergman, Gilda, 38