6

EMANATION AND NECESSITY

At the end of a long and interesting article entitled 'La Liberté chez Plotin', Henry comes to the following conclusion about *Ennead* 6.8:[1] 'Si d'autres de ses ouvrages nous apprennent que l'Un engendre nécessairement le monde, nous ne pourrons, au nom de sa doctrine de la liberté divine, le déclarer exempt de panthéisme.' We are asked to accept that the problem of whether the One produced the world out of necessity is not a subject of *Ennead* 6.8. If therefore this doctrine appears elsewhere in the *Enneads*, we must, in Henry's opinion, admit that Plotinus' account of the divine will does not enable him to avoid the tendency to pantheism to which all believers in Providence are prone. In order to test these conclusions it will be necessary to re-examine parts of *Ennead* 6.8 in some detail; but before we can embark on that extremely difficult task it will be advisable to see what Plotinus has to say about emanation in other parts of his works.

Following Trouillard, I have suggested elsewhere[2] that a germ of the Plotinian doctrine of emanation is to be found in Plato's account of Eros and—as is more generally admitted—that this germ is supplemented by Plotinus' turning Plato's moral rule 'Being good means doing good' into a law of the cosmos.[3] The *philosophical* problem with which we are concerned here will be to determine exactly how this good is 'done' and what is the nature of the doer. It will therefore be necessary not only to examine the language Plotinus uses of the actual process of emanation, but also to enquire why the Good is what it is, for if we know why the Good is what it is, we shall also know why it does what it does. We shall not, of course, break Plotinus' own rules by separating the 'existence' of the One from its 'activity'. Rather we shall regard them as identical. Yet since the effect of the One's being what it is is

that the Second Hypostasis comes into being, we shall understand that generation only if we have more understanding of the One itself.

Armstrong has given what is perhaps the best traditional account of the way the emanation process takes place. He describes it as follows:[4] 'Νοῦς proceeds from the One (and Soul from Νοῦς) without in any way affecting its Source. There is no activity on the part of the One, still less any willing or planning or choice (planning and choice are excluded by Plotinus even on a much lower level when he comes to consider the forming and ruling of the material universe by Soul). There is simply a giving-out which leaves the Source unchanged and undiminished. But though this giving-out is necessary, in the sense that it cannot be conceived as not happening or as happening otherwise, it is also entirely spontaneous: there is no room for any sort of binding or constraint, internal or external, in Plotinus' thought about the One.' Now it is clear that there could be no external constraint, for what could there be to constrain the One, but how exactly are we to understand 'no internal constraint'? Armstrong seems to have been attempting part of an explanation when he wrote earlier[5] that 'the production of each lower stage of being from the higher is not the result of any conscious act on the part of the latter, but is a necessary, unconscious reflex of its primary activity of contemplation'.

We have already discussed the question of whether the One is conscious or unconscious, whether it has knowledge or not, and the results of that discussion may be assumed here.[6] We should now examine rather more closely the notion of a 'necessary reflex of contemplation'. The view underlying this would seem to be that the One contemplates, and that, as it were, an automatic by-product of this is the emanation of Νοῦς. The One has no control over such an emanation, indeed cannot help itself, contemplation being what it is. Our question is however: Why is contemplation what it is? And if 'necessary emanation' means 'emanation which could not

be imagined as happening in any other way', then we want to know why it could not happen in any other way. And if the One, as Plotinus so frequently says, is the power behind all things, then why does it make this thing happen in this way? It is clear that all these difficulties which face the traditional interpretation of the process of emanation arise because the commentators have not faced the problem whether the One is fully free in the sense of willing to be what it is, or whether it must be what it is because it could not be anything else.

It is time to turn to the texts themselves—and first of all to those texts which describe the fact of the emanation process without examining the nature of the cause of that process. It is well known that Plato's comparison of the Good to the Sun and his image of the Good as the light of the Intelligible World of Forms are basic sources of the emanation theory. It is also likely enough that Posidonius or other late Stoics supposed that the ruling principle in man (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) is some kind of emanation from the sun. Accordingly Plotinus uses the parallel of the sun and its light, or fire and its heat (and occasionally conversely snow and its coldness) to describe the procession of the Second Hypostasis from the One. At 5.1.6. 28ff. we read of a brightness encircling the Sun—a figure which represents the brightness of the Intelligible World around its source; and in explanation of this Plotinus goes on to say that all Beings, so long as they remain true to themselves, give off a 'necessary' (ἀναγκαίαν) kind of existence which is to their own nature as an image is to its pattern. Heat is such an image of fire and coldness of snow. We should notice here that Plotinus has actually employed the word 'necessary' for this emanation, and in terms of the similes he is using this is appropriate, for fire would hardly be what it is without giving off heat.

There is a very difficult passage in the latter part of Plotinus' short treatise on *Substance or Quality* (2.6.3.14ff.) which may shed further light on the significance of fire and heat. Plotinus seems to be saying that in the Intelligible World

heat has an intrinsic and formal connection with fire which it has with nothing else. In other things, that is, in warm objects, heat is merely a trace, a shadow and an image of its real nature, but in the Form of fire that real nature is not merely a quality but a Form and an activity which is essentially and necessarily associated with fire. It may well be suspected that behind Plotinus' arguments here, as well as in 5.1.6 of which we were treating just now, is a passage at the end of the *Phaedo* which Hackforth renders as follows:[7] 'Do you speak of "hot" and "cold"?' 'I do.' 'Meaning by them the same as "snow" and "fire"?' 'Why no, of course not.' 'That is to say, the hot is different from fire, and the cold from snow.' 'Yes.' 'But I think you would agree that what starts as snow cannot ever, as we were saying just now, admit the hot and still be what it was: still be snow and also hot; on the approach of the hot it will either withdraw or perish.' 'Quite so.' 'Again fire, when the cold approaches it, will either get out of its way or perish; it will never bring itself to admit coldness and still be what it was, still be fire and also cold.' The connection of these passages with Plotinus' view of the 'emanation' of heat from fire and thus ultimately of the hypostases of the intelligible universe each from an higher principle has apparently passed unnoticed. For our present purposes the point is, as Plato would have put it, that fire 'brings up' heat.

But the Form of fire brings it up, for Plotinus, in a way in which nothing else does. There is some kind of 'necessary' connection between the two, and it is that 'necessary' connection which we must bear in mind when we think of the importance and significance of this particular metaphor. Heat emanates from fire because fire is what it is. Our problem once again therefore is seen to be: What is the One that it emanates Νοῦς and Being?

We must now turn our attention to certain parts of 5.4. The subject of this treatise is precisely that appearance of what Plotinus calls 'secondaries' from the unity of the One. The argument in the relevant part of section one is familiar,

though presented in a rather illogical form. Even lifeless objects give out something of themselves, says Plotinus (l. 30). Fire, for example, heats, and snow makes cold and drugs have an effect on other things. All things imitate the source to the extent of their capabilities. How then could it be that the One itself which is perfect could remain enclosed within itself as though it were grudging of itself or were powerless? On the contrary, the One too—and indeed *par excellence*—must be productive.

So far we are on familiar ground, but in the next section an important philosophical interpretation of this metaphorical language is offered. The passage in question, beginning at line 27, runs as follows: 'There is in everything the Act of the essence (ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας) and the Act going out from the essence: the first Act is the thing itself in its realized identity, the second Act is an *inevitably* following outgo from the first, an emanation distinct from the thing itself (ἦν δεῖ παντὶ ἕπεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑτέραν οὖσαν αὐτοῦ). Thus even in fire there is the warmth comported by its essential nature and there is the warmth going instantaneously outward from that characterizing heat by the fact that the fire, remaining unchangeably fire, utters the Act native to its essential reality. So it is in the divine (the One) also: or rather we have there the earlier form of the double act: the divine remains in its own unchanging being, but from its perfection and from the act included in its nature there emanates the secondary or issuing act which attains to that Real Being as second to that which stands above all Being' (trans. MacKenna-Page).

Here then we have the formal account of the process of emanation. In everything that has any kind of Being—the One included—there can be distinguished an act by which, in so far as the thing is good, it is productive and imparts something of itself. Fire is supposed both to possess heat essentially and to impart it to other things: it thus exhibits the two kinds of act. It is to be noticed that in this chapter Plotinus does not warn us about introducing notions of duality into our views

of the One, but because we are not specifically warned of this danger there is no excuse for our overlooking it. We must recognize that no distinction of more than a purely abstract kind must be allowed to enter into the One. The act by which the One is what it is must be allowed to be identical and indistinguishable in fact from the act by which it does what it does. Thus once again our problem of why the One does what it does must reduce itself to the more fundamental problem of why the One is what it is. We can observe in the passages of 5.4 once again that the act deriving *from* the essence, the productive act, is called 'necessary'. We can see how in all other things than the One this is an adequate description, for to the question 'Why is it necessary?', one can always answer 'Because the thing in question is made that way by something above it'. But the One is inferior to nothing and is therefore not subject to extrinsic determination in the way that all other things are. This fact alone should make us recall that the language of emanation is metaphorical and that we cannot fully grasp the One's nature by employing it. There is an infinite gulf between the One and all things across which metaphors can only point vaguely. We should not expect exact descriptions from them—and it is obviously valuable to the student of Plotinus to point out precisely where their weaknesses lie. Here the major difficulty in the language is that Plotinus is trying to explain the action of what is self-caused (the One) by comparing it with what is caused by external factors—namely everything which is not the One.

We have observed already that in 5.4 the act of an essence must normally be distinguished from the act that arises from an essence. *Enneads* 5.3.12 and 1.7.1 will help us to understand the process of emanation from the One further. We learn from 1.7.1 that the One, like the sun, is the centre from which light streams forth. But although the sun is the cause of its own light, and, as we know from many other passages in the *Enneads*, although it is in a sense transcendent, yet it is not to be thought of as wholly cut off from its effects. Indeed its

effects are the mark of its presence. The last lines of 1.7.1 are as follows: 'The sun is everywhere present with its light and is not cut off from it (οὐκ ἀποτέτμηται). And if you try and cut the light off from the sun, you will not be able to, for the light always is related to the sun.' What is this but a suggestion that the act *from* the essence is intrinsically bound to the act *of* the essence? What it is that causes the act *from* the essence (light or the intelligible world, as the case may be) is none other than the act *of* the essence.

The comparable passage of 5.3.12, which is perhaps even more illuminating, runs as follows (from line 39): 'The only reasonable explanation of act flowing from it lies in the analogy of light from a sun. The entire intellectual order may be figured as a kind of light with the One in repose at its summit as its king: but this manifestation is not cast out from it—that would cause us to postulate another light before the light—but the One shines eternally, resting upon the Intellectual Realm; this, not identical with its source, is not yet severed from it [notice ἀποτέτμηται again!] nor of so remote a nature as to be less than Real-Being; it is no blind thing, but is seeing, self-knowing, the primal knower' (trans. MacKenna-Page). What is to be noticed here is the insistence again on the connection of the One with its effects. If this were not so, runs the argument, there would be another light before the light. What is meant is that, at least in the case of the One, and of the sun its image, we must not separate the light of the essence from the light of the effects. True the effects are not the One itself—they are the Intelligible World—but they are not cut off from the One itself, for, if they were, the light of the Intelligible World would be caused by a quite different light. Rather the existence of the One is felt in the Intelligible World. In other words the effects feel the continual and illuminating presence of the cause. It is the cause which holds the effects together—and it does so because it is what it is. Once again we are brought to asking ourselves why it is what it is.

The last passage which need be introduced here to demon-

strate the relevance of analogies from the sun and light is the opening of 5.1.7. 'We have learned', says Plotinus, 'that Νοῦς is an image first because there is a certain necessity (δεῖ πως) that the One should produce something which should preserve much of its character and be a likeness of itself, just as light preserves much of the character of the sun.' The use of the word δεῖ is important here, and we should observe how it is qualified by πως. We have met the 'necessity' of emanation before and concluded that we do not yet know the reason for that necessity. This passage does not alter our conclusions. Here we must recognize some kind of necessity, but the use of πως should at least suggest that there is no question of any ordinary kind of compulsion involved. What compulsion makes light share some of the characteristics of the sun? The compulsion is the nature of the sun itself; and the cause of that nature will need investigation before the problem of necessity can be tackled properly. Thus 5.1.7 reinforces our earlier conclusions.

Perhaps the most famous passage in the whole of the *Enneads* to deal with the procession of plurality from unity is to be found in 3.8.10. The chapter opens with the familiar description of the One as the power behind all things[8] and then proceeds to enquire how this power can best be understood. A pair of similes follow. The One is first compared with a spring which has no source outside itself, which gives waters to the rivers but always remains what it is in itself. Then we are invited to think of the life that spreads through a huge tree, while still remaining somehow fixed in its root (οἷον ἐν ῥίζῃ ἱδρυμένης). What goes out from the spring or from the root is an existent thing in its own right, yet it is still in some way bound to the source from which it arises. The life that courses through a tree depends on the existence and nature of the 'life' in the root and could not exist, let alone course through the tree, without it. To understand it therefore we need to understand the nature of the root itself.

We have already observed on several occasions that Plo-

tinus speaks in terms of *necessary* emanation and that we need to know why such emanation is necessary. Armstrong and others have exhibited nervousness on various occasions lest the answer that Plotinus gives to this question should convict the philosopher of turning his whole system on its head.[9] As Armstrong puts it, what Plotinus seems to do (against his better judgement, as it were) is to see 'the evolution from the One to the sense-world as an evolution from potency to act, a passage to greater fullness and extent of being'. This theory, which Armstrong calls a 'serious inconsistency', would seem to derive from the idea that we have already noticed, that the One is the power and potentiality of all things (δύναμις πάντων). Let us therefore present the recalcitrant passages and see whether these fears about Plotinus' consistency are justified. The texts are as follows:

(*a*) 4.8.6.1–3 'Something besides a unity there must be (εἴπερ οὖν δεῖ μὴ ἓν μόνον εἶναι) or all would be indiscernibly buried, shapeless within that unbroken whole. None of the real beings would exist if that unity remained at halt within itself. . . .'

(*b*) 4.8.6.12–13 'To this power we cannot impute any halt, any limit of jealous grudging; it must move for ever outward until the universe stands accomplished to the ultimate possibility.'[10]

(*c*) 2.9.3.8 'It is necessary (ἀνάγκη) that each thing should give of itself to another. If it did not, the Good would not be good nor the Νοῦς νοῦς nor Soul what it is.' (We should observe that ἀνάγκη is rejected at line 11.) It should be added that a similar problem is presented for Νοῦς in 5.9.6 and at 6.7.8.14.

As we have seen, this kind of language expresses an exaggerated version of the idea that the One is δύναμις πάντων, and Armstrong is doubtless right to see the effect of the Stoic σπερματικοὶ λόγοι. But does Plotinus give way to Stoicism more than he should? What does the 'must' mean in the statement 'Something besides a unity there *must* be or all would be shapeless', etc.? Plotinus is not in fact describing pressure on the One, but is simply trying to convince the reader. We know that all is not buried shapelessly; therefore we must grasp—by logical means—that the One has produced

what is other than itself. The same argument applies to 2.9.3.8 and is indicated by the peculiar language of the passage itself. Plotinus remarks that if there were no emanations the Good would not be good nor the Νοῦς νοῦς nor the Soul what it is (ἡ ψυχὴ μὴ τοῦτο). The last phrase—and in particular the word τοῦτο—indicates the method. We know what the soul is like. Since it is what it is, its causes must be such as we suppose them to be, and emanation therefore must be a fact. Again the 'must' is a logical must.

The 'must' of 4.8.6.12–13 is similar. We know from Plato's *Timaeus* (42 E 5–6) and *Phaedrus* (247 A) that the Gods, and for Plotinus *a fortiori* the One, can have no jealousy, can be in no way grudging of themselves, and since this is so, the infinite powers of the One must be translated into their appropriate effects, and the universe ordained 'to the ultimate possibility'. Once again the necessity that the possibilities will be realized is not an extrinsic necessity bringing pressure on the One. Rather it is a deduction made from the One's nature.

But what of the suggestion that these products of the One might be greater, more in act, than the One itself? There seems to be very little in the passages themselves to encourage such views. In the world below the One various effects of the One's power will be realized, but the very realization of them will simply confirm the One's superiority. The realization of a product of the One will entail its own delimitation, and the existence of the 'others' will entail their finitude. They will not be infinite in themselves or in their power, as the One is, and the measure of their powerlessness will be the measure of their inferiority. They will certainly not be a realization of the One's own nature, as some interpreters seem to assume erroneously on the basis, for example, of 2.9.3.8. For when they are realized they will be precisely not-the-One. This being so, it is absurd to interpret the phrase 'The Good would not be good if it did not give of itself to another', to mean that emanation fulfils the Good or brings it from potency to act,

or anything of that kind. Rather, as we have seen, the phrase means that it is part of the 'nature' of the Good as we understand it to cause this to happen. In fact, far from the One's being brought from potency to act by the emanation process, we should be well aware from other passages—and these allegedly recalcitrant ones can now be seen not to contradict this—that so far from the One's being fulfilled by the emanation process, it is totally unaffected by it.

We have not discussed all the passages dealing with emanation, but from the crucial ones we have examined it must be admitted that what Plotinus means by 'necessary' is not as easy to determine in the context of emanation as might appear at first sight. Indeed again and again it has become obvious that despite the pundits the problem of the necessity of emanation from the One must be reduced to the problem of why the One is what it is. For Plotinus the two propositions 'The One is what it is' and 'The One must be what it is' are in fact identical in meaning. And since the problem of emanation has to be seen in terms of the One's nature, we can only expect to find an answer to our question 'Why must the One be as it is?' if we know in advance whether and in what sense the One has free will. If emanation follows from the One's nature and the One's nature is caused by the One's will, then emanation will be an act of a kind of free will and Plotinus will be freed from the shackles of a deterministic universe.

The evidence from *Ennead* 6.8 has been handled in some detail by Henry and by Trouillard.[11] There is therefore no need to examine the whole of it, but only to summarize the main points. We shall then be able to decide whether Henry is right to conclude that 'sur la liberté de la création Plotin a donc gardé le silence',[12] or whether Trouillard's interpretation of the One's voluntarism brings us nearer the solution of our present problems.[13]

We recall from our earlier discussion that the act proceeding *from* the essence of the One—or indeed of anything else—is dependent and related to the act of that essence, and that for

our present purposes it is necessary to know *why* the One is as it is. One solution to this problem would be that the One acts 'according to its nature', but this is specifically ruled out in 6.8.7.50 and 6.8.8.15. The 'nature' of the One and its act as the One must be wholly indistinguishable. The term 'nature' (φύσις) can at best be referred only to the Intelligible World and possibly only to those things which exist in the world of time.

But if the One does not exist because of its own nature, it certainly does not exist by chance (κατὰ τύχην, 6.8.7.32) or by any kind of 'automatic action' (6.8.8.26). Nor in general can it be said that it 'happened to be' (συνέβη, 6.8.8.23). 'Happening to be' can only be meaningful in the context of plurality, for it implies the existence of some other factor than that which merely exists. Happening implies a relationship—and that is unintelligible in the context of the One. Plotinus is particularly energetic in ruling this suggestion out of court. He denies τὸ συνέβη as applicable to the One again at 6.8.11.35 (where, on the principles of negative theology, τὸ οὐ συνέβη is held to be more appropriate), at 6.8.14.36 (by implication), and at 6.8.16.18.

Nor of course can we say that the One is free to choose between contraries. Such a description would clearly be detrimental to its unity (6.8.8.1–11). The word αὐτεξούσιον is thus inappropriate, for the One does not choose between, for example, good and evil. Yet after taking this step are we to follow it up by thinking of the One as determined, as necessarily that which it is?

The first clear answer to this is to be found in 6.8.9.10–17. Plotinus has just been pointing out that the One is in a sense determined (ὡρισμένον) because it is different from its products. He proceeds as follows: 'It is therefore in a sense determined—determined, I mean, by its uniqueness and not in any sense of being under compulsion (ὅτι μοναχῶς καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης); compulsion did not co-exist with the Supreme, but has place only among secondaries and even there can

exercise no tyranny; this uniqueness is from outside. This then it is; this and no other; simply what it must be (ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι); it has not "happened" but is what by a *necessity prior to all necessities* it must be (τὸ δ' ἔδει τοῦτο ἀρχὴ τῶν ὅσα ἔδει). We cannot think of it as a chance existence; it is not what it chanced to be but what it must be—and yet without a "Must" (ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ὅπερ ἐχρῆν)' (trans. MacKenna-Page).

This passage teaches us much. The 'necessity' of the One's existence is different from other necessities. Indeed necessity is not really the right word for it. Compulsion (ἀνάγκη) too is an unsatisfactory word, because that would imply that the necessity is from something external to the essence of the One itself. Yet the chapter gives us a little more positive help as well as this string of rigorous negations, though even in lines 44ff., where a clue to the solution is offered, Plotinus, in his usual careful way, presents what is to form the basis of his answer so tentatively as to make one suppose at first glance that no answer will be forthcoming. Nevertheless it is here that for the first time in this *Ennead* he introduces the rôle of the will of the One. What he says is that the One is what it wills to be (οὖσαν ὃ θέλει), or rather that it flings out into existence what it wills, while remaining itself 'greater than all willing' and making willing a thing beneath it. He then qualifies this again, and in a most significant way. The One, he says, did not will itself to be 'such a thing (οὕτως) of the kind which would conform to what was willed'. The point of this statement will soon appear to be that the will of the One is not something which aims at an end, but the end itself. There is to be no distinction of any kind between the will and its accomplishment.

Chapters 10, 11 and 12 add little that is new except an interesting discussion of the notion of self-mastery (τὸ κύριον εἶναι αὑτοῦ). Probably following the pattern of Plato's discussion of a similar theme in the *Republic* (430E–431A), but applying the conclusions to the One, Plotinus indicates the

difficulties in saying that the One is master of itself. If anything can be said to be master of itself, he holds, it must be composed of a ruling and a subject part; and as this is intolerable in the One language which implies it will be inadequate.

In order to forward the enquiry, Plotinus now suggests that for the sake of persuasion (6.8.13.4) we must begin to use language of the One which is not strictly appropriate. The difficulty confronting the reader of Plotinus at this point is to know exactly which language and how much of the chapter Plotinus is meaning to tell us is only an approximation. After the initial *caveat*, we are introduced to the notion that (for the sake of explanation) we may assume activity in the One, and that such activity in some way (οἷον) depends on will (βούλησις). In fact the will of the One and its essence (οὐσία) are identical. Now we recall that when earlier in the *Ennead* the notion of will was introduced Plotinus insisted that in a sense the One was higher than will, and that will came from it. And now in 6.8.13 we are speaking the language of persuasion rather than of strict reasoning—and will has come up again. What we want to discover is what Plotinus is trying to say about will. One thing is certain: the distinction between the One's activity and its will on which such activity depends is 'for the sake of persuasion'. No such distinction is possible in reality. We cannot speak of the One's being activated by its will, for it is fully active already. Nor is the reference to the One's essence (οὐσία) appropriate except in a very special and unusual sense. Nevertheless if we say not that the One's will *is responsible* for its activity and that this kind of self-dependence is appropriate, but rather that the One's will *is* its act already and that this is the true and unique kind of mastery of itself which the One can have, may we not be nearer the truth?

In lines 47ff. of the same chapter we are again told that in speaking of the One we must be patient with language and must make use of the word οἷον ('as it were') in our descriptions. This raises the question of the accuracy of the termin-

ology employed between the first few sentences—which are clearly governed by the original *caveat* about language—and this new warning. It seems most likely that the second warning is a reminder, just in case we have forgotten the original, and even if it is a specific admonition on a new point, namely the use of οἷον, we should still be particularly careful about the treatment of the previous lines. Nevertheless these previous lines are important, and even if we cannot be certain how precisely they can be taken, we should still observe them carefully. MacKenna-Page translates lines 26ff. thus: 'What we must call its essence comports its will (σύνεστιν τῇ οἷον οὐσίᾳ ἡ θέλησις) to possess such a manner of being; we can form no idea of it without including in it the will towards itself as it is. It must be a consistent self willing its being and being what it wills; its will and itself must be one thing.' We must notice how Plotinus is trying in every possible way to bring the will and the 'being' together. This cannot be completely achieved —that is why language is inadequate—but at least the attempt can be made; and it is to be hoped that the reader will grasp the spirit rather than the letter. We should remember that this will is not the power of choice as we understand it, though as Henry[14] indicates it is parallel to the *real* as opposed to the apparent freedom of the human soul, for in Plotinus' view true freedom is a direction of the soul to its source in the One. For the One itself then there is no choice of opposites; the Good could not choose the bad. And in any case there is nothing to choose, for the One is already δύναμις πάντων. There is, as Plotinus says in line 40, nothing outside itself to which it could be attracted. In brief therefore we may accept as a hypothesis that what Plotinus is trying to say in chapter 13—but what he finds easier to express in the language of persuasion than in that of reality—is that for the One the will is its own accomplishment and that to say that this will is determined simply because it is already all-embracing and that there is nothing outside itself is like claiming that a man has no free will because he already exists. For in a sense the

only alternative to the One is nothingness. We can therefore proceed to see whether this version of the One's will is maintained in those remaining chapters of the *Ennead* where it is discussed, and in particular in chapters 19ff., for the way of persuasion seems to end at 6.8.18.53. If there is a sharp change of idea after this, however, our hypothesis will have to be discarded.

Our first indication is the latter part of chapter 14. Here, after repeating once more the now familiar doctrine that the One is wholly unconcerned and unaffected by chance, Plotinus tells us that he is cause of himself καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτόν. He is in fact primarily and transcendently his own self (πρώτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός). We see the same pattern emerging in all this. No distinction can be made in the One's selfhood. He is his own cause because he could not be caused by anything else. And the wording here should be emphasized. It should not be said that the One *causes* himself (which might imply a causing and a caused, a will and a willed) but that he *is* his own cause. We should not therefore be at all surprised to find in the next chapter (6.8.15.9) that he is master of himself in the specific and particular sense that he 'made himself' not as something else wished (for what else could there be?) but as he himself wishes (for how else could he wish?).

Chapter 16 contains the same ideas with little further explanation. In line 17 the One is not as he happened to be but as he acts himself into being (ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτός); in line 23 he is not by chance (ὡς ἔτυχεν) but as he wills—we should notice the very frequent application of the present tense to the One, to mark its continuity; finally, after finding the One described as an awakening without an awakener, we revert to the now familiar conclusion that he is as he willed to be, not as he happened to be (l. 39).

We are beginning to realize that the 'nature' of the One is to be seen as its will, a will of such a kind as to be simultaneously both will and the achievement of will. Chapter 18 gives

us a further indication of the effect of this will. We recall from earlier in the discussion that the act *of* a thing has to be distinguished from the act *from* it. We saw too that emanation is 'necessary' because the One is as it is. Now, however, that we see that the One is as it is because it wills to be so, we realize that emanation is necessary because the One wills it to be so. Hence Plotinus can write in 6.8.18.41 that it is author not of the chance-made but of what the divine willed (γεννητικὸν τοῦ οὐχ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός). Here perhaps he comes as near as he ever comes to drawing the formal conclusion of his theorizings about emanation, namely that since emanation is necessary because of the act of the One itself and since the One itself acts as it wills, therefore the products of the One, as well as the One itself, are the products of will.

Chapter 18—the last, as we noticed, of the chapters in which inadequate language is to be employed of the One 'for the sake of persuasion'—ends with an interesting explanation of some Platonic terminology. One of the terms discussed is δέον ('it is necessary'), and Plotinus remarks that Plato used this word of the One because he wanted something diametrically opposed to 'chance'. 'Necessary' is not to be contrasted with 'free' but with 'by chance'. Hence the One can be said to will what is necessary, and what is necessary cannot be distinguished from the accomplishment of that necessity (εἴπερ τὰ δέοντα βούλεται καὶ ἓν τὸ δέον καὶ ἡ τοῦ δέοντος ἐνέργεια).

By chapter 21 we are well clear of terminology used for the sake of persuasion. Yet it turns out that the positions we noticed in the earlier chapters are confirmed, at least as regards the problem of will. Πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτός, writes Plotinus in line 16. The One therefore, he continues, is such as he willed and of the kind that he willed. Yet this willing did not precede its products: rather it was contemporaneous with them, and in fact is them. Hence, as Trouillard has so rightly insisted,[15] the One is seen, even here where Plotinus is dealing strictly, so far as he can, in voluntarist terms. We cannot in

fact elude the conclusion that *Ennead* 6.8 answers our question about why the One is as it is. It is because it has willed to be so. Necessity is in fact the One's own will which by its very act is its own accomplishment.

We are now in a position to consider the conclusion of Henry that in 6.8 Plotinus never alludes, even vaguely, to 'free creation'. We shall recall that there is in fact an allusion in chapter 18 to the One as γεννητικόν of what it wills—which would seem to refer to the emanation process. But more important than this is the general result of this enquiry that the One itself is as it wills to be, because we now know that emanation follows 'of necessity' because of the nature of the One. Since, however, the One as an emanating being is itself in a sense the product of its own will, we must conclude that the One's willing of its own nature is the direct cause of the emanation from that nature. We are thus in a better position to understand remarks such as that at 5.1.6.25ff. that the One neither asserted (προσνεύσαντος) nor willed (βουληθέντος) nor was moved in any way towards the existence of a second hypostasis. The One does not concern itself directly with the second hypostasis; it concerns itself with itself. But the *result* of willing itself is its production of the second hypostasis, for it wills itself to be such as to produce it. Creation is as free, no more and no less, than the One itself. As for pantheism it is irrelevant.