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THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

JOWETT

VOL. I.

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Oxford

THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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IN FIVE VOLUMES

VOL. I

SECOND EDITION

*REVISED AND CORRECTED THROUGHOUT, WITH ADDITIONS
AND AN INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES*

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

M DCCC LXXV

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TO MY FORMER PUPILS
IN BALLIOL COLLEGE
AND IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,
WHO DURING THIRTY YEARS
HAVE BEEN THE BEST OF FRIENDS TO ME,
THESE VOLUMES ARE INSCRIBED,
IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION
OF THEIR NEVER FAILING ATTACHMENT.

PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

THE Text which has been mostly followed in this Translation of Plato is the latest 8vo. edition of Stallbaum; the principal deviations are noted at the bottom of the page.

I have to acknowledge many obligations to old friends and pupils. These are:—Mr. John Purves, Fellow of Balliol College, with whom I have revised about half of the entire Translation; the Rev. Professor Campbell, of St. Andrews, who has helped me in the revision of several parts of the work, especially of the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus; Mr. Robinson Ellis, Fellow of Trinity College, and Mr. Alfred Robinson, Fellow of New College, who read with me the Cratylus and the Gorgias; Mr. Paravicini, Student of Christ Church, who assisted me in the Symposium; Mr. Raper, Fellow of Queen's College, Mr. Monro, Fellow of Oriel College, and Mr. Shadwell, Student of Christ Church, who gave me similar assistance in the Laws. Dr. Greenhill, of Hastings, has also kindly sent me remarks on the physiological part of the Timaeus, which I have inserted as corrections under the head of *errata* at the end of the Introduction. The degree of accuracy which I have been enabled to attain is in great measure due to these gentlemen, and I heartily thank them for the pains and time which they have bestowed on my work.

I have further to explain how far I have received help from other labourers in the same field. The books which I have found of most use are Steinhart and Müller's German Translation of Plato with Introductions; Zeller's 'Philosophie der Griechen,' and 'Platonische Studien;' Susemihl's 'Genetische Entwicklung der Platonischen Philosophie;' Hermann's 'Geschichte der Platonischen Philosophie;' Bonitz, 'Platonische Studien;' Stallbaum's Notes and Introductions; Professor Campbell's editions of the 'Theaetetus,' the 'Sophist,' and the 'Politicus;' Professor Thompson's 'Phaedrus;' Th. Martin's 'Études sur le Timée;' Mr. Poste's edition and translation of the 'Philebus;' the Translation of the 'Republic,' by Messrs. Davies and Vaughan, and the Translation of the 'Gorgias,' by Mr. Cope.

I have also derived much assistance from the great work of Mr. Grote, which contains excellent analyses of the Dialogues, and is rich in original thoughts and observations. I agree with him in rejecting as futile the attempt of Schleiermacher and others to arrange the Dialogues of Plato into a harmonious whole. Any such arrangement appears to me not only to be unsupported by evidence, but to involve an anachronism in the history of philosophy. There is a common spirit in the writings of Plato, but not a unity of design in the whole, nor perhaps a perfect unity in any single Dialogue. The hypothesis of a general plan which is worked out in the successive Dialogues is an after-thought of the critics who have attributed a system to writings belonging to an age when system had not as yet taken possession of philosophy.

If Mr. Grote should do me the honour to read any portion of this work he will probably remark that I have

endeavoured to approach Plato from a point of view which is opposed to his own. The aim of the Introductions in these volumes has been to represent Plato as the father of Idealism, who is not to be measured by the standard of utilitarianism or any other modern philosophical system. He is the poet or maker of ideas, satisfying the wants of his own age, providing the instruments of thought for future generations. He is no dreamer, but a great philosophical genius struggling with the unequal conditions of light and knowledge under which he is living. He may be illustrated by the writings of moderns, but he must be interpreted by his own, and by his place in the history of philosophy. We are not concerned to determine what is the residuum of truth which remains for ourselves. His truth may not be our truth, and nevertheless may have an extraordinary value and interest for us.

I cannot agree with Mr. Grote in admitting as genuine all the writings commonly attributed to Plato in antiquity, any more than with Schaarschmidt and some other German critics who reject nearly half of them. The German critics, to whom I refer, proceed chiefly on grounds of internal evidence; they appear to me to lay too much stress on the variety of doctrine and style, which must be equally acknowledged as a fact, even in the Dialogues regarded by Schaarschmidt as genuine, e.g. in the *Phaedrus*, or *Symposium*, when compared with the *Laws*. He who admits works so different in style and matter to have been the composition of the same author, need have no difficulty (see vol. iv, Appendix) in admitting the *Sophist* or the *Politicus*. [The negative argument adduced by the same school of critics, which is based on the silence of Aristotle, is not worthy of much consideration. For why should Aristotle, because

he has quoted several Dialogues of Plato, have quoted them all? Something must be allowed to chance, and to the nature of the subjects treated of in them.] On the other hand, Mr. Grote trusts mainly to the Alexandrian Canon. But I hardly think that we are justified in attributing much weight to the authority of the Alexandrian librarians in an age when there was no regular publication of books, and every temptation to forge them; and in which the writings of a school were naturally attributed to the founder of the school. And even without intentional fraud, there was an inclination to believe rather than to enquire. Would Mr. Grote accept as genuine all the writings which he finds in the lists of learned ancients attributed to Hippocrates, to Xenophon, to Aristotle? The Alexandrian Canon of the Platonic writings is deprived of credit by the admission of the Epistles, which are not only unworthy of Plato, and in several passages plagiarized from him, but flagrantly at variance with historical fact. It will be seen also that I do not agree with Mr. Grote's views about the Sophists; nor with the low estimate which he has formed of Plato's Laws; nor with his opinion respecting Plato's doctrine of the rotation of the earth. But I 'am not going to lay hands on my father Parmenides' [Soph. 241 D], who will, I hope, forgive me for differing from him on these points. I cannot close this Preface without expressing my deep respect for his noble and gentle character, and the great services which he has rendered to Greek Literature.

BALLIOL COLLEGE,

January, 1871.

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN publishing a Second Edition of the Dialogues of Plato in English, I have to acknowledge the assistance of several friends: of the Rev. G. G. Bradley, Master of University College, who sent me some valuable remarks on the *Phaedo*; of Dr. Greenhill, who has again revised a portion of the *Timaeus*; of Mr. R. L. Nettleship, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, to whom I am indebted for an excellent criticism of the *Parmenides*; and, above all, of the Rev. Professor Campbell of St. Andrews, and Mr. Paravicini, late Student of Christ Church and Tutor of Balliol College, with whom I have read over the greater part of the translation. I am also indebted to Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, for a complete and accurate index.

The Prefaces to the Dialogues have been enlarged, and essays on subjects of modern philosophy having an affinity to the Platonic Dialogues have been introduced into several of them. The analyses have been corrected, and innumerable alterations have been made in the Text.

At the end of a long task, the translator may without

impropriety point out the difficulties which he has had to encounter. These have been far greater than he would have anticipated; nor is he at all sanguine that he has succeeded in overcoming them.

I. It may seem a truism to say that an English translation must have a distinct meaning and must be English. Its object is not merely to render the words of one language into the words of another, but to produce an impression similar or nearly similar to that of the original on the mind of the reader. It should be rhythmical and varied, and, above all, equable in style. It should in some degree at least retain the characteristic qualities of the ancient writer—his freedom, grace, simplicity, stateliness, weight, precision; or the best part of him will be lost to the English reader. It should read as an original work, and should also be the most faithful transcript which can be made of the language from which the translation is taken, consistently with the first requirement of all, that it be English. But it is difficult to harmonize all these opposite claims. In translating Plato what may be termed the interests of the Greek and of the English will often be at war with one another. In framing an English sentence or in rounding a paragraph the attention is insensibly diverted from the exact meaning of the Greek. The freest and the most literal translation are not necessarily opposed, but the two principles can only be harmonized by a series of corrections. All the subtle effects of words upon one another, the allusions which play upon the surface or lie underneath, are not perceived at a first or a second reading, and cannot, with the utmost pains of the translator, be perfectly imitated.

There are fundamental differences in Greek and English of which some may be managed while others

remain intractable. (1). The structure of the Greek language is partly adversative and alternative, and partly inferential; that is to say, the members of a sentence are either opposed to one another, or one of them expresses the cause or effect or condition or reason of another. The two tendencies may be called the horizontal or perpendicular lines of the language; and the opposition or inference is often much more one of words than of ideas. But modern languages have rubbed off this inferential and adversative form: they have fewer links of connection, and are content to place sentences side by side, leaving their relation to one another to be inferred from their position or from the rest of the sentence. The difficulty of preserving the effect of the Greek is increased by the want of adversative or inferential particles in English, and by the nice sense of tautology which characterizes all modern languages. We cannot have two 'buts' or 'fors' in the same sentence where the Greek repeats *ἀλλὰ* or *γάρ*. There is a similar want of particles expressing the various gradations of objective and subjective thought—*που*, *δή*, *μήν*, *μέντοι*, and the like, which are so thickly scattered over the Greek page. And while English is more dependent than Greek upon the apposition of clauses and sentences, there is a further difficulty in using this form of construction owing to the want of case endings. For the same reason there cannot be an equal variety in the order of words or an equal nicety of emphasis in English as in Greek.

(2). Still greater is the difficulty which arises from the restriction of the use of the genders. Men and women in English are masculine and feminine, and there is a similar distinction of sex in the words denoting

animals; but all things else, whether outward objects or abstract ideas, are relegated to the class of neuters. Hardly in some flight of poetry do we ever endue any of them with the characteristics of a sentient being, and then only by speaking of them in the feminine gender. The virtues may be pictured in female forms, but they are not so described in language; a ship is humorously supposed to be the sailor's bride; more doubtful are the personifications of church and country as females. So rare are the exceptions to the general rule which has just been laid down. Now the genius of the Greek language is the opposite of this. The same tendency to personification which is seen in the Greek mythology is common also in language; and genders are attributed to things as well as persons according to their various degrees of strength and weakness; or from fanciful resemblances to the male or female form, or in consequence of some analogy too subtle to be discovered. When the gender of any object was once fixed, a similar gender was naturally assigned to all similar objects. This use of genders in the denotation of objects or ideas not only affects the words to which a masculine or feminine gender is attributed, but the words with which they are construed or connected, and passes into the general character of the style. Hence arises a difficulty in translating Greek into English which cannot altogether be overcome. Shall we speak of the soul and its qualities, of virtue, power, wisdom, and the like, as feminine or neuter? The usage of the English language does not admit of the former, and yet the life and beauty of the style are impaired by the latter. For how can we attribute intelligence and mind to what is neuter? Often the translator will have recourse to the repetition of the

word, or to the ambiguous 'they,' 'their,' or 'whose,' etc.; for fear of spoiling the effect of the sentence by introducing 'it.' Words signifying things or persons can almost always be expressed by equivalents in English; the difficulty begins with the intermediate degrees or half personifications which pervade a Greek sentence.

(3). The use of relation is far more extended in Greek than in English. Partly the greater variety of genders and cases makes the connection of relative and antecedent less ambiguous: partly also the greater number of demonstrative and relative pronouns, and the use of the article, make the correlation of ideas simpler and more natural. The Greek appears to have had an ear or intelligence for a long and complicated sentence which is not to be found in modern nations. Neither is the same precision required in Greek as in English; there was nothing shocking to the contemporary of Thucydides and Plato in anacolutha and repetitions. In such cases the genius of the English language requires that the translation should be more perspicuous than the Greek. The want of more distinctions between the demonstrative pronouns is also greatly felt. Frequently the noun has to take the place of the pronoun. 'This' and 'that' are found repeating themselves to weariness in the translation. As in the previous case, while the feeling of the modern language is more opposed to tautology, there is also a greater difficulty in avoiding it.

(4). Though no precise rule can be laid down about the repetition of words, there seems to be a kind of impertinence in presenting to the reader the same thought in the same words, repeated twice over in the same passage without any new aspect or modification of it. Evasions of tautology—that is to say, the substitution

of one word of precisely the same meaning for another—are resented by us equally with repetitions of words. Yet on the other hand the least difference of meaning or the least change of the word from a substantive to an adjective, or from a participle to a verb, will often remedy the unpleasant effect. Rarely for the sake of emphasis or clearness can we allow an important verb or substantive to be used twice over in two successive sentences. The particles and pronouns, as they are of most frequent occurrence, are also the most troublesome. Strictly speaking, except a few of the commonest of them, ‘and,’ ‘the,’ etc., they ought not to occur twice in the same sentence. But the Greek has no such precise rules; and hence a literal translation of a Greek author is full of tautology. The tendency of modern languages is to become more correct as well as more perspicuous than ancient. And, therefore, while the English translator is limited in the power of expressing relation or connection, by the law of his own language increased precision and also increased clearness are required of him. The familiar use of logic, and the progress of science, have in these two respects raised the standard. But modern languages while they have become more exacting in their demands, are in many respects not so well furnished with powers of expression as the ancient classical ones.

Such are a few of the difficulties which have to be overcome in the work of translation; and there are many others. (5). The excellence of a translation will consist not merely in the faithful rendering of words, or in the composition of a sentence only, or yet of a single paragraph, but in the colour and style of the whole work. The metaphors admissible in different languages vary, and the translator will often be compelled to

substitute one for another, not giving word for word, but leading up to and making preparation for striking or metaphorical expressions. He must find modern equivalents taken from Scripture, or from the English poets, for ancient phrases; for ideas must be given through something. He must also provide expressions for philosophical terms of very indefinite meaning in the more definite language of modern philosophy. And he must not allow discordant elements to enter into the work. For example, in translating Plato, it would equally be an anachronism to intrude on him the feeling and spirit of the Jewish or Christian Scriptures or the technical terms of the Modern German philosophy.

(6). As no two words are precise equivalents (just as no two leaves of the forest are exactly similar), it is impossible that the same Greek word should always be translated by the same English word. In such cases the translator may be allowed to employ two words—sometimes when the two meanings occur in the same passage, varying them by an ‘or’—e.g. *ἐπιστήμη*, ‘science’ or ‘knowledge,’ *εἶδος*, ‘idea’ or ‘class,’—at the point where the change of meaning occurs. Proverbial expressions may be replaced by parallel expressions in English or modern languages. If translations are intended not for the Greek scholar but for the general reader, their worst fault will be that they sacrifice the general effect and meaning to the over precise rendering of words and forms of speech.

(7). There is no kind of literature in English which corresponds to the Greek Dialogue; nor is the English language easily adapted to it. Most of the so-called English Dialogues are only imitations of Plato, which fall very far short of the original. The breath of conversation, the subtle adjustment of question and answer,

the lively play of fancy, the power of drawing characters, are wanting in them. But the Platonic dialogue is a drama as well as a dialogue, of which Socrates is the central figure, and there are lesser performers as well:—the insolence of Thrasymachus, the anger of Callicles and Anytus, the patronizing style of Protagoras, the self-consciousness of Prodicus and Hippias, are all part of the entertainment. To reproduce this living image the same sort of effort is required as in translating poetry—*πολλῆς ἐστὶ πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγένημα*. The English language is slow in lending itself to the form of question and answer, and so the ease of conversation is partly lost, and at the same time the dialectical precision with which the steps of the argument are drawn out is apt to be impaired.

II. In the Introductions to the Dialogues have been added some essays on modern philosophy, and on political and social life. The chief subjects discussed in these are Utility, Communism, and the Kantian and Hegelian philosophies.

Ancient and modern philosophy throw a light upon one another: but they should be compared, not confounded. Although the connection between them is sometimes accidental, it is often real. The same questions are discussed by them under different conditions of language and civilization; but frequently a mere word has survived, while nothing or hardly anything of the Platonic or Aristotelian meaning is retained. There are other questions familiar to the moderns, which have no place in ancient philosophy. The world has grown older in two thousand years, and has enlarged its stock of ideas and methods of reasoning. The germ of modern thought is found in ancient, and we may claim to have inherited, notwithstanding many accidents of

time and place, the spirit of Greek philosophy. Yet there is no continuous growth of one into the other, but a new beginning, partly artificial, partly arising out of the questionings of the mind itself, and also receiving a stimulus from the study of ancient writings.

Considering the great and fundamental differences which exist in ancient and modern philosophy, it seems best that we should at first study them separately, and seek for the interpretation of either, especially of the ancient, from itself only, comparing the same author with himself and with his contemporaries, and with the general state of thought and feeling prevalent in his age. Afterwards comes the remoter light which they cast on one another. Then we feel that the ancients had the same thoughts as ourselves, the same difficulties which characterize all periods of transition, almost the same opposition between science and religion. Although we cannot maintain that ancient and modern philosophy are one and continuous (as has been affirmed with more truth respecting ancient and modern history), for they are separated by an interval of a thousand years, yet they seem to recur in a sort of cycle, and we are surprised to find that the new is ever old, and that the teaching of the past has still a meaning for us.

III. In the preface to the first edition I expressed a strong opinion at variance with Mr. Grote's, that the so called Epistles of Plato were spurious. His friend and editor, Professor Bain, naturally thinks that I ought to give the reasons why I differ from so eminent an authority. Reserving the fuller discussion of the question for another work, I will shortly defend my opinion by the following arguments:—

(a) Because almost all epistles purporting to be of

the classical age of Greek literature are forgeries¹. Of all documents they are the least likely to be preserved and the most likely to be invented. The ancient world swarmed with them, and it may be questioned whether any of the extant Greek epistles are genuine.

(*β*) When one epistle out of a number is spurious, another can hardly be genuine; when all but one are spurious, overwhelming evidence is required of the genuineness of the one. But no one, not even Mr. Grote, would maintain that all the Epistles of Plato are genuine, and very few critics think that more than one of them is so.

The external probability therefore against them is enormous, and the internal probability is not less: for they are trivial and unmeaning, devoid of delicacy and subtlety, wanting in a single fine expression. And even if this be matter of dispute, there can be no dispute that they are full of plagiarisms, inappropriately borrowed, which is a common note of forgery. Compare 330 foll. with Rep. iv. 425 E, 426 B, vi. 488 A; Laws vi. 752 D: 347 E with Phaedrus 249 D: 326 A and 328 A with Rep. v. 473 C, etc. They also contain several historical blunders, such as the statement that Socrates was put to death by the Tyrants (324 C); or that respecting the nephews of Dionysius (328 A), who, being of the age of six or seven, are said to 'have been well inclined to philosophy, and well able to dispose the mind of Dionysius in the same course'; or the foolish allusion to the Athenian empire, and the other allusion to the empire of Darius (332 A), which shows a spirit very different from that of Plato. These palpable errors and absurdities, for the observation of

¹ Compare Bentley's Phalaris, vol. ii. 182 foll.

which I am indebted to Karsten (*Comment. Critica*), are absolutely irreconcilable with the genuineness of the Seventh Epistle, which is supposed to be the most genuine of them. They appear to have a common parentage, and therefore the condemnation of one is the condemnation of all; and the more they are compared, the more they will be found to furnish evidence against one another.

I have to correct an oversight in the first edition, which has been continued in the second. In speaking of an early work of Professor Zeller, I omitted to mention that in his *History of Philosophy* he has retracted his former opinion respecting the un-Platonic character of the *Laws*. May I take the opportunity of saying that there is no living writer to whom I and many other students of Plato are under greater obligations than to Professor Zeller?

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CHARMIDES.

VOL. I.

B

INTRODUCTION.

THE subject of the Charmides is Temperance or *σωφροσύνη*, a peculiarly Greek notion, which may also be rendered Moderation¹, Modesty, Discretion, Wisdom, without completely exhausting by all these terms the various associations of the word. It may be described as 'mens sana in corpore sano,' the harmony or due proportion of the higher and lower elements of human nature which 'makes a man his own master,' according to the definition of the Republic. In the accompanying translation the word has been rendered in different places either Temperance or Wisdom, as the connection seemed to require: for in the philosophy of Plato *σωφροσύνη* still retains an intellectual element (as Socrates is also said to have identified *σωφροσύνη* with *σοφία*: Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4), and is not yet relegated to the sphere of moral virtue, as in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (iii. 10).

The beautiful youth, Charmides, who is also the most temperate of human beings, is asked by Socrates, 'What is Temperance?' He answers characteristically, (1) 'Quietness.' 'But Temperance is a fine and noble thing; and quietness in many or most cases is not so fine a thing as quickness.' He tries again and says (2) that temperance is modesty. But this again is set aside by a sophistical application of Homer: for temperance is good as well as noble, and Homer has declared that 'modesty is not good for a needy man.' (3) Once more Charmides makes the attempt. This time he gives a definition which he has heard, and of which Socrates conjectures that Critias must be the author: 'Temperance is doing one's own business.' But the artisan who makes another man's shoes may be temperate, and yet he is

¹ Cp. Cic. Tusc. iii. 8, 16, '*σωφροσύνη*, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam tum moderationem appellare nonnunquam etiam modestiam:' foll.

not doing his own business; and temperance defined thus would be opposed to the division of labour which exists in every temperate or well-ordered state. How is this riddle to be explained?

Critias, who takes the place of Charmides, distinguishes in his answer between 'making' and 'doing,' and with the help of a misapplied quotation from Hesiod assigns to the words 'doing' and 'work' an exclusively good sense: temperance is doing one's own business;—(4) is doing good.

Still an element of knowledge is wanting which Critias is readily induced to admit at the suggestion of Socrates; and, in the spirit of Socrates and of Greek life generally, proposes as a fifth definition, (5) Temperance is self-knowledge. But all sciences have a subject: number is the subject of arithmetic, health of medicine—what is the subject of temperance or wisdom? The answer is that (6) Temperance is the knowledge of what a man knows and of what he does not know. But this is contrary to analogy; there is no vision of vision, but only of visible things; no love of loves, but only of beautiful things; how then can there be a knowledge of knowledge? That which is older, heavier, lighter, is older, heavier, and lighter than something else, not than itself, and this seems to be true of all relative notions—the object of relation is outside of them; at any rate they can only have relation to themselves in the form of that object. Whether there are any such cases of reflex relation or not, and whether that sort of knowledge which we term Temperance is of this reflex nature, has yet to be determined by the great metaphysician. But even if knowledge can know itself, how does the knowledge of what we know imply the knowledge of what we do not know? Besides, knowledge is an abstraction only, and will not inform us of any particular subject, such as medicine, building, and the like. It may tell us that we or other men know something, but can never tell us what we know.

Admitting that there is a knowledge of what we know and of what we do not know, which would supply a rule and measure of all things, still there would be no good in this; and the knowledge which temperance gives must be of a kind which will do us good; for temperance is a good. But this universal knowledge does not tend to our happiness and good: the only kind of knowledge which brings happiness is the knowledge of good and evil. To this Critias replies that the science or knowledge of good and evil, and all the other

sciences, are regulated by the higher science or knowledge of knowledge. Socrates replies by again dividing the abstract from the concrete, and asks how this knowledge conduces to happiness in the same definite way in which medicine conduces to health.

And now, after making all these concessions, which are really inadmissible, we are still as far as ever from ascertaining the nature of temperance, which Charmides has already discovered, and had therefore better rest in the knowledge that the more temperate he is the happier he will be, and not trouble himself with the speculations of Socrates.

In this Dialogue may be noted (1) The Greek ideal of beauty and goodness, the vision of the fair soul in the fair body, realised in the beautiful Charmides; (2) The true conception of medicine as a science of the whole as well as the parts, and of the mind as well as the body, which is playfully intimated in the story of the Thracian; (3) The tendency of the age to verbal distinctions, which here, as in the Protagoras and Cratylus, are ascribed to the ingenuity of Prodicus; and to interpretations or rather parodies of Homer or Hesiod, which are eminently characteristic of Plato and his contemporaries; (4) The germ of an ethical principle contained in the notion that temperance is 'doing one's own business,' which in the Republic (such is the shifting character of the Platonic philosophy) is given as the definition, not of temperance, but of justice; (5) The impatience which is exhibited by Socrates of any definition of temperance in which an element of science or knowledge is not included; (6) The beginning of metaphysics and logic implied in the two questions: whether there can be a science of science, and whether the knowledge of what you know is the same as the knowledge of what you do not know; and also in the distinction between 'what you know' and 'that you know,' *ἀ οἶδεν* and *ὅτι οἶδεν*; here too is the first conception of an absolute self-determined science (the claims of which, however, are disputed by Socrates, who asks *cui bono?*) as well as the first suggestion of the difficulty of the abstract and concrete, and one of the earliest anticipations of the relation of subject and object, and of the subjective element in knowledge—a 'rich banquet' of metaphysical questions in which we 'taste of many things.' (7) The conception of a science of good and evil also first occurs here, an anticipation of the Philebus and Republic, as well as of moral philosophy in later ages; (8) We may observe that a practice of virtue without philosophy is attributed

to Charmides, who already possesses that of which he and Socrates are seeking an explanation.

The dramatic interest of the Dialogue chiefly centres in the youth Charmides, with whom Socrates talks in the kindly spirit of an elder. His youthful simplicity and ingenuousness are contrasted with the dialectical and rhetorical arts of Critias, who is the grown-up man of the world, having a tincture of philosophy. No hint is given, either here or in the *Timaeus*, of the infamy which attaches to the name of the latter in Athenian history. He is simply a cultivated person who, like his kinsman Plato, is ennobled by the connection of his family with Solon (cp. *Tim.* 20, 21), and had been the follower, if not the disciple, both of Socrates and of the Sophists. In the argument he is not unfair, if allowance is made for a slight rhetorical tendency, and for a natural desire to save his reputation with the company; he is sometimes nearer the truth than Socrates. Nothing in his language or behaviour is unbecoming the guardian of the beautiful Charmides. His love of reputation is characteristically Greek, and contrasts with the humility of Socrates. Nor in Charmides himself do we find any resemblance to the Charmides of history, except, perhaps, the modest and retiring nature which, according to Xenophon, at one time of his life prevented him from speaking in the Assembly (*Mem.* 3, 7); and we are surprised to hear that, like Critias, he afterwards became one of the thirty tyrants. In the Dialogue he is a pattern of virtue, and is therefore in no need of the charm which Socrates is unable to apply. With youthful *naïveté*, keeping his secret and entering into the spirit of Socrates, he enjoys the detection of his elder and guardian Critias, who is easily seen to be the author of the definition which he has so great an interest in maintaining (262 B). The preceding definition, 'justice is doing one's own business,' is assumed to have been borrowed by Charmides from another; and when the enquiry becomes more abstract he is superseded by Critias: cp. *Theaet.* 168 E; *Euthyd.* 290 E. Socrates preserves his accustomed irony to the end; he is in the neighbourhood of several great truths, which he views in various lights, but always either by bringing them to the test of common sense, or by demanding too great exactness in the use of words, turns aside from them and comes at last to no conclusion.

The definitions of temperance proceed in regular order from the popular to the philosophical. The first two are simple enough and par-

tially true, like the first thoughts of an intelligent youth; the third, which is a real contribution to ethical philosophy, is perverted by the ingenuity of Socrates, and hardly rescued by an equal perversion on the part of Critias. The remaining definitions have a higher aim, which is to introduce the element of knowledge, and at last to unite good and truth in a single science. But the time has not yet arrived for the realization of this vision of metaphysical philosophy; and such a science when brought nearer to us in the *Philebus* and the *Republic* will not be called by the name of *σωφροσύνη*. Hence we see with surprise that Plato, who in his other writings identifies good and knowledge, here opposes them, and asks, almost in the spirit of Aristotle, how can there be a knowledge of knowledge, and even if attainable, how can such a knowledge be of any use?

The relations of knowledge and virtue are again brought forward in the companion Dialogues of the *Lysis* and *Laches*; and also in the *Protagoras* and *Euthydemus*. The opposition of abstract and particular knowledge in this Dialogue may be compared with a similar opposition of ideas and phenomena which occurs in the Introduction to the *Parmenides*, but seems rather to belong to a later stage of the philosophy of Plato.

CHARMIDES, OR TEMPERANCE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator.*

CHARMIDES.

CHAEREPHON.

CRITIAS.

SCENE:—The Palaestra of Taureas, which is near the Porch of the King Archon.

Steph. ¹⁵³ **Y**ESTERDAY evening I returned from the army at Potidaea, and having been a good while away, I thought that I would go and look at my old haunts. So I went into the palaestra of Taureas, which is over against the temple adjoining the porch of the King Archon, and there I found a number of persons, most of whom I knew, but not all. My visit was unexpected, and no sooner did they see me entering than they saluted me from afar on all sides; and Chaerephon, who is a kind of madman, started up and ran to me, seizing my hand, and saying, How did you escape, Socrates?—(I should explain that an engagement had taken place at Potidaea not long before we came away, the news of which had only just reached Athens.)

You see, I replied, that here I am.

There was a report, he said, that the engagement was very severe, and that many of our acquaintance had fallen.

That, I replied, was not far from the truth.

I suppose, he said, that you were present.

I was.

Then sit down, and tell us the whole story, which as yet we have only heard imperfectly.

I took the place which he assigned to me, by the side of Critias the son of Callaeschrus, and when I had saluted him

and the rest of the company, I told them the news from the army, and answered their several enquiries.

Then, when there had been enough of this, I, in my turn, began to make enquiries about matters at home—about the present state of philosophy, and about the youth. I asked whether any of them were remarkable for wisdom or beauty, or both. Critias, glancing at the door, invited my attention to some 154 youths who were coming in, and talking noisily to one another, followed by a crowd. Of the beauties, Socrates, he said, I fancy that you will soon be able to form a judgment. For those who are just entering are the advanced guard of the great beauty of the day, and he is likely to be not far off himself.

Who is he, I said; and who is his father?

Charmides, he replied, is his name; he is my cousin, and the son of my uncle Glaucon: I rather think that you know him, although he was not grown up at the time of your departure.

Certainly, I know him, I said, for he was remarkable even then when he was still a child, and I should imagine that now he must be almost a young man.

You will see, he said, in a moment what progress he has made and what he is like. He had scarcely said the word, when Charmides entered.

Now you know, my friend, that I cannot measure anything, and of the beautiful, I am simply such a measure as a white line is of chalk; for almost all young persons appear to be beautiful in my eyes. But at that moment, when I saw him coming in, I confess that I was quite astonished at his beauty and stature; all the world seemed to be enamoured of him; amazement and confusion reigned when he entered; and a troop of lovers followed him. That grown-up men like ourselves should have been affected in this way was not surprising, but I observed that there was the same feeling among the boys; all of them, down to the very least child, turned and looked at him, as if he had been a statue.

Chaerephon called me and said: What do you think of him, Socrates? Has he not a beautiful face?

Most beautiful, I said.

But you would think nothing of his face, he replied, if you could see his naked form: he is absolutely perfect.

And to this they all agreed.

By Heracles, I said, there never was such a paragon, if he has only one other slight addition.

What is that? said Critias.

If he has a noble soul; and being of your house, Critias, he may be expected to have this.

He is as fair and good within, as he is without, replied Critias.

Then, before we see his body, should we not ask him to show us his soul, naked and undisguised; he is just of an age at which he will like to talk.

155 That he will, said Critias, and I can tell you that he is a philosopher already, and also a considerable poet, not in his own opinion only, but in that of others.

That, my dear Critias, I replied, is a distinction which has long been in your family, and is inherited by you from Solon. But why do you not call him, and show him to us? for even if he were younger than he is, there could be no impropriety in his talking to us in the presence of you, who are his guardian and cousin.

Very well, he said; then I will call him; and turning to the attendant, he said, Call Charmides, and tell him that I want him to come and see a physician about the illness of which he spoke to me the day before yesterday. Then again addressing me, he added: He has been complaining lately of having a headache when he rises in the morning: now why should you not make him believe that you know a cure for the headache?

There will be no difficulty about that, I said, if he comes.

He will be sure to come, he replied.

He came as he was bidden, and sat down between Critias and me. Great amusement was occasioned by every one pushing with might and main at his neighbour in order to make a place for him next to them, until at the two ends of the row one had to get up and the other was rolled over sideways. Now I, my friend, was beginning to feel awkward; my former bold belief in my powers of conversing with him had vanished. And when Critias told him that I was the person who had the cure, he looked at me in such an indescribable manner, and was going to ask a question; and then all the people in the

palaestra crowded about us, and, O rare! I caught a sight of the inwards of his garment, and took the flame. Then I could no longer contain myself. I thought how well Cydias understood the nature of love, when, in speaking of a fair youth, he warns some one 'not to bring the fawn in the sight of the lion to be devoured by him,' for I felt that I had been overcome by a sort of wild-beast appetite. But I controlled myself, and when he asked me if I knew the cure of the headache, I answered, but with an effort, that I did know.

And what is it? he said.

I replied that it was a kind of leaf, which required to be accompanied by a charm, and if a person would repeat the charm at the same time that he used the cure, he would be made whole; but that without the charm the leaf would be of no avail.

Then I will write out the charm from your dictation, he said. 156

With my good will? I said, or without my good will?

With your good will, Socrates, he said, laughing.

Very good, I said? and are you quite sure that you know my name?

I ought to know you, he replied, for there is a great deal said about you among my companions; and I remember when I was a child seeing you in company with my cousin Critias.

I am glad to find that you remember me, I said; for I shall now be more at home with you and shall be better able to explain the nature of the charm, about which I felt a difficulty before. For the charm will do more, Charmides, than only cure the headache. I dare say that you have heard eminent physicians say to a patient who comes to them with bad eyes, that they cannot cure his eyes by themselves, but that if his eyes are to be cured, his head must be treated; and then again they say that to think of curing the head alone, and not the rest of the body also, is the height of folly. And arguing in this way they apply their methods to the whole body, and try to treat and heal the whole and the part together. Did you ever observe that this is what they say?

Yes, he said.

And they are right, and you would agree with them?

Yes, he said, certainly I should.

His approving answers reassured me, and I began by degrees

to regain confidence, and the vital heat returned. Such, Charmides, I said, is the nature of the charm, which I learned from one of the physicians of the Thracian king Zamolxis, when serving with the army. He was one of those who are said to give immortality. This Thracian told me that in these notions of theirs, which I was mentioning, the Greek physicians are quite right as far as they go; but Zamolxis, he added, our king, who is also a god, says further, 'that as you ought not to attempt to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the eyes, so neither ought you to attempt to cure the body without the soul; and this,' he said, 'is the reason why the cure of many diseases is unknown to the physicians of Hellas, because they are ignorant of the whole, which ought to be studied also; for the part can never be well unless the whole is well.' For all good and evil, whether in the body or in human nature, originates, as he declared, in the soul, and overflows from thence, 157 as from the head into the eyes. And therefore if the head and body are to be well, you must begin by curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure, my dear youth, has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted in the soul, and where temperance is, there health is speedily imparted, not only to the head, but to the whole body. And he who taught me the cure and the charm at the same time added a special direction: 'Let no one,' he said, 'persuade you to cure the head, until he has first given you his soul to be cured by the charm. For this,' he said, 'is the great error of our day in the treatment of the human body, that physicians separate the soul from the body.' And he added with emphasis, at the same time making me swear to his words, 'let no one, however rich, or noble, or fair, persuade you to give him the cure, without the charm.' Now I have sworn, and I must keep my oath, and therefore if you will allow me to apply the Thracian charm first to your soul, as the stranger directed, I will afterwards proceed to apply the cure to your head. But if not, I do not know what I am to do with you, my dear Charmides.

Critias, when he heard this, said: The headache will be an unexpected gain to my young relation, if the pain in his head compels him to improve his mind: and I can tell you, Socrates,

that Charmides is not only pre-eminent in beauty among his equals, but also in that quality which is given by the charm ; and this, as you say, is temperance ?

Yes, I said.

Then let me tell you that he is the most temperate of human beings, and for his age inferior to none in any quality.

Yes, I said, Charmides ; and indeed I think that you ought to excel others in all good qualities ; for if I am not mistaken there is no one present who could easily point out two Athenian houses, whose union would be likely to produce a better or nobler son than the two from which you are sprung. There is your father's house, which is descended from Critias the son of Dropidas, whose family has been commemorated in the panegyric verses of Anacreon, Solon, and many other poets, as famous for beauty and virtue and all other high fortune : and your mother's house is equally distinguished ; for your maternal uncle, Pyrilampes, never met with his equal in Persia at the court of the great king, or on the continent of Asia, in all the places to which he went as ambassador, for stature and beauty ; that whole family is not a whit inferior to the other. Having such ancestors you ought to be first in all things, and, sweet son of Glaucon, your outward form is no dishonour to any of them. If to beauty is added temperance, then blessed art thou, dear Charmides, in being the son of thy mother. And here lies the point ; for if, as Critias declares, you have this gift of temperance already, and are temperate enough, in that case you have no need of any charms, whether of Zamolxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean, and I may as well let you have the cure of the head at once ; but if you are wanting in this quality, I must use the charm before I give you the medicine. Please, therefore, to inform me whether you admit the truth of what Critias has been saying :—have you or have you not this quality of temperance ?

Charmides blushed, and the blush heightened his beauty, for modesty is becoming in youth ; he then said very ingenuously, that he really could not at once answer, either yes, or no, to the question which I had asked : For, said he, if I affirm that I am not temperate, that would be a strange thing for me to say of myself, and also I should give the lie to Critias, and many others

who think that I am temperate, as he tells you: but, on the other hand, if I say that I am, I shall have to praise myself, which would be ill manners; and therefore I have no answer to make to you.

I said to him: That is a natural reply, Charmides, and I think that you and I ought together to enquire whether you have this quality about which I am asking or not; and then you will not be compelled to say what you do not like; neither shall I be a rash practitioner of medicine: therefore, if you please, I will share the enquiry with you, but I will not press you if you would rather not.

There is nothing which I should like better, he said; and as far as I am concerned you may proceed in the way which you think best.

I think, I said, that I had better begin by asking you a question; for if temperance abides in you, you must have
159 an opinion about her; she must give some intimation of her nature and qualities, which may enable you to form a notion of her. Is not that true?

Yes, he said, that I think is true.

You know your native language, I said, and therefore you must be able to tell what you feel about this.

Certainly, he said.

In order, then, that I may form a conjecture whether you have temperance abiding in you or not, tell me, I said, what, in your opinion, is Temperance?

At first he hesitated, and was very unwilling to answer: then he said that he thought temperance was doing things orderly and quietly, such things for example as walking in the streets, and talking, or anything else of that nature. In a word, he said, I should answer that, in my opinion, temperance is quietness.

Are you right, Charmides? I said. No doubt some would affirm that the quiet are the temperate; but let us see whether there is any meaning in this; and first tell me whether you would not acknowledge temperance to be of the class of the noble and good?

Yes.

But which is best when you are at the writing-master's, to write the same letters quickly or quietly?

Quickly.

And to read quickly or slowly?

Quickly again.

And in playing the lyre, or wrestling, quickness or cleverness are far better than quietness and slowness?

Yes.

And the same holds in boxing and in the pancratium?

Certainly.

And in leaping and running, and bodily exercises generally, quickness and agility are good; slowness, and inactivity, and quietness, are bad?

That is evident.

Then, I said, in all bodily actions, not quietness, but the greatest agility and quickness, is noblest and best?

Yes, certainly.

And is temperance a good?

Yes.

Then, in reference to the body, not quietness, but quickness will be the higher degree of temperance, if temperance is a good?

True, he said.

And which, I said, is better—facility in learning, or difficulty in learning?

Facility.

Yes, I said; and facility in learning is learning quickly, and difficulty in learning is learning quietly and slowly?

True.

And is it not better to teach one another quickly and energetically, rather than quietly and slowly?

Yes.

And to call to mind, and to remember, quickly and readily—that is also better than to remember quietly and slowly?

Yes.

And is not shrewdness a quickness or cleverness of the soul, 160 and not a quietness?

True.

And is it not best to understand what is said, whether at the writing-master's or the music-master's, or anywhere else, not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible?

Yes.

And when the soul enquires, and in deliberations, not the quietest, as I imagine, and he who with difficulty deliberates and discovers, is thought worthy of praise, but he who does this most easily and quickly?

That is true, he said.

And in all that concerns either body or soul, swiftness and activity are clearly better than slowness and quietness?

That, he said, is the inference.

Then temperance is not quietness, nor is the temperate life quiet,—certainly not upon this view; for the life which is temperate is supposed to be the good. And of two things, one is true,—either never, or very seldom, do the quiet actions in life appear to be better than the quick and energetic ones; or supposing that of the nobler actions, there are as many quiet, as quick and vehement: still, even if we grant this, temperance will not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly and energetically, either in walking, or in anything else; nor will the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet, seeing that temperance is admitted by us to be a good and noble thing, and the quick have been shown to be as good as the quiet.

I think, he said, Socrates, that you are right.

Then once more, Charmides, I said, fix your attention, and look within; consider the effect which temperance has upon yourself, and the nature of that which has the effect. Think over all this, and, like a brave youth, tell me—What is temperance?

After a moment's pause, in which he made a real manly effort to think, he said: My opinion is, Socrates, that temperance makes a man ashamed or modest, and that temperance is the same as modesty.

Very good, I said; and did you not admit, just now, that temperance is noble?

Yes, certainly, he said.

And the temperate are also good?

Yes.

And can that be good which does not make men good?

Certainly not.

And you would infer that temperance is not only noble, but also good?

That is my opinion.

Well, I said ; and surely you would agree with Homer when he says,

‘Modesty is not good for a needy man’?

Yes, he said ; I agree to that.

Then I suppose that modesty is and is not good ?

That is plain.

But temperance, whose presence makes men only good, and not bad, is always good ?

That appears to me to be as you say.

And the inference is that temperance cannot be modesty—if temperance is a good, and if modesty is as much an evil as a good ?

All that, Socrates, appears to me to be true ; but I should like to know what you think about another definition of temperance, which I just now remember to have heard from some one, who said, ‘That temperance is doing our own business.’ Was he right who affirmed that ?

You monster ! I said ; this is what Critias, or some philosopher has told you.

Some one else, then, said Critias ; for certainly I have not.

But what matter, said Charmides, from whom I heard this ? .

No matter at all, I replied ; for the point is not who said the words, but whether they are true or not.

There you are in the right, Socrates, he replied.

To be sure, I said ; yet I doubt whether we shall ever be able to discover their truth or falsehood ; for they are a riddle.

What makes you think that ? he said.

Because, I said, he who uttered them seems to me to have meant one thing, and said another. Is the scribe, for example, to be regarded as doing nothing when he reads or writes ?

I should rather think that he was doing something.

And does the scribe write or read, or teach you boys to write or read, your own names only, or did you write your enemies’ names as well as your own and your friends’ ?

As much one as the other.

And was there anything meddling or intemperate in this ?

Certainly not.

And yet if reading and writing are the same as doing, you were doing what was not your own business?

But they are the same as doing.

And the healing art, my friend, and building, and weaving, and doing anything whatever which is done by art, all come under the head of doing?

Certainly.

And do you think that a state would be well ordered by a law which compelled every man to weave and wash his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and strigil, and other
162 implements, on this principle of every one doing and performing his own, and abstaining from what is not his own?

I think not, he said.

But, I said, a temperate state will be a well-ordered state.

Of course, he replied.

Then temperance, I said, will not be doing one's own business; not at least in this way, or doing these sort of things?

Clearly not.

Then, as I was just now saying, he who declared that temperance is a man doing his own business had another and a hidden meaning; for I do not think that he could have been such a fool as to mean this. Was he a fool who told you, Charmides?

Nay, he replied, I certainly thought him a very wise man.

Then I am quite certain that he put forth his definition as a riddle, thinking that no one would know the meaning of the words 'doing his own business.'

I dare say, he replied.

And what is the meaning of a man doing his own business? Can you tell me?

Indeed, I cannot; and I should not wonder if he who said this did not understand what he was saying. Whereupon he laughed slyly, and looked at Critias.

Critias had long been showing uneasiness, for he felt that he had a reputation to maintain with Charmides and the rest of the company. He had, however, hitherto managed to restrain himself; but now he could no longer forbear, and his eagerness satisfied me of the truth of my suspicion, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias. And

Charmides, who did not want to answer himself, but to make Critias answer, tried to stir him up. He went on pointing out that he had been refuted, at which Critias grew angry, and appeared, as I thought, inclined to quarrel with him; just as a poet might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in repeating them; so he looked hard at him and said—

Do you imagine, Charmides, that the author of the definition of temperance did not understand the meaning of his own words, because you do not understand them?

Why, at his age, I said, most excellent Critias, he can hardly be expected to understand; but you, who are older, and have studied, may well be assumed to know the meaning of them; and therefore, if you agree with him, and accept his definition of temperance, I would much rather argue with you than with him about the truth or falsehood of the definition.

I entirely agree, said Critias, and accept the definition.

Very good, I said; and now let me repeat my question—Do you admit, as I was just now saying, that all craftsmen make or do something?

I do.

And do they make or do their own business only, or that of 163 others also?

They make that of others also.

And are they temperate, seeing that they make not for themselves or their own business only?

Why not? he said.

No objection on my part, I said, but there may be a difficulty on his who proposes as a definition of temperance, 'doing one's own business,' and then says that there is no reason why those who do the business of others should not be temperate.

Nay¹, said he; did I ever acknowledge that those who do the business of others are temperate? I said, those who make, not those who do.

What! I asked; do you mean to say that doing and making are not the same?

No more, he replied, than making or working are the same;

¹ The English reader has to observe that the word 'make' (*ποιεῖν*), in Greek has also the sense of 'do' (*πράττειν*).

that I have learned from Hesiod, who says that 'work is no disgrace.' Now do you imagine that if he had meant by working such things as you were describing, he would have said that there was no disgrace in them? in making shoes, for example, or in selling pickles, or sitting for hire in a house of ill fame. That, Socrates, is not to be supposed: but I conceive him to have distinguished making from action and work; and, while admitting that the making anything might sometimes become a disgrace, when the employment was not honourable, to have thought that work was never any disgrace at all. For things nobly and usefully made he called works; and such makings he called workings, and doings; and he must be supposed to have called such things only man's proper business, and what is hurtful, not his business: and in that sense Hesiod, and any other wise man, may be reasonably supposed to call him wise who does his own work.

O Critias, I said, no sooner had you opened your mouth, than I pretty well knew that you would call that which is proper to a man, and that which is his own, good; and that the makings (*ποιήσεις*) of the good you would call doings (*πράξεις*), for I have heard Prodicus drawing endless distinctions about names. Now I have no objection to your giving names any signification which you please, if you will only tell me what you mean by them. Please then to begin again, and be a little plainer. Do you mean that this doing or making, or whatever is the word which you would use, of good actions, is temperance?

I do, he said.

Then not he who does evil, but he who does good, is temperate?

Yes, he said; and you would agree to that.

Never mind whether I agree or not; as yet we are only concerned with your meaning.

Well, he answered; I mean to say, that he who does evil, and not good, is not temperate; and that he is temperate who does good, and not evil: for temperance I define in plain words to be the doing of good actions.

164 And you may be very likely right in that, I said; but I am curious to know whether you imagine that temperate men are ignorant of their own temperance?

I do not imagine that, he said.

And yet were you not saying, just now, that craftsmen might be temperate in doing another's work, as well as in doing their own?

Yes, I was, he replied; but why do you refer to that?

I have no particular reason, but I wish that you would tell me whether a physician who cures a patient may do good to himself and good to another also?

I think that he may.

And he who does this does his duty. And does not he who does his duty act temperately or wisely?

Yes, he acts wisely.

But must the physician necessarily know when his treatment is likely to prove beneficial, and when not? or must the craftsman necessarily know when he is likely to be benefited, and when not to be benefited, by the work which he is doing?

I suppose not.

Then, I said, he may sometimes do good or harm, and not know what he is himself doing, and yet, in doing good, as you say, he has done temperately or wisely. Was not that your statement?

Yes.

Then, as would seem, in doing good, he may act wisely or temperately, and be wise or temperate, but not know his own wisdom or temperance?

But that, Socrates, he said, is impossible; and therefore if that is, as you imply, the necessary consequence of any of my previous admissions, I will withdraw them, rather than admit that a man can be temperate or wise who does not know himself; and I am not ashamed to confess that I was in error. For self-knowledge would certainly be maintained by me to be the very essence of knowledge, and in this I agree with him who dedicated the inscription, 'Know thyself!' at Delphi. That word, if I am not mistaken, is put there as a sort of salutation which the god addresses to those who enter the temple; as much as to say that the ordinary salutation of 'Hail!' is not right, and that the exhortation 'Be temperate!' would be a far better way of saluting one another. The notion of him who dedicated the inscription was, as I believe,

that the god speaks to those who enter his temple not as men speak; but, when a worshipper enters, the first word which he hears is 'Be temperate!' This, however, like a prophet he expresses in a sort of riddle, for 'Know thyself!' and 'Be temperate!' are the same, as I maintain, and as the writing implies [*σωφρόνει, γνῶθι σεαυτόν*], and yet they may
 165 be easily misunderstood; and succeeding sages who added 'Never too much,' or, 'Give a pledge, and evil is nigh at hand,' would appear to have misunderstood them; for they imagined that 'Know thyself!' was a piece of advice which the god gave, and not his salutation of the worshippers at their first coming in; and they wrote their inscription under the idea that they would give equally useful pieces of advice. Shall I tell you, Socrates, why I say all this? My object is to leave the previous discussion (in which I know not whether you or I are more right, but, at any rate, no clear result was attained), and to raise a new one in which I will attempt to prove, if you deny, that temperance is self-knowledge.

Yes, I said, Critias; but you come to me as though I professed to know about the questions which I ask, and as though I could, if only I would, agree with you². Whereas the fact is that I enquire with you into the truth of that which is advanced from time to time, just because I do not know; and when I have enquired, I will say whether I agree with you or not. Please then to allow me time to reflect.

Reflect, he said.

I am reflecting, I replied, and discover that temperance, or wisdom, if implying a knowledge of anything, must be a science, and a science of something.

Yes, he said; the science of itself.

Is not medicine, I said, the science of health?

True.

And suppose, I said, that I were asked by you what is the use or effect of medicine, which is this science of health, I should answer that medicine is of very great use in producing health, which, as you will admit, is an excellent effect.

Granted.

² Reading, according to Heusde's conjecture, *ὁμολογήσοντός σοι*.

And if you were to ask me, what is the result or effect of architecture, which is the science of building, I should say, houses, and so of other arts, which all have their different results. Now I want you, Critias, to answer a similar question about temperance, or wisdom, which, according to you, is the science of itself. Admitting this view, I ask of you, what good work, worthy of the name wise, does temperance or wisdom, which is the science of itself, effect? Answer me.

That is not the true way of pursuing the enquiry, Socrates, he said; for wisdom is not like the other sciences, any more than they are like one another: but you proceed as if they were alike. For tell me, he said, what result is there of computation or geometry, in the same sense as a house is the result of building, or a garment of weaving, or any other work of any other art? Can you show me any such result of them? You cannot. 166

That is true, I said; but still each of these sciences has a subject which is different from the science. I can show you that the art of computation has to do with odd and even numbers in their numerical relations to themselves and to each other. Is not that true?

Yes, he said.

And the odd and even numbers are not the same with the art of computation?

They are not.

The art of weighing, again, has to do with lighter and heavier; but the art of weighing is one thing, and the heavy and the light another. Do you admit that?

Yes.

Now, I want to know, what is that which is not wisdom, and of which wisdom is the science?

That is precisely the old error, Socrates, he said. You come asking in what wisdom or temperance differs from the other sciences, and then you try to discover some respect in which they are alike; but they are not, for all the other sciences are of something else, and not of themselves; wisdom alone is a science of other sciences, and of itself. And of this, as I believe, you are very well aware; and that you are only doing what you denied that you were doing just now, trying to refute me, instead of pursuing the argument.

And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other motive in refuting you but what I should have in examining into myself? which motive would be just a fear of my unconsciously fancying that I knew something of which I was ignorant. And at this moment I pursue the argument chiefly for my own sake, and perhaps in some degree also for the sake of my other friends. For is not the discovery of things as they truly are a good common to all mankind?

Yes, certainly, Socrates, he said.

Then, I said, be cheerful, sweet sir, and give your opinion in answer to the question which I asked, never minding whether Critias or Socrates is the person refuted; attend only to the argument, and see what will come of the refutation.

I think that you are right, he replied; and I will do as you say.

Tell me, then, I said, what you mean to affirm about wisdom.

I mean, he said, that wisdom is the only science which is the science of itself and of the other sciences as well.

But the science of science, I said, will also be the science of the absence of science.

Very true, he said.

167 Then the wise or temperate man, and he only, will know himself, and be able to examine what he knows or does not know, and see what others know, and think that they know and do really know; and what they do not know, and fancy that they know, when they do not. No other person will be able to do this. And this is the state and virtue of wisdom, or temperance, and self-knowledge, which is just knowing what a man knows, and what he does not know. That is your view?

Yes, he said.

Now then, I said, making an offering of the third or last argument to Zeus the Saviour, let us once more begin, and ask, in the first place, whether this knowledge that you know and do not know what you know and do not know is possible; and in the second place, whether, if perfectly possible, such knowledge is of any use.

That is what we must consider, he said.

And here, Critias, I said, I hope that you will find a way out

of a difficulty into which I have got myself. Shall I tell you the difficulty?

By all means, he replied.

Does not what you have been saying, if true, amount to this: that there must be a science which is wholly a science of itself, and also of other sciences, and that the same is also the science of the absence of science?

Yes.

But consider how monstrous this is, my friend: in any parallel case, the impossibility will be transparent to you.

How is that? and in what cases do you mean?

In such cases as this: Suppose that there is a kind of vision which is not like ordinary vision, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision, and of the defect of them, which in seeing sees no colour, but only itself and other sorts of vision: Do you think that there is such a kind of vision?

Certainly not.

Or is there a kind of hearing which hears no sound at all, but only itself and other sorts of hearing, or the defects of them?

There is not.

Or take all the senses: can you imagine that there is any sense of itself and of other senses, but which is incapable of perceiving the objects of the senses?

I think not.

Could there be any desire which is not the desire of any pleasure, but of itself, and of all other desires?

Certainly not.

Or can you imagine a wish which wishes for no good, but only for itself and all other wishes?

I should answer, No.

Or would you say that there is a love which is not the love of beauty, but of itself and of other loves?

I should not.

Or did you ever know of a fear which fears itself or other fears, but has no object of fear?

I never did, he said.

Or of an opinion which is an opinion of itself and of other opinions, and which has no opinion on the subjects of opinion in general?

Certainly not.

But surely we are assuming a science of this kind, which, having no subject-matter, is a science of itself and of the other sciences; for that is what is affirmed. Now this is strange, if true: however, we must not as yet absolutely deny the possibility of such a science; let us rather consider the matter.

You are quite right.

Well then, this science of which we are speaking is a science of something, and is of a nature to be a science of something?

Yes.

Just as that which is greater is of a nature to be greater than something³?

Yes.

Which is less, if the other is to be conceived as greater?

To be sure.

And if we could find something which is at once greater than itself, and greater than other great things, but not greater than those things in comparison of which the others are greater, then that thing would have the property of being greater and also less than itself?

That, Socrates, he said, is the inevitable inference.

Or if there be a double which is double of other doubles and of itself, these will be halves; for the double is relative to the half?

That is true.

And that which is greater than itself will also be less, and that which is heavier will also be lighter, and that which is older will also be younger: and the same of other things; that which has a nature relative to self will retain also the nature of its object: I mean to say, for example, that hearing is, as we say, of sound or voice. Is that true?

Yes.

Then if hearing hears itself, it must hear a voice; for there is no other way of hearing.

³ Socrates is intending to show that science differs from the object of science, as any other relative differs from the object of relation. But where there is comparison—greater, less, heavier, lighter, and the like—a relation to self as well as to other things involves an absolute contradiction; and in other cases, as in the case of the senses, is hardly conceivable. The use of the genitive after the comparative in Greek, *μείζον τινος*, creates an unavoidable obscurity in the translation.

Certainly.

And sight also, my excellent friend, if it sees itself must see a colour, for sight cannot see that which has no colour.

No.

Then do you see, Critias, that in several of the examples which have been recited the notion of a relation to self is altogether inadmissible, and in other cases hardly credible—inadmissible, for example, in the case of magnitudes, numbers, and the like.

Very true.

But in the case of hearing and sight, or in the power of self-motion, and the power of heat to burn, this relation to self will be regarded as incredible by some, but perhaps not by others. 169 And some great man, my friend, is wanted, who will satisfactorily determine for us, whether there is nothing which has an inherent property of relation to self, or some things only and not others; and whether in this latter class, if there be such a class, that science which is called wisdom or temperance is included. I altogether distrust my own power of determining this: I am not certain whether there is such a science of science at all; and even if there be, I should not acknowledge this to be wisdom or temperance, until I can also see whether such a knowledge would or would not do us any good; for I have an impression that temperance is a benefit and a good. And therefore, O son of Callaeschrus, as you maintain that temperance or wisdom is a science of science, and also of the absence of science, I will request you to show in the first place, as I was saying before, the possibility, and in the second place, the advantage, of such a science; and then perhaps you may satisfy me that you are right in your view of temperance.

Critias heard me say this, and saw that I was in a difficulty; and as one person when another yawns in his presence catches the infection of yawning from him, so did he seem to be driven into a difficulty by my difficulty. But as he had a reputation to maintain, he was ashamed to admit before the company that he could not answer my challenge or determine the question at issue; and he made an unintelligible attempt to hide his perplexity. In order that the argument might proceed, I said to him, Well then, Critias, if you like, let us assume that there

is this science of science ; whether the assumption is right or wrong may hereafter be investigated. But fully admitting this, will you tell me how such a science enables us to distinguish what we know or do not know, which, as we were saying, is self-knowledge or wisdom : that is what we were saying ?

Yes, Socrates, he said ; and that I think is certainly true : for he who has this science or knowledge which knows itself will become like the knowledge which he has, in the same way that he who has swiftness will be swift, and he who has beauty will be beautiful, and he who has knowledge will know. In the same way he who has that knowledge which is self-knowing, will know himself.

I do not doubt, I said, that a man will know himself, when he possesses that which has self-knowledge : but what necessity is there that, having this, he should know what he knows and what he does not know ?

170 Because, Socrates, they are the same.

Very likely, I said ; but I remain as stupid as ever ; for still I fail to comprehend how this knowing what you know and do not know is the same as the knowledge of self.

What do you mean ? he said.

This is what I mean, I replied : I will admit that there is a science of science ;—can this do more than determine that of two things one is and the other is not science or knowledge ?

No, just that.

But is knowledge or want of knowledge of health the same as knowledge or want of knowledge of justice ?

Certainly not.

The one is medicine, and the other is politics ; whereas that of which we are speaking is knowledge pure and simple.

Very true.

And if a man knows only, and has only knowledge of knowledge, and has no further knowledge of health and justice, the probability is that he will only know that he knows something, and has a certain knowledge, whether concerning himself or other men.

True.

Then how will this knowledge or science teach him to know what he knows ? Say that he knows health ;—not wisdom or

temperance, but the art of medicine has taught him that ;—and he has learned harmony from the art of music, and building from the art of building,—neither, from wisdom or temperance : and the same of other things.

That is evident.

How will wisdom, regarded only as a knowledge of knowledge or science of science, ever teach him that he knows health, or that he knows building ?

That is impossible.

Then he who is ignorant of this will only know that he knows, but not what he knows ?

True.

Then wisdom or being wise appears to be not the knowledge of the things which we do or do not know, but only the knowledge that we know or do not know ?

That is the inference.

Then he who has this knowledge will not be able to examine whether a pretender knows or does not know that which he says that he knows : he will only know that he has a knowledge of some kind ; but wisdom will not show him of what the knowledge is ?

Plainly not.

Neither will he be able to distinguish the pretender in medicine from the true physician, nor between any other true and false professor of knowledge. Let us consider the matter in this way : If the wise man or any other man wants to distinguish the true physician from the false, what is he to do ? He will not talk to him about medicine ; and that, as we were saying, is the only thing which the physician understands.

True.

And, on the other hand, the physician knows nothing of science, for this has been assumed to be the province of wisdom.

True.

And further, since medicine is science, we must infer that he 171 does not know anything of medicine.

Exactly.

Then the wise man may indeed know that the physician has some kind of science or knowledge ; but when he wants to

discover the nature of this he will ask, What is the subject-matter? For each science is distinguished, not as science, but by the nature of the subject. Is not that true?

Yes; that is quite true.

And medicine is distinguished from other sciences as having the subject-matter of health and disease?

Yes.

And he who would enquire into the nature of medicine must pursue the enquiry into health and disease, and not into what is extraneous?

True.

And he who judges rightly will judge of the physician as a physician in what relates to these?

He will.

He will consider whether what he says is true, and whether what he does is right in relation to these?

He will.

But can any one appreciate either without having a knowledge of medicine?

He cannot.

Nor any one but the physician, not even the wise man, as appears; for that would require him to be a physician as well as a wise man?

Very true.

Then, assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else.

That is evident, he said.

But then what profit, Critias, I said, is there any longer in wisdom or temperance which yet remains, if this is wisdom? If, indeed, as we were supposing at first, the wise man had been able to distinguish what he knew and did not know, and that he knew the one and did not know the other, and to recognize a similar faculty of discernment in others, there would certainly have been a great advantage in being wise; for then we should never have made a mistake, but have passed through

life the unerring guides of ourselves and of those who were under us ; and we should not have attempted to do what we did not know, but we should have found out those who knew, and confided in them ; nor should we have allowed those who were under us to do anything which they were not likely to do well ; and they would be likely to do well just that of which they had knowledge ; and the house or state which was ordered or administered under the guidance of wisdom, and everything else of which wisdom was the lord, would have been well ordered ; for truth guiding, and error having been expelled, in all their doings, men would have done well, and would have 172 been happy. Was not this, Critias, what we spoke of as the great advantage of wisdom—to know what is known and what is unknown to us ?

Very true, he said.

And now you perceive, I said, that no such science is to be found anywhere.

I perceive, he said.

May we assume then, I said, that wisdom, viewed in this new light merely as a knowledge of knowledge and ignorance, has this advantage:—that he who possesses such knowledge will more easily learn anything which he learns ; and that everything will be clearer to him, because, in addition to the knowledge of individuals, he sees the science, and this also will better enable him to test the knowledge which others have of what he knows himself ; whereas the enquirer who is without this knowledge may be supposed to have a feebler and weaker insight ? Are not these, my friend, the real advantages which are to be gained from wisdom ? And are not we looking and seeking after something more than is to be found in her ?

That is very likely, he said.

That is very likely, I said ; but very likely, too, we have been enquiring to no purpose ; as I am led to infer, because I observe that if this is wisdom, some strange consequences would follow. Let us, if you please, assume the possibility of this science of sciences, and further admit and allow, as was originally suggested, that wisdom is the knowledge of what we know and do not know. Assuming all this, still, upon further consideration, I am doubtful, Critias, whether wisdom,

such as this, would do us any good. For we were wrong, I think, in supposing, as we were saying just now, that such wisdom ordering the government of house or state would be a great benefit.

How is that? he said.

Why, I said we were far too ready to admit the great benefits which mankind would obtain from their severally doing the things which they knew, and committing to others who knew the things of which they are ignorant.

Were we not right in making that admission?

I think not.

That is certainly strange, Socrates.

By the dog of Egypt, I said, there I agree with you; and I was thinking as much just now when I said that strange consequences would follow, and that I was afraid we were on the wrong track; for however ready we may be to admit
173 that this is wisdom, I certainly cannot make out what good this sort of thing does to us.

What do you mean? he said; I wish that you could make me understand what you mean.

I dare say that what I am saying is nonsense, I replied; and yet if a man has any feeling of what is due to himself, he cannot let the thought which comes into his mind pass away unheeded and unexamined.

I like that, he said.

Hear, then, I said, my own dream; whether coming through the horn or the ivory gate, I cannot tell. The dream is this: Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us; then each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no one professing to be a pilot when he is not, or any physician or general, or any one else pretending to know matters of which he is ignorant, will deceive or elude us; our health will be improved; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured; our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements will be well made, because the workmen will be good and true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy, which is the knowledge of the future, will be under the control of wisdom, and that she will deter deceivers and set up the true prophet

in their place as the revealer of the future. Now I quite agree that mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance from intruding on us. But we have not as yet discovered why, because we act according to knowledge, we act well and are happy, my dear Critias.

Yet I think, he replied, that if you discard knowledge, you will hardly find the crown of happiness in anything else.

But of what is this knowledge? I said. Just answer me that small question. Do you mean a knowledge of shoemaking?

God forbid.

Or of working in brass?

Certainly not.

Or in wool, or wood, or anything of that sort?

No, I do not.

Then, I said, we are giving up the doctrine that he who lives according to knowledge is happy, for these live according to knowledge, and yet they are not allowed by you to be happy; but I think that you mean to confine happiness to particular individuals who live according to knowledge, such for example 174 as the prophet, who, as I was saying, knows the future.

Yes, I mean him, but there are others as well.

Yes, I said, some one who knows the past and present as well as the future, and is ignorant of nothing. Let us suppose that there is such a person, and if there is, you will allow that he is the most knowing of all living men.

Certainly he is.

Yet I should like to know one thing more: which of the different kinds of knowledge makes him happy? or do all equally make him happy?

Not all equally, he replied.

But which most tends to make him happy? the knowledge of what past, present, or future thing? May I infer this to be the knowledge of the game of draughts?

Nonsense about the game of draughts.

Or of computation?

No.

Or of health?

That is nearer the truth, he said.

And that knowledge which is nearest of all, I said, is the knowledge of what ?

The knowledge with which he discerns good and evil.

Monster! I said; you have been carrying me round in a circle, and all this time hiding from me the fact that the life according to knowledge is not that which makes men act rightly and be happy, nor all the sciences put together, but one science only, that of good and evil. For, let me ask you, Critias, whether, if you take away this, medicine will not equally give health, and shoemaking equally produce shoes, and the art of the weaver clothes?—whether the art of the pilot will not equally save our lives at sea, and the art of the general in war ?

Quite so.

And yet, my dear Critias, none of these things will be well or beneficially done, if the science of the good be wanting.

That is true.

But that science is not wisdom or temperance, but a science of human advantage; not a science of other sciences, or of ignorance, but of good and evil: and if this be of use, then wisdom or temperance will not be of use.

And why, he replied, will not wisdom be of use? For if we really assume that wisdom is a science of sciences, and has a sway over other sciences, surely she will have this particular science of the good under her control, and in this way will benefit us.

And will wisdom give health? I said; is not this rather the effect of medicine? Or does wisdom do the work of any of the other arts,—do they not each of them do their own work? Have we not long ago asseverated that wisdom is only the knowledge of knowledge and of ignorance, and of nothing else?

That is clear.

Another art is the producer of health.

Another.

The art of health is different.

Yes, different.

175 Nor does wisdom give advantage, my good friend; for that again we have just now been attributing to another art.

Very true.

How then can wisdom be advantageous, giving no advantage?

That, Socrates, is certainly inconceivable.

You see then, Critias, that I was not far wrong in fearing that I could have no sound notion about wisdom; I was quite right in depreciating myself; for that which is admitted to be the best of all things would never have seemed to us useless, if I had been good for anything at an enquiry. But now I have been utterly defeated, and have failed to discover what that is to which the imposer of names gave this name of temperance or wisdom. And yet many more admissions were made by us than could be really granted; for we admitted that there was a science of science, although the argument said No, and protested against us; and we admitted further, that this science knew the works of the other sciences (although this too was denied by the argument), because we wanted to show that the wise man had knowledge of what he knew and did not know; also we nobly disregarded, and never even considered, the impossibility of a man knowing in a sort of way that which he does not know at all; for our assumption was, that he knows that which he does not know; than which nothing, as I think, can be more irrational. And yet, after finding us so easy and good-natured, the enquiry is still unable to discover the truth; but mocks us to a degree, and has gone out of its way to prove the inutility of that which we admitted only by a sort of supposition and fiction to be the true definition of temperance or wisdom: which result, as far as I am concerned, is not so much to be lamented, I said. But for your sake, Charmides, I am very sorry—that you, having such beauty and such wisdom and temperance of soul, should have no profit or good in life from your wisdom and temperance. And still more am I grieved about the charm which I learned with so much pain, and to so little profit, from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth. I think indeed that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad enquirer, for I am persuaded that wisdom or temperance is really a great good; and happy are you if you possess that good. And therefore examine yourself, and see whether you have this gift 176 and can do without the charm; for if you can, I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to

reason out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are, the happier you will be.

Charmides said: I am sure that I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I know whether I have that, the very nature of which even you and Critias, as you say, are unable to discover? —(not that I believe you.) And further, I am sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm, and as far as I am concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say that I have had enough.

Very good, Charmides, said Critias; if you do this I shall have a proof of your temperance, that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, and never desert him at all.

You may depend on my following and not deserting him, said Charmides: if you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you.

And I do command you, he said.

Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day.

You sirs, I said, what are you conspiring about?

We are not conspiring, said Charmides, we have conspired already.

And are you about to use violence, without even going through the forms of justice?

Yes, I shall use violence, he replied, since he orders me; and therefore you had better consider well.

But the time for consideration has passed, I said, when violence is employed; and you, when you are determined on anything, and in the mood of violence, are irresistible.

Do not you resist me then, he said.

I will not resist you, I replied.

LYSIS.

INTRODUCTION.

No answer is given in the *Lysis* to the question, 'What is Friendship?' any more than in the *Charmides* to the question, 'What is Temperance?' There are several resemblances in the two Dialogues: the same youthfulness and sense of beauty pervades both of them; they are alike rich in the description of Greek life. The question is again raised of the relation of knowledge to virtue and good, which also recurs in the *Laches*; and Socrates appears again as the elder friend of the two boys *Lysis* and *Menexenus*. In the *Charmides*, as also in the *Laches*, he is described as middle-aged; in the *Lysis* he is advanced in years.

The Dialogue consists of two scenes or conversations which seem to have no relation to each other. The first is a conversation between Socrates and *Lysis*, who, like *Charmides*, is an Athenian youth of noble descent and of great beauty, goodness, and intelligence: this is carried on in the absence of *Menexenus*, who is called away to take part in a sacrifice. Socrates asks *Lysis* whether his father and mother do not love him very much? 'Yes, that they do.' 'Then of course they allow him to do exactly as he likes.' 'Of course not: the very slaves have more liberty than he has.' 'But how is this?' 'The reason is that he is not old enough.' 'No; the real reason is that he is not wise enough: for are there not some things which he is allowed to do, although he is not allowed to do others?' 'Yes, because he knows them, and does not know the others.' This leads to the conclusion that all men everywhere will trust him in what he knows, but not in what he does not know; for in such matters he will be unprofitable to them, and do them no good. And no one will love him, if he does them no good; and he can only do them good by knowledge; and as he is still without knowledge, he can have as yet no conceit of knowledge. In this

manner Socrates reads a lesson to Hippothales, the foolish lover of Lysis, respecting the style of conversation which he should address to his beloved.

After the return of Menexenus, Socrates, at the request of Lysis, asks him a new question: 'What is friendship? You, Menexenus, who have a friend already, can tell me, who am always longing to find one, what is the secret of this great blessing.'

When one man loves another, which is the friend—he who loves, or he who is loved? or are both friends? From the first of these suppositions they are driven to the second; and from the second to the third; and neither the two boys nor Socrates are satisfied with any of them. Socrates turns to the poets, who affirm that God brings like to like (Homer), and to philosophers (Empedocles), who assert also that like is the friend of like. But the bad are not friends, for they are not even like themselves, and still less are they like one another. And the good have no need of one another, and therefore do not care about one another. Moreover there are others who say that likeness is a cause of aversion, and unlikeness of love and friendship; and they too adduce the authority of poets and philosophers in support of their doctrines; for Hesiod says that 'potter is jealous of potter, bard of bard;' and subtle doctors tell us that 'moist is the friend of dry, hot of cold,' and the like. But neither can their doctrine be maintained; for then the just would be the friend of the unjust, good of evil.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that like is not the friend of like, nor unlike of unlike; and therefore good is not the friend of good, nor evil of evil, nor good of evil, nor evil of good. What remains but that the indifferent, which is neither good nor evil, should be the friend (not of the indifferent, for that would be 'like the friend of like,' but) of the good, or rather of the beautiful?

But why should the indifferent have this attachment to the beautiful or good? There are circumstances under which such an attachment would be natural. Suppose the indifferent, say the human body, to be desirous of getting rid of some evil, such as disease, which is not essential but only accidental to it (for if the evil were essential the body would cease to be indifferent, and would become evil)—in such a case the indifferent becomes a friend of the good for the sake of getting rid of the evil. In this intermediate 'indifferent' position the philosopher or lover of wisdom stands: he is not wise, and yet not unwise, but he

has ignorance accidentally clinging to him, and he yearns for wisdom as the cure of the evil. (Cp. Symp. 204.)

After this explanation has been received with triumphant accord, a fresh dissatisfaction begins to steal over the mind of Socrates: Must not friendship be for the sake of some ulterior end? and what can that final cause or end of friendship be, other than the good? But the good is desired by us only as the cure of evil; and therefore if there were no evil there would be no friendship. Some other explanation then has to be devised. May not desire be the source of friendship? And desire is of what a man wants and of what is congenial to him. But then again, the congenial cannot be the same as the like; for like cannot be the friend of like. Nor can the congenial be explained as the good; for good is not the friend of good, as has been also shown. The problem is unsolved, and the three friends, Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, are still unable to find out what a friend is.

Thus, as in the Charmides and Laches, and several of the other Dialogues of Plato (compare especially the Protagoras and Theaetetus), no conclusion is arrived at. Socrates maintains his character of a 'know nothing;' the boys have already learned the lesson which he is unable to teach them, and they are free from the conceit of knowledge. (Cp. Charm.) The dialogue is what would be called in the language of Thrasylus tentative or inquisitive. The subject is continued in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and treated, with a manifest reference to the Lysis, in the eighth and ninth books of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. As in other writings of Plato (for example, the Republic), there is a progress from unconscious morality, illustrated by the friendship of the two youths, and also by the sayings of the poets ('who are our fathers in wisdom,' and yet only tell us half the truth, and in this particular instance are not much improved upon by the philosophers), to a more comprehensive notion of friendship. This, however, is far from being cleared of its perplexity. Two notions appear to be struggling or balancing in the mind of Socrates:—First, the sense that friendship arises out of human needs and wants; Secondly, that the higher form or ideal of friendship exists only for the sake of the good. That friends are not necessarily either like or unlike, is also a truth confirmed by experience. But the use of the terms 'like' or 'good' is too strictly limited; Socrates has allowed himself to be carried away by a sort of eristic or illogical logic against

which no definition of friendship would be able to stand. In the course of the argument (217 D, E) he makes a distinction between property and accident which is a real contribution to the science of logic. Some higher truths appear through the mist. The manner in which the field of argument is widened, as in the Charmides and Laches by the introduction of the idea of knowledge, so here by the introduction of the good, is deserving of attention. The sense of the interdependence of good and evil, and the allusion to the possibility of the non-existence of evil, are also very remarkable.

The dialectical interest is fully sustained by the dramatic accompaniments. Observe, first, the scene, which is a Greek Palaestra, at a time when a sacrifice is going on, and the Hermaea are in course of celebration; secondly, the 'accustomed irony' of Socrates, who declares, as in the Symposium (177 D), that he is ignorant of all other things, but claims to have a knowledge of the mysteries of love. There are also several contrasts of character; first of the dry, caustic Ctesippus, of whom Socrates professes a humorous sort of fear, and Hippothales the flighty lover, who murders sleep by bawling out the name of his beloved; also there is a contrast between the false, exaggerated, sentimental love of Hippothales towards Lysis, and the simple and innocent friendship of the boys with one another. Some difference appears to be intended between the characters of the more talkative Menexenus and the reserved and simple Lysis. Socrates draws out the latter by a new sort of irony, which is sometimes adopted in talking to children, and consists in asking a leading question which can only be answered in a sense contrary to the intention of the question: 'Your father and mother of course allow you to drive the chariot?' 'No they do not.' When Menexenus returns, the serious dialectic begins. He is described as 'very pugnacious,' and we are thus prepared for the part which a mere youth takes in a difficult argument. But Plato has not forgotten dramatic propriety, and Socrates proposes at last to refer the question to some older person (223 A).

LYSIS, OR FRIENDSHIP.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator.* MENEXENUS. !
HIPPOTHALES. LYSIS.
CTESIPPUS.

SCENE:—A newly-erected Palaestra outside the walls of Athens.

Steph. **I** WAS going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum, in-
203 tending to take the outer road, which is close under the wall. When I came to the postern gate of the city, which is by the fountain of Panops, I fell in with Hippothales, the son of Hieronymus, and Ctesippus the Paeanian, and a company of young men who were standing with them. Hippothales, seeing me approach, asked whence I came and whither I was going.

I am going, I replied, from the Academy straight to the Lyceum.

Then come straight to us, he said, and put in here; you may as well.

Who are you, I said; and where am I to come?

He showed me an enclosed space and an open door over against the wall. And there, he said, is the building at which we all meet: and a goodly company we are.

And what is this building, I asked; and what sort of entertainment have you?

204 The building, he replied, is a newly-erected Palaestra; and the entertainment is generally conversation, to which you are welcome.

Thank you, I said; and is there any teacher there?

Yes, he said, your old friend and admirer, Miccus.

Indeed, I replied ; he is a very eminent professor.

Are you disposed, he said, to go with me and see them ?

Yes, I said ; but I should like to know first, what is expected of me, and who is the favourite among you ?

Some persons have one favourite, Socrates, and some another, he said.

And who is yours ? I asked : tell me that, Hippothales.

At this he blushed ; and I said to him, O Hippothales, thou son of Hieronymus ! do not say that you are, or that you are not, in love ; the confession is too late ; for I see not only that you are in love, but that you are already far gone in your love. Simple and foolish as I am, the Gods have given me the power of understanding this sort of affections.

At this he blushed more and more.

Ctesippus said : I like to see you blushing, Hippothales, and hesitating to tell Socrates the name ; when, if he were with you but for a very short time, he would be plagued to death by hearing of nothing else. Indeed, Socrates, he has literally deafened us, and stopped our ears with the praises of Lysis ; and if he is a little intoxicated, there is every likelihood that we may have our sleep murdered with a cry of Lysis. His performances in prose are bad enough, but nothing at all in comparison with his verse ; and when he drenches us with his poems and other compositions, that is really too bad ; and what is even worse, is his manner of singing them to his love ; this he does in a voice which is truly appalling, and we cannot help hearing him : and now he has a question put to him by you, and lo ! he is blushing.

Who is Lysis ? I said : I suppose that he must be young ; for the name does not recall any one to me.

Why, he said, his father being a very well-known man, he retains his patronymic, and is not as yet commonly called by his own name ; but, although you do not know his name, I am sure that you must know his face, for that is quite enough to distinguish him.

But tell me whose son he is, I said.

He is the eldest son of Democrates, of the deme of Aexonè.

Ah, Hippothales, I said ; what a noble and really perfect love you have found ! I wish that you would favour me with the exhibition which you have been making to the rest of the com-

205 pany, and then I shall be able to judge whether you know what a lover ought to say about his love, either to the youth himself, or to others.

Nay, Socrates, he said; you surely do not attach any weight to what he is saying.

Do you mean, I said, that you disown the love of the person whom he says that you love?

No; but I deny that I make verses or address compositions to him.

He is not in his right mind, said Ctesippus; he is talking nonsense, and is stark mad.

O Hippothales, I said, if you have ever made any verses or songs in honour of your favourite, I do not want to hear them; but I want to know the purport of them, that I may be able to judge of your mode of approaching your fair one.

Ctesippus will be able to tell you, he said; for if, as he avers, I talk to him of nothing else, he must have a very accurate knowledge and recollection of that.

Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; I know only too well; and very ridiculous the tale is: for although he is a lover, and very devotedly in love, he has nothing particular to talk about to his beloved which a child might not say. Now is not that ridiculous? He can only speak of the wealth of Democrates, which the whole city celebrates, and grandfather Lysis, and the other ancestors of the youth, and their stud of horses, and their victory at the Pythian games, and at the Isthmus, and at Nemea with four horses and single horses; and these he sings and says, and greater twaddle still. For the day before yesterday he made a poem in which he described how Heracles, who was a connexion of the family, was entertained by an ancestor of Lysis as his relation; this ancestor was himself the son of Zeus and the daughter of the founder of the demc. And these are the sort of old wives' tales which he sings and recites to us, and we are obliged to listen to him.

When I heard this, I said: O ridiculous Hippothales! how can you be making and singing hymns in honour of yourself before you have won?

But my songs and verses, he said, are not in honour of myself, Socrates.

You think not, I said.

But what are they, then? he replied.

Most assuredly, I said, those songs are all in your own honour; for if you win your beautiful love, your discourses and songs will be a glory to you, and may be truly regarded as hymns of praise composed in honour of you who have conquered and won such a love; but if he slips away from you, the more you have praised him, the more ridiculous you will look at having lost this fairest and best of blessings; and therefore the wise lover does not praise his beloved until he 206 has won him, because he is afraid of accidents. There is also another danger; the fair, when any one praises or magnifies them, are filled with the spirit of pride and vain-glory. Is not that true?

Yes, he said.

And the more vain-glorious they are, the more difficult is the capture of them?

I believe that.

What should you say of a hunter who frightened away his prey, and made the capture of the animals which he is hunting more difficult?

He would be a bad hunter, that is clear.

Yes; and if, instead of soothing them, he were to infuriate them with words and songs, that would show a great want of wit: do you not agree with me?

Yes.

And now reflect, Hippothales, and see whether you are not guilty of all these errors in writing poetry. For I can hardly suppose that you will affirm a man to be a good poet who injures himself by his poetry.

Assuredly not, he said: I should be a fool if I said that; and this makes me desirous, Socrates, of taking you into my counsels, and I shall be glad of any further advice which you may have to offer. Will you tell me by what words or actions I may become endeared to my love?

That is not easy to determine, I said; but if you will bring your love to me, and will let me talk with him, I may perhaps be able to show you how to converse with him, instead of singing and reciting in the fashion of which you are accused.

There will be no difficulty in bringing him, he replied ; if you will only go into the house with Ctesippus, and sit down and talk, I believe that he will come of himself ; for he is fond of listening, Socrates. And as this is the festival of the Hermaea, the young men and boys are all together, and there is no separation between them. He will be sure to come : but if he does not, Ctesippus with whom he is familiar, and whose relation Menexenus is his great friend, shall call him.

That will be the way, I said. Thereupon I and Ctesippus went towards the Palaestra, and the rest followed.

Upon entering we found that the boys had just been sacrificing ; and this part of the festival was nearly at an end. They were all in white array, and games at dice were going on among them. Most of them were in the outer court amusing themselves ; but some were in a corner of the Apodyterium playing at odd and even with a number of dice, which they took out of little wicker baskets. There was also a circle of lookers on, one of whom was Lysis. He was standing among the other
207 boys and youths, having a crown upon his head, like a fair vision, and not less worthy of praise for his goodness than for his beauty. We left them, and went over to the opposite side of the room, where, finding a quiet place, we sat down ; and then we began to talk. This attracted Lysis, who was constantly turning round to look at us—he was evidently wanting to come to us. For a time he hesitated and had not the courage to come alone ; but first of all, his friend Menexenus came in out of the court in the interval of his play, and when he saw Ctesippus and myself, came and sat by us ; and then Lysis, seeing him, followed, and sat down with him ; and the other boys joined. I should observe that Hippothales, when he saw the crowd, got behind them, where he thought that he would be out of sight of Lysis, lest he should anger him ; and there he stood and listened.

I turned to Menexenus, and said : Son of Demophon, which of you two youths is the elder ?

That is a matter of dispute between us, he said.

And which is the nobler ? Is that a matter of dispute too ?

Yes, certainly.

And another disputed point is, which is the fairer ?

The two boys laughed.

I shall not ask which is the richer, I said ; for you two are friends, are you not ?

Certainly, they replied.

And friends have all things in common, so that one of you can be no richer than the other, if you say truly that you are friends.

They assented. I was about to ask which was the juster of the two, and which was the wiser of the two ; but at this moment Menexenus was called away by some one who came and said that the gymnastic-master wanted him. I supposed that he had to offer sacrifice. So he went away, and I asked Lysis some more questions. I dare say, Lysis, I said, that your father and mother love you very much.

That they do, he said.

And they would wish you to be perfectly happy.

Yes.

But do you think that any one is happy who is in the condition of a slave, and who cannot do what he likes ?

I should think not indeed, he said.

And if your father and mother love you, and desire that you should be happy, no one can doubt that they are very ready to promote your happiness.

Certainly, he replied.

And do they then permit you to do what you like, and never rebuke you or hinder you from doing what you desire ?

Yes, indeed, Socrates ; there are a great many things which they hinder me from doing.

What do you mean ? I said. Do they want you to be happy, and yet hinder you from doing what you like ? for example, if 208
you want to mount one of your father's chariots, and take the reins at a race, they will not allow you to do that—they will prevent you ?

Certainly, he said, they will not allow me to do that.

Whom then will they allow ?

There is a charioteer, whom my father pays for driving.

And do they trust a hireling more than you ? and may he do what he likes with the horses ? and do they pay him for this ?

They do.

But I dare say that you may take the whip and guide the mule-cart if you like;—they will permit that?

Permit me! no they will not.

Then, I said, may no one use the whip to the mules?

Yes, he said, the muleteer.

And is he a slave or a free man?

A slave, he said.

And do they esteem a slave of more value than you who are their son? And do they entrust their property to him rather than to you? and allow him to do what he likes, when you may not? Answer me now: Are you your own master, or do they not even allow that?

Nay, he said; of course they do not allow that.

Then you have a master?

Yes, my tutor; there he is.

And is he a slave?

To be sure; he is our slave, he replied.

Surely, I said, this is a strange thing, that a free man should be governed by a slave. And what does he do with you?

He takes me to my teachers.

You do not mean to say that your teachers also rule over you?

Of course they do.

Then I must say that your father is pleased to inflict many lords and masters on you. But at any rate when you go home to your mother, she will let you have your own way, and will not interfere with your happiness; her wool, or the piece of cloth which she is weaving, are at your disposal: I am sure that there is nothing to hinder you from touching her wooden spathe, or her comb, or any other of her spinning implements.

Nay, Socrates, he replied, laughing; not only does she hinder me, but I should be beaten, if I were to touch one of them.

Well, I said, that is amazing. And did you ever behave ill to your father or your mother?

No, indeed, he replied.

But why then are they so terribly anxious to prevent you from being happy, and doing as you like?—keeping you all day long in subjection to another, and, in a word, doing nothing which you desire; so that you have no good, as would appear, 209 out of their great possessions, which are under the control of

anybody rather than of you, and have no use of your own fair person, which is committed to the care of a shepherd; while you, Lysis, are master of nobody, and can do nothing?

Why, he said, Socrates, the reason is that I am not of age.

I doubt whether that is the real reason, I said; for I should imagine that your father Democrates, and your mother, do permit you to do many things already, and do not wait until you are of age: for example, if they want anything read or written, you, I presume, would be the first person in the house who is summoned by them.

Very true.

And you would be allowed to write or read the letters in any order which you please, or to take up the lyre and tune the notes, and play with the fingers, or strike with the plectrum, exactly as you please, and neither father nor mother would interfere with you.

That is true, he said.

Then what can be the reason, Lysis, I said, why they allow you to do the one and not the other?

I suppose, he said, because I understand the one, and not the other.

Yes, my dear youth, I said, the reason is not any deficiency of years, but a deficiency of knowledge; and whenever your father thinks that you are wiser than he is, he will instantly commit himself and his possessions to you.

That I believe.

Aye, I said; and about your neighbour, too, does not the same rule hold as about your father? If he is satisfied that you know more of housekeeping than he does, will he continue to administer his affairs himself, or will he commit them to you?

I think that he will commit them to me.

Will not the Athenian people, too, entrust their affairs to you when they see that you have wisdom enough to manage them?

Yes.

And oh! let me put another case, I said: There is the great king, and he has an eldest son, who is the Prince of Asia;—suppose that you and I go to him and establish to his satisfaction that we are better cooks than his son, will he not entrust to us the prerogative of making soup, and putting in anything

that we like while the pot is boiling, rather than to the Prince of Asia, who is his son?

To us, clearly.

And we shall be allowed to throw in salt by handfuls, whereas the son will not be allowed to put in as much as he can take up between his fingers?

Of course.

Or suppose again that the son has bad eyes, will he allow him, or will he not allow him, to touch his own eyes if he thinks that he has no knowledge of medicine?

210 He will not allow him.

Whereas, if we are supposed to have a knowledge of medicine, he will allow us to do what we like with him—even to open the eyes wide and sprinkle ashes upon them, because he supposes that we know what is best?

That is true.

And everything in which we appear to him to be wiser than himself or his son he will commit to us?

That is very true, Socrates, he replied.

Then now, my dear Lysis, I said, you perceive that in things which we know every one will trust us,—Hellenes and barbarians, men and women,—and we may do as we please about them, and no one will like to interfere with us; we shall be free, and masters of others; and these things will be really ours, for we shall be benefited by them. But in things of which we have no understanding, no one will trust us to do as seems good to us—they will hinder us as far as they can; and not only strangers, but father and mother, and the friend, if there be one, who is dearer still, will also hinder us; and we shall be subject to others; and these things will not be ours, for we shall not be benefited by them. Do you admit that?

He assented.

And shall we be friends to others, and will any others love us, in as far as we are useless to them?

Certainly not.

Neither can your father or mother love you, nor can anybody love anybody else, in as far as they are useless to them?

No.

And therefore, my boy, if you are wise, all men will be your

friends and kindred, for you will be useful and good ; but if you are not wise, neither father, nor mother, nor kindred, nor any one else, will be your friends. And in matters of which you have as yet no knowledge, can you have any conceit of knowledge ?

That is impossible, he replied.

And you, Lysis, if you require a teacher, have not yet attained to wisdom.

True.

And therefore you are not conceited, having nothing of which to be conceited.

Indeed, Socrates, I think not.

When I heard him say this, I turned to Hippothales, and was very nearly making a blunder, for I was going to say to him : That is the way, Hippothales, in which you should talk to your beloved, humbling and lowering him, and not as you do, puffing him up and spoiling him. But I saw that he was in great excitement and confusion at what had been said, and I remembered that, although he was in the neighbourhood, he did not want to be seen by Lysis ; so I thought better and refrained. 211

In the meantime Menexenus came back and sat down in his place by Lysis ; and Lysis, in a childish and affectionate manner, whispered privately in my ear, so that Menexenus should not hear : Do, Socrates, tell Menexenus what you have been telling me.

Suppose that you tell him yourself, Lysis, I replied ; for I am sure that you were attending.

That I was, he replied.

Try, then, to remember the words, and be as exact as you can in repeating them to him, and if you have forgotten anything, ask me again the next time that you see me.

I will be sure to do that, Socrates ; but go on telling him something new, and let me hear, as long as I am allowed to stay.

I certainly cannot refuse, I said, as you ask me ; but then, as you know, Menexenus is very pugnacious, and therefore you must come to the rescue if he attempts to upset me.

Yes, indeed, he said ; he is very pugnacious, and that is the reason why I want you to argue with him.

That I may make a fool of myself?

No, indeed, he said ; but that you may put him down.

That is no easy matter, I replied ; for he is a terrible fellow—a pupil of Ctesippus. And there is Ctesippus : do you see him?

Never mind, Socrates, you shall argue with him.

Well, I suppose that I must, I replied.

Hereupon Ctesippus complained that we were talking in secret, and keeping the feast to ourselves.

I shall be happy, I said, to let you have a share. Here is Lysis, who does not understand something that I was saying, and wants me to ask Menexenus, who, as he thinks, will be able to answer.

And why do not you ask him? he said.

Very well, I said, I will ask him ; and do you, Menexenus, answer. But first I must tell you that I am one who from my childhood upward have set my heart upon a certain thing. All people have their fancies ; some desire horses, and others dogs ; and some are fond of gold, and others of honour. Now, I have no violent desire of any of these things ; but I have a passion for friends ; and I would rather have a good friend than the best cock or quail in the world : I would even go further, and say than a horse or dog. Yea, by the dog of Egypt, I should
 212 greatly prefer a real friend to all the gold of Darius, or even to Darius himself : I am such a lover of friends as that. And when I see you and Lysis, at your early age, so easily possessed of this treasure, and so soon, he of you, and you of him, I am amazed and delighted, seeing that I myself, although I am now advanced in years, am so far from having made a similar acquisition, that I do not even know in what way a friend is acquired. But I want to ask you a question about this, for you have experience : tell me then, when one loves another, is the lover or the beloved the friend ; or may either be the friend ?

I think that either may be the friend.

Do you mean, I said, that if only one of them loves the other, they are mutual friends ?

Yes, he said ; that is my meaning.

But what if the lover is not loved in return? That is a possible case.

Yes.

Or is, perhaps, even hated? for that is a fancy which lovers sometimes have. Nothing can exceed their love; and yet they imagine either that they are not loved in return, or that they are hated. Is not that true?

Yes, he said, quite true.

In that case, the one loves, and the other is loved?

Yes.

Then which is the friend of which? Is the lover the friend of the beloved, whether he be loved in return, or hated; or is the beloved the friend; or is there no friendship at all on either side, unless they both love one another?

There would seem to be none at all.

Then that is at variance with our former notion. Just now, both were friends, if one only loved; and now, unless they both love, neither is a friend.

That appears to be true.

Then nothing which does not love in return is beloved by a lover?

I think not.

Then they are not lovers of horses, whom the horses do not love in return; nor lovers of quails, nor of dogs, nor of wine, nor of gymnastic exercises, who have no return of love; no, nor of wisdom, unless wisdom loves them in return. Or shall we say that they do love them, although they are not beloved by them; and that the poet was wrong who sings:—

‘Happy the man to whom his children are dear, and steeds having single hoofs, and dogs of chase, and the stranger of another land.’

I do not think that he was wrong.

Then you think that he is right?

Yes.

Then, Menexenus, the conclusion is, that what is beloved may be dear, whether loving or hating: for example, very young children, too young to love, or even hating their father or 213 mother when they are punished by them, are never dearer to them than at the time when they are being hated by them.

I think that what you say is true.

And, if so, not the lover, but the beloved, is the friend or dear one?

Yes.

And the hated one, and not the hater, is the enemy?

That is plain.

Then many men are loved by their enemies, and hated by their friends, and are the friends of their enemies, and the enemies of their friends—this, my dear friend, is the absurdity, or rather the impossibility, which follows, if the beloved is dear and not the lover.

I believe, Socrates, that what you say is true.

But if this cannot be, the lover will be the friend of that which is loved?

True.

And the hater will be the enemy of that which is hated?

Certainly.

Yet we must acknowledge in this, as in the preceding instance, that a man may be the friend of one who is not his friend, or who may be his enemy, when he loves that which does not love him, or perhaps hates him. And he may be the enemy of one who is not his enemy, and is even his friend: for example, when he hates that which does not hate him, or perhaps even loves him.

That appears to be true.

But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor both together, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one another? Do any remain?

Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.

But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in our conclusions?

I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed as he spoke; for the words seemed to come from his lips involuntarily, because he was taken up with the argument; there was no mistaking his attentive look while he was listening.

I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted to give Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, that what you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never have gone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for the road seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other in which the poets

will be our guide ; for they are to us in a manner the fathers ²¹⁴ and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in no light or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and draws them to one another ; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in the following words :—

‘God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.’

I dare say that you have heard those words.

Yes, he said ; I have.

And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say that like must love like ? they are the people who argue and write about nature and the universe.

That is true, he said.

And are they right in saying that ?

They may be.

Perhaps, I said, about half right, or probably altogether right, if their meaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to do with a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him, the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him ; and injurer and injured cannot be friends. Is not that true ?

Yes, he said.

Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another ?

That is true.

But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good are like one another, and friends to one another ; and that the bad, as is often said of them, are never at unity with one another or with themselves ; for they are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance and enmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any other thing. Do you not agree to that ?

Yes, I do.

Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like mean to intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friend of the good, and of him only ; but that the evil never attains to any real friendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree ?

He nodded assent.

Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for the argument declares 'That the good are friends.'

Yes, he said, that is true.

Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. Shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like, inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him—or rather let me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good or harm to like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his like which he would not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of any
215 use to the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now?

They cannot.

And can he who is not loved be a friend?

Certainly not.

But say that the like is not the friend of the like in as far as he is like; still the good may be the friend of the good in as far as he is good.

True.

But then again, will not the good, in as far as he is good, be sufficient for himself? And he who is sufficient wants nothing—that is implied in the word sufficient.

Of course not.

And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?

He will not.

Neither can he love that which he does not desire?

He cannot.

And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?

Clearly not.

What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have no desire of one another (for when alone they are sufficient for themselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can such persons ever be induced to value one another?

They cannot.

And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?

Very true.

But see now, Lysis, how we are being deceived in all this; are we not entirely wrong?

How is that? he said.

Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like is the greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?—Yes, and he quoted the authority of Hesiod, who says:

‘Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard,
Beggar with beggar;’

and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, ‘That of necessity the most like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, and the most unlike of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be the friend of the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick man of the physician; every one who knows not has to love and court him who knows.’ And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, that the idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly; for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike: for example, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet, the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the void, and so of all other things; for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas like receives nothing from like. And 216 I thought that he was a charming man who said this, and that he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?

I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.

Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?

Exactly.

Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not the all-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough, whether love is not the very opposite of hate? and what answer shall we make to them—must we not admit that they speak truly?

That we must.

They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of the friend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?

Neither, he replied.

Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of the intemperate, or the good of the bad?

I do not see how that is possible.

And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must be friends.

They must.

Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.

I suppose not.

And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions of friendship be erroneous? but still may there not be cases in which that which is neither good nor bad is the friend of the good?

How do you mean? he said.

Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is dizzy with thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that 'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says. Beauty is certainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature which easily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that the good is the beautiful. You will agree to that?

Yes.

This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is the friend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclined to think so: I assume that there are three principles—the good, the bad, and that which is neither good nor bad. What do you say to that?

I agree.

And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil, nor the good of the evil;—that the preceding argument will not allow: and therefore the only alternative is—if there be such a thing as friendship or love at all—that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend, either of the good, or of that which is neither good nor evil, for nothing can be the friend of the bad.

True.

Nor can like be the friend of like, as we were just now saying.

True.

Then that which is neither good nor evil can have no friend which is neither good nor evil.

That is evident.

Then the good alone is the friend of that only which is neither good nor evil.

That may be assumed to be certain.

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And does not this seem to put us in the right way? Just remark, that the body which is in health requires neither medical nor any other aid, but is well enough; and the healthy man has no love of the physician, because he is in health.

He has none.

But the sick loves him, because he is sick?

Certainly.

And sickness is an evil, and the art of medicine a good and useful thing?

Yes.

But the human body, regarded as a body, is neither good nor evil?

True.

And the body is compelled by reason of disease to court and make friends of the art of medicine?

Yes.

Then that which is neither good nor evil becomes the friend of good, by reason of the presence of evil?

That is the inference.

And clearly this must have happened before that which was neither good nor evil had become altogether corrupted with the element of evil, for then it would not still desire and love the good; for, as we were saying, the evil cannot be the friend of the good.

That is impossible.

Further, I must observe that some substances are assimilated when others are present with them; and there are some which are not assimilated: take, for example, the case of an ointment or colour which is put on another substance.

Very good.

In such a case, is the substance which is anointed the same as the colour or ointment?

What do you mean? he said.

This is what I mean, I said: Suppose that I were to cover your auburn locks with white lead, would they be really white, or would they only appear to be white?

They would only appear to be white, he replied.

And yet whiteness would be present in them.

True.

But that would not make them at all the more white, notwithstanding the presence of white in them—they would be neither white nor black.

True.

But when old age infuses whiteness into them, then they become assimilated, and are white by the presence of white.

Certainly.

Now I want to know whether in all cases a substance is assimilated by the presence of another substance; or must the presence be after a peculiar sort?

The latter, he said.

Then that which is neither good nor evil may be in the presence of evil, but not as yet evil, and that has happened before now?

True.

And when anything is in the presence of evil, not being as yet evil, the presence of good arouses the desire of good in that thing; but the presence of evil, which makes a thing evil, takes away the desire and friendship of the good; for that which was once both good and evil has now become evil only, and the good had no friendship with the evil?

None.

And therefore we say that those who are already wise, whether Gods or men, are no longer lovers of wisdom; nor can they be lovers of wisdom, who are ignorant to the extent of being evil, for no evil or ignorant person is a lover of wisdom. There remain those who have the misfortune to be ignorant, but are not yet hardened in their ignorance, or void of understanding, and do not as yet fancy that they know what they do not know: and therefore those who are the lovers of wisdom are as yet neither good nor bad. But the bad do not love wisdom any more than the good; for, as we have already seen, neither unlike is the friend of unlike, nor like of like. You remember that?

Yes, they both said.

And so, Lysis and Menexenus, we have discovered the nature

of friendship—there can be no doubt of that: Friendship is the love which the neither good nor evil has of the good, when the evil is present, either in the soul, or in the body, or anywhere.

They both agreed and entirely assented, and for a moment I rejoiced and was satisfied like a huntsman whose prey is within his grasp. But then a suspicion came across me, and I fancied unaccountably that the conclusion was untrue, and I felt pained, and said, Alas! Lysis and Menexenus, I am afraid that we have gained a shadow.

Why do you say that? said Menexenus.

I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: arguments, like men, are often pretenders.

How is that? he asked.

Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend of some one; is he not?

Certainly he is.

And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive and object?

He has a motive and object.

And is the object which makes him a friend dear to him, or neither dear nor hateful to him?

I do not quite follow you, he said.

I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter in another way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will be clearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friend of the physician—is he not?

Yes.

And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sake of health?

Yes.

And disease is an evil?

Certainly.

And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither?

Good, he replied.

And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor evil, because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend of medicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine

has entered into this friendship for the sake of health, and health is a good.

True.

And is health a friend, or not a friend?

A friend.

And disease is an enemy?

Yes.

Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good because of the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?

That is clear.

Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of the enemy?

That is to be inferred.

Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard against deceptions. I will no more say that the friend is the friend of the friend, and the like of the like, which has been declared by us to be an impossibility; but, in order that this new statement may not delude us, let us attentively examine another point, which I will proceed to explain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to us for the sake of health?

Yes.

And health is also dear?

Certainly.

And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?

Yes.

And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previous admissions?

Yes.

And that something dear involves something else dear?

Yes.

But then, proceeding in this way, we shall at last come to an end, and arrive at some first principle of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referred to any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things are dear.

Certainly.

My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for the sake of that other, are illusions and deceptions only, of which that other is the reality or true principle of friendship.

Let me put the matter thus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is more precious to his father than all his other treasures); would not the father, who values his son above all things, value other things also for the sake of his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunk hemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would value the wine?

Certainly.

And also the vessel which contains the wine?

Certainly.

But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthen vessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather the true state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means which are provided for the sake 220 of an object, but to the object for the sake of which they are provided. And although we may often say that gold and silver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for the truth is that there is a further object, whatever that may be, which we value most of all, and for the sake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us. Am I not right?

Yes, certainly.

And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to us for the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the truly dear is that in which all these so-called dear friendships terminate.

That, he said, appears to be true.

And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sake of any other or further dear.

True.

Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?

That is my view.

And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case in this way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that which is neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, and that evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or body, nor ever at all that class of things which, as we say, are neither good nor evil in themselves;—would the good be of any use, or other than

useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Then would be clearly seen that we did but love and desire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy of the evil, which was the disease; but if there had been no disease, there would have been no need of a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good—to be loved because of the evil, by us who are between the two? but there is no use in the good for its own sake.

I suppose that you are right.

Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendships which are relative only, were supposed by us to terminate, is of another and a different nature from them. For they are called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the true friend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to be dear because of the hated, and if the hated were away, the loved would no longer stay.

That is true, he replied: at least, that is implied in the argument.

But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, we should hunger any more, or thirst any more, or
 221 have any similar desire? Or may we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, but not so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other desires,—that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished? Or rather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be is ridiculous, for who knows? This we do know, that in our present condition hunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:—Is not that true?

Yes.

And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good and sometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?

To be sure.

But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evil should also perish?

None.

Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evil will remain?

That is evident.

And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?
He must.

Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of love or friendship?

Yes.

But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing will be the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for the effect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.

True.

And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for a reason? and the reason then given was because of the evil which leads the neither good nor evil to love the good?

Very true.

But now our view is changed, and there must be some other cause of friendship?

I suppose that there must.

May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is the cause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which is desired at the time of desire? and may not the other theory have been only a long story about nothing?

That is possibly true.

But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?

Yes.

And that of which he is in want is dear to him?

True.

And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?

Certainly.

Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural or congenial. That, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference.

They assented.

Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial to one another?

Certainly, they both said.

And I say, my boys, that no one who loves or desires
 222 another would ever have loved or desired or affected him, if
 he had not been in some way congenial to him, either in his
 soul, or in his character, or in his manners, or in his form.

Yes, yes, said Menexenus. But Lysis was silent.

Then, I said, the conclusion is, that what is of a congenial
 nature must be loved.

That follows, he said.

Then the lover, who is true and no counterfeit, must of
 necessity be loved by his love.

Lysis and Menexenus gave a faint assent to this; and Hip-
 pothales changed into all manner of colours with delight.

Here, intending to revise the argument, I said: Can we
 point out any difference between the congenial and the like?
 For if that is possible, then I think, Lysis and Menexenus,
 there may be some sense in our argument about friendship.
 But if the congenial is only the like, how will you get rid of
 the other argument, of the uselessness of like to like in as far
 as they are like; for to say that what is useless is dear, would
 be absurd? Suppose, then, that we agree to distinguish between
 the congenial and the like—in the intoxication of argument,
 that may perhaps be allowed.

Very true.

And shall we further say that the good is congenial, and the
 evil uncongenial to every one? Or again that the evil is con-
 genial to the evil, and the good to the good; and that which
 is neither good nor evil to that which is neither good nor evil?

They agreed to the latter alternative.

Then, my boys, we have again fallen into the old discarded
 error; for the unjust will be the friend of the unjust, and the
 bad of the bad, as well as the good of the good.

That appears to be true.

But again if we say that the congenial is the same as the
 good, in that case the good will only be the friend of the good.

True.

But that too was a position of ours which, as you will re-
 member, has been already refuted by ourselves.

We remember.

Then what is to be done? Or rather is there anything to

be done? I can only, like the wise men who argue in courts, sum up the arguments:—If neither the beloved, nor the lover, nor the like, nor the unlike, nor the good, nor the congenial, nor any other of whom we spoke—for there were such a number of them that I cannot remember them—if, I say, none of these are friends, I know not what remains to be said.

Here I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, 223 when suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them go home, as it was getting late. At first, we and the by-standers drove them off; but afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the boys—they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the Hermaea, which made them difficult to manage—we fairly gave way and broke up the company.

I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting: O Menexenus and Lysis, how ridiculous that you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would fain be one of you, should imagine ourselves to be friends—this is what the by-standers will go away and say—and as yet we have not been able to discover what is a friend!

LACHES.

INTRODUCTION.

LYSIMACHUS, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son of the elder Thucydides, two aged men who live together, are desirous of educating their sons in the best manner. Their own education, as often happens with the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they are resolved that their children shall have more care taken of them, than they received themselves at the hands of their fathers.

At their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a man named Stesilaus fighting in heavy armour. The two fathers ask the two generals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they would advise that their sons should acquire the accomplishment. Nicias and Laches are quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest that Socrates should be invited to take part in the consultation. He is a stranger to Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognised as the son of his old friend Sophroniscus, with whom he never had a difference to the hour of his death. Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he had introduced the excellent Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for his son, and to Laches, who had witnessed his heroic behaviour at the battle of Delium (cp. *Symp.* 221).

Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers to wait until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in a characteristic manner. Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favour of the new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war—useful when the ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken; creating a general interest in military studies, and greatly adding to the appearance of the soldier in the field. Laches, the blunt warrior, is of opinion that such an art is not knowledge, and

cannot be of any value, because the Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglect it. His own experience in actual service has taught him that these pretenders are useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seen by him on board ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. The possession of the art will make the coward rash, and subject the courageous, if he chance to make a slip, to invidious remarks. And now let Socrates be taken into counsel. As they differ he must decide.

Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes: in such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, he would consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has works to show as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has never been able to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never had the wit to do or discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are older and richer than he is: they have had teachers, and perhaps have made discoveries; and he would have trusted them entirely, if they had not been diametrically opposed.

Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of the younger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. He earnestly requests Socrates to remain;—in this showing, as Nicias says, how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until he has cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has often submitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn from Socrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond to his words.

Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better and more thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What is Virtue?'—or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtue which is concerned with the use of weapons—'What is Courage?' Laches thinks that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at his post.' But some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas in Homer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea. (2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of military courage, but of courage of all sorts, tried both amid pleasures and pains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance. But courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful and injurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. But then again unintelligent endur-

ance may often be more courageous than the intelligent, the bad than the good. How is this contradiction to be solved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to the Dorian mode' of words and actions; for their words are all confusion, although their actions are courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an argument about endurance. Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that he knows what courage is, if he could only tell.

Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition which he has heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage is intelligence.' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sort of intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of things terrible.' 'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his own art.' 'No they do not. They may predict results, but cannot tell whether they are really terrible; only the courageous man can do that.' Laches draws the inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or a god.

Again, (2) in Nicias' way of speaking, the term 'courageous' must be denied to animals or children, because they do not know the danger. Against this inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims, but is in some degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage. Still, he does not like to see an Athenian statesman and general descending to sophistries of this sort. Socrates resumes the argument. Courage has been defined to be intelligence or knowledge of the terrible; and courage is not all virtue, but only one of the virtues. The terrible is in the future, and therefore the knowledge of the terrible is a knowledge of the future. But there can be no knowledge of future good or evil separated from a knowledge of the good and evil of the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil. Courage, therefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally. But he who has the knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have courage, but also temperance, justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a single virtue would be the same as all virtues (cp. Protagoras, 350 foll.). And after all the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still in ignorance of the nature of courage. They must go to school again, boys, old men and all.

Some points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear in the Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis. There is less of poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest

and power. They are richer in the externals of the scene; the Laches has more play and development of character. In the *Lysis* and *Charmides* the youths are the central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place of meeting, which is a palaestra. Here the place of meeting, which is also a palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part. The *séance* is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest.

First is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in the *Republic*, and, like him, withdraws from the argument. Melesias, who is only his shadow, also subsides into silence. Both of them, by their own confession, have been ill-educated, as is further shown by the circumstance that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has never heard of the fame of Socrates, his son; they belong to different circles. In the *Meno* (p. 94) their want of education in all but the arts of riding and wrestling is adduced as a proof that virtue cannot be taught. The recognition of Socrates by Lysimachus is extremely graceful; and his military exploits naturally connect him with the two generals, of whom one has witnessed them. The characters of Nicias and Laches are indicated by their opinions on the exhibition of the man fighting in heavy armour. The more enlightened Nicias is quite ready to accept the new art, which Laches treats with ridicule, seeming to think that this, or any other military question, may be settled by asking, 'What do the Lacedaemonians say?' The one is the thoughtful general, willing to avail himself of any discovery in the art of war (*Aristoph. Aves*, 363); the other is the practical man, who relies on his own experience, and is the enemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak, and is apt to lose his temper. It is to be noted that one of them is supposed to be a hearer of Socrates; the other is only acquainted with his actions. Laches is the admirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the remark is put that there are some persons who, never having been taught, are better than those who have. Like a novice in the art of disputation, he is delighted with the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with the refinements of Nicias.

In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue—'What is Courage?' the antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out; and in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted between them. Gradually, and not without difficulty, Laches is

made to pass on from the more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurred to him that there was any other courage than that of the soldier; and only by an effort of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. No sooner has this general notion been formed than it evanesces before the dialectic of Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with the Socratic doctrine, that courage is knowledge. This is explained to mean knowledge of things terrible in the future. But Socrates denies that the knowledge of the future is separable from that of the past and present; in other words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of the philosopher. And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue—a position which elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but which will not assist us in distinguishing the nature of courage. In this part of the Dialogue the contrast between the mode of cross-examination which is practised by Laches and by Socrates, and also the manner in which the definition of Laches is made to approximate to that of Nicias, are worthy of attention.

Thus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue and knowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two aspects of courage are never harmonized. The knowledge which in the Protagoras is explained as the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in an unmeaning and transcendental conception. Yet several true intimations of the nature of courage are allowed to appear: (1) That courage is moral as well as physical: (2) That true courage is inseparable from knowledge, and yet (3) is based on a sort of natural instinct. Laches exhibits one aspect of courage; Nicias the other. The perfect image and harmony of both is only realized in Socrates himself.

The Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with which Plato treats facts. For the scene must be supposed to have occurred between B.C. 424, the year of the Battle of Delium (181 B), and B.C. 414, the year of the Battle of Mantinea, at which Laches fell. But if Socrates was more than seventy years of age at his trial in 399 (see Apology), he could not have been a young man at any time after the battle of Delium.

LACHES, OR COURAGE.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

LYSIMACHUS, *son of Aristides.*

NICIAS.

MELESIAS, *son of Thucydides.*

LACHES.

THEIR SONS.

SOCRATES.

Steph. *Lys.* You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in
178 armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the
time the reason why my friend Melesias and I asked you to
go with us and see him. I think that we may as well confess
this, for we certainly ought not to have any reserve with you.
The reason was, that we were intending to ask your advice.
Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when
they are asked will not say what they think. They guess at
the wishes of the person who asks them, and answer according
to his, and not according to their own, opinion. But as we
know that you are good judges, and will say exactly what
you think, we have taken you into our counsels. The matter
about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesias
and I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucy-
179 dides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also
called after his grandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved
to take the greatest care of the youths, and not to let them run
about as they like, which is too often the way with the young,
when they are no longer children, but to begin at once and do
the utmost that we can for them. And knowing that you
have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely
to have attended to their training and improvement, and, if
you have not attended to them, we may remind you that you

ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty. I will tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our two sons live with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confess to you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deeds which our own fathers did in war and peace—in the management of the allies, and in the administration of the city; but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. Now we are somewhat ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied with the concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads, pointing out to them that they will not grow up to honour if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on their part, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discover what studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Some one commended to us the art of using weapons, which he thought an excellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised the man whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. And we determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we were intending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel with you about the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wanted to talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinion about this art of fighting in armour, 180 and about any other studies or pursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn. Please to say whether you agree to our proposal.

Nic. As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaud your purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you, Laches, will be equally glad.

La. Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark which Lysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, and which is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one who is occupied with public affairs. As he says, they are too apt to be negligent and careless of their

own children and their private concerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. But why, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socrates about the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you, and is always passing his time in places in which the youth have any noble study or pursuit, such as you are enquiring after.

Lys. Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of this sort?

La. Certainly, Lysimachus.

Nic. That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quite lately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons,—Damon, the disciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as well as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age.

Lys. Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Nicias and Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they are generally detained at home by old age; but I hope that you, O son of Sophroniscus, will let your fellow demesmen have the benefit of any advice which you are able to give them. And I have a claim upon you as an old friend of your father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to the hour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now it comes back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard these lads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socrates in terms of the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask them whether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boy, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?

Son. Certainly, father, this is he.

Lys. I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the name of your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice at the prospect of our family ties being renewed.

La. Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I can assure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, but also his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honour of our country would

have been maintained, and the great defeat would never have occurred.

Lys. That is very high praise which is given to you, Socrates, by faithful witnesses and for actions like these. And let me tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and I hope that you will regard me as one of your best friends; indeed you ought to have visited us long ago, and reckoned us among your friends; but now, from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as I say—come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, that I may continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect you to do this, and shall venture to remind you. But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning to speak—the art of fighting in armour? Is that a practice in which the lads may be advantageously instructed?

Soc. I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can in this matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but as I am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly to hear first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if I have anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them as well as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one of you speaks first.

Nic. I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that the acquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. There is an advantage in their being employed during their leisure hours in a way which tends to improve their 182 bodily constitution, and not in the way in which young men are too apt to be employed. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise; and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to a freeman; for they only who are thus trained in the use of arms are the athletes of our military profession, trained in that on which the conflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in a line with a number of others, this sort of acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest, when the ranks are broken and you have to fight singly; either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one who is defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourself against an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meet with any harm

at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several; and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort of skill inclines a man to other noble lessons; for every man who has learned how to fight in arms will desire to learn the proper arrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when he has learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learn the complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing that the knowledge and practice of other military arts will be useful and valuable to a man; and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let me add a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one,—that this science will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessed in the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what to some may appear to be a small matter, that he will make a better appearance at the right time; that is to say, at the time when his appearance will strike terror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, that the youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons which I have given. But I shall be very glad to hear Laches, if he has another view.

La. I should not like to say, Nicias, that any kind of knowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good: and if, as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use of arms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; but if not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or if it be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use of learning it? I say this, 183 because I think that if it had been really valuable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war, would have discovered this one. And even if they had not, still these professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discover that of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interest in such matters, and that a master of the art who was honoured among them would have been sure to have made his fortune among other nations, just as a tragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves; which is the reason why he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go about itinerating in the neighbouring

states, but rushes hither straight, and exhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that these fighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they make a circuit of the neighbouring states, and would rather exhibit to any others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who would themselves acknowledge that they are by no means firstrate in the arts of war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of these gentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I can give you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever been distinguished in war,—there has been a sort of fatality about them; while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who have practised the art, these appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessed exhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions of his powers, I have seen at another time making, in sober truth, an involuntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. He was a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel, and was armed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe, the singularity of which was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long story short, I will only tell you what happened to this notable invention of the scythe-spear. He was fighting, and the scythe end caught in the rigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he tugged, but was unable to get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He first ran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but as the other ship passed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let the spear slip through his hand until he retained only the end of the 184 handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at his ridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on the deck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crew of his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain when they beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Nicias asserts, but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whether this be an art of which the advantage is

so slight, or not an art at all, but only an imposition, in either case there is no use in such an acquirement. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be a coward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be only more notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other men will be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced; for there is a jealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour, he cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this skill in weapons. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness of this art; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go until he has given you his opinion of the matter.

Lys. I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is the more necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is needed to decide between them. Had they agreed, this might not have been required. But as Laches has voted one way and Nicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends you agree.

Soc. What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of the majority?

Lys. Why, yes, Socrates; what other way is there?

Soc. And would you agree in that, Melesias? If you were deliberating about the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice of the majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained and exercised under a skilful master?

Mel. I should take the advice of the latter, Socrates; as would be reasonable.

Soc. His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

Mel. Certainly.

Soc. And for this reason, as I imagine,—because a good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers?

Mel. To be sure.

185 *Soc.* Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one of us who has knowledge in that about which we are deliberating? If there is, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind the others; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slight matter about which you and

Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you not risking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches; and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of their father's house.

Mel. That is true.

Soc. Great care, then, is required in the matter?

Mel. Certainly.

Soc. Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not decide in his favour who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?

Mel. I think that we should.

Soc. But would there not arise a prior question about the nature of the art of which we want to find the masters?

Mel. I do not understand.

Soc. Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not think that we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or has not had a teacher of the art.

Nic. Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought or ought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?

Soc. Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which I may illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying a medicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about the medicine or about the eyes?

Nic. About the eyes.

Soc. And when he considers if he shall set a bridle on a horse, he thinks of the horse and not of the bridle?

Nic. True.

Soc. And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake of another thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he is skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view, as well as of the means?

Nic. Most true.

Soc. And at present we have in view some kind of knowledge, the end of which is the soul of youth?

Nic. Yes.

Soc. The question is, Which of us is skilful or successful in the treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

La. Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in some things?

Soc. Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be very willing to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their skill
186 or excellence in one or more works.

La. That is true.

Soc. And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked our advice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if we say that we have had any, and prove them to be men of merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has works to show of his own; then he should point out to them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generally acknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither teachers nor works, then he should tell them to look out for others; and not run the risk of spoiling the children of friends, which is the most formidable accusation that can be brought against any one by those nearest to him. As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am the first to confess that I have never had a teacher; although I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. But I am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professors of moral improvement; and to this day I have never been able to discover the art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches may have learned or discovered it; for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are older too; so that they have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe that they are able to educate a man; for unless they had been confident in their own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly of the pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I repose confidence

in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they differ from one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested that you should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turn earnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, and question them. I would have you say to them: Socrates avers that he has no knowledge of the matter—he is unable to decide which of you speaks truly; neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the most skilful educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented the art yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were your respective teachers, and who 187 were their brothers in the art; and then, if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let us go to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of all our families, in order that they may not grow up inferior, and disgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverers in that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good and noble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a danger that you may be trying the experiment, not on the 'vile corpus' of a Carian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend, and, as the proverb says, 'break the large vessel in learning to make pots.' Tell us then, what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tell you that, Lysimachus, and do not let them off.

Lys. I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends; but you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will be questioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I and Melesias would be greatly pleased to hear you answer the questions which Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by saying that we took you into our counsels because we thought that you would have attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, like our own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well, then, if you have no objection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership; and do you and he ask and answer one another's questions: for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most important

of our concerns. I hope that you will see fit to comply with our request.

Nic. I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only known Socrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: at least, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may have met him among his fellow-tribesmen, in company with his father, at a sacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you have never known him since he arrived at manhood.

Lys. Why do you say that, Nicias?

Nic. You do not seem to be aware that any one who has an intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with him is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he may start, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until at last he finds that he has to give an
188 account both of his present and past life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to his ways; and I know that he will certainly do as I say, and also that I myself will be the sufferer; for I am fond of his conversation, Lysimachus. Neither do I think that there is any harm in being reminded of the evil which we are, or have been, doing: he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his after life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives, and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; indeed, I knew all along that where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I am quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.

La. I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings, about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy of his theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and his words, and note the harmony and correspondence of them.

And such an one I deem to be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or in the Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whose actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me; and the better he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater of discourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments may be expected 189 from him. And if his words accord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him: for I too agree with Solon, 'that I would fain grow old, learning many things.' But I must be allowed to add 'of the good only.' Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute—anything of that sort is of no account with me. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach and confute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything which I know. Such is the opinion which I have had of you ever since that day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave an unmistakable proof of your valour. Therefore, say whatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages.

Soc. I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me.

Ljs. But that is our business; and yours as well as ours, for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of the youths, and talk and advise with them: for I am old, and my memory is bad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, or the answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by your-

selves ; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.

Soc. Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request of Lysimachus and Melesias. There would be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was first proposed to us: Who have been our own instructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better? But the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us to the same point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way.

190 Suppose we knew that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able to impart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature of sight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained ; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor what hearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes or the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.

La. That is true, Socrates.

Soc. And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds?

La. Very true.

Soc. Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining that of which we are wholly ignorant?

La. I do not think that we can, Socrates.

Soc. Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?

La. Yes.

Soc. And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

La. Certainly.

Soc. I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring about the whole of virtue ; for that may be too much ; let us

first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part ; that will probably be for us an easier mode of proceeding.

La. Let us do as you say, Socrates.

Soc. Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must we not select that to which the use of arms is supposed to conduce? And is not that generally supposed to be courage?

La. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining the nature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how the young men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits. Try, and see whether you can tell me what is courage.

La. Indeed, Socrates, that is soon answered ; he is a man of courage who remains at his post, and does not run away, but fights against the enemy ; of that you may be very certain.

Soc. That is good, Laches ; and yet I fear that I did not express myself clearly ; and therefore you have answered not the question which I intended to ask, but another.

La. What do you mean, Socrates?

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Soc. I will endeavour to explain ; you would call a man courageous who remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?

La. Certainly I should.

Soc. And so should I ; but what would you say of another man, who fights flying, instead of remaining?

La. How flying?

Soc. Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well as pursuing ; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that they knew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither ;' and he passes an encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him 'an author of fear or flight.'

La. Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right : for he was speaking of chariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have that way of fighting ; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remaining in his rank.

Soc. And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight,

and to have fled; but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won the battle.

La. That is true.

Soc. That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in having put my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answering badly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armed soldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style of soldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageous in perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again in politics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against pain or fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, either fixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort of courage—is there not, Laches?

La. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. And all these are courageous, but some have courage in pleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, and some are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine.

La. Very true.

Soc. Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And I will begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Do you understand now what I mean?

La. Not over well.

192 *Soc.* I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which is called quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or rather which we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning of arms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;—would you not apply the term quickness to all of them?

La. Quite true.

Soc. And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is that common quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you call quickness? I should say that which accomplishes much in a little time—that I call quickness in running, speaking, and every other sort of action.

La. You would be quite correct.

Soc. And now, Laches, do you try and tell me, What is that common quality which is called courage, and which includes all the various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, and in all the cases which I was just now mentioning?

La. I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, if I am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all.

Soc. But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you would consider courage to be a very noble quality.

La. Most noble, certainly.

Soc. And you would say that a wise endurance is also good and noble?

La. Very noble.

Soc. But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, on the other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

La. True.

Soc. And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

La. I ought not to say that, Socrates.

Soc. Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to be courage—for that is not noble, but courage is noble?

La. You are right.

Soc. Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

La. True.

Soc. But as to the epithet 'wise,'—wise in what? In all things small as well as great? For example, if a man endures in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he will acquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

La. Assuredly not.

Soc. Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or some patient of his, has inflammation of the lungs; and begs that he may be allowed to eat or drink something, and the other refuses; is that courage?

La. No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last. 193

Soc. Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willing to fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there are with him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position;—would you say of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the opposite circumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is the braver?

La. I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver.

Soc. But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison with the other?

La. That is true.

Soc. And you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalry endures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous as he who endures, having no knowledge of horsemanship?

La. That is my view.

Soc. And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of the sling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he who endures, not having such a knowledge?

La. True.

Soc. And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out in this or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or the like, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have this knowledge?

La. Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

Soc. Nothing, if that is what he thinks.

La. But that is what I do think.

Soc. And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to do them.

La. That is true.

Soc. But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be base and hurtful to us.

La. Quite true.

Soc. Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality.

La. True.

Soc. And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolish endurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage.

La. Very true.

Soc. And are we right in saying that?

La. Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right.

Soc. Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are not attuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; for our deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say that we had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard us talking about courage just now.

La. That is most true.

Soc. And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

La. Quite the reverse.

Soc. Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we are speaking to a certain extent.

La. What principle? And to what extent?

Soc. The principle of endurance. We too must endure and persevere in the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartedness in searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, be endurance.

La. I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused to investigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has been aroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at being thus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the nature of courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and I cannot get hold of her and tell her nature.

Soc. But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow the track, and not be lazy?

La. Certainly, he should.

Soc. And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at the sport than we are. What do you say?

La. I should like that.

Soc. Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you see our extremity, and may save us, and also settle your own opinion, if you will tell us what you think about courage.

Nic. I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are not defining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellent saying which I have heard from your own lips.

Soc. What is that, Nicias?

Nic. I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that in which he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise.'

Soc. That is certainly true, Nicias.

Nic. And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise.

Soc. Do you hear him, Laches?

La. Yes, I hear him, but I do not understand him.

Soc. I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to mean that courage is a sort of wisdom.

La. What sort of wisdom, Socrates?

Soc. That is a question which you must ask of Nicias.

La. Yes.

Soc. Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for you surely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

Nic. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

Nic. No.

Soc. But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

La. I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates; and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge or wisdom.

195 *Nic.* I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything.

La. How strangely he is talking, Socrates.

Soc. What makes you say that, Laches?

La. What makes me say that? Why surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another.

Soc. That is just what Nicias denies.

La. Yes, that is what he denies in his foolishness.

Soc. Shall we enlighten him instead of abusing him?

Nic. Laches does not want to enlighten me, Socrates; but having been proved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I have been doing the same.

La. Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shall endeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians know the dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are the physicians the same as the courageous?

Nic. Not at all.

La. No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspires them with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are not courageous a whit the more for that.

Soc. What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be saying something.

Nic. Yes, he is saying something, but something which is not true.

Soc. How is that?

Nic. Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge only extends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man that, and nothing more. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whether health or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a man better never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether you think that life is always better than death. May not death often be the better of the two?

La. Yes, I certainly think that.

Nic. And do you think that the same things are terrible to those who had better die, and to those who had better live?

La. Certainly not.

Nic. And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knows this, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fear and hope? And him I call the courageous.

Soc. Do you understand his meaning, Laches?

La. Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers are courageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to live is better? And yet, Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself a soothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?

Nic. What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know the grounds of hope or fear?

La. Indeed I do: who but he?

Nic. Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayer ought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether death or disease, or loss of
196 property, or victory, or defeat in war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or not suffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decided by the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer.

La. I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for he represents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. My opinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talking nonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal the difficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, might have practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted to avoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in a court of law there might have been reason in so doing; but why should a man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such as this?

Soc. I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. But perhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake of talking. Let us ask him to explain what he means, and if he has reason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him.

La. Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I have asked enough.

Soc. I do not see why I should not; and my question will do for both of us.

La. Very good.

Soc. Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and I are partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

Nic. I do.

Soc. And not every man has this knowledge; neither the physician, nor the soothsayer, who will not be courageous unless they superadd this particular knowledge—that is what you were saying?

Nic. I was.

Soc. Then courage is not a thing which every pig would

have, any more than he would have knowledge, as the proverb says?

Nic. I think not.

Soc. Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as the Crommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not as a joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, that courage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allow that any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or a leopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree of wisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever know by reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage must affirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equally little pretensions to courage.

La. Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admit to be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you will have the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny their courage. 197

Nic. Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things courageous, which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, but fearless and senseless only. Do you imagine that I should call little children courageous, which fear no dangers because they know none? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessness and courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by many men, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men in general, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash, and my courageous actions are wise actions.

La. Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresses himself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of courage those whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous.

Nic. Be of good cheer, Laches; for I am quite willing to say of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that you are courageous and therefore wise.

La. I could answer that ; but I would not have you cast in my teeth that I am a haughty Aexonian.

Soc. I would not have you answer him, for I fancy, Laches, that you have not discovered whence his wisdom comes ; he has got all this from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, of all the Sophists, is considered to be the best taker to pieces of words of this sort.

La. Yes, Socrates ; and the examination of such niceties is a much more suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whom the city chooses to preside over her.

Soc. But still, my sweet friend, a great statesman is likely to have great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied in Nicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination.

La. Then examine for yourself, Socrates.

Soc. That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership ; for I shall expect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration of the question.

La. I will if you think that I ought.

198 *Soc.* Yes, I do ; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. You remember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue.

Nic. Very true.

Soc. And you yourself said that it was a part ; and there were many other parts, all of which taken together are called virtue.

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. Do you agree with me about the parts ? For I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well as courage. Would you not say the same ?

Nic. Certainly.

Soc. Well then, about that we are agreed. And now let us proceed a step, and see whether we are equally agreed about the fearful and the hopeful. Let me tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set me right : in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things which do or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of the past, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches ?

La. Yes, Socrates, entirely.

Soc. That is my view, Nicias ; the terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future ; and the hopeful are the good or not evil things which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me ?

Nic. I agree.

Soc. And the knowledge of these things you call courage ?

Nic. Precisely.

Soc. And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself in a third point.

Nic. What is that ?

Soc. I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not one knowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third of what will be and will be best in the future ; but that of all three there is one science only : for example, there is one science of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of health equally in all times, present, past, and future ; and of husbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of the earth in all times. As to the general's art, yourselves will be my witnesses, that the general has to think of the future as well as the present ; and he considers that he is not to be the servant of the soothsayer, but his master, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in 199 war : and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and not the general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct, Laches ?

La. Quite correct.

Soc. And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science has understanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past ?

Nic. Yes, indeed, Socrates ; that is my opinion.

Soc. And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of the fearful and of the hopeful ?

Nic. Yes.

Soc. And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be future goods and future evils ?

Nic. True.

Soc. And the same science has to do with the same things in the future or at any time ?

Nic. That is true.

Soc. Then courage is not the science which is concerned with the fearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the other sciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but of the present and past, and of any time?

Nic. That, as I suppose, is true.

Soc. Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only a third part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature of courage: and according to your view, that is, according to your present view, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference to time. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

Nic. I agree to that, Socrates.

Soc. But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not be perfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which were dangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they were supernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would know how to deal with gods or men.

Nic. I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in what you say.

Soc. But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition of yours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?

Nic. I suppose that you are right.

Soc. But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?

Nic. Yes, that was what we were saying.

Soc. And that is in contradiction with our present view?

Nic. That appears to be the case.

Soc. Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is.

Nic. We have not.

200 *La.* And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made the discovery, as you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made to Socrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened by the wisdom of Damon.

Nic. I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayed your ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to see whether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equally ignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to me very like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and not at yourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject of discussion; and if anything has been imperfectly said, that may be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to deride, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. And when I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge.

La. You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: nevertheless I would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me as advisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates; and if my sons were old enough, I would have asked him myself.

Nic. To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take them under his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutor of Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him he recommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may be more ready to listen to you, Lysimachus.

Lys. He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for him which I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates—will you comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement of the youths?

Soc. Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aid in the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversation that I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admit that you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as we are all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferred to another? I certainly think that no one should; and under these circum- 201 stances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not go further than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of us should seek out the best teacher whom he can find,

first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless of expense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. And if any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote to them the authority of Homer, who says, that

‘Modesty is not good for a needy man.’

Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education of the youths our own education.

Lys. I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I am also the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favour of you: come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise about these matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation.

Soc. I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, God willing.

PROTAGORAS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias—‘the man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world,’ and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words—in the presence of a distinguished company consisting of disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic circle. The Dialogue commences with a request on the part of Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated teacher. He has come before the dawn had risen to testify his zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement and advises him to find out ‘what Protagoras will make of him,’ before he becomes his pupil.

They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the question ‘What he will make of Hippocrates?’ Protagoras answers, ‘That he will make him a better and a wiser man.’ ‘But in what will he be better?’—Socrates desires to have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, ‘That he will teach him prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science or knowledge of human life.’

This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession: but he is or rather would have been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if Protagoras had not assured him of the fact, for two reasons: (1) Because the Athenian people, who recognise in their assemblies the distinction between the skilled and the unskilled, do not distinguish between the trained politician and the untrained; (2) Because the wisest and best Athenian citizens do not teach their sons political virtue. Will Protagoras answer these objections?

Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which, after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not, like the arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to be partakers of them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in distinguishing between the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not between skilled and unskilled politicians. (1) For all men have the political virtues to a certain degree, and are obliged to say that they have them, whether they have them or not. A man would be thought a madman who professed an art which he did not know; and he would be thought equally a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had not. (2) And that the political virtues can be taught and acquired, in the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they punish evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course—mere retribution is for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would parents who teach their sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens? (4) To the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the fact, that the education of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can speak, and is continued by the state, when they pass out of the parental control. (5) Nor is there any inconsistency in wise and good fathers having foolish and worthless sons; for the young do not learn of their fathers only, but of all the citizens; and this is partly a matter of chance and of natural gifts: the sons of a great statesman are not necessarily great statesmen any more than the sons of a good artist are necessarily good artists. (6) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that there are no teachers, when all men are teachers. Only a few, like Protagoras himself, are better than others.

Socrates is highly delighted, and quite satisfied with this explanation of Protagoras. But he has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like the parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:

‘Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness opposed to one another?’—‘Then justice is unholy.’ Protagoras would rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this

way from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already admitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has now to be compared with justice.

Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause of the audience.

Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short?

Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask, and he will answer. To this Protagoras yields a reluctant assent.

Protagoras selects as the thesis of his questions a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says,

‘Hard is it to become good,’

and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, ‘Hard is it to be good.’ How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus the Cean, who must come to the help of his countryman, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (*εἶναι*) to be, and (*γενέσθαι*) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then the word difficult or hard is explained to mean ‘evil’ in the Cean dialect. To all this Prodicus assents;

but when Protagoras reclaims, Socrates silyly withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole passage. The explanation is as follows :—

The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. Now Pittacus had a saying, ‘Hard is it to be good:’ and Simonides, who was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not ‘hard to be good,’ but ‘hard to become good.’ Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer.

The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men’s own thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates, and then the old question is repeated, ‘Whether the virtues are one or many?’ To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:

The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and are still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates, courage is knowledge—an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent speech.

Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? Protagoras seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to this; he would rather say that ‘some pleasures are good, some pains are evil,’ which is also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What

does he think of knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power.

This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really the opposition of a greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are evils because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is the preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes in the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in order to show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art of mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument is drawn out in an imaginary 'dialogue within a dialogue,' conducted by Socrates and Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world on the other. Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the soundness of the conclusion.

Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage—the only virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:—because they form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are the courageous willing to go to war?—because they form a right estimate of pleasures and pains, of things terrible and not terrible. Courage then is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which were originally maintained to have five different natures, after having been easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The assent of Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great difficulty.

Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, and remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had changed sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, the teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things,

while Protagoras has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is not satisfied with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with the help of Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, and (2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer, but commends Socrates' earnestness and mode of discussion.

The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These are partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are (1) Chronological,—which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus (v. 59), and are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one time, whether in the year 425 B.C., or in any other. But Plato, like other writers of fiction, aims only at the probable, and shows in other Dialogues (e.g. the Symposium and Republic, and already in the Laches), an extreme disregard of the historical accuracy which is sometimes demanded of him. (2) The exact place of the Protagoras among the Dialogues, and the date of composition, have also been much disputed. But there are no criteria which afford any real grounds for determining the date of composition; and the affinities of the Dialogues, when they are not indicated by Plato himself, must always to some extent remain uncertain. (3) There is another class of difficulties, which may be ascribed to pre-conceived notions of commentators, who imagine that Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in the wrong, and his adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage—e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure—Plato is inconsistent with himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper beginning, middle, and ending. They seem to forget that Plato is a dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument, and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his subject; also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and far off and opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or definite results.

The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, which, as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect piece of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of philosophy broken and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils thrown over truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together in a single design, and moving towards one end.

In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a 'great personage' is about to appear on the stage (perhaps with a further view of showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who makes no pretensions). Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates thinks proper to warn the youth against the dangers of 'influence,' to the invidious nature of which Protagoras is not insensible. Hippocrates readily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall learn the accomplishments which befit an Athenian gentleman of Protagoras and let alone his 'sophistry.' There is nothing however in the introduction which leads to the inference that Plato intended to blacken the character of the Sophists; he only makes a little merry at their expense.

The 'great personage' is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. He is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him—at the house of the rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the Athenians. He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in answer to the favourite accusation of the Sophists that they received pay. He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout the discussion under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination of Socrates. Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue the discussion, he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be, as he says of himself, the 'least jealous of mankind.'

Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect is that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between him and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, but of the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and argument; also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the Sophists. There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as of Socrates; but the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and common maxims of morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical or transcendental, and though full of meaning and insight, hardly intelligible to the rest of mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual contrast between the Sophists representing average public opinion and Socrates seeking for increased clearness and unity of ideas. But to a great extent Protagoras has the best of the argument and represents the better mind of man.

For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity about the preventive nature of punishment is put into his mouth; (2) he is clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which Socrates himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); and also (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad sons; (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not like the arts, gifts or attainments of special individuals, but the common property of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength and weakness of ethics and politics, is deeply seated in human nature; (5) there is a sort of half truth in the notion that all civilized men are teachers of virtue; and more than a half truth (6) in ascribing to man, who in his outward conditions is more helpless than the other animals, the power of self-improvement; (7) the religious allegory should be noticed, in which the arts are said to be given by Prometheus (who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the political virtues could only be imparted by Zeus; (8) in the latter part of the Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that 'pleasure is the only good,' Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain that 'some pleasures only are good;' and admits that 'he, above all other men, is bound to say "that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things."'

There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us the teaching of the Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. Nor is there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity of virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this even on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere in Plato, in his intellectual superiority.

The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and knowledge is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the beginning. Had Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle that the same quality may have more than one opposite; or with Plato himself in the *Phaedo* to deny that good is a mere exchange of a greater pleasure for

a less—the unity of virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required to be proved by other arguments.

The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when their minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him after two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the first part, and completely in the second. Nor does he appear at any disadvantage when subjected to 'the question' by Protagoras. He succeeds in making his two 'friends,' Prodicus and Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he also makes a long speech in defence of the poem of Simonides, after the manner of the Sophists, showing, as Alcibiades says, that he is only pretending to have a bad memory. Against the authority of the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously identified himself at the commencement of the Dialogue, Socrates sets up the proverbial philosophers and those masters of brevity the Lacedaemonians. The poets, the Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at the same time.

Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us to answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages of Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconciliation offered by Socrates is only a caricature of the methods of interpretation which were practised by the Sophists—for the following reasons: (1) The transparent irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates. (2) The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are described as the true philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches. (3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of *ἐμῶν ἐπαίημι ἀλαθείως*, which is hardly consistent with the rational interpretation of the rest of the poem. The opposition of *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι* seems also intended to express the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a sort of facetious commentary on their differences. (4) The general treatment in Plato both of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters, and whom he delights to identify with them. (5) The depreciating spirit in which Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a substitute for original conversation, which is intended to contrast with Protagoras' exaltation of the study of them—this again is hardly consistent with the serious defence of Simonides. (6) The marked approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to catch the familiar

sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is represented as ready to accept any distinctions of language however absurd. At the same time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation of his own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were only to be regarded as affording a field for the ingenuity of the interpreter.

This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on the tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts when applied to mythology in the *Phaedrus*, and with his other parodies, e. g. with the second speech in the *Phaedrus* and with the *Menexenus*. Several lesser touches of satire appear in it, e. g. the claim of philosophy advanced for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of the claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the Laconizing set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really too bad,' that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, *ἐπαίνημι*, because he is addressing a Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on those who spin pompous theories out of nothing.

All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work like the *Protagoras* are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of Socrates in the second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters to whom we are introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a part more or less conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of impartiality; Callias, here as always inclining to the Sophists, but eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity for displaying his distinctions of language, which are valueless and pedantic, because they are not based on dialectic; Hippias, who has previously exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy, to which, as in both the Dialogues called by his name, he now adds the profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two latter personages have been already damaged by the mock sublime description of them in the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is consistently presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue; there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which are attributed to him in the *Theaetetus* and

elsewhere, or to his denial of the existence of the gods; he is the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue. Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is consistent with his own ironical character; he admits that the dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to a conclusion opposed to his first thesis. The force of argument, not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day.

But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught; (2) that the virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of pleasures and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an appearance of paradox—they are really moments or aspects of the truth by the help of which we pass from the old conventional morality to a higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or citations from the poets. The second question, whether the virtues are one or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of the same subject; for if the virtues are to be taught, they must be reducible to a common principle; and this common principle is found to be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the truth—they make a part of virtue into the whole. Further, the nature of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and pains, appears to us too superficial and at variance with the spirit of Plato himself. Yet in this Plato is only following the historical Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. Like Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one common bond by which the virtues are united,—their tendency to produce happiness—though such a principle is afterwards repudiated by him.

It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely Socratic works—perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of them—is indicated by the absence of all allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence; and also probably by the different attitude assumed towards the teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, all touch on the question of the relation of knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as

preliminary studies or sketches of the more important work, at any rate as closely connected with it. The *Io* and the *Lesser Hippias* contain discussions of the Poets, which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are conceived in a similar spirit. The affinity of the Protagoras to the *Meno* is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is discussed, 'whether virtue can be taught,' and the relation of *Meno* to the Sophists is much the same as that of *Hippocrates*, the answer to the question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is already passing into the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it appear to have been retracted. The *Phaedo*, the *Gorgias*, and the *Philebus* offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly renounced.

Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters of men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the way, which, as Theodorus says in the *Theaetetus*, are quite as agreeable as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by every one for himself who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. The moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be reunited, and in the highest conception of them are inseparable. The thesis of Socrates is not merely a hasty assumption, but may be also deemed an anticipation of some 'metaphysic of the future,' in which the divided elements of human nature are reconciled.

PROTAGORAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

| | |
|--|---|
| SOCRATES, <i>who is the narrator of the Dialogue to his Companion.</i> | PROTAGORAS, } HIPPIAS, } <i>Sophists.</i> PRODICUS, } |
| HIPPOCRATES. | CALLIAS, <i>a wealthy Athenian.</i> |
| ALCIBIADES. | |
| CRITIAS. | |

SCENE:—The House of Callias.

Steph. *Com.* WHERE do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need
309 hardly ask the question, as I know that you have been in
chase of the fair Alcibiades. I saw him the day before
yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man,—and he is
a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that
he was still very charming.

Soc. What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion,
who says¹

'Youth is most charming when the beard first appears?'

And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.

Com. Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been
visiting him, and was he gracious to you?

Soc. Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially
to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping
me in an argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing?
Although he was present, I never attended to him, and several
times he quite passed out of my mind.

Com. What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened
between you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered
a fairer love than he is; certainly not in this city of Athens.

Soc. Yes, much fairer.

Com. What do you mean—a citizen or a foreigner?

¹ Il. xxiv. 348.

Soc. A foreigner.

Com. Of what country?

Soc. Of Abdera.

Com. And is this stranger really in your opinion fairer than the son of Cleinias?

Soc. And is not the wisest always fairer, sweet friend?

Com. But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?

Soc. Yes; I would say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are willing to accord that title to Protagoras.

Com. What! Do you mean to say that Protagoras is in Athens?

Soc. Yes; he has been here two days.

Com. And do you just come from an interview with him?

Soc. Yes; and I have heard and said many things.

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Com. Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place to you.

Soc. To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.

Com. Thank you, too, for telling us.

Soc. That is thank you twice over. Listen then:—

Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep?

I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any news?

Good news, he said; nothing but good.

Very good, but what news? and why have you come hither at this unearthly hour?

He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come.

Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his arrival?

Yes, by the gods, he said; I heard yesterday evening.

At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, of whose escape I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in

the way ;—on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said to me : Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my toil, I got up and came hither direct.

I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said : What is the matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?

He replied, laughing : Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he keeps to himself.

But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he will make you as wise as he is himself.

Would to heaven, he replied, that he would! He might take all that I have, and all that my friends have, if he would. But that is why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf ; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him ; (when he visited Athens before
311 I was but a child ;) and all men praise him, Socrates, as being the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus : let us start.

I replied : Not yet, my good friend ; the hour is too early. But let us rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break ; when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at home, and we shall be sure to find him ; never fear.

Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him your money, and some one had said to you : You are paying money to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates ; tell me, what is he that you give him money? how would you have answered?

I should say, he replied, that I give money to him as a physician.

And what will he make of you?

A physician, he said.

And if you had resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the Athenian, and intended to give them money, and some one had asked you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this money? how would you have answered?

I should have answered, as being statuaries.

And what will they make of you?

A statuary, of course.

Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to pay him money for you. If our own means are sufficient, and we can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to spend your friends' money as well. Now suppose, that while we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras that you are going to pay him money? how should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?

They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.

Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?

Certainly.

But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?

He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.

And are you not, in sober earnest, ashamed, I said, at having to appear before the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?

Indeed, Socrates, if I must speak my thoughts, I am.

But why do you assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras is of this nature? and why may you not learn of him in the same way that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the view of making any of

them a profession, but only as a part of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them?

Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the teaching of Protagoras.

I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?

And what am I doing?

You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if not, then you do not even know whether you are committing your soul to good or to evil.

I certainly think that I do know, he replied.

Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?

I take him to be one who is wise and knowing, he replied, as his name implies.

And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter also; are not they, too, wise and knowing? But suppose a person were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the manufacture over which he presides? how should we answer him?

How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?

Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing the lyre. Is not that true?

Yes.

Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him eloquent in that which he understands?

Yes, that may be assumed.

And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?

Indeed, he said, I cannot tell.

Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the 313 danger which you are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all—about this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, never deliberating, or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not;—you have quite made up your mind that you will be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.

When he heard me say this he replied: That I suppose, Socrates, is the conclusion which I must draw from your words.

I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be the sort of man.

And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?

Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want of them, praise

them all alike ; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul ; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one ; but if not, 314 then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink : the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when ; and hence the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But when you buy the wares of knowledge you cannot carry them away in another vessel ; they have been sold to you, and you must take them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or greatly benefited by the lesson ; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with our elders ; for we are still young—too young to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras ; and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of others ; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men.

To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule of the house ; and there we stopped in order to conclude a dispute which had arisen as we were going along ; and we stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled : They are Sophists—he is not at home ; and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without opening : Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows ? But, my friend, I said, you need not be alarmed ; for we are not

Sophists, and we are not come to see Callias, but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the door.

When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the portico; and next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his half-brother, and Charmides, the 315 son of Glaucon. On the other side of him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son of Philomelus; also Antimoærus of Mende, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities through which he journeyed, he, like Orpheus, attracting them by his voice, and they following. I should mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never got into his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned back, then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in perfect order.

After him, as Homer says¹, 'I lifted up my eyes and saw' Hippias the Elean sitting in the opposite portico on a chair of state, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions, and he, *ex cathedrâ*, was determining their several questions to them, and discoursing of them.

Also, 'my eyes beheld Tantalus²;' for Prodicus the Cean was at Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in

¹ Od. xi. 601 foll.

² Od. xi. 582.

sheepskins and bedclothes, of which he seemed to have a great heap ; and there were sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not mistaken, is also of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon, and my suspicion is that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for he seemed to me to be an extraordinarily wise and divine man ;
 316 but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the room which rendered his words inaudible.

No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, as you say, and I believe you ; and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus.

On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then walked up to Protagoras, and I said : Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and I have come to see you.

Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the company ?

That is as you please, I said : you shall determine when you have heard the object of our visit.

And what is that ? he said.

I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian ; he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and he is himself in natural ability quite a match for those of his own age. I believe that he aspires to political eminence ; and this he thinks that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of these matters alone or in the presence of the company.

Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave the company of their other kinsmen or acquaintance, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious ; great jealousies are

occasioned by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies. I maintain the art of the Sophist to be of ancient date; but that in ancient times those who practised the art, fearing this odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, of hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were afraid of the envy of the multitude. But that is not my way, for I do not believe ³¹⁷ that they effected their purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgment appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I have been now many years in the profession—for all my years when added up are many—and there is no one here present of whom I might not be the father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want to speak with me, in the presence of the company.

As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us?

Very good, he said.

Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit and discuss. This was determined, and great delight was felt at the prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves all took the chairs and benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got up Prodicus and brought in him and his companions.

When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man
318 of whom you were just now speaking.

I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what will happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say.

Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on the day before.

When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if any one were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no doubt: but please to answer in a different way—I will explain how by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of Heraclea, who has lately visited Athens, and he had come to him as he has come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then suppose that he were to ask him, 'In what would he be better, and in what would he grow?' Zeuxippus would answer, 'In painting.' And suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same, and asked him, 'In what would he become better day by day?' he would reply, 'In flute-playing.' Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his account. When you say that on the first day on which he

associates with you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner—in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what?

When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own house in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the best in the affairs of the state.

Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens? 319

That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.

Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that the Athenians are an understanding people, as indeed they are esteemed by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then the ship-builders; and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoot him, until either he is clamoured down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving

about the arts which have professors. When, however, the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say—carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high and low—any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are unable to
320 impart their political wisdom to others: as for example, Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I am disposed to waver; and I believe that there must be something in what you say, because I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?

That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue the question?

To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself.

Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting.

Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the inward parts of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: 'Let me distribute, and do you inspect.' This was agreed, and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate ³²¹ them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist the summer heat, and to be a natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties of food,—to some herb of the soil, to others fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were very prolific; and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give,—and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching when man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his

salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering into the castle of heaven, in which Zeus dwelt, who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to practise their favourite arts, and took away Hephaestus' art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of Epimetheus.

322 Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing language and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and would not enable them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among men:—should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? Shall this be the manner in which I distribute justice

and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all? To all, said Zeus; I should like them all to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the state.

And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when any one else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favoured few, and that, as I say, is very natural. But when they come to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice 323 and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon.

And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all men regard every man as having a share of justice and of every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, in this case they deem that to be madness which in the other case was held by them to be good sense. They say that men ought to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is mad who does not make such a profession. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world.

I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour further to show that they regard this virtue, not as

given by nature, or growing spontaneously, but as capable of being learned and acquired by study. For injustice is punished, whereas no one would instruct, or rebuke, or be angry at those whose calamities they suppose to come to them either by nature or chance; they do not try to alter them, they do but pity them. Who would be so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason; they know, I imagine, that this sort of good and evil comes to them by nature and chance; whereas if a man is wanting in those good qualities which come to men from study and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities, men are angry with him, and punish and reprove him; of which evil qualities one is impiety and another
324 injustice; and they may be described generally as the opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with another, and reprimand him,—clearly under the impression that by study and learning, the virtue in which he is deficient may be acquired. For if you will think, Socrates, of the effect which punishment has on evil-doers, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong,—only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that way. But he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He clearly punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like other men, retaliate on all whom they regard as evil doers; which argues them to be of the number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and acquired.

There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by

you about the sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and take up the argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality in which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but ³²⁵ justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue—if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable—if, I say, this be true, and nevertheless good men have their sons taught other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and inculcated both in private and public; and yet, notwithstanding this, they teach their sons lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death: but those things, the ignorance of which may cause death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them—aye, and confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families—those things, I say, they are supposed not to teach them,—not to take the utmost care that they should learn. That is not likely, Socrates.

Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are quarrelling about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is able to understand them: he cannot say or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is unjust; this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy, that is unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is

straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what was spoken, 326 they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he reads at school; in these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the children's souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action; for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and those who have the means are the rich; their children begin education soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers who were of old time; these are given to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether as ruler or ruled; and he who transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in your country, but also in many others. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder

and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more surprising.

But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? Let me explain that,—which is far from being wonderful, if, as I have been saying, the very existence of the state implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If this be ³²⁷ true—and nothing can be truer—then I will ask you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them—for all of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one is ready to teach justice and the laws;—suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, and all flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue—with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's Lenaeon festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the

rascality of this part of the world. And you, Socrates, are discontented, and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his ability, and you say that there is no teacher. You might as well ask, Who teaches Greek? For 328 of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have taught them to the best of their ability,—but who will carry them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of anything; and if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever so little, that is as much as we can expect. A teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment:—When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be their value.

Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to wonder at good sons having bad fathers, or at good fathers having bad sons, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison with their father; and this is true of the sons of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them.

Protagoras ended, and in my ear

‘So charming left his voice, that I the while
Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear.’

At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had finished, nor without difficulty I began to collect myself, and

looking at Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for having brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about 329 these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, have a little question that I want to ask of you, and if you will only answer me that, I shall be quite satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught;—that I will take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several times while you were speaking justice, and temperance, and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind.

There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.

And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger or smaller?

I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; as the parts of a face are related to the whole face.

And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man has one part, must he also have all the others?

By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not wise.

Why then, I said, courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue?

330 Most undoubtedly, he said; and wisdom is the noblest of the parts.

And they are all different from one another? I said.

Yes.

And each of them has a distinct function like the parts of the face;—the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their functions, or in any other way? Now I want to know whether the parts of virtue do not also differ in themselves and in their functions; as that is clearly what the simile would imply.

Yes, Socrates, you are right in that.

Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?

No, he answered.

Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, would you not? That is my opinion, would not that be yours also?

Yes, he said; that is mine also.

And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, O Protagoras, and you Socrates, what about this thing which you just now called justice, is it just or unjust? And I were to answer, just: and you—will you vote with me or against me?

With you, he said.

Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the nature of the just: would not you?

Yes, he said.

And suppose that he went on to say: Well now, is there such a thing as holiness?—we should answer, Yes, if I am not mistaken?

Yes, he said.

And that you acknowledge to be a thing—should we admit that ?

He assented.

And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the nature of the unholy ? I should be angry at his putting such a question, and should say, Peace, man ; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy. What do you say to that ? Would you not answer in the same way ?

Certainly, he said.

And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, What were you saying just now ? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one another. I should reply, You certainly heard that said, but not, as you imagine, 33^r said by me ; for Protagoras gave the answer, and I only asked the question. And suppose that he turned to you and said, Is this true, Protagoras ? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your position ? how would you answer him ?

I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.

Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this ; and now supposing that he proceeded to say further, Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness ; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and the unjust is unholy ; how shall we answer him ? I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is just ; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the same ; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice ; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would agree with me.

He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a difference between them. But what matter ? if you please I please ; and let us assume, if you will, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just.

Pardon me, I replied ; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will' sort of argument to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven : I mean to say that the argument will be best proven if there be no 'if.'

Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other thing ; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common ; even the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one another ; and yet things which are alike in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike.

And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness have but a small degree of likeness?

Certainly not ; but I do not agree with what I understand to be your view.

332 Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the existence of folly ?

I do.

And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly ?

That is true, he said.

And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be temperate [or moderate] ?

Yes, he said.

And moderation makes them moderate ?

Certainly.

And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not moderate ?

I agree to that, he said.

Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting moderately ?

He assented.

And foolish actions are done by folly, and moderate [or temperate] actions by moderation ?

He agreed.

And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and weakly which is done by weakness?

He assented.

And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is done with slowness, slowly?

He acknowledged that.

And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?

He agreed.

Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?

Yes.

To which the only opposite is the ugly?

There is no other.

And is there anything good?

There is.

To which the only opposite is the evil?

There is no other.

And there is the acute in sound?

True.

To which the only opposite is the grave?

There is no other, he said, but that.

Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?

He assented.

Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?

To that we assented.

And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by opposites?

Yes.

And that which was done foolishly, as we also admitted, was done in the opposite way to that which was done temperately [or moderately]?

Yes.

And that which was done temperately [or moderately] was done by temperance [or moderation], and that which was done foolishly by folly?

He agreed.

And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?

Yes.

And one thing is done by temperance [or moderation], and quite another thing by folly?

Yes.

And those are opposite ways?

Certainly.

And therefore done by opposites. Then folly is the opposite of temperance [or moderation]?

That is evident.

And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be the opposite of wisdom?

He assented.

And we said that everything has only one opposite?

Yes.

333 Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct from temperance [or moderation], and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say?

He assented, but with great reluctance.

Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be temperate in his injustice?

I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which nevertheless many may be found to assert.

And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.

I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you will.

Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; and yet the result may be that I and you who ask and answer may also be put on our trial.

Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.

Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that some men are moderate [or temperate], and yet unjust?

Yes, he said; let that be admitted.

And moderation is good sense?

Yes.

And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?

Granted.

If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?

If they succeed.

And you would admit the existence of goods?

Yes.

And is the good that which is expedient for man?

Yes; indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, and yet I call them good.

I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, and gently said:—

When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, 334 do you mean inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the latter good?

Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things, meats, drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are partly expedient for man, and partly inexpedient; and some which are expedient for horses, and not for men; and some for oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with the

exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit) that which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces.

When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you.

What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make them too short?

Certainly not, I said.

But short enough?

Yes, I said.

Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to you to be short enough?

I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with such brevity that no one could
335 use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method.

Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of Protagoras would have been nowhere.

I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a

way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to hear you at length (for I have to be in another place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.

Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.

Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himera, when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course runners. To that I should reply, that I humbly make the same request to my own legs; and they cannot comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration is quite another, in my humble opinion.

But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours.

Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a fair statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make a speech—in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is asked, having recourse to shifts and evasions, and instead of answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to say what he thinks.

When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one—Critias, I believe—went on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up the discussion.

337 Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their con-

viction. And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words.

Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind. I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peace-makers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen 338 and let go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming to you¹. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper length.

This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; Callias said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of choosing him? And if you say 'Let us have a better then'—to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is better, to put

¹ Reading *ἑμῖν*.

another over him as though he were an inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no special arbiter: all of you shall be arbiters.

This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows:—

I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is
339 the principal part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry, speaking as before of virtue [or excellence], but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian:—

‘Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good; built four-square in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.’

Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole?

There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode, of which I have made a careful study.

Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, and true?

Yes, I said, both good and true.

But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?

No, not in that case, I replied.

And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect.

Well, my friend, I have reflected.

And does not the poet proceed to say, 'I do not agree with the word of Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly,' says he, 'can a man be good.' Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.

I know that, I said.

And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?

Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise?

Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising as his own thought, 'Hardly can a man become truly good;' and then a little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to agree with him, when he says, 'Hardly can a man be good,' which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second assertion.

Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the expert hand of a boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander ³⁴⁰ in Homer, who, when beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simois to aid him, saying:

'Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero!'

And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application of your charming philosophy of synonyms, which distinguishes 'will' and 'wish' and many similar words which you mentioned in your admirable speech. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides.

¹ Il. xxi. 308.

And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, 'being' is the same as 'becoming.'

Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus.

Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that 'Hardly can a man become truly good'?

Quite right, said Prodicus.

And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating that which he says himself, but for saying something different from himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says, 'Hardly can a man become good, for the gods have placed toil in front of virtue; but when you have climbed the height, then the acquisition of virtue, however difficult, is easy¹.'

Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which you are correcting.

Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure.

The fact, he said, is as I have stated.

How is that? I asked.

The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can be easily acquired.

Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more than human and of very
 341 ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word 'hard' (*χαλεπόν*) in the sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word 'dreadful' (*δεινός*) as a term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or any one else is a dreadfully wise man, he asks me if I am not

¹ Works and Days, 264 foll.

ashamed of calling that which is good dreadful; and then he explains to me that the term 'dreadful' is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being dreadfully healthy or wealthy, or of dreadful peace, but of dreadful war, dreadful poverty, dreadful disease, meaning by the term 'dreadful,' evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Cean, when they spoke of 'hard' meant 'evil,' or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term 'hard'?

Evil, said Prodicus.

And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, 'Hard is the good,' just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.

Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural.

Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? And have you an answer for him?

You are all wrong, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very well that Simonides in using the word 'hard' meant what all of us mean, not evil, but that which is not easy—that which takes a great deal of trouble. Of this I am positive.

I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis; for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell ³⁴² you, I said, what I imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of speaking, would be called my skill in poetry; or if you would rather, I will be the listener.

Protagoras hearing me offer this, replied : As you please ; and Hippias, Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed.

Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about this poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny ; and they pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it thought that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras was speaking, and not by valour of arms ; considering that if the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practising their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short cloaks ; for they imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their country, and they hold a philosophical *séance* unknown to the strangers ; and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into other cities (in this they are like the Cretans), in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. And in Lacedaemon and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation. And hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation : If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, with unerring aim ; and the person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger than

the love of gymnastics ; they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such were 343
 Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian ; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that their wisdom was of this character, consisting of short memorable sentences, which individuals uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all men's mouths, 'Know thyself,' and 'Nothing too much.'

Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise, 'Hard to be good.' And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken, he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying.

Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first words of the poem, wanting to say only that to be good is hard, he inserted *μέν*, 'on the one hand' (on the one hand to become good is hard); there would be no possible reason for the introduction of *μέν*, unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Pittacus is saying 'Hard to be good,' and he says, controverting this, 'No, the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good,' not joining 'truly' with 'good,' but with 'hard.' Not the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly good (that would be a very simple observation, and quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajection of the word 'truly' (*ἀλαθέως*), construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him):

344 'O my friends,' says Pittacus, 'hard to be good,' and Simonides answers, 'In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet and mind, without a flaw—that is hard truly.' This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of (*μέν*) 'on the one hand,' and for the use of the word 'truly,' which is rightly placed at the end; and all that follows tends to prove that this is the meaning. A great deal might be said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of workmanship, and very finished, but that would be tedious. I should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm, is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this blessing; 'but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances overpowers him.' Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel?—not the private individual, for he is always overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown, but only he who is standing upright and not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only be said to overpower him who has resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another poet witnesses:—

'The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.'

But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, 'Hard to be good.' Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility; 'for he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad.' But what sort of

doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes a man 345 good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of healing the sick. 'But he who does ill is the bad.' Now who becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all, clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real ill-doing is the deprivation of knowledge), but the bad man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again that 'they are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.'

All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he adds: 'Therefore I will not throw away my life in searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed earth, and when I have found him to tell you of him' (this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus throughout the whole poem): 'but him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love;—not even the gods war against necessity.' All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do evil and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word 'voluntarily' applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a 346 good man might often compel himself to love and praise

another¹, and to be the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother, or country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or country have any defects, rejoice at the sight of them, and find fault with them and expose and denounce them to others, under the idea that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of neglect; and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them; and if they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he is not censorious and does not censure him. 'For I am satisfied,' he says, 'when a man is neither bad nor very stupid, and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, and there are innumerable fools' (implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant opportunity of finding fault). 'All things are good with which evil is unmingled.' In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good which have no evil in them, as you might say 'All things are white which have no black in them,' for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state. 'I do not hope,' he says, 'to find a perfectly blameless man among those who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth, and when I have found him to tell you of him; in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and approve every one' (and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, *ἐπαινῆμι*, because he is addressing Pittacus,—'who love and approve every one voluntarily, who does no evil:' and

¹ Reading *φιλεῖν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ φίλον τινὶ κ.τ.λ.*

that the stop should be put after 'voluntarily'); 'but there are some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, 347 Pittacus, I would never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do blame you because, wearing the appearance of truth, you are speaking falsely about the greatest matters.' And this, I said, Prodicus and Protagoras, I take to be the true meaning of Simonides in this poem.

Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good explanation of this poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my own which I will expound to you, if you will allow me.

Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but another time. At present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that Socrates should ask.

I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I would rather have done with poems and odes, if you do not object, and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and conversation by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that the

poet has one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point which is in dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another to the proof in conversation.

348 And these are the models which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. If you have a mind to ask I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and completing our unfinished argument.

I made these and other similar observations; but Protagoras would not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to Callias, and said:—Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly to refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will be free to talk with one another.

I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and he would answer.

So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I think that Homer was very right in saying that

‘When two go together, one sees before the other!’

for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but if a man

‘Sees a thing when he is alone,’

he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to

¹ Il. x. 224.

understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you?—who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet have not the power of making others good—whereas you are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask 349 questions and take advice of you? Indeed, I must. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a proper function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in order to make trial of me.

I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless remarkable for their courage.

Stop, I said; that requires consideration. When you speak of brave men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?

Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are afraid to approach.

In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.

Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right mind.

And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?

Wholly good, and that in the highest degree.

350 Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?

I should say, the divers.

And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?

Yes, that is the reason.

And who have confidence when fighting on horseback—the skilled horseman or the unskilled?

The skilled.

And who when fighting with light shields—the peltasts or the nonpeltasts?

The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than before.

And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, and yet confident about them?

Yes, he said, I have seen persons very confident.

And are not these confident persons also courageous?

In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of whom we are speaking are surely madmen.

Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?

Yes, he said; and I still maintain that.

And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that view again wisdom will be courage.

Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are the confident; but I was not asked whether the confident are the courageous; for if you had asked me that, I should have answered 'not all of them.'

and what I did answer you have not disproved, although you proceed to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who have no knowledge; and this makes you think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, and I should say 'Yes;' and then whether those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and strength; ³⁵¹ the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul.

I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others ill?

He agreed to this.

And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?

He does not.

But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, do you not think that in that case he will have lived well?

I do.

Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?

Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.

And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are

pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad.

I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the rest of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which are neither good nor evil.

And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in pleasure or create pleasure?

Certainly, he said.

Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.

According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, let us enquire about this, he said; and if the enquiry is relevant, and the result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but if not, then we will argue.

And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin?

You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the discussion.

35² May I use this as an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring into the health or some other bodily quality of another:—he looks at his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest and back to me that I may have a better view:—that is the sort of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,—just as if knowledge were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now

is that your view? or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?

I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only that, but I, above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human things.

Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that those who act contrary to knowledge were overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those affections which I was just now mentioning.

Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which mankind are in error.

Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is the nature of this affection, which is called by them being overcome by pleasure, and which, as they declare, 353 is the reason why they know the better and choose the worse. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be described as being overcome by pleasure, what is it, and how do you call it? Tell us that.

But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?

I think, I replied, that their opinion may help us to discover how courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to abide by our recent agreement, that I should lead in the way in which I think that we shall find the truth best, do you follow; but if you are disinclined, never mind.

You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have begun.

Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What account do you give of that which, in our language, is termed being overcome by pleasure? I should

answer them thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I were to go on and ask them again: In what way do you say that they are evil,—in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature? Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after consequences—diseases and the like?

I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would give that answer.

And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do they not cause pain;—they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken?

Protagoras assented.

Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil for any other reason, except that they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures:—that again they would admit?

354 We both of us thought that they would.

And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and say: Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the things which are good but painful?—they would assent to that?

He agreed.

And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and empires and wealth?—they would agree to that, if I am not mistaken?

He assented.

Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?—they would acknowledge that they were not?

I think that they would, said Protagoras.

And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an evil?

He assented.

Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good : and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.

I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.

And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater than the pains : for I say that if you have some standard other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.

That is true, said Protagoras.

Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways on this subject? Excuse me, friends, I should reply ; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the meaning of the expression 'overcome by pleasure ;' and the whole argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the consequences:—If this be true, then I say that the argument is absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, because he is seduced and amazed by pleasure ; or again, when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if only we give up the use of various 355

names, such as pleasant and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names—first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to reply ‘By pleasure,’ for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. ‘By what?’ he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. But how, he will reply, can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good? Is not the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of being overcome—what do you mean, he will say, but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good? That is true. And now substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome
 356 by pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one says: ‘Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future pleasure and pain’—To that I should reply: And do they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures,

you of course take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this.

He agreed with me.

Well then, I shall say, if you admit that, be so good as to answer me a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. They will grant that also. Now supposing that happiness consisted in doing or choosing the greater, and in not doing or avoiding the less, what would be the saving principle of human life? Would the art of measuring be the saving principle, or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of measurement is that which would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes this is the art of measurement?

Yes, he said, the art of measurement.

Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other whether near or at a distance; what 357 would be the saving principle of our lives? Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd and even? The world will acknowledge that, will they not?

Protagoras himself thought that they would.

Well then, my friends, I say to them ; seeing that the salvation of human life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other ?

That is undeniably true.

And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and science ?

They will agree to that.

The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration ; the demonstration of the existence of such a science is a sufficient answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things ; and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has knowledge ; and we refused to allow this, and you rejoined : O Protagoras and Socrates, what is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not this ?—tell us what you call such a state :—if we had immediately and at the time answered ‘Ignorance,’ you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves : for you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains ; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge ; and you admitted further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure ;—ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance ; but you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these things—you take care of your money and give them none ; and the result is, that you are the worse off

both in public and private life :—Let us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general. But I would like now to ask 358 you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth or not?

They all thought that what I said was entirely true.

Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, delightful, joyful. However and in whatever way he rejoices to name them, I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the words.

Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.

Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions, the tendency of which is to make life painless and pleasant, honourable and useful? The honourable work is also useful and good?

This was admitted.

Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is wisdom.

They all assented.

And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about important matters?

To that they also unanimously assented.

Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he might have the less.

All of us agreed to every word of this.

Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would agree with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.

Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not terror.

Never mind about that, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he need not? Would not this be in contradiction to the admission which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be evil?

359 That also was universally admitted.

Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; which proves that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.)

He assented.

Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go—against the same as the cowards?

No, he answered.

Then against something different?

Yes, he said.

Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is danger?

Yes, Socrates, that is what men say.

That is true, I said. But I want to know against what the courageous are ready to go—against dangers, believing them to be dangers, or not against dangers?

No, said he; that has been proved by you in the previous argument to be impossible.

That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to be ignorance.

He assented.

And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and the courageous go to meet the same things.

And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready.

And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said.

Honourable, he replied.

And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all honourable actions we have admitted to be good.

That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.

True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you 360 say, are unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?

The cowards, he replied.

And yet, I said, that which is good and honourable is also pleasant?

That, he said, was certainly admitted.

And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, and better?

The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions.

But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, and nobler?

That must be admitted.

And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?

True, he replied.

And if not base, then honourable?

He admitted this.

And if honourable, then good?

Yes.

But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the contrary, are base?

He assented.

And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and uninstructedness?

True, he said.

Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call that cowardice or courage?

I should say cowardice, he replied.

And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of dangers?

Assuredly, he said.

And because of that ignorance they are cowards?

He assented.

And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?

He assented.

Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?

He nodded assent.

But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?

Yes.

Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the ignorance of them?

To that again he nodded assent.

And the ignorance of them is cowardice?

To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.

And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is opposed to the ignorance of these things?

At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.

And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?

Finish the argument by yourself, he said.

I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most courageous?

You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this

appears to me to be impossible consistently with the argument.

My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire to ascertain the relations of virtue and the essential nature of virtue; for if this were clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great length by both of us—you affirming and I denying that virtue can be taught—would also become clear. The result of our discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage,—which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to show that it is anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught. Now I, Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, and whether capable of being taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument, as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to your Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the enquiry.

Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy and your conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to the

subject at some future time ; at present we had better turn to something else.

By all means, I said, if that is your wish ; for I too ought long since to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the conversation ended, and we went our way.

EUTHYDEMUS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader, the irony more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two Sophists, although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his writings. Even Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last pacified, and becomes a friendly and interested auditor of the great discourse. But in the Euthydemus the mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of Socrates continues to the end.

Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself taken part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who have been exiled from Thuri, and in former days had appeared at Athens as teachers of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armour. To this they have now added a new fighting accomplishment—the art of Eristic, or fighting with words, which they are likewise willing to teach ‘for a consideration.’ But they can also teach virtue in a very short time and in the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the look out for teachers of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of the great Alcibiades, and is desirous that he should have the benefit of their instructions. He is ready to fall down and worship them; although the greatness of their professions does arouse in his mind a temporary incredulity.

A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of his lover Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; and such a performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and the Muses. It is agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias. ‘Cleinias,’ says Euthydemus, ‘who learn, the wise or the unwise?’ ‘The

wise,' is the reply; given with blushing and hesitation. 'And yet when you learned you did not know and were not wise.' Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball: 'Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar-master; the wise boys or the foolish boys?' 'The wise.' 'Then after all the wise learn.' 'And do they learn,' said Euthydemus, 'what they know or what they do not know?' 'The latter.' 'And dictation is a dictation of letters?' 'Yes.' 'And you know letters?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn what you know.' 'But,' retorts Dionysodorus, 'is not learning acquiring knowledge?' 'Yes.' 'And you acquire that which you have not got already?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn that which you do not know.'

Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the nature of the process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are not serious; there are jests at the mysteries which precede the enthronement, and he is being initiated into the mysteries of the sophistical ritual. This is all a sort of horse-play, which is now ended. The exhortation to virtue will follow, and Socrates himself (if the wise men will not laugh at him) is desirous of showing the way in which such an exhortation should be carried on, according to his own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias. The result of the investigation may be summed up as follows:—

All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honour; not forgetting the virtues and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is omitted. What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good fortune when we have wisdom already:—in every art and business are not the wise also the fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the possession of goods is not enough; there must be a right use of them as well, and this can only be given by knowledge: in themselves they are neither good nor evil, but knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and folly the only evil. The conclusion is that we must get 'wisdom.' But can wisdom be taught? 'Yes,' says Cleinias. Socrates is delighted at the ingenuousness of the youth relieving him from the necessity of discussing one of his great puzzles. 'As wisdom is the only good, he must become a philosopher, or lover of wisdom.' 'That I will,' says Cleinias.

After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction,

the two brothers recommence their exhortation to virtue, which is of quite another sort.

‘You want Cleinias to be wise?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And he is not wise yet?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then you want him to be what he is not, and not to be what he is?—not to be—that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all be!’

Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement, thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of good manners. But he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as a storm seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and Ctesippus then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only contradicting them. ‘But,’ says Dionysodorus, ‘there is no such thing as contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I describe another, how is there any contradiction in that?’ Ctesippus is unable to reply.

Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would like to be informed by the great master of the art, ‘What is the meaning of this?’ Do they mean that there is no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? Then what are they professing to teach? The two Sophists complain that Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but is ‘non-plussed’ at what they are saying now. ‘What does the word “non-plussed” mean?’ Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews the conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus, hopes to restore them to their natural form.

He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a philosopher. And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable and may be used. What knowledge is there which is of such a nature? Not the knowledge which is required in any particular art; nor again the art of the composer of speeches, who knows how to write them, but cannot speak them, although he too must be admitted to be a kind of enchanter of wild animals. Neither is the knowledge which we are seeking the knowledge of the general. For the general makes over his prey to the statesman, as the huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails to the keeper of quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The

two enquirers, Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a wilderness, vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At last they fix upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But the kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good nor evil: and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does it make us wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, but only in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer to the question, 'good in what?' At length in despair Cleinias and Socrates turn to the 'Dioscuri' and request their aid.

Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot know and not know, he cannot know some things and not know others, and therefore he knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men know all things. 'Do they know shoemaking, &c.?' 'Yes.' The sceptical Ctesippus would like to have some evidence of this extraordinary statement: he will believe if Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth Dionysodorus has, and if Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of information about Euthydemus. Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges in a little raillery at the expense of the brothers. But he restrains himself, remembering that if the men who are to be his teachers think him stupid they will take no pains with him. Another fallacy is producèd which turns on the absoluteness of the verb 'to know.' And here Dionysodorus is caught 'napping,' and is induced by Socrates to confess that 'he does not know the good to be unjust.' Socrates appeals to his brother Euthydemus; at the same time he acknowledges that he cannot, like Heracles, fight against a Hydra, and even Heracles, on the approach of a second monster, called upon his nephew Iolaus to help. Dionysodorus rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of Heracles than of Socrates. For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a brother, and a father is a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of men only, but of dogs and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the consequences which follow: 'Much good has your father got out of the wisdom of his puppies.'

'But,' says Euthydemus, unabashed, 'nobody wants much good.' Medicine is a good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much of them in wrong places. 'No,' says Ctesippus, 'there cannot be too much gold.' 'And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?' Ctesippus, imitating the new wisdom, replies, 'And do not

the Scythians reckon those to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the inside of them?' 'Do you see,' retorts Euthydemus, 'what has the quality of vision or what has not the quality of vision?' 'What has the quality of vision.' 'And you see our garments?' 'Yes.' 'Then our garments have the quality of vision.' A similar play of words follows, which is successfully retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, who is rebuked by Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful things.

'But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the same or not the same as absolute beauty?' Socrates replies that they are not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. 'And are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?' After a few more amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and laughing, and a panegyric oration from Socrates:—

First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus to public opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he remarks upon their impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as well as those of other people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which makes them give away their secret to all the world: they should be more reserved, and let no one be present at this exhibition who does not pay them a handsome fee; or better still they might practise on one another only. He concludes with a respectful request that they will receive him and Cleinias among their disciples.

Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise severely this wisdom,—not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious critic. 'Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.' Socrates understands that he is an amphibious animal, half philosopher, half politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves and a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. They are a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both of politics and of philosophy. They do not understand the

principles of combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of two good things which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them taken separately.

Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to him the reflection that the professors of education are strange beings. Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions are few, and recommends that 'he and his house' should continue to serve philosophy, and not mind about its professors.

There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies like the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of the human mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms which have rooted themselves in language—as troublesome elements of thought which cannot be either used or explained away. The same absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached to the words which are the signs of them. The philosophy which in the first and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of reflection, in the third becomes sophistical, verbal, eristic.

It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirises in the Euthydemus. The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to perplex human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably received more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously maintained them. They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to wonder how any one could ever have been deceived by them; but we must remember also that there was a time when the human mind was only with great difficulty disentangled from such fallacies.

To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a mental state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during more than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the conception of rest, and therefore the very word 'thus' from language; in which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved to be contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative change was a puzzle, and even differences of degree, when applied to abstract notions

were not understood; in which there was no analysis of grammar, and mere puns or plays of words received serious attention; in which contradiction itself was denied, and, on the one hand, every predicate was affirmed to be true of every subject, and on the other, it was held that no predicate was true of any subject, and that nothing was, or was known, or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried on with religious earnestness and more than scholastic subtlety, in which the catchwords of philosophy are completely detached from their context. To such disputes the humour, whether of Plato in the ancient, or of Pope and Swift in the modern world, is the natural enemy. Nor must we forget that in modern times also there is no fallacy so gross, no trick of language so transparent, no abstraction so barren and unmeaning, no form of thought so contradictory to experience, which has not been found to satisfy the minds of philosophical enquirers at a certain stage, or when regarded from a certain point of view only. The peculiarity of the fallacies of our own age is that we live within them, and are therefore generally unconscious of them.

Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book 'De Sophisticis Elenchis,' which Plato, with equal command of their true nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we are only struck with the broad humour of this 'reductio ad absurdum:' gradually we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge. Here, as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put words in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny predication, and thus make knowledge impossible. Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which allows the same words to be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of meaning: (2) The necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena. Plato is aware that his own doctrine of ideas (p. 301 A), as well as the Eleatic Being and Not-being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies (p. 284 A, B.) The sophism advanced in the Meno (p. 80 D), 'that you cannot enquire either into what you know or do not know,' is lightly touched upon at the commencement of the Dialogue (pp. 275, 276); the thesis of Protagoras, that everything is true to him to whom it seems to be true, is satirized at p. 286. In contrast with these fallacies is maintained the Socratic doctrine that happiness is gained by knowledge. The grammatical puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes probably contain allusions to tricks

of language which may have been practised by the disciples of Prodicus or Antisthenes. They would have had more point, if we were acquainted with the writings against which Plato's humour is directed. Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning; but we have lost the clue to some of them, and cannot determine whether, as in the *Cratylus*, Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun with his satire.

The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects with the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect relevancy to the subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages the youth, instead of 'knocking him down,' after the manner of the two Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion—for while Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they are not able to arrive at any certain result about the art which is to teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the *Republic*; as the conception of the kingly art (291, 292) is more fully developed in the *Politicus*, and the caricature of rhetoric (290) in the *Gorgias*.

The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is Socrates once more in the character of an old man; and his equal in years, Crito, the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the *Laches*, his fellow demesman (*Apol.* 33 D), to whom the scene is narrated, and who once or twice interrupts with a remark after the manner of the interlocutor in the *Phaedo*, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes a playful allusion to his money-getting habits. There is the youth Cleinias, the grandson of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis, Charmides, Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths Socrates draws his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in a kindly and sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe that Socrates has not improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias (cp. *Phaedrus*, 275 B). The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as long dead, τοῦ παλαιοῦ, and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year 404 B.C., suggests not only that the intended scene of the *Euthydemus* could not have been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue could not have been composed before 390 at the soonest. Ctesippus, who is the lover of Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the *Lysis*, and seems there too to deserve the character which is here given him, of a somewhat uproarious young man. But the chief study of all is the picture of the two brothers, who

are unapproachable in their effrontery, equally careless of what they say to others and of what is said to them, and never at a loss. They are 'Arcades ambo et cantare pares et respondere parati.' Some superior degree of wit or subtlety is attributed to Euthydemus, who sees the trap in which Socrates catches Dionysodorus (296 A).

The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the variety which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play, just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same time he takes the opportunity of assailing another class of persons who are as alien from the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been apt to have a bad name both in ancient and modern times. The persons whom Plato ridicules in the epilogue to the Euthydemus are of this class. They occupy a border-ground between philosophy and politics; they are free from the dangers of politics, and at the same time use philosophy as a means of serving their own interests. Plato quaintly describes them as making two good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by perverting the objects of both. Men like Antiphon or Lysias would be types of the class. Out of a regard to the respectabilities of life, they are disposed to censure the interest which Socrates takes in the exhibition of the two brothers. They do not understand, any more than Crito himself, that he is pursuing his vocation of detecting the follies of mankind, which he finds 'not unpleasant.' (Cp. Apol. 23 B, 33 B.)

Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues. The concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his two sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give up philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that 'Virtue cannot be taught because there are no teachers.'

The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are: (1) the similarity in plan and style to the Protagoras, Charmides, and Lysis;—the relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of humorous antagonism, not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of embittered hatred; and the places and persons have a considerable family likeness; (2) the

Euthydemus still belongs to the Socratic period in which Socrates is represented as willing to learn, but unable to teach; and in the spirit of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, philosophy is defined as 'the knowledge which will make us happy;' (3) we seem to have passed the stage arrived at in the *Protagoras*, for Socrates is no longer discussing whether virtue can be taught—from this question he is relieved by the ingenuous declaration of the youth Cleinias; and (4) not yet to have reached the point at which he asserts 'that there are no teachers.' Such grounds are precarious, as arguments from style and plan are apt to be (*ἄλισθηρότατον τὸ γένος*). But no arguments equally strong can be urged in favour of assigning to the *Euthydemus* any other position in the series.

EUTHYDEMUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator
of the Dialogue.*

CRITO.

CLEINIAS.

EUTHYDEMUS.

DIONYSODORUS.

CTESIPPUS.

SCENE:—The Lyceum.

Crito. WHO was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, and I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who was he?

Socrates. There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?

Cri. The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks younger than he is.

Soc. He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the conversation.

Cri. ¹Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are

¹ Or, according to the arrangement of Stallbaum:—

Cri. Neither of them are known to me.

Soc. They are a new importation of Sophists, as I should imagine.

Cri. Of what country, &c.

a new importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they, and what is their line of wisdom?

Soc. As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in this region. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful—consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair are perfect in the use of their bodies and invincible in every sort of warfare; for they are 272 capital at fighting in armour, and will teach the art to any one who pays them; and also they are most skilful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts. And this was only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares to look at them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of putting myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to any one.

Cri. But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear that.

Soc. Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience similar treatment; and perhaps they may be afraid and not like to receive me in consequence; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to go along with me to them, as I persuaded them to go to Connus, and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps we

had better take your sons as a bait; they will want to have them, and will be willing to receive us as pupils for the sake of them.

Cri. I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know beforehand what we are going to learn.

Soc. In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I did not attend—I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone in the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and being about to depart, as I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so I sat
273 down again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to be their disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at us, for I particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time; and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not in a small but in a large way of wisdom, for they know all about war,—all that a good general ought to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of fighting in armour: and they know about law too, and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured.

They heard me say this, and I was despised by them; they looked at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus said: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; they are secondary occupations to us.

Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as

secondary, what must the principal one be ; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study is ?

The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal occupation ; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man.

My God ! I said, and where did you learn that ? I always thought, as I was saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting in armour ; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the other knowledge, O forgive me : I address you as I would superior beings, and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus : ²⁷⁴ the promise is so vast, that a feeling of incredulity will creep in.

You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact.

Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit your wisdom ; or what will you do ?

That is why we are come hither, Socrates ; and our purpose is not-only to exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn.

But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want to learn. I shall be the first ; and there is the youth Cleinias, and Ctesippus : and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers of Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting at some distance from Cleinias ; and when Euthydemus leaned forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between us ; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to us : and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all eager to learn : to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said : O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do myself and the company the favour to exhibit. There may be

some trouble in giving the whole exhibition ; but tell me one thing,—can you make a good man only of him who is convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is not a thing which can be taught at all, or that you two are not the teachers of it? Say whether your art is able to persuade such an one nevertheless that virtue can be taught ; and that you are the men from whom he will be most likely to learn.

Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus ; our art will do both.

And you, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and the study of virtue?

275 Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.

Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will confer a great favour on me and on every one present ; for the fact is that I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should be truly good. His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is most happily timed ; and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objection.

These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used ; and Euthydemus, in a lofty and at the same time cheerful tone, replied : There can be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions.

He is quite accustomed to that, I replied ; for his friends often come and ask him questions and argue with him ; so that he is at home in answering.

What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows : O Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant ?

The youth, overpowered by the question, blushed, and in his perplexity looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my belief is that you will derive the greatest good from their questions.

Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward in my ear and laughing, I prophesy that he will be refuted, Socrates.

While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and he answered that those who learned 276 were the wise.

Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are there not?

The boy assented.

And they are the teachers of those who learn—the grammar-master and the lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?

Yes.

And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you were learning?

No, he said.

And were you wise then?

No, indeed, he said.

But if you were not wise you were unlearned?

Certainly.

You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were learning?

The youth nodded assent.

Then the unlearned learn¹, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.

At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, before the youth had time to recover, Dionysodorus cleverly took him in hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master dictated to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the dictation?

The wise, replied Cleinias.

¹ Omitting *σφαί.*

Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned ; and your last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.

Then followed another peal of laughter and shouting, which came from the admirers of the two heroes, who were ravished with their wisdom, while the rest of us were silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere with the youth ; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they do not know ?

Again Dionysodorus whispered to me : That, Socrates, is just another of the same sort.

Good heavens, I said ; and your last question was so good !

Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied—inevitable.

I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your disciples.

Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn what they do not know ; and he put him through a series of questions as before.

277 Do you not know letters ?

He assented.

All letters ?

Yes.

But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters ?

He admitted that.

Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know ?

He admitted that also.

Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates ; but he only who does not know letters learns ?

Nay, said Cleinias ; but I do learn.

Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters ?

He admitted that.

Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer.

The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth. Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is

deceiving you. For tell me now, is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?

Cleinias assented.

And knowing is having knowledge at the time?

He agreed.

And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?

He admitted that.

And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?

Those who have not.

And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of those who have not?

He nodded assent.

Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of those who have?

He agreed.

Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who know.

Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to rest him, and also in order that he might not get out of heart, I said to him consolingly: You must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use of terms. The two gentlemen wanted to explain to you, as you do not know, that the word 'to learn' has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this same matter done or spoken by the light of this knowledge; the latter is generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning,' but the word 'learning'

is also used ; and you did not see that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those who do not know, as they explained. There was a similar trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser ; he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and claps his hands at the sight of his friend sprawling on the ground. And you must regard all that has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them how) ; for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom ? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, and what I desire to hear ; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom : and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you : Do not all men desire happiness ? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man : for what human being is there who does not desire happiness ?

279 There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.

Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy ?—that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things ? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.

He assented.

And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth is a good.

Certainly, he said.

And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?

He agreed.

Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's own land, are goods?

He assented.

And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of justice, temperance, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?

They are goods, said Cleinias.

Very well, I said; and in what company shall we find a place for wisdom—among the goods or not?

Among the goods.

And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.

I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.

Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the greatest of them all.

What is that? he asked.

Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to be the greatest of goods.

True, he said.

On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axi-ochus, have you and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.

Why do you say that?

Why, because we have already spoken of fortune, and are but repeating ourselves.

What do you mean?

I mean that there is something ridiculous in putting fortune again forward, and saying the same thing twice over.

He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is good fortune; even a child may know that.

The simple-minded youth was amazed ; and, observing this, I said to him : Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and successful in performing on the flute ?

He assented.

And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters ?

Certainly.

Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole than wise pilots ?

None, certainly.

And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the risk—in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one ?

With a wise one.

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one ?

A wise one.

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to act with an ignorant one ?

He assented.

280 Then wisdom always makes men fortunate : for by wisdom no man would ever err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be wisdom no longer.

We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us ?

He assented.

And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they profited us not, or if they profited us ?

If they profited us, he said.

And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them ? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited ?

Certainly not, he said.

Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of all that he ought to possess? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?

Certainly not, he said.

And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?

No indeed, Socrates.

Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?

True.

Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?

Yes, in my opinion.

And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?

He must use them rightly.

That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an evil. You admit that?

281

He assented.

Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?

Nothing else, he said.

And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives the right way of making them?

He agreed.

And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first—wealth and health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of them, and guides our practice about them?

He assented.

Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which gives a man not only good fortune but success?

He assented.

And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit

a man, if he have neither sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?

Certainly, he said.

And who would do least—a poor man or a rich man?

A poor man.

A weak man or a strong man?

A weak man.

A noble man or a mean man?

A mean man.

And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?

Yes.

And an indolent man less than an active man?

He assented.

And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?

All this was mutually allowed by us.

Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and virtue, they are greater goods: but in themselves they are nothing?

That, he said, appears to be certain.

What then, I said, is the result of all this? Is not this the result—that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and ignorance the only evil?

He assented.

282 Let us consider this further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is

gained by a use, and a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,—the inference is that every man ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can?

Yes, he said.

And the desire to obtain this treasure, which is far more precious than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen or stranger—the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is any one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree to that? I said.

Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right.

Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to man spontaneously; for that is a point which has still to be considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me.

But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.

Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say that; and I am also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome speculation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her?

Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best.

I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of exhortations which I desire you to offer; and I hope that one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: at any rate take up the enquiry where I left off, and next show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.

Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was 283

coming. I wanted to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man, Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully persuasive as an exhortation to virtue.

Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?

I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said:

Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words.

I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words.

Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?

Undoubtedly.

And he is not wise as yet?

At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is.

You wish him, he said, to become wise and not to be ignorant?

That we do.

You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is.

I was thrown into consternation at this.

Taking advantage of my consternation he added: You wish him no longer to be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be, or to perish!

When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover might) and said: Strangers of Thurii—if politeness would allow me I should say, Perish yourselves. What can make you tell such a lie about me and the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?

Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to tell a lie?

Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to deny that.

And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak 284 or not?

You tell the thing of which you speak.

And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?

Yes, said Ctesippus.

And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?

Certainly.

And he who says that thing says that which is?

Yes.

And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie.

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is not.

Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not?

True.

And that which is not is nowhere?

Nowhere.

And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?

I think not, said Ctesippus.

Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?

Nay, he said, they do something.

And doing is making?

Yes.

And speaking is doing and making?

He agreed.

Then no one says that which is not, for in saying that, he would be doing nothing; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false; but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is.

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain way and manner, and not as they really are.

Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks of things as they are?

Yes, he said,—all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons.

And are not good things good, and evil things evil?

He assented.

And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?

Yes.

Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are?

Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil.

And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm things of the warm?

Yes, indeed, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid and cold dialectician.

You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive!

Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor to say in my presence that I desire
285 my beloved, whom I value above all men, to perish.

I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones—whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether they have learned from some one else this new sort of death and destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and put a good one in his place—if they know this (and they do know this—at any rate they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art)—let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with them, then *fiat experimentum in corpore senis*; I will be the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like

Medea the Colchian, kill me, pickle me, eat me, if he will only make me good.

Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things.

Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing.

Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?

You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one contradicting any one else.

Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting Dionysodorus.

Are you prepared to make that good?

Certainly, he said.

Well, have not all things words expressive of them?

Yes.

Of their existence or of their non-existence?

Of their existence.

Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not.

And what does that signify, said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all the same for that.

But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?

He admitted that.

Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of us says a word about the thing at all?

He granted that also.

But when I describe something and you describe another

thing, or I say something and you say nothing—is there any contradiction? How can he who speaks contradict him who speaks not?

Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most likely to hear the truth of this from you. The dictum is that there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing. Is not that your position?

He assented.

But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely?

No, he cannot, he said.

Then there is no such thing as false opinion?

No, he said.

Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?

Certainly, he said.

And that is impossible?

Impossible, he replied.

Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously maintain that no man is ignorant?

Refute me, he said.

But how can I refute you, if, as you say, falsehood is impossible?

Very true, said Euthydemus.

Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how can I tell you to do that which is not?

O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and you must forgive me therefore if
287 I ask a very stupid question: if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting—that is what you mean?

Yes, he replied.

And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who could learn?

And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you bring up now what I said at first—and if I had said anything last year, I suppose that you would bring that up—but are non-plussed at the words which I have just uttered?

Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'non-plussed,' which you used last: what do you mean by that, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense.

Certainly, he said; that is my meaning; and I wish that you would answer.

What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.

Answer, said he.

And is that fair?

Yes, quite fair, he said.

Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise man, who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows when to answer and when not to answer—and now you will not open your mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.

You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit that I am wise, answer as I tell you.

I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.

Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?

They are alive.

And do you know of any word which is alive?

I cannot say that I do.

Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?

Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was right after all in saying that words have a sense;—what do you say, wise man? If I was not in error, you will not refute me, and all your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you are wrong in saying that

288 there is no error,—and this remark was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument is not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling yourself.

Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking nonsense.

Fearing that there would be high words, I endeavoured to soothe Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said before to Cleinias—that you do not understand the peculiarity of these philosophers. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in which I pray to behold them; that will be a guide to them. I will go on where I left off before, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply serious and interested, they may also be serious. You, Cleinias, I said, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?

Yes, he replied.

And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?

Yes, he said.

And what knowledge ought we to acquire? Is not the simple answer to that, A knowledge that will do us good?

Certainly, he said.

And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?

Perhaps we should, he said.

But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold that there is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how

to convert stones into gold, the knowledge would be of no value 289 to us, unless we also knew how to use the gold? Do you not remember? I said.

I quite remember, he said.

Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use that which is made, be of any use to us. Is not that true?

He agreed.

And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous instances?

To all this he agreed.

Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as well as makes?

True, he said.

And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort—far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which uses is another. Having to do with the same, they are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely from one another. Am I not right?

He agreed.

And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; for that is another of the same sort?

He assented.

But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches—would that be the art which would make us happy?

I think not, rejoined Cleinias.

And what proof have you of that? I asked.

I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do not know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers of lyres do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of themselves unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the others make for them; and this proves that the art of making speeches is not the same as the art of using them.

Yes, I said; and that I take to be a sufficient proof that the art

of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered in that direction ; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it : and whereas
 290 the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and consoling of them. Do you agree with me?

Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right.

Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse?

I do not see my way, he said.

But I think that I do, I replied.

And what is your notion? asked Cleinias.

I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which the possession is most likely to make a man happy.

I do not think that, he said.

Why not? I said.

The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind.

What of that? I said.

Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing ; and when the prey is taken they cannot use it ; but the huntsman or fisherman hands it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in them)—they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their prey, hand over their inventions to the dialecticians to be applied by them, if they have any sense in them.

Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true?

Certainly, he said ; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use them himself ; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to the keeper of them. If we are looking for that art which is to make us blessed, and which is able to

use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not the one, and some other must be found.

Cri. And do you mean to say, Socrates, that the youngster said that?

Soc. Are you incredulous, Crito?

Cri. Indeed, I am; for if he said that, I am of opinion that he needs neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor.

Soc. Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real answerer.

Cri. Ctesippus! nonsense.

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Soc. All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I heard them I am certain.

Cri. Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and did you find the art which you were seeking?

Soc. Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story? At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as much as ever.

Cri. How did that happen, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the political.

Cri. Well, and what came of that?

Soc. To this royal or political art all the arts, including that of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, as to the only one which knew how to use that which they created. Here obviously was the very art which we were seeking—the art which is the source of good government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, and utilizing them.

Cri. And were you not right, Socrates?

Soc. You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was asked: Does this kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same?

Cri. Yes, I should.

Soc. And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say that it produces health?

Cri. I should.

Soc. And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have supreme authority over the subject arts—what does that do? Does it not supply us with the fruits of the earth?

Cri. Yes.

Soc. And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?

Cri. Indeed I am not, Socrates.

Soc. No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful.

Cri. Certainly.

Soc. And surely it ought to do us some good?

Cri. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge is the only good.

Cri. Yes, that was what you were saying.

Soc. All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart wisdom to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, and make us happy.

Cri. Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to your report of the conversation.

Soc. And does the kingly art make men wise and good?

Cri. Why not, Socrates?

Soc. What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them

all the arts,—carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?

Cri. I do not think that, Socrates.

Soc. But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil, nor of any knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can it be, and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?

Cri. By all means.

Soc. And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that they will make others good, and that these others will make others again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.

Cri. Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great perplexity.

Soc. Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and ²⁹³ called upon the strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.

Cri. And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?

Soc. Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this knowledge about which you are doubting, or shall I prove that you already have it?

What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?

Indeed I am.

Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn.

Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?

Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.

That will do, he said. And would you admit that anything is what it is, and at the same time is not what it is?

Certainly not.

And did you not say that you knew something?

I did.

If you know, you are knowing.

Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.

That makes no difference;—and must you not, if you are knowing, know all things?

Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not know.

And if you do not know, you are not knowing.

Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.

Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the same things.

That is a pretty clatter of words, Euthydemus; and yet I must ask you to explain how I have that knowledge which we were seeking. Do you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and not be; and therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have that knowledge? May I assume this to be your ingenious notion?

Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said.

Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you; for if I am only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not know others?

Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.

What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?

Nay, he replied, we do know something.

294 Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything?

Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us.

O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And do all other men know all things or nothing?

Certainly, he replied ; they cannot know some things, and not know others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.

Then what is the inference ? I said.

They all know all things, he replied, if they know one thing.

O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest ; hardly have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know all things, including carpentering and leather-cutting ?

Certainly, he said.

And do you know stitching ?

Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too.

And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand ?

Certainly ; did you think that we should say No to that ?

By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give me some proof which would enable me to know whether you say truly.

What proof shall I give you ? he said.

Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has ? and Euthydemus shall tell how many teeth you have.

Will you not take our word that we know all things ?

Certainly not, said Ctesippus : you must further tell us this one thing, and then we shall know that you are speaking the truth ; if you tell us the number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they refused, and they would only say, in answer to each of his questions, that they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to throw off all restraint ; no question in fact was too bad for him ; he would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild boars, came rushing on his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance.

Certainly, he replied.

And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age ? has he got to such a height of skill as that ?

He can do anything, he said.

And did you always know this?

Always, he said.

When you were children, and at your birth?

295 They both said that they did.

This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous, Socrates.

Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know that you are wise men.

But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar marvels.

Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all things, there is nothing in life that would be a greater gain to me than that.

Answer then, he said.

Ask, I said, and I will answer.

Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?

Something, I said.

And do you know with what you know, or with something else?

With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?

Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked?

Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid; when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer nevertheless, and not to ask again.

Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said.

Yes, I replied.

Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning.

Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood and answered by me in another, will that please you—if I answer what is not to the point?

That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I imagine.

I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said.

You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning, because you will be prating, and are an ancient.

Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil, I thought that I had better let him have his way, as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So I said: You are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never made a profession of the art, and therefore do as you say; ask your questions once more, and I will answer.

Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with something, or with nothing.

Yes, I said; I know with my soul.

The man will answer more than the question; for I did not 296 ask you, he said, with what you know, but whether you know with something.

Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always know what I know with something.

And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one thing, and sometimes another thing?

Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this.

Will you not cease adding to your answers?

My fear is that this word 'always' may get us into trouble.

You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know with this?

Always; since I am required to withdraw the words 'when I know.'

You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things with this?

All that I know, I replied, I know with this.

There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous.

Well, then, I said, I will take away the words 'that I know.'

Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?

Quite impossible.

And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that you know all things.

I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words 'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things.

And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which you know, whether you make the addition of 'when you know them' or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known all things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know them; and I swear that you shall always continue to know them, if I am of the mind to make you.

But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, if you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your power to accomplish this unless you have the help of your brother Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am told so by men of your prodigious wisdom—how can I say that I know such things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or not?

Certainly, you know that.

What do I know?

That the good are not unjust.

297 Quite true, I said; and I have always known that; but the question is, where did I learn that the good are unjust?

Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.

Then, I said, I do not know this.

You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will be proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing at the same time.

Dionysodorus blushed.

I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?

What, replied Dionysodorus in an instant; am I the brother of Euthydemus?

Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a lesson you might at least allow me to learn.

You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to answer.

No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and *a fortiori* I must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, opening his mouth and biting. Then he called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, and he ably succoured him; but if my Iolaus, who is Patrocles the statuary, were to come, he would make a bad business worse.

And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles any more than he is yours?

I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will insist on asking—that I pretty well know—out of envy, in order to prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus.

Then answer me, he said.

Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of Heracles.

And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?

Yes, I said, he is my half brother, the son of my mother, but not of my father.

Then he is and is not your brother.

Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chacredemus was his father, and mine was Sophroniscus.

And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also?

Yes, I said; the former was mine, and the latter his father.

298 Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father.

He is not my father, I said.

But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?

I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid that you may prove me one.

Are you not other than a stone?

I am.

And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than gold, you are not gold?

Very true.

And so Chacredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father?

I suppose that he is not a father, I replied.

For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a father, then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; and you, Socrates, are without a father.

Ctesippus retorted: And is not your father in the same case, for he is other than my father?

Assuredly not, said Euthydemus.

Then he is the same?

He is the same.

I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?

Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose that he is a father and not a father?

Certainly, I did imagine that, said Ctesippus.

And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?

They are not '*in pari materia*,' Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the father of all.

But he is, he replied.

What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals?

Of all, he said.

And your mother, too, is the mother of all?

Yes, our mother too.

Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then?

Yes; and yours, he said.

And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?

And yours too.

And your papa is a dog?

And so is yours, he said.

If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog.

Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus.

And he has puppies?

Yes, and they are very like himself.

And the dog is the father of them?

Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come together.

And is he not yours?

To be sure he is.

Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers.

Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat this dog?

Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him.

Then you beat your father, he said.

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I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this father of you and the puppies who are your brothers got out of this wisdom of yours.

But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good.

And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said.

Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; or to go to war armed rather than unarmed.

Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your charming puzzles.

That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; for seeing that you admitted medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be good for him to drink as much as possible—a cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him?

Ctesippus said: Certainly not, Euthydemus, if he who drinks be as big as the statue of Delphi.

And if, he said, in war it be good to have arms, he ought to have as many spears and shields as possible?

Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think that he ought to have one shield only, Euthydemus, and one spear?

I do.

And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering the skill which you and your companion have in fighting in armour, I thought that you would have known better. Here Euthydemus held his peace, and Dionysodorus returned to the previous answer.

Do you not think that the possession of gold is good?

Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better.

And to have money everywhere and always is a good?

Certainly, a great good, he said.

And you admit gold to be a good?

I have admitted that, he replied.

And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his head, and a stater of gold in either eye?

Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in their hands.

300 And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus.

That which has the quality of vision clearly.

And¹ you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said.

Yes, I do.

Then do you see our garments?

Yes.

Then our garments have the quality of vision.

They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus.

What can they see?

Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to say and say nothing—that is what you are doing.

And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus.

Impossible, said Ctesippus.

Or a speaking of the silent?

That is still more impossible, he said.

But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the silent?

¹ Note: the ambiguity of *δυνατὰ ὁρᾶν*, 'things visible and able to see,' *σιγῶντα λέγειν*, 'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English. Compare Aristot. Soph. Elenchi, c. iv. (Poste's translation, p. 9):—

'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:—

'I hope that you the enemy may slay.

'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known is here affirmed to know.

'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar sees.

'What you *are* holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a stone you are.

'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the speaker or the subject of speech.

'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; the second when one is improper, but customary; the third when the ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.'

Not when I pass a smithy ; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise and outcry if they are touched : so that here your wisdom is strangely mistaken ; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was present).

When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things ?

Yes, he said.

But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are silent.

What, said Ctesippus ; then all things are not silent ?

Certainly not, said Euthydemus.

Then, my good friend, do they all speak ?

Yes ; those which speak.

Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are silent or speak ?

Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing ; I am sure that you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer.

Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter ; he said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma ; all is over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as uproarious ; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked up this answer from them ; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful things ?

Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing ?

Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many.

301 Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful ?

Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all : I said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have beauty present with each of them.

And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you ?

I entreat you not to say that, I replied.

But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will one thing be another?

Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their skill, on which my heart was set.

Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the non-existent.

What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable and the base base?

That, he said, is as I please.

And do you please?

Yes, he said.

And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you seem to me to be a good workman, and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.

What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first place, whose business is hammering?

The smith's.

And whose the making of pots?

The potter's.

And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?

The cook, I said.

And if a man does his business he does rightly?

Certainly.

And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that?

Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too severe upon me.

Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the potter, he would do their business.

Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such wisdom of my own?

And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has become your own?

Certainly, I said, if you will allow me.

What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?

Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.

Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have in your own power, and which you are able to
302 use as you would desire, for example, an ox or a sheep—would you not think that, which you could sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own, and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not to be in your own power?

Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come of the questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such things only are mine.

Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?

Yes, I said.

You admit then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the power to do all these things which I was just naming.

I admit that.

Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? Here anticipating the final move which was to enclose me in the net, in the attempt to get away, I gave a desperate twist and said: No, Dionysodorus, I have not.

What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian at all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of gentility.

Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you please; in the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and ancestral, and all that other Athenians have.

And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus?

That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether colonists or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who is the father of Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an Athene guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us.

No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, and Athene.

Certainly, I said.

And they are your gods, he said.

Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors.

At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that?

I did, I said; what is going to happen to me?

And are not these gods animals? For you admit that all things which have life are animals; and have not these gods life?

They have life, I said.

Then are they not animals?

They are animals, I said.

And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?

I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape.

Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, can you sell them or give them away, or do what you 303 will with them, as you would with other animals?

At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came to the rescue.

Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he.

Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus.

Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more of them; the pair are invincible.

Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only had cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous

disregard of any opinion—whether of the many, or of the grave and reverend seigniors—you regard only those who are like yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you, and would approve of your arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other; the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, not excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others; and thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted to any one. I observe that
304 Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments; there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of learning; the exhibition would be best of all, if the discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee;—you should be careful of this;—and if you are wise, you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For only what is rare is valuable; and ‘water,’ which, as Pindar says, is the ‘best of all things,’ is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils.

Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, since they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them money; no age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat one thing which they said, for your especial benefit,—that the learning of their art did not at all interfere with the business of money-making.

Cri. Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be

refuted by such arguments than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions—he was a professor of legal oratory—who came away from you while I was walking up and down. ‘Crito,’ said he to me, ‘are you giving no attention to these wise men?’ ‘No, indeed,’ I said to him; ‘I could not get within hearing of them—there was such a crowd.’ ‘You would have heard something worth hearing if you had.’ ‘What was that?’ I said. ‘You would have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing.’ ‘And what did you think of them?’ I said. ‘What did I think of them?’ he said:—‘what any one would think of them who heard them talking nonsense, and making much ado about nothing.’ That was the expression which he used. ‘Surely,’ I said, ‘philosophy is a charming thing.’ ‘Charming!’ he said; ‘what simplicity! philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had 305 been present you would have been ashamed of your friend—his conduct was so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous.’ Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, I confess that I thought he was in the right about that.

Soc. O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? What manner of man was he who came up to you and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which they do battle?

Cri. He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a clever man, and composes wonderful speeches.

Soc. Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, whom I was on the point of mentioning—one of those whom Prodicus describes as on the border-ground between

philosophers and statesmen—they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the wisest ; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in their way ; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friend, when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural ; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political wisdom ; there is reason in what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of both, while they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom.

Cri. What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something specious in that notion of theirs.

Soc. Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth ; they
306 cannot be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate in both of them—if one of these two things is good and the other evil, are better than the one and worse than the other ; but if they are in a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either. Now, if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between them, then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either ; or, if the one be good and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than the other ; only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be any truth in what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil ; but the truth is, that these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the attainment of their respective ends, and are really third, although they would like to stand first. There is no need, however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs—they may be forgiven that ; for every man

ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all like wisdom : at the same time we shall do well to see them as they really are.

Cri. I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the younger one, who is only a child ; but the other, Critobulus, is getting on, and needs some one who will improve him. I cannot help thinking, when I hear you talk, that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties about our children :—in the first place, about marrying a wife of good family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for them—and yet taking no care about their education. But then again, when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am amazed. They all seem to me to be such outrageous beings, if I am to confess the 307 truth : so that I do not know how I can advise the youth to study philosophy.

Soc. Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and beyond all price : for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and money-making and the art of the general, noble arts?

Cri. Certainly they are, in my judgment.

Soc. Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are ridiculous performers?

Cri. Yes, indeed, that is very true.

Soc. And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself and refuse to allow them to your son?

Cri. That would not be reasonable, Socrates.

Soc. Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to turn away all men from her, and not your sons only ; but if she be what I believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as the saying is, and be of good cheer.

I O N.

INTRODUCTION.

THE *ION* is the shortest, or nearly the shortest, of all the writings which bear the name of Plato, and is not authenticated by any early external testimony. The grace and beauty of this little work supply the only, and perhaps a sufficient, proof of its genuineness. The plan is simple, and the dramatic interest consists entirely in the contrast between the irony of Socrates and the transparent vanity and childlike enthusiasm of the rhapsode Ion. The theme of the Dialogue may possibly have been suggested by the passage of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (iv. 2, 10) in which the rhapsodists are described by Euthydemus as 'very precise about the exact words of Homer, but very idiotic themselves.' (Cp. Aristotle, *Met.* xiii. chap. 6, 7.)

Ion the rhapsode has just come to Athens; he has been exhibiting in Epidaurus at the festival of Asclepius, and is intending to exhibit at the festival of the Panathenaea. Socrates admires and envies the rhapsode's art—for he is always well dressed and in good company—in the company of good poets and of Homer, who is the prince of them. In the course of conversation the admission is elicited from Ion that his skill is restricted to Homer, and that he knows nothing of inferior poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus;—he brightens up and is wide awake when Homer is being recited, but is apt to go to sleep at the recitations of any other poet. 'And yet, surely, he who knows the superior ought to know the inferior also;—he who can judge of the good speaker is able to judge of the bad. And poetry is a whole; and he who judges of poetry by rules of art ought to be able to judge of all poetry.' This is confirmed by the analogy of sculpture, painting, flute-playing, and the other arts. The argument is at last brought home to the mind of Ion, who asks how this contradiction is to be solved. The solution given by Socrates is as follows:—

The rhapsode is not guided by rules of art, but is an inspired person who derives a mysterious power from the poet; and the poet, in like

manner, is inspired by the God. The poets and their interpreters may be compared to a chain of magnetic rings suspended from one another, and from a magnet. The magnet is the Muse, and the large ring which comes next in order is the poet himself; then follow the rhapsodes and actors, who are rings of inferior power; and the last ring of all is the spectator. The poet is the inspired interpreter of the God, and this is the reason why some poets, like Homer, are restricted to a single theme, or, like Tynnichus, are famous for a single poem; and the rhapsode is the inspired interpreter of the poet, and for a similar reason some rhapsodes, like Ion, are the interpreters of single poets.

Ion is delighted at the notion of being inspired, and acknowledges that he is beside himself when he is performing;—his eyes rain tears and his hair stands on end. Socrates is of opinion that a man must be mad who behaves in this way at a festival when there is nothing to trouble him. Ion is confident that Socrates would never think him mad if he could only hear his embellishments of Homer. Socrates asks whether he can speak well about everything in Homer. ‘Yes, indeed he can.’ ‘What about things of which he has no knowledge?’ Ion answers that he can interpret anything in Homer. But, rejoins Socrates, when Homer speaks of the arts, as for example, of chariot-driving, or of medicine, or of prophecy, or of navigation—will he, or will the charioteer or physician or prophet or pilot be the better judge? Ion is compelled to admit that every man will judge of his own particular art better than the rhapsode. He still maintains, however, that he understands the art of the general as well as any one. ‘Then why in this city of Athens, in which men of merit are always being sought after, is he not at once appointed a general?’ Ion replies that he is a foreigner, and the Athenians and Spartans will not appoint a foreigner to be their general. ‘No, that is not the real reason. But Ion has long been playing tricks with the argument; like Proteus, he transforms himself into a variety of shapes, and is at last about to escape in the disguise of a general. Would he rather be regarded as inspired or dishonest?’ Ion, who has no suspicion of the irony of Socrates, eagerly embraces the alternative of inspiration.

The Ion, like the other earlier Platonic Dialogues, is a mixture of jest and earnest, in which no definite result is obtained, but some Socratic or Platonic truths are allowed dimly to appear.

The elements of a true theory of poetry are contained in the notion

that the poet is inspired. Genius is often said to be unconscious, or spontaneous, or a gift of nature: that genius is akin to madness is a popular aphorism of modern times. The greatest strength is observed to have an element of limitation. Imagination is often at war with reason and fact. Reflections of this kind may have been passing before Plato's mind when he describes the poet as inspired, or when, as in the *Apology* (22 b, foll.), he speaks of poets as the worst critics of their own writings—anybody taken at random from the crowd is a better interpreter of them than they are of themselves. They are sacred persons, 'winged and holy things,' who have a touch of madness in their composition (*Phaedr.* 245 a), and should be treated with every sort of respect (*Rep.* iii. 398 a), but not allowed to live in a well-ordered state. Like the Statesmen in the *Meno* (p. 99), they have a divine instinct, but they are narrow and confused; they do not attain to the clearness of ideas, or to the knowledge of poetry or of any other art as a whole.

In the *Protagoras* (316 d, foll.) the ancient poets are recognized by Protagoras himself as the original sophists; and this family resemblance may be traced in the *Ion*. The rhapsode belongs to the realm of imitation and of opinion: he professes to have all knowledge, which is derived by him from Homer, just as the sophist professes to have all wisdom, which is contained in his art of rhetoric. Even more than the sophist he is incapable of appreciating the commonest logical distinctions; he cannot explain the nature of his own art; his great memory contrasts with his inability to follow the steps of the argument. And in his highest dramatic flights he has an eye to his own gains.

The old quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which in the *Republic* leads to their final separation, is already working in the mind of Plato, and is embodied by him in the contrast between Socrates and Ion. Yet here, as in the *Republic*, Socrates shows a sympathy with the poetic nature. Also, the manner in which Ion is affected by his own recitations affords a lively illustration of the power which, in the *Republic* (394 foll.), Socrates attributes to dramatic performances over the mind of the performer. His allusion to his embellishments of Homer, in which he declares himself to have surpassed Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Stesimbrotus of Thasos, seems to show that, like them, he belonged to the allegorical school of interpreters. The circumstance that nothing more is known of him may be adduced in confirmation of the argument that this truly Platonic little work is not a forgery of later times.

I O N.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES. ION.

530 *Socrates.* WELCOME, Ion. Are you from your native city of Ephesus?

Ion. No, Socrates; but from Epidaurus, where I attended the festival of Asclepius.

Soc. And do the Epidaurians have contests of rhapsodes at the festival?

Ion. O yes, and of all sorts of musical performers.

Soc. And were you one of the competitors—and did you succeed?

Ion. I obtained the first prize of all, Socrates.

Soc. Well done; and I hope that you will do the same for us at the Panathenaea.

Ion. And I will, please heaven.

Soc. I often envy the profession of a rhapsode, Ion; for you have always to wear fine clothes, and to look as beautiful as you can is a part of your art. Then, again, you are obliged to be continually in the company of many good poets; and especially of Homer, who is the best and most divine of them; and to understand him, and not merely learn his words by rote, is a thing greatly to be envied. And no man can be a rhapsode who does not understand the meaning of the poet. For the rhapsode ought to interpret the mind of the poet to his hearers, but how can he interpret him well unless he knows what he means? All this is greatly to be envied.

Ion. Very true, Socrates; interpretation has certainly been the most laborious part of my art; and I believe myself able to

speak about Homer better than any man; and that neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus of Thasos, nor Glaucou, nor any one else who ever was, had as good ideas about Homer, or as many of them, as I have.

Soc. I am glad to hear that, Ion; for I see that you will not refuse to acquaint me with them.

Ion. Certainly, Socrates; and you ought to hear my embellishments of Homer. I think that the Homeridae should give me a golden crown as a reward for them.

Soc. I shall take an opportunity of hearing them at some future time. But just now I should like to ask you a question: 53¹ Does your art extend to Hesiod and Archilochus, or to Homer only?

Ion. To Homer only; and that appears to me to be quite enough.

Soc. Are there any things about which Homer and Hesiod agree?

Ion. Yes; I am of opinion that there are a good many.

Soc. And can you interpret better what Homer says, or what Hesiod says, about these matters in which they agree?

Ion. I can interpret them equally well, Socrates, where they agree.

Soc. But what about matters in which they do not agree?—for example, about divination, of which both Homer and Hesiod have something to say.

Ion. Very true.

Soc. Would you or a good prophet be a better interpreter of what these two poets say about divination, not only when they agree, but when they disagree?

Ion. A prophet.

Soc. And if you were a prophet, would you not be able to interpret them when they disagree as well as when they agree?

Ion. Clearly.

Soc. But how did you come to have this skill about Homer only, and not about Hesiod or the other poets? Does not Homer speak of the same themes which all other poets handle? Is not war his great argument? and does he not speak of human society and of intercourse of men, good and bad, skilled and unskilled, and of the gods conversing with one another and with

mankind, and about what happens in heaven and in the world below, and the generations of gods and heroes? Are not these the themes of which Homer sings?

Ion. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. And do not the other poets sing of the same?

Ion. Yes, Socrates; but not in the same way as Homer.

Soc. What, in a worse way?

Ion. Yes, in a far worse.

Soc. And Homer is better?

Ion. He is incomparably better.

Soc. And yet surely, my dear friend Ion, in a discussion about arithmetic, where many people are speaking, and some one person speaks better than the rest, any one can judge who is the good speaker?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And he who judges of the good will be the same as he who judges of the bad speakers?

Ion. The same.

Soc. And he will be the arithmetician?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Well, and in discussions about the wholesomeness of food, when many persons are speaking, and one speaks better than the rest, will he who recognizes the better speaker be a different person from him who recognizes the worse, or the same?

Ion. Clearly the same.

Soc. And who is he, and what is his name?

Ion. The physician.

Soc. And speaking generally, in all discussions in which the subject is the same and many men are speaking, will not he who ⁵³² knows the good know the bad speaker also? For if he does not know the bad, neither will he know the good.

Ion. True.

Soc. Is not the same person skilful in both?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And you say that Homer and the other poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, although not in the same way; but the one speaks well and the other not so well?

Ion. Yes; and I am right in saying that.

Soc. And if you knew the good speaker, you would also know of the inferior speakers that they are inferior?

Ion. That is true.

Soc. Then, my dear friend, can I be mistaken in saying that Ion is equally skilled in Homer and in other poets, since he himself acknowledges that the same person will be a good judge of all those who speak of the same things; and that almost all poets do speak of the same things?

Ion. What then, Socrates, is the reason why I lose attention and go to sleep and have absolutely no ideas, when any one speaks of any other poet; but when Homer is mentioned, I wake up at once and am all attention and have plenty to say?

Soc. That, my friend, is easily explained. No one can fail to see that you speak of Homer without any art or knowledge. If you were able to speak of him by rules of art, you would have been able to speak of all other poets; for poetry is a whole.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And when any one acquires any other art as a whole, the same may be said of them. Would you like me to explain my meaning, Ion?

Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates; I wish that you would: for I love to hear you wise men talk.

Soc. O that we were wise, Ion, and that you could truly call us so; but indeed you rhapsodes and actors, and the poets whose verses you sing, are wise; and I am a common man, who only speak the truth. For consider what a very common and trivial thing this is, which I have said—a thing which any man might say: that when a man has acquired a knowledge of a whole art, the enquiry into good and bad is one and the same. Let us think about this; is not the art of painting a whole?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And there are and have been many painters good and bad?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And did you ever know any one who was skilful in pointing out the excellences and defects of Polygnotus the son of Aglaophon, but incapable of criticizing other painters; and when the work of any other painter was produced, went to sleep and was at a loss, and had no ideas; but when he had to give

his opinion about Polygnotus, or whoever the painter might be, woke up and was attentive and had plenty to say?

Ion. No indeed, I never did.

Soc. Or did you ever know of any one in sculpture, who was skilful in expounding the merits of Daedalus the son of Metion, or of Epeius the son of Panopeus, or of Theodorus the Samian, or of some other individual sculptor; but when the works of other sculptors were produced, was at a loss and went to sleep and had nothing to say?

Ion. No indeed, I never did.

Soc. And if I am not mistaken, you never met with any one among flute-players or harp-players or singers to the harp or rhapsodes who was able to discourse of Olympus or Thamyras or Orpheus, or Phemius the rhapsode of Ithaca, but was at a loss when he came to speak of Ion of Ephesus, and had no notion of his merits or defects?

Ion. I cannot deny that, Socrates. Nevertheless I am conscious in my own self, and the general opinion is that I do speak better and have more to say about Homer than any other man. But I do not speak equally well about others—tell me the reason of this?

Soc. I perceive, Ion; and I will proceed to explain to you what I imagine to be the reason of this. The gift which you possess of speaking excellently about Homer is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. For that stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. Now this is like the Muse, who first of all inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended, who take the inspiration from them. For all good poets, epic as well as lyric, compose their beautiful poems not as works of art, but because they are inspired and possessed. And as the
534 Corybantian revellers when they dance are not in their right mind, so the lyric poets are not in their right mind when they

are composing their beautiful strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey from the rivers, when they are under the influence of Dionysus, but not when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does the same, as they themselves tell us; for they tell us that they bring songs from honied fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the Muses; whither, like the bees, they wing their way. And this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles. Many are the noble words in which poets speak of the actions which they record, like your own words about Homer; but they do not speak of them by any rules of art: they are inspired to utter that to which the Muse impels them, and that only; and when inspired, one of them will make dithyrambs, another hymns of praise, another choral strains, another epic or iambic verses—and he who is good at one is not good at any other kind of verse: for not by art does the poet sing, but by power divine. Had he learned by rules of art, he would have known how to speak not of one theme only, but of all; and therefore God takes away the minds of poets, and uses them as his ministers, as he also uses diviners and holy prophets, in order that we who hear them may know that they speak not of themselves who utter these priceless words in a state of unconsciousness, but that God is the speaker, and that through them he is conversing with us. And Tynnichus the Chalcidian affords a striking instance of what I am saying: he wrote nothing that any one would care to remember but the famous pæan which is in every one's mouth, one of the finest poems ever written, and truly an invention of the Muses, as he himself says. For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubt that these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and the work of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whom they are severally possessed. Was not this the lesson which the God intended to teach when by the mouth of the worst of poets he sang the best of songs? Am I not right, Ion? 535

Ion. Yes, indeed, Socrates, I feel that you are ; for your words touch my soul, and I am persuaded somehow that good poets are the inspired interpreters of the Gods.

Soc. And you rhapsodists are the interpreters of the poets?

Ion. That again is true.

Soc. Then you are the interpreters of interpreters?

Ion. Precisely.

Soc. I wish you would frankly tell me, Ion, what I am going to ask of you : When you produce the greatest effect upon the audience in the recitation of some striking passage, such as the apparition of Odysseus leaping forth on the floor, recognized by the suitors and casting his arrows at his feet, or the description of Achilles rushing at Hector, or the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam,—are you in your right mind? Are you not carried out of yourself, and does not your soul in an ecstasy seem to be among the persons or places of which she is speaking, whether they are in Ithaca or in Troy or whatever may be the scene of the poem?

Ion. That proof strikes home to me, Socrates. For I must confess that at the tale of pity my eyes are filled with tears, and when I speak of horrors, my hair stands on end and my heart throbs.

Soc. Well, Ion, and what are we to say of a man who at a sacrifice or festival, when he is dressed in holiday attire, and has golden crowns upon his head, of which nobody has robbed him, appears weeping or panic-stricken in the presence of more than twenty thousand friendly faces, when there is no one spoiling or wronging him ;—is he in his right mind or is he not?

Ion. No indeed, Socrates, I must say that, strictly speaking, he is not in his right mind.

Soc. And are you aware that you produce similar effects on most of the spectators?

Ion. Yes indeed, I am ; for I look down upon them from the stage, and behold the various emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their countenances when I am speaking : and I am obliged to attend to them ; for unless I make them cry I myself shall not laugh, and if I make them laugh, I shall do anything but laugh myself when the hour of payment arrives.

Soc. Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, receive the power of the original magnet from one another? The rhapsode like yourself and the actors are intermediate links, and the poet himself is the first of them. 536 Through all these the God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang down from another. There is also a chain of dancers and masters and under-masters of choruses, who are suspended at the side from the rings which hang from the Muse. And every poet has a Muse from whom he is suspended, and by whom he is said to be possessed, which is nearly the same thing; for he is taken possession of. And from these first rings, which are the poets, depend others, some deriving their inspiration from Orpheus, others from Musaeus; but the greater number are possessed and held by Homer. Of whom, Ion, you are one, and are possessed by Homer; and when any one repeats the words of another poet you go to sleep, and know not what to say; but when any one recites a strain of Homer you wake up in a moment, and your soul leaps within you, and you have plenty to say, for not by art or knowledge about Homer do you say what you say, but by divine inspiration and by possession; just as the revellers too have a quick perception of that strain only which is appropriated to the God by whom they are possessed, and have plenty of dances and words for that, but take no heed of any other. And you, Ion, when the name of Homer is mentioned have plenty to say, and have nothing to say of others. The reason of this is, that you praise Homer not by art but by divine inspiration: and so your question is answered.

Ion. That is good, Socrates; and yet I doubt whether you will ever have eloquence enough to persuade me that I praise Homer only when I am mad and possessed; and if you could hear me speak of him I am sure that you would never think that.

Soc. I should like very much to hear you, but not until you have answered a question which I have to ask. On what part of Homer do you speak well?—not surely about every part?

Ion. There is no part, Socrates, about which I do not speak well: of that I can assure you.

Soc. Surely not about things in Homer of which you have no knowledge?

Ion. And what is there in Homer of which I have no knowledge?

Soc. Why, does not Homer speak in many passages about 537 arts? For example, about driving; if I can only remember the lines I will repeat them.

Ion. I remember, and will repeat them.

Soc. Tell me then, what Nestor says to Antilochus, his son, where he tells him to be careful of the bend at the horse race in honour of Patroclus.

Ion. 'Bend gently,' he says, 'in the polished chariot to the left of them, and give the horse on the right hand a touch of the whip, and shout—and at the same time slacken his rein. And when you are at the goal, let the left horse draw near, yet so that the nave of the well-wrought wheel may not even seem to touch the extremity; and keep from catching the stone.'¹

Soc. Enough. Now, Ion, will the charioteer or the physician be the better judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion. The charioteer, clearly.

Soc. And will the reason be that this is his art, or will there be any other reason?

Ion. No, that will be the reason.

Soc. And every art is appointed by God to have knowledge of a certain work; for that which we know by the art of the pilot we do not know by the art of medicine?

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor do we know by the art of the carpenter that which we know by the art of medicine?

Ion. Certainly not.

Soc. And this is true of all the arts;—that which we know with one art we do not know with the other? But let me ask a prior question: You admit that there are differences of arts?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. You would argue, as I should, that when one art is of one kind of knowledge and another of another, they are different?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Yes; for surely, if the subject of knowledge were the same, there would be no meaning in saying that the arts were

¹ Il. xxiii. 335.

different,—if they both gave the same knowledge. For example, I know that here are five fingers, and you know the same. And if I were to ask whether I and you became acquainted with this fact by the help of the same science of arithmetic, you would acknowledge that we did?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Tell me, then, what I was going to ask you just now,— 538 whether this holds universally? Must the same art have the same subject of knowledge, and any others have other subjects of knowledge?

Ion. That is my opinion, Socrates.

Soc. Then he who has no knowledge of a particular art will have no right judgment of the sayings and doings of that art?

Ion. That is true.

Soc. Then which will be a better judge of the lines of Homer which you were reciting, you or the charioteer?

Ion. The charioteer.

Soc. Why, yes, because you are a rhapsode and not a charioteer.

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And the art of the rhapsode is different from that of the charioteer?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And if a different knowledge, then a knowledge of different matters?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. You know the passage in which Hecamede, the concubine of Nestor, is described as giving to the wounded Machaon a posset, as he says,

‘Made with Pramnian wine; and she grated cheese of goat’s milk with a brazen knife, and at his side placed an onion which gives a relish to drink.’¹

Would you say now that the art of the rhapsode or the art of medicine was better able to judge of these lines?

Ion. The art of medicine.

Soc. And when Homer says,

‘And she descended into the deep like a leaden plummet, which, set in the horn of ox that ranges in the fields, rushes along carrying death among the ravenous fishes,’²

¹ Il. xi. 638, 630.

² Il. xxiv. 80.

will the art of the fisherman or of the rhapsode be better able to judge of the propriety of these lines?

Ion. Clearly, Socrates, the art of the fisherman.

Soc. Come now, suppose that you were to say to me: Since you, Socrates, are able to assign different passages in Homer to their corresponding arts, I wish that you would tell me what are the passages of which the excellence ought to be judged by the prophet and prophetic art, and you shall see how readily and truly I will answer you. For there are many such passages, particularly in the *Odyssee*; as, for example, the passage in which Theoclymenus of the house of Melampus says to the suitors:—

539 'Wretched men! what is happening to you? Your heads and your faces and your limbs underneath are shrouded in night; and the voice of lamentation bursts forth, and your cheeks are wet with tears. And the vestibule is full, and the court is full, of ghosts descending into the darkness of Erebus, and the sun has perished out of heaven, and an evil mist is spread abroad.'¹

And there are many such passages in the *Iliad* also; as for example in the description of the battle near the rampart, where he says:—

'As they were eager to pass the ditch, there came to them an omen: a soaring eagle, holding back the people on the left, bore a huge bloody dragon in his talons, still living and panting; nor had he yet resigned the strife, for he bent back and smote the bird which carried him on the breast by the neck, and he in pain let him fall from him to the ground into the midst of the multitude. And the eagle, with a cry, was borne afar on the wings of the wind.'²

These are the sort of things which I should say that the prophet ought to consider and determine.

Ion. And you are quite right, Socrates, in saying that.

Soc. Yes, Ion, and you are right also. And as I have selected from the *Iliad* and *Odyssee* for you passages which describe the office of the prophet and the physician and the fisherman, do you, who know Homer so much better than I do, Ion, select for me passages which relate to the rhapsode and the rhapsode's art, and which the rhapsode ought to examine and judge of better than other men.

Ion. All passages, I should say, Socrates.

Soc. Not all, Ion, surely. Have you already forgotten what you were saying? A rhapsode ought to have a better memory.

¹ *Od.* xx. 351.

² *Il.* xii. 200.

Ion. Why, what am I forgetting?

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Soc. Do you not remember that you declared the art of the rhapsode to be different from the art of the charioteer?

Ion. Yes, I remember.

Soc. And you admitted that being different they would have different subjects of knowledge?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Then upon your own showing the rhapsode, and the art of the rhapsode, will not know everything?

Ion. I dare say, Socrates, that there may be exceptions.

Soc. You mean to say that he will not know the subjects of the other arts. As he does not know all of them, which of them will he know?

Ion. He will know what a man ought to say and what a woman ought to say, and what a freeman and what a slave ought to say, and what a ruler and what a subject.

Soc. Do you mean that a rhapsode will know better than the pilot what the ruler of a sea-tossed vessel ought to say?

Ion. No; the pilot will know that best.

Soc. Or will the rhapsode know better than the physician what the ruler of a sick man ought to say?

Ion. He will not.

Soc. But he will know what a slave ought to say?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. Suppose the slave to be a cowherd; the rhapsode will know better than the cowherd what he ought to say in order to soothe the infuriated cows?

Ion. No, he will not.

Soc. But he will know what a spinning-woman ought to say about the working of wool?

Ion. No.

Soc. At any rate he will know what a general ought to say when exhorting his soldiers?

Ion. Yes, that is the sort of thing which the rhapsode will know.

Soc. Well, but is the art of the rhapsode the art of the general?

Ion. I am sure that I should know what a general ought to say.

Soc. Why, yes, Ion, because you may possibly have a know-

ledge of the general's art ; and you may also have a knowledge of horsemanship as well as of the lyre : in that case you would know when horses were well or ill managed. But suppose I were to ask you : By the help of which art, Ion, do you know whether horses are well managed, by your skill as a horseman or as a performer on the lyre—what would you answer?

Ion. I should reply, by my skill as a horseman.

Soc. And if you judged of performers on the lyre, you would admit that you judged of them as performers on the lyre, and not as horsemen?

Ion. Yes.

Soc. And in judging of the general's art, do you judge of that as a general or a rhapsode?

Ion. That appears to me to be all one.

541 *Soc.* What do you mean? Do you mean to say that the art of the rhapsode and of the general is the same?

Ion. Yes, one and the same.

Soc. Then he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?

Ion. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. And he who is a good general is also a good rhapsode?

Ion. No ; I do not say that.

Soc. But you do say that he who is a good rhapsode is also a good general?

Ion. Certainly.

Soc. And you are the best of Hellenic rhapsodes?

Ion. Far the best, Socrates.

Soc. And are you the best general, Ion?

Ion. To be sure, Socrates ; and Homer was my master.

Soc. But then, Ion, what in the name of goodness can be the reason why you, who are the best of generals as well as the best of rhapsodes in all Hellas, go about as a rhapsode instead of being a general? Do you think that the Hellenes want a rhapsode with his golden crown, and do not want a general?

Ion. Why, Socrates, the reason is, that my countrymen, the Ephesians, are the servants and soldiers of Athens, and do not need a general ; and you and Sparta are not likely to have me, for you think that you have enough generals of your own.

Soc. My good Ion, did you never hear of Apollodorus of Cyzicus?

Ion. Who may he be?

Soc. One who, though a foreigner, has often been chosen their general by the Athenians: and there is Phanosthenes of Andros, and Heraclides of Clazomenae, whom they have also appointed to the command of their armies and to other offices, although aliens, after they had shown their merit. And will they not choose Ion the Ephesian to be their general, and honour him, if he prove himself worthy? Were not the Ephesians originally Athenians? and Ephesus is no mean city. But, indeed, Ion, if you are correct in saying that by art and knowledge you are able to praise Homer, you do not deal fairly with me, and after all your professions of knowing many glorious things about Homer, and promises that you would exhibit them to me, do only deceive me, and will not even explain at my earnest entreaties what is the art of which you are a master. You have literally as many forms as Proteus; and now you go all manner of ways, twisting and turning, and, like Proteus, become all manner of people at once, and at last slip away from me in the disguise of a general, in order that you may escape exhibiting your Homeric lore. And if you have art, then, as I was saying, ⁵⁴² in falsifying your promise that you would exhibit Homer, you are not dealing fairly with me. But if, as I believe, you have no art, but speak all these beautiful words about Homer unconsciously under his inspiring influence, then I acquit you of dishonesty, and shall only say that you are inspired. Which do you prefer to be thought, dishonest or inspired?

Ion. There is a great difference, Socrates, between them; and inspiration is the far nobler alternative.

Soc. Then, Ion, I shall assume the nobler alternative; and attribute to you in your praises of Homer inspiration, and not art.

MENO.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks 'whether virtue can be taught.' Socrates replies that he does not as yet know what virtue is, and has never known any one who did. 'Then he cannot have met Gorgias when he was at Athens.' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has a bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell him his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O yes—nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an old man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state of life, all of which may be easily described.'

Socrates reminds Meno that this is only an enumeration of the virtues and not a definition of the notion which is common to them all. In a second attempt Meno defines virtue to be 'the power of command.' But to this, again, exceptions are taken. For there must be a virtue of those who obey, as well as of those who command; and the power of command must be justly or not unjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice is virtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are other virtues, such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as round is a figure, and black and white are colours, and yet there are other figures and other colours. Let Meno take the examples of figure and colour, and try to define them.' Meno confesses his inability, and after a process of interrogation, in which Socrates explains to him the nature of a 'simile in multis,' Socrates himself defines figure as 'the accompaniment of colour.' But some one may object that he does not know the meaning of the word 'colour;' and if he is a candid friend, and not a mere disputant, Socrates is willing to furnish him with a simpler and more philosophical definition, into which no disputed word

is allowed to intrude: 'Figure is the limit of form.' Meno imperiously insists that he must still have a definition of colour. Some raillery follows; and at length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colour is the effluence of form in due proportion to the sight.' This definition is exactly suited to the taste of Meno, who welcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and Empedocles. Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract or dialectical definition of figure is far better.

Now that Meno has been made to understand the nature of a general definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greek gentleman, and in the words of a poet, 'that virtue is to delight in things honourable, and to have the power of getting them.' This is a nearer approximation than he has yet made to a complete definition, and, regarded as a piece of proverbial or popular morality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged, 'that the honourable is the good,' and as every one desires the good, the point of the definition is contained in the last words, 'the power of getting them.' 'And they must be got justly or with justice.' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue is the power of getting good with justice.' But justice is a part of virtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of good with a part of virtue. The definition repeats the word defined.

Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates has the effect of a torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with other persons he has plenty to say about virtue; in the presence of Socrates, his thoughts seem to desert him. Socrates replies that he is only the cause of perplexity in others, because he is himself perplexed. He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how, asks Meno, can he enquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know? This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates remarks, saves a great deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has a real difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates replies in a figure. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge.

He professes to have heard from priests and priestesses, and from the poet Pindar, of an immortal soul which is born again and again in successive periods of existence, returning into this world when she has paid the penalty of ancient crime, and having wandered over all places of the upper and under world, and seen and known all things at one time or other, is by association out of one thing capable of recovering all. For nature is of one kindred; and every soul has a

seed or germ which may be developed into all knowledge. The existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by the interrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands of Socrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations of geometrical figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal is double the square of the side—that famous discovery of primitive mathematics, in honour of which the legendary Pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a hecatomb—is elicited from him. The first step in the process of teaching has made him conscious of his own ignorance. He has had the 'torpedo's shock' given him, and is the better for the operation. But whence had the uneducated man this knowledge? He had never learnt geometry in this world; nor was it born with him; he must therefore have had it when he was not a man. And as he always either was or was not a man, he must have always had it. (Cp. *Phaedo*, 73 B.)

After Socrates has given this specimen of the true nature of teaching, the original question of the teachableness of virtue is renewed. Again he professes a desire to know 'what virtue is' first. But he is willing to argue the question, as mathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will assume that if virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was the stage of the argument at which the *Protagoras* concluded.)

Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue is a good, and that goods, whether of body or mind, must be under the direction of knowledge. Upon the assumption just made, then, virtue is teachable. But where are the teachers? There are none found. This is extremely discouraging. Virtue is no sooner discovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows that it is not taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable.

In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, a respectable and well-to-do citizen of the old school, who happens to be present. He is asked 'whether Meno shall go to the Sophists and be taught.' The very suggestion of this throws him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall Meno go?' asks Socrates. 'To any Athenian gentleman—to the great Athenian statesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere (*Laches*, 179 C foll.; *Prot.* 319 foll.), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men, never taught their sons anything worth learning; and they would surely, if they could, have imparted to them their own political wisdom. Anytus is angry at the imputation which is cast on his

favourite statesmen, and on a class to which he supposes himself to belong (cp. 95 A), and breaks off with a significant hint. The mention of another opportunity of talking with him (99 E), and the suggestion that Meno may do the Athenian people a service by pacifying him, are evident allusions to the trial of Socrates.

Socrates returns to the consideration of the question 'whether virtue is teachable,' which was denied on the ground that there are no teachers of it: (for the Sophists are bad teachers, and the rest of the world do not profess to teach). But there is another point which we failed to observe, and in which Gorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. This is the nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidance of right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is for practical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of being taught, and is also liable to 'walk off,' because not bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sort of instinct which is possessed by statesmen, who are not wise or knowing persons, but only inspired or divine. The higher virtue, which is identical with knowledge, is an ideal only. If the statesman had this knowledge, and could teach what he knew, he would be like Tiresias in the world below,—'he alone would have wisdom, while the rest flit as shadows.'

This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question, Can virtue be taught? No one would either ask or answer such a question in modern times. But in the age of Socrates it was only by an effort that the mind could rise to a general notion of virtue as distinct from the particular virtues of courage, liberality, and the like. And when a hazy conception of this ideal was attained, it was only by a further effort that the question of the teachableness of virtue could be resolved.

The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxical enough, and seems rather intended to stimulate than to satisfy enquiry. Virtue is knowledge, and therefore virtue can be taught. But virtue is not taught, and therefore in this higher and ideal sense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The teaching of the Sophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their pupil, is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can only produce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neither enquire into what you know nor into what you do not know;' to which Socrates replies by his theory of reminiscence.

To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato has been constantly tending in the previous Dialogues. But the new truth is no sooner found than it seems to vanish away. 'If there is knowledge, there must be teachers; and where are the teachers?' There is no knowledge in the higher sense of systematic, connected, reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be attained, and such as Plato himself seems to see in some far off vision of a single science. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the word; that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit of enquiry in their pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoric or impart to them ready-made information for a fee of 'one' or of 'fifty drachms.' Plato is desirous of deepening the notion of education, and therefore he asserts the seeming paradox that there are no educators. This, though somewhat different in form, is not really different from the remark which is often made in modern times by those who would depreciate either the methods of education commonly employed, or the standard attained; that 'there is no true education among us.'

But there is still a possibility which must not be overlooked. Even if there is no knowledge, as has been proved by 'the wretched state of education,' there may be right opinion. This is a sort of guessing or divination which rests on no knowledge of causes, and is incommunicable to others. This is what our statesmen have, as is proved by the circumstance that they are unable to impart their knowledge to others. Those who are possessed of this gift cannot be said to be men of science or philosophers, but they are inspired and divine.

There is no trace of irony in this curious passage, which forms the concluding portion of the Dialogue. Nor again does Plato mean to intimate that the supernatural or divine is the true basis of human life. To him knowledge, if only attainable in this world, is of all things the most divine. But, like other philosophers, he is willing to admit that 'probability is the guide of life;' and he is at the same time desirous of contrasting the wisdom which governs the world with a higher wisdom. There are many instincts, judgments, and anticipations of the human mind which cannot be reduced to rule, and of which the grounds cannot always be given in words. A person may have some skill or latent experience which he is able to use himself and is yet unable to teach others, because he has no principles, and is incapable

of collecting or arranging his ideas. He has practice, but not theory; art, but not science. This is a true fact of psychology, which is recognized by Plato in this passage. But he is far from saying, as some have imagined, that inspiration or divine grace is to be regarded as higher than knowledge. He would not have preferred the poet or man of action to the philosopher, or the virtue of custom to the virtue based upon ideas.

Also here, as in the *Ion* and *Phaedrus*, Plato appears to acknowledge an unreasoning element in the higher nature of man. The philosopher only has knowledge, and yet the statesman and the poet are inspired. There may be a sort of irony in regarding in this way the gifts of genius. But there is no reason to suppose that he is deriding them, any more than he is deriding the phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in the *Symposium*, or of oracles in the *Apology*, or of divine intimations when he is speaking of the *daemonium* of Socrates. He recognizes the lower form of right opinion, as well as the higher one of science, in the spirit of one who desires to include in his philosophy every aspect of human life; just as he recognizes the existence of popular opinion as a fact, and the Sophists as the expression of it.

This Dialogue contains the first intimation of the doctrine of reminiscence and of the immortality of the soul. The proof is very slight, even slighter than in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Because men had abstract ideas in a previous state, they must have always had them, and their souls therefore must have always existed (86 A). For they must always have been either men or not men. The fallacy of the latter words is transparent. And Socrates himself appears to be conscious of their weakness; for he adds immediately afterwards, 'I have said some things of which I am not altogether confident.' (Cp. *Phaedo*, 114 D, 115 D.) It may be observed, however, that the fanciful notion of pre-existence is combined with a true but partial view of the origin and unity of knowledge, and of the association of ideas. Knowledge is prior to any particular knowledge, existing not in the previous state of the individual, but of the race. It is potential, not actual, and can only be recovered by strenuous exertion.

The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form, than in the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates

positive of anything but the duty of enquiry (86 B). The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained in a manner more in accordance with fact and experience out of the affinities of nature (*ἄτε τῆς φύσεως ὄλης συγγενοῦς οὐσίας*). Modern philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; the ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The subjective was converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon of the association of ideas (cp. *Phaedo*, 73 foll.) became a real chain of existences. The germs of two valuable principles of education may also be gathered from the 'words of priests and priestesses:' (1) that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes (cp. Aristotle's theory of *ἐπιστήμη*); and (2) that the process of learning consists not in what is brought to the learner, but in what is drawn out of him.

Some lesser traits of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished with poetical language, to the better and truer one (p. 76 D); or (2) the shrewd reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes, this must surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man could get a living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker (91 C); or (3) the remark conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic is saved the labour of thought and enquiry (*οὐδὲν δέι τῷ τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως*, 80 E). Characteristic also of the temper of the Socratic enquiry is, (4) the proposal to discuss the teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after the manner of the mathematicians (87 A); and (5) the repetition of the favourite doctrine which occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives a colour to all of them—that mankind only desire evil through ignorance (77, 78 foll.); (6) the experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth which is latent in him, and (7) the remark (p. 84 B) that he is all the better for knowing his ignorance.

The character of Meno, like that of Critias, has no relation to the actual circumstances of his life. Plato is silent about his treachery to the ten thousand Greeks, which Xenophon has recorded, as he is also silent about the crimes of Critias. He is a Thessalian Alcibiades, rich and luxurious—a spoilt child of fortune, and is described as the

hereditary friend of the great king. Like Alcibiades, he is inspired with an ardent desire of knowledge, and is equally willing to learn of Socrates and of the Sophists. He may be regarded as standing in the same relation to Gorgias as Hippocrates in the *Protagoras* to the other great Sophist. He is the sophisticated youth on whom Socrates tries his cross-examining powers, with a view of exhibiting him and his teachers in their true light, just as in the *Charmides*, the *Lysis*, and the *Euthydemus*, he makes ingenuous boyhood the subject of a similar experiment. Meno is treated by Socrates in a half playful manner suited to his character; while he tries to exhibit him to himself and to the reader as ignorant of the very elements of dialectics, in which the Sophists have failed to instruct their disciple. His definition of virtue as 'the power and desire of attaining things honourable,' like the first definition of justice in the *Republic*, is taken from a poet. His answers have a sophistical ring, and at the same time show the sophistical incapacity to grasp a general notion.

Anytus is the type of the narrow-minded man of the world, who is indignant at innovation, and equally detests the popular teacher and the true philosopher. He seems, like Aristophanes, to regard the new opinions, whether of Socrates or the Sophists, as fatal to Athenian greatness. He is of the same class as Calicles in the *Gorgias*, but of a different variety; the immoral and sophistical doctrines of Calicles are not attributed to him. The moderation with which he is described is remarkable, if he be the accuser of Socrates; and this seems to be indicated by his parting words. Perhaps Plato may have been desirous of showing that the accusation of Socrates was not to be attributed to badness or malevolence, but rather to a tendency in men's minds. Or he may have been regardless of the historical truth of the characters of his dialogue, as in the case of Meno and Critias. Like Chaerephon (*Apol.* 21) the real Anytus was a democrat, and had joined Thrasybulus in the conflict with the thirty.

The *Protagoras* arrived at a sort of hypothetical conclusion, that if 'virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.' In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates himself offered an example of the manner in which ingenuous youth should be taught; this was in contrast to the quibbling follies of the Sophists. In the *Meno* the subject is more developed; the foundations of the enquiry are laid deeper, and the nature of knowledge is more distinctly explained. There is a sort of progression by anta-

gonism of two opposite aspects of philosophy. But at the moment when we approach nearest, the truth doubles upon us and is again beyond our reach. We seem to find that the ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable with experience. In human life there is indeed the profession of knowledge, but right opinion is our actual guide. There is another sort of progress from the general notions of Socrates, who asked simply, 'what is friendship?' 'what is temperance?' 'what is courage?' as in the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, to the transcendentalism of Plato, who, in the second stage of his philosophy, sought to find the nature of knowledge in a prior and future state of existence.

The difficulty in framing general notions which has appeared in this and in all the previous Dialogues recurs in the *Gorgias* and *Theaetetus* as well as in the *Republic*. In the *Gorgias* too the statesmen reappear, but in stronger opposition to the philosopher. They are no longer allowed to have a divine insight, but, though acknowledged to have been clever men and good speakers, are denounced as 'blind leaders of the blind.' The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is also carried further, being made the foundation not only of a theory of knowledge, but of a doctrine of rewards and punishments. In the *Republic* the relation of knowledge to virtue is described in a manner more consistent with modern distinctions. The existence of the virtues without the possession of knowledge in the higher or philosophical sense, is admitted to be possible. Right opinion is again introduced in the *Theaetetus* as an account of knowledge, but is rejected on the ground that it is irrational (as here, because it is not bound by the tie of the cause), and also because the conception of false opinion is given up as hopeless. Such are the shifting points of view which Plato presents to us in his life-long effort to work out the great intellectual puzzle of his age—the nature of knowledge and of good, and their relation to one another, and to human life. His doctrines are necessarily different at different times of his life, as new distinctions are realized, or new stages of thought attained by him. We are not therefore justified, in order to take away the appearance of inconsistency, in attributing to him hidden meanings or remote allusions.

There are no external criteria by which we can determine the date of the *Meno*. There is no reason to suppose that any of the Dialogues

of Plato were written before the death of Socrates; the Meno, which appears to be one of the earliest of them, is proved to have been of a later date by the allusion of Anytus.

We cannot argue that Plato was more likely to have written, as he has done, of Meno before than after his miserable death; for we have already seen, in the examples of Charmides and Critias, that the characters in Plato are very far from resembling the same characters in history. The repulsive picture which is given of him in the Anabasis of Xenophon (ii. 6), where he also appears as the friend of Aristippus 'and a fair youth having lovers,' has no other trait of likeness to the Meno of Plato.

The place of the Meno in the series is doubtfully indicated by internal evidence. The main character of the Dialogue is Socrates; but to the 'general definitions' of Socrates is added the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. The problems of virtue and knowledge have been discussed in the Lysis, Laches, Charmides, and Protagoras; the puzzle about knowing and learning has already appeared in the Euthydemus. The doctrines of immortality and pre-existence are carried further in the Phaedo and Phaedrus; the distinction between opinion and knowledge is now fully developed in the Theaetetus. The lessons of Prodicus, whom he facetiously calls his master, are still running in the mind of Socrates. Unlike the later Platonic Dialogues, the Meno arrives at no conclusion. Hence we are led to place the Dialogue at some point in the series later than the Protagoras, and earlier than the Phaedrus and Gorgias.

M E N O.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

MENO.

A SLAVE OF MENO.

SOCRATES.

ANYTUS.

Meno. CAN you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor by practice, then whether it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?

Socrates. O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom, especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus. And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of the Aleuadæ, of whom your lover Aristippus is one, and the other chiefs of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you. I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: Stranger, you have far too good an opinion of me; if I were inspired I might answer your question. But now I literally do not know what virtue is, and much less whether it is acquired by teaching or not. And I myself, Meno, living as I

Steph.
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do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of the citizens; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing about virtue; and when I do not know the 'quid' of anything how can I know the 'quale'? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?

Men. No, indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report of you to Thessaly?

Soc. Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.

Men. Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?

Soc. Yes, I have.

Men. And did you not think that he knew?

Soc. I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know, and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view, for I suspect that you and he think much alike.

Men. True.

Soc. Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me. By the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken, and that you and Gorgias do really know this; although I have been saying that I have never found anybody who knew.

Men. There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question. Take first the virtue of a man—he should know how to administer the state, in the administration of which he will benefit his friends and damage his enemies, and will take care not to suffer damage himself. A woman's virtue may also be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life, young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue: there are virtues numberless, and no lack of 72

definitions of them; for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.

Soc. How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees, and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How would you answer me?

Men. I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as bees.

Soc. And suppose that I went on to say: That is what I want to know, Meno; tell me what is that quality in which they do not differ, but are all alike;—you would be able to answer?

Men. I should.

Soc. And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be, they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this he who would answer the question, 'What is virtue?' would do well to have his eye fixed. Do you understand?

Men. I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of the question as I could wish.

Soc. When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another of a woman, another of a child, and so on; does this apply only to virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength? Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?

Men. I should say that health is the same, whether of man or woman.

Soc. And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong, she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength, as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference?

Men. I think not.

Soc. And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether 73
in a child or in a grown up person, in a woman or in a
man?

Men. I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is not like
the others.

Soc. Why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man
was to order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a
house?

Men. I did say that.

Soc. And can either house or state or anything be well
ordered without temperance and without justice?

Men. Certainly not.

Soc. Then they who order a state or a house temperately or
justly order them with temperance and justice?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Then both men and women, if they are to be good men
and women, must have the same virtues of temperance and
justice?

Men. True.

Soc. And can either a young man or an old one be good, if
they are intemperate and unjust?

Men. They cannot.

Soc. They must be temperate and just?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then all men are good in the same way, and by parti-
cipation in the same virtues?

Men. That is the inference.

Soc. And they surely would not have been good in the same
way, unless their virtue had been the same?

Men. They would not.

Soc. Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been
proven, try and remember what you and Gorgias say that
virtue is.

Men. Will you have one definition of them all?

Soc. That is what I am seeking.

Men. What can I say but that virtue is the power of
governing mankind?

Soc. And does this definition of virtue include all virtue?
Is virtue the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Ought

the child to govern his father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any longer a slave?

Men. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more, fair friend; according to you, virtue is 'the power of governing;' but do you not add 'justly and not unjustly'?

Men. Yes, Socrates; I agree to that, for justice is virtue.

Soc. Would you say 'virtue,' Meno, or 'a virtue'?

Men. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example, is 'a figure' and not simply 'figure,' and I should adopt this mode of speaking, because there are other figures.

Men. Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue—that there are other virtues as well as justice.

74 *Soc.* What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you the names of the other figures if you asked me.

Men. Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnificence are virtues; and there are many others.

Soc. Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before; but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through them all.

Men. Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.

Soc. No wonder; but I will try to arrive a little nearer if I can, for you know that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is figure? And if you answered 'roundness,' he would reply to you, in my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness is 'figure' or 'a figure;' and you would answer 'a figure.'

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And for this reason—that there are other figures?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you would have told him.

Men. I should.

Soc. And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you an-

swered whiteness, and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours as well.

Men. I should.

Soc. And if he had said, Tell me what they are?—you would have told him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.

Men. Yes.

Soc. And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what is that common nature which you designate as figure—which contains straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other—that would be your mode of speaking?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than round?

Men. Certainly not.

Soc. You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than the straight, or the straight than the round?

Men. That is true.

Soc. To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose that when a person asked you this question either about figure or colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not 75 understand what you want, or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say: Do you not understand that I am looking for the 'simile in multis'? And then he might put the question in another form: Meno, he might say, what is that 'simile in multis' which you call figure, and which includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.

Men. I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.

Soc. Shall I indulge you?

Men. By all means.

Soc. And then you will tell me about virtue?

Men. I will.

Soc. Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you say to this answer?—Figure is the only thing that always follows colour. I hope that you are satisfied with that, as I am sure I should be content if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue.

Men. But that, Socrates, is a simple answer.

Soc. Why simple?

Men. Because you say that figure is that which always follows colour; but if a person says that he does not know what colour is, any more than what figure is—what sort of answer would you have given him?

Soc. I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument and refute me. But if I were talking as you and I now are, as between friends, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's way; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should make use of premisses which the person interrogated would be willing to admit. And this is the way in which I shall approach you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing as an end, or termination, or extremity?—all of which words I use in the same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might quarrel with us about this: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended or terminated—that is all which I am saying—not anything very difficult.

Men. Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.

76 *Soc.* And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for example in geometry.

Men. Yes.

Soc. Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid.

Men. And now, Socrates, what is colour?

Soc. You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.

Men. When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.

Soc. A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.

Men. Why do you say that?

Soc. Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have a weakness for the fair, and therefore I must humour you and answer.

Men. Please do.

Soc. Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?

Men. I should very much like that.

Soc. Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?

Men. Exactly.

Soc. And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?

Men. True.

Soc. And there is such a thing as sight?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:—colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and sensible.

Men. That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.

Soc. Why, yes, because it is just such an one as you have been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell, and of many other similar phenomena.

Men. Quite true.

Soc. The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein,

and therefore was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.

Men. Yes.

Soc. And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled, as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.

Men. But I will gladly stay, Socrates, if you will give me 77 many such answers.

Soc. Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise, and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but deliver virtue, to me whole and sound and not broken into a number of pieces. I have given you the pattern.

Men. Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is the love and attainment of the honourable; that is what the poet says, and I say too—

‘Virtue is the desire and power of attaining the honourable.’

Soc. And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire the good! Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?

Men. No, I do not think that.

Soc. There are some who desire evil?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire to be good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?

Men. Both, as I think.

Soc. And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be evils and desires them notwithstanding?

Men. Certainly I do.

Soc. And desire is of possession?

Men. Yes, of possession.

Soc. And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses them, or does he know that they will do him harm?

Men. There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and others who know that they will do them harm.

Soc. And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them good know that they are evils?

Men. No, I certainly do not think that.

Soc. Do you not see that they do not desire the evils, who are ignorant of their nature, but they desire what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods?

Men. Yes, in that case.

Soc. Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be hurt by them?

Men. They must know that.

Soc. And do they not suppose that they are miserable in the 78 degree that they are hurt?

Men. That again they must believe.

Soc. And are not the miserable ill-fated?

Men. Yes, indeed.

Soc. And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?

Men. I should say not, Socrates.

Soc. But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil?

Men. That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil.

Soc. And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good?

Men. Yes, I did say that.

Soc. But granting that, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that?

Men. True.

Soc. And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining good?

Men. Exactly.

Soc. Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good?

Men. I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you view this matter.

Soc. Then now let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right:—You mean to say that virtue is the power of attaining good?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And you would say that goods are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the state—those are what you would call goods?

Men. Yes, all those.

Soc. Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add piously, justly, or do you deem this of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust or dishonest, equally to be regarded as virtue?

Men. Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.

Soc. Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.

Men. Why, how can there be virtue without these?

Soc. And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner may be equally virtue?

Men. True.

Soc. Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice 79 is vice.

Men. There can be no doubt about that, in my judgment.

Soc. And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and the like, were each of them a part of virtue?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.

Men. Why do you say that, Socrates?

Soc. Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice; and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are each of them parts of virtue.

Men. What of that?

Soc. What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue; as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue, and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore, my dear Meno, I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question: What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue know a part of virtue?

Men. No; I do not say that he can.

Soc. Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?

Men. Yes, Socrates; and we were right in that.

Soc. Well, my friend, do as we did then: and do not suppose that we can explain to any one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; for that only leads to a repetition of the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?

Men. I believe that you are.

Soc. Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your friend, is the definition of virtue?

Men. O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were always puzzling yourself and others; and now you are casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies those who come near him with the touch, as you have now torpified me, I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not know how to

answer you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons—and very good ones they were, as I thought—at this moment I cannot even say what virtue is. And I think that you are very wise in not voyaging and going away from home, for if you did in other places as you do in Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.

Soc. You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.

Men. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I can tell you why you made a simile about me.

Men. Why?

Soc. In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about them—as well they may—but I shall not return the compliment. As to my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise; for I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem to be in the same case, although you did once know before you touched me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the enquiry.

Men. And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is what you did not know?

Soc. I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute you are introducing. You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for he knows, and therefore has no need to enquire about that—nor about that which he does not know; for he does not know that about which he is to enquire.¹

81 *Men.* Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?

Soc. I think not.

Men. Why not?

Soc. I will tell you why. I have heard from certain wise men and women who spoke of things divine that—

Men. What did they say?

Soc. They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.

¹ Cp. Aristot. Post. Anal. I. i. 6.

Men. What was that? and who were they?

Soc. Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there have been poets also, such as the poet Pindar and other inspired men. And what they say is—mark, now, and see whether their words are true—they say that the soul of man is immortal, and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. *‘For in the ninth year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received the penalty of ancient crime back again into the light of this world, and these are they who become noble kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages.’* The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that there are, whether in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or as men say learning, all out of a single recollection, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: that is a saying which will make us idle, and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.

Men. Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection? Can you teach me that?

Soc. I told you, Meno, that you were a rogue, and now you ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching, but only recollection; and thus you imagine 82 that you will involve me in a contradiction.

Men. Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what you say is true, I wish that you would.

Soc. That is no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants, that I may demonstrate on him.

Men. Certainly. Come hither, boy.

Soc. He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?

Men. Yes; he was born in the house.

Soc. Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether he learns of me or only remembers.

Men. I will.

Soc. Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?

Boy. I do.

Soc. And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the square are also equal?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. A square may be of any size?

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in one direction the space was of two feet, and in the other direction of one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two feet?

Boy. There are.

Soc. Then the square is of twice two feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.

Boy. Four, Socrates.

Soc. And might there not be another square twice as large as this, and having like this the lines equal?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And of how many feet will that be?

Boy. Of eight feet.

Soc. And now try and tell me the length of the line which

forms the side of that double square: this is two feet—what will that be?

Boy. Clearly, Socrates, that will be double.

Soc. Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything, but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square feet; does he not?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And does he really know?

Men. Certainly not.

Soc. He only guesses that [because the square is double], the line is double.

Men. True.

Soc. Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (*To the Boy.*) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space 8_3 comes from a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of a square, and of a square twice the size of this one—that is to say of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double square comes from a double line?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. But does not this line become doubled if we add another such line here?

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Let us describe such a figure: is not that what you would say is the figure of eight feet?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of which is equal to the figure of four feet?

Boy. True.

Soc. And is not that four times four?


Boy. Certainly.

Soc. And four times is not double?

Boy. No, indeed.

Soc. But how much?

Boy. Four times as much.



Soc. Therefore the double line, boy, has formed a space, not twice, but four times as much.

Boy. True.

Soc. And four times four are sixteen—are they not?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. What line would give you a space of eight feet, as this gives one of sixteen feet;—do you see?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And the space of four feet is made from this half line?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Good; and is not a space of eight feet twice the size of this, and half the size of the other?

Boy. Certainly.

Soc. Such a space, then, will be made out of a line greater than this one, and less than that one?

Boy. Yes; that is what I think.

Soc. Very good; I like to hear you say what you think. And now tell me, is not this a line of two feet and that of four?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Then the line which forms the side of eight feet ought to be more than this line of two feet, and less than the other of four feet?

Boy. It ought.

Soc. Try and see if you can tell me how much it will be.

Boy. Three feet.

Soc. Then if we add a half to this line of two, that will be the line of three. Here are two and there is one; and on the other side, here are two also and there is one: and that makes the figure of which you speak?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. But if there are three feet this way and three feet that way, the whole space will be three times three feet?

Boy. That is evident.

Soc. And how much are three times three feet?

Boy. Nine.

Soc. And how much is the double of four?

Boy. Eight.

Soc. Then the figure of eight is not made out of a line of three?

Boy. No.

Soc. But from what line?—tell me exactly; and if you would rather not reckon, try and show me the line.

Boy. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know.

Soc. Do you see, Meno, what advances he has made in his power of recollection? He did not know at first, and he does not know now, what is the side of a figure of eight feet: but then he thought that he knew, and answered confidently as if he knew, and had no difficulty; now he has a difficulty, and neither knows nor fancies that he knows.

Meno. True.

Soc. Is he not better off in knowing his ignorance?

Meno. I think that he is.

Soc. If we have made him doubt, and given him the 'torpedo's shock,' have we done him any harm?

Meno. I think not.

Soc. We have certainly, as would seem, assisted him in some degree to the discovery of the truth; and now he will wish to remedy his ignorance, but then he would have been ready to tell all the world that the double space should have a double side.

Meno. True.

Soc. But do you suppose that he would ever have enquired into or learned what he fancied that he knew and did not know, until he had fallen into perplexity under the idea that he did not know, and had desired to know?

Meno. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. Then he was the better for the torpedo's touch?

Meno. I think that he was.

Soc. Mark now the farther development. I shall only ask him, and not teach him, and he shall share the enquiry with me: and do you watch and see if you find me telling or explaining anything to him, instead of eliciting his opinion. Tell me, boy, is not this a square of four feet which I have drawn?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And now I add another square equal to the former one?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And a third, which is equal to either of them?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. Suppose that we fill up the vacant corner.

Boy. Very good.

Soc. Here, then, there are four equal spaces?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And how many times larger is this space than this other?

Boy. Four times.

Soc. But it ought to have been twice only, as you will remember.

Boy. True.

Soc. And does not this line, reaching from corner to corner, 85 bisect each of these spaces?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And are there not here four equal lines which contain this space?

Boy. There are.

Soc. Look and see how much this space is.

Boy. I do not understand.

Soc. Has not each interior line cut off half of the four spaces?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And how many such spaces are there in this division?

Boy. Four.

Soc. And how many in this?

Boy. Two.

Soc. And four is how many times two?

Boy. Twice.

Soc. And this space is of how many feet?

Boy. Of eight feet.

Soc. And from what line do you get this figure?

Boy. From this.

Soc. That is, from the line which extends from corner to corner?

Boy. Yes.

Soc. And that is the line which the learned call the diagonal. And if this is the proper name, then you, Meno's slave, are prepared to affirm that the double space is the square of the diagonal?

Boy. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. What do you say of him, Meno? Were not all these answers given out of his own head?

Men. Yes, they were all his own.

Soc. And yet, as we were just now saying, he did not know?

Men. True.

Soc. But still he had those notions in him—had he not?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then he who does not know has yet true notions of that which he does not know?

Men. He has.

Soc. And at present these notions have just been stirred up in him, as in a dream; but if he were frequently asked the same questions, in different forms, he would know as well as any one at last?

Men. I dare say.

Soc. Without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And this spontaneous recovery in him is recollection?

Men. True.

Soc. And this knowledge which he now has must he not either have acquired or always possessed?

Men. Yes.

Soc. But if he always possessed this knowledge he would always have known; or if he has acquired the knowledge he could not have acquired it in this life, unless he has been taught geometry; for he may be made to do the same with all geometry and every other branch of knowledge. Now, has any one ever taught him? You must know that, if, as you say, he was born and bred in your house.

Men. And I am certain that no one ever did teach him.

Soc. And yet has he not the knowledge?

Men. That, Socrates, is most certain.

Soc. But if he did not acquire the knowledge in this life, then clearly he must have had and learned it at some other time?

Men. That is evident.

Soc. And that must have been the time when he was not a man?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And if there have been always true thoughts in him, both at the time when he was and was not a man, which only need to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him, his soul must have always possessed this knowledge, for he always either was or was not a man?

Men. That is clear.

Soc. And if the truth of all things always existed in the soul, then the soul is immortal. Wherefore be of good cheer, and try to recollect what you do not know, or rather do not remember.

Men. I feel, somehow, that I like what you are saying.

Soc. And I, Meno, like what I am saying. Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in searching after what we do not know;—that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.

Men. That again, Socrates, appears to me to be well said.

Soc. Then, as we are agreed that a man should enquire about that which he does not know, shall you and I make an effort to enquire together into the nature of virtue?

Men. By all means, Socrates. And yet I would rather return to my original question, Whether virtue comes by instruction, or by nature, or is gained in some other way?

Soc. Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first ascertained 'what virtue is.' But as you never think of controlling yourself, but only of controlling him who is your slave, and this is your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for I cannot help. And therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of that of which I do not at present know the nature. At any rate, will you condescend a little, and allow the question 'Whether virtue is given by instruction, or in any other way,' to be argued upon hypothesis?

87 As the geometrician, when he is asked whether a certain triangle is capable of being described in a certain circle, will reply: 'I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer a hypothesis which

may assist us in forming a conclusion: If the space be such that when you have drawn along the line given by it another figure, the original figure is reduced by a space equal to that which is added,¹ then one consequence follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether this triangle is capable of being included in the circle:—that is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,—in that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now saying, ‘remembered’? For there is no use in disputing about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather, does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?

Men. I agree.

Soc. Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Then now we have made a quick end of this question: if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And the next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or of another species?

Men. Yes, that appears to be the question which comes next in order.

Soc. Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a hypothesis which is not set aside.

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that virtue is knowledge?

Men. True.

Soc. And virtue makes us good?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all good things are profitable?

¹ Or, in simpler phrase, ‘If so much be taken from the triangle.’

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then virtue is profitable?

Men. That is the only inference.

Soc. Then now let us see what are the things which severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and wealth—these, and the like of these, we call profitable?

Men. True.

88 *Soc.* And yet these things may also sometimes do us harm: would you not admit that?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And what is the guiding principle which makes them profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension, memory, magnificence, and the like?

Men. Surely.

Soc. And such of these as are not knowledge, but of another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful; as, for example, courage, which has no prudence, but is only a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?

Men. True.

Soc. And the same may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?

Men. Very true.

Soc. And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite?

Men. That appears to be true.

Soc. If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?

Men. That is my view.

Soc. And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, are they not also made profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly—as in the soul generally, wisdom is the useful and folly the hurtful guide?

Men. True.

Soc. And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable? 89

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?

Men. I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.

Soc. But if this is true, then the good are not by nature good?

Men. I think not.

Soc. If they had been, there would assuredly have been discerners of characters among us who would have known our future great men; and we should have taken them on their showing, and when we had got them, we should have kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set a stamp upon them far rather than upon gold, in order that no one might tamper with them; and then when they grew up they would have been useful to the state?

Men. Yes, Socrates, that would have been the way.

Soc. But if the good are not by nature good, are they made good by instruction?

Men. There is no other alternative, Socrates. On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no doubt that virtue is taught.

Soc. Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?

Men. I certainly thought just now that we were right.

Soc. Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness should stand firm not only now and then, but always and for ever.

Men. Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe that knowledge is virtue?

Soc. I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught; but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue is knowledge: for consider now and say whether virtue, or anything that is taught, must not have teachers and disciples?

Men. Surely.

Soc. And again, may not that art of which there are neither teachers nor disciples be assumed to be incapable of being taught?

Men. True; but do you think that there are no teachers of virtue?

Soc. I have certainly often enquired whether there were any, and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded; and many have assisted me in the search, and they were the persons whom I thought the most likely to know. Here is Anytus, who is sitting by us at the very moment when he is
90 wanted; he is the person whom we should ask. In the first place, he is the son of a wealthy and wise father, Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or gift, like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as rich as a Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or over-bearing, or annoying; moreover, this son of his has had a good education, as the Athenian people certainly appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest offices. And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in answering our question, Who are the teachers? Consider the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician, to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to the physicians?

Any. Certainly.

Soc. Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we not send him to the cobblers?

Any. Yes.

Soc. And so forth?

Any. Yes.

Soc. Let me trouble you with one more question. When we say that we should be right in sending him to the physicians if we wanted him to be a physician, do we mean that we should be right in sending him to those who profess the art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it to any one who will come and learn? If we were right in sending him, would that be the reason?

Any. Yes.

Soc. And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and of the other arts? No man who wanted to make another a flute-player would refuse to send him to those who profess to teach the art for money, and be plaguing other persons to give him instruction who do not profess to teach, and never had a disciple in that branch of knowledge which he wishes him to acquire—that would be the height of folly.

Any. Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.

Soc. Very good. And now you are in a position to advise 91 with me about my friend Meno. He has been saying to me, Anytus, that he desires to attain that wisdom and virtue, by which men order the state or the house, and honour their parents, and know when to receive and when to send away citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom ought we to send him in order that he may learn this virtue? Does not the previous argument imply clearly that he ought to go to those who profess and avouch that they are the common teachers of Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction to any one who likes, at a fixed price?

Any. Whom do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are the people whom mankind call Sophists?

Any. By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen or stranger, will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted by them; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting influence to those who have to do with them.

Soc. What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but positively

corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in return for this disservice publicly demand money? Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man, Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious Pheidias, who created such noble works, or any ten other statuaries. How could that be? A mender of old shoes, or patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse than he received them, could not have remained thirty days undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas, during more than forty years, Protagoras was corrupting his disciples, and sending them from him worse than he received them, and yet all Hellas failed in detecting him. For, if I am not mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty of which were spent in the practice of his profession; and during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this day he retains: and not only Protagoras, but many others have a good reputation; some who
92 lived before him, and others who are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted them intentionally or unintentionally? Can those who were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have been out of their minds?

Any. Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men who gave their money to them were out of their minds, and their relations and guardians who entrusted them to their care were still more out of their minds, and most of all the cities who allowed them to come in and did not drive them out, citizen or stranger alike.

Soc. Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus? What makes you so angry with them?

Any. No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has ever had, nor would I suffer them to have, anything to do with them.

Soc. Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?

Any. And I have no wish to be acquainted.

Soc. Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?

Any. Quite well; I am quite sure that I know what manner of men these are, whether I know them or not.

Soc. You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot make

out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not acquainted with them, you know about them. But I am not enquiring of you who are the teachers who will corrupt Meno (let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask you to tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing. He is the friend of your family, and you will oblige him.

Any. Why do not you tell him?

Soc. I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers of these things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at fault, and I dare say that you are right. And now I wish that you, on your part, would tell me to whom among the Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?

Any. Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman, taken at random, if he will mind him, will do him far more good than the Sophists.

Soc. And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and without having been taught by any one, were they nevertheless able to teach others that which they had never learned themselves?

Any. I imagine that they learned of the previous generation of gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?

Soc. Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also there always have been and there are still, in the city of Athens. But the question is whether they were also good teachers of their own virtue;—not whether there are, or have been, good men, but whether virtue can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing. Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is the question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that Themistocles was a good man?

Any. Certainly; no man better.

Soc. And must not he then have been a good teacher, if any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?

Any. Yes, certainly,—if he wanted to be that.

Soc. But would he not have wanted? He would, at any rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a gentleman; he could not have been jealous of him, or have intentionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue. Did you never hear that he made Cleophantus, who was his son, a famous horseman?—he would stand upright on horseback and hurl a javelin; and many other marvellous things he could do which his father had him taught; and in anything which the skill of a master could teach him he was well trained. Have you not heard from our elders of this?

Any. I have.

Soc. Then no one could say that his son showed any want of capacity?

Any. Possibly not.

Soc. But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good man, as his father was?

Any. I have certainly never heard that.

Soc. And if virtue could have been taught, would his father Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments, and allowed him who, as you must remember, was his own son, to be no better than his neighbours in those qualities in which he himself excelled?

Any. Indeed, indeed, I think not.

Soc. Here then is a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be 94 among the best men of the past. Let us take another,—Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge that he was a good man?

Any. To be sure I should.

Soc. And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters? But what has been the result? Is he a bit better than any other mortal? He is an acquaintance of yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, again, magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you know, had two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

Any. I know.

Soc. And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled horsemen, and had them trained in music and gym-

nastics and all sorts of arts—in these respects they were on a level with the best—and had he no wish to make good men of them? Nay, he must have wished that. But I suspect that virtue could not be taught. And that you may not suppose that the incompetent teachers are the meaner sort of Athenians and few in number, remember again that Thucydides had two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, whom he trained chiefly in wrestling; and they too had an excellent education, and were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of them he committed to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of that day. Do you remember them?

Any. I have heard of them.

Soc. Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, who had his children taught wrestling at a considerable expense, would have taught them to be good men, which would have cost him nothing, if virtue could have been taught? Will you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas, and, if virtue could have been taught, he would have found out some one either in or out of Hellas who would have made good men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from cares of state. Again, I suspect, friend Anytus, that virtue is not a thing which can be taught?

Any. Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak evil of men: and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which it is not easier to do men harm than to do them good, and this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you know.

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Soc. O Meno, I think that Anytus is in a rage. And he may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I am defaming these gentlemen; and then, in the second place, he thinks that he is one of them. But when he understands, which he does not at present, what is the meaning of defamation, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your region too?

Men. Certainly there are.

Soc. And are they willing to teach the young? and do

they profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is taught?

Men. No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed; and you may hear them saying at one time that virtue can be taught, and then again the reverse.

Soc. Can we call them teachers who do not acknowledge the possibility of their own vocation?

Men. I think not, Socrates.

Soc. And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the only professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of virtue?

Men. I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be taught to speak.

Soc. Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?

Men. I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world, I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers and sometimes not.

Soc. And are you aware that not you only and other political men have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but that Theognis the poet says the very same thing—are you aware of that?

Men. Where does he say so?

Soc. In these elegiac verses:¹—

‘Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself agreeable to them; for from the good you will learn what is good, but if you mix with the bad you will lose the intelligence which you already have.’

Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can be taught?

Men. Clearly.

Soc. But in some other verses he shifts about and says:²—

‘If understanding could be created and put into a man, then they (who were able to accomplish this) would have obtained great rewards.’

And again:—

96 ‘Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one.’

And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.

¹ Theog. 33 ff.

² Theog. 435 ff.

Men. That is palpable.

Soc. And is there anything else of which the professors are not only asserted not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they profess to teach, and about which the acknowledged 'gentlemen' are themselves saying sometimes that 'this thing can be taught,' and sometimes the opposite? Can you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas are in this state of confusion?

Men. I should say, certainly not.

Soc. But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?

Men. No.

Soc. And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?

Men. Agreed.

Soc. And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?

Men. We have.

Soc. And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?

Men. There are not.

Soc. And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?

Men. That, I think, is true.

Soc. Then virtue cannot be taught?

Men. Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good men. And if there are, how did they come into existence?

Soc. I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge;—and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all.

Men. How do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I mean this—that good men must necessarily be useful or profitable. Were we not right in admitting that?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides of action—in that we were also right?

Men. Yes.

Soc. But we do not seem to have been right in saying that knowledge only was the right and good guide of action.

Men. What do you mean by the word 'right'?

Soc. I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And while he has true opinion about that which the other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth, as if he knows the truth?

Men. Exactly.

Soc. Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action as wisdom; and that was the point which we omitted in our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that wisdom only is the guide of right action; whereas there is also right opinion.

Men. True.

Soc. Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

Men. The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has knowledge will always be right; but he who has right opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not right.

Soc. What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has right opinion, as long as he has right opinion?

Men. I admit the cogency of that, and therefore, Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to right opinion—or why they should ever differ.

Soc. And shall I explain this wonder to you?

Men. Do tell me.

Soc. You would not wonder if you had ever observed the images of Daedalus; but perhaps you have not got them in your country?

Men. Why do you refer to them?

Soc. Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and if they are not fastened they will run away.

Mcn. Well, what of that?

Soc. I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide with us they are 98 beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection, as has been already agreed by us. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

Mcn. Yes, indeed, Socrates, that I should conjecture to be the truth.

Soc. I too speak not as one who knows; and yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is not a matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things which I should affirm that I knew, but that is most certainly one of them.

Mcn. You are right, Socrates.

Soc. And am I not right also in saying that true opinion is as good a guide in the performance of an action as knowledge?

Mcn. That also appears to me to be true.

Soc. Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to him who has knowledge?

Mcn. That is true.

Soc. And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be useful?

Mcn. Yes.

Soc. Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?)

Men. Not I.)

Soc. Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by nature good?

Men. Certainly not.

Soc. And nature being excluded, then came the question whether virtue is acquired by teaching?

Men. Yes.

Soc. If virtue was wisdom, then, as we thought, it was taught?

Men. Yes.

Soc. And if it was taught it was wisdom?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there were no teachers, not?

Men. True.

Soc. But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of virtue?

Men. Yes.

Soc. Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not wisdom?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And yet we admitted that it was a good?

Men. Yes.

99 *Soc.* And the right guide is useful and good?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. And the only right guides are knowledge and true opinion—these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.

Men. I think so too.

Soc. But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.

Men. Clearly not.

Soc. Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political life.

Men. I think not.

Soc. And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern states. And this was the reason why they were

unable to make others like themselves—because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.

Men. That is probably true, Socrates.

Soc. But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but they know not what they say.

Men. Very true.

Soc. And may we not, Meno, truly call those men divine who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?

Men. Certainly.

Soc. Then we shall also be right in calling those divine whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say many grand things, not knowing what they say.

Men. Yes.

Soc. And the women too, Meno, call good men divine; and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine man.'

Men. And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.

Soc. I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry—the result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen any one who is also the educator of statesmen. And if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living what Tiresias was among the dead, who 'alone,' according to Homer, 'of those in the world below, has understanding; but the rest flit as shades;' and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among shadows.

Men. That is excellent, Socrates.

Soc. Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the

virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be so exasperated; for if you can conciliate him, you will have done some service to the Athenian people.

EUTHYPHRO.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the *Meno* Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words: 'That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men harm than to do them good' (94 E); and Socrates was anticipating another opportunity of talking with him (99 E). In the *Euthyphro* Socrates is awaiting his trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would like to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.

This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the porch of the King Archon. (Cp. *Theaet.* sub fin.) Both have legal business in hand. Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety which Meletus has brought against him (it is remarked by the way that he is not a likely man himself to have brought a suit against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in an action for murder, which he has brought against his own father. The latter has originated in the following manner:—A poor dependant of the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command of Euthyphro's father, who sent to the interpreters of religion at Athens to ask what should be done with him. Before the messenger came back the criminal had died from hunger and exposure.

This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro brings against his father. Socrates is confident that before he could have undertaken the responsibility of such a prosecution, he must have been perfectly informed of the nature of piety and impiety; and as he is going to be tried for impiety himself, he thinks that he cannot do better

than learn of Euthyphro (who will be admitted by all men, including the judges, to be an unimpeachable authority) what piety is, and what is impiety. What then is piety?

Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very willing to undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is doing as I do, prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge of murder; doing as the gods do—as Zeus did to Cronos, and Cronos to Uranus.

Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies that this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with impiety. 'Are they really true?' 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell Socrates some more of them. But Socrates would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the question, 'What is piety?' 'Doing as I do, charging a father with murder,' may be a single instance of piety, but can hardly be regarded as a general definition.

Euthyphro replies, that 'Piety is what is dear to the gods, and impiety is what is not dear to them.' But may there not be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the gods? Especially, about good and evil, which have no fixed rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences which give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear to one god may not be dear to another, and the same action may be both pious and impious; e. g. your chastisement of your father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted a similar chastisement on his own father), but not equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the hands of their sons).

Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either among gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer. Yes, rejoins Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but that assumes the point at issue. If all the circumstances of the case are considered, are you able to show that your father was guilty of murder, or that all the gods are agreed in approving of your prosecution of him? And must you not allow that what is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving this last, however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that 'what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.' To this Euthyphro agrees.

Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. He shows that in other cases the act precedes the state; e. g. the act of being carried, loved, &c., precedes the state of being carried, loved, &c., and therefore that which is dear to the gods is dear to the gods because

it is first loved of them, not loved of them because it is dear to them. But the pious or holy is loved by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is equivalent to saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to them. Here then appears to be a contradiction,—Euthyphro has been giving an attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence. Euthyphro acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk away or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus, the ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his descendants.

Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: 'Is all the pious just?' 'Yes.' 'Is all the just pious?' 'No.' 'Then what part of justice is piety?' Euthyphro replies that piety is that part of justice which 'attends' to the gods, as there is another part of justice which 'attends' to men. But what is the meaning of 'attending' to the gods? The word 'attending,' when applied to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better? Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service or ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman, the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult questions cannot be resolved in a short time; and he would rather say simply that piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is 'a science of asking and giving'—asking what we want and giving what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between gods and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can we give them any good in return? 'Nay, but we give them honour.' Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is pleasing or dear to them; and this is what has been already disproved.

Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of Euthyphro, remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know the nature of piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old father. He is still hoping that he will condescend to instruct him. But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates' last hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is prosecuted for impiety has disappeared.

The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of

piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any definition of his own: as in the *Laches* and *Lysis*, he prepares the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own character, refuses to answer himself.

Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose 'prancing steeds' Socrates in the *Cratylus* is carried away (p. 396). He has the conceit and self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest. Though unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame. To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal.

Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. 'Piety is doing as I do' is the first idea of religion which is suggested to his mind, and to that of many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are not easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that other nations, e. g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief difference between us and them, is that they were slowly learning what we are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly, as Heraclitus more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is

ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of which, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one answer to the question, 'Why Socrates was put to death,' suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, 'The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:' which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at Athens only. In the course of the argument (7 A, B) Socrates remarks that the controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty of verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be referred.

The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (*φίλον*) and the participle (*φιλούμενον*), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (*φιλούμενον* and *φιλείται*). The act is prior to the state; and the state of being loved is preceded by the act of being loved, but piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great poets Æschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,' he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions. (Cp. *Politicus*, 290 C, D; *Rep.* ii. 365 E; *Sym.* 202 E.) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only; (3) the defence of Socrates.

The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back of the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other Dialogues; the deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II (378 ff.). The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic IV (428 ff.). The figure of Daedalus (15 C) has occurred in the Meno (97 D); that of Proteus (15 D) in the Euthydemus (288 E) and Io (541 E). The kingly science has already appeared in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting the suitability of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.

EUTHYPHRO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

EUTHYPHRO.

SCENE:—The Porch of the King Archon.

Steph. *Euthyphro.* WHY have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and
2 what are you doing in the porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be engaged in an action before the king, as I am.

Socrates. Not in an action, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use.

Euth. What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another.

Soc. Certainly not.

Euth. Then some one else has been prosecuting you?

Soc. Yes.

Euth. And who is he?

Soc. A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.

Euth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against you?

Soc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am anything but a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of

corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears away us who are the 3 destroyers of them. That is the first step; he will afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor.

Euth. I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the reverse will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the state in a sacred place. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young?

Soc. He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I make new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment.

Euth. I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world. I can tell you that, for when I myself speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me as a madman; and yet every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of all of us. I suppose that we must be brave and not mind them.

Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others; and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry.

Euth. I am never likely to try their temper in this way.

Soc. I dare say not, for you are select in your acquaintance, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians know this; and therefore, as I was saying, if the Athenians would only laugh at me as you say that they laugh at you, the time might

pass gaily enough in the court ; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict.

Euth. I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your cause ; and I think that I shall win mine.

Soc. And now what is your suit, Euthyphro ? are you the pursuer or the defendant ?

Euth. I am the pursuer.

Soc. Of whom ?

4 *Euth.* You will think me mad when I tell you.

Soc. Why, has the fugitive wings ?

Euth. Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.

Soc. Who is he ?

Euth. My father.

Soc. Your father ! my good man ?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And of what is he accused ?

Euth. Of murder, Socrates.

Soc. By the powers, Euthyphro ! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to this.

Euth. Indeed, Socrates, he must have made great strides.

Soc. I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of your relatives ; if he had been a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him.

Euth. I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation ; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone ; but if unjustly, then even if the murderer is under the same roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him. Now the man who is dead was a poor dependant of mine who worked for us as a field labourer at our farm in Naxos, and one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our domestic

servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him. Meantime he had no care or thought of him, being under the impression that he was a murderer; and that even if he did die there would be no great harm. And this was just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know of the opinions of the gods about piety and impiety.

Soc. Good heavens, Euthyphro! and have you such a precise knowledge of piety and impiety, and of divine things in general, that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state, you are not afraid that you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an action against your father?

Euth. The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all these matters. What should I be good for without that?

Soc. Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who is the real corruptor, not of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court.

Euth. Yes, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am

mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him ; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me.

Soc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you—not even this Meletus ; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and the rest of them. What are they ? Is not piety in every action always the same ? and impiety, again, is not that always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious ?

Euth. To be sure, Socrates.

Soc. And what is piety, and what is impiety ?

Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing ; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be, that makes no difference—and not prosecuting them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of what I am saying, which I have already given to others :—of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods ?—and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.

Soc. May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety—that I cannot away with these stories about the gods ? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. For what else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them ? I wish you would tell me whether you really believe that they are true.

Euth. Yes, Socrates ; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.

Soc. And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them ; and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?

Euth. Yes, Socrates ; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.

Soc. I dare say ; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is 'piety'? In reply, you only say that piety is, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.

Euth. And that is true, Socrates.

Soc. I dare say, Euthyphro, but there are many other pious acts.

Euth. There are.

Soc. Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the pious pious?

Euth. I remember.

Soc. Tell me what you mean, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure the nature of actions, whether yours or any one's else, and say that this action is pious, and that impious.

Euth. I will tell you, if you like.

Soc. I should very much like.

Euth. Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.

Soc. Very good, Euthyphro ; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.

Euth. Of course.

Soc. Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious. Was not that said?

Euth. Yes, that was said.

Soc. And that seems to have been very well said too?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, I think so; it was certainly said.

Soc. And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences—that was also said?

Euth. Yes, that was said.

Soc. And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to calculation, and end them by a sum?

Euth. True.

Soc. Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly put an end to that difference by measuring?

Euth. That is true.

Soc. And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing-machine?

Euth. To be sure.

Soc. But what differences are those which, because they cannot be thus decided, make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that this happens when the matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about which, when differing, and unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all men quarrel, when we do quarrel?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, that is the nature of the differences about which we quarrel.

Soc. And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?

Euth. They are.

Soc. They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there

would have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such differences—would there now?

Euth. You are quite right.

Soc. Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?

Euth. Very true.

Soc. But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust; about which they dispute; and so there arise wars and fightings among them. 8

Euth. Yes, that is true.

Soc. Then the same things, as appears, are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?

Euth. True.

Soc. And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?

Euth. That, I suppose, is true.

Soc. Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered what I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what was that which is both pious and impious: and now what is loved by the gods appears also to be hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.

Euth. But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.

Soc. Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?

Euth. I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in order to escape punishment.

Soc. But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?

Euth. No; they do not.

Soc. Then there are some things which they do not venture

to say and do : for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and what he did and when?

Euth. True.

Soc. And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say that there is injustice done among them, and others of them deny this. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of evil is not to be punished?

Euth. That is true, Socrates, in the main.

Soc. But they join issue about particulars; and this applies not only to men but to the gods, who, if they dispute at all, dispute about some act which is called in question, and which some affirm to be just, others to be unjust. Is not that true?

Euth. Quite true.

9 *Soc.* Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before his corrector can learn from the interpreters what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as you live.

Euth. That would not be an easy task, although I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.

Soc. I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.

Euth. Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.

Soc. But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the

death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still these distinctions have no bearing on the definition of piety and impiety, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?

Euth. Why not, Socrates?

Soc. Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.

Euth. Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?

Euth. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.

Soc. That, my good friend, we shall know better in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is 10 holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

Euth. I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.

Soc. I will endeavour to explain: we speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. And here is a difference, the nature of which you understand.

Euth. I think that I understand.

Soc. And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euth. No ; that is the reason.

Soc. And the same is true of that which is led and of that which is seen ?

Euth. True.

Soc. And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible because it is seen ; nor is a thing led because it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible ; and my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not become because it is becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes ; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you admit that ?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or suffering ?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And the same holds as in the previous instances ; the state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro : is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods ?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason ?

Euth. No, that is the reason.

Soc. It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved ?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And that which is in a state to be loved of the gods, and is dear to them, is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them ?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Then that which is loved of God, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm ; but they are two different things.

Euth. How do you mean, Socrates ?

Soc. I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by

us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.

Euth. Yes.

Soc. But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.

Euth. True.

Soc. But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same as that which is dear to God, and that which is holy is loved as being holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from one another. For one (*θεοφιλές*) is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (*ὄσιον*) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel). And what is impiety?

Euth. I really do not know, Socrates, how to say what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away.

Soc. Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say that this comes of my being his relation; and that this is the reason why my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are placed. But now, since these notions are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.

Euth. Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but

you make them move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

Soc. Then I must be a greater than Daedalus; for whereas he only made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are indolent, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour. Tell me, then,—Is not that which is pious necessarily just?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which
12 is pious all just, but that which is just only in part, and not all pious?

Euth. I do not understand you, Socrates.

Soc. And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your wisdom makes you indolent. Please to exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—

‘Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,

You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.’

And I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what I disagree?

Euth. By all means.

Soc. I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.

Euth. Very true.

Soc. But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.

Euth. No doubt.

Soc. Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is

rèverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?

Euth. Quite well.

Soc. That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when asking whether the just is the pious, or the pious the just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not always piety; for justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do you agree in that?

Euth. Yes; that, I think, is correct.

Soc. Then, now, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you agree?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.

Euth. Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men.

Soc. That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point about which I should like to have further information, What is the meaning of 'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is not that true?

Euth. Quite true.

Soc. I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of attending to horses?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the huntsman?

Euth. True.

Soc. And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the art of attending to dogs?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?

Euth. Very true.

Soc. And as holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are benefited and improved, are they not?

Euth. True.

Soc. As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?

Euth. Certainly, not for their hurt.

Soc. But for their good?

Euth. Of course.

Soc. And does piety or holiness, which has been defined as the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?

Euth. No, no; that is certainly not my meaning.

Soc. Indeed, Euthyphro, I did not suppose that this was your meaning; far otherwise. And I asked you the nature of the attention, because I thought that you could not mean this.

Euth. You do me justice, Socrates; for that is not my meaning.

Soc. Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which is called piety?

Euth. It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.

Soc. I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods.

Euth. Exactly.

Soc. Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, tending to the attainment of some object—would you not say health?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder with a view to the attainment of some result?

Euth. Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.

Soc. As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a view to the building of a house?

Euth. Yes.

Soc. And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.

Euth. And that is true, Socrates.

Soc. Tell me then, oh tell me—what is that fair work which the gods do by the help of us as their ministers?

Euth. Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.

Soc. Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the chief of them?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?

Euth. Exactly.

Soc. And of the many and fair things which the gods do, which is the chief and principal one?

Euth. I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. That is piety, which is the salvation of families and states, just as the impious, which is displeasing to the gods, is their ruin and destruction.

Soc. I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me: else why, when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I should have learned of you by this time the nature of piety. Now, as the asker of a question

is necessarily dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow ; and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?

Euth. Yes, I do.

Soc. And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the gods?

Euth. Yes, Socrates.

Soc. Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?

Euth. You understand me capitally, Socrates.

Soc. Yes, my friend ; the reason is that I am a votary of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts to them?

Euth. Yes, I do.

Soc. Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they want of us. There would be no meaning in an art which gives to any one that which he does not want.

Euth. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of doing business with one another?

Euth. That is an expression which you may use, if you like.

Soc. But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about
15 what they give to us ; for there is no good thing which they do not give ; but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.

Euth. And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the gods from what they receive of us?

Soc. But if not, Euthyphro, what sort of gifts do we confer upon the gods?

Euth. What should we confer upon them, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now saying, what is grateful to them?

Soc. Piety, then, is grateful to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to them?

Euth. I should say that nothing could be dearer.

Soc. Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to the gods?

Euth. Certainly.

Soc. And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and that is yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes round to the same point. I think that you must remember our saying that the holy or pious was not the same as that which is loved of the gods. Do you remember that?

Euth. I do.

Soc. And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy, but this is the same as what is dear to them—do you see that?

Euth. True.

Soc. Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.

Euth. I suppose that is the case.

Soc. Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I shall detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. For if you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident that you would never, on behalf of a scrf, have charged your aged father with murder. You would not have run such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would have had too much respect for the opinions of men. I am sure, therefore, that you

know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your knowledge.

Euth. Another time, Socrates ; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.

Soc. Alas ! my companion, and will you leave me in despair ? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety, so that I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. Then I might have proved to him that
16 I had been converted by Euthyphro, and had done with rash innovations and speculations, in which I had indulged through ignorance, and was about to lead a better life.

APOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

IN what relation the Apology of Plato stands to the real defence of Socrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in tone and character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the Memorabilia (iv. 4, 4) that Socrates might have been acquitted 'if in any moderate degree he would have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;' and who informs us in another passage (iv. 8, 4), on the testimony of Hermogenes, the friend of Socrates, that he had no wish to live; and that the divine sign refused to allow him to prepare a defence, and also that Socrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on the ground that all his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For the speech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, 'ut non supplex aut reus sed magister aut dominus videretur esse iudicium' (Cic. de Orat. i. 54); and the loose and desultory style is an imitation of the 'accustomed manner' in which Socrates spoke in 'the agora and among the tables of the money-changers.' The allusion in the Crito (45 B) may, perhaps, be adduced as a further evidence of the literal accuracy of some parts (37 C, D). But in the main it must be regarded as the ideal of Socrates, according to Plato's conception of him, appearing in the greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height of his triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is greatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of tragic pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed up, and the features of his character are brought out as if by accident in the course of the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming want of arrangement, the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a perfect work of art, which is the portrait of Socrates.

Yet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the recollection of his very words may have rung in the ears of his disciple. The Apology of Plato may be compared generally with those

speeches of Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the lofty character and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same time furnish a commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of view of the historian. So in the Apology there is an ideal rather than a literal truth; much is said which was not said, and is only Plato's view of the situation. Plato was not, like Xenophon, a chronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have aimed at literal accuracy. And we may perhaps even indulge in the fancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the Platonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in any case, some of the words actually used have probably been preserved. It is significant that Plato is said to have been present at the defence (38 B), as he is also said to have been absent at the last scene in the Phaedo (59 B). Is it fanciful to suppose that he meant to give the stamp of authenticity to the one and not to the other?—especially when we remember that these two passages are the only ones in which Plato makes mention of himself. The circumstance that Plato was to be one of his sureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed, is not likely to have been invented. Moreover, the Apology appears to combine the common characteristics both of the Xenophontean and Platonic Socrates, while the Phaedo passes into a region of thought which is very characteristic of Plato, but not of his master.

There is not much in the other Dialogues which can be compared with the Apology. The same recollection of his master may have been present to the mind of Plato when depicting the sufferings of the Just in the Republic (ii. 361 foll., vi. 500 A). The Crito may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to the Apology, in which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is nevertheless represented as scrupulously obedient to the laws. The idealization of the sufferer is carried still further in the Gorgias (476 foll.), in which the thesis is maintained, that 'to suffer is better than to do evil'; and the art of rhetoric is described as only useful for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur in the so-called Apology of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because the writing in which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The statements of the Memorabilia (i. 2, iv. 8) respecting the trial and death of Socrates agree generally with Plato; but they have lost the flavour of Socratic irony in the narrative of Xenophon.

The Apology or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three

parts: 1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in mitigation of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and exhortation.

The first part commences with an apology for his colloquial style; he is, as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and knows of no rhetoric but truth; he will not falsify his character by making a speech. Then he proceeds to divide his accusers into two classes; first, there is the nameless accuser—public opinion. All the world from their earliest years had heard that he was a corruptor of youth, and had seen him caricatured in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes. Secondly, there are the professed accusers, who are but the mouth-piece of the others. The accusations of both might be summed up in a formula. The first say, ‘Socrates is an evil-doer and a curious person, searching into things under the earth and above the heaven; and making the worse appear the better cause, and teaching all this to others.’ The second, ‘Socrates is an evil-doer and corruptor of the youth, who does not receive the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other new divinities.’ These last appear to have been the words of the actual indictment (cp. Xen. Mem. i. 1), of which the previous formula is a parody.

The answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations of the Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude, he had been identified with the teachers of physical science and with the Sophists. But this was an error. For both of them he professes a respect in the open court, which contrasts with his manner of speaking about them in other places. (Cp. for Anaxagoras, *Phaedo* 98 B, *Laws* xii. 967; for the Sophists *passim*.) But at the same time he shows that he is not one of them. Of natural philosophy he knows nothing; not that he despises such pursuits, but the fact is that he is ignorant of them, and never says a word about them. Nor is he paid for giving instruction—that is another mistaken notion; for he has nothing to teach. But he commends Evenus for teaching virtue at such a moderate rate. Something of the ‘accustomed irony,’ which may perhaps be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude, is lurking here.

He then goes on to explain the reason why he is in such an evil name. That had arisen out of a peculiar mission which he had taken upon himself. The enthusiastic Chaerephon (probably in anticipation of the answer which he received) had gone to Delphi and asked the oracle if there was any man wiser than Socrates; and the answer was,

that there was no man wiser. What could be the meaning of this—that he who knew nothing, and knew that he knew nothing, should be declared by the oracle to be the wisest of men?’ Reflecting upon this, he determined to refute the oracle by finding ‘a wiser;’ and first he went to the politicians, and then to the poets, and then to the craftsmen, but always with the same result—he found that they knew nothing, or hardly anything more than himself; and that the little advantage which in some cases they possessed was more than counterbalanced by their conceit of knowledge. He knew nothing, and knew that he knew nothing: they knew little or nothing, and imagined that they knew all things. Thus he had passed his life as a sort of missionary in detecting the pretended wisdom of mankind; and this occupation had quite absorbed him and taken him away both from public and private affairs. Young men of the richer sort had made a pastime of the same pursuit, ‘which was not unamusing.’ And hence bitter enmities had arisen; the professors of knowledge had revenged themselves by calling him a villainous corruptor of the youth, and by repeating the commonplaces about atheism and materialism and sophistry, which are the stock-accusations against all philosophers when there is nothing else to be said of them.

The second accusation he meets by interrogating Meletus, who is present and can be interrogated. ‘If he is the corruptor, who is the improver of the citizens?’ ‘All mankind.’ But how absurd, how contrary to analogy is this! How inconceivable too, that he should make the citizens worse when he has to live with them. This surely cannot be intentional; and if unintentional, he ought to have been instructed by Meletus, and not accused in the court.

But there is another part of the indictment which says that he teaches men not to receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new gods. ‘Is that the way in which he is supposed to corrupt the youth?’ ‘Yes, that is the way.’ ‘Has he only new gods, or none at all?’ ‘None at all.’ ‘What, not even the sun and moon?’ ‘No; why, he says that the sun is a stone, and the moon earth.’ That, replies Socrates, is the old confusion about Anaxagoras; the Athenian people are not so ignorant as to attribute to the influence of Socrates notions which have found their way into the drama, and may be learned at the theatre. Socrates undertakes to show that Meletus (rather unjustifiably) has been compounding a riddle in this part of the indictment: ‘There

are no gods, but Socrates believes in the existence of the sons of gods, which is absurd.'

Leaving Meletus, who has had enough words spent upon him, he returns to the original accusation. The question may be asked, Why will he persist in following a profession which leads him to death? Why?—because he must remain at his post where the god has placed him, as he remained at Potidaea, and Amphipolis, and Delium, where the generals placed him. Besides, he is not so overwise as to imagine that he knows whether death is a good or an evil; and he is certain that desertion of his duty is an evil. Anytus is quite right in saying that they should never have indicted him if they meant to let him go. For he will certainly obey God rather than man; and will continue to preach to all men of all ages the necessity of virtue and improvement; and if they refuse to listen to him he will still persevere and reprove them. This is his way of corrupting the youth, which he will not cease to follow in obedience to the god, even if a thousand deaths await him.

He is desirous that they should not put him to death—not for his own sake, but for theirs; because he is their heaven-sent friend (and they will never have such another), or, as he may be ludicrously described, the gadfly who stirs the generous steed into motion. Why then has he never taken part in public affairs? Because the familiar divine voice has hindered him; if he had been a public man, and had fought for the right, as he would certainly have fought against the many, he would not have lived, and could therefore have done no good. Twice in public matters he has risked his life for the sake of justice—once at the trial of the generals; and again in resistance to the tyrannical commands of the Thirty.

But, though not a public man, he has passed his days in instructing the citizens without fee or reward—this was his mission. Whether his disciples have turned out well or ill, he cannot justly be charged with the result, for he never promised to teach them anything. They might come if they liked, and they might stay away if they liked: and they did come, because they found an amusement in hearing the pretenders to wisdom detected. If they have been corrupted, their elder relatives (if not themselves) might surely come into court and witness against him, and there is an opportunity still for them to appear. But their fathers and brothers all appear in court (including 'this' Plato), to witness on his behalf; and if their relatives are corrupted, at least they

are uncorrupted; 'and they are my witnesses. For they know that I am speaking the truth, and that Meletus is lying.'

This is about all that he has to say. He will not entreat the judges to spare his life; neither will he present a spectacle of weeping children, although he, too, is not made of 'rock or oak.' Some of the judges themselves may have complied with this practice on similar occasions, and he trusts that they will not be angry with him for not following their example. But he feels that such conduct brings discredit on the name of Athens: he feels, too, that the judge has sworn not to give away justice; and he cannot be guilty of the impiety of asking the judge to break his oath, when he is himself being tried for impiety.

As he expected, and probably intended, he is convicted. And now the tone of the speech, instead of being more conciliatory, becomes more lofty and commanding. Anytus proposes death as the penalty: and what counter-proposition shall he make? He, the benefactor of the Athenian people, whose whole life has been spent in doing them good, should at least have the Olympic victor's reward of maintenance in the prytaneum. Or why should he propose any counter-penalty when he does not know whether death, which Anytus proposes, is a good or an evil? and he is certain that imprisonment is an evil, exile is an evil. Loss of money might be no evil, but then he has none to give; perhaps he can make up a mina. Let that be the penalty, or, if his friends wish, thirty minæ; for which they will be excellent securities.

[*He is condemned to death.*]

He is an old man already, and the Athenians will gain nothing but disgrace by depriving him of a few years of life. Perhaps he could have escaped, if he had chosen to throw down his arms and entreat for his life. But he does not at all repent of the manner of his defence; he would rather die in his own fashion than live in theirs. For the penalty of unrighteousness is swifter than death, and that has already overtaken his accusers as death will soon overtake him.

And now, as one who is about to die, he will prophesy to them. They have put him to death in order to escape the necessity of giving an account of their lives. But his death 'will be the seed' of many

disciples who will convict them of their evil ways, and will come forth to reprove them in harsher terms, because they are younger and more inconsiderate.

He would like to say a few words, while there is time, to those who would have acquitted him. He wishes them to know that the divine sign never interrupted him in the course of his defence; the reason of which, as he conjectures, is that the death to which he is going is a good and not an evil. For either death is a long sleep, the best of sleeps, or a journey to another world in which the souls of the dead are gathered together, and in which there may be a hope of seeing the heroes of old—in which, too, there are just judges; and as all are immortal, there can be no fear of any one being put to death for his opinions.

Nothing evil can happen to the good man either in life or death, and his own death has been permitted by the gods, because it was better for him to depart; and therefore he forgives his judges because they have done him no harm, although they never meant to do him any good.

He has a last request to make to them—that they will trouble his sons as he has troubled them, if they appear to prefer riches to virtue, or to think themselves something when they are nothing.

‘ Few persons will be found to wish that Socrates should have defended himself otherwise,’—if, as we must add, his defence was that with which Plato has provided him. But leaving this question, which does not admit of a precise solution, we may go on to ask what was the impression which Plato in the *Apology* intended to leave of the character and conduct of his master in the last great scene? Did he intend to represent him (1) as employing sophistries; (2) as designedly irritating the judges? Or are these sophistries to be regarded as belonging to the age in which he lived and to his personal character, and this apparent haughtiness as flowing from the natural elevation of his position?

For example, when he says that it is absurd to suppose that one man is the corruptor and all the rest of the world the improvers of the youth; or, when he argues that he never could have corrupted the men with whom he had to live; or, when he proves his belief in the gods because

he believes in the sons of gods, is he serious or jesting? It may be observed that these sophisms all occur in his cross-examination of Meletus, who is easily foiled and mastered in the hands of the great dialectician. Perhaps he regarded these answers as good enough for his accuser, of whom he makes very light. Also there is a touch of irony in them, which takes them out of the category of sophistry. (Cp. Euthyph. 2.)

That the manner in which he defends himself about the lives of his disciples is not satisfactory, can hardly be denied. Fresh in the memory of the Athenians, and detestable as they deserved to be to the newly restored democracy, were the names of Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides. It is obviously not a sufficient answer that Socrates had never professed to teach them anything, and is therefore not justly chargeable with their crimes. Yet the defence, when taken out of this ironical form, is doubtless sound: that his teaching had nothing to do with their evil lives. Here, then, the sophistry is rather in form than in substance, though we might desire that to such a serious charge Socrates had given a more serious answer.

Truly characteristic of Socrates is another point in his answer, which may also be regarded as sophistical. He says that 'if he has corrupted the youth, he must have corrupted them involuntarily.' But if, as Socrates argues, all evil is involuntary, then all criminals ought to be admonished and not punished. In these words the Socratic doctrine of the involuntariness of evil is clearly intended to be conveyed. Here again, as in the former instance, the defence of Socrates is untrue practically, but may be true in some ideal or transcendental sense. The commonplace reply, that if he had been guilty of corrupting the youth their relations would surely have witnessed against him, with which he concludes this part of his defence, is more satisfactory.

Again, when Socrates argues that he must believe in the gods because he believes in the sons of gods, we must remember that this is a refutation not of the original indictment, which is consistent enough—'Socrates does not receive the gods whom the city receives, and has other new divinities'—but of the interpretation put upon the words by Meletus, who has affirmed that he is a downright atheist. To this Socrates fairly answers, in accordance with the ideas of the time, that a downright atheist cannot believe in the sons of gods or in divine things. The notion that demons or lesser divinities are the sons of gods is not to be

regarded as ironical or sceptical. He is arguing '*ad hominem*' according to the notions of mythology current in his age. Yet he abstains from saying that he believed in the gods whom the State approved. He does not defend himself, as Xenophon has defended him, by appealing to his practice of religion. Probably he neither wholly believed, nor disbelieved, in the existence of the popular gods; he had no means of knowing about them. According to Plato, as well as Xenophon, he was punctual in the performance of the least religious duties; and he must have believed in his own oracular sign, of which he seemed to have an internal witness. But the existence of Apollo or Zeus, or the other gods whom the State approves, would have appeared to him both uncertain and unimportant in comparison of the duty of self-examination, and of those principles of truth and right which he deemed to be the foundation of religion. (Cp. *Phaedr.* 230; *Euthyph.* 6, 7; *Rep.* 373 ff.)

The second question, whether Plato meant to represent Socrates as braving or irritating his judges, must also be answered in the negative. His irony, his superiority, his audacity, 'regarding not the person of man,' necessarily flow out of the loftiness of his situation. He is not acting a part upon a great occasion, but he is what he has been all his life long, 'a king of men.' He would rather not appear insolent, if he could avoid this (*οὐχ ὡς αὐθαδιζόμενος τοῦτο λέγω*). Neither is he desirous of hastening his own end, for life and death are simply indifferent to him. But such a defence as would be acceptable to his judges and might procure an acquittal, it is not in his nature to make. He will not say or do anything that might pervert the course of justice; he cannot have his tongue bound even 'in the throat of death.' With his accusers he will only fence and play, as he had fenced with other 'improvers of youth,' answering the Sophist according to his sophistry all his life long. He is serious when he is speaking of his own mission, which seems to distinguish him from all other reformers of mankind, and originates in an accident. The dedication of himself to the improvement of his fellow-citizens is not so remarkable as the ironical spirit in which he goes about doing good only in vindication of the credit of the oracle, and in the vain hope of finding a wiser man than himself. Yet this singular and almost accidental character of his mission agrees with the divine sign which, according to our notions, is equally accidental and irrational, and is nevertheless accepted by him as the guiding principle of his life. Socrates is nowhere represented to us as a freethinker or

sceptic. There is no reason to doubt his sincerity when he speculates on the possibility of seeing and knowing the heroes of the Trojan war in another world. On the other hand, his hope of immortality is uncertain;—he also conceives of death as a long sleep (in this respect differing from the *Phaedo*), and at last falls back on resignation to the divine will, and the certainty that no evil can happen to the good man either in life or death. His absolute truthfulness seems to hinder him from asserting positively more than this; and he makes no attempt to veil his ignorance in mythology and figures of speech. The gentleness of the first part of the speech contrasts with the aggravated, almost threatening, tone of the conclusion. He characteristically remarks that he will not speak as a rhetorician, that is to say, he will not make a regular defence such as *Lysias* or one of the orators might have composed for him, or, according to some accounts, did compose for him. But he first procures himself a hearing by conciliatory words. He does not attack the Sophists; for they were open to the same charges as himself; they were equally ridiculed by the Comic poets, and almost equally hateful to *Anytus* and *Meletus*. Yet incidentally the antagonism between *Socrates* and the Sophists is allowed to appear. He is poor and they are rich; his profession that he teaches nothing is opposed to their readiness to teach all things; his talking in the market-place to their private instructions; his tarry-at-home life to their wandering from city to city. The tone which he assumes towards them is one of real friendliness, but also of concealed irony. Towards *Anaxagoras*, who had disappointed him in his hopes of learning about mind and nature, he shows a less kindly feeling, which is also the feeling of *Plato* in other passages (*Laws*, 967 B). But *Anaxagoras* had been dead thirty years, and was beyond the reach of persecution.

It has been remarked that the prophecy of a new generation of teachers who would rebuke and exhort the Athenian people in harsher and more violent terms was, as far as we know, never fulfilled. No inference can be drawn from this circumstance as to the probability of the words attributed to him having been actually uttered. They express the aspiration of the first martyr of philosophy, that he would leave behind him many followers, accompanied by the not unnatural feeling that they would be fiercer and more inconsiderate in their words when emancipated from his control.

The above remarks must be understood as applying with any degree

of certainty to the Platonic Socrates only. For, although these or similar words may have been spoken by Socrates himself, we cannot exclude the possibility, that like so much else, *e. g.* the wisdom of Critias, the poem of Solon, the virtues of Charmides, they may have been due only to the imagination of Plato. The arguments of those who maintain that the Apology was composed during the process, resting on no evidence, do not require a serious refutation. Nor are the reasonings of Schleiermacher, who argues that the Platonic defence is an exact or nearly exact reproduction of the words of Socrates, partly because Plato would not have been guilty of the impiety of altering them, and also because many points of the defence might have been improved and strengthened, at all more conclusive. (See English Translation, p. 137.) What effect the death of Socrates produced on the mind of Plato, we cannot certainly determine; nor can we say how he would or must have written under the circumstances. We observe that the enmity of Aristophanes to Socrates does not prevent Plato from introducing them together in the Symposium engaged in friendly intercourse. Nor is there any trace in the dialogues of an attempt to make Anytus or Meletus personally odious in the eyes of the Athenian public.

A P O L O G Y.

Steph. ¹⁷ **H**OW you, O Athenians, have been affected by my accusers, I cannot tell; but I know that they almost made me forget myself—so persuasively did they speak; and yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. But many as their falsehoods were, there was one of them which quite amazed me;—I mean when they told you that you should be upon your guard and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the force of my eloquence. To use such language, when they were sure to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and displayed my deficiency, did certainly appear to me most shameless—unless by the force of eloquence they mean the force of truth; for if this is their meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have hardly uttered a word, or not more than a word, of truth; but you shall hear from me the whole truth: not, however, delivered after their manner in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment; for I am certain that I am right in this; and that at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile orator—let no one expect it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me a favour:—If you hear me using the same words in my defence which I have been in the habit of using, and which most of you may have heard in the agora, and at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, I would ask you not to be surprised, and not to interrupt

me on this account. For I am more than seventy years of age, and appearing now for the first time in a court of law, I am quite a stranger to the language which is used here ; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom 18 you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the fashion of his country :—Am I making an unfair request of you? Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good ; but think only of the justice of my cause, and give heed to that : let the judge decide justly and the speaker speak truly.

And first, I have to reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go on to the later ones. For of old I have had many accusers, who have accused me falsely to you during many years ; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are the others, who began when you were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, a wise man, who speculated about the heaven above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. The disseminators of this tale are the accusers whom I dread ; for their hearers are apt to fancy that such enquirers do not believe in the existence of the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they made them in days when you were impressible—in childhood, or perhaps in youth—and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And hardest of all, their names I do not know and cannot tell ; unless in the chance case of a comic poet. But the main body of these slanderers who from envy and malice have wrought upon you—and there are some of them who are convinced themselves, and impart their convictions to others—all this class of men are most difficult to deal with ; for I cannot have them up here, and examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defence, and examine when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was saying, that my opponents are of two kinds ; one recent, the other ancient : and I hope that you will see the propriety of my answering the latter first, for these accusations you heard long before the others, and much oftener.

Well, then, I must make my defence, and endeavour to clear 19

away in a short time, a slander which has lasted a long time ; and I hope that I may succeed, and that my words may find favour with you, if this be well for you and me. But I know that to accomplish this is not easy—I quite see the nature of the task. Let the event be as God wills : in obedience to the law I make my defence.

I will begin at the beginning, and ask what the accusation is which has given rise to this slander of me, and which has encouraged Meletus to proceed against me. Well, what do the slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit: 'Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, who searches into things under the earth and in heaven, and he makes the worse appear the better cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.' Such is the accusation, and is just what you have yourselves seen in the comedy of Aristophanes, who has introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, going about and saying that he can walk in the air, and talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of which I do not pretend to know either much or little—not that I mean to speak disparagingly of any one who is a student of natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus could lay that to my charge. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with physical speculations. Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon such matters. . . . You hear their answer. And from what they say of this part of the charge you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.

As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take money; that is no more true than the other. Although, if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to take money for giving instruction would, in my opinion, be honourable. There is Gorgias of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens, by whom they might be taught for nothing, and come to them, whom they
20 not only pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to pay them. There is at this time a Parian philosopher residing in

Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way:—I met a man who has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: ‘Callias,’ I said, ‘if your two sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in finding some one to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, or a farmer probably, who would improve and perfect them in their own proper virtue and excellence; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there any one who understands human and political virtue? You must have thought about the matter, for you have sons; is there any one?’ ‘There is,’ he said. ‘Who is he?’ said I; ‘and of what country? and what does he charge?’ ‘Evenus the Parian,’ he replied; ‘he is the man, and his charge is five minae.’ Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a modest charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and satisfied; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.

I dare say, Athenians, that some one among you will reply, ‘Yes, Socrates, but what is the origin of these accusations which are brought against you; there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All this rumour and talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, what is the cause of them, for we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.’ Now I regard this as a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain to you the origin of this name of ‘wise,’ and of my evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think that I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom, I reply, such wisdom as is attainable by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman wisdom, which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness

who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about my wisdom—whether I have any, and of what sort—and that witness shall be the God of Delphi. You must have known Chaerephon; he
 21 was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was any one wiser than I was, and the Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of what I am saying.

Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, small or great. What then can he mean when he says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his nature. After long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question. I reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. I should say to him, 'Here is a man who is wiser than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.' Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him—his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain to him that he thought himself wise, but was not really wise; and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good, I am better off than he is,—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him. Then I went to another who had still higher philosophical pretensions,

and my conclusion was exactly the same. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

Then I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!—for I must tell you the truth—the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that some inferior men were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale of my wanderings and of the ‘Herculean’ labours, as I may call them, which I endured only to find at last the oracle irrefutable. When I left the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be instantly detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew without going further that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them. And the poets appeared to me to be much in the same case; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the wisest of men in other things in which they were not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans, for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and here I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets;—because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all

sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom—therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and the oracle that I was better off as I was.

This investigation has led to my having many enemies of the 23 worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies. And I am called wise, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that God only is wise; and in his answer he means to say that the wisdom of men is little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wisest, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom is in truth worth nothing. And so I go my way, obedient to the god, and make inquisition into the wisdom of any one, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and my occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.

There is another thing:—young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and proceed to examine others; there are plenty of persons, as they soon enough discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth!—and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretence of knowledge has been detected—

which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen; Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth?—this is the occasion and reason of their slander of me, as you will find out either in this or in any future enquiry.

I have said enough in my defence against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class who are headed by Meletus, that good and patriotic man, as he calls himself. And now I will try to defend myself against them: these new accusers must also have their affidavit read. What do they say? Something of this sort:—That Socrates is a doer of evil, and a corruptor of the youth; he does not believe in the gods of the state, and has other new divinities of his own. That is the sort of charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, who corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus is a doer of evil, and the evil is that he mixes up jest and earnest, and is too ready at bringing other men to trial from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavour to prove.

Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. You think a great deal about the improvement of youth?

Yes, I do.

Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corruptor, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is. Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying,

that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.

The laws.

But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws.

The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.

What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?

Certainly they are.

What, all of them, or some only and not others?

All of them.

By the goddess Here, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience,—
25 do they improve them?

Yes, they do.

And the senators?

Yes, the senators improve them.

But perhaps the members of the assembly corrupt them?—
or do they too improve them?

They improve them.

Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corruptor? Is that what you affirm?

That is what I stoutly affirm.

I am very unfortunate if you are right. But suppose I ask you a question: Would you say that the same holds true in the case of horses? Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact opposite of this true? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many;—the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or any other animals? Yes, unmistakably; whether you and Anytus say yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corruptor only, and all the rest of the world were their improvers. And you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about the matters spoken of in your own indictment.

And now, Meletus, I must ask you another question: Which

is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; for that is a question which may be easily answered. Do not the good do their neighbours good, and the bad do them evil?

Certainly.

And is there any one who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to answer—does any one like to be injured?

Certainly not.

And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

Intentionally, I say.

But you have just admitted that the good do their neighbours good, and the evil do them evil. Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too—that is what you are saying, and of that you will never persuade me or any other human being. But either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt 26 them unintentionally; and so on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; whereas you hated to converse with me or teach me, but you indicted me in this court, which is a place not of instruction, but of punishment.

I have shown, Athenians, as I was saying, that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead. These are the lessons which corrupt the youth, as you say.

Yes, that I say emphatically.

Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach others to acknowledge some gods, and therefore do believe in gods, and am not an entire atheist—this you do not lay to my charge,—but only that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that they are different gods. Or, do you mean to say that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?

I mean the latter—that you are a complete atheist.

That is an extraordinary statement, Meletus. Why do you say that? Do you mean that I do not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, which is the common creed of all men?

I assure you, judges, that he does not believe in them; for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them ignorant to such a degree as not to know that these doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian, who is full of them. And these are the doctrines which the youth are said to learn of Socrates, when there are not unfrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre¹ (price of admission one drachma at the most); and they might cheaply purchase them, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father such remarkable views. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?

I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.

You are a liar, Meletus, not believed even by yourself. For I cannot help thinking, O men of Athens, that Meletus is reckless and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. Has he
 27 not compounded a riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself:—I shall see whether the wise Socrates will discover my pleasant contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said

¹ Probably in allusion to Aristophanes who caricatured, and to Euripides who borrowed the notions of Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.

that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them—but this surely is a piece of fun.

I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must remind the audience that they are not to interrupt me if I speak in my accustomed manner.

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings? . . . I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please to answer the next question: Can a man believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not in spirits or demigods?

He cannot.

I am glad that I have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court; nevertheless you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual agencies, as you say and swear in the affidavit; but if I believe in divine beings, I must believe in spirits or demigods;—is not that true? Yes, that is true, for I may assume that your silence gives assent to that. Now what are spirits or demigods? are they not either gods or the sons of gods? Is that true?

Yes, that is true.

But this is just the ingenious riddle of which I was speaking: the demigods or spirits are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs or by any other mothers, as is thought, that, as all men will allow, necessarily implies the existence of their parents. You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been intended by you as a trial of me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real of which to accuse me.

But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same men can believe in divine and superhuman things, and yet not believe that there are gods
28 and demigods and heroes.

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary; but as I was saying before, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed; of that I am certain;—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good men, and will probably be the death of many more; there is no danger of my being the last of them.

Some one will say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to bring you to an untimely end? To him I may fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing anything he is doing right or wrong—acting the part of a good man or of a bad. Whereas, according to your view, the heroes who fell at Troy were not good for much, and the son of Thetis above all, who altogether despised danger in comparison with disgrace; and when his goddess mother said to him, in his eagerness to slay Hector, that if he avenged his companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would die himself—‘Fate,’ as she said, ‘waits upon you next after Hector;’ he, hearing this, utterly despised danger and death, and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live in dishonour, and not to avenge his friend. ‘Let me die next,’ he replies, ‘and be avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by the beaked ships, a scorn and a burden of the earth.’ Had Achilles any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man’s place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true saying.

Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidæa and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death; if, I

say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, God orders me to fulfil the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle because I was afraid of death: then I should be fancying that I was wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real wisdom, being a pretended knowledge of the unknown; and no one knows whether death, which men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil, may not be the greatest good. Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which is a disgraceful sort of ignorance? And this is the point in which, as I think, I differ from others, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself wiser than men in general,—that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether God or man, is evil and dishonourable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me go now, and reject the counsels of Anytus, who said that if I were not put to death I ought not to have been prosecuted, and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words—if you say to me, Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and will let you off, but upon one condition, that you are not to enquire and speculate in this way any more, and that if you are caught doing this again you shall die;—if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour and love you; but I shall obey God rather than you, and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying: O my friend, why do you, who are a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and honour and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, which you never regard or heed at all? Are you not ashamed of this? And if the person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I do care; I do not depart or let him go at once; I interrogate and examine and cross-examine him,

and if I think that he has no virtue, but only says that he has, I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the
 30 less. And I say the same to every one whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that this is the command of God; and I believe that to this day no greater good has ever happened in the state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue come money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my influence is ruinous indeed. But if any one says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; but whatever you do, understand that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an agreement between us that you should hear me out. And I think that what I am going to say will do you good: for I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I beg that you will not. I would have you know, that if you kill such an one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Nothing will injure me, not Meletus nor yet Anytus—they cannot, for a bad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself. I do not deny that he may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others may imagine, that he is doing him a great injury: but in that I do not agree with him; for the evil of doing as Anytus is doing—of unjustly taking away another man's life—is greater far. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the God, or lightly reject his boon by condemning me. For if you kill me you will not easily find another like me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by the God; and the state is like a great and noble

steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which God has given the state, and all day long and in all places am always³¹ fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. And as you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping; and you may think that if you were to strike me dead as Anytus advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his care of you gave you another gadfly. And that I am given to you by God is proved by this:—that if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue; such conduct, I say, would be unlike human nature. And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in that; but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; of that they have no witness. And I have a witness of the truth of what I say; my poverty is a sufficient witness.

Some one may wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you why. You have often heard me speak in times past of an oracle or sign which comes to me, and is the divinity which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This sign I have had ever since I was a child. The sign is a voice which comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never commands me to do anything, and this is what stands in the way of my being a politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling you the truth: for the truth is, that no man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly struggling against the commission of unrighteousness and wrong in the state, will save his life; he who will really fight for the right, if³²

he would live even for a little while, must have a private station and not a public one.

I can give you as proofs of what I say, not words only, but deeds, which you value far more. Let me tell you a passage of my own life which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that when I refused to yield I must have died. I will tell you a tale of the courts, not very interesting perhaps, but nevertheless true. The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator: the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed to try them in a body, which was illegal, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and have me taken away, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to execute him. That was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my sole fear was the fear of doing an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words.

Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good man I had always supported the right and had made justice, as I ought, the first thing? No indeed, men of Athens, neither I

nor any other. But I have been always the same in all my 33 actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples, or to any other. For the truth is that I have no regular disciples: but if any one likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he may freely come. Nor do I converse with those who pay only, and not with those who do not pay; but any one, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, that cannot be justly laid to my charge, as I never taught or professed to teach him anything. And if any one says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, I should like you to know that he is speaking an untruth.

But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth about this: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom; there is amusement in it. To converse with others is a duty which the God has imposed upon me, as I am assured by oracles, visions, and in every way in which the will of divine power was ever signified to any one. This is true, O Athenians; or, if not true, would be soon refuted. For if I am really corrupting the youth, and have corrupted some of them already, those of them who have grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers, and take their revenge; and if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age and of the same deme with myself, and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus, who is the father of Aeschines—he is present; and also there is Antiphon of Cephissus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me. There is Nicostratus the son of Theodotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to stop him);

and there is Paralus the son of Demodocus, who had a brother
34 Theages; and Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother
Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollo-
dorus, whom I also see. I might mention a great many others,
any of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the
course of his speech; and let him still produce them, if he has
forgotten—I will make way for him. And let him say, if he
has any testimony of the sort which he can produce. Nay,
Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are
ready to witness on behalf of the corruptor, of the destroyer of
their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; not the corrupted
youth only—there might have been a motive for that—but their
uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me
with their testimony? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth
and justice, and because they know that I am speaking the
truth, and that Meletus is lying.

Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is nearly all the
defence which I have to offer. Yet a word more. Perhaps there
may be some one who is offended at me, when he calls to mind
how he himself on a similar, or even a less serious occasion, had
prayed and entreated the judges with many tears, and how he
produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle,
together with a host of relations and friends; whereas I, who
am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things.
The contrast may occur to his mind, and he may be set against
me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at me on this
account. Now if there be such a person among you, which I
am far from affirming, I may fairly reply to him: My friend,
I am a man, and like other men, a creature of flesh and blood,
and not 'of wood or stone,' as Homer says; and I have a
family, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, one of
whom is growing up, and the two others are still young; and
yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you
for an acquittal. And why not? Not from any self-will or dis-
regard of you. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is
another question, of which I will not now speak. But my
reason simply is, that I feel such conduct to be discreditable
to myself, and to you, and to the whole state. One who has
reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, whether

deserved or not, ought not to demean himself. At any rate, the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior 35 in wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that they were a dishonour to the state, and that any stranger coming in would have said of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give honour and command, are no better than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who are of reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show that you are more inclined to condemn, not the man who is quiet, but the man who gets up a doleful scene, and makes the city ridiculous.

But, setting aside the question of dishonour, there seems to be something unjust in petitioning a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but to give judgment; and he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws, and not according to his own good pleasure; and we ought not to encourage you, or you allow yourselves to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonourable and impious and wrong, especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and convict myself, in my own defence, of not believing in them. But that is not the case; for I do believe that there are gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best for you and me.

There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of
 36 Athens, at the vote of condemnation. I expected it, and am
 only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal; for I had
 thought that the majority against me would have been far
 larger; but now, had three votes gone over to the other side, I
 should have been acquitted. And I may say, I think, that I have
 escaped Meletus. Nay, I may say more; for without the assist-
 ance of Anytus and Lycon, he would not have had a fifth part
 of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have
 incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae, as is evident.

And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I
 propose on my part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is
 my due. And what is that which I ought to pay or to receive?
 What shall be done to the man who has never had the wit to
 be idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the
 many care about—wealth, and family interests, and military
 offices, and speaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and
 plots, and parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest
 a man to follow in this way and live, I did not go where I
 could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do
 the greatest good privately to every one of you, thither I went,
 and sought to persuade every man among you, that he must
 look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom before he looks to
 his private interests, and look to the state before he looks to
 the interests of the state; and that this should be the order
 which he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to
 such an one? Doubtless some good thing, O men of Athens,
 if he has his reward; and the good should be of a kind suitable
 to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who
 is your benefactor, who desires leisure that he may instruct
 you? There can be no more fitting reward than maintenance
 in the Prytaneum, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves
 far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in
 the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by
 two horses or by many. For I am in want, and he has enough;
 and he only gives you the appearance of happiness, and I give
 you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty fairly,
 37 I should say that maintenance in the Prytaneum is the just
 return.

Perhaps you think that I am braving you in what I am saying now, as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But this is not the case. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged any one, although I cannot convince you of that—for we have had a short conversation only; but if there were a law at Athens, such as there is in other cities, that a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you; but now the time is too short. I cannot in a moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a good or an evil, why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why should I live in prison, and be the slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of life, if I am so irrational as to expect that when you, who are my own citizens, cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you would fain have done with them, others are likely to endure me. No indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, living in ever-changing exile, and always being driven out! For I am quite sure that into whatever place I go, as here so also there, the young men will come and listen to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their desire; and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their sakes.

Some one will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that to do as you say would be a disobedience to the God, and therefore

that I cannot hold my tongue, you will not believe that I am
38 serious; and if I say again that the greatest good of man
is daily to converse about virtue, and all that concerning which
you hear me examining myself and others, and that the life
which is unexamined is not worth living, you are still less likely
to believe me. And yet what I say is indeed true, although a
thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you. Moreover, I
have not been accustomed to think that I deserve any punishment.
Had I money I might have estimated the offence at what I was
able to pay, and have been none the worse. But you see that I
have none, and I can only ask you to proportion the fine to my
means. However, I think that I could afford a mina, and
therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and
Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty minae, and
they will be the sureties. Well, then, say thirty minae, let that
be the penalty; and for that sum they will be ample security
to you.

Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for
the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the
city, who will say that you killed Socrates, a wise man; for
they will call me wise, even although I am not wise, when they
want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your
desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I
am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far
from death. I am speaking now only to those of you who
have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to
say to them: You think that I was convicted because I had no
words of the sort which would have procured my acquittal—I
mean, if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone or unsaid.
Not so; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of
words—certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence
or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to
address you, weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying and
doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear
from others, and which, as I maintain, are unworthy of me. I
thought at the time that I ought not to do anything common

or mean when in danger : nor do I now repent of the manner of my defence, and I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought I or any man to use every way of 39 escaping death. Often in battle there can be no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape death ; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death, but in avoiding unrighteousness ; for that runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death, and they too go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong ; and I must abide by my award—let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated,—and I think that they are well.

And now, O men who have condemned me, I would fain prophesy to you ; for I am about to die, and that is the hour in which men are gifted with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that immediately after my death punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose : far otherwise. For I say that there will be more accusers of you than there are now ; accusers whom hitherto I have restrained : and as they are younger they will be more inconsiderate with you, and you will be more offended at them. If you think that by killing men you can prevent some one from censuring your evil lives, you are mistaken ; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or honourable ; the easiest and the noblest way is not to be disabling others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter before my departure to the judges who have condemned me.

Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you about this thing which has happened, while the

magistrates are busy, and before I go to the place at which I must die. Stay then awhile, for we may as well talk with one
40 another while there is time. You are my friends, and I should like to show you the meaning of this event which has happened to me. O my judges—for you I may truly call judges—I should like to tell you of a wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the familiar oracle within me has constantly been in the habit of opposing me even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip or error in any matter; and now as you see there has come upon me that which may be thought, and is generally believed to be, the last and worst evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, either as I was leaving my house and going out in the morning, or when I was going up into this court, or while I was speaking, at anything which I was going to say; and yet I have often been stopped in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing I either said or did touching this matter has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be the explanation of this? I will tell you. I regard this as a great proof that what has happened to me is a good, and that those of us who think that death is an evil are in error. For the customary sign would surely have opposed me had I been going to evil and not to good.

Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good; for one of two things—either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams, and were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life better and more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a private man, but even the great king will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death is like this, I say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only a single night. But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the

dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I myself, too, shall have a wonderful interest in there meeting and conversing with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall then be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in that; and I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! In another world they do not put a man to death for asking questions; assuredly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.

Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty, that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me; and therefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not angry with my condemners, or with my accusers; they have done me no harm, although they did not mean to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them.

Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, to punish them; and I would have you trouble them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to care about riches, or anything, more than about virtue; or if they pretend to be something when they are really

nothing,—then reprove them, as I have reproved you, for not caring about that for which they ought to care, and thinking that they are something when they are really nothing. And if
42 you do this, I and my sons will have received justice at your hands.

The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.

CRITO.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Crito seems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one light only, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and trusting in the will of heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who having been unjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in obedience to the laws of the state.

The days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship has been seen off Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend and contemporary Crito, who visits him before the dawn has broken; he himself has been warned in a dream that on the third day he must depart. Time is precious, and Crito has come early in order to gain his consent to a plan of escape. This can be easily accomplished by his friends, who will incur no danger in making the attempt to save him, but will be disgraced for ever if they allow him to perish. He should think of his duty to his children, and not play into the hands of his enemies. Money is already provided by Crito as well as by Simmias and others, and he will have no difficulty in finding friends in Thessaly and other places.

Socrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the opinions of the many: whereas, all his life long he has followed the dictates of reason only and the opinion of the one wise or skilled man. There was a time when Crito himself had allowed the propriety of this. And although some one will say 'the many can kill us,' that makes no difference; but a good life, in other words, a just and honourable life, is alone to be valued. All considerations of loss of reputation or injury to his children should be dismissed: the only question is whether he would be right in attempting to escape. Crito, who is a disinterested person not having the fear of death before his eyes, shall answer this for him. Before he was condemned they had often held discussions,

in which they agreed that no man should either do evil, or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are these principles to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are altered? Crito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape consistent with the maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or unwilling to reply.

Socrates proceeds:—Suppose the Laws of Athens to come and remonstrate with him: they will ask ‘Why does he seek to overturn them?’ and if he replies, ‘they have injured him,’ will not the laws answer, ‘Yes, but was that the agreement? Has he any objection to make to them which would justify him in overturning them? Was he not brought into the world and educated by their help, and are they not his parents? He might have left Athens and gone where he pleased, but he has lived there for seventy years more constantly than any other citizen.’ Thus he has clearly shown that he acknowledged the agreement, which he cannot now break without dishonour to himself and danger to his friends. Even in the course of the trial he might have proposed exile as the penalty, but then he declared that he preferred death to exile. And whither will he direct his footsteps? In any well-ordered state the laws will consider him as an enemy. Possibly in a land of misrule like Thessaly he may be welcomed at first, and the unseemly narrative of his escape regarded by the inhabitants as an amusing tale. But if he offends them he will have to learn another sort of lesson. Will he continue to give lectures in virtue? That would hardly be decent. And how will his children be the gainers if he takes them into Thessaly, and deprives them of Athenian citizenship? Or if he leaves them behind, does he expect that they will be better taken care of by his friends because he is in Thessaly? Will not true friends care for them equally whether he is alive or dead?

Finally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life and children afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and returns evil for evil, they will be angry with him while he lives; and their brethren the Laws of the world below will receive him as an enemy. Such is the mystic voice which is always murmuring in his ears.

That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against

him during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils, were still recent in the memory of the now restored democracy. The fact that he had been neutral in the death-struggle of Athens was not likely to conciliate popular good-will. Plato, writing probably in the next generation, undertakes the defence of his friend and master in this particular, not to the Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at large.

Whether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of Crito and the proposal of escape is uncertain: Plato could easily have invented far more than that (Phaedr. 275 B); and in the selection of Crito, the aged friend, as the fittest person to make the proposal to Socrates, we seem to recognize the hand of the artist. Whether any one who has been subjected by the laws of his country to an unjust judgment is right in attempting to escape, is a thesis about which casuists might disagree. Shelley (Prose Works, p. 78) is of opinion that Socrates 'did well to die,' but not for the 'sophistical' reasons which Plato has put into his mouth. And there would be no difficulty in arguing that Socrates should have lived and preferred to a glorious death the good which he might still be able to perform. 'A rhetorician would have had much to say about that' (50 C). It may be observed however that Plato never intended to answer the question of casuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to do the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show his master maintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not 'the world,' but the 'one wise man,' is still the paradox of Socrates in his last hours. He must be guided by reason, although her conclusions may be fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the wicked can do neither good nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he means, of moral evil; in his own words, 'they cannot make a man wise or foolish.'

This little dialogue is a perfect piece of dialectic, in which granting the 'common principle' (49 D), there is no escaping from the conclusion. The personification of the Laws, and of their brethren the Laws in the world below, is one of the noblest and boldest figures of speech which occur in Plato.

C R I T O.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

CRITO.

SCENE:—The Prison of Socrates.

Steph. *Socrates.* WHY have you come at this hour, Crito? it must
43 bc quite early?

Crito. Yes, certainly.

Soc. What is the exact time?

Cr. The dawn is breaking.

Soc. I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.

Cr. He knows me, because I often come, Socrates; moreover,
I have done him a kindness.

Soc. And are you only just arrived?

Cr. No, I came some time ago.

Soc. Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at once
awakening me?

Cr. By the Gods, Socrates, I would rather not myself have all
this sleeplessness and sorrow. And I have been wondering at
your peaceful slumbers, which was the reason why I did not
awaken you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have
always thought you of a happy disposition; but never did I see
anything like the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear this
calamity.

Soc. Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought
not to be repining at the prospect of death.

Cr. And yet other old men find themselves in similar mis-
fortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining.

Soc. That may be. But you have not told me why you come at this early hour.

Cr. I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not, as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest of all to me.

Soc. What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival of which I am to die?

Cr. No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day of your life.

Soc. Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.

Cr. Why do you think so?

Soc. I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship. 44

Cr. Yes; that is what the authorities say.

Soc. But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow; this I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.

Cr. And what was the nature of the vision?

Soc. There came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed in white raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates,

‘The third day hence to Phthia shalt thou go.’¹

Cr. What a singular dream, Socrates!

Soc. There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.

Cr. Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, Oh! my beloved Socrates, let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape. For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this—that I should be thought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.

Soc. But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion

¹ Homer, *Il.* ix. 363.

of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they occurred.

Cr. But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be regarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatest evil to any one who has lost their good opinion.

Soc. I only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also do the greatest good, and that would be well. But in reality they can do neither; for they cannot either make a man wise or make him foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.

Cr. Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me, Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other friends: are you not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either the whole or a great part of
45 our property; or that even a worse evil may happen to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at ease; for in order to save you, we ought surely to run this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.

Soc. Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means the only one.

Cr. Fear not. There are persons who at no great cost are willing to save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, they are far from being exorbitant in their demands; you may observe that a little money will satisfy them. My means, which are certainly ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple about spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a sum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are willing to spend their money too. I say therefore, do not on that account hesitate about making your escape, and do not say, as you did in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself if you escape. For men will love you in other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are justified, Socrates, in betraying your

own life when you might be saved ; this is playing into the hands of your enemies and destroyers ; and further I should say that you were deserting your own children ; for you might bring them up and educate them ; instead of which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their chance ; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will be small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and education. But you appear to be choosing the easier part, not the better and manlier, which would rather have become one who professes to care for virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that this affair of yours will be attributed entirely to our want of courage. The trial need never have come on, or might have been managed differently ; and this last act, or crowning folly, will seem to have occurred through our negligence and cowardice, who might have saved you, if we had 46 been good for anything, as you might have saved yourself, for there was no difficulty at all. See now, Socrates, how sad and dishonourable are the consequences, both to us and you. Make up your mind then, or rather have your mind already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one thing to be done, which must be done this very night, and if we delay at all will be no longer practicable or possible ; I beseech you therefore, Socrates, be persuaded by me, and do as I say.

Soc. Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one ; but if wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger ; and therefore we ought to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best ; and now that this fortune has come upon me, I cannot put away the conclusion at which I had arrived : the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am certain not to agree with you ; no, not even if the power of the multitude could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin terrors. But what will be the fairest way of considering the question ? Shall I return to your

old argument about the opinions of men? some of which are to be regarded, and others, as we were saying, are not to be regarded. Now were we right in maintaining this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking;—in fact an amusement only, and altogether vanity? That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito:—whether, under my present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as I believe, is maintained by many who assume to be authorities, was to the effect, as I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are a disinterested person who are not
 47 going to die to-morrow—at least, there is no human probability of this, and you are therefore not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?

Cr. Certainly.

Soc. The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the unwise are evil?

Cr. Certainly.

Soc. And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only—his physician or trainer, whoever that was?

Cr. Of one man only.

Soc. And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the praise of that one only, and not of the many?

Cr. That is clear.

Soc. And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the way which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather than according to the opinion of all other men put together?

Cr. True.

Soc. And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no understanding, will he not suffer evil?

Cr. Certainly he will.

Soc. And what will the evil be, whither tending and what affecting, in the disobedient person?

Cr. Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil.

Soc. Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust, fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding? ought we not to fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the world: and if we desert him shall we not destroy and injure that principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice;—there is such a principle?

Cr. Certainly there is, Socrates.

Soc. Take a parallel instance:—if, acting under the advice of men who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And that which has been destroyed is—the body?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior 48 to the body?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. More honoured, then?

Cr. Far more honoured.

Soc. Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in error when you advise that we should regard

the opinion of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.—‘Well,’ some one will say, ‘but the many can kill us.’

Cr. Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.

Soc. That is true: but still I find with surprise that the old argument is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition—that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?

Cr. Yes, that also remains.

Soc. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honourable one—that holds also?

Cr. Yes, that holds.

Soc. From these premisses I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of educating one’s children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death—and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation.

Cr. I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?

Soc. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by you, but not against my own better judgment.

49 And now please to consider my first position, and try how you can best answer me.

Cr. I will.

Soc. Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do

wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonourable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? Are all our former admissions which were made within a few days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age, been earnestly discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover that we are no better than children? Or, in spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences whether better or worse, shall we insist on the truth of what was then said, that injustice is always an evil and dishonour to him who acts unjustly? Shall we say so or not?

Cr. Yes.

Soc. Then we must do no wrong?

Cr. Certainly not.

Soc. Nor when injured injure in return, as the many imagine; for we must injure no one at all?

Cr. Clearly not.

Soc. Again, Crito, may we do evil?

Cr. Surely not, Socrates.

Soc. And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality of the many—is that just or not?

Cr. Not just.

Soc. For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?

Cr. Very true.

Soc. Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying. For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by any considerable number of persons; and those who are agreed and those who are not agreed upon this point have no common ground, and can only despise one another when they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether you agree with and assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiss of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For thus I have ever thought, and still think; but, if you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as formerly, I will proceed to the next step.

Cr. You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind.

Soc. Then I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the form of a question:—Ought a man to do what he admits to be right, or ought he to betray the right?

Cr. He ought to do what he thinks right.

Soc. But if this is true, what is the application? In leaving
50 the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just—what do you say?

Cr. I cannot tell, Socrates; for I do not know.

Soc. Then consider the matter in this way:—Imagine that I am about to play truant (you may call the proceeding by any name which you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate me: ‘Tell us, Socrates,’ they say; ‘what are you about? are you going by an act of yours to overturn us—the laws, and the whole state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?’ What will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? Any one, and especially a rhetorician, will have a good deal to say on behalf of the law which requires a sentence to be carried out;—he will argue that this law should not be set aside; and we might reply, ‘Yes; but the state has injured us and given an unjust sentence.’ Suppose I say that?

Cr. Very good, Socrates.

Soc. ‘And was that our agreement with you?’ the law would reply; ‘or were you to abide by the sentence of the state?’ And if I were to express my astonishment at their words, the law would probably add: ‘Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to urge against those of us who regulate marriage?’ None, I should reply. ‘Or against those of us who after birth regulate the nurture and education of children,

in which you also were trained? Were not the laws, which have the charge of education, right in commanding your father to train you in music and gymnastic?' Right, I should reply. 'Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us, can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is true you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to your father or your master, if you had one, because you have been struck or reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?—you would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your country as far as in you lies? Will you, O professor of true virtue, pretend that you are justified in this? Has a philosopher like you failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher and holier far than mother or father or any ancestor, and more to be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding? also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when angry, even more than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? And when we are punished by her, whether with imprisonment or stripes, the punishment is to be endured in silence; and if she lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right; neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, but whether in battle or in a court of law, or in any other place, he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or mother, much less may he do violence to his country.' What answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do they not?

Cr. I think that they do.

Soc. Then the laws will say: 'Consider, Socrates, if we are speaking truly that in your present attempt you are going to do us an injury. For, after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good which we had to give, we further proclaim to every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has come of age and has seen the ways of the city, and made

our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him ; and none of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who does not like us and the city, and who wants to emigrate to a colony or to any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him. But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong ; first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents ; secondly, because we are the authors of his education ; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands ; and he
 52 neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are unjust ; and we do not rudely impose them, but give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us ;—that is what we offer, and he does neither. These are the sort of accusations to which, as we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish your intentions ; you, above all other Athenians.’ Suppose I ask, why is this ? they will justly retort upon me that I above all other men have acknowledged the agreement. ‘There is clear proof,’ they will say, ‘Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games, except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place unless when you were on military service ; nor did you travel as other men do. Nor had you any curiosity to know other states or their laws : your affections did not go beyond us and our state ; we were your special favourites, and you acquiesced in our government of you ; and here in this city you begat your children, which is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the trial—the state which refuses to let you go now would have let you go then. But you pretended that you preferred death to exile, and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us the laws, of whom you are the destroyer ; and are doing what only a miserable slave would do, running away and turning your

back upon the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen. And first of all answer this very question : Are we right in saying that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in word only? Is that true or not?' How shall we answer, Crito? Must we not assent?

Cr. There is no help, Socrates.

Soc. Then will they not say : 'You, Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind, or if our covenants appeared to you to be unfair. You had your choice, and might have gone either to Lacedaemon or Crete, which you often praise for their good government, or to some other Hellenic or foreign state. Whereas you, ⁵³ above all other Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words, of us her laws (for who would like a state that has no laws), that you never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the maimed were not more stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and forsake your agreements. Not so, Socrates, if you will take our advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the city.

'For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way, what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? That your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship, or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if you fly to one of the neighbouring cities, as, for example, Thebes or Megara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you, and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye upon you as a subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who is a corruptor of the laws is more than likely to be a corruptor of the young and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth having on these terms? Or will you go to them without shame, and talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? What you say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being the best

things among men? Would that be decent of you? Surely not. But if you go away from well-governed states to Crito's friends in Thessaly, where there is great disorder and licence, they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison, set off with ludicrous particulars of the manner in which you were wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed as the fashion of runaways is—that is very likely; but will there be no one to remind you that in your old age you were not ashamed to violate the most sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little more life? Perhaps not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of temper you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and doing what?—eating and drinking in Thessaly, having gone abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And where will be your fine senti-
54 ments about justice and virtue then? Say that you wish to live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and educate them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive them of Athenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would confer upon them? Or are you under the impression that they will be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive, although absent from them; for that your friends will take care of them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the other world that they will not take care of them? Nay; but if they who call themselves friends are good for anything, they surely will.

‘Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws but of men. But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with you while you live, and our

brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.'

This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Leave me then to follow whithersoever God leads.

PHAEDO.

INTRODUCTION.

AFTER an interval of some months or years, and at Phlius, a town of Peloponnesus, the tale of the last hours of Socrates is narrated to Echeocrates and other Phliasians by Phaedo the 'beloved disciple.' The Dialogue necessarily takes the form of a narrative, because Socrates has to be described acting as well as speaking. The minutest particulars of the event are interesting to distant friends, and the narrator has an equal interest in them.

During the voyage of the sacred ship to and from Delos, which has occupied thirty days, the execution of Socrates has been deferred. (Cp. Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2.) The time has been passed by him in conversation with a select company of disciples. But now the holy season is over, and the disciples meet earlier than usual in order that they may converse with Socrates for the last time. Those who were present, and those who might have been expected to be present, are specially mentioned. There are Simmias and Cebes (Crito, 45 B), two disciples of Philolaus whom Socrates 'by his enchantments has attracted from Thebes' (Mem. iii. 11. 17), Crito the aged friend, the attendant of the prison, who is as good as a friend—these take part in the conversation. There are present also, Hermogenes, from whom Xenophon derived his information about the trial of Socrates (Mem. iv. 8. 4), the 'madman' Apollodorus (Symp. 173 D), Euclid and Terpsion from Megara (cp. Theaet. sub init.), Ctesippus, Antisthenes, Menexenus, and some other less-known members of the Socratic circle, all of whom are silent auditors. Aristippus and Plato are noted as absent. Soon the wife and children of Socrates are sent away, under the direction of Crito; he himself has just been released from chains, and is led by this circumstance to make the natural remark that 'pleasure follows

pain.' (Observe that Plato is preparing the way for his doctrine of the alternation of opposites.) 'Aesop would have represented them in a fable as a two-headed creature of the gods.' The mention of Aesop reminds Cebes of a question which had been asked by Evenus the poet (cp. *Apol.* 20 A): 'Why Socrates, who was not a poet, while in prison had been putting Aesop into verse?'—'Because several times in his life he had been warned in dreams that he should practise music; and as he was about to die and was not certain of what was meant, he wished to fulfil the admonition in the letter as well as in the spirit, by writing verses as well as by cultivating philosophy. Tell Evenus this and bid him follow me in death.' 'He is not the sort of man to do that, Socrates.' 'Why, is he not a philosopher?' 'Yes.' 'Then he will be willing to die, although he will not take his own life, for that is held not to be right.'

Cebes asks why men say that suicide is not right, if death is to be accounted a good? Well, (1) according to one explanation, because man is a prisoner, and is not allowed to open the door of his prison and run away—this is the truth in a 'mystery.' Or rather, perhaps, (2) because he is not his own property, but a possession of the gods, and has no right to make away with that which does not belong to him. But why, asks Cebes, if he is a possession of the gods, should he wish to die and leave them? for he is under their protection; and surely he cannot take better care of himself than they take of him. Simmias explains that Cebes is really referring to Socrates, whom they think too unmoved at the prospect of leaving the gods and his friends. Socrates answers that he is going to other gods who are wise and good, and perhaps to better friends; and he professes that he is ready to defend himself against the charge of Cebes. They shall be his judges, and he hopes that he will be more successful in convincing them than he had been in convincing the court.

The philosopher desires death—which the wicked world will insinuate that he also deserves: and perhaps he does, but not in any sense which they are capable of understanding. Enough of them: the real question is, What is the nature of that death which he desires? Death is the separation of soul and body—and the philosopher desires such a separation. He would like to be freed from the dominion of bodily pleasures and of the senses, which are always perturbing his mental vision. He wants to get rid of eyes and ears, and with the light of the mind only

to behold the light of truth. All the evils and impurities and necessities of men come from the body. And death separates him from these evils, which in this life he cannot wholly cast aside. Why then should he repine when the hour of separation arrives? Why, if he is dead while he lives, should he fear that other death, through which alone he can behold wisdom in her purity?

Besides, the philosopher has notions of good and evil unlike those of other men. For they are courageous because they are afraid of greater dangers, and temperate because they desire greater pleasures. But he disdains this balancing of pleasures and pains, which is the exchange of commerce and not of virtue. All the virtues, including wisdom, are regarded by him only as purifications of the soul. And this was the meaning of the founders of the mysteries when they said, 'Many are the wand-bearers but few are the mystics.' (Cp. Matt. xxii. 14 : 'Many are called, but few are chosen.') And in the hope that he is one of these mystics, Socrates is now departing. This is his answer to those who charge him with indifference at the prospect of leaving the gods and his friends.

Still, a fear is expressed that the soul upon leaving the body may vanish away like smoke or air. Socrates in answer appeals first of all to the old Orphic tradition that the souls of the dead are in the world below, and that the living come from them. This he attempts to found on a philosophical assumption that all opposites—e. g. less, greater; weaker, stronger; sleeping, waking; life, death—are generated out of each other. Nor can the process of generation be only a passage from living to dying, for then all would end in death. The perpetual sleeper (Endymion) would be no longer distinguished, for all the world would sink in rest. The circle of nature is not complete unless the living come from the dead as well as pass to them.

The Platonic doctrine of reminiscence is then adduced as a confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. Some proofs of this doctrine are demanded. One proof given is the same as that of the Meno (82 foll.), and is derived from the latent knowledge of mathematics, which may be elicited from an unlearned person when a diagram is presented to him. Again, there is a power of association, which from seeing Simmias may remember Cebes, or from seeing a picture of Simmias may remember Simmias. The lyre may recall the player of the lyre, and equal pieces of wood or stone may be associated with the

higher notion of absolute equality. But here observe that material equalities fall short of the conception of absolute equality with which they are compared, and which is the measure of them. And the measure or standard must be prior to that which is measured, the idea of equality prior to the visible equals. And if prior to them, then prior also to the perceptions of the senses which recall them, and therefore either given before birth or at birth. But all men have not this knowledge, nor have any without a process of reminiscence; which is a proof that it is not innate or given at birth, unless indeed it was given and taken away at the same instant. But if not given to men in birth, it must have been given before birth—this is the only alternative which remains. And if we had ideas in a former state, then our souls must have existed and must have had intelligence in a former state. The pre-existence of the soul stands or falls with the doctrine of ideas.

It is objected by Simmias and Cebes that these arguments only prove a former and not a future existence. Socrates answers this objection by recalling the previous argument, in which he had shown that the living had come from the dead. But the fear that the soul at departing may vanish into air (especially if there is a wind blowing at the time) has not yet been charmed away. He proceeds: When we fear that the soul will vanish away, let us ask ourselves what is that which we suppose to be liable to dissolution? Is it the simple or the compound, the unchanging or the changing, the invisible idea or the visible object of sense? Clearly the latter and not the former; and therefore not the soul, which in her own pure thought is unchangeable, and only when using the senses descends into the region of change. Again, the soul commands, the body serves: in this respect too the soul is akin to the divine, and the body to the mortal. And in every point of view the soul is the image of divinity and immortality, and the body of the human and mortal. And whereas the body is liable to speedy dissolution, the soul is almost if not quite indissoluble. (Cp. *Tim.* 41 A.) Yet even the body may be preserved for ages by the embalmer's art; how much more the soul returning into herself on her way to the good and wise God! She has been practising death all her life long, and is now finally released from the errors and follies and passions of men, and for ever dwells in the company of the gods.

But the soul which is polluted and engrossed by the corporeal, and has no eye except that of the senses, and is weighed down by the bodily

appetites, cannot attain to this abstraction. In her fear of the world below she lingers about her sepulchre, a ghostly apparition, saturated with sense, and therefore visible. At length entering into the body of some animal of a nature congenial to her former life of sensuality or violence, she takes the form of an ass, a wolf or a kite. And of these earthly souls the happiest are those who have practised virtue without philosophy; they are allowed to pass into gentle and social natures, such as bees and ants. (Cp. Rep. 619 C, Meno 100 A.) But only the philosopher who departs pure is permitted to enter the company of the gods. (Cp. Phaedrus, 249.) This is the reason why he abstains from fleshly lusts, and not from the fear of loss or disgrace, which are the motives of other men. He too has been a captive, and the willing agent of his own captivity. But philosophy has spoken to him, and he has heard her voice; she has gently entreated him, and brought him out of the 'miry clay,' and purged away the mists of passion and the illusions of sense which envelope him; his soul has escaped from the influence of pleasures and pains, which are like nails fastening her to the body. To that prison-house she will not return; and therefore she abstains from bodily pleasures—not from a desire of having more or greater ones, but because she knows that only when calm and free from the dominion of the body can she behold the light of truth.

Simmias and Cebes remain in doubt; but they are unwilling to raise objections at such a time. Socrates wonders at their reluctance. Let them regard him rather as the swan, who, having sung the praises of Apollo all his life long, sings at his death more lustily than ever. (Cp. 60 D.) Simmias acknowledges that there is cowardice in not probing truth to the bottom. 'And if truth divine and inspired is not to be had, then let a man take the best of human notions, and upon this frail bark let him sail through life.' He proceeds to state his difficulty: It has been argued that the soul is invisible and incorporeal, and therefore immortal, and prior to the body. But is not the soul acknowledged to be a harmony, and has she not the same relation to the body, as the harmony—which like her is invisible—has to the lyre? And yet the harmony does not survive the lyre. Cebes has also an objection, which like Simmias he expresses in a figure. He is willing to admit that the soul is more lasting than the body. But the more lasting nature of the soul does not prove her immortality; for after having worn out many bodies in a single life, and many more in successive

births and deaths, she may at last perish, or, as Socrates afterwards restates the objection, the very act of birth may be the beginning of her death, and her last body may survive her, just as the coat of an old weaver is left behind him after he is dead, although a man is more lasting than his coat. And he who would prove the immortality of the soul, must prove not only that the soul outlives one or many bodies, but that she outlives them all.

The audience, like the chorus in a play, for a moment interpret the feelings of the actors; there is a temporary depression, and then the enquiry is resumed. It is a melancholy reflection that arguments, like men, are apt to be deceivers; and those who have been often deceived become distrustful both of arguments and of friends. But this unfortunate experience should not make us either haters of men or haters of arguments. The want of health and truth is not in the argument, but in ourselves. Socrates, who is about to die, is sensible of his own weakness; he desires to be impartial, but he cannot help feeling that he has too great an interest in the truth of the argument. And therefore he would have his friends examine and refute him, if they think that he is in error.

At his request Simmias and Cebes repeat their objections. They do not go to the length of denying the pre-existence of ideas. Simmias is of opinion that the soul is a harmony of the body. But the admission of the pre-existence of ideas, and therefore of the soul, is at variance with this. (Cp. a parallel difficulty in *Theæt.* 203, 204.) For a harmony is an effect, whereas the soul is not an effect, but a cause; a harmony follows, but the soul leads; a harmony admits of degrees, and the soul has no degrees. Again, upon the supposition that the soul is a harmony, why is one soul better than another? Are they more or less harmonized, or is there one harmony within another? But the soul does not admit of degrees, and cannot therefore be more or less harmonized. Further, the soul is often engaged in resisting the affections of the body, as Homer describes Odysseus 'rebuking his heart.' Could he have written this under the idea that the soul is a harmony of the body? Nay rather, are we not contradicting Homer and ourselves in affirming anything of the sort?

The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of Simmias, has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given to the Theban Cadmus. Socrates recapitulates the argument of

Cebes, which, as he remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or causation; about this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience. When he was young he had puzzled himself with physics: he had enquired into the growth and decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until at last he began to doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the result of eating and drinking, and then he arrived at the conclusion that he was not meant for such enquiries. Nor was he less perplexed with notions of comparison and number. At first he had imagined himself to understand differences of greater and less, and to know that ten is two more than eight, and the like. But now those very notions appeared to him to contain a contradiction. For how can one be divided into two? or two be compounded into one? These are difficulties which Socrates cannot answer. Of generation and destruction he knows nothing. But he has a confused notion of another method in which matters of this sort are to be investigated. (Cp. Rep. iv. 435 D; vii. 533 A; Char. 170 foll.)

Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind is the cause of all things. And he said to himself: If mind is the cause of all things, mind must dispose them all for the best. The new teacher will show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature. How great had been his hopes and how great his disappointment! For he found that his new friend was anything but consistent in his use of mind as a cause, and that he soon introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric notions. (Cp. Arist. Metaph. i. 4, 5.) It was as if a person had said that Socrates is sitting here because he is made up of bones and muscles, instead of telling the true reason—that he is here because the Athenians have thought good to sentence him to death, and he has thought good to await his sentence. Had his bones and muscles been left by him to their own ideas of right, they would long ago have taken themselves off. But surely there is a great confusion of the cause and condition in all this. And this confusion also leads people into all sorts of erroneous theories about the position and motions of the earth. None of them know how much stronger than any Atlas is the power of the best. But this 'best' is still undiscovered; and in enquiring after the cause, we can only hope to attain the second best.

Now there is a danger in the contemplation of the nature of things, as there is a danger in looking at the sun during an eclipse, unless the precaution is taken of looking only at the image reflected in the water,

or in a glass. (Cp. *Laws*, 897 D; *Rep.* 516 foll.) 'I was afraid,' says Socrates, 'that I might injure the eye of the soul. I thought that I had better return to the old and safe method of ideas. Though I do not mean to say that he who contemplates existence through the medium of ideas sees only through a glass darkly, any more than he who contemplates actual effects.'

If the existence of ideas is granted to him, Socrates is of opinion that he will then have no difficulty in proving the immortality of the soul. He will only ask for a further admission:—that beauty is the cause of the beautiful, greatness the cause of the great, smallness of the small, and so on of other things. This is a safe and simple answer, which escapes the contradictions of greater and less (greater by reason of that which is smaller!), of addition and subtraction, and the other difficulties of relation. These subtleties he is for leaving to wiser heads than his own; he prefers to test ideas by the consistency of their consequences, and, if asked to give an account of them, goes back to some higher idea or hypothesis which appears to him to be the best, until at last he arrives at a resting-place. (*Rep.* vi. 510 foll.; *Phil.* 16 foll.)

The doctrine of ideas, which has long ago received the assent of the Socratic circle, is now affirmed by the Phliasian auditor to command the assent of any man of sense. The narrative is continued; Socrates is desirous of explaining how opposite ideas may appear to co-exist but do not really co-exist in the same thing or person. For example, Simmias may be said to have greatness and also smallness, because he is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo. And yet Simmias is not really great and also small, but only when compared to Phaedo and Socrates. I use the illustration, says Socrates, because I want to show you not only that ideal opposites exclude one another, but also the opposites in us. I, for example, having the attribute of smallness remain small, and cannot become great: the smallness which is in me drives out greatness.

One of the company here remarked that this was inconsistent with the old assertion that opposites generated opposites. But that, replies Socrates, was affirmed, not of opposite ideas either in us or in nature, but of opposition in the concrete—not of life and death, but of individuals living and dying. When this objection has been removed, Socrates proceeds: This doctrine of the mutual exclusion of opposites is not only true of the opposites themselves, but of things which are inseparable from them. For example, cold and heat are opposed; and fire, which is inseparable

from heat, cannot co-exist with cold, or snow, which is inseparable from cold, with heat. Again, the number three excludes the number four, because three is an odd number and four is an even number, and the odd is opposed to the even. Thus we are able to proceed a step beyond 'the safe and simple answer.' We may say, not only that the odd excludes the even, but that the number three, which participates in oddness, excludes the even. And in like manner, not only does life exclude death, but the soul, of which life is the inseparable attribute, also excludes death. And that of which life is the inseparable attribute is by the force of the terms imperishable. If the odd principle were imperishable, then the number three would not perish, but remove on the approach of the even principle. But the immortal is imperishable; and therefore the soul on the approach of death does not perish but removes.

Thus all objections appear to be finally silenced. And now the application has to be made: If the soul is immortal, 'what manner of persons ought we to be?' having regard not only to time but to eternity. For death is not the end of all, and the wicked is not released from his evil by death; but every one carries with him into the world below that which he is and that which he becomes, and that only.

For after death the soul is carried away to judgment, and when she has received her punishment returns to earth in the course of ages. The wise soul is conscious of her situation, and follows the attendant angel who guides her through the windings of the world below; but the impure soul wanders hither and thither without a guide, and is carried at last to her own place, as the pure soul is also carried away to hers. 'In order that you may understand this, I must first describe to you the nature and conformation of the earth.'

Now the whole earth is a globe placed in the centre of the heavens, and is maintained there by the perfection of balance. That which we call the earth is only a small hollow, of which there are many; but the true earth is above, and is a finer and subtler element, and is full of precious stones and bright colours, of which the stones and colours in our earth are but fragments and reflexions, and the earth itself is corroded and crusted over just as the shore is by the sea. And if, like birds, we could fly to the surface of the air, in the same manner that fishes come to the top of the sea, then we should behold the true earth and the true heaven and the true stars. This heavenly

earth is of divers colours, sparkling with jewels brighter than gold and whiter than any snow, having flowers and fruits innumerable. And the inhabitants dwell some on the shore of the sea of air, others in 'islets of the blest,' and they hold converse with the gods, and behold the sun, moon and stars as they truly are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.

But the interior of the earth has other and deeper hollows, and one huge chasm or opening called Tartarus, into which streams of fire and water and liquid mud are ever flowing; of these small portions find their way to the surface and form seas and rivers and volcanoes. There is a perpetual inhalation and exhalation of the air rising and falling as the waters pass into the depths of the earth and return again, in their course forming lakes and rivers, but never descending below the centre of the earth; for a precipice stops the rivers on both sides. These rivers are many and mighty, and there are four principal ones, Oceanus, Acheron, Pyriphlegethon, and Cocytus. Oceanus is the river which encircles the earth; Acheron takes an opposite direction, and after flowing under the earth through desert places at last reaches the Acherusian lake, and this is the river at which the dead await their return to earth. Pyriphlegethon is a stream of fire, which coils round the earth and flows into the depths of Tartarus. The fourth river, Cocytus, is that which is called by the poets the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the lake Styx, receiving strange powers in the waters. This river, too, falls into Tartarus.

The dead are first of all judged according to their deeds, and those who are incurable are thrust into Tartarus, from which they never come out. Those who have only committed venial sins are first purified of them, and then rewarded for the good which they have done. Those who have committed crimes, great indeed, but not unpardonable, are thrust into Tartarus, but are cast forth at the end of the year on the shores of the rivers, and borne thence to the Acherusian lake, where they stand calling upon their victims to let them come out of the rivers into the lake. And if they prevail, then they are let out and their sufferings cease; if not, they are borne in a ceaseless whirl along the rivers of Tartarus. The pure souls also receive their reward, and have their abode in the upper earth, and a select few in still fairer 'mansions.'

Socrates is not prepared to insist on the literal accuracy of this

description, but he is confident that something of the kind is true. He who has sought after the pleasures of knowledge and rejected the pleasures of the body, has reason to be of good hope at the approach of death; whose voice is already heard calling to him, and will be heard calling by all men.

The hour has come at which he must drink the poison, and not much remains to be done. How shall they bury him? That is a question which he refuses to entertain, for they are not burying him, but his dead body. His friends had once been sureties that he would remain, and they shall now be sureties that he has run away. Yet he would not die without the customary ceremonies of washing and burial. Shall he make a libation of the poison? In the spirit he will, but not in the letter. One request he utters in the very act of death, which has been a puzzle to after ages. With a sort of irony he remembers that a trifling religious duty is still unfulfilled, just as above (60 E) he desires before he departs to compose a few verses in order to satisfy a scruple about a dream—unless, indeed, we suppose him to mean, that he was now restored to health, and made the customary offering to Asclepius in token of his recovery.

1. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has sunk deep into the heart of the human race; and men are apt to rebel against any examination of the nature of their belief. They do not like to acknowledge that this, as well as the other 'eternal ideas' of man, has a history in time, which may be traced in Greek poetry or philosophy, and also in the Hebrew Scriptures. They convert feeling into reasoning, and throw a network of dialectics over that which is really a deeply-rooted instinct. In the same temper which Socrates reproves in himself (91 B) they are disposed to think that even bad arguments will do no harm, for they will die with them, and while they live they will gain by the delusion. But there is a better and higher spirit to be gathered from the *Phaedo*, as well as from the other writings of Plato, which says that first principles should be most constantly reviewed (*Phaed.* 107 B), and that the highest subjects demand of us the greatest accuracy (*Rep.* vi. 504 E).

2. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith.

The perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the *Phaedo* of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form of the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united with the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the body as the ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means? Shall we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the *entelechy* or form of an organized living body? or with Plato, that she has a life of her own? Is the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or of the monad, the truer expression? Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the boatman to his boat? (Arist. *de Anim.* ii. 1, 11, 12.) And in another state of being is the soul to be conceived of as vanishing into infinity, hardly possessing an existence which she can call her own, as in the pantheistic system of Spinoza? or as an individual informing another body and entering into new relations, but retaining her own character? (Cp. *Gorgias*, 524 B, C.) Or is the opposition of soul and body a mere illusion, and the true self neither soul nor body, but the union of the two in the 'I' which is above them? And is death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and the falling away into nothingness of the lower? Or are we vainly attempting to pass the boundaries of human thought? The body and the soul seem to be inseparable, not only in fact, but in our conceptions of them; and any philosophy which too closely unites them, or too widely separates them, either in this life or in another, disturbs the balance of human nature. No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or been entirely consistent with himself in describing their relation to one another. Nor can we wonder that Plato in the infancy of human thought should have confused mythology and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal arguments for real ones.

3. Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the question of Socrates, 'what is that which we suppose to be immortal?' Is it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and universal? Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union of the two? Is it the mere force of life which is determined to be, or the consciousness of self which cannot be got rid of, or the fire of genius which refuses to be extinguished? Or is there a hidden being which is allied to the Author of all existence, who is because he is perfect, and to whom our ideas of perfection give us a title to belong? What-

ever answer is given by us to these questions, there still remains the necessity of allowing the permanence of evil, if not for ever, at any rate for a time, in order that the wicked 'may not have too good a bargain.' For the annihilation of evil at death, or the eternal duration of it, seem to involve equal difficulties in the moral government of the universe. Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather than by our reason, to think of the good and wise only as existing in another life. Why should the mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, the herd of men who have never in any proper sense the use of reason, reappear with blinking eyes in the light of another world? But our second thought is that the hope of humanity is a common one, and that all or none will be partakers of immortality. Reason does not allow us to suppose that we have any greater claims than others, and experience sometimes reveals to us unexpected flashes of the higher nature in those whom we had despised. Why should the wicked suffer any more than ourselves? had we been placed in their circumstances should we have been any better than they? The worst of men are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they not be equally objects of pity to divine benevolence? Even more than the good they seem to have need of another life; not that they may be punished, but that they may be educated. These are some of the reflections which arise in our minds when we attempt to assign any form to our conceptions of a future state.

4. Again, ideas must be given through something; and we are always prone to argue about the soul from analogies of outward things which may serve to embody our thoughts, but are also partly delusive. For we cannot reason from the natural to the spiritual, or from the outward to the inward. The progress of physiological science, without bringing us nearer to the great secret, has tended to remove some erroneous notions respecting the relations of body and mind, and in this we have the advantage of the ancients. But no one imagines that any seed of immortality is to be discerned in our mortal frames. Most people have been content to rest their belief in immortality on the agreement of the more enlightened part of mankind, and on the inseparable connection of such a doctrine with the existence of a God—also in a less degree on the impossibility of doubting about the continued existence of those whom we love and reverence in this world. And after all has been said, the figure, the analogy, the argument, are felt to be only approximations

in different forms to the expression of the common sentiment of the human heart.

5. When we speak of the immortality of the soul, we must ask further what we mean by the word immortality. For of the duration of a living being in countless ages we can form no conception; far less than a three years' old child of the whole of life. The naked eye might as well try to see the furthest star in the infinity of heaven. Whether time and space really exist when we take away the limits of them may be doubted; at any rate the thought of them when unlimited is so overwhelming to us as to lose all distinctness. Philosophers have spoken of them as forms of the human mind, but what is the mind without them? As then infinite time, or an existence out of time, which are the only possible explanations of eternal duration, are equally inconceivable to us, let us substitute for them a hundred or a thousand years after death, and ask not what will be our employment in eternity, but what will happen to us in that definite portion of time; or what is now happening to those who passed out of life a hundred or a thousand years ago. Do we imagine that the wicked are suffering torments, or that the good are singing the praises of God, during a period longer than that of a whole life, or of ten lives of men? Is the suffering physical or mental? And does the worship of God consist only of praise, or of many forms of service? Who are the wicked, and who are the good, whom we venture to divide by a hard and fast line; and in which of the two classes should we place ourselves and our friends? May we not suspect that we are making differences of kind, because we are unable to imagine differences of degree?—putting the whole human race into heaven or hell for the greater convenience of logical division? Are we not at the same time describing them both in superlatives, only that we may satisfy the demands of rhetoric? What is that pain which does not become deadened after a thousand years? or what is the nature of that pleasure or happiness which never wearies by monotony? Earthly pleasures and pains are short in proportion as they are keen; of any others which are equally intense and lasting we have no experience, and can form no idea. The words or figures of speech which we use are not consistent with themselves. For are we not imagining Heaven under the similitude of a church, and Hell as a prison, or perhaps a madhouse or chamber of horrors? And yet to beings constituted as we are, the monotony of singing psalms would be as great an infliction as the pains

of hell, and might be even pleasantly interrupted by them. Where are the actions worthy of rewards greater than those which are conferred on the greatest benefactors of mankind? And where are the crimes which according to Plato's merciful reckoning, more merciful, at any rate, than the eternal damnation of so-called Christian teachers, for every ten years in this life deserve a hundred of punishment in the life to come? We should be ready to die of pity if we could see the least of the sufferings which the writers of *Infernos* and *Purgatorios* have attributed to the damned. Yet these joys and terrors seem hardly to exercise an appreciable influence over the lives of men. The wicked man when old is not, as Plato supposes (*Rep.* 530 D, E), more agitated by the terrors of another world when he is nearer to them, nor the good in an ecstasy at the joys of which he is soon to be the partaker. Age numbs the sense of both worlds; and the habit of life is strongest in death. Even the dying mother is dreaming of her lost children as they were forty or fifty years before, 'pattering over the boards,' not of reunion with them in another state of being. Most persons when the last hour comes are resigned to the order of nature and the will of God. They are not thinking of Dante's *Inferno* or *Paradiso*, or of the *Pilgrim's Progress*. Heaven and hell, are not realities to them but words or ideas; the outward symbols of some great mystery, they hardly know what. Many noble poems and pictures have been suggested by the traditional representations of them, which have been fixed in forms of art and can no longer be altered. Many sermons have been filled with descriptions of celestial or infernal mansions. But hardly even in childhood did the thought of heaven and hell supply the motives of our actions, or at any time seriously affect the substance of our belief.

6. Another life must be described, if at all, in forms of thought and not of sense. To draw pictures of heaven and hell, whether in the language of Scripture or any other, adds nothing to our real knowledge, but may perhaps disguise our ignorance. The truest conception which we can form of a future life is a state of progress or education—a progress from evil to good, from ignorance to knowledge. To this we are led by the analogy of the present life, in which we see different races and nations of men, and different men and women of the same nation, at various stages of their existence; some more and some less developed, and all of them capable of improvement under favourable circumstances. There are punishments too of children when they are growing up

inflicted by their parents, of elder offenders imposed by the law of the land, of all men at all times of life which are attached by the laws of nature to the performance of certain actions. All these punishments are really educational; that is to say, they are not intended to retaliate on the offender, but to teach him a lesson. Also there is an element of chance in them, which is another name for our ignorance of the laws of nature. There is evil too, the correlative of good (Cp. *Lysis*, 220 E); not always punished here, as good is not always rewarded, but capable of being indefinitely diminished, and the element of chance eliminated.

For we do not argue merely from the analogy of the present state of this world to another, but from the analogy of a probable future to which we are tending. The greatest changes of which we have had experience as yet are due to our increasing knowledge of history and of nature. They have been produced by a few minds appearing in three or four favoured nations, in a comparatively short period of time. May we be allowed to imagine the minds of men everywhere working together during many ages for the completion of our knowledge? May not the increase of knowledge transfigure the world? Again, the majority of mankind have really experienced some moral improvement; almost every one feels that he has tendencies to good, and is capable of becoming better. And these germs of good are often found to be developed by new circumstances, like stunted trees when transplanted to another soil. The differences between the savage and the civilized man, or between the civilized man in old and new countries, may be indefinitely increased. The first difference is the effect of a few thousand, the second of a few hundred years. We congratulate ourselves that slavery has become industry; that law and constitutional government have superseded despotism and violence; that an ethical religion has taken the place of Fetichism. There may yet come a time when the many may be as well off as the few; when no one will be weighed down by excessive toil; nor the necessity of providing for the body interfere with mental improvement; when the physical frame may be strengthened and developed; and the religion of all men be a reasonable service.

Nothing therefore, either in the present state of man or in the tendencies of the future, as far as we can entertain conjecture of them, would lead us to suppose that God governs us vindictively in this world, and therefore we have no reason to infer that he will govern us vindic-

tively in another. The true argument from analogy is not: 'This life is a mixed state of justice and injustice, of great waste, of sudden casualties, of disproportionate punishments, and therefore the like inconsistencies, irregularities, injustices, are to be expected in another;' but 'this life is subject to law, and is in a state of progress, and therefore law and progress may be believed to be the governing principles of another.' All the analogies of this world would be against unmeaning punishments inflicted a hundred or a thousand years after an offence had been committed. Suffering there might be as a part of education, but not hopeless or protracted; as there might be a retrogression of individuals or of bodies of men, yet not such as to interfere with a plan for the improvement of the whole. (Cp. *Laws*, x. 903.)

7. But some one will say: That we cannot reason from the seen to the unseen, and that we are creating another world after the image of this, just as men in former ages have created gods in their own likeness. And we, like the companions of Socrates, may feel discouraged at hearing our favourite 'argument from analogy' thus summarily disposed of. Like him, too, we may adduce other arguments in which he seems to have anticipated us, though he expresses them in different language. For we feel that the soul partakes of the ideal and invisible; and can never fall into the error of confusing the external circumstances of man with his higher self; or his origin with his nature; or of imagining that our moral ideas are to be attributed only to cerebral forces. The value of a human soul, like the value of a man's life to himself, is inestimable, and cannot be reckoned in earthly or material things. That alone has the consciousness of truth and justice and love, which is the consciousness of God. And the soul becoming more conscious of these, becomes more conscious of her own immortality.

8. The last ground of our belief in immortality, and the strongest, is the perfection of the divine nature. The mere fact of the existence of God does not tend to show the continued existence of man. An evil God or an indifferent God might have had the power, but not the will, to preserve us. He might have regarded us as fitted to minister to his service by a succession of existences,—like the animals, without attributing to each soul an incomparable value. But if he is perfect, he must will that all other beings should partake of that perfection which he himself is. In the words of the *Timæus*, he is good, and therefore he desires that all other things should be as like himself as possible.

And the manner in which he accomplishes this is by permitting evil, or rather degrees of good, which are otherwise called evil. For all progress is good relatively to the past, and yet may be comparatively evil when regarded in the light of the future. Good and evil are relative terms, and degrees of evil are merely the negative aspect of degrees of good. Of the absolute goodness of any finite nature we can form no conception; we are all of us in process of transition from one degree of good or evil to another. The difficulties which are urged about the origin or existence of evil are mere dialectical puzzles, standing in the same relation to Christian philosophy as the puzzles of the Cynics and Megarians to the philosophy of Plato. They arise out of the tendency of the human mind to regard good and evil both as relative and absolute; just as the riddles about motion are to be explained by the double conception of space or matter, which the human mind has the power of regarding either as continuous or discrete.

In speaking of divine perfection, we mean to say that God is just and true and loving, the author of order and not of disorder, of good and not of evil. Or rather, that he is justice, that he is truth, that he is love, that he is order, that he is the very progress of which we were speaking; and that wherever these qualities are present, whether in the human soul or in the order of nature, there is God. We might still see him everywhere, if we had not been mistakenly seeking for him apart from us, instead of in us; away from the laws of nature, instead of in them. And we become united to him not by mystical absorption, but by partaking, whether consciously or unconsciously, of that truth and justice and love which he himself is.

Thus the belief in the immortality of the soul rests at last on the belief in God. If there is a good and wise God, then there is a progress of mankind towards perfection; and if there is no progress of men towards perfection, then there is no good and wise God. We cannot suppose that the moral government of God of which we see the beginnings in the world and in ourselves will cease when we pass out of life.

9. These are some of the thoughts which pass through our minds when reading the *Phaedo* of Plato. They are not wholly the same as those which he has put into the mouth of the dying Socrates. The conception of laws of nature, which seems almost to overwhelm us, had to him no existence; his difficulties were in the mind itself, the

uniformity of nature. Either the Divine being must be recognized in the laws of nature, or he must be excluded from human life. But if he exists in the laws of nature, he equally exists in those more complex laws which we sometimes distinguish from them, as laws of mind; and through these we become conscious of him, and are enabled dimly to see him completing in other worlds what he has begun in this.

10. Returning now to the earlier stage of human thought which is represented by the writings of Plato, we find that many of the same questions have already arisen: there is the same tendency to materialism; the same inconsistency in the application of the idea of mind; the same doubt whether the soul is to be regarded as a cause or as an effect; the same falling back on moral convictions. In the *Phaedo* the soul is conscious of her divine nature, and the separation from the body which has been commenced in this life is perfected in another. Beginning in mystery, Socrates, in the intermediate part of the *Dialogue*, attempts to bring the doctrine of a future life into connection with his theory of knowledge. In proportion as he succeeds in this, the individual seems to disappear in a more general notion of the soul; the contemplation of ideas 'under the form of eternity' takes the place of past and future states of existence. His language may be compared to that of some modern philosophers, who speak of eternity, not in the sense of perpetual duration of time, but as an ever-present quality of the soul. Yet at the conclusion of the *Dialogue*, having 'arrived at the end of the intellectual world' (*Rep.* vii. 532 B), he replaces the veil of mythology, and describes the soul and her attendant genius in the language of the mysteries or of a disciple of Zoroaster. Nor can we fairly demand of Plato a consistency which is wanting among ourselves, who acknowledge that another world is beyond the range of human thought, and yet are always seeking to represent the mansions of heaven or hell in the colours of the painter, or in the descriptions of the poet or rhetorician.

11. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul was not new to the Greeks in the age of Socrates, but, like the unity of God, had a foundation in the popular belief. The old Homeric notion of a gibbering ghost flitting away to Hades; or of a few illustrious heroes enjoying the isles of the blest; or of an existence divided between the two; or the Hesiodic, of righteous spirits, who become guardian angels,—had given place in the mysteries and the Orphic poets to representations,

partly fanciful, of a future state of rewards and punishments. (Laws, ix. 870.) The reticence of the Greeks on public occasions and in some part of their literature respecting this 'underground' religion, is not to be taken as a measure of the diffusion of such beliefs. If Pericles in the funeral oration is silent on the consolations of immortality, the poet Pindar and the tragedians on the other hand constantly assume the continued existence of the dead in an upper or under world. Darius and Laius are still alive; Antigone will be dear to her brethren after death; the way to the palace of Cronos is found by those who 'have thrice departed from evil.' The tragedy of the Greeks is not 'rounded' by this life, but is deeply set in decrees of fate and mysterious workings of powers beneath the earth. In the caricature of Aristophanes there is also a witness to the common sentiment. The Ionian and Pythagorean philosophies arose, and some new elements were added to the popular belief. The individual must find an expression as well as the world. Either the soul was supposed to exist in the form of a magnet, or of a particle of fire, or of light, or air, or water; or of a number or of a harmony of number; or to be or have, like the stars, a principle of motion (Arist. de Anim. i. 1, 2, 3). At length Anaxagoras, hardly distinguishing between life and mind, or between mind human and divine, attained the pure abstraction; and this, like the other abstractions of Greek philosophy, sank deep into the human intelligence. The opposition of the intelligible and the sensible, and of God to the world, supplied an analogy which assisted in the separation of soul and body. If ideas were separable from phenomena, mind was also separable from matter; if the ideas were eternal, the mind that conceived them was eternal too. As the unity of God was more distinctly acknowledged the conception of the human soul became more developed. The succession, or alternation of life and death, had occurred to Heracleitus. The Eleatic Parmenides had stumbled upon the modern thesis, that 'thought and being are the same.' The eastern belief in transmigration defined the sense of individuality; and some, like Empedocles, fancied that the blood which they had shed in another state of being was crying against them, and that for thirty thousand years they were to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon the earth.' The desire of recognizing a lost mother or love or friend in the world below (Phaedo, 68) is a natural feeling which, in that age as well as in every other, has given distinctness to the hope of immortality.

Nor were ethical considerations wanting, partly derived from the necessity of punishing the greater sort of criminals, whom no avenging power of this world could reach. The voice of conscience, too, was heard reminding the good man that he was not altogether innocent. (Rep. i. 330.) To these indistinct longings and fears an expression was given in the mysteries and Orphic poets: a 'heap of books' (Rep. ii. 364 E), passing under the names of Musaeus and Orpheus in Plato's time, were filled with notions of an under world.

12. Yet probably the belief in the individuality of the soul after death had but a feeble hold on the Greek mind. Like the personality of God, the personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound up with the reality of his existence. For the distinction between the personal and impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far less marked to the Greek than to ourselves. And as Plato readily passes from the notion of the good to that of God, he also passes almost imperceptibly to himself and his reader from the future life of the individual soul to the eternal being of the absolute soul. There has been a clearer statement and a clearer denial of the belief in modern times than is found in early Greek philosophy, and hence the comparative silence on the whole subject which is often remarked in ancient writers, and particularly in Aristotle. For Plato and Aristotle are not further removed in their teaching about the immortality of the soul than they are in their theory of knowledge.

13. That in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought, Plato should have cast his belief in immortality into a logical form, is not surprising. And when we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, we cannot wonder that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies: early logic is always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of the matter. It is easy to see that the alternation of opposites is not the same as the generation of them out of each other; and that the generation of them out of each other, which is the first argument in the *Phaedo*, is at variance with their mutual exclusion of each other, whether in themselves or in us, which is the last. For even if we admit the distinction which he draws at p. 103, between the opposites and the things which have the opposites, still individuals fall under the latter class; and we have to pass out of the region of human hopes and fears to a conception of an abstract soul which is the impersonation of the ideas. Such a conception, which

in Plato himself is but half expressed, is unmeaning to us, and relative only to a particular stage in the history of thought. The doctrine of reminiscence is also a fragment of a former world, which has no place in the philosophy of modern times. But Plato had the wonders of psychology just opening to him, and he had not the explanation of them which is supplied by the analysis of language and the history of the human mind. The question, 'Whence come our abstract ideas?' he could only answer by an imaginary hypothesis. Nor is it difficult to see that his crowning argument is purely verbal, and is but the expression of an instinctive confidence put into a logical form:—'The soul is immortal because it contains a principle of imperishableness.' Nor does he himself seem at all to be aware that nothing is added to human knowledge by his 'safe and simple answer,' that beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that he is merely reasserting the Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean numbers,' against the Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation. The answer to the 'very serious question' of generation and destruction is really the denial of them. For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a system of ideas, tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, and not explained by actual causes, but by a higher, that is, more general notion—consistency with themselves is all that is required of them. (Rep. vi. 510 foll., and Phaedo, 101 foll.)

14. To deal fairly with such arguments, they should be translated as far as possible into their modern equivalents. 'If the ideas of men are eternal, their souls are eternal, and if not the ideas, then not the souls.' Such an argument stands nearly in the same relation to Plato and his age, as the argument from the existence of God to immortality among ourselves. 'If God exists, then the soul exists after death; and if there is no God, there is no existence of the soul after death.' For the ideas are to his mind the reality, the truth, the principle of permanence, as well as of intelligence and order in the world. When Simmias and Cebes say that they are more strongly persuaded of the existence of ideas than they are of the immortality of the soul, they represent fairly enough the order of thought in Greek philosophy. And we might say in the same way that we are more certain of the existence of God than we are of the immortality of the soul, and are led by the belief in the one to a belief in the other. The parallel, as Socrates would say, is not perfect, but agrees in as far as the

mind in either case is regarded, as dependent on something above and beyond herself. The analogy may even be pressed a step further: 'We are more certain of our ideas of truth and right than we are of the existence of God, and are led on in the order of thought from one to the other.' Or more correctly: 'The existence of right and truth is the existence of God, and can never for a moment be separated from Him.'

15. The main argument of the *Phaedo* is derived from the existence of eternal ideas of which the soul is a partaker; the other argument of the alternation of opposites is replaced by this. And there have not been wanting philosophers of the idealist school who have imagined that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a theory of knowledge, and that in what has preceded Plato is accommodating himself to the popular belief. Such a view can only be elicited from the *Phaedo* by what may be termed the transcendental method of interpretation, and is obviously inconsistent with the *Gorgias* and the *Republic*. Those who maintain it are immediately compelled to renounce the shadow which they have grasped, as a play of words only. But the truth is, that Plato in his argument for the immortality of the soul has collected many elements of proof or persuasion, ethical and mythological as well as dialectical, which are not easily to be reconciled with one another; and he is as much in earnest about his doctrine of retribution, which is repeated in all his more ethical writings, as about his theory of knowledge. And while we may fairly translate the dialectical into the language of Hegel, and the religious and mythological into the language of Dante or Bunyan, the ethical speaks to us still in the same voice, and appeals to a common feeling.

16. Two arguments of this ethical character occur in the *Phaedo*. The first may be described as the aspiration of the soul after another state of being. Like the Oriental or Christian mystic, the philosopher is seeking to withdraw from impurities of sense, to leave the world and the things of the world, and to find his higher self. Plato recognizes in these aspirations the foretaste of immortality; as Butler and Addison in modern times have argued, the one from the moral tendencies of mankind, the other from the progress of the soul towards perfection. In using this argument Plato has certainly confused the soul which has left the body, with the soul of the good and wise. (Cp. *Rep.* x. 611 C.) Such a confusion was natural, and arose partly out of the antithesis of

soul and body. The soul in her own essence, and the soul 'clothed upon' with virtues and graces, were easily interchanged with one another, because on a subject which passes expression the distinctions of language can hardly be maintained.

17. The other ethical proof of the immortality of the soul is derived from the necessity of retribution. The wicked would be too well off if their evil deeds came to an end. It is not to be supposed that an Ardiaeus, an Archelaus, an Ismenias could ever have suffered the penalty of their crimes in this world. The manner in which this retribution is accomplished Plato represents under the figures of mythology. Doubtless he felt that it was easier to improve than to invent, and that in religion especially the traditional form was required in order to give verisimilitude to the myth. The myth too is far more probable to that age than to ours, and may fairly be regarded as 'one guess among many' about the nature of the earth, which he cleverly supports by the indications of geology. Not that he insists on the absolute truth of his own particular notions: 'no man of sense will be confident of that; but he will be confident that something of the kind is true' (114 D). As in other passages (Gorg. 527 A, Tim. 29 D; cp. Crito, 107 B), he wins belief for his fictions by the moderation of his statements; he does not, like Dante or Swedenborg, allow himself to be deceived by his own creations.

The Dialogue must be read in the light of the situation. And first of all we are struck by the calmness of the scene. Like the spectators at the time, we cannot pity Socrates; his mien and his language are so noble and fearless. He is the same that he ever was, but milder and gentler, and he has in no degree lost his interest in dialectics; he will not forego the delight of an argument in compliance with the jailer's intimation that he should not heat himself with talking. At such a time he naturally expresses the hope of his life, that he has been a true mystic and not a mere routinier or wand-bearer: and he refers to passages of his personal history. To his old enemies the Comic poets, and to the proceedings on the trial, he alludes playfully; but he vividly remembers the disappointment which he felt in reading the books of Anaxagoras. The return of Xanthippe and his children indicates that the philosopher is not 'made of oak or rock.' Some other traits of his character may be noted; for example, the courteous manner in which he inclines his head to the last objector, or the ironical touch, 'Me

already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls;’ or the depreciation of the arguments with which ‘he comforted himself and them;’ or his fear of ‘misology;’ or his references to Homer; or the playful smile with which he ‘talks like a book’ about greater and less; or the allusion to the possibility of finding another teacher among barbarous races (cp. *Polit.* 262 D); or the mysterious reference to another science (mathematics?) of generation and destruction for which he is vainly feeling. There is no change in him; only now he is invested with a sort of sacred character, as the prophet or priest of Apollo the God of the festival, in whose honour he first of all composes a hymn, and then like the swan pours forth his dying lay. Perhaps the extreme elevation of Socrates above his own situation, and the ordinary interests of life (compare his *jeu d’esprit* about his burial, in which for a moment he puts on the ‘Silenus mask’) create in the mind of the reader an impression stronger than could be derived from arguments that such an one, in his own language, has in him ‘a principle which does not admit of death.’

The other persons of the Dialogue may be considered under two heads: (1) private friends; (2) the respondents in the argument.

First there is Crito, who has been already introduced to us in the *Euthydemus* and the *Crito*; he is the equal in years of Socrates, and stands in quite a different relation to him from his younger disciples. He is a man of the world who is rich and prosperous (cp. the jest in the *Euthydemus*, 304 C), the best friend of Socrates, who wants to know his last commands, in whose presence he talks to his family, and who performs the last duty of closing his eyes. It is observable too that, as in the *Euthydemus*, Crito shows no aptitude for philosophical discussions. Nor among the friends of Socrates must the jailer be forgotten, who seems to have been introduced by Plato in order to show the impression made by the extraordinary man on the common. The gentle nature of the man is indicated by his weeping at the announcement of his errand and then turning away, and also by the words of Socrates to his disciples: ‘How charming the man is! since I have been in prison he has been always coming to me, and is as good as could be to me.’ We are reminded too that he has retained this gentle nature amid scenes of death and violence by the contrasts which he draws between the behaviour of Socrates and of others when about to die.

Another person who takes no part in the philosophical discussion is

the excitable Apollodorus, the same who, in the Symposium, of which he is the narrator, is called 'the madman,' and who testifies his grief by the most violent emotions. Phaedo is also present, the 'beloved disciple' as he may be termed, who is described, if not 'leaning on his bosom,' as seated next to Socrates, who is playing with his hair. He too, like Apollodorus, takes no part in the discussion, but he loves above all things to hear and speak of Socrates after his death. The calmness of his behaviour, veiling his face when he can no longer restrain his tears, contrasts with the passionate outcries of the other. At a particular point the argument is described as falling before the attack of Simmias. A sort of despair is introduced in the minds of the company. The effect of this is heightened by the description of Phaedo, who has been the eye-witness of the scene, and by the sympathy of his Phliasian auditors who are beginning to think 'that they too can never trust an argument again.' And the intense interest of the company is communicated not only to the first auditors, but to us who in a distant country read the narrative of their emotions after more than two thousand years have passed away.

The two principal interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, the disciples of Philolaus the Pythagorean philosopher of Thebes. Simmias is described in the *Phaedrus* (242 B) as fonder of an argument than any man living; and Cebes, although finally persuaded by Socrates, is said to be the most incredulous of human beings. It is Cebes who at the commencement of the Dialogue asks why 'suicide is held to be unlawful,' and who first supplies the doctrine of recollection in confirmation of the pre-existence of the soul. It is Cebes who urges that the pre-existence does not necessarily involve the future existence of the soul, as is shown by the illustration of the weaver and his coat. Simmias, on the other hand, raises the question about harmony and the lyre, which is naturally put into the mouth of a Pythagorean disciple. It is Simmias, too, who first remarks on the uncertainty of human knowledge, and only at last concedes to the argument such a qualified approval as is consistent with the feebleness of the human faculties. Cebes is the deeper and more consecutive thinker, Simmias more superficial and rhetorical; they are distinguished in much the same manner as Adeimantus and Glaucon in the *Republic*.

Other persons, Menexenus, Ctesippus, Lysis, are old friends; Euenus has been already satirized in the *Apology*; Aeschines and Epigenes

were present at the trial; Euclid and Terpsion will reappear in the Introduction to the Theaetetus, Hermogenes in the Cratylus. No inference can fairly be drawn from the absence of Aristippus, nor from the omission of Xenophon, who at the time of Socrates' death was in Asia. The mention of Plato's own absence seems like an expression of sorrow, and may, perhaps, be an indication that the report of the conversation is not to be taken literally.

The place of the Dialogue in the series is doubtful. The doctrine of ideas is certainly carried beyond the Socratic point of view; in no other of the writings of Plato is the theory of them so completely developed. Whether the belief in immortality can be attributed to Socrates or not is uncertain; the silence of the Memorabilia, and of the earlier Dialogues of Plato, is an argument to the contrary. Yet in the Cyropaedia Xenophon (viii. 7, 19 foll.) has put language into the mouth of the dying Cyrus which recalls the Phaedo, and may have been derived from the teaching of Socrates. It may be fairly urged that the greatest religious interest of mankind could not have been wholly ignored by one who passed his life in fulfilling the commands of an oracle, and who recognized a Divine plan in man and nature. (Xen. Mem. 1, 4.) And the language of the Apology confirms this view.

The Phaedo is not one of the Socratic Dialogues of Plato; nor, on the other hand, can it be assigned to that later stage of the Platonic writings at which the doctrine of ideas appears to be forgotten. It belongs rather to the intermediate period of the Platonic philosophy, which roughly corresponds to the Phaedrus, Gorgias, Republic, Theaetetus. Without pretending to determine the real time of their composition, the Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, Phaedo, Symposium may be conveniently read by us in this order as illustrative of the life of Socrates. Another chain may be formed of the Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus in which the immortality of the soul is connected with the doctrine of ideas. In the Meno the theory of ideas is based on the ancient belief in transmigration, which reappears again in the Phaedrus as well as in the Republic and Timaeus, and in all of them is connected with a doctrine of retribution. In the Phaedrus the immortality of the soul is supposed to rest on the conception of the soul as a principle of motion, whereas in the Republic the argument turns on the natural continuance of the soul, which, if not destroyed by her own proper evil, can hardly be destroyed by any other. The soul of man in the Timaeus (42 foll.)

is derived from the Supreme Creator, and either returns after death to her kindred star, or descends into the lower life of an animal. The Apology expresses the same view as the Phaedo, but with less confidence; there the probability of death being a long sleep is not excluded. The Theaetetus also describes, in a digression, the desire of the soul to fly away and be with God—'and to fly to him is to be like him' (176 B). Lastly, the Symposium may be observed to resemble as well as to differ from the Phaedo. While the first notion of immortality is only in the way of natural procreation or of posthumous fame and glory, the higher revelation of beauty, like the good in the Republic, is the vision of the eternal idea. So deeply rooted in Plato's mind is the belief in immortality; so various are the forms of expression which he employs.

As in several other Dialogues, there is more of system in the Phaedo than appears at first sight. The succession of arguments is based on previous philosophies; beginning with the mysteries and the Heracleitean alternation of opposites, and proceeding to the Pythagorean harmony and transmigration; making a step by the aid of Platonic reminiscence, and a further step by the help of the *poēs* of Anaxagoras; until at last we rest in the conviction that the soul is inseparable from the ideas, and belongs to the world of the invisible and unknown. Then, as in the Gorgias or Republic, the curtain falls, and the veil of mythology descends upon the argument. After the confession of Socrates that he is an interested party, and the acknowledgment that no man of sense will think the details of his narrative true, but that something of the kind is true, we return from speculation to practice. He is himself more confident of immortality than he is of his own arguments; and the confidence which he expresses is less strong than that which his cheerfulness and composure in death inspire in us.

Difficulties of two kinds occur in the Phaedo—one kind to be explained out of contemporary philosophy, the other not admitting of an entire solution. (1) The difficulty which Socrates says that he experienced in explaining generation and corruption; the assumption of hypotheses which proceed from the less general to the more general, and are tested by their consequences; the puzzle about greater and less; the resort to the method of ideas, which to us appear only abstract terms,—these are to be explained out of the position of Socrates and Plato in the history of philosophy. They were living in a twilight between the sensible and the intellectual world, and saw no way of connecting them.

They could neither explain the relation of ideas to phenomena, nor their correlation to one another. The very idea of relation or comparison was embarrassing to them. Yet in this intellectual uncertainty they had a conception of a proof from results, and of a moral truth, which remained unshaken amid the questionings of philosophy. (2) The other is a difficulty which is touched upon in the Republic as well as in the Phaedo, and is common to modern and ancient philosophy. Plato is not altogether satisfied with his safe and simple method of ideas. He wants to have proved to him by facts that all things are for the best, and that there is one mind or design which pervades them all. But this 'power of the best' he is unable to explain; and therefore takes refuge in universal ideas. And are not we at this day seeking to discover that which Socrates in a glass darkly foresaw?

Some resemblances to the Greek drama may be noted in all the Dialogues of Plato. The Phaedo is the tragedy of which Socrates is the protagonist and Simmias and Cebes the secondary performers. No Dialogue has a greater unity of subject and feeling. Plato has certainly fulfilled the condition of Greek, or rather of all art, which requires that scenes of death and suffering should be clothed in beauty. The gathering of the friends at the commencement of the Dialogue, the dejection of the audience at the temporary overthrow of the argument, the picture of Socrates playing with the hair of Phaedo, the final scene in which Socrates alone retains his composure—are masterpieces of art. And the chorus at the end might have interpreted the feeling of the play: 'There can no evil happen to a good man in life or death.'

But 'the art of concealing art' is nowhere more perfect than in those writings of Plato which describe the trial and death of Socrates. Their charm is their simplicity, which gives them verisimilitude; and yet they touch, as if incidentally, and because they were suitable to the occasion, on some of the deepest truths of philosophy. There is nothing in all tragedians, ancient or modern, nothing in poetry or history (with one exception), like the last hours of Socrates in Plato. The master could not be more fitly occupied at such a time than in discoursing of immortality; nor the disciples more divinely consoled. The arguments, taken in the spirit and not in the letter, are our arguments; and Socrates by anticipation may be even thought to refute some 'eccentric notions' current in our own age. For there are philosophers among ourselves who do not seem to understand how much stronger is the power of

intelligence, or of the best, than of Atlas, or mechanical force. How far the words attributed to Socrates were actually uttered by him we forbear to ask; for no answer can be given to this question. And it is better to resign ourselves to the feeling of a great work, than to linger among critical uncertainties.

PHAEDO.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

| | |
|---|--------------|
| PHAEDO, <i>who is the narrator of the Dialogue to</i> | APOLLODORUS. |
| ECHECRATES <i>of Phlius.</i> | SIMMIAS. |
| SOCRATES. | CEBES. |
| ATTENDANT OF THE PRISON. | CRITO. |

SCENE :—The Prison of Socrates.

PLACE OF THE NARRATION :—Phlius.

Steph. *Echecrates.* Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with
57 Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?

Phaedo. Yes, Echecrates, I was.

Ech. I wish that you would tell me about his death. What did he say in his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, nor has any Athenian of late found his way to Phlius, and therefore we have had no clear account.

58 *Phaed.* Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?

Ech. Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not understand why, having been condemned, he was put to death, as appeared, not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this?

Phaed. An accident, Echecrates: the stern of the ship which the Athenians send to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he was tried.

Ech. What is this ship?

Phaed. This is the ship in which, as the Athenians say,

Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was the saviour of them and of himself. And they were said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would send a yearly mission to Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions; and when the vessel is detained by contrary winds, the time spent in going and coming is very considerable. As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after he was condemned.

Ech. What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or done? And which of his friends had he with him? Were they allowed by the authorities to be present? Or did he die alone?

Phaed. No; there were several of his friends with him.

Ech. If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what passed, as exactly as you can.

Phaed. I have nothing to do, and will try to gratify your wish. For to me too there is no greater pleasure than to have Socrates brought to my recollection; whether I speak myself or hear another speak of him.

Ech. You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and I hope that you will be as exact as you can.

Phaed. I had a singular feeling at being in his company. For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him, Echeocrates; his mien and his language were so noble and fearless in the hour of death that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there; and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour. But neither could I feel the pleasure which I usually felt in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). I was pleased, and I was also pained, for I reflected that he was soon to die, and this double feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by

turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus—you know the sort of man?

Ech. Yes.

Phaed. He was quite beside himself; and I and all of us were greatly moved.

Ech. Who were present?

Phaed. Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, and Antisthenes; likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paecania, Menexenus, and some others; but Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.

Ech. Were there any strangers?

Phaed. Yes, there were; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaedondes; Euclid and Terpsion, who came from Megara.

Ech. And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus?

Phaed. No, they were said to be in Aegina.

Ech. Any one else?

Phaed. I think that these were nearly all.

Ech. Well, and what did you talk about?

Phaed. I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire conversation. On the previous days we had been in the habit of assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial was held, and which is not far from the prison. There we remained talking with one another until the opening of the prison doors (for they were not opened very early), and then went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning the meeting was earlier than usual; for we had heard on the evening before that the sacred ship had arrived from Delos, and so we arranged to meet very early at the accustomed place. We went to the prison, but the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and told us to wait until he called us. 'For the eleven,' he said, 'are now with Socrates; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die to-day.' He soon returned and
60 said that we might come in. On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a cry and said, as women will: 'O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your

friends, or they with you.' Socrates turned to Crito and said: 'Crito, let some one take her home.' Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, began to bend and rub his leg, saying, as he rubbed: How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it; for they never will come to a man together, and yet he who pursues either of them is generally compelled to take the other. Their bodies are two, and yet they are joined to a single head; and I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had noticed them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and how, when he could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows, as I find in my own case pleasure comes following after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain.

Upon this Cebes said: I am very glad indeed, Socrates, that you mentioned the name of Aesop. For that reminds me of a question which has been asked by others, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet; and as he will be sure to ask again, if you would like me to have an answer ready for him, you may as well tell me what I should say to him. He wanted to know why you, who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are putting Aesop into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.

Tell him, Cebes, he replied, that I had no idea of rivalling him or his poems; (which is the truth, for that, as I knew, would be no easy task). But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about the meaning of certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams 'that I should compose music.' The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: Compose and practise music, said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has always been the pur- 61
suit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the

spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this, as the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that I should be safer if I satisfied the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, composed a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet, should not only put together words, but should invent stories, and that I have no invention, I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and knew, and turned them into verse. Tell Evenus this, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say that I must.

Simmius said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take your advice unless he is obliged.

Why, said Socrates,—is not Evenus a philosopher?

I think that he is, said Simmius.

Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die, though he will not take his own life, for that is held not to be right.

Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.

Why do you say, enquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?

Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmius, who are acquainted with Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?

Yes, but I never understood him, Socrates.

My words, too, are only an echo; yet there is no reason why I should not repeat what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, I ought to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?

Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held not to be right?

as I have certainly heard Philolaus affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes; and there are others who say the same, although none of them has ever made me understand him.

But do your best, replied Socrates, and the day may come ⁶² when you will understand. I suppose that you wonder why, as most things which are evil may be accidentally good, death is to be the only exception (for may not death, too, be better than life in some cases?), and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.

Aye, indeed, said Cebes, laughing and speaking in his native Doric.

I admit the appearance of inconsistency in what I am saying; but there may not be any real inconsistency after all. There is a doctrine whispered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door of his prison and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs. Do you not agree?

Yes, I agree to that, said Cebes.

And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?

Certainly, replied Cebes.

Then there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.

Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there is surely reason in that. And yet how can you reconcile the seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions, with this willingness to die which we were attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable, for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think so—he may argue that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his

duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there would be no sense in his running away. But the wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.

63 The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning to us, is a man who is always enquiring, and is not to be convinced all in a moment, nor by every argument.

And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself. And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods who, as you acknowledge, are our good rulers.

Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in that. And you think that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?

That is what we should like, said Simmias.

Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I did before the judges. For I am quite ready to acknowledge, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of which I am as certain as I can be of anything of the sort), and to men departed (though I am not so certain of this last) who are better than those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.

But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said Simmias. Will you not communicate them to us?—the benefit is one in which we too may hope to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.

I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what Crito wants; he was going to say something to me.

Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:—the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me, and he wants me to tell you, that you are not to talk much; for that by talking, heat is increased, and this interferes with the action of the poison; those who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to drink the poison two or three times.

Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison twice or even thrice if necessary; that is all.

I was almost certain that you would say that, replied Crito; but I was obliged to satisfy him.

Never mind him, he said.

And now I will make answer to you, O my judges, and show that he who has lived as a true philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after ⁶⁴ death he may hope to obtain the greatest good in the other world. And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem that the true disciple of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is ever pursuing death and dying; and if this is true, why, having had the desire of death all his life long, should he repine at the arrival of that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?

Simmias laughed and said: Though not in a laughing humour, I swear that I cannot help laughing, when I think what the wicked world will say when they hear this. They will say that it is delightfully true, and our people at home will agree with them in saying that the life which philosophers desire is in reality death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.

And they are right, Simmias, in saying so, with the exception of the words 'they have found them out;' for they have not found out what is the nature of that death which the true philosopher desires, or how he deserves or desires death. But let us leave them and have a word with ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

To be sure, replied Simmias.

And is this anything but the separation of soul and body? And being dead is the completion of the separation; when the

soul exists in herself, and is parted from the body and the body is parted from the soul—that is death?

Exactly: that and nothing else, he replied.

Consider, further, my friend, whether you and I are agreed about another question, which will probably throw light on our present enquiry: Do you think that the philosopher ought to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures—of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered Simmias.

And what do you say of the pleasures of love—should he care about them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals, or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?

I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to be quit of the body and turn to the soul.

That is true.

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may
65 be observed in every sort of way to dissever the soul from the communion of the body.

That is true.

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that a life which has no share in bodily pleasures is not worth having; and that he who is indifferent about them is as good as dead.

That is quite true.

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Certainly, he replied.

Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to

consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

Yes, that is true.

Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,—when she has as little as possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feeling, but is aspiring after true being?

Certainly.

And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true.

Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? (and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything). Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of that which he considers?

Certainly.

And he attains to the purest knowledge of them who goes to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the act of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or any other sense in the company of reason, but with the very light ⁶⁶ of the mind in her clearness searches into the very truth of each; he has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing

element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of truth and knowledge when in company with her—is not this the sort of man who, if any man, is likely to attain to the knowledge of true being?

What you say is excellent, Socrates, replied Simmias.

And when they consider all this, must not true philosophers make a reflection, of which they will speak to one another in such words as these: We have found, they will say, a path of speculation which seems to bring the argument and ourselves to the conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is mingled with this mass of evil, our desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and is liable also to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after truth: and by filling us full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies, and all kinds of folly, in real earnest prevents our ever having, as the saying is, a particle of thought. For whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? Wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and in consequence of all these things the time which ought to be given to philosophy is lost. Moreover, if there is time and an inclination towards philosophy, yet the body introduces turmoil and confusion and amazement into the course of speculation, and hinders us from seeing the truth; proving by experience to us that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold all things in themselves: and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers; not while we live, but after death, as the argument shows; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things seems to follow—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not
67 till then, the soul will be in herself alone and without the body. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible communion or fellowship with the body, and are not infected with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when God himself is

pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we shall be pure and hold converse with other pure souls, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth. For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of knowledge cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You will agree with me in that?

Certainly, Socrates.

But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great hope that, going whither I go, I shall have the full enjoyment of that which has been the chief concern of you and me in our past lives. And now that the hour of departure is appointed to me, this is the hope with which I depart, and not I only, but every man who believes that he is prepared and has his mind purified.

Certainly, replied Simmias.

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself on every side out of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true, he said.

And what is that which is termed death, but this very separation and release of the soul from the body?

To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, are ever seeking to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

That is true.

And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when death comes.

Certainly.

Then Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying death, to them, of all men, death is the least terrible. Look at the matter in this way:—if they have been always enemies of the body, and wanting to have the soul alone, when this is

granted to them, how inconsistent would they be to be trembling and repining, instead of rejoicing at their departing to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life 68 they loved (and this was wisdom), and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below animated by the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is strongly persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely he will, my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were to fear death.

He would indeed, replied Simmias.

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?

That is very true, he replied.

There is a virtue, Simmias, which is named courage. Is not that characteristic of the philosopher?

Certainly.

Again, there is temperance: Is not that calmness, and order, and control of the passions which even the many call temperance, a quality belonging only to those who despise the body, and live in philosophy?

That is not to be denied.

For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.

How is that, Socrates?

Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.

That is true, he said.

And do not courageous men endure death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?

That is true.

Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because they are afraid; and yet that a man should be

courageous from fear, and because he is a coward, is surely contradictory.

Very true.

And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate—which may seem to be a contradiction, but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they must have, and are afraid of losing; and therefore they abstain from one class of pleasures because they are overcome by another: and whereas intemperance is defined as 'being under the dominion of pleasure,' they overcome only 69 because they are overcome by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that they have been made temperate through intemperance.

That appears to be true.

Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, and of the greater for the less, as if they were coins, is not the exchange of virtue. O my dear Simmias, is there not one true coin for which all things ought to exchange?—and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself are the purgation of them. And I conceive that the founders of the mysteries had a real meaning and were not mere triflers when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passes unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will lie in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For 'many,' as they say in the mysteries, 'are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,'—meaning, as I interpret the words, the true philosophers. In the number of whom, during my whole life, I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find

a place;—whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world—that is my belief. Such is my answer, Simmias and Cebes, to those who charge me with not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world; and I am right in not repining, for I believe that I shall find other masters and friends who are as good in the world below. But most men do not believe this saying, and I shall be glad if my words have any more success with you than with the judges of the Athenians.

70 Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what relates to the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she has left the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may be destroyed and perish—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth dissolved like smoke or air and in her flight vanishing away into nothingness. If she could only hold together and be herself after she was released from the evils of the body, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But much persuasion and many arguments are required in order to prove that when the man is dead the soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.

True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we talk a little of the probabilities of these things?

I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.

I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern. Let us then, if you please, proceed with the enquiry.

Whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below, is a question which may be argued in this manner:—The ancient doctrine of which I have been speaking affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and return hither, and are born from the dead. Now if this be true, and the living come from the dead, then our souls must exist in the other world, for if not, how could they have been born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence

that the living are only born from the dead ; but if there is no evidence of this, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

That is very true, replied Cebes.

Then let us consider this question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that in all opposites there is a similar alternative ; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.

True.

And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then have become less.

71

Yes.

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.

Very true.

And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust.

Of course.

And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?

Yes.

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other, and back again ; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?

Yes, he said.

And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words—they are generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?

Very true, he replied.

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?

True, he said.

And what is that?

Death, he answered.

And these then are generated, if they are opposites, the one from the other, and have their two intermediate processes also?

Of course.

Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Are you agreed about that?

Quite agreed.

Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?

Yes.

And they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

What is generated from the living?

The dead.

And what from the dead?

I can only say in answer—the living.

Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?

That is clear, he replied.

Then the inference is that our souls exist in the world below?

That is true.

And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for surely the act of dying is visible?

Surely, he said.

And may not the other be inferred as the complement of nature, who is not to be supposed to go on one leg only? And if not, a corresponding process of generation in death must also be assigned to her?

Certainly, he replied.

And what is that process?

Revival.

And revival, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?

72

Quite true.

Then here is a new way in which we arrive at the inference that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and this, if true, affords a satisfactory proof that the souls of the dead must exist in some place out of which they come again.

Yes, Socrates, he said; the conclusion seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.

And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, I think, as follows: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return of elements into one another, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.

What do you mean? he said.

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no alternation of sleeping and waking, the story of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep too, and he would not be distinguishable from the rest. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—how could this be otherwise? For if the living spring from any others who are not the dead, and they die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?

There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes; and I think that what you say is entirely true.

Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too; nor is this a delusion in which we are agreeing; but I am confident in the

belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.

Cebes added: Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we have learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul had
73 been in some place before existing in the human form; here then is another argument of the soul's immortality.

But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what proofs are given of this doctrine of recollection? I am not very sure at this moment that I remember them.

One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort.

But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way;—I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?

Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced: but I should still like to hear what you were going to say.

This is what I should say, he replied:—We should agree, if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.

Very true.

And what is the nature of this knowledge or recollection? I mean to ask, whether when a person has already seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, and he knows not only that, but something else of which he has not the same but another knowledge, we may not fairly say that he recollects that which comes into his mind:—Are we agreed about that?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance :—The knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

True.

And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection. In like manner any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless other things of the same nature.

Yes, indeed, there are,—endless, replied Simmias.

And recollection is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been already forgotten through time and inattention.

Very true, he said.

Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes?

True.

Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

True, he said.

And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?

That is true.

And when the recollection is derived from like things, then another consideration is sure to arise, which is—whether the likeness in any degree falls short or not of that which is recollected?

Very true, he said.

And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is such a thing as equality, not of one piece of wood or stone with another, but that, over and above this, there is equality in the abstract? Shall we say so?

Say so, yes, replied Simmias, and swear to it, with all the confidence in life.

And do we know the nature of this abstract essence?

To be sure, he said.

And whence did we obtain our knowledge? Did we not see

equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the idea of an equality which is different from them? For you will acknowledge that there is a difference. Or look at the matter in another way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another time unequal?

That is certain.

But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality the same as that of inequality?

Impossible, Socrates.

Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?

I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?

Very true, he said.

Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

Yes.

But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceived another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?

Very true.

But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they fall short of this equality in a measure?

Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.

And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object, observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot be that other,—he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which the other, although similar, was inferior?

Certainly.

And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?

Precisely.

Then we must have known equality previously to the time
75 when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all

these apparent equals strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?

That is true.

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?

Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.

And from the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short—is not that true?

Yes.

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous statements.

And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon as we were born?

Certainly.

Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous time?

Yes.

That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

True.

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty, goodness, justice, holiness, and all which we stamp with the name of essence in the dialectical process, when we ask and answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth?

That is true.

But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten that which we acquired, then we must always have come into life

having knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

Quite true, Socrates.

But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered that which we previously knew, will not that which we call learning be a recovering of the knowledge which is natural to us, and may not this be rightly termed recollection?

Very true.

So much is clear—that when we perceived something, either 76 by the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, from that perception we obtained a notion of some other thing like or unlike which we had forgotten and which was associated with it; and therefore, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is simply recollection.

Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.

And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we recollect the things which we knew previously to our birth?

I cannot decide at the moment.

At any rate you can decide whether he who knows ought or ought not to be able to give an account of his knowledge.

Certainly, he ought.

But do you think that every man is able to give an account of these very matters about which we are speaking?

I wish that they could, Socrates, but I greatly fear that to-morrow at this time no one will be able.

Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?

Certainly not.

They are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?

Certainly.

But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were born as men?

Certainly not.

And therefore, previously?

Yes.

Then, Simmias, our souls must have existed without bodies before they were in the form of man, and must have had intelligence.

Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions were given us at the very moment of birth; for this is the only time that remains.

Yes, my friend, but if so, when did we lose them? for they are not in us when we are born—that is admitted. Did we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or at some other time?

No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating, there is an absolute beauty, and goodness, and other similar ideas or essences, and to this standard, which is now discovered to have existed in our former state, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them—assuming these ideas to have a prior existence, then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument? There is the same proof that these ideas must have existed before we were born, as that our souls existed before we were born; and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the one as for the other; and the argument retreats successfully to the position that the existence of the 77 soul before birth cannot be separated from the existence of the essences of which you speak. For there is nothing which to my mind is so evident as that beauty, goodness, and the other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.

Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too.

I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is convinced of the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to

my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the feeling that when the man dies the soul may be scattered, and that this may be the end of her. For admitting that she may have been born elsewhere, and framed out of other elements, and was in existence before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?

Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; that our soul existed before we were born was the first half of the argument, and this appears to have been proven; that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied.

But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the soul exists before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born again? surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further. Like children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves the body, the wind may really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a man should happen to die in stormy weather and not when the sky is calm.

Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; him too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone in the dark.

Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed away the fear.

78 And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are gone?

Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of using your money. And

you must not forget to seek for him among yourselves too ; for he is nowhere more likely to be found.

The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed.

By all means, replied Socrates ; what else should I please ?

Very good.

Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves what that is which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered away, and about which we fear ? and what again is that about which we have no fear ? And then we may proceed further to enquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon the answers to these questions.

Very true, he said.

Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable, as of being compounded, so also of being dissolved ; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble.

Yes ; I should imagine so, said Cebes.

And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and never the same.

That I also think, he said.

Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else—are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change ? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms, and not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time ?

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which may be called equal or beautiful,—are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse ? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another ?

The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.

79 And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?

That may be also supposed.

And, further, is not one part of us body, and the rest of us soul?

To be sure.

And to which class may we say that the body is more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen—no one can doubt that.

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not by man, Socrates.

And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?

Yes, to the eye of man.

And what do we say of the soul?—is that seen or not seen?

Not seen.

Unseen then?

Yes.

Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?

That is most certain, Socrates.

And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses)—were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard, when possessed by change?

Very true.

But when returning into herself she reflects, then she passes

into the other world, the abode of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?

That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied.

And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?

I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even the most stupid person will not deny that.

And the body is more like the changing?

Yes.

Yet once more consider the matter in another light: When the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to 80 rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?

True.

And which does the soul resemble?

The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal—there can be no doubt of that, Socrates.

Then reflect, Cebes: of all that has been said is not this the conclusion?—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?

No indeed.

But if this is true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?

Certainly.

And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the

body, or visible part of him, which is lying in the visible world, and is called a corpse, and would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for some time, nay even for a long time, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year favourable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as is the custom in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, there are still some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible. You allow that?

Yes.

And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go,—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and perishes immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing and draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself; (for such abstraction has been the study of her life. And what does this mean but that she has been a true disciple of philosophy, and has practised how to die cheerfully? Is not philosophy the practice of death?

Certainly.)

That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she is secure of bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods. Is not this true, Cebes?

Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.

But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste, and use for the purposes of his

lusts,—the soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy;—do you suppose that such a soul will depart pure and unalloyed?

That is impossible, he replied.

She is held fast by the corporeal, which the continual association and constant care of the body have wrought into her nature.

Very true.

And this corporeal element, my friend, is heavy and weighty and earthy, and is that element of sight by which such a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below—prowling about tombs and sepulchres, in the neighbourhood of which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible¹.

That is very likely, Socrates.

Yes, that is very likely, Cebes; and these must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life; and they continue to wander until through the craving after the corporeal which never leaves them, they are imprisoned finally in another body. And they may be supposed to find their prisons in the same natures which they have had in their former lives.

¹ Compare Milton, *Comus*, 463 foll. :—

‘But when lust,
By unchaste looks, loose gestures, and foul talk,
But most by lewd and lavish act of sin,
Lets in defilement to the inward parts,
The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose,
The divine property of her first being.
Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp
Oft seen in charnel vaults and sepulchres,
Lingering, and sitting by a new made grave,
As loath to leave the body that it lov’d,
And linked itself by carnal sensuality
To a degenerate and degraded state.’

What do you mean, Socrates?

I mean to say that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into asses and animals of that sort.

82 What do you think?

I think that opinion exceedingly probable.

And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and violence, will pass into wolves, or into hawks and kites;—whither else can we suppose them to go?

Yes, said Cebes; that is doubtless the place of natures such as theirs.

And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?

There is not, he said.

Even among them some are happier than others; and the happiest both in themselves and their place of abode are those who have practised the civil and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and mind.

Why are they the happiest?

Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle social nature which is like their own, such as that of bees or wasps or ants, or even back again into the form of man, and just and moderate men to spring from them.

That is not impossible.

But he who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is entirely pure at departing, is alone permitted to attain to the divine nature. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and endure and refuse to give themselves up to them,—not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds.

No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.

No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have any care of their own souls, and do not merely live moulding and fashioning the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them

purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and whither she leads they turn and follow.

What do you mean, Socrates?

I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that their souls when philosophy takes them in hand, are simply fastened and glued to their bodies: the soul is able to view real existence only through the bars of a prison, and not of herself unhindered; she is wallowing in the mire of all ignorance; and philosophy, beholding the terrible nature of her confinement, inasmuch as the captive through lust becomes a chief accomplice in her own captivity—for the lovers of knowledge are aware that this was the original state of the soul, but that when she was in this state philosophy adopted and comforted her, and wanted to release her, pointing out to her that the eye and the ear and the other senses are full of deceit, and persuading her to retire from them in all but the necessary use of them, and to be gathered up and collected into herself, and to trust only to herself and her own pure apprehensions of pure existence, and to mistrust whatever comes to her through other channels and is subject to vicissitude—philosophy, I say, shows her that all this is visible and tangible, but that what she sees in her own nature is intellectual and invisible. And the soul of the true philosopher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not merely the sort of evil which might be anticipated—as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts—but an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.

And what is that, Socrates? said Cebes.

Why that when the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul is most intense, all of us naturally suppose that the object of this intense feeling is then plainest and truest: but such is not the case.

Very true.

And this is the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body.

How is that?

Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body, until she becomes like the body, and believes that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and haunts, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, but is always infected by the body; and so she sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple.

That is most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.

And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.

84 Certainly not.

Certainly not! For the soul of a philosopher will reason in another way; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will calm passion, and follow reason, and dwell in her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence derive nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to a congenial world and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.

When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence; he himself appeared to be meditating, as most of us were, on what had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. And Socrates observing this asked them what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting? For, said he, there are many points still open to suspicion and attack, if any one were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly. If you are considering some other matter forgive the interruption, but if you

are still doubtful about the argument do not hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let us have anything better which you can suggest; and if I am likely to be of any use, allow me to help you.

Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question which we wanted to have answered and which neither of us liked to ask, fearing that our importunity might be troublesome at such a time as this.

Socrates replied with a smile: O Simmias, what are you saying? I am not very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, if I am unable to persuade you, and you will keep fancying that I am at all more discomposed now than at any former time in my life. Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they perceive that they must die, having sung all their life long, do then sing more than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are ⁸⁵ about to go away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any more than of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo, they have the gift of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of another world; wherefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than ever they did before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God, and the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the swans. Never mind then, if this be your only objection, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow.

Well Socrates, said Simmias, then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you his. For I dare say that you, Socrates, feel as I do, how very hard or almost impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life.

And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has achieved one of two things: either he should discover, or be taught the truth about them; or, if this is impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, as I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, and then I shall not have to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient.

Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I should like to know in what respect the argument is not sufficient.

In this respect, replied Simmias:—might not a person use the same argument about harmony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, incorporeal, perfect, divine, 86 existing in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished; for you cannot imagine, as he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves which are mortal remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished—and perished too before the mortal. That harmony, he would say, must still exist somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before that decays. For you yourself, Socrates, would, if I am not mistaken, agree with us in putting our notion thus: that when the body is in a manner strung and held together by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them. And, if this is true, the inference clearly is, that when the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through diseases or other injury, then the soul, though most

divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes at once; although the material remains of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt. Now if any one maintains that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, is first to perish in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?

Socrates looked round at us as his manner was, and said with a smile: Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is abler than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me. But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say against the argument—this will give us time for reflection, and when both of them have spoken, we may either assent to them, if their words appear to be in accordance with the truth, or if not, we may take up the other side, and argue with them. Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?

Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is still in the same position, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, as I may be allowed to say, quite sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body. Well then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced?—When you see that the weaker continues in existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time? Now I, like Simmias, will employ a figure; and I shall ask you to consider whether the figure is to the point. The parallel which I will suppose is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:—He is not dead, he must be alive; and he appeals to the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which remains whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and

wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to remark, is a mistake, and every one will at once answer that he who says so is talking nonsense. For the truth is, that this weaver, having worn and woven many such coats, outlived several of them; and although he was himself outlived by the last, a man is not therefore proved to be slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure; and any one may very fairly say in like manner that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison. For he might argue that the soul wears out many bodies, especially in the course of a long life. While the man is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and the soul always weaves another garment and repairs the waste; but of course, when the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this will survive her; and then at length, when the soul is dead, the body will show its native weakness, and quickly corrupt and pass away. I would therefore rather not rely on the argument from superior strength as proving the continued existence of the soul
 88 after death. For suppose that we grant as within the range of possibility even more than you affirm, and besides acknowledging that the soul existed before birth, admit also that after death the souls of some exist, and will continue to exist, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times—nevertheless, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it: and if so, then I maintain that he who is confident about death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he cannot prove the soul's immortality, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.

All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant feeling at hearing them say this. When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one; either we were not good judges, or there were no grounds of belief.

Ech. There I feel with you—by heaven I do, Phaedo, and when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back to me at once, as my own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul dies not with him. Tell me, I beg, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he calmly meet the attack? And did he answer forcibly or feebly? Tell us what passed as exactly as you can.

Phaed. Often, Echecrates, as I have admired Socrates, I never admired him more than at that moment. That he should be 89 able to answer was nothing, but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he received the words of the young men, and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and his ready application of the healing art. He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to follow him and return to the field of argument.

Ech. How was that?

Phaed. You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. He stroked my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck—he had a way of playing with my hair; and then he said: To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.

Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied.

Not so, if you will take my advice.

What shall I do with them? I said.

To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and cannot be brought to life again by us, you and I will both shave our locks: and if I were you, and the argument got away from me, and I could not hold my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.

Yes, I said; but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two.

Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes down.

I summon you rather, I said, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as Iolaus might summon Heracles.

That will be all the same, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid a danger.

And what is that? I said.

The danger of becoming misologists, he replied, which is one of the very worst things that can happen to us. For as there are misanthropists or haters of men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy springs out of the too great confidence of inexperience;—you trust a man and think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially within the circle of his own most trusted friends, as he would deem them, and he has often quarrelled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all. I dare say that you must have observed this.

Yes, I said.

And is not the feeling discreditable? Such an one having to deal with other men, had clearly no experience of them; for experience would have taught him the true state of the case, 90 that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in the interval between them.

How do you mean? I said.

I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small—that nothing is more uncommon than a very large

or very small man; and this applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?

Yes, I said, I have.

And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition in evil, the worst would be found to be very few?

Yes, that is very likely, I said.

Yes, that is very likely, he replied; although in this respect arguments are unlike men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.

That is quite true, I said.

Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and very melancholy too, if there be such a thing as truth or certainty or possibility of knowledge, that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general: and for ever afterwards should hate and revile them, and lose truth and the knowledge of realities.

Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy.

Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no truth or health or soundness in any arguments at all; but let us rather say that there is as yet no health in us, and that we must quit ourselves like men and do our best to gain health—you and all other men with a view to the whole of your future life, and I myself with a view to death. For at this moment I am sensible 91

that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. For the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertions. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is only this—that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by the argument. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth; but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall not distress my friends with lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, but will die with me, and therefore no harm will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die.

And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I have in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and misgivings whether the soul, being as she is in the form of harmony, although a fairer and diviner thing than the body, may not perish first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul, for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?

They both agreed to this statement of them.

He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?

Of a part only, they replied.

And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we said that knowledge was recollection, and hence

inferred that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body?

Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument, and that his conviction remained unshaken. Simmias agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently.

But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose the harmony.

No, Socrates, that is impossible.

But do you not see that you *are* saying this when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?

Not at all, replied Simmias.

And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony when harmony is the theme of discourse.

There ought, replied Simmias.

But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them then will you retain?

I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible grounds; and is therefore believed by the many. I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive—in geometry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds: and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having,

as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.

Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view : Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded?

Certainly not.

Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?

He agreed.

Then a harmony does not lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony, but only follows them.

He assented.

For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to its parts.

That would be impossible, he replied.

And does not the nature of every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?

I do not understand you, he said.

I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more truly and fully harmonized, if that be possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less truly and fully harmonized.

True.

But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?

Not in the least.

Yet surely of two souls, one is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and the other to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly?

Yes, truly.

But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being a harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?

I cannot tell, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of this kind would be asserted by those who say that the soul is a harmony.

And we have already admitted that no soul is more a soul than another; which is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or more or less completely a harmony?

Quite true.

And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?

True.

And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony?

Yes, an equal harmony.

Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?

Exactly.

And therefore has neither more nor less of harmony or of discord?

She has not.

And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?

Not at all more.

Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a 94 harmony, will never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical.

No.

And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?

How can she have, if the previous argument holds?

Then, if all souls are equally by their nature souls, all souls of all living creatures will be equally good?

I agree with you, Socrates, he said.

And can all this be true, think you? he said; for these are the consequences which seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?

Certainly not.

Once more, he said, what ruler is there of the elements of human nature other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?

Indeed, I do not.

And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them? For example, when the body is hot and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.

Very true.

But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them?

Yes, he said, we acknowledged that, certainly.

And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite—leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more gently;—threatening and also reprimanding the desires, passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the *Odyssey* represents *Odysseus* doing in the words—

‘He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart:
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!’

Do you think that *Homer* wrote this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather of a nature which should lead and master them—herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?

Yes, *Socrates*, I quite agree to that.

Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the
95 soul is a harmony, for that would clearly contradict the divine
Homer as well as ourselves.

True, he said,

Thus much, said *Socrates*, of *Harmonia*, your *Theban* goddess, *Cebes*, who has not been ungracious to us, I think; but what shall I say to the *Theban* *Cadmus*, and how shall I make peace with him?

I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said *Cebes*; I am sure that you have put the argument with

Harmonia in a manner that I could never have expected. For when Simmias was mentioning his difficulty, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours, and not impossibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a similar fate.

Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, may be left in the hands of those above; while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Here lies the point:—You want to have proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and you think that the philosopher who is confident in death has but a vain and foolish confidence, if he believes that he will fare better than one who has led another sort of life, in the world below, unless he can prove this: and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality. Granting that the soul is longlived, and has known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, that, as you would say, makes no difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of sense, must fear, if he has no knowledge or proof of the soul's immortality. That is what I suppose you to say, Cebes, which I designedly repeat, in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract anything.

But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or subtract: you have expressed my meaning.

Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length he said: You are raising a very serious enquiry, Cebes, involving the whole question of generation and corruption, about which I will, if you like, give you my own ⁹⁶ experience; and you can apply this to yourself, if you think that anything which I say will avail towards the solution of your difficulty.

I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say.

Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called Natural Science; this appeared to me to have lofty aims, as being the science which has to do with the causes of things, and which teaches why a thing is, and is created and destroyed; and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of questions such as these:—Is the growth of animals the result of some decay which the hot and cold principle contracts, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of this sort—but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when they have attained fixity. And then I went on to examine the corruption of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded that I was utterly and absolutely incapable of these enquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things which I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; I forgot what I had before thought to be self-evident facts,—e.g. such as that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man great. Was not that a reasonable notion?

Yes, said Cebes, I think so.

Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; or one horse would appear to be greater than another horse: and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is twice one.

And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes.

I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I

knew the cause of any of them, by heaven I should; for I cannot satisfy myself that, when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two units added 97 together make two by reason of the addition. I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition or meeting of them should be the cause of their becoming two: neither can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two; for then a different cause would produce the same effect,—as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else is either generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of a new method, and can never admit the other.

Then I heard some one who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, out of which he read that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was quite delighted at this notion, which appeared admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or suffering or doing was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, for that the same science comprised both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and then he would further explain the cause and the necessity of this, and would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied with the explanation given, and not want any other sort 98 of cause. And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, active and passive, and how all of them were for

the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was best for all. I had hopes which I would not have sold for much, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.

What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have joints which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture;—that is what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these
99 muscles and bones of mine would have gone off long ago to Megara or Boeotia—by the dog of Egypt they would, if they had been moved only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen as the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, to undergo any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I

cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in disposing them as they are disposes them for the best never enters into their minds, nor do they imagine that there is any superhuman strength in that; they rather expect to find another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good is, and are clearly of opinion that the obligatory and containing power of the good is as nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of enquiring into the cause.

I should very much like to hear, he replied.

Socrates proceeded:—I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the precaution of only looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. That occurred to me, and I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not 100 perfect—for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only 'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who sees them in their working and effects. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to

the cause or to anything else ; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do not think that you as yet understand me.

No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.

There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you ; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions : I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and the like ; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.

Cebes said : You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you this.

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the next step ; for I cannot help thinking that if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty, that can only be beautiful in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and this I should say of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause ?

Yes, he said, I agree.

He proceeded : I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged ; and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or anything else of that sort is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained ; for as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. That appears to me to be the only safe answer that I can give, either to myself or to any other, and to that I cling, in the persuasion that I shall never be overthrown, and that I may safely answer to myself or any other, that by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree to that ?

Yes, I agree.

And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, and by smallness the less become less?

True.

Then if a person remarks that A is taller by a head than B, and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit this, and would stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and by reason of, greatness, and the less is less only by, or by reason of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. Would you not be afraid of that?

Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.

In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or you would say that two cubits exceed one cubit not by a half, but by magnitude?—that is what you would say, for there is the same danger in all these cases.

Very true, he said.

Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in duality; that is the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher principle, and a higher, until you found a resting-place in the best of the higher; but you would not confuse

the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics—at least if you wanted to discover real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them who never care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of
102 their ideas. But you, if you are a philosopher, will certainly do as I say.

What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once.

Ech. Yes, Phaedo; and I do not wonder at their assenting. Any one who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of Socrates' reasoning.

Phaed. Certainly, Echecrates; and that was the feeling of the whole company at the time.

Ech. Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, and are now listening to your recital. But what followed?

Phaed. After all this was admitted, and they had agreed that ideas exist, and that other things participate in them and derive their names from them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:—

This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both greatness and smallness?

Yes, I do.

But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?

Truc.

And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is comparatively smaller?

That is truc.

And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and allowing the

greatness of the other to exceed his smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am saying is true.

Simmias assented.

I speak as I do because I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded: instead of this one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the approach of the less has already ceased to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting of smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or 103 perishes in the change.

That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion.

Hereupon one of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of them, said: In heaven's name, is not this the direct contrary of what was admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; which assertion now seems to be utterly denied.

Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them; and these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of one another. At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Are you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection?

No, I do not feel so, said Cebes ; and yet I cannot deny that I am apt to be disconcerted.

Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself ?

To that we are quite agreed, he replied.

Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of view, and see whether you agree with me :— There is a thing which you term heat, and another thing which you term cold ?

Certainly.

But are they the same as fire and snow ?

Most assuredly not.

Heat is not the same as fire, nor is cold the same as snow ?

No.

And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat ; but at the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish ?

Very true, he replied.

And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish ; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain as before, fire and cold.

That is true, he said.

And in some cases the name of the idea is not only attached to the idea in an eternal connection, but anything else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this clearer by an example :—The odd number is always called by the name of odd ?

Very true.

104 But is this the only thing which is called odd ? Are there not other things which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness ?—that is what I mean to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd. And there are many other examples : would you not say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same with three ? and this may be said not only of three but also of five, and of every alternate

number—each of them without being oddness is odd ; and in the same way two and four, and the other series of alternate numbers, has every number even, without being evenness. Do you admit that ?

Yes, he said, how can I deny that ?

Then now mark the point at which I am aiming :—not only do essential opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites ; these, I say, likewise reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and when that idea approaches them they either perish or withdraw. There is the number three for example ;—will not that endure annihilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, remaining three ?

Very true, said Cebes.

And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three ?

It is not.

Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also there are other natures which repel the approach of opposites.

That is quite true, he said.

Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what these are.

By all means.

Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite ?

What do you mean ?

I mean, as I was just now saying, and as I am sure that you know, that those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three in number, but must also be odd.

Quite true.

And on this oddness, of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude ?

No.

And this impress was given by the odd principle ?

Yes.

And to the odd is opposed the even ?

True.

Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?
No.

Then three has no part in the even?

None.

Then the triad or number three is uneven?

Very true.

To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposites, and yet do not admit opposites: as, in the instance given, three, although not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the
105 cold—from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings in that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd. The double has another opposite, and is not strictly opposed to the odd, but nevertheless rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio of 3:2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole. You will agree to that?

Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.

And now, he said, I think that I may begin again; and do not you answer my question in the words in which I ask you: let me have not the old safe answer of which I spoke at first, but another equally safe, of which the truth will be inferred by you from what has been just said. I mean that if any one asks you 'what that is, of which the inherence makes the body hot,' you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far superior answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one asks you 'why a body is diseased,' you will not say from disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples.

Yes, he said, I quite understand you.

Tell me, then, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive?

The soul, he replied.

And is this always the case?

Yes, he said, of course.

Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?

Yes, certainly.

And is there any opposite to life?

There is, he said.

And what is that?

Death.

Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings.

Impossible, replied Cebes.

And now, he said, what did we call that principle which repels the even?

The odd.

And that principle which repels the musical or the just?

The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.

And what do we call that principle which does not admit of death?

The immortal, he said.

And does the soul admit of death?

No.

Then the soul is immortal?

Yes, he said.

And may we say that this is proven?

Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.

And supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not 106
three be imperishable?

Of course.

And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat?

True, he said.

Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable,

the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected?

Certainly, he said.

And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire, or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took their departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing.

Very true.

And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have to be given.

No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable.

Yes, replied Socrates, and yet all men will agree that God, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.

Yes, all men, he said—that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not mistaken, as well as men.

Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?

Most certainly.

Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound?

True.

Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world!

I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection, he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know to what other season he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or have said.

But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor can I see any reason for doubt after what has been said. But I still feel and cannot help feeling uncertain in my own mind, when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man.

Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and more than that, first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument; and if that be plain and clear, there will be no need for any further enquiry.

Very true.

But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; and these are said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his pilgrimage in the other world.

For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together, whence after judgment they must go into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other: and when they have there received their due and remained

their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this journey to the other world is 108 not, as Aeschylus says in the *Telephus*, a single and straight path—no guide would be wanted for that, and no one could miss a single path; but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul follows in the path and knows what is happening; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, or been concerned in foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.

Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know in what you are putting your faith, and I should like to know.

And I, Simmias, replied Socrates, if I had the art of Glaucus would tell you; although I know not that the art of Glaucus could prove the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them.

That, said Simmias, will be enough.

Well then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need

of air or any similar force as a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my first notion.

Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias.

Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Heracles inhabit a small section only on the borders of the sea, like ants or frogs about a marsh, and that there are other inhabitants of many other like places. For I should say that in all parts of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and the mist and the lower air collect; and that the true earth is pure and in the pure heaven, in which also are the stars—that is the heaven which is commonly spoken of as the ether, of which this is but the sediment gathering in the hollows of the earth. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth; which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars,—he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, how much purer and fairer the world above is than his own. And such is exactly our case: for we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air we call the heaven, wherein we imagine that the stars move. But this again is owing to our feebleness and sluggishness, which prevent our reaching the surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and fly upward, then like a fish who puts his head out and sees this world, he would see a world beyond; and, if the nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this other world was the place of the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For our earth, and the stones, and the

entire region which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, as in the sea all things are corroded by the brine, and there is hardly any noble or perfect growth, but clefts only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud; and even the shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. And still less is this our world to be compared with the other. Of that upper earth which is under the heaven, I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth hearing.

And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen.

The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:—In the first place, the earth, when looked at from above, is in appearance streaked like one of those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is decked with various colours, of which the colours which painters use on earth may be deemed samples. But there the whole earth is made up of them, and they are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of wonderful lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any chalk or snow. Of these and other colours the earth is made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen; and the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water have a colour of their own, and are seen like light gleaming amid the diversity of the other colours, so that the whole presents an appearance of variety in unity. And in this fair region everything that grows—trees, and flowers, and fruits—are in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are hills, and stones in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in colour than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still. The reason of this is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us, and which breed foulness and disease both in earth and stones, as well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels
 III of the upper earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are set in the light of day and are large and abundant and in all places, making the earth a sight to

gladden the beholder's eye. And there are animals and men, some in a middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in islands which the air flows round, near the continent: and in a word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover, the temperament of their seasons is such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater perfection, in the same degree that air is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse with them, and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they really are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.

Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe everywhere, some of them deeper and more extended than that which we inhabit, others deeper and with a narrower opening than ours, and some are shallower and also wider; all have numerous perforations, and passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them with one another; and there flows out of and into them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams which follow them), and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a swinging or see-saw in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down, and is due to the following cause:—There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that which Homer describes in the words:—

‘Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;’

and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called Tartarus. And the see-saw is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this chasm, and they each have the nature of the

soil through which they flow. And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the watery element has no bed or bottom, but is swinging and surging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth—just as in the act of respiration the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;—and the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth in those regions, and fill them up like water raised by a pump, and then when they leave those regions and rush back hither, they again fill the hollows here, and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Thence they again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many lands, others going to a few places and not so distant; and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose, and others not much lower, but all in some degree lower than the point of issue. And some burst forth again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they can, but always return and fall into the lake. The rivers on either side can descend only to the centre and no further, for opposite to the rivers on both sides is a precipice.

Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction flows Acheron, which passes
113 under the earth through desert places into the Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back again to be born as animals. The third river rises between the two, and near the place of rising pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among

other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire in all sorts of places. The fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli; and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction and meeting Pyriphlegethon in the Acherusian lake from the opposite side. And the water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of this river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each severally conveys them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and using such means of conveyance as they have, are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and suffer the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds according to their deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not irremediable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done some violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who have 114 taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon—and

they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to be kind to them, and let them come out into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have wronged: for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those too who have been preeminent for holiness of life are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and those who have duly purified themselves with philosophy, live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell.

Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do that we may obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great!

A man of sense ought not to say, nor will I be too confident, that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him, and hurtful rather in their effects, and has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life; who has arrayed the soul in her own proper jewels, which are temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth—thus adorned she is ready to go on her journey to
 115 the world below, when her hour comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead.

When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any

commands for us, Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which we can serve you?

Nothing particular, he said: only, as I have always told you, I would have you look to yourselves; that is a service which you may always be doing to me and mine as well as to yourselves. And you need not make professions; for if you take no thought for yourselves, and walk not according to the precepts which I have given you, not now for the first time, the warmth of your professions will be of no avail.

We will do our best, said Crito. But in what way would you have us bury you?

In any way that you like; only you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not walk away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:—I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed,—these words of mine, with which I comforted you and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me now, as he was surety for me at the trial: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was my surety to the judges that I would remain, and you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that as is usual, 116 and as you think best.

When he had spoken these words, he arose and told us to wait while he went into the bath-chamber with Crito; and we waited, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the

rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him—(he had two young sons and an elder one); and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; and he then dismissed them and returned to us.

Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the eleven, entered and stood by him, saying:—To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are the guilty cause. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be; you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good as could be, and now see how generously he sorrows for me. But we must do as he says, Crito; let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some.

Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and I know that many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and enjoyed the society of his beloved; do not hasten then, there is still time.

Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right in doing thus, for they think that they will gain by the delay; but I am right in not doing thus, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should be sparing and saving a life which is already gone, and could only despise myself for this. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.

Crito made a sign to the servant, who was standing by; and

he went out, and having been absent for some time, returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: but I may and must ask the gods to prosper my journey from this to that other world—even so—and so be it according to my prayer. Then holding the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept over myself, for certainly I was not weeping over him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having lost such a friend. Nor was I the first, for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up and moved away, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out in a loud and passionate cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not offend in this way, for I have heard that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and have patience. When we heard that, we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison

reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said (they were his last words)—he said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may truly call the wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom I have ever known.

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THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

JOWETT

London

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Oxford

THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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SYMPOSIUM.

INTRODUCTION.

OF all the works of Plato the Symposium is the most perfect in form, and may be truly thought to contain more than any commentator has ever dreamed of; or, as Goethe said of one of his own writings, more than the author himself knew. For in philosophy as in prophecy glimpses of the future may often be conveyed in words which could hardly have been understood or interpreted at the time when they were uttered (cp. *Symp.* 210 foll., 223 D). More than any other Platonic work the Symposium is Greek both in style and subject, having a beauty 'as of a statue,' while the companion Dialogue of the Phaedrus is marked by a sort of Gothic irregularity. More too than in any other part of his writings, Plato is emancipated from former philosophies. The genius of Greek art seems to triumph over the traditions of Pythagorean, Eleatic, or Megarian systems, and 'the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy' has at least a superficial reconciliation. (*Rep.* x. 607 B.)

An unknown person who had heard of the discourses in praise of love spoken by Socrates and others at the banquet of Agathon, is desirous of having an authentic account of them, which he thinks that he can obtain from Apollodorus, the same excitable, or rather 'mad' friend of Socrates, who has already appeared in the Phaedo. He had imagined that the discourses were recent. There he is mistaken: but they are still fresh in the memory of his informant, who had just been repeating them to Glaucon, and is quite prepared to have another rehearsal of them in a walk from the Piraeus to Athens. Although he had not been present himself, he had heard them from the best authority. Aristodemus, who is described as having been in past times a humble but inseparable attendant of Socrates, had reported them to him (cp. *Xen. Mem.* i. 4).

The narrative which he had heard was as follows:—

Aristodemus meeting Socrates in holiday attire, is invited by him to a banquet at the house of Agathon, who had been sacrificing in thanksgiving for his tragic victory on the day previous. But no sooner has he entered the house than he finds that he is alone; Socrates has stayed behind in a fit of abstraction, and does not appear until the banquet is half over. On his appearing he and the host jest a little; the question is then asked by Pausanias, one of the guests, ‘What shall they do about drinking? as they had been all well drunk on the day before, and drinking on two successive days is a bad thing.’ This is confirmed by the authority of Eryximachus the physician, who further proposes that instead of listening to the flute-girl and her ‘noise’ they shall make speeches in honour of love, one after another, going from left to right as they are sitting at the table. All of them agree to this proposal, and Phaedrus, who is the ‘father’ of the idea, which he has previously communicated to Eryximachus, begins as follows:—

He descants first of all upon the antiquity of love, which is proved by the authority of the poets, and then upon the benefits which love gives to man. The greatest of these is the sense of honour and dishonour. The lover is ashamed to be seen by the beloved doing or suffering any cowardly or mean act. And a state or army which was made up only of lovers and their loves would be invincible. For love will convert the veriest coward into an inspired hero.

And there have been true loves not only of men but of women also. Such was the love of Alcestis, who dared to die for her husband, and in recompense of her virtue was allowed to come again from the dead. But Orpheus, the miserable harper, who went down to Hades alive, that he might bring back his wife, was mocked with an apparition only, and the gods afterwards contrived his death as the punishment of his cowardliness. The love of Achilles, like that of Alcestis, was courageous and true; for he was willing to avenge his lover Patroclus, although he knew that his own death would immediately follow: and the gods, who honour the love of the beloved above that of the lover, rewarded him, and sent him to the islands of the blest.

Pausanias, who was sitting next, then takes up the tale. He says that Phaedrus should have distinguished the heavenly love from the earthly, before he praised either. For there are two loves, as there are two Aphrodites—one the daughter of Uranus, who has no mother and is the

elder and wiser goddess, and the other, the daughter of Zeus and Dione, who is popular and common. The first of the two loves has a noble purpose, and delights only in the intelligent nature of man, and is faithful to the end, and has no shadow of wantonness or lust. The second is the coarser kind of love, which is a love of the body rather than of the soul, and is of women and boys as well as of men. Now the actions of lovers vary, like every other sort of action, according to the manner of their performance. And in different countries there is a difference of opinion about male loves. Some, like the Boeotians, approve of them; others, like the Ionians, and most of the barbarians, disapprove of them; partly because they are aware of the political dangers which ensue from them, as may be seen in the instance of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. At Athens and Sparta there is an apparent contradiction about them. For at times they are encouraged, and then the lover is allowed to play all sorts of fantastic tricks; he may swear and forswear himself (and 'at lovers' perjuries they say Jove laughs'); he may be a servant, and lie on a mat at the door of his love, without any loss of character; but there are also times when elders look grave and guard their young relations, and personal remarks are made. The truth is that some of these loves are disgraceful and others honourable. The vulgar love of the body which takes wing and flies away when the bloom of youth is over, is disgraceful, and so is the interested love of power or wealth; but the love of the noble mind is lasting. The lover should be tested, and the beloved should not be too ready to yield. The rule in our country is that the beloved may do the same service to the lover in the way of virtue which the lover may do to him.

A voluntary service to be rendered for the sake of virtue and wisdom is permitted among us; and when these two customs—one the love of youth, the other the practice of virtue and philosophy—meet in one, then the lovers may lawfully unite. Nor is there any disgrace to a disinterested lover in being deceived: but the interested lover is doubly disgraced, for if he loses his love he loses his character; whereas the noble love of the other remains the same, although the object of his love is unworthy: for nothing can be nobler than love for the sake of virtue. This is that love of the heavenly goddess which is of great price to individuals and cities, making them work together for their improvement.

The turn of Aristophanes comes next; but he has the hiccough, and therefore proposes that Eryximachus the physician shall cure him or

speak in his turn. Eryximachus is ready to do both, and after prescribing for the hiccough, speaks as follows:—

He agrees with Pausanias in maintaining that there are two kinds of love; but his art has led him to the further conclusion that the empire of this double love extends over all things, and is to be found in animals and plants as well as in man. In the human body also there are two loves; and the art of medicine shows which is the good and which is the bad love, and persuades the body to accept the good and reject the bad, and reconciles conflicting elements and makes them friends. Every art, gymnastic and husbandry as well as medicine, is the reconciliation of opposites; and this is what Heracleitus meant, when he spoke of a harmony of opposites: but in strictness he should rather have spoken of a harmony which succeeds opposites, for an agreement of disagreements there cannot be. Music too is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. In the abstract, all is simple, and we are not troubled with the twofold love; but when they are applied in education with their accompaniments of song and metre, then the discord begins. Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair Urania and the coarse Polyhymnia, who must be indulged sparingly, just as in my own art of medicine care must be taken that the taste of the epicure be gratified without inflicting upon him the attendant penalty of disease.

There is a similar harmony or disagreement in the course of the seasons and in the relations of moist and dry, hot and cold, hoar frost and blight; and diseases of all sorts spring from the excesses or disorders of the element of love. The knowledge of these elements of love and discord in the heavenly bodies is termed astronomy, in the relations of men towards gods and parents is called divination. For divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, and works by a knowledge of the tendencies of merely human loves to piety and impiety. Such is the power of love; and that love which is just and temperate has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and friendship with the gods and with one another. I dare say that I have omitted to mention many things which you, Aristophanes, may supply, as I perceive that you are cured of the hiccough.

Aristophanes is the next speaker:

He professes to open a new vein of discourse, in which he begins by treating of the origin of human nature. The sexes were originally three,

men, women, and the union of the two; and they were made round, having four hands, four feet, two faces on a round neck, and the rest to correspond. Terrible was their strength and swiftness; and they were essaying to scale heaven and attack the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils; the gods were divided between the desire of quelling the pride of man and the fear of losing the sacrifices. At last Zeus hit upon an expedient. Let us cut them in two, he said; then they will only have half their strength, and we shall have twice as many sacrifices. He spake, and split them as you might split an egg with a hair; and when this was done, he told Apollo to give their faces a twist and rearrange their persons, taking out the wrinkles and tying the skin in a knot about the navel. The two halves went about looking for one another, and were ready to die of hunger in one another's arms. Then Zeus invented an adjustment of the sexes, which enabled them to marry and go their way to the business of life. Now the characters of men differ accordingly as they are derived from the original man or the original woman, or the original man-woman. Those who come from the man-woman are lascivious and adulterous; those who come from the woman form female attachments; those who are a section of the male follow the male and embrace him, and in him all their desires centre. The pair are inseparable and live together in pure and manly affection; yet they cannot tell what they want of one another. But if Hephaestus were to come to them with his instruments and propose that they should be melted into one and remain one here and hereafter, they would acknowledge that this was the very expression of their want. For love is the desire of the whole, and the pursuit of the whole is called love. There was a time when the two sexes were only one, but now God has halved them,—much as the Lacedaemonians have cut up the Arcadians,—and if they do not behave themselves he will quarter them, and they will hop about with half a nose and face in basso relievo. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may obtain the goods of which love is the author, and be reconciled to God, and find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world. And now I must beg you not to suppose that I am alluding to Pausanias and Agathon (cp. Protag. 315 E), for my words refer to all mankind everywhere.

Some raillery ensues first between Aristophanes and Eryximachus, and then between Agathon, who fears a few select friends more than 30,000 spectators, and Socrates, who is disposed to begin an argument. This

is speedily repressed by Phaedrus, who reminds the disputants of their tribute to the god. Agathon's speech follows.

He will speak of the god first and then of his gifts. He is the fairest and blessedest and best of the gods, and also the youngest, having had no existence in the old days of Iapetus and Cronos when the gods were at war. The things that were done then were done of necessity and not of love. For love is young and dwells in soft places,—not like Ate in Homer, walking on the skulls of men, but in their hearts and souls, which are soft enough. He is all flexibility and grace, and his habitation is among the flowers, and he cannot do or suffer wrong; for all men serve and obey him of their own free will, and where there is love there is obedience, and where obedience is, there is justice; for none can be wronged of his own free will. And he is temperate as well as just, for he is the ruler of the desires, and if he rules them he must be temperate. Also he is courageous, for he is the conqueror of the lord of war. And he is wise too; for he is a poet, and the author of poesy in others. He created the animals; he is the inventor of the arts; all the gods are his subjects; he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in others; he makes men to be of one mind at a banquet, filling them with affection and emptying them of disaffection; the pilot, helper, defender, saviour of men, in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a strain of love. Such is the discourse, half playful, half serious, which I dedicate to the god.

The turn of Socrates comes next. He begins by remarking satirically that he has not understood the terms of the original agreement, for he fancied that they meant to speak the true praises of love, but now he finds that they only say what is good of him, whether true or false. He begs to be absolved from speaking falsely, but he is willing to speak the truth, and proposes to begin by questioning Agathon. The result of his questions may be summed up as follows:—

Love is of something, and that which love desires is not that which love is or has; for no man desires that which he is or has. And love is of the beautiful (cp. the speech of Agathon, 196 A, B), and therefore has not the beautiful. And the beautiful is the good, and therefore, in wanting and desiring the beautiful, love also wants and desires the good. Socrates professes to have asked the same questions and to have obtained the same answers from Diotima, a wise woman of Mantinea, who, like Agathon, had spoken first of love and then of his works.

Socrates, like Agathon, had told her that love is a mighty god and also fair, and she had shown him in return that love was neither, but in a mean between fair and foul, good and evil, and not a god at all, but only a great *dæmon* or intermediate power (cp. the speech of Eryximachus, 186 D) who conveys to the gods the prayers of men, and to men the commands of the gods.

Socrates asks: Who are his father and mother? To this Diotima replies that he is the son of Plenty and Poverty, and partakes of the nature of both, and is full and starved by turns. Like his mother he is poor and squalid, lying on mats at doors (cp. the speech of Pausanias, 183 A); like his father he is full of arts and resources, and is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. And in this he resembles the philosopher who is also in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. Such is the nature of love, who is not to be confused with the beloved.

But love desires the beautiful; and then arises the question, What does he desire of the beautiful? He desires, of course, the possession of the beautiful;—but what is given by that? For the beautiful let us substitute the good, and we have no difficulty in seeing that the possession of the good is happiness, and that love is the desire of happiness, although the meaning of the word has been too often confined to one kind of love. And love desires not only the good, but the everlasting possession of the good. Why then is there all this flutter and excitement about love? Because all men and women at a certain age are desirous of bringing to the birth. And love is not of beauty only, but of birth in beauty; this is the principle of immortality in a mortal creature. When beauty approaches, then the conceiving power is benign and diffuse; when foulness, she is averted and morose.

But why again does this extend not only to men but also to animals? Because they too have an instinct of immortality. Even in the same individual there is a perpetual succession as well of the parts of the material body as of the thoughts and desires of the mind; nay, even knowledge comes and goes. There is no sameness of existence, but the new mortality is always taking the place of the old. This is the reason why parents love their children—for the sake of immortality; and this is why men love the immortality of fame. For the creative soul creates not children, but conceptions of wisdom and virtue, such as poets and other creators have invented. And the noblest creations of all are those of legislators, in honour of whom temples have been raised. Who

would not sooner have these children of the mind than the ordinary human ones?¹

I will now initiate you, she said, into the greater mysteries; for he who would proceed in due course should love first one fair form, and then many, and learn the connexion of them; and from beautiful bodies he should proceed to beautiful minds, and the beauty of laws and institutions, until he perceives that all beauty is of one kindred; and from institutions he should go on to the sciences, until at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science of universal beauty, and then he will behold the everlasting nature which is the cause of all, and will be near the end. In the contemplation of that supreme being of love he will be purified of earthly leaven, and will behold beauty, not with the bodily eye, but with the eye of the mind, and will bring forth true creations of virtue and wisdom, and be the friend of God and heir of immortality.

Such, Phaedrus, is the tale which I heard from the stranger of Mantinea, and which you may call the encomium of love, or what you please.

The company applaud the speech of Socrates, and Aristophanes is about to say something, when suddenly a band of revellers breaks into the court, and the voice of Alcibiades is heard asking for Agathon. He is led in drunk, and welcomed by Agathon, whom he has come to crown with a garland. He is placed on a couch at his side, but suddenly, on recognizing Socrates, he starts up, and a sort of conflict is carried on between them, which Agathon is requested to appease. Alcibiades then insists that they shall drink, and has a large wine-cooler filled, which he first empties himself, and then fills again and passes on to Socrates. He is informed of the nature of the entertainment; and is ready to join, if only in the character of a drunken and disappointed lover he may be allowed to sing the praises of Socrates.

He begins by comparing Socrates first to the masks of Silenus, which have images of the gods inside them; and, secondly, to Marsyas the flute-player. For Socrates produces the same effect with the voice which Marsyas did with the flute. He is the great speaker and enchanter who ravishes the souls of men; the convincer of hearts too, as he has convinced Alcibiades, and made him ashamed of his mean and miserable

¹ Cp. Bacon's Essays, 8.—'Certainly the best works and of greatest merit for the public have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men; which both in affection and means have married and endowed the public.'

life. Socrates at one time seemed about to fall in love with him; and he thought that he would thereby gain a wonderful opportunity of receiving lessons of wisdom. He narrates the failure of his design. He has suffered agonies from him, and is at his wit's end. He then proceeds to mention some other particulars of the life of Socrates; how they were at Potidaea together, where Socrates showed his superior powers of enduring cold and fatigue; how on one occasion he had stood for an entire day and night absorbed in reflection amid the wonder of the spectators; how on another occasion he had saved Alcibiades' life; how at the battle of Delium, after the defeat, he might be seen stalking about like a pelican, rolling his eyes as Aristophanes had described him in the *Clouds*. He is the most wonderful of human beings, and absolutely unlike any one but a satyr. Like the satyr in his language too; for he uses the commonest words as the outward mask of the divinest truths.

When Alcibiades has done speaking, a dispute begins between him and Agathon and Socrates. Socrates piques Alcibiades by a pretended affection for Agathon. Presently another band of revellers appears, who introduce disorder into the feast; the sober part of the company, Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others, withdraw; and Aristodemus, the follower of Socrates, sleeps during the whole of a long winter's night. When he wakes at cockcrow the revellers are nearly all asleep. Only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon hold out; they are drinking out of a large goblet, which they pass round, and Socrates is explaining to the two others, who are half asleep, that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of tragedy ought to be a writer of comedy also. And first Aristophanes drops, and then, as the day is dawning, Agathon. Socrates, having laid them to rest, takes a bath and goes to his daily avocations until the evening. Aristodemus follows.

If it be true that there are more things in the *Symposium* of Plato than any commentator has dreamed of, it is also true that many things have been imagined which are not really to be found there. Some writings hardly admit of a more distinct interpretation than a musical composition; and every reader may form his own accompaniment of thought or feeling to the strain which he hears. The *Symposium* of Plato is a work of this character, and can with difficulty be rendered in any words but the writer's own. There are so many half-lights and cross-lights, so much of the colour of mythology, and of

the manner of sophistry adhering—rhetoric and poetry, the playful and the serious, are so subtly intermingled in it, and vestiges of old philosophy so curiously blend with germs of future knowledge, that agreement among interpreters is not to be expected. The expression ‘*poema magis putandum quam comicorum poetarum,*’ which has been applied to all the writings of Plato, is especially applicable to the Symposium.

The power of love is represented in the Symposium as running through all nature and all being: at one end descending to animals and plants, and attaining to the highest vision of truth at the other. In an age when man was seeking for an expression of the world around him, the conception of love greatly affected him. One of the first distinctions of language and of mythology was that of gender; and at a later period the ancient physicist, anticipating modern science, saw, or thought that he saw, a sex in plants; there were elective affinities among the elements, marriages of earth and heaven. (Aesch. Frag. Dan. 38.) Love became a mythic personage, whom philosophy, borrowing from poetry, converted into an efficient cause of creation. As of number and figure, the traces of the existence of love were everywhere discerned; and in the Pythagorean list of opposites male and female were ranged side by side with odd and even, finite and infinite.

But Plato seems also to be aware that there is a mystery of love in man as well as in nature, extending beyond the mere immediate relation of the sexes. He is conscious that the highest and noblest things in the world are not easily severed from the sensual desires, or may even be regarded as a spiritualised form of them. We may observe that Socrates himself is not represented as originally unimpassioned, but as one who has overcome his passions; the secret of his power over others partly lies in his passionate but self-controlled nature. In the Phaedrus and Symposium love is not merely the feeling usually so called, but the mystical contemplation of the beautiful and the good. The same passion which may wallow in the mire is capable of rising to the loftiest heights—of penetrating the inmost secret of philosophy. The highest love is the love not of a person, but of the highest and purest abstraction. This abstraction is the far off heaven on which the eye of the mind is fixed in fond amazement. The unity of truth, the consistency of the warring elements of the world, the enthusiasm for knowledge when first beaming upon mankind, the relativity of ideas to the human mind, and of

the human mind to ideas, the faith in the invisible, the adoration of the eternal nature, are all included, consciously or unconsciously, in Plato's doctrine of love.

The successive speeches in praise of love are characteristic of the speakers, and contribute in various degrees to the final result; they are all designed to prepare the way for Socrates, who gathers up the threads anew, and skims the highest points of each of them. But they are not to be regarded as the stages of an idea, rising above one another to a climax. They are fanciful, partly facetious performances, 'yet also having a certain degree of seriousness,' which the successive speakers dedicate to the god. All of them are rhetorical and poetical rather than dialectical, but glimpses of truth appear in them. When Eryximachus says that the principles of music are simple in themselves, but confused in their application, he touches lightly upon a difficulty which has troubled the moderns as well as the ancients in music, and may be extended to the other applied sciences. That confusion begins in the concrete, was the natural feeling of a mind dwelling in the world of ideas. When Pausanias remarks that personal attachments are inimical to despots, the experience of Greek history confirms the truth of his remark. When Aristophanes declares that love is the desire of the whole, he expresses a feeling not unlike that of the German philosopher, who says that 'philosophy is home sickness.' When Agathon says that no man 'can be wronged of his own free will,' he is alluding playfully to a serious problem of Greek philosophy (cp. *Aris. Nic. Ethics*, v. 9). So naturally does Plato mingle jest and earnest, truth and opinion in the same work.

The characters—of Phaedrus, who has been the cause of more philosophical discussions than any other man, with the exception of Simmias, the Theban (*Phaedrus* 242 B); of Aristophanes, who disguises under comic imagery a serious purpose; of Agathon, who in later life is satirized by Aristophanes in the *Thesmophoriazuse*, for his effeminate manners and the feeble rhythms of his verse; of Alcibiades, who is the same strange contrast of great powers and great vices, which meets us in history—are drawn to the life; and we may suppose the less-known characters of Pausanias and Eryximachus to be also true to the traditional recollection of them (cp. *Phaed.* 268 A, *Protag.* 315 C, D; and compare *Sympos.* 214 B with *Phaedr.* 227 A). We may also remark that Aristodemus is called 'the little' in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, i. 4 (cp. *Sym.* 173 B).

The speeches have been said to follow each other in pairs: Phaedrus and Pausanias being the ethical, Eryximachus and Aristophanes the physical speakers, while in Agathon and Socrates poetry and philosophy blend together. The speech of Phaedrus is also described as the mythological, that of Pausanias as the political, that of Eryximachus as the scientific, that of Aristophanes as the artistic (!), that of Socrates as the philosophical. But these and similar distinctions are not found in Plato;—they are the points of view of his critics, and seem rather too general to assist us in understanding him.

When the turn of Socrates comes round he cannot be allowed to disturb the arrangement made at first. With the leave of Phaedrus he asks a few questions, and then he throws his argument into the form of a speech (cp. *Gorg.* 505 E, *Protag.* 353 B). But his speech is really the narrative of a dialogue between himself and Diotima. And as at a banquet good manners would not allow him to win a victory either over his host or any of the guests, the superiority which he gains over Agathon is ingeniously represented as having been already gained over himself by her. The artifice has the further advantage of maintaining his accustomed profession of ignorance (cp. *Menex.* 236 fol.). Even his knowledge of the mysteries of love, to which he lays claim here and elsewhere (*Lys.* 204 C), is given by Diotima.

The speeches are attested to us by the very best authority. The madman Apollodorus, who for three years past has made a daily study of the actions of Socrates—to whom the world is summed up in the words 'Great is Socrates'—he has heard them from another 'madman' who was the shadow of Socrates in days of old, like him going about bare-footed, and who had been present at the time. Would you desire better witness? The extraordinary narrative of Alcibiades is ingeniously represented as admitted by Socrates, whose silence when he is invited to contradict gives consent to the narrator. We may observe, by the way, (1) how the very appearance of Aristodemus by himself is a sufficient indication to Agathon that Socrates has been left behind; also, (2) how the courtesy of Agathon anticipates the excuse which Socrates was to have made on Aristodemus' behalf for coming uninvited; (3) how the story of the fit or trance of Socrates is confirmed by the mention which Alcibiades makes of a similar fit of abstraction occurring when he was serving with the army at Potidaea; like (4) the drinking powers of Socrates and his love of the fair, which receive a similar attestation in the

concluding scene; or the attachment of Aristodemus, who is not forgotten when Socrates takes his departure. (5) We may notice the manner in which Socrates himself regards the first five speeches, not as true, but as fanciful and exaggerated encomiums of the god Love; (6) the ruling passion of Socrates for dialectics, who will argue with Agathon instead of making a speech, and will only speak at all upon the condition that he is allowed to speak the truth. We may note also the touch of Socratic irony, (7) which admits of a wide application and reveals a deep insight into the world:—that in speaking of holy things and persons there is a general understanding that you should praise them, not that you should speak the truth of them—this is the sort of praise which Socrates is unable to give. Lastly (8) we may remark that the banquet is a real banquet after all, at which love is the theme of discourse, and huge quantities of wine are drunk. (214 A, 223 B.)

The discourse of Phaedrus is half-mythical, half-ethical; and he himself, true to the character which is given him in the Dialogue bearing his name, is half-sophist, half-enthusiast. He is the critic of poetry also, who compares Homer and Aeschylus in the insipid and irrational manner of the schools of the day, characteristically reasoning about the probability of matters which do not admit of reasoning. He starts from a noble text: ‘That without the sense of honour and dishonour neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work.’ But he soon passes on to more common-place topics. The antiquity of love, the blessing of having a lover, the incentive which love is to daring deeds, the examples of Alcestis and Achilles, are the chief themes of his discourse. The love of women is regarded by him as almost on an equality with that of men; and he makes the singular remark that the gods favour the return of love which is made by the beloved more than the original sentiment, because the lover is of a nobler and diviner nature.

There is something of a sophistical ring in the speech of Phaedrus, which recalls the first speech in imitation of Lysias, occurring in the Dialogue called the Phaedrus. This is still more marked in the speech of Pausanias which follows; and which is at once hyperlogical in form and also extremely confused and pedantic. Plato is attacking the logical feebleness of the sophists and rhetoricians, through their pupils, not forgetting by the way to satirize the monotonous and unmeaning rhythms which Prodicus and others were introducing into Attic prose

(185 D, cp. Protag. 337). Of course, he is 'playing both sides of the game,' as in the Phaedrus; but it is not necessary in order to understand him that we should discuss the fairness of his mode of proceeding. The love of Pausanias for Agathon has already been touched upon in the Protagoras (315 D), and is alluded to by Aristophanes (193 B). Hence he is naturally the upholder of male loves, which, like all the other affections or actions of men, he regards as varying according to the manner of their performance. Like the sophists and like Plato himself, though in a different sense, he begins his discussion by an appeal to mythology, and distinguishes between the elder and younger love. The value which he attributes to such loves as motives to virtue and philosophy is greatly at variance with modern and Christian notions, but is in accordance with Hellenic sentiment. For it is impossible to deny that some of the best and greatest of the Greeks indulged in attachments, which Plato in the Laws, no less than the universal opinion of Christendom, has stigmatised as unnatural. Pausanias is very earnest in insisting on the innocence of such loves; and he speaks of them as generally approved among Hellenes and disapproved by barbarians. His speech is 'more words than matter,' and might have been composed by a pupil of Lysias or of Prodicus, although there is no hint given that Plato is designing to parody them. As Eryximachus says, 'he makes a fair beginning, but a lame ending.'

Plato transposes the two next speeches, as in the Republic he would transpose the virtues (iv. 430 D) and the mathematical sciences (vii. 528 A). This is done partly to avoid monotony, partly for the sake of making Aristophanes 'the cause of wit in others,' and also in order to bring the comic and tragic poet into juxtaposition, as if by accident. A suitable 'expectation' of Aristophanes is raised by the ludicrous circumstance of his having the hiccough, which is appropriately cured by his substitute, the physician Eryximachus. To Eryximachus Love is the good physician; he sees everything as an intelligent physicist, and, like many professors of his art in modern times, attempts to reduce the moral to the physical; or recognises one law of love which pervades them both. There are loves and strifes of the body as well as of the mind. Like Hippocrates the Asclepiad, he is a disciple of Heracleitus, whose conception of the harmony of opposites he explains in a new way as the harmony after discord; to his common sense, as to that of many moderns as well as ancients, the identity of contradictories is an ab-

surdity. His notion of love may be summed up as the harmony of man with himself in soul as well as body, and of all things in heaven and earth with one another.

Aristophanes is ready to laugh and make laugh before he opens his mouth, just as Socrates, true to his character, is ready to argue before he begins to speak. He expresses the very genius of the old comedy, its coarse and forcible imagery, and the licence of its language in speaking about the gods. He has no sophistical notions about love, which is brought back by him to its common-sense meaning of love between intelligent beings. His account of the origin of the sexes has the greatest (comic) probability and verisimilitude. Nothing in Aristophanes is more truly Aristophanic than the description of the human monster whirling round on four arms and four legs, eight in all, with incredible rapidity. Yet there is a mixture of earnestness in this jest; three serious principles seem to be insinuated:—first, that man cannot exist in isolation; he must be reunited if he is to be perfected: secondly, that love is the mediator and reconciler of poor, divided human nature: thirdly, that the loves of this world are an indistinct anticipation of an ideal union which is not yet realised.

The speech of Agathon is conceived in a higher strain, and receives the real, if half-ironical, approval of Socrates. It is the speech of the tragic poet and a sort of poem, like tragedy, moving among the gods of Olympus, and not among the elder or Orphic deities. In the idea of the antiquity of love he cannot agree; love is not of the olden time, but present and youthful ever. The speech may be compared with that speech of Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, in which he describes himself as talking dithyrambs. It is at once a preparation for Socrates and a foil to him. The rhetoric of Agathon elevates the soul to 'sunlit heights,' but at the same time contrasts with the natural and necessary eloquence of Socrates. Agathon contributes the distinction between love and the works of love, and also hints incidentally that love is always of beauty, which Socrates afterwards raises into a principle. While the consciousness of discord is stronger in the comic poet Aristophanes, Agathon, the tragic poet, has a deeper sense of harmony and reconciliation, and speaks of Love as the creator and artist.

All the earlier speeches embody common opinions coloured with a tinge of philosophy. They furnish the material out of which Socrates proceeds to form his discourse, starting, as in other places, from

mythology and the opinions of men. From Phaedrus he takes the thought that love is stronger than death; from Pausanias, that the true love is akin to intellect and political activity; from Eryximachus, that love is a universal phenomenon and the great power of nature; from Aristophanes, that love is the child of want, and is not merely the love of the congenial or of the whole, but (as he adds) of the good; from Agathon, that love is of beauty, not however of beauty only, but of birth in beauty.

The speech of the day begins with a short argument which overthrows not only Agathon but all of them, by the help of a distinction which has escaped them. Extravagant praises have been ascribed to Love as the author of every good; no sort of encomium was too high for him, whether deserved and true or not. But Socrates has no talent for speaking anything but the truth, and if he is to speak the truth of Love he must honestly confess that he is not a good at all: for love is of the good, and no man can desire that which he has. This piece of dialectics is ascribed to Diotima, who has already urged upon Socrates the argument which he urges against Agathon. That the distinction is a fallacy is obvious. For he who has beauty or good may desire more of them; and he who has beauty or good in himself may desire beauty and good in others. The fallacy seems to arise out of a confusion between the abstract ideas of good and beauty, which do not admit of degrees, and their partial realization in individuals.

But Diotima, the prophetess of Mantinea, whose sacred and super-human character raises her above the ordinary proprieties of women, has taught Socrates far more than this about the art and mystery of love. She has taught him that love is another aspect of philosophy. The same want in the human soul which is satisfied in the vulgar by the procreation of children, may become the highest aspiration of intellectual desire. As the Christian might speak of hungering and thirsting after righteousness; or of divine loves under the figure of human (cp. Eph. v. 32: 'This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church'); as the mediæval saint might speak of the 'fruitio Dei;' as Dante saw all things contained in his love of Beatrice, so Plato would have us absorb all other loves and desires in the love of knowledge. Here is the beginning of Neoplatonism, or rather, perhaps, a proof (of which there are many) that the so-called mysticism of the East was not strange to the Greek of the fifth century before Christ. The first tumult

of the affections was not wholly subdued; there were longings of a creature

Moving about in worlds not realized,

which no art could satisfy. To most men reason and passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea and fact. The union of the greatest comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature, which may have existed in a far-off primeval age in the mind of some Hebrew prophet or other Eastern sage, but has now become an imagination only. Yet this 'passion of the reason' is the theme of the Symposium of Plato. And as there is no impossibility in supposing that 'one king, or son of a king, may be a philosopher,' so also there is a probability that there may be some few—perhaps one or two in a whole generation—in whom the light of truth may not lack the warmth of desire. And if there be such natures, no one will be disposed to deny that 'from them flow most of the benefits of individuals and states;' and even from imperfect combinations of the two elements in teachers or statesmen great good may often arise.

Yet there is a higher region in which love is not only felt, but satisfied, in the perfect beauty of eternal knowledge, beginning with the beauty of earthly things, and at last by regular steps reaching a beauty in which all existence is seen harmonious and one. The limited affection is enlarged, and enabled to behold the ideal beauty of all things. This ideal beauty of the Symposium is the ideal good of the Republic; regarded not with the eye of knowledge, but of faith and desire. The one seems to say to us 'the idea is love,' the other 'the idea is truth.' In both the lover of wisdom is the 'spectator of all time and all existence.' This is a sort of 'mystery' in which Plato also obscurely intimates the interpenetration of the moral and intellectual faculties.

The divine image of beauty which resides within Socrates has been revealed; the Silenus mask, or outward man, has now to be exhibited. The description of Socrates follows immediately after the speech of Socrates; one is the complement of the other. At the height of divine inspiration, when the force of nature can no further go, as if by way of contrast to this extreme idealism or mysticism, Alcibiades, accompanied by a troop of revellers, staggers in, and in his drunken state is able to tell of things which he would have been ashamed to mention if he had been sober. The state of his affections towards Socrates,

unintelligible to us and perverted as they appear, is a perfect illustration of the power ascribed to the loves of men in the speech of Pausanias. Indeed, he is confident that the whole company will sympathise with him; several of them have been in love with Socrates, and, like himself, have been deceived by him. The singular part of this confession is the combination of the most degrading passion with the desire of virtue and improvement. Such an union is not wholly untrue to human nature, which is capable of combining good and evil in a degree beyond the power of imagination to conceive. The Platonic Socrates (for of the real Socrates this may be doubted: cp. Xenophon's *Mem.* I. 2, 29, 30) does not appear to regard the greatest evil of Greek life as a matter of abhorrence, but as a subject for irony, and is far from resenting the imputation of such attachments. Nor does Plato feel any repugnance, such as would be felt in modern times, at bringing his great master and hero into connexion with nameless crimes. He is contented with representing him as a saint, who has won 'the Olympian victory' over the temptations of human nature. The fault of taste, which to us appears glaring, and which was recognised by the Greeks of a later age (*Athænaeus*, xi. 114), was not perceived by Plato himself. We are still more surprised to find that the first step in the upward progress of the philosopher (*Symp.* 210 A) is aroused by the beauty of youth, which alone seems to have been capable of inspiring the modern feeling of romance in the Greek mind. The passion of love took the spurious form of an enthusiasm for the ideal of beauty—a worship as of some godlike image of an Apollo or Antinous. Thus wide is the gulf which separates a portion of Hellenic sentiment in the age of Plato (for about the opinion of Plato himself, as of Socrates, respecting these male loves we are in the same perplexity which he attributes to his countrymen, 182 A, B; cp. *Laws* viii. 841 foll.) not only from Christian, but from Homeric feeling. Yet we should hesitate in ascribing to these attachments any more than to the attachment of Achilles and Patroclus in Homer an immoral or licentious character. There were some, doubtless, to whom the love of the fair mind was the noblest form of friendship (*Rep.* iii. 402 D), and the friendship of man with man seemed higher than the love of woman, because altogether separated from the bodily appetites.

The character of Alcibiades in the *Symposium* is hardly less remarkable than that of Socrates, and agrees with the picture given of him in the first of the two Dialogues which are called by his name, and also with

the slight sketch of him in the Protagoras. He is the impersonation of lawlessness—‘the lion’s whelp, who ought not to be reared in the city,’ yet not without a certain generosity which gained the hearts of men,—strangely fascinated by Socrates, and possessed of a genius which might have been either the destruction or salvation of Athens. The dramatic interest of the character is heightened by the recollection of his after history. He seems to have been present to the mind of Plato in the description of the democratic man of the Republic (viii. 560).

There is no criterion of the date of the Symposium, except that which is furnished by the allusion to the division of Arcadia after the destruction of Mantinea. This took place in the year B. C. 384, which is the forty-fourth year of Plato’s life. The Symposium cannot therefore be regarded as a youthful work. As Mantinea was restored in the year 369, the composition of the Dialogue will probably fall between 384 and 369. Whether the recollection of the event is more likely to have been renewed at the destruction or restoration of the city, rather than at some intermediate period, is a consideration not worth raising.

The Symposium is connected with the Phaedrus both in style and subject; they are the only Dialogues of Plato in which the theme of love is discussed at length. In both of them philosophy is regarded as a sort of enthusiasm or madness, and Socrates is like ‘a prophet new inspired’ with Bacchanalian revelry, which he characteristically pretends to have derived not from himself but from others. The Phaedo also presents some points of comparison with the Symposium. For there, too, philosophy might be described as ‘dying for love;’ and there are not wanting many touches of humour and fancy, which remind us of the Symposium (64 B, 85 B, 99 A). But while the Phaedo and Phaedrus look backwards and forwards to past and future states of existence, in the Symposium there is no break between this world and another; and we rise from one to the other by a regular series of steps or stages, proceeding from the particulars of sense to the universal of reason, and from one universal to many, which are finally reunited in a single science (cp. Rep. vi. 511 B). At first immortality means only the succession of existences; even knowledge comes and goes. Then follows, in the language of the mysteries, a higher and a higher degree of initiation; at last we arrive at the perfect vision of beauty, not relative or changing, but eternal and absolute; not bounded by this world, or in or out of this world, but an aspect of the divine,

extending over all things, and having no limit of space or time : this is the highest knowledge of which the human mind is capable. Plato does not go on to ask whether the individual is absorbed in the sea of light and beauty or retains his personality. Enough for him to have attained the true beauty or good, without enquiring precisely into the relation in which human beings stood to it. That the soul has such a reach of thought, and is capable of partaking of the eternal nature, seems to imply that she too is eternal (cp. *Phaedrus*, 245 foll.). But Plato does not distinguish the eternal in man from the eternal in the world or in God. He is willing to rest in the contemplation of the idea, which to him is the cause of all things (*Rep.* 508 E), and has no strength to go further.

The *Symposium* of Xenophon, in which Socrates describes himself as a pander, and also discourses of the difference between sensual and sentimental love, likewise offers several interesting points of comparison. But the suspicion which hangs over other writings of Xenophon, and the numerous minute references to the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, as well as to some of the other writings of Plato, throw a doubt on the genuineness of the work. The *Symposium* of Xenophon, if written by him at all, would certainly show that he wrote against Plato, and was acquainted with his works. Of this there is no trace in the *Memorabilia*. Such a rivalry is more characteristic of an imitator than of an original writer. This (so-called) *Symposium* of Xenophon may therefore have no more title to be regarded as genuine than the confessedly spurious *Apology*.

There are no means of determining the relative order in time of the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*. The order which has been adopted in this translation rests on no other principle than the desire to bring together in a series the memorials of the life of Socrates.

SYMPOSIUM.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

APOLLODORUS, *who repeats to his companion the dialogue which he had heard from Aristodemus, and had already once narrated to Glaucon.*

PHAEDRUS.

PAUSANIAS.

ERYXIMACHUS.

ARISTOPHANES.

AGATHON.

SOCRATES.

ALCIBIADES.

A TROOP OF REVELLERS.

SCENE:—The House of Agathon.

Steph. 17² I BELIEVE that I have an answer prepared. For the day before yesterday I was coming from my own home at Phalerum to the city, and one of my acquaintance, who had caught a sight of me from behind, calling out playfully in the distance, said: Apollodorus, O thou man of Phalerum, halt! So I did as I was bid; and then he said, I was looking for you, Apollodorus, only just now, that I might hear about the speeches in praise of love, which were delivered by Socrates, Alcibiades, and others, at Agathon's supper. Phoenix, the son of Philip, told another person who told me of them; his narrative was very indistinct, but he said that you knew, and I wish that you would give me an account of them. Who, if not you, should be the reporter of the words of your friend? And first tell me, he said, were you present at this meeting?

Your informant, Glaucon, I said, must have been very indistinct indeed, if you imagine that the occasion was recent; or that I could have been present.

Why, yes, he replied, I thought so.

But how is that possible? I said. Are you ignorant that for many years Agathon has not resided at Athens; and not three have elapsed since I became acquainted with Socrates, of whose every word and action I now make a continual study. 173
In former days I was running about the world, fancying that I was doing something, when I was really a wretched being, no less so than you are now, who would do anything rather than be a philosopher.

Well, he said, jesting apart, tell me when the meeting occurred.

In our boyhood, I replied, when Agathon won the prize with his first tragedy, on the day after that on which he and his chorus offered the sacrifice of victory.

That is a long while ago, he said; and who told you—did Socrates?

No indeed, I replied, but the same person who told Phoenix;—he was a little fellow, who never wore any shoes, Aristodemus, of the deme of Cydathenaeum. He had been at Agathon's feast; and I think that there was no one in those days who was a more devoted admirer of Socrates. Moreover, I have asked Socrates about the truth of some parts of his narrative, and he confirmed them. Then, said Glaucon, let us have the tale over again; is not the road to Athens made for conversation? And so we walked, and talked of the discourses on love; and therefore, as I said at first, I have an answer prepared, and will have another rehearsal of them if you like. For to speak or to hear others speak of philosophy always gives me the greatest pleasure, to say nothing of the profit. But when I hear another strain, especially that of you rich men and traders, such conversation displeases me; and I pity you who are my companions, because you think that you are doing something when in reality you are doing nothing. And I dare say that you pity me in return, whom you regard as an unhappy creature, and very probably you are right. But I certainly know of you what you only think of me—there is the difference.

Companion. I see, Apollodorus, that you are just the same—always speaking evil of yourself, and of others; and I do believe that you pity all mankind, with the exception of Socrates, yourself first of all, true in this to your old name, which, however deserved, I know not how you acquired, of Apollodorus the madman; for you are always raging against yourself and everybody but Socrates.

Apollodorus. Yes, friend, and I am proved to be mad, and out of my wits, because I have these notions of myself and you; no other evidence is required.

Com. I have no wish to dispute about that, Apollodorus; but let me renew my request that you would repeat the tale of love.

Apoll. Well, the tale of love was on this wise:—But perhaps
174 I had better begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat to you the very words of Aristodemus:

He said that he met Socrates fresh from the bath and sandalled; and as the sight of the sandals was unusual, he asked him whither he was going so finely dressed:—

To a banquet at Agathon's, he replied, whose invitation to his sacrifice of victory I refused yesterday, fearing that there would be a crowd, but promising that I would come to-day instead; and I have put on my finery because he is a fine man. What say you to going with me unasked?

Yes, I replied, I will go with you, if you like.

Follow then, he said, and let us demolish the Homeric proverb that

‘To the feasts of lesser men the good unbidden go;’

instead of which our proverb will run that

‘To the feasts of the good the good unbidden go;’

and this alteration may be supported by the authority of Homer himself, who not only demolishes but literally outrages his own proverb. For, after picturing Agamemnon as the most valiant of men, he makes Menelaus, who is but a faint-hearted warrior, come unbidden¹ to the sacrificial feast of Agamemnon, not the better to the worse, but the worse to the better.

¹ Iliad xvii. 588.

I am afraid, Socrates, said Aristodemus, that I may be the inferior person, who, like Menelaus in Homer,

‘To the feasts of the wise unbidden goes.’

But I shall say that I was bidden of you, and then you will have to make the excuse.

‘Two going together,’

he replied, in Homeric fashion, may invent an excuse by the way¹.

This was the style of their conversation as they went along on the way. Socrates stayed behind in a fit of abstraction, and desired Aristodemus, who was waiting, to go on before him. When he reached the house of Agathon he found the doors wide open, and a comical thing happened. A servant coming out met him, and led him at once into the banqueting-hall in which the guests were reclining, for the banquet was about to begin. Welcome, Aristodemus, said Agathon, you are just in time to sup with us; if you come on any other business put that off, and make one of us, as I was looking for you yesterday and meant to have asked you, if I could have found you. But what have you done with Socrates?

I turned round and saw that Socrates was missing, and I had to explain that he had been with me a moment before, and that I came by his invitation.

You were quite right in coming, said Agathon; but where is he himself?

He was behind me just now, as I entered, he said, and I cannot think what has become of him.

Go and look for him, boy, said Agathon, and bring him in; and do you, Aristodemus, meanwhile take the place by Eryximachus.

The attendant then assisted him to wash, and he lay down, and presently another servant came in and said that our friend Socrates had retired into the portico of the neighbouring house. ‘There he is fixed, and when I call to him,’ said the servant, ‘he will not stir.’

How strange, said Agathon; then you must call him again, and keep calling him.

¹ Iliad x. 224.

Let him alone, said my informant ; he has a way of stopping anywhere and losing himself without any reason ; do not disturb him, as I believe he will soon appear.

Well, if you think so, I will leave him, said Agathon. And then, turning to the servants, he added, 'Let us have supper without waiting for him. Put on the table whatever you like, as usual when there is no one to give you orders, which I never do. Imagine that you are our hosts, and that I and the company are your guests ; and treat us well, and then we shall commend you.' After this they had supper, but still no Socrates ; and during the meal Agathon several times expressed a wish to send for him, but Aristodemus objected ; and at last when the feast was about half over—for the fit, as usual, was not of long duration—Socrates entered. Agathon, who was reclining alone at the end of the table, begged that he would take the place next to him ; that I may touch the sage, he said, and have the benefit of that wise thought which came into your mind in the portico, and is now in your possession ; for I am certain that you would not have come away until you had found what you sought.

How I wish, said Socrates, taking his place as he was desired, that wisdom could be infused by touch, out of the fuller into the emptier man, like water which is poured through wool out of a fuller cup into an emptier one ; in that case how much I should prize sitting by you ! For you would have filled me full of much and beautiful wisdom, in comparison of which my own is of a very mean and questionable sort, no better than a dream ; but yours is bright and only beginning, and was manifested forth in all the splendour of youth the day before yesterday, in the presence of more than thirty thousand Hellenes.

You are mocking, Socrates, said Agathon, and ere long you and I will have to settle who bears off the palm of wisdom—of this Dionysus shall be the judge ; but at present you will be better occupied with the banquet.

176 Socrates took his place on the couch, and supped with the rest ; and then libations were offered, and after a hymn had been sung to the god, and there had been the usual ceremonies, they were about to commence drinking, when Pausanias said, And now, my friends, how can we drink with least injury to ourselves ? I can assure you that I feel severely the effect of

yesterday's potations, and must have time to recover; and I suspect that most of you are in the same predicament, for you were of the party yesterday. Consider then: How can the drinking be made easiest?

I entirely agree, said Aristophanes, that we should, by all means, avoid hard drinking, for I was myself one of those who were yesterday drowned in drink.

I think that you are right, said Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus; but I should still like to hear one other person speak. What are the inclinations of our host?

I am not able to drink either, said Agathon.

Then, said Eryximachus, the weak heads like myself, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and others who never can drink, are fortunate in finding that the stronger ones are not in a drinking mood. (I do not include Socrates, who is able either to drink or to abstain, and will not mind, whichever we do.) Well, as none of the company seem disposed to drink much, I may be forgiven for saying, as a physician, that drinking deep is a bad practice, which I never follow, if I can help, and certainly do not recommend to another, least of all to any one who still feels the effects of yesterday's carouse.

I always do what you advise, and especially what you prescribe as a physician, rejoined Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and the rest of the company, if they are wise, will do the same.

All agreed that drinking was not to be the order of the day. Then, said Eryximachus, as you are all agreed that drinking is to be voluntary, and that there is to be no compulsion, I move, in the next place, that the flute-girl, who has just made her appearance, be told to go away and play to herself, or, if she likes, to the women who are within. To-day let us have conversation instead; and, if you will allow me, I will tell you what sort of conversation. This proposal having been accepted, 177 Eryximachus proceeded as follows:—

I will begin, he said, after the manner of Melanippe in Euripides,

‘Not mine the word’

which I am about to speak, but that of Phaedrus. For he is in the habit of complaining that, whereas other gods have poems

and hymns made in their honour, the great and glorious god, Love, has no encomiast among all the poets who are so many. There are the worthy sophists too—the excellent Prodicus for example, who have descanted in prose on the virtues of Heracles and other heroes ; and, what is still more extraordinary, I have met with a philosophical work in which the utility of salt has been made the theme of an eloquent discourse ; and many other like things have had a like honour bestowed upon them. And only to think that there should have been an eager interest created about them, and yet that to this day, as Phaedrus well and truly says, no one has ever dared worthily to hymn Love's praises ! So entirely has so great a deity been neglected. Now I want to offer Phaedrus a contribution ; and also I think that at the present moment we who are here assembled cannot do better than honour the god Love. If you agree with me, there will be no lack of conversation ; for I mean to propose that each of us in turn shall make a speech in honour of Love. Let us have the best which he can make ; and Phaedrus, who is sitting first on the left hand, and is the father of the thought, shall begin.

No one will vote against you, Eryximachus, said Socrates ; on the only subject of which I profess to have any knowledge I certainly cannot refuse to speak, nor, I presume, Agathon and Pausanias ; and there can be no doubt of Aristophanes, who is the constant servant of Dionysus and Aphrodite ; nor will any one disagree of those whom I see around me. The proposal, as I am aware, may seem hard upon us whose place is last ; but we shall be contented if we hear some good speeches first. Let Phaedrus begin the praise of Love, and good luck to him. All the company expressed their assent, and desired him to do as
178 Socrates bade him.

Aristodemus did not recollect all that was said, nor do I recollect all that he related to me ; but I will tell you what I thought most worthy of remembrance, and what the chief speakers said.

Phaedrus began by affirming that Love is a mighty god, and wonderful among gods and men, but especially wonderful in his birth. For that he is the eldest of the gods is an honour to him ; and a proof of this is, that of his parents there is no

memorial ; neither poet nor prose-writer has ever affirmed that he had any. As Hesiod says :—

‘ First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed Earth,
The everlasting seat of all that is,
And Love.’

In other words, after Chaos the Earth and Love, these two, came into being. Also Parmenides sings of the generation of the gods :

‘ First in the train of gods, he fashioned Love.’

And Acusilaus agrees with Hesiod. Thus numerous are the witnesses who acknowledge Love to be the eldest of the gods. And not only is he the eldest, he is also the source of the greatest benefits to us. For I know not any greater blessing to a young man beginning life than a virtuous lover, or to the lover than a beloved youth. For the principle which ought to be the guide of men who would nobly live—that principle, I say, neither kindred, nor honour, nor wealth, nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love. Of what am I speaking? Of the sense of honour and dishonour, without which neither states nor individuals ever do any good or great work. And I say that a lover who is detected in doing any dishonourable act, or submitting through cowardice when any dishonour is done to him by another, will be more pained at being detected by his beloved than at being seen by his father, or by his companions, or by any one else. The beloved too, when he is seen in any disgraceful situation, has the same feeling about his lover. And if there were only some way of contriving that a state or an army should be made up of lovers and their loves, they would be the very best governors of their own city, abstaining from all dishonour, and emulating one another in honour ; and when fighting at one another’s side, although a mere handful, they would overcome the world. For what lover would not choose rather to be seen by all mankind than by his beloved, either when abandoning his post or throwing away his arms? He would be ready to die a thousand deaths rather than endure this. Or who would desert his beloved or fail him in the hour of danger? The veriest coward would become an inspired hero, equal to the bravest, at such a time ; Love would inspire him.

That courage which, as Homer says, the god breathes into the soul of heroes, Love of his own nature infuses into the lover.

Love will make men dare to die for their beloved—love alone; and women as well as men. Of this, Alcestis, the daughter of Pelias, is a monument to all Hellas; for she was willing to lay down her life on behalf of her husband, when no one else would, although he had a father and mother; but the tenderness of her love so far exceeded theirs, that she made them seem to be strangers in blood to their own son, and in name only related to him; and so noble did this action of hers appear to the gods, as well as to men, that among the many who have done virtuously she is one of the very few to whom they have granted the privilege of returning to earth, in admiration of her virtue; such exceeding honour is paid by them to the devotion and virtue of love. But Orpheus, the son of Oeagrus, the harper, they sent empty away, and showed him an apparition only of her whom he sought, but herself they would not give up; because he appeared to them to be enervated by his art, and not daring like Alcestis to die for love, to have been contriving how he might enter Hades alive; moreover, they afterwards caused him to suffer death at the hands of women, as the punishment of his cowardliness. Far other was the reward of the true love of Achilles towards his lover Patroclus—his lover and not his love (the notion that Patroclus was the beloved one is a foolish error into which Aeschylus has fallen, for Achilles was surely the fairer of the two, fairer also than all the other heroes; and, as Homer informs us, he was still beardless, and younger far). And greatly as the gods honour the virtue of love, still the return of love on the part of the beloved to the lover is more admired and valued and rewarded by them, for the lover has a nature more divine and more worthy of worship. Now Achilles was quite aware, for he had been told by his mother, that he might avoid death and return home, and live to a good old age, if he abstained from slaying Hector. Nevertheless he gave his life to revenge his friend, and dared to die, not only on his behalf, but after his death. Wherefore the gods honoured him even above Alcestis, and sent him to the Islands of the Blest. These are my reasons for affirming that Love is the eldest and

noblest and mightiest of the gods, and the chiefest author and giver of virtue in life, and of happiness after death.

This, or something like this, was the speech of Phaedrus; and some other speeches followed which Aristodemus did not remember; the next which he repeated was that of Pausanias, who observed that the proposal of Phaedrus was too indiscriminate, and that we should not be called upon to praise Love in this unqualified manner. If there were only one Love, then what he said would be well enough; but since there are more Loves than one, he should have begun by determining which of them was to be the theme of our praises. I will amend this defect, he said; and first of all I will tell you which Love is deserving of praise, and then try to hymn the praiseworthy one in a manner worthy of him. For we all know that Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love; but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves. And am I not right in asserting that there are two goddesses? The elder one, having no mother, who is called the heavenly Aphrodite—she is the daughter of Uranus; the younger, who is the daughter of Zeus and Dione—her we call common; and the Love who is her fellow-worker may and must also have the name of common, as the other love is called heavenly. All the gods ought to have praise given to them. But still I must try to distinguish the characters of the two Loves. For actions vary according to the manner of their performance. Take for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking—these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them; and when well done they are good, and when wrongly done they are evil; and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noble and worthy of praise. Now the Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimination, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women as well as of youths, and is of the body rather than of the soul—the most foolish beings are the objects of this love which desires only to gain an end, but never thinks of accomplishing the end nobly, and therefore does good and evil quite indiscrimi-

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nately. The goddess who is his mother is far younger than the other, and she was born of the union of the male and female, and partakes of both. But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part,—she is from the male only; this is that love which is of youths, and the goddess being older has nothing of wantonness. Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in him who is the more valiant and intelligent nature; any one may recognise the pure enthusiasts in the very character of their attachments. For they love not boys, but intelligent beings whose reason is beginning to be developed, much about the time at which their beards begin to grow. And in choosing them as their companions, they mean to be faithful to them, and pass their whole life in company with them, not to take them in their inexperience, and deceive them, and play the fool with them, or run away from one to another of them. But the love of young boys should be forbidden by law, because their future is uncertain; they may turn out good or bad, either in body or soul, and much noble enthusiasm may be thrown away upon them; in this matter the good are a law to themselves, and the coarser sort of lovers ought to be restrained by force, as we restrain or attempt to

182 restrain them from fixing their affections on women of free birth. For the abuse of a thing brings discredit on the lawful use, and some have been ready to deny the lawfulness of love when they see the impropriety and evil of attachments of this sort; for surely nothing that is decorously and lawfully done can justly be censured. Now here and in Lacedaemon the rules about love are perplexing, but in most cities they are simple and easily intelligible; in Elis and Boeotia, and in countries having no gifts of eloquence, they are very straightforward; the established feeling is simply in favour of these connexions, and no one, whether young or old, has anything to say to their discredit, the reason being, as I suppose, that they are men of few words in those parts, and therefore the lovers do not like the trouble of pleading their suit. In Ionia and other places, and generally in countries which are subject to the barbarians, the custom is held to be dishonourable; loves of youths share the evil repute of philosophy and gymnastics, because they are inimical to

tyranny ; for the interests of rulers require that their subjects should be poor in spirit, and that there should be no strong bond of friendship or society among them, which love, above all other motives, is likely to inspire, as our Athenian tyrants learned by experience ; for the love of Aristogeiton and the constancy of Harmodius had a strength which undid their power. And, therefore, the ill-repute into which these attachments have fallen is to be ascribed to the evil condition of those who make them to be ill-reputed ; that is to say, to the self-seeking of the governors and the cowardice of the governed ; on the other hand, the indiscriminate honour which is given to them in some countries is attributable to the laziness of those who hold this opinion of them. There is yet a more excellent way of legislating about them, which is our own way ; but this, as I was saying, is rather perplexing. For, observe that open loves are held to be more honourable than secret ones, and that the love of the noblest and highest, even if their persons are less beautiful than others, is especially honourable. Consider, too, how great is the encouragement which all the world gives to the lover ; neither is he supposed to be doing anything dishonourable ; but if he succeeds he is praised, and if he fail he is blamed. And in the pursuit of his love the custom of mankind allows him to do many strange things, which philosophy would bitterly censure if they were done from any ¹⁸³ motive of interest, or wish for office or power. He may pray, and entreat, and supplicate, and swear, and be a servant of servants, and lie on a mat at the door ; in any other case friends and enemies would be equally ready to prevent him, but now there is no friend who will be ashamed of him and admonish him, and no enemy will charge him with meanness or flattery ; the actions of a lover have a grace which ennoble them ; and custom has decided that they are highly commendable and that there is no loss of character in them ; and, what is strangest of all, he only may swear and forswear himself (this is what the world says), and the gods will forgive his transgression, for there is no such thing as a lover's oath. Such is the entire liberty which gods and men have allowed the lover, according to the custom which prevails in our part of the world. From this point of view a man fairly argues that in Athens to

love and to be loved is held to be a very honourable thing. But when there is another regime, and parents forbid their sons to talk with their lovers, and place them under a tutor's care, and their companions and equals cast in their teeth anything of this sort which they may observe, and their elders refuse to silence the reprovers and do not rebuke them—any one who reflects on all this will, on the contrary, think that we hold these practices to be most disgraceful. But the truth, as I imagine, and as I said at first, is, that whether such practices are honourable or whether they are dishonourable is not a simple question ; they are honourable to him who follows them honourably, dishonourable to him who follows them dishonourably. There is dishonour in yielding to the evil, or in an evil manner ; but there is honour in yielding to the good, or in an honourable manner. Evil is the vulgar lover who loves the body rather than the soul, and who is inconstant because he is a lover of the inconstant, and therefore when the bloom of youth which he was desiring is over, takes wing and flies away, in spite of all his words and promises ; whereas the love of the noble mind, which is one with the unchanging, is life-long. The custom of our country would have them both proven well and truly, and would have us yield to the one sort of lover and avoid the other, and therefore encourages some to pursue, and others to fly ; testing both the lover and beloved in contests and trials, which will show to which of the two classes they respectively belong. And this is the reason why, in the first place, a hasty attachment is held to be dishonourable, because time is the true test of this as of most other things ; and then again there is a dishonour in being overcome by the love of money, or of wealth, or of political power, whether a man is frightened into surrender by the loss of them, or is unable to rise above the advantages of them. For none of these things are of a permanent or lasting nature ; not to mention that no generous friendship ever sprang from them. There remains, then, only one way of honourable attachment which custom allows in the beloved, and this is the way of virtue ; for as we admitted that any service which the lover does to him is not to be accounted flattery or dishonour, so the beloved has also one way of voluntary service which is not dishonourable, and this is virtuous service.

For we have a custom, and according to our custom any one who does service to another under the idea that he will be improved by him either in wisdom, or in some other particular of virtue—such a voluntary service, I say, is not to be regarded as a dishonour, and is not open to the charge of flattery. And these two customs, one the love of youth, and the other the practice of philosophy and virtue in general, ought to meet in one, and then the beloved may honourably indulge the lover. For when the lover and beloved come together, having each of them a law, and the lover thinks that he is right in doing any service which he can to his gracious loving one; and the other that he is right in showing any kindness which he can to him who is making him wise and good; the one capable of communicating wisdom and virtue, the other seeking to acquire them with a view to education and wisdom; when the two laws of love are fulfilled and meet in one—then, and then only, may the beloved yield with honour to the lover. Nor when love is of this disinterested sort is there any disgrace in being deceived, but in every other case there is equal disgrace in being or not being deceived. For he who is gracious to his lover under the 185 impression that he is rich, and is disappointed of his gains because he turns out to be poor, is disgraced all the same: for he has done his best to show that he would turn himself to any one's base uses for the sake of money; and this is not honourable. But on the same principle he who lives for the sake of virtue, and in the hope that he will be improved by his lover's company, shows himself to be virtuous, even though the object of his affection be proved to be a villain, and to have no virtue; and if he is deceived he has committed a noble error. For he has proved that for his part he will do anything for anybody for the sake of virtue and improvement, than which there can be nothing nobler. Thus noble in every case is the acceptance of another for the sake of virtue. This is that love which is the love of the heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to individuals and cities, making the lover and the beloved alike eager in the work of their own improvement. But all other loves are the offspring of the other, who is the common goddess. To you, Phaedrus, I offer this my contribu-

tion in praise of love, which is as good as I could make on the sudden.

Pāusānīās cāme tō ā pāuse—this is the balanced way in which I have been taught by the wise to speak; and Aristodemus said that the turn of Aristophanes was next, but either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause he had the hiccough, and was obliged to change with Eryximachus the physician, who was reclining on the couch below him. Eryximachus, he said, you ought either to stop my hiccough, or to speak in my turn until I am better.

I will do both, said Eryximachus: I will speak in your turn, and do you speak in mine; and while I am speaking let me recommend you to hold your breath, and if this fails, then to gargle with a little water; and if the hiccough still continues, tickle your nose with something and sneeze; and if you sneeze once or twice, even the most violent hiccough is sure to go. I will do as you prescribe, said Aristophanes, and now get on.

Eryximachus spoke as follows: Seeing that Pausanias made
186 a fair beginning, and but a lame ending, I must endeavour to supply his deficiency. I think that he has rightly distinguished two kinds of love. But my art further informs me that a double love is to be found in all animals and plants, and I may say in all that is; and is not merely an affection of the soul of man towards the fair, or towards anything; this, I say, is a view of the subject which I seem to have gathered from my own art of medicine, which shows me how great and wonderful and universal is the deity of love, whose empire extends over all that is, divine as well as human. And from medicine I will begin that I may do honour to my art. For there are in the human body two loves, which are confessedly different and unlike, and being unlike, have loves and desires which are unlike; and the desire of the healthy is one, and the desire of the diseased is another; and as Pausanias says, to indulge good men is honourable, and bad men dishonourable; so too in the body the good and healthy elements are to be indulged, and the bad elements and the elements of desire are not to be indulged, but discouraged. And this is what the physician has to do, and in this the art of medicine consists: for medicine may be regarded generally as the knowledge of the loves and desires of the

body, and how to satisfy them or not ; and the good physician is he who is able to separate fair love from foul, or to convert one into the other ; and he who knows how to eradicate and how to implant love, whichever is required, and can reconcile the most hostile elements in the constitution and make them friends, is a skilful practitioner. Now the most hostile are the most opposite, such as hot and cold, moist and dry, bitter and sweet, and the like. And my ancestor, Asclepius, knowing how to implant friendship and accord in these elements, was the creator of our art, as our friends the poets here tell us, and I believe them ; and not only medicine in every branch, but the arts of gymnastic and husbandry are under his dominion. Any 187 one who pays the least attention will also perceive that in music there is the same reconciliation of opposites ; and I suppose that this must have been the meaning of Heracleitus, although his words are not accurate ; for he says that The One is united by disunion, like the harmony of the bow and the lyre. Now there is an absurdity in saying that harmony is discord or is composed of elements which are still in a state of discord. But perhaps what he really meant to say was that harmony is composed of differing notes of higher or lower pitch which disagreed once, and are now reconciled by the art of music ; for if the higher and lower notes still disagreed, there could be no harmony, as is indeed evident. For harmony is a symphony, and symphony is an agreement ; but an agreement of disagreements while they disagree there cannot be ; you cannot harmonize that which disagrees. This may be illustrated by rhythm, which is composed of elements short and long, once differing and now in accord ; which accordance, as in the former instance, medicine, so in this, music implants, making love and unison to grow up among them : and thus music, too, is concerned with the principles of love in their application to harmony and rhythm. Again in the essential nature of harmony and rhythm there is no difficulty in discerning love which has not yet become double. But when you want to use them in actual life, either in the composition of music or in the correct performance of airs or metres composed already, which latter is called education, then the difficulty begins, and the good artist is needed.

Then the old tale has to be repeated of fair and heavenly love—the love of Urania the fair and heavenly muse, and of the duty of accepting the temperate, and those who are as yet intemperate only that they may become temperate, and of preserving their love; and again, of the vulgar Polyhymnia, who must be used with circumspection that the pleasure may not generate licentiousness; just as in my own art it is a great matter so to regulate the desires of the epicure that he may gratify his tastes without the attendant evil of disease. The conclusion is that in music, in medicine, in all other things human as well as divine, both loves ought to be noted as far as may be, for
188 they are both present.

The course of the seasons is also full of both principles; and when, as I was saying, the elements of hot and cold, moist and dry, attain the harmonious love of one another and blend in temperance and harmony, they bring to men, animals, and vegetables health and plenty, and do them no harm; whereas the wanton love, getting the upper hand and affecting the seasons of the year, is very injurious and destructive, and is the source of pestilence, and brings many different sorts of diseases on animals and plants; for hoar-frost and hail and blight spring from the excesses and disorders of these elements of love, the knowledge of which in relation to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies and the seasons of the year is termed astronomy. Furthermore all sacrifices and the whole province of divination, which is the art of communion between gods and men—these, I say, are concerned only with the preservation of the good and the cure of the evil love. For all impiety is likely to ensue if, instead of accepting and honouring and reverencing the harmonious love in all his actions, a man honours the other love, whether in his feelings towards gods or parents, towards the living or the dead. Wherefore the business of divination is to see to these loves and to heal them, and divination is the peacemaker of gods and men, working by a knowledge of the religious or irreligious tendencies which exist in human loves. Such is the great and mighty, or rather omnipotent force of love in general. And this love, especially, which is concerned with the good, and which is perfected in company with temperance and justice, whether among gods or

men, has the greatest power, and is the source of all our happiness and harmony, and makes us friends with the gods who are above us, and with one another. I dare say that I too have omitted several things which might be said in praise of Love, but this was not intentional, and you, Aristophanes, may now supply the omission or take some other line of commendation; as I perceive that you are cured of the hiccough.

Yes, said Aristophanes, who followed, the hiccough is gone; 189
not, however, until I applied the sneezing; and I wonder whether the harmony of the body has a love of such noises and ticklings, for I no sooner applied the sneezing than I was cured.

Eryximachus said: Take care, friend Aristophanes, you are making a jest of me, although you are going to speak; and I shall have to watch and see whether I cannot have a laugh at something which you say, when you might speak in peace.

You are quite right, said Aristophanes, laughing, and I will retract what I said; and do you please not to watch me, as I fear that in what I am going to say, instead of others laughing with me, which is to the manner born of our muse and would be all the better, I shall only be laughed at by them.

Do you expect to shoot your bolt and escape, Aristophanes? Well, perhaps if you are very careful and have a due sense of responsibility, I may be induced to let you off.

Aristophanes professed to open another vein of discourse; he had a mind to praise Love in another way, not like that either of Pausanias or Eryximachus. Mankind, he said, judging by their neglect of him, have never, as I think, at all understood the power of Love. For if they had understood him they would surely have built noble temples and altars, and offered solemn sacrifices in his honour; but this is not done, and certainly ought to be done: since of all the gods he is the best friend of men, the helper and the healer of the ills which are the great obstruction to the happiness of the race. I will describe to you his power, and you may repeat what I say to the rest of the world. And first let me treat of the nature and state of man; for the original human nature was not like the present, but different. In the first place, the sexes were originally three in number, not two as they are now; there

was man, woman, and the union of the two, having a name corresponding to this double nature, which had once a real existence, but is now lost, and the name is only preserved as a term of reproach. In the second place, the primeval man was round, his back and sides forming a circle; and he had four hands and four feet, one head with two faces, looking
190 opposite ways, set on a round neck and precisely alike; also four ears, two privy members, and the remainder to correspond. He could walk upright as men now do, backwards or forwards as he pleased, and he could also roll over and over at a great rate, turning on his four hands and four feet, eight in all, like tumblers going over and over with their legs in the air; this was when he wanted to run fast. Now there were these three sexes, because the sun, moon, and earth are three; and the man was originally the child of the sun, the woman of the earth, and the man-woman of the moon, which is made up of sun and earth, and they were all round and moved round and round like their parents. Terrible was their might and strength, and the thoughts of their hearts were great, and they made an attack upon the gods; of them is told the tale of Otys and Ephialtes who, as Homer says, dared to scale heaven, and would have laid hands upon the gods. Doubt reigned in the celestial councils. Should they kill them and annihilate the race with thunderbolts, as they had done the giants, then there would be an end of the sacrifices and worship which men offered to them; but, on the other hand, the gods could not suffer their insolence to be unrestrained. At last, after a good deal of reflection, Zeus discovered a way. He said: 'Methinks I have a plan which will humble their pride and mend their manners; they shall continue to exist, but I will cut them in two and then they will be diminished in strength and increased in numbers; this will have the advantage of making them more profitable to us. They shall walk upright on two legs, and if they continue insolent and will not be quiet, I will split them again and they shall hop about on a single leg.' He spoke and cut men in two, like a sorb-apple which is halved for pickling, or as you might divide an egg with a hair; and as he cut them one after another, he bade Apollo give the face and the half of the neck a turn in order that the man might

contemplate the section of himself: this would teach him a lesson of humility. He was also bidden to heal their wounds and compose their forms. Apollo twisted the face and pulled the skin all round over that which in our language is called the belly, like the purses which draw in, and he made one mouth at the centre, which he fastened in a knot (this is called the navel); he also moulded the breast and took out 191 most of the wrinkles, much as a shoemaker might smooth leather upon a last; he left a few, however, in the region of the belly and navel, as a memorial of the primeval change. After the division the two parts of man, each desiring his other half, came together, and throwing their arms about one another clung, and in their eagerness to grow into one were perishing from hunger without ever making an effort, because they did not like to do anything apart; and when one of the halves died and the other survived, the survivor sought another mate, man or woman as we call them,—being the sections of entire men or women,—and clung to that. They were being destroyed, when Zeus in pity of them invented a new plan: he turned the parts of generation round to the front, for this had not been always their position, and they sowed the seed no longer as hitherto like grasshoppers in the ground, but in one another; and after the transposition the male generated in the female in order that by the mutual embraces of man and woman they might breed, and the race might continue; or if man came to man they might be satisfied, and rest, and go their ways to the business of life: so ancient is the desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature, making one of two, and healing the state of man. Each of us when separated is but the indenture of a man, having one side only, like a flat fish, and he is always looking for his other half. Men who are a section of that double nature which was once called Androgynous are lascivious; adulterers are generally of this breed, and also adulterous and lascivious women: the women who are a section of the woman do not care for men, but have female attachments; the female companions are of this sort. But they who are a section of the male follow the male, and while they are young, being slices of the original man, they hang about men and 192 embrace them, and they are themselves the best of boys and

youths, because they have the most manly nature. Some indeed assert that they are shameless, but this is not true; for they do not act thus from any want of shame, but because they are valiant and manly, and have a manly countenance, and they embrace that which is like them. And these when they grow up are our statesmen, and these only, which is a great proof of the truth of what I am saying. And when they reach manhood they are lovers of youth, and are not naturally inclined to marry or beget children, which they do, if at all, only in obedience to the law, but they are satisfied if they may be allowed to live with one another unwedded; and such a nature is prone to love and ready to return love, always embracing that which is akin to him. And when one of them finds his other half, whether he be a lover of youth or a lover of another sort, the pair are lost in an amazement of love and friendship and intimacy, and one will not be out of the other's sight, as I may say, even for a moment: they will pass their whole lives together; yet they could not explain what they desire of one another. For the intense yearning which each of them has towards the other does not appear to be the desire of lover's intercourse, but of something else which the soul of either evidently desires and cannot tell, and of which she has only a dark and doubtful presentiment. Suppose Hephaestus, with his instruments, to come to the pair who are lying side by side and say to them, 'What do you people want of one another?' they would be unable to explain. And suppose further, that when he saw their perplexity he said: 'Do you desire to be wholly one; always day and night to be in one another's company? for if this is what you desire, I am ready to melt you into one and let you grow together, so that being two you shall become one, and while you live live a common life as if you were a single man, and after your death in the world below still be one departed soul instead of two—I ask whether this is what you lovingly desire, and whether you are satisfied to attain this?'—there is not a man of them who when he heard the proposal would deny or would not acknowledge that this meeting and melting in one another's arms, this becoming one instead of two, was the very expression of his ancient need. And the reason is that human nature was originally one and we were a whole, and the desire and pursuit

of the whole is called love. There was a time, I say, when the two were one, but now because of the wickedness of mankind God has dispersed us, as the Arcadians were dispersed into villages by the Lacedaemonians. And if we are not obedient to the gods there is a danger that we shall be split up again and go about in basso-relievo, like the figures having only half a nose which are sculptured on columns, and that we shall be like tallies. Wherefore let us exhort all men to piety, that we may avoid evil, and obtain the good, of which Love is to us the lord and minister; and let no one oppose him—he is the enemy of the gods who opposes him. For if we are friends of God and reconciled to him we shall find our own true loves, which rarely happens in this world at present. I am serious, and therefore I must beg Eryximachus not to make fun or to find any allusion to Pausanias and Agathon, who, as I suspect, belong to the class which I have been describing, and are both of the manly sort. But my words have a wider application—they include men and women everywhere; and I believe that if our loves were perfectly accomplished, and each one returning to his primeval nature had his original true love, then our race would be happy. And if this would be best of all, the best in the next degree and under present circumstances must be the nearest approach to such an union; and that will be the attainment of a congenial love. Therefore, if we would praise him who has given to us the benefit, we must praise the god Love, who is our greatest benefactor, both leading us in this life back to our own nature, and giving us high hopes for the future, that if we are pious, he will restore us to our original state, and heal us and make us happy and blessed. This, Eryximachus, is my discourse of love, which, although different to yours, I must beg you to leave unassailed by the shafts of your ridicule, in order that each may have his turn; each, or rather either, for Agathon and Socrates are the only ones left.

Indeed, I am not going to attack you, said Eryximachus, for I thought your speech charming, and did I not know that Agathon and Socrates are masters in the art of love, I should be really afraid that they would have nothing to say, after the world of things which have been said already. But, for all that, I am not without hopes.

194 Socrates said: You did your part well, Eryximachus; but if you were as I am now, or rather as I shall be when Agathon has spoken, you would, indeed, be in a great strait.

You want to cast a spell over me, Socrates, said Agathon, in the hope that I may be disconcerted at the expectation raised among the audience that I shall speak well.

I should be strangely forgetful, Agathon, replied Socrates, of the courage and magnanimity which you showed when your own compositions were about to be exhibited, coming upon the stage with the actors and facing the vast theatre altogether undismayed, if I thought that your nerves could be fluttered at a small party of friends.

Do you think, Socrates, said Agathon, that my head is so full of the theatre as not to know how much more formidable to a man of sense a few good judges are than many fools?

Nay, replied Socrates, I should be very wrong in attributing to you, Agathon, that or any other want of refinement. And I am quite aware that if you happened to meet with any whom you thought wise, you would care for their opinion much more than for that of the many. But then we, having been a part of the foolish many in the theatre, cannot be regarded as the select wise; though I know that if you chanced to light upon a really wise man, you would be ashamed of disgracing yourself before him—would you not?

Yes, said Agathon.

And would you not be ashamed of disgracing yourself before the many?

Here Phaedrus interrupted them, saying: Do not answer him, my dear Agathon; for if he can only get a partner with whom he can talk, especially a good-looking one, he will no longer care about the completion of our plan. Now I love to hear him talk; but just at present I must not forget the encomium on Love which I ought to receive from him and every one. When you and he have paid your tribute to the god, then you may talk.

Very good, Phaedrus, said Agathon; I see no reason why I should not proceed with my speech, as I shall have many other opportunities of conversing with Socrates. Let me say first how I ought to speak, and then speak:

The previous speakers, instead of praising the god Love, or unfolding his nature, appear to have congratulated mankind on the benefits which he confers upon them. But I would rather 195 praise the god first, and then speak of his gifts; this is always the right way of praising everything. May I say without impiety or offence, that of all the blessed gods he is the blessedest because he is the fairest and best? And he is the fairest: because, in the first place, Phaedrus, he is the youngest, and of his youth he is himself the witness, fleeing out of the way of age, who is swift enough surely, swifter than most of us like:—love hates him and will not come near him; but youth and love live and move together—like to like, as the proverb says. There are many things which Phaedrus said about Love in which I agree with him; but I cannot agree that he is older than Iapetus and Kronos—that is not the truth; as I maintain, he is the youngest of the gods, and youthful ever. The ancient things of which Hesiod and Parmenides speak, if they were done at all, were done of Necessity and not of Love; had Love been in those days, there would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods, or other violence, but peace and sweetness, as there is now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is young and also tender; he ought to have a poet like Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of Ate, that she is a goddess and tender:—

‘Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,
Not on the ground but on the heads of men:’

which is an excellent proof of her tenderness, because she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love; for he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls of men, which are not so very soft, but in the hearts and souls of men: in them he walks and dwells and has his home. Not in every soul without exception, for where there is hardness he departs, where there is softness there he dwells; and nestling always with his feet and in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how can he be other than the softest of all things? And therefore he is the tenderest as well as the youngest, and 196 also he is of flexile form; for if he were hard and without flexure he could not enfold all things, or wind his way into and

out of every soul of man undiscovered. And a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial manner the attribute of Love; ungrace and love are always at war with one another. The fairness of his complexion is revealed by his habitation among the flowers; for he dwells not amid bloomless or fading beauties, whether of body or soul or aught else, but in the place of flowers and scents, there he sits and abides. Enough of his beauty--of which, however, there is more to tell. But I must now speak of his virtue: his greatest glory is that he can neither do nor suffer wrong to or from any god or any man; for he suffers not by force if he suffers; force comes not near him, neither does he act by force. For all men in all things serve him of their own free will, and where there is voluntary agreement, there, as the laws which are the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only is he just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no pleasure ever masters Love; he is their master and they are his servants; and if he conquers them he must be temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War is no match for him; he is the captive and Love is the lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the tale runs; and the master is stronger than the servant. And if he conquers the bravest of all others he must be himself the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temperance I have spoken; but I have yet to speak of his wisdom, and I must try to do my best, according to the measure of my ability. For in the first place he is a poet (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art), and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the touch of him every one becomes a poet, even though he had no music in him before; this also is a proof that Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the fine arts; for no one can give to another that which he has not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowledge. Who will deny that the creation of
197 the animals is his doing? Are they not all the works of his wisdom, born and begotten of him? And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of them whom love inspires, has the

light of fame?—he whom love touches not walks in darkness. The arts of medicine and archery and divination were discovered by Apollo, under the guidance of love and desire, so that he too is a disciple of love. Also the melody of the Muses, the metallurgy of Hephaestus, the weaving of Athene, the empire of Zeus over gods and men, are all due to love, who was the inventor of them. Love set in order the empire of the gods—the love of beauty, as is evident, for of deformity there is no love. And formerly, as I was saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, because of the rule of Necessity; but now since the birth of Love, and from the Love of the beautiful, has sprung every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus, I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself, and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other things. And I have a mind to say of him in verse that he is the god who

‘Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,
Who stills the waves and bids the sufferer sleep.’

He fills men with affection, and takes away their disaffection, making them meet together at such banquets as these. In sacrifices, feasts, dances, he is our lord—supplying kindness and banishing unkindness, giving friendship and forgiving enmity, the joy of the good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; regardful of the good, regardless of the evil. In every word, work, wish, fear—pilot, comrade, helper, saviour; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest: in whose footsteps let every man follow, sweetly singing in his honour that sweet strain with which love charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the speech, Phaedrus, half playful, yet having a certain measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability, I dedicate to the god.

When Agathon had done speaking, Aristodemus said that 198 there was a general cheer; the fair youth was thought to have spoken in a manner worthy of himself, and of the god. And Socrates, looking at Eryximachus, said: Tell me, son of Acumenus, were my fears groundless? was I not a prophet when I

said that Agathon would make a wonderful oration, and that I should be in a strait?

One part of the prophecy, replied Eryximachus—that about Agathon, appears to me to be true; but not the other part—that you will be in a strait.

Why, my dear friend, said Socrates, must not I or any one be in a strait who has to speak after he has heard such a rich and varied discourse? I am especially struck with the beauty of the concluding words—who could listen to them without amazement? When I reflected on the immeasurable inferiority of my own powers, I was ready to run away for shame, if there had been any escape. For I was reminded of Gorgias, and at the end of his speech I fancied that Agathon was shaking at me the Gorginian or Gorgonian head of the great master of rhetoric, which was simply to turn me and my speech into stone, as Homer says, and strike me dumb. And then I perceived how foolish I had been in consenting to take my turn with you in praising love, and saying that I too was a master of the art, when I really had no conception how anything ought to be praised. For in my simplicity I imagined that the topics of praise should be true, and that this being presupposed, out of the true the speaker was to choose the best and arrange them in the best order. And I felt quite proud, thinking that I knew the nature of true praise, and should speak well. Whereas I now see that the intention was to attribute to love every species of greatness and glory, whether really belonging to him or not, without regard to truth or falsehood—that was no matter; for the original proposal seems to have been not that each of you should praise love, but only that you should appear to praise him. And so you attribute to love every imaginable form of praise, and say that 'he is all this,' 'the cause of
199 all that,' making him appear the fairest and best of all to those who know him not, for you cannot impose on those who know him. And a noble and solemn hymn of praise have you rehearsed. But as I misunderstood the nature of the praise when I said that I would take my turn, I must beg to be absolved from the promise which (as Euripides would say) was a promise of the lips and not of the mind. Farewell then to such a strain: for I do not praise in that way; no, indeed, I cannot. But if

you like to hear the truth about love, I am ready to speak in my own manner, though I will not make myself ridiculous by entering into any rivalry with you. Say then, Phaedrus, whether you would like to have the truth about love, spoken in any words and in any order which may happen to come into my mind at the time. Will that be agreeable to you?

Aristodemus said that Phaedrus and the company bid him take his own course. Then, he added, let me have your permission first to ask Agathon a few more questions, in order that I may take his admissions as the premisses of my discourse.

I grant the permission, said Phaedrus: put your questions. Socrates then proceeded as follows:—

In the magnificent oration which you have uttered, I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, when you said that you would begin with the nature of love and afterwards speak of his works—that is a way of beginning which I very much approve. And as you have spoken thus eloquently of the nature of love, may I ask you further, Whether love is the love of something or of nothing? And here I must explain myself: I do not want you to say that love is the love of a father or the love of a mother—that would be ridiculous; but to answer as you would, if I asked is a father a father of something? to which you would find no difficulty in replying, of a son or daughter: and that would be right.

Very true, said Agathon.

And you would say the same of a mother?

He assented.

Yet let me ask you one more question in order to illustrate my meaning. Is not a brother to be regarded essentially as a brother of something?

Certainly, he replied.

That is, of a brother or sister?

Yes, he said.

And now, said Socrates, I will ask about love:—Is love of something or of nothing?

Of something, surely, he replied.

Keep in mind what this is, and tell me what I want to know—whether love desires that of which love is.

Yes, surely.

And does he possess, or does he not possess, that which he loves and desires?

Probably not, I should say.

Nay, replied Socrates, I would have you consider whether 'necessarily' is not rather the word. The inference that he who desires something is in want of something, and that he who desires nothing is in want of nothing, is in my judgment, Agathon, absolutely and necessarily true. What do you think?

I agree with you, said Agathon.

Very good. And would he who is great desire to be great, or he who is strong desire to be strong?

That would be inconsistent with our previous admissions.

True. For he who is anything cannot want to be that which he is?

Very true.

And yet, added Socrates, if a man being strong desired to be strong, or being swift desired to be swift, or being healthy desired to be healthy, in that case he might be thought to desire a quality which he already has. I give the example in order that we may avoid misconception. For the possessors of these qualities, Agathon, must be supposed to have their respective advantages at the time, whether they choose or not; and who can desire that which he has? Therefore, when a person says, I am well and wish to be well, or I am rich and wish to be rich, and I desire simply to have what I have—to him we shall reply: 'You, my friend, having wealth and health and strength, want to have the continuance of them; for at this moment, whether you choose or no, you have them. And when you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?' He must agree with us—must he not?

He must, said Agathon.

Then, said Socrates, this is equivalent, not to desiring what he has or possesses already, but to desiring that what he has may be preserved to him in the future?

Very true, he said.

Then he and every one who desires, desires that which he has not already, and which is future and not present, and which

he has not, and is not, and of which he is in want ;—these are the sort of things which love and desire seek?

Very true, he said.

Then now, said Socrates, let us recapitulate the argument. First, is not love of something, and of something too which is wanting to a man?

Yes, he replied.

Remember further what you said in your speech, or if you do not remember I will remind you: you said that the love of the beautiful set in order the empire of the gods, for that of deformed things there is no love—did you not say something like that?

Yes, said Agathon.

Yes, my friend, and the remark was a just one. And if this is true, love is the love of beauty and not of deformity?

He assented.

And the admission has been already made that love is of that which a man wants and has not?

True, he said.

Then love wants and has not beauty?

Certainly, he replied.

And would you call that beautiful which wants and does not possess beauty?

Certainly not.

Then would you still say that love is beautiful?

Agathon replied: I fear that I did not understand what I was saying.

Yet you made a fair speech, Agathon, replied Socrates; but once more say:—Is not the good also the beautiful?

Yes.

Then in wanting the beautiful, love wants also the good?

I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon. And let us suppose that what you say is true.

Say rather, dear Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth; for Socrates is easily refuted.

And now I will take my leave of you, and rehearse the tale of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantinea, a woman wise in this and many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years. She was

my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to the wise woman when she questioned me: I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can. Like Agathon, she spoke first of the being and nature of love, and then of his works. And I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that love was a mighty god, and likewise fair; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing, love was neither fair nor good. 'What do you mean, Diotima,' I said, 'is love then evil and foul?' 'Hush,' she cried; 'is that to be deemed foul
202 which is not fair?' 'Certainly,' I said. 'And is that which is not wise, ignorant? do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?' 'And what may that be?' I said. 'Right opinion,' she replied; 'which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.' 'Quite true,' I replied. 'Do not then insist,' she said, 'that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.' 'Well,' I said, 'love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.' 'By those who know or by those who do not know?' 'By all.' 'And how, Socrates,' she said with a smile, 'can love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is not a god at all?' 'And who are they?' I said. 'You and I are two of them,' she replied. 'How can that be?' I said. 'That is very intelligible,' she replied; 'for you yourself would acknowledge that the gods are happy and fair—of course you would—would you dare to say that any god was not?' 'Certainly not,' I replied. 'And you mean by the happy, those who are the possessors of things good or fair?' 'Yes.' 'And you admitted that Love, because he was in want, desires those good and fair things of which he is in want?' 'Yes, I admitted that.' 'But how can he be a god who has no share in the good or the fair?' 'That is not to be supposed.' 'Then you see that you also deny the divinity of Love.'

‘What then is love?’ I asked; ‘Is he mortal?’ ‘No.’ ‘What then?’ ‘As in the former instance, he is neither mortal nor immortal, but in a mean between the two.’ ‘What is he then, Diotima?’ ‘He is a great spirit (*δαίμων*), and like all spirits he is intermediate between the divine and the mortal.’ ‘And what,’ I said, ‘is his power?’ ‘He interprets,’ she replied, ‘between gods and men, conveying to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and replies of the gods; he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them, and in him all is bound together, and through him the arts of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, 203 and all prophecy and incantation, find their way. For God mingles not with man; but through Love all the intercourse and speech of God with man, whether awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which understands this is spiritual; all other wisdom, such as that of arts and handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now these spirits or intermediate powers are many and diverse, and one of them is Love.’ ‘And who,’ I said, ‘was his father, and who his mother?’ ‘The tale,’ she said, ‘will take time; nevertheless I will tell you. On the birthday of Aphrodite there was a feast of the gods, at which the god Poros or Plenty, who is the son of Metis or Discretion, was one of the guests. When the feast was over, Penia or Poverty, as the manner is on such occasions, came about the doors to beg. Now Plenty, who was the worse for nectar (there was no wine in those days), went into the garden of Zeus and fell into a heavy sleep; and Poverty considering her own straitened circumstances, plotted to have a child by him, and accordingly she lay down at his side and conceived Love, who partly because he is naturally a lover of the beautiful, and because Aphrodite is herself beautiful, and also because he was born on her birthday, is her follower and attendant. And as his parentage is, so also are his fortunes. In the first place he is always poor, and anything but tender and fair, as the many imagine him; and he is hard-featured and squalid, and has no shoes, nor a house to dwell in; on the bare earth exposed he lies under the open heaven, in the streets, or at the doors of houses, taking his rest; and like his mother he is always in distress. Like his father too, whom he also partly resembles, he is always plotting against the fair and good; he

is bold, enterprising, strong, a hunter of men, always weaving some intrigue or other, keen in the pursuit of wisdom, and never wanting resources; a philosopher at all times, terrible as an enchanter, sorcerer, sophist; for as he is neither mortal nor immortal, he is alive and flourishing at one moment when he is in plenty, and dead at another moment, and again alive by reason of his father's nature. But that which is always flowing in is always flowing out, and so he is never in want and never in wealth; and, further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge. The truth of the matter is as follows: No god is a philosopher or seeker after wisdom, for he is wise already; nor does any man who is wise seek after wisdom. Neither
 204 do the ignorant seek after wisdom. For herein is the evil of ignorance, that he who is neither good nor wise is nevertheless satisfied: he has no desire for that of which he feels no want.' 'But who then, Diotima,' I said, 'are the lovers of wisdom, if they are neither the wise nor the foolish?' 'A child may answer that question,' she replied; 'they are those who, like love, are in a mean between the two. For wisdom is a most beautiful thing, and love is of the beautiful; and therefore love is also a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and being a lover of wisdom is in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. And this again is a quality which Love inherits from his parents; for his father is wealthy and wise, and his mother poor and foolish. Such, my dear Socrates, is the nature of the spirit Love. The error in your conception of him was very natural, and as I imagine from what you say, has arisen out of a confusion of love and the beloved, which made you think that love was all beautiful. For the beloved is the truly beautiful, and delicate, and perfect, and blessed; but the principle of love is of another nature, and is such as I have described.'

I said: 'O thou stranger woman, thou sayest well, and now, assuming love to be such as you say, what is the use of him to us men?' 'That, Socrates,' she replied, 'I will proceed to unfold: of his nature and birth I have already spoken; and you acknowledge that love is of the beautiful. But some one will say: Of the beautiful in what, Socrates and Diotima?—or rather let me put the question more clearly, and ask: When a man loves the beautiful, what does he desire?' I answered

her 'That the beautiful may be his.' 'Still,' she said, 'the answer suggests a further question: What is given by the possession of beauty?' 'To what you have asked,' I replied, 'I have no answer ready.' 'Then,' she said, 'let me put the word "good" in the place of the beautiful, and repeat the question once more: He who loves the good loves; what does he love?' 'The possession of the good,' I said. 'And what does he gain who possesses the good?' 'Happiness,' I replied; 'there is no difficulty in answering that.' 'Yes,' she said, 'the happy are²⁰⁵ made happy by the acquisition of good things. Nor is there any need to ask why a man desires happiness; the answer is already final.' 'You are right,' I said. 'And is this wish and this desire common to all? and do all men always desire their own good, or only some men?—what say you?' 'All men,' I replied; 'the desire is common to all.' 'Why, then,' she rejoined, 'are not all men, Socrates, said to love, but only some of them? whereas you say that all men are always loving the same things.' 'I myself wonder,' I said, 'why that is.' 'There is nothing to wonder at,' she replied; 'the reason is that one part of love is separated off and receives the name of the whole, but the other parts have other names.' 'Give an illustration,' I said. She answered me as follows: 'There is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold. All creation or passage of non-being into being is poetry or making, and the processes of all art are creative; and the masters of arts are all poets or makers.' 'Very true.' 'Still,' she said, 'you know that they are not called poets, but have other names; the specific term, poetry, is confined to that portion of the art which is separated off from the rest of poetry, and is concerned with music and metre; and this is what is called poetry, and they who possess this kind of poetry are called poets.' 'Very true,' I said. 'And the same holds of love. For you may say generally that all desire of good and happiness is only the great and subtle power of love; but those who turn towards him by any other path, whether the path of money-making or gymnastics or philosophy, are not called lovers—the name of the genus is reserved for those whose affection takes one form only—they alone are said to love, or to be lovers.' 'I dare say,' I replied, 'that you are right.' 'Yes,' she added, 'and you hear people say that lovers are seeking for their other half;

but I say that they are seeking neither for the half of themselves, nor for the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good. And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast them away, if they are evil; for they love not what is their own, but what is another's, unless indeed by the words "good" and "their own" and "bad" and "another's" they mean the same thing.

²⁰⁶ For there is nothing which men love but the good. Do you think that there is?' 'Certainly, I should say, that there is nothing.' 'Then,' she said, 'the conclusion of the whole matter is, that men love the good.' 'Yes,' I said. 'To which may be added that they love the possession of the good?' 'Yes, that may be added.' 'And not only the possession, but the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That may be added too.' 'Then love,' she said, 'may be described generally as the love of the everlasting possession of the good?' 'That is most true.'

'Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me further,' she said, 'what is the manner of the pursuit? what are they doing who show all this eagerness and heat which is called love? Answer me.' 'Nay, Diotima,' I replied, 'if I had known, I should not have wondered at your wisdom, neither should I have come to you to learn about this very matter.' 'Well,' she said, 'I will teach you;—love is only birth in beauty, whether of body or soul.' 'The oracle requires an explanation,' I said; 'I do not understand you.' 'I will make my meaning clearer,' she replied. 'I mean to say, that all men are bringing to the birth in their bodies and in their souls. There is a certain age at which human nature is desirous of procreation—procreation which must be in beauty and not in deformity; and this procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature, and in the inharmonious they can never be. But the deformed is always inharmonious with the divine, and the beautiful harmonious. Beauty, then, is the destiny or goddess of parturition who presides at birth, and therefore when approaching beauty the conceiving power is propitious, and diffuse, and benign, and begets and bears fruit: at the sight of ugliness it frowns and contracts in pain, and is averted and morose, and shrinks up, and not without a pang refrains from conception. And this is the reason why, when the hour of conception arrives,

and the teeming nature is full, there is such a flutter and ecstasy about beauty whose approach is the alleviation of the pain of travail. For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love of the beautiful only.' 'What then?' 'The love of generation and of birth in beauty.' 'Yes,' I said. 'Yes, indeed,' she replied. 'But why of generation?' I said. 'Because to the mortal, generation is a sort of eternity and immortality,' she replied; 'and if, as has been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good, all men will necessarily desire immortality together with good. Wherefore love is of immortality.'

All this she taught me at various times when she spoke of love. And I remember that she once said to me, 'What is the cause, Socrates, of love, and the attendant desire? See you not how all animals, birds as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in agony when they take the infection of love, which begins with the desire of union; whereto is added the care of offspring, on behalf of whom the weakest are ready to battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain their offspring. Man may be supposed to act thus from reason; but why should animals have these passionate feelings? Can you tell me why?' Again I replied, that I did not know. She said to me: 'And do you expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you do not know this?' 'But that, Diotima, is the reason why I come to you; as I have told you already, I am aware that I want a teacher, and I wish that you would explain to me the cause of this and of the other mysteries of love.' 'Marvel not,' she said, 'if you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have already several times acknowledged; for here again, and on the same principle too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal: and this is only to be attained by generation, because generation always leaves behind a new existence in the place of the old. Nay even in the life of the same individual there is succession and not absolute unity: a man is called the same, and yet in the short interval which elapses between youth and age, and in which every animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing a perpetual process of

loss and reparation—hair, flesh, bones, blood, and the whole body are always changing. Which is true not only of the body, but also of the soul, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but are always coming and going; and equally true of knowledge, which is still more surprising—for not only do the sciences in general come and go, so that in respect of them we are never the same; but each of them individually experiences a like change. For what is implied in the word “recollection,” but the departure of knowledge, which is ever being forgotten and is renewed and preserved by recollection, and appears to be the same although in reality new, according to that law of succession by which all mortal things are preserved, not absolutely the same, but by substitution, the old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar existence behind—unlike the divine, which is always the same and not another? And in this way, Socrates, the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of immortality; but the immortal in another way. Marvel not then at the love which all men have of their offspring; for that universal love and interest is for the sake of immortality.’

I was astonished at her words, and said: ‘Is this really true, O thou wise Diotima?’ And she answered with all the authority of a sophist: ‘Of that, Socrates, you may be assured;—think only of the ambition of men, and you will wonder at the senselessness of their ways, unless you consider how they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame. They are ready to run risks greater far than they would have run for their children, and to spend money and undergo any sort of toil, and even to die for the sake of leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal. Do you imagine that Alcestis would have died to save Admetus, or Achilles to avenge Patroclus, or your own Codrus in order to preserve the kingdom for his sons, if they had not imagined that the memory of their virtues, which is still retained among us, would be immortal? Nay,’ she said, ‘I am persuaded that all men do all things, and the better they are the more they do them, in hope of the glorious fame of immortal virtue; for they desire the immortal.’

‘They whose bodies only are creative, betake themselves to women and beget children—this is the character of their love;

their offspring, as they hope, will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future. But creative souls—for there certainly are men who are more creative in their souls than in their bodies—conceive that which is proper for the soul to conceive or retain. And what are these conceptions?—wisdom and virtue in general. And such creators are poets and all artists who are deserving of the name inventor. But the greatest and fairest sort of wisdom by far is that which is concerned with the ordering of states and families, and which is called temperance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he comes to maturity desires to beget and generate. He wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget offspring—for in deformity he will beget nothing—and naturally embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed body; above all when he finds a fair and noble and well-nurtured soul, he embraces the two in one person, and to such an one he is full of speech about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man; and he tries to educate him; and at the touch of the beautiful which is ever present to his memory, even when absent, he brings forth that which he had conceived long before, and in company with him tends that which he brings forth; and they are married by a far nearer tie and have a closer friendship than those who beget mortal children, for the children who are their common offspring are fairer and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have their children than ordinary human ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory? Or who would not have such children as Lycurgus left behind him to be the saviours, not only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say? There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian laws; and many others there are in many other places, both among Hellenes and barbarians. All of them have given to the world many noble works, and have been the parents of virtue of every kind, and many temples have been raised in their honour for the sake of their children; which were never raised in honour of any one, for the sake of his mortal children.

‘These are the lesser mysteries of love, into which even you,
210 Socrates, may enter; to the greater and more hidden ones which
are the crown of these, and to which, if you pursue them in a
right spirit, they will lead, I know not whether you will be able
to attain. But I will do my utmost to inform you, and do you
follow if you can. For he who would proceed aright in this
matter should begin in youth to visit beautiful forms; and first,
if he be guided by his instructor aright, to love one such form
only—out of that he should create fair thoughts; and soon he
will of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to
the beauty of another; and then if beauty of form in general
is his pursuit, how foolish would he be not to recognize that the
beauty in every form is one and the same! And when he per-
ceives this he will abate his violent love of the one, which he
will despise and deem a small thing, and will become a lover
of all beautiful forms; in the next stage he will consider that the
beauty of the mind is more honourable than the beauty of the
outward form. So that if a virtuous soul have but a little
comeliness, he will be content to love and tend him, and will
search out and bring to the birth thoughts which may improve
the young, until he is compelled to contemplate and see the
beauty of institutions and laws, and to understand that the
beauty of them all is of one family, and that personal beauty
is a trifle; and after laws and institutions he will go on to the
sciences, that he may see their beauty, being not like a servant
in love with the beauty of one youth or man or institution, him-
self a slave mean and narrow-minded, but drawing towards and
contemplating the vast sea of beauty, he will create many fair
and noble thoughts and notions in boundless love of wisdom;
until on that shore he grows and waxes strong, and at last the
vision is revealed to him of a single science, which is the science
of beauty everywhere. To this I will proceed; please to give
me your very best attention.

‘He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love,
and who has learned to see the beautiful in due order and suc-
cession, when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive
a nature of wondrous beauty (and this, Socrates, is the final
211 cause of all our former toils)—a nature which in the first place
is everlasting, not growing and decaying, or waxing and waning;

in the next place not fair in one point of view and foul in another, or at one time or in one relation or at one place fair, at another time or in another relation or at another place foul, as if fair to some and foul to others, or in the likeness of a face or hands or any other part of the bodily frame, or in any form of speech or knowledge, or existing in any other being; as for example, in an animal, or in heaven, or in earth, or in any other place, but beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting, which without diminution and without increase, or any change, is imparted to the ever-growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who under the influence of true love rising upward from these begins to see that beauty, is not far from the end. And the true order of going or being led by another to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear Socrates,' said the stranger of Mantinea, 'is that life above all others which man should live, in the contemplation of beauty absolute; a beauty which if you once beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, whose presence now entrances you; and you and many a one would be content to live seeing only and conversing with them without meat or drink, if that were possible—you only want to be with them and to look at them. But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty—the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colours and vanities of human life—thither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty divine and simple? Do you not see that ²¹² in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an ignoble life?'

Such, Phaedrus—and I speak not only to you, but to all of

you—were the words of Diotima ; and I am persuaded of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human nature will not easily find a better helper than love. And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honour him as I myself honour him, and walk in his ways, and exhort others to do the same, and praise the power and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability now and ever.

The words which I have spoken, you, Phaedrus, may call an encomium of love, or anything else which you please.

When Socrates had done speaking, the company applauded, and Aristophanes was beginning to say something in answer to the allusion to his own speech which Socrates had made¹, when suddenly there was a great knocking at the door of the house, as of revellers, and the sound of a flute-girl was heard. Agathon told the attendants to go and see who were the intruders. 'If they are friends of ours,' he said, 'invite them in, but if not, say that the drinking is over.' A little while afterwards they heard the voice of Alcibiades resounding in the court ; he was in a great state of intoxication, and kept roaring and shouting 'Where is Agathon? Lead me to Agathon,' and at length, supported by the flute-girl and some of his companions, he found his way to them. 'Hail, friends,' he said, appearing at the door crowned with a massive garland of ivy and flowers, his head flowing with ribands. 'Will you have a very drunken man as a companion of your revels? Or shall I crown Agathon, which was my intention in coming, and go away? For I was unable to come yesterday, and therefore I come today, carrying on my head these ribands, that taking them from my own head, I may crown the head of this fairest and wisest of men, as I may be allowed to call him. Will you laugh at me because I am drunk? Yet I know very well that I am speaking the truth, although you may laugh. But first tell me ; if I come in shall we have an understanding? Will you drink with me or not?'

The company were vociferous in begging that he would take his place among them, and Agathon specially invited him. Thereupon he was led in by the people who were with him ;

and as he was being led he took the crown and ribands from his head, intending to crown Agathon, and had them before his eyes; this prevented him from seeing Socrates, who made way for him, and Alcibiades took the vacant place between Agathon and Socrates, and in taking the place he embraced Agathon and crowned him. Take off his sandals, said Agathon, and let him make a third on the same couch.

By all means; but who makes the third partner in our revels? said Alcibiades, turning round and starting up as he caught sight of Socrates. By Heracles, he said, what is this? here is Socrates always lying in wait for me, and always, as his way is, coming out at all sorts of unsuspected places: and now, what have you to say for yourself, and why are you lying here, where I perceive that you have contrived to find a place, not by a joker or lover of jokes, like Aristophanes, but by the fairest of the company?

Socrates turned to Agathon and said: I must ask you to protect me, Agathon; for this passion of his has grown quite a serious matter. Since I became his admirer I have never been allowed to speak to any other fair one, or so much as to look at them. If I do, he goes wild with envy and jealousy, and not only abuses me but can hardly keep his hands off me, and at this moment he may do me some harm. Please to see to this, and either reconcile me to him, or, if he attempts violence, protect me, as I am in bodily fear of his mad and passionate attempts.

There can never be reconciliation between you and me, said Alcibiades; but for the present I will defer your chastisement. And I must beg you, Agathon, to give me back some of the ribands that I may crown the marvellous head of this universal despot—I would not have him complain of me for crowning you, and neglecting him, who in conversation is the conqueror of all mankind; and this not only once, as you were the day before yesterday, but always. Whereupon, taking some of the ribands, he crowned Socrates, and again reclined.

Then he said: You seem, my friends, to be sober, which is a thing not to be endured; you must drink—for that was the agreement which I made with you—and I elect myself master of the feast until you are well drunk. Let us have a large

goblet, Agathon, or rather, he said, addressing the attendant, bring me that wine-cooler. The wine-cooler which had caught
 214 his eye was a vessel holding more than two quarts—this he filled and emptied, and bade the attendant fill it again for Socrates. Observe, my friends, said Alcibiades, that my ingenious device will have no effect on Socrates, for he can drink any quantity of wine and not be at all nearer being drunk. Socrates drank the cup which the attendant filled for him.

Eryximachus said: What is this, Alcibiades? Are we to have neither conversation nor singing over our cups; but simply to drink as if we were thirsty?

Alcibiades replied: Hail, worthy son of a most wise and worthy sire.

The same to you, said Eryximachus; but what shall we do? That I leave to you, said Alcibiades.

‘The wise physician skilled our wounds to heal’

shall prescribe and we will obey. What do you want?

Well, said Eryximachus, before you appeared a resolution was agreed to by us that each one in turn should make a speech in praise of love, and as good a one as he could: the turn was passed round from left to right; and as all of us have spoken, and you have not spoken but have well drunken, you ought to speak, and then impose upon Socrates any task which you please, and he on his right hand neighbour, and so on.

That is good, Eryximachus, said Alcibiades; and yet the comparison of a drunken man’s speech with those of sober men is hardly fair; and I should like to know, sweet friend, whether you really believe what Socrates was just now saying; for I can assure you that the very reverse is the fact, and that if I praise any one but himself in his presence, whether God or man, he will hardly keep his hands off me.

For shame, said Socrates.

Hold your tongue, said Alcibiades, for by Poseidon, there is no one else whom I will praise in your presence.

Well then, said Eryximachus, if you like praise Socrates.

What do you think, Eryximachus? said Alcibiades; shall I attack him and inflict the punishment in your presence?

What are you about? said Socrates; are you going to raise a laugh at my expense? Is that the meaning of your praise?

I am going to speak the truth, if you will permit me.

I not only permit, but exhort you to speak the truth.

Then I will begin at once, said Alcibiades, and if I say anything that is not true, you may interrupt me if you will, and say that I speak falsely, though my intention is to speak the truth. But you must not wonder if I speak any how as things come into my mind; for the fluent and orderly enumeration of all your singularities is not a task which is easy to a man in my condition.

I shall praise Socrates in a figure which will appear to him ²¹⁵ to be a caricature, and yet I do not mean to laugh at him, but only to speak the truth. I say then, that he is exactly like the masks of Silenus, which may be seen in the statuaries' shops, sitting with pipes and flutes in their mouths; and they are made to open in the middle, and have images of gods inside them. I say also that he is like Marsyas the satyr. You yourself will not deny, Socrates, that your face is like that of a satyr. Aye, and there is a resemblance in other points too. For example, you are a bully, as I can prove by witnesses, if you will not confess. And are you not a flute-player? That you are, and a far more wonderful performer than Marsyas. He indeed with instruments used to charm the souls of men by the power of his breath, and the performers of his music do so still: for the melodies of Olympus are derived from Marsyas who taught them, and these, whether they are played by a great master or by a miserable flute-girl, have a power which no others have; they alone possess the soul and reveal the wants of those who have need of gods and mysteries, because they are inspired. But you produce the same effect with your voice only, and do not require the flute: that is the difference between you and him. When we hear any other speaker, even a very good one, his words produce absolutely no effect upon us in comparison, whereas the very fragments of you and your words, even at second-hand, and however imperfectly repeated, amaze and possess the souls of every man, woman, and child who comes within hearing of them. And if I were not afraid that you would think me hopelessly drunk, I would have sworn as well

as spoken to the influence which they have always had and still have over me. For my heart leaps within me more than that of any Corybantian reveller, and my eyes rain tears when I hear them. And I observe that many others are affected in the same way. I have heard Pericles and other great orators, but though I thought that they spoke well, I never had any similar feeling; my soul was not stirred by them, nor was I angry at the thought of my own slavish state. But this Marsyas has
 16 often brought me to such a pass, that I have felt as if I could hardly endure the life which I am leading (this, Socrates, you admit); and I am conscious that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly from the voice of the siren, he would detain me until I grew old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the wants of my own soul, and busying myself with the concerns of the Athenians; therefore I hold my ears and tear myself away from him. And he is the only person who ever made me ashamed, which you might think not to be in my nature, and there is no one else who does the same. For I know that I cannot answer him or say that I ought not to do as he bids, but when I leave his presence the love of popularity gets the better of me. And therefore I run away and fly from him, and when I see him I am ashamed of what I have confessed to him. Many a time have I wished that he were dead, and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die: so that I am at my wit's end.

And this is what I and many others have suffered from the flute-playing of this satyr. Yet hear me once more while I show you how exact the image is, and how marvellous his power. For I am sure that none of you know him; but I know him and will describe him, as I have begun. See you how fond he is of the fair? He is always with them and is always being smitten by them, and then again he knows nothing and is ignorant of all things—that is the appearance which he puts on. Is he not like a Silenus in this? Yes, surely: his outer mask is the carved head of the Silenus; but, O my companions in drink, when he is opened, what temperance there is residing within. Know you that beauty and wealth and honour, at which the many wonder, are of no account with him, and are

utterly despised by him : he regards not at all the persons who are gifted with them ; mankind are nothing to him ; all his life is spent in mocking and flouting at them. But when I opened him, and looked within at his serious purpose, I saw in him divine and golden images of such fascinating beauty that I was ready to do in a moment whatever Socrates commanded : they may have escaped the observation of others, but I saw them. Now I fancied that he was seriously enamoured of my beauty, and I thought that I should therefore have a grand opportunity of hearing him tell what he knew, for I had a wonderful opinion of the attractions of my youth. In the prosecution of this design, when I next went to him, I sent away the attendant who usually accompanied me (I will confess the whole truth, and beg you to listen ; and if I speak falsely, do you, Socrates, expose the falsehood). Well, he and I were alone together, and I thought that when there was nobody with us, I should hear him speak the language of love as lovers do, and I was delighted. Not a word ; he conversed as usual, and spent the day with me and then went away. Afterwards I challenged him to the palaestra ; and he wrestled and closed with me several times alone ; I fancied that I might succeed in this way. Not a bit ; there was no use in that. Lastly, as I had failed hitherto, I thought that I must use stronger measures and attack him boldly, and, as I had begun, not give him up until I saw how the matter stood. So I invited him to supper, just as if he were a fair youth, and I a designing lover. He was not easily persuaded to come ; he did, however, after a while accept the invitation, and when he came the first time, he wanted to go away at once as soon as supper was over, and I had not the face to detain him. The second time, still in pursuance of my design, after we had supped, I went on conversing far into the night, and when he wanted to go away, I pretended that the hour was late and that he had better remain. So he lay down on the next couch to me, the same on which he had supped, and there was no one else sleeping in the apartment. All this may be told without shame to any one. But what follows I could hardly tell you if I were sober. Yet as the proverb says, 'In vino veritas,' whether there is in boys or not¹ ; and therefore I must

¹ In allusion to the proverb, οἶνος καὶ παῖδες ἀληθείς.

218 speak. Nor, again, should I be justified in concealing the lofty actions of Socrates when I come to praise him. Moreover I have felt the serpent's sting; and he who has suffered, as they say, is willing to tell his fellow-sufferers only, as they alone will be likely to understand him, and will not be extreme in judging of the sayings or doings which have been wrung from his agony. For I have been bitten by the viper too; I have known in my soul, or in my heart, or in some other part, that worst of pangs, more violent in ingenuous youth than any serpent's tooth, the pang of philosophy, which will make a man say or do anything. And you whom I see around me, Phaedrus and Agathon and Eryximachus and Pausanias and Aristodemus and Aristophanes, all of you, and I need not say Socrates himself, have all had experience of the same madness and passion of philosophy. Therefore listen and excuse my doings then and my sayings now. But let the attendants and other profane and unmannered persons close the doors of their ears.

When the lamp was put out and the servants had gone away, I thought that I must be plain with him and have no more ambiguity. So I gave him a shake, and I said: 'Socrates, are you asleep?' 'No,' he said. 'Do you know what I am meditating?' 'What is that?' he said. 'I think,' I replied, 'that of all the lovers whom I have ever had you are the only one who is worthy of me, and you appear to be too modest to speak. Now I feel that I should be a fool to refuse you this or any other favour, and therefore I come to lay at your feet all that I have and all that my friends have, in the hope that you will assist me in the way of virtue, which I desire above all things, and in which I believe that you can help me better than any one else. And I should certainly have more reason to be ashamed of what wise men would say if I were to refuse a favour to such as you, than of what fools would say if I granted it.' When he heard this, he said in his usual ironical manner: 'Alcibiades, my friend, you have indeed an elevated aim if what you say is true, and if there really is in me any power by which you may become better; truly you must see in me some rare beauty of a kind infinitely higher than that which I see in you. And therefore, if you mean to share with me and to exchange beauty for beauty, you will have greatly the advantage of me; you will gain true beauty in

return for appearance—like Diomede, gold in exchange for brass. 219
 But look again, sweet friend, and see whether you are not deceived in me. The mind begins to grow critical when the bodily eye fails, and you have not come to that yet.' Hearing this, I said: 'I have told you my purpose, which is quite serious, and do you consider what you think best for you and me.' 'That is good,' he said; 'at some other time then we will consider and act as seems best about this and about other matters.' Whereupon, I fancied that he was smitten, and that my arrows had wounded him, and so without waiting to hear more I got up, and throwing my coat about him crept under his threadbare cloak, as the time of year was winter, and there I lay during the whole night having this wonderful monster in my arms. You will not deny it, Socrates. And yet, notwithstanding all, he was so superior to my solicitations, so contemptuous and derisive and disdainful of my beauty—which really, as I believe, had some attractions—hear, O judges; for judges you shall be of the haughty virtue of Socrates—that in the morning when I awoke (let all the gods and goddesses be my witnesses) I arose as from the couch of a father or an elder brother.

What do you suppose must have been my feelings, after this rejection, at the thought of my own dishonour? And yet I could not help wondering at his natural temperance and self-restraint and courage. I never could have thought that I should have met with a man like him in wisdom and endurance. Neither could I be angry with him or renounce his company, any more than I could hope to win him. For I well knew that if Ajax could not be wounded by steel, much less he by money; and in my only chance of captivating him I had failed. So I wandered about and was at my wit's end; no one was ever more hopelessly enslaved by another. All this, as I should explain, happened before he and I went on the expedition to Potidaea; there we messed together, and I had the opportunity of observing his extraordinary power of sustaining fatigue and going without food when our supplies were intercepted at any place, as 220
 will happen with an army. In the faculty of endurance he was superior not only to me but to everybody; there was no one to be compared to him. Yet at a festival he was the only person who had any real powers of enjoyment; though not willing

to drink, he could if compelled beat us all at that, and the most wonderful thing was that no human being had ever seen Socrates drunk ; and his powers, if I am not mistaken, will be tested before long. His endurance of cold was also surprising. There was a severe frost, for the winter in that region is really tremendous, and everybody else either remained indoors, or if they went out had on a wonderful quantity of clothes, and were well shod, and had their feet swathed in felt and fleeces : in the midst of this, Socrates, with his bare feet on the ice, and in his ordinary dress, marched better than the other soldiers who had shoes, and they looked daggers at him because he seemed to despise them.

I have told you one tale, and now I must tell you another, which is worth hearing, of the doings and sufferings of this enduring man while he was on the expedition. One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve ; he would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon—there he stood fixed in thought ; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumour ran through the wondering crowd that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in winter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and see whether he would stand all night. There he stood all night until the following morning ; and with the return of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way. I will also tell, if you please—and indeed I am bound to tell—of his courage in battle ; for who but he saved my life ? Now this was the engagement in which I received the prize of valour : for I was wounded and he would not leave me, but he rescued me and my arms ; and he ought to have received the prize of valour which the generals wanted to confer on me partly on account of my rank, and I told them so (this Socrates will not impeach or deny), but he was more eager than the generals that I and not he should have the prize. There was another occasion on which his behaviour was very noticeable—in the flight of the army after the battle of Delium, where he served among the heavy-armed, and I had a better opportunity of seeing him than at Potidaea, as I was myself on horseback, and therefore com-

paratively out of danger. He and Laches were retreating as the troops were in flight, and I met them and told them not to be discouraged, and promised to remain with them; and there you might see him, Aristophanes, as you describe, just as he is in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance; and in this way he and his companion escaped—for persons of this class are never touched in war; those only are pursued who are running away headlong. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind. Many are the wonders of Socrates which I might narrate in his praise; most of his ways might perhaps be paralleled in another man, but his absolute unlikeness to any human being that is or ever has been is perfectly astonishing. You may imagine Brasidas and others to have been like Achilles; or you may imagine Nestor and Antenor to have been like Pericles; and the same may be said of other famous men, but of this strange being you will never be able to find any likeness however remote, either among men who now are or who ever have been, except that which I have already suggested of Silenus and the satyrs; and they represent in a figure not only himself, but also his words. For, although I forgot to mention this to you before, his words are like the images of Silenus which open; they are ridiculous when you first hear them; he clothes himself in language that is as the skin of the wanton satyr—for his talk is of pack-asses and smiths and cobblers and curriers, and he is always repeating the same things in the same words, so that an ignorant man who did not know him might feel disposed to laugh at him; 222 but he who opens the mask and sees what is within will find that they are the only words which have a meaning in them, and also the most divine, abounding in fair examples of virtue, and of the widest comprehension, or rather extending to the whole duty of a good and honourable man.

This, friends, is my praise of Socrates. I have added my blame of him for his ill-treatment of me; and he has ill-treated not only me, but Charmides the son of Glaucon, and Euthydemus the son of Diocles, and many others in the same way—beginning

as their lover he has ended by making them pay their addresses to him. Wherefore I say to you, Agathon, 'Be not deceived by him; learn from me and take warning, and do not be a fool and learn by experience,' as the proverb says.

When Alcibiades had done speaking, there was a laugh at his plainness of speech, for he seemed to be still in love with Socrates. You are sober, Alcibiades, said Socrates, or you would never have gone about to hide the purpose of your satyr's praises, for all this long story is only an ingenious circumlocution, the point of which comes in by the way at the end; you want to get up a quarrel between me and Agathon, and your notion is that I ought to love you and nobody else, and that you and you only ought to love Agathon. But the plot of this Satyric or Silenic drama has been detected, and you must not allow him, Agathon, to set us at variance.

I believe you are right, said Agathon, and I am disposed to think that his intention in placing himself between you and me was only to divide us; but he shall gain nothing by that move, as I will go and lie on the couch next to you.

Yes, yes, replied Socrates, by all means come here and lie on the couch below me.

Alas, said Alcibiades, how I am fooled by this man; he is determined to get the better of me at every turn. I do beseech you, allow Agathon to lie between us.

Impossible, said Socrates, as you praised me, and I ought to praise my neighbour on the right, he will be out of order in praising me again when he ought rather to be praised by me, and I must entreat you to consent to this, and not be jealous, 223 for I have a great desire to praise the youth.

Hurrah! cried Agathon, I will rise instantly, that I may be praised by Socrates.

The usual way, said Alcibiades; where Socrates is, no one else has any chance with the fair, and now how readily has he invented a specious reason for attracting Agathon to himself.

Agathon arose in order that he might take his place on the couch by Socrates, when suddenly a band of revellers entered, and spoiled the order of the banquet. Some one who was going out having left the door open, they had found their way in, and made themselves at home; great confusion ensued, and every

one was compelled to drink large quantities of wine. Aristodemus said that Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and others went away—he himself fell asleep, and as the nights were long took a good rest: he was awakened towards daybreak by a crowing of cocks, and when he awoke, the others were either asleep, or had gone away; there remained awake only Socrates, Aristophanes, and Agathon, who were drinking out of a large goblet which they passed round, and Socrates was discoursing to them. Aristodemus did not hear the beginning of the discourse, and he was only half awake, but the chief thing which he remembered was Socrates compelling the other two to acknowledge that the genius of comedy was the same as that of tragedy, and that the true artist in tragedy was an artist in comedy also. To this they assented, being drowsy, and not quite following the argument. And first of all Aristophanes dropped off, then, when the day was already dawning, Agathon. Socrates, when he had laid them to sleep, rose to depart; Aristodemus, as his manner was, following him. At the Lyceum he took a bath, and passed the day as usual. In the evening he retired to rest at his own home.

PHAEDRUS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE *Phaedrus* is closely connected with the *Symposium*, and may be regarded either as introducing or following it. The two Dialogues together contain the whole philosophy of Plato on the nature of love, which in the *Republic* and in the later writings of Plato is only introduced playfully or as a figure of speech. But in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* love and philosophy join hands, and one is an aspect of the other. The spiritual and emotional part is elevated into the ideal, to which in the *Symposium* mankind are described as looking forward, and which in the *Phaedrus*, as well as in the *Phaedo*, they are seeking to recover from a former state of existence. Whether the subject of the Dialogue is love or rhetoric, or the union of the two, or the relation of philosophy to love and to art in general, will appear hereafter.

Phaedrus has been passing the morning with *Lysias*, the celebrated rhetorician, and is going to refresh himself by taking a walk outside the wall, when he is met by *Socrates*, who professes that he will not leave him until he has delivered up the speech with which *Lysias* has regaled him, and which he is carrying about in his mind, or more probably in a book hidden under his cloak, and is intending to study as he walks. The imputation is not denied, and the two agree to direct their steps out of the public way along the stream of the *Ilissus* towards a plane-tree which is seen in the distance. There, lying down amidst pleasant sounds and scents, they will read the speech of *Lysias*. The country is a novelty to *Socrates*, who never goes out of the town; and hence he is full of admiration for the beauties of nature, of which he seems for the first time to be conscious.

As they are on their way, *Phaedrus* asks the opinion of *Socrates* respecting the local tradition of *Boreas* and *Oreithyia*. *Socrates*, after a satirical allusion to the 'rationalizers' of his day, replies that he has

no time for these 'nice' interpretations of mythology, and he pities any one who has. For when you once begin there is no end of them, and they spring from an uncritical philosophy after all. 'The proper study of mankind is man;' and he is a far more complex and wonderful being than the serpent Typho. Socrates as yet does not know himself; and why should he care to know about unearthly monsters? Engaged in such conversation, they reach the plane-tree; Phaedrus pulls out the speech and reads.

The speech consists of a foolish paradox which is to the effect that the non-lover ought to be accepted rather than the lover—because he is more rational, more agreeable, more enduring, less suspicious, less hurtful, less boastful, less engrossing, and because there are more of them, and for a great many other reasons which are equally unmeaning. Phaedrus is captivated with the beauty of the periods, and wants to make Socrates say that nothing was or ever could be better written. Socrates does not think much of the matter, but then he has only attended to the form, and in the form he has detected repetitions and other marks of haste. He cannot agree with Phaedrus in the extreme value which he sets upon this performance, because he is afraid of doing injustice to Anacreon and Sappho and other great writers, and is almost inclined to think that he himself, or rather some power residing within him, could make a speech better than that of Lysias on the same theme, and also different from his, if he may be allowed the use of a few commonplaces which all speakers must equally employ.

Phaedrus is delighted at the prospect of having another speech, and promises that he will set up a golden statue of Socrates at Delphi, if he keeps his word. Some raillery ensues, and at length Socrates, conquered by the threat that he shall never hear a speech of Lysias again unless he fulfils his promise, veils his face and begins.

First, invoking the Muses and assuming ironically the person of the non-lover (who is a lover all the same), he will enquire into the nature and power of love. For this is a necessary preliminary to the other question: How is the non-lover to be distinguished from the lover? In all of us there are two principles—a better and a worse—reason and desire, which are generally at war with one another; and the victory of the rational is called temperance, and the victory of the irrational intemperance or excess. The latter takes many forms and has many bad names—gluttony, drunkenness, and the like. But of all the irrational

desires or excesses the greatest is that which is led away by kindred desires to the enjoyment of personal beauty; this is the master power of love.

Here Socrates fancies that he detects in himself an unusual flow of eloquence—this he can only attribute to the inspiration of the place, which appears to be dedicated to the nymphs. Starting again from the philosophical basis which has been laid down, he proceeds to show how many advantages the non-lover has over the lover. The one encourages softness and effeminacy and exclusiveness; he cannot endure any superiority in his beloved; he will train him in luxury, he will keep him out of society, he will deprive him of parents, friends, money, knowledge, and of every other good, that he may have him all to himself. Then again his ways are not ways of pleasantness; he is mighty disagreeable; ‘crabbed age and youth cannot live together.’ At every hour of the night and day he is intruding upon him; there is the same old withered face and the remainder to match—and he is always repeating, in season or out of season, the praises or dispraises of his beloved, which are bad enough when he is sober, and published all over the world when he is drunk. At length his love ceases; he is converted into an enemy, and the spectacle may be seen of the lover running away from the beloved, who pursues him with vain reproaches, and demands his reward which the other refuses to pay. Too late the beloved learns, after all his pains and disagreeables, that ‘As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves.’ (Cp. Char. 155 D.) Here is the end; the ‘other’ or ‘non-lover’ part of the speech had better be understood, for if in the censure of the lover Socrates has broken out in verse, what will he do in his praise of the non-lover? He has said his say and is preparing to go away.

Phaedrus begs him to remain, at any rate until the heat of noon has passed; he would like to have a little more conversation before they go. Socrates, who has risen, recognises the oracular sign which forbids him to depart until he has done penance. His conscience has been awakened, and like Stesichorus over Helen he will sing a palinode for having blasphemed the majesty of love. His palinode takes the form of a myth.

Socrates begins his tale with a glorification of madness, which he divides into four kinds: first, there is the art of divination or prophecy—this, in a vein similar to that of the Cratylus, he connects with mad-

ness by an etymological explanation (*μαντική*, *μανική*)—compare *οίονοιστική*, *οίωνοιστική*, ‘tis all one reckoning, save the phrase is a little variations’); secondly, there is the art of purification by mysteries; thirdly, poetry or the inspiration of the Muses (cp. *Ion*, 533 foll.), without which no man can enter their temple. All this shows that madness is one of heaven’s blessings, and may sometimes be a great deal better than sense. There is also a fourth kind of madness—that of love—which cannot be explained without enquiring into the nature of the soul.

The soul is immortal, for she is the source of all motion both in herself and in others. Her form may be described in a figure as a composite nature made up of a charioteer and a pair of winged steeds. The steeds of the gods are immortal, but ours are one mortal and the other immortal. The immortal soul soars upwards into the heavens, but the mortal drops her plumes and settles upon the earth.

Now the use of the wing is to rise and carry the downward element into the upper world—there to behold beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the other things of God by which the soul is nourished. On a certain day Zeus the lord of heaven goes forth in a winged chariot; and an array of gods and demi-gods and of human souls in their train, follows him. There are glorious and blessed sights in the interior of heaven, and he who will may freely behold them. The great vision of all is seen at the feast of the gods, when they ascend the heights of the empyrean—all but Hestia, who is left at home to keep house. The chariots of the gods glide readily upwards and stand upon the outside, and are carried round in the revolutions of the spheres in view of the world beyond; but the others labour in vain; for the mortal steed, if he has not been properly trained, keeps them down and sinks them towards the earth. Of the world which is beyond the heavens, who can tell? There is an essence formless, colourless, intangible, perceived by the mind only, dwelling in the region of true knowledge. The divine mind in her revolution enjoys this fair prospect, and beholds justice, temperance, and knowledge in their everlasting essence. When fulfilled with the sight of them she returns home, and the charioteer puts up the horses in their stable, and gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink. This is the life of the gods; the human soul tries to reach the same heights, but hardly succeeds; and sometimes the head of the charioteer rises above, and sometimes sinks below, the fair vision, and

is at last obliged, after much contention, to turn away and leave the plain of truth. Yet if she has followed in the train of her god and once beheld truth she is preserved harmless, and is carried round in the next revolution of the spheres; and if always following, and always seeing the truth, then for ever harmless. But if she drops her wings and falls to the earth, then she takes the form of man, and the soul which has seen most of the truth passes into a philosopher or lover; that which has seen truth in the second degree, into a king or warrior; the third, into a householder or money-maker; the fourth, into a gymnast; the fifth, into a prophet or mystic; the sixth, into a poet or imitator; the seventh, into a husbandman or craftsman; the eighth, into a sophist or demagogue; the ninth, into a tyrant. In all these conditions the lot of him who lives righteously is improved, and the lot of him who lives unrighteously deteriorates. At the end of every thousand years the soul has another choice, and may go upwards or downwards. And the soul of a man may descend into a beast, and return again into the form of man. But the form of man can only be acquired at all by those who have once beheld truth, for the soul of man alone apprehends the universal; and this is the recollection of that knowledge which she attained when in the company of the god. Ten thousand years elapse before the souls of men in general can regain their first lot, and have their wings restored to them. But the soul of a philosopher or lover who has three times in succession chosen the better life may receive wings and go her way in three thousand years.

For the soul in her own nature having the vision of true being remembers in her condition here those glorious sights of justice and temperance and wisdom and truth which she once gazed upon when in company with the heavenly choir. Then she celebrated holy mysteries and beheld blessed apparitions shining in pure light, herself pure and not as yet entombed in the oyster-shell of the body. And still she is eager to depart, and like a bird is fluttering and looking upwards, and is therefore esteemed mad. Such a recollection of other days is spread over her when she receives through sight, the purest of the senses, the copy of that beauty which alone of the ideas has any representation on earth. For wisdom has no outward form, and is 'too dazzling bright for mortal eye.' Now the corrupted nature, when blindly excited by the vision of beauty, rushes on to enjoy, and would fain wallow like a quadruped in sensual pleasures. But the true

mystic, who has seen the many sights of bliss, when he beholds a god-like form or face is amazed with delight, and if he were not afraid of being thought mad he would fall down and worship. Then the stiffened wing begins to relax and grow again; desire which has been imprisoned pours over the soul of the lover; the germ of the wing unfolds, and stings and pangs at birth, like the cutting of teeth, are everywhere felt. (Cp. Symp. 206 foll.) Father and mother, and goods and laws and proprieties are nothing to him; his beloved is his physician, who can alone cure his pain. An apocryphal sacred writer says that the power which thus works in him is by mortals called love, but the immortals call him dove, or the winged one, in order to represent the force of his wings—such at any rate is his nature. Now the characters of lovers depend upon the god whom they followed in the other world; and they choose their loves in this world accordingly. The followers of Ares are fierce and violent; those of Zeus seek out some philosophical and imperial nature; the attendants of Here find a royal love; and in like manner the followers of every god seek a love who is in his likeness, and they communicate to him the nature which they have received from their god. The manner in which they take their love is as follows:—

I told you about the charioteer and his two steeds, the one a noble animal who is guided by word and admonition only, the other an ill-looking villain who will hardly yield to blow or spur. Together all three, who are a figure of the soul, approach the vision of love. And now a conflict begins. The ill-conditioned steed rushes on to enjoy, but the charioteer, who beholds the beloved with awe, falls back in adoration, and forces both the steeds on their haunches; again the evil steed rushes forwards and pulls shamelessly. Then a still more fearful conflict ensues; the charioteer, throwing himself backwards, jerks violently the bit from the clenched teeth of the brute, and pulling harder than ever at the reins, covers his tongue and jaws with blood, and forces him to rest his legs and haunches with pain upon the ground. When this has happened several times, the villain is tamed and humbled, and from that time forward the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear. And now their bliss is consummated; the same image of love dwells in the breast of either; and if they have self-control, they pass their lives in the greatest happiness which is attainable by man—they continue masters of themselves,

and conquer in one of the three heavenly victories. But if they choose the lower life of ambition they may still have a happy destiny, though inferior, because they have not the approval of the whole soul. At last they leave the body and proceed on their pilgrim's progress, and those who have once begun can never go back. When the time comes they receive their wings and fly away, and the lovers have the same wings.

Socrates concludes:—

These are the blessings of love, and thus have I made my recantation in finer language than before: I did so in order to please Phaedrus. If I said what was wrong at first, please to attribute my error to Lysias, who ought to study philosophy instead of rhetoric, and then he will not mislead his disciple Phaedrus.

Phaedrus is afraid that he will lose conceit of Lysias, and that Lysias will be out of conceit with himself, and leave off making speeches, as the politicians have been deriding him. Socrates is of opinion that there is small danger of this; the politicians are themselves the great rhetoricians of the age, who desire to attain immortality by the authorship of laws. And therefore there can be no disgrace—nothing with which anybody could reproach Lysias in being a writer; but there may be disgrace in being a bad one.

And what is good or bad writing or speaking? While the sun is hot in the sky above us, let us ask that question: since by rational conversation man lives, and not by the indulgence of bodily pleasures. And the grasshoppers who are chirruping around may carry our words to the Muses, who are their patronesses; for the grasshoppers were human beings themselves in a world before the Muses, and when the Muses came they died of hunger for the love of song. And they carry to them in heaven the report of those who honour them on earth.

The first rule of good speaking is to know and speak truth; true art is truth, says a Spartan proverb, whereas rhetoric is a mode of enchanting the soul, which makes things appear good and evil, like and unlike, according to the fancy of the speaker. Still even in rhetoric an element of truth is required. For mankind are deceived, not all at once, but by degrees, and therefore he who would either impose on others or escape imposition must know the truth.

Socrates then proposes that they shall use the two speeches as illustrations of the art of rhetoric; first distinguishing between the debatable and undisputed class of subjects. In the debatable class there ought to

be a definition of all disputed matters. But there was no such definition in the speech of Lysias; nor is there any order or connection in his words any more than in a nursery rhyme. With this he compares the regular divisions of the other speech, which was his own (and yet not his own, for the local deities must have inspired him). This 'fancy' of his will be found to embody two principles: first, that of synthesis or the comprehension of parts in a whole; secondly, analysis, or the resolution of the whole into parts. These are the processes of division and generalization which are so dear to the dialectician, that king of men. But this is dialectic, and not rhetoric, of which the remains are but scanty after order and arrangement have been subtracted. There is nothing left but a heap of 'ologies' and other technical terms invented by Polus Theodorus, Evenus, Tisias, Gorgias, and others who have rules for everything, and who teach how to be short or long at pleasure. Prodicus showed his good sense in saying that there was a better thing than either being short or long, which was to be of convenient length.

Still, notwithstanding the absurdities of Polus and others, rhetoric has great power in public assemblies. This power, however, is not given by any technical rules, but is the gift of genius. The real art is always being confused by rhetoricians with the preliminaries of the art. The perfection of oratory is the perfection of all things; but for this rhetoric can do little. Pericles, the most accomplished of all speakers, derived his eloquence not from rhetoric but from the philosophy of nature which he learnt of Anaxagoras.

Even the little which rhetoric can teach is not taught by the art now in vogue. True rhetoric is like medicine, and the rhetorician has to consider the natures of men's souls as the physician considers the natures of their bodies. Such and such persons are to be affected in this way, such and such others in that; he must know the times and the seasons for saying this or that. This is not an easy task, and this, if there be such an art, is the art of rhetoric.

I know that there are some professors of the art who maintain that probability is stronger than truth. But we maintain that probability is engendered by likeness of the truth which can only be attained by knowledge of the truth, and that the aim of the good man should not be to please or persuade his fellow-servants, but to please his good masters who are the gods. Rhetoric has a fair beginning in this.

Enough of the art of speaking; let us now proceed to consider the

true use of writing. There is an old Egyptian tale of Theuth, the inventor of writing, showing his invention to the god Thamuz, who told him that he would only spoil men's memories and take away their understandings. From this tale, which young Athens will probably scorn, may be gathered the lesson that writing is inferior to speech. For writing is like a picture, which can give no answer to a question, and has only a deceitful likeness of a living creature. It has no power of adaptation, but uses the same words for all. It is a sort of bastard and not a legitimate son of knowledge, and when an attack is made upon this illegitimate progeny neither the parent nor any one else is there to defend it. The husbandman will not seriously incline to sow his seed in such a hot-bed or garden of Adonis; he will rather sow in the natural soil of the human soul which has depth of earth; and he will anticipate this natural process by writing, if at all, only as a remedy against old age. The natural growth will be far nobler, and bring forth fruit not only in his own but in other minds.

The conclusion of the whole matter is just this,—that until a man knows the truth, and the manner of adapting the truth to the natures of other men, he cannot be a good orator; also, that the living is better than the written word, and that the principles of justice and truth when delivered by word of mouth are the legitimate offspring of a man's own bosom, and their lawful descendants take up their abode in others. Such an orator as he is who has them, you and I would fain become. And to all composers in the world, poets, orators, legislators, we hereby announce that if their compositions are based upon these principles then they are not only poets, orators, legislators, but philosophers. All others are mere flatterers and putters together of words. This is the message which Phaedrus undertakes to carry to Lysias from the local deities, and Socrates himself will carry a similar message to his favourite Isocrates, whose future distinction as a great rhetorician he prophesies. The heat of the day has passed, and after offering up a prayer to Pan and the nymphs, Socrates and Phaedrus depart.

There are two principal controversies which have been raised about the Phaedrus; the first relates to the subject, the second to the date of the Dialogue.

There seems to be a notion that the work of a great artist like Plato could not fail in unity, and that the unity of a dialogue requires a single subject. But the conception of unity really applies in very

different degrees and ways to different kinds of art; to a statue, for example, far more than to any kind of literary composition, and to some species of literature far more than to others. Nor does the dialogue appear to be a style of composition in which the requirement of unity is most stringent; nor should the idea of unity derived from one sort of art be hastily transferred to another. The double titles of several of the Platonic Dialogues seem to indicate that the severer rule was not observed by Plato. The Republic is divided between the search after justice and the construction of the ideal state; the Parmenides between the criticism of the Platonic ideas and of the Eleatic one or being; the Gorgias between the art of speaking and the nature of the good; the Sophist between the detection of the Sophist and the correlation of ideas. The Theaetetus, the Politicus, and the Philebus, have also digressions which are but remotely connected with the main subject.

Thus the comparison of Plato's other writings, as well as the reason of the thing, lead us to the conclusion that we must not expect to find one idea pervading a whole work, but one, two, or more, as the invention of the writer may suggest or his fancy wander. If each dialogue were confined to the development of a single idea, this would appear on the face of the dialogue, nor could any controversy be raised as to whether the Phaedrus treated of love or rhetoric. But the truth is that Plato subjects himself to no rule of this sort. Like every great artist he gives unity of form to the different and apparently distracting topics which he brings together. He works freely and is not to be supposed to have arranged every part of the dialogue before he begins to write. He fastens or weaves together the frame of his discourse loosely and imperfectly, and which is the warp and which is the woof cannot always be determined.

The subjects of the Phaedrus (exclusive of the short introductory passage about mythology which is suggested by the local tradition) are first the false or conventional art of rhetoric; secondly, love or the inspiration of beauty and knowledge, which is described as madness; thirdly, dialectic or the art of composition and division; fourthly, the true rhetoric, which is based upon dialectic, and is neither the art of persuasion nor knowledge of the truth alone, but the art of persuasion founded on knowledge of truth and knowledge of character; fifthly, the superiority of the spoken over the written word. The continuous thread which appears and reappears throughout is rhetoric; this is the ground

into which the rest of the Dialogue is inlaid, in parts embroidered with fine words which are not in Socrates' manner, as he says, 'in order to please Phaedrus.' The speech of Lysias which has thrown Phaedrus into an ecstasy is adduced as an example of the false rhetoric; the first speech of Socrates, though an improvement, partakes of the same character; his second speech, which is full of that higher element said to have been learned of Anaxagoras by Pericles, and in the midst of poetry does not forget order, is an illustration of the higher or true rhetoric. This higher rhetoric is based upon dialectic, and dialectic is a sort of inspiration akin to love (cp. *Symp.* 210 foll.); in these two aspects of philosophy the technicalities of rhetoric are absorbed. And so the example becomes also the deeper theme of discourse. The true knowledge of things in heaven and earth is based upon enthusiasm or love of the ideas going before us and ever present to us in this world and in another; and the true order of speech or writing proceeds accordingly. Love, again, has three degrees: first, of interested love corresponding to the conventionalities of rhetoric; secondly, of disinterested or mad love, fixed on objects of sense, and answering, perhaps, to poetry; thirdly, of disinterested love directed towards the unseen, answering to dialectic or the science of the ideas. Lastly, the art of rhetoric in the lower sense is found to rest on a knowledge of the natures and characters of men, which Socrates at the commencement of the Dialogue has described as his own peculiar study.

Thus amid discord a harmony begins to appear; there are many links of connection which are not visible at first sight. At the same time the Phaedrus, although one of the most beautiful of the Platonic Dialogues, is also more irregular than any other. For insight into the world, for sustained irony, for depth of thought, there is no Dialogue superior, or perhaps equal to it. Nevertheless the form of the work has tended to obscure some of Plato's higher aims.

The first speech is composed 'in that balanced style in which the wise love to talk.' (*Symp.* 185 C.) The characteristics of rhetoric are insipidity, mannerism, and monotonous parallelism of clauses. There is more rhythm than reason; the creative power of imagination is wanting.

'Tis Greece, but living Greece no more.'

Plato has seized by anticipation the spirit which hung over Greek literature for a thousand years afterwards. Yet doubtless there were some

who, like Phaedrus, felt a delight in the harmonious cadence and the pedantic reasoning of the rhetoricians newly imported from Sicily, which had ceased to be awakened in them by really great works, such as the odes of Anacreon or Sappho or the orations of Pericles. That the first speech was really written by Lysias is improbable. Like the poem of Solon, or the story of Thamuz and Theuth, or the funeral oration of Aspasia (if genuine), or the pretence of Socrates in the *Cratylus* that his knowledge of philology is derived from Euthyphro, the invention is really due to the imagination of Plato, and may be compared to the parodies of the Sophists in the *Protagoras*. Numerous fictions of this sort occur in the *Dialogues*, and the gravity of Plato has sometimes imposed upon his commentators. The introduction of a considerable writing of another would seem not to be in keeping with a great work of art, and has no parallel elsewhere.

In the second speech Socrates is exhibited as beating the rhetoricians at their own weapons; he 'an unpractised man and they masters of the art.' True to his character he must, however, profess that the speech which he makes is not his own, for he knows nothing of himself. (Cp. *Symp.* 201 D.) Regarded as a rhetorical exercise, the superiority of his speech seems to consist chiefly in a better arrangement of the topics; he begins with a definition of love, and he gives weight to his words by going back to general maxims; a lesser merit is the greater liveliness of Socrates, which hurries him into verse and relieves the monotony of the style.

But Plato had doubtless a higher purpose than to exhibit Socrates as the rival or superior of the Athenian rhetoricians. Even in the speech of Lysias there is a germ of truth, and this is further developed in the parallel oration of Socrates. First, passionate love is overthrown by the sophisticated or interested, and then both yield to that higher view of love which is afterwards revealed to us. The extreme of commonplace is contrasted with the most ideal and imaginative of speculations. Socrates, half in jest and to satisfy his own wild humour, takes the disguise of Lysias, but he is also in profound earnest and in a deeper vein of irony than usual. Having improvised his own speech, which is based upon the model of the preceding, he condemns them both. Yet the condemnation is not to be taken seriously, for he is evidently trying to express an aspect of the truth. To understand him, we must make abstraction of morality and of the Greek manner of regarding the rela-

tion of the sexes. In this, as in his other discussions about love, what Plato says of the loves of men must be transferred to the loves of women before we can attach any serious meaning to his words. Had he lived in our times he would have made the transposition himself. But seeing in his own age the impossibility of woman being the intellectual helpmate or friend of man (except in the rare instances of a Diotima or an Aspasia), seeing that, even as to personal beauty, her place was taken by young mankind instead of woman-kind, he tries to work out the problem of love without regard to the distinctions of nature. And full of the evils which he recognised as flowing from the spurious form of love, he proceeds with a deep meaning, though partly in joke, to show that the 'non-lover's' love is better than the 'lover's.'

We may raise the same question in another form: Is marriage preferable with or without love? 'Among ourselves,' as we may say, a little parodying the words of Pausanias in the Symposium, 'there would be one answer to this question: the practice and feeling of some foreign countries appears to be more doubtful.' Suppose a modern Socrates, in defiance of the received notions of society and the sentimental literature of the day, alone against all the writers and readers of novels, to suggest this enquiry, would not the younger 'part of the world be ready to take off its coat and run at him might and main?' (Rep. v. 474.) Yet, if like Peisthetaerus in Aristophanes, he could persuade the 'birds' to hear him, retiring a little behind a rampart, not of pots and dishes, but of unreadable books, he might have something to say for himself. Might he not argue, 'that a rational being should not follow the dictates of passion in the most important act of his or her life?' Who would willingly enter into a contract at first sight, almost without thought, against the advice and opinion of his friends, at a time when he acknowledges that he is not in his right mind? And yet they are praised by the authors of romances, who reject the warnings of their friends or parents, rather than those who listen to them in such matters. Two inexperienced persons, ignorant of the world and of one another, how can they be said to choose?—they draw lots, whence also the saying, 'marriage is a lottery.' Then he would describe their way of life after marriage; how they monopolize one another's affections to the exclusion of friends and relations: how they pass their days in unmeaning fondness or trivial conversation; how the inferior of the two drags the other down to his or her level; how the cares of a family 'breed

meanness in their souls.' In the fulfilment of military or public duties, they are not helpers but hinderers of one another: they cannot undertake any noble enterprise, such as makes the names of men and women famous, from domestic considerations. Too late their eyes are opened; they were taken unawares and desire to part company. Better, he would say, a 'little love at the beginning,' for heaven might have increased it; but now their foolish fondness has changed into mutual dislike. In the days of their honeymoon they never understood that they must provide against offences, that they must have interests, that they must learn the art of living as well as loving. Our misogynist will not appeal to Anacreon or Sappho for a confirmation of his view, but to the universal experience of mankind. How much nobler, in conclusion, he will say, is friendship, which does not receive unmeaning praises from novelists and poets, is not exacting or exclusive, is not impaired by familiarity, is much less expensive, is not so likely to take offence, seldom changes, and may be dissolved from time to time without the assistance of the courts. Besides, he will remark that there is a much greater choice of friends than of wives—you may have more of them and they will be far more improving to your mind. They will not keep you dawdling at home, or dancing attendance upon them; or withdraw you from the great world and stirring scenes of life and action which would make a man of you.

In such a manner, turning the seamy side outwards, a modern Socrates might describe the evils of married and domestic life. They are evils which mankind in general have agreed to conceal, partly because they are compensated by greater goods. Socrates or Archilochus would soon have to sing a palinode for the injustice done to lovely Helen, or some misfortune worse than blindness might befall them. Then they would take up their parable again and say:—that there were two loves, a higher and a lower, holy and unholy, a love of the mind and a love of the body.

'Let me not to the marriage of true minds
Admit impediments. Love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds.

* * * * *

Love's not time's fool, though rosy lips and cheeks
Within his bending sickle's compass come;
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out even to the edge of doom.'

But this true love of the mind cannot exist between two souls, until they are purified from the grossness of earthly passion: they must pass through a time of trial and conflict first; in the language of religion they must be converted or born again. Then they would see the world transformed into a scene of heavenly beauty; a divine idea would accompany them in all their thoughts and actions. Something too of the recollections of childhood might float about them still; they might regain that old simplicity which had been theirs in other days at their first entrance on life. And although their love of one another was ever present to them, they would acknowledge also a higher love of duty and of God, which united them. And their happiness would depend upon their preserving in them this principle—not losing the ideals of justice and holiness and truth, but renewing them at the fountain of light. When they have attained to this exalted state, let them marry (something too may be conceded to the animal nature of man): or live together in holy and innocent friendship. The poet might describe in eloquent words the nature of such a union; how after many struggles the true love was found: how the two passed their lives together in the service of God and man; how their characters were reflected upon one another, and seemed to grow more like year by year; how they read in one another's eyes the thoughts, wishes, actions of the other; how they saw each other in God; how in a figure they grew wings like doves, and were 'ready to fly away together and be at rest.' And lastly, he might tell how, after a time at no long intervals, first one and then the other fell asleep, and 'appeared to the unwise' to die, but were reunited in another state of being, in which they saw justice and holiness and truth, not according to the imperfect copies of them which are found in this world, but justice absolute in existence absolute, and so of the rest. And they would hold converse not only with each other, but with blessed souls everywhere; and would be employed in the service of God, every soul fulfilling his own nature and character, and would see into the wonders of earth and heaven, and trace the works of creation to their author.

So, partly in jest but also with a certain degree of seriousness, we may appropriate to ourselves the words of Plato. The use of such a parody, though very imperfect, is to transfer his thoughts to our sphere of religion and feeling, to bring him nearer to us and us to him. Like the Scriptures, Plato admits of endless applications, if we allow for the

difference of times and manners; and we lose the better half of him when we regard his Dialogues merely as literary compositions. Any ancient work which is worth reading has a practical and speculative as well as a literary interest. And in Plato, more than in any other Greek writer, the local and transitory is inextricably blended with what is spiritual and eternal. Socrates is necessarily ironical; for he has to withdraw from the received opinions and beliefs of mankind. We cannot separate the transitory from the permanent; nor can we translate the language of irony into that of plain reflection and common sense. But we can imagine the mind of Socrates in another age and country; and we can interpret him by analogy with reference to the errors and prejudices which prevail among ourselves. To return to the Phaedrus:—

Both speeches are strongly condemned by Socrates as sinful and blasphemous towards the god Love, and as worthy only of some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown. The meaning of this and other wild language to the same effect, which is introduced by way of contrast to the formality of the two speeches (Socrates has a sense of relief when he has escaped from the trammels of rhetoric) seems to be that the two speeches proceed upon the supposition that love is and ought to be interested, and that no such thing as a real or disinterested passion, which would be at the same time lasting, could be conceived. 'But did I call this "love"? O God, forgive my blasphemy. This is not love. Rather it is the love of the world. But there is another kingdom of love, a kingdom not of this world, divine, eternal. And this other love I will now show you in a mystery.'

Then follows the famous myth, which is a sort of parable, and like other parables ought not to receive too minute an interpretation. In all such allegories there is a great deal which is merely ornamental, and the interpreter has to separate the important from the unimportant. Socrates himself has given the right clue when, in using his own discourse afterwards as the text for his examination of rhetoric, he characterizes it as a 'partly true and tolerably credible mythus,' in which amid poetical figures, order and arrangement were not forgotten.

The soul is described in magnificent language as the self-moved and the source of motion in all other things. This is the philosophical theme or poem of the whole. But ideas must be given through something, and under the pretext that to realize the true nature of the soul would be not only tedious but impossible, we at once pass on to

describe the souls of gods as well as men under the figure of two winged steeds and a charioteer. No connection is traced between the soul as the great motive power and the triple soul which is thus imaged. There is no difficulty in seeing that the charioteer represents the reason, or that the black horse is the symbol of the sensual or concupiscent element of human nature. The white horse also represents rational impulse, but the description in 253, 'a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and a follower of true glory,' though similar, does not at once recall the 'spirit' (*θυμὸς*) of the Republic. The two steeds really correspond in a figure more nearly to the appetitive and moral or semi-rational soul of Aristotle. And thus, for the first time perhaps in the history of philosophy, we have represented to us the threefold division of psychology. The image of the charioteer and the steeds has been compared with a similar image which occurs in the verses of Parmenides; but it is important to remark that the horses of Parmenides have no allegorical meaning, and that the poet is only describing his own approach in a chariot to the regions of light and the house of the goddess of truth.

The triple soul has had a previous existence, in which following in the train of some god, from whom she derived her character, she beheld partially and imperfectly the vision of absolute truth. All her after existence, passed in many forms of men and animals, is spent in regaining this. In the various stages of this long struggle she is sorely let and hindered by the animal desires of the inferior or concupiscent steed. Again and again she beholds the flashing beauty of the beloved. But before that vision can be finally enjoyed the animal desires must be subjected.

The moral or spiritual element in man is represented by the immortal steed which, like *θυμὸς* in the Republic, always sides with the reason. Both are dragged out of their course by the furious impulses of desire. In the end something is conceded to the desires, after they have been finally humbled and overpowered. And yet the way of philosophy, or perfect love of the unseen is total abstinence from bodily delights. 'But all men cannot receive this saying': in the lower life of ambition they may be taken off their guard and stoop to folly unawares, and then, although they do not attain to the highest bliss, yet if they have once conquered they may be happy enough.

The language of the Meno and the Phaedo as well as of the Phaedrus,

seems to show that at one time of his life Plato was quite serious in maintaining a former state of existence. His mission was to realize the abstract; in that, all good and truth, all the hopes of this and another life seemed to centre. To him abstractions, as we call them, were another kind of knowledge—an inner and unseen world, which seemed to exist far more truly than the fleeting objects of sense which were without him. When we are once able to imagine the intense power which abstract ideas exercised over the mind of Plato, we see that there was no more difficulty to him in realizing the eternal existence of them and of the human minds which were associated with them, in the past and future than in the present. The difficulty was not how they could exist, but how they could fail to exist. In the attempt to regain this 'saving' knowledge of the ideas, the sense was found to be as great an enemy as the desires; and hence two things which to us seem quite distinct are inextricably blended in the representation of Plato.

Thus far we may believe that Plato was serious in his conception of the soul as a motive power, in his reminiscence of a former state of being, in his elevation of the reason over sense and passion, and perhaps in his doctrine of transmigration. Was he equally serious in the rest? For example, are we to attribute his tripartite division of the soul to the gods? Or is this merely assigned to them by way of parallelism with men? The latter is the more probable; for the horses of the gods are both white, i. e. their every impulse is in harmony with reason; their dualism, on the other hand, only carries out the figure of the chariot. Is he serious, again, in regarding love as 'a madness'? That seems to arise out of the antithesis to the former conception of love. At the same time he appears to intimate here, as in the *Ion*, *Apology*, *Meno*, and elsewhere, that there is a faculty in man, whether to be termed in modern language genius, or inspiration, or imagination, or idealism, or communion with God, which cannot be reduced to rule and measure. Perhaps, too, he is ironically repeating the common language of mankind about philosophy, and is turning their jest into a sort of earnest. (Cp. *Phaedr.* 61 B; *Symp.* 218 B.) Or is he serious in holding that each soul bears the character of a god? Perhaps he had no other account to give of the differences of human characters to which he afterwards refers. Or, again, in his absurd derivation of *μαντική* and *οἰωνοστική* and *ἡμερος* (cp. *Cratylus*)? It seems to be characteristic of the irony of Socrates to mix up sense and nonsense in such a way that no exact line

can be drawn between them. And allegory helps to increase this sort of confusion.

As is often the case in the parables and prophecies of Scripture, the meaning is allowed to break through the figure, and the details are not always consistent. When the charioteers and their steeds stand upon the dome of heaven they behold the intangible invisible essences which are not objects of sight. This is because the force of language can no further go. Nor can we dwell much on the circumstance, that at the completion of ten thousand years all are to return to the place from whence they came; because he represents their return as dependent on their own good conduct in the successive stages of existence. Nor again can we attribute anything to the accidental inference which would also follow, that even a tyrant may live righteously in the condition of life to which fate has called him ('he aiblins might, I dinna ken'). But to suppose this would be at variance with Plato himself and with Greek notions generally. He is much more serious in distinguishing men from animals by their recognition of the universal which they have known in a former state, and in denying that this gift of reason can ever be obliterated or lost. In the language of some modern theologians he might be said to maintain the 'final perseverance' of those who have entered on their pilgrim's progress. Other intimations of a 'metaphysic' or 'theology' of the future may also be discerned in him: (1) The moderate predestinarianism which here, as in the Republic, acknowledges the element of chance in human life, and yet asserts the freedom and responsibility of man; (2) The recognition of a moral as well as an intellectual principle in man under the image of an immortal steed; (3) The notion that the divine nature exists by the contemplation of ideas of virtue and justice — or, in other words, the assertion of the essentially moral nature of God; (4) Again, there is the hint that human life is a life of aspiration only, and that the true ideal is not to be found in art; (5) There occurs the first trace of the distinction between certain and contingent matter; (6) The conception of the soul itself as the motive power and reason of the universe.

The conception of the philosopher, or the philosopher and lover in one, as a sort of madman, may be compared with the Republic and Theaetetus, in both of which the philosopher is regarded as a stranger and monster upon the earth. The whole myth, like the other myths of Plato, describes in a figure things which are beyond the range of

human faculties, or inaccessible to the knowledge of the age. That philosophy should be represented as the inspiration of love is a conception that has already become familiar to us in the Symposium, and is the expression partly of Plato's enthusiasm for the idea, and is also an indication of the real power exercised by the passion of friendship over the mind of the Greek. The master in the art of love knew that there was a mystery in these feelings and their associations, and especially in the contrast of the sensible and permanent which is afforded by them; and he sought to explain this, as he explained universal ideas, by a reference to a former state of existence. The capriciousness of love is also derived by him from an attachment to some god in a former world. The singular remark that the beloved is more affected than the lover at the final consummation of their love, seems likewise to have a psychological truth.

We may now pass on to the second part of the Dialogue, which is a criticism on the first. Rhetoric is assailed on various grounds: first, as desiring to persuade, without a knowledge of the truth; and secondly, as ignoring the distinction between certain and probable matter. The three speeches are then passed in review: the first of them has no definition of the nature of love, and no order in the topics (being in these respects far inferior to the second); while the third of them is found (though a fancy of the hour) to be framed upon real dialectical principles. But dialectic is not rhetoric; nothing on that subject is to be found in the endless treatises of rhetoric, however prolific in hard names. When Plato has sufficiently put them to the test of ridicule he touches, as with the point of a needle, the real error, which is the confusion of preliminary knowledge with creative power. No attainments will provide the speaker with genius; and the sort of attainments which can alone be of any value are the higher philosophy and the power of psychological analysis, which is given by dialectic, not by the rules of the rhetoricians.

In this latter portion of the Dialogue there are many texts which may help us to speak and to think. The names dialectic and rhetoric are passing out of use; we hardly examine seriously into their nature and limits, and probably the cultivation of the art of speaking has been unduly neglected by us. But the mind of Socrates pierces through the differences of times and countries into the essential nature of man; and his words apply equally to the modern world and to the Athenians of

old. Would he not have asked of us, or rather is he not asking of us, Whether we have ceased to prefer appearances to reality? Let us take a survey of the professions to which he refers and try them by his standard. Is not all literature passing into criticism, just as Athenian literature in the age of Plato was degenerating into sophistry and rhetoric? We can converse and write about poems and paintings, but we seem to have lost the gift of creating them. Can we wonder that few of them 'come sweetly from nature,' while ten thousand reviewers (*μάλα μύριοι*) are engaged in dissecting them? Young men, like Phaedrus, are enamoured of their own literary clique and have but a feeble sympathy with the master-minds of former ages. They recognize 'a *poetical* necessity in the writings of their favourite author, even when he boldly wrote off just what came in his head.' They are beginning to think that Art is enough, just at the time when Art is about to disappear from the world. And would not a great painter, such as Michael Angelo, or a great poet, such as Shakespeare, returning to earth, 'courteously rebuke' us—would he not say that we are putting 'in the place of Art the preliminaries of Art,' confusing Art the expression of mind and truth with Art the composition of colours and forms; and perhaps he might more severely chastise some of us for trying to invent 'a new shudder' instead of bringing to the birth living and healthy creations? These he would regard as the signs of an age wanting in original power.

Turning from literature and the arts to law and politics, again we fall under the lash of Socrates. For do we not often make 'the worse appear the better cause;' and do not 'both parties sometimes agree to tell lies'? Is not pleading 'an art of speaking unconnected with the truth'? There is another text of Socrates which must not be forgotten in relation to this subject. In the endless maze of English law is there any 'dividing the whole into parts or reuniting the parts into a whole'—any semblance of an organized being 'having hands and feet and other members'? Instead of a code there is the Chaos of Anaxagoras (*ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα*) and no Mind or Order. Then again in the noble art of politics, who thinks of first principles and of true ideas? We avowedly follow not the truth but the will of the many (cp. Rep. 493). Is not legislation too a sort of literary effort, and might not statesmanship be described as the 'art of enchanting' the house? While there are some politicians who have no knowledge of

the truth, but only of what is likely to be approved by 'the many who sit in judgment,' there are others who can give no form to their ideal, neither having learned 'the art of persuasion,' nor having any insight into the 'characters of men.' Once more, has not medical science become a professional routine, which many 'practise without being able to say who were their instructors'—the application of a few drugs taken from a book instead of a life-long study of the natures and constitutions of human beings? Do we see as clearly as Hippocrates 'that the nature of the body can only be understood as a whole'? (270 C; cp. Charm. 156 E.) And are not they held to be the wisest physicians who have the greatest distrust of their art? What would Socrates think of our newspapers, of our theology? Perhaps he would be afraid to speak of them;—the one *vox populi*, the other *vox Dei*, he might hesitate to attack them; or he might trace a fanciful connexion between them, and ask doubtfully, whether they are not equally inspired? He would remark that we are always searching for a belief and deploring our unbelief, seeming to prefer popular opinions unverified and contradictory to unpopular truths which are assured to us by the most certain proofs: that our preachers are in the habit of praising God 'without regard to truth and falsehood, attributing to Him every species of greatness and glory, saying that He is all this and the cause of all that, in order that we may exhibit Him as the fairest and best of all' (Symp. 198), without any consideration of His real nature and character or of the laws by which He governs the world—seeking for a 'private judgment' and not for the truth or 'God's judgment.' What would he say of the Church, which we praise in like manner, 'meaning ourselves' (258 A), without regard to history or experience? Might he not ask, whether we 'care more for the truth of religion, or for the speaker and the country from which the truth comes'? or, whether the 'select wise' are not 'the many' after all? (Symp. 194 C.) So we may fill up the sketch of Socrates, lest, as Phaedrus says, the argument should be too 'abstract and barren of illustrations.' (Cp. Symp. Apol. Euthyphro.)

He next proceeds with enthusiasm to define the royal art of dialectic as the power of dividing a whole into parts, and of uniting the parts in a whole, and which may also be regarded (cp. Soph.) as the process of the mind talking with herself. The latter view has probably led Plato to the paradox that speech is superior to writing, in which he may seem also to be doing an injustice to himself. For the two cannot be fairly

compared in the manner which Plato suggests. The contrast of the living and dead word, and the example of Socrates, which he has represented in the form of the Dialogue, seem to have misled him. For speech and writing have really different functions; the one is more transitory, more diffuse, more elastic and capable of adaptation to moods and times; the other is more permanent, more concentrated, and is uttered not to this or that person or audience, but to all the world. In the *Politicus* (294 foll.) the paradox is carried further; the mind or will of the king is preferred to the written law; he is supposed to be the Law personified, the ideal made Life.

Yet in both these statements there is also contained a truth; they may be compared with one another, and also with the other famous paradox, that 'knowledge cannot be taught.' Socrates means to say, that what is truly written is written in the soul, just as what is truly taught grows up in the soul from within and is not forced upon it from without. When planted in a congenial soil the little seed becomes a tree, and 'the birds of the air build their nests in the branches.' There is an echo of this in the prayer at the end of the Dialogue, 'Give me beauty in the inward soul, and may the inward and outward man be at one.' We may further compare the words of St. Paul, 'Written not on tables of stone, but on fleshly tables of the heart;' and again, 'Ye are my epistles known and read of all men.' There may be a use in writing as a preservative against the forgetfulness of old age, but to live is higher far, to be ourselves the book, or the epistle, the truth embodied in a person, the Word made flesh. Something like this we may believe to have passed before Plato's mind when he affirmed that speech was superior to writing. So in other ages, weary of literature and criticism, of making many books, of writing articles in reviews, some have desired to live more closely in communion with their fellow men, to speak heart to heart, to speak and act only, and not to write, following the example of Socrates and of Christ. Some other touches of inimitable grace and art and of the deepest wisdom may be also noted; such as the prayer or 'collect' which has just been cited, 'Give me beauty,' &c.; or 'the great name which belongs to God alone' (278); or 'the saying of wiser men than ourselves that a man of sense should try to please not his fellow servants, but his good and noble masters' (274), like St. Paul again; or the description of the 'heavenly originals' at p. 250.

The chief criteria for determining the date of the Dialogue are (1) the ages of Lysias and Isocrates; (2) the character of the work.

Lysias was born in the year 458; Isocrates in the year 436, about seven years before the birth of Plato. The first of the two great rhetoricians is described as in the zenith of his fame; the second is still young and full of promise. Now it is argued that this must have been written in the youth of Isocrates, when the promise was not yet fulfilled. And thus we should have to assign the Dialogue to a year not later than 406, when Isocrates was thirty and Plato twenty-three years of age, and while Socrates himself was still alive.

Those who argue in this way seem not to reflect how easily Plato can 'invent Egyptians or anything else,' and how careless he is of historical truth or probability. Who would suspect that the wise Critias, the virtuous Charmides, had ended their lives among the thirty tyrants? Who would imagine that Lysias, who is here assailed by Socrates, is the son of his old friend Cephalus? or that Isocrates himself is the enemy of Plato and his school? No arguments can be drawn from the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the characters of Plato. (Else, perhaps, it might be further argued that, judging from their extant remains, insipid rhetoric is far more characteristic of Isocrates than of Lysias.) But Plato makes use of names which have often hardly any connection with the historical characters to whom they belong. In this instance the comparative favour shown to Isocrates may possibly be accounted for by the circumstance of his belonging to the aristocratical, as Lysias to the democratical party.

Few persons will be inclined to suppose, in the superficial manner of some ancient critics, that a dialogue which treats of love must necessarily have been written in youth. As little weight can be attached to the argument that he had probably visited Egypt before he wrote the story of Theuth and Thamuz. For there is no real proof that he ever was in Egypt; and even if he was, he might have known or invented Egyptian traditions before he went there. The late date of the *Phaedrus* will have to be established by other arguments than these: the maturity of the thought, the perfection of the style, the insight, the relation to the other Platonic Dialogues, seem to contradict the notion that it could have been the work of a youth of twenty or twenty-three years of age. The cosmological notion of the mind as the *primum mobile*, and the admission of impulse into the immortal nature, afford

grounds for assigning a much later date. (Cp. *Tim.*, *Soph.*, *Laws.*) Add to this that the picture of Socrates, though in some lesser particulars,—e. g. his going without sandals, his habit of remaining within the walls, his emphatic declaration that his study is human nature,—an exact resemblance, is in the main the Platonic and not the real Socrates. Can we suppose ‘the young man to have told such lies’ about his master while he was still alive? Moreover, when two Dialogues are so closely connected as the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, there is great improbability in supposing that one of them was written at least twenty years after the other. The conclusion seems to be, that the Dialogue was written at some comparatively late but unknown period of Plato’s life, after he had deserted the purely Socratic point of view, but before he had entered on the more abstract speculations of the *Sophist* or the *Philebus*. Taking into account the divisions of the soul, the doctrine of transmigration, the isolation of the philosophic life, and the general character of the style, we shall not be far wrong in placing the *Phaedrus* in the neighbourhood of the *Republic*; remarking only that allowance must be made for the poetical element in the *Phaedrus*, which, while falling short of the *Republic* in definite philosophic results, seems to have glimpses of a truth beyond.

Two short passages, which are unconnected with the main subject of the Dialogue, may seem to merit a more particular notice: (1) the *locus classicus* about mythology; (2) the tale of the grasshoppers.

The first passage is remarkable as showing that Plato was entirely free from what may be termed the Euhemerism of his age. (For there were Euhemerists in Greece before Euhemerus.) Other philosophers, like Anaxagoras and Metrodorus, had found in Homer and mythology hidden meanings. Plato, with a truer instinct, rejects these attractive interpretations; he regards the inventor of them as ‘unfortunate,’ and they draw a man off from the knowledge of himself. There is a latent criticism, and also a poetical sense in Plato, which enable him to discard them, and yet in another way to make use of poetry and mythology as a vehicle of thought and feeling. What would he have said of the discovery of Christian doctrines in these old Greek legends? While acknowledging that such interpretations are ‘very nice’; would he not have remarked that they are found in all sacred literatures? They cannot be tested by any criterion of truth, or used to establish any truth; they add nothing to the sum of human knowledge;

they are—what we please, and if employed as ‘peacemakers’ between the new and old are liable to serious misconstruction, as he elsewhere remarks (Rep. 378 E). And therefore he would have ‘bid Farewell to them; the study of them would take up too much of his time; and he has not as yet learned the true nature of religion.’ The ‘sophistical’ interest of Phaedrus, the little touch about the two versions of the story, the ironical manner in which these explanations are set aside—the common opinion about them is enough for me—the allusion to the serpent Typho, may be noted in passing; also the general agreement between the tone of this speech and the remark of Socrates which follows afterwards, ‘I am a diviner, but a poor one.’

The tale of the grasshoppers is naturally suggested by the surrounding scene. Yet we must not forget also that they are the representatives of the Athenians as children of the soil. Under the image of the lively chirruping grasshoppers who inform the Muses in heaven who honours them on earth, Plato intends to represent an Athenian audience (*τρεττιγεσσω ἐουκότες*). The story is introduced, apparently, to mark a change of subject, and also, like several other allusions which occur in the course of the Dialogue, in order to preserve the scene in the recollection of the reader.

No one can duly appreciate the dialogues of Plato, especially the Phaedrus, Symposium, and portions of the Republic, who has not a sympathy with mysticism. To the uninitiated, as he would himself have acknowledged, they will appear to be the dreams of a poet who is disguised as a philosopher. There is a twofold difficulty in apprehending this aspect of the Platonic writings. First, we do not immediately realize that under the marble exterior of Greek literature was concealed a soul thrilling with spiritual emotion. Secondly, the forms or figures which the Platonic philosophy assumes, are not like the images of the prophet Isaiah, or of the Apocalypse, familiar to us in the days of our youth. By mysticism we mean, not the extravagance of an erring fancy, but the concentration of reason in feeling, the enthusiastic love of the good, the true, the one, the sense of the infinity of knowledge and of the marvel of the human faculties. When feeding upon such thoughts the ‘wing of the soul’ is renewed and gains strength; she is raised above ‘the mannikins of earth’ and their opinions, waiting in wonder to know, and working with reverence to find out what God in this or in another life may reveal to her.

PHAEDRUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES. PHAEDRUS.

SCENE:—Under a plane-tree, by the banks of the Ilissus.

Steph.
227 *Socrates.* My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?

Phaedrus. I have come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I have been sitting with him the whole morning; and our common friend Acumenus advises me to walk in the country, which he says is more invigorating than to walk in the courts.

Soc. There he is right. Lysias then, I suppose, was in the town?

Phaedr. Yes, he was with Epicrates, at the house of Morychus; that house which is near the temple of Olympian Zeus.

Soc. And how did he entertain you? Can I be wrong in supposing that Lysias gave you a feast of discourse?

Phaedr. You shall hear, if you can spare time to accompany me.

Soc. And would I not deem the conversation of you and Lysias 'a thing of higher import,' as I may say in the words of Pindar, 'than any business'?

Phaedr. Will you go on?

Soc. And will you go on with the narration?

Phaedr. My tale, Socrates, is one of your sort, for the theme which occupied us was love—after a fashion: Lysias has been

writing about a fair youth who was being tempted, but not by a lover; and this was the point: he ingeniously proved that the non-lover should be accepted rather than the lover.

Soc. O that is noble of him. I wish that he would say the poor man rather than the rich, and the old man rather than the young one; he should meet the case of me, and all of us—his words would then be charming, and a public good; and I am so eager to hear them that if you walk all the way to Megara, and when you have reached the wall come back, as Herodicus recommends, without going in, I will keep you company.

Phaedr. What do you mean, Socrates? How can you imagine that my unpractised memory can do justice to an elaborate 228 work, which the greatest rhetorician of the day spent a long time in composing. Indeed, I cannot; I would give a great deal if I could.

Soc. I believe that I know Phaedrus about as well as I know myself, and I am very sure that a speech of Lysias was heard by him, not once only, but again and again he asked him to repeat his words, and Lysias was very willing to gratify him; at last, when nothing else would satisfy him, he got hold of the book, and looked at what he wanted—this occupied him during the whole morning;—and then when he was tired with sitting, he went out to take a walk, not until, as I believe, he had simply learned by heart the entire discourse, unless it was unusually long; and as he was going outside the wall to practise his lesson, he saw a certain lover of discourse who had the same complaint as himself;—he saw and rejoiced; now thought he, ‘I shall have a partner in my revels.’ And he invited him to come with him. But when the lover of discourse asked to hear the tale, he gave himself airs and said, ‘No I cannot,’ as if he were indisposed; although, if the hearer had refused, he would sooner or later have compelled him to listen whether he would or no. Therefore, Phaedrus, as he will speak in any case, beg him to speak at once.

Phaedr. I suppose that you will not let me off until I speak in some way; and therefore my best plan is to speak as I best may.

Soc. That is a very true supposition of yours.

Phaedr. I will do my best; for believe me, Socrates, I did not

learn the very words—O no; nevertheless I have a general notion of what he said, and will give you in a short summary the successive arguments by which the case of the non-lover was proved to be superior to that of the lover. Let me begin at the beginning.

Soc. Yes, my friend; but you must first of all show what you have got in your left hand under your cloak, for that roll, as I suspect, is the actual discourse. Now, much as I love you, I would not have you suppose that I am going to have your memory exercised at my expense, if you have Lysias himself here.

Phaedr. Enough; I see that I have no hope of practising
229 upon you. But if I am to read, where would you please to sit?

Soc. Turn this way; let us go to the Ilissus, and sit down at some quiet spot.

Phaedr. I am fortunate in not having my sandals, and as you never have any, I think that we may go along the brook and cool our feet in the water; this is the easiest way, and at mid-day and in the summer is far from being unpleasant.

Soc. Lead on, and look out for a place in which we can sit down.

Phaedr. Do you see that tallest plane-tree in the distance?

Soc. Yes.

Phaedr. There are shade and gentle breezes, and grass on which we may either sit or lie down.

Soc. Move on.

Phaedr. I should like to know, Socrates, whether the place is not somewhere here at which Boreas is said to have carried off Orithyia from the banks of the Ilissus?

Soc. That is the tradition.

Phaedr. And is this the exact spot? The little stream is delightfully clear and bright; I can fancy that there might be maidens playing near.

Soc. I believe that the spot is not exactly here, but about a quarter of a mile lower down, where you cross to the temple of Artemis, and I think that there is some sort of an altar of Boreas at the place.

Phaedr. I do not recollect; but I beseech you to tell me, Socrates, do you believe this tale?

Soc. The wise are doubtful, and I should not be singular if, like them, I also doubted. I might have a rational explanation that Orithyia was playing with Pharmacia, when a northern gust carried her over the neighbouring rocks; and this being the manner of her death, she was said to have been carried away by Boreas. There is a discrepancy, however, about the locality; according to another version of the story she was taken from the Areopagus, and not from this place. Now I quite acknowledge that these allegories are very nice, but he is not to be envied who has to invent them; much labour and ingenuity will be required of him; and when he has once begun, he must go on and rehabilitate centaurs and chimeras dire. Gorgons and winged steeds flow in apace, and numberless other inconceivable and portentous monsters. And if he is sceptical about them, and would fain reduce them one after another to the rules of probability, this sort of crude philosophy will take up all his time. Now I have certainly not time for such enquiries; shall I tell you why? I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to be curious about that which is not my business, while I am still in ignorance of my own self, would be ridiculous. And therefore I say farewell to all this; the common opinion is enough for me. For, as I was saying, I want to know not about this, but about myself. Am I indeed a wonder more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort, to whom Nature has given a diviner and lowlier destiny? But let me ask you, friend: have we not reached the plane-tree to which you were conducting us? 230

Phaedr. Yes, here is the tree.

Soc. Yes, indeed, and a fair and shady resting-place, full of summer sounds and scents. There is the lofty and spreading plane-tree, and the agnus castus high and clustering, in the fullest blossom and the greatest fragrance; and the stream which flows beneath the plane-tree is deliciously cold to the feet. Judging from the ornaments and images, this must be a spot sacred to Achelous and the Nymphs; moreover, there is a sweet breeze, and the grasshoppers chirrup; and the greatest charm of all is the grass like a pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phaedrus, you have been an admirable guide.

Phaedr. I always wonder at you, Socrates ; for when you are in the country, you really are like a stranger who is being led about by a guide. Do you ever cross the border? I rather think that you never venture even outside the gates.

Soc. Very true, my good friend ; and I hope that you will excuse me when you hear the reason, which is, that I am a lover of knowledge, and the men who dwell in the city are my teachers, and not the trees, or the country. Though I do indeed believe that you have found a spell with which to draw me out of the city into the country, as hungry cows are led by waving before them a bough or a fruit. For only hold up in like manner a book before me, and you may lead me all round Attica, and over the wide world. And now having arrived, I intend to lie down, and do you choose any posture in which you can read best. Begin.

Phaedr. Listen. ‘ You know my views of our common interest, and I do not think that I ought to fail in the object of my suit, because I am not your lover : for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown when their passion ceases, but non-lovers have no time of repentance, because they are free and not subject to necessity, and they confer their benefits according to the measure of their ability, in the way which is most conducive to their own interest. Then again, lovers remember how they have neglected their interests, for the sake of their loves ; they consider the benefits which they have conferred on them ; and when to these they add the troubles which they have endured, they think that they have long ago paid all that is due to them. But the non-lover has no such tormenting recollections ; he has never neglected his affairs or quarrelled with his relations ; he has no troubles to reckon up or excuses to allege ; he is well rid of all these evils. What remains, then, but that he should freely do what will gratify the beloved? Still you will say that the lover is more to be esteemed, because his love is thought to be greater ; for he is willing to say and do what is hateful to other men, in order to please his beloved ; well, that, if true, is only a proof that he will prefer any future love to his present, and will injure his old love at the pleasure of the new. And how can a man reasonably sacrifice himself to one who is possessed with a malady which no experienced

person would attempt to cure, for the patient himself admits that he is not in his right mind, and acknowledges that he is wrong in his mind, but is unable, as he says, to control himself. How, if he came to his right mind, could he imagine that the desires were good which he conceived when in his wrong mind? Then again, there are many more non-lovers than lovers; and, therefore, you will have a larger choice, and are far more likely to find among them a desirable friend. And if you fear common opinion, and would avoid publicity and reproach, the lover, who is always thinking that other men are as emulous of him as he ²³² is of them, will be sure to boast of his successes, and make a show of them openly in the pride of his heart;—he wants others to know that his labour has not been lost: but the non-lover is more his own master, and is desirous of solid good, and not of the opinion of mankind. Again, the lover may be generally seen and known following the beloved (this is his regular occupation), and when they are observed to exchange two words they are supposed to meet about some affair of love either past or in contemplation; but when non-lovers meet, no one asks the reason why, because people know that talking is natural, whether friendship or mere pleasure is the motive. And, again, if you fear the fickleness of friendship, consider that in any other case a quarrel might be a mutual calamity; but now, when you have given up what is most precious to you, you will be the greater loser, and therefore, you will have more reason in being afraid of the lover, for his vexations are many, and he is always fancying that every one is leagued against him. Wherefore also he debarb his beloved from society; he will not have you intimate with the wealthy, lest they should exceed him in wealth, or with men of education, lest they should be his superiors in understanding; and he is equally afraid of those who have any other advantage. If he can persuade you to break with them, he leaves you without a friend in the world; or if, out of a regard to your own interest, you have more sense than to comply with his desire, he will quarrel with you. But those who are non-lovers, and whose success in love is the reward of their merit, will not be jealous of the companions of their beloved, and will rather hate those who refuse to be his companions, thinking that they are slighted by

the latter and benefited by the former; for more love than hatred may be expected to come of his friendship with others. Many lovers also have loved the person of a youth before they knew his character or his relations; so that when their passion has passed away, there is no knowing whether they will continue
233 to be his friends; whereas, in the case of non-lovers who were always friends, the friendship is not lessened by the favours granted; but the recollection of these remains with them, and is an earnest of good things to come. Further, I say that you are likely to be improved by me, whereas the lover will spoil you. For they praise your words and actions in a bad way; partly, they are afraid of offending you, and partly, their judgment is weakened by their passion: for love has a wonderful way of making that painful to the disappointed which is not painful to others, and of compelling those who succeed to praise that which ought not to give them pleasure: so that the beloved is more to be pitied than envied. But if you listen to me, in the first place, I, in my intercourse with you, shall not regard present enjoyment, but future advantage, being not conquered by love, but conquering myself; nor for small causes taking violent offences, but even when the cause is great, slowly laying up little wrath—unintentional offences I shall forgive, and intentional ones I shall try to prevent; and these are the marks of a friendship which will last. Do you think that only a lover can be a firm friend? reflect:—if this were true, we should set small value on sons, or fathers, or mothers; nor should we ever have loyal friends, for our love of them arises not from passion, but from other associations. Further, if we ought to confer favours on those who are the most eager suitors, we ought to confer them not on the most virtuous, but on the most needy; for they are the persons who will be most relieved, and will therefore be the most grateful; and, in general, when you make a feast invite not your friend, but the beggar and the empty soul, for they will love you, and attend you, and come about your doors, and will be the best pleased, and the most grateful, and will invoke blessings on your head. Yet surely you ought not to be granting favours to those who besiege you with prayer, but to those who are best able to reward you; nor to the lover only, but to those who are worthy of love; nor to those who will

enjoy the charm of your youth, but to those who will share ²³⁴ their goods with you in age; nor to those who, having succeeded, will glory in their success to others, but to those who will be modest and hold their peace; nor to those who care about you for a moment only, but to those who will continue your friends through life; nor to those who, when their passion is over, will pick a quarrel with you, but rather to those who, when the bloom of youth has left you, will show their own virtue. Remember what I have said; and consider this further point; that friends admonish the lover under the idea that his way of life is bad, but no one of his kindred ever yet censured the non-lover, or thought that he was ill-advised about his own interests.

'Perhaps you will ask me whether I propose that you should indulge every non-lover. To which I reply that not even the lover would advise you to indulge all lovers, for the indiscriminate favour is less esteemed by the rational recipient, and less easily hidden by him who would escape the world. Now love ought to be for the advantage of both parties, and for the injury of neither.

'I believe that I have said enough; but if there is anything more which you desire or which needs to be supplied, ask and I will answer.'

Now, Socrates, what do you think? Is not the discourse excellent, especially the language?

Soc. Yes, indeed, admirable; the effect on me was ravishing. And this I owe to you, Phaedrus, for I observed you while reading to be in an ecstasy, and thinking that you are more experienced in these matters than I am, I followed your example, and, like you, became inspired with a divine phrenzy.

Phaedr. Indeed, you are pleased to be merry.

Soc. Do you mean that I am not in earnest?

Phaedr. Now don't talk in that way, Socrates, but let me have your real opinion; I adjure you, by the god of friendship, to tell me whether you think that any Hellene could have said more or spoken better on the same subject.

Soc. Well, but are you and I expected to praise the sentiments of the author, or only the clearness, and roundness, and finish, and tournure of the language? As to the first I willingly submit to your better judgment, for I am unworthy to form ²³⁵

an opinion, having only attended to the rhetorical manner ; and I was doubting whether Lysias himself would be able to defend that ; I thought, though I speak under correction, that he repeated himself two or three times, either from want of words or from want of pains ; and also, he appeared to me wantonly ambitious of showing how well he could say the same thing in two or three ways.

Phaedr. Nonsense, Socrates ; what you call repetition was the especial merit of the speech ; for he omitted no topic of which the subject rightly allowed, and I do not think that any one could have spoken better or more exhaustively.

Soc. I cannot go so far as that with you. Ancient sages, men and women, who have spoken and written of these things, would rise up in judgment against me, if I lightly assented to you.

Phaedr. Who are they, and where did you hear anything better than this ?

Soc. I am sure that I must have heard ; but I do not remember at this moment from whom ; perhaps from Sappho the fair, Anacreon the wise ; or, possibly, from a prose writer. Why do I say so ? Why, because I perceive that my bosom is full, and that I could make another speech as good as that of Lysias, and different. Now I am certain that this is not an invention of my own, for I am conscious that I know nothing, and therefore I can only infer that I have been filled through the ears, like a pitcher from the waters of another, though I have actually forgotten in my stupidity who was my informant.

Phaedr. That is grand. But never mind where you heard the discourse or of whom ; let that, if you will, be a mystery not to be divulged even at my earnest desire. Only, as you say, promise to make another and better oration of equal length on the same subject, with other arguments ; and I, like the nine Archons, will promise to set up a golden image at Delphi, not only of myself, but of you, and as large as life.

Soc. You are a dear golden simpleton if you suppose me to mean that Lysias has altogether missed the mark, and that I can make a speech from which all his arguments are to be excluded. The worst of authors will say something which is to the point. Who, for example, could speak on this thesis
236 of yours without praising the discretion of the non-lover and

blaming the folly of the lover? These are the commonplaces which must come in (for what else is there to be said?) and must be allowed and excused; the only merit is in the arrangement of them, for there can be none in the invention; but when you leave the commonplaces, then there may be some originality.

Phaedr. I admit that there is reason in what you say, and I will be reasonable, and will allow you to start with the premiss that the lover is more disordered in his wits than the non-lover; if you go on after that and make a longer and better speech than Lysias, and use other arguments, then I say again, that a statue you shall have of beaten gold, and take your place by the colossal offerings of the Cypselids at Olympia.

Soc. Is not the lover serious, because only in fun I lay a finger upon his love? And so, Phaedrus, you really imagine that I am going to improve upon his ingenuity?

Phaedr. There I have you as you had me, and you must just speak 'as you best can.' Do not let us exchange 'tu quoque' as in a farce, or compel me to say to you as you said to me, 'I know Socrates as well as I know myself, and he was wanting to speak, but he gave himself airs.' Rather I would have you consider that from this place we stir not until you have unbosomed yourself of the speech; for here are we all alone, and I am stronger, remember, and younger than you; therefore perpend, and do not compel me to use violence.

Soc. But, my sweet Phaedrus, how can I ever compete with Lysias in an extempore speech? He is a master in his art and I am an untaught man.

Phaedr. You see how matters stand; and therefore let there be no more pretences; for, indeed, I know the word that is irresistible.

Soc. Then don't say it.

Phaedr. Yes, but I will; and my word shall be an oath. 'I say, or rather swear'—but what god will be the witness of my oath?—'I swear by this plane-tree, that unless you repeat the discourse here in the face of the plane-tree, I will never tell you another; never let you have word of another!'

Soc. Villain! I am conquered; the poor lover of discourse has no more to say.

Phædr. Then why are you still at your tricks?

Soc. I am not going to play tricks now that you have taken the oath, for I cannot allow myself to be starved.

Phædr. Proceed.

237 *Soc.* Shall I tell you what I will do?

Phædr. What?

Soc. I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can, for if I see you I shall feel ashamed and not know what to say.

Phædr. Only go on and you may do as you please.

Soc. Come, O ye Muses, melodious (*λιγυραὶ*), as ye are called, whether you have received this name from the character of your strains, or because the Melians¹ are a musical race, help, O help me in the tale which my good friend desires me to rehearse, for the good of his friend whom he always deemed wise and will now deem wiser than ever.

Once upon a time there was a fair boy, or, more properly speaking, a youth; he was very fair and had a great many lovers; and there was one special cunning one, who had persuaded the youth that he did not love him, but he really loved him all the same; and one day when he was paying his addresses to him, he used this very argument—that he ought to accept the non-lover rather than the lover; his words were as follows:—

‘All good counsel begins in the same way; a man should know what he is advising about, or his counsel will come to nought. But people imagine that they know about the nature of things, when they don’t know about them, and, not agreeing at the beginning, they end, as might be expected, in contradicting one another and themselves. Now you and I must not be guilty of the error which we condemn in others; but as our question is whether the lover or non-lover is to be preferred, let us first of all agree in defining the nature and power of love, and then, keeping our eyes upon the definition and to this appealing, let us further enquire whether love brings advantage or disadvantage.

‘Every one sees that love is a desire, and we know also that

¹ In the original, *λιγυραὶ* *λίγυες*.

non-lovers desire the beautiful and good. Now in what way is the lover to be distinguished from the non-lover? Let us note that in every one of us there are two guiding and ruling principles which lead us whither they will; one is the natural desire of pleasure, the other is an acquired opinion which aspires after the best; and these two are sometimes in harmony and then again at war, and sometimes the one, sometimes the other conquers. When opinion conquers, and by the help of reason leads us to the best, the conquering principle is called temperance; but when desire, which is devoid of reason, rules in us and drags us to pleasure, that power of misrule is called excess. Now excess has many names, and many members, and many forms, and any of these forms when very marked gives a name to the bearer of the name, neither honourable nor desirable. The desire of eating, which gets the better of the higher reason and the other desires, is called gluttony, and he who is possessed by this is called a glutton; the tyrannical desire of drink, which inclines the possessor of the desire to drink, has a name which is only too obvious; and the same may be said of the whole family of desires and their names, whichever of them happens to be dominant. And now I think that you will perceive the drift of my discourse; but as every spoken word is in a manner plainer than the unspoken, I had better say further that the irrational desire which overcomes the tendency of opinion towards right, and is led away to the enjoyment of beauty, and especially of personal beauty, by the desires which are her kindred—that desire, I say, the conqueror and leader of the rest, strengthened from having this very power, is called the power of love (*ἐρρώμενος ἔρως*).

And now, dear Phaedrus, I shall pause for an instant to ask whether you do not think me, as I appear to myself, inspired?

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you seem to have a very unusual flow of words.

Soc. Listen to me, then, in silence; for surely the place is holy; so that you must not wonder, if, as I proceed, I appear to be in a divine fury, for already I am getting into dithyrambics.

Phaedr. That is quite true.

Soc. And that I attribute to you. But hear what follows, and perhaps the fit may be averted; all is in their hands above. I will go on talking to my youth. Listen:—

Thus, my friend, we have declared and defined the nature of love. Keeping the definition in view, let us now enquire what advantage or disadvantage is likely to ensue from the lover or the non-lover to him who accepts their advances.

He who is the victim of his passions and the slave of pleasure will of course desire to make his beloved as agreeable to himself as possible. Now to him who is not in his right senses that is agreeable which is not opposed to him, but that which is equal or superior is hateful to him, and therefore the lover will not brook any superiority or equality on the part of his
 239 beloved; he is always employed in reducing him to inferiority. And the ignorant is the inferior of the wise, the coward of the brave, the slow of speech of the speaker, the dull of the clever. These are the sort of natural and inherent defects in the mind of the beloved which enhance the delight of the lover; and there are acquired defects which he must produce in him, or he will be deprived of his fleeting joy. And therefore he cannot help being jealous, and will debar him from the advantages of society which would make a man of him, and especially from that society which would have given him wisdom. That is to say, in his excessive fear lest he should come to be despised in his eyes he will be compelled to banish from him divine philosophy; and there is no greater injury which he can inflict upon him than this. Moreover, he will contrive that he shall be wholly ignorant, and in everything dependent on himself; he is to be the delight of his lover's heart, and a curse to himself. Verily, a lover is a profitable guardian and associate for him in all that relates to his mind.

Let us next see how his master, whose law of life is pleasure and not good, will keep and train the body of his servant. Will he not choose a beloved who is delicate rather than sturdy and strong? One brought up in shady bowers and not in the bright sun, a stranger to manly exercises and the sweat of toil, accustomed only to a soft and luxurious diet, instead of the hues of health having the colours of paint and ornament and the rest of a piece?—such a life as any one can imagine

and which I need not detail at length. But I may sum up all that I have to say in a word, and pass on. Such a person in war, or in any of the great crises of life, will be the anxiety of his friends and also of his lover, and certainly not the terror of his enemies; which nobody can deny.

And now let us tell what advantage or disadvantage the beloved will receive from the guardianship and society of his lover in the matter of his possessions; that is the next point to consider. The lover will be the first to see what, indeed, will be sufficiently evident to all men, that he above all desires to deprive his beloved of his dearest and best and most sacred possessions, father, mother, kindred, friends, all whom he thinks 240 may be hinderers or reprovers of their sweet converse; he will even cast a jealous eye upon his gold and silver or other property, because these make him a less easy prey, and when caught less manageable; hence he is of necessity displeased at his possession of them and rejoices at their loss; and he would like him to be wifeless, childless, homeless, as well; and the longer the better, for the longer he is all this, the longer he will enjoy him.

There are some sort of animals, such as flatterers, which are dangerous and mischievous enough, and yet nature has mingled a temporary pleasure and grace in their composition. You may say that a courtesan is hurtful, and disapprove of such creatures and their practices, and yet for the time they are very pleasant. But the lover is not only mischievous to his love, he is also extremely unpleasant to live with. The old proverb says, that equals delight in equals; equality of years inclines them to the same pleasures, and similarity begets friendship, and yet you may have more than enough even of this; and verily compulsion is always said to be grievous. Now the lover is not only unlike his beloved, but he forces himself upon him. For he is old and his love is young, and neither day nor night will he leave him if he can help; necessity and the sting of desire drive him on, and allure him with the pleasure which he receives from seeing, hearing, touching, perceiving him in every way. And therefore he is delighted to fasten upon him and to minister to him. But what pleasure or consolation can the beloved be receiving all this time? Must he not feel the extremity of disgust when

he looks at an old withered face and the remainder to match, which even in a description is disagreeable, and quite detestable when he is forced into daily contact with his lover; moreover he is jealously watched and guarded against everything and everybody, and has to hear misplaced and exaggerated praises of himself, and censures as inappropriate, which are intolerable when the man is sober, and, besides being intolerable, are published all over the world in all their indelicacy and wearisomeness when he is drunk.

And not only while his love continues is he mischievous and unpleasant, but when his love ceases he becomes a perfidious
 241 enemy of him on whom he showered his oaths and prayers and promises, and yet could hardly prevail upon him to tolerate the tedium of his company even from motives of interest. The time of payment arrives, and now he is the servant of another master; instead of love and infatuation, wisdom and temperance are his bosom's lords; the man has changed, but the beloved is not aware of this; he asks for a return and recalls to his recollection former acts and words, under the idea that he is talking to the same person, and the other, being ashamed and not having the courage to tell him that he has changed, and not knowing how to fulfil the oaths and promises which he made when under the dominion of folly, has now grown wise and temperate; he does not want to do as he did or to be as he was before. Therefore he runs away and is constrained to be a defaulter; the oyster-shell¹ has the other side uppermost—he changes pursuit into flight, while the other is compelled to follow him with passion and imprecation, not knowing that he ought never from the first to have accepted a demented lover instead of a sensible non-lover; and that in making such a choice he was yielding to a faithless, morose, envious, disagreeable being, hurtful to his estate, hurtful to his bodily health, and still more hurtful to the cultivation of his mind, which is and ever will be the most honourable possession both of gods and men. Consider this, fair youth, and know that

¹ In allusion to a game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell which was thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.

in the friendship of the lover there is no real kindness; he has an appetite and wants to feed upon you.

‘As wolves love lambs so lovers love their loves.’

But I told you so, I am speaking in verse, and therefore I had better make an end; enough.

Phaedr. I thought that you were only half-way and were going to make a similar speech about all the advantages of accepting the non-lover. Why do you not proceed?

Soc. Does not your simplicity observe that I have got out of dithyrambics into epics; and if my censure was in verse, what will my praise be? Do you not perceive that I am already overtaken by the Nymphs to whom you have mischievously exposed me? And therefore I will only add that the non-lover has all the advantages in which the lover is charged with being deficient. And now I will say no more; there has been enough said of both of them. Leaving the tale to its fate, I will cross the river and make the best of my way home, lest a worse thing be inflicted upon me by you. ²⁴²

Phaedr. Not yet, Socrates; not until the heat of the day has passed; do you not see that the hour is almost noon? there is the sun standing over our heads. Let us rather stay and talk over what has been said, and then return in the cool.

Soc. Your love of discourse, Phaedrus, is superhuman, simply marvellous, and I do not believe that there is any one of your contemporaries who has either made or in one way or another has been the cause of others making an equal number of speeches. I would except Simmias the Theban, but all the rest are far behind you. And now I do verily believe that you have been the cause of another.

Phaedr. That is good news. But what do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that as I was about to cross the stream the usual sign was given to me; that is the sign which never bids but always forbids me to do what I am going to do; and I thought that I heard a voice saying in my ear that I had been guilty of impiety, and that I must not go away until I had made an atonement. Now I am a diviner, though not a very good one, but I have enough religion for my own needs, as you might say of a bad writer—his writing is good

enough for him, and I am beginning to see that I was in error. O my friend, how singularly prophetic is the soul! For at the time I had a sort of misgiving, and, like Ibycus, 'I was troubled,' and I suspected that I might be buying honour from men at the price of sinning against the gods. Now I am aware of my error.

Phaedr. What error?

Soc. That was a dreadful speech which you brought with you, and you made me utter one as bad.

Phaedr. How was that?

Soc. Foolish, I say, and in a degree impious; and what can be more dreadful than this?

Phaedr. Nothing, if the speech was really such as you describe.

Soc. Well, and is not Eros the son of Aphrodite, and a god?

Phaedr. That is the language of mankind about him.

Soc. But that was not the language of Lysias' speech any more than of that other speech uttered through my lips when under the influence of your enchantments, and which I may call yours and not mine. For if love be, as he surely is, a god or divine, he cannot be evil. Yet this was the error of both our speeches. There was also a simplicity about them which was
243 refreshing; having no truth or honesty in them, nevertheless they pretended to be something, hoping to succeed in deceiving the manikins of earth and be famous among them. Wherefore I must have a purgation. And I bethink me of an ancient purgation of mythological error which was devised, not by Homer, for he never had the wit to discover why he was blind, but by Stesichorus, who was a philosopher and knew the reason why; and therefore, when he lost his eyes, for that was the penalty which was inflicted upon him for reviling the lovely Helen, he at once purged himself. And the purgation was a recantation, which began thus:—

'I told a lie when I said that thou never embarkedst on the swift ships, or wentest to the walls of Troy.'

and when he had completed his poem, which is called 'the recantation,' immediately his sight returned to him. Now I will be wiser than either Stesichorus or Homer, in that I am going

to make my recantation for reviling love before I suffer ; and this I will attempt, not as before, veiled and ashamed, but with forehead bold and bare.

Phaedr. Nothing could be more agreeable to me than to listen to you.

Soc. Only think, my good Phaedrus, what an utter want of delicacy was shown in the two discourses ; I mean, in my own and in the one which you recited out of the book. Would not any one who was himself of a noble and gentle nature, and who loved or ever had loved a nature like his own, when he heard us speaking of the petty causes of lovers' jealousies, and of their exceeding animosities, and the injuries which they do to their beloved, have imagined that our ideas of love were taken from some haunt of sailors to which good manners were unknown—he would certainly never have admitted the justice of our censure ?

Phaedr. Certainly not.

Soc. Therefore, because I blush at the thought of this person, and also because I am afraid of the god Love, I desire to wash the brine out of my ears with water from the spring ; and I would counsel Lysias not to delay, but to write another discourse, which shall prove that 'ceteris paribus' the lover ought to be accepted rather than the non-lover.

Phaedr. Be assured that he shall. You shall speak the praises of the lover, and Lysias shall be made to write them in another discourse. I will compel him to do so.

Soc. You will be true to your nature in that, and therefore I believe you.

Phaedr. Speak, and fear not.

Soc. But where is the fair youth whom I was addressing, and who ought to listen, in order that he may not be misled by one side before he has heard the other ?

Phaedr. He is close at hand, and always at your service.

Soc. Know then, fair youth, that the former discourse was that of Phaedrus, the son of Vain Man, who dwells in the 244 city of Myrrhina (Myrrhinusius). And this is the recantation of Stesichorus the son of Godly Man (Euphemus), who comes from the town of Desire (Himera), and is to the following effect : That was a lie in which I said that the beloved ought to accept

the non-lover and reject the lover, because the one is sane, and the other mad. For that might have been truly said if madness were simply an evil; but there is also a madness which is the special gift of heaven, and the source of the chiefest blessings among men. For prophecy is a madness, and the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona when out of their senses have conferred great benefits on Hellas, both in public and private life, but when in their senses few or none. And I might also tell you how the Sibyl and other persons, who have had the gift of prophecy, have told the future of many an one and guided them aright; but that is obvious, and would be tedious.

There will be more reason in appealing to the ancient inventors of names, who, if they had thought madness a disgrace or dishonour, would never have called prophecy (*μαντική*), which is the noblest of arts, by the very same name as madness (*μανική*), thus inseparably connecting them; but they must have thought that there was an inspired madness which was no disgrace; for the two words, *μαντική* and *μανική*, are really the same, and the letter τ is only a modern and tasteless insertion. And this is confirmed by the name which they gave to the rational investigation of futurity, whether made by the help of birds or of other signs; this because supplying from the reasoning faculty insight (*νοῦς*) and information (*ἱστορία*) to human thought (*οἴησις*), they originally termed *οἰοροιστική*, but the word has been lately altered and made sonorous by the modern introduction of the letter Omega (*οἰοροιστική* and *οἰωνοιστική*), and in proportion as prophecy (*μαντική*) is higher and more perfect than divination both in name and reality, in the same proportion, as the ancients testify, is madness superior to a sane mind (*σωφροσύνη*), for the one is only of human, but the other of divine origin. Again, where plagues and mightiest woes have bred in a race, owing to some ancient wrath, there madness enters with holy prayers and rites, and by inspired utterances finds a way of deliverance for those who are in need; and he who has part in this gift, and is truly possessed and duly out of his mind, is by the use of purifications and mysteries made whole and exempt from evil, future as well as present, and has a release from

245 the calamity which afflicts him. There is also a third kind of

madness, of those who are possessed by the Muses ; which enters into a delicate and virgin soul, and there inspiring frenzy, awakens lyrical and all other numbers ; with these adorning the myriad actions of ancient heroes for the instruction of posterity. But he who, having no touch of the Muses' madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted ; the sane man is nowhere at all when he enters into rivalry with the madman.

I might tell of many other noble deeds which have sprung from inspired madness. And therefore, let no one frighten or flutter us by saying that temperate love is preferable to mad love, but let him further show, if he would carry off the palm, that love is not sent by the gods for any good to lover or beloved. And we, on our part, will prove in answer to him that the madness of love is the greatest of heaven's blessings, and the proof shall be one which the wise will receive, and the witting disbelieve. And, first of all, let us inquire what is the truth about the affections and actions of the soul divine and human. And thus we begin our proof :

The soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is ever in motion ; but that which moves another and is moved by another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. Therefore, only that which is self-moving, never leaving self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has a beginning ; but the beginning itself has no beginning, for if a beginning were begotten of something, that something would not be a beginning. But that which is unbegotten must also be indestructible ; for if beginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning out of anything, nor anything out of a beginning ; and all things must have a beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the beginning of motion ; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten, else the whole heavens and all creation would collapse and stand still, and never again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion. For the body which is moved from without is soulless ; but that which is

moved from within has a soul, for such is the nature of the soul.
 246 But if the soul be truly affirmed to be the self-moving, then must she also be without beginning, and immortal. Enough of the soul's immortality.

Her form is a theme of divine and large discourse ; the tongue of man may, however, speak of this briefly, and in a figure. Let our figure be a composite nature—a pair of winged horses and a charioteer. Now the winged horses and the charioteer of the gods are all of them noble, and of noble breed, but our horses are mixed ; moreover, our charioteer drives them in a pair ; and one of them is noble and of noble origin, and the other is ignoble and of ignoble origin ; and the driving, as might be expected, is no easy matter with us. I will endeavour to explain to you in what way the mortal differs from the immortal creature. The soul has the care of inanimate being everywhere, and traverses the whole heaven in divers forms appearing ;—when perfect and fully winged she soars upward, and is the ruler of the universe ; while the imperfect soul loses her feathers, and drooping in her flight at last settles on the solid ground—there, finding a home, she receives an earthly frame which appears to be self-moved, but is really moved by her power ; and this composition of soul and body is called a living and mortal creature. For immortal no such union can be reasonably believed to be ; although fancy, not having seen nor surely known the nature of God, may imagine an immortal creature having a body, and having also a soul which are united throughout all time. Let that, however, be as God wills, and be spoken of acceptably to him. And now let us ask the reason why the soul loses her feathers.

The wing is that corporeal element which is most akin to the divine, and is intended to soar aloft and carry that which gravitates downwards into the upper region, where dwell the gods. Now the divine is beauty, wisdom, goodness, and the like ; and by these the wing of the soul is nourished, and grows apace ; but when fed upon evil and foulness, and the like, wastes and falls away. Zeus, the mighty lord holding the reins of a winged chariot, leads the way in heaven, ordering all and caring for all ; and there follows him the array of gods and demi-gods, marshalled in eleven bands ; for Hestia only abides at home in the house of heaven ; of the rest they who are reckoned among the

princely twelve march in their order. They see many blessed sights in the inner heaven, and there are many ways to and fro, along which the happy gods are passing, each one fulfilling his own work; and he who will and can may follow, for jealousy has no place in the celestial choir. But when they go to feast and festival, then they mount to the top of the dome of heaven up the steep. Now the chariots of the gods in even poise, obeying the rein glide rapidly; but the others labour, for the steed who has evil in him, sinking heavily to the earth, keeps them down, when he has not been rightly trained by the charioteer:— and this is the hour of agony and extremest conflict for the soul. For the immortals, when they are at the end of their course, go out and stand upon the back of heaven, and the revolution of the spheres carries them round, and they behold the world beyond. Now of the heaven which is above the heavens, no earthly poet has ever sung or will sing worthily. But I must tell, for I am bound to speak truly when speaking of the truth. The colourless and formless and intangible essence and only reality dwells encircled by true knowledge in this home, visible to the mind alone who is the lord of the soul. And the divine intelligence, feeding upon mind and pure knowledge, the proper food of every soul, rejoices at beholding reality, and once more gazing upon truth, is replenished and made glad, until the revolution of the worlds bring, her round again to the same place. In the revolution she beholds justice, and temperance, and knowledge absolute, not in the form of created things or of things relative, which men call existence, but knowledge absolute in existence absolute; and beholding the other true existences in like manner, and feasting upon them, she passes down into the interior of the heavens and returns home, and there the charioteer putting up his horses at the stall, gives them ambrosia to eat and nectar to drink.

This is the life of the gods; but of other souls, that which follows God best and is likest to him lifts the head of the charioteer into the outer world, and is carried round in the revolution, troubled indeed by the steeds, and with difficulty beholding true being; while another rises and falls, and sees, and again fails to see by reason of the unruliness of the steeds. The rest of the souls are also longing after the upper world and

they all follow, but not being strong enough they are carried round in the deep below, plunging, treading on one another, striving to be first; and there is confusion and the extremity of effort, and many of them are lamed or have their wings broken through the ill-driving of the charioteers; and all of them after a fruitless toil depart, without being initiated into the mysteries of true being, and departing feed upon opinion. The reason of their great desire to behold the plain of truth is that the food which is suited to the highest part of the soul comes out of that meadow; and the wing on which the soul soars is nourished with this. And there is a law of Destiny, that the soul which attains any vision of truth in company with the god is preserved from harm until the next period, and if attaining always is always unharmed. But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the vision of truth, and through some ill hap sinks beneath the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her feathers fall from her and she drops to earth, then the law ordains that this soul shall at her first birth pass, not into any other animal, but only into man; and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as a philosopher, or artist, or some musical and loving nature; that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be a righteous king or lordly warrior; the soul which is of the third class shall be a politician, or economist, or trader; the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils, or a physician; the fifth a prophet or hierophant; to the sixth a poet or some other imitative artist will be appropriate; to the seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the eighth that of a sophist or demagogue; to the ninth that of a tyrant;—all these are states of probation, in which he who lives righteously improves, and he who lives unrighteously deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul can return to the place from whence she came, for she cannot grow her wings
 249 in less; only the soul of a philosopher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is not without philosophy, may acquire wings in the third recurring period of a thousand years: and if they choose this life three times in succession, then they have their wings given them, and go away at the end of three thousand years. But the others receive judgment when they

have completed their first life, and after the judgment they go, some of them to the houses of correction which are under the earth, and are punished; others to some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the life which they led here when in the form of men. And at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and also the evil souls both come to draw lots and choose their second life, and they may take any which they like. The soul of a man may pass into the life of a beast, or from the beast return again into the man. But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass into the human form, for man ought to have general notions, proceeding from many particulars of sense to one conception of reason; and this is the recollection of those things which our soul once saw while following God—when regardless of that which we now call being she raised her head up towards the true being. And therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings; and this is just, for he is always, according to the measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those things in which God abides, and in beholding which He is what he is. And he who employs aright these memories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad, and rebuke him; they do not see that he is inspired.

Thus far I have been speaking of the fourth and last kind of madness, which is imputed to him who, when he sees the beauty of earth, is transported with the recollection of the true beauty; he would like to fly away, but he cannot; he is like a bird fluttering and looking upward and careless of the world below; and he is therefore esteemed mad. And I have shown this of all inspirations to be the noblest and highest and the offspring of the highest, and that he who loves the beautiful is called a lover because he partakes of it. For, as has been already said, every soul of man has in the way of nature beheld true being; this was the condition of her passing into the form of man. But all souls do not easily recal the things of the other world; 250 they may have seen them for a short time only, or they may have been unfortunate in their earthly lot, and may have lost

the memory of the holy things which they saw there through some evil and corrupting association. Few only retain an adequate remembrance of them ; and they, when they behold any image of that other world, are rapt in amazement ; but they are ignorant of what this rapture means, because they do not clearly perceive. For there is no light in the earthly copies of justice or temperance or any of the higher qualities which are precious to souls : they are seen through a glass dimly ; and there are few who, going to the images, behold in them the realities, and they only with difficulty. They might have seen beauty shining in brightness, when, with the happy band following in the train of Zeus, as we philosophers, or of other gods as others did, they saw a vision and were initiated into mysteries which may be truly called most blessed, and which we celebrated in our state of innocence ; having no experience of evils as yet to come ; admitted to the sight of apparitions innocent and simple and calm and happy, shining in pure light, pure ourselves and not yet enshrined in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the body, like an oyster in his shell. Let me linger thus long over the memory of scenes which have passed away.

But of beauty, I repeat again that we saw her there shining in company with the celestial forms ; and coming to earth we find her here too, shining in clearness through the clearest aperture of sense. For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses ; though not by that is wisdom seen ; her loveliness would have been transporting if there had been a visible image of her, and the same is true of the loveliness of the other ideas as well. But this is the privilege of beauty, that she is the loveliest and also the most palpable to sight. Now he who is not newly initiated or who has become corrupted, does not easily rise out of this world to the sight of true beauty in the other ; he looks only at her earthly namesake, and instead of being awed at the sight of her, like a brutish beast he rushes on to
 251 enjoy and beget ; he consorts with wantonness, and is not afraid or ashamed of pursuing pleasure in violation of nature. But he whose initiation is recent, and who has been the spectator of many glories in the other world, is amazed when he sees any one having a godlike face or form, which is

the expression of divine beauty ; and at first a shudder runs through him, and again the old awe steals over him ; then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him, and if were not afraid of being thought a downright madman, he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god ; then as he gazes on him there is a sort of reaction, and the shudder naturally passes into an unusual heat and perspiration ; for, as he receives the effluence of beauty through the eyes, the wing moistens and he warms. And as he warms, the parts out of which the wing grew, and which had been hitherto closed and rigid, and had prevented the wing from shooting forth, are melted, and as nourishment streams upon him, the lower end of the wing begins to swell and grow from the root upwards ; and the growth extends under the whole soul—for once the whole was winged. During this process the whole soul is in a state of effervescence and irritation, like the state of irritation and pain in the gums at the time of cutting teeth ; in like manner the soul when beginning to grow wings has inflammation and pains and ticklings, and when looking at the beauty of youth she receives the sensible warm motion of particles which flow towards her, therefore called emotion (*ἔμπερος*), and is refreshed and warmed by them, and then she ceases from her pain with joy. But when she is separated and her moisture fails, then the orifices of the passage out of which the wing shoots dry up and close, and intercept the germ of the wing ; which, being shut up with the emotion, throbbing as with the pulsations of an artery, pricks the aperture which is nearest, until at length the entire soul is pierced and maddened and pained, and at the recollection of beauty is again delighted. And from both of them together the soul is oppressed at the strangeness of her condition, and is in a great strait and excitement, and in her madness can neither sleep by night nor abide in her place by day. And wherever she thinks that she will behold the beautiful one, thither in her desire she runs. And when she has seen him, and bathed herself with the waters of desire, her constraint is loosened, and she is refreshed, and has no more pangs and pains ; and this is the sweetest of all pleasures at the time, and is the reason why the soul of the lover will never forsake his beautiful one, whom he esteems

above all; he has forgotten mother and brethren and companions, and he thinks nothing of the neglect and loss of his property; the rules and proprieties of life, on which he formerly prided himself, he now despises, and is ready to sleep like a servant, wherever he is allowed, as near as he can to his beautiful one, who is not only the object of his worship, but the only physician who can heal him in his extreme agony. And this state, my dear imaginary youth, is by men called love, and among the gods has a name which you, in your simplicity, may be inclined to mock; there are two lines in the apocryphal writings of Homer in which the name occurs. One of them is rather outrageous, and not altogether metrical. They are as follows:—

‘Mortals call him Eros (love),
But the immortals call him Pteros (feathered dove),
Because the growing of feathers is a necessity to him.’

You may believe this or not as you like. At any rate the loves of lovers and their causes are such as I have described.

Now the lover who is the attendant of Zeus is better able to bear the winged god, and can endure a heavier burden; but the attendants and companions of Ares, when under the influence of love, if they fancy that they have been at all wronged, are ready to kill and put an end to themselves and their beloved. And in like manner he who follows in the train of any other god honours and imitates him, as far as he is able, while he is unspoiled and the impression lasts; and his way of life and behaviour to his beloved and to every other in the first period of his earthly existence is in harmony. Every one chooses the object of his affections according to his character, and this he makes his god, and fashions and adorns as a sort of image which he is to fall down and worship. The followers of Zeus desire that their beloved should have a soul like him; and therefore they seek some one of a philosophical and imperial nature, and when they have found him and loved him, they do all they can to confirm such a nature in him, and if they have no experience hitherto, they learn of any one who can teach them, and themselves follow in the same way. And

253 they have the less difficulty in finding the nature of their own

god in themselves, because they have been compelled to gaze intensely on him; their recollection clings to him, and they become possessed of him, and receive his character and ways, as far as man can participate in God. The qualities of their god they attribute to the beloved, wherefore they love him all the more, and if they draw inspiration from Zeus, like the Bacchic Nymphs, they pour out their own fountain upon him in order to make him as like their god as possible. But those who are the followers of Hera seek a royal love, and when they have found him they do the same with him; and in like manner the followers of Apollo, and of every other god walking in the ways of their god, seek a love who is to be like their god, and when they have found him, they themselves imitate their god, and persuade their love to do the same, and bring him into harmony with the form and ways of the god as far as they can; for they have no feelings of envy or jealousy towards their beloved, but they do their utmost to create in him the greatest likeness of themselves and of the god whom they honour. Thus fair and blissful to the beloved when he is taken, is the desire of the inspired lover, and the initiation of which I speak into the mysteries of true love, if their purpose is effected. Now the beloved is taken captive in the following manner:—

As I said at the beginning of this tale, I divided each soul into three—two horses and a charioteer; and one of the horses was good and the other bad: the division may remain, but I have not yet explained in what the goodness or badness of either consists, and to that I will now proceed. The right hand horse is upright and cleanly made; he has a lofty neck and an aquiline nose; his colour is white, and he has dark eyes and is a lover of honour and modesty and temperance, and the follower of true glory; he needs not the touch of the whip, but is guided by word and admonition only. Whereas the other is a crooked lumbering animal, put together anyhow; he has a short thick neck; he is flat-faced and of a dark colour, with grey and blood-shot eyes; the mate of insolence and pride, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur. Now when the charioteer beholds the vision of love, and has his whole soul warmed through sense, and is full of the prickings and ticklings of

254 desire, the obedient steed, then as always under the government of shame, refrains from leaping on the beloved; but the other, without heeding the blows of the whip, plunges and runs away, giving all manner of trouble to his companion and the charioteer, whom he forces to approach the beloved and to remember the joys of love. They at first indignantly oppose him and will not be urged on to do terrible and unlawful deeds; but at last, when he persists in plaguing them, they yield and agree to do as he bids them. And now they are at the spot and behold the flashing beauty of the beloved; which when the charioteer sees, his memory is carried to the true beauty, whom he beholds in company with Modesty set in her holy place. He sees her, but he is afraid and falls backwards in adoration, and by his fall is compelled to pull back the reins with such violence as to bring both the steeds on their haunches, the one willing and unresisting, the unruly one very unwilling; and when they have gone back a little, the one is overcome with shame and wonder, and the perspiration streams from his whole soul; the other, when the pain is over which the bridle and the fall had given him, having with difficulty taken breath, is full of wrath and reproaches, which he heaps upon the charioteer and his fellow-steed, for want of courage and manhood, declaring that they have been false to their agreement and guilty of desertion. Again they refuse, and again he urges them on, and will scarce yield to their prayer that he would wait until another time. When the appointed hour comes, they make as if they had forgotten, and he reminds them, fighting and neighing and dragging them on, until at length he on the same thoughts intent, forces them to draw near. And when they are near he stoops his head and puts up his tail, and takes the bit in his teeth and pulls shamelessly. Then the charioteer is worse off than ever; he falls back like racers at the barrier, and with a still more violent wrench drags the bit out of the teeth of the wild steed and covers his abusive tongue and jaws with blood, and forces his legs and haunches to the ground and punishes him sorely. And when this has happened several times and the villain has ceased from his wanton way, he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer, and when he sees the beautiful one he is ready to die of fear. And from that time forward

the soul of the lover follows the beloved in modesty and holy fear.

And so the beloved who, like a god, has received every true 255
and loyal service from his lover, not in pretence but in reality, being also himself of a nature friendly to his admirer, if in former days he has blushed to own his passion and turned away his lover, because his youthful companions or others slanderously told him that he would be disgraced, now as years advance, at the appointed age and time, is led to receive him into communion. For fate which has ordained that there shall be no friendship among the evil has also ordained that there shall ever be friendship among the good. And when he has received him into communion and intimacy, then the beloved is amazed at the good-will of the lover; he recognises that the inspired friend is worth all other friendships or kinships, which have nothing of friendship in them in comparison. And when this feeling continues and he is nearer to him and embraces him, in gymnastic exercises and at other times of meeting, then does the fountain of that stream, which Zeus when he was in love with Ganymede named desire, overflow upon the lover, and some enters into his soul, and some when he is filled flows out again; and as a breeze or an echo rebounds from the smooth rocks and returns whence it came, so does the stream of beauty, passing the eyes which are the natural doors and windows of the soul, return again to the beautiful one; there arriving and quickening the passages of the wings, watering them and inclining them to grow, and filling the soul of the beloved also with love. And thus he loves, but he knows not what; he does not understand and cannot explain his own state; he appears to have caught the infection of blindness from another; the lover is his mirror in whom he is beholding himself, but he is not aware of this. When he is with the lover, both cease from their pain, but when he is away then he longs as he is longed for, and has love's image, love for love (Anteros) lodging in his breast, which he calls and deems not love but friendship only, and his desire is as the desire of the other, but weaker; he wants to see him, touch him, kiss, embrace him, and probably not long afterwards his desire is accomplished. When they meet, the wanton steed of the lover has a word to say to the charioteer; he would like

256 to have a little pleasure as a return for many pains, but the wanton steed of the beloved says not a word, for he is bursting with passion which he understands not, but he throws his arms round the lover and embraces him as his dearest friend; and, when they are side by side, he is not in a state in which he can refuse the lover anything, if he ask him, while his fellow-steed and the charioteer oppose him with the arguments of shame and reason. After this their happiness depends upon their self-control; if the better elements of the mind which lead to order and philosophy prevail, then they pass their life in this world in happiness and harmony—masters of themselves and orderly—enslaving the vicious and emancipating the virtuous elements; and when the end comes, they are light and ready to fly away, having conquered in one of the three heavenly or truly Olympian victories; nor can human discipline or divine inspiration confer any greater blessing on man than this. If, on the other hand, they leave philosophy and lead the lower life of ambition, then probably, after wine or in some other careless hour, the two wanton animals take the two souls when off their guard and bring them together, and they accomplish that desire of their hearts which to the many is bliss; and this having once enjoyed they continue to enjoy, yet rarely because they have not the approval of the whole soul. They too are dear, but not so dear to one another as the others, either at the time of their love or afterwards. They consider that they have given and taken from each other the most sacred pledges, and they may not break them and fall into enmity. At last they pass out of the body, unwinged, but eager to soar, and thus obtain no mean reward of love and madness. For those who have once begun the heavenward pilgrimage may not go down again to darkness and the journey beneath the earth, but they live in light always; happy companions in their pilgrimage, and when the time comes at which they receive their wings they have the same plumage because of their love.

Thus great are the heavenly blessings which the friendship of a lover will confer on you, my youth. Whereas the attachment of the non-lover, which is just a vulgar compound of temperance and niggardly earthly ways and motives, will breed meanness in your inmost soul, which is praised by the vulgar as virtue,

will send you bowling round the earth during a period of nine 257
thousand years, and leave you a fool in the world below.

And thus, dear Eros, I have made and paid my recantation, as well as I could and as fairly as I could; the poetical figures I was compelled to use, because Phaedrus would have them. And now forgive the past and accept the present, and be gracious and merciful to me, and do not deprive me of sight or take from me the art of love which thou hast given me, but grant that I may be yet more esteemed in the eyes of the fair. And if Phaedrus or I myself said anything rude in our first speeches, blame Lysias, who is the father of the brat, and let us have no more of his progeny; bid him study philosophy, like his brother Polemarchus; and then his lover Phaedrus will no longer halt divided between two, but will dedicate himself wholly to love and philosophical discourses.

Phaedr. I say with you, Socrates, if this be for my good, may this come true. But why did you make your second oration so much finer than the first? I wonder at that. And I begin to be afraid that I shall lose conceit of Lysias, even if he be willing to make another as long as yours, which I doubt. For quite lately one of your politicians took to abusing him on this very account; and called him a speech-writer again and again. So that a feeling of pride may probably induce him to give up writing.

Soc. That is an amusing notion; but I think that you are a little mistaken in your friend if you imagine that he is frightened at every noise; and, possibly, you think that his assailant was in earnest?

Phaedr. I thought, Socrates, that he was. And you are aware that the greatest and most influential statesmen are ashamed of writing speeches and leaving them in a written form because they are afraid of posterity, and do not like to be called sophists.

Soc. I do not know whether you are aware, Phaedrus, that the 'sweet elbow'¹ of which the proverb speaks is really derived from the long arm of the Nile. And you appear to be equally

¹ A proverb, like 'the grapes are sour,' applied to pleasures which cannot be had, meaning sweet things which are out of the reach of the mouth.

unaware of the fact that this sweet elbow of theirs is also a long arm. For there is nothing of which great politicians are so fond as of writing speeches and bequeathing them to posterity. And they add their admirers' names at the top of the writing, out of gratitude to them.

258 *Phaedr.* What do you mean? I do not understand.

Soc. Why, do you not know that when a politician writes, he begins with the names of his approvers?

Phaedr. How is that?

Soc. Why, he begins thus: 'Be it enacted by the senate, the people, or both, on the motion of a certain person,' who is our author; and then he makes a flourish about himself, and proceeds to display his own wisdom to his admirers in what is often a long and tedious composition. Now what is that sort of thing but a regular piece of authorship?

Phaedr. True.

Soc. And if the law is finally approved, then the author leaves the theatre in high delight; but if the law is rejected and he is done out of his speech-making, and not thought good enough to write, then he and his party are in mourning.

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. So far are they from despising, or rather so highly do they value the practice of writing.

Phaedr. No doubt.

Soc. And when the king or orator has the power, as Lycurgus or Solon or Darius had, of attaining an immortality of authorship in a state, is he not thought by posterity, when they see his writings, and does he not think himself, while he is yet alive, to be a god?

Phaedr. That is true.

Soc. Then do you think that any one of this class, however ill-disposed, would reproach Lysias with being an author?

Phaedr. Not upon your view; for according to you he would be casting a slur upon his own favourite pursuit.

Soc. Any one may see that there is no disgrace in the mere fact of writing.

Phaedr. Certainly not.

Soc. There may however be a disgrace in writing, not well, but badly.

Phaedr. That is true.

Soc. And what is well and what is badly—need we ask Lysias, or any other poet or orator, who ever wrote or will write either a political or any other work, in metre or out of metre, poet or prose writer, to teach us this?

Phaedr. Need we? What motive has a man to live if not for the pleasures of discourse? Surely he would not live for the sake of bodily pleasures, which almost always have previous pain as a condition of them, and therefore are rightly called slavish.

Soc. There is time yet. And I can fancy that the grasshoppers 259 who are still chirruping in the sun over our heads are talking to one another and looking at us. What would they say if they saw that we also, like the many, are not talking, but slumbering at mid-day, lulled by their voices, too indolent to think? They would have a right to laugh at us, and might imagine that we were slaves coming to our place of resort, who like sheep lie asleep at noon about the fountain. But if they see us discoursing, and like Odysseus sailing on deaf to their siren voices, they may perhaps, out of respect, give us of the gifts which they receive of the gods and impart to men.

Phaedr. What gifts do you mean? I never heard of any.

Soc. A lover of music like yourself ought surely to have heard the story of the grasshoppers, who are said to have been human beings in an age before the Muses. And when the Muses came and song appeared they were ravished with delight; and singing always, never thought of eating and drinking, until at last in their forgetfulness they died. And now they live again in the grasshoppers; and this is the return which the Muses make to them—they hunger no more, neither thirst any more, but are always singing from the moment that they are born, and never eating or drinking; and when they die they go and inform the Muses in heaven who honours them on earth. They win the love of Terpsichore for the dancers by their report of them; of Erato for the lovers, and of the other Muses for those who do them honour, according to the several ways of honouring them;—of Calliope the eldest Muse, and of Urania who is next to her for the votaries of philosophy; for these are the Muses who are chiefly concerned with heaven and thought, divine as

well as human, and they have the sweetest utterance. For many reasons, then, we ought always to talk and not to sleep at mid-day.

Phaedr. Let us talk.

Soc. Shall we discuss the rules of writing and speech as we were proposing?

Phaedr. Very good.

Soc. In good speaking should not the mind of the speaker know the truth of what he is going to speak about?

260 *Phaedr.* And yet, Socrates, I have heard that he who would be an orator has nothing to do with true justice, but only with that which is likely to be approved by the many who sit in judgment; nor with the truly good or honourable, but only with opinion about them, and that from opinion comes persuasion, and not from the truth.

Soc. Any words of the wise ought to be regarded and not trampled under foot, for they have probably something in them, and perhaps there may be something in this saying which is worthy of attention.

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. Let us put the matter thus:—Suppose that I persuaded you to buy a horse and go to the wars. Neither of us knew what a horse was like, but I knew that you believed a horse to be the longest-eared of domestic animals.

Phaedr. That would be ridiculous.

Soc. There is something more ridiculous coming:—Suppose, further, that I was in earnest and went and composed a speech in honour of an ass, whom I entitled a horse, beginning: ‘A noble animal and a most useful possession, especially in war, and you may get on his back and fight, and he will carry baggage or anything.’

Phaedr. That would be most ridiculous.

Soc. Ridiculous! Yes; but is not even a ridiculous friend better than a cunning enemy?

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. And when the orator instead of putting an ass in the place of a horse, puts good for evil, being himself as ignorant of their true nature as the city on which he imposes is ignorant; and having studied the notions of the multitude, per-

suades them to do evil instead of good,—what will be the harvest which rhetoric will be likely to gather after the sowing of that fruit?

Phaedr. Anything but good.

Soc. Perhaps, however, rhetoric has been getting too roughly handled by us, and she might answer: What amazing nonsense is this! As if I forced any man to learn to speak in ignorance of the truth! Whatever my advice may be worth, I should have told him to arrive at the truth first, and then come to me. At the same time I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth will not give you the art of persuasion.

Phaedr. There is reason in the lady's defence of herself.

Soc. Yes, I admit that, if the arguments which she has yet in store bear witness that she is an art at all. But I seem to hear them arraying themselves on the opposite side, declaring that she speaks falsely, and that rhetoric is only a dilettante amusement and not an art. Lo! a Spartan appears, and says that there never is nor ever will be a real art of speaking which is divorced from the truth.

Phaedr. And what are these arguments, Socrates? Bring 261 them out that we may examine them.

Soc. Come out, fair children, and convince Phaedrus, who is the father of similar beauties, that he will never know how to speak about anything unless he know philosophy. And let Phaedrus answer you.

Phaedr. Put the question.

Soc. Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art of enchanting the mind by arguments; which is practised not only in courts and public assemblies, but in private houses also, having to do with all matters, great as well as small, good and bad alike, and is in all equally right, and equally to be esteemed—that is what you have heard?

Phaedr. Nay, not exactly that; I should rather say that I have heard the art confined to speaking and writing in lawsuits, and to speaking in public assemblies—not extended farther.

Soc. Then I suppose that you have only heard of the rhetoric of Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure hours when at Troy, and never of Palamedes?

Phaedr. No more than of Nestor and Odysseus, unless Gorgias is your Nestor, and Thrasymachus or Theodorus your Odysseus.

Soc. Perhaps that is my meaning. But let us leave them. And do you tell me, instead, what are plaintiff and defendant doing in a law-court—are they not contending?

Phaedr. Exactly.

Soc. About the just and unjust—that is the matter in dispute?

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And he who is practised in the art, if he has a mind, will make the same thing appear to the same persons to be at one time just, at another time unjust?

Phaedr. Exactly.

Soc. And when he speaks in the assembly, he will make the same things seem good to the city at one time, and at another time the reverse of good?

Phaedr. That is true.

Soc. Have we not heard of the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno), who has an art of speaking which makes the same things appear to his hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion too?

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. The art of disputation, then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, but is one and the same in every use of language; this is that art, if such an art there be, which finds a likeness of everything to which a likeness can be found, and draws into the light of day the likenesses and disguises which are used by others?

Phaedr. How do you mean?

Soc. Let me put the matter thus: When will there be more chance of deception—when the difference is large or small?

262 *Phaedr.* When the difference is small.

Soc. And you will be less likely to be discovered in passing by degrees into the other extreme than when you go all at once?

Phaedr. Of course.

Soc. He, then, who would deceive others, and not be deceived, must exactly know the real likenesses and differences of things?

Phaedr. Yes, he must.

Soc. And if he is ignorant of the true nature of anything, how can he ever distinguish the greater or less degree of likeness to other things of that which he does not know?

Phaedr. He cannot.

Soc. And when men are deceived and their notions are at variance with realities, it is clear that the error slips in through resemblances?

Phaedr. Yes, that is the way.

Soc. Then he who would be a master of the art must know the real nature of everything; or he will never know either how to make the gradual departure from truth into the opposite of truth which is effected by the help of resemblances, or how to avoid it?

Phaedr. He will not.

Soc. He then, who being ignorant of the truth aims at appearances, will only attain an art of rhetoric which is ridiculous and is not an art at all?

Phaedr. That may be expected.

Soc. Shall I propose that we look for examples of art and want of art, according to our notion of them, in the speech of Lysias which you have in your hand, and in my own speech?

Phaedr. Nothing could be better; and indeed I think that our previous argument has been too abstract and wanting in illustrations.

Soc. Yes; and the two speeches afford a very good illustration of the way in which the speaker who knows the truth may, without any serious purpose, steal away the hearts of his hearers. This piece of good fortune I attribute to the local deities; and, perhaps, the prophets of the Muses who are singing over our heads may have imparted their inspiration to me. For I do not imagine that I have any rhetorical art myself.

Phaedr. I will not dispute that; only please to go forward.

Soc. Suppose that you read me the first words of Lysias' speech.

Phaedr. 'You know my views of our common interest, and I do not think that I ought to fail in the object of my suit because I am not your lover. For lovers repent when——'

Soc. Enough. Now, shall I point out the rhetorical error of 263 those words?

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Every one is aware that about some things we are agreed, whereas about other things we differ.

Phaedr. I think that I understand you ; but will you explain yourself ?

Soc. When any one speaks of iron and silver, is not the same thing present in the minds of all ?

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But when any one speaks of justice and goodness we part company and are at odds with one another and with ourselves ?

Phaedr. Precisely.

Soc. Then in some things we agree, but not in others ?

Phaedr. That is true.

Soc. In which are we more likely to be deceived, and in which has rhetoric the greater power ?

Phaedr. Clearly, in the uncertain class.

Soc. Then the rhetorician ought to make a regular division, and acquire a distinct notion of both classes, as well of that in which the many err, as of that in which they do not err ?

Phaedr. He who made such a distinction would have an excellent principle.

Soc. Yes ; and in the next place he must have a keen eye for the observation of particulars in speaking, and not make a mistake about the class to which they are to be referred.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Now to which class does love belong—to the debatable or to the undisputed class ?

Phaedr. To the debatable class surely ; for if not, do you think that love would have allowed you to say as you did, that he is an evil both to the lover and the beloved, and also the greatest possible good ?

Soc. Capital. But will you tell me whether I defined love at the beginning of my speech ? for, having been in an ecstasy, I cannot well remember.

Phaedr. Yes, indeed ; that you did, and no mistake.

Soc. Then I perceive that the Nymphs of Achelous and Pan the son of Hermes, who inspired me, were far better rhetoricians than Lysias the son of Cephalus. Alas ! how inferior

to them he is! But perhaps I am mistaken; and Lysias at the commencement of his lover's speech did insist on our supposing love to be something or other which he fancied him to be, and according to this model he fashioned and framed the remainder of his discourse. Suppose we read his beginning over again.

Phaedr. If you please; but you will not find what you want.

Soc. Read, that I may have his exact words.

Phaedr. 'You know my views of our common interest; and I do not think that I ought to fail in the object of my suit because I am not your lover, for lovers repent of the kindnesses which they have shown, when their love is over.' ²⁶⁴

Soc. Here he appears to have done just the reverse of what he ought; for he has begun at the end, and is swimming on his back through the flood to the place of starting. His address to the fair youth begins where the lover would have ended. Am I not right, sweet Phaedrus?

Phaedr. Yes, indeed, Socrates; he does begin at the end.

Soc. Then as to the other topics—are they not thrown down anyhow? Is there any principle in them? Why should the next topic follow in that order, or any other topic? I cannot help fancying in my ignorance that he wrote boldly off just what came into his head, but I dare say that you would recognize a rhetorical necessity in the succession of the several parts of the composition?

Phaedr. You have too good an opinion of me if you think that I have any such insight into his principles of composition.

Soc. At any rate, you will allow that every discourse ought to be a living creature, having its own body and head and feet; there ought to be a middle, beginning, and end, which accord with one another and the whole?

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Can this be said of the discourse of Lysias? See whether you can find any more connexion in his words than in the epitaph which is said by some to have been inscribed on the grave of Midas the Phrygian.

Phaedr. What is there remarkable in the epitaph?

Soc. The epitaph is as follows:

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'I am a maiden of brass,
I lie on the tomb of Midas;
While waters flow and tall trees grow,
On Midas' tearful tomb I lie;
I say to every passer by
Here Midas sleeps in earth below.'

Now in this rhyme whether a line comes first or comes last, that, as you will perceive, makes no difference.

Phaedr. You are making fun of that oration of ours.

Soc. Well, I will say no more about your friend lest I should give offence to you; although I think that he might furnish many other examples of what a man ought to avoid. But I
265 will proceed to the other speech, which, as I think, is also suggestive to students of rhetoric.

Phaedr. In what way?

Soc. The two speeches, as you may remember, were of an opposite character, the one argued that the lover and the other that the non-lover ought to be accepted.

Phaedr. And right manfully.

Soc. You should rather say 'madly;' and madness was the argument of them, for, as I said, 'love is a madness.'

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And there were two kinds of madness; one produced by human infirmity, the other by a divine release from the ordinary ways of men.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. The divine madness was subdivided into four kinds, prophetic, initiatory, poetic, erotic, having four gods presiding over them; the first was the inspiration of Apollo, the second that of Dionysus, the third that of the Muses, the fourth that of Aphrodite and Eros. In the description of the last kind of madness, which was also the best, being a figure of love, we introduced a tolerably credible and possibly true though partly erring myth, which was also a hymn in honour of Eros, who is your lord and also mine, Phaedrus, and the guardian of fair children, and to him we sung the hymn in measured and solemn strain.

Phaedr. I know that I had great pleasure in listening to you.

Soc. Let us take this instance and examine how the transition was made from blame to praise.

Phaedr. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that the composition was mostly playful. Yet in these chance fancies of the hour were involved two principles which would be charming if they could be fixed by art.

Phaedr. What are they?

Soc. First, the comprehension of scattered particulars in one idea ;—the speaker defines his several notions in order that he may make his meaning clear, as in our definition of love, which whether true or false certainly gave clearness and consistency to the discourse.

Phaedr. What is the other principle, Socrates?

Soc. The second principle is that of division into species according to the natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might. In the two discourses ²⁶⁶ there was assumed, first of all, one idea of unreason, and then, as the body which is one may be divided into a left side and right side, each having parts right and left, one of the two proceeded to divide the parts of the left side and did not desist until the speaker found in them an evil or left-handed love which he justly reviled ; and the other leading us to the madness which lay on the right side, found another love, having the same name, but yet divine, which he held up before us and applauded as the author of the greatest benefits.

Phaedr. That is most true.

Soc. I am a great lover of these processes of division and generalization ; they help me to speak and think. And if I find any man who is able to see a One and Many in nature, him I follow, and walk in his steps as if he were a god. And those who have this art, I have hitherto been in the habit of calling dialecticians ; but God knows whether the name is right or not. And I should like to know what name you would give to your or Lysias' disciples, and whether this may not be that famous art of rhetoric which Thrasymachus and others practise? Skilful speakers they are, and impart their skill to any who will consent to worship them as kings and to bring them gifts.

Phaedr. Yes, they are royal men ; but their art is not the same with the art of those whom you call, and rightly, in my opinion, dialecticians. Still we are in the dark about rhetoric.

Soc. What do you mean? The remains of the art, when all

this has been taken away, must be of rare value; and are not at all to be despised by you and me. But what are the remains?—tell me that.

Phaedr. There is a great deal surely to be found in books of rhetoric?

Soc. Yes; thank you for reminding me of that, there is the exordium, if I remember rightly—that is what you mean—the niceties of the art?

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. There follows the statement of facts, and upon that witnesses; thirdly, proofs; fourthly, probabilities are to come; the great Byzantian artist also speaks, if I am not mistaken, of confirmation and further confirmation.

Phaedr. You mean the excellent Theodorus.

267 *Soc.* Yes; and he tells how refutation or further refutation is to be managed, whether in accusation or defence. I need hardly mention the illustrious Parian Evenus, who first invented insinuations and indirect praises, and censures, of which last this wise man made a *memoria technica* in verse. But shall I

‘To dumb forgetfulness consign’

Tisias and Gorgias, who are not ignorant that probability is superior to truth, and who by force of argument make the little appear great and the great little, disguise the new in old fashions and the old in new fashions, and have discovered forms for everything, either short or going on to infinity. I remember Prodicus laughing when I told him of this; he said that he had himself discovered the true rule of art, which was to be neither long nor short, but of a convenient length.

Phaedr. Well done, Prodicus!

Soc. Then there is Hippias of Elis, who probably agrees with him.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. And there is also Polus, who has schools of diplasiology, and gnomology, and eikonology, and who teaches in them the words of which Licymnius made him a present; they were to give a polish.

Phaedr. Had not Protagoras something of the same sort?

Soc. Yes, rules of correct diction, and many other fine pre-

cepts ; for the 'sorrows of a poor old man,' or any other pathetic case, no one is better than the Chalcedonian giant ; he can put a whole company of people into a passion and out of one again by his mighty magic, and is first-rate at inventing or disposing of any sort of calumny on any grounds or none. All of them agree in asserting that a speech should end in a recapitulation, though they do not all agree in the use of this word.

Phaedr. You mean that there should be a summing up of the arguments in order to remind the hearers of them.

Soc. I have now said all that I have to say of the art of rhetoric : have you anything to add ?

Phaedr. Not much ; nothing very important.

Soc. Leave the unimportant and let us bring the really im- 268
portant question into the light of day, which is : What power has this art of rhetoric, and when ?

Phaedr. A very great power in public meetings.

Soc. Yes, that is true. But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians ? To me there seem to be a great many holes in their web.

Phaedr. Give an example.

Soc. I will. Suppose a person to come to your friend Eryximachus, or to his father Acumenus, and to say to him : 'I know how to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that sort of thing ; and knowing all this, as I do, I claim to be a physician and to make physicians'—what do you suppose that they would say ?

Phaedr. They would be sure to ask him whether he knew 'to whom' he would give his medicines, and 'when,' and 'how much.'

Soc. And suppose that he were to reply : 'No ; I know nothing of that ; I expect the patient who consults me to be able to do all that for himself' ?

Phaedr. They would reply that he is a madman or a pedant who fancies that he is a physician because he has read something in a book, or has stumbled on a prescription or two, although he has no real understanding of the art of medicine.

Soc. And suppose a person were to come to Sophocles or Euripides and say that he knows how to make a long speech

about a small matter, and a short speech about a great matter, and also a sorrowful speech, or a terrible, or threatening speech, or any other kind of speech, and in teaching this fancies that he is teaching the art of tragedy?

Phaedr. They too would surely laugh at him if he fancies that tragedy is anything but the arranging of these elements in a manner suitable to one another and to the whole.

Soc. But I do not suppose that they would be rude to him or revile him. Would they not treat him as a musician would treat a man who thinks that he is a harmonist because he knows how to pitch the highest and lowest note; happening to meet such an one he would not say to him savagely, 'Fool, you are mad!' Oh, no; he would rather say to him in a gentle and musical tone of voice: 'My good friend, he who would be a harmonist must certainly know this, and yet he may understand nothing of harmony if he has not got beyond your stage of knowledge, for you only know the preliminaries of harmony and not harmony.'

Phaedr. Very true.

269 *Soc.* And would not Sophocles say to the display of the would-be tragedian, that this was not tragedy but the preliminaries of tragedy? and would not Acumenus say to the would-be doctor that this was not medicine but the preliminaries of medicine?

Phaedr. Very true.

Soc. And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles heard of these wonderful arts, brachylogies and cikonologies and all the hard names which we have been endeavouring to draw into the light of day, what would they say? Instead of losing temper and applying uncomplimentary epithets, as you and I have been doing to the authors of such an imaginary art, their superior wisdom would rather censure us, as well as them. Have a little patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would say, and do not be angry with those who from some want of dialectical skill are unable to define the nature of rhetoric, and consequently suppose that they have found the art in the preliminary conditions of the art, and when they have taught these to others, fancy that they have been teaching the whole art of rhetoric; but as to using the several instruments of the art effectively, or making

the composition a whole, that they regard as an easy thing with which their disciples may supply themselves.

Phaedr. I quite admit, Socrates, that the art of rhetoric which these men teach and of which they write is such as you describe—in that I agree with you. But I still want to know where and how the true art of rhetoric and persuasion is to be acquired.

Soc. The perfection of oratory is, or rather must be, like the perfection of all things, partly given by nature, but may be assisted by art. If you have the natural power and add thereto knowledge and practice, you will be a distinguished speaker; if you fall short in either of these, you will be to that extent defective. But the art, as far as there is an art, of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Tisias or Thrasymachus.

Phaedr. But in what direction then?

Soc. I should conceive that Pericles was the most accomplished of rhetoricians.

Phaedr. What of that?

Soc. All the superior arts require many words and much discussion of the higher truths of nature; hence comes all loftiness 270 of thought and perfectness of execution. And this, as I conceive, was the quality which, in addition to his natural gifts, Pericles acquired from Anaxagoras whom he happened to know. He was thus imbued with the higher philosophy, and attained the knowledge of Mind, which was the favourite theme of Anaxagoras, and applied what he learnt to the art of speaking.

Phaedr. Explain.

Soc. Rhetoric is like medicine.

Phaedr. How is that?

Soc. Why, because medicine has to define the nature of the body and rhetoric of the soul—if we would proceed, not empirically but scientifically, in the one case to impart health and strength by giving medicine and food, in the other to implant the principle or virtue which you require by the right application of words and training.

Phaedr. There, Socrates, I suspect that you are right.

Soc. And do you think that you can know the nature of the soul intelligently without knowing the nature of the whole?

Phaedr. Hippocrates the Asclepiad says that the nature even of the body can only be understood as a whole.

Soc. Yes, friend, and he says truly. Still, we ought not to be content with the name of Hippocrates, but to examine and see whether he has reason on his side.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. Then consider what right reason as well as Hippocrates says about this or any other nature. Ought we not to consider first whether that which we wish to learn and to teach is a simple or multiform thing, and if simple, then to enquire what power it has of acting or being acted upon in relation to other things, and if multiform, then to number the forms; and see first in the case of one of them, and then in the case of all of them, wherein resides the power which they by nature have of acting or being acted upon.

Phaedr. That will be the way.

Soc. The method which proceeds without analysis is like the groping of a blind man. Yet, surely, he who is an artist ought not to admit of a comparison with the blind, or deaf. The rhetorician, who teaches his pupil to speak scientifically, will particularly set forth the nature of that to which he addresses his speeches; and that is, as I suppose, the soul.

Phaedr. Certainly.

271 *Soc.* His whole effort is directed to the soul; for in that he seeks to produce conviction.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Then clearly, Thrasymachus or any one else who teaches rhetoric in earnest, will give an exact description of the nature of the soul; so that we shall see whether she be single and same, or, like the body, multiform. That is what we should call showing the nature of the soul.

Phaedr. Exactly.

Soc. He will next proceed to say wherein resides the power which the soul has of acting or being acted upon.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. Thirdly, having classified men and speeches, and their modes and affections, and adapted them to one another, he will explain the reasons of his arrangement, and show why one soul is naturally persuaded by a particular form of argument, and another not.

Phaedr. That will certainly be a very good way.

Soc. Yes, that is the true and only way in which any subject can be set forth or treated by rules of art, whether in speaking or writing. But the writers of the present day, at whose feet you have sat, improperly conceal the nature of the soul which they know quite well. Nor, until they adopt our method of reading and writing, can we admit that they write by rules of art.

Phaedr. What is our method?

Soc. I cannot give you the exact details; but I should like to tell you generally, as far as I can, how a man ought to proceed according to rules of art.

Phaedr. Let me hear.

Soc. Oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore he who would be an orator has to learn the differences of human souls—they are so many and of such a nature, and from them come the differences between man and man—he will then proceed to divide speeches into their different classes. Such and such persons, he will say, are affected by this or that kind of speech in this or that way, and he will tell you why; the pupil must have a theoretical notion of them first, and then he must have experience of them in actual life, and be able to follow them with all his senses about him, or he will never get beyond the precepts of his masters. But when he is able to say what persons are persuaded by what arguments, and recognize the individual about whom he used to theorize as actually present to him, and say to himself, ‘This is the man or the character who ought to have that argument applied to him in order to convince him of a certain opinion;’—when he has attained the knowledge of all this, and knows also when he should speak and when he should abstain from speaking, and when he should make use of pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sensational effects, and all the other arts of speech which he has learned;—when, I say, he knows the times and seasons of all these things, then, and not till then, he is a perfect master of his art; but if he fail in any of these points, whether in speaking or teaching or writing them, and says that he speaks by rules of art, he who says the opposite has the better of him. Well, the teacher will say, is this, Phaedrus and Socrates, your account of the art of rhetoric, or am I to look for another?

Phaedr. He must take this, Socrates, for there is no possibility of another, and yet the creation of such an art is not easy.

Soc. That is true ; and therefore let us turn the matter up and down, and see whether there may not be a shorter and easier road ; there is no use in taking the longer and more difficult way when there is a shorter and easier one. And I wish that you would try and remember whether you have heard from Lysias or any one else anything which might be of service to us.

Phaedr. If trying would avail, then I might ; but I fear that I cannot remember anything at the moment.

Soc. Suppose I tell you something which somebody who knows told me.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. May not 'the wolf,' as the proverb says, 'claim a hearing'?

Phaedr. Do you say what can be said for him.

Soc. Well, they say that there is no use in putting a solemn face on a matter, or in going round and round, until you arrive at the beginning of all things ; for that when the question is of justice and good, as I said at first, or a question in which men are concerned who are just and good, either by nature or habit, he who would be a skilful rhetorician has no need of truth—for that in courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about conviction : and this is based on probability, to which he who would be a skilful orator should therefore give his whole attention. And they say also that there are cases in which the actual facts ought to be withheld, and only the probabilities should be told either in accusation or defence, and that always in speaking the orator should keep probability in view, and say
273 good bye to the truth. And the observance of this principle throughout a speech furnishes the whole art.

Phaedr. That is what the professors of rhetoric do actually say, Socrates. I remember that we have touched lightly¹ upon this matter already, but with them the point is all-important.

Soc. I dare say that you are familiar with Tisias. Does he not define probability to be that which the many think ?

Phaedr. Certainly, he does.

Soc. I believe that he has a clever and ingenious case of this

sort:—He supposes a feeble and valiant man to have assaulted a strong and cowardly one, and to have robbed him of his coat or of something or other; he is brought into court, and then Tisias says that both parties should tell lies: the coward should say that he was assaulted by more men than one; the other should prove that they were alone, and should use this argument: ‘How could a man like me have assaulted a man like him?’ The complainant will not like to confess his own cowardice, and will therefore invent some other lie which his adversary will thus gain an opportunity of refuting. And there are other devices of the same kind which have a place in the system. Am I not right, Phaedrus?

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. I cannot help feeling that this is a wonderfully mysterious art which Tisias or some other gentleman, in whatever name or country he rejoices, has discovered. Shall we say a word to him or not?

Phaedr. What shall we say to him?

Soc. Let us tell him that, before he appeared, you and I were saying that probability was engendered in the minds of the many by the likeness of the truth, and had just been asserting that he who knew the truth would always know best how to discover the resemblances of the truth. If he has anything further to say about the art of speaking we should like to hear him; but if not, we are satisfied with our own view, that unless a man estimates the various characters of his hearers and is able to divide all things into classes and to comprehend them under single ideas, he will never be a skilful rhetorician even within the limits of human power. And this art he will not attain without a great deal of trouble, which a good man ought to undergo, not for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order that he may be able to say what is acceptable to God and always to act acceptably to Him as far as in him lies; for there is a saying of wiser men than ourselves, that a man of sense should ²⁷⁴ not try to please his fellow-servants (at least this should not be his first object) but his good and noble masters; and therefore if the way is long and circuitous, marvel not at this, for, where the end is great, there we may take the longer road, but not for lesser ends such as yours. Truly, the argument may say, Tisias,

that if you do not mind going so far, rhetoric has a fair beginning here.

Phaedr. I think, Socrates, that this is admirable, if only practicable.

Soc. But even to fail in an honourable object is honourable.

Phaedr. True.

Soc. Enough appears to have been said by us of a true and false art of speaking.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But there is something yet to be said of propriety and impropriety of writing.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?

Phaedr. No, indeed. Do you?

Soc. I have heard a tradition of antiquity, whether true or not antiquity only knows; although if we had the truth ourselves, do you think that we should care much about the opinions of men?

Phaedr. That is a question which needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard.

Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis was sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days Thamus was the king of the whole of Upper Egypt, which is the district surrounding that great city called by the Hellenes Egyptian Thebes, and they call the god himself Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he went through them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. There would be no use in repeating all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; for this is the cure of forgetfulness and of folly. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, he

who has the gift of invention is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance a paternal love of your own child has ²⁷⁵ led you to say what is not the fact ; for this invention of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories ; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. You have found a specific, not for memory but for reminiscence, and you give your disciples only the pretence of wisdom ; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing ; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing ; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country.

Soc. There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of that day, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from 'oak or rock,' that was enough for them ; whereas you seem to think not of the truth but of the speaker, and of the country from which the truth comes.

Phaedr. I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke ; and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.

Soc. He would be a simple person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Theuth or Ammon, who should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain ; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters.

Phaedr. That is most true.

Soc. I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting ; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who do and among those who do not understand them.

And they have no reticences or proprieties towards different classes of persons; and, if they are unjustly assailed or abused, their parent is needed to protect his offspring, for they cannot protect or defend themselves.

Phaedr. That again is most true.

Soc. May we not imagine another kind of writing or speaking far better than this is, and having far greater power—which is 276 one of the same family, but lawfully begotten? Let us see what his origin is.

Phaedr. Who is he, and what do you mean about his origin?

Soc. I am speaking of an intelligent writing which is graven in the soul of him who has learned, and can defend itself, and knows to whom to speak and to whom to be silent.

Phaedr. You mean the word of knowledge which has a living soul, and of which the written word is properly no more than an image?

Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. And I wish that you would let me ask you a question: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to be fruitful, and in sober earnest plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? would he not do that, if at all, to please the spectators at a festival? But the seeds about which he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practises husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months they arrive at perfection?

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he will do the other, as you say, only in play.

Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding about his own seeds than the husbandman?

Phaedr. Certainly not.

Soc. Then he will not seriously incline to write his thoughts in water with pen and ink, tracing dumb characters which have not a word to say for themselves and cannot adequately express the truth?

Phaedr. No, that is not likely.

Soc. No, that is not likely—in the garden of letters he will

indeed plant them, but only as an amusement; or he will write them down as memorials against the forgetfulness of old age, to be treasured by him and his equals when they, like him, have one foot in the grave; and he will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and they will be his pastime while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like.

Phaedr. A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, when a man is able to pass time merrily in conversing about justice and the like.

Soc. True, Phaedrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who finds a congenial soul, and then with knowledge engrafts and sows words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them seeds which may bear fruit in other natures, nurtured in other ways—making the seed everlasting and the possessors happy to the utmost extent of human happiness. 277

Phaedr. Yes, indeed, that is far nobler.

Soc. And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon the premises we may decide about the conclusion.

Phaedr. About what conclusion?

Soc. About Lysias, whom we censured, and his art of writing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill or want of skill which was shown in them; for he brought us to this point. And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the nature of art and its opposite.

Phaedr. Yes, I think with you; but I wish that you would repeat what was said.

Soc. Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the more complex nature—until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to

be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading;—such is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument.

Phaedr. Yes, that was our view, certainly.

Soc. Secondly, as to the justice of the censure which was passed on speaking or writing discourses—did not our previous argument show—?

Phaedr. Show what?

Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman, tries his hand at authorship in making laws, and fancies that there is a great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of his writing as he does is only a disgrace to him, whatever men may say. For entire ignorance about the nature of justice and injustice, and good and evil, and the inability to distinguish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry
278 nor prose, spoken or written, are of any great value, if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of them are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally and written in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness, and that such principles are like legitimate offspring;—being, in the first place, that which the man finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of his idea which have been duly implanted by him in the souls of others;—and who cares for them and no others—this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phaedrus, would pray that we may become like him.

Phaedr. That is most assuredly my desire and prayer.

Soc. And now the play is played out; and of rhetoric enough. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches—to Homer

and other writers of poems, whether set to music or not ; and to Solon and others who have composed writings which they term laws—to all of them we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are not only poets, orators, legislators, but worthy of a higher name.

Phaedr. What name is that ?

Soc. Wise, I may not call them ; for that is a great name which belongs to God alone,—lovers of wisdom or philosophers is their modest and befitting title.

Phaedr. Very good.

Soc. And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long patching and piecing, adding some and taking away some, may be justly called poet or speech-maker or law-maker.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. Now go and tell this to your companion.

Phaedr. But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten.

Soc. Who is he ?

Phaedr. Isocrates the fair.

Soc. What of him ?

Phaedr. What message shall we send to him ?

Soc. Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus ; but I am willing to risk a prophecy concerning him.

Phaedr. What would you prophesy ?

Soc. I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and that he has a character of a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvellously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with rhetoric, but that some divine impulse will lead him to things higher still. For there is an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message which comes from the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight ; and do you give the other to Lysias who is yours.

Phaedr. I will ; and now as the heat is abated let us depart.

Soc. Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities?

Phaedr. By all means.

Soc. Beloved Pan, and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as none but the temperate can bear and carry. Anything more? That prayer, I think, is enough for me.

Phaedr. Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common.

Soc. Let us go.

CRATYLUS.

VOL. II.

M

INTRODUCTION.

THE Cratylus has always been a source of perplexity to the student of Plato. While in fancy and humour, and perfection of style and metaphysical originality, this dialogue may be ranked with the best of the Platonic writings, there has been an uncertainty about the motive of the piece, which interpreters have hitherto not succeeded in dispelling. We need not suppose that Plato used words in order to conceal his thoughts, or that he would have been unintelligible to an educated contemporary. In the Phaedrus and Euthydemus we also found a difficulty in determining the precise aim of the author. Plato wrote satires in the form of dialogues, and his meaning, like that of other satirical writers, has often slept in the ear of posterity. Two causes may be assigned for this obscurity: 1st, the subtlety and allusiveness of this species of composition; 2nd, the difficulty of reproducing a state of life and literature which has passed away. A satire is unmeaning unless we can place ourselves back among the persons and thoughts of the age in which it was written. Had the treatise of Antisthenes upon words, or the speculations of Cratylus, or some other Heracleitean of the fourth century B.C., on the nature of language been preserved to us; or if we had lived at the time, and been rich enough to attend 'the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus,' we should have understood Plato better, and many points which are now attributed to the extravagance of Socrates' humour would have been found, like the allusions of Aristophanes in the Clouds, to have gone home to the sophists and grammarians of the day.

For the age was very busy with philological speculation; and many

questions were beginning to be asked about language which were parallel to other questions about justice, virtue, knowledge, and were illustrated in a similar manner by the analogy of the arts. Was there a correctness in words, and were they given by nature or convention? In the presocratic philosophy mankind had been striving to attain an expression of their ideas; and now they were beginning to ask themselves whether the expression might not be distinguished from the idea? These were some of the problems which were occupying the minds of speculative men in the age of Plato. But of these beginnings of the study of language we know little, and there necessarily arises an obscurity when the surroundings of such a work as the Cratylus are taken away. Moreover, in this, as in most of the dialogues of Plato, allowance has to be made for the character of Socrates. For the theory of language can only be propounded by him in a manner which is consistent with his own profession of ignorance. Hence his ridicule of the new school of etymology is interspersed with many declarations, 'that he knows nothing,' 'that he has learned from Euthyphro,' and the like. Even the truest things which he says are depreciated by himself. He professes to be guessing, but the guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories of the ancients respecting language put together.

The dialogue hardly derives any light from Plato's other writings, and still less from Scholiasts and Neoplatonist writers. Socrates must be interpreted from himself, and on first reading we certainly have a difficulty in understanding his drift, or his relation to the two other interlocutors in the dialogue. Does he agree with Cratylus or with Hermogenes, and is he serious in those fanciful etymologies, extending over more than half the dialogue, which he seems so greatly to relish? Or is he serious in part only; and can we separate his jest from his earnest?—*Sunt bona, sunt quaedam mediocria, sunt mala plura.* Most of them are ridiculously bad, and yet among them are found, as if by accident, principles of philology which are unsurpassed in any ancient writer, and even in advance of any philologer of the last century. May we suppose that Plato, like Lucian, has been amusing his fancy by writing a comedy in the form of a prose dialogue? And what is the final result of the enquiry? Is Plato an upholder of the conventional theory of language, which he acknowledges to be imperfect? or does he mean to imply that a perfect language can only be based on his own theory of ideas? Or if this latter explanation is refuted by his silence, then in what relation does

his account of language stand to the rest of his philosophy? Or may we be so bold as to deny the connexion between them? [For the allusion to the ideas at the end of the dialogue (439 C) is merely intended to show that we must not put words in the place of things or realities, which is a thesis strongly insisted on by Plato in many other passages] . . . These are some of the first thoughts which arise in the mind of the reader of the *Cratylus*. And the consideration of them may form a convenient introduction to the general subject of the dialogue.

We have already seen in the case of the *Phaedrus*, that we must not expect all the parts of a dialogue of Plato to tend equally to some clearly-defined end. His idea of literary art is not the absolute proportion of the whole, such as we appear to find in a Greek temple or statue; nor should his works be tried by any such standard. They have often the beauty of poetry, but they have also the freedom of conversation. 'Words are more plastic than wax' (*Rep.* 588 D), and may be moulded into any form. He wanders on from one topic to another, careless of the unity of his work, not fearing any 'judge, or spectator, who may recall him to the point' (*Theat.* 173 C), 'whither the argument blows we follow' (*Rep.* 394 D). To have determined beforehand, as in a modern didactic treatise, the nature and limits of the subject, would have been fatal to the spirit of enquiry or discovery, which is the soul of the dialogue.

There is another aspect under which some of the dialogues of Plato may be more truly viewed:—they are dramatic sketches of an argument. We have found that in the *Lysis*, *Charmides*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Meno*, we arrived at no conclusion—the different sides of the argument were personified in the different speakers; but the victory was not distinctly attributed to any of them, nor the truth wholly the property of any. And in the *Cratylus* we have no reason to assume that Socrates is either wholly right or wholly wrong, or that Plato, though he evidently inclines to him, had any other aim than that of personifying, in the characters of *Hermogenes*, *Socrates*, and *Cratylus*, the three theories of language which are respectively maintained by them.

The two subordinate persons of the dialogue, *Hermogenes* and *Cratylus*, are at the opposite poles of the argument. But after a while the disciple of the Sophist and the follower of *Heracleitus* are found to be not so far removed from one another as at first sight appeared; and both show an inclination to accept the third view which Socrates inter-

poses between them. First, Hermogenes, the poor brother of the rich Callias, expounds the doctrine that names are conventional; like the names of slaves, they may be given and altered at pleasure. This is one of those principles which, whether applied to society or language, explains everything and nothing. For in all things there is an element of convention; but the admission of this does not help us to understand the rational ground or basis in human nature on which the convention proceeds. Socrates first of all intimates to Hermogenes, that his view of language is only a part of a sophistical whole, and ultimately tends to abolish the distinction between truth and falsehood. Hermogenes is very ready to throw aside the sophistical tenet, and listens with a sort of half admiration, half belief, to the speculations of Socrates.

Cratylus is of opinion that a name is either a true name or not a name at all. He is unable to conceive of degrees of imitation; a word is either the perfect expression of a thing, or a mere inarticulate sound (a fallacy which is still prevalent among theorizers about the origin of language). He is at once a philosopher and a sophist; for while wanting to rest language on an immutable basis, he would deny the possibility of falsehood. He is inclined to derive all truth from language, and in language he sees reflected the philosophy of Heracleitus. His views are not like those of Hermogenes, hastily taken up, but are said to be the result of mature consideration, although he is described as still a young man. With a tenacity characteristic of the Heracleitean philosophers, he clings to the doctrine of the flux. (Cp. Theaet. 180.) Of the real Cratylus we know nothing, except that he is recorded by Aristotle to have been the friend or teacher of Plato; nor have we any proof that he resembled the likeness of him in Plato any more than the Critias of Plato is like the real Critias, or the Euthyphro in this dialogue like the other Euthyphro, the diviner, in the dialogue which is called after him.

Between these two extremes, which have both of them a sophistical character, the view of Socrates is introduced, which is in a manner the union of the two. Language is conventional and also natural, and the true conventional-natural is the rational. It is a work not of chance, but of art; the dialectician is the artificer of words, and the legislator gives authority to them. They are the expressions or imitations in sound of things. In a sense, Cratylus is right in saying that things have by nature names (p. 390); for nature is not opposed either to art or to law. But vocal imitation, like any other copy, may be imperfectly executed; and

in this way an element of chance or convention enters in. There is much which is accidental or exceptional in language. Some words have had their original meaning so obscured, that they require to be helped out by convention. But still the true name is that which has a natural meaning. Thus nature, art, chance, all combine in the formation of language. And the three views respectively propounded by Hermogenes, Socrates, Cratylus, may be described as the conventional, the artificial or rational, and the natural. The view of Socrates is the meeting-point of the other two, just as conceptualism is the meeting-point of nominalism and realism.

We can hardly say that Plato was aware of the truth, that 'languages are not made, but grow.' But still, when he says that 'the legislator made language with the dialectician standing on his right hand,' we need not infer from this that he conceived words, like coins, to be issued from the mint of the State. The creator of laws and of social life is naturally regarded as the creator of language, according to Hellenic notions, and the philosopher is his natural adviser. We are not to suppose that the legislator is performing any extraordinary function; he is merely the Eponymus of the State, who prescribes rules for the dialectician and for all other artists. According to a truly Platonic mode of approaching the subject, language, like virtue in the Republic, is examined by the analogy of the arts. Words are works of art which may be equally made in different materials, and are well made when they have a meaning. Of the process which he thus describes, Plato had probably no very definite notion. But he means to express generally that language is the product of intelligence, and that languages belong to States and not to individuals.

A better conception of language could not have been formed in Plato's age, than that which he attributes to Socrates. Yet many persons have thought that the mind of Plato is more truly seen in the vague realism of Cratylus. This misconception has probably arisen from two causes: first, the desire to bring Plato's theory of language into accordance with the received doctrine of the Platonic ideas; secondly, the impression created by Socrates himself, that he is not in earnest, and is only indulging the fancy of the hour.

1. We shall have occasion to show more at length, in the Introduction to future dialogues, that the so-called Platonic ideas are only a semi-mythical form, in which he attempts to realize abstractions, and

that they are replaced in his later writings by a rational theory of psychology. (See, especially, Introduction to the Sophist.) And in the Cratylus he gives a general account of the nature and origin of language, in which Adam Smith, Rousseau, and other writers of the last century, would have substantially agreed. At the end of the dialogue, he speaks as in the Symposium and Republic of absolute beauty and good; but he never supposed that they were capable of being embodied in words. Of the names of the ideas, he would have said, as he says of the names of the Gods, that we know nothing. Even the realism of Cratylus is not based upon the ideas of Plato, but upon the flux of Heraclitus. Here, as in the Sophist and Politicus, Plato expressly draws attention to the want of correspondence of words and things. Hence we are led to infer, that the view of Socrates is not the less Plato's own, because not based upon the ideas; 2nd, that Plato's theory of language is not inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy.

2. We do not deny that Socrates is partly in jest and partly in earnest. He is discoursing in a high-flown vein, which may be compared to the dithyrambics of the Phaedrus. They are mysteries of which he is speaking, and he professes a kind of ludicrous fear of his imaginary wisdom. When he is arguing out of Homer, about the names of Hector's son, or when he describes himself as inspired or maddened by Euthyphro, with whom he has been sitting from the early dawn (compare again Phaedrus and Lysias), and expresses his intention of yielding to the illusion to-day, and to-morrow he will go to a priest and be purified, we easily see that his words are not to be taken seriously. In this part of the dialogue his dread of committing impiety, the pretended derivation of his wisdom from another, the extravagance of some of his etymologies, and, in general, the manner in which the fun, fast and furious, *vires acquirit eundo*, remind us strongly of the Phaedrus. The jest is a long one, extending over more than half the dialogue. But then, we remember that the Euthydemus is a still longer jest, in which the irony is preserved to the very end. There he is parodying the ingenious follies of early logic; in the Cratylus he is ridiculing the fancies of a new school of sophists and grammarians. The fallacies of the Euthydemus are still retained at the end of our logic books; and the etymologies of the Cratylus have also found their way into later writers. Some of these are not much worse than the conjectures of Hemsterhuis, and other critics of the last century; but this does not prove that they

are serious. For Plato is in advance of his age in his conception of language, as much as he is in his conception of mythology. (Cp. Phaedrus sub initio.)

When the fervour of his etymological enthusiasm has abated, Socrates ends, as he has begun, with a rational explanation of language. Still he preserves his 'know nothing' disguise, and himself declares his first notions about names to be reckless and ridiculous. Having explained compound words by resolving them into their original elements, he now proceeds to analyse simple words into the letters of which they are composed. The Socrates who 'knows nothing,' here passes into the teacher, the dialectician, the arranger of species. There is nothing in this part of the dialogue which is either weak or extravagant. Plato is a supporter of the Onomatopoeic theory of language; that is to say, he supposes words to be formed by the imitation of ideas in sounds; he also recognises the effect of time, the influence of foreign languages, the desire of euphony, to be formative principles; and he admits a certain element of chance. But he gives no intimation in all this, that he is preparing the way for the construction of an ideal language, or that he has any Eleatic speculation to oppose to the Heracleiteanism of Cratylus.

The theory of language which is propounded in the Cratylus, is in accordance with the later phase of the philosophy of Plato, and would have been regarded by him as in the main true. The dialogue is also a satire on the philological fancies of the day. Socrates in pursuit of his vocation as a detector of false knowledge, lights by accident on the truth. He is guessing, he is dreaming; he has heard, as he says in the Phaedrus, from another: no one is more surprised than himself at his own discoveries. And yet some of his best remarks, as for example his view of the derivation of Greek words from other languages, or of the permutations of letters, or again, his observation that in speaking of the Gods we are only speaking of our names of them, occur among these flights of humour.

We can imagine a character having a profound insight into the nature of men and things, and yet hardly dwelling upon them seriously; blending inextricably sense and nonsense; sometimes enveloping in a blaze of jests the most serious matters, and then again allowing the truth to peer through; enjoying the flow of his own humour, and puzzling mankind by an ironical exaggeration of their absurdities. Such were

Aristophanes and Rabelais; such, in a different style, were Sterne, Jean Paul, Hamann,—writers who sometimes become unintelligible through the extravagance of their fancies. Such is the character which Plato intends to depict in some of his dialogues as the Silenus Socrates; and through this medium we have to receive our theory of language.

There remains a difficulty which seems to demand a more exact answer: In what relation does the satirical or etymological portion of the dialogue stand to the serious? Granting all that can be said about the provoking irony of Socrates, about the parody of Euthyphro, or Prodicus, or Antisthenes, how does the long catalogue of etymologies furnish any answer to the question of Hermogenes, which is evidently the main thesis of the dialogue: What is the truth, or correctness, or principle of names?

After illustrating the nature of correctness by the analogy of the arts, and then, as in the Republic, ironically appealing to the authority of the Homeric poems, Socrates shows that the truth or correctness of names can only be ascertained by an appeal to etymology. The truth of names is to be found in the analysis of their elements. But why does he admit etymologies which are absurd, based on Heracleitean fancies, fourfold interpretations of words, impossible unions and separations of syllables and letters?

1. The answer to this difficulty has been already anticipated in part: Socrates is not a dogmatic teacher, and therefore he puts on this wild and fanciful disguise, in order that the truth may be permitted to appear: 2. as Benfey remarks, an erroneous example may illustrate a principle of language as well as a true one: 3. many of these etymologies, as, for example, that of *δικαιον*, are indicated, by the manner in which Socrates speaks of them, to have been current in his own age. 4. The philosophy of language had not made such progress as would have justified Plato in propounding real derivations. Like his master, Socrates, he saw through the hollowness of the incipient sciences of the day, and tries to move in a circle apart from them, laying down the conditions under which they are to be pursued, but, as in the Timaeus, cautious and tentative, when he is speaking of actual phenomena. To have made etymologies seriously, would have seemed to him like the interpretation of the myths in the Phaedrus, the task 'of a not very fortunate individual, who had a great deal of time on his hands.' (See p. 169.) The irony of Socrates places him above and beyond the errors of his contemporaries.

The Cratylus is full of humour and satirical touches: the inspiration which comes from Euthyphro, and his prancing steeds, the light admixture of quotations from Homer, and the spurious dialectic which is applied to them; the jest about the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus, which is declared on the best authority, viz. his own, to be a complete education in grammar and rhetoric; the double explanation of the name Hermogenes, either as 'not being in luck,' or 'being no speaker;' the dearly-bought wisdom of Callias, the Lacedaemonian whose name was 'Rush,' and, above all, the pleasure which Socrates expresses in his own dangerous discoveries, which 'to-morrow he will purge away,' are truly humorous. While delivering a lecture on the philosophy of language, Socrates is also satirising the endless fertility of the human mind in spinning arguments out of nothing, and employing the most trifling and fanciful analogies in support of a theory. Etymology in ancient as in modern times was a favourite recreation; and Socrates makes merry at the expense of the etymologists. The simplicity of Hermogenes, who is ready to believe anything that he is told, heightens the effect. (See especially 392 E; 395 A; 397 D.) Socrates in his genial and ironical mood hits right and left at his adversaries: *Ὀυρανός* is so called *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄραν τὰ ἄνω*, which, as some philosophers say, is the way to have a pure mind; the sophists are by a fanciful explanation converted into heroes; 'the givers of names were like some philosophers who fancy that the earth goes round because their heads are always going round.' There is a great deal of 'mischief' lurking in the following: 'I found myself in greater perplexity about justice than I was before I began to learn;' 'The *ῥ* in *κάτοπτρον* must be the addition of some one who cares nothing about truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape;' 'Tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the Tragic and goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them.' Several philosophers and sophists are mentioned by name: first, Protagoras and Euthydemus are assailed; then the interpreters of Homer, *οἱ παλαιοὶ Ὀμηρικοὶ* (cp. Arist. Met. xiii. 6. 7) and the Orphic poets are alluded to by the way; then he discovers a hive of wisdom in the philosophy of Heraclitus;—the doctrine of the flux is contained in the word *οὐσία* (= *ὠσία* the pushing principle), an anticipation of Anaxagoras is found in *ψυχή* and *σελήμη*. Again, he ridicules the arbitrary methods of pulling out and putting in letters which were in vogue among the philologers of his time; or slightly scoffs at contemporary religious beliefs. Lastly, he is impatient of hearing from

the half-converted Cratylus, the doctrine that falsehood can neither be spoken, nor uttered, nor addressed; a piece of sophistry attributed to Gorgias, which reappears in the Sophist. And he proceeds to demolish, with no less delight than he had set up, the Heracleitean theory of language.

In the latter part of the dialogue Socrates becomes more serious, though he does not lay aside but rather aggravates his banter of the Heracleiteans, whom here, as in the Theaetetus, he delights to ridicule. What was the origin of this enmity we can hardly determine:—was it due to the natural dislike which may be supposed to exist between the ‘patrons of the flux’ and the ‘friends of the ideas’? or is it to be attributed to the indignation which Plato felt at having wasted his time upon ‘Cratylus and the doctrines of Heracleitus’ in the days of his youth? Socrates, touching on some of the characteristic difficulties of early Greek philosophy, endeavours to show Cratylus that imitation may be partial or imperfect, that a knowledge of things is higher than a knowledge of names, and that there can be no knowledge if all things are in a state of transition. But Cratylus, who does not easily apprehend the argument from common sense, remains unconvinced, and on the whole inclines to his former opinion. Some profound philosophical remarks are scattered up and down, admitting of an application not only to language but to knowledge generally; such as the assertion that ‘consistency is no test of truth’ (436 D, foll.): or again, ‘If we are over-precise about words, truth will say “too late” to us as to the belated traveller in Ægina’ (433 E).

The place of the dialogue in the series cannot be determined with certainty. The style and subject, and the treatment of the character of Socrates, have a close resemblance to the earlier dialogues, especially to the Phaedrus and Euthydemus. The manner in which the ideas are spoken of at the end of the dialogue, also indicates a comparatively early date. The imaginative element is still in full vigour; the Socrates of the Cratylus is the Socrates of the Apology and Symposium, not yet Platonized; and he describes, as in the Theaetetus, the philosophy of Heraclitus by ‘unsavoury’ similes—he cannot believe that the world is like ‘a leaky vessel,’ or ‘a man who has a running at the nose’; he attributes the flux of the world to the swimming in some folks’ heads. On the other hand, the relation of thought to language is omitted here, but is treated of in the Sophist. These grounds are not sufficient

to enable us to arrive at a precise conclusion. But we shall not be far wrong in placing the Cratylus about the middle, or at any rate in the first half, of the series.

Cratylus, the Heracleitean philosopher, and Hermogenes, the brother of Callias, have been arguing about names; the former maintaining that they are natural, the latter that they are conventional. Cratylus affirms that his own is a true name, but will not allow that the name of Hermogenes is equally true. Hermogenes is mystified by this, and asks Socrates to explain to him what Cratylus means; and he would like to know, What Socrates himself thinks about the truth or correctness of names? Socrates replies, that hard is knowledge, and the nature of names is a considerable part of knowledge: he has never been to hear the fifty-drachma course of Prodicus; and having only attended the single-drachma course, he is not competent to give an opinion on such matters. When Cratylus denies that Hermogenes is a true name, he supposes him to mean that he is not a true son of Hermes, because he is never in luck. But he would like to have an open council and to hear both sides.

Hermogenes has often considered the question, and is of opinion that there is no principle in names; they may be changed, as we change the names of slaves, whenever we please, and the altered name is as good as the original one.

You mean to say, rejoins Socrates, who re-states the proposition of Hermogenes, that if I agree to call a man a horse, then a man will be rightly called a horse by me, and a man by the rest of the world? But to this he proceeds to object, that there is in words a true and a false, which is contained in propositions; and if a whole proposition be true or false, then the parts of a proposition may be true or false, and the least parts as well as the greatest; and the least parts are names, and therefore names may be true or false. And would Hermogenes maintain that anybody may give a name to anything, and as many names as he pleases; and would all these names be always true at the time of giving them? Hermogenes replies that this is the only consistent account of the correctness of names; and he appeals to the practice of different nations, and of the different Hellenic tribes, in confirmation of his view. Socrates asks, whether the things differ as the words which represent them differ:—Are we to maintain with Protagoras, that what appears is?

Hermogenes has considered this question and is puzzled at first, but acknowledges, when he is pressed by Socrates, that there are a few very good men in the world, and a great many very bad; and the very good are the wise, and the very bad are the foolish; and this is not mere appearance but reality. Nor is he disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally and always belong to all men; in that case, again, there would be no distinction between bad and good men. But if Protagoras and Euthydemus are both admitted to be wrong, then the only remaining possibility is, that all things have their several distinct natures, and are independent of our notions about them. And not only things, but actions, have distinct natures, and are done by different processes. There is a natural way of cutting or burning, and a natural instrument with which men cut or burn, and any other way will fail;—this is true of all actions. And speaking is a kind of action, and naming is a kind of speaking, and we must name according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument. We cut with a knife, we pierce with an awl, we weave with a shuttle, we name with a name. And as a shuttle divides the warp and the woof, so a name distinguishes the natures of things. And the weaver will use the shuttle well,—that is, like a weaver; and the teacher will use the name well,—that is, like a teacher. The shuttle will be made by the carpenter; the awl by the smith or skilled person. But who makes a name? Does not the law give names, and does not the teacher receive them from the legislator? He is the skilled person who makes them, and of all skilled workmen he is the rarest. But how does the carpenter make or repair the shuttle, and to what will he look? Will he not look at the ideal which he has in his mind? And as the different kinds of work differ, so ought the instruments which make them to differ. The several kinds of shuttles ought to answer in material and form to the several kinds of webs. And the legislator ought to know the different materials and forms of which names are made in Hellas and other countries. But who is to be the judge of the proper form? The judge of shuttles is the weaver who uses them; the judge of lyres is the player of the lyre; the judge of ships is the pilot who sails in them. And will not the judge who is able to direct the legislator in his work of naming, be he who knows how to use the names—he who can ask and answer questions—in short, the dialectician? The pilot directs the carpenter how to make the rudder, and the dialectician directs the legislator how he is to impose names; for to express

the ideal forms of things in syllables and letters is no easy task; Hermogenes—of that I can assure you.

‘I wish you would explain to me the natural correctness of names.’

Indeed I cannot; but I see that you have advanced; for you now admit that there is a correctness of names, and that not every one can give a name. But what is the nature of this correctness or truth, you must learn from the Sophists, of whom your brother Callias has bought his reputation for wisdom rather dearly; and since they require to be paid, you, having no money, had better learn from him at second-hand. ‘Well, but I have just given up Protagoras, and I should be inconsistent in going to learn of him.’ Then if you reject him you may learn of the poets, and in particular of Homer, who distinguishes the names given by Gods and men to the same things, as in the verse about the river God who fought with Achilles, ‘whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander;’ or in the lines in which he mentions the bird which the Gods call ‘Chalcis,’ and men ‘Cymindis;’ or the hill which men call ‘Batieia,’ and the Gods call ‘Myrinna’s Tomb.’ Now here is a mysterious lesson which we may take to heart; for the Gods must of course be right in their use of names. And this is not the only truth about philology which may be learnt from Homer. For does he not say that the women called Hector’s son Scamandrius, and the men called him Astyanax? And which are more likely to be right—the wiser or the less wise, the men or the women? Homer evidently thought that the men were likely to be right; and of the name given by the men he offers an explanation;—he was called Astyanax because his father saved the city. Hence you may properly call his son ‘the king of the city;’ and the names of Astyanax and Hector are really the same, for the one means a king, and the other is ‘a holder or possessor;’ ‘’tis all one meaning, save the phrase is a little variatious.’ As the lion’s whelp may be called a lion, so the son of a king may be called a king. But if the lion had produced a foal, then the offspring of the lion would be called a foal. Whether the syllables of a name are the same or not makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained. For example; the names of letters, whether vowels or consonants, do not correspond to their sounds, with the exception of ϵ , ν , σ , ω . The name Beta has three letters added to the sound—and yet this does not alter the sense of the word, or prevent the whole name having the value which the legislator intended. And the same may be said of a king and the son of a king,

who like other animals resemble each other in the course of nature ; the words by which they are signified may be disguised, and yet amid differences of sound the etymologist may recognise the same notion, just as the physician may recognise the power of the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell. Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, but they may have the same meaning ; and Agis (leader), is altogether different in sound from Polemarchus (chief in war), or Eupolemus (good warrior) ; but the two words present the same idea of leader or general, like the words Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus, which equally denote a doctor. The son succeeds the father as the foal succeeds the horse ; but when, out of the course of nature, a prodigy occurs, like a lion producing a dog, that is to say, when the offspring no longer resembles the parent, then the names no longer agree. This may be illustrated by the case of Agamemnon and Orestes, of whom the former has a name significant of his patience at the siege of Troy ; while the name of the latter indicates his savage, man-of-the-mountain nature. Atreus again, for his murder of Chrysippus, and his cruelty to Thyestes, is rightly named Atreus, which, to the eye of the etymologist, is ἀτηρός (destructive), ἀτειρής (stubborn), ἄτρεστος (fearless) ; and Pelops is ὁ πέλας ὄρων (he who sees what is near only), because in his eagerness to win Hippodamia, he was unconscious of the remoter consequences which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his race. The name Tantalus, if slightly changed, offers two etymologies ; either ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ λίθου ταλαντείας, or ἀπὸ τοῦ ταλάντατον εἶναι, signifying at once the misery which he brought upon his country, and the hanging of the stone over his head in the world below. And the name of his father, Zeus, Διὸς, Ζητὸς, has an excellent meaning, though hard to be understood, because really a sentence which is divided into two parts (Zeus, Διὸς). For he, being the lord and king of all, is the author of our being, and in him all live : this is implied in the double form, Διὸς Ζητὸς, which being put together and interpreted is δι' ὃν ζῆ πάντα. There may, at first sight, appear to be a want of reverence in calling him the son of Cronos, who is a proverb for stupidity ; but the meaning, I suspect, is that Zeus himself is the son of a mighty intellect ; Κρόνος, quasi κόρος, not in the sense of a youth, but quasi τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ—the pure and garnished mind, which in turn is begotten of Uranus, who is so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρν ταῖ ἄνω, from looking upwards ; which, as philologists say, is the way to have a pure mind. The earlier portion of

Hesiod's genealogy has escaped my memory, or I would try more conclusions of the same sort. 'You talk like an oracle.' I caught the infection from Euthyphro, who gave me a long lecture which began at dawn, and has not only entered into my ears, but filled my soul, and my intention is to yield to the inspiration to-day; and to-morrow I will be exorcised by a priest or sophist. 'Go on; I am anxious to hear the rest.' Now that we have a general notion, how shall we proceed? What names will afford the most crucial test of natural fitness? Those of heroes are often deceptive, because they are patronymics or expressions of a wish; let us try gods and demi-gods. Gods are so called, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν, from the verb 'to run;' because the sun, moon, and stars run about the heaven; and they being the original gods of the Hellenes, as they still are of the Barbarians, their name is given to all Gods. The demons are the golden race of Hesiod, and by golden he means not literally golden, but good; and they are called demons, quasi δαίμονες, which in the old language was δαίμονες—good men are well said by Hesiod to become δαίμονες when they die, because they are knowing. Ἥρωες is the same word as ἔρωες: 'the sons of God saw the daughters of men that they were fair;' perhaps, also, they are a kind of sophists who are likewise of heroic breed, and called ἥρωες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν, or εἶρειν, from their habit of spinning questions; for εἶρειν is equivalent to λέγειν. I get all this from Euthyphro; and now I bethink me of a very new and ingenious notion which occurs to me; and, if I do not mind, I shall be wiser than I ought to be by to-morrow's dawn. My notion is, that we may put in and pull out letters at pleasure and alter the accents (as, for example, Διὶ φίλος may be turned into Διφιλος), and we may make words into sentences and sentences into words. The name ἄνθρωπος is a case in point, for a letter has been omitted and the accent changed; the original meaning being ὁ ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπεν—he who looks up at what he sees. Ψυχὴ may be thought to be the cooling, or refreshing, or animating principle—ἡ ἀναψύχουσα τὸ σῶμα; but I am afraid that Euthyphro and his disciples will scorn this derivation, and I must find another: shall we say with Anaxagoras, that ψυχὴ is the κοσμοῦσα διάνοια, quasi φυσέχη ἡ φύσιν ἔχει or ὀχεί—this by a refinement may be called ψυχή. 'That is a better and more artistic etymology.'

After ψυχὴ follows σῶμα; this, by a change of a letter, is converted into σῆμα—the grave in which the soul is buried, or the sign of the

soul through which her will is signified; or without changing even a letter may be thought to mean the place of ward in which the soul is safely kept and endures punishment—ἐν ᾧ σώζεται. ‘I should like to hear some more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that excellent one of Zeus.’ The truest names of the Gods are those which they give themselves; but these are unknown to us. Less true are those by which we propitiate them, as men say in prayers, ‘May he graciously receive any name by which I call him.’ And to avoid offence, I should like to let them know beforehand that we are not enquiring about them—that would be a piece of impertinence on our part; but we are enquiring about the names which men give to them. Let us begin with Hestia. What did he mean who gave the name Hestia? ‘That is a very difficult question to answer.’ O, my dear Hermogenes, I believe that there was a power of philosophy and talk among the first inventors of names, both in our own and in other languages; for even in foreign words a principle is discernible. Hestia is the same with *ἑστία*, which is an old form of *οὐσία*, and means the first principle of things: this agrees with the fact that to Hestia the first sacrifices are offered. There is also another reading — *ῶσία*, which implies that ‘pushing’ is the first principle of all things. And here I seem to discover a delicate allusion to the flux of Heracleitus—that antediluvian philosopher who cannot walk twice in the same stream; and this flux of his may accomplish yet greater marvels. For the names Cronos and Rhea cannot have been accidental; the giver of them must have known something about the doctrine of Heracleitus. Moreover, there is a remarkable coincidence in the words of Hesiod, when he speaks of Oceanus, ‘the origin of Gods;’ or in the verse of Orpheus, in which he describes Oceanus espousing his sister Tethys. Tethys is nothing more than the name of a spring—τὸ ἠθούμενον καὶ διαττώμενον. Poseidon is *ποσιδεσμος*, the chain of the feet, because you cannot walk on the sea—the *ε* is inserted by way of ornament; or perhaps the name may have been originally *πολλεῖδων*, meaning, that the God knew many things (*πολλὰ εἰδώς*): he may also be the shaker, *ἀπὸ τοῦ σείειν*. Pluto is connected with *πλοῦτος*, because wealth comes out of the earth; or because there are riches in the world below; or the word may be a euphemism for Hades. And Hades is so called, not *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς*, but *ἀπὸ τοῦ πάντα τὰ κατὰ εἰδέναι*—from knowing all good and beautiful things. Hades binds men by the strongest of chains, and the love of the beautiful is the

strongest; the men who are bound by this chain never want to come back, and indeed, when they have once been laid under his spell, they cannot. He is the perfect and accomplished sophist, and the great benefactor of the world below; for he has much more than he wants there, and this is why he is called Pluto, or the rich. He will have nothing to do with the souls of men while in the body, because he cannot bind them with the desire of virtue until they are liberated from their earthly tenement. Demeter is the mother and giver of food—*ἡ διδοῦσα μήτηρ τῆς ἐδωδῆς*. Herè is *ἐρατή τις*, or perhaps, the legislator may have been thinking of the weather, and has merely transposed the letters of the word *ἀήρ*. You will see the truth of this when you say the letters over fast. Pherephatta, that awful name, is *φερεπάφα*—and means only *ἡ τοῦ φερομένου ἐφαπτομένη*—all things in the world are in motion, and she in her wisdom moves with them, and Hades consorts with her—there is nothing very terrible in this. Apollo is another name, which is supposed to have some dreadful meaning, but is susceptible, if I am not mistaken, of at least four perfectly innocent explanations, which agree marvellously with his four attributes of musician, diviner, doctor, archer. First, he is the purifier or purger or fumigator (*ἀπολούων*); secondly, he is the true diviner (*ἀπλωδς*), as he is called in the Thessalian dialect; thirdly, he is the archer (*ἀεὶ βάλλων*), always shooting; or again, supposing *α* to mean *ἄμα* or *ὅμον*, Apollo becomes equivalent to *ἄμα πολῶν*, which is significant both of his musical and of his heavenly attributes; for he is the God of music, and also of the movement of the spheres. The second *λ* is inserted in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction. The Muses are so called—*ἀπὸ τοῦ μῶσθαι*. Leto or Letho means, forget and forgive; she is such a gentle deity. Artemis is named from her healthy happy nature *διὰ τὸ ἀρτεμές*, or as *ἀρετῆς ἴστωρ*; or as a lover of virginity, *ἄροτον μισήσασα τοῦ ἀνδρός*. One, if not all of these explanations, is probably true. Dionysus is *ὁ διδοὺς τὸν οἶνον*, and *οἶνος* is quasi *οἰόνους* because wine gives a mind to those who have not got one. The established derivation of *Ἄφροδίτη διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀφροῦ γένεσιν*, may be accepted on the authority of Hesiod. Again, there is the name of Pallas, or Athene, which you, who are an Athenian, must not forget. Pallas is derived from armed dances—*ἀπὸ τοῦ πάλλειν τὰ ὄπλα*. For Athene we must have recourse to the allegorical interpreters of Homer, who make the name equivalent to *θεονόη* or *ἠθονόη*; this has been beautified into Athene. Hephaestus, again, is the lord of light—*ὁ τοῦ φάεος ἴστωρ*. This is a

good notion; and, to prevent any other getting into our heads, let us go on to Ares. He is the manly one (*ἄρῶν*), or the unbroken one (*ἄρρατος*). Enough of the Gods; for, by the Gods, I am afraid of them; but if you suggest other words, you will see how the horses of Euthyphro prance. 'Only one more God; tell me about my godfather Hermes.' He is *ἔρμηνεύς*, the messenger or cheater or thief or bargainer; or *ὁ εἴρει μάμενος*, that is, *εἰρέμης* or *ἔρμης*—the speaker or contriver of speeches. 'Well said Cratylus, then, that I am no son of Hermes.' Pan, the son of Hermes, is *λόγος*, and is called Pan because he indicates everything—*ὁ πᾶν μνηύων*. He has two forms, a true and a false; and is in the upper part smooth, and in the lower part shaggy. He is the goat of Tragedy, in which there are plenty of falsehoods.

Enough of the names of the Gods. Shall I go on to the elements—sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, seasons, years? And which shall I take first? Let us begin with *ἥλιος*, or the sun. The origin of *ἥλιος* will be clearer in the Doric form *ἄλιος*, which is so called *κατὰ τὸ ἀλίξεν εἰς ταῦτὸ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπειδὴν ἀνατεῖλῃ*, because at his rising he gathers men together; or, *διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν γῆν εἰλεῖν*, because he goes round the earth; or, *διὰ τὸ αἰολεῖν*, the meaning of which is *παικίλλειν*, because he variegates the earth. Selene is an anticipation of Anaxagoras, being a contraction of *σελαενονοεάεια*, the light which is ever old and new, and which, as Anaxagoras says, is borrowed from the sun; the name was beaten into shape and called *σελαναία*. 'That is a name of the true dithyrambic sort.' *Μεῖς* is so called *ἀπὸ τοῦ μειοῦσθαι*, from suffering diminution, and *ἄστρον* is from *ἀστραπή*, which is an improvement of *ἀναστρωπή*, that which turns the eyes inside out. 'How do you explain *πῦρ* and *ὔδωρ*?' I suspect *πῦρ*, like *ὔδωρ* and *κύων*, which are found in the Phoenician language, to be a word of which the origin must be sought in some other language; for the Hellenes borrowed many words from the barbarians, and I always have recourse to them when I am at a loss. 'Ἄηρ may be explained, *ὅτι αἶρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς*; or, *ὅτι αἰεῖ ρεῖ*; or, *ὅτι πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται* (compare the poetic word *ἀῆται*). So *αἰθήρ* quasi *αἰεθεῖρ* *ὅτι αἰεῖ θεῖ*: *γῆ*, *γαῖα* quasi *γεννήτειρα* (compare the Homeric form *γεγαῖασι*); *ᾠρα*, or, according to the old Attic form, *ᾠρα*, is derived *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρίζειν*, because it divides the year; *ἐνιαυτός* and *ἔτος* are the same thought—*ὁ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐτάζων*, cut into two parts, *ἐν ἑαυτῷ* and *ἐτάζων*, like *δι' ὃν ζῆ* into *Διός* and *Ζηνός*.

'You make surprising progress.' True; I am run away with, and am not even yet at my utmost speed. 'I should like very much to hear your

account of the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in all those charming words, wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them? To explain all that will be a serious business; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, appearances must be maintained. My opinion is, that primitive men were like some modern philosophers, who, by always going round in their search after the nature of things, become dizzy; and this latter phenomenon, which was really in themselves, they imagined to take place in the external world. You have no doubt remarked, that the doctrine of the universal flux, or generation of things, is indicated in names. 'No, I never did.' Φρόνησις is only φορᾶς καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις, or perhaps ὕνησις φορᾶς, and in any case is connected with φέρεσθαι; γνώμη is γωνῆς σκέψις καὶ νόμησις; νόησις is νέου or γυγνομένου ἕσις; the word νέος implies that creation is always going on—the original form was νεόσις; σωφροσύνη is σωτηρία φρονήσεως; ἐπιστήμη is ἡ ἐπομένη τοῖς πράγμασιν—the faculty which keeps close, neither anticipating nor lagging behind; σύνεσις is equivalent to συνιέναι, συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν ψυχῆν, and is a kind of conclusion—συλλογισμός τις, akin therefore in idea to ἐπιστήμη; σοφία is very difficult, and has a foreign look—the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things, and may be illustrated by the poetical ἐσύθη and the Lacedaemonian proper name Σοῦς, or Rush; ἀγαθὸν is τὸ ἀγαστὸν ἐν τῇ ταχύτητι,—for all things are in motion, and some are swifter than others: δικαιοσύνη is clearly ἡ τοῦ δικαίου σύνεσις. The word δίκαιον is more difficult, and appears to mean the subtle penetrating power which, as the lovers of motion say, preserves all things, and is the cause of all things, quasi διαῖον going through—the letter κ being inserted for the sake of euphony. This is a great mystery which has been confided to me; but when I ask for an explanation of the mystery, I am thought irreverent, and another derivation is proposed to me. Justice is said to be ὁ καίων, or the sun; and when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered, 'What, is there no justice when the sun is down?' And when I entreat my questioner to tell me his own opinion, he replies, that justice is fire in the abstract, or heat in the abstract; which is not very intelligible. Others laugh at all this, and say with Anaxagoras, that justice is the ordering mind. 'I think that some one must have told you this.' And not the rest? Let me proceed then, in the hope of proving to you my originality. Ἀνδρεία is quasi ἀνρεία quasi ἡ ἄνω ῥοή, the stream which flows upwards, and is opposed to injustice, which clearly hinders the principle of penetration; γυνή is the same as γονή; θῆλυ is derived ἀπὸ τῆς θηλῆς, of

ἀπὸ τοῦ θάλλειν, and implies increase of youth, which is swift and sudden ever (θεῖν and ἄλλεσθαι). Observe how I run away when I am on smooth ground! Τέχνη, by an aphaeresis of τ and an epenthesis of ο in two places, may be identified with ἐχονόη.

‘That is a very poor etymology.’ Yes; but you must remember that all language is in a process of disguise or transition; and letters are taken in and put out at pleasure, and twisted and twirled about in the lapse of ages—sometimes for the sake of euphony. For example, what business has the letter ρ in the word κάτοπτρον, or the letter σ in the word σφίγξ? The additions are often such that no human being can by any possibility make out the original word. ‘True.’ And yet, if you may put in and pull out, as you like, any name is equally good for any object (‘les consonants ne sont pas grand chose et les voyelles rien.’) ‘That is true.’ The fact is, that great dictators of literature like yourself should observe the rules of moderation. ‘I will do my best.’ But do not be too much of a precisian, or you will paralyse me. If you will let me add μηχανή, ἀπὸ τοῦ μήκους, which means πολὺν, and ἄνειν, I shall be at the summit of my powers, from which elevation I will examine the two words κακία and ἀρετή. The explanation of the first is obvious, and in accordance with what has preceded; for all things being in a flux, κακία is τὸ κακῶς ἶόν. This is evident, and is further confirmed by the poor forgotten word δειλία, which ought to have come after ἀνδρεία, and may be regarded as ὁ λίαν δεσμὸς, just as ἀπορία is τὸ ἐμπόδιον τῷ πορεύεσθαι, and ἀρετή is εὐπορία, which is the opposite of this—the everflowing (ἀεὶ ῥέουσα or ἀειρευτή), or the eligible, quasi αἰρευτή—this has been contracted into ἀρετή. You will, perhaps, say that I am inventing, but I say that if κακία is right, then ἀρετή is also right. But what is κακόν? That is a very obscure word, to which I can only apply my old notion. ‘What is that?’ I shall say, that κακόν is a foreign word. Next, let us proceed to καλόν, αἰσχρόν. About αἰσχρόν I have no doubt—τὸ ἴσχυον τῆς ῥοῆς τὰ ὄντα or ἀεισχοροῦν; which has been contracted into αἰσχρόν. The inventor of words being a patron of the flux, was an enemy to stagnation of all sorts. Καλόν is τὸ καλοῦν τὰ πράγματα—that which gives expression to νοῦς or διάνοια; this is the principle of beauty; and mind, which does the work of beauty, is rightly called the beautiful. The meaning of συμφέρον is explained by previous examples;—like ἐπιστήμη, signifying that the soul moves in harmony with the world. Κέρδος is τὸ πᾶσι κεραυνύμενον—that which mingles with all things: λυσιτελοῦν is equivalent to τὸ τῆς φορᾶς λύνον τὸ τέλος, and is not to

be taken in the vulgar sense of gainful, but rather in that of swift, being the principle which makes motion immortal and unceasing; *ὠφέλιμον* is *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὠφέλλειν*—that which gives increase: this word, which is Homeric, is of foreign origin. *βλαβερόν* is *τὸ βλάπτειν* or *βουλόμενον ἄπτειν τοῦ ῥοῦ*—that which injures or seeks to bind the stream. The proper word would be *βουλαπτεροῦν*, but this is too much of a mouthful—like a prelude on the flute in honour of Athene. The word *ζημιῶδες* is difficult; great changes, as I was saying, have been made in words, and even a small change will alter their meaning very much. The word *δέον* is one of these disguised words. You know that according to the old pronunciation, which is especially affected by the women, who are great conservatives, *ι* and *δ* were used where we should now use *η* and *ζ*: for example, what we now call *ἡμέρα* was formerly called *ιμέρα*; and this shows the meaning of the word to have been ‘the desired one after night.’ *Ζυγόν* is *δυογόν*, meaning *δέσις δυεῖν εἰς ἀγωγὴν*—the binding of two together for the purpose of drawing. The word *δέον* has also the meaning of obligation, but when taken in this sense should be written *διόν*; for the cessation of motion implies censure and evil. Thus *ζημιώδης* is really *δημιώδης*, and means that which binds motion: *ἴδων* is *ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὕψισιν τείνουσα πρᾶξις*: *λύπη* appears to be derived *ἀπὸ τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος*: *άνια* is from *α* and *ιέναι*, to go: *ἀληθῶν* is a foreign word, and is so called *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ*: *ὀδυνή* is *ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης*: *ἀχθηδών* is a word of which the very sound is a burden: *χαρὰ* is expressive of the flow of soul: *τερπνός* is *ἀπὸ τοῦ τερπνοῦ*, and *τερπνόν* is properly *ἔρπνον*: *εὐφροσύνη* and *ἐπιθυμία* explain themselves: *θυμός* is *ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως τῆς ψυχῆς*: *ἕμερος*—*ὅτι ἐίμενος ῥεῖ*: *πόθος*, the desire which is in another place, *ἄλλοθί που*: *ἔρως* was anciently *ἔσρος ὅτι ἐσρεῖ*: *δόξα* is *ἡ δίωξις τοῦ εἰδέναι*, or *ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόξου βολή*. *Βουλή* is the shooting of a bow: *ἀβουλία* is the missing. ‘You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.’ Why, yes, because I wish to make an end. But I must first explain *ἐκούσιον* and *ἀνάγκη*. *Ἐκούσιον* is *τὸ εἶκον*—the yielding—*ἀνάγκη* is *ἡ κατὰ τὰ ἄγκη πορεία*, the passage through ravines which impede motion: *ἀληθεία* is *θεία ἄλη*, divine motion. *Ψεῦδος* is the opposite of this, implying the constraining and reposing principle, which is expressed under the figure of sleep, *τὸ εὔδον*; this is disguised by the addition of *ψ*. **Όνομα*, a name, affirms the real existence of that which is sought after—*ὄν οὐ μάσμα ἔστιν*. **Όν* is *ἰόν*, agreeably to our theory, and *οὐκ ὄν* is *οὐκ ἰόν*. ‘And what are *ἰόν*, *ῥέον*, *δοῦν*?’ One way of explaining them has been already suggested—they may be of foreign

origin; and this is very likely the true answer. Mere antiquity may often prevent our recognising words, after all their complications; and we must remember that however far we carry back the analysis of nouns or verbs, there must be some ultimate elements or roots which can be no further analysed. For example; the word *ἀγαθός* was supposed by us to be a compound of *ἀγαστός* and *θός*, and probably *θός* may be further resolvable. But when we have arrived at the letter *θ*, then there is no further resolution; and possibly the words about which you are asking are like letters, original elements, and their truth or law will have to be examined according to some new method. In the attempt to find this method, I shall ask for your assistance.

All names, whether primary or secondary, are intended to show the nature of things; and the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary. But then, how do the primary names indicate anything? And here I will ask a further question,—If we had no faculty of speech, how should we communicate with one another? Should we not use signs, like the deaf and dumb? The elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness—heaviness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground. The running of a horse, or any other animal, would be described by a similar movement of our own frames. The only way in which the body can express anything, is by imitation; and the tongue or mouth can imitate as well as the rest of the body. But this imitation of the tongue or voice is not yet a name, because people may imitate sheep or goats without naming them. What, then, is a name? In the first place, a name is not a musical, or, secondly, a pictorial imitation, but an imitation of that kind which expresses the nature of a thing; and is the invention not of a musician, or of a painter, but of a namer.

And now, I think that we may consider the names *ῥοή*, stream—*ἰέναι*, to go. The way to analyse them will be by going back to the letters, or primary elements of which they are composed. First, we separate the alphabet into classes of letters, distinguishing the consonants, vowels, and semivowels; and when we have learnt them singly, we shall learn to know them in their various combinations of two or more letters; just as the painter knows how to use either a single colour, which may be purple or some other colour, or a combination of them. And like the painter, we may apply letters to the expression of objects, and form them into syllables; and these again into words, until the picture or figure, large and fair—that is, language—is completed. Not that I am literally

speaking of ourselves, but I mean to say that this was the way in which the ancients framed language. And this leads me to consider whether the primary as well as the secondary elements are rightly given. I may remark, as I was saying about the Gods, that we can only attain to conjecture about them. But still we insist that this which we are pursuing is the true and only method of discovery ; and not having this, we must have recourse, like the tragic poets, to a *Deus ex machinâ*, and say that God gave the first names, and therefore they are right. And this will perhaps be our best device ; unless indeed we say that the barbarians are older than we are, and that we learnt of them, or that antiquity has cast a veil over the truth. Yet all these are not reasons ; they are only ingenious excuses for having no reasons.

I will freely impart to you my own notions, though they are somewhat crude :—The letter ρ appears to me to be the general instrument expressing all motion or *κίνησις*. I ought to explain that this word *κίνησις* was just *ἕσις*, for the letter η was unknown to the ancients ; and the root, *κίειν*, is a dialectical variety of *ίέναι* : of *κίνησις* or *εἴσις*, the opposite is *στάσις*. The letter ρ appeared to the legislator an excellent instrument for expressing motion, as is evident in the words tremble, break, crush, crumble, and the like ; he perceived that the tongue is most agitated in the pronunciation of this letter, just as he used ι to express the subtle penetrating power which passes through all things. The letters ϕ , ψ , σ , ζ , which require a great deal of wind, are employed in the imitation of such notions as shivering, seething, and in general of what is windy. The letters δ and τ have a notion of binding and rest in a place : the limpid movement of λ expresses smoothness, as in the words slip, sleek, sleep, and the like. But when the slipping tongue is detained by the heavier sound of γ , then arises the notion of a glutinous clammy nature : ν is sounded from within, and has a notion of inwardness : α is the expression of size ; η of length ; \omicron of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of \omicron in the word *γόγγυλον*. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the correctness of names ; and I should like to hear what Cratylus would say. ‘But, Socrates, as I was telling you, Cratylus mystifies me ; I should like to ask him, in your presence, what he means by the fitness of names?’ To this appeal, Cratylus replies ‘that he cannot explain that or any other subject all in a moment.’ ‘No, but you may “add little to little,” as Hesiod says.’ Socrates here interposes his own request, that Cratylus will tell him the nature of his theory. Hermogenes and himself are

mere sciolists, but Cratylus has reflected on these matters, and has had teachers. Cratylus replies in the words which Achilles uses to Ajax: "Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, you have spoken in all things very much to my mind," whether Euthyphro, or some Muse inhabiting your own breast, was the inspirer.' Socrates replies, that he is afraid of being self-deceived; there is nothing worse than self-deception, and therefore he must 'look fore and aft,' as the aforesaid Homer remarks; and proceeds to confirm his own opinion by that of Cratylus. Names teach us the nature of things. 'Yes.' And naming is an art, and the artists are legislators, and like artists in general, some of them are better and some of them are worse than others, and give better or worse laws, and make better or worse names. Cratylus is not disposed to admit that one name is better than another; they are either true names, or they are not names at all; and when he is asked about the name of Hermogenes, who is acknowledged to have no luck in him, he affirms this to be the name of somebody else. Socrates supposes him to mean that falsehood is impossible, to which he himself is disposed to reply, that there have been liars in all ages. But Cratylus presses him with the old sophistical argument, that falsehood is saying that which is not, and therefore saying nothing;—you can neither speak, say, utter, or address the word which is not. Socrates complains that this argument is too subtle for an old man like himself to understand: Suppose a person addressing Cratylus were to say, Hail, Athenian Stranger, Hermogenes! Would these words be true or false? 'I should say that they would be a succession of unmeaning sounds, like the hammering of a brass pot.' But you would acknowledge that names, as well as pictures, are imitations; and also that pictures may give a right or wrong representation of a man or woman, and that names may equally give a representation true and right or false and wrong. Cratylus admits that pictures may give a true or false representation, but denies that names can. Socrates argues, that he may go up to a man and say 'this is your picture,' and again, he may go and say to him 'this is your name'—in the one case appealing to his sense of sight, and in the other to his sense of hearing; you admit that? 'Yes.' Then you must admit that there is a right or a wrong assignment of names, and if of names, then of verbs and nouns; and if of verbs and nouns, then of the sentences which are made up of them; and comparing nouns to pictures, you may give them all the appropriate sounds, or only some of them. And as he who gives all the colours makes a good picture,

and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but still a picture; so he who gives all the sounds makes a good name, and he who gives only some of them, a bad or imperfect one, but a name still. The artist of names, that is, the legislator, may be a good or he may be a bad artist. 'Yes, Socrates, but the cases are not altogether parallel; for if you subtract or misplace a letter, the name ceases to be a name.' Socrates admits that the number 10, if an unit is subtracted, would cease to be 10, but denies that names are of this purely quantitative nature. Let me suppose two objects: there is Cratylus and the image of Cratylus; and we will further imagine that some God makes them perfectly alike, not only in their outward form, but also in their inner nature and qualities: then there will be two Cratyluses, and not merely Cratylus and the image of Cratylus. But do you not see that an image always falls short in some degree of the original, and if images are very far from being exact counterparts, why should names be? If they were, they would be the doubles of their originals, and indistinguishable from them; and how ridiculous would this be! Cratylus admits the truth of Socrates' remark. But then Socrates rejoins, he should have the courage to acknowledge that letters may be wrongly inserted in a noun, or a noun in a sentence; and yet the noun or the sentence may retain a meaning. If we deny this, the argument will say 'too late' to us, as in the story of the belated traveller in Aegina. And, errors excepted, we may still affirm that a name to be correct must have proper letters, which bear a resemblance to the thing signified. I must remind you of what Hermogenes and I were saying about the letter ρ , which was held to be expressive of motion and hardness, as λ is of smoothness;—and this you will admit to be their natural meaning. But then, why do the Eretrians call that *σκληρότηρ* which we call *σκληρότης*? We can understand one another, although the letter ρ is not equivalent to the letter σ : why is this? You reply, because the two letters are sufficiently alike for the purpose of expressing motion. Well, then, there is the letter λ ; what business has this in a word meaning hardness? 'Why, Socrates, I retort upon you, that we put in and pull out letters at pleasure.' And the explanation of this is custom or agreement: we have made a convention that the ρ shall mean σ , and a convention may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. How could there be names for all the numbers unless you allow that convention is used? Imitation is a poor thing, and has to be supplemented by convention, which is another poor thing; although I

quite agree, that if we could always have a perfect correspondence of sound and meaning, that would be the most perfect form of language. But let me ask you what is the use and force of names? 'The use of names, Socrates, is to inform, and he who knows names knows things.' Do you mean that the discovery of names is the same as the discovery of things? 'Yes.' But do you not see that there is a degree of deception about names? He who first gave names, gave them according to his conception, and that may have been erroneous. 'But then, why, Socrates, is language so consistent? all words have the same laws.' Mere consistency is no test of truth. In geometrical problems, for example, there may be a flaw at the beginning, and yet the conclusion may follow consistently. And, therefore, a wise man will take especial care of first principles. But I should be surprised to find that words were really consistent; for are there not as many terms of praise which signify rest as which signify motion? There is *ἐπιστήμη*, which is connected with *στάσις*, as *μῆμη* is with *μένω*. *Βέβαιον*, again, is the expression of station and position; and *ἰστορία* is clearly descriptive of the stopping of the stream: and there are many words having a bad sense, which are connected with ideas of motion, as *συμφορὰ*, *ἁμαρτία*, &c.: *ἁμαθία*, again, might be explained, as *ἡ ἅμα θεῶ ἰόντος πορεία*. Thus the bad names are framed on the same principle as the good, and other examples might be given, which would favour a theory of rest rather than of motion. 'Yes; but the greater number of words express motion.' Are we to count them, Cratylus; and is correctness of names to be determined by the voice of a majority?

Here is another point: we were saying that the legislator gives names; and we must suppose that he knows the things which he names: but how can he have learnt things from names before there were names? 'I believe, Socrates, that some power more than human first gave things their names, and that these were necessarily true names.' Then how came the giver of names to contradict himself, and to make some names expressive of rest, and others of motion? 'I do not suppose that he did make them both.' Then which did he make—those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? . . . But if some names are true and others false, we can only decide between them, not by counting words, but by appealing to things. And, if so, we must allow that things may be known without names; for names, as we have several times admitted, are the images of things; and the higher knowledge is

of things, and is not to be derived from names; and though I do not doubt that the inventors of language gave names, under the idea that all things are in a state of motion and flux, I believe that they were mistaken; and that having fallen into a whirlpool themselves, they are trying to drag us after them. For is there not a true beauty and a true good, which is always beautiful and always good? Can the thing beauty be vanishing away from us while the words are yet in our mouths? And they could not be known by any one if they are always passing away—for if they are always passing away, the observer has no opportunity of knowing their state. Whether the doctrine of the flux or of the eternal nature be the truer, is hard to determine. But no man of sense will put himself, or the education of his mind, in the power of names: he will not condemn himself to be an unreal thing, nor will he believe that everything is in a flux like the water in a leaky vessel, or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This doctrine may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would have you reflect while you are young, and find out the truth, and when you know come and tell me. ‘I have thought, Socrates, and after a good deal of thinking I incline to Heracleitus.’ Then another day, my friend, you shall give me a lesson. ‘Very good, Socrates, and I hope that you will continue to study these things yourself.’

We may now consider (I) how far Plato in the *Cratylus* has discovered the true principles of language, and then (II) proceed to compare modern speculations respecting the origin and nature of language with the anticipations of his genius.

I. (1) Plato is aware that language is not the work of chance; nor does he deny that there is a natural fitness in names. He only insists that this natural fitness shall be intelligibly explained. But he has no idea that language is a natural organism. He would have heard with surprise that languages are the common work of whole nations in a primitive or semi-barbarous age. How, he would probably have argued, could men devoid of art have contrived a structure of such complexity? No answer could have been given to this question, either in ancient or in modern times, until the nature of primitive antiquity had been thoroughly studied, and the instincts of man had been shown to exist in greater force, when his state approaches more nearly to that of children or animals. The

philosophers of the last century, after their manner, would have vainly endeavoured to trace the process by which proper names were converted into common, and would have shown how the last effort of abstraction invented prepositions and auxiliaries. The theologian would have proved that language must have had a divine origin, because in childhood, while the organs are pliable, the intelligence is wanting, and when the intelligence is able to frame conceptions, the organs are no longer able to express them. Or, as others have said: Man is man because he has the gift of speech; and he could not have invented that which he is. But this would have been an 'argument too subtle' for Socrates (429 D), who rejects the theological account of the origin of language 'as an excuse for not giving a reason,' which he compares to the introduction of the '*Deus ex machinā*' by the tragic poets when they have to solve a difficulty; thus anticipating many modern controversies in which the primary agency of the Divine Being is confused with the secondary cause; and God is assumed to have worked a miracle in order to fill up a lacuna in human knowledge. (Cp. Timaeus, p. 46.)

Neither is Plato wrong in supposing that an element of design and art enters into language. The creative power abating is supplemented by a mechanical process. 'Languages are not made but grow,' but they are made as well as grow; bursting into life like a plant or a flower, they are also capable of being trained and improved and engrafted upon one another. The change in them is effected in earlier ages by musical and euphonic improvements, at a later stage by the influence of grammar and logic, and by the poetical and literary use of words. They develop rapidly in childhood, and when they are full grown and set they may still put forth intellectual powers, like the mind in the body, or rather we may say that the nobler use of language only begins when the framework is complete. The savage or primitive man, in whom the natural instinct is strongest, is also the greatest improver of the forms of language. He is the poet or maker of words, as in civilized ages the dialectician is the definer or distinguisher of them. The latter calls the second world of abstract terms into existence, as the former has created the picture sounds which represent natural objects or processes. Poetry and philosophy—these two, are the two great formative principles of language, when they have passed their first stage, of which, as of the first invention of the arts in general, we only entertain conjecture. And mythology is a link between them, connecting the visible and invisible,

until at length the sensuous exterior falls away, and the severance of the inner and outer world, of the idea and the object of sense, becomes complete. At a later period, logic and grammar, sister arts, preserve and enlarge the decaying instinct of language, by rule and method, which they gather from analysis and observation.

(2) There is no trace in any of Plato's writings that he was acquainted with any language but Greek. Yet he has conceived very truly the relation of Greek to foreign languages, which he is led to consider, because he finds that many Greek words are incapable of explanation. Allowing a good deal for accident, and also for the fancies of the *conditores linguae Graecae*, there is an element of which he is unable to give an account. These unintelligible words he supposes to be of foreign origin, and to have been derived from a time when the Greeks were either barbarians, or in close relations to the barbarians. Socrates is aware that this principle is liable to great abuse; and, like the '*Deus ex machinâ*,' explains nothing. Hence he excuses himself for the employment of such a device, and remarks that in foreign words there is still a principle of correctness, which applies equally both to Greeks and barbarians.

(3) But the greater number of primary words do not admit of derivation from foreign languages; they must be resolved into the letters out of which they are composed, and therefore the letters must have a meaning. The framers of language were aware of this; they observed that *a* was adapted to express size; η length; *o* roundness; ν inwardness; ρ rush or roar; λ liquidity; $\gamma\lambda$ the detention of the liquid or slippery element; δ and τ binding; ϕ , ψ , σ , ξ , wind and cold, and so on. Plato's analysis of the letters of the alphabet shows a wonderful insight into the nature of language. He does not expressly distinguish between mere imitation and the symbolical use of sound to express thought, but he recognises in the examples which he gives both modes of imitation. Gesture is the mode which a deaf and dumb person would take of indicating his meaning. And language is the gesture of the tongue; in the use of the letter ρ , to express a rushing or roaring, or of *o* to express roundness, there is a direct imitation; while in the use of the letter *a* to express size, or of η to express length, the imitation is symbolical. The use of analogous or similar sounds, in order to express similar or analogous ideas, seems to have escaped him.

In passing from the gesture of the body to the movement of the

tongue, Plato makes a great step in the physiology of language. He was probably the first who said that 'language is imitative sound,' which is the greatest and deepest truth of philology; although he is not aware of the laws of euphony and association by which imitation must be regulated. He was probably also the first who made a distinction between simple and compound words, a truth second only in importance to that which has just been mentioned. His great insight in one direction curiously contrasts with his blindness in another; for he appears to be wholly unaware (cp. his derivation of ἀγαθός from ἀγαρός and θός) of the difference between the root and termination. But we must recollect that he was necessarily more ignorant than any schoolboy of Greek grammar, and had no table of the inflexions of verbs and nouns before his eyes, which might have suggested to him the distinction.

(4) Plato distinctly affirms that language is not truth, or '*philosophie une langue bien faite.*' At first, Socrates has delighted himself with discovering the flux of Heraclitus in language. But he is covertly satirising the pretence of that or any other age to find philosophy in words; and he afterwards corrects any erroneous inference which might be gathered from his experiment. For he finds as many, or almost as many, words expressive of rest, as he had previously found expressive of motion. And even if this had been otherwise, who would learn of words when he might learn of things? There is a great controversy and high argument between Heracliteans and Eleatics, but no man of sense would commit his soul in such enquiries to the imposers of names. . . In this and other passages Plato shows that he is as completely emancipated from the influence of 'Idols of the tribe' as Bacon himself.

The lesson which may be gathered from words is not metaphysical or moral, but historical. They teach us the affinity of races, they tell us something about the association of ideas, they occasionally preserve the memory of a disused custom; but we cannot safely argue from them about right and wrong, matter and mind, freedom and necessity, or the other problems of moral and metaphysical philosophy. For the use of words on such subjects may often be metaphorical, accidental, derived from other languages, and may have no relation to the contemporary state of thought and feeling. Nor in any case is the invention of them the result of philosophical reflection; they have been commonly transferred from matter to mind, and their meaning is the very reverse of their etymology. Because there is or is not a name for a thing, we

cannot argue that the thing has or has not an actual existence; or that the antitheses, parallels, conjugates, correlatives of language have anything corresponding to them in nature. There are too many words as well as too few; and they generalize the objects or ideas which they represent. The greatest lesson which the philosophical analysis of language teaches us is, that we should be above language, making words our servants, and not allowing them to be our masters.

Plato does not add the further observation, that the etymological meaning of words is in process of being lost. If at first framed on a principle of intelligibility, they would gradually cease to be intelligible, like those of a foreign language. He is willing to admit that they are subject to many changes, and put on many disguises. He acknowledges that the 'poor creature' imitation is supplemented by another 'poor creature,'—convention. But he does not see that 'habit and repute,' and their relation to other words, are always exercising an influence over them. Words appear to be isolated, but they are really the parts of an organism which is always being reproduced. They are refined by civilization, harmonized by poetry, emphasized by literature, technically applied in philosophy and art; they are used as symbols on the border-ground of human knowledge; they receive a fresh impress from individual genius, and come with a new force and association to every lively-minded person. They are fixed by the simultaneous utterance of millions, and yet are always imperceptibly changing;—not the inventors of language, but writing and speaking, and particularly great writers, or works which pass into the hearts of nations, Homer, Shakespeare, Dante, the German or English Bible, Kant and Hegel, are the makers of them in later ages. They carry with them the faded recollection of their own past history; the use of a word in a striking and familiar passage gives a complexion to its use everywhere else, and the new use of an old and familiar phrase has also a peculiar power over us. But these and other subtleties of language escaped the observation of Plato. He is not aware that the languages of the world are organic structures, and that every word in them is related to every other; nor does he conceive of language as the joint work of the speaker and the hearer, requiring in man a faculty not only of expressing his thoughts but of understanding those of others.

On the other hand, he cannot be justly charged with a desire to frame language on artificial principles. Philosophers have sometimes dreamed

of a technical or scientific language, in words which should have fixed meanings, and stand in the same relation to one another as the substances which they denote. But there is no more trace of this in Plato than there is of a language corresponding to the ideas; nor, indeed, could the want of such a language be felt until the sciences were far more developed. Those who would extend the use of technical phraseology beyond the limits of science or of custom, seem to forget that freedom and suggestiveness and the play of association are essential characteristics of language. The great master has shown how he regarded pedantic distinctions of words or attempts to confine their meaning in the satire on Prodicus in the *Protagoras*.

(5) In addition to these anticipations of the general principles of philology, we may note also a few curious observations on words and sounds. 'The Eretrians say *σκληρότης* for *σκληρότηρ*;' 'the Thessalians call Apollo *Ἀπλῶς*;' 'the Phrygians have the words *πῦρ*, *ὔδωρ*, *κύνες* slightly inflected;' 'there is an old Homeric word *ἐμήσατο*, meaning "he contrived";' 'our forefathers, and especially the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, loved the letters *ι* and *δ*; but now *ι* is changed into *η* and *ε*, and *δ* into *ζ*; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.' Plato was very willing to use inductive arguments, so far as they were within his reach; but he would also have assigned a large influence to chance. Nor indeed is induction applicable to philology in the same degree as to most of the physical sciences. For after we have pushed our researches to the furthest point, in language as in all the other creations of the human mind, there will always remain an element of exception or accident or free-will, which cannot be eliminated.

The question, 'whether falsehood is impossible,' which Socrates characteristically sets aside as too subtle for an old man (429 D; cp. *Euthyd.* 284), could only have arisen in an age of imperfect consciousness, which had not yet learned to distinguish words from things. Socrates replies in effect that words have an independent existence; thus anticipating the solution of the mediaeval controversy of Nominalism and Realism. He is aware too that languages exist in various degrees of perfection (435), and that the analysis of them can only be carried to a certain point (422). 'If we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are the appropriate expressions, that would be the most perfect state of language' (439 D). These words suggest a question of deeper interest

than the origin of language; viz. what is the ideal of language, how far by any correction of their usages existing languages might become clearer and more expressive than they are, more poetical, and also more logical; or whether they are now finally fixed and have received their last impress from time and authority.

On the whole, the Cratylus seems to contain deeper truths about language than any other ancient writing. But feeling the uncertain ground upon which he is walking, and partly in order to preserve the character of Socrates, Plato envelopes the whole subject in a robe of fancy, and allows his principles to drop out as if by accident.

II. What is the result of recent speculations about the origin and nature of language? Like other modern metaphysical enquiries, they end at last in a statement of facts. But, in order to state or understand the facts, a metaphysical insight seems to be required. There are more things in language than the human mind easily conceives. And many fallacies have to be dispelled, as well as observations made. The true spirit of philosophy or metaphysics can alone charm away metaphysical illusions, which are always reappearing, formerly in the fancies of neoplatonist writers, now in the disguise of experience and common sense. An analogy, a figure of speech, an intelligible theory, a superficial observation of the individual, have often been mistaken for a true account of the origin of language.

Speaking is one of the simplest natural operations, and also the most complex. Nothing would seem to be easier or more trivial than a few words uttered by a child in any language. Yet into the formation of those words have entered causes which the human mind is not capable of calculating. They are a drop or two of the great stream or ocean of speech which has been flowing in all ages. They have been transmitted from one language to another; like the child himself, they go back to the beginnings of the human race. How they originated, who can tell? Nevertheless we can imagine a stage of human society in which the circle of men's minds was narrower and their sympathies and instincts stronger; in which their organs of speech were more flexible, and the sense of hearing finer and more discerning; in which they lived more in company, and after the manner of children were more given to express their feelings; in which 'they moved all together,' like a herd of wild animals, 'when they moved at all.' Among them, as in every society, a particular person would be more sensitive and intelligent

than the rest. Suddenly, on some occasion of interest (at the approach of a wild beast, shall we say?), he first, they following him, utter a cry which resounds through the forest. The cry is almost or quite involuntary, and may be an imitation of the roar of the animal. Thus far we have not speech, but only the inarticulate expression of feeling or emotion in no respect differing from the cries of animals; for they too call to one another and are answered. But now suppose that some one at a distance not only hears the sound, but apprehends the meaning: or we may imagine that the cry is repeated to a member of the society who had been absent; the others act the scene over again when he returns home in the evening. And so the cry becomes a word. The hearer in turn gives back the word to the speaker, who is now aware that he has acquired a new power. Many thousand times he exercises this power; like a child learning to talk, he repeats the same cry again, and again he is answered; he tries experiments with a like result, and the speaker and the hearer rejoice together in their newly-discovered faculty. At first there would be few such cries, and little danger of mistaking or confusing them. For the mind of primitive man had a narrow range of perceptions and feelings; his senses were microscopic; twenty or thirty sounds or gestures would be enough for him, nor would he have any difficulty in finding them. Naturally he broke out into speech—like the young infant he laughed and babbled; but not until there were hearers as well as speakers did language begin. Not the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object, but the interjection or the vocal imitation of the object understood, is the first rudiment of human speech.

After a while the word gathers associations, and has an independent existence. The imitation of the lion's roar calls up the fears and hopes of the chase, which are excited by his appearance. In the moment of hearing the sound, without any appreciable interval, these and other latent experiences wake up in the mind of the hearer. Not only does he receive an impression, but he brings previous knowledge to bear upon that impression. Necessarily the pictorial image becomes less vivid, while the association of the nature and habits of the animal is more distinctly perceived. The picture passes into a symbol, for there would be too many of them and they would crowd the mind; the vocal imitation, too, is always in process of being lost and being renewed, just as the picture is brought back again in the description of the poet. Words now can be used more freely because there are more of them. What was

once an involuntary expression becomes voluntary. Not only can men utter a cry or call, but they can communicate and converse; they can not only use words, but they can even play with them. The word is separated both from the object and from the mind; and slowly nations and individuals attain to a fuller consciousness of themselves.

Parallel with this mental process the articulation of sounds is gradually becoming perfected. The finer sense detects the differences of them, and begins, first to agglomerate, then to distinguish them. Times, persons, places, relations of all kinds, are expressed by modifications of them. The earliest parts of speech, as we may call them by anticipation, like the first utterances of children, probably partook of the nature of interjections and nouns; then came verbs; at length the whole sentence appeared, and rhythm and metre followed. Each stage in the progress of language was accompanied by some corresponding stage in the mind and civilization of man. In time, when the family became a nation, the wild growth of dialects passed into a language. Then arose poetry and literature. We can hardly realize to ourselves how much with each improvement of language the powers of the human mind were enlarged; how the inner world took the place of the outer; how the pictorial or symbolical or analogical word was refined into a notion; how language, fair and large and free, was at last complete.

So we may imagine the speech of man to have begun as with the cries of animals, or the stammering lips of children, and to have attained by degrees the perfection of Homer and Plato. Yet we are far from saying that this or any other theory of language is proved by facts. It is not difficult to form an hypothesis which by a series of imaginary transitions will bridge over the chasm which separates man from the animals. Differences of kind may often be thus resolved into differences of degree. But we must not assume that we have in this way discovered the true account of them. Through what struggles the harmonious use of the organs of speech was acquired; to what extent the conditions of human life were different; how far the genius of individuals may have contributed to the discovery of this as of the other arts, we cannot say: Only we seem to see that language is as much the creation of the ear as of the tongue, and the expression of a movement stirring the hearts not of one man only but of many, 'as the trees of the wood are stirred by the wind.' The theory is consistent or not inconsistent with our own mental

experience, and throws some degree of light upon a dark corner of the human mind.

In the later analysis of language, we trace the opposite and contrasted elements of the individual and nation, of the past and present, of the inward and outward, of the subject and object, of the notional and relational, of the root or unchanging part of the word and of the changing inflexion, of the vowel and the consonant, of quantity and accent, of speech and writing, of poetry and prose. We observe also the reciprocal influence of sounds and conceptions on each other, like the connexion of body and mind; and further remark that although the names of objects were originally proper names, as the grammarian or logician might call them, yet at a later stage they become universal notions, which combine into particulars and individuals, and are taken out of the first rude agglomeration of sounds that they may be replaced in a higher and more logical order. We see that in the simplest sentences are contained grammar and logic—the parts of speech, the Eleatic philosophy and the Kantian categories. So complex is language, and so expressive not only of the meanest wants of man, but of his highest thoughts; so various are the aspects in which it is regarded by us. Then again, when we follow the history of languages, we observe that they are always slowly moving, half dead, half alive, half solid, half fluid; the breath of a moment, yet like the air, continuous in all ages and countries,—like the glacier, too, containing within them a trickling stream which deposits fossil strata. There were happy moments, as we may conjecture, in the lives of nations, at which they came to the birth—as in the golden age of literature, the man and the time seem to conspire; the eloquence of the bard or chief, as in later times the creations of the great writer who is the expression of his age, became impressed on the minds of their countrymen, perhaps in the hour of some crisis of national development—a migration, a conquest, or the like. The picture of the word which was beginning to be lost, is now revived; the sound again echoes to the sense; men find themselves capable not only of expressing more feelings, and describing more objects, but of expressing and describing them better. The world before the flood, that is to say, the world of ten, twenty, a hundred thousand years ago, has passed away and left no sign. But the best conception that we can form of it, though imperfect and uncertain, is gained from the analogy of causes still in action, some powerful and sudden, others working slowly in the course

of infinite ages. Something too may be allowed to 'the persistency of the strongest,' to 'the survival of the fittest,' in this as in the other realms of nature.

These are some of the reflections which the modern philosophy of language suggests to us about the powers of the human mind and the forces and influences by which the efforts of men to utter articulate sounds were inspired. Yet in making these and similar generalizations we may note also dangers to which we are exposed. (1) There is the confusion of ideas with facts—of mere possibilities, and generalities, and modes of conception with actual and definite knowledge. The words 'evolution,' 'birth,' 'law,' 'development,' 'instinct,' 'implicit,' 'explicit,' and the like, have a false clearness or comprehensiveness, which adds nothing to our knowledge. The metaphor of a flower or a tree, or some other work of nature or art, is often in like manner only a pleasing picture. (2) There is the fallacy of resolving the languages which we know into their parts, and then imagining that we can discover the nature of language by reconstructing them. (3) There is the danger of identifying language, not with thoughts but with ideas. (4) There is the error of supposing that the analysis of grammar and logic has always existed, or that their distinctions were familiar to Socrates and Plato. (5) There is the fallacy of exaggerating, and also of diminishing the interval which separates articulate from inarticulate language—the cries of animals from the speech of man—the instinct of animals from the reason of man. (6) There is the danger which besets all enquiries into the early history of man—of interpreting the past by the present, and of substituting the definite and intelligible for the true but dim outline which is the horizon of human knowledge.

The greatest light is thrown upon the nature of language by analogy. We have the analogy of the cries of animals, of the songs of birds ('man, like the nightingale, is a singing bird, but is ever binding up thoughts with musical notes'), of music, of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations in which the linguistic instinct is still undecayed, of ourselves learning to think and speak a new language, of the deaf and dumb who have words without sounds, of the various disorders of speech; and we have the after-growth of mythology, which, like language, is an unconscious creation of the human mind. We can observe the social and collective instincts of animals; and may remark how, when domesticated, they have the power of understanding but not of speaking,

while on the other hand, some birds which are comparatively devoid of intelligence, make a nearer approach to articulate speech. We may note how in the animals there is a want of that sympathy with one another which appears to be the soul of language. We can compare the use of speech with other mental and bodily operations; for speech too is a kind of gesture, and in the child or savage accompanied with gesture. We may observe that the child learns to speak, as he learns to walk or to eat, by a natural impulse; yet in either case not without a power of imitation which is also natural to him—he is taught to read, but he breaks forth spontaneously in speech. We can trace the impulse to bind together the world in ideas beginning in the first efforts to speak and culminating in philosophy. But there remains an element which cannot be explained, or even adequately described. We can understand how man creates or constructs consciously and by design; and see, if we do not understand, how nature, by a law, calls into being an organized structure. But the intermediate organism which stands between man and nature, which is the work of mind yet unconscious, and in which mind and matter seem to meet, and mind unperceived to herself is really limited by all other minds, is neither understood nor seen by us, and is with reluctance admitted to be a fact.

Language is an aspect of man, of nature, and of nations, the transfiguration of the world in thought, the meeting-point of the physical and mental sciences, and also the mirror in which they are reflected, present at every moment to the individual, and yet having a sort of eternal or universal nature. When we analyze our own mental processes, we find words everywhere in every degree of clearness and consistency, fading away in dreams and more like pictures, rapidly succeeding one another in our waking thoughts, attaining a greater distinctness and consecutiveness in speech, and a greater still in writing, taking the place of one another when we try to become emancipated from their influence. For in all processes of the mind which are conscious we are talking to ourselves; the attempt to think without words is a mere illusion,—they are always reappearing when we fix our thoughts. And speech is not a separate faculty, but the expression of all our faculties, to which all our other powers of expression, signs, looks, gestures, lend their aid.

The minds of men are sometimes carried on to think of their lives and of their actions as links in a chain of causes and effects going back to the beginning of time. A few have seemed to lose the sense of their

own individuality in the universal cause or nature. In like manner we might think of the words which we daily use, as derived from the first speech of man, and of all the languages in the world, as the expressions or varieties of a single force or life of language of which the thoughts of men are the accident. Such a conception enables us to grasp the power and wonder of languages, and is very natural to the scientific philologist. For he, like the metaphysician, believes in the reality of that which absorbs his own mind. Nor do we deny the enormous influence which language has exercised over thought. Fixed words, like fixed ideas, have often governed the world. But in such representations we attribute to language too much the nature of a cause, and too little of an effect,—too much of an absolute, too little of a relative character,—too much of an ideal, too little of a matter-of-fact existence.

Or again, we may frame a single abstract notion of language of which all existent languages may be supposed to be the perversion. But we must not conceive that this logical figment had ever a real existence, or is anything more than an effort of the mind to give unity to infinitely various phenomena. There is no abstract language '*in rerum natura*,' any more than there is an abstract tree, but only languages in various stages of growth, maturity, and decay. Nor do other logical distinctions or even grammatical exactly correspond to the facts of language; for they too are attempts to give unity and regularity to a subject which is partly irregular.

We find, however, that there are distinctions of another kind by which this vast field of language admits of being mapped out. There is the distinction between biliteral and triliteral roots, and the various inflexions which accompany them; between the mere mechanical cohesion of sounds or words, and the 'chemical' combination of them into a new word; there is the distinction between languages which have had a free and full development of their organisms, and languages which have been stunted in their growth,—lamed in their hands or feet, and never able to acquire afterwards the powers in which they are deficient; there is the distinction between synthetical languages like Greek and Latin, which have retained their inflexions, and analytical languages like English or French, which have lost them. Innumerable as are the languages and dialects of mankind, there are comparatively few classes to which they can be referred.

Another road through this chaos is provided by the physiology of speech. The organs of language are the same in all mankind, and are only capable of uttering a certain number of sounds. Every man has tongue, teeth, lips, palate, throat, mouth, which he may close or open, and adapt in various ways; making, first, vowels and consonants; and secondly, other classes of letters. The elements of all speech, like the elements of the musical scale, are few and simple, though admitting of infinite gradations and combinations. Whatever slight differences exist in the use or formation of these organs, owing to climate or the sense of euphony or other causes, they are as nothing compared with their agreement. Here then is a real basis of unity in the study of philology, unlike that imaginary abstract unity of which we were just now speaking.

Whether we regard language from the psychological, or historical, or physiological point of view, the materials of our knowledge are inexhaustible. The comparisons of children learning to speak, of barbarous nations, of musical notes, of the cries of animals, of the song of birds, increase our insight into the nature of human speech. Many observations which would otherwise have escaped us are suggested by them. But they do not explain why, in man and in man only, the speaker met with a response from the hearer, and the half articulate sound gradually developed into Sanscrit and Greek. They hardly enable us to approach any nearer the secret of the origin of language, which, like some of the other great secrets of nature,—the origin of birth and death, or of animal life,—remains inviolable. That problem is indissolubly bound up with the origin of man; and if we ever know more of the one, we may expect to know more of the other¹.

¹ Compare W. Humboldt, 'Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues;' M. Müller, 'Lectures on the Science of Language;' Steintal, 'Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft.'

CRATYLUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, HERMOGENES, CRATYLUS.

Steph. *Hermogenes*. SUPPOSE that we make Socrates a party to the
383 argument?

Cratylus. If you please.

Her. I must inform you, Socrates, that Cratylus has been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and not conventional; not articulate sounds which men agree to utter, but that there is a truth or correctness in them, which is the same for Hellenes as for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers 'Yes.' And Socrates? 'Yes.' Then every man's name, as I tell him, is that which he is called. To this he replies—'If all the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would not be your name.' And when I am anxious to have
384 a further explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to imply that he has a notion in his own mind, if he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good, what is your own view of the truth or correctness of names, which I would far sooner hear.

Socrates. Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the knowledge of the good.' And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language—these are his own words—and then I should have been at once able

to answer your question about the correctness of names. But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them. When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;—he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck. But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides.

Her. I have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and others, and cannot convince myself that there is any principle of correctness in names other than convention and agreement; any name which you give, in my judgment, is the right one, and if you change that and give another, the new name is as correct as the old: we frequently change the names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good as the old: for there is no name given to anything by nature; all is convention and habit of the users;—that is my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and learn of Cratylus, or of any one.

Soc. I dare say that you may be right, Hermogenes: let us see;—Your meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which anybody agrees to call it? 385

Her. That is my view.

Soc. Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Well, now, let me take an instance;—suppose that I call a man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the world:—that is your meaning?

Her. Yes, that is my view.

Soc. But how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is in words a true and a false?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. Which is contained in propositions?

Her. To be sure.

Soc. And a true proposition says that which is, and a false proposition says that which is not?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Then in a proposition there is a true and false?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. But is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts untrue?

Her. No; the parts are true as well as the whole.

Soc. Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or every part?

Her. I should say that every part is true.

Soc. Is a proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?

Her. No; that is the smallest.

Soc. Then the name is a part of the true proposition?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Yes, and a true part, as you say.

Her. Yes.

Soc. And is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be true and false?

Her. That is the inference.

Soc. And the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the name?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And will there be as many names of each thing as are given by any one? and will they be true names at the time of giving them?

Her. Yes, Socrates, that is the only correctness of names which I can imagine; I have one name which I give, and you have another which you give—that is all; and in different cities and countries there are different names for the same things; Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes from one another.

Soc. But would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ
386 as the names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of

all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree with him, or would you say that things have a permanent essence of their own?

Her. There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I agree with him at all.

Soc. What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no such thing as a bad man?

Her. No, indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are very bad men, and a good many of them.

Soc. Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?

Her. Not many.

Soc. Still you have found them?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?

Her. Yes; that would be my view.

Soc. But if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some of us foolish?

Her. Impossible.

Soc. But admitting the existence of wisdom and folly, you will allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.

Her. He cannot.

Soc. Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for neither on that view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all.

Her. That is true.

Soc. But if neither is right; and things are not relative to individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according to our fancy, but

they are independent, and maintain to their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.

Her. I think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.

Soc. Does what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or to the actions which proceed from them? Are not actions also a class of being?

Her. Yes, the actions are real as well as the things.

387 *Soc.* Then the actions also are done according to their proper nature, and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail and be of no use at all.

Her. I should say that the natural way is the right way.

Soc. Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the natural instrument.

Her. True.

Soc. And this holds good of all actions?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And speech is a kind of action?

Her. True.

Soc. And will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases? Will not the successful speaker rather be he who speaks in the natural way of speaking, and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural instrument? Any other mode of speaking will result in failure and error.

Her. I quite agree with you.

Soc. And is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men speak.

Her. That is true.

Soc. And if speaking is a sort of action and concerned with acts, is not naming also a sort of action?

Her. True.

Soc. And we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had a special nature of their own?

Her. Precisely.

Soc. Then the argument would lead us to infer that names

ought to be given according to a natural process, and with a proper instrument, and not at our pleasure : in this and no other way shall we name with success.

Her. That seems to me true.

Soc. But again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with something?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or pierced with something?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. And that which has to be named has to be named with something?

Her. That is true.

Soc. What is that with which we pierce?

Her. An awl.

Soc. And with which we weave?

Her. A shuttle.

Soc. And with which we name?

Her. A name.

Soc. Very good : then a name is an instrument?

Her. True.

Soc. Suppose that I ask, 'What sort of instrument is a shuttle?' And you answer, 'A weaving instrument.'

Her. Well.

Soc. And I ask again, 'What do we do when we weave?'—The answer is, that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of instruments in general?

Her. To be sure.

Soc. And now suppose that I ask a similar question about names : will you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do we do when we name?

Her. I cannot answer.

Soc. Do we not give information to one another, and distinguish things according to their natures?

Her. That is very true.

Soc. Then a name is an instrument of teaching and of distin-

guishing natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of the web.

Her. Yes.

Soc. And the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?

Her. Assuredly.

Soc. Then the weaver will use the shuttle well—and well means like a weaver? and the teacher will use the name well—and well means like a teacher?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be using well?

Her. That of the carpenter.

Soc. And is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?

Her. Only the skilled.

Soc. And when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using well?

Her. That of the smith.

Soc. And is every man a smith, or only the skilled?

Her. The skilled only.

Soc. And when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?

Her. There I am puzzled.

Soc. Cannot you tell me who gives us the names which we use?

Her. Indeed I cannot.

Soc. Does not the law seem to you to give us them?

Her. Yes, that is so, I suppose.

Soc. Then the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the legislator?

Her. I agree.

Soc. And is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?

Her. The skilled only.

Soc. Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest.

Her. That is true.

Soc. And how does the legislator make names? and to what does he look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances: to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle?

Does he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a shuttle?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. And suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the form according to which he made the other?

Her. To the latter, I should imagine.

Soc. Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?

Her. I should say 'Yes' to that.

Soc. And whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of garments, thin or thick, of woollen, flaxen, or other material, ought all of them to have the true form of the shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker produces in each case.

Her. Yes.

Soc. And the same holds of other instruments: when a man has discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each work, he must take care to introduce that into the material of which he makes his work, and in the natural form, not in some other which he fancies; for example, he ought to know how to put into iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several works.

Her. Certainly.

Soc. And how to put into wood forms of a shuttle adapted to their works.

Her. True.

Soc. For the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in general.

Her. Yes.

Soc. Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how to put the true natural name of each thing into sounds and syllables, and to make and give all names with a view to the ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the material may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—that makes no difference.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And the legislator, whether he be Hellene or barbarian, is not therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever syllables; this or that country makes no matter.

Her. Quite true.

Soc. But who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to the shuttle, whatever material may be used? the carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them?

Her. I should say, that he who is to use them ought to know, Socrates.

Soc. And who uses the work of the lyre-maker? Will not he be the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who will know also whether the work is being well done or not?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. And who is he?

Her. The player of the lyre.

Soc. And who will direct the shipwright?

Her. The pilot.

Soc. And who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work, and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any other country? Will not the user be the man?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And this is he who knows how to ask questions?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And how to answer them?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a dialectician?

Her. Yes; that would be the name of him.

Soc. Then the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.

Her. True.

Soc. And the work of the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his director if the names are to be rightly given?

Her. That is true.

Soc. Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light

or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which each thing by nature has and is will be able to express the true forms of things in letters and syllables.

Her. I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I should 391 be more readily persuaded, if you would show me what this is which you term the natural fitness of names.

Soc. My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and proposing to share the enquiry with you? But now that you and I have talked over the matter, a step has been gained; for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth, and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.

Her. Very good.

Soc. And what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names? That, if you care to know, is the next question.

Her. But I do care to know.

Soc. Then reflect.

Her. How shall I reflect?

Soc. The true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you must pay them well in money and not merely in thanks; these are the Sophists, of whom your brother, Callias, has—rather dearly—bought the reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your inheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from Protagoras about the fitness of names.

Her. But how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating Protagoras and his truth¹, I were to attach any value to what he and his book affirm!

Soc. Then if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.

Her. And where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he say?

Soc. He often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the

¹ 'Truth' was the title of the book of Protagoras; cp. Theaet. 161 E.

places where he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give to the same things. Does he not in these passages make a remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right and natural names; do you not think so?

Her. Why, of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all. But to what are you referring?

Soc. Do you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a single combat with Hephaestus?

‘Whom,’ as he says, ‘the Gods call Xanthus, and men call Scamander.’

Her. I remember.

39² *Soc.* Well, and about this river—to know that he ought to be called Xanthus and not Scamander—is not that a solemn lesson? Or about the bird which, as he says,

‘The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis:’

to be taught how much more correct the name Chalcis is than the name Cymindis,—do you deem that a light matter? There is also the hill, which

‘Men call Baticia, and the immortals Myrina’s tomb.’

And there are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of Hector’s son, are more within the range of human faculties, as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by correctness may be more readily apprehended in that instance: I dare say that you remember the lines to which I refer.

Her. I do.

Soc. Let me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of the names given to Hector’s son—Astyanax or Scamandrius?

Her. I do not know.

Soc. How would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the unwise are more likely to give correct names?

Her. I should say the wise, of course.

Soc. And are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the wiser?

Her. I should say, the men.

Soc. And Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been given to him by the women.

Her. That may be inferred.

Soc. And must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than their wives?

Her. To be sure.

Soc. Then he must have thought that Astyanax was a more correct name for the boy than Scamandrius?

Her. That is clear.

Soc. And what is the reason of this? Let us consider:—does he not himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,

‘For he alone defended their city and long walls?’

This appears to be a good reason for calling the son of the saviour king of the city which his father was saving, as Homer observes.

Her. I see.

Soc. Why, Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?

Her. No, indeed.

Soc. But tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give 393 Hector a name?

Her. What of that?

Soc. That name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of Astyanax—both are Hellenic; and a king (*ἀναξ*) and a holder (*ἔκτωρ*) have nearly the same meaning, and are both descriptive of a king; for a man is clearly the holder of that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds that. But, perhaps, you do not understand me; and I think that I am very likely mistaken in supposing myself to have found some indication of the opinion of Homer about the correctness of names.

Her. I assure you that I think otherwise, and that I believe you to be on the right track.

Soc. There is reason, I think, in calling the lion’s whelp a lion, and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of the ordi-

nary course of nature, when an animal produces after his kind¹, and not of extraordinary births ;—if, contrary to nature, a horse have a calf, then I should not call that a foal but a calf ; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other things. Do you agree to that ?

Her. Yes, I agree.

Soc. Very good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of the name are the same or not the same, that makes no difference, provided the meaning is retained ; nor does the addition or subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and appears in it.

Her. What do you mean ?

Soc. A very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters themselves, with the exception of the four, ε, υ, ο, ω,—the names of the other letters, whether vowels or consonants, are made up of letters which we attach to them ; but so long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for example, the letter *beta*—the addition of η, τ, α, gives no offence, and does not prevent the whole name from having the value which the legislator intended—so well did he know how to give the letters names.

Her. There is truth in that.

Soc. And may not the same be said of a king ? a king will
394 often be the son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or noble sire ; and similarly the offspring of every kind, in the course of nature, is like the parent, and therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be disguised until they appear different to the ignorant person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same drugs under different disguises of colour and smell, although to the physician, who regards the power of them, they are the same, and he is not put out by the addition ; and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the addition or transposition or subtraction of a letter or two,

¹ Reading οὐ ἄν.

or indeed by the change of all the letters, for this need not interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is the τ , and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in common with the letters of their names has Archepolis (ruler of the city)—and yet the meaning is the same. And there are many other names which just mean 'king.' Again, there are several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader) and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good warrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles (famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others which might be cited, differing in their syllables and letters, but having the same meaning. You admit that?

Her. Yes.

Soc. The same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow in the course of nature?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his father, but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a calf.

Her. Quite true.

Soc. Then the irreligious son of a religious father should be called irreligious?

Her. That is true.

Soc. He should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God), or any of these names: if names are correctly given, his should have an opposite meaning.

Her. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who is rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness and mountain wildness of his hero's nature.

Her. That is very likely, Socrates.

Soc. And his father's name is also according to nature.

Her. That seems to be true.

Soc. Yes, for as is his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon (admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and perse-

vering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by his virtue crowns them; and the proof of this is the continuance of his purpose and of the host at Troy¹. I have told you the meaning of the name Agamemnon; and I think that Atreus is rightly called, for his murder of Chrysippus and his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his reputation; the name is a little altered and disguised so as not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist there is no difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether you think of him as ἀτειρής the stubborn, or as ἄτρεστος the fearless, or as ἀτηρός the destructive one, the name is perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly called Pelops who sees what is near only (ὁ τὰ πέλας ὄρων).

Her. How is that?

Soc. Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought or foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus would entail upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only what was near and immediate,—or in other words, πέλας (near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature, if the traditions about him are true.

Her. And what are the traditions?

Soc. Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life—he ended by being the ruin of his country; and after his death he had the stone suspended over his head in the world below—all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. You might imagine that some person who wanted to call him *ταλάντατος* (the most weighed down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; but this transformation has been produced in the legend by accident. The name of Zeus, 396 who is his alleged father, has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for some call him *Zēna* (Ζήνα), and use the one half, and others call him *Dia* (Δία), and use the other

¹ Or: his long stay in Troy is a sign of the fulness and endurance of his character.

half; the two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express this. For there is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we ought to call him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the God in whom all creatures always have life (*δι' οὗ ζῆν ὑπάρχει πᾶσι*). There is a want of reverence, at first sight, in calling him the son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the meaning of his father's name: *Κρόνος* quasi *Κόρος*, not in the sense of a youth, but signifying *τὸ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀκίρατον τοῦ νοῦ*, the pure and garnished mind. He, as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, who is called *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρᾶν τὰ ἄνω* from looking upwards; and this, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods, —then I might have seen whether this philosophy, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will hold good to the end.

Her. You seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly inspired, and to be uttering oracles.

Soc. Yes, Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a long lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken possession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman power work and finish the investigation of names—that will be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications of this sort.

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Her. With all my heart; for I am very curious to hear the rest of the enquiry about names.

Soc. Then let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any names which witness of themselves that they are not given arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The names

of heroes and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they are often called after ancestors with whose names, as we were saying, they may have no business, or they are the expression of a wish like Eutyichides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think that we had better leave these, for there will be more chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable essences;—there ought to have been more care taken in naming them, and perhaps there may have been some more than human power at work occasionally in giving them names.

Her. I think so, Socrates.

Soc. Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods, and show that they are rightly named Gods?

Her. Yes, that will be well.

Soc. My notion would be something of this sort:—I suspect that the sun, moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and running, from this running nature of them they called them Gods or runners (*θεοὺς θεόκοντας*); and afterwards, when they discovered all the other Gods, they retained the old name. Do you think that likely?

Her. I think that very likely indeed.

Soc. What shall follow the Gods? Must not demons and heroes and men come next?

Her. Let us take demons.

Soc. I wish that you would consider what is the real meaning of this word ‘demons.’ I wonder whether you would think my view right?

Her. Let me hear.

Soc. You know how Hesiod uses the word?

Her. Indeed I do not.

Soc. Do you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who came first?

Her. Yes, I know that.

Soc. He says of them—

‘But now that fate has closed over this race

They are holy demons upon the earth,

Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.’

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Her. What of that?

Soc. What of that! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and I am convinced of this, because he further says that we are the iron race.

Her. That is true.

Soc. And do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him be said to be of that golden race?

Her. Very likely.

Soc. And are not the good wise?

Her. Yes, they are wise.

Soc. And therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them demons, because they were *δαίμονες* (knowing or wise), and in the ancient Attic dialect this is the very form of the word. Now he and other poets say truly, that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion among the dead, and becomes a demon; which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who happens to be a good man is more than human (*δαιμόνιον*) both in life and death, and is rightly called a demon.

Her. I believe that I quite agree with you in that. But what is the meaning of the word 'hero'? (*ἦρως*, in the old writing *ἔρως*.)

Soc. I think that there is no difficulty in explaining that, for the name is not much altered, and signifies that they were born of love.

Her. What do you mean?

Soc. Do you not know that the heroes are demigods?

Her. What then?

Soc. All of them sprang either from the love of a God for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you will see better that the name *heros* is only a slight alteration of *Eros*, from whom the heroes sprang: either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they must have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question (*ἔρωσαν*), for *ἔρειν* is equivalent to *λέγειν*. And therefore, as I was saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and rhetors.

But can you tell me why men are called ἄνθρωποι?—that is more difficult.

Her. No, I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I think that you are the more likely to succeed.

399 *Soc.* That is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.

Her. Of course.

Soc. Your faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful, before to-morrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be. Now, attend to me; and first, remember that we often put in and pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and change the accents. Take, for example, the word Δὲ φίλος; in order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave instead of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes inserted in words, and the acute takes the place of the grave.

Her. That is true.

Soc. The name ἄνθρωπος, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the *a*, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has been changed to a grave.

Her. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say that the word 'man' implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up at what they see, but that man not only sees (ὄπωπε) but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly called ἄνθρωπος, meaning ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπει.

Her. May I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?

Soc. Certainly.

Her. I will take that which appears to me to follow next in order. You know the distinction of soul and body?

Soc. Of course.

Her. Let us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.

Soc. You want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the word ψυχή (soul), and then of the word σῶμα (body)?

Her. Yes.

Soc. If I am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I

should imagine that those who first used the name $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ meant to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life, and gives the power of breath and revival, and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche. But please stay a moment; I fancy that I can discover something which will be more acceptable to the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that ⁴⁰⁰ they will scorn this explanation. What do you say to another?

Her. Let me hear.

Soc. What is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to the entire nature of the body? What is that but the soul?

Her. Just that.

Soc. And do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is the ordering and containing principle of all things?

Her. Yes; I do.

Soc. Then you may well call that power $\phi\upsilon\sigma\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta$ which carries and holds nature, and this may be refined away into $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$.

Her. Certainly; and I think that this is a more scientific derivation.

Soc. True; and yet I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that this is the original meaning.

Her. But what shall we say of the next word?

Soc. You mean $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ (the body).

Her. Yes.

Soc. That may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave ($\sigma\eta\mu\alpha$) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; or again the index of the soul, because the soul indicates ($\sigma\eta\mu\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota$) through the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul is suffering the punishment of sin, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept ($\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$, $\sigma\acute{\omega}\zeta\eta\tau\alpha\iota$), as the name $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ implies, until the penalty is paid; according to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed.

Her. I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus? I should

like to know whether any similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them.

Soc. Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,—that of the Gods we know nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, because we do
401 not know of any other. That, I think, is a very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do that; but we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these names,—in this there can be small blame.

Her. I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to do as you say.

Soc. Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?

Her. Yes, that will be very proper.

Soc. What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?

Her. That is another and certainly a most difficult question.

Soc. My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had something to say.

Her. Well, and what of that?

Soc. They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For example, that which we term *οὐσία* is by some called *ἔστία*, and by others again *ὠσία*. Now that the essence of things should be called *ἔστία*, which is akin to the first of these (*ἔστία*=*ἔστία*), is rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that *ἔστία* which participates in *οὐσία*. For in ancient times we too seem to have said *ἔστία* for *οὐσία*, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to *ἔστία*, which was natural enough if they meant that *ἔστία* was the essence of things. Those again who read *ὠσία* seem to have

inclined to the opinion of Heraclitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore rightly called *ᾠσία*. Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense.

Her. Why, Socrates?

Soc. My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.

Her. Of what nature?

Soc. Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.

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Her. How plausible?

Soc. I fancy to myself Heraclitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke.

Her. How do you mean?

Soc. Heraclitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.

Her. That is true.

Soc. Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed in the doctrine of Heraclitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of

‘Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys.’

And again, Orpheus says, that

‘The fair river of Ocean was the first to marry, and he espoused his sister Tethys, who was his mother’s daughter.’

You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of Heraclitus.

Her. I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.

Soc. Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered (*διαττώμενον ἠθούμενον*) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these two words.

Her. That is ingenious, Socrates.

Soc. To be sure. But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken.

Her. Yes.

Soc. Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.

Her. By all means.

Soc. Poseidon is *ποσιδεσμος*, the chain of the feet; the original inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the ruler of this element Poseidon; the *ε* was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double *λ* and not with a *σ*, meaning that the God knew many things (*πολλὰ εἰδώς*). And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (*σειεω*), and then *π* and *δ* have been added. Pluto gives wealth (*πλοῦτος*), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general use the term as a euphemism for Hades, which their fears lead them erroneously to derive from the invisible (*ἀειδής*).

Her. And what is the true derivation?

Soc. In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to him, my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond.

Her. Why, how is that?

Soc. I will tell you my own view; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? and which confines him more to the same spot,—desire or necessity?

Her. Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.

Soc. And do you not think that many an one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?

Her. There can be no doubt of that.

Soc. And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity?

Her. That is clear.

Soc. And there are many desires?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another?

Her. Certainly not.

Soc. And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants there, and that is why he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great ⁴⁰⁴ deal of philosophy and reflection in that; for in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own far-famed chains.

Her. I think that there is reason in that.

Soc. Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the unseen (*ἀειδὲς*)—far otherwise, but from his knowledge (*εἰδέναι*) of all noble things.

Her. Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Herè, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?

Soc. Demeter is ἡ διδοῦσα μήτηρ, who gives food like a mother; Herè is the lovely one (*ἐρατὴ*)—for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (*ἀήρ*), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if you

repeat the letters of Herè several times over. People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo,—and with as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (*σοφή*); for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (*φερομένων*), that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepaphè (*Φερεπάφα*), or something of that sort, because she touches that which is in motion (*τοῦ φερομένου ἐφαπτομένη*), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name, Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked that?

Her. To be sure I have, and what you say is true.

Soc. But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power of the God.

Her. How is that?

Soc. I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any
405 single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes of the God, touching on and in a manner signifying all four of them,—music, and prophecy, and medicine, and archery.

Her. That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the explanation.

Soc. Say rather an harmonious name, as becoms the God of Harmony. In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities?

Her. Very true.

Soc. Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as

being the physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Ἀπολούων (purifier); or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called Ἀπλῶς, from ἀπλοῦς (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him Ἀπλῶς; also he is ἀεὶ βᾶλλον (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in ἀκόλουθος, and ἄκοιτις, and in many other words the α is supposed to mean 'together,' so the meaning of the name Apollo will be 'moving together,' whether in the so-called poles of heaven, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by a harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move round together, both among Gods and men. And as in the words ἀκόλουθος and ἄκοιτις the α is substituted for an ο, so the name Ἀπόλλων is equivalent to ὁμοπολῶν; only the second λ is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (ἀπολῶν). Now the suspicion of this still haunts the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, which, as 406 I was saying just now¹, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (ἀπλοῦς, ἀεὶ βᾶλλον, ἀπολούων, ὁμοπολῶν). The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical enquiries (μῶσθαι); and Leto is called by this name, because she is such a gentle Goddess, and willing (ἐθελήμων) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as strangers often call her—they seem to imply in this her slowness to anger, and her readiness to forgive and forget (λήθη). Artemis is named from her healthy (ἀρτεμῖς), happy nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (ἀρετή), and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the sexes (τὸν ἄροτον μισήσασα). He who gave the Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.

Her. What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?

Soc. Son of Hipponicus, that is a solemn question; there is a serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names;

¹ Omitting πολύ.

the serious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Διόνυσος is simply διδοὺς οἶνον (giver of wine), Διδόνυσος, as he might be called in fun,—and οἶνος is properly οἰόνους, because wine makes those who drink, think (οἶεσθαι) that they have a mind (νοῦν) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (ἀφρός), may be fairly accepted on the authority of Hesiod.

Her. Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.

Soc. I am not likely to forget them.

Her. No.

Soc. There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene.

Her. What other appellation?

Soc. We call her Pallas.

Her. To be sure.

Soc. And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or any-
407 thing else above the earth or in the hands we call shaking (πάλλειν), or dancing.

Her. That is quite true.

Soc. Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?

Her. Yes; but what do you say of the other name?

Soc. Athene?

Her. Yes.

Soc. That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, I think that the modern interpreters of Homer may assist in explaining the view of the ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athene 'mind' (νοῦς) and 'intelligence' (διάνοια), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her; and indeed calls her by a still higher title, 'divine intelligence' (θεοῦ νόησις), as though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (θεονόα);—using α as a dialectical variety for η, and taking away ι and σ. Perhaps, however, there may be a further explanation; the name θεονόη may mean 'she who knows divine things' (θεῖα νοοῦσα). Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that he wished to identify this

Goddess with moral intelligence (*ἐν ἡθελι νόησιν*), and therefore gave her the name *ἡθουόη*; which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene.

Her. But what do you say of Hephaestus?

Soc. Speak you of the princely lord of light (*φάεος ἵστορα*)?

Her. Surely.

Soc. *Ἡφαιστος* is *Φαῖστος*, and has added the *η* by attraction; that is obvious to anybody.

Her. That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into your head.

Soc. To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares.

Her. What is Ares?

Soc. Ares may be called, if you will, from his manhood (*ἀρρεν*) and manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is the meaning of *ἀρράτος*: this latter is a derivation quite appropriate to the God of war.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds of Euthyphro can prance.

Her. Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know whether there is anything in what Cratylus says.

Soc. I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the interpreter (*ἐρμηθεύς*), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language; as I was telling you, the word *εἶρειν* is expressive of the use of speech, and there is an old Homeric word *ἐμήσατο*, which means 'he contrived;' and out of these two words, *εἶρειν* and *μήσασθαι*, the legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech¹; and we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: 'O my friends,' says he to us, 'seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him *Εἰρέμης*.' And this has been

¹ Omitting τὸ δὲ λέγειν δὴ ἔστω εἶρειν.

improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb 'to tell' (εἶρειν), because she was a messenger.

Her. Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I was no true son of Hermes (Ἑρμογένης), for I am not a good hand at speeches.

Soc. There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son of Hermes.

Her. How do you make that out?

Soc. You are aware that speech signifies all things (πάν), and is always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true and false?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy; for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them.

Her. Very true.

Soc. Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (πάν) and the perpetual revolver (ἀεὶ πολῶν) of all things, is rightly called αἰπόλος (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.

Her. From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods—the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

Soc. You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not refuse.

Her. You will oblige me.

Soc. How would you have me begin? Shall I take the sun first, which you mentioned first?

Her. Very good.

Soc. The origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the
409 Doric form, for the Dorians call him ἄλιος, and this name is given to him because when he rises he gathers (ἀλιζοι) men

together or because he is always rolling in his course (εἰλεῖν ἰὼν) about the earth; or from αἰολεῖν, of which the meaning is the same as ποικίλλειν (to variegate), because he variegates the productions of the earth.

Her. But what is σελήμη (the moon)?

Soc. That name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.

Her. How is that?

Soc. The word seems to forestall his recent discovery, that the moon receives her light from the sun.

Her. Very true.

Soc. The two words σέλας (brightness) and φῶς (light) have the same meaning?

Her. Yes.

Soc. This light about the moon is always new (νέον) and always old (ἔρον), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly. For the sun in his revolution always adds new light, and there is the old light of the previous month.

Her. Very true.

Soc. Many call the moon σελαναία.

Her. True.

Soc. And as she has a light which is always old and always new (ἔρον νέον ἀεὶ), she may very properly have the name σελα-ερονουόαία, and this is hammered into shape and called σελαναία.

Her. A real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you say of the month and the stars?

Soc. Μεῖς (month) is called from μειοῦσθαι (to lessen), because suffering diminution; the name of ἄστρα (stars) seems to be derived from ἀστραπή, which is an improvement on ἀναστρωπή, signifying the upsetting of the eyes (ἀναστρέφειν ὄπα).

Her. What do you say of πῦρ (fire) and ὕδωρ (water)?

Soc. I am at a loss how to explain πῦρ; either the muse of Euthyphro has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in the word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.

Her. What is that?

Soc. I will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you can tell me what is the meaning of the word πῦρ?

Her. Indeed I cannot.

Soc. Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation

of this and several other words?—I believe that they are of foreign origin. For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the dominion of the barbarians, often took words from them.

Her. Well, and what follows from that?

Soc. Why, you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not according to the language from which the words are derived, is rather likely to be at fault.

Her. Yes, certainly.

410 *Soc.* Well then, consider whether this $\pi\tilde{\upsilon}\rho$ is not foreign; for the word is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic tongue, and the Phrygians may be observed to have the same word slightly inflected, just as they have $\tilde{\upsilon}\delta\omega\rho$ and $\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$ (dogs), and many other words.

Her. That is true.

Soc. Any violent interpretations of the words should be avoided; for something to say about them may easily be found. And thus I get rid of $\pi\tilde{\upsilon}\rho$ and $\tilde{\upsilon}\delta\omega\rho$. 'Αἴρ (air), Hermogenes, may be explained as the element which raises ($\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\iota$) things from the earth, or as ever flowing ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ $\acute{\rho}\acute{\epsilon}\tilde{\iota}$), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poet calls the winds 'air-blasts,' and I suppose him to mean by the word 'wind-flux,' 'air-flux,' as you might say, because they are air. Αἰθήρ (aether) I should interpret as $\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\theta\epsilon\acute{\eta}\rho$; this may be correctly said, because this element is always running in a flux about the air ($\acute{\alpha}\epsilon\tilde{\iota}$ $\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\alpha}\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$ $\acute{\rho}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$). The meaning of the word $\gamma\eta$ (earth) comes out better when in the form of $\gamma\alpha\acute{\iota}\alpha$, for the earth may be truly called 'mother' ($\gamma\alpha\acute{\iota}\alpha$ $\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\tau\epsilon\iota\rho\alpha$), as Homer implies when he uses the term $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\acute{\alpha}\alpha\sigma\iota$ for $\gamma\epsilon\gamma\epsilon\nu\eta\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$.

Her. Good.

Soc. What shall we take next?

Her. There are $\delta\tilde{\upsilon}\rho\alpha\iota$ (the seasons), and the two names of the year, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omicron\varsigma$.

Soc. The $\delta\tilde{\upsilon}\rho\alpha\iota$ should be spelt in the old Attic way, if you desire to know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called the $\delta\tilde{\upsilon}\rho\alpha\iota$ because they divide ($\delta\acute{\omicron}\rho\acute{\iota}\zeta\omicron\nu\sigma\iota\nu$) the summers and winters and winds and the fruits of the earth. The words $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\iota\alpha\nu\tau\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omicron\varsigma$ appear to be the same,—'that which brings to

light the plants and growths of the earth in their turn, and passes them in review within itself (*αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐξετάζει*):' this is broken up into two words, *ἐνιαυτὸς* from *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, and *ἔτος* from *ἐτάζει*, just as the original name of Ζεὺς was divided into Ζῆνα and Δία; and the whole proposition means that this power of reviewing from within is one, but has two names, two words *ἔτος* and *ἐνιαυτὸς* being thus formed out of a single proposition.

Her. Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.

Soc. I am run away with.

Her. Very true.

Soc. But not yet at my utmost speed.

Her. I should like very much to know, in the next place, how 411
you would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in those charming words—wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?

Soc. That is a tremendous class of names which you are dis-interring; still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint of heart; and I suppose that I must consider the meaning of wisdom and understanding, and judgment and knowledge, and all those other charming words, as you call them?

Her. Surely, we must not leave off until we find out their meaning.

Soc. By the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into my head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like too many of our modern philosophers, who, in their search after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round, and then they imagine that the world is going round and round and moving anyhow; and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is full of every sort of motion and change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has led me into making this reflection.

Her. How is that, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have been just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things is most surely indicated.

Her. No, indeed, I never thought of it.

Soc. Take the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a name indicative of motion.

Her. What was the name?

Soc. Φρόνησις (wisdom), which may signify φορᾶς καὶ ῥοῦ νόησις (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps φορᾶς ὄνησις (the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with φέρεσθαι (motion); γνώμη (judgment), again, certainly implies the ponderation or consideration (νόμησις) of generation, for to ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would rather, there is νόησις, which is νέου ἔσις (the desire of the new); the word νέος implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express this longing of the soul, for the original name was νεόεσις and not νόησις, but η took the place of a double ε. The word σωφροσύνη is the salvation (σωτηρία) of that wisdom 412 (φρόνησις) which we were just now considering. Ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul which is good for anything follows (ἔπεται) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling behind them; wherefore the word should rather be read as ἐπιστημένη¹, adding an ε. Σύνεσις (understanding) is a kind of conclusion, and is derived from συνιέναι (to go along with), which, like ἐπίστασθαι (to know), implies the progression of the soul in company with the nature of things. Σοφία (wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth; the meaning is, touching the motion or stream of things. You must remember that the poets, when they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion, often use the word ἐσύθη (he rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian who was named Σοῦς (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians signify rapid motion, and the touching (ἐπαφή) of motion is expressed by σοφία, for all things are supposed to be in motion. Good (ἀγαθόν) is the name which is given to the admirable (ἀγαστῶ) in nature; for, although all things move, still there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some slower; but there are some things which are admirable for their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is called ἀγαθόν. Δικαιοσύνη (justice) is clearly δικαίου σύνεσις (understanding of the just); but the actual word δίκαιον is more difficult: men are only agreed to a certain extent

¹ The reading is here uncertain.

about justice, and then they begin to disagree. For those who suppose all things to be in motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power which passes through all this, and is the instrument of creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element; for if it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through the moving universe. And this element, which superintends all things and pierces (*διαῖόν*) all, is rightly called *δίκαιον*; the letter *κ* is only added for the sake of euphony. Thus far, as I was saying, there is a general agreement about the nature of justice; but I, Hermo- 413 genes, being an enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that this is justice and the cause of the world: now a cause is that because of which anything is created; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that justice is so called because partaking of the nature of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he has said, to interrogate him gently: 'Well, my excellent friend,' say I, 'but if all this be true, I still want to know what is justice.' Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me with one derivation after another, and at length they quarrel. For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing (*διαῖόντα*) and burning (*κᾶοντα*) element which is the guardian of nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I am answered by the satirical remark, 'What, is there no justice in the world when the sun is down?' And when I earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest opinion, he says, 'Fire in the abstract;' but this is not very intelligible. Another says, 'No, not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire.' Another man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and passes through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the name, which has led me into this digression, was given for the reasons which I have mentioned.

Her. I think, Socrates, that you are not improvising now; you must have heard this from some one else.

Soc. And not the rest?

Her. Hardly.

Soc. Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making you believe in the originality of the rest. What remains after justice? I do not think that we have as yet discussed courage (*ἀνδρεία*), for injustice (*ἀδικία*), which is obviously nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle (*διαϊόντος*), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of *ἀνδρεία* seems to imply a battle;—this battle is in the world of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only the counterflux (*ἐναντία ῥοή*): if you extract the *δ* from *ἀνδρεία*, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may clearly understand that not the stream opposed to every stream is *ἀνδρεία*, but only to that which
414 is contrary to justice, for otherwise courage would not have been praised. The words *ἄρρην* (male) and *ἄνθρωπος* (man) also contain a similar allusion to the same principle of the upward flux (*τῆ ἄνω ῥοή*). *Γυνή* (woman) I suspect to be the same word as *γονή* (birth): *θηλυ* (female) appears to be derived from *θηλή* (the teat), because the teat is like rain, and makes things have a flourishing look (*τρεθηλέναι*).

Her. That is surely probable.

Soc. Yes; and the very word *θάλλειν* (to flourish) seems to figure the growth of youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of *θεῖν* (running), and *ἄλλεσθαι* (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names generally thought to be of importance, which have still to be explained.

Her. That is true.

Soc. There is the meaning of the word *τέχνη* (art), for example.

Her. Very true.

Soc. That may be identified with *ἐχονόη*, and expresses the possession of mind: you have only to take away the *τ* and insert two *ο*'s, one between the *χ* and *ν*, and another between the *ν* and *η*.

Her. That is a very shabby etymology.

Soc. Yes, my dear friend; but then you know that the original

names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking on and stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share in the change. Take, for example, the word *κάτοπτρον*; why is the letter *ρ* inserted? This must surely be the addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth, but thinks only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often such that at last no human being can possibly make out the original meaning of the word. Another example is the word *σφιγξ*, *σφιγγὸς*, which ought properly to be *φίγξ*, *φιγγὸς*, and there are other examples.

Her. That is quite true, Socrates.

Soc. And yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters which you please, names will be too easily made, and any name may be adapted to any object.

Her. That is true.

Soc. Yes, that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself, should observe the laws of moderation and probability.

Her. That is my desire.

Soc. And mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a precisian, or 'you will unnerve me of my strength'¹. When 415 you have allowed me to add *μηχανή* (contrivance) to *τέχνη* (art) I shall be at the top of my bent, for I conceive *μηχανή* to be a sign of great accomplishment—*ἄνευ*; for *μῆκος* has the meaning of greatness, and these two, *μῆκος* and *ἄνευ*, make up the word *μηχανή*. But, as I was saying, being at the top of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two words *ἀρετή* (virtue) and *κακία* (vice); *ἀρετή* I do not as yet understand, but *κακία* is transparent, and agrees with the principles which preceded, for all things being in a flux (*ιόντων*), *κακία* is *κακῶς ἰόν* (going badly); and this evil motion when existing in the soul has assuredly the general name of *κακία*, or vice. The meaning of *κακῶς ἰέναι* may be further illustrated by the use of *δειλία* (cowardice), which ought to have come after *ἀνδρεία*, but was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which has been passed over. *Δειλία* signifies that the soul is bound with a strong chain (*δεσμὸς*), for *λίαν* means strength, and therefore *δειλία* expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the soul; and *ἀπορία*

¹ Iliad vi. 265.

(difficulty) is an evil of the same nature (from *a* not, and *πορεύεσθαι* to go), like anything else which is an impediment to motion and movement. Then the word *κακία* appears to mean *κακῶς ἵεναι*, or going badly, or limping and halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes filled with vice. And if *κακία* is the name of this sort of thing, *ἀρετή* will be the opposite of this, signifying in the first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called *ἀρετή*, or, more correctly, *ἀειρετιή* (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had another form, *αἰρετιή* (eligible), indicating that nothing is more eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into *ἀρετή*. I daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of mine, but I think that if the previous word *κακία* was right, then *ἀρετή* is also right.

416 *Hcr.* But what is the meaning of *κακόν*, which has indeed played a great part in your etymologies?

Soc. That is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to that ingenious device of mine.

Hcr. What device?

Soc. The device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word also.

Hcr. Very likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these words, and endeavour to see the rationale of *καλόν* and *αἰσχρόν*.

Soc. The meaning of *αἰσχρόν* is evident, being only *ἀεὶ ἴσχυον ῥοῆς* (always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance with our former derivations. For the name-giver was a great enemy to stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name *ἀεισχοροῦν* to that which hindered the flux (*ἀεὶ ἴσχυον ῥοῦν*), and this is now beaten together into *αἰσχρόν*.

Hcr. But what do you say of *καλόν*?

Soc. That is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity, and has been changed by altering *ου* into *ο*.

Hcr. What do you mean?

Soc. This name appears to denote mind.

Hcr. How is that?

Soc. Let me ask you, what is the cause why anything has

a name; is not the principle which imposes the name the cause?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. And must not this be the mind of Gods, or of men, or of both?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Is not mind that which called (καλέσαν) things by their names, and is not mind the beautiful (καλόν)?

Her. That is evident.

Soc. And are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise, and are not other works worthy of blame?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. Physic does the work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a carpenter?

Her. Exactly.

Soc. And the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?

Her. Of course.

Soc. And that principle we affirm to be mind?

Her. Very true.

Soc. Then mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?

Her. That is evident.

Soc. What more names remain to us?

Her. There are the words which are connected with ἀγαθόν and καλόν, such as συμφέρον and λυσιτελοῦν, ὠφέλιμον, κερδαλέον, and their opposites.

Soc. The meaning of συμφέρον (expedient) I think that you may discover for yourself by the light of the previous examples,—for it is a sister word to ἐπιστήμη, meaning just the motion (φορά) of the soul accompanying the world, and things which are done upon this principle are called σύμφορα or συμφέροντα, because they are carried round with the world.

417

Her. That is probable.

Soc. Again, κερδαλέον (gainful) is called from κέρδος (gain), but you must alter the δ into ν if you want to get at the meaning; for this word also signifies good, but in another way; he who gave the name intended to express the power of admixture (κεραννύμενον) and universal penetration in the good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a δ instead of an ν, and so made κέρδος.

Her. Well, but what is *λυσιτελοῦν* (profitable)?

Soc. I suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the profitable the gainful or that which pays (*λύει*) the retailer, but they use the word in the sense of swift. You regard the profitable (*λυσιτελοῦν*), as that which being the swiftest thing in existence, allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end, lets things go again (*λύει*), and makes motion immortal and unceasing: and in this point of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated *λυσιτελοῦν*—being that which looses (*λύον*) the end (*τέλος*) of motion. *ᾠφέλιμον* (the advantageous) is derived from *ὀφέλλειν*, meaning that which creates and increases; this is a common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.

Her. And what do you say of the inopposites?

Soc. Of such as are mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.

Her. Which are they?

Soc. The words *ἀξύμφορον* (inexpedient), *ἀνωφελές* (unprofitable), *ἀλυσιτελές* (unadvantageous), *ἀκερδές* (ungainful).

Her. True.

Soc. But I would rather take the words *βλαβερόν* (harmful), *ζημιώδες* (hurtful).

Her. Good.

Soc. The word *βλαβερόν* is that which is said to hinder or harm (*βλάπτειν*) the stream (*ῥοῦν*); *βλάπτον* is *βουλόμενον ἄπτειν* (seeking to hold or bind); for *ἄπτειν* is the same as *δεῖν*, and *δεῖν* is always a term of censure; *βουλόμενον ἄπτειν ῥοῦν* (wanting to bind the stream), would properly be *βουλαπτεροῦν*, and this, as I imagine, is improved into *βλαβερόν*.

Her. You bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names; and when I hear the word *βουλαπτεροῦν* I cannot help imagining that you are making your mouth into a flute, and puffing away at a prelude to Athene.

418 *Soc.* That is the fault of the name, Hermogenes; not mine.

Her. Very true; but what is the derivation of *ζημιώδες*?

Soc. What is the meaning of *ζημιώδες*?—let me remark, Hermogenes, how right I was in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very slight permutation will sometimes give an entirely

opposite sense; I may instance the word *δέον*, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine fashionable language of modern times has twisted and disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of *δέον*, and also of *ζημιῶδες*, which in the old language is clearly indicated.

Her. What do you mean?

Soc. I will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers loved the sounds *ι* and *δ*, especially the women, who are most conservative of the ancient language, but now they change *ι* into *η* or *ε*, and *δ* into *ζ*; this is supposed to increase the grandeur of the sound.

Her. How do you mean?

Soc. For example, in very ancient times they called the day either *ἰμέρα* or *έμέρα*, which is called by us *ἡμέρα*.

Her. That is true.

Soc. Do you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention of the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men long for (*ἰμέρουσι*) and love the light coming after the darkness, thence called *ἰμέρα* (from *ἔμερος*, desire.) But now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the meaning, although some are of opinion that the day is called *ἡμέρα*, because making things gentle (*ἡμερα*).

Her. That is my view.

Soc. And do you know that the ancients said *δυογόν* and not *ζυγόν*?

Her. Very true.

Soc. And *ζυγόν* (yoke) has no meaning, but the word *δυογόν* is very expressive of the binding of two together (*δύειν ἀγωγῆ*) for the purpose of drawing;—this has been changed into *ζυγόν*, and there are many other examples of similar changes.

Her. There are.

Soc. Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that the word *δέον* (obligation) has a meaning which is the opposite of all the other appellations of good; for *δέον* is here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, the chain (*δεσμός*) or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of *βλαβερόν*.

Her. Yes, Socrates, and that is true.

Soc. Not if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely
 419 to be the correct one, and read διὸν instead of δέον; if you convert the ε into an ι after the old fashion, this word will then agree with other words meaning good; for διὸν, not δέον, signifies the good, and is a term of praise; and the author of names has not fallen into any contradiction, but in all these various appellations, δέον (obligatory), ὠφέλιμον (advantageous), λυσιτελοῦν (profitable), κερδαλέον (gainful), ἀγαθόν (good), συμφέρον (expedient), εὖπορον (plenteous), the same conception is implied of the ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised, and the restraining and binding principle which is censured. And this is further illustrated by the word ζημιώδης (hurtful), which if the ζ is only changed into δ as in the ancient language, becomes δημιώδης; and this name, as you will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (δοῦντι ἰόν).

Her. What do you say of ἡδονή (pleasure), λύπη (pain), ἐπιθυμία (desire), and the like, Socrates?

Soc. I do not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty about them—ἡδονή is ἡ ὄνησις, the action which tends to advantage; and the original form may be supposed to have been ἡονή, but this has been altered by the insertion of the δ. Λύπη appears to be derived from the relaxation (λύειν) which the body feels when in sorrow; ἀνία (trouble) is the hindrance of motion (α and ἰέναι); ἀλγηδών (distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which is derived from ἀλγευὸς (grievous); ὀδύνη (grief) is called from the putting on (ἔνδυσις) sorrow; in ἀχθηδών (vexation) the word too labours, as any one may see; χαρὰ (joy) is the very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (χέω); τερπνόν (delightful) is so called from the breath creeping (ἔρπον) through the soul, which may be likened to a breath, and is properly ἔρπνοῦν, but has been altered by time into τερπνόν; εὐφροσύνη (cheerfulness) and ἐπιθυμία explain themselves; the former, which ought to be εὐφροσύνη and has been changed into εὐφροσύνη, is named, as every one may see, from the soul moving (φέρεσθαι) in harmony with nature; ἐπιθυμία is really ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἴουσα δύναμις, the power which enters into the soul; θυμὸς (passion) is called from the rushing (θύσεως) and boiling of the soul; ἕμερος (desire) denotes the stream (ρόυς) which most draws the soul διὰ τὴν ἔσιν τῆς ροῆς—because flowing with desire (ἕμερος) and expresses a

longing after things and violent attraction of the soul to them, 420 and is termed *ἕμερος* from possessing this power; *πόθος* (longing) is expressive of the desire of that which is not present but absent, and in another place (*πov*); this is the reason why the name *πόθος* is applied to things absent, as *ἕμερος* is to things present; *ἔρως* (love) is so called because flowing in (*ἐσρῶν*) from without; the stream is not inherent, but is an influence introduced through the eyes, and from flowing in was called *ἔσρος* (influx) in the old time when they used *ο* for *ω*, and is called *ἔρως*, now that *ω* is substituted for *ο*. But why do you not give me another word?

Her. What do you think of *δόξα* (opinion), and that class of words?

Soc. *Δόξα* is either derived from *δίωξις* (pursuit), and expresses the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge, or from the shooting of a bow (*τόξον*); the latter is more likely, and is confirmed by *οἴησις* (thinking), which is only *οἴσις* (moving), and implies the movement of the soul to the essential nature of each thing—just as *βουλή* (counsel) has to do with shooting (*βολή*); and *βούλεσθαι* (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating—all these words seem to follow *δόξα*, and all involve the idea of shooting, just as *ἀβουλία*, absence of counsel, on the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or aim, or proposal, or object.

Her. You are quickening your pace now, Socrates.

Soc. Why yes, the end I now dedicate to ¹ God, not, however, until I have explained *ἀνάγκη* (necessity), which ought to come next, and *ἐκούσιον* (the voluntary). *Ἐκούσιον* is certainly the yielding (*εἶκον*) and unresisting—the notion implied is yielding and not opposing, yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion which is in accordance with our will; but the necessary and resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion—and this is the derivation of the word *ἀναγκαῖον* (necessary) *ἀν' ἄγκη ἰδόν*, going through a ravine. But while my strength lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere with your questions.

¹ Reading θεῶ.

Her. Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, 421 such as ἀλήθεια (truth) and ψεῦδος (falsehood) and ὄν (being), not forgetting to enquire why the word ὄνομα (name), which is the theme of our discussion, has this name of ὄνομα.

Soc. You know the word μαίεσθαι (to seek)?

Her. Yes ;—meaning the same as ζητεῖν (to enquire).

Soc. The word ὄνομα seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying ὄν οὐ ζήτημα (that this is in reality that which is being sought); as is still more obvious in ὀνομαστὸν (notable), which states in so many words that real existence is that for which there is a search (ὄν οὐ μάσμα); ἀλήθεια is also an agglomeration of θεία ἄλη (divine wandering), implying the divine motion of existence; ψεῦδος (falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced inaction, which he compares to sleep (εὔδειν); but the original meaning of the word is disguised by the addition of ψ; ὄν and οὐσία are ἰόν with an ι broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for being (ὄν) is also moving (ἰόν), and the same may be said of not being, which is likewise called not going (οὐκίον or οὐκὶ ὄν=οὐκ ἰόν).

Her. You have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some one were to say to you, what is the word ἰόν, and what are ῥέον and δοῦν?—show me their fitness.

Soc. You mean to say, how should I answer him?

Her. Yes.

Soc. One way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already suggested.

Her. What way?

Soc. To say that names which we do not understand are of foreign origin—this is very likely the true answer, and some of them may be foreign words; but also the original forms may have been lost in the lapse of ages; names have been so twisted in all manner of ways, that I should not be surprised if the old language were to appear to us now to be quite like a barbarous tongue.

Her. Very likely.

Soc. Yes, very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember, that if a person go on analysing names into words, and

enquiring also into the elements out of which the words are formed, and is always repeating his question, he who has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in despair.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And at what point ought he to lose heart and give up ⁴²² the enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which are the elements of all other names and sentences; for these cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? The word ἀγαθόν (good), for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of ἀγαρός (admirable) and θοός (swift). And probably θοός is made up of other elements, and these again of others. But if we take a word which is incapable of further resolution, then we shall be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary element, which need not be resolved any further.

Her. I believe that to be true.

Soc. And suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn out to be primary elements, then their truth or law must be examined according to some new method.

Her. That is very likely.

Soc. Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true, then I shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of primary names.

Her. Let me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.

Soc. I think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary, when regarded simply as names.

Her. Certainly.

Soc. All the names that we have been explaining were intended to indicate the nature of things.

Her. Of course.

Soc. And that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the secondary names, is implied in their being names.

Her. Surely.

Soc. But the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from the primary.

Her. That is evident.

Soc. Very good; but then how do the primary names which precede analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can

be shown ; which they must do, if they are to be real names? And here I will ask you a question : Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another, should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the rest of the body?

Her. There would be no choice, Socrates.

423 *Soc.* We should imitate the nature of the thing ; the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness ; heaviness and downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground ; the running of a horse, or any other animal, would be expressed by the most nearly similar gestures of our own frame.

Her. I do not see that we could do anything else.

Soc. We could not ; for by bodily imitation only can the body ever express anything.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or tongue, or mouth, the expression is simply their imitation of that which we want to express.

Her. That, I think, must be acknowledged.

Soc. Then a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator names or imitates?

Her. That, I think, is true.

Soc. Nay, my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached the truth as yet.

Her. Why not?

Soc. Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals, name that which they imitate.

Her. That is true.

Soc. Then could I have been right in what I was saying?

Her. In my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates, what sort of an imitation is a name?

Soc. In the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation, although that is also vocal ; nor, again, an imitation of that which music imitates ; that, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the matter thus : all objects have sound and figure, and many have colour.

Her. Certainly.

Soc. But the art of naming is not to be supposed to have anything to do with those forms of imitation ; the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing.

Her. True.

Soc. Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there is a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to have an essence?

Her. That is true.

Soc. Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing in letters and syllables, would he not express the nature of each thing?

Her. Certainly he would.

Soc. The musician and the painter were the two names which you gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?

Her. I imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of whom we are in search.

Soc. If this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to consider the names ῥοή (stream), λέγειν (to go), στήσις (retention), about which you were asking; and we may see whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in letters and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or not.

Her. Very good.

Soc. But are these the only primary names, or are there others?

Her. There must be others.

Soc. Yes, that I should expect. But how shall we analyse them, and where does the imitator begin? Imitation of the essence is made by syllables and letters; ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the powers of single elements, and then of compounds, and then, and not until then, proceed to the consideration of rhythms?

Her. Yes.

Soc. Must we not begin in the same way with letters; first separating the vowels into classes, and then the consonants and mutes, according to the received distinctions of the learned; also the semi-vowels, which are not vowels, neither are they

mutes ; and the different classes of the vowels themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of things, we shall give them names, and see whether, as in the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may be all referred¹ ; and hence we shall see their natures, and see, too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the letters ; and when we have well considered all this, we shall know how to apply them—whether one letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to be an admixture of several of them ; just as in painting the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh colour or anything of that kind—he uses his colours as his figures appear to require them ; and so, too, we shall apply letters to the expression of objects, either single letters when required, or several letters ; and then we shall form syllables, as they are called, and from
 425 syllables make nouns and verbs ; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole ; and as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make speech by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or by some art or other. Not that I am literally speaking of ourselves, but I was carried away—meaning to say that this was the way in which the ancients formed language, and what they put together we must take to pieces in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the whole subject ; and we must see whether the primary, and also whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for if they are not, the composition of them, my dear Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong direction.

Her. That, Socrates, I can quite believe.

Soc. Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse them in this way ? for I am certain that I should not.

Her. Much less am I likely to be able.

Soc. Shall we leave them, then ? or shall we seek to discover, if we can, something about them, according to the measure of our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of the

¹ The text is here uncertain ; the most probable meaning has been followed. Cf. Phaedrus, 271.

Gods, that we know nothing of the truth about them, and do but attain conjecture of human notions of them. And in this present enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that the higher method is the one which we or others who would analyse language to any purpose must follow; but under the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can. What do you think?

Her. I very much approve.

Soc. That objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but cannot be avoided—there is no better principle to which we can look for the truth of first names. Deprived of this, we must have recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets, who in any perplexity have their gods waiting in the air; and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by saying that ‘the Gods gave the first names, and therefore they are right.’ This will be the best contrivance, or perhaps that other notion may be even better still, of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians are older than we are; or we may say that antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same sort of 426 excuse as the last; for all these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons. And yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance of secondary words; for they can only be explained by the primary. Clearly then the professor of languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he will only talk nonsense about the rest. Do you not suppose this to be true?

Her. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. My first notions of original names are truly wild and ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in return anything better which you may have.

Her. Fear not; I will do my best.

Soc. In the first place, the letter ρ appears to me to be the general instrument expressing all motion ($\kappaίνησις$). But I have not yet explained the meaning of this latter word, which is just $\dot{\iota}εσις$ (going); for the letter η was not in use among the ancients, who only employed ϵ ; and the root is $\kappaίειν$, which is a dialectical

form, the same as *ίναί*. And the old word *κίνησις* will be correctly given as *ίεσις* in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign root *κίειν*, and allowing for the change of the *η* and the insertion of the *ν*, we have *κίνησις*, which should have been *κιένησις* or *είσις*; and *στάσις* is the negative of *ίναί* (or *είσις*), and has been improved into *στάσις*. Now the letter *ρ*, as I was saying, appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for the expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter for this purpose: for example, in the actual words *ρῆίν* and *ρόη* he represents motion by *ρ*; also in the words *τρόμος* (trembling), *τραχύς* (rugged); and again, in words such as *θραύειν* (crush), *κρούειν* (strike), *ἐρείκειν* (bruise), *θρύπτειν* (break), *κερματίζειν* (crumble), *ῥυμβεῖν* (whirl): of all these sorts of movements he generally finds an expression in the letter R, because, as I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this letter, which he therefore used in order to express motion, just as he used *ι* to express the subtle elements which pass through

427 all things. This is why he uses the letter *ι* as imitative of motion, *ίναί*, *ίεσθαι*. And there is another class of letters, *φ*, *ψ*, *σ* and *ζ*, of which the pronunciation is accompanied by great expenditure of breath; these are used in the imitation of such notions as *ψυχρόν* (shivering), *ζέον* (seething), *σειέσθαι* (to be shaken), *σεισμός* (shock), and are also introduced by the imposer of names whenever he wants to imitate what is windy. He seems to have thought that the closing and pressure of the tongue in the utterance of *δ* and *τ* was expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further observed the liquid movement of *λ*, in the pronunciation of which the tongue slips, and in this he found the expression of smoothness, as in *λείος* (level), and in the word *όλισθάνειν* (to slip) itself, *λιπαρόν* (sleek), *κολλῶδες* (gluey), and the like; the heavier sound of *γ* detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion of a glutinous clammy nature, as in *γλίσχυρος*, *γλυκὺς*, *γλοιῶδες*. The *ν* he observed to be sounded from within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness; hence he introduced the sound in *ἐνδόν* and *ἐντός*: *α* he assigned to the expression of size, and *η* of length, because they are great letters: *ο* was the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of *ο* mixed up

in the word γογγύλον (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say.

Her. But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what this fitness is, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you.

Crat. Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all.

Her. No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, ⁴²⁸ 'to add little to little' is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you can do any good at all, however small, take a little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you.

Soc. I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and myself have worked out, and therefore I should like to hear yours, which I daresay is far better, and which, if better, I shall gladly receive. For you have evidently reflected on these matters, and have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may add me to the number of your disciples.

Crat. You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have attended to these matters, and possibly I might even turn you into a disciple. But I fear that the converse is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in the 'Prayers' says to Ajax,—

'Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, king of men,
You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.'

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give

answers much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.

Soc. Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom ; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying ? for there is nothing worse than self-deception—when the deceiver is always at home and always with you—that is indeed terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to ‘look before me and behind me,’ in the words of the aforesaid Homer. Have we not been saying that the true name indicates the nature of the thing :—is that acknowledged ?

Crat. Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite true.

Soc. Names, then, are given in order to instruct ?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. And naming is an art, and has artificers ?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And who are they ?

429 *Crat.* The legislators, of whom you spoke at first.

Soc. And does this art grow up among men like other arts ? Let me explain what I mean : of painters, some are better and some worse ?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse execute them worse ; and of builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse.

Crat. True.

Soc. And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse ?

Crat. No, I do not agree with you in thinking that.

Soc. Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse ?

Crat. No, indeed.

Soc. Or that one name is better than another ?

Crat. Certainly not.

Soc. Then all names are rightly imposed ?

Crat. Yes, if they are names at all.

Soc. Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before:—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all?

Crat. I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really that of somebody else, who has the nature which answers to the name.

Soc. And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not.

Crat. What do you mean?

Soc. Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For to that I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.

Crat. Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?—say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not?

Soc. That, my friend, is an argument which is too subtle for me at my age. But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said?

Crat. Neither spoken nor said.

Soc. Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: 'Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion'—these words, whether spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all?

Crat. In my opinion, Socrates, the speaker would only be talking nonsense.

Soc. Well, but that will be quite enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense would be true or false, or partly true and partly false:—that is all which I want to know.

Crat. I should say that the motion of his lips would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot.

Soc. But let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a meeting point, for you would admit that the name is not the same as the thing named?

Crat. I should.

Soc. And would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. And you would say that pictures are also imitations of things, but in another way?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. I daresay that you may be right, and that I do not rightly understand you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I mean both pictures or words) are not equally attributable and applicable to the things imitated.

Crat. They are.

Soc. First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the woman; and so on?

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. And conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the woman, and of the woman to the man?

Crat. That is true.

Soc. And are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?

Crat. Only the first.

Soc. That is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each that which belongs to them and is like them?

Crat. That is my view.

Soc. Now then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a good understanding about the argument, let me state my view to you: the first mode of assignment, whether applied to figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in the case of names, false as well as wrong.

Crat. That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they may be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names—they must be always right.

Soc. Why, what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to him, 'This is your picture,' showing him his own likeness, or perhaps the likeness of a woman; and when I say 'show,' I mean bring before the sense of sight.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. And may I not go to him again, and say, 'This is your name'?—for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not say to him—'This is your name'? and may I not then bring 431 to his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say, 'This is a man;' or of a female of the human species, when I say, 'This is a woman,' as the case may be? Is not all that quite possible?

Crat. I would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say, Granted.

Soc. That is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as pictures to objects, the right assignment of them may be said to be truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may also be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of them. What do you say, Cratylus?

Crat. I agree; and think that what you say is very good.

Soc. And further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and figures, or you may not give them all—some may be wanting; or there may be too many or too much of them? Is not that true?

Crat. Yes; that is true.

Soc. And he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but not a good one.

Crat. Yes.

Soc. In like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will produce a good image, or in other words a name; but if he subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well and others ill made.

Crat. That is true.

Soc. Then the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad;—that is also true?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And this artist of names is called the legislator?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Then like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be bad: there can be no mistake about that, assuming our previous admission.

Crat. Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you see, is different; for when by the help of grammar we assign the
 432 letters α or β , or any other letters to a certain name, then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name which is written is not only written wrongly, but not written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than a name.

Soc. But I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.

Crat. How do you mean?

Soc. I believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example, the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be added or subtracted, and so of any other number: but this does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything which is represented under an image. I should say rather that the image, if expressing in every point the entire reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects: one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses?

Crat. I should say that there were two Cratyluses.

Soc. Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent?

Crat. Yes, I see.

Soc. But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the realities.

Crat. That is true.

Soc. Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same as the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance 433 of the names of the letters.

Crat. Yes, I remember.

Soc. Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;—well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, or truth will say ‘Too late’ to us as to the belated traveller in Aegina, and at things we shall never arrive; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be inconsistent with yourself.

Crat. I quite acknowledge, Socrates, the truth of what you say, which is very reasonable.

Soc. Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And the proper letters are those which are like the things?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or there

would be no likeness; but there is likewise a part which is improper and spoils the formation of the word: you would admit that?

Crat. There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all.

Soc. Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?

Crat. Yes, I admit that.

Soc. But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived?

Crat. Yes, I do.

Soc. Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call small great and great small—that, as they say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you prefer?

434 *Crat.* There is the most utter and entire difference, Socrates, between representation by likeness and representation by any chance sign.

Soc. Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could any one ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed?

Crat. Impossible.

Soc. No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore a resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the original elements are letters?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter ρ is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so?

Crat. I should say that you were right.

Soc. And that λ was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like?

Crat. Right in that too.

Soc. And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us *σκληρότης*, is by the Eretrians called *σκληρότηρ*.

Crat. Very true.

Soc. But are the letters ρ and σ equivalents; and is there the same significance to them in the termination ρ , which there is to us in σ , or is there no significance to one of us?

Crat. I should say that there is a significance to both of us.

Soc. In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?

Crat. In as far as they are like.

Soc. Are they altogether alike?

Crat. Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.

Soc. And what do you say of the insertion of the λ ? for that is expressive not of hardness but of softness.

Crat. Why, perhaps that is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and should be altered into ρ , as you were saying to Hermogenes, and in my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion.

Soc. Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I say *σκληρὸς* (hard), you know what I mean.

Crat. Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.

Soc. And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: that is what you are maintaining?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. But if when I speak you know my meaning, that is an indication given by me to you?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And yet this indication of my meaning may proceed not only from like, but from unlike, as in the instance of the λ

in *σκληρότης*. But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words is good by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed about this, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names for all the numbers, unless you allow that which you term convention and agreement to be in some way concerned with the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; but the force of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a mean thing; and the mechanical aid of convention must be further employed to make names correct; for I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, that would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite of this is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them?

Crat. The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by them.

Soc. I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so is also the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things.

Crat. That is exactly what I mean.

Soc. But let us consider what is the nature of this information about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say?

436 *Crat.* I believe that it is the only and the best sort of information about them, and that there can be no other.

Soc. But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers the names discovers also the things; or is there one mode of enquiry and discovery, and of instruction another?

Crat. I certainly believe that there is one method of enquiry and discovery, and of instruction.

Soc. Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?

Crat. How is that?

Soc. Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified—you would allow that?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, what will be the situation of us who follow him? Shall we not be deceived by him?

Crat. But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof is—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all words have a common character and purpose?

Soc. But that, friend Cratylus, is no defence of him. For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first principles:—are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has sifted them all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion, and progress, and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them?

Crat. Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.

437 *Soc.* Let us revert to ἐπιστήμη (knowledge), and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the ε (cp. 412 A.), but make an insertion of an ι instead of an ε (not πιστήμη, but ἐπιστήμη). Take another example: βέβαιον (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word ἱστορία (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (ἱστάναι) of the stream; and the word πιστὸν (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then, again, μνήμη (memory), as one may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as ἀμαρτία and συμφορὰ, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as σύνεσις and ἐπιστήμη and other words which have a good sense (cp. δμαρτεῖν, συνιέναι, ἔπεσθαι, συμφέρεσθαι); and much the same may be said of ἀμαθία and ἀκολασία, for ἀμαθία may be explained as ἡ ἄμα θεῶ ἰόντος πορεία, and ἀκολασία as ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασι. Thus the names which, as we imagine, have the worst sense, will turn out to be like those which have the best. And I have no doubt that, if you were to take the trouble, you might find many other examples which would lead to the inference that the giver of names meant to imply, not that things were in motion or progress, but that they were at rest, which is the opposite of motion.

Crat. Yes, Socrates; but observe that the greater number of words express motion.

Soc. What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are to be true ones?

Crat. No; that is not reasonable.

Soc. Certainly not. Let us, then, have done with this, and proceed to another question about which I should like to know whether you agree with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator?

Crat. Quite true.

Soc. Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the

givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named?

Crat. I imagine, Socrates, that they must have known.

Soc. Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been 438 ignorant.

Crat. I should say not.

Soc. Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion?

Crat. That I am.

Soc. And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named?

Crat. I should.

Soc. But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given? For, as we maintain, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either by learning their names of others or discovering them ourselves.

Crat. I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.

Soc. But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them?

Crat. I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which are thus given are necessarily their true names.

Soc. Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken?

Crat. But I do not suppose that he did make both of them.

Soc. And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? That is a point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them.

Crat. No; that ought not to be the way, Socrates.

Soc. But if this is a battle of names, and some of them are

asserting that they are like the truth, and others that *they* are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things.

Crat. I agree.

Soc. But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names?

Crat. Clearly.

Soc. But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them must signify something other and different from them.

Crat. That, as I think, is true.

439 *Soc.* Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name?

Crat. Yes.

Soc. Then, supposing that you can learn things in one or two ways—either through the medium of names, or through the things themselves—which is likely to be the nobler and clearer way; to learn of the image whether the truth is fairly imitated, or to learn of the truth whether the image is rightly executed?

Crat. I should say that we certainly ought to learn of the truth.

Soc. How real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the knowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No; they must be studied and investigated in themselves.

Crat. That is evident, Socrates.

Soc. There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all tending in the same direction. I do not deny that the givers of names did really give them under the idea that all things were in motion and flux, which was their sincere but, as I think,

mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus, about which I often dream, and should like to ask your opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute beauty or good, or any other absolute existence?

Crat. Certainly, Socrates, I think that there is.

Soc. Then let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is fair, or anything of that sort, or whether all is in a flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is not always beautiful.

Crat. Certainly.

Soc. And can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing away, and is first this and then that; must not the same thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our mouths?

Crat. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Then how can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? for obviously things which are the same cannot change while they remain the same; and if they are always in the same state and the same, and never change their original form, they can never change or be moved.

Crat. Certainly they cannot.

Soc. Nor yet can they be known by any one; for at the mo- 440
ment that the observer approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you cannot get any further in knowing their nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no state.

Crat. True.

Soc. Nor can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding; for knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge without continuing always to abide and exist. But if the very nature of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be no knowledge; and if the transition is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, and, according to this view, there will be no one to know and nothing to be known: but if that which knows and that which is known exists ever, and the beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist, then I do not think that they can be in a pro-

cess or flux, as we were just now supposing. Whether there is this eternal nature in things, or whether the truth is what Heraclitus and his followers and many others say, is a question hard to determine; and no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality; he will not believe that all things leak like a pot, or that the world is a man who has a running at the nose. This may be true, Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue; and therefore I would not have you be too easily persuaded of it. Reflect well and manfully now in the days of your youth, which is the time of learning; and when you have found the truth, come and tell me.

Crat. I will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates, that I have been considering the matter already, and the result of a great deal of trouble and consideration is that I incline to Heraclitus.

Soc. Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall give me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.

Crat. Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue to think about these things yourself.

GORGIAS.

INTRODUCTION.

IN several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus (177 c), that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Cp. Introduction to the Phaedrus.)

Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the very slightest threads; and this has led to opposite and contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most various results. The value and use of the method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. Secondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may readily admit that the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or

the intellectual antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to find them equally in all the dialogues.

There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural form and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and lose the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great works receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to the indications of the text.

Like the *Phaedrus*, the *Gorgias* has puzzled students of Plato by the appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric much higher themes are introduced; the world is convinced of falsehood; and the argument expands into a general view of the good and evil of man. First, after an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound definition of his art from Gorgias, we begin by imagining a universal art of flattery or simulation; this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life which he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at last triumphs, if not in this world, at any rate in another. These two aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of the dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the forms of true and false art. In the development of this opposition there arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in general, ideals as they may be more worthily called): (1) that to do is worse than to suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not what they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain, and

by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class of flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the judgment-seat of the gods below.

The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and the form and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. In the first division the question is asked—What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, for Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is transferred to the hands of the younger Polus, who rushes to the defence of his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. Socrates denies that they have any real power, and this leads to the three paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, Polus is at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue closes. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a lower—that which makes the people better, and that which only flatters them, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric.

The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts which are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain dignity, and is

treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has been teaching rhetoric all his life long, he is still incapable of defining his own art. When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates' manner of approaching a question; he is quite 'one of Socrates' sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,' and very eager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything and know nothing.

Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway 'colt,' as Socrates describes him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the pretext that he was tired, and avails himself of the earliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on rhetoric (462 C), and is again mentioned in the *Phaedrus* (267 B), as the inventor of balanced or double forms of speech (cp. 448 C, 467 C; *Sym.* 185 C). At first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon restored to good humour, and compelled to assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of the question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as they appear to him, of Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of Archelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. When the argument with him has fairly run out,

Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of society are upside down. In him another type of character is represented; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be described in modern

language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of power and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the interests of morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like Thrāsymachus in the Republic, though he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains that might is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in this he is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of the Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as an excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind as he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a violation of the order of nature, which intended that the stronger should govern the weaker (cp. Rep. 358-360). Like other men of the world who are of a speculative turn of mind, he generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily brought down his principles to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with distinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which he makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the argument. Like Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the world; the Athenian statesmen of a former generation, who showed no weakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has developed to the utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government of others. Had Critias been the name instead of Calicles, about whom we know nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed to reflect the history of his life.

And now the combat deepens. In Calicles, far more than in any sophist or rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which Socrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many contending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he describes them in the Republic, are the imitators rather than the authors, being themselves carried away by the great tide of public opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance, with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his personal vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as Chaerephon remarks. Calicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is irritated, the

more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. A repartee of his which appears to have been really made to the 'omniscient' Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon (*Mem.* IV. 4, 6, 10), is introduced (490 E). He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being 'as long as he pleases,' or 'as short as he pleases' (cp. *Protag.* 336 D). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is scandalized (p. 494) that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be stated in plain terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to preserve the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad sense of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself with the people, he partially recognises the truth of his words.

The Socrates of the *Gorgias* may be compared with the Socrates of the *Protagoras* and *Meno*. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the Sophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by that of his opponents; the least forwardness or egotism on their part is met by a corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak, for philosophy will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more ironical and provoking than in any other of Plato's writings: for he is 'fooled to the top of his bent' by the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also more deeply in earnest. He rises higher than even in the *Phaedo* and *Crito*: at first enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust and dialectics, he ends by losing his method, his life, himself, in them. As in the *Protagoras* and *Phaedrus*, throwing aside the veil of irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his adversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of his own fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to war with the whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will be condemned. But he will be justified in the world below. Then the position of himself and Callicles will be reversed; all those things unfit for ears polite which Callicles has prophesied as likely to happen to him in this

life, the insulting language, the box on the ears, will then fall upon himself. (Compare Rep. 613, D, E, and the similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in the Theaetetus, 173-176.)

There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be taken (473 E). This is said to have happened 'last year' (B.C. 406), and therefore the dramatic date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would already have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely reconcilable with another indication of time, viz. the 'recent' usurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413 (470 D); and still less with the 'recent' death (503 B) of Pericles, who really died twenty-four years previously (429 B.C.) and is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past age (cp. 517 A); or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as a living witness (472 A, B). But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the dialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his commentators.

The conclusion of the dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly characteristic declaration of Socrates (p. 509 A) that he is ignorant of the true nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time that no one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively Socratic dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the Apology, nor in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this 'among the multitude of questions' which agitate human life 'as the principle which alone remains unshaken' (527 B). He does not insist here, any more than in the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is worse than suffering, that a man should be rather than seem; for the next best thing to a man's being just is that he should be corrected and become just; also that he should avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of others; and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the right only. The revelation of another life is a recapitulation of the argument in a figure.

(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the *Apology*, he disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to death before he had done any good to himself or others. Here he anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is 'the only man of the present day who performs his public duties at all.' The two points of view are not really inconsistent, but the difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same consequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither can he separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although he foresees the dangers which await him; but he must first become a better and wiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and uncertainty (527 D, E). And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens better than to put him to death (519)?

And now, as he himself says (506 D), we will 'resume the argument from the beginning.'

Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, meets Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was desirous, not of hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning the nature of his art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to his own house, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great rhetorician and his younger friend and disciple Polus.

Soc. Put the question to him, Chaerephon. *Ch.* What question? *Soc.* Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the answer, 'I am a cobbler.' Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him. 'Who is Gorgias?' asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his master Socrates. 'One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best and noblest of experimental arts,' etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not

how to answer a question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is willing enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerephon,—that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language, ‘boasts himself to be a good one.’ At the request of Socrates he promises to be brief; for ‘he can be as long as he pleases, and as short as he pleases.’ Socrates would have him bestow his length on others, and proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are answered by him to his own great satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows:—

Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other particular arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then does rhetoric differ from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the art which deals with words, and the arts which have to do with external actions. Socrates extends this distinction further, and divides all productive arts into two classes: (1) arts which may be carried on in silence; and (2) arts which have to do with words, or in which words are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric. But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words there are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to do with words? ‘The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and greatest of human things.’ But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best? ‘Health first, beauty next, wealth third,’ in the words of the old song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you in a body, each claiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior to that of the rest—How will you choose between them? ‘I should say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest good.’ But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?—is the persevering retort: You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures; neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives knowledge, and

another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true, but belief may be either true or false,—there is therefore a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few minutes. And there is another point to be considered:—when the assembly meets to advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the architect or the general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who intend to become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not Socrates only, are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach us to persuade or advise the state?

Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about the middle wall of the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar power over the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete with a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the lessons which they have learned from him.

Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the

trouble of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained?

The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may know justice and not be just—here is the old confusion of the arts and the virtues;—nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly the bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; of course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit that he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on their legs again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. After some altercation they agree (cp. *Protag.* 338), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer.

‘What is the art of rhetoric?’ says Polus. Not an art at all, replies Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created art. Polus asks, ‘What thing?’ and Socrates answers, An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. ‘But is not rhetoric a fine thing?’ I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will you ask me another question—What is cookery? ‘What is cookery?’ An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and rhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. ‘What is rhetoric?’ asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole, which may be termed flattery, is the reply. ‘But what part?’ A shadow of a part of

politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his meaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or appearances and realities; e. g. there is real health of body or soul, and the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art attending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as having two divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give no reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is the simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in an arithmetical formula:—

Tiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine :: sophistic : legislation.

And,

Cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.

And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and begs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him.

‘Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?’ They are not esteemed at all. ‘Why, have they not great power, and can they not do whatever they desire?’ They have no power, and they only do what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the true object of desire, which is the good. ‘As if you, Socrates, would not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one whom he pleases.’ But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He instances Archelaus, son of

Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of Macedon—and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle and then his cousin and half brother, obtained the kingdom. This was very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he will, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias, Aristocrates, whose splendid offerings fill the temples, the house of Pericles, or any other great family—this is the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his appeal is to one witness only,—that is to say, the person with whom he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked man and yet happy.

The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt against the state, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusæ) is unable to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that every man believes that to do is worse than to suffer evil.

Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do evil is considered the more-foul or dishonourable of the two. But what is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies,

colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter doctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more hurtful than suffering.

There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if to punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved. There are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him in estate, body, and soul;—these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and the foulest of these is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt. And there are three arts which heal these evils—trading, medicine, justice—and the fairest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and happy in the second degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary penalty. This is at least a conceivable use of the art, and no other has been discovered by us. And if a man had an enemy, he would desire not to punish him, but that he should go unpunished and become worse and worse, taking care only that he did no injury to himself.

Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks Chaerephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the assurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates himself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned upside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought to be doing.

Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can understand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a community of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both of them are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of Callicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pylampes; the beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity

of Callicles is that he can never contradict his loves ; he changes as his Demos changes in all his opinions ; he watches the countenance of both his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the explanation of Socrates' peculiarities also. He is always repeating what his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who, unlike his other love, Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will never be at unity with himself ; and discord in life is far worse than the discord of musical sounds.

Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil did not know justice the rhetorician must teach him ; and Polus has been similarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom 'yes,' but not by nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that 'injustice is dishonourable,' but nature says that 'might is right.' And we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot all our formularies, and then the light of natural justice shines forth. As Pindar says, 'Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand ;' as is proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid for them.

This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy is an excellent thing ; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not 'passed his metaphysics' before he has grown up to manhood will never know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to philosophy : 'Every man,' as Euripides says, 'is fondest of that in which he is best.' Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, and should be cultivated as a part of education ; but when a grown-up man lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those over-refined natures ever come to any good ; they avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in corners, whispering

to a few admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any noble sentiments.

For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have 'a noble soul disguised in a puerile exterior.' And I would have you consider the danger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court,—there you would stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise.

Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher's touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a critic—knowledge, goodwill, frankness; Gorgias and Polus were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict themselves. But Callicles is a well-educated man; and he is not too modest to speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his good-will is shown both by his own profession and by his giving the same caution against philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give long ago to his own clique of friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error into which he may have fallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of all what he and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better? 'There is no difference.' Then are not the many superior to the one, and the opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is equality, and that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong. And as they are the superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural as well as conventional justice. 'Why will you continue splitting words? Have I not told you that the superior is the better?' But what do you mean by the better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder in your language, if you do not wish to drive me away. 'I mean the worthier, the wiser.' You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools? 'Yes, that is my meaning.' Ought the physician then to have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more seed? 'You are always saying the same things, Socrates.' Yes, and on the same subjects

too; but you are never saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;—whom *do* you mean? ‘I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern, and have more than the governed.’ Than themselves? ‘What do you mean?’ I mean to say that every man is his own governor. ‘I see that you mean the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a king, and has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To invite the common herd to be lord over him, when he might have the enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere talk.’

Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy. ‘Why,’ says Callicles, ‘if they were, stones and the dead would be happy.’ Socrates in reply is led into a half serious, half comic vein of reflection. ‘Who knows,’ as Euripides says, ‘whether life may not be death, and the body a tomb?’ How true is this! Moreover, the part of the soul in which the desires are situated is a leaky vessel, and some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water to this vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless is a figure of a truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment is better than the life of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? ‘Far otherwise.’ Then hear another parable. The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of the one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, and has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would suffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? ‘Yes, Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.’ And to be itching and always scratching? ‘I do not deny that there may be happiness even in that.’ And to indulge unnatural desires,

if they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain this? 'Yes, for the sake of consistency, he will.' The answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing his touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles reassures him, and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure or good, or with one another. Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that two opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are simultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e. g. in the case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good.

Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go on by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded against objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure and good, proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as good as the brave or may be even better.

Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we should choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates observes, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that all things should be done for the sake of the good.

Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of empirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, and the arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and body. Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to anything, in order that he may get through the argument. Which of the arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral exhibitions, the

dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, and children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to what is best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were children.

Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two species of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the latter? Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were such in the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were true artists, setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled design, running through his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the physician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving.

Here Callicles, who has been with difficulty brought to this point, turns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions. 'Then,' says Socrates, 'one man must do for two;' and though he had hoped to have given Callicles an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus,' he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates the advantages which he has already won:—

The pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed about that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is

temperate is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never discovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would have men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this, and if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation is true, and Polus was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man. And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be stricken—to do than to suffer. What I say is now made fast in adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the greatest of all evils will befall him. ‘But this imitator of the tyrant,’ rejoins Callicles, ‘will kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.’ Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a good one. ‘Yes, and that is the provoking thing.’ Not provoking to a man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve him from danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from death, and are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least as much service as the rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge more than two obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The reason is that he is not certain

whether he has done his passengers any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and still more if he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer too will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own or another's, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of saving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved? I would have you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have influence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this?

‘There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely believe you.’

That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little more conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was directed to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make the citizens as good as possible. But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty of state-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else? Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office? And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him? Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is the statesman's proper business. And we must ask the same question about Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they make better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave them pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they condemned him to death. And yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals who, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and butt; and man is an animal, and Pericles had the charge of man, and he made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. And yet the charioteer who keeps his seat at first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The inference is, that the statesman of a

past age were no better than those of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and harbours, but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I have told you again and again (and I purposely use the same images) that the soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways—there is the meaner and the higher art. And you seemed to understand this at the time, but when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered, Thearion, the baker, Mithoeucus, the author of the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin. And those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding fault with them, and lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their physicians. And in this, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who pandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled the city with docks and harbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, the citizens who in like manner applaud Themistocles, Pericles, and others, will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always being repeated—‘after all his services, the ungrateful city banished him, or condemned him to death.’ As if the statesman should not have taught the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having unjustly used him, any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in the same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple desirous of requiting his teacher.

Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving the state Callicles invites him:—‘to the inferior and ministerial one,’ is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of avoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear again, that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case which he described to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one charges him with perplexing them,

or with reviling their elders, he will not be able to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. 'And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good condition?' Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no evil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of evils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale:

Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and when judgment had been given on them they departed—the good to the islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they were being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, on his coming to the throne, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after death, having first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, were appointed to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment.

For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment—the curable and the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same power of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus in Homer, and not Thersites, are undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is shown by the famous example of Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. But to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks with love

and admiration on the soul of some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. Similar is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him

‘Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.’

My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast upon me,—that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil.

Perhaps you think that this is an old wives’ fable. But you, who are the three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few.

Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to politics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow in the way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth.

We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the dialogue. Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical character of his writings, we may compare him with himself and with other great teachers, and we may note in passing the objections of his critics. And then (2) casting one eye upon him, we may cast another upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the great lessons which he teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in which they are enveloped.

(1) In the *Gorgias*, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The

possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the present day (cp. Charmides, 166 ff.). The defect of clearness is also apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see Analysis). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates; —a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, V. i. 4; xi. 2. Traces of a 'robust sophistry' are likewise discernible in his argument with Callicles (pp. 490, 496, 516).

(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the *Protagoras*, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the *Phaedo*. What then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few.

He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the

idea of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends in the opening of the *Phaedo* are described as regarding him; or as was said of another, 'they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel.' We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or public opinion, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better part of human nature.

The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in 'considering the agent only, and making no reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.' But the happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as Plato's conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant consequences. Nor can Plato in the *Gorgias* be deemed purely self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking another form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics.

The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that the ideal of

the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak and miserable; he is like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and obloquy.

Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if 'the ways of God' to man are to be 'justified,' the hopes of another life must be included. If the question could have been put to him, whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests in the Apology, 'death be only a long sleep,' we can hardly tell what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in which the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished (522 E). Though, as he says in the Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind is true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future. Even in the Republic he introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior happiness of the just has been established on what is thought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main thesis independently of remoter consequences (612 A).

(3) Plato's theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective. In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a few great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for their improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. On this representation of

Plato's the criticism has been made, that the analogy of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering instead of improving men may have just the opposite effect.

Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect. But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the mind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from visible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake of the imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of his age.

Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and supplies no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off the higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and to be continued in other stages of existence, which is further developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured out of the beaten track in their meditations on the 'last things,' have found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, that 'God is the author of evil only with a view to good,' and that 'they were the better for being punished.' Still his doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that perversion of Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting punishment of human beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation.

We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a

future world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according to the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or transcendental virtue in the description of the just man in the *Gorgias*, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the *Theaetetus*; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the world which always has existed and always will exist among men. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly involved in the general condemnation.

Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, which may be briefly considered:—

a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another, and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that Plato's conception of pleasure is the Heraclitean flux transferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of pleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed his mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness of happiness, that would have been found to be as transient and precarious as pleasure.

b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on self-interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to have found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is the only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to another.

Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is merely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, which he describes in the Republic.

c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between the Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, and the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and language in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal similarity tending to show that they were written at the same period of Plato's life. For the Republic supplies that education and training of which the Gorgias suggests the necessity. The theory of the many weak combining against the few strong in the formation of society (which is indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is expressed in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in another life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians, are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic they are expelled the State, because they are imitators, and minister to the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to rhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in the Protagoras, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day. In some other respects the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with that of Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two dialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic notion, as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and in the Phaedo, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed.

This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the Gorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, are allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias' definition of rhetoric (Philebus, 58 A, B; cp. Gor. 452 D, E), as the art of persuasion, and the best of arts, and the art which subjects all things, not by force, but voluntarily, seems to mark a designed connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful and the good.

In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public opinion, the *Gorgias* most nearly resembles the *Apology*, *Crito*, and portions of the *Republic*, and like the *Philebus*, though from another point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to Plato's theory of morals which the *Theaetetus* bears to his theory of knowledge.

d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot's modest charge (p. 512); and in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation (p. 480); and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds (p. 508). (2) The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals such as Archelaus (p. 525); the retaliation of the box on the ears (p. 527); the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the clothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided for them (p. 523; cp. Swift's notion that the universe is a suit of clothes). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death (p. 524). (3) The appeal to the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in his court 'holding a golden sceptre,' which gives verisimilitude to the tale (p. 526).

It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing 'both sides of the game,' and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting to analyze the 'dramatis personae' as they were conceived by him. Neither is it necessary to remark that Plato is a dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have the best of the argument: or that he is to be criticised as a poet rather than as a mere philosopher: or that he is not to be tried by a modern standard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought and the opinion of his time.

It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the *Gorgias* is the assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting any abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings (c. g. *Laws*, X), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of in-

tolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the 'liberty of prophesying;' and Plato is not affirming any abstract right of this nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences, will probably share the fate of Socrates.

The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to which he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, he puts on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of ridicule are taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against themselves. The disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables of the New Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God; they half conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical than in the *Gorgias*. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher reason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all ages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found the world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of the wildness of his humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but by the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At length he makes even Polus (p. 468) in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument, and heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in a sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his adversaries. - From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of the dialogue.

First Thesis :—

It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.

Compare the New Testament—

'It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.'—1 Pet. iii. 17.

And the Sermon on the Mount—

'Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness' sake.'—Matt. v. 10.

The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but they equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous may suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no reward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by Polus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is dishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish the offender (cp. Rep. 360 D). But they are not equally willing to acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil, and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes are committed on the great scale—the crimes of tyrants, ancient or modern—after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by time, and to forgive is convenient to them. The tangle of good and evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or for evil cannot alter a hair's breadth the morality of actions which are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of our practice.

And so of private individuals—to them, too, the world occasionally speaks of the consequences of their actions:—if they are lovers of pleasure, they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, they will lose their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of what will be, but of what is—of the present consequence of lowering and degrading the soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men everywhere, if they were not tempted by interest or passion, would agree with him—they would rather be the victims than the perpetrators of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason tells them that death comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil as an unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but to a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering ideals of truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a new life in us.

Second Thesis :—

It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer.

There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty followed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would then be scarcely distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid vice as they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening and enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the consequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business of early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be unfortunate—he had better have suffered when he was young, and been saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally unfortunate whose education and manner of life are always concealing from him the consequences of his own actions, until at length they are revealed to him in some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have been caused not by his own fault? Another illustration is afforded by the pauper and criminal classes, who scarcely reflect at all, except on the means by which they can compass their immediate ends. We pity them, and make allowances for them; but we do not consider that the same principle applies to human actions generally. Not to have been found out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or religious point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our evil doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, and therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are healed by time;

‘While rank corruption, mining all within,
Infects unseen.’

The ‘accustomed irony’ of Socrates adds a corollary to the argument:—‘Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape unpunished’—this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of Proverbs, xxv. 21, 22, ‘Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,’ etc., quoted in Romans xii. 20.)

Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own lives: they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are very kind and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love is always pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar

figure of speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence but in accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather than by reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must speak to themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint in eloquent words the character of their own evil deeds. To any suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves to submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not we too accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while the struggle between the better and the worse is going on within us. And sometimes we are too hard upon ourselves, because we want to restore the balance which self-love has overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear a voice as of a parent consoling us. In religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the consciences of men 'accusing or else excusing them.' For all our life long we are talking with ourselves: —What is thought but speech? What is feeling but rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be always in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us.

Third Thesis:—

We do not what we will, but what we wish.

Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn—that good intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by wisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which we afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be inevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often be the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an advantage over us—we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All actions of which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this impotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has 'the least possible power' while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually bringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet

the book of nature is open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will exercise ordinary attention; every day offers him experiences of his own and of other men's characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The contemplation of the consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men in regard to them, seems to have led Socrates to his famous thesis:—'Virtue is knowledge;' which is not so much an error or paradox as a half truth, seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but also the half of the truth which is especially needed in the present age. For as the world has grown older men have been too apt to imagine a right and wrong apart from consequences; while a few, on the other hand, have sought to resolve them wholly into their consequences. But Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides nor identifies them; though the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian or transcendental systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements which seem to lie at the basis of morality.

Fourth Thesis:—

To be and not to seem is the end of life.

The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief incentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows is a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of seeming enters into all things; all or almost all desire to appear better than they are, that they may win the esteem or admiration of others. A man of ability can easily feign the language of piety or virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious hypocrisy which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there is the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different opinions about themselves and one another which prevail in different ranks of society. There is the bias given to the mind by the study of one department of human knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and stronger far the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party interest in certain tenets. There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry of medicine, the sophistry of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; some of them are very ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from them; for we have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The sophistry of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of a religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has been accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the other. The conventions and cus-

toms which we observe in conversation, and the opposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another ('the buyer saith, it is nought—it is nought,' etc.), are always obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from their own natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most of us imperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which we partly help to make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, requires great force of mind; he hardly knows where to begin in the search after truth. On every side he is met by the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the most real of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded collectively and subjected to the influences of society.

Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the unreality and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that they must be and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must have the spirit and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are weak, and have nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must acquire firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must try to be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow men. A single individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be true and innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, and what he does not know; and though not without an effort, he can form a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In his most secret actions he can show the same high principle (cp. Rep. VIII. 554 D) which he shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And on some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right, even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition, may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and lawyers, and be too much for them.

Who is the true and who the false statesman?—

The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first organizes and then administers the government of his own country; and having made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with those of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a dealer in expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his mind;

while the head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on an ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health and life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the moral and intellectual qualities of every individual are freely developed, and 'the idea of good' is the animating principle of the whole. Not the attainment of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how to unite freedom with order is the problem which he has to solve.

The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken a task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself before he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage them. He has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal enmity under the disguise of moral or political principle: such meannesses, into which men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed in the consciousness of his mission, and in his love for his country and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself what the next generation will say of him; not because he is careful of posthumous fame, but because he knows that the result of his life as a whole will then be more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his plans; not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them; but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed time, for he knows that human life, 'if not long in comparison with eternity' (Rep. VI. 498 D), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great purposes. He knows, too, that the work will be still going on when he is no longer here; and he will sometimes, especially when his powers are failing, think of that other city of which the pattern is in heaven (Rep. IX. 592 B).

The false politician is the serving man of the state. In order to govern men he becomes like them; their 'minds are married in conjunction;' they 'bear themselves' like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is their obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make them like himself; he must 'educate his party' until they cease to be a party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give form to their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for seeming what he is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a representative man, he is the representative not of the lower but of the higher elements of the nation. There is a better

(as well as a worse) public opinion of which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are threatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by force—two or three moves on the political chessboard are all that he can foresee—two or three weeks or months are granted to him in which he can provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also that there are permanent principles of politics which are always tending to the well-being of states—better administration, better education, the reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased security against external enemies. These are not ‘of to-day or yesterday,’ but are the same in all times, and under all forms of government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, though he knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like Plato’s captain in the Republic, half blind and deaf, but with penetrating eye and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide her into port.

The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of the world—not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures of which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no intention of fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of politics. He is unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which political convictions would entail upon him. He begins with popularity, and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and wiser than themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in extremity; they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of the popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed. Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done what might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received justice at their hands.

The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; he must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act together. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the majority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader and not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He will neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman, neither adopting the ‘laissez faire’ nor the ‘paternal government’ principle; but

he will, whether he is dealing with children in politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the people what the government can do for them, and what, from imperfect education or deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He knows that if he does too much for them they will do nothing ; and that if he does nothing for them in some states of society they will be utterly helpless. For the many cannot exist without the few ; if the material force of a country is from below, wisdom and experience are from above. It is not a small part of human evils which kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is well aware that a great purpose carried out consistently during many years will at last be executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by some accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown element of politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill are combined, if he plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will not be always consistent, for the world is changing ; and though he depends upon the support of a party, he will remember that he is the minister of the whole. He lives not for the present, but for the future, and he is not at all sure that he will be appreciated either now or then. For he may have the existing order of society against him, and may not be remembered by a distant posterity.

There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates in the *Gorgias*, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, not excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy feeling that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as the actual philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the faults of eminent men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own powers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at all—they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes the more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more conscientious, because he has not equally deceived expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, but they are widely spread ; we constantly find them recurring in reviews and newspapers, and still oftener in private conversation.

We may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as institutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot

easily be combined with governing by the people : the interests of classes are too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. According to Socrates the true governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and will only be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man than himself (Rep. I. 347 C). And in modern times, though the world has grown milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no longer await an English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a blind ambition will only undertake from a sense of duty a work in which he is most likely to fail ; and even if he succeed, will rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own generation.

Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only real politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words by applying them to the history of our own country. He would have said that not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real politicians of their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo. These during the greater part of their lives occupied an inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They were private persons ; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which in the next generation have become an irresistible power. ‘ Herein is that saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.’ We may imagine with Plato an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly harmonized ; for there is no necessary opposition between them. But experience shows that they are commonly divorced—the ordinary politician is the interpreter or executor of the thoughts of others, and hardly ever brings to the birth a new political conception. One or two only in modern times, like the Italian statesman Cavour, have created the world in which they moved. The philosopher is naturally unfitted for political life ; his great ideas are not understood by the many ; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also happier than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have the promise of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and visionaries by their own contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, those who would have been ashamed of them during their lives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be called by their names. (Cp. Thucyd. VI. 16.)

Who is the true poet ?

Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to

sense; because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice removed from the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the Gorgias that the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and not of truth. In modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry admitting of a moral. The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in later ages they seem to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that peculiar creation of our own and the last century, which, together with the sister art of review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less of seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?

Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or bad, or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have been poets in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not forgotten their high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity to their ethical character. The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and sweetest language, are still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes them with beauty, and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and memories of men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary life, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old he makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new dignity; he finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality and politics. He uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is beyond; he raises us through earth to heaven. He expresses what the better part of us would fain say, and the half-conscious feeling is strengthened by the expression. He is his own critic, for the spirit of poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His mission is not to disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own nature, and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry is the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the happiest and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of the greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what may not be effected for the human race by a better use of the poetical and imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of religion, with truth, may still be possible.

Neither is the element of pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic and artistic influences, though he is not without a true sense of the noble purposes to which art may be applied (Rep. III. 401).

Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato's language, a flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which without any serious purpose, the poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and metre. Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the '*savoir faire*,' or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit of poetry. He has no conception that true art should bring order out of disorder (504 A); that it should make provision for the soul's highest interest (501 C); that it should be pursued only with a view to 'the improvement of the citizens' (502, 503). He ministers to the weaker side of human nature (Rep. X. 603-605); he sings the strain of love in the latest fashion; instead of raising men above themselves he brings them back to the 'tyranny of the many masters,' from which all his life long a good man has been praying to be delivered. And often, forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that which is truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated brain is worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the master of his words, but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the faded reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any healing or life-giving influence on the minds of men?

'Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:' Art then must be true, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way 'we can best spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God.' (512 E). Plato does not say that God will order all things for the best (ep. Phaedo, 97 C), but he indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be corrected in another. How indeed could we without stupidity 'leave the result with God,' unless we were satisfied that He had a settled

order and law which we knew to be good? And as we are very far from the best imaginable world at present, Plato here, as in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, supposes a purgatory or place of education for mankind in general, and for a very few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the dialogue is not the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, whether in the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing can reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on Scripture, is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner in which we are 'born again' (*Rep.* VI. 498 D). Only he is prepared to maintain the ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no one, not even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine without being ridiculous.

G O R G I A S.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CALLICLES.

SOCRATES.

CHAEREPHON.

GORGIAS.

POLUS.

Steph.
447

Callicles. The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.

Socrates. And are we late for a feast?

Cal. Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has been just exhibiting to us many fine things.

Soc. I must throw the blame, Callicles, on my friend Chacrephon here, who would keep us loitering in the Agora.

Chacrephon. Never mind, Socrates—the misfortune of which I have been the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him repeat the exhibition either now or at some future time.

Cal. What is the matter, Chacrephon—does Socrates want to hear Gorgias?

Chaer. Yes, that was our intention in coming.

Cal. Suppose, then, that you proceed to my house; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he shall exhibit to you.

Soc. Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what this is which he professes and teaches; he may defer the exhibition, as you suggested, to another time.

Cal. There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer.

Soc. I am glad to hear that ;—will you ask him, Chaerephon?

Chaer. What shall I ask him?

Soc. Ask him who he is.

Chaer. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand?

Chaer. I understand, and will ask him : Tell me, Gorgias, is Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you are asked?

Gorgias. Quite right, Chaerephon : I was saying as much only just now ; and I may add, that many years have elapsed since 448 any one has asked me a new one.

Chaer. You must be very ready, Gorgias.

Gor. Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.

Polus. Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been a long time talking, is tired.

Chaer. And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias?

Pol. What matters that, if I answer well enough for you?

Chaer. Not in the least :—and you shall answer if you like.

Pol. Ask :—

Chaer. My question is this : If Gorgias had the skill of his brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is given to his brother?

Pol. Certainly.

Chaer. Then we should be right in calling him a physician?

Pol. Yes.

Chaer. And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?

Pol. Clearly, a painter.

Chaer. But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he is skilled?

Pol. O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different persons in

different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest.

Soc. Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.

Gor. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was asked.

Gor. Then ask him yourself, if you are so disposed.

Soc. But I would rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic.

Pol. Why do you say that, Socrates?

Soc. Why, Polus, because, when Chaerephon asked you what is the art which Gorgias knows, you praised the art as if you were answering some one who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.

Pol. Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?

Soc. Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and how we were to call Gorgias. And I would still
449 beg you briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question,—what is your art, and what are you?

Gor. Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.

Soc. Then I am to call you a rhetorician?

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in Homeric language, 'I boast to be.'

Soc. I should wish to do so.

Gor. Then pray do.

Soc. And are we to say that you make other men rhetoricians?

Gor. Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, but in all places.

Soc. And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are at present doing, and reserve for another

occasion the longer mode of speech which Polus was attempting? and will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?

Gor. Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best to make them as short as I can; for a part of my profession is that I can be as short as any one.

Soc. That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and the longer one at some other time.

Gor. Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man use fewer words.

Soc. Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the making of garments?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?

Gor. It is.

Soc. By Herè, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers.

Gor. Yes, Socrates; I do think myself good at that.

Soc. I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?

Gor. With discourse.

Soc. What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?

Gor. No.

Soc. Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And to understand that of which they speak?

Gor. To be sure.

Soc. But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about 450 the sick?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Then medicine also treats of discourse?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Of discourse concerning diseases?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or evil condition of the body?

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them treat of discourse concerning the subject of which they are the arts.

Gor. That is evident.

Soc. Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric?

Gor. Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of the hand in rhetoric which operates and is perfected through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified, as I maintain, in saying that rhetoric treats of discourse.

Soc. I do not know whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I shall soon find out: please to answer me a question:—you would allow that there are arts?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And in some of the arts a great deal is done and nothing or very little said; in painting, or statuary, or many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and these are the arts, with which, as I suppose you would say, rhetoric has no concern?

Gor. You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.

Soc. And there are other arts which work wholly by words, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in some of which words are nearly co-extensive with things, but the greater number of them are dependent wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this better sort?

Gor. Exactly.

Soc. And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression

which you used was, that rhetoric is an art which operates and is perfected through the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might take a fancy to say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that you *would* call arithmetic rhetoric, any more than you would call geometry rhetoric.

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Gor. You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning.

Soc. Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:—seeing that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:—Suppose that a person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, 'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, as you replied to me just now, that arithmetic is one of those arts which is perfected by words. And then he would proceed: 'With what?' and I should say, With the knowledge of odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked again: 'And what is the art of calculation?' I should say, That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, 'Concerned with what?' I should say in the clerk's phrase, 'as aforesaid,' like arithmetic, but with a difference, and the difference is that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their relation to themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words—he would ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their relative swiftness.

Gor. Very true, Socrates; I admit that.

Soc. And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which operate and are perfected through the medium of words?

Gor. True.

Soc. Tell me, I say, what about? To what class of things do the words which rhetoric uses relate?

Gor. To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.

Soc. That again, Gorgias, is ambiguous ; I am still in the dark : for which are the greatest and best of human things ? I dare say that you have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.

452 *Gor.* Yes, I know the song ; but what is your drift ?

Soc. I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say : ‘ O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men and not his.’ And when I ask, Who are you ? he will reply, ‘ I am a physician.’ What do you mean ? I shall say. Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good ? ‘ Certainly,’ he will answer, ‘ for is not health the greatest good ? What greater good can men have, Socrates ?’ And after him the trainer will come and say, ‘ I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I can show of mine.’ To him I shall say, Who are you, my friend, and what is your business ? ‘ I am a trainer,’ he will reply, ‘ and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.’ When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. ‘ Consider, Socrates,’ he will say, ‘ whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.’ Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth ? ‘ Yes,’ he replies. And who are you ? ‘ A money-maker.’ And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man ? ‘ Yes,’ he will reply, ‘ of course.’ And we shall rejoin : Yes ; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, ‘ What good ? Let Gorgias answer.’ Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me ; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator ? Answer us.

Gor. That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to rulers the power of ruling over others in their several states.

Soc. And what would you consider this to be ?

Gor. What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude.

Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer 453 of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?

Gor. No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the crown of rhetoric.

Soc. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am one, and I believe that you are another.

Gor. What is coming, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have a suspicion both about the one and about the other. And I am going to ask—what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to elicit the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked, ‘What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?’ and you said, ‘the painter of figures,’ should I not be right in asking, ‘What sort of figures, and where do you find them?’

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there are other painters as well, who paint many other figures?

Gor. True.

Soc. But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you would have answered very well?

Gor. Quite so.

Soc. Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he teaches or not?

Gor. He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that.

Soc. Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And therefore persuade us of them?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion?

Gor. Clearly.

Soc. And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; and we shall be in a position to show that
454 all the other arts of which we were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about what.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?

Gor. True.

Soc. Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question?

Gor. I think so.

Soc. Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer?

Gor. I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in the courts and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and unjust.

Soc. And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am

found repeating a seemingly plain question ; for as I was saying, I ask not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's words, and that you may proceed in your own way.

Gor. I think that you are quite right, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me raise this question; you would say that there is such a thing as 'having learned?'

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And there is also 'having believed?'

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and are learning and belief the same things?

Gor. In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.

Soc. And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:—If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well as a true?'—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is.

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?

Gor. No.

Soc. No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ.

Gor. That is true.

Soc. And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are persuaded?

Gor. That is so.

Soc. Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?

Gor. By all means.

Soc. And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge?

Gor. Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.

Soc. Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about them?

Gor. True.

Soc. And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other assemblies about just and unjust, but he only creates belief about them ; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high matters in a short time ?

Gor. Certainly not.

Soc. Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric ; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel ? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled ; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise ; or when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians : would you admit that, Gorgias ? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For I dare say that some one or other of the young men present might like to become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. ‘What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias ?’ they will say—‘about what will you teach us to advise the state ?—about the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned ?’ How will you answer them ?

Gor. I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders.

Soc. Certainly, Gorgias, that is the tradition about Themistocles, and I myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall.

Gor. And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision 456
has to be given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers ;
they are the men who win their point.

Soc. I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked
what is the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when
I look at the matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.

Gor. A marvel indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how
rhetoric comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior
arts. Let me offer you a striking example of this. On several
occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or some other
physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the
physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron
to him ; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would
not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say
that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city,
and there had to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as
to which of them should be elected, the physician would have no
chance ; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished,
and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician
more than any one would have the power of getting
himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the
multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is
the power and quality of rhetoric, Socrates. And yet rhetoric
ought to be used like any other competitive art, not against
every body,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength
any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of
fence ;—because he has powers which are more than a match
either for enemy or friend, he ought not therefore to strike,
stab, or slay his friends. And suppose a man who has been
trained in the palestra and is a skilful boxer, and in the ful-
ness of his strength he goes and strikes his father or mother
or one of his familiars or friends, that is no reason why the
trainer or master of fence should be held in detestation or
banished ;—surely not. For they taught this art for a good
purpose, as an art to be used against enemies and evil-doers,
in self-defence, not in aggression, and others have perverted
their instructions, making a bad use of their own strength and 457
skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is
the art in fault or bad in itself ; I should rather say that those

who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and on any subject, and in general he can persuade the multitude of anything better than any other man, but he ought not on that account to defraud the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his instructions, and he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor.

Soc. You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of arguments, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate to the satisfaction or mutual improvement of the disputants; but disagreements are apt to arise, and one party will often deny that the other has spoken truly or clearly; and then they leave off arguing and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are only speaking from personal feeling. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering the truth, but from personal feeling. Now if you are one of my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, 45⁸ but if not I will let you alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and just as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing the evil in another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an

erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are speaking ; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter ;—let us make an end.

Gor. I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate ; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something else.

Chacr. You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows their desire to listen to you, and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have any business which would take me away from so important and interesting a discussion.

Cal. I swear by the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many discussions, that I doubt whether I was ever as much delighted before, and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall only be the better pleased.

Soc. I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.

Gor. After this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, especially as I have professed to answer all comers ; in accordance with the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you like.

Soc. Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what I wonder at in your words ; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have mistaken your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a rhetorician ?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion ?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health ?

Gor. Yes, with the multitude,—that is.

Soc. That is to say, greater with the ignorant ; for with those who know he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion than the physician has.

Gor. Very true.

Soc. And if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Though he is not a physician :—is he?

Gor. No.

Soc. And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what the physician knows.

Gor. That is evident.

Soc. Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?

Gor. In the case which is supposed :—yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who know?

Gor. Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great blessing?—not to have learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way inferior to the professors of them?

Soc. Whether the rhetorician is or is not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he know anything actually of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more than another who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? And if he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him, for that is not your business, but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be wholly
460 unable to teach him rhetoric, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said, Gorgias, about all this? I swear that I wish you would, as you were saying, reveal to me the power of rhetoric.

Gor. Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.

Soc. Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust of his own previous knowledge, or he must be taught by you.

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And he who has learned music a musician?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him.

Gor. Certainly.

Soc. And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?

Gor. To be sure.

Soc. And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And must not the rhetorician be just, and is not the just man desirous to do what is just?

Gor. That is clearly the inference.

Soc. Then the just man will surely never be willing to do injustice?

Gor. That is certain.

Soc. And according to the argument the rhetorician ought to be a just man?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?

Gor. Clearly not.

Soc. But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his instructor, neither is he to be banished,

but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric is to be banished—was not that said?

Gor. Yes, that was said.

Soc. And now it turns out that this same rhetorician can never have done any injustice.

Gor. True.

Soc. And at the very outset, Gorgias, there was an assertion made, that rhetoric treated of discourse, not about odd and even, but about just and unjust. Is not that true?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. And I thought at the time, when I heard you saying this, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you said, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric
461 I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our examination, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this.

Polus. And do you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, you fancy, I suppose, that out of this admission a contradiction arose to which you delight in bringing the argument by your captious questions? But do you imagine that any one will ever say that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass.

Soc. Illustrious Polus, the great reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand, and set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, there are you a present help to us,

as you ought to be ; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen—upon one condition :

Pol. What is that ?

Soc. That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you indulged at first.

Pol. What ! do you mean that I am not to use as many words as I please ?

Soc. Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you of all men should be deprived of the power of speech—that is hard indeed. But then look at my case :—shall not I be very hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay ⁴⁶² and listen to you, and may not go away ? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set me on my legs, take back any statement which you please ; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted : for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he likes, and you will know how to answer him ?

Pol. To be sure.

Soc. And now, which will you do, ask or answer ?

Pol. I will ask ; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer : What is rhetoric ?

Soc. Do you mean what sort of an art ?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Not an art at all, in my opinion, if I am to tell you the truth, Polus.

Pol. Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric ?

Soc. A thing of which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say that you have made an art.

Pol. What thing ?

Soc. I should say a sort of experience.

Pol. Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience ?

Soc. That is my view, if that is yours.

Pol. An experience in what?

Soc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification.

Pol. And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing?

Soc. What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is?

Pol. Why did you not tell me that rhetoric was a sort of experience?

Soc. As you are so fond of gratifying others, will you gratify me in a small particular?

Pol. I will.

Soc. Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?

Pol. What sort of an art is cookery?

Soc. Not an art at all, Polus.

Pol. What then?

Soc. I should say an experience.

Pol. In what? I wish that you would tell me.

Soc. An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Polus.

Pol. Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?

Soc. No, they are only different parts of the same profession.

Pol. And what is that?

Soc. I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; I should not like Gorgias to imagine that I am ridiculing his profession, and therefore I hesitate to answer. For whether or
463 no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I really do not know:—from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole.

Gor. A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me.

Soc. In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word 'flattery;' and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an

art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of dressing up and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, ‘What is rhetoric?’ For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Pol. I will ask, and do you answer: What part of flattery is rhetoric?

Soc. Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the shadow of a part of politics.

Pol. And noble or ignoble?

Soc. Ignoble, as I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble:—though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before.

Gor. Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.

Soc. I do not wonder at that; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, like a young colt as he is, is apt to run away¹.

Gor. Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the shadow of a part of politics.

Soc. I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. Are there not bodies and souls? 464

Gor. There are.

Soc. And you would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them?

Gor. Yes.

Soc. Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health.

¹ There is an untranslatable play on the name ‘Polus,’ which means ‘a colt.’

Gor. True.

Soc. And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality?

Gor. Yes, certainly.

Soc. And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no specific name, but which may be described as having two divisions—one of them is gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, yet there is a difference between them. Now, seeing that there are these four arts which are ever ministering to the body and the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of one or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and has no regard for men's highest interests, but is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this and an ignoble sort of thing,
465 Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure instead of good. An art I do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them.

Cookery, then, as I maintain, is a flattery which takes the form of medicine, and dressing up, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble,

illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic.

I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner of the geometricians, (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow,)

as dressing up : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine ;

or rather,

as dressing up : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation ;

and

as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice.

And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up together ; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would come true : Chaos would return, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is in relation to the soul what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my shorter answer, and therefore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, ⁴⁶⁶ I hope that you will speak at equal length ; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair ; and now you may do what you please with my answer.

Pol. What do you mean ? do you think that rhetoric is flattery ?

Soc. Nay, I said a part of flattery ; if at your age, Polus, you

cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?

Pol. And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea that they are flatterers?

Soc. Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?

Pol. I am asking a question.

Soc. Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.

Pol. How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?

Soc. Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.

Pol. And that is what I do mean to say.

Soc. Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the citizens.

Pol. What! Are they not like tyrants, who kill whom they will, or despoil or exile any one whom they think good?

Soc. By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me.

Pol. I am asking a question of you.

Soc. Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.

Pol. How two questions?

Soc. Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, and that they kill whom they will, and despoil or exile any one whom they think good?

Pol. I did.

Soc. Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what they think best.

Pol. And is not that a great power?

Soc. Polus has already said the reverse.

Pol. The reverse! nay, that is what I affirm.

Soc. No, by the great—what do you call him?—not you, for you say that great power is a good to him who has the power.

Pol. I do.

Soc. And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best he does what is good, and would you call this great power?

Pol. I do not say that.

Soc. Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—in this way you 467 may refute me; but if you leave me unrefuted, then the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states and the tyrants will be deprived of the power or good which they have; for you assume that power is a good thing, and yet admit that the power which is exercised without understanding is an evil.

Pol. Yes; I admit that.

Soc. How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will?

Pol. This fellow—

Soc. I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me.

Pol. Why, have you not already admitted that they do as they think best?

Soc. And that I still admit.

Pol. Then surely they do as they will?

Soc. To that I say 'No.'

Pol. And yet they do as they think best?

Soc. Aye.

Pol. That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.

Soc. Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself.

Pol. Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.

Soc. Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or do they will that further end, for the sake of which they do it; for example, when they take medicine at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink?

Pol. Clearly, the health.

Soc. And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of busi-

ness?—But they will to have the wealth, for the sake of which they go on a voyage.

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it.

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent?

Pol. To be sure, Socrates.

Soc. Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils?

Pol. I should.

468 *Soc.* And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil?

Pol. Exactly.

Soc. And are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent?

Pol. Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.

Soc. When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that this is better, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, that will conduce to our good?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Men who do these things do them all for the sake of the good?

Pol. I admit that.

Soc. And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that further thing for the sake of which we do them?

Pol. Most true.

Soc. Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which

conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right?

Pol. Yes, that is true.

Soc. Granting this, if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or despoils him of his goods, under the idea that the act is for his interests when really not for his interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer?

Pol. Well, I suppose not.

Soc. Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such an one have great power in his state?

Pol. He will not.

Soc. Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?

Pol. As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh no!

Soc. Justly or unjustly, do you mean?

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Pol. In either case is he not equally to be envied?

Soc. Have done, Polus!

Pol. Why 'have done'?

Soc. Because you should not envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only pity them.

Pol. And are those of whom I spoke wretches?

Soc. Yes, certainly they are.

Pol. And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?

Soc. No, I do not think that of him any more than that he is to be envied.

Pol. Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?

Soc. Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied: neither is he to be envied if he killed him justly.

Pol. At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?

Soc. Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.

Pol. How can that be, Socrates?

Soc. That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.

Pol. But is that the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?

Soc. Certainly not.

Pol. Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?

Soc. I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.

Pol. Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?

Soc. Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.

Pol. I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.

Soc. Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into the crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, he is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?

Pol. Certainly not, so doing.

470 *Soc.* But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?

Pol. I can.

Soc. Why then?

Pol. Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.

Soc. And punishment is an evil?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way:—do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. About that you and I may be supposed to agree?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil—what principle do you lay down?

Pol. I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that question.

Soc. Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.

Pol. Though you are hard of refutation, Socrates, a child may refute that statement.

Soc. Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that you will refute me and not weary of doing good to a friend.

Pol. Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; circumstances, which may be said to have happened only yesterday, are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.

Soc. What circumstances?

Pol. You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?

Soc. At any rate I hear that he is.

Pol. And do you think that he is happy or miserable?

Soc. I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.

Pol. And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?

Soc. Indeed I cannot.

Pol. Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?

Soc. And I should say the truth ; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.

Pol. What ! and does all happiness consist in this ?

Soc. Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine ; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.

471 *Pol.* Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable ?

Soc. Yes, my friend, if he is wicked he is.

Pol. I cannot deny that he is wicked ; for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas, and therefore in strict right himself the slave of Alcetas ; if he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been happy ; but now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes : in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas had usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way ; and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far from repenting : shall I tell you how he showed his remorse ? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom belonged ; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him ; that was not his notion of happiness ; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal in all Macedonia, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not the happiest, and I dare say that his misery would not be desired

by any Athenian ;—and by you least of all—certainly not ; he is the last of the Macedonians whose lot you would choose.

Soc. I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying.

Pol. That is because you will not ; for you surely must think as I do.

Soc. Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me in the way which rhetoricians fancy to be refutation in courts of law. For there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is ⁴⁷² of no value where truth is the aim—though a man may sometimes be slandered by a crowd of false witnesses seeming to be somewhat. And now I know that nearly every one, Athenian as well as stranger, will be on your side in this argument, if you like to bring witnesses in disproof of my statement ;—you may, if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brother, who gave the row of tripods which stand in the temple of Dionysus, come with him ; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering which is at Delphi ; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose ;—they will all agree with you : I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me ; you only produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that I shall have proved nothing unless I make you yourself the one willing witness of my words ; neither will you, unless you have me as the one witness of yours ; no matter about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world in general ; but mine is of another sort—let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, the matters at issue between us are not trifling ; to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the sum of them. And

what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? Am I not right in supposing that to be your meaning?

Pol. Quite right.

Soc. And I say that for him to be happy is an impossibility, and here is one point about which we are at issue:—very good. But do you mean to say also that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy?

Pol. Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.

Soc. On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to you, he will be happy?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets with retribution at
473 the hands of God and men.

Pol. You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.

Soc. I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?

Pol. Exactly.

Soc. And you said the opposite?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me?

Pol. By heaven I did.

Soc. In your own opinion, Polus.

Pol. Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.

Soc. And you said again that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And I say that he is most miserable, and that those who are punished are less miserable—are you going to refute this too?

Pol. That sentiment is truly hard of refutation, harder than the other, Socrates.

Soc. Not hard only, say rather, impossible, Polus; for who can refute the truth?

Pol. What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer, is at last impaled or tarred and burned, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted?

Soc. There, again, you are raising hobgoblins, noble Polus, instead of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say—'in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant?'

Pol. Yes, I did.

Soc. Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of elenchus,—when any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.

Pol. But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company.

Soc. O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe were serving as Prytanēs, and the lot fell upon me and I was made a senator, and had to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And 474 as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, ought to be given; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing;

his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished.

Pol. And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice?

Soc. Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.

Pol. Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.

Soc. But will you answer?

Pol. To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you are going to say.

Soc. Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst?—to do injustice or to suffer?

Pol. I should say that suffering was worst.

Soc. And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer.

Pol. To do.

Soc. And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, as, for example, bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard:—bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty?

Pol. I cannot.

Soc. And you would speak of everything else—of figures or colours, for example, as beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, or of both?

Pol. Yes, I should.

Soc. And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason?

Pol. I should.

Soc. Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are pleasant or useful or both?

Pol. I think not.

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Soc. And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?

Pol. To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.

Soc. And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure or good or both?

Pol. Very true.

Soc. And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—does not that follow?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But then again, what was that observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?

Pol. I did say that.

Soc. Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that also of necessity follow?

Pol. Of course.

Soc. First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the injured?

Pol. No, Socrates; certainly not.

Soc. Then they do not exceed in pain?

Pol. No.

Soc. But if not in pain, then not in both?

Pol. Certainly not.

Soc. Then they can only exceed in the other?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. That is to say, in evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And that is now discovered to be more evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you resign yourself without shrinking into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me.

Pol. I should say 'No.'

Soc. Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?

Pol. No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.

Soc. Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two.

Pol. That is true.

Soc. Then you see, Polus, that when you compare the two kinds of refutations they are quite unlike. All men, with the exception of myself, agree with you; but your assent is enough
476 for me, and I have no need of any other witness; I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:—Would you not say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected?

Pol. I should.

Soc. And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in as far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion.

Pol. Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.

Soc. Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be a patient?

Pol. I admit that.

Soc. And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck will be struck violently or quickly?

Pol. True.

Soc. And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the act of him who strikes?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And if he burns in excess or with pain, the thing burned will be burned in the same way?

Pol. Truly.

Soc. And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something cut?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And if the cutting be great or deep or painful, the cut will be of the same nature?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the act of the agent?

Pol. I agree.

Soc. Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is suffering or acting?

Pol. Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.

Soc. And suffering implies an agent?

Pol. Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.

Soc. And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And therefore he acts justly?

Pol. Justly.

Soc. Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers what is honourable?

Pol. True.

Soc. And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the
477 honourable is either pleasant or useful?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. Then he who is punished suffers what is good?

Pol. That is true.

Soc. Then he is benefited?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'? I mean, that his soul is improved, if he be justly punished.

Pol. Surely.

Soc. Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the matter in this way:—In respect of a man's estate, do you see any greater evil than poverty?

Pol. There is no greater evil.

Soc. Again, in a man's body, you would say that the evil is weakness and disease and deformity?

Pol. I should.

Soc. And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her own?

Pol. Of course.

Soc. And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and the like?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty?

Pol. True.

Soc. And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul?

Pol. By far the most.

Soc. And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?

Pol. What do you mean, Socrates? I do not understand.

Soc. I mean to say, that what is most disgraceful has been already admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to be most disgraceful?

Pol. That has been admitted.

Soc. And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?

Pol. Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your premises.

Soc. Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil, or both.

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of evils?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the soul, are the greatest of evils?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the art of making money?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine?

Pol. Very true.

Soc. And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able 478 to answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them.

Pol. To the physicians, Socrates.

Soc. And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?

Pol. To the judges, you mean.

Soc. Who are to punish them?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance with a certain rule of justice?

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?

Pol. That is evident.

Soc. Which, then, is the best of these three?

Pol. Will you enumerate them?

Soc. Money-making, medicine, and justice.

Pol. Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.

Soc. And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or both?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being healed pleased?

Pol. I think not.

Soc. Useful, then?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Why, yes, because giving deliverance from great evils; and this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well.

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is healed, or who never was out of health?

Pol. Clearly he who was never out of health.

Soc. Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from evils, but in never having had them.

Pol. True.

Soc. And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the most miserable?

Pol. Clearly he who is not healed.

Soc. And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the greatest of evils, which is vice?

Pol. True.

Soc. And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the healer of our vice?

Pol. True.

Soc. He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils.

Pol. Clearly.

Soc. And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?

Pol. True.

Soc. That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from injustice?

Pol. Certainly.

Soc. That is, he who commits the greatest crimes lives worst, 479 and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or punishment, which, as you say, is the case of Archelaus and of all your tyrants and rhetoricians and mighty men?

Pol. True.

Soc. May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case?

Pol. Yes, truly.

Soc. He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus,

are right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?

Pol. If you please.

Soc. It follows that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the greatest of evils?

Pol. That is clear.

Soc. And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from this evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?

Pol. That is true.

Soc. Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice, whether Archelaus or any other, is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said?

Pol. Yes.

Soc. And that has been proved to be true?

Pol. Certainly.

480 *Soc.* Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil?

Pol. True.

Soc. And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow that, Polus, if our former admissions are to stand? and is any other inference consistent with them?

Pol. To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.

Soc. Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse his own injustice, or that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree, his family, or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; if he does not want to conceal, but to bring to light the iniquity, that the wrong-doer may suffer and be healed, and if he would force himself and others to stand firm, closing their eyes manfully, and letting the physician cut, as I may say, and burn him or them, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable, not regarding the pain, but if he have done things worthy of stripes, allowing himself to be scourged, or if of bonds, to be bound, or if of a fine, to be fined, or if of exile, to be exiled, or if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to that?

Pol. To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though probably in agreement with your premises.

Soc. Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven?

Pol. Yes; that is true.

Soc. And from the opposite point of view, of doing harm to some one, whether he be an enemy or not—I except the case in which I myself am suffering injury at the hands of another, for I must take precautions against that—but if my enemy injures 481 a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep and spend what he has stolen on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any

use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.

Cal. Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking?

Chaer. I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; but you may as well ask him.

Cal. By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing?

Soc. O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves apiece:—I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the fair son of Pylilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus, the fair young son of Pylilampes. For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you are apt to say when under their influence, you
482 would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you must use the same language as your loves, and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who is my love, for she is always saying to me what I am now saying to you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of Cleinias is inconstant, but philosophy

is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering when you hear them spoken ;—her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils ; or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I provided ; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict myself.

Cal. O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and are manifestly running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has met with the same evil fate himself which he accused you of bringing upon Gorgias : he said, if I remember rightly, that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice ? and Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would expect this of him, and would be displeased if he said ‘ No ; ’ in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and you were delighted ; Polus laughed at you at the time, deservedly, as I think ; but now he has himself experienced the same misfortune. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you, that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was what led to his being entangled by you ; and because he was too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another : and hence, if a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself ; and you, in your 483
ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the rule of nature ; and if he is talking

of the rule of nature, you slip away to custom: as you did in this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). These are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which we forge and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions,—

484 charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws, sinning against

nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, in the poem in which he says, that

Law is the king of all, mortals as well as immortals;

this, as he says,

Makes might to be right, and does violence with high hand; as I infer from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them—

—I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says,

Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest portion of the day to that in which he thinks himself to excel most,

and anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, 485 and praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as

I do towards those who lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. And when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. But when I see a man lisping as if he were a child, that appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when I see a youth so engaged,—that I consider to be quite in character, and becoming a man of a liberal education, and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later life, and not leaving off, I think that he ought to be beaten, Socrates; for, as I was saying, such an one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out like a free-man in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of Euripides, of which I was just now speaking: for I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are careless when you ought to be careful;

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Having a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;
 Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason
 or proof,
 Or offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.

And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not know what to do:—there you would

stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of

An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,

who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his goods, and deprived of his rights of citizenship?—he being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more :

Learn the arts of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom.
But leave to others these niceties,

whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities :

For they will only
Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.

Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.

Soc. If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me.

Cal. What makes you say that, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you; I think that in you I have found the desired touchstone.

Cal. Why?

Soc. Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought to have three 487 qualities—knowledge, good-will, frankness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are; others are wise,

but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the interest in me which you have ; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not frank enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an excellent education ; to this many Athenians can testify. And I am certain that you are my friend. How do I prove it ? Shall I tell you how ? I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together : there were four of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise, lest, without your knowing, this should be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have in that a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference clearly is, that if you and I agree in an argument about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by you and me, and will not require to be referred to any further test. For you cannot have been led to agree with me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor from a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of the perfect truth. Nevertheless, Callicles, there is no nobler enquiry than that which in me you censure,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth ? For

488 be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from my ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it.

And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me 'dolt,' and 'good-for-nothing,' and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection?

Cal. Yes; that is what I was saying, and what I still maintain.

Soc. And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior:—this is the point which I want to have clearly explained. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different?

Cal. I say unequivocally that they are the same.

Soc. Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior are far better, as you were saying?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then the laws which are made by them are by nature noble, as they are the superior?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful ⁴⁸⁹ than to suffer injustice? and that equality and not excess is justice?—is that so or no? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be found to come in the way¹:—I must beg of you to answer,

¹ Cp. what is said of Gorgias by Callicles at p. 482.

in order that if you agree with me I may be fortified in my judgment by the assent of so competent an authority.

Cal. Yes; that is the opinion of the many.

Soc. Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was artfully playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom?

Cal. This man always will be talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, are you not ashamed to be word-catching, and when a man trips in a word, thinking that to be a piece of luck? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?

Soc. Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question, what is the superior, because I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you.

Cal. You are ironical.

Soc. No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just now saying (485 A) many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then, whom you mean by the better?

Cal. I mean the more excellent.

Soc. Do you not see that you are yourself repeating words and explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?

490 *Cal.* Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.

Soc. Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they

ought to be his subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. That is what I believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand?

Cal. Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.

Soc. Stop now, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of food?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;—his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, Callicles:—am I not right, my friend?

Cal. You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I am not speaking of them.

Soc. Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer that.

Cal. I do.

Soc. And ought not the better to have a larger share?

Cal. Not of meats and drinks.

Soc. I understand: then, perhaps, of coats—the skilfullest weaver ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about clothed in the best and finest of them?

Cal. Nonsense about coats.

Soc. Then the skilfullest and wisest in making shoes ought to have the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should

walk about in the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?

Cal. Shoes! fudge. What nonsense you are talking!

Soc. Or, if that is not your meaning, perhaps you mean to say that the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own especial use?

Cal. How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!

Soc. Yes, Callicles, and not only talking in the same way, but
491 on the same subjects.

Cal. Yes, by Heaven, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.

Soc. But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor offer one?

Cal. I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by the superior not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul.

Soc. See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior as the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what they are better?

Cal. I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and courageous in the administration of a state; they ought to be the rulers of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects.

Soc. But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more than themselves, my friend?

Cal. How do you mean?

Soc. I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule others?

Cal. What do you mean by his 'ruling over himself'?

Soc. A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and passions.

Cal. What innocence! you mean those fools,—the temperate?

Soc. Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning.

Cal. Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this the many cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I was saying before, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or exclusive power, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to hinder him, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?—must not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:—that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they are duly supported, are happiness and virtue—all the rest is a mere bauble, custom contrary to nature, fond inventions of men nothing worth.

Soc. There is a noble freedom, Calicles, in your way of approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but are unwilling to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life may become

manifest. Tell me, then:—you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue?

Cal. Yes; that is what I say.

Soc. Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?

Cal. No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of all.

Soc. But surely according to you life is an awful thing; and indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,

‘Who knows if life be not death and death life;’

493 and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at this moment we *are* dead, and that the body (*σῶμα*) is a tomb (*σῆμα*), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the desires is liable to be blown and tossed about; and some ingenious man, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the soul a vessel (*πίθος*), meaning a believing (*πιστικὸς*) vessel, and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, because they can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world (*ἄειδὲς*), these uninitiated or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they carry water to a vessel which is full of holes in a similarly holey colander. The colander, as he declares, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These are strange words, but still they show what, if I can, I desire to prove to you; that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, you should choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you,

and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?

Cal. The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.

Soc. Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony 49 of pain. Such are their respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite is the truth?

Cal. You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the life of pleasure is the pouring in of the stream.

Soc. And if the stream is always pouring in, must there not be a stream always running out, and holes large enough to admit of the discharge?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. The life, then, of which you are now speaking, is not that of a dead man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And he is to be thirsting and drinking?

Cal. Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.

Soc. Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have

no shame ; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame : and first, will you tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of scratching and continue scratching through life, in your notion of happiness ?

Cal. What a strange being you are, Socrates ! a regular clap-trap speaker.

Soc. That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared the modesty out of Polus and Gorgias ; but your modesty will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question.

Cal. I answer, that the scratcher would live pleasantly.

Soc. And if pleasantly, then also happily ?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. But what if the itching is not confined to the head ? Shall I pursue the question. And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable ? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want ?

Cal. Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument ?

Soc. Well, my fine friend, but am I to blame for that, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure are happy, whatever may be the character of their pleasure, and
495 admits of no distinction of good and bad pleasures ? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good ?

Cal. Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same.

Soc. You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion.

Cal. Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.

Soc. Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good ; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been shadowed forth must follow, and many others.

Cal. That, Socrates, is only your opinion.

Soc. And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying?

Cal. Indeed I do.

Soc. Then, as you are in earnest, let us proceed with the argument.

Cal. By all means.

Soc. Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me :—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?

Cal. There is.

Soc. And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge?

Cal. I was.

Soc. And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another?

Cal. Certainly I was.

Soc. And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same?

Cal. Not the same, O man of wisdom.

Soc. And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same ; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.

Cal. And what does our friend Socrates, of Fox-Court, say to this : does he assent, or not?

Soc. He does not assent ; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another : a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time?

Cal. What do you mean?

Soc. Take the case of any bodily affection :—a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. He surely cannot have the same eyes at the same time well and sound?

Cal. Certainly not.

Soc. And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together?

Cal. Certainly not.

Soc. That would surely be marvellous and absurd?

Cal. Very.

Soc. I suppose that he has them, and gets rid of them in turns?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Or swiftness and slowness?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?

Cal. Certainly he has.

Soc. If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we admit that? Please not to answer without consideration.

Cal. I entirely admit that.

Soc. Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?

Cal. I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant.

Soc. I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And thirst, too, is painful?

Cal. Yes, very.

Soc. Need I adduce any more instances, or would you admit of all wants or desires, that they are painful?

Cal. That I admit, and therefore you need not adduce any more.

Soc. Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word 'thirsty' implies pain?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. There is pleasure in that you drink?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. When you are thirsty?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. When in pain?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body; which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence? Is that true, or not?

Cal. True.

Soc. You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?

Cal. Yes, I say that.

Soc. But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also 497 have pleasure?

Cal. That is evident.

Soc. Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?

Cal. I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.

Soc. You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.

Cal. Well, get on, and don't be fooling: exhibit your wisdom in instructing me.

Soc. Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time?

Cal. I do not understand what you are saying.

Gor. Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes, as we should like to hear the argument out.

Cal. Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates: he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.

Gor. What matter? That does you no harm, Callicles; let Socrates argue in his own fashion.

Cal. Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these narrow and little questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.

Soc. I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the little. I thought that was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking, at the same moment?

Cal. True.

Soc. And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted:—do you not still admit that?

Cal. Yes, I do; but what is the inference?

Soc. Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful, for there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you still say so?

Cal. Certainly I should.

Soc. And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?

Cal. Yes, I have.

Soc. And a foolish man too?

Cal. Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?

498 *Soc.* Nothing particular, if you will only answer.

Cal. Yes, I have.

Soc. And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?

Cal. They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.

Soc. Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave?

Cal. I should say 'most' of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally.

Soc. No matter; then the cowards rejoice?

Cal. Greatly.

Soc. And the foolish, as would appear?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained?

Cal. Both are pained.

Soc. And are they equally pained?

Cal. I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.

Soc. And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure?

Cal. I dare say.

Soc. Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all nearly equally pleased and pained, as you were saying, but the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then are the good and the bad nearly equally pleased and pained?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then are the good and bad equally good and equally bad, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? [i. e. in having more pleasure and more pain.]

Cal. I really do not know what you mean.

Soc. Why, do you not remember saying that the good were

good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?

Cal. Yes, I remember.

Soc. And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice—if they do rejoice?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. Then those who rejoice are good by reason of the presence of good?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil?

Cal. I should.

Soc. Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?

Cal. I should say that he has.

Soc. Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what 499 is man twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And he who has joy is good?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And he who is in pain is evil?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. We say further that the good and evil both have joy and pain, and, perhaps, that the evil has more of them?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?

Cal. I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad?

Soc. Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. But not the evil?

Cal. Clearly.

Soc. Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that

all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good ;—and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake
500 of the good, and not the good for the sake of them?—will you add a third vote to our two?

Cal. I will.

Soc. Then pleasure as well as all else is for the sake of good, and not good for the sake of pleasure?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?

Cal. He must have art.

Soc. Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus ; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim at pleasure, and at pleasure only, and know nothing of good and evil, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Calicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you ; do not answer at random what is not your real opinion ;—for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life ; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, after your manner ; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy ;—and in what the latter way of life differs from the former. But perhaps we had better distinguish them first, as I attempted to do before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?

Cal. No, I do not.

Soc. Then I will explain myself more clearly : seeing that you

and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you agree thus far or not?

Cal. Yes, I agree.

Soc. Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further 501 said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure, never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she had usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ.

Cal. I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.

Soc. And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?

Cal. Equally true of two or more.

Soc. Then one may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?

Cal. I assent.

Soc. And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?—is not that of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend 502 to the moral improvement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?

Cal. In the case of Cinesias, Socrates, the answer is manifest.

Soc. And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure?

Cal. That is my notion of them.

Soc. And to what does their solemn sister, the wondrous muse of Tragedy, devote herself? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which is her character?

Cal. There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and gratification.

Soc. And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery?

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?

Cal. True.

Soc. And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, bond and free. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery.

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best in their speeches, and to desire only the greatest improvement of the citizens, or are they too bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this?

Cal. I must distinguish. There are some who have a real 503 care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.

Soc. I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, will you tell me who he is?

Cal. But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living.

Soc. Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches; for, indeed, I do not know of such a man?

Cal. What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself?

Soc. Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did distinguish them?

Cal. No, indeed, I cannot.

Soc. Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such an one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of them was such as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look to their work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but keep in view the form of their work? The artist
504 disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny that?

Cal. No; I am ready to admit that.

Soc. Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the same is true of a ship?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And the same may be said of the human body?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order?

Cal. The latter follows from our previous admissions.

Soc. What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body?

Cal. I suppose that you mean health and strength?

Soc. Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to

the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other.

Cal. Why do you not give the name yourself, Socrates?

Soc. Well, if you would rather, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. Healthy, as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not?

Cal. True.

Soc. And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And will not the true rhetorician who is honest as well as skilful have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you allow that?

Cal. Yes, I do.

Soc. For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even 505 worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true?

Cal. I will not say No to that.

Soc. For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not right?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement.

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And that will be for her true interests?

Cal. To be sure.

Soc. And controlling her desires is chastising her?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then control or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring?

Cal. I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask some one who does.

Soc. Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or corrected, as the argument would say.

Cal. I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.

Soc. What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?

Cal. That I leave for you to determine.

Soc. Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle,' and I should not like to have the argument wandering about without a head; please then to go on a little longer, and put the head on.

Cal. How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you.

Soc. But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument.

Cal. Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself?

Soc. Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my

own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclu- 506
sions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways.

Gor. I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say.

Soc. I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus¹;' but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that you will listen and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul.

Cal. My good friend, never mind me, but get on.

Soc. Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:— Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? That is my view.

¹ p. 485.

And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order of her own? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which
 507 is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?

Cal. Go on, my good fellow.

Soc. Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.

And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy cannot be other than just and holy? Very true. And he must be courageous, for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position which I assert to be true, and if I am right, then I affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be

unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire to satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such an one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.—Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz. that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true. And now, let us proceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity of danger, or that I am like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,—he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or he may take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; and this, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my face and purse cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrong-

fully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have
 509 been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would seem now, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, to have been fixed and riveted by us, in iron and adamantine bonds; and unless you or some other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. For what I am always saying is, that I know not the truth about these things, and yet that I have never known anybody who could say anything else, any more than you can, and not be ridiculous. This has always been my position, and if this position is a true one, and if injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than the greatest evils, in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defence without which a man will be truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?—and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right, Callicles?

Cal. Yes, quite right.

Soc. Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—how can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power?

Cal. He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.

Soc. And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will

only sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will?

Cal. Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.

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Soc. Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order that we may do no injustice?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And what is that art which will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a tyrant or ruler himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power.

Cal. Well said, Socrates; I hope that you will observe how ready I am to praise you when you talk sense.

Soc. Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like him—like to like, as ancient sages say. What do you think of that?

Cal. I approve.

Soc. But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, if there is any one who is his superior in virtue, he may be expected to fear him, and will never be able to be perfectly friendly with him.

Cal. That is true.

Soc. Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a friend.

Cal. That again is true.

Soc. Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with impunity:—is that true?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And if a young man begins to ask how he may be-

come great and formidable, this would seem to be the way; he will accustom himself, from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And in this way he will have accomplished, as you say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite be true, if he is to be like the tyrant in his
511 injustice, and to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as possible, and not be punished?

Cal. True.

Soc. And as he imitates his master and acquires power his soul will become bad and corrupted, and that will be the greatest evil to him?

Cal. You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?

Soc. Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a mind—the bad man will kill the good and true.

Cal. And is not that just the provoking thing?

Soc. Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that all our cares are to be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you recommend me to cultivate?

Cal. Yes, truly, and very good advice too.

Soc. Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of any great pretensions?

Cal. No, indeed.

Soc. And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, which not only saves the souls

of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. But the pilot's art is modest and un-presuming, and has no airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt at the utmost two drachmae, in return for the great benefit of saving the passenger and his wife and children and goods, and disembarking them safely at the Piraeus; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is a philosopher, you must know, and is aware that there is no certainty as to which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in ⁵¹² their bodies or in their souls; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him in having been kept alive, much less can he have benefited one who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be saved from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other devourer;—of him he knows that he had better not live, for he cannot live well.

And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that they are the only realities; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the other whom I was just

now mentioning? I know that you will say, 'I am better, and better born.' But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving and being saved, and that he who is truly a man ought not to care about living a certain time:—he knows, as women say, that we must all die, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term;—whether by assimilating himself to that constitution
 513 under which he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the Athenian people, if you intend to be dear to them, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us;—I would not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thesalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, Callicles; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pylilampes' darling, who is called after them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?

Cal. Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by you.

Soc. The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things,

including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew?

Cal. Very true.

Soc. And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions?

Cal. I will not deny what you say.

Soc. And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was ministered to, whether body or soul?

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other good, unless the 514 mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that?

Cal. Yes, certainly, if you like.

Soc. Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were engaged in the administration of political affairs, and were advising one another about some public work, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, and who taught us?—would not that be necessary, Callicles?

Cal. True.

Soc. In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in building, not only with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill—in that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is not this true?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask you, and would you not ask me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as a state-physician, and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired experience of the art. Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter's art; which is a foolish thing?

515 *Cal.* True.

Soc. And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer?

Cal. You are contentious, Socrates.

Soc. Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among us—whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect

for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good citizens.

Cal. I do.

Soc. But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the citizens better instead of worse?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?

Cal. Very likely.

Soc. Nay, my friend, 'likely' is not the word; for if he was a good citizen, the inference is certain.

Cal. And what difference does that make?

Soc. None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk and of money.

Cal. You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise their ears.

Soc. But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was during the time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a malefactor.

Cal. Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness?

Soc. Why, surely, you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting nor biting him, and imparted to them all these savage tricks? Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you say to that?

Cal. I will do you the favour of saying 'yes.'

Soc. And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an animal?

Cal. Certainly he is.

Soc. And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who were under him, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, and not more unjust?

Cal. Quite true.

Soc. And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of another mind?

Cal. I agree.

Soc. And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have been very far from desiring.

Cal. Do you want me to agree with you?

Soc. Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.

Cal. I grant what you say.

Soc. And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and inferior?

Cal. Granted.

Soc. Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?

Cal. That is, upon your view.

Soc. Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracise him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years; and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the chief Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any other sort of occupation.—What do you think?

Cal. I should think not.

Soc. Well, but if so, the truth is as I said, that in the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself a good statesman; and you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.

Cal. But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of them in his performances.

Soc. O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the serving men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly better servants than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the desires of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow-citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were more skilful at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,—the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing he is naturally supposed by himself and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another art—an art of gymnastic and medi-

cine which is the true minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the others, and to use their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of the real
518 good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have been good trainers?—and you replied, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital wine;—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom you mention. And yet you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could they would do him some harm; while they praise those who are the real authors of the mischief. That, I repeat, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the ulcerated and swollen condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice

and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, ⁵¹⁹ the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these calamities of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories after the fact. A foolish piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old, about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed ill behaviour to them; 'after all their valuable services, that they should unjustly perish,'—so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice imparted to them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more irrational, my friend, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a claptrap speaker, because you will not answer.

Cal. And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to answer?

Soc. I suppose that I can; at any rate, I am making long speeches now because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there is not a great inconsistency in professing to have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?

Cal. Yes, I acknowledge that.

Soc. Do you never hear our professors of education speak- ⁵²⁰ ing in this inconsistent manner?

Cal. Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?

Soc. I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city :—do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine: the orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without accusing themselves in the same breath of having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not that true?

Cal. Certainly.

Soc. If they are right in saying that they make men better than they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have been benefited by them: whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice.

Cal. Very true.

Soc. But he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave this question of payment to his pupils, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right?

Cal. Yes.

Soc. Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art?

Cal. Yes, we have found the reason.

Soc. But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?

Cal. True.

Soc. And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is not that true?

Cal. Yes, that is true.

Soc. Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine that for me. Am I to be the physician of the State 521 who will strive and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind.

Cal. I say then that you should be the servant of the State.

Soc. The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.

Cal. The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the consequences will be—

Soc. Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.

Cal. How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some miserable and mean person.

Soc. Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?

Cal. By all means.

Soc. I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, seeing that when I speak I speak

not with any view of pleasing, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply in such a case, if some one were to accuse him, saying, ‘O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!’ What do you suppose that the physician would reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say: ‘All this, my boys, I did for your health,’ and then would there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry out!

Cal. I dare say.

Soc. Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?

Cal. He certainly would.

Soc. And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:—‘All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and of that only.’ And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me.

Cal. And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in a good position?

Soc. Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which you have often admitted that he should have; if he be his own defence, and have never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; for that has often been acknowledged by us to

be the best sort of defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone ; and if I died for want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no man but an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.

Cal. Very well, proceed ; and then we shall have done.

Soc. Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, ⁵²³ which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us¹, how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto' divided the empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in Heaven, —that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he dies, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil ; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even later in the reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die ; the judges were alive, and the men were alive ; and the consequence was that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said : ' I shall put a stop to this ; the judgments are not well given, and the reason is that the judged have their clothes on, for they are alive ; and there are many having evil souls who are apparelled in fair bodies, or wrapt in wealth or rank, and when the day of judgment arrives many witnesses come forward and witness on their behalf that they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have their clothes on

¹ Il. xv. 187. foll.

when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged.—What is to be done? I will tell you:—In the first place, I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they at present possess; that is a commission, of which I have already entrusted the execution to Prometheus: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead: he with his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked soul, and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth; conducted in this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before you did, and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, 524 when they are dead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the place where the three ways meet, out of which the two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt:—then the judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.'

From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the following inferences:—Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And after they are separated they retain their several characteristics, which are much the same as in life; the body has the same nature and ways and affections, all clearly discernible; for example, he who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a

word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and for a considerable time. And I should imagine that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.—And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and 525 has no straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves.

Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit themselves. But others get good when they behold them for ever enduring the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins—there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most

impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than those
 526 who had the power. Yes, Callicles, the very bad men come from the class of those who have power. And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend.

As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. Acacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:

‘Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.’

Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as

well as I can, and, when the time comes, to die. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of ⁵²⁷ Aegina, and when you are in the hands of justice you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you every sort of insult.

Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale, which you will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others;—of the few as of the many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done, always with a view to justice.

Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after death, as your own argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to

us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds ; and what a state of education does that imply ! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go ; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way in which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you ; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth.

APPENDIX.

A P P E N D I X.

IT seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a century later include manifest forgeries. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while, perhaps, there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines great excellence with considerable length. A really great writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant original genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and therefore mistakes may have sometimes

happened. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us.

These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle has various degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under their own names, e. g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of really great works, e. g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e. g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit of his writings.

Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that nine-tenths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to

Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions of scholars; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to his own powers, or writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected to think always like himself during a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.

The dialogues which have been translated in the Appendix, and which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the First Alcibiades, the Menexenus, or Funeral Oration. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited by Aristotle; the first in the *Metaphysics*, iv. 29, 5, the latter in the *Rhetoric*, iii. 14, 11. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias

does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 21, and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' in an undoubted dialogue of Plato, which is taken from Xenophon. On the other hand, the upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in the *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of the argument.

The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon, and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic, cp. 465 A; and the Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. i. 3, 1. A similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides.

To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and is somewhat longer, though not verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the two preceding works, if genuine it is to be compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates (216 B, C). For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the genuineness of the extant dialogue.

Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them is different. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether spurious;—that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can we exclude the possibility that some dialogues which are usually rejected,

such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine.

On the whole, not a sixteenth part of the writings which pass under the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves, can be fairly doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have taken place in his philosophy. That sixteenth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader.

LESSER HIPPIAS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Lesser Hippias may be compared with the earlier dialogues of Plato, in which the contrast of Socrates and the Sophists is most strongly exhibited. Hippias, like Protagoras and Gorgias, though civil, is vain and boastful: he knows all things; he can make anything, including his own clothes; he is a manufacturer of poems and declamations, and also of seal-rings, shoes, strigils; his girdle, which he has woven himself, is of a finer than Persian quality. He is a vainer, lighter nature than the two great Sophists (cp. *Protag.* 314, 337), but of the same character with them, and equally impatient of the short cut-and-thrust method of Socrates, whom he endeavours to draw into a long oration. At last, he gets tired of being defeated at every point by Socrates, and is with difficulty induced to proceed (compare *Thrasymachus*, *Protagoras*, *Callicles*, and others, to whom the same reluctance is ascribed).

Hippias like Protagoras has common sense on his side, when he argues, citing passages of the *Iliad* in support of his view, that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest, Odysseus the wisest of the Greeks. But he is easily overthrown by the superior dialectics of Socrates, who pretends to show that Achilles is not true to his word, and that no similar inconsistency is to be found in Odysseus. Hippias replies that Achilles unintentionally, but Odysseus intentionally, speaks falsehood. But is it better to do wrong intentionally or unintentionally? Socrates, relying on the analogy of the arts, maintains the former, Hippias the latter of the two alternatives. All this is quite conceived in the spirit of Plato, who is very far from making Socrates always argue on the side of truth. The over-reasoning on Homer, which is of course satirical, is also in the spirit of Plato. Poetry turned logic is more ridiculous than

'rhetoric turned logic,' and equally fallacious. There were reasoners in ancient as well as in modern times, who could never receive the natural impression of Homer, or of any other book which they read. The argument of Socrates, in which he picks out the apparent inconsistencies and discrepancies in the speech and actions of Achilles, and the final paradox, 'that he who is true is also false,' remind us of the explanation of Pittacus in the Protagoras, and of similar reasonings in the first book of the Republic. The discrepancies which Socrates discovers in the words of Achilles are perhaps as great as those discovered by some of the modern separatists of the Homeric poems.

At last, Socrates having caught Hippias in the toils of the voluntary and involuntary, is obliged to confess that he is wandering about in the same labyrinth; he makes the reflection on himself which others would make upon him (cp. Protagoras, sub fin.). He does not wonder that he should be in a difficulty, but he wonders at Hippias, and he becomes sensible of the gravity of the situation, when ordinary men like himself can no longer go to the wise and be taught by them.

LESSER HIPPIAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

EUDICUS, SOCRATES, HIPPIAS.

Steph. *Eudicus.* WHY are you silent, Socrates, after the magnificent
363 display which Hippias has been making? Why do you not either refute his words, if he seems to you to have been wrong in any point, or join with us in commending him? There is the more reason why you should speak, because we are now alone, and the audience is confined to those who may fairly claim to take part in a philosophical discussion.

Socrates. I should much like, Eudicus, to question Hippias about what he was just now saying of Homer. I have heard your father, Apemantus, declare that the Iliad of Homer is a finer poem than the Odyssey in the same degree that Achilles was a better man than Odysseus; for, as he said, Odysseus is the central figure of the one poem and Achilles of the other. Now, I should like to know, if Hippias has no objection to tell me, what is his opinion about these two heroes, and which of them he maintains to be the better; he has already told us in the course of his exhibition many things of various kinds about Homer and divers other poets.

Eud. I am sure that Hippias will have no objection to answer anything that you ask him; tell me, Hippias, if Socrates asks you a question, will you answer him?

Hippias. Indeed, Eudicus, I should be strangely inconsistent if I refused to answer Socrates, when at each Olympic festival, as I went up from my house at Elis to the temple of Olympia, where all the Hellenes were assembled, I continually professed my willingness to perform any of the exhibitions which I had prepared, and to answer any questions which any one had to ask.

Soc. Truly, Hippias, you are a happy man, if at every Olympic festival you have such an encouraging opinion of your own powers when you go up to the temple. I doubt whether any muscular hero would be as fearless and confident in offering his body to the combat at Olympia, as you are in offering your mind.

Hip. And with good reason, Socrates; for since the day when I first entered the lists at Olympia I have never found any one who was my superior in anything.

Soc. What an ornament, Hippias, will the reputation of your wisdom be to the city of Elis and to your parents! But to return: what do you say of Odysseus and Achilles? Which of the two is the better of them? and in what particular does either surpass the other? For when you were exhibiting and company was in the room, though I could not follow you, I did not like to ask what you meant, because there were other people present, and I was afraid that the question might interrupt your exhibition. But now that there are not so many of us, and my friend Eudicus bids me ask, I wish you would tell me what you were saying about these two heroes, so that I may clearly understand; how did you distinguish them?

Hip. I shall have much pleasure, Socrates, in explaining to you more clearly than I could in public my views about these and also about other heroes. I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of those who went to Troy, and Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wildest.

Soc. O rare Hippias, will you be so good as not to laugh, if I find a difficulty in following you, and repeat my questions several times over? Please to answer me kindly and gently.

Hip. I should be greatly ashamed of myself, Socrates, if I, who teach others and take money of them, could not, when I was asked by you, answer in a civil and agreeable manner.

Soc. Thank you: the fact is, that I seemed to understand what you meant when you said that the poet intended Achilles to be the bravest of men, and also that he intended Nestor to be the wisest; but when you said that he meant Odysseus to be the wildest, I must confess that I could not understand what you said. Will you tell me, and then I shall perhaps understand you better; has not Homer made Achilles equally wild?

Hip. Certainly not, Socrates; he is the most straightforward of mankind, and in the passage called the Prayers, when he makes them talking with one another, Achilles is supposed by the poet to say to Odysseus:—

365 ‘Son of Laertes, sprung from heaven, crafty Odysseus, I will speak out plainly the word which I intend to act, and which I believe will be accomplished. For I hate him like the gates of death, who thinks one thing and says another. But I will speak that which shall be accomplished.’

Now, in these verses he clearly indicates the character of the two men; he shows Achilles to be true and simple, and Odysseus to be wily and false; for he supposes Achilles to be addressing Odysseus in these lines.

Soc. Now, Hippias, I think that I understand your meaning; when you say that Odysseus is wily, you clearly mean that he is false?

Hip. Exactly, Socrates, and that is the character of Odysseus, as represented by Homer in many passages both of the Iliad and Odyssey.

Soc. And Homer must be presumed to have meant that the true man is not the same as the false?

Hip. Of course, Socrates.

Soc. And is that your own opinion, Hippias?

Hip. Certainly; how can I have any other?

Soc. Well, then, as there is no possibility of asking Homer what he meant in these verses of his, let us leave him; but as you are a friend of his, and are ready to take up his cause, will you answer on behalf of yourself and him?

Hip. I will; ask shortly anything that you like.

Soc. Do you say that the false, like the sick, have no power to do things, or that they have power to do things?

Hip. I should say that they have power to do many things, and in particular to deceive mankind.

Soc. Then, according to you, they are both powerful and wily, are they not? And are they wily, and do they deceive by reason of their simplicity and folly, or by reason of their cunning and a certain sort of prudence?

Hip. By reason of their cunning and prudence, I should say.

Soc. Then they are prudent, I suppose?

Hip. That they are—very.

Soc. And if they are prudent, do they know or do they not know what they do?

Hip. Of course, they know very well indeed; and that is why they do mischief to others.

Soc. And having this knowledge, are they ignorant, or are they wise?

Hip. Wise, certainly; at least, in so far as they can deceive.

Soc. Stop, and let us recall to mind what you are saying; 366 are you not saying that the false are powerful and prudent and knowing and wise in those things about which they are false?

Hip. That is what I am saying.

Soc. And the true are different from the false; and the true and the false are the very opposite of each other?

Hip. That is my view.

Soc. Then, according to your view, it would seem that the false are to be ranked among the powerful and wise?

Hip. Assuredly.

Soc. And when you say that the false are powerful and wise in so far as they are false, do you mean that they have or have not the power of uttering their falsehoods if they like?

Hip. I mean to say that they have the power.

Soc. In a word, then, the false are they who are wise and have the power to speak falsely?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then a man who has not the power of speaking falsely and is ignorant cannot be false?

Hip. You are right.

Soc. And every man has power who does that which he wishes at the time when he wishes. I am not speaking in any special case of his being prevented by disease or something of that sort, but I am speaking generally, as I might say of you, that you are able to write my name when you like. Would you not call a man able who could do that?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And tell me, Hippias, are you not a skilful calculator and arithmetician?

Hip. Yes, Socrates, assuredly I am.

Soc. And if some one were to ask you what is the sum of

3 multiplied by 700, you would tell him the true answer in a moment, if you pleased?

Hip. Certainly I should.

Soc. Is not that because you are the wisest and ablest of men in these matters?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And are you only the wisest and ablest of men, and not also the best in these matters of calculation in which you are the ablest and wisest?

Hip. To be sure, Socrates, I am the best.

Soc. And so you would be the best able to tell the truth about these matters, would you not?

Hip. Yes, I should.

Soc. And could you speak falsehoods about them equally well? I must beg, Hippias, that you will answer me with the same frankness and magnanimity which you have hitherto shown. If a person were to ask you what is the sum of 3 multiplied by 700, would you not be the best teller of a falsehood, having always the power of speaking falsely as you have of speaking truly, about these same matters, if you wanted to tell
367 a falsehood, and not to answer truly? Would the ignorant man be better able to tell a falsehood in matters of calculation than you would be, if you chose? Might he not sometimes stumble upon the truth, when he wanted to tell a lie, because he did not know, whereas you who are the wise man, if you wanted to tell a lie would always and uniformly lie?

Hip. Yes; you are quite right in that.

Soc. Does the false man tell lies about other things, but not about number, or when he is making a calculation?

Hip. To be sure; he would speak falsely about number as about all other things.

Soc. Then may we further assume, Hippias, that there are men who are false about calculation and number?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Who can they be? For you have already admitted that he who is false must have the ability to be false: you said, as you will remember, that he who is unable to be false will not be false?

Hip. Yes, I remember.

Soc. And were you not yourself just now shown to be best able to speak falsely about calculation?

Hip. Yes; that was also said.

Soc. And are you not likewise said to speak truly about calculation?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. Then is not the same person able to speak both falsely and truly about calculation? And that person is he who is good at calculation or the arithmetician?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Who, then, Hippias, is discovered to be false at calculation? Is he not the good man? For the good man is the able man, and he is the true man.

Hip. That is evident.

Soc. Do you not see, then, that the same man is false and also true about these matters? And the true man is not a whit better than the false; for indeed he is the same with him and not the very opposite, as you were just now imagining.

Hip. That appears to be the case in that instance.

Soc. Shall we examine other instances?

Hip. Certainly, if you are disposed.

Soc. Are you not also skilled in geometry?

Hip. I am.

Soc. Well, and does not the same hold in that? Is not the same person best able to speak falsely or to speak truly about diagrams; and he is the geometrician?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. He and no one else is good at that?

Hip. Yes, he and no one else.

Soc. Then the good and wise geometer has this double power in the highest degree; and if there be a man who is false about diagrams the good man will be the man, for he is able to be false; whereas the bad is unable, and for this reason is not false, as has been acknowledged.

Hip. True.

Soc. Once more—let us examine a third case; that of the astronomer, in whose art, again, you, Hippias, are a still greater proficient than in the previous arts—are you not?

Hip. Yes, I am.

Soc. And does not the same hold of astronomy?

Hip. True, Socrates.

Soc. And in astronomy, too, if any man be able to speak falsely he will be the good astronomer, but he who is not able will not speak falsely, for he has no knowledge.

Hip. That is true.

Soc. Then in astronomy also, the same man will be true and false?

Hip. That seems to be the case.

Soc. And now, Hippias, consider the question at large about all the sciences, and see whether the same principle does not always hold. I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men, as I have heard you boasting in the agora at the tables of the money-changers, when you were setting forth the great and enviable stores of your wisdom; and you said that upon one occasion, when you went to the Olympic games, all that you had on your person was made by yourself. In the first place, there was your ring;—you began with that, which was of your own workmanship, and you said that you could engrave rings; and you had another seal which was also of your own workmanship, and a strigil and an oil flask, which you had made yourself; you said also that you had made the shoes which you had on your feet, and the cloak and the tunic; but what appeared to us all most extraordinary and a proof of singular art, was the girdle of your tunic, which, you said, was as fine as the most costly Persian fabric, and of your own weaving; moreover, you told us that you had brought with you poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose writings of the most various kinds; and you said that your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which I was just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography; and if I remember rightly, there were a great many other accomplishments in which you excelled. I have forgotten to mention your art of memory, which you regard as your special glory, and I dare say that I have forgotten many other things; but, as I was saying, only look to your own arts—and there are plenty of them—and to those of others; and tell me, having regard to the admissions which you and I have made, whether you discover any department of art or any description of wisdom or cunning, whichever name you use,

in which the true and false are different and not the same: 369
tell me, if you can, of any. But you cannot.

Hip. Not without consideration, Socrates.

Soc. Nor will consideration help you, Hippias, as I believe; but then if I am right, remember what the consequence will be.

Hip. I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

Soc. I suppose that you are not using your art of memory, doubtless because you think that such an accomplishment is not needed on the present occasion. I will therefore remind you of what you were saying: were you not saying that Achilles was a true man, and Odysseus false and wily?

Hip. I was.

Soc. And now do you perceive that the same person has turned out to be false as well as true? And if Odysseus is false he is also true, and if Achilles is true he is also false, and the two men are not different from one another, but they are the same.

Hip. O Socrates, you are always weaving the meshes of an argument, selecting the most difficult point, and fastening upon details instead of grappling with the matter in hand as a whole. Come now, and I will demonstrate to you, if you will allow me, by many satisfactory proofs, that Homer has made Achilles a better man than Odysseus, and a truthful man too; and that he has made the other crafty, and a teller of many untruths, and inferior to Achilles. And then, if you please, you shall make a speech on the other side, in order to prove that Odysseus is the better man; and this may be compared to mine, and then the company will know which of us is the better speaker.

Soc. O Hippias, I do not doubt that you are wiser than I am. But I have a way, when anybody else says anything, of giving close attention to him, especially if the speaker appears to me to be a wise man. Having a desire to understand, I question him, and I examine and analyse and compare what he says, in order that I may understand; but if the speaker appears to me to be little worth, I do not interrogate him, or trouble myself about him, and you may know by this who they are whom I deem to be wise men, for you will see that when I am talking with a wise man, I am very attentive to what he says; and I ask questions of him, in order that I may learn, and be improved by him.

And I could not help remarking while you were speaking, that when you recited the verses in which Achilles, as you declared, attacks Odysseus as a deceiver, that you must be strangely mistaken, because Odysseus, the man of wiles, is never found to
 370 tell a lie ; but Achilles is found to be wily on your own showing. At any rate he speaks falsely ; for first he utters these words, which you just now repeated,—

‘ He is hateful to me even as the gates of death, who thinks one thing and says another :’—

And then he says, a little while afterwards, he will not be persuaded by Odysseus and Agamemnon, neither will he remain at Troy ; but, says he,—

‘ To-morrow, when I have offered sacrifices to Zeus and all the Gods, I will drag my ships down into the deep, and will load them well ; and then you shall see, if you have a mind, and if such things are a care to you, early in the morning my ships sailing over the fishy Hellespont, and my men eagerly pulling the oar ; and, if the illustrious shaker of the earth gives me a good voyage, on the third day I shall reach the fertile Phthia.’

And before that, when he was reviling Agamemnon, he said,—

‘ And now to Phthia I will go, since to return home in the beaked ships is far better, nor do I think that you remaining here, while I am dishonoured, will receive riches and wealth.’

But although on that occasion, in the presence of the whole army, he said this, and on the other occasion to his companions, he appears never to have made any preparation or attempt to draw down the ships, as if he had the least intention of sailing home ; so entirely regardless was he of speaking truth. Now I, Hippias, originally asked you the question, because I was in doubt as to which of the two heroes was intended by the poet to be the best, and because I thought that both of them were the best, and it was difficult to decide which was the better of them, not only in respect of truth and falsehood, but of virtue generally, for even in this matter of speaking the truth they are much upon a par.

Hip. There you are wrong, Socrates ; for in so far as Achilles speaks falsely, the falsehood is obviously unintentional. He is compelled against his will to remain and rescue the army in

their misfortune. But when Odysseus speaks falsely he is voluntarily and intentionally false.

Soc. You, sweet Hippias, like Odysseus, are a deceiver yourself.

Hip. Certainly not, Socrates; what makes you say that? 371

Soc. Because you say that Achilles does not speak falsely from design, when he is not only a deceiver, but in the picture which Homer has drawn of him, a master in the art of falsehood, and so far superior to Odysseus in lying and deception, that he dares to contradict himself, and Odysseus does not find him out; at any rate he does not appear to say anything to him which would imply that he perceived his falsehood.

Hip. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. Did you not observe that afterwards, when he is speaking to Odysseus, he says that he will sail away with the early dawn; but to Ajax he tells quite a different story?

Hip. Where is that?

Soc. Where he says,—

‘I will not think about bloody war until the son of warlike Priam, illustrious Hector, comes to the tents and ships of the Myrmidons, slaughtering the Argives, and burning the ships with fire; and I suspect that about my tent and dark ship, Hector, although eager for the battle, will yet stay his hand.’

Now, do you really think, Hippias, that the son of Thetis and the pupil of the sage Cheiron had such a bad memory, considering that he had been assailing liars in the most violent terms only the instant before, or that he would have carried lying so far, as to say to Odysseus that he would sail away, and to Ajax that he would remain, and that he was not rather practising upon the simplicity of Odysseus, and thinking that he would get the better of him by his cunning and falsehood?

Hip. No, I do not agree with you, Socrates; but I believe that Achilles is induced to say one thing to Ajax, and another to Odysseus in the innocence of his heart, whereas Odysseus, whether he speaks falsely or truly, speaks always out of design.

Soc. Then Odysseus would appear after all to be better than Achilles?

Hip. Certainly not, Socrates.

Soc. Why, were not the voluntary liars only just now shown to be better than the involuntary?

Hip. And how, Socrates, can those who intentionally err, and voluntarily and designedly commit iniquities, be better than 372 those who err and do wrong involuntarily? Surely there is a great excuse to be made for a man telling a falsehood, or doing an injury or any sort of harm to another in ignorance. And the laws are obviously far more severe on those who lie, or do evil voluntarily, than on those who do evil involuntarily.

Soc. You see, Hippias, as I have already told you, how pertinacious I am in asking questions of a wise man. And I think that this is the only good point about me, for I am full of defects, and always getting wrong in some way or other. My deficiency is proved to me by the fact that when I meet one of you who are famous for wisdom, and to whose wisdom all the Hellenes are witnesses, I am found out to know nothing. For speaking generally, I hardly ever have the same opinion about anything which you have, and what proof of ignorance can be greater than to differ from wise men? But I have one singular good quality, which is my salvation; I am not ashamed to learn, and I ask and enquire, and am very grateful to those who answer me, and never fail to give them my grateful thanks; and when I learn a thing I never deny my teacher, or pretend that the lesson is a discovery of my own; but I praise his wisdom, and proclaim what I have learned from him. And now I cannot agree in what you are saying, but I strongly disagree. Well, I know that this is my own fault, and is a defect in my character, but I will not pretend to be more than I am; and my opinion, Hippias, is the very contrary of what you are saying. For I maintain that those who hurt or injure mankind, and speak falsely and deceive, and err voluntarily, are better far than those who do wrong involuntarily. Sometimes, however, I am of the opposite opinion; for I am all abroad in my ideas about this matter, and my perplexity is obviously occasioned by my not knowing. And just now I happen to be in a crisis of my disorder at which those who err voluntarily appear to me better than those who err involuntarily. My present state of mind is due to our previous argument, which inclines me to believe that in general those who do wrong involuntarily are worse than those who do wrong voluntarily, and therefore I hope that you will be good to me, and not refuse to heal me; for you will do me a much

greater benefit if you cure my soul of ignorance, than you would if you were to cure my body of disease. I must, however, tell 373 you beforehand, that if you make a long oration to me you will not cure me, for I shall not be able to follow you; but if you will answer me, as you did just now, you will do me a great deal of good, and I do not think that you will be any the worse yourself. And I have some claim upon you also, O son of Apemantus, for you incited me to converse with Hippias; and now, if Hippias will not answer me, you must entreat him on my behalf.

Eud. But I do not think, Socrates, that Hippias will require any entreaty of mine; for he has already said that he will refuse to answer no man.—Did you not say so, Hippias?

Hip. Yes, I did; but then, Eudicus, Socrates is always troublesome in an argument, and appears to be dishonest.

Soc. Excellent Hippias, that is not intentional on my part (that would show me to be a wise man and a master of wiles, as you would argue), but unintentional, and therefore you must pardon me; for, as you say, he who is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned.

Eud. Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you.

Hip. I will answer, as you wish; and do you ask whatever you like.

Soc. I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better—those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good runners?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And there are bad runners?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner?

Hip. Very true.

Soc. And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good and slowness is an evil?

Hip. To be sure.

Soc. Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily?

Hip. He who runs slowly voluntarily.

Soc. And is not running a species of doing?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. And if a species of doing, also a species of action?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a race?

Hip. Yes; a bad action, certainly.

Soc. And he who runs slowly runs badly?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily?

Hip. That is to be inferred.

Soc. Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily?

Hip. Yes, in a race.

374 *Soc.* Well; but at a wrestling match—which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hip. He who falls voluntarily, doubtless.

Soc. And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match to fall or to throw another?

Hip. To fall.

Soc. Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them involuntarily?

Hip. That appears to be the truth.

Soc. And what would you say of any other bodily exercise—is not he who has the stronger frame able to do both that which is strong and that which is weak—that which is honourable and that which is dishonourable?—so that when he does bad actions with the body, he who has the better frame does them voluntarily, and he who has the worse frame does them involuntarily.

Hip. Yes, that appears to be true about strength.

Soc. And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not the better frame able to make evil and disgraceful figures and postures voluntarily, as he who has the worse frame makes them involuntarily?

Hip. True.

Soc. Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame?

Hip. True.

Soc. And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune?

Hip. That which is voluntarily out of tune.

Soc. The involuntary is the worse of the two?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And would you choose to possess goods or evils?

Hip. Goods.

Soc. And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or involuntarily lame?

Hip. Feet which are voluntarily lame.

Soc. But is not lameness a defect or deformity?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And is not blinking a defect in the eyes?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink?

Hip. I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink.

Soc. Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill?

Hip. Yes, certainly, in such cases as that.

Soc. And does not the same hold of ears or nostrils, mouth, and all the senses—that those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as being defective; and that those which voluntarily act ill are to be desired as being good?

Hip. I agree.

Soc. And what would you say of instruments;—which are the better sort of instruments—those with which a man acts ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better

have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hip. He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill voluntarily.

Soc. And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things?

Hip. Very true.

Soc. And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily?

375 *Hip.* I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily.

Soc. That would be the better temper?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark?

Hip. Of him who voluntarily misses.

Soc. That would be the better mind for the purpose of archery?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than that which errs voluntarily?

Hip. Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow.

Soc. And what would you say of the art of medicine;—has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse that which does all this involuntarily?

Hip. That is evident.

Soc. But what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them involuntarily?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And will our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily?

Hip. O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily!

Soc. And yet that appears to be the inference.

Hip. I do not agree to that.

Soc. But I thought, Hippias, that you did agree. Please to answer once more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at all events, be one of these?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better.

Hip. Yes, that has been proved.

Soc. And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser soul will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. But if justice be power as well as knowledge—then will not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is the more ignorant [and weaker] be the more unjust? Must not that be so?

Hip. Clearly.

Soc. And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action?

Hip. Certainly.

Soc. The soul, then, which acts ill, acts involuntarily by power and art—and these either one or both of them are elements of justice?

Hip. That seems to be true.

Soc. And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily?

Hip. Clearly.

Soc. And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad?

Hip. Yes.

Soc. Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul?

Hip. Which he certainly has.

Soc. Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man?

Hip. There I cannot agree with you.

Soc. Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be the deduction which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our argument. As I was saying before, I wander up and down, and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, and we cannot come to you and find rest, the matter begins to be serious to us as well as to you.

FIRST ALCIBIADES.

INTRODUCTION.

THE First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium; in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth.

Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians—about what? Not about any particular art, but about politics—when to fight and when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must either have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades admits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. But he never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, he charged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just and unjust. He learned of the multitude, that is his own explanation. And why should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To

this Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice ; for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other : and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth.

Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but about what is expedient ; and he asserts that the two principles of justice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient.

However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen ; and he will not need training, for others are as ignorant as he is. Socrates reminds him that he has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies—with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia ; and he can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates. Not that he himself professes to have attained, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue.

The dialogue continues:—We wish to become as good as possible. But to be good in what ? Alcibiades replies—‘Good in transacting business.’ But what business ? ‘The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.’ The cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that ; he is not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad ? ‘I mean,’ replies Alcibiades, ‘the man who is able to command in the city.’ But to command what—horses or men ? and if men, under what circumstances ? ‘I mean to say, that he is able to command men living in social and political relations.’ And what is their aim ? ‘The better preservation of the city.’ But when is a city better ? ‘When there is unanimity, such as exists between husband and wife.’ Then, when husbands and wives perform their own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them ; nor can a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only. Alcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work, is brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him to confess his own ignorance.

But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that is to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or truer self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows his own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image in another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part in political affairs. Both for the sake of the individual and of the state, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth or power. The evil and unjust should have no power,—they should be the slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous are deserving of freedom.

And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I will never leave you.'

The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the other dialogues. The process of interrogation is of the same kind as that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the Euthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the answers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is narrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge, even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he is, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his life, at least, been convicted of error. The process by which the soul is elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under the name of 'conversion,' if we substitute the sense of ignorance for the consciousness of sin.

In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic composition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process by which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic writings, and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of humour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks generally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and

Persian queens; and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit. But we have a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given so profound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiades and Socrates in the Symposium, should have treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer of the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There is none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little dramatic verisimilitude.

ALCIBIADES I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

ALCIBIADES, SOCRATES.

Steph. *Socrates.* I DARESAY that you may be surprised to find, O son
103 of Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken
to you for many years, when the rest of the world were wearying
you with their attentions, am the last of your lovers who still
speaks to you. The reason was, that I was hindered from speak-
ing to you by a power—not human but divine, the nature of
which I will some day explain to you; that impediment has
been now removed, and I present myself before you, hoping that
the hindrance will not again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed
that your pride has been too much for the pride of your ad-
mirers; they were very numerous, but they have all run away,
overpowered by your superior force of character; not one of
104 them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why
you have overpowered them. You imagine that you have no
need of any other man at all, as you have great possessions and
abundance of all things, beginning with the body, and ending
with the soul. In the first place, you think that you are the
fairest and tallest of the citizens, and this every one who has
eyes sees to be true; in the second place, that you are among
the noblest of them, highly connected both on the father's and
the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most distinguished
families in your own state, which is the greatest in Hellas, and
having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can

assist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can not only do as he pleases in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these things have lifted you up, and you have overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked their absence? And now I know that you wonder why I have not gone away like the rest of them, and what can be my motive in remaining.

Alcibiades. Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just coming to ask you the same question—What do you want? And what is your motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming? I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like to know.

Soc. Then, if you desire to know, I suppose that you will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor who will remain, and will not run away?

Alc. Certainly, let me hear.

Soc. You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.

Alc. Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.

Soc. I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one who has no feeling of love in him, I will make an effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to live in the enjoyment of them. But I know that you entertain other thoughts; and I will prove to you that I have always had my eye on you by declaring them. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: O Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of honour than Pericles,

or any other man that ever lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state; and when you have got the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name—no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be your hopes—I am not guessing only—and very likely you, who know that I am saying the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomachè. The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall have the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you desire, but I only, God being my helper. Now, when you were young and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me.

Al. Your silence, Socrates, was always a marvel to me. I never could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my intentions, why is your

assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?

Soc. I suppose that you want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favour.

Al. Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.

Soc. Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?

Al. No.

Soc. Then please to answer.

Al. Ask me.

Soc. Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?

Al. I say 'yes,' in the hope of hearing what more you have to say.

Soc. You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How would you answer?

Al. I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they.

Soc. Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself?

Al. That is all.

Soc. And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?

Al. I should not.

Soc. And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. I think that I know the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you.

Al. Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.

107 *Soc.* And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing?

Al. No, indeed.

Soc. Or about the touch of the lyre?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly?

Al. Hardly.

Soc. Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? Surely not about building?

Al. No.

Soc. For the builder will advise better than you will about that?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Nor about divination?

Al. No.

Soc. About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?

Al. True.

Soc. Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble—makes no difference.

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge?

Al. Assuredly.

Soc. Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician.

Al. Of course.

Soc. Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them?

Al. About their own concerns, Socrates.

Soc. You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build?

Al. No, I should not advise them about that.

Soc. I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:—is that the reason?

Al. Yes, that is the reason.

Soc. Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?

Al. About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state.

Soc. You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And when it is better?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And for as long a time as is better?

Al. Yes.

Soc. But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they shall seize by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?

Al. Clearly, the master of gymnastics.

Soc. And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And as much as is best?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And at such times as are best?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance?

Al. Yes.

Soc. When it is well to do so?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And as much as is well?

Al. Just so.

Soc. And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell me what this latter is;—the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.

Al. I do not understand you.

Soc. Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.

Al. Yes.

Soc. And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?

Al. You did.

Soc. And I was right?

Al. I think that you were.

Soc. Well, now,—for you should learn to argue prettily—let me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,—what is the name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.

Al. Indeed I cannot.

Soc. Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?

Al. The Muses do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. Very good; and what is the name of the art which is called after them?

Al. I suppose that you mean music.

Soc. Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic—what is the excellence of music—to be what?

Al. To be musical, I suppose.

Soc. Very good ; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace ; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more gymnastical was the more excellent ; tell me, what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace ?

Al. But I cannot.

Soc. But if you, offering advice to another, said to him—This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you—What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word ‘better’? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant ‘more wholesome,’ although you do not profess to be a physician. And when the subject is one on which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed of having nothing to say, as appears to be the case? Is not that dis- 109 graceful?

Al. Very.

Soc. Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of ‘better,’ in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?

Al. I am thinking, and I cannot tell.

Soc. But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them?

Al. Yes, certainly ; we say that we have been deceived, or forced, or defrauded.

Soc. And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner.

Al. Do you mean by ‘how,’ Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?

Soc. Exactly.

Al. There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust.

Soc. And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?

Al. That is an awkward question ; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just.

Soc. He would not go to war, because that would be unlawful?

Al. Yes; and not honourable.

Soc. Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?

Al. Clearly.

Soc. But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the school-master without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you shall introduce me.

Al. You are mocking, Socrates.

Soc. No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists?

Al. But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?

Soc. Yes; if you have discovered them.

Al. But do you not think that I could discover them?

Soc. I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.

Al. And do you not think that I would enquire?

Soc. Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.

Al. And was there ever a time when I did not know them?

Soc. Very good; then can you tell me the time when you
110 thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you say to a year ago? Were you in the state of conscious ignorance and enquiry? or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.

Al. Well, I thought that I knew.

Soc. And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same?

Al. I did.

Soc. And more than four years ago you were a child—were you not?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.

Al. And why are you sure?

Soc. Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating. Is not that true?

Al. But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?

Soc. Yes; and that very question implies that you knew the nature of just and unjust.

Al. To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated.

Soc. Then you suppose yourself when a child to have known the nature of just and unjust?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And when did you discover them—not, surely, at the time at which you thought that you knew them?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. And when did you think that you were ignorant—if you consider, you will find that there never was such a time?

Al. Really, Socrates, I cannot say.

Soc. Then you did not learn them by discovering them?

Al. Clearly not.

Soc. But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you come to know them?

Al. I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the same way that other people learn.

Soc. That is what you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.

Al. Of the many.

Soc. Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your teachers.

Al. Why, are they not able to teach?

Soc. They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse?

Al. I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far better things than to play at draughts.

111 *Soc.* What things?

Al. Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.

Soc. Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of Greek, and their instructions in that line may be justly praised.

Al. Why is that?

Soc. Why, because they have the qualities of good teachers.

Al. What qualities?

Soc. Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any teacher?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And would you say that they knew the things about which they differ?

Al. No.

Soc. Then how can they teach them?

Al. They cannot.

Soc. Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek.

Al. True.

Soc. These, as we were saying, are matters about which they

are agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some another.

Al. They do not.

Soc. Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?

Al. Very true.

Soc. But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the many be able to inform us?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these things and are not true teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never agreed about them?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, but what healthy or diseased men are like—would the many be able to teach us?

Al. They would not.

Soc. And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these matters, if you saw them at variance?

Al. I should.

Soc. Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one another, about the justice or injustice of men and things? 112

Al. Assuredly not, Socrates.

Soc. There is no subject about which they are more at variance?

Al. None.

Soc. I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war and kill one another for the sake of them?

Al. No, indeed.

Soc. But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?

Al. To be sure, Socrates.

Soc. A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems?

Al. True.

Soc. Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus.

Al. Very true.

Soc. And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boco-tians fell at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father, Cleinias, met his end, the question was one of justice—this was the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.

Al. Very true.

Soc. But can they be said to understand that about which they are quarrelling to the death?

Al. Clearly not.

Soc. And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the teachers to whom you are appealing.

Al. Very true.

Soc. But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned them of others nor discovered them yourself?

Al. From what you say, I suppose not.

Soc. See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!

Al. In what respect?

Soc. In saying that I say so.

Al. Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and unjust?

Soc. No; I did not.

Al. Did I, then?

Soc. Yes.

Al. How was that?

Soc. Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater number, two or one; you would reply 'two'?

Al. I should.

Soc. And by how much greater?

Al. By one.

Soc. Which of us now says that two is more than one?

Al. I do.

Soc. Did not I ask, and you answer the question?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you 113
who answer me?

Al. I am.

Soc. Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?

Al. I am.

Soc. Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question and answer, who is the speaker,—the questioner or the answerer?

Al. I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.

Soc. And have I not been the questioner all through?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And you the answerer?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Which of us, then, was the speaker?

Al. The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.

Soc. Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he did not know? Was not that said?

Al. That is true.

Soc. Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not from me;' nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.

Al. But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a great difference between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and suffered.

Soc. Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are

ever so much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?

Al. Why not, Socrates?—But I am not going to be asked again from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.

Soc. What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different refutation; the old argument is a worn-out garment which you will no longer put on, but some one must
114 produce another which is clean and new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and proceed to enquire again—where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your teacher? If I do but ask a single question, then, as is obvious, you will be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of an argument which you have had already, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.

Al. But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to discuss the matter with you.

Soc. Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men individually.

Al. Yes.

Soc. And is not the same person able to persuade one individual singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters.

Al. True.

Soc. And about number, will not the same person persuade one and persuade many?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?

Al. Quite true.

Soc. And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can persuade many?

Al. I suppose that I can.

Soc. And that is clearly what you know?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things.

Al. That may be supposed.

Soc. Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the just is not always expedient.

Al. You take liberties, Socrates.

Soc. I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that which you will not prove to me.

Al. Proceed.

Soc. Answer my questions—that is all.

Al. Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.

Soc. What, do you not wish to be persuaded?

Al. Certainly I do.

Soc. And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?

Al. I think not.

Soc. Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that the just is the expedient, coming out of your own lips, never believe another man again.

Al. No, indeed; and answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to any harm.

Soc. A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of 115 you whether you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?

Al. What do you mean?

Soc. I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was dishonourable and yet just?

Al. I never did.

Soc. All just things are honourable?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, or are they always good?

Al. I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are evil.

Soc. And are some dishonourable things good?

Al. Yes.

Soc. You mean in such a case as the following:—In time of war, men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety?

Al. True.

Soc. And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, because of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is courage?

Al. True.

Soc. But evil because of death and wounds?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and the death another?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of view, but evil in another?

Al. True.

Soc. And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil?

Al. Good.

Soc. And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and would least like to be deprived of them?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. What would you say of courage? At what price would you be willing to be deprived of courage?

Al. I would rather die than be a coward.

Soc. Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?

Al. I do.

Soc. As bad as death, I suppose?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And they are what you would most desire to have, and their opposites you would least desire?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death and cowardice the worst?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And you would regard the rescue of a friend in battle as good, because of the courage which is there shown?

Al. I should.

Soc. But evil because of the death which ensues?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Might we not describe their different effects as follows:— You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the effect, and good in respect of the good which is the effect 116 of either of them?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?

Al. True.

Soc. Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?

Al. I believe that you are right, Socrates.

Soc. Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.

Al. Clearly not.

Soc. Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And he who acts well is happy?

Al. Of course.

Soc. And the happy are those who obtain good?

Al. True.

Soc. And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then acting well is a good?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And happiness is a good?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then the good and the honourable are again identified?

Al. That is evident.

Soc. Then, according to the argument, that which we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And is the good expedient or not?

Al. Expedient.

Soc. Do you remember our admissions about the just?

Al. Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably.

Soc. And the honourable is the good?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And the good is expedient?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?

Al. I should infer so.

Soc. And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?

Al. I must acknowledge that you do.

Soc. And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peperethians, that the just may be the evil?

Al. I declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.

Soc. And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?

Al. Indeed I am not.

Soc. Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?

Al. I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should be of different minds about that.

Soc. You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know?

Al. I suppose so.

Soc. And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?

Al. Very likely.

Soc. And if you feel this perplexity in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear?

Al. I agree.

Soc. But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?

Al. Certainly he is.

Soc. And do you know how to ascend into heaven?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?

Al. No.

Soc. Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?

Al. Tell me.

Soc. The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.

Al. There again; what do you mean?

Soc. Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.

Al. Very true.

Soc. And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?

Al. The latter.

Soc. Or if you are on a voyage, do you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?

Al. That would be the concern of the pilot.

Soc. Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?

Al. I imagine not.

Soc. Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?

Al. What do you mean by that, again?

Soc. I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?

Al. Yes.

Soc. But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others?

Al. True.

Soc. Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of course, be those who know?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. But if neither those who know, nor those who know that
118 they do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think that they know.

Al. Yes, only those.

Soc. Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is mischievous?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with the greatest matters?

Al. By far.

Soc. And can there be any matters greater than the just, the honourable, the good, and the expedient?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?

Al. Yes.

Soc. But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being ignorant you fancy that you know them?

Al. I fear that you are right.

Soc. And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: you are living, my good friend, in the most disgraceful

state of ignorance, of which you are convicted, not by me, but by the argument, and out of your own mouth—this is what makes you rush into politics before you are educated. Neither is your case singular. For I might say the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps, of your guardian, Pericles.

Al. Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.

Soc. Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked wise.

Al. Yes.

Soc. And you, whom he taught, can do the same?

Al. True.

Soc. And the same is true of the harper and gymnastic-master?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. When a person is enabled to impart his knowledge to another, that surely proves his own understanding of any matter.

Al. I agree.

Soc. Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making his sons wise?

Al. But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what has that to do with the matter?

Soc. Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?

Al. Cleinias was a madman; there is no use in talking of him

Soc. But if Cleinias was a madman and the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be as you are?

Al. I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.

Soc. But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society 119 of Pericles,—as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the

society of Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae to the increase of their wisdom and name.

Al. I certainly never did hear of any one.

Soc. Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain as you are, or will you take pains about yourself?

Al. With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite uneducated.

Soc. What is the inference from this?

Al. Why, that if they were educated they would be trained athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and experience in assailing them; but now, as they have become politicians quite without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the better of them.

Soc. My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your noble form and your high estate!

Al. What makes you say that, Socrates?

Soc. I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.

Al. At what?

Soc. At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is with people here.

Al. Why, what others are there?

Soc. Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?

Al. Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?

Soc. And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while acknowledging that you must attain this degree of excellence, rather look to your true rivals, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellows?—You ought to be so far above these, that, instead of regarding them as rivals, you should despise them and not allow them to serve in the same ranks with you against the enemy, if you mean to accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.

Al. That would certainly be my aim.

Soc. Verily you have reason to be satisfied, for are you not better than the soldiers? and why, having trained yourself to

be the best of them, should you look so high as the generals of the enemy?

Al. But who are they, Socrates?

Soc. Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king? 120

Al. True enough.

Soc. And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings were your true rivals?

Al. I believe that you are right.

Soc. Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like him, who manage our politics; in whom as the women would remark, you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you will have no need to take any heed of yourself in this noble contest; you will not have to trouble yourself either with learning what has to be learned, or practising what has to be practised, or to prepare yourself thoroughly for a political career.

Al. There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really different from anybody else.

Soc. But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.

Al. What shall I consider?

Soc. In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are not?

Al. Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.

Soc. And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take care of yourself?

Al. No, I shall be greatly benefited.

Soc. And this is one very important respect in which that notion of yours is bad.

Al. True.

Soc. In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false.

Al. How so?

Soc. Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in noble races or not in noble races?

Al. Clearly in noble races.

Soc. Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be perfect in nature?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?

121 *Al.* Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!

Soc. And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, son of Zeus. But, for all this, we are far inferior to them. For they are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings—either kings of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you made a parade of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers, and watch over them, in order to preserve the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child,

he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with the fashioning and formation of his limbs, in order that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal school-masters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,—lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most valiant makes him bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who takes care of him. And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians—in all these respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that

our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never flowing out, as in the fable of Aesop, the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? and therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and their kings are the richest of all, for they have a larger share of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up to the king [at Susa], that he passed through a large tract of excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, There is a certain Dinomachè, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchia, and he has a mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom—these are the things which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and that when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that

he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask, 'On what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I believe that Lampido, the daughter of 124 Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' wives have of the qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'—not the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired anything.

Al. I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which are required, Socrates,—can you tell me?

Soc. Yes, I can; but, as you say, with your aid¹: we will enquire how we may be most improved; for what I am telling you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.

Al. What is that?

Soc. I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, Pericles.

Al. Who is he, Socrates?

Soc. God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially designed to bring you to honour.

Al. You are jesting, Socrates.

Soc. Perhaps; at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.

Al. You are not far wrong about me.

Soc. And certainly not about myself.

Al. But what can we do?

Soc. There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.

Al. That would not become us, Socrates.

Soc. No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not wish to be as good as possible?

Al. We do.

Soc. In what sort of virtue?

Al. Plainly, in the virtue of good men.

Soc. Who are good in what?

Al. Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.

Soc. What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Well; naval affairs?

Al. No.

Soc. You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then what affairs? And who do them?

125 *Al.* The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.

Soc. And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the unwise?

Al. The wise.

Soc. And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of shoes?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then in that he is good?

Al. He is.

Soc. But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then in that he is bad?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also bad?

Al. True.

Soc. But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. Then whom do you call the good?

Al. I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.

Soc. Not, surely, over horses?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. But over men?

Al. Yes.

Soc. When they are sick?

Al. No.

Soc. Or on a voyage?

Al. No.

Soc. Or reaping the harvest?

Al. No.

Soc. When they are doing something or nothing?

Al. When they are doing something, I should say.

Soc. I wish that you would explain to me what that is.

Al. When they are having dealings with one another, and using one another's services, as citizens do.

Soc. Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the services of other men?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Are they ruling over the signal-men who use the services of the rowers?

Al. No; they are not.

Soc. That would be the office of the pilot?

Al. Yes.

Soc. But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use other men?

Al. I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of citizenship, and dealings with one another.

Soc. And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow-sailors,—how would you answer?

Al. The art of the pilot.

Soc. And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables them to rule over their fellow-singers?

Al. The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now mentioning.

Soc. And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?

Al. Good counsel, Socrates, I should say.

Soc. And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?

Al. No.

Soc. But good counsel?

126 *Al.* Yes, that is what I should say,—good counsel, of which the aim is the preservation of the voyagers.

Soc. True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which you speak?

Al. The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.

Soc. And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. You would agree to that?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in them.

Al. True.

Soc. And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered?

Al. I should say, Socrates:—the presence of friendship and the absence of hatred and division.

Soc. And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?

Al. Agreement.

Soc. What art makes cities agree about numbers?

Al. Arithmetic.

Soc. And private individuals?

Al. The same.

Soc. And what art makes each individual agree with himself?

Al. The same.

Soc. And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of measure?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Individuals and states are equally agreed about this?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And the same holds of the balance?

Al. True.

Soc. But what is that other agreement of which you speak, and about what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with himself and with another?

Al. I should suppose so.

Soc. But what is the nature of the agreement?—answer, and faint not.

Al. I mean to say that there should be such friendship and agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.

Soc. But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?

Al. No, truly.

Soc. Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.

Al. Yes.

Soc. And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, which she has never learned?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a male accomplishment?

Al. I should.

Soc. Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men?

Al. There is not.

Soc. Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?

Al. Plainly not.

Soc. Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?

Al. I suppose not.

Soc. Nor men by women when they do their own work?

Al. No.

Soc. Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work?

Al. I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth.

Soc. What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order?

Al. But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.

Soc. That was not what you were saying just now; and what do you mean by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance?

Al. Impossible.

Soc. And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust?

Al. What is just, certainly.

Soc. And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them?

Al. I suppose that there must be, Socrates.

Soc. Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.

Al. But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying ; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.

Soc. Nevertheless, cheer up ; at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made.

Al. And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery ?

Soc. Answer questions, Alcibiades ; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us.

Al. If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.

Soc. And first of all, that we may not be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself ? and when does he take care ? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him ?

Al. I should think so.

Soc. When does a man take care of his feet ? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet ?

Al. I do not understand.

Soc. Let me take the hand as an illustration ; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only ?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And the shoe in like manner to the foot ?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet ?

Al. I do not comprehend, Socrates.

Soc. But you acknowledge, Alcibiades, that there is such a thing as taking proper care ?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And taking proper care means improving ?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And what is the art which improves our shoes ?

Al. Shoemaking.

Soc. Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes ?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet?

Al. By some other art.

Soc. And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body?

Al. Very true.

Soc. And that is gymnastic?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet?

Al. Very true.

Soc. And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of gravings rings of that which belongs to our hands?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?

Al. Clearly.

Soc. Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?

Al. True.

Soc. Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?

Al. Clearly not.

Soc. And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves?

Al. I cannot say.

Soc. At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our belongings, but which makes ourselves better?

Al. True.

Soc. But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe?

Al. Impossible.

Soc. Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring?

Al. That is true.

Soc. And can we ever know what art makes a man better, 129 if we do not know what we are ourselves?

Al. Impossible.

Soc. And is self-knowledge an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?

Al. At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult.

Soc. But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.

Al. That is true.

Soc. Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know.

Al. You say truly.

Soc. Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with whom but with me?

Al. Yes.

Soc. As I am, with you?

Al. Yes.

Soc. That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And I in talking use words?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?

Al. To be sure.

Soc. And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?

Al. What do you mean?

Soc. I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?

Al. Yes.

Soc. But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool?

Al. Of course not.

Soc. And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be distinguished from the harper himself?

Al. It is.

Soc. Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user to be always different from that which he uses?

Al. I do.

Soc. Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his tools only or with his hands?

Al. With his hands as well.

Soc. He uses his hands too?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?

Al. He does.

Soc. And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which he uses?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from the hands and feet which they use?

Al. That is clear.

Soc. And does not a man use the whole body?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. And that which uses is different from that which is used?

Al. True.

Soc. Then a man is not the same as his own body?

Al. That is the inference.

Soc. What is he, then?

Al. I cannot say.

Soc. Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.

Al. Yes.

130 *Soc.* And the user of the body is the soul?

Al. Yes, the soul.

Soc. And the soul rules?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.

Al. What is that?

Soc. That man is one of three things.

Al. What are they?

Soc. Soul, body, or the union of the two.

Al. Certainly.

Soc. But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?

Al. Yes, we did.

Soc. And does the body rule over itself?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. It is subject, as we were saying?

Al. Yes.

Soc. Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?

Al. It would seem not.

Soc. But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?

Al. Very likely.

Soc. The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.

Al. True.

Soc. But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?

Al. Just so.

Soc. Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?

Al. No; I think that the proof is sufficient.

Soc. If the proof, although not quite precise, is fair, we may be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.

Al. What was that?

Soc. What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing belonging to us which may be more properly said to exist than the soul?

Al. There is nothing.

Soc. Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?

Al. Very true.

Soc. And that is just what I was saying before—that I Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.

Al. True.

Soc. Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?

Al. That appears to be true.

131 *Soc.* He, then, whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of a man, and not the man himself?

Al. That is true.

Soc. Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?

Al. He does not.

Soc. Then the husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even further removed, for they only know the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.

Al. That is true.

Soc. Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his art, none of them is temperate?

Al. I agree.

Soc. And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and are not such as a good man would practise?

Al. Quite true.

Soc. Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what belongs to him?

Al. That is true.

Soc. But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?

Al. I agree.

Soc. Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his own concerns?

Al. True.

Soc. And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?

Al. True.

Soc. But he who loves your soul is the true lover?

Al. That is the necessary inference.

Soc. The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades?

Al. True.

Soc. But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul follows after virtue?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?

Al. Yes, Socrates; and in that you do well, and I hope that you will remain.

Soc. Then you must try to look your best.

Al. I will.

Soc. The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and this only darling in whom he rejoices is Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete.

Al. True.

Soc. And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?

Al. That is true.

Soc. The reason was that I only love you, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And ¹³² I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechtheus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you.

Al. What caution?

Soc. Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you harmless.

Al. Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself.

Soc. Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer

any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves.

Al. That is true.

Soc. And our first duty will be to take care of the soul, and look to that?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others?

Al. Very good.

Soc. But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?—For if we know them, the inference is that we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking?

Al. What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?

Soc. I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.

Al. What do you mean?

Soc. Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself?

Al. Clearly.

Soc. And what is the object in looking at which, we see ourselves?

Al. Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.

Soc. Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror in the visual
133 organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil—there is a sort of image of the person looking?

Al. That is quite true.

Soc. Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself?

Al. That is evident.

Soc. But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?

Al. Very true.

Soc. Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides?

Al. True.

Soc. And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and which is like herself?

Al. I agree, Socrates.

Soc. And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?

Al. There is none.

Soc. Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine, and he who by looking at this knows all that is divine, will be most likely to know himself?

Al. That is plain.

Soc. And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?

Al. True.

Soc. But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil?

Al. How is that possible, Socrates?

Soc. You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his?

Al. That would indeed be impossible.

Soc. Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves?

Al. How could we?

Soc. And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings?

Al. Clearly not.

Soc. Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self,

appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art.

Al. That is to be supposed.

Soc. And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?

Al. Very true.

Soc. And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. Then such a man can never be a statesman?

Al. He cannot.

Soc. Nor an economist?

Al. He cannot.

134 *Soc.* He will not know what he is doing?

Al. He will not.

Soc. And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?

Al. Assuredly.

Soc. And if he errs, he will fail both in his public and private capacity?

Al. Yes, indeed.

Soc. And failing, will he not be miserable?

Al. Very.

Soc. And what will become of those for whom he is acting?

Al. They will be miserable also.

Soc. Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?

Al. He cannot.

Soc. The bad, then, are miserable?

Al. Yes, very.

Soc. And not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is delivered from his misery?

Al. Clearly.

Soc. Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?

Al. Indeed they do not.

Soc. And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer their affairs rightly or nobly?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. But can a man give that which he has not?

Al. Certainly not.

Soc. Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.

Al. That is true.

Soc. You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and wisdom.

Al. That is true.

Soc. You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act according to the will of God?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and divine, and act with a view to them?

Al. Yes.

Soc. In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own good?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And so you will act rightly and well?

Al. Yes.

Soc. In which case, I will be security for your happiness.

Al. I accept the security.

Soc. But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will probably do deeds of darkness.

Al. Very possibly.

Soc. For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to him as an individual or to the state—for 135 example, if he be sick and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?

Al. That is true.

Soc. Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?

Al. Yes ; I see that they will all perish.

Soc. And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not the result be the same?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Not royal power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.

Al. That is true.

Soc. And before they have virtue, to be commanded by their betters, is better for men as well as for children?

Al. That is evident.

Soc. And that which is better is also nobler?

Al. True.

Soc. And what is nobler is more becoming?

Al. Certainly.

Soc. Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?

Al. True.

Soc. Then vice is slavish?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And virtue is the attribute of a freeman?

Al. Yes.

Soc. And, O my friend, is not slavery to be avoided?

Al. Certainly, Socrates.

Soc. And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know whether you are a freeman or not?

Al. I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.

Soc. And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even like to name to my beauty?

Al. Yes, I do.

Soc. How?

Al. By your help, Socrates.

Soc. That is not well said, Alcibiades.

Al. What ought I to have said?

Soc. By the help of God.

Al. I agree ; and I further say, that our relations are likely to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you

as you have followed me ; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.

Soc. O that is rare ! My love breeds another love : and so like the stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.

Al. Strange, but true ; and henceforward I shall begin to think about justice.

Soc. And I hope that you will persist ; although I have fears, not because I doubt you ; but I see the power of the state, which may be too much for both of us.

MENEXENUS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE *Menexenus* has more the character of a rhetorical exercise than any other of the Platonic works. The writer seem to have wished to emulate Thucydides, and the far slighter work of Lysias. In his rivalry with the latter, to whom in the *Phaedrus* Plato shows a strong antipathy, he is entirely successful, but he is not equal to Thucydides. The *Menexenus*, though not without real Hellenic interest, falls very far short of the rugged grandeur and political insight of the great historian. The fiction of the speech having been invented by Aspasia, is well sustained, and is in the manner of Plato; notwithstanding the anachronism which puts into her mouth an allusion to the peace of Antalcidas, an event occurring forty years after the date of the supposed oration. But Plato, like Shakespeare, is careless of such anachronisms, which are not supposed to strike the mind of the reader. The effect produced by these grandiloquent orations on Socrates, who does not recover after having heard one of them for three days and more, is truly Platonic.

Such discourses, if we may form a judgment from the three which are extant (for the so-called Funeral Oration of Demosthenes is a bad and spurious imitation of Thucydides and Lysias), conformed to a regular type. They began with Gods and ancestors, and the legendary history of Athens, to which succeeded an almost equally fictitious account of later times. The Persian war usually formed the centre of the narrative; in the age of Isocrates and Demosthenes the Athenians were still living on the glories of Marathon and Salamis. The *Menexenus* casts a veil over the weak places of Athenian history. The war of Athens and Boeotia is a war of liberation; the Athenians gave back the Spartans taken at Sphacteria out of kindness—indeed, the only fault of the city

was too great kindness—their enemies were more honoured than the friends of others (cp. Thucyd. ii. 41, which seems to contain the germ of the idea); we democrats are the true aristocracy of virtue. These are the platitudes and falsehoods in which Athenian history is disguised.

The author of the *Menexenus*, whether Plato or not, is evidently intending to ridicule the practice, and at the same time to show that he can beat the rhetoricians in their own line, as in the *Phaedrus* he may be supposed to offer an example of what Lysias might have said, and of how much better he might have written in his own style. The orators had recourse to their favourite *loci communes*, one of which, as we find in Lysias, was the shortness of the time allowed them for preparation. But Socrates points out that they had them always ready for delivery, and that there was no difficulty in improvising any number of such orations. To praise the Athenians among the Athenians was easy,—to praise them among the Lacedaemonians would have been a much more difficult task. Socrates himself has turned rhetorician, having learned of a woman, Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles; and any one who had had far inferior teachers to him,—say, one who had learned from Antiphon the Rhamnusian—would be quite equal to the task of praising men to themselves. When we remember that Antiphon is described by Thucydides as the best pleader of his day, the satire on him and on the whole tribe of rhetoricians is transparent.

The ironical assumption of Socrates, that he must be a good orator because he had learnt of Aspasia, is not coarse, as Schleiermacher supposes, but is rather to be regarded as fanciful. Nor can we say that the offer of Socrates to dance naked out of love for Menexenus, is any more unPlatonic than the threat of physical force which *Phaedrus* uses towards Socrates (286 C). Nor is there any real vulgarity in the fear which Socrates expresses that he will get a beating from his mistress, Aspasia: this is the natural exaggeration of what might be expected from an imperious woman. Socrates is not to be taken seriously in all that he says, and Plato, both in the *Symposium* and elsewhere, is not slow to admit a sort of Aristophanic humour. How a great original genius like Plato might or might not have written, what was his conception of humour, or what limits he would have prescribed to himself, if any, in drawing the picture of the Silenus Socrates, are problems which no critical instinct can determine.

On the other hand, the dialogue has several Platonic traits, whether original or imitated may be uncertain. Socrates, when he departs from his character of a 'know nothing' and delivers a speech, generally pretends that what he is speaking is not his own composition. Thus in the *Cratylus* he is run away with (410 E); in the *Phaedrus* he has heard somebody say something (235 C)—is inspired by the *genius loci* (238 D), and the like. But he does not impose on Menexenus by his dissimulation. Without violating the character of Socrates, Plato, who knows so well how to give a hint, or some one writing in his name, intimates clearly enough that the speech in the *Menexenus* like that in the *Phaedrus* is to be attributed to Socrates. The address of the dead to the living at the end of the oration may also be compared to the numerous addresses of the same kind which occur in Plato, in whom the dramatic element is always tending to prevail over the rhetorical. The remark has been often made, that in the Funeral Oration of Thucydides there is no allusion to the existence of the dead. But in the *Menexenus* a future state is clearly, although not strongly, asserted.

Whether the *Menexenus* is a mere imitation of Plato or an original work, remains uncertain; in either case, the thoughts appear to be partly borrowed from the Funeral Oration of Thucydides. Internal evidence seems to leave the question of authorship in doubt. There are merits and there are defects which might lead to either conclusion. The form of the greater part of the work makes the enquiry difficult; the introduction and the finale certainly wear the look either of Plato or of a skilful imitator of Plato. In this uncertainty the express testimony of Aristotle, who quotes, in the *Rhetoric*¹, the well-known words, 'It is easy to praise the Athenians among the Athenians,' from the Funeral Oration, may perhaps turn the balance in its favour. It must be remembered also that the work was famous in antiquity, and is included in the Alexandrian catalogues of Platonic writings.

¹ i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11.

MENEXENUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES and MENEXENUS.

Steph. *Socrates.* Whence come you, Menexenus? Are you from the
234 Agora?

Menexenus. Yes, Socrates; I have been at the council.

Soc. And what might you be doing at the council? And yet I need hardly ask, for I see that you, believing yourself to have arrived at the end of education and of philosophy, having had enough of them, and, being now grown up, are going higher, and intend to govern us old men like the rest of your family, which has always provided some one who kindly took care of us.

Men. Yes, Socrates, I shall be ready to hold office, if you allow and advise that I should, but not if you think otherwise. I went to the council chamber because I heard that the council was about to choose some one who was to speak over the dead. For you know that there is to be a public funeral?

Soc. Yes, I know. And whom did they choose?

Men. No one; they delayed the election until to-morrow, but I believe that either Aeschines or Dion will be chosen.

Soc. O Menexenus! death in battle is certainly in many respects a noble thing. The dead man gets a fine and costly funeral, although he may have been poor, and an elaborate speech is made over him by a wise man who has long ago prepared what he has to say, although he who is praised may not have been good for much. The speakers praise him for what he has done and for what he has not done—that is the beauty of them—and they steal away our souls with their

embellished words; in every conceivable form they praise the ²³⁵ city; and they praise those who died in war, and all our ancestors who went before us; and they praise ourselves also who are still alive, until I feel quite elevated by their laudations, and I stand listening to their words, Menexenus, and become enchanted by them, and all of a sudden I imagine myself to have grown up into a greater and nobler and finer man than I was before. And if, as often happens, there are any foreigners who accompany me to the speech, I become suddenly conscious of having a sort of triumph over them, and they seem to experience a corresponding feeling of admiration at me, and at the greatness of the city, which appears to them, when they are under the influence of the speaker, more wonderful than ever. This consciousness of dignity lasts me more than three days, and not until the fourth or fifth day do I come to my senses and know where I am; in the meantime I have been living in the Islands of the Blest. Such is the art of our rhetoricians, and in such manner does the sound of their words keep ringing in our ears.

Men. You are always making fun of the rhetoricians, Socrates; this time, however, I am inclined to think that the speaker who is chosen will not have much to say, for he has been called upon to speak at a moment's notice, and he will be compelled almost to improvise.

Soc. But why, my friend, should he not have plenty to say? Every rhetorician has speeches ready made; nor is there any difficulty in improvising that sort of stuff. Had the orator to praise Athenians among Peloponnesians, or Peloponnesians among Athenians, he must be a good rhetorician who could succeed and gain credit. But there is no difficulty in a man's winning applause when he is contending for fame among the persons who are being praised.

Men. Do you think not, Socrates?

Soc. Certainly 'not.'

Men. Do you think that you could speak yourself if there should be a necessity, and if the council were to choose you?

Soc. That I should be able to speak is no great wonder, Menexenus, considering that I have an excellent mistress in the art of rhetoric,—she who made so many good speakers, and one

who was the best among all the Hellenes—Pericles, the son of Xanthippus.

Men. And who is she? I suppose that you mean Aspasia.

Soc. Yes, I do; and besides her I had Connus, the son of
 236 Metrobius, as a master, and he was my master in music, as she was in rhetoric. No wonder that a man who has received such an education should be a finished speaker; even the pupil of very inferior masters, say, for example, one who had learned music of Lamprus, and rhetoric of Antiphon the Rhamnusian, might make a figure if he were to praise the Athenians among the Athenians.

Men. And what would you be able to say if you had to speak?

Soc. Of my own wit, most likely nothing; but yesterday I heard Aspasia composing a funeral oration about these very dead. For she had been told, as you were saying, that the Athenians were going to choose a speaker, and she repeated to me the sort of speech which he should deliver, partly improvising and partly from previous thought, putting together fragments of the funeral oration which Pericles spoke, and, I believe, she composed.

Men. And can you remember what Aspasia said?

Soc. I ought to be able, for she taught me, and she was ready to strike me because I was always forgetting.

Men. Then why will you not rehearse what she said?

Soc. Because I am afraid that my mistress may be angry with me if I publish her speech.

Men. Nay, Socrates, let us have the speech, whether Aspasia's or any one else's, no matter about that. I hope that you will oblige me.

Soc. But I am afraid that you will laugh at me if I continue the games of youth in old age.

Men. Far otherwise, Socrates; let us by all means have the speech.

Soc. Truly I have such a disposition to oblige you, that if you bid me dance naked I should not like to refuse, since we are alone. Listen then. If I remember rightly, she began as follows, with the mention of the dead:—

There is a tribute of deeds and of words. The departed have

already had the first, when going forth on their destined journey they were attended on their way by the state and by their friends; the tribute of words remains to be given to them, as is meet and by law ordained. For noble words are a memorial and a crown of noble actions, which are given to the doers of them by the hearers. A word is needed which will duly praise the dead and gently admonish the living, exhorting the brethren and descendants of the departed to imitate their virtue, and consoling their fathers and mothers and the survivors, if any, who may chance to be alive of the previous generation. What ²³⁷ sort of a word will this be, and how shall we rightly begin the praises of these brave men? In their life they rejoiced their own friends with their virtue, and their death they gave in exchange for the salvation of the living. And I think that we should praise them in the order in which nature made them good, for they were good because they were sprung from good fathers. Wherefore let us first of all praise the goodness of their birth; secondly, their nurture and education; and then let us set forth how noble their actions were, and how worthy of the education which they had received.

And first as to their birth. Their ancestors were not strangers, nor are these their descendants sojourners only, whose fathers have come from another country; but they are the children of the soil, dwelling and living in their own land. And the country which brought them up is not like other countries, a stepmother to her children, but their own true mother; she bore them and nourished them and received them, and in her bosom they now repose. It is meet and right, therefore, that we should begin by praising the land which is their mother, and that will be a way of praising their noble birth.

The country is worthy to be praised, not only by us, but by all mankind; first, and above all, as being dear to the Gods. This is proved by the strife and contention of the Gods respecting her. And ought not the country which the Gods praise to be praised by all mankind? The second praise which may be fairly claimed by her, is that at the time when the whole earth was sending forth and creating diverse animals, tame and wild, she our mother was free and pure from savage monsters, and out of all animals selected and brought forth man, who is

superior to the rest in understanding, and alone has justice and religion. And a great proof that she was the mother of us and of our ancestors, is that she provided the means of support for her offspring. For as a woman proves her motherhood by giving milk to her young ones (and she who has no fountain of milk is not a mother), so did this our land prove that she was going to be the mother of men, for in those days she alone and first of all brought forth wheat and barley for human food, which ²³⁸ is the best and noblest sustenance for man, whom she regarded as her true offspring. And these are truer proofs of motherhood in a country than in a woman, for the woman in her conception and generation is but the imitation of the earth, and not the earth of the woman. And of the fruit of the earth she gave a plenteous supply, not only to her own, but to others also; and after that she made the olive to spring up to be a boon to her children, and to help them in their toils. And when she had herself nursed them and brought them up to manhood, she gave them Gods to be their rulers and teachers, whose names are well known, and need not now be repeated. They are the Gods who first ordered our lives, and gave us arts to supply our daily needs, and taught us the possession and use of arms for the guardianship of the country.

Thus born into the world and thus educated, the ancestors of the departed lived and made themselves a government, which I ought briefly to commemorate. For government is the nurture of man, and the government of good men is good, and of bad men bad. And I must show that our ancestors were trained under a good government, and for this reason they were good, and our contemporaries are also good, among whom our departed friends are to be reckoned. Then as now, and indeed always, from that time to this, speaking generally, our government was an aristocracy—a form of government which receives various names, according to the fancies of men, and is sometimes called democracy, being really an aristocracy of the many who love virtue. For kings we have always had, first hereditary and then elected, and authority is mostly in the hands of the people, who dispense offices and power to those who appear to be most deserving of them. Neither is a man rejected from weakness or poverty or obscurity of origin, nor honoured by reason of the

opposite, as in other states, but there is one principle—he who appears to be wise and good is a governor and ruler. The basis of this our government is equality of birth; for other states are made up of all sorts and unequal conditions of men, and therefore their governments are unequal; there are tyrannies and there are oligarchies, in which the one party are slaves and the others masters. But we and our citizens are brethren, the children all of one mother, and we do not claim to be one another's masters or servants; but the natural equality of birth compels us to seek for legal equality, and to recognize no superiority except in the reputation of virtue and wisdom. 239

And so their and our fathers, and these, too, our brethren, having been brought up in all freedom, and nobly born, did both in their public and private capacity many noble deeds famous over the whole world. They were the deeds of men who thought that they ought to fight both against Hellenes for the sake of Hellenes on behalf of freedom, and against barbarians in the common interest of Hellas. The time would fail me to tell of their defence of their country against the invasion of Eumolpus and the Amazons, or of their defence of the Argives against the Cadmeians, or of the Heracleids against the Argives; besides, the poets have already declared in song their glory to all mankind, and therefore any commemoration of them in prose which we might attempt would hold a second place. They have their reward of them, and I say no more; but there are other worthy deeds of which no poet has worthily sung, and which are still wooing the poet's favour. Of these I am bound to make honourable mention, and shall invoke others to sing of them also in lyric and other strains, in a manner becoming the actors. And first I will tell how the Persians, lords of Asia, were enslaving Europe, and how the children of this land, who were our fathers, held them back. Of these I will speak first, and praise their valour, as is meet and fitting. He who would rightly estimate them should place himself in thought at that time, when the whole of Asia was subject to the third king of Persia. The first king, Cyrus, by his valour freed the Persians, who were his countrymen, and subjected the Medes, who were their lords, and he ruled over the rest of Asia, as far as Egypt; and after him came his son, who ruled all the accessible part of Egypt

and Libya ; the third king was Darius, who extended the land boundaries of the empire to Scythia, and with his fleet held the
240 sea and the islands. None presumed to be his equal ; the minds of all men were enthralled by him—so many and mighty and warlike nations had the power of Persia subdued. Now Darius had a quarrel against us and the Eretrians, because, as he said, we had conspired against Sardis, and he sent 500,000 men in transports and vessels of war, and 300 ships, and Datis as commander, telling him to bring the Eretrians and Athenians to the king, if he wished to keep his head on his shoulders. He sailed against the Eretrians, who were reputed to be amongst the noblest and most warlike of the Hellenes of that day, and they were numerous, but he conquered them all in three days ; and when he had conquered them, in order that no one might escape, he searched the whole country after this manner : his soldiers, coming to the borders of Eretria and spreading from sea to sea, joined hands and passed through the whole country, in order that they might be able to tell the king that no one had escaped them. And from Eretria they went to Marathon, expecting to bind the Athenians in the same yoke of necessity in which they had bound the Eretrians. Having effected one-half of their purpose, they were in the act of attempting the other, and none of the Hellenes dared to assist either the Eretrians or the Athenians, except the Lacedaemonians, and they only came the day after the battle ; but the rest were panic-stricken and remained quiet, happy that they had escaped for a time. He who has present to him that conflict will know what manner of men they were who received the onset of the barbarians at Marathon, and chastened the pride of the whole of Asia, and by the victory which they gained over the barbarians first taught other men that the power of the Persians was not invincible, but that hosts of men and the multitude of riches alike yield to virtue. And I assert that those men are the fathers not only of ourselves, but of our liberties and of the liberties of all who are on the continent, for that was the action to which the Hellenes looked back when they ventured to fight for their own safety in the battles which followed : they became disciples of the men of Marathon. To them, therefore, I assign in
241 my speech the first place, and the second to those who fought

and conquered in the sea fights at Salamis and Artemisium, for of them, too, one might have many things to say; of the assaults which they endured by sea and land, and how they repelled them. But I will mention only that act of theirs which appears to me to be the noblest, and which was next in order of succession to Marathon, for the men of Marathon only showed the Hellenes that it was possible to ward off the barbarians by land, the many by the few; but there was no proof that they could be defeated by ships, and at sea the Persians retained the reputation of being invincible in numbers and wealth and skill and strength. This is the glory of the men who fought at sea, that they dispelled the second fear which had hitherto possessed the Hellenes, and so made the fear of numbers, whether of ships or men, to cease among them. This was the effect, and thus the soldiers of Marathon and the sailors of Salamis became the schoolmasters of Hellas; the one teaching and habituating the Hellenes not to fear the barbarians at sea, and the others not to fear them by land. Third in order, for the number and valour of the combatants, and third in the salvation of Hellas, I place the battle of Plataea. And now the Athenians and Lacedaemonians shared in the struggle; they were all united in this greatest and most terrible conflict of all, and for this their virtue will be celebrated in times to come, as they are now celebrated by us. But at a later period many Hellenic tribes were still on the side of the barbarians, and there was a report that the great king was going to make a new attempt upon the Hellenes, and therefore justice requires that we should also make mention of those who crowned the previous work of our salvation, and drove and purged away all barbarians from the sea. These were the men who fought by sea at the river Eurymedon, and who went on the expedition to Cyprus, and who sailed to Egypt and divers others places; and they should be gratefully remembered by us, because they compelled the king to look at home instead of plotting the destruction of Hellas.

And so the war against the barbarians was fought out to the 242 end by the whole city on their own behalf, and on behalf of their countrymen. There was peace, and our city was held in honour; and then, as prosperity makes men jealous, there succeeded a jealousy of her, and jealousy beget envy, and so she became

engaged against her will in a war with the Hellenes. On the breaking out of war, our citizens met the Lacedaemonians at Tanagra, and fought for the freedom of the Boeotians; the issue was doubtful, and was decided by the engagement which followed. For when the Lacedaemonians had gone on their way, leaving the Boeotians, whom they were aiding, on the third day after the battle of Tanagra, our countrymen conquered at Oenophyta, and righteously restored those who had been unrighteously exiled. And they were the first after the Persian war who fought on behalf of liberty in aid of Hellenes against Hellenes; they were brave men, and freed those whom they aided, and were the first too who were honourably interred in this sepulchre by the state. Afterwards there was a mighty war, in which all the Hellenes joined, and devastated our country, which was very ungrateful of them; and our countrymen, after defeating them in a naval engagement and taking their leaders, the Spartans, at Sphagia, when they might have destroyed them, spared their lives, and gave them back, and made peace, considering that they should war with their fellow-countrymen only until they gained a victory over them, and not because of the private anger of the state destroy the common interest of Hellas; but that with barbarians they should war to the death. Worthy of praise are they also, who waged this war, and are here interred, for they proved, if any one doubted the superior prowess of the Athenians in the former war with the barbarians, that their doubts had no foundation—showing by their victory in the civil war with Hellas, in which they subdued the other chief state of the Hellenes, that they could conquer single-handed those with whom they had been allied in the war against the barbarians. After the peace there followed a third war, which was of a terrible and desperate nature, and in this many brave men who are here interred lost their lives—many of them

243 who had conquered Sicily, whither they had gone over the seas to fight for the liberties of the Leontines, to whom they were bound by oaths, and on whose behalf many trophies were raised by them; but, owing to the distance, the city was unable to help them, and they lost heart and came to misfortune, their very enemies and opponents winning more renown for virtue and temperance than the friends of others. Many also fell in naval

engagements at the Hellespont, after having in one day taken all the ships of the enemy, and defeated them in other naval engagements. And what I call the terrible and desperate nature of the war, is that the other Hellenes, in their extreme animosity towards the city, should have entered into negotiations with their bitterest enemy, the king of Persia, whom they, together with us, had expelled;—him, without us, they again brought back, barbarian against Hellenes, and all the hosts, both of Hellenes and barbarians, were united against Athens. And then shone forth the power and value of our city. Her enemies had supposed that she was exhausted by the war, and her ships were blockaded at Mitylene. But the citizens themselves embarked, and came to the rescue with sixty other ships, and their valour was confessed of all men, for they conquered their enemies and delivered their friends. And yet by some evil fortune they were left to perish at sea, and therefore are¹ not interred here. Ever to be remembered and honoured are they, for by their valour not only that sea-fight was won for us, but the entire war was decided by them, and through them the city gained the reputation of being invincible, even though attacked by all mankind. And that reputation was a true one, for the defeat which came upon us was our own doing. We were never conquered by others, and to this day we are still unconquered by them; but we were our own conquerors, and received defeat at our own hands. Afterwards there was quiet and peace abroad, but there sprang up war at home; and, if men are destined to have civil war, no one could have desired that his city should take the disorder in a milder form. How joyful and natural was the reconciliation of those who came from the Piræus and those who came from the city; with what moderation did they order the war against the tyrants in Eleusis, and how differently from what the other Hellenes expected! And the reason of this ²⁴⁴ gentleness was the veritable tie of blood, which created among them a friendship as of kinsmen, faithful not in word only, but in deed. And we ought also to remember those who then fell by one another's hands, and on such occasions as these to reconcile them with sacrifices and prayers, praying to those who have power over them, that they may be reconciled even as we are

¹ Reading *οὐ κείνται*.

reconciled. For they did not assail one another out of malice or enmity, but they were unfortunate. And that such was the fact we ourselves are witnesses, who are of the same race with them, and have mutually received and granted forgiveness of what we have done and suffered. After this there was perfect peace, and the city had rest; and her feeling was that she forgave the barbarians, who had severely suffered at her hands and severely retaliated, but that she was indignant at the ingratitude of the Hellenes, when she remembered how they had received good from her and returned evil, having made common cause with the barbarians, depriving her of the ships which had once been their salvation, and dismantling our walls, when we had prevented their walls from falling. She thought that she would no longer defend the Hellenes, when enslaved either by one another or by the barbarians, and did accordingly. This was our feeling, while the Lacedaemonians were thinking that the champions of liberty had fallen, and that their business was to subject the remaining Hellenes. And why should I say more? for the events of which I am speaking happened not long ago and we can all of us remember how the chief peoples of Hellas, Argives and Boeotians and Corinthians, came to feel the need of us, and, what is the greatest miracle of all, the Persian king himself was driven to such extremity as to come round to the opinion, that from this city, of which he was the destroyer, and from no other, his salvation would proceed.

And if a person desired to bring a deserved accusation against our city, he would find only one charge which he could justly urge—that she was too compassionate and too much inclined to favour the weak. And in this instance she was not able to hold out or keep her resolution of refusing aid to her injurers when
245 they were being enslaved, but she was softened, and did in fact send out aid, and delivered the Hellenes from slavery, and they were free until they afterwards enslaved themselves. Whereas, to the great king she refused to give the assistance of the state, for she could not forget the trophies of Marathon and Salamis and Plataea; but she allowed exiles and volunteers to assist him, and they were his salvation. And she herself, when she was compelled, entered into the war, and built walls and ships, and fought with the Lacedaemonians on behalf of the Parians. Now

the king fearing this city, when he saw the Lacedaemonians giving up the war at sea, asked, as the price of his alliance with us and the other allies, the Hellenes on the continent, whom the Lacedaemonians had already given up to him, he thinking that we should refuse, and that then he might have a pretence for being quit of us. About the other allies he was mistaken, for the Corinthians and Argives and Boeotians, and the other states, were quite willing to give them up, and swore and covenanted, that, if he would give them money, they would leave the Hellenes of the continent in his hands, and we alone refused to give them up and swear. Such was the noble disposition of this city, so sound and healthy was the spirit of freedom among us, which is the natural enemy of the barbarian, because we are pure Hellenes, having no mixture of barbarians. For we are not like many others, descendants of Pelops or Cadmus or Egyptus or Danaus, who are by nature barbarians, and yet pass for Hellenes, and dwell among us; but we are pure Hellenes, having no admixture of foreigners, and therefore the hatred of the foreigner has passed unadulterated into the life-blood of the city. The result of our refusal was that we were again isolated, because we were unwilling to be guilty of the base and unholy act of giving up Hellenes to barbarians. And so we were in the same case as when we were subdued before; but, by the favour of Heaven, we managed better, for we ended the war without the loss of our ships or walls or colonies; the enemy was only too glad to be quit of us. Yet in this war we lost many brave men, such as were those who fell owing to the ruggedness of the ground at the battle of Corinth, or by treason at Lechaem. Brave men, too, were those who delivered the Persian king, and drove the Lacedaemonians from the sea. I remind you of them, and you must ²⁴⁶ celebrate them together with me, and do honour to their memories.

Such were the actions of the men who are here interred, and of others who have died on behalf of their country; many and glorious things I have told you of them, and there are yet many more and more glorious things remaining to be told, which many days and nights would not suffice to tell. Let them not be forgotten, and let every man remind their descendants that

they also are soldiers who must not desert the ranks of their ancestors, or fall behind from cowardice. Even as I exhort you this day, and in all future time and on every occasion on which I meet with any of you shall continue to remind and exhort you, O ye sons of heroes, that you strive to be the bravest of men. And I think that I ought now to repeat to you what your fathers desired to have said to you who are their survivors, when they went out to battle, in case anything happened to them. I will tell you what I heard them say, and what, if they had only speech, they would fain be saying, judging from what they then said. And you must imagine that you hear them saying what I now repeat to you :—

Sons, the event proves that your fathers were brave men ; for we might have lived dishonourably, but have preferred to die honourably rather than bring you and your children into disgrace, and rather than dishonour our own fathers and forefathers ; considering that life is not life to one who is a dishonour to his race, and that to such an one neither men nor Gods are friendly, either while he is on the earth or after death in the world below. Remember our words, then, and whatever is your aim let virtue be the condition of the attainment of your aim, and know that without this all possessions and pursuits are dishonourable and evil. For neither does wealth bring honour to the owner, if he be a coward ; of such an one the wealth belongs to another, and not to himself. Nor does beauty and strength of body, when dwelling in a base and cowardly man, appear comely, but the reverse of comely, making the possessor more conspicuous, and manifesting forth his cowardice. And all knowledge, when separated from justice and virtue, is seen to be cunning and not wisdom ; wherefore make this your first and last and only and
 247 everlasting desire, that if possible you may exceed not only us but all your ancestors in virtue ; and know that to excel you in virtue only brings us shame, but that to be excelled by you is a source of joy to us. And we shall most likely be defeated, and you will most likely be victors in the contest, if you learn so to order your lives as not to misuse or waste the reputation of your ancestors, knowing that to a man who has any self-respect, nothing is more dishonourable than to be honoured, not for his own sake, but on account of the reputation of his ancestors.

The honour of parents is a fair and noble treasure to their posterity, but to have the use of a treasure of wealth and honour, and to leave none to your successors, because you have neither money nor reputation of your own, is alike base and dishonourable. And if you follow our precepts you will be received by us as friends, when the hour of destiny brings you hither; but if you neglect our words and are disgraced in your lives, no one will welcome or receive you. This is the message which is to be delivered to our children.

Some of us have fathers and mothers still living, and we would urge them, if, as is likely, we shall die, to bear the calamity as lightly as possible, and not to condole with one another; for they have sorrows enough, and will not need any one to stimulate them. While we gently heal their wounds, let us remind them that the Gods have heard the chief part of their prayers; for they prayed, not that their children might live for ever, but that they might be famous and brave. And this, which is the greatest good, they have attained. A mortal man cannot expect to have everything in his own life turning out according to his will; and they, if they bear their misfortunes bravely, will be truly deemed brave fathers of the brave. But if they give way to their sorrows, either they will be suspected of not being our parents, or we of not being such as our panegyrists declare. Let not either of the two alternatives happen, but rather let them be our chief and true panegyrists, who show in their lives that they are true men, and had men for their sons. The ancient saying, 'never too much,' appears to be, and really is, well said. For he whose happiness rests with himself, if possible, wholly, and if not, as far as is possible,—who is not ²⁴⁸ hanging in suspense on other men, or changing with the vicissitude of their fortune,—has his life ordered for the best. He is the temperate and valiant and wise; and when his riches come and go, when his children are given and taken away, he will remember the proverb—'neither rejoicing overmuch nor grieving overmuch,' for he relies upon himself. And such we would have our parents to be—that is our word and wish, and as such we now offer ourselves, neither lamenting overmuch, nor fearing overmuch, if we are to die at this instant. And we entreat our fathers and mothers to retain these feelings throughout their

future life, and to be assured that they will not please us by sorrowing and lamenting over us. But, if the dead have any knowledge of the living, they will displease us most by making themselves miserable and by taking their misfortunes to heart, and they will please us best if they bear their loss lightly and temperately. For our life will have the noblest end which is vouchsafed to man, and should be glorified rather than lamented. And if they will direct their minds to the care and nurture of our wives and children, they will soonest forget their misfortunes, and live more honourably and uprightly, and in a way that is more agreeable to us.

This is all that we have to say to our families: and to the state we would say—Let her take care of our parents and sons, educating the one in principles of order, and worthily cherishing the old age of the other. But we know that she will of her own accord take care of them, and does not need exhortation from us.

These, O ye children and parents of the dead, are the words which they bid us proclaim to you, and which I do proclaim to you with the utmost good will. And on their behalf I beseech you, the children, to imitate your fathers, and you, parents, to be of good cheer about yourselves; for we will nourish your age, and take care of you both publicly and privately in any place in which one of us may meet one of you who are the parents of the dead. And the care which the city shows you yourselves know; for she has made provision by law concerning the parents
 249 and children of those who die in war; and the highest authority is specially entrusted with the duty of watching over them above all other citizens, in order to see that there is no wrong done to them. She herself takes part in the nurture of the children, desiring as far as it is possible that their orphanhood may not be felt by them; she is a parent to them while they are children, and when they arrive at the age of manhood she sends them to their several duties, clothing them in armour; she displays to them and recalls to their minds the pursuits of their fathers, and puts into their hands the instruments of their fathers' virtues; for the sake of the omen, she would have them begin and go to rule over their own houses arrayed in the strength and arms of their fathers. And she never ceases honour-

ing the dead every year, celebrating in public the rites which are proper to each and all; and in addition to this, holding gymnastic and equestrian festivals, and musical festivals of every sort. She is to the dead in the place of a son and heir, and to their sons in the place of a father, and to their parents and elder kindred in the place of a protector—ever and always caring for them. Considering this, you ought to bear your calamity the more gently; for thus you will be most endeared to the dead and to the living, and your sorrows will heal and be healed. And now do you and all, having lamented the dead together in the usual manner, go your ways.

Such, Menexenus, was the oration of Aspasia the Milesian.

Men. Truly, Socrates, I marvel that Aspasia, who is only a woman, should be able to compose such a speech; she must be a rare one.

Soc. Well, if you are incredulous, you may come with me and hear her.

Men. I have often met Aspasia, Socrates, and know what she is like.

Soc. Well, and do you not admire her, and are you not grateful for her speech?

Men. Yes, Socrates, I am very grateful to her or to him who told you, and still more to you who have told me.

Soc. Very good. But you must take care not to tell of me, and then at some other time I will repeat to you many more excellent political speeches of hers.

Men. Fear not; only let me hear them, and I will keep the secret.

Soc. Then I will keep my promise.

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THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

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THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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THE REPUBLIC.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of the Laws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer approaches to modern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist. The Politicus or Statesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of the State are more clearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the Symposium and the Protagoras are of higher excellence. But no other Dialogue of Plato has the same largeness of view and the same perfection of style; no other shows an equal knowledge of the world, or contains more of those thoughts which are new as well as old, and not of one age only but of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a deeper irony or a greater wealth of humour or imagery, or more dramatic power. Nor in any other of his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and speculation, or to connect the State with philosophy. Neither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still larger work which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as well as a political and physical philosophy. Again, Plato may be regarded as the 'captain' (*ἀρχηγός*) or leader of a goodly band of followers; for in the Republic is to be found the original of Cicero's *De Republica*, of St. Augustine's *City of God*, of the *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More, and of the numerous other imaginary States which are framed upon the same model. The Republic of Plato is also the first treatise upon education, of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean Paul, and Goethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, he has a revelation of another world; in the early Church he exercised a real influence on theology, and at the Revival of Literature on politics. Even the fragments of his words when 'repeated at second hand' (Sym. 215 D), have in all ages ravished the hearts of men, who have seen reflected in them their own higher nature. He is the father of idealism in philosophy, in politics, in literature. And many of the latest conceptions of modern thinkers and statesmen, such as the unity of knowledge, the

reign of law, and the equality of the sexes, have been anticipated in a dream by him.

The argument of the Republic is the search after Justice, the nature of which is first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless old man—then discussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and Polemarchus—then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by Socrates—reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and having become invisible in the individual reappears at length in the ideal State which is constructed by Socrates. The State introduces the subject of education, of which the first outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model, providing only for an improved religion and morality, and more simplicity in music and gymnastic, and greater harmony of the individual and the State. But this leads to the conception of a higher State, in which ‘no man calls anything his own,’ and in which there is neither ‘marrying nor giving in marriage,’ and ‘kings are philosophers’ and ‘philosophers are kings;’ and there is another and higher education, intellectual as well as moral and religious, of science as well as of art, and not of youth only but of the whole of life. Such a State soon begins to degenerate, and is hardly to be realized in this world. The old quarrel of poetry and philosophy which has been more lightly touched in the earlier books of the Republic is then fought out to the end. Poetry is discovered to be an imitation thrice removed from the truth, and Homer, as well as the dramatic poets, having been condemned as an imitator, is sent into banishment along with them. And the idea of the State is supplemented by the revelation of a future life.

The division into books, like all similar divisions¹, is probably later than the age of Plato. The natural divisions are five in number;—(1) Book I and the first half of Book II down to p. 368, which is introductory; the first book containing a refutation of the popular and sophistical notions of justice, and concluding, like some of the earlier Dialogues, without arriving at a definite conclusion. To this is appended a restatement of the nature of justice according to common opinion, and an answer is demanded to the question—What is justice, stripped of appearances? The second division (2) includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and fourth books, which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first State and the first education.

¹ Cp. Sir G. C. Lewis in the *Classical Museum*, vol. ii. p. 1.

The third division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and seventh books, in which philosophy rather than justice is the subject of enquiry, and the second State is constructed on principles of communism and ruled by philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea of good takes the place of the social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books (4) the perversions of States and the individuals which correspond to them are reviewed in succession; and the nature of pleasure and the principle of tyranny are further analysed in the individual character. The tenth book (5) is the conclusion of the whole, in which the relations of philosophy to poetry are finally determined, and the happiness of the citizens in this life, which has now been assured, is crowned by the vision of another.

Or a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first (Books I—IV) containing the description of a State framed generally in accordance with Hellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the second (Books V—X) the Hellenic State is transformed into an ideal kingdom of philosophy, of which all other governments are the perversions. These two points of view are really opposed, and the opposition is only veiled by the genius of Plato. The Republic, like the Phaedrus (see vol. i. p. 85 foll.), is an imperfect whole; the higher light of philosophy breaks through the regularity of the Hellenic temple, which at last fades away into the heavens (592 B). Whether this imperfection of structure arises from an enlargement of the plan; or from the imperfect reconciliation in the writer's own mind of the struggling elements of thought which are now first brought together by him; or, perhaps, from the composition of the work at different times—are questions, like the similar question about the Iliad and the Odyssey, which are worth asking, but which cannot have a distinct answer. In the age of Plato there was no regular mode of publication, and an author would have the less scruple in altering or adding to a work which was known only to a few of his friends. There is no absurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for a time, or turned from one work to another; and such interruptions would be more likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all attempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on internal evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being composed at one time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to affect longer works, such as the Republic and the Laws, more than shorter ones. But, on the other hand,

the seeming discrepancies of the Republic may only arise out of the discordant elements which the philosopher has attempted to unite in a single whole, perhaps without being himself able to recognise the inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a judgment of after ages which few great writers have ever been able to anticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the want of connexion in their own writings, or the gaps in their systems which are visible enough to those who come after them. In the beginnings of literature and philosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and language, more inconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of speculation are well worn and the meaning of words precisely defined. For consistency, too, is the growth of time; and some of the greatest creations of the human mind have been wanting in unity. Tried by this test, several of the Platonic Dialogues, according to our modern ideas, appear to be defective, but the deficiency is no proof that they were composed at different times or by different hands. And the supposition that the Republic was written uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is confirmed by numerous references from one part of the work to another.

The second title, 'Concerning Justice,' is not the one by which the Republic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and, like the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore be assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the definition of justice, which is the professed aim, or the construction of the State is the principal argument of the work. The answer is, that the two blend in one, and are two faces of the same truth; for justice is the order of the State, and the State is the visible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human society. The one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of the State, as of the individual, is a fair mind in a fair body. In Hegelian phraseology the State is the reality of which justice is the idea. Or, described in Christian language, the kingdom of God is within, and yet is imagined to be a Church or external kingdom. Or, to use a Platonic image, justice and the State are the warp and the woof which run through the whole texture. And when the constitution of the State is completed, the conception of justice is not dismissed, but reappears under the same or different names throughout the work, both as the inner law of the individual soul, and finally as the principle of rewards and punishments in another life. The virtues are based on justice, of which common honesty in buying and

selling is the shadow, and justice is based on the idea of good, which is the harmony of the world, and is reflected both in the institutions of states and in the motions of the heavenly bodies (cp. Tim. 47). The *Timaeus*, which takes up and continues the political rather than the ethical side of the *Republic*, yet contains many indications that the same law is supposed to reign over nature and over man.

Too much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and modern times. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether of nature or of art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings, and indeed in literature generally, there remains often a large element which was not comprehended in the original design. For the work grows under the author's hand; new ideas occur to him in the act of writing; he has not thought out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks to find some one idea under which the whole may be conceived, must necessarily seize on the vaguest and most general. Thus Stallbaum, who is dissatisfied with the ordinary explanations of the argument of the *Republic*, imagines himself to have found the true argument 'in the representation of human life in a State perfected by justice, and governed according to the idea of good.' There may be some use in such general descriptions, but they can hardly be said to express the design of the writer. The truth is, that we may as well speak of many designs as of one; nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas. To Plato himself, the question 'what was the principal argument of the *Republic*,' would have been hardly intelligible, and therefore need not longer detain us (cp. the Introduction to the *Phaedrus*, p. 85, 86).

Is not the *Republic* the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to Plato's own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the State? Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah or 'the day of the Lord' only convey, to us at least, their great spiritual ideals, so through the Greek State Plato reveals to us his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of good—about human perfection, which is justice—about poets and tyrants who are the false teachers and evil rulers of mankind—about 'the world' which is the embodiment of them. We have no need to discuss whether such a State is practicable or not, or whether the outward form or the inward life came first in the mind of the writer. For the practicability of his ideas

has nothing to do with their truth; and the highest thoughts to which he attains may be truly said to bear the greatest 'marks of design'—justice more than the external framework of the State, the idea of good more than justice. It is in the fifth, sixth, and seventh books of the Republic that he reaches the 'summit of speculation,' at the same time that he fails most to satisfy the requirements of a modern reader, and these, notwithstanding their defects, may therefore be regarded as the most important, as they are also the most original, portions of the work.

It is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been raised by Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation was held (the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will do as well as any other); for a writer of fiction, and especially a writer who, like Plato, is notoriously careless of chronology, only aims at general probability. Whether all the persons mentioned in the Republic could ever have met at any one time is not a difficulty which would have occurred to an Athenian reading the work forty years later, or to Plato himself at the time of writing (any more than to Shakespeare in a parallel case); and need not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be another of those questions having no answer 'which are worth asking,' because the investigation shows that we cannot argue historically from the dates in Plato, and have therefore no need to waste time in inventing far-fetched reconcilements of them in order to avoid chronological difficulties, such, for example, as the conjecture of C. F. Hermann, that Glaucon and Adeimantus are not the brothers but the uncles of Plato, or the fancy of Stallbaum that Plato intentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which some of his Dialogues were written.

The principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in the introduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument, and Thrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The main discussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Among the company are Lysias the orator and Euthydemus the sons of Cephalus and brothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides—these are mute auditors; also there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts (340 A), and there, as in the Dialogue which bears his name, appears as the friend and ally of Thrasymachus.

Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus and his two brothers, is the patriarch of the house who has been appropriately engaged in offering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost done with life, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He feels that he is drawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger around the memory of the past. He is eager that Socrates should come to visit him, fond of the poetry of the last generation, happy in the consciousness of a well-spent life, glad at having escaped from the tyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation, his kindness, his indifference to riches, even his garrulity, are interesting traits of character. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because their whole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges that money has a value in taking away the temptation to dishonesty. The respectful attention shown to him by Socrates, who must however be asking questions of him as of all men, should also be noted. The moderation with which old age is pictured by him as a very tolerable portion of existence is characteristic, not only of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the exaggeration of Cicero in his work on old age. The evening of life is described by Plato in the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest possible touches. As Cicero remarks, the aged Cephalus would have been out of place in the discussion which follows, and which he could neither have understood nor taken part in without a violation of dramatic propriety (cp. Lysimachus in the *Laches*, 89).

His 'son and heir' Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuosity of youth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and will not 'let him off' (449 B) on the subject of women and children. Like Cephalus, he is limited in his point of view, and represents the proverbial stage of morality which has rules of life rather than principles; and he quotes Simonides as his father had quoted Pindar. But after appealing to this authority he has no more to say; the answers which he makes are only elicited from him by the dialectic of Socrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of the Sophists like Glaucon and Adeimantus, nor is he sensible of the necessity of refuting them; he belongs to the pre-Socratic age. He is incapable of arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree that he does not know what he is saying. From his brother Lysias (*contra Eratosth.* p. 121) we learn that he fell a victim to the thirty tyrants, but no allusion is

here made to his fate, nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and his family were of Syracusan origin, and had migrated to Athens.

The 'Chalcedonian giant,' Thrasymachus, of whom we have already heard in the *Phaedrus* (p. 267), is the personification of the Sophists according to Plato's conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He is vain and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of making an oration, and hoping in that way to escape the inevitable Socrates; but a mere child in argument, and unable to foresee that the next 'move' (to use a Platonic expression) will 'shut him up' (487 B). He has reached the stage of framing general notions, and in this respect may be regarded as in advance of Cephalus and Polemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them in a discussion, and vainly tries to cover his confusion with banter and insolence. He can only make an irrelevant appeal to the experience of daily life. Whether such doctrines as are attributed to him by Plato were really held either by him or by any other Sophist is uncertain:—in the eagerness for generalization such fundamental errors might easily grow up, and are certainly put into the mouths of speakers in *Thucydides*; but we are concerned at present with Plato's description of him, and not with the historical reality. The inequality of the contest adds greatly to the humour of the scene. He is utterly helpless in the hands of Socrates, who knows how to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in him. His determination to cram down their throats, or put 'bodily into their souls' his own words, elicits a cry of horror from Socrates. The state of his temper is quite as worthy of remark as the process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing than his complete submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first he seems to carry on the discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent good-will, and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two occasional remarks (v. 450 A, B). When attacked by *Glaucón* (vi. 498 C, D) he is humorously protected by Socrates: 'as one who has never been his enemy and is now his friend.'

When Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents, *Glaucón* and *Adeimantus*, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy (cp. *Introd.* to *Phaedo*), three actors are introduced. At first sight the two sons of *Ariston* may seem to wear a family likeness, like the two friends *Simmias* and *Cebes* in the *Phaedo*. But on a nearer examination of them the similarity vanishes, and they are seen to be

distinct characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can 'just never have enough of fechtng' (cp. the character of him in Xen. Mem. iii. 6); the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of love (v. 474 D); the 'juvenis qui gaudet canibus,' and who improves the breed of animals (v. 459 A); the lover of art and music (iii. 398 D, E) who has all the experiences of youthful life. He is full of quickness and penetration, piercing easily below the clumsy platitudes of Thrasymachus to the real difficulty; he turns out to the light the seamy side of human life, and yet does not lose faith in the just and true. It is Glaucon who seizes what may be termed the ludicrous relation of the philosopher to the world, to whom a state of simplicity is 'a city of pigs,' who is always prepared with a jest (iii. 398 C; iv. 427; v. 450, 451, 468 C; vi. 509 C; ix. 586) when the argument offers him an opportunity, and is ever ready to second the humour of Socrates and to appreciate the ridiculous, whether in the connoisseurs of music (vii. 531 A), or in the lovers of theatricals (v. 475 D), or in the fantastic behaviour of the citizens of democracy (viii. 557 foll.). His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates (iii. 402 E; v. 474 D, 475 E), who, however, will not allow him to be attacked by his brother Adeimantus (viii. 548 D, E). He is a soldier, and, like Adeimantus, has been distinguished at the battle of Megara (368 A, anno 456?). The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver, and the profounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more demonstrative, and generally opens the game; Adeimantus pursues the argument further. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth; Adeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world. In the second book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall be considered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks that they are regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their consequences; and in a similar vein of reflection he urges at the beginning of the fourth book that Socrates fails in making his citizens happy, and is answered that happiness is not the direct aim, but the indirect consequence of the good government of a State. In the discussion about religion and mythology, Adeimantus is the respondent (376-398), but at p. 398 C, Glaucon breaks in with a slight jest, and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about music and gymnastic to the end of the book. It is Adeimantus again who volunteers the criticism of common sense on the Socratic method

of argument (vi. 487 B), and who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question of women and children (v. 449). It is Adeimantus who is the respondent in the more argumentative, as Glaucon in the lighter and more imaginative portions of the Dialogue. For example, throughout the greater part of the sixth book, the causes of the corruption of philosophy and the conception of the idea of good are discussed with Adeimantus. At p. 506 C, Glaucon resumes his place of principal respondent; but he has a difficulty in apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some false hits in the course of the discussion (526 D, 527 D). Once more Adeimantus returns (viii. 548) with the allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious State; in the next book (ix. 580) he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end (x. 621 B).

Thus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages of morality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who is followed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by proverbs and saws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly come the young disciples of the great teacher, who know the sophistical arguments but will not be convinced by them, and desire to go deeper into the nature of things. These too, like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly distinguished from one another. For neither in the Republic, nor in any other Dialogue of Plato, is a single character repeated.

The delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In the first book we appear to have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in the earliest Dialogues of Plato and in the Apology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy of the Sophists, ready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue seriously. But in the sixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates; he acknowledges that they are the representatives rather than the corrupters of the world (vi. 492 A). He also becomes more dogmatic and constructive, passing beyond the range either of the political or the speculative ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage (vi. 506 C) Plato himself seems to intimate that the time had now come for Socrates, who had passed his whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be always repeating the notions of other men. There is no evidence that either the idea of good or the conception of a perfect state were comprehended in the Socratic teaching, though he

certainly dwelt on the nature of the universal and of final causes (cp. Xen. Mem. i. 4; Phaed. 97); and a deep thinker like him, in his thirty or forty years of public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch on the nature of family relations, for which there is also some positive evidence in the Memorabilia (Mem. i. 2, 51 foll.) The Socratic method is nominally retained; and every inference is either put into the mouth of the respondent or represented as the common discovery of him and Socrates. But any one can see that this is a mere form, the affectation of which grows wearisome as the work advances. The method of enquiry has passed into a method of teaching in which by the help of interlocutors the same thesis is looked at from various points of view. The nature of the process is truly characterized by Glaucon, when he describes himself as a companion who is not good for much in an investigation, but can see what he is shown (iv. 432 C), and may, perhaps, give the answer to a question more aptly than another (v. 474 A; cp. 389 A).

Neither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the immortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the Republic (x. 608 D; cp. vi. 498 D, E); nor is there any reason to suppose that he used myths or revelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction, or that he would have banished poetry or have denounced the Greek mythology. His favourite oath is retained, and a slight mention is made of the *daemonium*, or internal sign, which is alluded to by Socrates as a phenomenon peculiar to himself (vi. 496 C). A real element of Socratic teaching, which is more prominent in the Republic than in any of the other Dialogues of Plato, is the use of example and illustration (*τὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες*, iv. 442 E): 'Let us apply the test of common instances.' 'You,' says Adeimantus, ironically, in the sixth book, 'are so unaccustomed to speak in images.' And this use of examples or images, though truly Socratic in origin, is enlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of an allegory or parable, which embodies in the concrete what has been already described, or is about to be described, in the abstract. Thus the figure of the cave in Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in Book VI. The composite animal in Book IX is an allegory of the parts of the soul. The captain and the ship and the true pilot in Book VI are a figure of the relation of philosophers to the State which is about to be described. Other figures, such as the dog (ii. 375 A, D; iii. 404 A, 416 A; v. 451 D),

or the marriage of the portionless maiden (vi. 495, 496), or the drones and wasps in the eighth and ninth books, also form links of connexion in long passages, or are used to recall previous discussions.

Plato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him as 'not of this world.' And with this the paradox of the ideal state and the other paradoxes of the Republic, though they cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates, are in harmony. He is not any nearer the common opinions of mankind when he is constructing than when he is destroying. But it must also be observed that this opposition to the world in the latter part of the work turns to a sort of ironical pity or love. Men in general are incapable of philosophy, and are therefore at enmity with the philosopher; but their misunderstanding of him is unavoidable (vi. 494 foll.; ix. 589 D): for they have never seen him as he truly is in his own image; they are only acquainted with artificial systems in which there is no native force of truth—words which admit of another application. Their leaders have nothing to measure with, and are therefore ignorant of their own stature. But they are to be pitied or laughed at, not to be quarrelled with; they mean well with their nostrums, if they could only learn that they are cutting off a Hydra's head (iv. 426 D, E). This moderation towards those who are in error is one of the most characteristic features of Socrates in the Republic (vi. 499-502). In all the different representations of Socrates, whether of Xenophon or Plato, and amid the differences of the earlier or later Dialogues, he always retains the character of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after truth, without which he would have ceased to be Socrates.

Leaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic, and then proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic ideal of the State, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato may be read.

BOOK I. The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene—a festival in honour of the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piræus; to this is added the promise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole work is supposed to be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a small party, consisting of Critias, Timæus, Hermocrates, and another; this we learn from the first words of the Timæus.

When the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained, the attention is not distracted by any reference to the audience;

nor is the reader further reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative. Of the numerous company, three only take any serious part in the discussion; nor are we informed whether in the evening they went to the torch-race, or talked, as in the Symposium, through the night. The manner in which the conversation has arisen is described as follows:—Socrates and his companion Glaucon are about to leave the festival when they are detained by a message from Polemarchus, who soon appears accompanied by Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and with playful violence compels them to remain, promising them not only the torch-race, but the pleasure of conversation with the young, which to Socrates is a far greater attraction. They return to the house of Cephalus, Polemarchus' father, who is now in extreme old age, and is found sitting upon a cushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. 'You should come to me oftener, Socrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at my time of life, having lost other pleasures, I care the more for conversation.' Socrates asks him what he thinks of age, to which the old man replies, that the miseries and discontents of age are to be attributed to the tempers of men, and that age is a time of peace in which the tyranny of the passions is no longer felt. Yes, replies Socrates, but the world will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old age because you are rich. 'And there is something in what they say, Socrates, but not so much as they imagine—as Themistocles replied to the Seriphian, "Neither you, if you had been an Athenian, nor I, if I had been a Seriphian, would ever have been famous," I might in like manner reply to you, Neither a good poor man can be happy in age, nor yet a bad rich man.' Socrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to care about riches, and would like to know what he considers the chief advantage of them. Cephalus answers that when you are old the belief in the world below grows upon you, and then to have done justice and never to have been compelled to do injustice through poverty, or to have deceived any one, is felt to be an unspeakable blessing. Socrates, who is evidently preparing for an argument, next asks, What is the meaning of the word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts? No more than this? Or must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put back into the hands of my friend, who is a madman, the sword which I borrowed of him when he was in his right mind? 'There must be exceptions.' 'And yet,' said Polemarchus, 'the definition given has the authority of Simonides.' Here Cephalus retires to look after the sacrifices, and

bequeaths, as Socrates says, the possession of the argument to his heir, Polemarchus. The description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has touched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of justice, just raising the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues respecting external goods, and preparing for the concluding mythus of the world below in the slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the just man is a natural frontispiece or introduction to the long discourse which follows, and may perhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the nature of justice, there is no difficulty in discerning 'who is a just man.' The first explanation has been supported by a saying of Simonides; and now Socrates has a mind to show that the resolution of justice into two unconnected precepts, which have no common principle, fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic.

He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he mean that I was to give back arms to a madman? 'No, not in that case, not if the parties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you were to do what was proper, good to friends, and harm to enemies.' Every act does something to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks, What is this due and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? He is answered that justice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in what way good or harm? 'In making alliances with the one, and going to war with the other.' Then in time of peace what is the good of justice? The answer is that justice is of use in contracts, and contracts are money partnerships. Yes; but how in such partnerships is the just man of more use than any other man? 'When you want to have money safely kept and not used.' Then justice will be useful when money is useless. And there is another difficulty: justice, like the art of war or any other art, must be of opposites, good at attack as well as at defence, at stealing as well as guarding. But then justice is a thief, though a hero notwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric hero, who was 'excellent above all men in theft and perjury'—to such a pass have you and Homer and Simonides brought us; though I do not forget that the thieving must be for the good of friends and the harm of enemies. And still there arises another question: Are friends to be interpreted as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming? And are our friends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer is, that we must do good to our seeming and real good friends, and evil to our seeming and real evil enemies—good to the good, and evil

to the evil. But ought we to render evil for evil at all, for this will only make men more evil? Can justice produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship can make bad horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final conclusion is, that no sage or poet ever said that the just return evil for evil; this was a maxim of some rich and mighty man, Periander, Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C. 398-381). . .

Thus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to be inadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is set aside, and through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to the Christian precept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words are applied by the Persian mystic poet to the Divine being when the questioning spirit is stirred within him:—‘If because I do evil, Thou punishest me by evil what is the difference between Thee and me?’ In this both Plato and Khèyam rise above the level of many Christian (?) theologians. We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry, which not only arises out of the conflict of established principles in particular cases, but also out of the effort to attain them, and is prior as well as posterior to our fundamental notions of morality. The ‘interrogation’ of moral ideas; the appeal to the authority of Homer; the conclusion that the maxim, ‘Do good to your friends and harm to your enemies,’ being erroneous, could not have been the word of any great man (cp. ii. 380 A, B), are all of them very characteristic of the Platonic Socrates.

. . . Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but has hitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause and rushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a roar. ‘Socrates,’ he says, ‘what folly is this?—Why do you agree to be vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?’ He then prohibits all the ordinary definitions of justice; to which Socrates replies that he cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2×6 , or 3×4 , or 6×2 , or 4×3 . At first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue; but at length, with a promise of payment on the part of the company and of praise from Socrates, he is induced to open the game. ‘Listen,’ he says; ‘my answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger: now praise me.’ Let me understand you first. Do you mean that because Polydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the eating of beef for his interest, the eating of beef is also for our interest, who are not so strong? Thrasymachus is indignant at the illustration, and explains his meaning to be that the rulers make laws for

their own interests. But suppose, says Socrates, that the ruler or stronger makes a mistake—then the interest of the stronger is not his interest. Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy downfall by his disciple Cleitophon, who introduces the word ‘thinks;’—not the actual interest of the ruler, but what he thinks to be his interest, is justice. The contradiction is escaped by the unmeaning evasion: for though his real and apparent interests may differ, what the ruler thinks to be his interest will always be what he thinks to be his interest.

Of course this was not the original assertion, but Socrates is not disposed to quarrel about words, if, as he significantly adds, his adversary has changed his mind. In what follows Thrasymachus does in fact withdraw his admission that the ruler may make a mistake, for he affirms that the ruler as a ruler is infallible. Socrates is quite ready to accept the new position, which he equally turns against Thrasymachus by the help of the analogy of the arts. Every art or science has an interest, but this interest is to be distinguished from the accidental interest of the artist, and is only concerned with the good of the things or persons which come under the art. And justice has an interest which is the interest not of the ruler or judge, but of those who come under his sway.

Thrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he makes a bold diversion. ‘Tell me, Socrates,’ he says, ‘have you a nurse?’ What a question! Why do you ask? ‘Because, if you have, she neglects you and lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to know the shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never think of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects, whereas the truth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and subjects alike. And experience proves that in every relation of life the just man is the loser and the unjust the gainer, especially where injustice is on the grand scale, which is quite another thing from the petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and robbers of temples. The language of men proves this—our gracious and blessed tyrant and the like—all which tends to show (1) that justice is the interest of the stronger; and (2) that injustice is more profitable and also stronger than justice.’

Thrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having deluged the company with words has a mind to escape. But the others will not let him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that he will not desert them at such a crisis of their fate. ‘And

what can I do more for you?' he says; 'would you have me put the words bodily into your souls?' God forbid! replies Socrates; we only want you to be consistent in the use of terms, and not to employ 'physician' in an exact sense, and then again 'shepherd' or 'ruler' in an inexact sense,—whereas the ruler in himself and the shepherd in himself are looking only to the good of their flocks and not to their own: but you will insist that the ruler likes being in office. 'No doubt about it,' replies Thrasymachus. Then why are they paid? Is not the reason, that their interest is not comprehended in their art, and is therefore the concern of another art, the art of pay, which is common to the arts in general, and therefore not identical with any one of them. Nor would any man be a ruler unless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear of punishment; the reward is money or honour, the punishment is the necessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State (or Church) were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by the last motive only; and there would be as much 'nolo episcopari' as there is at present of the opposite. . . .

The satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and apparently incidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. There is a similar irony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not like being in office, and that therefore they demand pay.

Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far more important—that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as you and I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we ought to try and answer him, and as we cannot number the gains of either kind of life, we had better proceed by making mutual admissions of the truth to one another.

Thrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than perfect justice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates to admit the still greater paradox that injustice is virtue and justice vice. Socrates praises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of one whose only wish is to understand the meaning of his opponents. At the same time he is weaving a net in which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed. The admission is elicited from him that the just man only seeks to gain an advantage over the unjust, but not over the just, while the unjust would gain an advantage over either. Socrates, in order to test this statement, employs once more the favourite analogy of the arts. The musician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort, does not seek to gain more than the

skilled, but only more than the unskilled (that is to say, he works up to a rule, standard, law, and does not exceed it), whereas the unskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls on the side of the good, and the unskilled on the side of the evil, and the just is the skilled, and the unjust is the unskilled.

There was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the day was hot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first time in his life he was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was stronger than justice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds to the consideration of this, which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus, he hopes to clear up; the latter is at first churlish, but in the judicious hands of Socrates is soon restored to good humour: Is there not honour among thieves? Is not the strength of injustice only a remnant of justice? Is not absolute injustice absolute weakness also? A house that is divided against itself cannot stand; two men who quarrel detract from one another's strength, and he who is at war with himself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not wickedness therefore, but semi-wickedness flourishes in states,—a remnant of good is needed in order to make union in action possible,—there is no kingdom of evil in this world.

There is another question to be answered: Is the just or the unjust the happier? To this we answer, that every art has an end and an excellence or virtue by which the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul happiness, and justice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is attained? Justice and happiness being thus shown to be inseparable, the question whether the just or the unjust is the happier, has disappeared.

Thrasymachus replies: 'Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis.' Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your kindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet not a good entertainment—but that was my own fault for tasting of many things. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our enquiry, and then whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and then the comparative advantages of just and unjust: and the sum of all is that I know not what justice is; how then shall I know whether the just is happy or not?...

Thus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing to the analogy of the arts. 'Justice is like the arts (1) in having no

external interest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is to happiness what the implement of the workman is to his work.' At this the modern reader is apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is writing in an age when the arts and the virtues, like the moral and intellectual faculties, were still undistinguished. Among early enquirers into the nature of human action the arts helped to fill up the void of speculation; and at first the comparison of the arts and the virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They only saw the points of agreement in them and not the points of difference. Virtue, like art, must take means to an end; good manners are both an art and a virtue; character is naturally described under the image of a statue (362 D, 540 C); and there are many other figures of speech which are readily transferred from art to morals. The next generation cleared up these perplexities; or at least supplied after ages with a further analysis of them. The contemporaries of Plato were in a state of transition, and had not yet fully realized the common-sense distinction of Aristotle, that 'virtue is concerned with action, art with production' (Nic. Eth. vi. 4), or that 'virtue implies intention and constancy of purpose,' whereas 'art requires knowledge only' (Nic. Eth. ii. 3). And yet in the absurdities which follow from some uses of the analogy (cp. 333 E, 334 B), there seems to be an intimation conveyed that virtue is more than art. This is implied in the conclusion that 'justice is a thief,' and in the dissatisfaction which Socrates expresses at the final result.

The second of the three arguments, 'that the just does not aim at excess,' has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form. That the good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic sentiment, which may be compared with the language of those modern writers who speak of virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to law. The mathematical or logical notion of limit easily passes into an ethical one, and even finds a mythological expression in the conception of (*φθόνος*) envy. Ideas of measure, equality, order, unity, proportion, still linger in the writings of moralists; and the true spirit of the fine arts is better conveyed by such terms than by superlatives.

'When workmen strive to do better than well,
They do confound their skill in covetousness.'

(King John, Act iv. Sc. 2.)

The harmony of the soul and body (402 D), and of the parts of the

soul with one another (442 C), a harmony 'fairer far than that of musical notes,' is the true Hellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature.

In what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus, Plato argues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord and dissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated in modern times by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature of evil (cp. on the other hand, x. 610). In the last argument we trace the germ of the Aristotelian doctrine of an end and a virtue directed towards the end, which again is suggested by the arts. The final reconciliation of justice and happiness and the identity of the individual and the State are also intimated. Nothing is concluded; but the tendency of the dialectical process, here as always, is to enlarge our conception of ideas, and to widen their application to human life.

BOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on continuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner in which, at the end of the last book, Socrates had contrived to dispose of the question 'Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.' He begins by dividing goods into three classes:—first, goods desirable in themselves; secondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their results; thirdly, goods desirable for their results only. He then asks Socrates in which of the three classes he would place justice. In the second class, replies Socrates, among goods desirable for themselves and also for their results. 'Then the world in general are of another mind, for they say that justice belongs to the troublesome class of goods which are desirable for their results only. Socrates answers that this is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon thinks that Thrasymachus was too ready to listen to the voice of the charmer, and proposes to consider the nature of justice and injustice in themselves and apart from the results and rewards of them which the world is always dinning in his ears. He will first of all speak of the nature and origin of justice; secondly, of the manner in which men view justice as a necessity and not a good; and thirdly, he will prove the reasonableness of this view.

'To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil.' As the evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the sufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will

have neither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the impossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if he were not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have two rings, like that of Gyges in the well-known story, which make them invisible, and then no difference will appear in them, for every one will do evil if he can. And he who abstains will be regarded by the world as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of fear for themselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts. (Cp. Gorgias, 483 B.)

‘And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily correcting them; having gifts of money, speech, strength—the greatest villain bearing the highest character: and at his side let us place the just in his nobleness and simplicity—being, not seeming—without name or reward—clothed in his justice only—the best of men who is thought to be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would rather put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injustice—they will tell you) that the just man will be scourged, racked, bound, will have his eyes put out, and will at last be crucified [literally *impaled*][—]and all this because he ought to have preferred seeming to being. How different is the case of the unjust who clings to appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him a ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes, help his friends and hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty he can worship the gods better, and will therefore be more loved by them than the just.’

I was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus, like an Homeric hero, ‘brother helping brother,’ desired to join in the already unequal contest. He considered that the most important point of all had been omitted: ‘the grand error has been that men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards; parents and guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other advantages are promised by them of a more solid kind; e. g. wealthy marriages, and high offices which depend upon the good opinion of mankind. There is the picture in Homer of fat sheep and heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with fruit, which the gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets add a similar picture of another. Musaeus gets his heroes down in the world below, and has the ‘saints feasting on couches,

with garlands on their heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a gross paradise of immortal drunkenness. Some go further, and speak also of a fair posterity in the third and fourth generation. But the wicked are drowned by them in a slough of despond, or made to carry water in a sieve. Our description of the infamy and sufferings of the just is transferred by them to the unjust. This is all that their imagination supplies.

‘Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and prose:—“Virtue,” as Hesiod says, “is honourable but difficult”—“steep is the way and narrow is the gate;” but vice is easy and profitable—“broad is the way and many walk therein.” And you may often see the wicked in great prosperity and the righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And mendicant prophets knock at rich men’s doors, promising to atone for the sins of themselves or their fathers in a pleasant easy manner with festive games, or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine help and at a small charge;—they appeal to a heap of books professing to be written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the minds of whole cities, and promise to “get souls out of purgatory;” and if we refuse to listen to them, no one knows what will happen to us.

‘When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his conclusion? “Will he,” in the language of Pindar, “make justice his high tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?” Justice, he reflects, without the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice has the promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of happiness. To appearance then he will turn,—he will put on the show of virtue and trail behind him the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying that “wickedness is not easily concealed,” to which I reply that “nothing great is easy.” And even if there is a risk of being discovered, union and force and rhetoric will do much; and although they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know that there are gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may be appeased by sacrifices. Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For if the righteous are unpunished, the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. But is there not a danger of the world below? Nay, my friends, says the argument, there are mysteries and atoning power who will set that matter right, as the poets, who

are the sons of the gods, tell us, and this is confirmed by the authority of the State.

‘On what principle can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good manners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall fare well both with gods and men; we shall make the best of both worlds. Who that is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be angry with other men; for he knows also that more than human virtue is needed to save a man, and that he only praises justice who is incapable of injustice.

‘And the origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, poets, instructors of youth, have always asserted “the temporal dispensation,” the honours, glories, profits, expediencies of justice. Had they been taught in early youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen by any human or divine eye, they would not have needed others to be their guardians, but every one would have been the guardian of himself. And this is what I want you to show, Socrates;—other men use arguments which rather tend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that “might is right;” but from you I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude reputation; let the just be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you still prove to us the superiority of justice.’ . . .

The thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon, is the converse of that of Thrasymachus—not right is the interest of the stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same premises he carries the analysis of society a step further back;—might is still right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against the strength of the few.

There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have a family likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e. g. that power is the foundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to govern well or ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that war is the natural state of man; or that private vices are public benefits. All such theories have a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement with experience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil, and the motives of actions and the origin of institutions may be explained to a certain extent on either hypothesis according to the character or point of view of a particular thinker.

But theories of this sort do not represent the real nature of the State, which is based on a vague sense of right gradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable also of perversion), any more than the origin of society, which is to be sought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent the average character of individuals, which cannot be explained simply on a theory of evil, but has always a counteracting element of good. And as men become better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them, because they are more conscious of their own disinterestedness. A little experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kindlier view of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow men.

The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily supposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must always be a paradox when compared with the ordinary conditions of human life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is none the worse because 'some one has made the discovery' that no such ideal was ever realized. (Cp. v. 472 D.) And in a few exceptional individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of humanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery. This may be the state which the reason deliberately approves, and which the utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain cases to prefer.

Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with the view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing his own final conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of ethical truth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series of positions or situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time undergoing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word 'happiness' involves some degree of confusion because associated in the language of modern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally present to his mind.

Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the happiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is

the answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is 'the homage which vice pays to virtue.' But now Adeimantus, taking up the hint which had been already given by Glaucon (358 C), proceeds to show that in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to such arguments as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional morality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man.' Both the brothers touch upon the question, how far the morality of actions is determined by their consequences (cp. iv. 420 foll.); and both of them go beyond the position of Socrates, that justice belongs to the class of goods not desirable for themselves only, but desirable for themselves and for their results, to which he recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an internal principle, and in their condemnation of the poets they anticipate him. The common life of Greece is not enough for them; they must penetrate deeper into the nature of things.

It has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates, and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first in the State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his old question 'whether the virtues are one or many,' viz. that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish the purely internal nature of justice, he is met by the fact that man is a social being, and he tries to harmonise them as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency in this than was inevitable in his age and country; there is no use in turning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy, which, from some other point of view, would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does not give the final solution of philosophical questions for us; nor can he be judged of by our standard.

The remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the sons of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately follows:—First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of justice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to his natural condition, before he will answer the question at all. He

too will frame an ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole relations of man. Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he implies that he will only look for justice in society, and that from the State he will proceed to the individual. His answer in substance amounts to this,—that under favourable conditions, i.e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness will coincide, and that when justice has been once found, happiness may be left to take care of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency, when in the tenth book (612 A) he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honours of justice, may be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher ‘who retires under the shelter of a wall’ (vi. 496) can hardly have been esteemed happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he maintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first, without asking whether he will be happy or not, and happiness will be the inseparable accident which attends him. ‘Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.’

Secondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the true character of Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the individual. First ethics, then politics is the order of ideas to us; the reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is not one, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him; and he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country or the creed of his church. And to this type he is constantly tending to revert, whenever the influence of custom, or of party spirit, or the recollection of the past becomes too strong for him.

Thirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early Greek speculation, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of influence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual action of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are sometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action; either elevating politics into ethics, or lowering ethics to the standard of politics. The good man and the good citizen only coincide in the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be attained by legislation acting upon them from without, but, if at all, by education fashioning them from within.

... Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, 'inspired offspring of the renowned hero,' as the elegiac poet terms them; but he is at a loss to understand how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their character shows that their own arguments have no influence on them. He does not know how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes he shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to the smaller. He means to say, that he must be allowed to look for justice in the State first, and shall then proceed to the individual. This is agreed, and Socrates begins to construct the State.

Society arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on the same spot; and this is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent, although necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman, secondly, a builder, thirdly, a weaver, to which may be added a cobbler. Four or five citizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have different natures, and one man will do one thing better than many; and business waits for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour into different employments; into wholesale and retail; into workers, and makers of workmen's tools; into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this will have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very large. But then again imports will be required, and imports necessitate exports, and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the taste of purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too we must have a market and money and retail trades, otherwise buyers and sellers will never meet, and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted in vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be complete, and we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse of the citizens with one another justice and injustice will appear.

Here follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They build houses, and produce corn and wine, and make coats and shoes. They are lightly clad in summer while at their work, but well shod and clothed in winter. Their principal food is flour and meal, of which they make noble puddings, and these they serve up on a mat of reeds or clean

leaves. They repose on couches strewn with yew and myrtle, passing their time in pleasant converse with one another, hymning the gods over their wine, and taking care not to have too many children. 'Yes, Socrates,' said Glaucon, 'but you should give them a relish.' Yes, I replied, and a relish they shall have—salt and olives and cheese and potherbs and chestnuts which they will roast at the fire, indulging in moderate potations. Fed on such a diet they will live in peace and health, and bequeath a similar life to their descendants. Glaucon said, 'Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.' Why, I replied, what do you want more? 'Only the conveniences of life, which every one has,—sofas to lie upon, tables to eat from, also meats and sweets.' I see that you want not only a State, but a luxurious State; and possibly in the more complex frame we shall sooner find justice and injustice. Then our ideas will have to enlarge themselves; the fine arts must go to work—every instrument and ornament of luxury in furniture and dress and food will be wanted in every form. There will be dancers, painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks, barbers, tire-women, nurses, artists; and we must not forget the swincherds and neatherds too for the animals, and physicians to cure the disorders of which luxury is the source. And to feed all these superfluous mouths we shall need a part of our neighbours' land, and they will want a part of ours: and this is the origin of war, which may be traced to the same causes as other political evils. Our city will now require the slight addition of a camp, and the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then our old doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a day, and there must be a natural aptitude for military duties. There will be some war-like natures who have this aptitude—dogs keen of scent and swift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage, such natures, whether of men or animals, will be full of spirit. And here arises a difficulty:—these spirited natures are apt to bite and devour one another; the union of gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies appears to be an impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both qualities. Who then can be a guardian? After a pause, Socrates adds that the image of the dog suggests a way of escape. For in dogs too there is a double character of gentleness to friends and enmity to strangers. Your dog is a philosopher and judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing; and philosophy, whether in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness. And the human watchdogs too

must be philosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how are they to be learned without education ?

But what is education? Is any better than the old-fashioned sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music includes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false. 'What do you mean?' he said. I mean that children hear stories before they learn gymnastics, and that the stories are mostly untrue, or have only one or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very impressible, and children ought not to be allowed to learn what they will have to unlearn when they grow up; and in order to prevent this we must have a censorship of nursery tales, banishing some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper, as we may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who really are to blame, for they not only tell lies but bad lies; stories about Uranus and Saturn, which are immoral as well as false, and which should never be spoken of to young persons or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in a mystery after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some unprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the example of Zeus, or our citizens be incited to war by seeing the wars of the gods and giants embroidered on the robe of Athene? Shall they hear the narrative of Hephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus sending him flying for helping her when she was beaten? Even if such tales are capable of a mystical interpretation, the interpretation is not obvious to the young at the age when impressions are most powerful. But if any one asks what tales are to be allowed, to that, Adeimantus, you and I answer that we are legislators and not book-makers; we only lay down the principles according to which books are to be written, but to write them is the duty of others.

And our first principle is, that God is to be represented as he is; not as the author of all things, but of good and of good only. We are not to be told that he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two casks full of destinies, as Homer says; or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the Trojan war; or that he picks a quarrel with men when he wants to destroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was just, and men were all the better for being punished. But that the deed was evil, and God the author of

the deed, is not to be said or sung in any well-ordered commonwealth by old or young, and is suicidal, immoral, impious. This is our first and great principle,—God is the author of good only.

And the second principle is like unto it:—With God is no variability or change of form; he is no Proteus. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God, he must be changed either by another or by himself. By another?—but the best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least liable to be changed by any external force. By himself?—but he cannot change for the better, and he will hardly change for the worse. He remains for ever fairest and best in his own image. Therefore we refuse to listen to the poets who tell us of the goddess Here begging in the likeness of a priestess or of other deities who prowl about at night in strange disguises; all that blasphemous nonsense with which mothers fool the manhood out of their children is got at secondhand from the poets and ought to be suppressed. But some one will say that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a form in relation to us. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul or principle of falsehood; and as for any other form of lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional cases—what need have the gods of this? For they are not ignorant of antiquity like the poets, nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor is any madman a friend of theirs. God then is true, he is absolutely true; he changes not, he deceives not, by day or night, by word or sign. This is our second great principle,—God is true. Away with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer, and the accusation of Thetis against Apollo in Aeschylus. . . .

In order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds to trace the first principles of mutual need and of division of labour in an imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this community increases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports necessitate exports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers sit in the market-place to save the time of the producers. These are the steps by which Plato constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the elements of political economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second or civilized State, the simple naturally comes before the complex. But although, like Rousseau, he indulges in a picture of primitive life, which has indeed often had a great influence

on the imagination of mankind, he does not seriously mean to say that one is better than the other (cp. *Politicus*, p. 272); nor can any inference be drawn from the description of the first state taken apart from the second, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the *Politics*, book iv. 4, 12.

The disappointment of Glaucon at the 'city of pigs,' the ludicrous description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined state, and the afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the nature of the guardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of offering some almost unprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be celebrated, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother, are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In speaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child must be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. Yet this is not very different from saying that children must be taught through the medium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds can only develop gradually, and that there is much which they must learn without understanding (cp. iii. 402 A). This is also the substance of Plato's view, though he must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from modern ethical writers respecting truth and falsehood. To us economies or accommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by the human faculties or necessary for the communication of knowledge to the simple and ignorant. We should insist that the word was inseparable from the intention, and that we must not be falsely true; i. e. speak or act falsely in support of what was right or true. But Plato would limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a good moral effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by the rulers alone and for great objects.

A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be conscious that the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond Homer and Hesiod. Whether their narratives were true or false did not seriously affect the political or social life of Hellas. Men only began to suspect that they were fictions when they recognised them to be immoral. And so in all religions: the consideration of their morality comes first, afterwards the truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the events natural or

supernatural which are told of them. But in modern times, and in Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic, we have been too much inclined to identify the historical with the moral; and some have refused to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman accuracy was discernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient or religious history are amongst the most important of all facts; but they are frequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections tend to show that the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him in placing the moral before the historical truth of religion; and, generally, in disregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know also that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day; and are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism would condemn.

A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul is a true lie, the corruption of the highest truth, the deception of the highest part of the soul, from which he who is deceived has the least power of delivering himself. For example, to represent God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding men with appearances or as the author of evil; or again, to affirm with Protagoras that 'knowledge is sensation,' or that 'being is becoming,' or with Thrasymachus 'that might is right,' would have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness of the greatest untruth, e. g. if, in the language of the Gospels, 'he who was blind' were to say 'I see,' is another aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke xii. 10), allowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of accommodation,—which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in certain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had himself raised, i. 331 C, about the propriety

of deceiving a madman. He is also contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or false. Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or education, we may note further, (1) the approval of the old traditional education of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making for the use of economies in the State; (4) the familiar use of the allegorical interpretation of the poets in the age of Plato, which here, as in the *Phaedrus*, is rejected by him; (5) the contemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below (iii. 390) he alludes to the *Chronique Scandaleuse* of the gods.

BOOK III. There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to banish fear; for no man can be courageous who is afraid of death, or who believes the tales which are repeated by the poets concerning the world below. A gentle request should be made to them by the authorities not to abuse hell, accompanied by an intimation that their tales are untrue, and the reverse of inspiring to heroes. The licenser is desired to expunge obnoxious passages, such as the chilling words of Achilles:—‘I would rather be a serving-man than rule over all the dead;’ and the verses which tell of the squalid mansions, the senseless shadows, the flitting soul mourning over her lost strength and youth, the soul with a gibber going beneath the earth like smoke, the souls of the suitors which flutter about like bats—all this sort of thing Homer and the other poets must not be angry at our erasing. The terrors and horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the rest of their Tartarian nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have their use; but they frighten people out of their wits, and are not the proper food for soldiers. As little can we admit the sorrows and sympathies of the Homeric heroes:—Achilles, the son of a goddess, lying first on his back, and then on his face, then starting up and sailing along the sea-shore; or Priam, the cousin of the gods, crying aloud, rolling in the mire. A good man is not altogether prostrated at the loss of children or fortune. Neither is death terrible to him; and therefore lamentations over the dead should not be practised by men of note; they should be the concern of women and of inferior persons only, whether women or men. Still worse is the attribution of such weakness to the gods; as when the goddesses say, ‘Alas! my

travail!' and worst of all, when the king of heaven himself laments his inability to save Hector, or sorrows over the impending doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of God, if not ridiculed by our young men, is likely to be imitated by them. Nor should our citizens be given to excess of laughter—'Such violent delights' are followed by a violent re-action. The description in the Iliad of the gods shaking their sides at the clumsiness of Hephaestus would not be admitted by you, says Socrates, addressing Glaucon. 'By me?—No,' replies the other, 'but you attribute to me what I never said.'

Truth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood is of no use to the gods and is useful only as a medicine in the case of men. The State physician or ruler may occasionally employ this medicine, but the subject must not in return tell a lie to the ruler; any more than the patient would tell a lie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain. If the ideal State is ever realized, the false word of any common man should be regarded as treason.

In the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists in obedience to the rulers and abstinence from sensual pleasures. That is a lesson which Homer teaches in some places: 'The Achaeans marched breathing prowess in silent awe of their leaders;'—and a very different lesson in other places: 'O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, and the heart of a stag.' Language of the latter kind is not likely to impress the lesson of self-control on the minds of youth. The same may be said of his praises of eating and drinking and of his dread of starvation; also of the verses in which he tells with much circumstance of the rapturous loves of Zeus and Here, which made the former forget his intention of honouring Achilles; or of how Hephaestus detained Ares and Aphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a nobler strain heard in the words:—'Endure, my soul, thou hast endured worse.' Nor must we allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say, 'Gifts persuade the gods, gifts reverend kings;' or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix to Achilles that he should get money out of the Greeks before he assisted them; or the meanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from Agamemnon; or his requiring a ransom for the body of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo; or his insolence to the river-god Scamander; or his dedication to the dead Patroclus of his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius; or the fit of cruelty which made Cheiron's pupil drag the body of Hector round the walls, and slay the captives at the pyre, especially as he is

avaricious also, which seems to be a contradiction. The amatory exploits of Peirithous and Theseus, Zeus' and Poseidon's sons are equally unworthy. Either these sons of gods were not the sons of god, or they were not such as the poets imagine them, any more than the gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who believes that such things are done by those who have the blue blood of heaven flowing in their veins will be too ready to imitate their example.

Enough of gods and heroes ;—what shall we say about men? What the poets and story-tellers say?—that the wicked prosper and the righteous are afflicted, or that justice is another's gain? Not this at all events, which is the opposite of the truth. But in raising the question at all we are anticipating the definition of justice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry.

Enough of the subject of poetry ; next follows style. Now all poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to come ; and narrative is of three kinds, the simple, imitative, and a composition of the two. An instance will make my meaning clear. The first scene in Homer is of the last or mixed kind, being partly description and partly dialogue. But if you throw the dialogue into the 'oratio obliqua' (I am no poet and therefore I drop the metre), the priest came and (do not say 'spoke these words,' but) prayed the gods that the Achaeans might take Troy and have a safe return if Agamemnon would only give him back his daughter, and the other Greeks assented, but Agamemnon was wroth, and so on,—then the whole becomes descriptive, and the poet is the only speaker left ; or, if you omit the narrative, the whole becomes dialogue. These are the three styles—which of them is to be admitted into our State? 'Do you ask whether tragedy and comedy are to be admitted?' Yes, but perhaps there is something more involved ; and indeed the question has been already answered, for we have decided that one man cannot in his life play many parts. And therefore he cannot both live and act, or compose both tragedy and comedy, or be a rhapsodist and actor at once. Human nature is coined into very small pieces, and as our guardians have their own business already, which is the care of freedom, they will have enough to do without imitating. But if they imitate they should not imitate any meanness or baseness, but the good only ; for the mask which the actor wears is apt to become his face. We cannot allow men to play the parts of women, young or old, quarrelling or weeping, scolding their husbands, or setting up their

necks against the gods,—least of all when making love or in labour. They must not represent slaves, or bullies, or cowards, or drunkards, or madmen, or blacksmiths, or neighing horses, or bellowing bulls, or sounding rivers, or a raging sea. A good or wise man will be willing to perform good and wise actions, but he will be ashamed to play an inferior part which he has never practised; and he will prefer the descriptive style with as little imitation as possible. The man who has no self-respect, on the contrary, will imitate anybody and anything; sounds of nature, cries of animals; he will whistle like the wind, rattle like hail, growl like thunder, and play on any instrument; also he will bark like a dog, baa like a sheep, and crow like a cock; his whole performance will be imitation of gesture and voice. Now in the descriptive style there are few changes, but in the dramatic there are a great many. Poets and musicians use either, or a compound of both, and this compound is very attractive to youth and their teachers as well as to the vulgar. But our State in which one man plays one part only, and a cobbler is a cobbler, and a ploughman a ploughman, is not adapted for complexity. And when one of these polyphonus pantomimic gentlemen offers to exhibit himself and his poetry we will fall down and worship him as a sweet creature, and a holy and wonderful being; he shall be anointed with myrrh and have a garland of wool set upon his head—but then we shall bid him turn about and go to the next city, for we are patrons of the rough, honest poet, and will not depart from our original models (ii. 379 foll.; cp. *Laws*, vii. 817.)

Next as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,—the subject, the harmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the first. As we banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the mixed Lydian harmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and as our citizens are to be temperate, we may also banish convivial harmonies, such as the Ionian and pure Lydian. Two remain,—the Dorian and Phrygian, the first for war, the second for peace; the one expressive of courage, the other of obedience, or instruction, or religious feeling. And as we reject varieties of harmony, we shall also reject the queer, many-stringed, variously-shaped instruments which give utterance to them, and in particular the flute, which is more complex than any of them. The lyre and the harp may be permitted in the town, and the Pan's-pipe in the fields. Thus we have made a purgation of music, and will now make a purgation of metres. They should be like the harmonies, simple and suitable to the occasion. There were four notes of

the tetrachord, and there are three ratios of metre $\frac{3}{2}$ $\frac{2}{1}$ $\frac{2}{1}$, which have all their characters, and the feet have different characters as well as the rhythms. But about this you and I must ask Damon, the musician, who speaks, if I remember rightly, of a martial measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic, and iambic rhythms, which he arranges so as to compensate and equalize with one another. We only venture to affirm the general principle that the style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style; and that the simplicity and harmony of the soul should be reflected in them. This principle of simplicity has to be learnt by every one in the days of his youth, and may be gathered anywhere from painting and embroidery, or any other creative and constructive art, as well as from the forms of plants and animals; it runs through nature as well as art, and has a wide kindred in the world.

Other artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or unseemliness. Sculpture and painting as well as music must conform to the law of simplicity. And he who violates it cannot be allowed to work in our city, and to corrupt the taste of our citizens. For images of deformity are like a hurtful pasture, and day by day, little by little, our guardians gather evil from them, which becomes a festering mass of evil in the soul. Place them only where they may breathe the air of health and beauty, amid fair sights and sounds, and they will quickly drink in from surrounding objects sweet and harmonious influences; and this is the great power of music, which more than any other influence enters into the soul and gives the sense of deformity and beauty. At first the effect is unconscious; but when reason arrives then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as the friend whom he always knew. As in learning to read, first we acquire the elements or letters separately, and afterwards their combinations, and do not recognize the reflections of them in the water until we know the letters themselves;—in like manner we must first attain the elements or essential forms of temperance and courage and liberality and magnificence and the like, and then trace the combinations of them in life and experience. There is a music of the soul which answers to the harmony of the world; and the fairest object of a musical soul is the fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the latter may be excused, but not in the former. True love is the daughter of temperance, and temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of bodily pleasure. Enough has been said of music, which makes a fair ending with love.

Next we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the soul is related to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we educate the mind we may leave the education of the body in her charge, and need only give a general outline of the course to be pursued. In the first place the guardians must abstain from strong drink, for they should be the last persons to lose their wits. Whether the habits of the palaestra are suitable to them is more doubtful, for the ordinary gymnastic is a sleepy, heavy sort of thing, and when left off suddenly is apt to be dangerous. And our warrior athletes must be wide-awake dogs, having all their senses about them, and must also be inured to all changes of food and climate. Hence they will require a finer sort of training and a simpler gymnastic, which will be twin sister to their simple music; and for their diet a rule may be found in Homer, who gives his heroes no fish although they were living at the sea-side, nor boiled meats which involve an apparatus of pots and pans; and, if I am not mistaken, he nowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery, and Attic confections, and Corinthian courtezans, which are to gymnastic what Lydian and Ionian melodies are to music, must not be allowed among our citizens. Where gluttony and intemperance prevail the town begins to fill with doctors and pleaders, who open their halls for practice; and law and medicine give themselves airs as soon as the freemen of a State go out and buy them. But what can show a more disgraceful state of education than the importation of justice from abroad because you have none of your own at home? And yet there *is* something more disgraceful still in the further stage of the same disease, when men have learned to take a pleasure and pride in the twists and turns of the law; not considering how much better it would be for them so to order their lives as to have no need of a nodding justice. And there is a similar disgrace in employing a physician, not for the cure of wounds or epidemic disorders, but because a man has blown himself out like a bladder, and has got more diseases than he knows the names of, or than ever existed in the days of Asclepius. For observe how simple is the Homeric practice of medicine. Eurypylos after he has been wounded drinks a posset of Pramnian wine, which is of a heating nature; and yet the sons of Asclepius blame neither the damsel who gives him the drink, nor Patroclus who is attending on him. The truth is that this modern system of nursing diseases was introduced by Herodicus the trainer; who, being of a sickly constitution, by a compound of training and

medicine tortured first himself and then a good many other people, and died a long time after he ought to have died. But Asclepius was a statesman, and refused to practise this art, because he knew that the citizens of a well-ordered State have no leisure to be ill, and therefore he adopted the rough 'kill or cure' method, which artisans and labourers employ. 'They must be at their business,' they say, 'and have no time for swathing and dieting: if they recover, well; and if they don't, there is an end of them.' Whereas the rich man is supposed to be a gentleman who can afford to be ill. Do you know a maxim of Phocylides,—that 'when a man begins to be rich' (or, perhaps, a little before) 'he should practise virtue?' But how can excessive care of health be inconsistent with an ordinary occupation, and yet consistent with the practice of virtue? A man ought to be thinking of something, and he says that philosophy gives him the headache, and never does anything because he is always unwell. And this was the reason why Asclepius and his sons practised no such art. They were in the interest of the public, and did not wish to preserve useless lives, or raise up a puny offspring to wretched sires. Honest diseases they honestly cured; and if a man was wounded, like Eurypylos in Homer, he might drink a sack posset, and he recovered all the same. But they would have nothing to do with persons whose lives were of no use either to themselves or to others, even though they might have made large fortunes out of them. And as to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain by a thunderbolt for restoring a rich man to life, that is a lie; following our old rule we must say either that he did not take bribes, or that he was not the son of a god.

Glaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best judges will not be those who have had severally the greatest experience of diseases and of crimes. Socrates draws a distinction between them. The physician should have had experience of disease in his own body, for he cures with his mind and not with his body. But the lawyer controls mind by mind; and therefore he should have no experience of evil in his own person. Where then is he to gain experience? How is he to be wise and also innocent? When young a good man is apt to be deceived by evil doers, because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and therefore the judge should be advanced in years; his youth should have been innocent, and he should have acquired an insight into evil by extended observation of others. This is the ideal of a judge; the criminal turned detective is wonderfully suspicious and cautious, but

when he is in company with good men who have the experience of age, he is at fault, for he foolishly imagines that every one is as bad as himself. Vice may be known of virtue, but cannot know virtue. This is the sort of medicine and this the sort of law which will prevail in our State; they will be healing arts to better natures; but the evil body will be left to die by the one, and the evil soul will be put to death by the other. And the need of either will be greatly diminished by good music which will give harmony to the soul, and good gymnastic which will give health to the body. Not that this division of music and gymnastic really corresponds to soul and body; for they are equally concerned with the soul, which requires both of them, and is tamed by the one and aroused and sustained by the other. The two together supply our guardians with their twofold nature. The passionate disposition which has too much gymnastic is hardened and brutalized, the gentle or philosophic character which has too much music becomes enervated. While a man is singing and twittering and pouring music like water through the funnel of his ears, the edge of his soul gradually wears away, and the passionate or spirited element is melted out of him. Too little spirit is easily wasted; too much is converted into nervous irritability. So, again, the athlete by feeding and training has his courage doubled, but he soon grows stupid; his senses are never purged, and like a wild beast he is ready to do everything by blows and nothing by counsel or policy. There are two principles in man, reason and passion, and the gods have given two arts corresponding to them, and not to the soul and body, as some vainly say—music and gymnastic; the unity of which makes a harmony higher far than the concord of musical notes. And the true musician is he who attempts them—he shall be the presiding genius of our State.

The next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must rule the younger; and the best of the elders will be the best guardians. He who guards best is he who loves best, and he who loves others has an interest in them and sympathy with them. Those then must be selected by us who have always been devoted to the good of their country. And a watch must be put over them to discover whether at every epoch of life they have retained the same opinions and held out against force and enchantment. For time and persuasion and the love of pleasure may enchant a man into a change of purpose, and force may compel him. And therefore we must choose for our guardians men of known

firmness, who have been tried by many tests, like gold in the refiner's fire, and have been passed first through dangers then through pleasure, and at every age have come out of such trials victorious and without stain in full command of themselves and their principles; having all their faculties in harmonious exercise for their country's good. Those who attain this degree of virtue are worthy of the highest honours both in life and death. It would perhaps be better to speak of the others whom we before called guardians as auxiliaries or allies, and to reserve the higher title for the more select class.

And now for one noble, useful lie, a lie upon a grand scale, to be the corner-stone of our State,—in the belief of which, O that we could train our rulers! and at any rate let us make the attempt with the rest of the world. I know not how to give utterance to my ideas, and yet what I am going to tell is only a republication of the Phœnician story of Cadmus and his earthborn men—which has often happened in past times, but not in our own; for the age of miracles has ceased, and the world is an unbelieving world. I am ashamed to look you in the face as I repeat the audacious tale, which I would have you impart in regular gradation, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. The lie is as follows:—The citizens shall be told that their youth was a dream, and that during all that time in which they seemed to be undergoing a process of education they were really being fashioned in the womb of the earth, their alma mater and true parent, who sent them up when they were ready; and that they are bound to protect and cherish her whose children they are, and to regard each other as brothers and sisters. 'I do not wonder at your being ashamed to propound such a fiction.' There is more behind. These brothers and sisters have different natures, and some of them God made to rule, whom he fashioned of gold; others he made of silver, to be helps; others again to be husbandmen and craftsmen, and these were formed by him of brass and iron. But sometimes a golden parent may have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son, and then nature orders a transposition of ranks; the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards his offspring if he has to descend in the social scale; for an oracle says 'that the State will come to an end if governed by a man of brass.' Is there any possibility of making our citizens believe all this? 'Not in the present generation, but in the next, perhaps, yes.'

Now let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their

rulers, and look about and pitch their camp in a high place, which will be safe against enemies descending upon the fold, and also against insurrections from within. There let them sacrifice and set up their tents; for soldiers they are to be and not shopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the sheep; and luxury and avarice will turn them into wolves and tyrants. Their habits and their dwellings should correspond to their education. They should have no property; their pay should only meet their expenses; and they should have common meals. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God, and this divine gift in their souls they must not alloy with that earthly dross which passes under the name of gold. They only of the citizens may not touch it, or be under the same roof with it, or drink from it; it is the accursed thing. Should they ever acquire houses or lands or money of their own, they will become householders and tradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of helpers, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and the rest of the State, will be at hand.

The religious and ethical aspect of Plato's education will hereafter be considered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more conveniently noticed in this place.

1. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave irony, Plato, after the manner of his age, summons as a witness about ethics and psychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting to distinguish the better lesson from the worse (390), sometimes altering the text from design (388, and, perhaps, 389); more than once quoting or alluding to Homer inaccurately (391, 406), after the manner of the early logographers, turning the Iliad into prose (393), and delighting to draw far-fetched inferences from his words, or to make ludicrous applications of them. He does not, like Heracleitus, get into a passion with the sacred books of his countrymen, but uses their forms of expression as a vehicle of a higher truth. His conclusions are always sound, although the premises are fallacious. These fanciful appeals to Homer add a charm to Plato's style, and at the same time they have the effect of a satire on the follies of Homeric interpretation. They may be compared with modern citations from Scripture, which have often a great rhetorical power even when the original meaning of the words is changed. The real, like the Platonic Socrates, as we gather from the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations. (i. 2, 58; ii. 6, 11.)

Great in all ages and countries, in religion as well as in law and literature, has been the art of interpretation.

2. 'The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the style.' Notwithstanding the fascination which the word 'classical' exercises over us, we can hardly maintain that this rule is observed in all the Greek poetry which has come down to us. We cannot deny that the thought often exceeds the power of lucid expression in Æschylus and Pindar; or that the style gets the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet Euripides. Only perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the two; in him alone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a Greek statue, in which there is nothing to add or to take away; at least this is true of single plays or of large portions of them. The connexion in the Choruses and in the Greek lyric poets generally is often a tangled thread which in an age before logic the poet was unable to draw out. Many thoughts and feelings mingled in his mind, and he had no power of disposing or arranging them. For there is a subtle influence of logic which requires to be transferred from prose to poetry, just as the music and perfection of language are infused by poetry into prose. In all ages the poet has been a bad judge of his own meaning (Apol. 22 B.); for he does not see that the word which is full of associations to his own mind is obscure and unmeaning to that of another; or that the sequence which is clear to himself is puzzling to others. In modern literature it would be easy to point out long passages, and even whole poems, in which there is no proportion between style and subject: in which any half-expressed figure, any harsh construction, any distorted collocation of words, any remote sequence of ideas is admitted; and there is no voice coming sweetly from nature, or music adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if there could be poetry without beauty, or beauty without ease and clearness. The obscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily out of the state of language and logic which existed in their age. They are not examples to be followed by us; for the use of language ought in every generation to become clearer and clearer. Like Shakespere, they were great in spite, not in consequence, of their imperfections of expression. But there is no reason for returning to the necessary obscurity which prevailed in the infancy of literature. The English poets of the last century were certainly not obscure; and we have no excuse for losing what they had gained, or for going back to the earlier or transitional age which preceded them. The thought of our own times has not

outstripped language; a want of Plato's 'art of measuring' is the real cause of the disproportion between them.

3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a theory of art than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up as follows:—True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and ideal,—the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or repose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and simple character, or to listen to such strains, is the best of influences,—the true Greek atmosphere, in which youth should be brought up. That is the way to create in them a natural good taste, which will have a feeling of truth and beauty everywhere. For though the poets are to be expelled, still art is recognized as another aspect of reason—like love in the Symposium, extending over the same sphere, but confined to the preliminary education and acting through the power of habit (vii. 522 A.); and this conception of art is not limited to strains of music or the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature. The Republic of Plato, like the Athens of Pericles, has an artistic as well as a political side.

There is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two or three passages does he even allude to them. He is not lost in rapture at the great works of Phidias, the Parthenon, the Propylea, the statues of Zeus or Athene. He would probably have regarded any abstract truth of number or figure (529 E) as higher than the greatest of them. Yet it is hard to suppose that some influence, such as he hopes to inspire in youth, did not pass into his own mind from the works of art which he saw around him. We are living upon the fragments of them, and find in a few broken stones the standard of truth and beauty. But in Plato this feeling has no expression; he nowhere says that beauty is the object of art; he seems to deny that wisdom can take an external form (Phaedrus, 250 E); he does not distinguish the fine from the mechanical arts. Whether or no, like some writers, he was thinking of his own friends without naming them, it is at any rate remarkable that the greatest perfection of the fine arts should coincide with an almost entire silence about them. In one other passage (iv. 420) he tells us that a work of art, like the State, is a whole; and this conception of a whole and the love of the newly-born mathematical sciences may be regarded, if not as the inspiring, at any rate, as the regulating principles of Greek art (cp. Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 6; and Sophist, 235, 236).

4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had

better not be in robust health; and should have known what illness is in his own person. But the judge ought to have had no similar experience of evil; he is to be a good man who having passed his youth in innocence, became acquainted late in life with the vices of others. And therefore, according to Plato, a judge should not be young, as, according to Aristotle, a young man is not fit to be a hearer of moral philosophy. The bad, on the other hand, have a knowledge of vice, but no knowledge of virtue. It may be doubted, however, whether this train of reflection is well founded. In a remarkable passage of the *Laws* (xii. 950 B) it is acknowledged that the evil may form a correct estimate of the good. The union of gentleness and courage in book ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, yet was afterwards ascertained to be a truth. And Plato might also have found that the intuition of evil may be consistent with the abhorrence of it. There is a directness of aim in virtue which gives an insight into vice. And the knowledge of character is in some degree a natural sense independent of any special experience of good or evil.

5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek and also very different from anything which existed at all in his age of the world, is the transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had been enfranchisement of Helots and degradation of citizens under special circumstances, but nothing like that 'open career' which he promises to his citizens. Two principles are indicated by him: first, that there is a distinction of ranks dependent on circumstances prior to the individual: second, that this distinction is and ought to be broken through by personal qualities. He embodies the conception in a myth, here, as elsewhere, adapting mythology to the wants of the State. Every Greek state had a myth respecting its own origin; the Platonic republic may also have a tale of earthborn men. The gravity and verisimilitude with which the tale is told, and the analogy of Greek tradition, are a sufficient verification of the 'monstrous falsehood.' Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and silver and brass and iron age succeeding one another, but Plato supposes these differences in the natures of men to exist together in a single state. Mythology supplies a figure under which the lesson may be taught (as Protagoras says, 'the myth is more interesting'), and also enables Plato to touch lightly on new principles without going into details. In this passage he shadows forth a general truth, but he does not tell us by what steps the transposition of ranks is to be effected. Indeed throughout the *Republic* he allows the lower ranks to fade into

the distance. We do not know whether they are to carry arms, and whether in the fifth book they are or are not included in the communistic regulations respecting property and marriage. Nor is there any use in arguing strictly either from a few chance words, or from the silence of Plato, or in drawing inferences which were beyond his vision. Aristotle, in his criticism on the position of the lower classes, does not perceive that the poetical creation is 'like the air, invulnerable,' and cannot be divided by the shafts of his logic. (Pol. 2, 5, 18 fol.)

6. Lesser matters of style may be remarked. (1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato's way of expressing that he is passing lightly over the subject. (2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he proceeds with the construction of the State. (3) The description of the State sometimes as a reality (389 D; 416 B), and then again as a work of imagination only (cp. 534 C; 592 B); these are the arts by which he sustains the reader's interest. (4) Connecting links (e. g. 408 C with 379), or the preparation (394 D) for the entire expulsion of the poets in book x. (5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the valetudinarian (405), the satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides (407), the manner in which the image of the gold and silver citizens is taken up into the subject (416 E), and the argument from the practice of Asclepius (407), should not escape notice.

BOOK IV. Adeimantus said: 'Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that you make your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they are the lords of the city, and yet instead of having lands, and houses, and furniture, and gold, and silver, and sacrifices, and hospitalities of their own, like other men, they live as mercenaries and are always mounting guard.' You may add, I replied, that they are on board wages, and have no money to spend on a journey or a lady of pleasure, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness. 'Well, suppose all this, what answer do you give?' My answer is, that our guardians may or may not be the happiest of men,—I should not be surprised to find in the long-run that they were,—but this is not the aim of our constitution, which was designed for the good of the whole and not of any one part. If I went to a sculptor and blamed him for having painted the eye, which is the noblest feature of the face, not purple but black, he would reply: 'The eye must be an eye, but you ought to look at the statue as a whole.' Now I can well imagine a fool's paradise, in

which everybody is eating and drinking, clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and have their wheel at hand, that they may work a little when they please; and cobblers and all the other classes of a State lose their distinctive character. And a State may get on without cobblers; but when the guardians degenerate into boon companions, then the ruin is complete. Remember that we are not talking of peasants keeping holiday, but of a State in which every man is expected to be doing his own work, and sharing with the rest. The happiness resides not in this or that class, but in the State as a whole. I have another remark to make:—A middle condition is best for artisans; they should have money enough to buy tools, and not money enough to be independent of their business. And will not the same condition be best for our citizens? Give them neither poverty nor riches, for the one is the parent of meanness, and the other of luxury, and both of discontent. ‘But then, Socrates, how will our city go to war, not having the sinews of war, especially against a rich enemy?’ There may be a difficulty in fighting against one enemy, but there is no difficulty in fighting against two of them. In the first place, remember that the contest will be carried on by trained warriors against well-to-do citizens: and might not a regular boxer upset more than one stout gentleman, stepping lightly back himself and making a sudden turn upon them—in hot weather especially? ‘Yes, many a one.’ And suppose, that before engaging we send ambassadors to one of the two cities, saying, ‘Silver and gold we neither have nor can have, do you help us and take our share;’—who in such a case would choose to fight with the lean, wiry dogs, instead of joining with them against the fatted sheep? ‘But if the wealth of many states coalesce in one, shall we not be in danger?’ I am amused to hear you use the word ‘state’ of any but our own State. They are ‘states,’ but not ‘a state,’ many in one;—a game of states at which men play¹. For every state, however small, has two nations, rich and poor, struggling within her, which you may set one against the other. But our State, while at unity with herself and fixed in her principles, will be the mightiest of Hellenic states, and will always have numerous allies and few enemies.

To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; it must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of

¹ In allusion to a game called cities or states (*πόλεις*.)

secondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was intimated in the parable of the men dug out of the earth. The meaning was that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at one with himself, and then the whole city would be united. But all these things are secondary, if education, which is the great matter, be duly regarded. When the wheel has once been set in motion, the speed is always increasing; and each generation improves upon the preceding, both in physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be directed to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation; alter the songs of a country, and you will soon end by altering its laws. When Homer praises new songs, he must not be supposed to praise new kinds of song. Damon assures me that new chants cannot be introduced without danger to the whole political system. The change appears innocent at first, and begins in play; but the evil soon becomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of individuals, then upon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon the institutions of a state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. But if education remains in the established form, there will be no danger. A restorative process will be always going on; the spirit of law and order will raise up what has fallen down. Nor will any rules be needed for the lesser matters of life—such as when to sit down and when to stand, when to speak and when to be silent, and what mode of tonsure is the true pattern. Like is always inviting like for good or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and supply the power of self-government. Far be it from us to legislate about the appointment of judges and the order of causes, harbour and market duties; let the guardians take care of education, and education will take care of all other things.

But without education they may mend and cobble and doctor as they please, they will make no progress, any more than a patient who asks the physician to cure him and will not give up his luxurious mode of living. If such persons are told that they will never improve unless they alter their habits, then they grow angry; they are charming people. ‘Charming,—nay, the reverse of charming.’ I see that these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the state which is like them. And such states there are which first make solemn ordinances that no one under penalty of death shall alter the constitution, and then suffer themselves to be flattered into and out of anything; and he who indulges them and fawns upon them, is their leader and saviour? ‘Yes, the men

are as bad as the states.' But do you not admire their cleverness? 'Nay, some of them are stupid enough to believe what the people tell them.' And when all the world is telling a man that he is eight feet high, and he has no measure, how can he believe otherwise? But don't get into a passion: to see our statesmen trying their nostrums, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra-like rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments are superfluous in good states, and are useless in bad ones.

And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all—that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon the centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any sense in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in our realms. . .

Here, as Socrates would say, let us 'reflect' (*σκοπῶμεν*) on what has preceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens, but only of the well-being of the State. They may be the happiest of men, but our principal aim in founding the State was not to make them happy. They were to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant manner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and modern philosophy, touching the relation of duty to happiness, of right to utility.

First duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The utilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of error, and shows to us a side of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted further that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who makes the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and noblest motives of human action. But utility is not the historical basis of morality; nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is, as we believe, the far-off result of the divine government of the universe. The greatest happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we can be of a divine purpose, that 'all mankind should be saved;' and we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness of the individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary sense of the term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary death. Further, the word 'happiness' is full of ambiguity, and may mean either

pleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective or objective, in this world or in another, of ourselves individually or of all men everywhere. We are apt to include under the same expression the happiness of ourselves and others—principles which, though involving one another, are also opposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word has not the definiteness or the sacredness of truth and right; it does not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk into the conscience of mankind. For these reasons the greatest happiness principle is not the true foundation of ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the second, which is like unto it, and is often of easier and wider application. For many actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far as they tend to the happiness of mankind.

The same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term expediency is merely the law of right limited by the conditions of human society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well as of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we cannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations; and sometimes, even when misunderstood, they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist. All the higher class of statesmen have in them something of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered from the teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognise that national character is of greater value than material comfort and prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato; first, he expects his citizens to do their duty, and then under favourable circumstances, that is to say, in a well-ordered State, their happiness is assured. That he was far from excluding the modern principle of utility in politics is sufficiently evident from other passages, in which the most beneficial is affirmed to be the most honourable (457 B), and also the most sacred (458 E).

We may note (1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, as at the commencement of Book VI, is designed to draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates. (2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of politics and of art, in the latter supplying the only principle of criticism, which, under the various names of harmony, symmetry, measure, proportion, unity, the Greek seems to have applied to works of art. (3) The requirement that the State should be

limited in size, after the traditional model of a Greek state. (4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of the light active boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the 'charming' patients who are always making themselves worse; or again, the playful assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave irony with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is eight feet high because he is told so, and having nothing to measure with is to be pardoned for his ignorance—he is too amusing for us to be seriously angry with him. (5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over when provision has been made for two great principles,—first, that religion shall be based on the highest conception of the gods (ii. 377 foll.), secondly, that the true national or Hellenic type shall be maintained.

Socrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston, tell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother and the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. 'Nonsense,' replied Glaucon, 'what were you saying about the impiety of deserting justice in the hour of need?' Well, I said, I will lead the way, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will contain all the four virtues—wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. If we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice.

First then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be wise because politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,—not the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the husbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the whole State. Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians, who are a small class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths, but in them is concentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class have wisdom, then the whole State will be wise.

Our second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in another class—that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of salvation—the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and education have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or of any other colour. The colours which are dyed in this way become fixed, and no soap or lye will ever wash them out. And laughable is the shabby washed-out look of any colour which has not been dyed in this way. Now the ground is education, and the laws are the

colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap of pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out. The power which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask you to call 'courage,' adding the epithet 'political' or 'civilized' in order to distinguish it from the brute courage of barbarians and from a higher courage which may hereafter be discussed.

Two virtues remain; shall we skip one and go to the other? 'Let us rather take them in their order; first temperance, then justice.' More than the preceding virtues temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is thrown upon the nature of this virtue by the amusing description of a man as master of himself—the absurdity of which is that the master is also the servant. The expression is really a term of praise, meaning that the better principle in a man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes—of women, slaves and the like—who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better; and in our State the former class are held under control by the latter. Now to which of these classes does temperance belong? 'To both of them.' And if in any state temperance dwells, that must be ours; and we were right in describing temperance as a harmony which is diffused through the whole, making the dwellers in the city to be of one mind, and uniting the upper and middle and lower classes like the strings of an instrument, whether you suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength or money. This unity, in whatever way acquired, is called temperance.

And now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and watch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell me if you see the thicket move first. 'Nay, I would have you lead.' Well then, offer up a prayer and follow. There is no path, and the way is dark; we must push on. I begin to see a track. 'Good news.' It is there and will not escape. Why, Glaucon, our dulness of scent is quite disgraceful! Shall we not be laughed at? While we are straining our eyes into the distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as the people who sweep the house to look for a thing which they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our old principle of the division of labour, or of every man doing his own business, concerning which we spoke at the foundation of the State—what but this was justice? Is there any other virtue remaining which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of political virtue? For every one having his own is the great object of government; and the great

object of trade is that every man should do his own business. Not that there is much harm in a carpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself into a carpenter; but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last and turning into a guardian or legislator, or when a single individual is trainer, warrior, legislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice, or every man doing another's business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to arrive at a final conclusion. For the definition which we believe to hold good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having read the large letters we will now come back to the small. From the two together a brilliant light may be struck out. . . .

Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of residues. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three parts of the soul, and one of the three classes in the State, although the third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the two first. If there be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for in the relation of the three parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It is obvious and simple, and for that very reason has not been found out. The modern logician will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be separated like chemical substances, but that they run into one another and may be only different aspects or names of the same thing, and such in this instance appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice is verbally the same as one of the definitions of temperance given by Socrates in the Charmides (162 A), which however is only provisional, and is afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic can with difficulty be distinguished. Temperance, although compared to a harmony, appears to be the virtue of a part only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole soul. Justice seems also to differ in degree from temperance; for whereas temperance is the harmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by which all natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the right place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice, again, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore, from Plato's point of view, the foundation of them, to which they are referred and which in idea precedes them. The proposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style intended to avoid monotony. (Cp. vii. 528.)

There is a famous question in the earlier Dialogues of Plato (cp. Protagoras 329, 330; Ar. Nic. Ethics, vi. 13. 6), 'Whether the virtues are one or many?' This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are four cardinal virtues (now for the first time brought together in ethical philosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like Aristotle's conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others, but the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this universal conception of justice or order in the first education and in the moral nature of man, the still more universal conception of the good in the second education, and in the speculative division, seems to succeed. Both might be equally described by the terms 'law,' 'order,' 'harmony;' but while the idea of good embraces all time and all existence, the conception of justice is not extended beyond man.

Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But first he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His argument is as follows:—Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word 'just,' whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same meaning. And the term 'justice' implied that the same three principles in the State and in the individual were doing their own business. But are they really three or one? There is a small matter for consideration. 'A very small matter,' is the ironical reply. Nay, the reverse of small; I should rather think one which will never be brought to a conclusion by the methods which we are now employing; there is a surer, but that is also a longer way, which would take up too much time. 'The shorter will satisfy me.' Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who compose them? Ask the question why the Scythians and Thracians are passionate, or our own race intellectual, or the Egyptians and Phoenicians covetous,—there is no difficulty in replying that individuals are of such or such a character, but there is great difficulty in determining whether the several principles are one or three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one part of our nature, desire with another, are angry with another, or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action. This enquiry, however, requires a very exact definition of terms. The same thing in the same relation cannot be affected in two opposite ways. But there will be no impossibility in a man standing still, yet moving his arms, or in a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis. There is no necessity to mention all the possible

exceptions; let us provisionally assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent and dissent, desire and avoidance. And one form of desire is thirst and hunger: and here arises a new point,—thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; not of warm drink or of a particular kind of food, with the single exception of course that the very fact of our desiring anything implies that it is good. When relative terms have no attributes, their correlatives have no attributes; when they have attributes, their correlatives also have them. For example, the term 'greater' is simply relative to 'less,' and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on the other hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again, every science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object; medicine, for example, is the science of health, although not to be confounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us return to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite object—drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the animal one saying Drink; the rational one, which says Do not drink, and is in direct contradiction to the former. Here are two contradictory acts of the soul; the one derived from reason, the other from desire; these two then are proved to be distinct principles in the soul. Is passion a third principle or, as our first impression may lead us to suppose, akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which throws some light on this question. He was coming up from the Piraeus by the way beneath the wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an abhorrence of them; at first he turned away and shut his eyes, then, suddenly tearing them open, he said,—'Take your fill, ye wretches, of the fair sight.' Now is there not here a third principle which is often found to come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never of desire against reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of which we may further convince ourselves by putting the following case:—When a man suffers justly, if he be of a generous nature he cannot chafe or boil or get into a state of righteous indignation at the hardships which he undergoes: but when he suffers unjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger and thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no more, is heard within. This shows that passion is the ally of reason. Is passion then the same as reason?

No, for the former exists in children and brutes; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them when he says, 'He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.'

And now, after much tossing in the argument, we have reached land, and are able to infer that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the three classes will do the work of his own class in the State, and each part in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the inferior, will be harmonized by the influence of music and gymnastic. The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will act together in the town of Mansoul, and music and gymnastic will put them in commission over the desires. The courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the subject-principle, both in the State and in the individual. Of justice we have already spoken; and the notion before given may be further confirmed by common instances. Will the just state or the just individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of impiety to gods and men? 'No.' And is not the reason of this that the several principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their own business? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just states. Moreover, our old division of labour, which required that there should be one man for one use, was a dream or anticipation of what was to follow; and that dream has now been realized in justice, which begins by binding together the three chords of the soul, and then acts harmoniously in every relation of life. And injustice, which is the habit of being a busybody and of doing another man's business, and which tries to rule and ought to serve, is the opposite of justice, and is inharmonious and unnatural, being to the soul what disease is to the body; for in the soul as well as in the body, good or bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the health and beauty and wellbeing of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul.

Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the more profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like mortal disease, is suicidal. Come up with me to the hill which over-

hangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, and the infinite forms of vice, among which are four special ones, characteristic both of states and of individuals. And there is one other form of the true state in which reason rules under one of two names—monarchy and aristocracy. So that there are five forms in all, both of states and of souls. . . .

In attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties, Plato takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the faculties. The same faculty cannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of early reasoners is beset by thorny entanglements, and he will not proceed a step without first clearing the ground. This leads him into a tiresome digression, which is intended to explain the nature of contradiction. First, the contradiction must be at the same time and in the same relation. Secondly, no extraneous word must be introduced into either of the terms in which the contradictory proposition is expressed: for example, thirst is of drink, not of warm drink. He implies, what he does not say, that if, by the advice of reason, or by the impulse of anger, a man is restrained from drinking, this proves that thirst, or desire under which thirst is included, is distinct from anger and reason. But suppose that we allow the term 'thirst' or 'desire' to be modified, and say an angry thirst, or a revengeful desire, then the two spheres of desire and anger overlap and become confused. This case therefore has to be excluded. And still there remains an exception to the exception in the use of the term 'good,' which is always implied in the object of desire. These are the discussions of an age before logic; and any one who is wearied by them should remember that they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas in the first development of the human faculties.

The psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul into the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far as we know, was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of the mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible faculty (*θυμὸς*), which may be variously described under the terms righteous indignation, spirit, passion. It is the foundation of courage, which includes in Plato moral courage, the courage of enduring pain, and of surmounting intellectual difficulties, as well as of meeting dangers in war. Though irrational, it inclines to side with the rational: it cannot be

aroused by punishment when justly inflicted: it sometimes takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the performance of great actions. It is the 'lion heart' with which the reason makes a treaty (ix. 589 B). On the other hand it is negative rather than positive; it is indignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like Love in the Symposium and Phaedrus, aspire to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the peremptory military spirit which prevails in the government of honour. It differs from *ὀργή*, which is simply anger, having no accessory notion of righteous indignation. Although Aristotle has retained the word, yet we may observe that 'passion' has with him lost its affinity to the rational and has become indistinguishable from anger (*ὀργή*). And to this vernacular use Plato himself in the Laws seems to revert (ix. 836 B), though not always (v. 731 A).

There is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by 'the longer way' (435 D): he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the sixth and seventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given us a sketch of such a metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final revelation of the idea of good, he is put off with the declaration that he has not yet studied the preliminary sciences. How he would have filled up the sketch, or argued about such questions from a higher point of view, we can only conjecture. Perhaps he hoped to find some *a priori* method of developing the parts out of the whole; or he might have asked which of the ideas contains the other ideas, and possibly have stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the 'ego' and the 'universal.' The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato the universal; and to this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or opinion, just as in modern times we are always seeking to rest them on the opposite pole of experience.

BOOK V. I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline in states, when Polemarchus—he was sitting a little farther from me than Adeimantus—taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said something in an undertone, of which I only caught the words, 'Shall we let him off?' 'Certainly not,' said Adeimantus, raising his voice. What or whom, I said, are you not going to let off? 'You,' he said. Why? I again asked. 'Why, because we think that you are not dealing fairly with us in omitting women and children, of whom you

have slyly disposed under the general formula that friends have all things in common.' And was I not right? 'Yes,' he replied, 'but there are many sorts of communism or community, and we want to know which of them is right. The company, as you have just heard, are resolved not to let you off without a further explanation.' Thrasy-machus said, 'Do you think that we have come hither to dig for gold, or to hear you discourse?' Yes, I said; but the discourse should be of a reasonable length. Glaucon added, 'Yes, Socrates, and there is reason in spending the whole of life in such discussions; but without further consideration of us proceed in your own manner, and tell us how this community is to be carried out, and how the interval between birth and education is to be filled up.' Well, I said, the subject has several difficulties—What is possible? is the first question. What is desirable? is the second. 'Fear not,' he replied, 'for you are speaking among friends, who will put a fair and liberal construction on what is said by you.' That, I replied, is anything but a consolation; I shall destroy my friends as well as myself. Not that I mind a little innocent laughter; but he who kills the truth is a murderer. 'Then,' said Glaucon, laughing, 'in case you should murder us we will acquit you beforehand, and just as in a criminal cause he who is acquitted is not guilty, you shall be acquitted and not guilty.'

Socrates proceeds:—The guardians of our State are to be watch-dogs, and their properties and families must be ordered with a view to their duties. Dogs are not divided into hes and shes, nor do we take the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home to look after their puppies. They have the same employments—the only difference between them is that the one are stronger and the other weaker. But if women are to have the same employments as men, they must have the same education—they must be taught music and gymnastics, and the art of war. I know that a great joke will be made of their riding on horseback and carrying weapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled women showing their agility in the palestra will certainly not be a vision of beauty, and may be expected to become a famous jest. But we must not mind the wits; there was a time when they might have laughed at our present gymnastics. All is habit: people have at last found out that the exposure is better than the concealment of the person, and now they laugh no more. Evil only should be the object of ridicule; 'Honi soit qui mal y pense.'

The first question is, whether women are able either wholly or partially to share in the employments of men. And here we may be charged with inconsistency in making the proposal at all. For we started originally with the division of labour; and the diversity of employments was based on the difference of natures. But is there no difference between men and women? Nay, are they not wholly different? *There* was the difficulty, Glaucon, which made me unwilling to speak of family relations. However, when a man is out of his depth, whether in a pool or in an ocean, he can only swim for his life, and may hope to be saved by Arion's dolphin, or some other miracle. Let us try then and find a way out, if we can.

The argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the natures of men and women are said to differ. 'Exactly.' But observe, Glaucon, that this is only a verbal opposition. We courageously repeat, different natures for different uses, never considering that the difference may be purely nominal and accidental; for example, a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a single point of view, but you cannot infer that because a bald man is a cobbler a hairy man ought not to be a cobbler. Now why should such an inference be erroneous? Simply because the opposition between them is partial only, like the difference between a male physician and a female physician, not running through the whole nature, like the difference between a physician and a carpenter. And if the difference of the sexes is only that the one beget and the other bear children, this does not prove that they ought to have distinct educations. Admitting that women differ from men in capacity, do not men equally differ from one another? Has not nature scattered all the qualities which our citizens require, whether as philosophers or physicians or weavers or makers of cakes, indifferently up and down among the two sexes? and even in the peculiar pursuits of women, are they not often, though in some cases superior to men, ridiculously enough surpassed by them? Women are the same in kind, and have the same aptitude or want of aptitude for medicine or gymnastic or war, but in a less degree. One woman will be a good guardian, another not; and the good must be chosen to be help-meets to our guardians. If however their natures are the same, the inference is that their education must also be the same; there is no longer anything unnatural or impossible in a woman learning music and gymnastic. And the education which we give them will be the very best, far better than that of

cobblers, and will train up the very best women, and nothing can be better for the State than this. Therefore let them strip, clothed in their chastity, and share in the toils of war and in the defence of their country; he who laughs at them is a fool for his pains.

The first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men and women have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is rolling in—community of wives and children; is this expedient? is this possible? The expediency I do not doubt, but I am not so sure of the possibility. ‘Nay, I think that a considerable doubt will be entertained on both subjects.’ I meant to have escaped the trouble of proving the first, but as you have detected the little stratagem I must even submit. Only allow me to feed my fancy like the solitary in his walks, with a dream of what might be, and then I will return to the question of what can be.

In the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones where they are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as legislator, have already selected the men; and now you shall select the women. After the selection has been made, they will live in common houses and have their meals in common, and will be brought together by a necessity more certain than that of mathematics. But they cannot be allowed to live in licentiousness; that is an unholy and unlawful thing, which the rulers are determined to prevent. For the avoidance of this, holy marriage festivals will be instituted, and their holiness will be in proportion to their usefulness. And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask (as I know that you are a breeder of birds and animals), Do you not take the greatest care in the mating? ‘Certainly.’ And there is no reason to suppose that less care is required in the marriage of human beings. But then, our rulers must be physicians, and use many medicines in their treatment of the body corporate; some falsehoods too, which are allowed by us in the practice of medicine. The good must be paired with the good as often as possible, and the bad with the bad as seldom as possible, and the offspring of the one must be reared, and of the other destroyed; in this way the flock will be preserved in prime condition. Hymeneal festivals will be celebrated at times fixed with an eye to population, and the brides and bridegrooms will meet at them, but not too often; and by an ingenious system of lots the rulers will contrive that the brave and the fair come together, and that those of inferior breed are paired with inferiors—the latter will ascribe to chance what

is really the invention of the rulers. And when children are born, the offspring of the brave and fair will be carried to an enclosure in a certain part of the city, and there attended by suitable nurses; the rest will be hurried away to places unknown. The mothers will be brought to the fold and will suckle the children; care however must be taken that none of them recognise her own offspring; and if necessary other nurses may also be hired. The trouble of watching and getting up at night will be transferred to attendants. 'Then the wives of our guardians will have a fine easy time when they are in the family way.' And quite right too, I said, that they should.

The parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be fixed at thirty years—from twenty-five, when he has 'passed the point at which the speed of life is greatest,' to fifty-five; and at twenty years for a woman—from twenty to forty. Any one above or below those ages who partakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety; also every one who forms a marriage connexion at other times without the consent of the rulers. This applies to those who are within the specified ages, after which they may range at will, provided they avoid the prohibited degrees of parents and children, or of brothers and sisters, which last, however, are not absolutely prohibited, if a dispensation from the oracle be procured. 'But how shall we know the degrees of affinity, when all things are common?' The answer is, that brothers and sisters are such as are born seven or nine months after the espousals, and their parents those who are then espoused, and every one will have many children and every child many parents.

Socrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous and also consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State is unity; the greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there will be unity where there are no private pleasures or pains or interests; where if one member suffer all the members suffer, if one citizen is touched all are quickly sensitive—and the least hurt to the little finger of the State runs through the whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the true State has the feelings of an individual, and is injured as a whole when any part is affected. Every State has subjects and rulers, who in a democracy are called rulers, and in other States masters: but in our State they are called saviours and allies; and the subjects who in other States are termed slaves, are by us termed nurturers and paymasters, and those who are termed comrades and colleagues in other

places, are by us called fathers and brothers. And whereas in other States members of the same government regard one of their colleagues as a friend and another as an enemy, in our State no man is a stranger to another; for everybody whom he meets is bound to him by ties of blood, and these names and this way of speaking will have a corresponding reality—brother, father, sister, mother, repeated from infancy in the ears of children, will not be mere words. Then again the citizens will have all things in common, and having common property they will have common pleasures and pains.

Can there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or lawsuits about property when men have nothing but their bodies which they call their own; or suits about violence and insult when every one is bound to defend himself? For young men will take the law into their own hands; if they are angry they will fight, and this will be an antidote against the gathering of conspiracies. But no younger man will strike an elder; two guardians will hold him back, reverence and fear,—reverence which will prevent him from laying hands on his kindred, and fear that the rest of the family may retaliate. Moreover, they will be rid of the lesser evils of life; there will be no flattering of rich men for the sake of a dinner, or heaping up of money for the support of their families, or borrowing and not paying. But I need not enter further into particulars. Let me say in conclusion, that when compared with the citizens of other States, ours will be Olympic victors, and crowned with blessings greater still,—they and their children having a better maintenance during life, and after death an honourable burial. Nor has the happiness of the individual been sacrificed to the happiness of the State (cp. iv. 419 E); our Olympic victor has not been turned into a cobbler, but he has a happiness beyond that of any cobbler. At the same time, if any conceited youth begins to dream of appropriating the State to himself, we shall do well to read him the lesson out of Hesiod, that ‘half is better than the whole.’ ‘If he were to consult me, I should say to him, Stay where you are, having such a brave life.’

But is such a community possible?—as among other animals, so also among men; and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no difficulty; the principle of communism is adapted to military service. Parents will take their children to look on at a battle, just as potters’ boys are trained to the business by looking on at the wheel. And to the parents themselves, as to other animals, the sight of their young

ones will prove a great incentive to bravery. Young warriors must learn, but they must not run into danger, although a certain degree of risk is worth incurring when the benefit is great. The young creatures should be placed under the care of experienced veterans, and they should have wings—that is to say, swift and tractable steeds on which they may fly away and escape. One of the first things to be done is to teach a youth to ride.

Cowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen; gentlemen who allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented to the enemy. But what shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall be crowned by all the youths in the army; secondly, he shall receive the right hand of fellowship; and thirdly, do you think that there is any harm in his being kissed? We have already determined that he shall have more wives than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible. And at a feast he shall have more to eat; we have the authority of Homer for honouring brave men with ‘perpetual chines,’ which is an appropriate compliment, because meat is a very strengthening thing. Fill the bowl then, and give the best seats and meats to the brave—may they do them good! And he who dies in battle will be at once declared to be of the golden race, and will, as we believe, become one of Hesiod’s guardian angels. He shall be worshipped in the manner prescribed by the oracle after death; and not only he, but all other benefactors of the State who die in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.

The next question is, How we shall treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be enslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing under the yoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled? Certainly not; for that sort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and has been the ruin of many an army. There is meanness and feminine malice in making an enemy of the dead body, when the soul which was the owner has fled—like a dog who cannot reach his assailants, and quarrels with the stones which are thrown at him instead. Thirdly, arms should not be offered up in the temples of the Gods, for they are a pollution when taken from brethren. And for similar reasons there should be a limit to the devastation of Hellenic territory—the houses should not be burnt, nor more than the annual produce carried off. For war is of two kinds, civil and foreign; the first of which is properly termed ‘discord,’ and only the second ‘war;’ and war between Hellenes

is in reality civil war—a quarrel in a family, which is ever to be regarded as unpatriotic and unnatural, and ought to be prosecuted with a view to reconciliation in a true phil-Hellenic spirit, as of those who would chasten but not utterly enslave. The war is not against a whole nation who are a friendly multitude of men, women, and children, but only against a few guilty persons; and when they are punished peace will be restored. That is the way in which Hellenes should war against one another—and against barbarians, as they war against one another now.

‘But, my dear Socrates, in all this you are only getting away from the main question: Is such a State possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness of being one family—fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out to war together; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal State.’ If I loiter for a moment, I said, you make a descent upon me. The first wave and the second wave I have hardly escaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the third. When you see the towering crest of the wave, I expect you to take pity. ‘Not a whit.’

Then let me begin by reminding you that we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after justice, and the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at all the worse for being impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly beautiful man be any the worse because no such man ever lived? Can any reality come up to the idea? Nature will not allow words to be fully realised; but if I am to try and realise the ideal of the State in a measure, I think that an approach may be made to the perfection of which I dream by one or two, I do not say slight, but possible changes in the present constitution of States. I would reduce them to a single one—the great wave, as I call it, at which I expect your laughter to be as the letting out of water. *Until, then, kings are philosophers, or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no, nor the human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being.* I know that this is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive. ‘Socrates, all the world will take off his coat and rush upon you with sticks and stones, and therefore I would advise you to prepare an answer.’ You got me into the scrape, I said. ‘And I was right,’ he replied; ‘however, I will stand by you as a sort of do-nothing, well-meaning ally.’ Having the help of such a champion, I will do my best to maintain my position. And first, I must explain of whom I speak and what sort of natures these are who are to be philosophers and rulers. As you

are a man of pleasure, I dare say that you have not forgotten how indiscriminate lovers are in their attachments; they love all, and turn blemishes into beauties. The snub-nosed youth is said by them to have a winning grace; the beak of another has a royal look; the featureless are faultless; the dark are manly, and the fair are angels; the sickly have a new term of endearment invented expressly for them, which is 'honey-pale.' Lovers of wine and lovers of ambition also desire their objects in every form. Now here comes the point:—The philosopher too is a lover of knowledge in every form; he has an insatiable curiosity. 'But will curiosity make a philosopher? Are the lovers of sights and sounds, who let out their ears at every Dionysiac festival in country as well as town, to be called philosophers?' They are not true philosophers, but only an imitation. 'Then how are we to describe the true?'

You would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, such as justice, beauty, good, evil, which are severally one, yet in their various combinations appear to be many. Those who recognize these realities are philosophers; whereas the other class hear sounds and see colours, and understand their use in the arts, but cannot attain to the true or waking vision of absolute justice or beauty or truth; they have not the light of knowledge, but of opinion, and what they see is a dream only. Perhaps he of whom we say the last will be angry with us; can we offer him any consolation without revealing the fact that he is not in his right mind? Come, then, and let us reason with him; if he has knowledge we rejoice to hear it, but knowledge must be of something which is, as ignorance is of something which is not; and there is a third thing, which both is and is not, and is matter of opinion only. Opinion and knowledge, then, having distinct objects, must also be distinct faculties. And by faculties I mean powers unseen and distinguishable only by the difference in their objects, as opinion and knowledge differ, since the one is liable to err but the other is unerring, and is the mightiest of all our faculties. If being is the object of knowledge, and not-being of ignorance, and these are the extremes, opinion must lie between them, and may be called darker than the one and brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent matter is and is not at the same time, and partakes both of existence and of non-existence. Now I would ask my good friend, who denies abstract beauty and justice, and affirms a many beautiful and a many just, whether everything he sees is not in some point of view different—the beautiful

ugly, the pious impious, the just unjust? Is not the double also the half, and are not heavy and light relative terms which pass into one another? Everything is and is not, as in the old riddle—‘A man and not a man shot and did not shoot a bird and not a bird with a stone and not a stone.’ The mind cannot be fixed on either alternative; and these ambiguous, intermediate, erring, half-lighted objects, which have a disorderly movement in the region between being and not-being, are the proper matter of opinion, as the immutable objects are the proper matter of knowledge. And he who grovels in the world of sense, and has only this uncertain perception of them, is not a philosopher, but a lover of opinion only.

. . . The fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the community of property and of family are first maintained, and the transition is made to the kingdom of philosophers. For both of these Plato, after his manner, has been preparing in some chance words of Book IV (424 A), which fall unperceived on the reader’s mind, as they are supposed at first to have fallen unperceived on the ear of Glaucon and Adeimantus. The ‘paradoxes,’ as Morgenstern terms them, of this book of the Republic will be reserved for another place; a few remarks on the style, and some explanations of difficulties, may be briefly added.

First, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of scheme or plan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third and greatest wave come rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All that can be said of the extravagance of Plato’s proposals is anticipated by himself. Nothing is more admirable than the hesitation with which he proposes the solemn text, ‘Until kings are philosophers,’ &c.; or the reaction from the sublime to the ridiculous, when Glaucon describes the manner in which the new truth will be received by mankind.

Some metaphysical and critical difficulties may be noted. Among them may be reckoned the imperfect execution of the communistic plan—nothing is told us of the application of communism to the lower classes; nor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of being made out. Plato is afraid of incestuous unions, but at the same time he does not wish to bring before us the fact that the city would be divided into families of those born seven and nine months after each hymeneal festival. The singular expression (460 E) which is employed

to describe the age of five-and-twenty may perhaps be taken from some poet.

In the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature of philosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of Glaucon, the Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or feelings. They are partly facetious, but also contain a germ of truth. That science is a whole remains a true principle of inductive as well as of metaphysical philosophy; and the love of universal knowledge is still the characteristic of the philosopher in modern as well as in ancient times.

At the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent matter, which occurs here for the first time in the history of philosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of knowledge in the subject have nothing corresponding to them in the object. With him a word must answer to an idea; and he could not conceive of an opinion which was an opinion about nothing. On the other hand, the conception of not-being was dark and mysterious to the mind of early thinkers (Sophist, 254 A); they did not see that this terrible apparition which threatened destruction to all knowledge was only a logical determination. In the attempt to introduce order into the first chaos of human thought, Plato seems to have confused perception and opinion, and to have failed to distinguish the contingent from the relative. In the Theaetetus the first of these difficulties begins to clear up; in the Sophist the second; and for this, as well as for other reasons, both these dialogues are probably to be regarded as later than the Republic.

BOOK VI. Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true being, and have no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty, truth, and that philosophers have such patterns, we have now to ask whether they, or the many shall be rulers in our State; and who can doubt that philosophers should be chosen, if they have the other qualities which are required in a ruler? For they are lovers of the knowledge of the eternal and of all truth; they are haters of falsehood; their meaner desires are absorbed in the interests of knowledge; they are spectators of all time and all existence; and in the magnificence of their contemplation the life of man is as nothing to them, nor is death fearful. Also they are of a social, gracious disposition, equally free from cowardice and arrogance. They learn and remember easily; they

are harmonious, well-regulated minds ; truth flows to them sweetly by nature. Can the god of Jealousy himself find any fault with such an assemblage of good qualities ?

Here Adeimantus interposes an objection. ‘No man,’ he says, ‘can answer you, Socrates ; but every man feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in the power of arguing. He is carried away little by little, until at last the discrepancy between the premises and the conclusion is enormous. The argument is like a game of draughts in which the unskilful player is reduced to his last move by his more skilful antagonist. And in this new game, of which words are the counters, the disputant is out-argued ; but nevertheless he may be in the right. He may know, in this very instance, that those who make philosophy the business of their lives, generally turn out rogues if they are bad men, and fools if they are good. What do you say ?’ I should say that he is quite right. ‘Then how is such an admission reconcilable with the doctrine that philosophers should be kings ?’

I shall answer you in a figure which will give you an opportunity of judging how poor a hand I am at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to their governments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must take an illustration from that world of fiction in which painters find their winged dragons and other fabulous monsters. Conceive the captain, whether of a ship or of a fleet, taller by a head and shoulders than all his sailors, yet a little deaf, a little blind, and rather ignorant of the seaman’s art. The sailors are wanting to steer, although they know nothing and have learnt nothing of the art of steering ; and they have a theory, which no one is allowed to doubt under pain of death, that the art cannot be learned. If the care of the helm is refused them, they drug the captain’s posset and bind him hand and foot ; having got rid of him, they take possession of the ship, and make themselves at home with the stores. He who joins in the mutiny is termed an able seaman, a good pilot, and what not ; they are ignorant that the true pilot is another sort of man, who must observe the wind and the stars, and who must and will have authority—but such an one is called by them a fool, prater, star-gazer. And now, I said, do you interpret the parable to those who ask why the philosopher has such an evil name, and make them understand that not he, but those who refuse to use him, are to blame for his uselessness. The philosopher should not blow a trumpet before him, or beg of mankind to be

put in authority over them. The wise man is not to seek the rich, but every man, whether rich or poor, must knock at the door of the physician when he has need of him. Now the captain is the people; the pilot is the philosopher—he whom in the parable they call star-gazer, and the mutinous sailors are the mob of politicians by whom he is rendered useless. Not that these are the worst enemies of philosophy, who is far more dishonoured by her own professing sons when they are corrupted by the world. Need I recall the original image of the philosopher? Did we not say of him just now, that he loved truth and hated falsehood, and that he could not rest in the multiplicity of phenomena, but was led by a sympathy in his own nature to the contemplation of the absolute? All the virtues as well as truth, who is the leader of them, took up their abode in his soul. But as you were observing, if we turn aside to view the reality, we see that the persons who were thus described, with the exception of a small and useless class, are utter rogues.

The point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption in nature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our description of him, is a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to destroy these rare beings! There is no good thing which may not be a cause of evil—health, wealth, strength, rank, and the virtues themselves, when placed under unfavourable circumstances. For as in the animal or vegetable world the strongest seeds most need the accompaniment of good air and soil, so the best of human characters turn out the worst when they fall upon an unsuitable soil; whereas weak natures hardly ever do any considerable good or harm; they are not the stuff out of which either great criminals or great heroes are made. The philosopher follows the same analogy: if he have suitable training he is the best of all men; if left to himself he becomes, when surrounded by evil influences, the worst of all. Some persons say that the Sophists are the corrupters of youth; but do they really corrupt them in any appreciable degree? Is not public opinion the real Sophist who is everywhere present—in those very persons, in the assembly, in the courts, in the camp, in the applauses and hisses of the theatre re-echoed by the surrounding hills? Will not a young man's heart leap for joy in the midst of these discordant sounds? and will any education save him from being carried away in the torrent of praise or blame? Nor is this all. For if he will not yield to opinion, there follows the gentle compulsion of exile or death. What principle of rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in such

an unequal contest? Characters there may be more than human, who are exceptions—God may save a man, but not his own strength. Further, I would have you consider that the hireling Sophist only gives back to the world their own opinions; he is the keeper of the monster, who knows how to flatter or anger him, and observes the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good is pronounced to be what pleases him, and evil is what he dislikes, and truth and beauty have no other standard but the taste of the brute, and the rules which embody this are the Sophist's wisdom. Such is the condition of those who make public opinion the test of truth, whether in art or in morals. The curse is laid upon them of being and doing what they approve, and when such men attempt first principles the failure is ludicrous. Think of all this and ask yourself whether the world is more likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the multiplicity of phenomena. And the world if not a believer in the idea cannot be a philosopher, and must therefore be a persecutor of philosophers. There is another evil:—the world does not like to lose the gifted nature, and so they flatter the young [Alcibiades] into a magnificent opinion of his own capacity; the tall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming of kingdoms and empires. If at this instant a friend whispers to him, 'Now the gods lighten thee; thou art a great fool and must be educated;' do you think that he will listen? Or suppose a better sort of man who is attracted towards philosophy, will they not make Herculean efforts to spoil and corrupt him? Are we not right in saying that philosophical parts, no less than riches, may divert him? Men of this class [Critias] often become politicians—they are the authors of great mischief in states, and sometimes also of great good. And thus philosophy is deserted by her natural protectors, and others enter in and dishonour her, and take away her good name. Vulgar little minds see the land open and rush from the prisons of the arts into her temple. A clever mechanic having a soul coarse as his body, thinks that he will gain caste by becoming her suitor. For philosophy, even in her fallen estate, has a dignity of her own—and he, like a bald little blacksmith's apprentice as he is, having made some money and got out of durance, washes and dresses himself as a bridegroom and marries his master's daughter. What will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and nature? 'They will.' Small, then, is the remnant of genuine philosophers; there may be a few who are citizens of small states, in which politics are not worth

thinking of, or who have been detained by Theages' bridle of ill health; for my own case of the oracular sign is almost singular, and too rare to be worth mentioning. And these few when they have tasted the pleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at that den of thieves and place of wild beasts, which is human life, will stand aside from the storm under the shelter of a wall, and try to preserve their own innocence and to depart in peace. 'A great work, too, will have been accomplished by them.' Great, yes, but not the greatest; for man is a social being, and can only attain his highest development in the society which is best suited to him.

Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name. Another question is, Which of existing states is suited to her? There is none; for at present she has no abiding-place on earth, and may be compared to the exotic seed which degenerates in a strange soil. Only in her proper state will she be shown to be of heavenly growth. 'And is her proper state ours or some other?' Ours in all points but one, which was left undetermined. You may remember our saying that some living mind or witness of the legislator was needed in states. But we were afraid to enter upon a subject of such difficulty, and now the question recurs and has not grown easier:—How may philosophy be safely studied? Let us bring her to the light of day, and make an end of the inquiry.

In the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the present mode of study. The fashion is, that for a few years in the days of youth, and in the intervals of household matters and business, persons get a smattering of philosophy, but run away as soon as they approach the real difficulty, which is dialectic. Later, they perhaps accompany a dilettante friend at his request to a lecture on philosophy. Years advance, and the sun of philosophy, like that of Heracleitus, sets, unlike that of Heracleitus, never to rise again. Now this order ought to be entirely reversed; education should never finish—beginning with gymnastics in youth, which will minister to philosophy in after life; but as the man strengthens increasing the gymnastics of the soul. Then, when nature begins to decay and active life is over, he should return to philosophy again and for ever. 'You are in profound earnest, Socrates, and I think that the world will be equally earnest in withstanding you—no one more likely than our friend Thrasymachus.' Do not make a quarrel between Thrasymachus and me, who were never enemies and are now very good friends. And I shall do my best to persuade him and all

mankind, and if I cannot, I will at any rate make a preparation for another life, when after coming to the birth again we hold similar discourses. 'That will be a long time hence.' Not long, I said, in comparison with eternity. I do not wonder that the many will not believe, for they have never seen natural unities of ideas, but only ingenious juxtapositions; not free and generous thoughts, but tricks of controversy and quips of law;—a perfect man ruling in a perfect state, even a single one they have not known. And we foresaw that there was no chance of perfection either in states or individuals until a necessity was laid upon that second small class of philosophers—not the rogues, but those whom we call useless—of taking the government; or until the sons of kings were inspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the infinity of past time there ever has been, or is in some distant land, or will be hereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain that there has been and might be such a state wherever the Muse of philosophy rules. Will you say that the world is of another mind? O, my friend, do not revile the world! They will be of another mind if they are gently entreated, and learn the true nature of the philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves them? or be jealous of one who has no jealousy? A few such natures there may be, but it is not the common temper. Consider, again, that the many hate not the true but the false philosophers—the hirelings who are not the shepherds and who enter in by force, and are always speaking of persons and not of principles, which is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher has no time to think of the quarrels of men; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in accordance with which he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not himself only, but the characters of other men), and is the creator of the virtues private as well as public. And when mankind see that the happiness of states is only to be found in that image, will they be angry with us for attempting to delineate it? 'Certainly not. But what will be the process of delineation?' The artist will do nothing until he has made a *tabula rasa*; on this he will draw the constitution of a state, glancing often at the divine truth of nature, and from that deriving the godlike among men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out and painting in, until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of the divine and human. But perhaps the world will doubt the existence of such an artist. What will they doubt? That the philosopher is a lover of truth, having a nature akin to the best?—and if they admit this will they still

quarrel with us for making philosophers our kings? 'They will be less disposed to quarrel.' Let us assume then that they make peace. Still, a person may hesitate about the probability of the son of a king being a philosopher. And we do not deny that they are very liable to be corrupted; but yet surely in the course of ages there might be one exception—and one is enough. If one son of a king were a philosopher, and had obedient citizens, he might bring the ideal polity into being. Hence we conclude that our laws are not only the best, but are also, though with difficulty, attainable.

I gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose concerning women and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge that we must go to the foundation of another question: What is to be the education of our guardians? It was agreed that they were to be lovers of their country, and were to be tested in the refiner's fire of pleasures and pains, and those who came forth pure and remained fixed in their principles were to have honours and rewards in life and after death. That was what we were saying, when, like a coy maiden, the argument put on her veil and turned into another path. There was an unwillingness to make the assertion which I now hazard,—that our guardians must be philosophers. You remember all the contradictory elements, intellectual as well as moral, which met in the philosopher. How difficult to find them all in a single person! The steadfast, immoveable nature which has not the wit to run away in battle is apt to go to sleep at a lecture on philosophy. And yet these opposite elements are both necessary, and therefore, as we were saying before, the aspirant must be tested in pleasures and dangers; and also, as we must now further add, in the highest branches of knowledge. You will remember, that when we spoke of the virtues mention was made of a longer road, which you were satisfied to leave unexplored. 'Enough seemed to us to have been said.' Enough, my friend; but what is enough while anything remains wanting? Of all men the guardian should be the last to faint in the search after truth; he must be prepared to take the longer road, or he will never reach the summit of perfection. 'What, is there a higher region of truth above the four virtues?' Yes, there is; and of the virtues too he must not only get an outline, but a clear and distinct vision. (Strange that we should be so precise about trifles, so confused and inaccurate about the highest truths!) And of this truth you have heard before a hundred times at least, although you put on that pro-

voking air of unconsciousness—the idea of good, about which we know so little, and without which though a man gain the world he has no good of it. Some people imagine that the good is wisdom; but this involves a circle,—the good is wisdom, wisdom is of the good. According to another notion the good is pleasure; but this involves the absurdity that good is bad, because there are bad pleasures as well as good. Again, the good must have reality; a man may desire the appearance of virtue, but he will not desire the appearance of good. And ought our guardians then to be ignorant of this supreme principle, of which every man has a presentiment, and upon which all things depend, and without which no man has any real knowledge of anything? ‘But, Socrates, what is this supreme principle, knowledge or pleasure, or what other? You may call me a troublesome fellow, but I say that you have no business to be always repeating the doctrines of others instead of giving us your own.’ Have I any business to say what I do not know? ‘You may offer an opinion.’ And will the crooked way of opinion content you where you ought to require the straightforwardness of certainty, or will you be satisfied with the cloudiness of opinion when you might have the light of science? ‘I will ask you to give such an explanation of the good as you did before of “temperance” and “justice;” —that will be enough.’ I wish that I could, but in my present mood I am not able to reach to the height of the knowledge of the good. To the parent or principal I cannot introduce you, but to the child begotten in his image, which I may compare with the interest on the principal, I will. (Audit the account, and do not let me give you a false statement of the debt.) You remember our old distinction of the many beautiful and the one beautiful, the particular and the universal, the objects of sight and the objects of thought? Did you ever consider that the objects of sight imply a faculty of sight which is the most complex and costly of our senses, requiring not only objects of sense, but also a medium, which is light; without which the sight will see nothing and the colours will remain blank? Which light is the noble bond between the perceiving faculty and the thing perceived, and the god who gives us light is the sun, who is the eye of the day, and is not to be confounded with the eye of man. The sun, or eye of the day, is what I call the child of the good, standing in the same relation to the visible world as the good to the intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in the intellectual world where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that which is

the sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause of knowledge and truth, yet fairer and other than they are, and standing in the same relation to them in which the sun stands to light. O inconceivable height of beauty, which is above knowledge and above truth! ('You cannot surely mean pleasure,' he said. Peace, I replied.) And this idea of good, like the sun, is also the cause of growth, and the author not of knowledge only, but of being, and far exceeds being in dignity and power. Glaucon said, with a comical air of earnestness: 'By heaven! that is a reach of thought more than human.' I must lay the exaggeration to your door, for you made me utter my fancies. 'Nay,' he said, 'go on with the image, for I suspect that there is more behind.' There is, I said; and bearing in mind our two suns or principles, imagine further their corresponding worlds—one of the visible, the other of the intelligible—you may assist your fancy by figuring the distinction under the image of a line divided into two unequal parts, and may again subdivide each part into two lesser segments representative of the stages of knowledge in either sphere. The lower half of the lower or visible sphere will consist of shadows and reflections, and the upper half of the same sphere will contain real objects in the world of nature or of art. The sphere of the intelligible will also have two divisions,—one of mathematics, in which there is no ascent but all is descent; no inquiring into premises, but only drawing of inferences. In this division the mind works with figures and numbers, the images of which are taken not from the shadows, but from the objects, although the truth of them is seen only with the mind's eye; and they are used as hypotheses without being analysed. Whereas in the other division reason uses the hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the idea of good, to which she fastens them, and then again descends, walking firmly in the region of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as descent, and finally resting in them. 'I partly understand,' he replied; 'you mean that the ideas of science are superior to the hypothetical, metaphorical conceptions of geometry and the other arts or sciences, whichever is to be the name of them; and the latter conceptions you refuse to make subjects of pure intellect, because they have no first principle, although when resting on a first principle, they pass into the higher sphere.' You understand me very well, I said. And now to those four divisions of knowledge you may assign four corresponding faculties—pure intelligence to the highest sphere; active intelligence to the second; to the third, faith; to the fourth,

the perception of likenesses—and the clearness of the several faculties will be in the same ratio as the truth of the objects to which they are related.

... Like Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In language which seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and country, he is described as 'the spectator of all time and all existence.' He has the noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest use of them. All his desires are absorbed in the love of wisdom, which is the love of truth. None of the graces of a beautiful soul are wanting in him; neither can he fear death, or think much of human life. The ideal of modern times hardly retains the simplicity of the antique; there is not the same originality either in truth or error which characterized the Greeks. The philosopher is no longer living in the unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convict mankind of ignorance; nor does he regard knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by regular stages to the idea of good. The eagerness of the pursuit has abated; there is more division of labour and less of comprehensive reflection upon nature and human life as a whole; more of exact observation and less of anticipation and inspiration. Still, in the altered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not wholly lost; and there may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into the language of our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who fixes his mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, not on fragments or pictures of nature; on history, not on controversy; on the truths which are acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions of the many. He is aware of the importance of 'classifying according to nature,' and will try to 'separate the limbs of science without breaking them.' (Phaedr. 265 E.) There is no part of truth, whether great or small, which he will dishonour; and in the least things he will discern the greatest. (Parmen. 130 C.) Like the ancient philosopher he sees the world pervaded by analogies, but he can also tell 'why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for an induction' (Mill's Logic 3, 3, 3), while in other cases a thousand examples would prove nothing. He inquires into a portion of knowledge only, because the whole has grown too vast to be embraced by a single mind or life. He has a clearer conception of the divisions of science and of their relation to the mind of man than was possible to the ancients. Like Plato, he has a vision of the unity of knowledge, not as the beginning of philosophy to be attained by a study of elementary mathematics, but as

the far-off result of the working of many minds in many ages. He is aware that mathematical studies are preliminary to almost every other; at the same time, he will not reduce all varieties of knowledge to the type of mathematics. He too must have a nobility of character, without which genius loses the better half of greatness. Regarding the world as a point in immensity, and each individual as a link in a never-ending chain of existence, he will not think much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of death.

Adeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning, thus showing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method. He brings the accusation against himself which might be brought against him by a modern logician—that he extracts the answer because he knows how to put the question. In a long argument words are apt to change their meaning slightly, or premises may be assumed or conclusions inferred with rather too much certainty or universality; the variation at each step may be unobserved, and yet at last the divergence becomes considerable. Hence the failure of attempts to apply arithmetical or algebraic formulæ to logic. The imperfection, or rather the higher and more elastic nature of language, does not allow words to have the precision of numbers or of symbols. And this quality in language impairs the force of an argument which has many steps.

The objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular instance, may be regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic mode of reasoning. And here, as at p. 506 B, Plato seems to intimate that the time had come when the negative and interrogative method of Socrates must be superseded by a positive and constructive one, of which examples are given in some of the later dialogues. Adeimantus further argues that the ideal is wholly at variance with facts; for experience proves philosophers to be either useless or rogues. Contrary to all expectation (cp. p. 497 for a similar surprise) Socrates has no hesitation in admitting the truth of this, and explains the anomaly in an allegory, first characteristically depreciating his own inventive powers. In this allegory the people are distinguished from the professional politicians, and, as at pp. 499, 500, are spoken of in a tone of pity rather than of censure under the image of 'the noble captain who is not very quick in his perceptions.'

The uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that mankind will not use them. The world in all ages has been divided

between contempt and fear of those who employ the power of ideas and know no other weapons. Concerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues that the best is most liable to corruption; the finer nature is more likely to suffer from alien conditions. There are some kinds of excellence which spring from a peculiar delicacy of constitution; this is evidently true of the poetical and imaginative temperament, which often seems to depend on impressibility, and hence can only live in a certain atmosphere. The man of genius has greater pains and greater pleasures, greater powers and greater weaknesses, and often a greater play of character than is to be found in ordinary men. He can assume the disguise of virtue or disinterestedness without having them, or veil personal enmity in the language of patriotism and philosophy,—he can say the word which all men are thinking, and is ever ready to take various forms as the situation changes. An Alcibiades, a Mirabeau, or a Napoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of great evils in states, or ‘of great good when they are drawn in that direction.’

Yet the thesis, ‘*corruptio optimi pessima*,’ cannot be maintained generally or without regard to the kind of excellence which is corrupted. For the alien conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may be the elements of culture to another. In general a man can only receive his highest development in a congenial state or family, among friends or fellow-workers. But also he may sometimes be stirred by adverse circumstances to such a degree that he rises up against them and reforms them. And while weaker or coarser characters will extract good out of evil, say in a corrupt state of the church or of society, and live on happily, allowing the evil to remain, the finer or stronger natures may be crushed or spoiled by surrounding influences—may become misanthrope and philanthrope by turns; or in a few instances, like the founders of the monastic orders, or the Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in themselves or in their age, may break away entirely from the world and from the church, sometimes into great good, sometimes into great evil, sometimes into both. And the same holds in the lesser sphere of a convent, a school, a family.

Plato would have us consider how easily the best natures are overpowered by public opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind will make to get possession of them. The world, the church, their own professions, any political or party organization, are always carrying them off their legs and teaching them to apply high and holy names to their

own prejudices and interests. The 'monster' corporation to which they belong judges right and truth to be the pleasure of the community. The individual becomes one with his order; or, if he resists, the world is too much for him, and will sooner or later be revenged on him. This is, perhaps, a one-sided but not wholly untrue picture of the maxims and practice of mankind when they 'sit down together at an assembly,' either in ancient or modern times.

When the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take possession of the vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one of those continuous images in which the argument, to use a Platonic expression, 'veils herself,' and which is dropped and reappears at intervals. Then arises the question,—Why the citizens of states are inimical to philosophy? The answer is, that they do not know her. And yet there is also a better mind of the many; they would believe if they were taught. But hitherto they have only known a conventional imitation of philosophy, words without thoughts, systems which have no life in them; a [divine] person uttering the words of beauty and freedom, the friend of man holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to frame the state in that image, they have never known. The same double feeling respecting the mass of mankind has always existed among men. The first thought is that the people are the enemies of truth and right; the second, that this only arises out of an accidental error and confusion, and that they do not really hate those who love them, if they could be educated to know them.

In the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be considered: 1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which is contrasted with the shorter and more imperfect method of Book IV; 2nd, the heavenly pattern or idea of the state; 3rd, the relation of the divisions of knowledge to one another and to the corresponding faculties of the soul.

1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse. Neither here nor in the Phaedrus or Symposium, nor yet in the Philebus or Sophist, does he give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would probably have described his method as proceeding by regular steps to a system of universal knowledge, which inferred the parts from the whole rather than the whole from the parts. This ideal logic is not practised by him in the search after justice, or in the analysis of the parts of the soul; there, like Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics,

he argues from experience and the common use of language. But at the end of the sixth book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which all ideas are only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a connected whole which is self-supporting, and in which consistency is the test of truth. He does not explain to us in detail the nature of the process. Like many other thinkers both in ancient and modern times his mind seems to be filled with a vacant form which he is unable to realize. He supposes the sciences to have a natural order and connexion in an age when they can hardly be said to exist. He is hastening on to the 'end of the intellectual world' without even making a beginning of them.

In modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of acquiring knowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute knowledge. In all science *a priori* and *a posteriori* truths mingle in various proportions. The *a priori* part is that which is derived from the most universal experience of men, or is universally accepted by them; the *a posteriori* is that which grows up around the more general principles and becomes imperceptibly one with them. But Plato erroneously imagines that the synthesis is separable from the analysis, and that the method of science can anticipate science. In entertaining such a vision of *a priori* knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at least his meaning may be sufficiently explained by the similar attempts of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and even of Bacon himself, in modern philosophy. Nor can we deny that in ancient times knowledge must have stood still, and the human mind been deprived of the very instruments of thought, if philosophy had been strictly confined to the results of experience.

2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist will fill in the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid up in heaven, or mere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with wondering eye? The answer is, that such ideals are framed partly by the omission of particulars, partly by imagination perfecting the form which experience supplies. (Phaedo 74.) Plato represents these ideals in a figure as belonging to another world; and in modern times the idea will sometimes seem to precede, at other times to co-operate with the hand of the artist. As in science, so also in creative art, there is a synthetical as well as an analytical method. One man will have the whole in his mind before he begins; to another the processes of mind and hand will be simultaneous.

3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato's divisions of knowledge are based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and intellectual which pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which is implied also the opposition of the permanent and transient, of the universal and particular. But the age of philosophy in which he lived seemed to require a further distinction;—numbers and figures were beginning to separate from ideas. The world could no longer regard justice as a cube, and was learning to see, though imperfectly, that the abstractions of sense were distinct from the abstractions of mind. Between the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of phenomena, the Pythagorean principle of number found a place, and was, as Aristotle remarks, a conducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is led to introduce a third term which had not hitherto entered into the scheme of philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in education; they were the best preparation for higher studies. The subjective relation between them further suggested an objective one; although the passage from one to the other is really imaginary. (*Metaph.* I, 6, 4.) For metaphysical and moral philosophy has no connexion with mathematics; number and figure are the abstractions of time and space, not the expressions of purely intellectual conceptions. When divested of metaphor, a straight line or a square has no more to do with right and justice than a crooked line with vice. The figurative association was mistaken for a real one; and thus the three latter divisions of the Platonic proportion were constructed.

There is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the first term of the series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no reference to any other part of his system. Nor indeed does the relation of shadows to objects correspond to the relation of numbers to ideas. Probably Plato has been led by the love of analogy (*cp.* *Timaeus*, p. 32 B) to make four terms instead of three, although the objects perceived in both divisions of the lower sphere are equally objects of sense. He is also preparing the way, as his manner is, for the shadows of images at the beginning of the seventh book, and the imitation of an imitation in the tenth. The line may be regarded as reaching from unity to infinity, and is divided into two unequal parts, and subdivided into two more; each lower sphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of the four faculties, faith in the lower division has an intermediate position, contrasting equally with the vagueness of the perception of

shadows (*εἰκασία*) and the higher certainty of understanding (*διάνοια*) and reason (*νοῦς*).

The difference between understanding and mind or reason (*νοῦς*) is analogous to the difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts and the contemplation of the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is at rest; consistency and universality are the tests of truth. To this self-evidencing knowledge of the whole the faculty of mind is supposed to correspond. But there is a knowledge of the understanding which is incomplete and in motion always, because unable to rest in the subordinate ideas. Those ideas are called both images and hypotheses—images because they are clothed in sense, hypotheses because they are assumptions only, until they are brought into connexion with the idea of good.

The method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller explanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the seventh book. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance of Socrates to make a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. The allusion to Theages' bridle and to the oracular sign, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory; the reference to a future state of existence, which is unknown to Glaucon in the tenth book; the surprise in the answers at 487 E and 497 B; the fanciful irony of Socrates, where he pretends that he can only describe the strange position of the philosopher in a figure of speech; the original remark that the Sophists, after all, are only the representatives and not the leaders of public opinion; the picture of the philosopher standing aside in the shower of sleet under a wall; the 'right noble thought' that the highest truths demand the greatest exactness; the hesitation of Socrates in returning once more to his well-worn theme of the idea of good; the ludicrous earnestness of Glaucon—are characteristic and interesting features.

BOOK VII. After this I took up my parable, and said: Imagine human beings living in a sort of underground den which has a mouth wide open towards the light; they have been there from childhood, and, having their necks and legs chained, can only see before them. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a raised way, and a low wall built along the way, like that over which marionette players show their puppets. Above the wall are seen moving figures, who hold in their hands various works of art, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the passers by

are talking and others silent. 'A strange parable,' he said, 'and strange captives.' They are ourselves, I replied; and they see nothing but the shadows which the fire throws on the wall of the cave; to these they give names, and if we add an echo which returns from the wall, the voices of the passengers will seem to proceed from the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly turn them round and make them look with pain and grief to themselves at the real images; will they believe them to be real? Will not their eyes be dazzled, and will they not try to get away from the light to something which they are able to behold without blinking? And suppose further, that they are dragged up a steep and rugged ascent into the presence of the sun himself, will not their sight be darkened with the excess of light? Some time will pass before they get the habit of perceiving at all; and at first they will be able to perceive only shadows and reflections in the water; then they will recognize the moon and the stars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper place as he is. Last of all they will conclude:—This is he who gives us the year and the seasons, and is the author of all that we see. How will they rejoice in passing from darkness to light! How worthless to them will seem the honours and glories of the den or cave out of which they came! As Homer says: 'Better to be the servant of a poor master than a prince over all the dead.' And now imagine further, that they descend into their old habitations;—in that underground dwelling they will not see as well as their fellows, and will not be able to compete with them in the measurement of the shadows on the wall; there will be many jokes about the man who went on a visit to the sun and lost his eyes—men should not do such things—and if they find anybody trying to set free and enlighten one of their number, they will put him to death, if they can catch him. Which things are an allegory: The cave or den is the world of sight, the fire is the sun, the way upwards is the way to knowledge, and in the world of knowledge the idea of good is last seen and with difficulty, but when seen is inferred to be the author of good and right—parent of the lord of light in this world and of truth and understanding in the other. He who attains to the beatific vision is always going upwards; he is unwilling to descend into political assemblies and courts of law; for his eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of images which they behold in them—he cannot enter into the ideas of those who have never in their lives understood the relation of the shadow to the substance. Now blindness is of two

kinds, and may be caused either by passing out of darkness into light or out of light into darkness, and a man of sense will distinguish between them, and will not laugh equally at both of them, but the blindness which arises from fulness of light he will deem blessed, and pity the other; or if he laugh at the blinking idiot looking up at the sun, he will have more reason to laugh than the inhabitants of the den at those who descend from above. There is a further lesson taught by this parable of ours. Some persons fancy that instruction is like giving eyes to the blind, but we say that the faculty of sight was always there, and that the soul only requires to be turned round towards the light. And this is conversion; other virtues are almost like bodily habits, and may be acquired in the same manner, but intelligence has a diviner life, and is indestructible, turning either to good or evil according to the direction given. Did you never observe how the mind of a clever rogue peers out of his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the more evil he does? Now if you take such an one and circumcise his passions, and cut away from him the leaden weights which drag him down and keep the eye of his soul fixed upon the ground, the same faculty in him will be turned round, and he will behold the truth as clearly as he now discerns his meaner ends. And have we not decided that our rulers must neither be so uneducated as to have no fixed rule of life, nor so over-educated as to be unwilling to leave their paradise for the business of the world? And we must choose out the natures who are most likely to ascend to the light and knowledge of the good, and not allow them to do as they do now. I mean to say that they must not be allowed to remain in the region of light, but must be forced down again among the captives in the den to partake of their labours and honours. 'Is not this hard? and what if they had rather not?' You should remember, my friend, that our purpose in framing the State was not that our citizens should do what they like, but that they should serve the State for the common good of all. May we not fairly say to our philosopher,—Friend, we do you no wrong; for in other States philosophy grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the gardener, but you we have trained to be the rulers and kings of our hive, and therefore we must insist on your descending into the darkness of the den? You must, each of you, take your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the dark, and with a little practice you will see ten thousand times as well as those who quarrel about the shadows, whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours is a

waking reality. It may be that the saint or philosopher who is best fitted, may also be the least inclined to rule, but necessity is laid upon him, and he must no longer live in the heaven of ideas. And this will be the salvation of the State. For those who rule must not be those who are desirous to rule; and, if you can offer to our citizens a better life than that of rulers generally is, there will be a chance that the rich, not only in this world's goods, but in virtue and wisdom, may bear rule. And the only life which is better than the life of political ambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation for the government of a State.

Then now comes the question,—How shall we create our rulers; what way is there from darkness to light? How like departed spirits may they be raised from the world below into the upper air? The change is effected by philosophy, which is not the turning over of an oyster shell, but the conversion of a soul from night to day, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the soul upwards? Our former education had two branches,—gymnastic, which was occupied with the body, and music, the sister art, which infused a natural harmony into mind and literature; but neither of these sciences gave any promise of doing what we want. What have we left? All that remains to us is that universal science which is the primary element of all the rest. ‘What is that?’ A small matter—one, two, three—or in other words, number, of which I say that all arts and sciences are partakers. ‘Very true.’ Including the art of war? ‘Yes, certainly.’ Then there is something very ludicrous about Palamedes in the tragedy, coming in and saying that he had invented number, and counted the ranks and set in order the ships. For if Agamemnon could not count his feet (and without number how could he?) he must have been a pretty sort of general indeed. No man should be a soldier who cannot count, and indeed he is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking of these practical applications of arithmetic, for number, in my view, is rather to be regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain what I mean by the last expression:—Things sensible are of two kinds; the one class invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the mind acquiesces. Now the stimulating class are the things which suggest contrast and relation. For example, suppose that I hold up to the eyes three fingers—a fore finger, a middle finger, a little finger—the sight equally recognizes all three fingers, but cannot distinguish which is first, second, or third. Or again, suppose two objects to be relatively great

and small, these ideas of greatness and smallness are supplied not by the sense, but by the mind. And the perception of their contrast or relation quickens and sets in motion the mind, which is puzzled by the confused intimations of sense, and has recourse to number in order to find out whether the things indicated are one or more than one. Number replies that they are two and not one, and are to be distinguished from one another. Again, the sight beholds great and small, but only in a confused chaos, and not until they are distinguished does the question arise of their respective natures, leading on to the distinction between the visible and intellectual. And that was what I meant when I spoke of stimulants to the intellect; I was thinking of the contradictions which arise in perception. The idea of unity, for example, like that of a finger, does not arouse thought unless involving some conception of plurality; but when the one is also the opposite of one, the contradiction gives rise to reflection. An example of this is afforded by any object of sight; and what is true of one is true of all number. It raises the mind out of the foam and flux of generation to the contemplation of being, having lesser military and retail uses also. The retail use is not required by us; but as our guardian is to be a soldier as well as a philosopher, the military one may be retained. No science can be more suitable for our higher purpose, when pursued for the sake of knowledge only, and not in the spirit of a shopkeeper. Great is the power of arithmetic in giving abstraction; for numbers are pure abstractions, and the true arithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is capable of division. You may divide, but he insists that you are only multiplying; his one is not material or divisible into parts, but an unvarying and absolute equality; and this shows the purely intellectual character of his study. Note also the great power which arithmetic has of sharpening the wits; no other discipline is equally severe, or an equal test of ability in general, or equally improving to a stupid man.

Let our second branch of education be geometry. 'I can easily see,' replied Glaucon, 'that in manœuvring an army or taking up a position, the skill of the general will be more than doubled by his knowledge of geometry.' Not much will be required for this purpose; the use of geometry, to which I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the idea of good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being, and not at generation only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these studies, as any one who is the least of a mathematician is

aware, is mean and ridiculous; they are made to look downwards to the arts, and not upwards to eternal existence. The geometer is always talking of squaring, subtending, apposing, as if he had in view action; whereas knowledge is the real object of the study. It should elevate the soul, and create the mind of philosophy; it should raise up what has fallen down, not to speak of lesser uses in war and military tactics, and in the improvement of the faculties.

Shall we propose as a third branch of our education—astronomy? ‘Very good,’ replied Glaucon; ‘the knowledge of the heavens is good at once for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.’ I like your way of giving useful reasons for everything in order to conciliate the world. Nor do I deny that there is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education is not only useful information but an illumination and purification of the soul—better than ten thousand eyes, for by that alone is truth seen. Now, will you appeal to mankind in general or to the philosopher? or would you prefer to look to yourself only? ‘Every man is his own best friend.’ Then take a step backward, for we are out of order, and insert the third dimension which is of solids, after the second which is of planes, and then you may proceed to solids in motion. But the properties of the third dimension can hardly be said to be as yet discovered. Solid geometry is not popular and has not the patronage of the State, nor is the use of it fully recognized; the difficulty is great, and the votaries of the study are full of conceit and impatient of direction. Still the charm of the pursuit wins upon men, and, if government would lend a little assistance, there might be great progress made. ‘Very true,’ replied Glaucon, ‘I admit the charm; and I understand you now to begin with plane geometry, and to place next geometry of solids, which you omitted as being a pursuit likely to raise a smile; thirdly, astronomy, or the motion of solids.’ Yes, I found the more haste the less speed.

‘Very good,’ he said; ‘and, now that the missing link is supplied, let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am willing to speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the contemplation of the heavens draws the soul upwards.’ I am an exception, then; astronomy as studied at present appears to me to draw the soul not upwards, but downwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the ceiling—no better; a man may float on his back by land or by water—he may look up or look down, but there is no science in that. The vision of knowledge of which I speak is seen not with the eyes, but with the mind. All the

magnificence of the heavens is but the embroidery of a copy which falls far short of the divine Original, and teaches nothing about the absolute harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty is like the beauty of figures drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great artist, which may be used for illustration, but no mathematician would seek to obtain from them true conceptions of equality or numerical relations. How ridiculous then to look for these in the map of the heavens, in which the imperfection of matter comes in everywhere as a disturbing element, marring the symmetry of day and night, of months and years, of the sun and stars in their courses. Only by problems can we place astronomy on a truly scientific basis. Let the heavens alone, and exert the intellect.

Still, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say, and we agree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion adapted to the ear as astronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications also. Let us inquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting that we have an aim higher than theirs, which is the relation of these sciences to the idea of good. The error which pervades astronomy also pervades harmonics. The musicians put their ears in the place of their minds. 'Yes,' replied Glaucon, 'I like to see them laying their ears alongside of their neighbours' faces—some saying, "that's a new note," others declaring that the two notes are the same.' Yes, I said; but you mean the gentlemen who are always twisting and torturing the strings of the lyre, and who quarrel about the tempers of the strings, as though they were human beings. These empirics are not the people of whom I am speaking; I refer rather to the Pythagorean harmonists, whom we were about to consult. Their error is, that they investigate only the numbers of the consonances which are heard, and ascend no higher,—of the true numerical harmony which is unheard, and is only to be found in problems, they have not even a conception. 'That last,' he said, 'must be a marvellous thing.' A thing of value, I replied, if pursued with a view to the good—if pursued in any other spirit, useless.

All these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if they are regarded in their natural relations to one another. 'I dare say, Socrates,' said Glaucon; 'but such a study will be an endless business.' What study do you mean—of the prelude, or what? For all these things are only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere mathematician is also a dialectician? 'Certainly not. In all my expe-

rience I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason.' And yet, Glaucon, is not true reasoning that hymn of dialectic which is the music of the intellectual world, and which was by us compared to the effort of sight, when from beholding the shadows on the wall we arrived at last at the images which gave the shadows? Even so the dialectical faculty withdrawing from sense arrives by the pure intellect at the contemplation of the idea of good, and never rests but at the very end of the intellectual world. And the royal road out of the cave into the light, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun and turning to contemplate the shadows of reality—not the shadows of an image only; this progress and gradual acquisition of a new faculty of sight by the help of the mathematical sciences, is the elevation of the soul to the contemplation of the highest ideal of being.

'I agree in what you say, as far as I understand you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed to the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither?' Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. There can be no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been disciplined in the previous sciences. But that there is a science of absolute truth, which is attained in some way very different from those now practised, I am confident. For all other arts or sciences are relative to the wants and opinions of men, and are designed for generation and production, or again for the preservation and support of life; and the mathematical sciences are but a dream and hypothesis, never attaining to the dignity of true knowledge, because never analysing their own principles. Dialectic only does away with hypotheses, and rises to the principle which is above them, converting and gently leading the eye of the soul out of the barbarous slough of ignorance into the light of the upper world, with the help of the sciences which we have been describing—sciences, as they are often termed, although they require some other name, implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science, and this in our previous sketch was understanding. And so we get four names—two for intellect, and two for opinion,—reason or mind, understanding, faith, knowledge of shadows—which make a proportion—being : becoming : : intellect : opinion —and science : belief : : understanding : knowledge of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that science which defines and explains the essence or being of each nature, which distinguishes and abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle against all opponents in the cause of

good. To him who is not a dialectician life is but a sleepy dream; and many a man is in his grave before he is well waked up. And would you have the children of your ideal State, who are to be your governors, intelligent beings, or stupid as posts? 'Certainly not the latter.' Then you must train them in dialectic, which will teach them to ask and answer questions, and is the coping-stone of the sciences.

I dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen; and the process of selection may be carried a step further:—As before they must be constant and valiant, and, as far as possible, good-looking, and of noble manners, but now they must also have the qualities which will be likely to profit by education; that is to say, they must be quick at learning, for the soul soon gets tired of mental gymnastics in which the toil is not divided with the body. And they must be retentive, solid, diligent, laborious natures, who combine intellectual with moral virtues,—not lame and one-sided, diligent in bodily exercise and indolent in mind, or conversely;—not a maimed soul, which hates falsehood and yet unintentionally is always losing the pearl of truth in the mire of ignorance; not a bastard or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb, and in perfect condition for the great gymnastic trial of the mind. Justice herself can find no fault with natures such as these, who will be the saviours of our State; disciples of another sort would only make philosophy more ridiculous than she is at present. Forgive my enthusiasm; I had forgotten that we were not in earnest, and became excited; when I see her trampled under foot, I am angry at the authors of her 'disgrace. 'I did not notice that you were more excited than you ought to have been.' But I felt that I was. Now do not let us forget another point in the selection of our disciples—that they must be young and not old. For Solon is mistaken in saying that an old man can be always learning—he can no more learn than he can run. Youth is the time of study, and here we must remember that the mind is free and dainty, and, unlike the body, must not be made to work against the grain. Learning in youth should be a sort of play, in which the natural bent is detected. As in training them for war, the young dogs should at first only taste blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over which during two or three years divide life between sleep and bodily exercise, then the education of the soul will become a more serious matter. At twenty years of age, after various trials in which 'muscular philosophy' is not to be neglected, a selection must be made of the more promising disciples, with whom

a new epoch of education will begin. The sciences which they have hitherto learned in fragments will now be viewed in a more comprehensive way, and brought into relation with each other and with true being; the power of combining them is the test of speculative and dialectical ability. And afterwards there shall be trials for still higher honours; and at thirty a further selection shall be made of those who are able to withdraw from the world of sense into the abstraction of ideas. But at this point, judging from present experience, there is a danger that dialectic may be the source of many evils. The danger may be illustrated by a parallel case:—Imagine a person who has been brought up in wealth and luxury amid a crowd of flatterers, and who is suddenly informed that he is a supposititious son. He has hitherto honoured his reputed parents and disregarded the flatterers, and now he does the reverse;—this is just what happens with a man's principles. There are certain doctrines which he learnt at home and which had a sort of parental authority over him. Presently he finds that imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and asks, 'What is the just and good?' or proves that virtue is vice and vice virtue, and his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour, and obey them as he has hitherto done. He is seduced into the life of pleasure, and becomes a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such speculators is very pitiable, and, in order that our thirty years' old pupils may not deserve this pity, let us take every possible care that young persons do not study philosophy too early. For a young man is a sort of puppy who only plays with an argument; he pulls and tears at all who come near him; and is reasoned into and out of his opinions every day; he soon begins to believe nothing, and brings himself and philosophy into discredit. A man of thirty has too much sense to run on in this way; he will argue and not merely contradict, and the moderation of his character will increase the honour of the pursuit. As we said before, the students of philosophy must be orderly and constant, not any chance aspirant or intruder. What time shall we allow for this second gymnastic training of the soul?—say, twice the time required for the gymnastics of the body; six, or perhaps five years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen years let the student go down into the den, and command armies, and gain experience of life. At fifty let him return to the end of all things, and have his eyes uplifted to the idea of good, and order his life after that pattern; if necessary, taking his turn at the

helm of State, and training up others to be his successors. When his time comes he shall depart in peace to the islands of the blest. He shall be honoured with sacrifices, and be worshipped as a god if the Pythian oracle approves; and at any rate, he shall be revered as a man.

‘You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our governors.’ Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in all things with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a mere aspiration, but may really come into being in the way which we have described, when there shall arise philosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise the pomps and vanities of this present world, and will be the servants of justice only in the administration of the State. ‘And how will they commence their administration?’ The first step will be to send away into the country all those who are more than ten years of age, and begin on those who are left.

... At the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his explanation of the relation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory; in this, as in other passages, following the order which he prescribes in education, and proceeding from the concrete to the abstract. At the commencement of Book VII, under the figure of a cave having an opening towards a fire and a way upwards to the true light, he returns to view the divisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly, as in a picture, the result which had been hardly won by a great effort of thought in the previous discussion; at the same time casting a glance onward at the dialectical process, which is represented by the way leading from darkness to light. The shadows, the images, the reflection of the sun and stars in the water, the stars and sun themselves, severally correspond,—the first, to the realm of fancy and poetry,—the second, to the world of sense,—the third, to the abstractions or universals of sense, of which the mathematical sciences furnish the type,—the fourth and last to the same abstractions, when seen in the unity of the idea, from which they derive a new meaning and power. The true dialectical process begins with the contemplation of the real stars, and not mere reflections of them, and ends with the recognition of the sun, or idea of good, as the parent not only of light but of warmth and growth. To the divisions of knowledge the stages of education partly answer;—first, there is the early education of childhood and youth in the fancies of the poets, and in the laws and customs of the State;—then there is the training

of the body to be a warrior athlete, and a good servant of the mind;— and thirdly, after an interval follows the education of later life, which begins with mathematics and proceeds to philosophy in general.

There seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,—first, to realize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the true education is that which draws men from becoming to being and to a comprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human mind the faculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last the particulars of sense drop away and the universal alone remains. He never understood that abstractions, as Hegel says, are ‘mere abstractions’—of use when employed in the arrangement of facts, but adding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart from them, or with reference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the exercise of the faculty of abstraction has enlarged the powers of the human mind, and played a great part in the education of the human race. Plato appreciated the value of this, and saw that the faculty might be quickened by the study of number and relation. All things in which there is opposition or proportion are suggestive of reflection. The dull impression of sense evokes no power of thought or of mind, but when objects of sense ask to be compared and distinguished, then philosophy begins. The science of arithmetic first suggests such distinctions. There follow in order the other sciences of plain and solid geometry, and of solids in motion, one branch of which is astronomy or the harmony of the spheres,—to this is appended the sister science of the harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint at the possibility of other applications of arithmetical or mathematical proportions.

The modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato’s delight in the properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say with him:—Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and figure in themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application to the arts. He will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, in which figures are to be dispensed with; thus in a distant and shadowy way seeming to anticipate the possibility of working geometrical problems by a more general mode of analysis. He will remark with interest on the backward state of solid geometry, which, alas! was not encouraged by the aid of the State in the age of Plato; and he will recognise the grasp of Plato’s mind in his ability to conceive of one science of solids in motion including the earth as well as the

heavens,—not forgetting to notice the intimation to which allusion has been already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics the science of solids in motion may have other applications. Still more will he be struck with the comprehensiveness of view which led Plato, at a time when these sciences hardly existed, to say that they must be studied in relation to one another, and to the idea of good, or common principle of truth and being. But he will also see (and perhaps without surprise) that in that stage of physical and mathematical knowledge, Plato has fallen into the error of supposing that he can construct the heavens *a priori* by mathematical problems, and determine the principles of harmony irrespective of their adaptation to the human ear. The illusion was a natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and certainty of astronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation and complexity of the world of sense;—hence the circumstance that there was some elementary basis of fact, some measurement of distance or time on which they must ultimately rest, was overlooked by him. The modern predecessors of Newton fell into errors at least equally great; and Plato can hardly be said to have been very far wrong, or may even claim a sort of prophetic insight into the subject, when we consider that the greater part of astronomy at the present day consists of abstract dynamics, by the help of which most astronomical discoveries have been made.

The metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes mathematics as an instrument of education,—which strengthens the power of attention, develops the sense of order and the faculty of construction, and enables the mind to grasp under simple formulæ the quantitative differences of physical phenomena. But while acknowledging their value in education, he sees also that they have no connexion with our higher moral and intellectual ideas. In the attempt which Plato makes to connect them, we easily trace the influences of the old Pythagorean notions. There is no reason to suppose that he is speaking of the ideal numbers at p. 525 E; but he is describing numbers which are pure abstractions, to which he assigns a real and separate existence, which, ‘as the teachers of the art’ (meaning probably the Pythagoreans) would have affirmed, repel all attempts at subdivision, and in which unity and every other number are conceived of as absolute. The truth and certainty of numbers, when thus disengaged from phenomena, gave them a kind of sacredness in the eyes of an ancient philoso-

pher. Nor is it easy to say how far ideas of order and fixedness may have had a moral and elevating influence on the minds of men, 'who,' in the words of the *Timaeus*, 'might learn to regulate their erring lives according to them' (47 C). It is worthy of remark that the old Pythagorean ethical symbols still exist as figures of speech among ourselves. And those who in modern times see the world pervaded by universal law, may also see an anticipation of this last word of modern philosophy in the Platonic idea of good, which is the source and measure of all things, and yet only an abstraction. (Cp. *Philebus*, sub fin.)

Two passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that which relates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage may be explained, like many others, from differences in the modes of conception prevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the perceptions of sense are inseparable from the act of the mind which accompanies them. The consciousness of form, colour, distance, is indistinguishable from the simple sensation, which is the medium of them. Whereas to Plato sense is the Heraclitean flux of sense, not the vision of objects in the order in which they actually present themselves to the experienced sight, but as they may be imagined to appear confused and blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant. The first action of the mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this chaos, and the reason is required to frame distinct conceptions under which the confused impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises the question, 'What is great, what is small?' and thus begins the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

The second difficulty relates to Plato's conception of harmonics. Three classes of harmonists are distinguished by him:—first, the Pythagoreans, whom he proposes to consult (as in the previous discussion on music he will consult Damon) and who are acknowledged to be masters in the art, but are nevertheless deficient in the knowledge of its higher import and relation to the good; secondly, the mere empirics, whom Glaucon appears to confuse with them, and whom both he and Socrates ludicrously describe as experimenting by mere auscultation on the intervals of sounds. Both of these fall short in different degrees of the Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely abstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part of universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good.

The allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The

den or cave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (cp. the description of the philosopher and lawyer in the *Theaetetus*, 172-176), and the light of the eternal ideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing influence on the minds of those who return to this lower world. In other words, their principles are too wide for practical application; they are looking far away into the past and future, when their business is with the present. The ideal is not easily reduced to the conditions of actual life, and may often seem to be at variance with them. And at first, those who return are unable to compete with the inhabitants of the den in the measurement of the shadows, and are derided and persecuted by them; but after a while they see the things below in far truer proportions than those who have never ascended into the upper world. The difference between the politician turned into a philosopher and the philosopher turned into a politician, is symbolized by the two kinds of disordered eyesight, the one which is experienced by the captive who is transferred from darkness to day, the other, of the heavenly messenger who voluntarily for the good of his fellow-men descends into the den. In what way the brighter light is to dawn on the inhabitants of the lower world, or how the idea of good is to become the guiding principle of politics, is left unexplained by Plato. Like the nature and divisions of dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently demands to be informed, perhaps he would have said that the explanation could not be given except to a disciple of the previous sciences. (Compare *Symposium* 210 A.)

Some modern elements of thought may be noted in this part of the *Republic*. We seem to hear the echo of our own times in the complaints which Plato utters respecting the dangers of speculation in youth. The minds of young men become unsettled, and their extravagance brings discredit on philosophy and on themselves. They argue about the laws and opinions in which they have been brought up, and soon begin to think that one thing is as good as another. Their position is ingeniously compared to that of a supposititious son, who has made the discovery that his reputed parents are not his real ones, and, in consequence, they have lost their authority over him. The distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also noticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the mathematician is quite distinct from the higher philosophical sense which recognizes and combines first principles (531 E). The contempt which he expresses at p. 533 for distinctions of words, the danger of involuntary falsehood, the apology

which Socrates makes for his earnestness of speech, are highly characteristic of the Platonic style and mode of thought. The quaint notion that if Palamedes was the inventor of number Agamemnon could not have counted his feet; the art by which we are made to believe that this State of ours is not a dream only; the gravity with which the first step is taken in the actual creation of the State, namely, the sending out of the city all who had arrived at ten years of age, in order to expedite the business of education by a generation, are also truly Platonic. (For the last, compare the passage at the end of the third book (415 D), in which he expects the lie about the earthborn men to be believed in the second generation.)

BOOK VIII. And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and the education and pursuits of men and women, both in war and peace, are also to be common, and kings are to be philosophers and warriors. And a further conclusion is, that our soldiers are to live in common houses, and to have all things in common; they are to be warrior athletes receiving no pay, but only their food from the other citizens. Now let us return to the point at which we digressed, and recover the track. ‘That is easily done,’ he replied: ‘You were speaking before we entered on the subject of women and children, of the State which you had constructed, and of the individual who answered to this, both of whom you affirmed to be good, although of both you were able to show still more excellent things; and you said that of inferior States there were four forms and four individuals corresponding to them, which although deficient in various degrees, were all of them worth inspecting with a view to determining the relative happiness or misery of the best or worst man. Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted you, and this led to another argument,—and so here we are.’ Suppose that we put ourselves again in the same position, and do you repeat your question. ‘I should like to know what the constitutions are of which you spoke?’ Besides the perfect State there are only four of any note:—first, the famous Lacedæmonian or Cretan commonwealth; secondly, oligarchy, a State full of evils; thirdly, democracy, which follows next in order; fourthly, tyranny, which is the disease or death of all governments; and there are other intermediate forms which are more commonly found among barbarians than among Hellenes. Now, States are not made of ‘oak and rock,’ but of

flesh and blood ; and therefore as there are five States there must be five human natures in individuals, which correspond to them. And first, there is the ambitious nature, which answers to the Lacedæmonian State ; secondly, the oligarchical nature ; thirdly, the democratical ; and fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will have to be compared with the perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may know which is the happier, and then we shall be able to determine whether the argument of Thrasymachus or our own is the more convincing. And as before we began with the State and went on to the individual, so let us do now—beginning with timocracy, let us go on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to the other forms of government, and the individuals who answer to them.

But how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State ? Plainly, like all changes of government, from division in the rulers ; for a government which is united cannot be moved. But whence came division ? ‘ Sing, heavenly Muses,’ as Homer says ; may we not suppose them to speak to us as to children, putting on a solemn face in jest ? ‘ And what will they say ?’ They will say that human things are fated to decay, and even the perfect State will not escape when the wheel comes full circle in a period short or long. Plants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which the intelligence of the rulers alloyed by sense will not enable them to ascertain, and children will be born out of season. For whereas divine creations are in a perfect cycle or number, the human creation is in a number which declines from perfection, and has four terms and three intervals of numbers, increasing, waning, assimilating, dissimilating, and yet perfectly commensurate with each other. The base of the number with a fourth added (or which is 3 : 4), multiplied by five and cubed, gives two harmonies :—The first a square number, which is a hundred times the base (or a hundred times a hundred) ; the second, an oblong, being a hundred squares of the rational diameter of a figure the side of which is five, subtracting one from each square or two perfect squares from all, and adding a hundred cubes of three. This entire number is geometrical and contains the rule or law of generation. And when this law is neglected marriages will be unpropitious ; the inferior offspring who are then born will in time become the rulers, and the State will decline, and education will fall into decay, and gymnastic be preferred to music, and the gold and silver and brass and iron will form a chaotic mass, and thus will division arise. Such is the Muses’ answer to our question. ‘ And a true answer.’ Of course ; for how can

the answer of the Muses be other than true?—‘But what more have the Muses to say?’ They say that the two races, the iron and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State different ways;—the one to trade and moneymaking, and the others having the true riches and not caring for money, will resist them—there will be a contest, which will end in a compromise; they will agree to have private property, and will enslave their fellow-citizens who were once their friends and nurturers. But they will retain their warlike character, and their chief occupation will be to make war, and to control their subjects. This is the origin of that middle state which is intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy.

The new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers and contempt for trades and handicrafts, in the institution of common meals, and in devotion to warlike and gymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into philosophy, and simplicity of character, which was once her note, is now looked for only in the military class. Arts of war begin to prevail over arts of peace; the ruler is no longer a philosopher; as in oligarchies, there springs up among them an extravagant love of gain—get another man’s and save your own, is their principle; and they have dark places in which they hoard their gold and silver, for the use of their women and others; they take their pleasures by stealth, like boys who are running away from their father, the law; and their education is not inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the strong arm of power. The leading characteristic of the State is party spirit and ambition.

And what manner of man answers to such a State? ‘In love of contention,’ replied Adeimantus, ‘he will be like our friend Glaucon.’ Perhaps, yes, he may be like him in that, but not in other ways; for he is self-asserting and ill-educated, yet fond of literature and of hearing recitations, although himself not a speaker,—fierce with slaves, but not truly above them—obedient to rulers, and a lover of power and honour, which he hopes to gain by deeds of arms—fond, too, of gymnastics and of hunting. As he advances in years he grows more and more avaricious, having never known a saviour or guardian—that is to say, reason and music—which are the only saviours of men. His origin is as follows:—His father may probably have been a good man dwelling in an ill-ordered State, who has retired from public life and is ready to waive his rights in order that he may be at peace. His mother is angry

at her loss of precedence among other women ; she is disgusted at the selfishness of her husband, and her woman's tongue expatiates to her son on the unmanliness and indolence of his father. 'Yes,' said Adeimantus, 'that is the way with all women.' Yes, I said, and you may observe also that the old family servant takes up the tale, and says to the youth :—'When you are grown up you must be more of a man than your father, and proceed against debtors and avenge insults.' All the world are agreed that the man who minds his own business is an idiot, while a busybody is highly honoured and esteemed. The young man hears and sees this, and he also hears his father's words and sees his ways, and as he is naturally well disposed, although liable to be perverted by evil influences, he rests at a middle point and becomes ambitious and a lover of honour.

And now, as Æschylus says, 'Set another man over against another city;' or rather, let the city come first. The next form of government is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only. No eyes are needed to see how this form of government springs out of the last. 'How is that?' The private treasury is the beginning of the decline; the possession of gold and silver leads to new fashions of expense, and the citizens and their wives break the law. One draws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches are thrown into the scale, and virtue kicks the beam;—lovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; misers of politicians; and, in time, political privileges are confined by law to the rich. The latter change is commonly effected by fear or violence.

Thus much of the origin,—let us next consider the evils of oligarchy. Would a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because he was rich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the analogy apply still more to the State? And there are yet greater evils: two nations are struggling together in one—the rich and the poor; and the rich dare not put arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling to pay for defenders out of their own money. And have we not already condemned that State in which the same persons are warriors as well as shopkeepers? The greatest evil of all is that a man may sell his property and have no place in the State; while there is one class which has enormous wealth, the other is entirely destitute. But observe that these destitutes had not really any more of the governing nature in them when they were rich than now that they are poor; they were miserable spendthrifts always. They are the drones

of the hive ; only whereas the actual drone is unprovided by nature with a sting, the 'unfeathered, two-legged things,' which we call drones, do not all agree in this respect, for some of them are without stings and some of them have dreadful stings ; in other words, there are paupers and there are rogues. In the cellars and underground places of an oligarchical city you will always find this scum of the earth, which includes nearly everybody but the governing class. And this state of things originates in bad education and in bad government.

Like State, like man,—the change in the latter begins with the representative of timocracy ; he walks at first in the ways of his father, who may have been a statesman, or general, perhaps ; and presently he sees him 'fallen from his high estate,' the victim of informers, dying in prison or exile, or by the hand of the executioner. The lesson which he learns from this is one of caution ; he leaves the dangerous arena of politics, and makes money ; hoping to retrieve his father's losses, he represses his pride and saves pence. Avarice is enthroned as his bosom's lord, and assumes the style of the Great King, and the newest Persian fashions. The rational and spirited elements sit humbly on the ground, the one immersed in calculation, the other absorbed in the admiration of wealth. The love of honour turns to love of money ; the conversion is instantaneous. And the man goes through the same process as the State ; he is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one passion which is the master of the rest, a skinflint, a hoarder, who chooses a life which the vulgar approve : Is he not the very image of the State ? He has had no education, or he would never have allowed the blind god of riches to lead the dance within him. And being uneducated he will have many slavish desires, some beggarly, some knavish, breeding in his soul. Shall I tell you where you may detect him ? If he is the trustee of an orphan, and has the power to defraud, he will prove that he is not without the will, and that his passions are only restrained by fear and not by reason. He will be respectable in his dealings generally but when he has to spend another man's money, he will show that he has the desires of a drone. Hence he leads a divided existence ; in which the better desires mostly prevail. But when he is contending for prizes and other distinctions, he is afraid to incur a loss which is to be repaid only by barren honour ; in time of war he fights with a small part of his resources, and usually saves his money and loses the victory.

Next comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and the oligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an oligarchy; they allow vice and extravagance among the citizens in order that they may be enriched by the sale of a spendthrift's property; and no man can serve two masters, wealth and virtue. In this disorderly condition of things men of family often lose their property or rights of citizenship, and there they are, not only poor and in debt, but a fixture in the State, with their stings out and arms in their hands—ready for any desperate enterprise against the new owners of their property and against the State. The usurer with stooping walk pretends not to see them; he passes by on the other side, and leaves his sting—that is, his money—in any one else who will be his victim; and many a man has to pay the parent or principal sum multiplied into a family of children, and is reduced into a state of dronage by him. The only way of diminishing this glaring evil is either to limit a man's use of his property, or to insist that the lender shall lend at his own risk, and have no protection from the law. But in an oligarchy the ruling class do not want to apply a remedy; they are careful only of money, and as careless of virtue as the poorest of the citizens. Now there are occasions on which the governors and the governed meet together,—at festivals, on a journey, voyaging or fighting. The wiry, sunburnt pauper finds that in the hour of danger he is not despised; he sees the rich man under an umbrella puffing and panting, and draws the conclusion which he privately imparts to his companions,—‘that our people are not good for much;’ and as a sickly frame is made ill by a mere touch from without, or sometimes without external impulse is ready to fall to pieces of itself, so from the least cause, perhaps from some offer of aristocratic or democratic help, or with no cause at all, the city, like the sick man, falls ill and fights a battle for life or death. And democracy comes into power when the poor are the victors, killing some and exiling some, and giving equal shares in the government to all the rest.

The manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom and plainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes, and has his own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of character; the State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours and figures are the manners of men, and there are many who, like women and children, prefer this variety to real beauty and excellence. The State is not one but many, like a bazaar

at which you can buy anything. The great charm is, that you may do as you like; you may govern if you like, let it alone if you like; go to war and make peace if you feel disposed, and all quite irrespective of anybody else. When you condemn men to death they remain alive all the same; a gentleman is desired to go into exile, and he stalks about the streets like a hero, and nobody sees him or cares for him. Take another look at the free and lordly nature of democracy, how grandly she sets her foot upon all our fine theories of education,—how little does she care for the training of her statesmen! The only qualification which is demanded by her is the profession of patriotism. Such is democracy;—a pleasing, lawless, various sort of government, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike.

Let us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case of the State, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly oligarch, and has been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary pleasures. Perhaps for the sake of clearness I ought to explain the meaning of this latter term; necessary pleasures are those which are good, and which we cannot do without; unnecessary pleasures are those which do no good, and of which the desire might be eradicated by early training. For example, the pleasures of eating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to a certain point; beyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and mind, and the excess may be avoided. When in excess, they may be rightly called expensive pleasures, in opposition to the useful ones. And the drone, as we called him, was the slave of these unnecessary pleasures and desires, whereas the miserly oligarch is subject only to the necessary.

The oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:—The youth who has had a mean and miserly bringing up, gets a taste of the drone's honey; he meets with wild reckless companions, who introduce him to every new pleasure. Thus the change begins; and, as in the State, so in the individual, there are allies on both sides, temptations from without and passions from within; there is reason also and external influences of parents and friends in alliance with the better nature; and these two factions or armies are in violent conflict with one another. Sometimes the party of order prevails, but then again new desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob of passions get possession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the head, which they find unguarded—void of acquirements and virtues, best sentinels over the lives of men dear to

the gods. Falsehoods and illusions ascend to take their place; the prodigal goes back into the country of the Lotophagi or drones, and openly dwells there. And if any offer of alliance or parley of individual elders comes from home, the false spirits shut the gates of the castle and permit no one to enter,—there is a battle, and the victory is with them; and then they banish modesty, which they call folly, and thrust away temperance; and all law and order are quickly despatched over the border by them and the rabble which are at their heels. And when the house is clean swept and garnished, their favourite is initiated by them in great mysteries;—they dress up the exiled vices in bright array, and bring them back again crowned with garlands, and give them new names. Insolence they call good breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, impudence courage. Such is the change from the use of the necessary pleasures to the unnecessary ones; after this the youth is divided impartially between them; and if he be fortunate and not too far gone in his badness, when he gets older and the turbulence of his passions begins to pass away, he receives back some of the exiles and lives in a sort of equilibrium; he indulges first one pleasure and then another, as they offer; and if reason comes and tells him that some pleasures are good and honourable, and others bad and vile, she is not admitted into the citadel—he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and he will have no invidious distinctions between them. Thus he lives in the fancy of the hour; sometimes he is drunken and lapped in wine and song; then he will drink water only and get thin; he takes to the gymnasium or he does nothing at all; then again he would be a philosopher or a politician, and he jumps up and says just what comes into his head; or again, he would be a warrior or a man of business; he is

‘Every thing by starts and nothing long.’

There remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all States—tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much in the same way that democracy springs from oligarchy. ‘How do you mean?’ Both arise from excess; the one from excess of wealth, the other from excess of freedom. ‘The great natural good which makes life worth having,’ says the democrat, ‘is freedom.’ And this exclusive love of freedom and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the change from democracy to tyranny. The State, served by evil cupbearers, swills the strong wine of freedom, and unless her rulers give her a

plentiful draught, breaks out and beats them; loyal citizens are called good for nothing, hereditary bondsmen and the like; equality and fraternity of governors and governed, is the approved principle. Anarchy is the law, not of the State only but of private houses, and is diffused over all. Father and son, citizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil, old and young, are all on a level; fathers and teachers fear their sons and pupils, and the wisdom of the young man is a match for the elder, and the old imitate the jaunty manners of the young because they are afraid of being thought morose. Slaves whom you have bought with money are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and there is no difference between men and women. And why, as Æschylus says, should I not utter the word which comes to my lips? The very animals in a democratic State have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The she-dogs are as good as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses march along with dignity and run their noses against anybody who comes in their way;—such exuberance is there and superabundance of freedom. ‘I have often experienced what you describe in my country walks.’ At last the skins of the citizens become so sensitive that they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written or unwritten; they would have no man call himself their master. Such is the fair, glorious beginning of things out of which tyranny springs. ‘Glorious, indeed; but what is to follow?’ The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; there is a law of contraries; the greatness of anything goes before a fall. The excess of freedom passes into the excess of slavery, and the greater the freedom the greater the slavery. You will remember that in the oligarchy were found two classes—rogues and paupers, who were compared by us to drones with and without stings. These two classes are to the State what phlegm and bile are to the human body; and the duty of the State-physician, or legislator, is to purge them away in the same manner that a bee-keeper would cut out the cells of drones. Now in a democracy, too, there are drones, but of a much more dangerous sort than in the oligarchy; there they are inert and unpractised, here they are full of life and animation; and the keener sort speak and act, while the others buzz about the bema and prevent their opponents from being heard. And there is another class in democratic States, of respectable, thriving individuals,—these are like a sponge, to be squeezed when the drones have need of their possessions; there is moreover a third class, who are the labourers and the artizans, and they make up the mass of the people.

When the people meet, they are omnipotent, but there is a difficulty in bringing them together unless they are attracted by a little honey; and the rich supply the honey, of which the demagogues keep the greater part for themselves and give the others a taste only. The possessions of the rich begin to be taken, and they are compelled to protect themselves; when they see the demagogues urging on their followers to do what they would not do of themselves, they are driven mad by the stings of the drones, and become downright oligarchs in self-defence. Then follow informations and convictions for treason. The people have some protector whom they nurse into greatness, and from this root the tree of tyranny springs. The nature of the change is indicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus Lycaeus: the story is, that he who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of other victims will be turned into a wolf. Even so the protector, who in his hour of popularity tastes human blood, and slays some and exiles others with or without pretence of law, and proclaims abolition of debts and division of lands, must either perish or become a wolf—that is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes back from exile in full power; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by legal means, they plot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the people makes his well-known request to them for a body-guard, which they readily grant, thinking only of his danger and not of their own. Then let the rich man make to himself wings, and not ‘turn back to take anything in the house,’ for he will never run away again if he does not do so then. And the Great Protector, instead of his vast bulk lying upon the earth, overstrides others, and stands like a colossus in the chariot of State, a full-blown tyrant now. Let us enquire into the nature of his happiness.

In the early days of his tyranny he has a smile and ‘Peace be with you,’ for everybody; he is not a ‘dominus,’ no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt and the monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes himself necessary to the State by always going to war. War-taxes depress the poor and keep them at work; this has the incidental advantage of preventing them from conspiring against him; and he can only get rid of bolder spirits by handing them over to the enemy,—hence he must be always stirring up war. Then comes unpopularity; some of those who assisted in setting him up have the courage to tell him a piece of their minds. The consequence is, that he must put them out of the way; he will always be keeping a sharp

look-out on the high spirited, the wise, the wealthy; and such is his blessed condition of life, that he is obliged to make a purgation of them. 'And what a purgation!' Yes, he purges away the good as the physician purges away the bad; he has to choose between death and a hateful and shameful life. And the more hated he is, the more he will require trusty guards; but whom will he trust, and where will he get them? 'They will come flocking like birds, for pay.' You mean that he will hire drones out of foreign parts; would he not rather obtain them on the spot? 'But how is that possible?' He will take the slaves from their owners and make them his body-guards; these are his trusted friends, from whom alone he receives the tribute of love and admiration. Verily the tragedians are wise, and Euripides wiser than any of them, who says,—

'Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise;'

and now, behold these wise men who are the companions of tyrants. Moreover, he magnifies tyranny as a state of superhuman glory; and this is an excellent reason, as the tragic poet will allow if he has any wit, why we should refuse to admit him into our State. 'I think that he may have wit enough for that.' He will go to other cities, and gather the mob about him with grand and plausible words, and change commonwealths into tyrannies and democracies,—receiving honours and rewards, first of all from tyrants, secondly from democracies, but the higher he and his friends ascend constitution hill, the more their honour will fail and become 'too asthmatic to mount.' To return to the tyrant;—how will he support that rare army of his? First, by robbing the temples of their treasures, which will enable him to lighten the taxes; then he will take all his father's property, and spend it on his companions, male or female. Now his father is the demus, and if the demus gets angry, and says that a great hulking son ought not to be a burden on his parents, and tells him to depart and take his riotous crew with him, then will the parent know what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom, and that the son whom he would fain expel is too strong for him. 'You do not mean to say that he will beat his father?' Yes, he will, after having taken away his arms. 'Then he is a parricide, and a cruel, unnatural son to a parent whom he is bound to cherish and maintain.' And the people have jumped from the fear of slavery into slavery, out of the smoke into the fire. Thus liberty, when out of all order and reason, passes into the worst form of slavery.

... In the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he returns to the perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly touched at the end of book iv. These he describes in a succession of parallels between the individuals and the State, tracing the origin of either in the State or individual which has preceded them. He begins by asking the point at which he digressed; and is thus led shortly to recapitulate the substance of the three former books, which also contain a parallel of the philosopher and the State.

Of the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have liked to admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State, which to us would appear to be the impracticability of communism or the natural antagonism of the ruling and subject classes. He throws a veil of mystery over the origin of the decline, which he attributes to ignorance of the law of population. Of this law the famous geometrical figure or number is the expression. Like the ancients in general, he had no idea of the gradual perfectibility of man or of the education of the human race. His ideal was not to be attained in the course of ages, but was to spring in full armour from the head of the legislator. When good laws had been given, he thought only of the manner in which they were likely to be corrupted, or of how they might be filled up in detail or restored in accordance with their original spirit. He appears not to have reflected upon the full meaning of his own words, 'in the brief space of human life, nothing great can be accomplished' (x. 608 B); or again, as he afterwards says in the *Laws* (iii. 676), 'infinite time is the maker of cities.' The order of constitutions which is adopted by him represents an order of thought rather than a succession of time, and may be considered as the first attempt to frame a philosophy of history.

The first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of soldiers and lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this is a government of force, in which education is not inspired by the Muses, but imposed by the law, and in which all the finer elements of organization have disappeared. The philosopher himself has lost the love of truth, and the soldier, who is of a simpler and honester nature, rules in his stead. The individual who answers to timocracy has some noticeable qualities. He is described as ill educated, but, like the Spartan, a lover of literature; and although he is a harsh master to his servants he has no natural superiority over them. His character is based upon a reaction against the circumstances of his father, who in a troubled

city has retired from politics, and his mother, who is dissatisfied at her own position, is always urging him towards the life of political ambition. Such a character may have had this origin, and indeed Livy attributes the Licinian laws to a feminine jealousy of a similar kind (vii. 34). But there is obviously no connection between the manner in which the timocratic State springs out of the ideal, and the mere accident by which the timocratic man is the son of a retired statesman.

The two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less historical foundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a polity like the Spartan or Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, or of the oligarchy of wealth passing into a democracy. The order of history appears to be different; first, in the Homeric times there is the royal or patriarchal form of government, which a century or two later was succeeded by an oligarchy of birth rather than of wealth, and in which wealth was only the accident of the hereditary possession of land and power. Sometimes this oligarchical government gave way to a government based upon a qualification of property, which, according to Aristotle's mode of using words would have been called a timocracy; and this in some cities, as at Athens, became the conducting medium to democracy. But such was not the necessary order of succession in States; nor, indeed, can any order be discerned in the endless fluctuation of Greek history (like the tides in the Euripus), except, perhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from monarchy to aristocracy in the earliest times. At first sight there appears to be a similar inversion in the last step of the Platonic succession, for tyranny instead of being the natural end of democracy, in early Greek history appears rather as a stage leading to democracy; the reign of Peisistratus and his sons is an episode which comes between the legislation of Solon and the constitution of Cleisthenes; and some secret cause common to them all seems to have led the greater part of Hellas at her first appearance in the dawn of history, e. g. Athens, Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly every State with the exception of Sparta, through a similar stage of tyranny which ended either in oligarchy or democracy. But then we must remember that Plato is describing rather the contemporary history of the Sicilian States, which was an alternation between democracy and tyranny, than the ancient history of Athens or Corinth.

The portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek delighted to draw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives of

mediaeval saints or mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were attributed to another in order to fill up the outline. There was no enormity which the Greek was not ready to believe of them; the tyrant was the negation of government and law; his assassination was glorious; there was no crime, however unnatural, which might not with probability be attributed to him. In this, Plato was only following the common thought of his countrymen, which he embellished and exaggerated with all the power of his genius. There is no need to suppose that he drew from life; or that his knowledge of tyrants is derived from a personal acquaintance with Dionysius. The manner in which he speaks of them would rather tend to render doubtful his ever having 'consorted' with them, or entertained the schemes which are attributed to him in the *Epistles*, of regenerating Sicily by their help.

Plato describes with a sort of amusement the follies of democracy, of which the political condition is reflected in social life. He conceives democracy as a state of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing what is right in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit of liberty, rising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the leading idea of democracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to think. But if he is not a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover of tyranny. His deeper and more serious condemnation is reserved for the tyrant, who is the ideal of wickedness and also of weakness, and who in his utter helplessness and suspiciousness is leading an almost impossible existence, without that remnant of good which, in Plato's opinion, was required to give power to evil (book i. p. 352). This ideal of wickedness living in helpless misery, is the reverse of that other portrait of perfect injustice ruling in happiness and splendour, which first of all Thrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had drawn, and is also the reverse of the king whose rule of life is the good of his subjects.

Each of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical gradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not extinguishing but harmonising the passions, and training them in virtue; in the timocracy and the timocratic man one virtue still remains, but has superseded all the rest—the constitution, whether of the State or of the individual, is based, first, upon courage, and secondly, upon the love of honour, which is hardly to be esteemed a virtue. In the second stage of decline the virtues have altogether disappeared, and the love of gain has succeeded

to them; in the third stage, or democracy, the various passions are allowed to have free play, and the virtues and vices are impartially cultivated. But this freedom, which leads to many curious extravagances of character, is in reality only a state of weakness and dissipation. At last, one monster passion takes possession of the whole nature of man—this is tyranny. In all of them excess—the excess first of wealth and then of freedom, is the element of decay.

The eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and fanciful allusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater extent than anywhere else in Plato. We may remark, first, the description of the two nations in one, which become more and more divided, as in the feudal ages, and perhaps in our own times, so also among the Greeks; the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula as equality among unequals; the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are characteristic of liberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust are of the tyrant. The proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a speculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law in modern times, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern legislation. Debt and land were the two great difficulties of the ancient lawgiver; and we may be said to have almost, if not quite, solved the one of these difficulties but hardly the other.

Still more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals: there is the family picture of the father and mother and the old servant of the timocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent meanness of the oligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of the democrat, in which the young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing right or wrong as he pleases, and who at last, like the prodigal, goes into a far country (note here the play of language by which the democratic man is himself represented under the image of a State having a citadel and receiving embassies); and there is the wild-beast nature, which breaks loose in his successor. The hit about the tyrant being a parricide; the representation of the tyrant's life as an obscene dream; the rhetorical surprise of the more miserable than the most miserable of men in book ix.; the requirement that the poets will have the good sense to see that if they are the friends of tyrants they ought to be excluded from the State; the continuous image of the drones who are of two kinds, swelling at last into the monster drone having wings (see *infra*, book ix.), are among Plato's happiest touches.

There remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the Republic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as great as the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though apparently known to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of obscurity (Ep. ad Att. vii. 13, 5). And some have imagined that there is no answer to the puzzle, and that Plato has been practising upon his readers. But such a deception as this is inconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the number (Pol. v. 12, 7), and would have been ridiculous to any reader of the Republic who was acquainted with Greek mathematics. As little reason is there for supposing that Plato intentionally used obscure expressions; the obscurity only arises from our want of familiarity with the subject. On the other hand, Plato himself indicates that he is not altogether serious, and in describing his number as a solemn jest of the Muses, he appears to imply some degree of satire on the symbolical use of number.

Our hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an accurate study of the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by the parallel passage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in Aristotle, who makes the important remark that the latter part of the passage (from *ὦν ἐπίτριτος πυθμῆν, κ.τ.λ.*) describes a solid figure¹. Some further clue may be gathered from the appearance of the Pythagorean triangle, which is denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in which, as in every right-angled triangle, the squares of the two lesser sides equal the square of the hypotenuse ($3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2$ or $9 + 16 = 25$).

Plato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (cp. Tim. 39 D); i. e. a number in which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the divine or perfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are complete; he also speaks of a human or imperfect number, having four terms and three intervals of numbers which are related to one another as roots to powers, and which he describes as assimilating and dissimilating, waxing and waning; in these he finds certain proportions, which give two 'harmonies,' the one square, the other oblong; but he does not say that the square number answers to the divine, or the oblong number to the human cycle.

¹ Pol. v. 12, 8:—'He says that the cause (of the change in the perfect state) is the instability of all things, and their changing in a certain period; and that this is dependent on certain progressions of number, when a root in the ratio of 3:4 joined with the number 5 gives two harmonies, meaning when the number of the diagram becomes solid.'

Nor is there any trace in the passage that this second or imperfect number either has reference to a period of time, or is the number of the population of the State. Plato is only thinking of some progression of number with which he chooses to connect the regulation of births. There would be less confusion if, instead of being termed the number of the world and of the State (of which nothing is said in Plato), the two numbers were called respectively the divine and human number of marriage or generation. For Plato does not suppose their influence to extend to anything but births. They preside over these in the same mysterious manner in which the stars preside over them, or in which, according to the Pythagoreans, opportunity, justice, marriage, are represented by some number or figure.

I need not repeat the translation and explanations of terms given in the text, in which I have supposed the number to be 8000. This interpretation derives a certain degree of plausibility,—first, from the circumstance that the numbers suggested in the first half of the passage coincide with the series of numbers which denote the interval between royal and tyrannical pleasure; secondly, the number 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens (Herod. vii. 34), and would be what Plato might have called ‘a number befitting the population of a city;’—the mysterious disappearance of the Spartan population may possibly have suggested to him the first cause of his decline of States; thirdly, the lesser or square ‘harmony’, of 400 might be a symbol of the guardians—the larger or oblong ‘harmony’, of the people, and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer to the three orders in the State or parts of the soul, the four virtues, the five forms of government. But in this explanation no clear connection is shown between the first and second half of the passage, nor are the words of Aristotle (*ὅταν γένηται στέρεος*) sufficiently explained. And the phrase *ἐπίτριτος πύθμην* seems to mean, not the number 3 with a third added (4), but the ratio of 4 : 3. For there would be no meaning in thus describing the number 4. And the connection with the Pythagorean triangle, the sides of which are represented by 3, 4, 5, would be lost.

More may be urged in defence of the number 216, which is adopted by Schleiermacher and ably supported by Dr. Donaldson (Proc. of the Philolog. Society, vol. i. p. 81 foll.). According to the latter, the *θείον γεννητόν* is the world (?); the *ἀνθρώπειον* either man or the State (?); *αὐξήσεις δυνάμεναι τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναι* multiplications of the square by its square root (?); similar numbers are those whose factors, or the sides

of the figures represented by them, are in the same ratio, e. g. 3 and 27; increasing numbers are those which are less than the sum of their parts, e. g. 12 and 18; *προσήγορα* is used of numbers which are expressible in the same terms of one another, e. g. 8, 12, 18, 27 ($\frac{2}{3}$), ῥητὰ when expressible at all in terms of one another; *ἐπίρριτος πυθμῶν* is the fundamental number $\frac{4}{3}$; *ἁρμονίαν ἴσιν κ.τ.λ.* a square number multiplied by 100,—this is the first harmony. The second harmony is a cube of the same number, and is also described as 100 (*ἰσομήκη μὲν τῆ*), multiplied by the sum of the three following terms:—(1) the square of the rational diameter of 5, less 1, = 48; (2) two incommensurable diameters, i. e. the two first irrationals, 2 and 3; (3) the cube of 3, = 27, and divided by the cube of 3. The first series of numbers is 8 : 12 :: 18 : 27, or the cubes of 2 and 3 with their mean proportionals. The first harmony is $(\frac{4}{3} \times 5)^2 = 100 \times \frac{2^2}{3^2} = \frac{400}{9}$. The second harmony is

$$(48 + 5 + 27) \times 10^2 \times \frac{1}{3^3} = 1000 \times \frac{2^3}{3^3} = \frac{8000}{27}.$$

The period of the world is defined by the first perfect number 6, that of the State by the cube of 6 = 216 = $5^3 + 4^3 + 3^3$; this, taking the roots of the cubes (5, 4, 3), represents the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, and has various other numerical and harmonic properties, e. g. 216 = $2^3 \times 3^3$ (cp. the first series); again, $\frac{4}{3} \times 5 = \frac{2}{3} \times 10$ (the Pythagorean *tetractys*), and $\frac{4}{3} \times \frac{3}{2} = 2$. The number 216 is also the period of Pythagorean metempsychosis.

Other interpreters have suggested the number 5040, which is the number of citizens in the Laws; or 17,500, which is the addition of the square of 100 (10,000) + 4800 + 2700, making a series 10,000 : 7500 : 4800 : 2700, of which the first is supposed to be the perfect or square number, and the three last stand to one another in the ratios of $5^2 : 4^2 : 3^2$. The number has also been supposed to be 50, apparently because the number 50 is equivalent to the squares of the three sides of the sacred triangle, and this is the opinion of Philo; or 10, which multiplied to the fourth power gives 10,000, and is supposed to be the perfect number, as 5 is the imperfect number: or again, the number is said to be made up of the two progressions of the Pythagorean tetractys 1 : 2 : 4 : 8 and 1 : 3 : 9 : 27. All these explanations show curious coincidences of number, which may put us on our guard against accepting other coincidences, but none of them is self-proving. A later explanation—that of Weber—deserves more notice.

He argues rightly for the substantial genuineness of the text; and supposes that the first division of the passage contains a general

description of the proportions which are to be found in the second half ; and explains 'assimilating and dissimilating' and 'waxing and waning' numbers respectively as numbers which form squares or which form oblongs. The increments of number which give these proportions are said to 'equal' and be 'equalled in power' (*δυναμέναι καὶ δυναστευόμεναι*), because they are obtained by multiplying powers of 3, 4, 5—the numbers of the Pythagorean triangle, of which the hypotenuse is said to 'equal in power' the two lesser sides. The numbers themselves are 6400, 4800, 3600, and 2700, which are then gained afresh by multiplying the numbers 4×5 and 3×5 (*ἐπίτριτος πυθμῆν πεμπάδι συζυγείς*) with the sides of the Pythagorean triangle :—

| First Series. | Second Series. |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| i. e. $3 \times 4 \times 5 = 60$ | $3 \times 3 \times 5 = 45$ |
| $4 \times 4 \times 5 = 80$ | $4 \times 3 \times 5 = 60$ |
| $5 \times 4 \times 5 = 100.$ | $5 \times 3 \times 5 = 75.$ |

The former series squared, and multiplied with the second, gives the following results :—

| | |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| $60^2 = 3,600$ | $60 \times 45 = 2,700$ |
| $80^2 = 6,400$ | $80 \times 60 = 4,800$ |
| $100^2 = 10,000.$ | $100 \times 75 = 7,500.$ |

Thus two convenient series of numbers are obtained which agree with the description already given in the first part of the passage, and with the explanation of assimilating and dissimilating numbers as square and oblong. But there is no proof that this was the manner in which Plato intended the roots 3 : 5 and 4 : 5 to be multiplied. Nor is it likely that he would have used the term *τρίς ἀξήθεις* to mean, not the raising of them to the third power, but the multiplication of them by 3, 4, 5. Nor is there any reason to suppose with Weber, that the words, 'this whole number is geometrical' refer only to the second of the two harmonies, or that the word *τέλειος* would be applied in such a passage as this (in which periods of revolution are spoken of) to any but a cyclical number ; or that the first harmony answers to the perfect number.

And here we take leave of the difficulty, without attempting a further solution. The meaning of many words in the passage is so uncertain that there is little probability of our finding the answer to the riddle. Among uncertain expressions may be reckoned, *δυναμέναι, δυναστευόμεναι, ὁμοιούντων, ἀνομοιούντων, αὐξόντων, φθινόντων, ἐπίτριτος πυθμῆν πεμπάδι συζυγείς* ; and even the words *ἁρμονία, τέλειος, αὐξήσεις, ἐν ᾧ πρῶτω, γεωμετρικός,*

are variously explained; again, the clause *δεομένων . . . δευῖν* may be either taken as an explanation of *ἀρρήτων* or as a further subtraction of 100, so that the entire number becomes either 4900 or 4800. And there is the further uncertainty of the relation of the first to the second half of the passage, and of the two harmonies to one another.

The discovery of the riddle would be useless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The point of interest is that Plato should have used such a symbol, and that so much of the Pythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His general meaning is that divine creation is perfect, and represented or presided over by a perfect or cyclical number; human generation is imperfect, and represented or presided over by an imperfect number or series of numbers. The number 5040, which is the number of the State in the *Laws*, is expressly based by him on utilitarian grounds, namely, the convenience of the number for division; but in this passage he is thinking of Pythagorean symbols and not of utility. The contrast of the perfect and imperfect number may have been easily suggested by the corrections of the cycle, which were made first by Meton and secondly by Callippus; (the latter is said to have been a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance or of exactness to be attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant in book ix. ($729 = 365 \times 2$), and the slight correction of the error in the number $5040 \div 12$ (*Laws*, 771 C) may furnish a criterion. There is nothing surprising in the circumstance that those who were seeking for order in nature and had found order in number, should have imagined one to give law to the other. Plato believes in a power of number far beyond what he could see realized in the world around him; and may even be thought to have a prophetic anticipation of the discoveries of Quetelet and others that numbers depend upon numbers; e. g.—in population, the numbers of births and the respective numbers of children born of either sex on the respective ages of parents, i. e. on other numbers.

BOOK IX. Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to enquire, Whence he is, and how does he live—in happiness or in misery? There is, however, a previous question of the nature and number of the appetites, which I should like to consider first. Some of them are unlawful, and yet admit of being chastened and weakened in various degrees by the power of reason and law. ‘What appetites do you mean?’ I mean those which are awake when the reasoning powers

are asleep, which get up and walk about naked without any self-respect or shame ; and there is no conceivable folly or crime, however cruel or unnatural, of which, in imagination, they may not be guilty. ' True,' he said, ' very true.' But when a man's pulse beats temperately ; and he has supped on a feast of reason and come to a knowledge of himself before going to rest, and has satisfied his desires just enough to prevent their perturbing his reason, which remains clear and luminous, and when he is free from quarrel and heat,—the visions which he has on his bed are least irregular and abnormal. I want you to bear in mind, for I have something more to say about this, that even in good men there is such an irregular wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep.

To return :—You remember what was said of the democrat ; that he was the son of a miserly father, and that he encouraged the saving desires and repressed the ornamental and expensive ones ; presently he got into fine company, and began to entertain a dislike to his father's narrow ways ; and being a better man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a mean, and led a life, not of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular and successive indulgence. Now imagine a generation to have passed away. The youth has become a father, and has a son who is exposed to the same temptations, and has companions who lead him into every sort of iniquity, which they call liberty, and he has parents and friends who try to keep him right. The counsellors of evil find that their only chance of retaining him is to implant in his soul a monster drone, or love ; while other desires buzz around him and mystify him with sweet sounds and scents, this monster love takes possession of him and carries him off, and puts an end to every true or modest thought or wish that remains in him. Love has of old been called a tyranny, and drunkenness is a tyranny, and a madman has in him the spirit of a tyrant, and is fancying that he can rule over gods and men. And the tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit, is just a drinking, lusting, furious sort of animal.

And how does such an one live ? ' That is for you to tell me, not for me to tell you.' Well then, I fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will dwell in the house, lord and master of all that is therein. Many desires require much money, and so he spends all that he has and borrows more ; and when he has nothing the young ravens are still in the nest in which they were hatched, crying for food. Love, whose attendants they are, sets them on ; and they must be gratified by

force or fraud, or if not, they become painful and troublesome; and as the new pleasures take the place of the old ones, so the son will be for taking away the inheritance of his parents; if they show signs of refusing, he will defraud and deceive them; and if they openly resist, do not you think that he will possibly be guilty of some tyrannical action? 'I can only say, that I should not much like to be in their place.' But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for some new-fangled love of a harlot or for the waxen beauty of a youth, he will give up his old father and mother, best and dearest of friends, or even enslave them to the fancies of the hour. Truly a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother. He takes their property first; and when that comes to an end, and he finds his lusts beginning to swarm in him, he turns burglar or pick-pocket, or robs a temple. Love, attended by them, gets the better of the thoughts of his youth, and he becomes always in life and reality the monster that he was sometimes in sleep. Love is his tyrant, under the rule of whom he is strong in all violence and lawlessness; ready for any deed of daring that will supply the wants of his rabble-rout, whether coming from without or generated within. In a well-ordered State there are only a few such, and these in time of war go out and become the mercenaries of a tyrant. But in time of peace they stay at home and do mischief; they are the thieves, burglars, footpads, cutpurses, man-stealers of the community; and if they are able to speak, they come out in another line as false-witnesses and informers. 'Yes,' said he, 'and a small catalogue of crimes truly, even if the perpetrators of them are not numerous.' Yes, I said; but small and great are relative terms, and the greatest crimes which are done by them do not approach the tyrant; whom this class waxing numerous and strong create out of their number. If the people yield, well and good; but, if they resist, then the old story is repeated—as he beat his father and mother, so now he beats his old fatherland and motherland, and places his mercenaries over them. Such men in their early days live with flatterers, and they themselves flatter others, and are all things to all men, in order to gain their ends; but they soon discard them, when they have no need of them; they are always either masters or servants, never the friends of anybody; no tyrant ever tasted the joys of friendship. And they are utterly treacherous and unjust, if the nature of justice be at all understood by us. They are the waking reality of the dream which we described; and he who is the most of a tyrant by nature, and leads the life of a tyrant for

the longest time, will be the worst of them, and being the worst of them, will also be the most miserable.

Like man, like State,—the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which is the extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the best and the other the worst. We need not stop to enquire which is which, but may at once proceed to the next question, Which is the happier? And great and terrible as is the outward appearance of the tyrant sitting upon a throne in the midst of his satellites, let us not be afraid to go in and ask; and the answer is, that the monarchical is the happiest, and the tyrannical the most miserable, of States. And may we not ask the same question about the men themselves, requesting some one to look into them who is able to penetrate the inner nature of man, and will not be struck all of a heap like a child by the vain pomp of tyranny. I will suppose that he is one who has lived with him, and has seen him in his undress when he is no longer a hero, and perhaps in the hour of trouble and danger. Let him who has seen all this speak to us of his happiness and misery.

Assuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek, let us begin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all, whether the State is likely to be free or enslaved—Will there not be a little freedom and a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the bad, and the slavery of the good; and this is true of the man as well as of the State; for his soul is full of meanness and slavery, and the better part is that which is enslaved, and the madman and beast have power over him. He cannot do what he would, and his mind is full of confusion; taking the whole man, he is the reverse of a freeman. And the State will be poor and not rich, and the man's soul will be poor. And the State will be full of groaning and lamentation and sorrow, and will be the most miserable of States, and the man will be full of sorrows, and the most miserable of men. No, not the most miserable, for there is yet a more miserable. 'Who is that?' The tyrannical man who has the misfortune also to become a public tyrant. 'There I suspect that you are right.' Say rather, I am sure, for the word 'suspect' is out of place in such an enquiry as this of ours. He is like a wealthy owner of slaves, only he has more of them than any private individual; and, as you know, the owners are not generally in any fear of their slaves. But why? Because the whole city is in a league which protects the individual. Suppose however that one of these owners and his household

is carried off by a god into a wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him (he is the master say of about fifty slaves);—will he not be in an agony of terror?—will he not be compelled to flatter his slaves and to promise them many things much against his will? And suppose the same god who carried him off were to surround him with neighbours who declare that no man has any right to have slaves, and that the owners of them should be punished with death. ‘Still worse and worse! He will be in the midst of his enemies.’ And is not our tyrant such an imprisoned, captive soul, who is made up of fears and loves, who has a swarm of passions which he is incapable of indulging; living indoors always like a woman, and being jealous of those who have the freedom of going about and seeing the world?

Having so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more miserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of himself, like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete,—he is the meanest of slaves and most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and having all his desires craving about him; always in fear and distraction, like the State of which he is the representative. His jealous, hateful, faithless temper grows worse with command; he is more and more faithless, envious, unrighteous, the most wretched of men, and the cause of wretchedness to himself and to others. And so let us have a final trial and proclamation; need we hire the herald, or shall I proclaim the result? The son of Ariston (the best) is of opinion that the best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust man is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. ‘Let the proclamation be made.’ And I add further—‘seen or unseen by gods or men.’

This is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of pleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul—reason, passion, desire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as sensual appetite, while passion may be said to include ambition, party-feeling, love of reputation. Reason, on the other hand, is solely directed to the attainment of truth, and may be truly described as a lover of knowledge and wisdom, careless of money and reputation. In accordance with the difference of men’s natures, one of these three principles is in the ascendant—love of wisdom, love of honour, love of gain, having their several pleasures corresponding to them. Interrogate now the three natures, and each one will be found praising his own pleasures

and depreciating those of others. The money-maker will contrast the vanity of knowledge with the solid advantages of gold and silver. The ambitious man will think knowledge which is without honour all smoke and nonsense; whereas the philosopher will regard only the fruition of truth, which is not far from the heaven of pleasure, and will deem all other pleasures to be necessary rather than good. Now, how shall we decide between them? 'I cannot say.' Well, is there any better criterion than experience and knowledge? And which of the three has the truest knowledge and the widest experience? The experience of youth makes the philosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the avaricious and the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and wisdom. Honour he has equally with them; for the wise man is honoured as well as the great and rich; they are 'judged of him,' but he is 'not judged of them,' for they never attain to the knowledge of true being. And his instrument is reason, whereas their measure is wealth and honour; and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest. And so we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the rational part of the soul, and a life passed in such pleasure is the pleasantest. He who has a right to judge judges thus. And next comes the life of ambition, and, in the third place, that of money.

Twice has the just man overthrown the unjust—once more, as in an Olympian contest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let him try a fall. A wise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise are true and pure; all others are a shadow only. Let us examine this: Is not pleasure opposed to pain, and is there not a mean state which is neither? When a man is sick, nothing is more pleasant to him than health. But this he never found out while he was well. In pain he desires only to cease from pain; his wishes reach no further. When he is in an ecstasy of pleasure, on the other hand, rest is painful to him. Thus rest or cessation is both pleasure and pain. But can that which is neither become both? Again, pleasure and pain are motions, and the absence of them is rest; but if so, how can the absence of either of them be the other? Thus we are led to infer that the contradiction is an appearance only, and witchery of the senses. And these are not the only pleasures, for there are others which have no preceding pains. Pure pleasure then is not the absence of pain, nor pure pain the absence of pleasure; although most of the pleasures which reach the mind through the body are of this character, and have not only their reactions when

they depart, but their anticipations before they come. Shall I find a simile which will help to describe them? There is in nature an upper, lower, and middle region, and he who passes from the lower to the middle imagines that he is going up and is already in the upper world; and if he were taken back again would think, and truly think, that he was descending. All this arises out of his ignorance of the true upper, middle, and lower regions. And a like confusion happens with pleasure and pain, and with many other things. The man who compares grey with black, calls grey white; and the man who compares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of pain pleasure. Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance and folly of the soul; and food is the satisfaction of the one, and knowledge of the other. Now which is the purer satisfaction—that of eating and drinking, or that of knowledge? Consider the matter thus: The satisfaction of that which has more existence is truer than of that which has less. And the invariable and immortal has a more real existence than the variable and mortal, and has a corresponding measure of knowledge and truth. And the soul has more existence and truth and knowledge than the body, and is therefore more really satisfied and has a more natural pleasure. Those who feast only on earthly food, are always going at random up to the middle and down again; but they never pass into the true upper world, or have a taste of true pleasure. Like animals, their heads are always turned towards the ground, and their bodies are leaning on the dining-table; they butt at one another with iron horns and hoofs, and kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust, for they are not filled with true being, and their vessel is leaky. (Cp. Gorgias, 243 A, foll.) Their pleasures are mixed with pain, and are mere shadows of pleasure, coloured and intensified by contrast, and therefore intensely desired; and men go fighting about them, as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy, in ignorance of the truth.

The same may be said of the passionate element, whether the ruling motive be ambitious envy, party violence, or angry discontent. The desires of the ambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior satisfaction. Only when under the guidance of reason do either of the other principles do their own business or attain the pleasure which is natural to them. When not attaining, they compel the other parts of the soul to pursue a shadow of pleasure which is not theirs. And the more distant they are from philosophy and reason, the more distant they will

be from law and order, and the more illusive will be their pleasures. The desires of love and tyranny are the farthest from law, and those of the king are nearest to it. There is one genuine pleasure, and two spurious ones: the tyrant goes beyond even the latter; he has run away altogether from law and reason. Nor can the measure of his inferiority be told, except in a figure. The tyrant is the third removed from the oligarch, and has therefore not a shadow of his pleasure, but the shadow of a shadow only. The oligarch, again, is thrice removed from the king, and thus we get the formula 3×3 , which is the number of a surface, representing the shadow which is the tyrant's pleasure, and if you like to cube this number of the beast you will find that the measure of the difference amounts to 729; the king is 729 times more happy than the tyrant. And this extraordinary number is *nearly* equal to the number of days and nights in a year ($365 \times 2 = 730$); and is therefore concerned with human life. This is the measure of the interval between a good and bad man in happiness only,—what must be the difference between them in comeliness of life, in beauty and virtue?

Perhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our discussion that the unjust man was profited if he had the reputation of justice? Now that we have determined the nature of justice and injustice, let us make an ideal image of the soul like the fabulous monsters of mythology, which will personify his words. First of all, fashion a multitudinous many-headed beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of animals, tame and wild, and able to produce and change them at pleasure. 'That would be no easy task for a statuary; but as imagination can create anything, I will do as you say.' Suppose now another form of a lion, and another of a man; the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second, and join them together and cover them outside with a human skin, in which you completely conceal all that is within. When this has been done, let us tell the supporter of injustice that he is feeding up the two beasts and starving the man, whom they torment and hate. The maintainer of justice, on the other hand, is aiming at strengthening the man; he is nourishing the gentle principle within him, and making an alliance with the lion heart, in order that he may be able to keep down the many-headed hydra, and bring all into unity with each other and with themselves. Thus in every point of view, whether in relation to pleasure, honour, or advantage, the just man is right, and the unjust wrong.

Come then, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. 'Sweet sir,' we will say to him, 'is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the God in man; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast?' He must assent. But if so, who would receive gold on condition that he was to degrade the noblest part of himself under the worst?—who would sell his son or daughter into the hands of brutal and evil men, for any amount of money? And will he sell his own fairer and diviner part without any compunction to the most godless and foul? Would he not be a traitor worse than Eriphyle, who sold her husband's life for a necklace? And intemperance is the letting loose of the multiform monster, and pride and sullenness are the growth and increase of the lion and serpent element, as on the other hand, luxury and effeminacy are caused by a too great relaxation of spirit. Flattery and meanness again arise when the spirited element is subjected to avarice, and the lion is habituated to become a monkey. The real disgrace of handicraft arts is, that those who are engaged in them have no control over themselves; they have to flatter, instead of mastering their desires; therefore we say that they should be placed under the control of the better principle in another because they have none of their own; not, as Thrasymachus imagined, to the injury of the subjects, but for their good. And our intention in educating the young, is to give them self-control; the law desires to nurse up in them a higher principle, and when they have acquired this, they may go their ways.

'What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world' and become more and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if the concealment of evil prevents the cure? Whereas if he had been punished, the brutal part of him would have been silenced, and the gentler element liberated; and he would have begun to add to temperance justice, and to justice wisdom, which is a union fairer far than the combination of beauty and health and strength in the body in the same degree that the soul is fairer than the body. He who has understanding will honour knowledge above all, and to this direct his energies; in the next place he will keep under his body, not only for the sake of health and strength, but for the sake of creating in himself the most perfect harmony of body and soul. In the acquisition of riches, too, he will aim at order and harmony; he will not be led by the admiration of the vulgar to heap up wealth without measure, but he will fear that the increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of his own soul. For the same

reason he will only accept such honours as will make him a better man; any others he will decline. 'Then,' said he, 'he will not be a politician if this be his chief care.' By the dog of Egypt, he will, I said, in his own city, but probably not in his native country, unless by some divine accident. 'I understand you,' he said, 'to mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city, which has no place upon earth.' But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern, of such a city, and he who has eyes to see it may order his life after that image. Whether such a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act according to that pattern and no other.

. . . . The most remarkable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:—(1) the account of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the king from the tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.

1. Plato's account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in this respect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are attributed to them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed to all pleasure, but rather desires that the several parts of the soul shall have their natural satisfaction; he even agrees with the Epicureans in describing pleasure as something more than the absence of pain. This is proved by the circumstance that there are pleasures which have no antecedent pains (as he also remarks in the *Philebus*), such as the pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope and anticipation. In the previous book (pp. 558, 559) he had made the distinction between necessary and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he now observes that there are a further class of 'wild beast' pleasures, corresponding to Aristotle's *θηρίότης*. He dwells upon the relative and unreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which arises out of the contrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority of the pleasures of reason, which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures of sense and emotion. The pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by the fact that reason is able to form a judgment of the lower pleasures, while the two lower parts of the soul are incapable of judging the pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of pleasure, as in many other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is 'sawn up into quantities' by Aristotle; the analysis which was originally made by him became in the next generation the foundation of technical distinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we may observe the illusion under which the ancients fell of regarding the transience of pleasure as a proof of its unreality, and of confounding

the permanence of the intellectual pleasures with the unchangeableness of the knowledge from which they are derived. Neither do we like to admit that the pleasures of knowledge, though more elevating, are not more lasting than other pleasures, and are almost equally dependent on the accidents of our bodily state. (Cp. *Introd. to Philebus.*)

2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant, and royal from tyrannical pleasures is 729, the cube of 9, which Plato characteristically designates as a number concerned with human life, because *nearly* equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year. He is desirous of proclaiming that the interval between them is immeasurable, and invents a formula to give expression to his idea. Those who spoke of justice as a cube, of virtue as an art of measuring (*Prot.* 357 A), saw no inappropriateness in conceiving the soul under the figure of a line, or the pleasure of the tyrant as separated from the pleasure of the king by the numerical interval of 729. And in modern times we sometimes use metaphorically what Plato employed as a philosophical formula. 'It is not easy to estimate the loss of the tyrant, except perhaps in this way,' says Plato. So we might say, that although the life of a good man is not to be compared to that of a bad man, yet you may measure the difference between them by valuing one minute of the one at an hour of the other ('one day in thy courts is better than a thousand'), or you might say that 'there is an infinite difference.' But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase, 'they are a thousand miles asunder.' And accordingly Plato finds the natural vehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this arithmetical formula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both here and in the number of generation seems to find an additional proof of the truth of his speculation in forming the number into a geometrical figure. In speaking of the number 729 as proper to human life, he probably intended to intimate that one year of the tyrannical = 12 hours of the royal life.

The simple observation that the comparison of two solids is effected by the comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the mathematical groundwork of this fanciful expression. There is some difficulty in explaining the steps by which the number 729 is obtained; the oligarch is removed in the third degree from the royal and aristocratical, and the tyrant in the third degree from the oligarchical, but we have to arrange the terms as the sides of a square and to count the oligarch twice over,

thus reckoning them not as = 5 but as = 9. The square of 9 is passed lightly over as only a step towards the cube.

3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more convinced of the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of the 9th Book the pattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city of philosophers on earth. The vision which has received form and substance at his hands, is now discovered to be at a distance. And yet this distant kingdom is also the rule of man's life. (Bk. vii. 540 E.) ('Say not lo! here, or lo! there, for the kingdom of God is within you.') Thus a note is struck which prepares for the revelation of a future life in the following Book. But the future life is present still; the ideal of politics is to be realized in the individual.

BOOK X. Many things pleased me in the order of our State, but there was nothing which I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The division of the soul throws a new light on our exclusion of imitation. I do not mind saying to you, what I would rather not have you repeat to the poets and their votaries, that all poetry is an outrage on the understanding of the hearers, if they have not that balm of knowledge which heals error. I have loved Homer ever since I was a boy, and he appears to me to be the great author and master of tragic poetry. But much as I love the man, I love truth more, and therefore I must speak out: and first of all, let me ask you to explain what is imitation, for really I do not understand? 'How likely then that I shall understand!' That may very well be, for the duller often sees better than the keener eye. 'That is true, but in your presence I can hardly venture to say what I think.' Then suppose that we begin in our old fashion, with the doctrine of universals;—let us assume the existence of beds and tables. There is one idea of a bed, or of a table, which the maker of each had in his mind when making them; he did not make the ideas of beds and tables, but he made beds and tables according to the ideas. And is there not a maker of the works of all workmen? 'A rare artist that!' Wait a little, and you may have some reason for your exclamation: He of whom I speak makes not only vessels but plants and animals, himself, and all other things; the earth and heaven, and things under the earth; he makes the Gods also. 'He must be a wizard, indeed!' But do you not see that there is a sense in which you could do the same? You have only to take a mirror, and catch the

reflection of the sun, and the earth, and plants and animals, and yourself in it,—there now you have made them. ‘Yes, in appearance, but not in reality.’ Exactly so; and the painter is such a creator as you are with the mirror, and he is even more unreal than the carpenter, although neither the carpenter nor any other artist can be supposed to make the absolute bed. ‘Not if philosophers may be believed.’ Nor is there any reason for wondering that his bed has but an imperfect relation to the truth. Reflect:—Here are three beds; one in nature, which is made by God; another, which is made by the carpenter; and the third, by the painter; and there are three artists, who preside over them,—God, the maker of the bed, the painter. God only made one, nor could he have made more than one; for if there had been two, there would always have been a third—more absolute and abstract than either, under which they would have been included. We may therefore conceive God to be the natural maker of the bed, and in a lower sense the carpenter is also the maker; but the painter may be more properly described as the imitator of what the other two make; he has to do with a creation which is thrice removed from reality. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, like every other imitator, is thrice removed from the king and from the truth. The painter imitates not the original bed, but the bed made by the carpenter. And this, without being really different, appears to be different, and has many points of view, of which only one is caught by the painter, who represents everything because he represents a piece of everything, and that piece an image. And he can paint any artist, although he knows nothing of their arts; and this with sufficient skill to deceive children or simple people. Let us now imagine some one to come to us and tell us of his having met a man who knows all that everybody knows, and better than anybody. Should we not infer him to be a simpleton who has no discernment of truth and falsehood, and has met with a wizard or enchanter, whom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we hear persons saying that Homer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the virtues, must we not infer that the persons who say these things are under a similar delusion? they do not see that the poets are imitators, and that their creations are only imitations. ‘Very true.’ But if a person could create as well as imitate, he would rather leave some permanent work and not an imitation only; he would rather be the receiver than the giver of praise. ‘Yes, for then he would have more honour and advantage.’

Let us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him, I am not going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your poems incidentally refer, but about their main subjects,—war, military tactics, politics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the truth—not an imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good you have ever done to mankind? Is there any city which professes to have received laws from you, as Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta from Lycurgus, Athens from Solon? Or was any war ever carried on by your counsels? or is any notion or invention attributed to you, as there is to Thales and Anacharsis? Or is there any Homeric way of life, such as Pythagoras taught, in which you instructed men, and which is called after you? ‘Nothing of the kind is recorded, and indeed that companion of Homer who had the misfortune to be called Flesh-child [Creophylus], was more unfortunate in his breeding than he was in his name, if, as tradition says, Homer in his lifetime was allowed by him and his other friends to starve.’ Yes, that is the tradition; but could this ever have happened if Homer had really been the educator of Hellas? Would he not have had many attached followers? If Protagoras and Prodicus persuaded their contemporaries that no one could manage house or State without them, (at which their admirers were so greatly delighted that they were ready to carry them about on their heads,)—is it at all likely that Homer and Hesiod would have been allowed to go about as beggars, I mean if they had really been able to do the world any good,—would not mankind have sought after them more than after gold and silver, and have followed them about in order to get education? But they did not; and therefore we may infer that Homer and all the poets are only imitators, who do but imitate the appearances of things. For as a painter by a knowledge of figure and colour can paint a cobbler without any practice in cobbling, so the poet can put the colours of language on any art, and give harmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you know how mere narration, when deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a face which has lost the beauty of youth and never had any other. Once more, the imitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The painter paints, and the worker in metal or leather makes a bridle and reins, but neither understands the use of them—the knowledge of this is confined to the horseman; and so of other things. Thus we have three arts: one of use, another of invention, a third of imitation;

and the user furnishes the rule to the two others. The flute-player will know the good and bad flute, and the maker will put faith in him; but the imitator will neither know nor have faith—neither science nor true opinion can be ascribed to him. Imitation, then, is devoid of knowledge, being only a kind of play or sport,—and the tragic and epic poets are imitators in the highest degree.

And now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to imitation? Allow me to explain my meaning thus:—Objects are differently seen when in the water and when out of the water, when near and when at a distance; and the painter or juggler makes use of this variation to impose upon us. And the art of measuring and weighing and calculating comes in to assist our bewildered minds, and save them from the power of appearance; for, as we were saying, two contrary opinions of the same about the same and at the same time, cannot both of them be true. But which of them is true is determined by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the better faculty in the soul, as the arts of imitation are to the worse. And the same holds of the ear as well as of the eye, of poetry as well as painting. There is a further aspect of poetical imitation, which I invite you to consider. The imitation is of actions voluntary or involuntary, in which there is an expectation of a good or bad result, and present experience of pleasure and pain. But is a man in harmony with himself when he is the subject of these conflicting influences? Is there not rather a contradiction in him? Let me further ask, whether he is more likely to control sorrow when he is alone or when he is in company with others? ‘The latter.’ Feeling would lead him to indulge his sorrow, but reason and law control him and bid him be patient, since he cannot know whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing is of any great consequence, and sorrow is certainly a very great impediment to the good counsel which he so greatly needs. For when we stumble, we should not, like children, set up a cry, holding the part affected in our hands; but, when the dice have once fallen, we should take the measures which reason prescribes, not making a lament, but finding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to follow reason, while the irrational principle is full of sorrow and distraction at the recollection of our troubles. Unfortunately, however, this latter furnishes the chief materials of the imitative arts. Whereas reason is ever in repose and cannot easily be displayed, especially to a mixed multitude who have no experience of her. Thus the poet is like the painter in two ways:

first he paints an inferior degree of truth, and secondly, he is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. He indulges the feelings, while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse to allow him to have authority over the mind of man; for he has no measure of greater and less, and is a maker of images and very far gone from truth.

But we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment, the power which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we hear Homer, or some tragedian, reciting at length the sorrows of heroes lamenting and beating their breasts, you know that we sympathize with them and praise the poet; and yet in our own sorrows such an exhibition of feeling is regarded as effeminate and unmanly (cp. *Ion*, 535 E). Now, ought a man to feel pleasure in seeing another do what he hates and abominates in himself? Remember that he gives way to a sentiment which in his own case he would control; he is off his guard because the sorrow is another's; and he thinks that he may indulge his feelings without disgrace, and will be the gainer by the pleasure. But a further consequence quickly follows. For he who begins by weeping at the sorrows of others, will end by weeping at his own. The same is true of comedy,—you may often laugh at buffoonery which you would be ashamed to utter, and the love of coarse merriment on the stage will at last turn you into a buffoon at home. Poetry feeds and waters the passions and desires, instead of withering and starving them; she lets them rule instead of ruling them. And therefore, when we hear the encomiasts of Homer affirming that he is the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for the administration of human things, we may allow that they have good intentions as far as their light extends, and agree with them in thinking Homer a great poet and tragedian. But we shall continue to maintain our prohibition of all poetry which goes beyond hymns to the Gods and praises of famous men. Not pleasure and pain, but law and reason shall rule in our State.

These are our reasons for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge us with discourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will say to her that there is an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, and many are the civilities which pass between them, such as the saying of 'the she-dog, yelping against her mistress,' and 'the philosophers who are ready to circumvent Zeus,' and the 'philosophers who are paupers;' and there are numberless other signs of ancient enmity between them. Nevertheless we are not enemies to her, or to the

sister arts of imitation, and will gladly allow her to return upon the condition that she will speak or sing in her own defence. For we acknowledge that we are charmed by her; (you would acknowledge, would you not, that you are a lover of Homer?) but if she cannot show that she is useful as well as delightful, we must do violence to ourselves, and like rational lovers renounce our loves, though endeared to us by early associations. Having come to years of discretion, we know that poetry is not truth, and that a man should be careful how he introduces her to that state or constitution which he himself is; for there is a mighty issue at stake—mightier than appears—the good or evil of the human soul. And it is not worth while to forsake justice and virtue for the attractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of honour or wealth. ‘I agree with you.’

And yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described. ‘And can we conceive still greater honours?’ Why, yes; I said, in the brief span of life there can be no greatness worth mentioning. Shall an immortal being care about anything short of eternity? ‘I should think not; but what do you mean?’ Do you not know that the soul is immortal? ‘Good heavens,’ he said, looking hard at me, ‘you do not mean to say that you can prove that.’ Quite easily, I said. ‘I should like to hear this argument, of which you make so light.’

You would admit that there is an element of good and evil, which is the salvation and corruption of all things. And all things have their own corrupting element; and if this does not destroy them nothing else will. And the soul has her own corrupting principles, which are injustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of these destroy the soul in the same sense that disease destroys the body. The soul may be full of all iniquities, but is not by reason of them all brought any nearer to death. For nothing ever perished by external affection of evil, which was not destroyed from within. The body, which is one thing, cannot be destroyed by food, which is another, unless infected from within. Neither can the soul, which is one thing, be corrupted by the body, which is another, unless she herself is corrupted. And as no bodily evil can infect the soul, neither can any bodily evil destroy the soul. Nothing of the nature of fever or any other disease—not even the dissection of the body into the minutest fragments—can kill the soul, unless these things can be shown to render the soul unholy and unjust. But no one will ever prove that the souls of men will become

more unjust because of death. And if a person has the audacity to deny this, the answer is—then why do criminals require the hand of the executioner, and not die of themselves? ‘Truly,’ he said, ‘injustice would not be very terrible if it brought a cessation of evil; but I should be inclined to think that the injustice which may destroy others may greatly quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.’ There you are right. If the natural inherent evil of the soul be unable to destroy the soul, hardly will anything else destroy her. But the soul which cannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must endure for ever, and lasting for ever, must be immortal. Now if this be true, souls will always exist in the same number. They cannot diminish, because they cannot be destroyed; nor yet increase, for the increase of the immortal must come from something mortal, and so all would end in immortality. Neither is the soul variable and diverse; for that which is immortal must be of the fairest and simplest composition. If we would conceive her truly, she must be viewed pure as at birth by the light of reason; then we shall behold justice and injustice far more clearly than now; in her present condition we see her only like the sea-god Glaucus, knocked about and crushed by the waves, overgrown with sea-weed and shells, and anything but what she by nature is. Her true image is to be seen in philosophy, when she is holding converse with the divine and immortal and eternal;—thereby we may conceive what she would be if she were wholly devoted to such pursuits;—now she is bruised and maimed in the sea, which is the world, and has been crushed against the rocks and covered with earth and stones, which adhere to her from the entertainments of earth. Then you might see her true nature and know whether she is simple or not,—her state and form in this present world have been sufficiently described.

Thus far I have said nothing of the rewards and honours which Homer and Hesiod attribute to her. Justice in herself has been shown to be best for the soul in herself, though a man may put on a Gyges’ ring and have a helmet of Hades too. And now you shall repay me what you borrowed in the argument; and I will enumerate the rewards of justice in life and after death. I granted, for the sake of argument, as you will remember, that evil might perhaps escape the knowledge of Gods and men, although this was really impossible. And now that I have shown that justice has reality, you must grant me also that she has the palm of appearance. In the first place, the just man is known

to the Gods, and he is therefore the friend of the Gods, and he will receive at their hands every good, always excepting such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. All things therefore may be supposed to end in good to him, either in life or after death, even what appears to be evil; for the Gods have a care of him who desires to be in their likeness. And what shall we say of men? Is not honesty the best policy? The clever rogue makes a great start at first, but he looks foolish when he appears at the goal with his ears trailing on his shoulders and without a crown; whereas the true runner perseveres to the end, and receives the prize. And you must allow me to repeat all the blessings which you attributed to the fortunate unjust,—they are rulers in the city, can marry and give their children in marriage to whom they like; and the evils which you attributed to the unfortunate just, do really fall in the end on the unjust, although, as you implied, their sufferings may be more genteelly veiled in silence.

But all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when compared with those which await good men after death. 'I should like to hear about them.' Come, then, and I will tell you a tale not taken from the 'Pilgrim's Progress,' and yet a story of a valiant man, Er, the son of Armenius, who was supposed to have died in battle, and when he had been put on the funeral pyre and had lain there twelve days, he came to life again, and told what he had seen in the world below. He said that when his soul left the body, he went with a great company to a wonderful place, in which there were two chasms near together in the earth beneath, and two chasms corresponding to them in the heaven above. And there were judges sitting in the intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand, having the seal of their judgment set upon them before; and the unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to descend in like manner by the way on the left hand. Him they told to look and listen, as he was to be their messenger and to carry to men the tidings of the world below. And he looked and saw the souls when they had been judged departing at either chasm; some who came from earth, were dusty and worn with travel; others, who came from heaven, were clean and bright. They seemed to have been a long way, and were glad to meet and rest in the meadow; and there they discoursed with one another of the things which they had seen in the other world. Those who came from the earth wept at the remembrance of their sorrows, while the spirits from

heaven spoke of glorious sights and heavenly bliss. He said that for every evil deed they were punished tenfold, and the journey was of a thousand years' duration, because the life of man was reckoned as a hundred years—all the cruelties and treacheries and impieties which they had done they also suffered—and the rewards of virtue were in the same proportion. He added something hardly worth repeating about infants dying almost as soon as they were born. Of parricides and other murderers he had tortures still more terrible to narrate. He was present when one of the spirits asked,—Where is Ardiaeus the great? (Now this Ardiaeus was a horrible wicked tyrant, who had murdered his old father, and his elder brother, a thousand years before.) The answer was, 'He comes not hither, and will never come.' And I myself, he said, actually saw this sight of terror. For at the entrance of the chasm, as we were about to reascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other sinners—most but not all of whom had been tyrants—and just as they fancied that they were returning to life, the chasm gave a roar, and then fiery wild-looking men who knew the meaning of the sound, seized him and some others, and bound them hand and foot and threw them down, and dragged them along at the side of the road, lacerating them and carding them, and explaining to the passers-by, that they were going to be cast into hell. The greatest terror of the pilgrims ascending was lest they should hear the voice, and when there was silence one by one they passed up with joy. To these sufferings there were corresponding delights.

Now when they had rested seven days, on the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and in four days came to a spot whence they looked down upon a column of light, in colour like a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day more brought them to the place, and looking along the column at the ends they saw the chain of light which encompasses heaven and earth, after the manner of the rope which fastens a trireme. At the extremities of the chain there was the distaff of Necessity, on which all the heavenly bodies turned;—the hook and spindle were of adamant, and the whorl of a mixed substance. And the form of the whorl was like a number of boxes fitting into one another with their edges turned upwards, making together a single whorl which was pierced by the spindle. Now the outermost had the rim broadest, and the inner whorls were smaller and smaller, and had their rims narrower. The largest (or fixed stars) was spangled

—the seventh (or sun) was brightest—the eighth (or moon) shone by the light of the seventh—the second and fifth (Saturn and Mercury) were most like one another and yellower than the eighth—the third (Jupiter) had the whitest light—the fourth (Mars) was red—the sixth (Venus) was in whiteness second. The whole had one motion, but while this was revolving in one direction the seven inner circles were moving in the opposite, with various degrees of swiftness and slowness. The spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and a Siren stood hymning upon each circle, while Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, the daughters of Necessity, sat on thrones at equal intervals, singing of past, present, and future, responsive to the music of the Sirens; Clotho from time to time guiding the outer circle with a touch of her right hand; Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner circle; Lachesis in turn putting forth her hand to guide both of them from time to time. On their arrival the pilgrims went to Lachesis, and there was an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from her knees lots, and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and said: ‘Mortal souls, hear the words of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. A new period of mortal life has begun, and you may choose what divinity you please—the responsibility of choosing is with you—God is blameless.’ After speaking thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took up the lot which fell near him. He then placed on the ground before them the samples of lives, many more than the souls present, and there were all sorts of lives of men and animals. There were tyrannies ending in misery and exile, and lives of men and women famous for their different qualities; and also mixed lives, made up of wealth and poverty, sickness and health. And here, beloved Glaucon, is the great risk of human life, and therefore the whole of education should be directed to the acquisition of such a knowledge as will teach a man to refuse the evil and choose the good. He should know all the combinations which occur in life—of beauty with poverty or with wealth,—of knowledge with external goods,—and at last choose with reference to the nature of the soul, regarding that only as the better life which makes men better, and leaving the rest. And a man must take with him an iron sense of truth and right into the world below, that there too he may remain undazzled by wealth or the allurements of evil, and be determined to avoid the extremes and choose the mean. For this, as the messenger reported the interpreter to have said, is the true happi-

ness of man; and any one, as he proclaimed, may, if he choose with understanding, have a good lot, even though he come last. 'Let not the first be careless in his choice, nor the last despair.' He spoke; and when he had spoken, he who had drawn the first lot chose a tyranny: he did not see that he was fated to devour his own children—and when he discovered his mistake, he wept and beat his breast, blaming not himself, as the interpreter had bidden him, but chance and the Gods and anybody rather than himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and in his previous life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had only habit and no philosophy. And this was the reason why he, like many others, made a bad choice, because he had no experience of life, whereas those who came from earth and had seen trouble were not in such a hurry to choose. And for this reason and because the lot was a chance, there was often an exchange of lives from good to evil. Whereas if a man followed the pursuits of philosophy while he was upon earth, and had been moderately fortunate in his lot, he might not only be happy here, but his pilgrimage from this world to the other, and from the other to this, would be smooth and heavenly. Nothing was more curious than the spectacle of the choice, at once sad and laughable and wonderful; most of the souls only seeking to avoid their own condition in a previous life. He saw the soul of Orpheus changing into a swan because he would not be born of a woman; there was Thamyras becoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the swan, choosing to be men; the twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, preferring the life of a lion to that of a man, in remembrance of the injustice which was done to him in the judgment of the arms; and Agamemnon, from a like enmity to human nature, passing into an eagle. About the middle was the soul of Atalanta choosing the honours of an athlete, and next to her Epeus going into the nature of a workwoman; among the last was Thersites, who was changing himself into a monkey. Thither, the last of all, came Odysseus, and chose the lot of a private man, which lay neglected and could hardly be found, and when he found it he went away rejoicing, and said that he was weary of ambition, and that if he had been first instead of last, he would have made the same choice. And he saw men passing into animals, and wild and tame animals passing into one another.

When all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with

each of them their genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all brought them under the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand; from her they were carried to Atropos, who made the threads irreversible; whence, without turning round, they passed beneath the throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they moved on in scorching heat to the desert of Forgetfulness and rested at evening by the river Unmindful, whose water could not be retained in any vessel; of this they had all to drink a certain quantity—some of them drank more than was required, and he who drank forgot all things. Er himself was prevented from drinking. When they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were thunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly they were all driven divers ways, shooting like stars to their birth. Concerning his return to the body, he only knew that awaking suddenly in the morning he saw himself lying on the pyre.

Thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation if we believe that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the heavenly way of Justice and Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of Lethe, and be dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a crown of reward and happiness both in this world and also in the millennial pilgrimage of the other.

The Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions; first, resuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the poets, who, now that the nature of the soul has been analysed, are seen to be very far gone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the reality of the happiness of the just, he demands that appearance shall be restored to him, and then proceeds to prove the immortality of the soul. The argument, as in the *Phaedo* and *Gorgias*, is supplemented by the vision of a future life.

Why Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and dramas, should have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially to the dramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may be embodied in verse as well as in prosè, and that there are some indefinable lights and shadows of human life which can only be expressed in poetry—some elements of imagination which always entwine with reason; why he should have supposed epic verse to be

inseparably associated with the impurities of the old Hellenic mythology; why he should try Homer and Hesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of utility,—are questions which have always been debated amongst students of Plato. Though unable to give a complete answer to them, we may show—first, that his views arose naturally out of the circumstances of his age; and secondly, we may elicit the truth as well as the error which is contained in them.

He is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own lifetime, and a theatrocracy, as he says in the *Laws* (iii. 701 A), had taken the place of an intellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last phase of the tragic drama, and in him Plato saw the friend and apologist of tyrants, and the Sophist of tragedy. The old comedy was almost extinct; the new had not yet arisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry, like every other branch of Greek literature, was falling under the power of rhetoric. There was no 'second or third' to Æschylus and Sophocles in the generation which followed them. Aristophanes, in one of his later comedies (*Frogs*, 89 foll.), speaks of 'thousands of tragedy making prattlers,' whose attempts at poetry he compares to the chirping of swallows; 'their garrulity went far beyond Euripides;'—'they appeared once upon the stage, and there was an end of them.' To a man of genius who had a real appreciation of the godlike Æschylus and the noble and gentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with some parts of their 'theology' (*Rep.* ii. 380), these 'minor poets' must have been contemptible and intolerable. There is no feeling stronger in the dialogues of Plato than a sense of the decline and decay in literature as well as in politics which marked his own age. Nor can he have been expected to look with favour on the licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of his career, who had begun by satirizing Socrates in the *Clouds*, and in a similar spirit forty years afterwards had satirized the founders of ideal commonwealths in his *Eccleziastusæ*, or *Female Parliament* (cp. x. 606 C).

There were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The profession of an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human nature, for 'one man in his life' cannot 'play many parts;' the characters which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, and to leave nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any man live his life and act it. The actor at the theatre is a figure of the actor in the world. Taking this view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of the dramatic than of the epic poets, though he must have known that

the Greek tragedians afforded noble lessons and examples of virtue and patriotism, to which nothing in Homer can be compared. But great dramatic or even great rhetorical power is hardly consistent with firmness or strength of mind, and dramatic talent is often incidentally associated with a dissolute character.

In the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, he says that the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third degree removed from the truth. His creations are not tested by rule and measure; they are only appearances. In modern times we should say that art is not merely imitation, but rather the expression of the ideal in forms of sense. Even adopting the humble image of Plato, from which his argument derives a colour, we should maintain that the artist may enoble the bed which he paints by the folds of the drapery, or by the feeling of home which he introduces; and there have been modern painters who have imparted such an ideal interest to a blacksmith's or a carpenter's shop. The eye or mind which feels as well as sees can give dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, or a straw-built shed [Rembrandt], to the hull of a vessel 'going to its last home' [Turner]. Still more would this apply to the greatest works of art, which seem to be the visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been asked whether the Zeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation only, would he not have been compelled to admit that something more was to be found in them than in the form of any mortal; and that the rule of proportion to which they conformed was 'higher far than any geometry or arithmetic could express?' (Polit. 257 A.)

Again, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional rather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit Aristotle's theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a purgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to afford the opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that we may sometimes cure disordered emotions by expressing them; and that they often gain strength when pent up within our own breast. All indulgence of the feelings is not to be condemned. For there may be a gratification of the higher as well as of the lower,—thoughts which are too deep or too sad to be expressed by ourselves, may find an utterance in the words of poets. Every one would acknowledge that there have been times when they were consoled and elevated by strains of music or by the sublimity of architecture. Plato has himself admitted,

in the earlier part of the Republic, that the arts might have the effect of harmonizing as well as of enervating the mind; but in the Tenth Book he regards them through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He asks only 'what good have they done?' and is not satisfied with the reply, that 'they have given innocent pleasure to mankind.'

He tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he has found by the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the inferior faculties. He means to say that the higher faculties have to do with universals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are on a level with their own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato; and he was well aware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of life by any process of legitimate interpretation; his ironical use of them is in fact a denial of their authority; he saw, too, that the poets were not critics—as he says in the Apology, 'any one was a better interpreter of their writings than they were themselves.' (22 C.) He too had ceased to be a poet when he became a disciple of Socrates; though, as he tells us of Solon, 'he might have been one of the greatest of them, if he had not been deterred by other pursuits.' (Tim. 21 C.) Thus from many points of view there is an antagonism between Plato and the poets, which was foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. The poets, as he says in the Protagoras (316 E), were the Sophists of their day; and his dislike of the one is reflected on the others. He regards them generally as the enemies of reasoning and abstraction, though in the case of Euripides more with reference to his immoral sentiments about tyrants and the like. For Plato is the prophet who came to convince the world—first of the fallibility of sense and opinion, and secondly of the reality of abstract ideas. Whatever strangeness there may be in modern times in opposing philosophy to poetry, which to us seem to have so many elements in common, the strangeness will disappear if we conceive of poetry as allied to sense, and of philosophy as equivalent to thought and abstraction. Unfortunately the very word idea, which to Plato is expressive of the most real of all things, is associated in our minds with an element of subjectiveness and unreality. We may note also how he differs from Aristotle who declares poetry to be truer than history, for the opposite reason, because it is concerned with universals, not like history, with particulars (Poet. ix. 3).

The things that are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things that

are unseen—they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. To him all particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; they have a taint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in seeing that this is an illusion; for there is no more error or variation in an individual man, horse, bed, &c., than in the class man, horse, bed, &c.; nor is the truth which is displayed in individual instances less certain than that which is conveyed through the medium of ideas. But Plato, who is deeply impressed with the real importance of universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them an essential truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be often false and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear conception of the individual, which is the synthesis of the universal and the particular; or had he been able to distinguish between opinion and sensation, which the ambiguity of the words *δόξα*, *φαίνεσθαι*, *εἰκὸς* and the like, tended to confuse, he would not have denied truth to the particulars of sense.

But the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in all departments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and rhetoricians of the Gorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, false prophets, lying spirits, enchanters of the world. There is another count put into the indictment against them by Plato, that they are the friends of the tyrant, and bask in the sunshine of his patronage. Despotism in all ages has had an apparatus of false ideas and false teachers at its service—in the history of Modern Europe as well as of Greece and Rome. For no government of men depends solely upon force;—without some corruption of literature and morals—some appeal to the imagination of the masses—some pretence to the favour of heaven—some element of good giving power to evil (cp. i. 352) tyranny, even for a short time, cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were not insensible to the importance of awakening in their cause a Pseudo-Hellenic feeling; they were proud of successes at the Olympic games; they were not devoid of the love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the first instance of Greek poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or Archelaus: and the old spirit of freedom is roused within him at their prostitution of the Tragic Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his prophetic eye extends beyond them to the false teachers of other ages who are the creatures of the government under which they live. He compares the corruption of his contemporaries with the idea of a perfect society, and gathers up into one mass of error and evil the errors of mankind; to him they are

personified in the rhetoricians, sophists, poets who deceive and govern the world.

A further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts is that they excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be disposed to introduce a distinction which appears to have escaped him. For the emotions are neither bad nor good in themselves, and are not most likely to be controlled by the attempt to eradicate them, but by the moderate indulgence of them. And the vocation of art is to present thought in the form of feeling, to enlist the feelings on the side of reason, to inspire even for a moment courage or resignation; perhaps to suggest a sense of infinity and eternity in a way which mere language is incapable of attaining. True, the same power which in the purer age of art embodies gods and heroes only, may be made to express the voluptuous image of a Corinthian courtesan. But this only shows that art, like other outward things, may be turned to good and also to evil, and is not more closely connected with the higher than with the lower part of the soul. All imitative art is subject to certain limitations, and therefore necessarily partakes of the nature of a compromise. Something of ideal truth is sacrificed for the sake of the representation, and something in the exactness of the representation is sacrificed to the ideal. Still, works of art have a permanent element; they idealize and detain the passing thought, and are the intermediates between sense and ideas.

In the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of fiction may certainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the existence of an age in which a severer conception of truth has either banished or transformed them. At any rate we must admit that they hold a different place at different periods of the world's history. In the infancy of mankind poetry, with the exception of proverbs, is the whole of literature, and the only instrument of intellectual culture; in modern times she is the shadow or echo of her former self, and appears to have a precarious existence. Milton in his day doubted whether an epic poem was any longer possible. At the same time we must remember, that what Plato would have called the charms of poetry have been partly transferred to prose; he himself admits *ῥητορεία* in the *Politicus*, and proposes to find in the strain of law (*Laws* vii. 811) a substitute for the old poets. Among ourselves the creative power seems often to be growing weaker, and scientific fact to be more engrossing and overpowering to the mind than formerly. The illusion of the feelings commonly called love, has hitherto been the inspiring influence of modern poetry and romance,

and has exercised a humanizing if not a strengthening influence on the world. But may not the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some day exhausted? The modern English novel which is the most popular of all forms of reading is not more than a century or two old: will the tale of love a hundred years hence, after so many thousand variations of the same theme, be still received with unabated interest?

Art cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may often corrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which all artistic representations are regarded as a false and imperfect expression, either of the religious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. The fairest forms may be revolting in certain moods of mind, as is proved by the fact that the Mahommedans, and many sects of Christians, have renounced the use of pictures and images. The beginning of a great religion, whether Christian or Gentile, has not been 'wood or stone,' but a spirit moving in the hearts of men. The disciples have met in a large upper room or in 'holes and caves of the earth'; in the second or third generation, they have had mosques, temples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or reform of religions, like the first revelation of them, has come from within and has generally disregarded external ceremonies and accompaniments.

But poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and the purest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between the two opposite views—when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be brought up amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book x, when he banishes the poets from his Republic. Admitting that the arts which some of us almost deify have fallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on the other hand that to banish imagination wholly would be suicidal as well as impossible. For nature too is a form of art; and a breath of the fresh air or a single glance at the varying landscape would in an instant revive and reillumine the extinguished spark of poetry in the human breast. In the lower stages of civilization imagination more than reason distinguishes man from the animals; and to banish art would be to banish thought, to banish language, to banish the expression of all truth. No religion is wholly devoid of external forms; even the Mahometan who renounces the use of pictures and images has a temple in which he worships the Most High, as solemn and beautiful as any Greek or Christian building. Feeling too and thought are not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel before he can execute:—And the highest

thoughts, when they become familiarized to us, are always tending to pass into the form of feeling.

Plato does not seriously intend to expel poetry from human life. But he feels strongly the unreality of poets; and he is protesting against the degeneracy of them in his own day as we might protest against the want of serious purpose in modern poetry, against the unseemliness or extravagance of some of our novelists, against the time-serving of preachers or public writers, against the regardlessness of truth, which to the eye of the philosopher seems to characterize the greater part of the world. For we too have reason to complain that our poets and novelists 'paint inferior truth' and are concerned 'with the inferior part of the soul'; that the readers of them become what they read and are injuriously affected by them. And we look in vain for that healthy atmosphere of which Plato speaks: 'the beauty which meets the sense like a breeze and insensibly draws the soul, even in childhood, into harmony with the beauty of reason.'

For there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine perfection, the harmony of justice and truth among men: a strain which should renew the youth of the world, as in primitive ages the poet was men's only teacher and best friend: which would find materials in the living present as well as in the romance of the past, and might subdue to the fairest forms of speech and verse the intractable materials of modern civilization: which might elicit the simple principles, or, as Plato would have called them, the essential forms of truth and goodness out of the variety of opinion and the complexity of modern society: which would preserve all the good of each generation and leave the bad unsung: which should be based not on vain longings or faint imaginings, but on a clear insight into the nature of man. Then the tale of love might begin again in poetry or prose, two in one, united in the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God and man; and feelings of love might still be the incentive to great thoughts and heroic deeds as in the days of Dante or Petrarch; and many types of manly and womanly beauty might appear among us, rising above the ordinary level of humanity, and many lives which were like poems (*Laws*, vii. 817 B) be not only written but lived among us. A few such strains have been heard among men in the tragedies of Æschylus and Sophocles, whom Plato quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and serious approval; in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in passages of other English

poets,—first and above all in the Hebrew prophets and psalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should speak and act; he has drawn characters of a wonderful purity and depth; he has ennobled the human mind, but, like Homer (Rep. x. 599 foll.), he ‘has left no way of life.’ The next greatest poet of modern times, Goethe, is concerned with ‘a lower degree of *truth*’; he paints the world as a stage on which ‘all the men and women are merely players’; he cultivates life as an art, but he furnishes no ideals of life and action. The poet may rebel against any attempt to set limits to his fancy; and he may argue truly that moralizing in verse is not poetry. Possibly, like Mephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his adversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking ‘How may the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?’

Returning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and error appears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the absurdity of mankind framing their whole lives according to Homer; just as in the Phaedrus he intimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology upon rational principles; both these were the modern tendencies of his own age, which he deservedly ridicules. On the other hand, his argument that Homer, if he had been able to teach mankind anything worth knowing, would not have been allowed by them to go about begging as a rhapsodist, is both false and contrary to the spirit of Plato. (Cp. Rep. vi. 489 A foll.) It may be compared with that other paradox of the Gorgias, that ‘no statesman was ever unjustly put to death by the city of which he was the head’; and that ‘no Sophist was ever defrauded by his pupils.’ (Gorg. 519 foll.)

The argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of soul and body. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force which is able to put an end to her. She is not destroyed by her own proper evil, which is sin; and still less can she be by any other. Yet Plato has acknowledged that the soul may be so overgrown by the incrustations of earth as to lose her original form, and in the Timæus he recognizes more strongly than in the Republic the influence which the body has over the mind, denying even the voluntariness of human actions, on the ground that they proceed from physical states. (Tim. 86.) In the Republic, as elsewhere, he wavers between the original soul which has to be restored, and the character which is developed by training and education.

The vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who is said by Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has certainly an oriental character, and may be compared with the pilgrimages of the soul in the Zend Avesta (cp. Haug, *Zend Avesta*, p. 197). But no trace of acquaintance with Zoroaster is found elsewhere in Plato's writings, and there is no reason for giving him the name of Er, the Pamphylian. The philosophy of Heracleitus cannot be shown to be borrowed from Zoroaster, and still less the myths of Plato.

The local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the Phaedrus and Phaedo. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology; the great sphere of heaven is represented under the symbol of a cylinder or box, containing the orbits of the planets and the fixed stars; this depends upon a spindle which turns on the knees of Necessity; the revolutions of the eight orbits are guided by the fates, and their harmonious motion produces the music of the spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of these, which is the moon, is passed the pole or axis; but it is doubtful whether this is the continuation of the column of light, from which the travellers contemplate the heavens. The words of Plato imply that they are connected, but not the same; the column of light is clearly not of adamant. The cylinder containing the orbits of the stars is almost as much a symbol as the figure of Necessity turning the spindle;—for the outermost rim is the sphere of the fixed stars, and nothing is said about the intervals of space which divide the paths of the stars in the heavens. The description is both a picture and an orrery. The column of light is probably not the milky way, which is neither straight, nor like a rainbow, but the imaginary axis of the earth. This is compared to the rainbow in respect not of form but of colour, and not to the undergirders of a trireme, but to the straight rope running from prow to stern in which the undergirders meet.

The orrery of the Republic differs in its mode of representation from the circles of the same and of the other in the Timaeus. In both the fixed stars are distinguished from the planets, and they move in orbits without them, although in an opposite direction: in the Republic (as in the Timaeus) they are all moving round the axis of the world, but we are not certain that in the former they are moving round the earth. No distinct mention is made in the Republic of the circles of the same and other; although both in the Timaeus and in the Republic the motion of the fixed stars is supposed to coincide with the motion

of the whole. The relative thickness of the rims is perhaps designed to express the relative distances of the planets. Plato probably intended to represent the earth, from which Er and his companions are viewing the heavens, as stationary in place; but whether or not herself revolving, unless this is implied in the revolution of the axis, is uncertain. (Cp. Timæus.) The spectator might be supposed to look at the heavenly bodies, either from above or below. The earth is a sort of earth and heaven in one, like the heaven of the Phædrus, on the back of which the spectator goes out to take a peep at the stars and is borne round in the revolution. There is no distinction between the equator and the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine that the planets have an opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in order to account for their appearances in the heavens. In the description of the meadow, and the retribution of the good and evil after death, there are traces of Homer.

The description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as forming a whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions of the heavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or weaving of the Fates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them and the making of them irreversible, which are ascribed to the three Fates—Lachesis, Clotho, Atropos, are obviously derived from their names. The element of chance in human life is indicated by the order of the lots. But chance, however adverse, might be overcome by the wisdom of man, if he knew how to choose aright; there was a worse enemy to man than chance, and this was himself. He who was moderately fortunate in the number of the lot—even the very last comer—might have a good life if he chose with wisdom. And as Plato does not like to make an assertion which is unproven, he more than confirms this statement a few sentences afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who chose last. But the virtue which is founded on habit is not sufficient to enable a man to choose; he must add to virtue knowledge, if he is to act rightly when placed in new circumstances. The routine of good actions and good habits is an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge says, ‘Common sense is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,’ so Plato would have said, ‘Custom is worthless which is not based upon philosophy.’

The freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is distinctly asserted. ‘Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours

her he will have more or less of her.' The life of man is 'rounded' by necessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him. (Cp. Pol. 273 B.) But within the walls of necessity there is an open space in which he is his own master, and can study for himself the effects which the variously compounded gifts of nature or fortune have upon the soul, and act accordingly. All men cannot have first choices in everything. But the lot of all men is good enough, if they choose wisely and will live diligently.

The verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years, by the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; the coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was supposed to have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed in the meadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the column of light; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who chose the twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite character among the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill blamed any one rather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank more than was necessary of the waters of forgetfulness, while Er himself was hindered from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, unlike the conception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned ignorance of how Er returned to the body, when the other souls went shooting like stars to their birth,—add greatly to the truthfulness of the narrative. They are such touches of nature as the art of Defoe might have introduced when he wished to win credibility for marvels and apparitions.

There still remain to be considered some points which have been intentionally reserved to the end: (I) the Janus-like character of the Republic, which presents two faces—one an Hellenic state, the other a kingdom of philosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects are (II) the paradoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by Morgenstern: (α) the community of property; (β) of families; (γ) the rule of philosophers; (δ) the analogy of the individual and the State, which, like some other analogies in the Republic, is carried too far. We may then proceed to consider (III) the subject of education as conceived by Plato, bringing together in a general view the education of youth and the education of after life; lastly, (IV), some light may be

thrown on the Republic of Plato by his imitators; and hence we may take occasion to consider the nature and value of political ideals.

I. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State (Book v. 470 E). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan; such as the prohibition of gold and silver, the common meals, the training of youth in a military gymnastic, the gymnastic exercises of the women. The life of Sparta was the life of a camp (Laws ii. 666 E), enforced even more rigidly in time of peace than in war; the citizens, like Plato's citizens, were forbidden to trade—they were to be soldiers and not shopkeepers. Nowhere else in Greece was the individual so completely subjected to the State; the time when he was to marry, the education of his children, the food which he was to eat, were prescribed by law. Some of the best enactments in the Republic, such as the reverence to be paid to parents and elders, and some of the worst, such as the exposure of deformed children, are borrowed from the practice of Sparta. The encouragement of friendships between men and youths, or of men with one another, as affording incentives to bravery, is also Spartan, and in Sparta a nearer approach was made than in any other Greek State to equality of the sexes, and to community of property; while there was probably less of licentiousness in the sense of immorality, the tie of marriage was regarded more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The 'suprema lex' was the preservation of the family, and the interest of the State. The coarse strength of a military government was not favourable to purity and refinement; and the excessive strictness of some regulations seems to have produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most accessible to bribery; several of the greatest of them might be described in the words of Plato as having a 'fierce secret longing after gold and silver.' Though not in the strict sense communists, the principle of communism was maintained among them in their division of lands, in their common meals, in their slaves, and in the free use of one another's goods. Marriage was a public institution: and the women were educated by the State, and sang and danced in public with the men.

Many traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the magistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry; as in the Republic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled. Hymns to the Gods, which were the only kind of music allowed at Sparta, are the only kind which he has admitted into his ideal State.

The council of elder men also corresponds to the Spartan *gerusia*; and the freedom with which they are permitted to judge about matters of detail agrees with what we are told of that institution. Once more, the military rule of not spoiling the dead or offering arms at the temples; the moderation in the pursuit of enemies; the importance attached to the physical well-being of the citizens; the use of warfare for the sake of defence rather than of aggression, are features probably suggested by the spirit and practice of Sparta.

To the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and the character of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan citizen. The love of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, but was shared by many undistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to find a principle which was wanting in their own democracy. The *εὐκοσμία* of Sparta attracted them, that is to say, not the goodness of their laws, but the spirit of order and loyalty which prevailed there. Fascinated by the idea, they would imitate the Lacedaemonians in their dress and manners; they were known to the contemporaries of Plato as 'the persons who had their ears bruised,' like the Roundheads of the Commonwealth. The love of another church or country when seen at a distance only, the longing for an imaginary simplicity in civilized times, the desire of what we are not, are tendencies of the human mind which are often displayed among ourselves. Such feelings would meet with a response in the Republic of Plato.

But there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example, the literary and philosophical education, and the grace and beauty of life, which are the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his citizens a taste of Athenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian discipline. His individual genius is purely Athenian, although in theory he is a lover of Sparta; and he is something more than either—he has also a true Hellenic feeling. He is desirous of humanizing the wars of Hellenes against one another; he acknowledges that the Delphian God is the grand hereditary interpreter of all Hellas. The spirit of harmony and the Dorian mode are to prevail, and the whole State is to have an external beauty which is the reflex of the harmony within. But he has not yet found out the truth which he afterwards enunciated in the Laws (i. 628 D)—that he was a better legislator who made men to be of one mind, than he who trained them for war. The citizens, as in other Hellenic States, democratic as well as aristocratic, are really

an upper class; for, although no mention is made of slaves, the lower classes are allowed to fade away into the distance, and are represented in the individual by the passions. Plato has no idea either of a social State in which all classes are harmonised, or of a federation of the world in which different nations have a place. His city is equipped for war rather than for peace, and this would seem to be justified by the ordinary condition of Hellenic States. The myth of the earth-born men is an embodiment of the orthodox tradition of Hellas, and the allusion to the four ages of the world is also sanctioned by the authority of Hesiod and the poets. Thus we see that the Republic is partly founded on the ideal of the old Greek *polis*, partly on the actual circumstances of Hellenic States. Plato, like the old painters, retains the traditional form, and like them he has also a vision of a city in the clouds.

There is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the work; for the Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean league. The way of life which was connected with the name of Pythagoras, like the Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which the mind of an individual might exercise over his contemporaries, and might naturally suggest to Plato the possibility of reviving such 'mediaeval institutions.' The Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule of life and a moral and intellectual training. The influence ascribed to music, which to us seems exaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature, and is not to be regarded as representing the real influence of music in the Greek world. More nearly than any other government of Hellas, the Pythagorean league of three hundred was an aristocracy of virtue. For once in the history of mankind 'the philosophy of order or *κόσμος*, expressing and consequently enlisting on its side the combined endeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the management of public affairs and held possession of it for a considerable time' (until about B.C. 500). Probably only in states prepared by Dorian institutions would such a league have been possible. The rulers, like Plato's *φύλακες*, were required to submit to a severe training in order to prepare the way for the education of the other members of the community. Long after the dissolution of the Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as Archytas of Tarentum, retained their political influence over the cities of Magna Grecia. There was much here that was suggestive to the kindred spirit of Plato, who had doubtless meditated deeply on the

'way of life of Pythagoras' and his followers. Slight traces of Pythagoreanism are to be found in the mystical number of the State, in the number which expresses the interval between the king and the tyrant, in the doctrine of transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well as in the great though secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in education.

But as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far beyond the old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which is to unite the past of Greek history with the future of philosophy, analogous to that other impossibility, which has often been the dream of Christendom, the attempt to unite the past history of Europe with the kingdom of Christ. Nothing actually existing in the world at all resembles Plato's ideal State; nor does he himself imagine that such a State is possible. This he repeats again and again; e. g. in the Laws (Book v. 739), where, casting a glance back on the Republic, he admits that the perfect state of communism and philosophy is unattainable in the present state of the world, though still to be retained as a pattern. The same doubt is implied in the earnestness with which he argues in the Republic (Book v. 472 D) that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be realized in fact, and in the chorus of laughter, like 'the letting out of water,' which, as he anticipates, will greet the mention of his proposals, though like other writers of fiction, he uses all his art to give reality to his inventions. When asked how the ideal polity can come into being, he answers ironically, when one son of a king becomes a philosopher; he designates the fiction of the earth-born men as 'a noble lie'; and at the end of the ninth Book, when he has completed the structure, he fairly tells you that his Republic is a vision only which in some sense may have reality, but not in the vulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon earth. It has been said that Plato flies as well as walks, but this hardly expresses the whole truth, for he flies and walks at the same time, and is in the air and on firm ground in successive instants.

Niebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in this place—Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal to Athenian institutions? he can hardly be said to be the friend of democracy: but neither is he the friend of existing forms of government; all of them he regarded as 'states of faction' (Laws viii. 832 C); none of them came up to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects,

which seems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other, and the worst of them is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has hardly any meaning when applied to a great philosopher whose writings are not meant for a particular age and country, but for all time and all mankind. The decline of Athenian politics was probably the motive which led Plato to frame an ideal State, and the Republic may be regarded as reflecting the departing glory of Hellas. As well might we complain of St. Augustin, whose great work 'The City of God' originated in a similar motive, for not being loyal to the Roman Empire; or even a nearer parallel might be afforded by the first Christians, who cannot fairly be charged with being bad citizens because, though 'subject to the higher powers,' they were looking forward to a city which is in heaven.

II. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age often become the commonplaces of the next; but the paradoxes of Plato are at least as paradoxical to us as they were to his contemporaries. The modern world has either ridiculed them as absurd or denounced them as unnatural and immoral; yet since they are the thoughts of one of the greatest of human intelligences, and of one who has done most to elevate morality and religion, they seem to deserve a better treatment at our hands. We may have to address the public, as Plato does poetry, and assure them that we mean no harm to existing institutions. But still the consideration of social questions in their most abstract form, may not be without use as a speculation, even if incapable of being reduced to practice.

(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned slightly at the end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle observes, is confined to the guardians; at least no mention is made of the other classes. But the omission is not of any real significance, and probably arises out of the plan of the work, which prevents the writer from entering into details.

Aristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of modern political economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing away with the spirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to consider the subject, which is supposed to have been long ago settled by the common opinion of mankind. But it must be remembered that the sacredness of property is a notion far more fixed in modern than in ancient times. The world has grown older, and is therefore more conservative. Primitive society offered many examples

of land held in common, either by a tribe or by a township, and such may probably have been the original form of landed tenure. Ancient legislators had invented various modes of dividing and preserving the divisions of land among the citizens; according to Aristotle there were nations who held the land in common and divided the produce, and there were others who divided the land and stored the produce in common. The evils of debt and the inequality of property were far greater in ancient than in modern times, and the accidents to which property was subject from war, or revolution, or taxation, or other legislative interference, were also greater. All these circumstances gave property a less fixed and sacred character. The early Christians are believed to have held their property in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words of Christ himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in almost all ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of modern enthusiasts who have made a religion of communism; in every age of religious excitement, notions like Wycliffe's 'inheritance of grace' have tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent, has appeared in politics. 'The preparation of the Gospel of peace' is also the red flag of Republicanism.

We can hardly judge what effect Plato's views would have upon his own contemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an exaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would acknowledge that the right of private property is based on expediency, and may be interfered with in a variety of ways for the public good. Any other mode of vesting property which was found to be more advantageous, would in time acquire the same basis of right; 'the most useful,' in Plato's words, 'would be the most sacred.' The lawyers and ecclesiastics of former ages would have spoken of property as a sacred institution. But they only meant by such language to oppose the greatest amount of resistance to any invasion of the rights of individuals and of the Church.

When we consider the question, without any fear of immediate application to practice, in the spirit of Plato's Republic, are we quite sure that the received notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of wealth which is customary in civilized countries the most favourable that can be conceived for the education and development of the mass of mankind? Can 'the spectator of all time and all existence' be quite convinced that one or two thousand years hence, great changes will not have

taken place in the rights of property, or even that the very notion of property, beyond what is necessary for personal maintenance, may not have disappeared? This was a distinction familiar to Aristotle, though likely to be laughed at among ourselves. Such a change would not be greater than some other changes through which the world has passed in the transition from ancient to modern society; as, for example, the emancipation of the serfs in Russia, or the abolition of slavery in our West India colonies, or greater than the interval which separates the Eastern village community from the Western world. And to accomplish such a revolution in the course of centuries, would not imply a more rapid rate of progress than has actually existed during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom of Japan has changed more in five or six years, than Europe in five or six hundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished among ourselves quite as strongly as the sacredness of property have passed away, and the most untenable propositions respecting the right of bequests or entail have been maintained with as much fervour as the most moderate. The reflection will occur that the state of society can hardly be final in which the interests of thousands are perilled on the life or character of a single person. And many will indulge the hope that the state in which we live will be only transitional, and may conduct to a higher state, in which property, besides ministering to the enjoyment of the few, may also furnish the means of the highest culture to all, and will be a greater benefit to the public generally, and also more under the control of public authority. There may come a time when the saying, 'Have I not a right to do what I will with my own,' may appear to be a barbarous relic of individualism; when the possession of a part may be a greater blessing to each and all than the possession of the whole is now to any one.

Such reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman, but they are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can imagine that in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of some individual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk as deep into the heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as private property is to us. He knows that this latter institution is not more than two or three thousand years old: may not the end revert to the beginning? In our own age even Utopias may affect the spirit of legislation, and the philosopher may be allowed sometimes to feast his imagination with speculations which he will never realize.

The objections that would be generally urged against Plato's community of property, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives for exertion would be taken away, and that disputes would arise when each was dependent upon all. Mankind could never become disinterested, or regard the interests of the community as the interests of the individual. But it may be doubted whether our present individualism is not rather an artificial result of the industrial state of modern Europe. Moral and political feelings seem from time to time to rise up and reassert themselves, even in a world bound hand and foot in the chains of economic necessity. And if we cannot expect the mass of mankind to become disinterested, at any rate we seem to observe in them the growth of a spirit of party and a power of organization which fifty years ago would never have been suspected. The same forces which have revolutionized the political system of Europe, may affect a similar change in the social and industrial relations of mankind. And if we suppose the influence of some good as well as neutral motives working in the community, there will be no absurdity in expecting that the mass of mankind having power, and becoming enlightened about the higher possibilities of human life, when they learn how much more is attainable for all than is at present the possession of a favoured few, may pursue the common interest with an intelligence and persistency which the world has not yet seen.

(β) Neither to the mind of Plato or Aristotle did the doctrine of community of property at all present the same difficulty, or appear the same violation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the paradox of the community of wives and children. This he prefaces by another proposal, that the pursuits of men and women shall be the same, and that to this end they shall have a common training and education. Male and female animals have the same pursuits—why not also the two sexes of man?

But here we seem to have fallen into a contradiction with our former principle, that different natures should have different pursuits. Men and women differ: are they capable then of the same pursuits? Is not the proposal inconsistent with our notion of the division of labour? The objection is no sooner raised than answered, for, according to Plato, there is no organic difference between men and women, but only the accidental difference of the one bearing and the other begetting children. Following the analogy of the other animals, Plato contends that all natural gifts are scattered about indifferently among men and women, though there may be a superiority of degree on the part of the men.

The objection on the score of delicacy to men and women partaking of the same gymnastic exercises, is met by Plato's assertion that the existing feeling is a matter of habit.

That Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own country and from the example of the East, shows a wonderful independence of mind. He is conscious that women are half the human race, and in some respects the most important half (*Laws*, vi. 781 B). He brings philosophy to bear upon a question which both in ancient and modern times has been chiefly regarded in the light of custom or feeling. The Greeks had noble conceptions of womanhood in the goddesses Athene and Artemis, and in the heroines Antigone and Andromache. But these ideals had no counterpart in actual life. The Athenian woman was in no way the equal of her husband; she was not the entertainer of his guests or the mistress of his house, but only his housekeeper and the mother of his children. She took no part in military or political matters; nor is there any instance in the later ages of Greece of a woman becoming famous in literature. 'Hers is the greatest glory who has the least renown among men,' is the historian's conception of feminine excellence. A very different ideal of womanhood is held up by Plato to the world; she is to be the companion of the man, and to share with him in the toils of war and in the cares of the government. She is to be similarly trained both in bodily and mental exercises. She is to lose as far as possible the incidents of maternity and the characteristics of the female sex.

The modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the differences between men and women are not confined to the single point urged by Plato; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities of women, while energy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked for in men. And the criticism is true: the differences affect the whole nature, and are not, as Plato supposes, confined to a single point. But neither can we say how far these differences are due to education and the opinions of mankind, or physically inherited from the habits and opinions of former generations. Women have been always taught, not exactly that they are slaves, but that they are in an inferior position, which is also supposed to have compensating advantages; and to this position they have conformed. Add to this that the physical form may easily change in the course of generations through the mode of life; and the weakness or delicacy, which was once a matter of opinion, may pass into a physical fact. The difference between the two sexes varies greatly in different

countries and ranks of society, and at different ages in the same individuals. And Plato may have been right in denying that there was any ultimate difference in the sexes other than that which exists in animals, because all other differences may be conceived to disappear in other states of society, or under different circumstances of life and training.

(γ) The first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second—community of wives and children. ‘Is it possible? Is it desirable?’ For, as Glaucon intimates, and as we far more strongly insist, ‘Great doubts may be entertained about both these points.’ Any free discussion of the question is impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing the ultimate bases of social life to be examined. Still, the manner in which Plato arrived at his conclusions should be considered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked, is a wonderful thing, that one of the wisest and best of men should have entertained ideas of morality which are wholly at variance with our own. And if we would do Plato justice, we must examine carefully the character of his proposals. First, we may observe that the relations of the sexes supposed by him are the reverse of licentious: he seems rather to aim at an impossible strictness. On the other hand, there is no sentiment or imagination in the connections which men and women are supposed to form; human nature is reduced to the level of the animals, neither exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing the natural instincts. All that world of poetry and fancy which the passion of love has called forth in modern literature and romance would have been banished by Plato (see above p. 144 foll.). The arrangements of marriage in the Republic are directed to one object—the improvement of the race. In successive generations a great development both of bodily and mental qualities might be possible. The experience of animals showed that mankind could within certain limits receive a change of nature. And as in animals we should commonly elect the best for breeding, and destroy the others, so there must be a selection made of the human beings whose lives are worthy to be preserved.

We start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first, that the higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed out; secondly, that if the plan could be carried into execution we should be poorly recompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss of the best things in life. The greatest regard for the weakest and meanest of human beings—the infant, the criminal, the insane, the idiot—truly seems to us one of the noblest results of Christianity. We

have learned, though as yet imperfectly, that the individual man has an endless value in the sight of God, and that we honour Him when we honour the darkened and disfigured image of Him (cp. Laws xi. 931 A). This is the lesson which Christ taught in a figure when He said, 'their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven.' Such lessons are only partially realized in any age; they were foreign to the age of Plato, as they have very different degrees of strength in different times or countries of the Christian world. To the Greek the family was a religious and customary institution binding the members together by a tie inferior in strength to that of friendship, and having a less solemn and sacred sound than that of country. The relationship which existed on the lower level of custom, Plato imagined that he was raising to the higher level of nature and reason; while from the modern and Christian point of view we regard him as sanctioning murder and destroying the first principles of morality.

The great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference between man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being is regarded with the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier (v. 459 A), or at best of a slave-owner; the higher or human qualities are left out. The breeder of animals aims chiefly at size or speed or strength; in a few cases at courage or temper; most often the fitness of the animal for food is the great desideratum. But mankind are not bred to be eaten, nor yet for their superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing carts. Neither does the improvement of the human race consist in the increase of the bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of the mind. Hence there must be 'a marriage of true minds' as well as of bodies, of imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts. Men and women without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes; yet Plato takes away these qualities and adds nothing in their place, not even the desire of a noble offspring, since parents are not to know their own children. The most important transaction of social life, he who is the idealist philosopher, converts into the most brutal. For the pair are to have no relation to one another, except at the hymeneal festival; their children are not theirs, but the state's; nor is any tie of affection to unite them. Yet here the analogy of the animals might have saved Plato from a gigantic error, if he had 'not lost sight of his own illustration' (ii. 375 D). For the 'nobler sort of birds and beasts' (v. 459 A) nourish and protect their offspring and are faithful to one another.

An eminent physiologist thinks it worth while 'to try and place life on a physical basis.' But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon the physical? The higher comes first, then the lower; first the human and rational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely divided; nor is there any meaning when we are speaking of a composite nature like that of man, in opposing the two principles to one another. Neither is the moral the limit of the physical, but the expansion and enlargement of it—the highest form which the physical is capable of receiving. As Plato would say, the body does not take care of the body, and still less of the mind, but the mind takes care of both. In all human action not that which is common to man and the animals is the characteristic element, but that which distinguishes him from them. Even if we admit the physical basis, and resolve all virtue into health of body, '*la façon que notre sang circule,*' still on merely physical grounds we must come back to ideas. Mind and reason and duty and conscience, under these or other names, are always reappearing. There cannot be health of body without health of mind; nor health of mind without the sense of duty and the love of truth (cp. Charm. 156 D, E).

That the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations about marriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, does indeed appear surprizing. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato, as Mr. Grote remarks, should have entertained ideas of morality at variance with our own, but that he should have contradicted himself to an extent which is scarcely conceivable, falling in an instant from the height of idealism into the crudest animalism. Rejoicing in the newly found gift of reflection, he appears to have thought out (?) a subject about which he had better have followed the enlightened feeling of his own age. The general sentiment of Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old poets, and in later time the tragedians, showed no want of respect for the family, on which much of their religion was based. But the example of Sparta, and perhaps in some degree the tendency to defy public opinion, seems to have misled him. He will make one family out of all the families of the state. He will select the finest specimens of men and women and breed from these only.

Yet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of human nature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of philosophy as well as of poetry, and also because any departure from established morality, even where this is not intended, is apt to be un-

settling) it may be worth while to draw out a little more at length the objections to the Platonic marriage. In the first place history shows that wherever polygamy has been largely allowed the race has deteriorated. One man to one woman is the law of God and nature. All the great civilized peoples of the world at some period before the age of written records, have become monogamists; and the step when once taken has never been retraced. The exceptions allowed to a few individuals among Brahmins or Mahometans, are of that sort which may be said to prove the rule. The connexions formed between superior and inferior races hardly ever produce a noble offspring, because they are licentious. Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans to vice die out; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from other countries, or dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and aristocracies which have disregarded the laws of nature have decreased in numbers and degenerated in stature; 'marriages de convenance,' leave their enfeebling stamp on the offspring of them. (Cp. *King Lear*, Act i. Sc. 2.) The marriage of near relations, or the marrying in and in of the same family tends constantly to weakness or idiocy in the children, sometimes assuming the form as they grow older of passionate licentiousness. The common prostitute rarely has any offspring. By such unmistakable evidence is the authority of morality asserted in the relations of the sexes: and so many more elements enter into this 'mystery' than are dreamed of by Plato and some other philosophers.

Recent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among primitive tribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and that the captive taken by the spear, was the only wife or slave whom any man was permitted to call his own. The prevalence of such customs among some of the lower races of man, and the survival of peculiar ceremonies in the marriages of some civilized nations, are thought to furnish a proof of similar customs having been once universal. There can be no question that recent discoveries have considerably changed our views respecting the first appearance of man upon the earth. We know more about the aborigines of the world than formerly, but our increasing knowledge shows above all things how little we know. With all the helps which written monuments afford, we do but faintly realize the condition of man two thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what his condition was 200,000 or

300,000 years, when he was perhaps lower and nearer the animals than any tribe now existing upon the earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato and Aristotle (*Laws* iii. 676 foll., *Arist. Met.* xi. 8, 19, 20) may have been more right than we imagine in supposing that some forms of civilization were discovered and lost several times over. If we cannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded civilization, neither can we set any limits to the degeneracy of which the human race may be capable from war, disease, or isolation. And if we are to draw inferences about the origin of marriage from the practice of barbarous nations, we should also consider the remoter analogy of the animals. Many birds and animals, especially the carnivorous, have only one mate, and the love and care of offspring which seems to be natural is inconsistent with the primitive theory of marriage. If we go back to an imaginary state in which men were almost animals and the companions of them, we have perhaps as much right to argue from the animal to the human as from the barbarous to the civilized man. The record of animal life on the globe is fragmentary—the connecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied; the record of social life is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we admit that our first ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still the stages by which men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative civilization of China, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly unknown to us.

Such speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to shew that an institution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is only the growth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of marriage, and we are told that like the right of property, after many wars and contests, it has gradually arisen out of the selfishness of barbarians. We stand face to face with human nature in its primitive nakedness. We are compelled to accept, not the highest but the lowest account of the origin of human society. But on the other hand we may truly say that every step in human progress has been in the same direction, and that in the course of ages the idea of marriage and of the family has been more and more defined and consecrated. The civilized East is immeasurably in advance of any savage tribes; the Greeks and Romans have improved upon them; the Christian nations have been stricter in their views of the marriage relation than any of the ancients. In this as in so many other things,

instead of looking back with regret to the past, we should look forward with hope to the future. We must sanctify that which we believe to be the most holy, and that 'which is most useful will be the most holy.' There is more reason for maintaining the sacredness of the marriage tie, when we see the benefit of it, than when we only felt a vague religious horror about the violation of it. But in all times of transition, when established beliefs are being undermined, there is a danger that in the passage from the old to the new we may insensibly let go the moral principle, finding an excuse for listening to the voice of passion in the uncertainty of knowledge, or the fluctuations of opinion.

Strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there are the more important considerations of mind and character and soul. We know how human nature may be degraded; we do not know how by artificial means any improvement in the breed can be effected. The problem is a complex one, for if you go back four steps (and these at least enter into the composition of a child) there are commonly thirty-two progenitors to be taken into account. Many curious facts, rarely admitting of proof, are told us respecting the inheritance of disease or character from a remote ancestor. We can trace the physical resemblances of parents and children in the same family,

'Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat';

but scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both from their parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental peculiarities running in families, and again of a tendency, as in the animals, to revert to a common or original stock. But we have a difficulty in distinguishing what is a true inheritance of genius or other qualities, and what is mere imitation or the result of similar circumstances. Great men and great women have rarely had great fathers and mothers. Nothing that we know of in the circumstances of their birth or lineage will explain their appearance. Of the English poets of the last and two preceding centuries scarcely a descendant remains,—none have ever been distinguished. So deeply has nature hidden her secret, and so ridiculous is the fancy which has been entertained by some that we might in time by suitable marriage arrangements or, as Plato would have said, by an ingenious system of lots, produce a Shakespeare or a Milton. Even supposing that we could breed men having the tenacity of bulldogs.

or like the Spartans, 'lacking the wit to run away in battle,' would the world be any the better? Many of the noblest specimens of the human race have been among the weakest physically. Tyrtæus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would have been exposed at Sparta; and some of the fairest and strongest men and women have been among the wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device of uniting the strong and fair with the strong and fair, regardless of sentiment and morality, nor yet by his other device of combining dissimilar natures (Polit. 310 A), have mankind gradually passed from the brutality and licentiousness of primitive marriage to marriage Christian and civilized.

Few persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of mental and physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through them from some remoter ancestor, secondly from our race, thirdly from the general condition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is commoner than the remark, that 'So and so is like his father or his uncle'; and an aged person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in a youth to some long-forgotten ancestor, observing that 'Nature sometimes skips a generation.' Admitting the facts which are thus described in a general way, we may however observe that there is no method of difference by which they can be defined or estimated. Nor is there any practical use which can be made of them. It may very likely be true, that if we knew more about our ancestors, these similarities would be even more striking to us. But still they would constitute a very small part of each individual. What we have received from our ancestors is a mere fraction of what we are or become. In the matter of our birth as in our nature generally, there are previous circumstances which affect us. But upon this platform of necessity or within this wall of circumstances, we have still the power of creating a life for ourselves by the informing energy of the human will.

There is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a stranger. All the children born in his state are foundlings. It never occurred to him that the greater part of them, according to universal experience, would have perished. For children can only be brought up in families. There is a subtle sympathy between the mother and the child which cannot be supplied by other mothers, or 'strong nurses one or more' (Laws vii. 789 E). If Plato's 'pen' was as fatal as the Crèches of Paris, or the foundling hospital of Dublin, more than nine tenths of his children would have perished. There would have been

no need to expose or put out of the way the weaklier children, for they would have died of themselves. So emphatically does nature protest against the destruction of the family.

What Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken way to his ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the Spartan men and women were superior in form and strength to the other Greeks; and this superiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws and customs relating to marriage. He did not consider that the desire of a noble offspring was a passion among the Spartans, or that their physical superiority was to be attributed chiefly, not to their marriage customs, but to their temperance and training. He did not reflect that Sparta was great, not in consequence of the relaxation of morality, but in spite of it, by virtue of a political principle stronger far than existed in any other Grecian state. Least of all did he consider that Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens of the Greek race. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the love of liberty—all that has made Greece famous with posterity—were wanting among the Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or Aeschylus, or Sophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not allowed to appear above the state; the laws were fixed, and he had no business to alter or reform them. Yet whence has the progress of cities and nations arisen, if not from remarkable individuals, coming into the world we know not how, and from causes over which we have no control? Something too much may have been said in modern times of the value of individuality. But we can hardly condemn too strongly a system which instead of fostering the scattered seeds or sparks of genius and character, tends to smother and extinguish them.

Still, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither Christianity, nor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto been able to cope with this most difficult of social problems, and that the side from which Plato regarded it is that from which we turn away. Population is the most untameable force in the political and social world. Do we not find, especially in large cities, that the greatest hindrance to the amelioration of the poor is their improvidence in marriage?—a small fault truly, if not involving endless consequences. There are whole countries too, such as India, or, nearer home, Ireland, in which a right solution of the marriage question seems to lie at the foundation of the happiness of the community. There are too many

people on a given space, or they marry too early and bring into the world a sickly and half developed offspring; or owing to the very conditions of their existence, they become emaciated and hand on a similar life to their descendants. But who can oppose the voice of prudence to the 'mightiest passions of mankind' (Laws viii. 835 C), especially when they have been licensed by custom and religion? In addition to the influences of education, we seem to require some new principles of right and wrong in these matters, some force of opinion, which may indeed be already heard whispering in private, but has never affected the moral sentiments of mankind in general. We almost unavoidably lose sight of the principle of utility, just in that action of our lives in which we have the most need of it. The influences which we can bring to bear upon this question are chiefly indirect. In a generation or two, education, emigration, improvements in agriculture and manufactures, may have provided the solution. The state physician hardly likes to probe the wound: it is beyond his art; a matter which he cannot safely let alone, but which he dare not touch:

'We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.'

When again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day twenty-five or thirty years before on which under the fairest auspices, amid the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined hands with one another? In making such a reflection we are not opposing physical considerations to moral, but moral to physical; we are seeking to make the voice of reason heard, which drives us back from the extravagance of sentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is said by his biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage, because he knew that he was subject to hereditary consumption. This little fact suggests the reflection, that one person in a thousand did from a sense of duty what the other nine hundred and ninety-nine ought to have done, if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were about to bring into the world. If we could prevent such marriages without any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought; and the prohibition in the course of time would be protected by a 'horror naturalis' similar to that which, in all civilized ages and countries, has prevented

the marriage of near relations by blood. Mankind would have been the happier, if some things which are now allowed had from the beginning been denied to them; if the sanction of religion could have prohibited practices inimical to health; if sanitary principles could in early ages have been invested with a superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on in the world's history, we are no longer able to stamp at once with the impress of religion a new prohibition. A free agent cannot have his fancies regulated by law; and the execution of the law would be rendered impossible, owing to the uncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to be forbidden. Nor is there any reason to suppose that marriages are to any great extent influenced by considerations of this sort, which seem too distant to be able to make any head against the irresistible impulse of individual attachment. Lastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions in youth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the whole mind and nature which follow from them, the stimulus which the mere imagination gives to them, without feeling that there is something unsatisfactory in our method of treating them. That the most important influence on human life should be wholly left to chance or shrouded in mystery, and instead of being disciplined or understood, should be required to conform only to an external standard of propriety—cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a safe or satisfactory condition of human things.

Nor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere with higher aims. If there have been those who 'to party gave up what was meant for mankind,' there have certainly been those who to family gave up what was meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of children, the necessity of procuring money for their support, the flatteries of the rich by the poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the pride of birth or wealth, the tendency of family life to divert men from the pursuit of the ideal or the heroic, are as lowering in our own age as in that of Plato. And if we prefer to look at the gentle influences of home, the development of the affections, the amenities of society, the devotion of one member of a family for the good of the others, which form one side of the picture, we must not quarrel with him, or perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him, for having presented to us the reverse. Without attempting to defend Plato on grounds of morality, we may allow that there is an aspect of the world which has not unnaturally led him into error.

We hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all other abstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State seems to be built up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework in which family and social life is contained. But to Plato in his present mood of mind the family is only a disturbing influence which, instead of filling up, tends to disarrange the higher unity of the State. No organization is needed except a political, which is also a military one. The State is all-sufficing for the wants and feelings of man, and, like the idea of the Church in later ages, absorbs all interests and affections. In time of war the thousand citizens are to stand like a rampart impregnable against the world or the Persian host; in time of peace the preparation for war and their duties to the State, which are also their duties to one another, take up their whole life and time. The only other interest which is allowed to them besides that of war, is the interest of philosophy. When they are too old to be soldiers they are to retire from active life and to have a second novitiate of study and contemplation. There is an element of monasticism even in Plato's communism. If he could have done without children, he might have converted his Republic into a religious order. Neither in the *Laws* (v. 739 B), when the daylight of common sense breaks in upon him, does he retract his error. In the state of which he would be the founder, there is no marrying or giving in marriage: but because of the infirmity of mankind, he condescends to allow the law of nature to prevail.

(γ) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater paradox in reserve, which is summed up in the famous text, 'Until kings are philosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill.' And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who are capable of apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good; and to the attainment of this the second education is to be directed. Through a process of training which has already made them good citizens they are now to be made good legislators. We find with some surprise (not unlike the feeling which Aristotle in a well-known passage describes the hearers of Plato's lectures as experiencing, when they went to a discourse on the idea of good, expecting to be instructed in moral truths, and received instead of them arithmetical and mathematical formulæ) that Plato does not propose for his future legislators any study of finance or law or military tactics, but only of abstract mathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract conception of good.

We ask, with Aristotle, what is the use of a man knowing the idea of good, if he does not know what is good for this individual, this state, this condition of society? We cannot understand how Plato's legislators or guardians are to be fitted for their work of statesmen by the study of the five mathematical sciences. We vainly search in Plato's own writings for any explanation of this seeming absurdity.

The discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the mind with a prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of estimating its value. No metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly criticised his own speculations; in his own judgment they have been above criticism; nor has he understood that what appeared to him to be absolute truth may reappear in the next generation as a form of logic or an instrument of thought. And posterity have also sometimes equally misapprehended the real value of his speculations. They seem to them to have contributed nothing to the stock of human knowledge. The *idea* of good is apt to be regarded by the modern thinker as an unmeaning abstraction; but he forgets that this abstraction is waiting ready for use, and will hereafter be filled up by the divisions of knowledge. When mankind do not as yet know that the world is subject to law, the introduction of the mere conception of law or design or final cause, and the far-off anticipation of the harmony of knowledge, are great steps onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity of all things leads men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily affect their conception of human life and of politics, and also their own conduct and character. We can well imagine how a great mind like that of Pericles might derive a sort of elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras. To be struggling towards a higher but unattainable conception is a more favourable intellectual condition than to rest satisfied in a narrow portion of ascertained fact. And the earlier, which have sometimes been the greater ideas of science, are often lost sight of at a later period. How rarely can we say of any modern enquirer in the magnificent language of Plato, that 'He is the spectator of all time and of all existence!'

Nor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast metaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first enthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them everywhere, and to apply them in the most remote sphere. They do not understand that the experience of ages is required to enable them to fill up 'the intermediate

axioms.' Plato himself seems to have imagined that the truths of psychology, like those of astronomy and harmonics, would be arrived at by a process of deduction, and that the method which he has pursued in the Fourth Book, of inferring them from experience and the use of language, was imperfect and only provisional. But when, after having arrived at the idea of good, which is the end of the science of dialectic, he is asked, What is the nature, and what are the divisions of the science? he refuses to answer, and seems to imply that the state of knowledge which then existed in the world was not such as would allow the philosopher to enter into his final rest. The previous sciences must first be studied, and will, we may add, continue to be cultivated till the end of time, although in a sense far other than Plato could have conceived. But we may observe, that while he is aware of the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full of enthusiasm in the contemplation of it. Looking into the orb of light, he sees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated. The Hebrew prophet believed that faith in God would enable him to govern the world; the Greek philosopher imagined that contemplation of the good would make a legislator. There is as much to be filled up in the one case as in the other, and the one mode of conception is to the Israelite what the other is to the Greek. Both find a repose in a divine perfection, which, whether in a more personal or impersonal form, exists without them and independently of them, as well as within them.

There is no mention of the idea of good in the *Timæus*, nor of the divine Creator of the world in the *Republic*; and we are naturally led to ask in what relation they stand to one another? Is God above or below the idea of good? Or is the idea of good another mode of conceiving God? The latter seems to be the truer answer. To the Greek philosopher the perfection and unity of God was a far higher conception than his personality, which he hardly found a word to express, and which to him would have seemed to be borrowed from mythology. To the Christian, on the other hand, or to the modern thinker in general, it is difficult if not impossible to attach reality to what he terms mere abstraction; while to Plato this very abstraction is the truest and most real of all things. Hence, from a difference in forms of thought, Plato appears to be resting on a creation of his own mind only. But if we may be allowed to paraphrase the idea of good by the words 'intelligent principle of law and order in the universe, embracing equally

man and nature,' we find a meeting point between him and ourselves.

The question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is one that has not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of Europe and Asia there has been some one in the course of ages who has truly united the power of command with the power of thought and reflection, as there have been also many false combinations of these qualities. Some kind of speculative power is necessary both in practical and political life; like the rhetorician in the *Phaedrus*, men require to have a conception of the varieties of human character, and to be raised on great occasions above the commonplaces of ordinary life. Yet the idea of the philosopher-statesman has never been popular with the mass of mankind; partly because he cannot take the world into his confidence or make them understand the motives from which he acts; and also because they are jealous of a power which they do not understand. The revolution which human nature desires to effect step by step in many ages is likely to be precipitated by him in a single year or life. They fear also that in the pursuit of his greater aims he may disregard the common feelings of humanity. He is too apt to be looking into the distant future or back into the remote past, and unable to see actions or events which, to use an expression of Plato's, 'are tumbling out at his feet.' Besides, as Plato would say, there are other corruptions of these philosophical statesmen. Either 'the native hue of resolution is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,' and at the moment when action above all things is required he is undecided, or general principles are enunciated by him in order to cover some change of policy; or his ignorance of the world has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of others; or in some cases he has been converted into a courtier, enjoying the luxury of liberal opinions and accompanying them with illiberal actions. No wonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen of this class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we may be allowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, 'they have seen bad imitations of the philosopher-statesman.' But a man in whom the power of thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present, reaching forward to the future, 'such a one,' ruling in a constitutional state, 'they have not seen.'

But as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life,

so the ordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. When the face of the world is beginning to alter, he is still guided by his old maxims, and is the slave of his inveterate party prejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the times: instead of looking forwards he looks back; he learns nothing and forgets nothing; with 'wise saws and modern instances' he would stem the rising tide of revolution. He lives more and more within the circle of his own party, as the world without him becomes stronger. This seems to be the reason why the old order of things makes so poor a figure when confronted with the new, why churches can never reform, why most political changes are made blindly and convulsively. The great crises in the history of nations have often been met by an ecclesiastical positiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of principles which have lost their hold upon a nation. The fixed ideas of a reactionary statesman may be compared to madness; he grows more and more convinced of the truth of his notions as he becomes more isolated, and would rather await the inevitable than in any degree yield to circumstances.

(δ) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, would appear to be a confusion of ideas, identifies the individual and the state—ethics with politics. He thinks that to be most of a state which is most like one man, and in which the citizens have the greatest uniformity of character. He does not see that the analogy of the individual and the state is partly fallacious, and that the will or character of a state or nation is really the balance or rather the surplus of individual wills, which are limited by the condition of having to act in common. The movement of a body of men can never have the pliancy or facility of a single man; the freedom of the individual, which is limited, becomes an imperfect necessity when transferred to a nation. The power of action and feeling is necessarily weaker and more uncertain when they are diffused through a community; hence arises the often discussed question, 'Whether a nation, like an individual, can have a conscience?' We hesitate to say that the characters of nations are nothing more than the sum of the characters of the individuals who compose them; because there may be tendencies in individuals which react upon one another; or a whole nation may be wiser than any one man; or may be animated by some common opinion or feeling which could not equally have affected the mind of a single individual. Plato does not appear to have analysed the complications which arise out of the

collective action of mankind. He is capable of discerning many of the illusions of language and logic, but he is not capable of seeing that analogies, though specious as arguments, might often have no foundation in fact, or of distinguishing between what is intelligible or vividly present to the mind, and what is true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle, who is comparatively seldom imposed upon by false analogies. In like manner Plato cannot see the difference between the arts and the virtues—at least he is always arguing from one to the other. His notion of music is transferred from harmony of sounds to harmony of life: in this he is assisted by the ambiguities of language as well as by the prevalence of Pythagorean notions. And having once identified the individual with the state, he imagines that he will find the succession of states paralleled in the lives of individuals.

Still, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is attained. When the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to the mind, a great advance was made by the comparison of them with the arts; for virtue is partly art, and has an outward form as well as an inward principle. The harmony of music affords a lively image of the harmony of the world and of human life, and may be regarded as a splendid illustration which was naturally mistaken for a real analogy. In the same way the identification of ethics with politics has a tendency to give definiteness to ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble men's notions of the aims of government and of the duties of citizens; for ethics from one point of view may be conceived as an idealized law and politics; and politics, as ethics reduced to the conditions of human society. There have been evils which have arisen out of the attempt to identify them, and this has led to the separation or antagonism of them, which has been introduced by modern political writers. But we may also feel that something has been lost in their separation, and that the ancient philosophers who estimated the moral and intellectual wellbeing of mankind first, and the wealth of nations and individuals second, may have a salutary influence on some of the speculations of modern times. Many political maxims originate in a reaction against the opposite error; and when the errors against which they were directed have passed away, in their turn become errors.

III. Plato's views of education are in several respects remarkable; like the rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, beginning with the ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending

to after life. Plato is the first writer who distinctly expresses the thought that education is to comprehend the whole of life, and to be a preparation for another in which education is to begin again. This is the continuous thread which runs through the whole of the Republic, and which more than any other of his ideas admits of an application to modern life.

He has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is disposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are one and not many. Neither is he unwilling to admit the sensible world into his scheme of truth. Nor does he positively assert in the Republic the involuntariness of vice, which reappears, however, in the *Timaeus*, *Sophist*, and *Laws*. Nor do the so-called Platonic ideas recovered from a former state affect his theory of mental improvement. Still we observe in him the remains of the old Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be elicited from within, and is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of sense. Education will implant a principle of intelligence which is better than ten thousand eyes. There is also a trace of his old doctrine that the virtues are one, and of the Socratic notion that all virtue is knowledge; this is seen in the supremacy given to justice over the rest, and in the tendency to absorb the moral virtues in the intellectual, and to centre all goodness in the contemplation of the idea of good. The world of sense is still depreciated and identified with opinion, though admitted to be a shadow of the true, and to be the source from which the figures of geometry are derived. And in the Republic he has not altogether given up the involuntariness of vice; as is shown in the feeling that evil arises chiefly from ignorance, and by the tone in which the multitude is regarded as hardly responsible for what they do. A faint allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book (621 A); but Plato's views of education have no more real connection with a previous state of existence than our own; he only proposes to elicit from the mind that which is there already. His conception of education is represented, not like many modern views, under the image of filling a vessel, but of turning the eye of the soul towards the light.

He begins with music or literature, which he divides into true and false, and then goes on to gymnastics; he takes no notice of infancy in the Republic, though in the *Laws* he gives sage counsels about the nursing of children and the management of the mothers; and

would have an education which is even prior to birth. But in the Republic he begins with the age at which the child is capable of perceiving ideas, and boldly asserts, in language which sounds paradoxical to modern ears, that he must be taught the false before he can learn the true. The modern and ancient philosophical world are not agreed in their conceptions of truth and falsehood; the one identifies truth almost exclusively with fact, the other with ideas. There is a like difference between ourselves and Plato, which is, however, partly a difference of words. For we too should admit that a child must learn many lessons which he imperfectly understands; he must be taught some things in a figure only, and some perhaps which he can hardly be expected to believe when he grows older; but we should limit the use of fiction by the necessity of the case. Plato would draw the line somewhat differently; according to him the aim of early education is not truth as a matter of fact, but truth as a matter of principle; the child is to be taught first simple religious truths, and then simple moral truths, and insensibly to learn the lesson of good manners and good taste. He proposes an entire reformation of the old mythology; like Xenophanes and Heraclitus he is sensible of the deep chasm which separates his own age from Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and invests with an imaginary authority, but only for his own purposes. The lusts and treacheries of the gods are to be banished; the terrors of the world below are to be dispelled; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is not to be a model for youth. But there is another strain heard in Homer which may teach our youth endurance; and something may be learnt in medicine from the simple practice of the Homeric age. The principles on which religion is to be based are two only: first, that God is true; secondly, that he is good. Modern and Christian writers have often fallen short of these; they can hardly be said to have got beyond them.

Education, according to Plato, is to place youth in happy circumstances, in which no sights or sounds of evil, or allurements of passion, can hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They are to live in an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to be wafting to them the impressions of truth and goodness. Could such an education be realized, or even could religious education be bound up with truth and virtue and good manners and good taste, that would perhaps be the best hope of human improvement. Plato, like ourselves, is looking forward to changes

in the moral and religious world, and is preparing for them. He recognizes the danger of unsettling young men's minds, and doing away with the sacredness of one set of ideas before we have anything to put in their place which has an equal hold on the mind. There is to be an absence of excitement in the Platonic Republic, and for this reason dramatic representations are excluded. Plato does not wish to have his children taken to the theatre; he thinks that the effect on the spectators is bad, and on the actors still worse. His idea of education is that of harmonious growth, in which are learnt the lessons of temperance and endurance, and the body and mind develop in equal proportions. The great principle which is to be recognized in all art and nature, and is to hold sway in education, is simplicity.

The next stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period of muscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in music is extended to gymnastics; Plato is aware that the training of the body may be inconsistent with the training of the mind, and that bodily exercise may be easily overdone. Men are apt to have a headache or go to sleep at a lecture on philosophy, and this they attribute not to the true cause, which is the excess of bodily training, but to the nature of the subject. Two points are noticeable in Plato's theory of gymnastic:—First, that the time of learning them is entirely separated from the time of literary education. He seems to have thought that two things of an opposite and different nature could not be learnt at the same time. Here we can hardly agree with him, for, if we may judge by experience, the effect of spending three years between the ages of fourteen and seventeen in mere bodily exercise would be far from improving to the intellect. Secondly, he regards gymnastic not primarily as a training of the body, but of the mind, which is to discipline the passionate element, as music restrains the appetitive and calls forth the rational. His whole idea is based upon the notion that the body depends upon the mind, and is to be trained to its service. And doubtless the mind may exercise a very great and paramount influence over the body, if exerted not only at a particular moment, but in making preparation for the whole of life. Other writers had seen the error of Spartan discipline (Arist. Pol. viii. 4, 1 foll.; Thuc. ii. 37, 39). Plato was the first who asserted that music and gymnastic are not, as common opinion affirms, the one intended for the cultivation of the mind, the other of the body; but that they are both equally designed for the improvement of the mind.

The subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine, and this he further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern disbelief in medicine has led in this, as in some other departments of knowledge, to a demand for greater simplicity; physicians are becoming aware that they often make diseases 'greater and more complicated' by their treatment of them. (Rep. iv. 426 A). In two thousand years their art has made but slender progress; what they have gained in the analysis of the parts is in a great degree lost by their feebler conception of the human frame as a whole. They have attended more to the cure of diseases than to the conditions of health; and the improvements in medicine have been more than counterbalanced by the disuse of gymnastics. Until lately they have hardly thought of air and water, the importance of which was well understood by the ancients; as Aristotle remarks, 'air and water, being the elements which we most use, have the greatest effect upon health.' (Polit. vii. 11, 4.) For ages physicians have been under the dominion of prejudices which have only recently given way; and now there are as many opinions in medicine as in theology, and almost as much scepticism about them. Plato has several good notions about medicine;—according to him, 'the eye cannot be cured without the rest of the body, nor the body without the mind.' (Charm. 156 E.) No man of sense, he says in the Timaeus, would take physic; and we heartily sympathize with him in the Laws when he declares that 'the limbs of the rustic worn with toil will derive more benefit from warm baths than from the prescriptions of a not over wise doctor.' On the other hand, we can hardly praise him when, in obedience to the authority of Homer, he depreciates diet, or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he would get rid of invalid and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does not seem to have considered that the 'bridle of Theages' might be accompanied by qualities which were of far more value to the State than the health or strength of the citizens; or that the duty of taking care of the helpless might be an important element of education in a State. The physician himself (this is a delicate and subtle observation) should not be a man in robust health; he should have experience of disease in his own person, in order that his powers of observation may be quickened in the case of others.

The perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in which, again, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity. Greater matters are to be determined by the legislator, but lesser matters

are to be left to the temporary regulation of the citizens themselves. Plato is aware that *laissez faire* is an important element of government. The diseases of a State are like the heads of a hydra, which multiply when they are cut off. The true remedy for them is not extirpation but prevention. And the way to prevent them is to take care of education, and education will take care of all the rest. So in modern times men have often felt that the only political measure worth having, the only one which would produce any certain or lasting effect, was a measure of national education.

When the first training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the first trial of active life. But soon education is to begin again from a new point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and Seventh Books we have discussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence been led to form a higher conception of what was required of us. For true knowledge, according to Plato, is of abstractions, and has to do, not with particulars or individuals, but with universals only; not with the beauties of poetry, but with the ideas of philosophy. And the great aim of education is the cultivation of the habit of abstraction. This is to be acquired through the study of the mathematical sciences. They alone are capable of giving ideas of relation, and of arousing the dormant energies of thought.

Mathematics in Plato's age comprehended a very small part of that which is now included in them; but they also bore a much larger proportion to the sum of human knowledge. They were the only organon of thought which the human mind at that time possessed, and the only measure by which the chaos of particulars could be reduced to rule and order. The faculty which they trained was naturally at war with the poetical or imaginative; and hence to Plato the difference between him who knew and who did not know mathematics, is like the difference between an educated and uneducated man. They gave a new sense of power and seemed to have an inexhaustible application, partly because their true limits were not yet understood. These Plato himself is beginning to investigate; though not aware that numbers and figures are the abstractions of sense, he recognized that the figures of geometry borrow their forms from the sensible world. He also seeks to find the ultimate ground of mathematical ideas in the idea of good; though in his conception of the relation of ideas to numbers, he falls very far short of the definiteness attributed to him by Aristotle (Met. i. 8, 24, ix. 17). But if he

failed to recognize the true limits of mathematics, he has also reached a point beyond them; in his view, ideas of number became secondary to a higher conception of knowledge. The one, the self-proving, is the only perfect truth to which all things ascend, and in which they finally repose.

This self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no distinct explanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage in Greek philosophy. And yet such a vision may have an immense effect. Although the method of science cannot anticipate science, the idea of science in the future may be a great and inspiring principle in the mind. For in the pursuit of knowledge we are always pressing forward to something beyond us; and as a false conception of knowledge, for example, the scholastic philosophy, may lead men astray during many ages, so the true ideal, though vacant, may draw all their thoughts in a right direction. Whether the general expectation of knowledge, as this indefinite feeling may be termed, conforms truly to the laws of the mind, is of great importance; for a true conception of what knowledge ought to be may be often combined with a slender experience of facts. The correlation of the sciences, the consciousness of the unity of knowledge, the sense of the importance of classification, the unwillingness to stop short of certainty or to confound probability with truth, are important principles of the higher education. Although Plato could tell us nothing, and perhaps knew that he could tell us nothing, of the absolute truth, he has exercised an influence on human thought which even at the present day is not exhausted; and political and social questions may yet arise in which the thoughts of Plato may be read anew and receive a fresh meaning.

The *idea* of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces of it in other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and in this point of view may be compared with the creator of the Timaeus, who out of his goodness created all things. It corresponds to a certain extent with the modern conception of a law of nature, or of a final cause, or of both in one, and in this regard may be connected with the measure and symmetry of the Philebus. It is represented in the Symposium under the aspect of beauty, and is supposed to be attained there by stages of initiation, as here by regular gradations of knowledge. Viewed subjectively it is the process or science of dialectic. This is the science which, according to the Phaedrus, is the true basis of rhetoric, which alone is

able to distinguish the natures and classes of men and things; which divides a whole into the natural parts, and reunites the scattered parts into a natural or organized whole; which defines the abstract essences or universal ideas of all things and connects them; which pierces the veil of hypotheses and reaches the final cause or first principle of all; which regards the sciences in relation to the idea of good. This ideal science is the highest process of thought, and may be described as the mind talking to herself, and in another form is the everlasting question and answer—the ceaseless interrogative of Socrates. The dialogues of Plato are themselves the best examples of the nature and method of dialectic.

If we ask whether this science which Plato only half reveals to us is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is that they are not as yet distinguished in his mind. Nor has he determined whether his science of dialectic is at rest or in motion, concerned with the contemplation of absolute being, or with the process by which this is to be attained. Modern metaphysics may be described as the science of abstractions, or as the science of the evolution of thought; modern logic, when passing beyond the bounds of mere Aristotelian forms, may be defined as the science of method. The germ of both of them is contained in the Platonic dialectic; all metaphysicians have something in common with the ideas of Plato; all logicians have derived something from the method of Plato. But perhaps the nearest approach in modern philosophy to the universal science of Plato, is to be found in the Hegelian ‘succession of moments in the unity of the idea.’ Plato and Hegel alike seem to have conceived the world as the correlation of abstractions; and not impossibly they would have understood one another better than any of their commentators. There is, however, a difference between them: for whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one mind, which develops the stages of the idea in different countries or at different times in the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded only as an order of thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had not yet dawned upon him.

Many criticisms may be made on Plato’s theory of education. While in some respects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others he is in advance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which prevailed in his own time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered new ones. He does not see that education is relative to the

characters of individuals; he only desires to impress the same form of the state on the minds of all of them. He has no sufficient idea of the effect of literature on the formation of the mind, but he greatly exaggerates that of mathematics. He would put all impure sights and sounds out of the way of youth, but he does not seem to have considered that some degree of freedom is necessary for strengthening the character. His citizens would not have acquired that knowledge which in the Vision of Er is supposed to be gained by the pilgrims from their experience of evil. Neither is he aware of the power of habit: the thesis that good actions produce good habits, which is, perhaps, the greatest single principle of education, was first taught mankind, not by Plato, but by Aristotle.

On the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and theologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through life and will begin again in another. Following the precept of Solon, he would have 'every man grow old in learning many things,' although aware that some kinds of study could only be imposed upon the young. Himself ravished with the contemplation of the idea of good, and delighting in solid geometry (Rep. vii. 528) he has no difficulty in imagining that a lifetime might be passed happily in such pursuits. We who know how many more men of business there are in the world than real students or thinkers, are not equally sanguine. The education which he proposes for his citizens is really the ideal life of the philosopher or man of genius, interrupted for a time by application to practical duties—a life not for the many, but for the few.

Yet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to our own times. Even if regarded as an ideal which can be only partially realized, it may have a great effect in elevating the characters of mankind, and raising them above the routine of their ordinary occupation or profession. It is the best form under which we can conceive the whole of life. Nevertheless it is not easy to carry out Plato's thought in detail. For the education of after life is necessarily the education which each one gives himself. Men and women cannot be brought together in schools or colleges at forty or fifty years of age; and if they could the result would be disappointing. The destination of most men is what Plato would call 'the Den' for the whole of life, and with that they are content. Neither have they teachers or advisers with whom they can take counsel in riper years. There is no schoolmaster who

can tell them of their faults, or inspire them with the higher sense of duty, or with the ambition of success in life; no Socrates who will convict them of ignorance; no Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them of sin. Hence they have a difficulty in receiving the first element of improvement, which is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir them; they rather wish to rest than to pursue great objects. A few only who have come across great men and women, or eminent teachers of religion and morality, have received a second life from them, and have lighted a candle from the fire of their genius.

The want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons continue to improve in later years. They have not the will, and they do not know the way. Genius has been defined as 'the power of taking pains'; but hardly any one has the power of taking pains through a long life. The care of children, the business of making money, the demands of a profession destroy the elasticity of the mind. There is no pressing necessity to learn—the stock of Classics or History or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is enough for him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer to any one who asks how he is to improve? For self-education consists in a thousand things, commonplace enough in themselves,—in adding to what we are by nature something of what we are not; in learning to see ourselves as others see us; in seeking out the society of superior minds; in observation of life and character; in receiving kindly the natural influence of different times of life; in any act or thought which is distinctly raised above the common practice or opinions of men.

Yet if any one is desirous of attempting to carry out more in detail the suggestion of Plato, some such counsels as the following may be offered to him:—That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind most distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight, either one which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or, perhaps, furnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the speculative side the profession or business in which he is practically engaged. He may think seriously and with some degree of originality about his daily life. An hour a day passed in some scientific or literary pursuit will furnish as many facts as the memory can retain, and will give him 'a pleasure not to be repented of.' Neither need he form beforehand vast schemes never destined to be realized. Better to creep on quietly from one thing to another and to gain insensibly new

powers of mind and new interests in knowledge. But perhaps, as Plato would say, 'This is part of another subject' (Tim. 87 B); though we may also defend our digression by his example (Theaet. 72, 77).

IV. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic as the form of conveying thoughts which they could not definitely express, or which were beyond the horizon of their own age. The classical writing which approaches most nearly to the Republic is the 'De Republica' of Cicero; but neither in this nor in any other of his dialogues does he rival the art of Plato. Like Socrates he turns away from the phenomena of the heavens to civil and political life. He would rather not discuss the 'two Suns' of which all Rome was talking, when he can converse about forms of government. He would confine the terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice, and he will not concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But under the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the natural superior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to the soul ruling over the body. The two images of the just and the unjust are depicted by him and transferred to the state—Philus maintaining against his will the necessity of injustice as a principle of government, while Laelius supports the opposite thesis. His views of language and number are derived from Plato; like him, in the person of Scipio, he denounces the drama, and declares that if his life were to be twice as long he would have no time to read the lyric poets. The picture of democracy is translated by him word for word, though he has hardly shown himself able to 'carry the jest' of Plato. He converts into a stately sentence the humorous fancy about the animals, who 'are so imbued with the spirit of democracy that they make the passers by get out of their way' (i. 42). But his most remarkable imitation of Plato is the adaptation of the vision of Er, which is converted by Cicero into the 'Somnium Scipionis'; he has 'romanized' the myth of the Republic, adding an argument for the immortality of the soul taken not from the Republic but from the Phaedrus, and some other touches derived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus. Though a beautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the 'Somnium Scipionis' is very inferior to the vision of Er in dramatic power, and hardly allows the reader to suppose that the writer believes in his own description. Whether, as he says, his dialogues were framed on the model of the lost dialogues of Aristotle, or of Plato, to which they bear so many superficial resemblances, the

orator always appears in them; he is not conversing, but making speeches, and is never able to mould the intractable Latin to the grace and ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue. But if he is defective in form, much more is he inferior to the Greek in matter; he never in his philosophical writings leaves upon our minds the impression of an original thinker.

Plato's Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such an ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian world, and is embodied in St. Augustine's 'De Civitate Dei,' which is suggested by the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much as the Republic of Plato is, by the decline of Greek politics. He stands in much the same relation to contemporary Rome as Plato did to his contemporaries in Greece. In all such parallels there is a certain degree of resemblance and also of difference, and the Christian Church is even more an ideal than the Republic of Plato and further removed from any existing institution. In many other respects the resemblance between the Republic and the great work of St. Augustine is merely nominal. The 'Civitas Dei' is a controversial treatise which maintains the thesis that the destruction of the Roman Empire is due not to the rise of Christianity but to the corruption of paganism. He has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato has with Greek life, nor has he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which was to arise out of the ruins. The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of antiquarian learning and quotations, feeble in reasoning and criticism; entering little into the spirit of the ancient Roman life, but deeply penetrated with Christian ethics. He has no power such as Plato possessed of conceiving a different state of the world, or of feeling or understanding anything external to his own theology. Of all the ancient philosophers he is most attracted by Plato, though he is very slightly acquainted with his writings. He is inclined to believe that the idea of creation in the *Timæus* is derived from the narrative in Genesis; and he is strangely taken with the coincidence (?) of Plato's saying that 'the philosopher is the lover of God,' and the words of the Book of Exodus in which God reveals himself to Moses. (Exod. iii. 14.)

The 'Utopia' of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his genius, and shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book was written by him at the age of about 34, and is full of

the generous sentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the miserable state of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of the Roses, and in the dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is indignant at the existing state of society, at the luxury of the nobility and gentry, at the sufferings of the poor, at the calamities caused by war. To the eye of More the whole fabric of the world seemed to be in decay, and by the picture of society as it was, described in the First Book of the *Utopia*, he places in the Second Book the ideal state which by the help of Plato he had constructed. The times were full of stir and intellectual interest. The distant murmur of the Reformation was beginning to be heard. To minds like More's, Greek literature was a revelation: there had arisen an art of interpretation, and the New Testament was beginning to be understood as it had never been before, and not often since, in its natural sense. The state of society there depicted appeared to him wholly unlike that of Christian commonwealths, in which 'he saw nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich procuring their own commodities under the name and title of the Commonwealth.' He thought that Christ, like Plato, 'instituted all things common,' for which reason, he tells us, the citizens of *Utopia* were the more willing to receive his doctrines¹. The community of property is a fixed idea with him, though he is aware of the arguments which may be urged on the other side². We wonder how in the reign of Henry VIII, though veiled in another language and published in a foreign country, such speculations could have been endured.

He is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who succeeded him, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he is a worthy disciple of Plato. Like him starting from a small portion of fact, he founds his tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the Latin narrative of the voyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise about dates and facts, and has the art of making us believe that the narrator of the tale must have been an eyewitness. We are fairly puzzled by his

¹ 'Howbeit, I think this was no small help and furtherance in the matter, that they heard us say that Christ instituted among his all things common, and that the same community doth yet remain in the rightest Christian communities.' (*Utopia*, English Reprints, p. 144.)

² 'These things (I say), when I consider with myself, I hold well with Plato, and do nothing marvel that he would make no laws for them that refused those laws, whereby all men should have and enjoy equal portions of riches and commodities. For the wise man did easily foresee this to be the one and only way to the wealth of a community, if equality of all things should be brought in and established.' (*Ib.* pp. 67, 68.)

manner of mixing up real and imaginary persons; his boy John Clement and Peter Giles, the citizen of Antwerp, with whom he disputes about the precise words which are supposed to have been used by the (imaginary) Portuguese traveller, Raphael Hythloday. 'I have the more cause,' says Hythloday, 'to fear that my words shall not be believed, for that I know how difficultly and hardly I myself would have believed another man telling the same, if I had not myself seen it with mine own eyes.' Or again, 'If you had been with me in Utopia, and had presently seen their fashions and laws as I did which lived there five years and more, and would never have come thence, but only to make the new land known here,' etc. More greatly regrets that he forgot to ask Hythloday in what part of the world Utopia is situated; he 'would have spent no small sum of money rather than it should have escaped him,' and he begs Peter Giles to see Hythloday or write to him and obtain an answer to the question. After this we are not surprised to hear that a Professor of Divinity (perhaps 'a late famous vicar of Croydon in Surrey,' as the translator thinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a missionary by the High Bishop, 'yea, and that he may himself be made Bishop of Utopia, nothing doubting that he must obtain this Bishopric with suit; and he counteth that a godly suit which proceedeth not of the desire of honour or lucre, but only of a godly zeal.' The design may have failed through the disappearance of Hythloday, concerning whom we have 'very uncertain news' after his departure. There is no doubt, however, that he had told More and Giles the exact situation of the island, but unfortunately at the same moment More's attention, as he is reminded in a letter from Giles, was drawn off by a servant, and one of the company from a cold caught on shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles from hearing. And 'the secret has perished' with him; to this day the place of Utopia remains unknown.

The words of Phaedrus (275 B), 'O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or anything,' are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction. Yet the greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the originality of thought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices of his age, and far more tolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who believes not in the immortality of the soul to share in the administration of the state (cp. *Laws* x. 908 foll.), 'howbeit they put him to no punishment, because they be persuaded that it is in no man's power to believe what he list'; and 'no man is to be blamed for reasoning in support of

his own religion¹. In the public services 'no prayers be used, but such as every man may boldly pronounce without giving offence to any sect.' He says significantly (p. 143) 'There be that give worship to a man that was once of excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only as God, but also the chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest part, rejecting all these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, far above the capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed throughout all the world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the Father of all. To him alone they attribute the beginnings, the increasings, the proceedings, the changes, and the ends of all things. Neither give they any divine honours to any other than him.' So far was More from sharing the popular religious beliefs of his time.

Nor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral speculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he would set all sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including in the same class, priests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and 'sturdy and valiant beggars,' that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a day. His dislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of offenders; his detestation of priests and lawyers²; his remark that 'although every one may hear of ravenous dogs and wolves and cruel man-eaters, it is not easy to find states that are well and wisely governed,' curiously disagree with the notions of his age and with his own life. There are many points in which he shows a modern feeling and a prophetic insight like Plato. He is a sanitary reformer; he maintains that civilized states have a right to the soil of waste countries; he is inclined to the opinion which places happiness in virtuous pleasures, but herein, as he thinks, not disagreeing from those other philosophers who define virtue to be a life according to nature. His ceremonies before marriage; his *humane* proposal that war should

¹ 'One of our company in my presence was sharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began, against our wills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of Christ's religion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not only prefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn all other, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and devilish, and the children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus long reasoned the matter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and condemned him into exile, not as a despiser of religion, but as a seditious person and a raiser up of dissension among the people.' (p. 145.)

² Compare his satirical observation:—'They (the Utopians) have priests of exceeding holiness, and therefore very few.' (p. 150.)

be carried on by assassinating the leaders of the enemy, may be compared to some of the paradoxes of Plato. He has a charming fancy worthy of the *Timæus* that the Utopians learnt the language of the Greeks with the more readiness because they were originally of the same race with them. In several passages he alludes to Plato and quotes or adapts thoughts both from the *Republic* and from the *Timæus*. He prefers public duties to private, and is somewhat impatient of the importunity of relations. His citizens have no silver or gold of their own, but are ready enough to pay them to their mercenaries (cp. *Rep.* iv. 422, 423). There is nothing of which he is more contemptuous than the love of money. Gold is used for fetters of criminals, and diamonds and pearls for children's necklaces¹.

Like Plato he is full of satirical reflections on the governments of mankind and on the state of the world. He ridicules the new logic of his time; the Utopians could never be made to understand the doctrine of Second Intentions². He is very severe on the sports of the gentry; the Utopians count 'hunting the lowest, the vilest, and the most abject part of butchery.' He quotes the words of the *Republic* in which the philosopher is described 'standing out of the way under a wall until the driving storm of sleet and rain be overpast,' which admit of a singular application to More's own fate; although writing twenty years before (about the year 1514), he can hardly be supposed to have foreseen this. There is no touch of satire which strikes deeper than his quiet remark that the greater part of

¹ When the ambassadors came arrayed in gold and peacocks' feathers 'to the eyes of all the Utopians except very few, which had been in other countries for some reasonable cause, all that gorgeousness of apparel seemed shameful and reproachful. In so much that they most reverently saluted the vilest and most abject of them for lords—passing over the ambassadors themselves without any honour, judging them by their wearing of golden chains to be bondmen. You should have seen children also, that had cast away their pearls and precious stones, when they saw the like sticking upon the ambassadors' caps, dig and push their mothers under the sides, saying thus to them—"Look, mother, how great a lubber doth yet wear pearls and precious stones, as though he were a little child still." But the mother; yea and that also in good earnest: "Peace, son," saith she, "I think he be some of the ambassadors' fools.'" (p. 102.)

² 'For they have not devised one of all those rules of restrictions, amplifications, and suppositions, very wittily invented in the small *Logicals*, which here our children in every place do learn. Furthermore, they were never yet able to find out the second intentions; insomuch that none of them all could ever see man himself in common, as they call him, though he be (as you know) bigger than was ever any giant, yea, and pointed to of us even with our finger.' (p. 105.)

the precepts of Christ are more at variance with the lives of ordinary Christians than the discourse of Utopia¹.

The 'New Atlantis' is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to the 'Utopia.' The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in creative fancy, and by no means impresses the reader with a sense of credibility. In some places Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir Thomas More, as, for example, in the external state which he attributes to the governor of Solomon's House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to Sir Thomas More such external trappings appear simply ridiculous. Yet, after this programme of dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, 'that he had a look as though he pitied men.' Several things are borrowed from the Timæus; but he has injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and passages which are taken from the Hebrew Scriptures.

Other writings on ideal States, such as the 'De Monarchia' of Dante, which is a dream of another Roman Empire, existing by the side of the Papacy, and, like that, deriving authority immediately from God—the divine right of this second power is established in true scholastic form, and by quotations from Scripture and the classics); the 'Oceana' of Harrington in which the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described not as he was but as he ought to have been; the 'Argenis' of Barclay, which is a political allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth mentioning. The change of government in the time of the Commonwealth set men thinking about first principles, and gave rise to many works of this class. In the 'City of the Sun,' by Campanella, who wrote in the year 1623, a community of women and goods is established, and the principal magistrate, who is called the Sun, is elected after a strict examination in all kinds of science. This book is a very dull and inartistic performance; some of its worst features are a bad imitation of the Republic. There are no traces in Swift of an acquaintance with Plato. Nor do I observe any knowledge of his writings in Dante's 'De Monarchia,' which is in many ways the most remarkable of these modern works,

¹ 'And yet the most part of them is more dissident from the manners of the world now a days, than my communication was. But preachers, sly and wily men, following your counsel (as I suppose) because they saw men evil-willing to frame their manners to Christ's rule, they have wrested and wried his doctrine, and, like a rule of lead, have applied it to men's manners, that by some means at the least way, they might agree together.' (p. 66.)

though Dante is well acquainted with the Nicomachean Ethics and with Augustine's 'De Civitate Dei.'

Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that they are affected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor the other are immediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue flowing from them which tends to raise individuals above the common routine of society or trade, and to elevate States above the mere interests of commerce or the necessities of self-defence. Like the ideals of art they are partly framed by the omission of particulars; they require to be viewed at a certain distance, and are apt to fade away if we attempt to approach them. They gain an imaginary distinctness when embodied in a State or an individual, but still remain the visions of 'a world unrealized.' Most men live in a corner and see but a little way beyond their own home or place of occupation; they 'do not lift up their eyes to the hills'; they are not awake when the dawn appears. But in Plato, as from some 'tower of speculation,' we look into the distance and behold the future of the world and of philosophy. The ideal of the State and of the life of the philosopher; the ideal of an education continuing through life and extending equally to both sexes; the ideal of the unity and correlation of knowledge; the faith in good and immortality—are the vacant forms of light on which Plato is seeking to fix the eye of mankind.

THE REPUBLIC.

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES, *who is the narrator.*

GLAUCON.

ADEIMANTUS.

POLEMARCHUS.

CEPHALUS.

THRASYMACHUS.

CLEITOPHON.

And others who are mute auditors.

The scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole discourse is narrated the day after it actually took place to Timaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who all reappear in the Timaeus.

Steph.
327 I WENT down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I might offer up a prayer to the goddess; and also because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival of Bendis¹, which was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants; this, however, was equalled or even exceeded in beauty by that of the Thracians. When we had finished our prayers and the spectacle was over, we turned in the direction of the city; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus, who had caught sight of us at a distance as we were departing homewards, told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the cloak behind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.

I turned round, and asked him where his master was.

He is coming, said the youth, if you will only wait.

Certainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Pole-

¹ The Thracian Artemis.

marchus appeared, and with him Adeimantus, Glaucon's brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, and several others who had been at the procession.

Polemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are already on your way to the city.

You are not far wrong, I said.

But do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?

I do.

And are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where you are.

May there not be yet another possibility, I said, that we may persuade you to let us go?

But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.

Of course not, replied Glaucon.

Then we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.

Adeimantus added: Has no one told you that in the evening ³²⁸ there will be a torch-race with horses in honour of the goddess?

With horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will the horsemen carry torches and pass them one to another during the race?

Yes, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at night, which you certainly ought to see. If we rise from supper in good time we may see this, and we shall find youths enough there with whom we can talk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.

Glaucon said: I suppose that we must stay.

Well, as you please, I replied.

Accordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his brothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, Charmantides the Pæanian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was their father Cephalus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I thought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, having a garland on his head, for he had been holding a sacrifice in the court; and there were other chairs, arranged in a circle upon which we sat down by him. He welcomed me eagerly, and then he said:—

You don't come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought. For if I were able to go to you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I can hardly get to the city, and there-

fore you ought to come oftener to the Piræus. For, indeed, I find that at my time of life, as the pleasures and delights of the body fade away, the love of discourse grows upon me. I only wish that you would come oftener, and be with your young friends here, and make yourself altogether at home with us.

I replied: There is nothing which I like better, Cephalus, than conversing with aged men like yourself; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a journey which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire, whether the way is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I should like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call the 'threshold of old age'—Is life harder towards the end, or what report do you give of it?

329 I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Old men flock together; they are birds of a feather, as the proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but that is gone, and now life is no longer life. Some of them lament over the slights which are put upon them by relations, and then they tell you plaintively of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, they seem to blame what is not to blame; for if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt the same. Such however is not my experience, nor that of others whom I have known. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the question, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,—are you still the man you were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped that, and I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have often come into my mind since, and they seem to me still as good as at the time when I first heard them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, you have escaped from the control not of one mad master only, but of many. And of these regrets, as well as of the complaint about relations, Socrates, the cause is to be sought, not in men's ages, but in their characters and tempers; for he who

is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but he who is of an opposite disposition will find youth and age equally a burden.

I listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go on—Yes, Cephalus, I said; but I suspect that people in general do not believe you when you say this; they think that old age sits lightly upon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and wealth is well known to be a great comforter.

You are right, he replied; they do not believe me: and there is something in what they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as Themistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was famous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: ‘If ³³⁰ you had been an Athenian and I a Seriphian, neither of us would have been famous.’ And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the same reply may be made; for neither can a good poor man lightly bear age, nor can a bad rich man ever be at peace with himself.

May I ask, Cephalus, whether you inherited or acquired the greater part of your wealth?

Acquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of making money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my grandfather, whose name like my own was Cephalus, doubled and trebled the value of his inheritance; but my father Lysanias reduced the property below what I now have: and I shall be satisfied if I leave to my sons a little more than I received.

That was why I asked you the question, I said, because I saw that you were indifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have inherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; for the latter have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of money for the sake of use and enjoyment which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.

That is true, he said.

Yes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?—What do you consider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from wealth?

Not one, he said, of which I could easily convince others. For let me tell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death he has fears and cares which never entered into his mind before; the tales of a life below and the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were a laughing matter to him once, but now he is haunted with the thought that they may be true: either because of the feebleness of age, or from the nearness of the prospect, he seems to have a clearer view of the other world; suspicions and alarms crowd upon him, and he begins to reckon up in his own mind what wrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his transgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings.

331 But to him who is conscious of no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of age.

‘Hope,’ he says, ‘cherishes the soul of him who lives in holiness and righteousness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his journey;—hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.’

How admirable his words are! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive another, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the other world he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now the possession of wealth contributes greatly to truth and honesty; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, in my opinion to a man of sense this is the greatest.

That is excellent, Cephalus, I replied; but then is justice no more than this—to speak the truth and pay your debts? And even to this are there not exceptions? If I have received arms from a friend when in his right mind and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind, ought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought, any more than they would say that I ought always to speak the truth to one who is in his condition.

You are quite right, he replied.

But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice.

And yet, said Polemarchus, that is the definition which has the authority of Simonides.

I fear, said Cephalus, that I must look to the sacrifices; and therefore I now take leave of this argument, which I bequeath to you and Polemarchus.

Is not Polemarchus your heir? I said.

To be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.

Tell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and according to you truly say, about justice?

He said that the return of a debt is just, and in that he appears to me to be right.

I should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his meaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he certainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a deposit of arms or anything else to one who is not in his right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt. 332

True.

Then when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am not to make the return?

Certainly not.

Then Simonides did not mean to include that case when he said that justice was the payment of a debt?

Certainly not; for according to him a friend is under an obligation to do good to a friend and not evil.

I understand, I said, that the return of a deposit of gold to the injury of the receiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the return of a debt,—that is what you would imagine him to say?

Yes.

And are enemies also to have their debt or due?

To be sure, he said, they are to have what is due to them, and what is really due from an enemy to an enemy is that which is appropriate to him—that is to say, evil.

Simonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken of the nature of justice in a parable; for he really

meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is appropriate to him, and this he termed his debt or due.

That must have been his meaning, he said.

By heaven! I replied; and if he were asked what due or appropriate thing is given by medicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make?

He would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human bodies.

And what due or appropriate thing is given by cookery, and to whom?

Seasoning to food.

And what is that which justice gives, and to whom?

If, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding instances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to enemies.

That is his meaning then?

Yes.

And who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time of sickness?

The physician.

Or when they are on a voyage and amid the perils of the sea?

The pilot.

And in what sort of actions is the just man most able to do them good?

In wars and alliances.

But when a man is well there is no need of a physician?

No.

And he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?

No.

Then in time of peace justice will be of no use?

I am very far from thinking so.

333 Then you think that justice may be of use in peace as well as war?

Yes.

Like husbandry which acquires corn, or like shoemaking which acquires shoes,—that is what you would say?

Yes.

And what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?

In contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.
 And by contracts you mean partnerships?
 Exactly.

But is the just man or the skilful player a more useful or better partner at a game of draughts?

The skilful player.

And in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better partner than the builder?

Quite the reverse.

Then in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the harp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better partner than the just man?

In a money partnership.

But surely not in the use of money, Polemarchus; for you do not want a just man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is knowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?

Certainly.

And when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?

True.

Then what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be preferred?

When you want a deposit to be kept safely.

You mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?

Precisely.

That is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?

That is the inference.

And when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the individual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the vine-dresser?

Clearly.

And when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would say that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the soldier or of the musician?

Certainly.

And so of all other things;—justice is useful when they are useless, and useless when they are useful?

That is the inference.

Then justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is not he who can best strike any kind of blow whether fighting or boxing best able to ward any kind of blow?

Certainly.

And he who can prevent or elude¹ a disease is best able to create one?

True.

And he is the best guard of a position who is best able to
334 steal a march upon the enemy?

Certainly.

Then he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?

That, I suppose, is to be inferred.

Then if the just man is good at keeping, he is good at stealing money?

So the argument declares.

Then after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson which I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of Autolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his, affirms that

He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.

And so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is a thief; who steals however 'for the good of friends and for the harm of enemies,'—that was what you were saying?

No, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still stand by the latter words.

Well, there is another question: Are friends to be interpreted as real or seeming, enemies as real or seeming?

Surely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and to hate those whom he thinks evil.

Yes, but do not persons often err in their judgment of good and evil: many who are not good appear to them to be good, and conversely?

That is true.

Then to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends?

True.

¹ Reading φυλάξισθαι καὶ λαθεῖν.

And in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the good?

Apparently.

But the good are just and would not do an injustice?

True.

Then according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?

Nay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.

Then I suppose that they ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?

I like that better.

But see the consequence:—Many a man who is ignorant of the world has friends who are bad friends, and then he ought to do harm to them; and he has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying the very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.

That is true, he said; and I think that we had better correct an error into which we have fallen in the use of the words 'friend' and 'enemy.'

What was the error, Polemarchus? I replied.

The error lay in the assumption that he is a friend who seems or is thought good.

And how is the error to be corrected?

We should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and that he who seems only, and is not good, 335 only seems to be and is not a friend; and of an enemy the same may be said.

You would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?

Yes.

And instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to your friends and harm to your enemies, you would now say, It is just to do good to your friends when they are good and harm to your enemies when they are evil?

Yes, that appears to me to be the truth.

But then ought the just to injure any one at all?

Undoubtedly he ought to injure the wicked who are his enemies.

And when horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?

The latter.

Deteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?

Yes, of horses.

And dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?

Of course.

And will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper virtue of man?

Certainly.

And that human virtue is justice?

To be sure.

Then men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?

That is the result.

But can the musician by his art make men unmusical?

Certainly not.

Or the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?

Impossible.

And can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the good by virtue make them bad?

Assuredly not.

Nor can heat produce cold?

No.

Nor drought moisture?

Never.

Nor can the good harm any one?

Clearly not.

And the just is the good?

Certainly.

Then to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of the opposite, who is the unjust?

I think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.

Then if a man says that justice consists in repaying a debt, meaning that a just man ought to do good to his friends and injure his enemies, he is not really wise; for he says what is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.

I agree with you, said Polemarchus.

Then you and I are prepared to take up arms against any

one who attributes such a saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?

I am quite ready to join with you, he said.

Shall I whisper in your ear whose I believe the saying to be? 336

Whose?

I believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some other rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, first said that justice is doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies.

Most true, he said.

Yes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can be offered?

Several times in the middle of our discourse Thrasymachus had made an attempt to get the argument into his hands, and had been put down by the rest of the company, who wanted to hear the end. But when I had done speaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and, gathering himself up like a wild beast, he came at us seeking to devour us. Polemarchus and I cowered in terror.

What folly has possessed you, Socrates? he said, with a roar. Why have you been knocking under to one another in this silly way? I say that if you want to know what justice really is, you should answer and not ask, and you should not pride yourself in refuting others, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And do not tell me that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for that sort of watery stuff will not do for me; I must and will have a precise answer.

I was panic-stricken at these words, and trembled at the very look of him; and I verily believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been deprived of utterance: but now, when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and therefore I was able to reply to him.

Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, have mercy on us. If Polemarchus and I have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, I can assure you that the error was unintentional; and you, in your wisdom, should have pity upon us, and not be angry with us. If we were seeking for gold, you would not imagine that we were pretending only, or knocking under, as

you say, out of foolish complaisance to one another, and so losing our chance of finding it. Do not imagine, then, that we are only pretending to seek for justice, which is a treasure far more precious than gold.

337 How characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter laugh; —that's your ironical way! Did I not foresee—did I not tell you all, that he would refuse to answer, and try irony or any other shift, in order that he might avoid answering?

You are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit the person whom you ask from answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three, 'for this sort of nonsense will not do for me,'—then obviously, if that is your way of putting the question to him, neither he nor any one can answer. And suppose he were to say, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? And if the true answer to the question is one of these numbers which you interdict, am I to say some other number which is not the right one?—is that your meaning?' How would you answer him?

Just as if the two cases were alike, he said.

Why should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to be so to the person who is asked, can he to whom the question is put avoid saying what he thinks, whether you and I forbid him or not?

I presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?

I dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve of any of them.

But what if I give you a new and better answer, he said, than any of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?

Done to me! I can but suffer the penalty of ignorance; and the penalty is to learn from the wise—that is what I deserve to have done to me.

What, and no payment! a pleasant notion!

I will pay when I have the money, I replied.

But you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no anxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.

Yes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does—

not answer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else.

Why, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says that he knows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is told by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the speaker should be one who like yourself professes that he knows 338 and can tell; and I must earnestly request that you will kindly answer, for the edification of the company and of myself.

Glaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as any one might see, was really eager to speak; for he thought that he had an excellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to insist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the wisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of others, to whom he never even says Thank you.

That I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I wholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I have; and how ready I am to praise any one who speaks well you will very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer well.

Listen, then, he said; I proclaim that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me?

Let me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of the stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to say that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, who is stronger than we are, finds the eating of beef for his interest, that to eat beef is equally for our interest who are weaker than he is, and right and just for us?

That's abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which is most damaging to the argument.

Not at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish that you would be a little clearer.

Well, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are tyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?

Yes, I know that.

And the government is that which has power in each state?

Certainly.

And the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, they deliver to their subjects as justice, and punish him who transgresses them as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is neither more nor less than the interest of the government; and as the government must be
339 supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice which is the interest of the stronger.

Now I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to learn. But let me first remark, that in describing justice you have yourself used the word 'interest' which you forbade me to use. I do not, however, deny that in your definition the words 'of the stronger' are added.

A slight addition you must allow, he said.

Great or small, never mind that; the simple question is, whether what you are saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of some sort, but we are not agreed as to the additional words 'of the stronger;' and this is the point which I will now examine.

Proceed.

I will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey their rulers?

I do.

But are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes liable to err?

To be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.

Then in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, but they are not always right?

True.

When they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when they are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?

Yes.

And the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,—and that is what you call justice?

Doubtless.

Then justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest of the stronger but the reverse?

What are you saying? he asked flurriedly.

I am repeating what you were saying, I believe. But let us consider. Have we not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in what they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been admitted?

Yes.

Then you must also have acknowledged that justice is not the interest of the stronger, when the rulers who are stronger unintentionally command that which is to their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the subject renders to their commands, in that case, O thou wisest of men, is there any escape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do not what is for the interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?

Nothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.

Yes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are admitted as his witness. 340

But there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself acknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own interest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.

Yes, Polemarchus,—Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was commanded by their rulers was just.

Yes, but he also said that justice was the interest of the stronger, and, while admitting both these propositions, he further admitted that the stronger commands what is not for his own interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the interest of the stronger.

But, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the stronger thought to be his interest, in which the weaker was to obey him; and this was affirmed to be justice.

That was not what he said, rejoined Polemarchus.

Never mind, I replied, if Thrasymachus says so now, let us accept his statement. Tell me, I said, turning to Thrasymachus,

did you mean by justice what the stronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?

Certainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the stronger at the time when he is mistaken?

Yes, I said, I supposed that to be your meaning when you admitted that the ruler was not infallible and might be mistaken.

You are a slanderer, Socrates. Pray do you imagine that he who is mistaken about the sick is a physician in so far as he is mistaken and at the time that he is mistaken? or that he who errs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian in so far as he is mistaken and at the time that he is mistaken? True, we say that the arithmetician or grammarian or physician has made a mistake, but this is only a way of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other person of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies; they all of them err only when their skill fails them. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what his name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common mode of speaking. But the more precise expression, since you will have precision, is that the ruler, as ruler, is unerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own interest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore, as I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.

Indeed, Thrasymachus, and do you really think that I am a slanderer?

Certainly, he replied.

And do you suppose that I ask these questions with any special design of injuring you?

Nay, he replied, I am quite sure of it; and your dishonesty shall do you no good, for I shall detect you, and when detected you will be defeated.

I shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid anything of the kind occurring between us again, please to say, when you speak of a ruler or stronger whose interest the weaker is required to execute, do you speak of a ruler in the popular or in the strict sense of the term?

The ruler in the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat

and deceive if you can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you won't be able.

And do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat Thrasymachus? I might as well try to shave a lion.

Why, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.

Enough, I said, of these civilities. I would rather ask you a question: Is the physician, in that strict sense of which you are speaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now speaking of the true physician.

A healer of the sick, he replied.

And the pilot—that is to say, the true pilot—is he a captain of sailors or a mere sailor?

A captain of sailors.

The circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be reckoned; this is an accident only, and has nothing to do with the name pilot, which is significant of his skill and of his authority.

Very true, he said.

Now, I said, each of these has an interest?

Certainly.

And the art has to find and provide for this interest?

Yes, that is the aim of the art.

And the interest of each of the arts is the perfection of each of them; nothing but that?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you were to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply: Certainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured, and has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is the origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?

Quite right, he replied.

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But is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality in the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of hearing, and, in consequence of this defect, require another art to provide for the interests of seeing

and hearing? Has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to provide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have the arts only to look after their own interests? Or have they no need either of themselves or of another?—having no faults or defects, they have no need to correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other—that is not required of them for the preservation of their interests; they have only to consider the interest of their subject-matter, for every art remains pure and faultless while remaining true—that is to say, while perfect and unimpaired? Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me whether I am not right.

Yes, clearly.

Then medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of the body?

True, he said.

Nor does farriery consider the interests of farriery, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care for themselves, for they have no needs, but they care only for that which is the subject of their art?

True, he said.

But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own subjects?

To this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.

Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?

He acquiesced in this too after a feint of resistance.

Then, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his own good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true physician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere money-maker; that has been admitted?

Yes.

And the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors and not a mere sailor?

That has been admitted.

And such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the

interest of the sailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler's interest?

He gave a very reluctant 'Yes.'

Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject and of his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.

When we had got to this point in the argument, and every 343 one saw that the definition of justice had been completely reversed, Thrasymachus, instead of replying to me, said: I want to know, Socrates, whether you have a nurse?

Why do you ask such a question, I said, instead of answering as you ought?

Why, because she leaves you to drivel, and never wipes your nose: her baby has not even been taught by her to know the shepherd from the sheep.

What makes you say that? I replied.

Because you fancy that the shepherd or neat-herd fattens or tends the sheep or oxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his master; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, who are true rulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying their own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in the very rudiments of justice and injustice as not even to know that justice and the just are in reality another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; whereas the reverse is the truth in the case of injustice; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the stronger, and his subjects do what is for his benefit, and minister to his happiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most foolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that the unjust man has always more and the just less. Next, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe

also that when they come into office, there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, but he will not compensate himself out of the public purse, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways. Now all this is reversed in the case of the unjust man. I am speaking, as before, of
344 injustice on a large scale in which the advantage of the unjust is most apparent, and my meaning will be most clearly seen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the happiest of men, as the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the most miserable—I mean tyranny, which by fraud and force takes away the property of others, not retail but wholesale; comprehending in one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for any one of which acts of wrong, if he were detected perpetrating them singly, he would be punished and incur great dishonour; since they who are guilty of any of these crimes in single instances are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and swindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the citizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these dishonourable names, he is called happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of his having achieved the consummation of injustice. For injustice is censured because the censurers are afraid of suffering, and not from any fear which they have of doing injustice. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.

Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bathman, deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not allow this, and they compelled him to remain and defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your words! And are you going away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man's life such a small matter in your eyes—to determine the way in which life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?

My reason is that I do not agree with you, he replied ¹.

Or rather you have no care or thought about us, Thrasy-machus, I said; and whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, be obliging and exhibit your wisdom to us; any benefit which is conferred on a large party such as this is will not be unrewarded. For my own part I openly declare ³⁴⁵ that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament as myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasy-machus, if you will look back at what preceded, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd, and you thought that in so far as he is a shepherd he tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but as a mere feaster or diner with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader with a view to the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since what is best for his art has been already provided when the duties of the shepherd are adequately fulfilled. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I imagined that the art of the ruler, considered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or sub-

¹ Or with a question: Do you suppose that I deny that?

jects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in states—and you are speaking of the true rulers—enjoy being in authority.

Think! Nay, I am sure of that.

Then why in lesser offices do men never take office willingly or without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for
346 the advantage of others and have no interest of their own? Let me ask you a question: Does not the difference of arts consist in their having different functions? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.

Yes, that is the difference, he replied.

And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one—health, for example, is the good of medicine; safety at sea is the good of navigation?

Yes, he said.

And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts; because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage, you would not say that navigation is the art of medicine—that is to say, if language is to be used in your exact manner?

Certainly not, he said.

Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that medicine is the art of payment?

No, he said.

Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

Certainly not.

And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

Yes.

Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

True, he replied.

And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?

He gave a reluctant assent to this.

Then the pay is not derived by the artists from their respec-

tive arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid?

I suppose not.

But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

Certainly, he confers one.

Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger—to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern without an equivalent; since the true artist obeys the rules of his art, ³⁴⁷ and does his work and gives his orders, never for himself or his own interest, but always for that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing.

How is that, Socrates? said Glaucon. The two first modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are said to be and are a disgrace?

Very true.

And for this reason money and honour have no attraction for them; they do not wish to be directly paid for governing and so get the name of hirelings, nor by indirectly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honour; and therefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment.

And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been thought dishonourable. Now he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself, than which no punishment can be greater. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help; nor under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For the probability is that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and every wise man will therefore choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest of the stronger. That, however, is a question which I will not now further discuss; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be a far more serious matter. Which of us is right, Glaucon? And which sort of life do you deem the most advantageous?

The life of the just, he answered.

348 Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

Yes, I heard him, but I was not convinced by him.

And would you desire to convince him, if we can only find a way, that he is saying what is not true?

Most certainly, he replied.

If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoice, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods that are claimed on either side, and the end will be that we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.

Very good, he said.

And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.

That which you propose.

Well then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose that you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than justice?

Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.

And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

Certainly.

I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice no.

What else then?

The opposite, he replied.

And would you call justice vice?

No, I would rather say sublime simplicity.

Then would you call injustice malignity?

No; I would rather say discretion.

And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing states and nations; but I dare say that you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if undetected has its profits, though they are not worth mentioning when compared with the advantages which I have just mentioned.

I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasy-machus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

Certainly, I do class them as you suppose.

Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost un-answerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you or by other men to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice strong and honourable, and to the unjust you will assign all the qualities which were assigned by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice as wisdom and virtue. 349

That is exactly the truth, he replied.

Now, I said, I see that you are speaking your mind, and therefore I do not shrink from the argument; for I do believe, Thrasymachus, that now you are in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

What is it to you, he said, whether I am in earnest or not? your business is to refute the argument.

Very true, I said; and will you be so good then as to answer another question?—Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he is.

And would he try to do more than is just?

He would not.

And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

He would think that just, and would try to gain the advantage. But he could not.

Whether he could or could not, I said, is not the question. I simply asked whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

Yes, he would.

And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

Of course, he said, he claims to have and do more than all men.

And the unjust man will desire and do more than the unjust man, and will strive to get more than all?

True.

Let us put the matter thus, I said; the just does not desire more than his like but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both like and unlike.

Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

And the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?

Good again, he said.

And is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?

Of course, he said, he who is just is like the just, and the unjust is like the unjust.

Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?

Certainly, he replied.

Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

Yes.

And the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is unwise?

True.

And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is unwise?

Yes.

And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

Yes.

And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre would desire or claim to exceed or have the advantage of a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

I do not think that he would.

But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?

Of course.

And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing 350 meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the art of medicine?

He would not.

But he would wish to exceed the non-physician?

Yes.

And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

That, I suppose, is not to be denied.

And what would you say of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

That, I suppose, must be as you say.

And the knowing is wise?

Yes.

And the wise is good?

True.

Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike?

That is evident.

Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

Yes.

But did you not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust exceeds both his like and unlike?

Yes, I did.

And you also said that the just will not exceed his like but his unlike?

Yes.

Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

That is the inference.

And each of them is such as his like is?

That was admitted.

Then the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and ignorant.

Thrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; he perspired extraordinarily, the day being hot; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point. Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength; do you remember?

Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are now saying or have no answer; if I do not answer, that is because I know you would accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer 'Go on,' as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod 'Yes' and 'No.'

Surely not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.

Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?

Nothing in the world, I said ; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

Proceed.

Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance ; no one can be any longer blind to that. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a new way. You would not deny that a state may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection ?

True, he replied ; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust state will be most likely to do so.

I know, I said, that such was your position ; but what I would further consider is, whether this power can be exercised without justice or only with justice.

If you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice ; but if I am right, then without justice.

I am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding 'Yes' and 'No,' but making answers that are quite excellent.

That is out of courtesy to you, he replied.

And very good of you too, I said ; would you have the goodness also to inform me, whether you think that an army, or a band of robbers and thieves, or any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another ?

No indeed, he said, they could not.

But if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act better ?

Yes.

And this is because from injustice spring divisions and hatreds and fighting, as from justice harmony and friendship ; is not that true, Thrasymachus ?

I agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.

How good of you, I said ; but I should like to know also, if the effect of injustice is to cause hatred, will not injustice, whether existing among slaves or freemen, make them hate one

another and set them at variance and render them incapable of common action ?

Certainly.

And even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight, and become enemies to one another and to the just ?

They will.

And suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that she loses or that she retains her natural power ?

Let us say that she retains her power.

Yet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever she takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any other body, that body is, to
352 begin with, rendered incapable of united action by reason of sedition and distraction ; and also becomes its own enemy and at variance with all that opposes it, and with the just ? Is not this the case ?

Yes, certainly.

And is not injustice equally suicidal when existing in an individual ; in the first place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with himself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just ? Is not that true, Thrasymachus ?

Yes.

And O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just ?

I et us assume that they are.

Then, as the gods are just, he will also be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be the friend of the gods ?

Take your fill of the argument, and fear nothing ; I will not oppose you, lest I should displease the company.

Well then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the rest of my feast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better and abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action ; nay more, that to speak as we did of evil-doers ever acting vigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil, they would have laid hands upon one another ; but there must evidently have been some remnant of justice in them, or they would have injured one another as well as their victims, and then they would

have been unable to act together; they were but semi-villainous, for had they been whole villains, wholly unjust, they would have been wholly incapable of action. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said at first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust is a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they have, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to examine further, for this is no light matter, concerning nothing less than the true rule of life.

Proceed.

I will proceed by asking a question: Would you not think that a horse has some end?

I should.

And the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I do not understand, he said.

Let me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?

Certainly not.

Or hear, except with the ear?

No.

These then are the ends of these faculties?

They are.

But you can cut off a vine-branch with a carving-knife or with 353 a chisel?

Of course.

And yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?

True.

May we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?

We may.

Then now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I said that the end of anything was that which could not be accomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?

I understand your meaning, he said, and assent.

And as all things have ends, have they not also excellences? Need I ask again whether the eye has an end?

It has.

And has not the eye an excellence?

Yes.

And the ear has an end and an excellence also?

True.

And the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a special excellence?

That is so.

Well, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper excellence and have a defect instead?

How can they, he said, if they are blind?

You mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but I have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more generally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil them by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own defect?

Certainly, he replied.

I might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence they cannot fulfil their end?

True.

And the same observation will apply to all other things?

I agree.

And has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example, to superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these peculiar to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?

To no other.

And is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?

Assuredly, he said.

And has not the soul an excellence also?

Yes.

And can she or can she not fulfil her ends when deprived of that excellence?

She cannot.

Then an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler, and the good soul a good ruler?

Yes, necessarily.

And we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice the defect of the soul?

That has been admitted.

Then the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will live ill?

That is what your argument proves.

And he who lives well will be blessed and happy, and he who 354 lives ill the reverse of happy?

Certainly.

Then the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?

Granted.

But happiness and not misery is profitable. Then, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than justice.

Let this, Socrates, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.

And for this I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle towards me and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained; but that was my own fault and not yours. I may liken myself to an epicure who snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table before he has fairly enjoyed the one before; and this has been the case with me. For before I had discovered the nature of justice, I left that enquiry and proceeded to consider whether justice was virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and then arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, and I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of all is that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.

BOOK II.

Steph. 357 WITH these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion ; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is at all times the boldest of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement ; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me : Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust ?

I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.

Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now :—How would you arrange goods—are there not some which are desirable in themselves, and independently of their results, as, for example, mere innocent pleasures and enjoyments, upon which nothing follows ?

I think that there is such a class, I replied.

Is there not also a second class of goods which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results, such as knowledge, sight, health ?

Certainly, I said.

Thirdly, would you recognize a class of goods troublesome in themselves, yet profitable to us ; such, for example, as gymnastic exercises, or the healing and treatment of disease, and the business of money-making, which no one would choose for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward or result of them ?

There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask ?

Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice ?

358 In the highest class, I replied,—among those goods which he who is to be happy desires for their own sakes as well as for their results.

Then the many are of another mind ; they think that justice is of the troublesome class of goods, which are to be pursued for the sake of rewards and reputation, but in themselves are rather to be avoided.

I know, I said, that this is their doctrine, and this was also the sentiment of Thrasymachus, when originally he blamed justice and praised injustice ; but I am slow of understanding.

I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me to have been charmed by your voice, like a snake, sooner than he ought to have been ; and I am not yet satisfied with the account which has been given of the nature of justice and injustice. The rewards and results of them I leave ; but I want to know what they are themselves, and what power they have in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so against their will, deeming it not a good but a necessity. And thirdly, I will maintain that there is reason in this, for the life of the unjust is better far than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my ears ; and, on the other hand, I have never yet heard the thesis that justice is better than injustice maintained in a satisfactory way. If I could hear the praises of justice and injustice considered in themselves, then I should be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I expect to hear this ; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and the manner in which I speak will indicate also the manner in which I desire to hear you praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal ?

Indeed I do ; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would oftener wish to converse.

I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking of the nature and origin of justice.

They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good ; to suffer injustice, evil ; but that the evil is greater than the good. And

when men have done and suffered and had experience of both, 359 not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree with one another to have neither, and thence arise laws and covenants among them; and that which is ordained by law they term lawful and just. This, as they affirm, is the origin and nature of justice;—there is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do and not to suffer injustice, and the worst of all, which is to suffer without the power of retaliation; and justice, being in a mean between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.

Now that justice is only the inability to do injustice will best appear if we imagine something of this kind: suppose we give both the just and the unjust entire liberty to do what they will, and let us attend and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall detect the just man in the very act; the just and unjust will be found going the same way—following their interest, which all natures follow as a good, and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are supposing may be most conveniently given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian¹. According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia, and, while he was in the field, there was a storm and earthquake which made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report concerning the flock to the king; and into their

¹ Reading Γύγη τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ πρόγονοι.

assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring towards the inner side of his hand, when instantly he became invisible, and the others began to speak of him as if he were no longer there. He was astonished at this, and again touching 360 the ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; thereupon he made trials of the ring, and always with the same result; when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Perceiving this, he immediately contrived to be chosen one of the messengers sent to the court, where he no sooner arrived than he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man, they say, is of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would endure to be honest when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both take the same road. And this is surely a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one having this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might be sufferers of injustice. Enough of this.

Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to be

perfected for the fulfilment of their respective parts. First, let the unjust be like other distinguished masters of crafts; like the
 361 skilful pilot or physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and attempts only what is within their limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and keep in the dark if he means to be great in his injustice: (he who is detected is nobody:) for the highest reach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to have gained the greatest reputation for justice. If he has taken a false step he must be able to retrieve himself, being one who can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and force his way where force is required, and having gifts of courage and strength, and command of money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and simplicity, being, as Aeschylus says, and not seeming. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life very different from that of the last. Let him be the best of men, and be esteemed to be the worst; then let us see whether his virtue is proof against infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. Then when both have reached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.

Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.

I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. But as you may think the description of this a little too coarse, I will ask you to fancy, Socrates, that the words which follow are not mine. Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice. They will tell you

that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked, bound—will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every kind of evil, he will be impaled. Then he will understand that he ought to seem only, and not to be, just; and that the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken ³⁶² of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; at any rate, he does not live with a view to appearances—he wants to be really unjust and not to seem only:—

‘His mind has a soil deep and fertile,
Out of which spring his prudent counsels ¹.’

In the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings about injustice; and in every contest, whether public or private, he gets the better of his antagonists, and has gains, and is rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies; moreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly and magnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to honour in far better style than the just, which is a very good reason why he should be dearer to the gods than the just. And thus, Socrates, gods and men unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.

I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is nothing more to be urged?

Why, what else is there? I answered.

The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.

Well, then, according to the proverb, ‘Let brother help brother;’ and if he fails in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from me the power of helping justice.

Nonsense, he replied; I want you to hear the converse of Glaucon’s argument, which is equally required in order to bring

¹ Seven against Thebes, 574.

out what I believe to be his meaning ; I mean the argument of those who praise justice and censure injustice, with a view to their consequences only. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that they are to be just ;
 363 but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of character and reputation ; in the hope of obtaining some of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the unjust from a fair reputation. More, however, is made of appearances by this class than by the others ; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious ; and this accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that for the just the gods make—

‘The oaks to bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the middle ;
 And the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their own fleeces¹ ;’

and many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a very similar strain ; for he speaks of one whose fame is—

‘As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god,
 Maintains justice ; to whom the black earth brings forth
 Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit,
 And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish².’

Still grander are the gifts of heaven which Musacus and his son Eumolpus offer the just ; they take them down into the world below, where they have the saints lying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, with garlands on their heads ; their idea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of virtue. Some extend their rewards to the third and fourth generation ; the posterity, as they say, of the faithful and just shall survive them. This is the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another strain ; they bury them in a slough, and make them carry water in a sieve ; such is the employment which they assign to them in Hades, and while yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion

¹ Hesiod, Works and Days, 230.

² Homer, Od. xix. 109.

of the just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the other.

Again, Socrates, let me mention another way of speaking about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is also found in prose writers. The universal voice of man-³⁶⁴ kind is always declaring that justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is generally less profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour them both in public and private when they are rich or have other sources of power, while they despise and neglect those who may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity and evil to many good men, and good and happiness to the evil. And mendicant prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they have a power committed to them of making an atonement for their sins or those of their fathers by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and games; and they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a small charge; with magic arts and incantations binding the will of heaven, as they say, to do their work. And the poets are the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod:—

‘Vice may be found easily, and by crowds; the way is smooth and her dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil¹,

and a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may be influenced by men; for he also says:—

‘The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed².’

And they produce a host of books written by Musæus and Orpheus, who were children of the Moon and the Muses—that

¹ Hesiod, Works and Days, 287.

² Homer, Iliad, ix. 493.

is what they say—according to which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call
 365 mysteries, and they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us.

He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice, and the manner in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be affected, my dear Socrates; those of them, I mean, who are quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and out of all they hear, gather inferences as to the character and way of life which are best for them? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words of Pindar—

‘Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower which may be a fortress to me all my life?’

For what men say is that, if I am really just without being thought just, there is no profit, but evident pain and loss. But if, though unjust, I acquire the character of justice, a heavenly life is to be mine. Since then, as philosophers say, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will have in front of me the painted form and figure of virtue; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus, first of sages, counsels. But I hear some one exclaiming that wickedness is not easily concealed; to which I answer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, this must be the way to happiness, and the way by which we must go if we follow in the steps of the argument. As to concealment, that may be secured by the formation of societies and political clubs. And there are professors of rhetoric who teach the philosophy of persuading courts and assemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no gods? or, suppose that the gods have no care about human things—why in either case should we care about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they have a care of us, yet we know about them only from tradition and the

genealogies of the poets ; and the poets are the persons who say that they may be influenced and turned by ‘ sacrifices and soothing entreaties.’ Let us be consistent then, and either believe both or neither. And if we believe them, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice ; for if we are just 366 we shall indeed escape the vengeance of heaven, but we shall lose the gains of injustice ; whereas, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be propitiated, and we shall be forgiven. ‘ But there is a world below in which either we or our children will suffer for our deeds.’ Yes, my friend, will be the reply, but there are mysteries and atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare ; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, affirm the same.

On what principle, then, shall we choose justice rather than the worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, here as well as hereafter, as say the most numerous and the highest authorities. Knowing all this, Socrates, how can any one who has any advantage of mind or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour, or indeed refrain from laughing at the praises of justice? For even if there should be any one who is able to disprove my words, and who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust ; he is very ready to forgive them, knowing as he also does that men are not just of their own free will ; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him has inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who abstains because he has found knowledge—but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust to the full extent of his power.

The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of all the professing panegyrists of justice—beginning with the heroes of old of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men

of our own time—no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man's soul which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the
367 greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade us of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep one another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his own watchman, because afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of evils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the language which I have been only repeating, and more of the same sort about justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true nature. But I am speaking with all my might, as I must confess, only because I want to hear you speak on the opposite side; and I would ask you to show not only the superiority of justice over injustice, but what they do to the possessor of them that makes the one to be a good and the other an evil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputation; for unless you clothe the just in the garb of injustice, and the unjust in that of justice, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of justice; we shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that you really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another's good and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man's own profit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted that justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired as well for their results as, in a far greater degree, for their own sakes—just as sight or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely conventional goods, are desired for their own sakes—I would ask you to direct your praises to that one point only: I mean to the essential good of justice and evil of injustice. Let others praise the rewards and appearances of justice; that is a manner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you who have spent your whole life in

thinking about the question, unless I hear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore, I say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show what they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be a good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.

I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these words I was quite charmed, and said: 368 Sons of Ariston, that was not a bad beginning of the Elegiacs in which the admirer of Glaucon addressed you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of Megara:—

‘Ariston’s sons, divine offspring of a glorious hero.’

The epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being able to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice and remaining unconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not convinced; as I infer from your general character, for had I judged only from your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now trusting you I have all the greater mistrust of myself. For I am in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel my own inability to maintain the cause of justice—your unwillingness to accept the answer which I made to Thrasymachus about the superiority of justice over injustice proves to me that I am unequal to the task; and yet on the other hand I cannot refuse to help, for I fear that there may be a sin when justice is evil spoken of in standing by and failing to offer help or succour while breath or speech remain to me. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.

Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the search would be no easy one, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may describe in this way; suppose a short-sighted person had been requested by some one to read small letters a long way off; and some one else told him that

he had seen the very same letters elsewhere written larger and on a larger scale—if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser—that would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.

Very true, said Adeimantus ; but how does the illustration apply to us?

I will tell you, I replied ; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is, as you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes as the virtue of a State.

True, he replied.

And is not a State larger than an individual?

It is.

Then in the larger the quantity of justice will be larger and more easily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice as appearing in the State 369 first, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.

That, he said, is an excellent proposal.

And suppose we imagine the State as in a process of creation, and then we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also.

Very likely.

When the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search will be more easily discovered.

Yes, more easily.

And shall we make the attempt? I said ; although I cannot promise you that the task will be a light one. Reflect therefore.

I have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind ; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

There can be no other.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another ; and when these helpers and partners are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said. .

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

True, he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand. We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

Clearly.

And how then will they proceed? Will each give the result of his labours to all?—the husbandman, for example, producing for four, and labouring in the production of food for himself and others four times as long and as much as he needs to labour; or will he leave others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but produce a fourth for himself in a fourth of the time, 370 and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes?

Adeimantus thought that for him to labour at producing food only would be the better way.

Most probably it would, I replied; and I am reminded by your words that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

No doubt.

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure ; but the doer must be at command, and make the business his first object.

He must.

And if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and at the right time, and leaves other things.

Undoubtedly.

Then more than four citizens will be required ; for the husbandman will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—and he too needs many ; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters, and smiths, and other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow ?

True.

Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may have beasts of burden for their carrying, while carriers and weavers make use of their fleeces and skins,—still our State will not be very large.

That is true ; yet neither will that be a very small State which contains all these.

Further, I said, to place the city on a spot where no imports are required is well nigh impossible.

Impossible.

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city ?

There must.

371 But if the trader goes empty-handed, taking nothing which those who are to supply the need want, he will come back empty-handed.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

Very true.

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?

Yes.

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall.

And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers.

Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? and for the sake of this, as you may remember, we made them into a society and constituted a State.

The way will be, that they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.

Certainly.

Suppose now that a husbandman, or possibly an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,—is he to leave his work and sit idle in the market-place?

Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, take upon themselves the duty of sale. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore unable to do anything else; their only business is to be in the market, and take money of those who desire to buy goods, and in exchange for goods to give money to those who desire to sell.

This want, then, will introduce retailers into our State. Is not 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes, he said.

And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make up our population?

Yes.

And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

Surely.

Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in which part of the State are they to be found?

372 Probably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine any other place in which they are more likely to be found.

I dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; still, we had better consider the matter further, and not shrink from the task.

First, then, let us consider what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will work in summer commonly stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley and wheat, baking the wheat and kneading the flour, making noble puddings and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat of reeds or clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds of yew or myrtle boughs. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and having the praises of the gods on their lips, dwelling together in unity, and having a care that their families do not exceed their means; for they will have an eye to poverty or war.

But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True, I replied, I had forgotten that; of course they will have a relish—salt, and olives, and cheese, and onions, and cabbages or any other vegetables which are fit for boiling; and we shall give them a dessert of figs, and pulse, and beans; and they will roast myrtle-berries and chestnuts at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were making a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

Why, he said, you should give them the proprieties of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have sauces and sweets in the modern fashion.

Yes, said I, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is to be created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice grow up. I am certainly of opinion that the true and healthy constitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish to see the State in a fever, I have no objection. For I suppose that many will be dissatisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and 373 tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, not of one sort only, but in profusion and variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes; and the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and other materials of the arts will be required.

True, he said.

Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is too small. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with postures and colours, another are musicians; there will be poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of utensils, including women's ornaments. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are needed now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be hosts of animals, if people are to eat them.

Certainly.

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater.

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Quite true.

Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

That, Socrates, will be unavoidable.

And then we shall go to war, Glaucon,—that will be the next thing.

So we shall, he replied.

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

And our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be nothing short of a whole army, which will
374 have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the precious souls whom we were describing above.

Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

No, I said; not if you and all of us were right in the principle which was acknowledged at the first creation of the State: that principle was, as you will remember, that one man could not practise many arts.

Very true, he said.

But is not war an art?

Certainly.

And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted, and he was to continue working all his life long at that and at no other, and not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good

workman. Now is there any more important work than to be a good soldier? And is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? Mere tools will not make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who knows not the nature of each, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

Yes, he said, the tools which would teach us how to use them would be of rare value

And the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and art, and skill will be needed by him?

That is what I should suppose, he replied.

Will he not also require natural gifts?

Certainly.

Then we shall have to select natures which are suited to their task of guarding the city?

We shall.

And the selection will be no easy task, I said; but still we must endeavour to do our best as far as we can?

We must.

The dog is a watcher, I said, and the guardian is also a 375 watcher; and in this point of view, is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog?

How do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the enemy; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required.

Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Certainly.

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal? Have you never observed how the presence of spirit makes the soul of any creature absolutely fearless and invincible?

I have.

Then now we have a clear idea of the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

True.

And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?

Yes.

But then, Glaucon, those spirited natures are apt to be furious with one another, and with everybody else.

There is the difficulty, he replied.

Whereas, I said, they ought to be gentle to their friends, and dangerous to their enemies; or, instead of their enemies destroying them, they will destroy themselves.

True, he said.

What is to be done then, I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for they seem to be inconsistent with one another?

True.

And yet he will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and, as the combination of them appears to be impossible, this is equivalent to saying that to be a good guardian is also impossible.

I am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded. My friend, I said, we deserve to be in a puzzle; for we have lost sight of the simile with which we started.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.

And where do you find them?

Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

Yes, I know.

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.

Would you not say that he should combine with the spirited nature the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning.

The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen 376
in the dog, and is remarkable in an animal.

What trait?

Why, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?

I never before thought of it, though I quite recognise the truth of your remark.

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;—your dog is a true philosopher.

Why?

Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not the creature be fond of learning who determines what is friendly and what is unfriendly by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Most assuredly.

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same, he replied.

And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly.

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is this an enquiry which may be fairly expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want to be tedious and irrelevant, or to leave out anything which is really to the point.

Ademantus thought that the enquiry would be of great use to us.

Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Certainly not.

Come then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story telling, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

By all means.

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the old-fashioned sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul.

True.

Shall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?

By all means.

And when you speak of music, do you rank literature under music or not?

I do.

And literature may be either true or false?

Yes.

377 And the young are trained in both kinds, and in the false before the true?

I do not understand your meaning, he said.

You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Very true.

That was my meaning in saying that we must teach music before gymnastics.

Quite right, he said.

You know also that the beginning is the chiefest part of any work, especially in a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and most readily receives the desired impression.

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be framed by casual persons, and to receive into their minds notions which are the very opposite of those which are to be held by them when they are grown up?

We cannot.

Then the first thing will be to have a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with these tales, even more fondly than they form the body with their hands; and most of those which are now in use must be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily cast in the same mould, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

That may be very true, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the greater.

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.

But which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is more, a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes,—like the drawing of a limner which has not the shadow of a likeness to the truth.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and what Cronus did to him¹. The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings 378 which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and in order to reduce the number of hearers they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are certainly objectionable.

¹ Hesiod, *Theogony*, 154, 459.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be narrated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous; and that if he chastises his father when he does wrong, in any manner that he likes, he will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

I quite agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are not fit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling as dishonourable, should anything be said of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue. Far be it from us to tell them of the battles of the giants, and embroider them on garments; or of all the innumerable other quarrels of Gods and heroes with their friends and relations. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up. And the poets should be required to compose accordingly. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten,—such tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For the young man cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is apt to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore the tales which they first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied; that is quite essential: but, then, where are such models to be found? and what are the tales in which they are contained? when that question is asked, what will be our answer?

379 I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, are not poets in what we are about just now, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which should be observed by them, but actually to make the tales is not their business.

Very true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?

Something of this kind, I replied :—God is always to be represented as he truly is; that is one form which is equally to be observed in every kind of verse, whether epic, lyric, or tragic.

Right.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No.

And that which does no evil is the cause of no evil?

Impossible.

And the good is the advantageous?

Yes.

And the good is the cause of well-being?

Yes.

The good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only, and not the cause of evil?

Assuredly.

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good is to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the cause is to be sought elsewhere, and not in him.

That appears to me to be most true, he said.

Then we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that two casks

‘Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of evil lots¹;

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

‘Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;’

but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

‘Him wild hunger drives over the divine earth.’

¹ Iliad xxiv. 527.

And again—

‘Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.’

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties of which Pandarus was the real author¹, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and conflict of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval²; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, that

380 ‘God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.’

And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe, which is the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur, or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war, or any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some explanation of them such as we are seeking: he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one, is to be strenuously denied, and not allowed to be sung or said in any well-ordered commonwealth by old or young. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

I agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.

Let this then be one of the rules of recitation and invention,—that God is not the author of evil, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

And what do you think of another principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another—sometimes himself changing and becoming different in form, sometimes deceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

I cannot answer you without more thought.

¹ Iliad ii. 69.

² Ib. xx.

Well, I said ; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be effected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?

That is most certain.

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed ; for example, when healthiest and strongest the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats, and drinks and labours, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from heat and wind, or other similar accidents.

Of course.

And this is true of the soul as well as of the body ; the bravest 381 and wisest soul will be least confused or deranged by any external influence.

True.

And further, as I should suppose, the same principle applies to all works of art—vessels, houses, garments ; and that when well made and in good condition, they are least altered by time and circumstances.

Very true.

Then everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is liable to receive the least change at the hands of others?

True.

But surely God and the things of God are absolutely perfect?

Of course they are.

He is therefore least likely to take many forms.

He is.

But suppose again that he changes and transforms himself?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better, or for the worse?

If he change at all he must change for the worse, for we cannot suppose that he is deficient in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus ; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to change for the worse?

Impossible.

Then God too cannot be willing to change ; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains absolutely and for ever in his own form.

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.

Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

‘The gods, taking the disguise of strangers, haunt cities in all sorts of forms¹;’

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in tragedy or any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess asking an alms

‘For the life-giving daughters of the river Inachus;’

let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with abominable tales of certain gods who, as they say,

‘Go about by night in the likeness of strangers from every land;’

let them beware lest they blaspheme against the gods, and at the same time make cowards of their children.

Heaven forbid, he said.

But although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and deception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?

Suppose that, he replied.

Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, or make a false representation of himself, whether in word or deed?

382 I cannot say, he replied.

Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if I may use such an expression, is hated of gods and men?

What do you mean? he said.

I mean this, I said,—that no one will admit falsehood into that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.

Still, he said, I do not comprehend you.

The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some grand meaning to me; but I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about realities in the highest faculty, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like;—that, I say, is what they utterly detest.

¹ Hom. Od. xvii. 485.

There is nothing more hateful to them.

And, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is deceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?

Perfectly right.

The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?

Yes.

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies—that would be an instance; or again, as a cure or preventive of the madness of those who are called your friends; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking—because we do not know the truth about ancient traditions, we make falsehood as much like truth as may be, and so of use.

Very true, he said.

But can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?

That would be ridiculous, he said.

Then the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?

I should say not.

Peradventure again he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

That is inconceivable.

But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

None.

Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?

Yes.

Then is God perfectly simple and true both in deed and word; he changes not; he deceives not, either by dream or waking vision, by sign or word.

Your words, he answered, are the very expression of my own 383 feelings.

You agree with me, I said, that this is the second type or

mould in which we are to cast our ideas about divine things. The Gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in word or deed.

I grant that.

Then, although we are lovers of Homer, we do not love the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials

‘Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And in conclusion he raised a note of triumph over the blessedness of my lot, and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this—he is the very god who has slain my son!’¹

These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow them to enter into education, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.

I entirely agree, he said, in the propriety of these principles, and promise to make them my laws.

¹ From a lost play.

BOOK III.

SUCH then, I said, are our principles of theology—some tales 386 are to be told, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards, if we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to value friendship with one another.

Yes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.

But if they are to be courageous, must they not learn, besides these, other lessons also, such as will have the effect of taking away the fear of death? Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?

Certainly not, he said.

And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes in the reality and the terror of the world below?

Impossible.

Then we must assume a control over this class of tales as well as over the others, and beg the relaters of them not simply to revile, but rather to commend the world below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do no good to our future warriors.

That will be our duty, he said.

Then, I said, we shall have to obliterate obnoxious passages, beginning with the verse,—

‘I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor portionless man who is not well to do, than rule over all the dead who have come to nought¹.’

We must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared,

‘Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen both of mortals and immortals².’

And again :—

‘O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form but no mind³!’

¹ Od. xi. 489.

² Il. xx. 64.

³ Ib. xxiii. 103.

Again of Tiresias :—

‘To him alone did Persephone give mind, that he should be wise even after death; but the other souls are flitting shades¹.’

Again :—

‘The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate, leaving strength and youth².’

Again :—

387 ‘And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the earth³.’

And,—

‘As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them dropped out of the string falls from the rock, fly shrilling and hold to one another, so did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved⁴.’

And we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out these and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to the popular ear, but because the greater the charm of them as poetry, the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are to be sons of freedom, and are to fear slavery more than death.

Undoubtedly.

Also we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which describe the world below—Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and sapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a shudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say that these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may become affected by them.

We have reason to fear that, he said.

Then there must be no more of them.

True.

Another and a nobler strain will be ours.

Clearly.

And shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?

They will go with the others.

¹ Od. x. 495. ² Il. xvi. 856. ³ Ib. xxiii. 100. ⁴ Od. xxiv. 6.

But shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that the good man will not consider death terrible to a good man.

Yes; that is our principle.

And therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had suffered anything terrible?

He will not.

Such an one, as we further maintain, is enough for himself and his own happiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.

True, he said.

And for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of fortune, is to him of all men least terrible.

Assuredly.

And therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the greatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.

Yes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.

Then we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and making them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or to men of a baser sort, 388 that those who are being educated by us to be the defenders of their country may scorn to do the like.

That will be very right.

Then we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict Achilles¹, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his back, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the shores of the barren sea; now taking the dusky ashes in both his hands² and pouring them over his head, or bewailing and sorrowing in the various modes which Homer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as praying and beseeching,

‘Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name³.’

Still more earnestly will we beg of him not to introduce the gods lamenting and saying,

‘Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow⁴.’

But if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare

¹ Il. xxiv. 10.

² Ib. xviii. 23.

³ Ib. xxii. 414.

⁴ Ib. xviii. 54.

so completely to misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say—

‘O heavens! with my eyes I behold a dear friend of mine driven round and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful¹.’

Or again :—

‘Woe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at the hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius².’

For if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously believe in such unworthy representations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly will any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonoured by similar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his mind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or self-control, he will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions.

Yes, he said, that is very certain.

Yes, I replied; but that is just what ought not to be, as the argument proved to us; and we must abide by our conviction until we find a better.

Truc.

Neither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter which has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.

So I believe.

Then persons of worth, even if only mortal, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be allowed.

389 Still less of the gods, as you say, he replied.

Then we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that in which Homer describes how

‘Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw Hephaestus bustling about the mansion³.’

On your views, we must not admit them.

On my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is certain.

Again, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless to the gods, and useful only as a medicine

¹ Il. xxii. 168.

² Ib. xvi. 433.

³ Ib. i. 599.

to men, then the use of such medicines should be restricted to physicians ; private individuals have no business with them.

Clearly not, he said.

Then if any persons are to have the privilege of lying, either at home or abroad, they will be the rulers of the State ; and they may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody else is to meddle with anything of the kind ; and for a private man to lie in return to the rulers is to be deemed a more heinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the truth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or trainer, or for a sailor not to tell the captain truly how matters are going on in a ship.

Most true, he said.

If, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,

‘ Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or carpenter ¹,’
he will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive of ship or State.

Yes, he said, if our theory is carried into execution.

Next, will not our youth require temperance ?

Certainly.

Under temperance, speaking generally, are included obedience to commanders and command of self in sensual pleasures.

True.

Then would you praise or blame the injunction of Diomedes in Homer,

‘ Friend, sit still and obey my word ²,’

and the verses which follow,

‘ The Greeks marched breathing prowess ³,
. . . . in silent awe of their leaders ⁴,’

and other sentiments of the same kind ?

They are good.

What again of this line,

‘ O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a stag ⁵,’

and of the verses which follow ? Would you say that these, or 390

¹ Od. xvii. 383 sq.

² Il. iv. 412.

³ Ib. iii. 8.

⁴ Ib. iv. 431.

⁵ Ib. i. 225.

any other impertinent words which private men are supposed to address to their rulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?

They are ill spoken.

They may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to temperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men—you would agree with me in that?

Yes.

And then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is more glorious than

‘When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries round wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups¹;

is this fit or improving for a young man to hear? Or that other verse which affirms that

‘The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger²?’

What would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men were asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them all in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight of Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on the ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before, even when they first met one another without the knowledge of their parents³; or that other tale of how Hephaestus, in consequence of a similar piece of work, bound Ares and Aphrodite⁴?

Indeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort of thing.

But any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they ought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,

‘He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart,
Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured⁵!’

Certainly, he said.

In the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of money.

¹ Od. ix. 8.

² Ib. xii. 342.

³ Il. xiv. 281.

⁴ Od. viii. 266.

⁵ Ib. xx. 17.

Certainly not.

Neither must we sing to them of

‘Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings¹.’

Neither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or regarded as having given his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of the Greeks and assist them²; but that without a gift he should not be reconciled to them. Neither will we believe or allow Achilles himself to have been such a lover of money that he took Agamemnon’s gifts, or required a price as the ransom of the dead³.

Undoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which ought 391 to be approved.

Loving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say what I must say nevertheless, that in speaking thus of Achilles, or in believing these words when spoken of him by others, there is downright impiety. As little can I credit the narrative of his insolence to Apollo, where he says,

‘Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I would be even with thee, if I had only the power⁴;

or his insubordination to the river-god⁵, on whose divinity he is ready to lay hands; or the dedication to the dead Patroclus of his own hair⁶, which had been previously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheus; or his dragging Hector round the tomb of Patroclus⁷, and his slaughter of the captives at the pyre⁸; of all this I cannot believe that he was guilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, Cheiron’s pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest of men and third in descent from Zeus, was in such rare perturbation of mind as to be at one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined with overwhelming contempt of gods and men.

You are quite right, he replied.

And let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of Theseus son of Poseidon, or of Perithous son of Zeus, going forth to perpetrate such a horrid rape; or of any other hero

¹ Quoted by Suidas as attributed to Hesiod.

² Il. ix. 515.

³ Ib. xxiv. 175.

⁴ Ib. xxii. 15 sq.

⁵ Ib. xxi. 130, 223 sq.

⁶ Ib. xxiii. 151.

⁷ Ib. xxii. 394.

⁸ Ib. xxiii. 175.

or son of a god daring to do such impious and horrible things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day: and let us compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not done by them, or that they were not the sons of gods;—both in the same breath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them teaching our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are no better than men; undoubtedly these sentiments, as we were saying, are neither pious nor true, for they are at variance with our demonstration that evil cannot come from God.

Undoubtedly.

And further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for everybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar wickednesses are always being perpetrated by the kindred of the gods,

‘The relatives of Zeus, whose paternal altar is in the heavens and on the mount of Ida,’

and who have

‘the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins¹.’

And therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender
39² laxity of morals among the young.

By all means, he replied.

And now, is there any class of subjects which still remain to be considered? About gods and demigods and heroes and the world below we have already made regulations.

Very true.

And what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our subject.

Clearly so.

But we are not in a condition to answer this question at present.

And why not?

Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that poets and story-tellers make the gravest misstatements about men when they say that many wicked men are happy, and many good men miserable; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, whereas justice is another's gain and one's own loss—these things we shall forbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite.

¹ From the Niobe of Aeschylus.

To be sure we shall, he replied.

But if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall say that you have admitted the point which we have been all along trying to determine, viz. whether justice is in itself good.

You are right in reminding me of that, he said.

Well then, I said, about men we must defer coming to a final decision until we have discovered what justice is, and how naturally advantageous to the possessor, whether seen to be just or not.

Most true, he said.

Enough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when this has been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated.

I do not know what you mean, said Adeimantus.

Then I must endeavour to explain. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and poetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?

Certainly, he replied.

And narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the two?

That again, he said, I do not quite understand.

I fear, I said, that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I cannot make myself better understood. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the whole of the subject, but will break a piece off as an illustration of my meaning. I dare say that you remember the first lines of the *Iliad*, in which the poet says that Chryses begs Agamemnon to release his daughter, and Agamemnon flies into a passion with Chryses, who invokes the anger of the gods against the Achaeans. I remember as far as these lines, 393

‘And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the chiefs of the people,’

the poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that he is any one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he does all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the aged priest himself. And this is the general form of the narrative both in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

Yes.

And it remains a narrative both in the speeches which the poet recites and in the intermediate passages?

Quite true.

But when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he assimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to speak?

Certainly.

And this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or gesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?

Of course.

Then in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of imitation?

Very true.

Or, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the imitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in order that I may make my meaning quite clear, I will return to my example. Suppose that Homer had said, 'The priest came, having his daughter's ransom in his hands, the suppliant of the Achaeans, and above all of the kings;' and then, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, suppose that he had continued in his own person, the imitation would have passed into narration. He would have said (I am no poet, and therefore I drop the metre), 'Chryses came and prayed the gods on behalf of the Greeks that they might take Troy and return in peace, if Agamemnon would only give him back his daughter, taking the ransom, and reverencing the gods. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks respected him and consented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come again, lest the sceptre and crown of the god should be of no avail to him—the daughter of Chryses, he said, should not be released until she had first grown old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to provoke him, if he intended to get home safely. And the old man went
394 away in fear and silence, and, having left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his many names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him, whether in building his temples, or offering sacrifice, and praying that his good deeds

might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his tears by the arrows of the god,'—and so on. In this way the whole becomes narrative.

That I understand, he said.

Or you may suppose that the intermediate passages are omitted, leaving only the dialogue, which is the opposite case.

That again, he said, I understand ; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.

That is precisely my meaning ; and I believe that you now see clearly what you did not see before, that poetry and mythology are, in some cases, wholly imitative—instances of this are supplied by tragedy and comedy ; of the opposite style, in which the poet is the only speaker, the dithyramb is the best example ; and the combination of both is found in epic, and in some other styles of poetry. Do I take you with me ?

Yes, he said ; I now understand what you meant to say.

I will beg you also to recall what I began by saying, that we had done with the subject and might proceed to the style.

Yes, I remember.

In saying this, I meant to imply that we must come to an understanding about the mimetic art,—whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be allowed to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the latter, in what parts ; or should all imitation be prohibited ?

You mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into our State ?

Yes, I said ; but there may be more than this in question : I really do not know as yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.

And go we will, he said.

Then, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators, or whether in fact this question has not been already answered by our previous recognition of the principle that one man can only do one thing well, and not many ; and that if he attempt many, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any ?

Certainly.

And this is equally true of imitation ; no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one ?

He cannot.

395 Then the same person will hardly be able to play the serious part of life, and at the same time be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well ; for even when two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot succeed in both, as is plain in the case of tragedy and comedy—did you not say that they are imitations?

Yes, I did ; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed in both.

Any more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once.

True.

Neither are actors the same as comic and tragic poets ; yet all these are imitations.

Yes, they are imitations.

And human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller pieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing well the actions of which the imitations are copies.

Quite true, he replied.

If then we would retain the notion with which we began, that our guardians are to be released from every other art, and to be the special artificers of freedom, and to minister to this and have no other end, they ought not to practise or imitate anything else ; and, if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward the characters which are suitable to their profession—the temperate, holy, free, courageous, and the like ; but they should not depict or be skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or other baseness, lest from imitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth, at last sink into the constitution and become a second nature of body, voice, and mind?

Yes, certainly, he said.

Then, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and desire that they should be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old, quarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods in conceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping ; and certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labour.

Very right, he said.

Neither must they represent slaves, male or female, doing the offices of slaves?

They must not.

And surely not rogues or cowards, or any who do the reverse of what we have prescribed—jesting, scolding, reviling, in drink or out of drink; or otherwise sinning against themselves or others in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither ³⁹⁶ should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of madmen; for madness, like vice, is to be known only to be avoided.

Very true, he replied.

Any more than they may imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains, or the like?

Impossible, he said; how can they imitate that with which they will have no concern at all?

And would you have them imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur of rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?

Nay, he said, if madness is forbidden, then neither may they copy the behaviour of madmen.

You mean, I said, if I understand you rightly, that there is one sort of narration which may be used or spoken by a truly good man, and that there is another sort which will be exclusively adapted to a man of another character and education.

And which are these two sorts? he asked.

Suppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of narration comes on some saying or action of another good man,—I should imagine that he will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of imitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is acting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when his steps falter owing to sickness or love, or from intoxication or any other mishap. But when he comes to a character which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will disdain his inferiors, and will wear their likeness, if at all, for a moment only when they are doing some good; at other times he will be ashamed to play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and frame himself after the baser models; he feels that the

serious use of such an art would be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it.

That is what I should expect, he replied.

Then he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of Homer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but there will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you agree?

Certainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker
397 must necessarily take.

But another sort of character will narrate anything, and, the worse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be beneath him: moreover he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large audience. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking of wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and all sorts of instruments: also he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, and crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration.

That, he said, will be his mode of speaking.

These, then, are the two kinds of style?

Yes.

And you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but slight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their simplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always pretty much the same in style, and keeps within the limits of a single harmony (for the changes are not great), and also keeps pretty nearly the same rhythm?

That is quite true, he said.

Whereas the other style requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if the music is to be expressive of the variety and complexity of the words?

That is also perfectly true, he replied.

And do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry, and every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or other of them or in both together.

They include all, he said.

And shall we receive one or both of the two pure styles? or would you include the mixed?

I should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.

Yes, I said, Adeimantus; but the mixed style is also very charming: and indeed the pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most popular style with children and their instructors, and with the world in general.

I do not deny it.

But I suppose you mean to say that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in which human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?

Yes; quite unsuitable.

And this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a shoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a husbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader also, and the same of all the other citizens?

True, he said.

And therefore when any one of these clever multiform gentlemen, who can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that there is no place for such as he is in our State,—the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls' health the rougher and severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when we began the education of our soldiers.

That, he said, we certainly will, if we have the power.

Then now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which relates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for the matter and manner have both been discussed.

I think so too, he said.

Next in order will follow melody and song.

That is plain.

Every one can see what we ought to say about them, if we are to be consistent with ourselves.

I fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word 'every one' hardly includes me, for I cannot at the moment say, though I may guess.

At any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts—the words, the melody, and the rhythm;—that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?

Yes, he said; so much as that you may.

And as for the words, there will be no difference between words which are and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same laws, and these have been already determined by us?

Yes.

Also the melody and rhythm will go with the subject?

Certainly.

And we were saying, as you may remember, in speaking of the words, that we had no need of lamentation and strains of sorrow?

True.

And which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? As you are a musician, I wish that you would tell me.

The harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned or bass Lydian, and others which are like them.

These then, I said, must be banished; even to women of virtue and character they are of no use, and much less to men.

Certainly.

In the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly at variance with the character of our guardians.

Of course.

Then I must ask you again, which are the soft or drinking harmonies?

399 The Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed 'solute.'

Well, and are these of any military use?

Quite the reverse, he replied; but then the Dorian and the Phrygian appear to be the only ones which remain.

I answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, which will sound the word or note which

a brave man utters in the hour of danger and stern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death or is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets fortune with calmness and endurance; and another to be used by him in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of necessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction and advice; or on the other hand, which expresses his willingness to listen to persuasion or entreaty or advice, and which represents him when he has accomplished his aim, not carried away by success, but acting moderately and wisely, and acquiescing in the event. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the strain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the fortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say, leave.

And these, he replied, are the very ones of which I was speaking.

Then, I said, if only the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies are used in our songs and melodies, we shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?

I suppose not.

Then we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and complex scales, or of any other many-stringed curiously-harmonised instruments?

Certainly not.

But what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute is worse than all the stringed instruments put together, for even the panharmonic music is only an imitation of the flute?

Clearly not.

There remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and you may have a pipe in the country.

Yes, certainly; thus far the argument is clear.

That we should prefer Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is not at all strange, I said.

Not at all, he replied.

And so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State, which not long ago we termed luxurious.

We have done wisely, he replied.

And now let us finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies, rhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules, for we ought not to have complex or manifold systems of metre, but rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and harmonious life; and the words should come first, and the rhythms should be adapted to them, not the rhythms first and the words afterwards. To say what rhythms they are will be your business, as you have already taught me the harmonies.

But, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some three principles of rhythm ($\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{2}{3}$) out of which metrical systems are framed, just as in sounds there are four elements¹ into which the harmonies are resolved; that is an observation which I have made. But what is the character of these metres I am unable to say.

Then, I said, we shall have to take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us what rhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other unworthiness, and what there are remaining for the expression of opposite feelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning a complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic and heroic, which he arranged, I know not how, so that the rise and fall of the foot were equal (e.g. as in dactylic and anapaestic rhythms) and unequally so as to become short and long (as in iambic or trochaic rhythms, where there is a proportion); and, unless I am mistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned to them short and long quantities². Also in some cases he appeared to praise or censure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a combination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. This, however, as I was saying, had better be referred to him, for the subject is difficult, you know?

¹ i. e. the four notes of the tetrachord.

² Socrates expresses himself carelessly in accordance with his assumed ignorance of the details of the subject. In the first part of the sentence he appears to be speaking of paonic rhythms which are in the ratio of $\frac{2}{3}$; in the second part, of dactylic rhythms, which are in the ratio of $\frac{1}{3}$; in the last clause, of iambic and trochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio of $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{2}{7}$.

To be sure.

But you have no difficulty in discerning that grace or the absence of grace is the effect of good or bad rhythm accompanying good or bad style : and the same is true of good or bad harmony ; for our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them.

Certainly, he said, they should follow the words.

And the words and the character of the style will depend on the temper of the soul ?

Yes.

And everything else on the style ?

Yes.

Then good language and harmony and grace and rhythm depend on simplicity,—I mean the simplicity of a truly and nobly ordered mind, not that other simplicity which is only a euphemism for folly ?

Very true, he replied.

And if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces and harmonics their perpetual aim ?

They must.

And all life is full of them, as well as every creative and constructive art—painting, weaving, embroidery, the art of building, and the manufacture of vessels, as well as the frames of animals and of plants ; in all of them there is grace or the absence of grace. And absence of grace and inharmonious movement and discord are nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the sisters of godness and virtue and bear their likeness.

That is quite true, he said.

But shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works as the condition of producing in our State ? Or is the same control to be exercised over other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts ; and is he who does not conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in our State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him ? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images

of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of beauty and grace; then will our youth dwell in the land of health, amid fair sights and sounds; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, will visit the eye and ear, like a healthful breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul even in childhood into harmony with the beauty of reason.

There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.

And therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the secret places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making the soul graceful of him who is rightly educated, or ungraceful of him who is ill-educated; and also because he who has received this true education of the inner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature, and with a true taste, 402 while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his soul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the bad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason why; and when reason comes he will recognise and salute her as a friend with whom his education has made him long familiar.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that on these grounds education should be in music.

Just as in learning to read, I said, we want to know the various letters in all their recurring sizes and combinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they be large or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not thinking ourselves perfect in the art until we recognise them wherever they are found:

True—

Or, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror, only when we know the letters themselves; the same art giving us the knowledge of both:

Exactly—

Even so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we

have to educate, can ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as well as the contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can recognise them and their images wherever they are found, not slighting them either in small things or great, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study.

Most assuredly.

And when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to contemplate the vision?

The fairest indeed.

And the fairest is also the loveliest?

That may be assumed.

And the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the loveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?

That is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but any merely personal defect he will not mind, and will love all the same.

I perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of that sort, and I agree. But let me ask you another question: Have temperance and the excess of pleasure any affinity?

Nay, he said, for pleasure deprives a man of the use of his faculties quite as much as pain.

But has pleasure no affinity to any other virtue?

None whatever.

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Any affinity to wantonness and intemperance?

Yes, the greatest.

And is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of bodily love?

None, certainly; and there is none which is more irrational.

Whereas true love is a love of beauty and order—temperate and harmonious?

Quite true, he said.

Then nothing violent or irrational must be allowed to approach true love?

Nothing.

Then no irrational pleasure must be allowed to approach the

lover and his beloved, for they can have no affinity with such pleasure if their mutual love is to be of the right sort?

No, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.

Then I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a father would use to his son, and then only for a virtuous end, and he must first have the other's consent; and this rule is to limit him in all his intercourse, and he is never to go further, or, if he exceeds, he is to be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.

I quite agree, he said.

Thus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of music if not the love of beauty?

I agree, he said.

After music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.

Certainly.

And gymnastic as well as music should receive careful attention in childhood, and continue through life. Now my belief is,—and this is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion, but my own belief is,—not that the good body improves the soul, but that the good soul improves the body. What do you say?

Yes, I agree.

Then, if we have educated the mind, the minuter care of the body may properly be committed to the mind, and we need only describe the outlines of the subject for brevity's sake.

Very good.

That they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; for of all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in the world he is.

Yes, he said; that a guardian should require another to guard him is ridiculous indeed.

But next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are athletes in the great contest of all—are they not?

Yes, he said.

404 And will the usual gymnastic exercises be suited to them?

I cannot say.

I am afraid, I said, that such exercise is but a sleepy sort of

thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that athletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if they depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen?

Yes, I do.

Then, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior athletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost keenness; in the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and winter cold, which they will have to endure, they must not be liable to break down in health.

That is quite my view, he said.

The really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we were just now describing.

How so?

Why, I conceive that there is a gymnastic also which is simple and good; and that such ought to be the military gymnastic.

What do you mean?

My meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes, when they are campaigning, on soldiers' fare; they have no fish, although they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are allowed nothing but roast meat—which only requires a fire, and is therefore the most convenient diet for soldiers—and not boiled, as this would involve a carrying about of pots and pans.

True.

And I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned in Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular, as all professional athletes know that a man who is to be in good condition should take nothing of the kind.

Yes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.

Then you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of Sicilian cookery?

I think not.

Nor, if a man is to keep his health, would you allow him to have a Corinthian girl as his fair friend?

Certainly not.

Neither would you approve of the delights, as they are esteemed, of Athenian confectionary?

I should not.

All such feeding and living may be likened to the composition of melody and song in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.

Exactly.

There complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas simplicity in music was the parent of temperance in the soul, and simplicity in gymnastic of health in the body.

Most true, he said.

405 But when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice and medicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer begin to give themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the slaves but the freemen of a city take about them.

Most true.

And yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of education than this, that not only the meaner classes and the artisans are in need of the high skill of physicians and judges, but also those who would pretend to have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign of the want of education, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and physic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender himself into the hands of others?

Of all things, he said, the most disgraceful.

Would you say 'most,' I replied, when you consider that there is a further stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant, passing his days always in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is led by his bad taste even to pride himself on this; he is ready to fancy that he is a master in cunning; and he will take every crooked turn, and wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy¹ and getting out of the way of justice: and all for what?—in order to gain small points not worth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do without a nodding judge is a far

¹ Reading *λυγιζόμενος*.

higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that still more disgraceful?

Yes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.

Well, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be cured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by their lives of indolence and luxury, men fill themselves with waters and winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of Asclepius to find names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is not this, too, a disgrace?

Yes, he said, those are certainly strange and newfangled names of diseases.

Yes, I said, and I do not believe that there were such diseases in the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylos, after he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian wine besprinkled with flour and grated cheese, which are certainly rather inflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war do not blame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating his case. 406

Well, he said, there is something strange in a person who was in his condition having such a drink given to him.

Not strange, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is commonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not practise our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases. But Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a happy combination of training and doctoring, found out a way of torturing first and chiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.

How was that? he said.

By the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he perpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his entire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself, and he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age.

A rare reward of his skill!

Yes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who

could not be made to see that, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the omission arose not from ignorance or inexperience of such a department of medicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every individual has an occupation to which he must attend, and therefore has no leisure to spend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but, ludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort.

How do you mean? he said.

I replied: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and ready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,—these are his remedies. And if any one tells him that he must go through a course of dietetics, and swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he replies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a life which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his ordinary calling; and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he resumes his customary diet, and either gets well and lives and does his business, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.

Yes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use this summary art of medicine.

407 Has he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life if he were deprived of his occupation?

Very true, he said.

But we do not say of the rich man that he has an appointed work, which if he does not do, he ought to die.

He is generally supposed to have nothing to do.

Then you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a livelihood he should practise virtue?

Nay, he said, I think that he need not wait till then.

I do not want to raise that question, I replied; but I want to know whether the practice of virtue is obligatory on the rich, and ought to be a necessity of life to him; and, if so, whether this dicting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of the mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the way of the maxim of Phocylides?

Of that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the body, when carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is

most inimical to the practice of virtue, and equally incompatible with the management of a house, an army, or an office of state.

¹ Yes, and even more incompatible, I replied, with any kind of study or thought or self-reflection; and this is the worst part of the affair—there is a constant suspicion that a headache is to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of virtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying that he is ill, and bemoaning the state of his body.

Yes, likely enough.

And therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power of his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and habits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purgations and operations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the State; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not have attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did not want to lengthen out useless lives, or that weak fathers should beget weaker sons;—if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way he had no business to cure him; for he would have done no good either to the man himself, or to the State.

Then, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.

Clearly, I said; and this is shown also by the example of his sons who, as you may observe, were heroes as well as physicians ⁴⁰⁸ at the siege of Troy. I dare say that you remember how, when the arrow of Pandarus wounded Menelaus, they

‘Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing remedies²,’

but they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in the case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the remedies, as they conceived, were enough to heal any man who was healthy and sound; and even though he did chance to drink a posset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have nothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves or others; the art of medicine was not designed for

¹ Making the answer of Socrates begin at τὸ δὲ μέγιστον.

² Iliad iv. 218.

their good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would have declined to attend them.

They were very sensible people, those sons of Asclepius.

As they were bound to be, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar, in violation of our principles, while acknowledging that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say also that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death, and this was the reason why he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with our previously-declared rule, will not believe both;—if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious; or, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.

All that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you. Ought there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those who have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad, just as good judges are those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral natures?

Yes, I said, I quite agree about the necessity of having good judges and good physicians. But do you know whom I think good?

Will you inform me?

Yes, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join two things which are not the same.

How so? he asked.

Why, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now skilful physicians are those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of their art the greatest experience of disease; they had better not be robust in health, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For the body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body; in that case we would not allow them ever to be sickly; but they cure the body with the mind, and the mind which is or has become sick can cure nothing.

That is very true, he said.

409 But with the judge the case is different; he governs mind by mind, and he ought not therefore to have been reared among vicious minds, and to have associated with them from youth upwards, in order that, having gone through the whole calendar of crime, he may quickly infer the crimes of others like their

diseases from the knowledge of himself; but the honourable mind which is to form a healthy judgment ought rather to have had no experience or contamination of evil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often appear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the evil, because they have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.

Yes, he said, that very often happens with them.

Therefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned to know evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the nature of evil in others: knowledge, and not his own experience, should be his guide.

Yes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.

Yes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your question); for he is good whose soul is good. Whereas your cunning and suspicious character, who has committed many crimes, and fancies himself to be a master in wickedness, when he is among men who are like himself, is wonderful in his precautions against others, because he judges of them by himself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the experience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable suspicion; he cannot recognise an honest man, because he has nothing in himself which will tell him what an honest man is like; at the same time, as the bad are more numerous than the good, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and others think him, rather wise than foolish.

Most true, he said.

Then the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man; the other is better suited to us; for vice cannot know virtue, but a virtuous nature, educated by time, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and not the vicious man has wisdom—in my opinion.

And in mine also.

This is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will sanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, giving health both of soul and of body; but the bad nature they will in the case of the body leave to die, and the diseased and incurable soul they will put to death themselves.

That is clearly best both for them and for the State.

And thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which infuses temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.

Clearly.

And in the same way simple gymnastic will incline him to have as little as possible to do with medicine.

That I quite believe.

The very exercises and toils which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the spirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will not, like common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develop his muscles.

Very right, he said.

Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training of the body.

But what is the real object?

I believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul.

How can that be? he asked.

Did you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind of exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?

In what way shown? he said.

In producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, or again of softness and effeminacy, I replied.

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that your mere athlete becomes too much of a savage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good for him.

Yet surely, I said, the fierce quality gives spirit, and, if educated rightly, will be valiant, but, if exaggerated, is likely to become hard and brutal.

That I quite think.

The philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if educated rightly, will be gentle and modest.

True.

Whereas in our judgment the guardians ought to have both these qualities?

Certainly they ought.

The qualities should be harmonized?

Beyond question.

And the harmonious soul is both temperate and valiant?

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Yes.

And the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?

Very true.

And, when a man allows music to play and pour over his soul through the funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we were just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the delights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which is in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle and useless. But, if he carries on the softening process, in the next stage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut out the sinews of his soul; and he makes a feeble warrior.

Very true.

If the element of spirit is naturally weak in him this is soon accomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening the spirit renders him excitable;—he soon flames up, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he becomes irritable and violent and very discontented.

Exactly.

And so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder, and the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high condition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and he becomes twice the man that he was.

Certainly.

But if he do nothing else, and never cultivates the Muses, even that intelligence which there may be in him, having no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought or music, grows feeble and dull and blind, because never roused or sustained, and because the senses are not purged of their mists.

True, he said.

And he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the weapon of persuasion,—he is like a wild beast, all violence and fierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all ignorance and evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.

That is quite true, he said.

And as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other the philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two arts answering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order that these⁴¹² two principles may be duly attuned and harmonized with one another.

That I am disposed to believe.

And he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best attempers them to the soul, may be called the true musician and harmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.

I dare say, Socrates.

And such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the government is to last.

Yes, he will be absolutely necessary.

Such, then, are our principles of nurture and education. There would be no use in going into further details about their dances, their hunting or chasing with dogs, their gymnastic and equestrian contests; for these all follow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no difficulty in discovering them.

I dare say that there will be no difficulty.

Very well, I said; and what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to be rulers and who subjects?

Certainly.

There can be no doubt that the elder sort must rule the younger.

Clearly.

And that the best of the elder sort must rule.

That is also clear.

Now, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?

Yes.

And as we must have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be those who have most the character of guardians?

Yes.

And to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special interest in the State?

True.

And a man will be most likely to care about that which he happens to love?

To be sure.

And he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same interests with himself, and anything the good or evil fortune of which he imagines to involve as a result his own good or evil fortune, and to be proportionably careless when he is less concerned?

Very true, he replied.

Then there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in their whole life show the greatest desire to do what is for the good of their country, and will not do what is against her interests.

Those are the right men.

They will have to be watched at every turn of their lives, in order that we may see whether they preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either of force or enchantment, forget or cast off their duty to the State.

How cast off? he said.

I will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man's mind either with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a falsehood, against his will whenever he ⁴¹³ is deprived of a truth.

I understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the unwilling I have yet to learn.

Why, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and willingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to have the truth a good? and you would allow that to conceive things as they are is to have the truth?

Yes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of truth against their will.

And is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or enchantment?

Still, he replied, I do not understand you.

I fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only mean that some men change and others forget; persuasion steals away the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this I call theft. Now you understand me?

Yes.

Those again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or grief compels to change their opinion.

I understand, he said, and you are quite right.

And you would also agree with me in saying that the enchanted are those who change their minds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner influence of fear?

Yes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.

Therefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best guardians of their own conviction that the interest of the State is to be the rule of all their actions. We must watch them from their youth upwards, and make them perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived, and he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in the trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?

Yes.

And there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in which they will give further proof of the same qualities.

Very right, he replied.

And then, I said, we must try them with enchantments—that is the third sort of test—and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take colts amid noises and cries to see if they are of a timid nature, so we must take our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures, and try them more thoroughly than gold is tried in the fire, in order to discover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a noble bearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have learned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious nature, such as will be most serviceable to the man himself and to the State. And he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of the trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the State; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and other memorials of honour, the greatest that we have to give. Him we must choose, and reject the opposite of him. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in which our rulers and guardians should be appointed. I speak generally, and not with any pretension to exactness.

And, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.

And perhaps the word 'guardian' in the fullest sense ought to be applied to this higher class only who are our warriors abroad and our peacemakers at home, and who save us from those who might have the will or the power to injure us. The young men whom we before called guardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and allies of the principles of the rulers.

In that I agree with you, he said.

How then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately spoke—just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be possible, and at any rate the rest of the city?

What sort of lie? he said.

Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale of what has often occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made the world believe,) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such an event could ever happen again, or would be believed, if it did.

How your words seem to hesitate on your lips!

You will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.

Speak, he said, and fear not.

Well then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the face, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to communicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to the people. They are to be informed that their youth was a dream, and the education and training which they received from us an appearance only; in reality during all that time they were in process of formation and nourishment in the womb of the earth, where they themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; and when they were completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and, their country being their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good, and to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as children of the earth and their own brothers.

I think, he said, that you did well to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to tell.

Nay, I replied, there is more coming; I have only told you 415

half. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and these he has composed of gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has made of brass and iron; and the species will generally be preserved in the children. But as you are of the same original family, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims to the rulers, as a first principle, that above all they should watch over their offspring, and see what elements mingle in their nature; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards his child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be others sprung from the artisan class who are raised to honour, and become guardians and auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will then be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Not in the present generation, he replied; I do not see any way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them.

I see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make them care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the fiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while we arm our earth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let them look around and select a spot whence they can best prevent insurrection, if any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who like wolves may come down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and when they have encamped, let them sacrifice and prepare their dwellings.

And what sort of dwellings are they to have?

Dwellings which will shield them against the cold of winter and the heat of summer.

I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.

Yes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shop-keepers.

What is the difference? he said.

That I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, from want of discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn upon the sheep and worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a foul and monstrous thing?

Truly monstrous, he said.

And therefore every care must be taken lest our auxiliaries, as they are stronger than our citizens, should prevail over them, and become savage tyrants instead of gentle allies to them?

Yes, care should be taken.

And would not education be the best preparation and safeguard of them?

But they are well-educated, he replied; education is a safeguard which they already have.

I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will greatly tend to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection.

True, he replied.

And not only their education, but their habitations, and also their means of subsistence, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense will say that.

He will.

Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or treasury closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more, and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the other earthly dross which passes under the name of gold, and ought not to pollute the divine by

417 earthly admixture, for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds ; but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and the salvation of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens ; hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass through life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that these are to be the regulations of our guardians respecting houses and all other things, and that such shall be our laws ?

Yes, said Glaucon.

BOOK IV.

HERE Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you ⁴¹⁹ answer, Socrates, said he, if a person were to say that you make your citizens miserable, and miserable of their own accord; for they are the actual owners of the city, and are none the better; whereas other men acquire lands, and build large and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering sacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practising hospitality; moreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that is usual among the favourites of fortune, while our poor citizens are no better than mercenaries who are fixed in the city and do nothing but mount guard?

Yes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not ⁴²⁰ paid in addition to their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot make a journey of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other luxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness; and many other accusations of the same nature might be added.

But, said he, let us suppose all that included in the charge.

You mean to ask, I said, what is to be our answer?

Yes.

If we proceed along the path which we are already going, I said, my belief is that we shall find the answer. Even if our guardians were such as you describe, there would not be anything wonderful in their still being the happiest of men; but let that pass, for our object in the construction of the State is the greatest happiness of the whole, and not that of any one class; and in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole, we think that we are most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered State injustice: and, having found them, we shall

then be able to decide which of the two is the happier. At present we are constructing the happy State, not piecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and by-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. If we were painting a statue, and some one were to come and blame us for not putting the most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body—for the eyes, he would say, ought to be purple, but they are black—in that case we might fairly answer, Sir, do not imagine that we ought to beautify the eyes to such a degree that they are no longer eyes; but see whether, by giving this and the other features their due, we make the whole beautiful. And so I would say now, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of happiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we also should have no difficulty in clothing our husbandmen in fine linen, and setting crowns of gold on their heads, bidding them till the ground no more than they like. There would be nothing easier than to allow our potters to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the glittering bowl, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery as much as they like, and no more; in this way we may make every class happy—and then, as you imagine, the whole State will be happy. But do not suggest this; for, 421 if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a husbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no class in the State will have any distinct character. Now this is not of much importance where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are not, extends only to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the government are only seemers and not real guardians, that, you will observe, is the utter ruin of the State: as, on the other hand, with them alone rests the order and happiness of a State. If we then really mean that our guardians are to be the saviours and not the destroyers of the State, and the advocate of the other view is talking of peasants at a festival, enjoying a life of revelry rather than fulfilling the duties of citizens, we mean different things, and he is speaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider whether in appointing our guardians we look to their greatest happiness, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in the State as a whole. But if so, the

guardians and auxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to do their own work in the best way; and then the whole State growing up in a noble order, the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness which nature assigns to them.

I think that you are quite right.

I wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.

What may that be?

There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.

What are they?

Wealth, I said, and poverty.

How do they act?

The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich he no longer takes the same pains with his art?

Certainly not.

He grows more and more indolent and careless?

Very true.

And the result is that he becomes a worse potter?

Yes; he greatly deteriorates.

But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and is unable to buy tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Certainly not.

Then workmen and also their works are alike apt to degenerate under the influence both of poverty and of wealth?

That is evident.

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.

What evils?

Wealth, I said, and poverty; for the one is the parent of ⁴²² luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.

That is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, how our city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and powerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.

There may possibly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war

with one such enemy ; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.

How so ? he asked

In the first place, I said, our side will be trained warriors fighting against an army of rich men.

That is true, he said.

And do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his art would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not boxers ?

Hardly, if they came upon him at once.

What, not, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the one who first came up ? And supposing he were to do this several times under the heat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one stout personage ?

Certainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.

And yet rich men are probably not so inferior to others in boxing as they are in military qualities.

Likely enough.

Then probably our athletes will be able to fight with three or four times their own number ?

I agree with you, for I think you right.

And suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one or two of the cities, telling them the truth : Silver and gold we neither have nor are permitted to have ; in that we are not like you ; do you therefore come and help us in war, and take the spoils of the other city. Who, on hearing these words, would choose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their side, against fat and tender sheep ?

That is not likely ; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the wealth of many others were to coalesce in one.

But how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own !

Why so ?

You ought to speak of other states in the plural number ; for they are many in one—a game of cities at which men play. Any ordinary city, however small, is in fact two cities, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich, at war with one another ; and in either division there are many smaller

ones, and you would make a great mistake if you treated them as single States; but if you deal with them as many, and give the money or means or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many friends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has now been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of States, not in reputation or appearance only, but in deed and truth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A State which is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or barbarians, though many that appear to be as great and many times greater.

That is most true, he said.

And this, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are considering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to include, and beyond which they will not go.

What is the limit?

The State may increase to any size which is consistent with unity; that, I think, is the limit.

Very good, he said.

Here then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our guardians,—that our city is to be neither large nor small, but of such a size as is consistent with unity.

And surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.

And the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter still,—I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when inferior, and of elevating the offspring of the lower classes, when naturally superior, into the rank of guardians. The intention was, that, in the case of the citizens generally, we should put each individual man to the use for which nature designed him, and then every man would do his own business, and be one and not many, and the whole city would be one and not many.

Yes, he said; there will be even less difficulty in that.

These things, my good Adcimantus, are not, as might be supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken, as the saying is, of the one great thing,—a thing, however, which I would rather call not great, but enough for our purpose.

What may that be? he asked.

Education, I said, and nurture. For our citizens are well educated, and grow into sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as other matters which I do not mention; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of
424 women and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general principle that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.

That will be the best way of settling them.

Also, I said, the State, if once started well, goes on with accumulating force like a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and these good constitutions having their roots in a good education improve more and more, and this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.

True, he said.

Then to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our rulers should be directed,—that music and gymnastic be preserved in their original form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain this. And when any one says that mankind most regard

‘The song which is the newest that the singers have¹,’

they will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind of song; and this ought not to be praised, nor is this to be regarded as the meaning of the poet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the State, and ought to be prevented. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him;—
X he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them.

Yes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon’s and your own.

Then, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in music?

Yes, he said; and the licence of which you speak very easily creeps in.

Yes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight appears harmless.

¹ Od. i. 352.

Why, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little the spirit of licence, finding a home, penetrates into manners and customs; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades agreements between man and man, and from agreements goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter recklessness, and ends, Socrates, by an overthrow of all things, private as well as public.

Is that true? I said.

That is my belief, he replied.

Then, as I was saying, our youth should be educated in a stricter rule from the first, for if education becomes lawless, and the youths themselves become lawless, they can never grow up ⁴²⁵ into well-conducted and meritorious citizens.

Very true, he said.

And the education must begin with their plays. The spirit of law must be imparted to them in music, and the spirit of order, attending them in all their actions, will make them grow; and if there be any part of the State which has fallen down, will raise it up again.

Very true, he said.

Thus educated, they will have no difficulty in rediscovering any lesser matters which have been neglected by their predecessors.

What do you mean?

I mean such things as these:—when the young are to be silent before their elders; how they are to show respect to them by sitting down and rising up; what honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode of dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with me?

Yes.

You would think, as I do, that there is small wisdom in legislating about such matters,—I doubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise verbal enactments about them likely to be lasting.

Impossible.

We may assume, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a man will determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?

To be sure.

Until he reaches some one rare and grand result, which may be good, and may be the reverse of good.

That is not to be denied.

And for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about them.

Naturally enough, he replied.

Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about insult and injury, or the order in which causes are to be tried, and the appointment of juries, what would you say? there may be also questions about any impositions and exactions of market and harbour dues which may be required, and in general about the regulations of markets, police, harbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?

I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.

Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only guard the laws which we have given them.

And without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever making and mending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.

You would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no self-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?

Exactly.

426 Yes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring and increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they will be cured by some nostrum which somebody advises them to try.

That is often the case, he said, with invalids such as you describe.

Yes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and drinking and lusting and sleeping, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet nor any other remedy will avail.

Charming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man who tells you what is good.

These gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.

Assuredly not.

Nor would a State which acts like them stand high in your estimation. And do not States act like them, which are ill governed? For they begin by proclaiming to their citizens that no one, under penalty of death, shall alter the constitution of the State; and at the same time, he who conforms to their politics and most sweetly serves them, who indulges them and fawns upon them and has a presentiment of their wishes, and is skilful in gratifying them, he is deemed to be their good man, and the wise and mighty one who is to be held in honour by them?

Yes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am far from approving of them.

But do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready ministers of political corruption?

Yes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the applause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really statesmen, and they are not much to be admired.

What do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a man cannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is four cubits high, can he help believing what they say?

He cannot.

Well, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play, trying their hand at legislation, and always fancying that by reforming they will make an end of frauds between man and man, and the other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in reality cutting away the heads of a hydra?

Yes, he said; that is just what they are doing.

I conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with enactments of this sort in an ill-ordered any more than in a well-ordered State; for in the former they are useless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in inventing them, and many of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.

What, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?

Nothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the god of Delphi, there remains the ordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest of all.

What is that? he said.

The institution of temples and sacrifices, and in general the service of gods, demigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rites which have to be observed in order to propitiate the inhabitants of the world below. For these are matters of which we are ignorant, and as founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of the earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.

You are right, and we will do as you propose.

But where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that our city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your brother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see whether we can discover where is justice and where is injustice, and in what they differ from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should have for his portion, whether perceived or unperceived by gods and men.

Nonsense, said Glaucon; did you not promise to search yourself, saying that to desert justice in her need would be an impiety?

Very true, I said; and as you remind me, I will be as good as my word; but you must join.

We will, he replied.

Well, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with the assumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.

That is most certain.

And being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.

That is likewise clear.

And whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not found will be the residue?

Very good.

Suppose the number of terms to be four, and we were searching for one of them, that one might be known to us at first, and there would be no further trouble; or, if we knew the other three first, and could eliminate them, then the fourth would clearly be the remainder.

Very true, he said.

And is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also four in number?

Clearly.

First among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this I detect a certain peculiarity.

What is that?

The State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in counsel?

Very true.

And good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by knowledge, do men counsel well?

Clearly.

And the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?

Of course.

There is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge which gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?

Certainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in carpentering.

Then a city is not to be called wise because possessed of knowledge which counsels for the best about wooden implements?

Certainly not.

Nor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen implements, he said, nor as possessing any other similar knowledge?

Not by reason of any of them, he said.

Nor by reason of agricultural knowledge; that would give the city the name of agricultural?

Yes.

Well, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-

founded State among any of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State, but about the whole State, and considers what may be regarded as the best policy, both internal and external?

There certainly is.

And what is this knowledge, and among whom found? I asked.

It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom we were just now describing as perfect guardians.

And is there any name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of knowledge?

The name of good in counsel and truly wise.

And do you suppose that there will be as many of these true guardians as there are blacksmiths in a city?

No, he replied; the blacksmiths will be far more numerous.

Will they not be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name from the profession of some kind of knowledge?

Much the smallest.

And by reason of this smallest part or class of a State, which is the governing and presiding class, and of the knowledge which resides in them, the whole State, being thus naturally
429 constituted, will be wise; and Nature appears to have ordained that this, which has the only knowledge worthy to be called knowledge, should be the smallest of all classes.

Most true.

Thus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four virtues has somehow or other been discovered.

And, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.

Again, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in what part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.

How do you mean?

Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to battle on the State's behalf.

No one, he replied, would ever think of any other.

The rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be

cowardly, but their courage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the city either one or the other.

Certainly not.

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of the citizens in whom resides a never-failing quality preservative of that opinion about things to be feared and not to be feared in which the legislature educated them; and this is what you term courage.

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Salvation of what?

The salvation, I said, of the opinion about proper objects of fear which the law implants through education; and I mean by the word 'never-failing' to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. Shall I give you an illustration of my meaning?

If you please.

You know, I said, that the dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true sea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they prepare and dress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the purple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed in this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing with lyes any more than without lyes can take away the bloom. I dare say that you know how purple or any other colour looks when the ground has not been duly prepared?

Yes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.

Then now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our soldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were contriving influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection, and the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to be indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, and not to be washed away by such potent lyes as pleasure—mightier agent far in washing the soul than any soda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, which are the mightiest of all other solvents. And

this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers, I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.

But I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave—this, in your judgment, is not courage in conformity with law, and ought to have another name.

Most certainly.

Then I may infer that this is courage?

Why, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words ‘of a citizen,’ you will not be far wrong;—hereafter, if you like, we will carry the examination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice; and for the general purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.

You are right, he replied.

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first, temperance, and then justice, which is the great object of our search.

Very true.

Now, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?

I do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that justice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore I wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.

Certainly, I replied, I cannot be wrong in granting you a favour.

Then do as I ask, he said.

Yes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of temperance has more of the nature of symphony and harmony than the preceding.

How so? he asked.

Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is implied in the saying of ‘a man being his own master;’ and there are other traces of the same notion.

No doubt, he said.

There is something ridiculous in the expression ‘master of himself;’ for the master is also the slave and the slave the

master ; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

Certainly.

The meaning is, I believe, that the human soul has a better principle, and has also a worse principle ; and when the better principle controls the worse, then a man is said to be master of himself ; and this is a term of praise : but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is less, is overcome by the worse principle, which is greater ; in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.

Yes, there is reason in that.

And now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one of these two conditions realized ; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the words 'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.

Yes, he said, I have looked, and perceived the truth of what you say.

Moreover, I said, the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and pains are found in children and women and servants, and in the lower classes of the free citizens.

Certainly, he said.

Whereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the guidance of mind and true opinion, are confined to a few, and those the best born and the best educated.

Very true.

And these, as you may perceive, have a place in our State, but the meaner desires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the few.

That I perceive, he said.

Then if there be any city which may be described as master of its pleasures and desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation ?

Certainly, he replied.

And also that of temperate, and for the same reasons ?

Yes.

And if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed about the question who are to rule, that again will be our State ?

Undoubtedly.

And the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will temperance be found—in the rulers or in the subjects?

In both, as I should imagine, he replied.

Do you observe that we were pretty right in our anticipation that temperance was a sort of harmony?

Why so?

Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; but that is not the way with temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through the notes of the scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or strength or numbers or wealth, or whatever else may be the measure of them. Most truly then do we describe temperance as the natural agreement of superior and inferior, both in states and individuals, about which of the two elements shall rule.

I entirely agree with you.

And so, I said, we may consider three of the virtues to have been discovered in our State. There remains the last of them, which must be justice, if we only knew what that was.

The inference is obvious.

The time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the cover, and look sharp that justice does not slip away, and pass out of sight, and get lost; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere near: watch therefore and strive to get a sight of her, that you may be first and tell me.

I wish that there were any chance of my doing so, he said; if you treat me as a follower who has just eyes enough to see what you show him, that is about as much as I am good for.

Offer up a prayer with me and follow.

I will, but you must show me the way.

Here is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must push on.

Let us push on.

Here I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I believe that the quarry will not escape.

That is good news, he said.

Truly, I said, we are very stupid.

Why so?

Why, my good sir, when we first began, ages ago, there was justice tumbling about at our feet, and we, fools that we were, failed to see her, like people who go about looking for what they have in their hands: and that was the way with us; we looked away into the far distance, and this, I suspect, was the reason why we never saw her.

What do you mean?

I mean to say that in reality we, having long been speaking and hearing of her, failed to recognise her.

I get impatient at the length of your exordium.

Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You 433 remember the original principle of which we spoke at the foundation of the State, that every man, as we often insisted, should practise one thing only, that being the thing to which his nature was most perfectly adapted;—now justice is this principle or a part of it.

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same.

Yes, we said so.

Then this doing in a certain way one's own business may be assumed to be justice. Do you know why?

I do not, and should like to be told.

Because I think that this alone remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them, and while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.

That follows of necessity.

Still, I said, if a question should arise as to which of these four qualities contributed most by their presence to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers would claim the palm, or whether this

which I am about to mention, and which is found in children and women, bond and free, artisan, ruler, subject, is not the one which conduces most to the excellence of the State,—this quality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody,—the question would not be easily determined.

Certainly, he replied, to answer the question would not be easy.

Then the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other virtues of wisdom, temperance, and courage?

Yes, he said.

And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?

Exactly.

Look at the matter in another light. Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office of determining causes?

Certainly.

And they will act on the principle that individuals are neither to take what is another's, nor to be deprived of what is their own?

Yes; that will be their principle.

Which is a just principle?

Yes.

Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him?

434 Very true.

Think, now, and say whether you agree with me. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange implements or prerogatives, or the same person to be doing the work of both; do you think that any great harm would happen to the State?

Certainly not.

But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all at once, then I think you will agree with me that this interchange of duties and

implements and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.

Most true.

Then, I said, as there are three distinct classes, any meddling of them with one another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?

Precisely.

And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city you would characterize as injustice?

Certainly.

This then is injustice; and conversely when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.

I agree with you.

Let us not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception of justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, then there will be no longer any room for doubt; if not, there must be another enquiry. Let us, however, finish the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could first examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed one, as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be surely found. Let us now apply what we discovered there to the individual, and if they agree, we are satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our 435 souls.

That is reasonable, and let us do as you say.

I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?

Like, he replied.

The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State?

He will.

And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?

True, he said.

And so of the individual; we shall be right in arguing that he has the same three principles in his own soul, and may fairly receive the same appellations as possessing the affections which correspond to them?

Certainly, he said.

Once more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question—whether the soul has these three principles or not?

An easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good.

Very true, I said; and I confess that the method which we are employing, in my judgment, seems to be altogether inadequate to the accurate solution of this question; for the true method is another and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous enquiry.

May we not be satisfied with that? he said;—under the circumstances, I am quite content.

I too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.

Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.

Can I be wrong, I said, in acknowledging that in the individual there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; for if they did not pass from one to the other, whence did they come? Take the quality of passion or spirit;—it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, which is characteristic of the Thracians, Scythians, and in general of the northern nations, when found in States, does not originate in the individuals who compose them; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is the special characteristic of our part of the world, or the love of money, which may, with
436 equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.

Exactly, he said.

There is no difficulty in understanding this.

None whatever.

But the difficulty begins as soon as we raise the question

whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action—to determine that is the difficulty.

Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty.

Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.

How can we? he asked.

I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing, at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are not really the same, but different.

Good.

For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion and at the same time in the same part?

Impossible.

Still, I said, let us have a more precise understanding, that we may not hereafter have a misunderstanding. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment—to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest.

Very true.

And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they revolve, having their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time (and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the straight line; and that the circumference goes round. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.

That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.

Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part
437 or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.

Certainly not, according to my way of thinking.

Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if the assumption turn out to be untrue, the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.

Yes, he said, that will be the best way.

Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and refusal, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition)?

Yes, he said, they are opposites.

Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, including willing and wishing,—all those you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say—would you not?—that the soul of him who desires is seeking after the object of desire; or that he is drawing to himself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wills anything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desire, makes a sign of assent, as if he had been asked a question?

Very true.

And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; would you not refer these to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?

Certainly.

Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires,—shall we say those which are the most evident to sense, and which are termed hunger and thirst?

Let us take that class, he said.

The object of one is food, and of the other drink?

Yes.

And here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink, and of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm or cold, or much or little, or,

in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if the thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if accompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then the drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of drink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and simple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as hunger will desire food?

Yes, he said; in every case the simple desire is of the simple object, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.

But here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard ⁴³⁸ against an opponent starting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food only, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst being a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is true of every other desire.

Yes, he replied, the opponent would have something to say.

Nevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality attached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their correlatives simple.

I do not know what you mean.

Well, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?

Yes.

And the much greater to the much less?

Yes.

And the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to the less that is to be?

Certainly, he said.

And so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and the half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower, of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;—is not this true of all of them?

Yes.

And does not the same hold with the sciences? The object of science is knowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for example, that the building of a house is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds of knowledge as the knowledge of house-building.

Certainly.

Because it has a particular quality which no other has?

Yes.

And it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular kind ; and this is true of the other arts and sciences ?

Yes.

Now, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning in what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if the first term of a relation is taken alone, the second is taken alone ; if the first term is qualified, the second is also qualified. I do not say that relatives need be 'in pari materiâ,' or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil ; but only that, from having health and disease as an object, the science of medicine has come to be of a certain nature, and is hence called not merely science, but medical science.

I understand your meaning, and assent to you.

439 Would you not say that thirst is one of these relative terms, thirst being obviously——

Yes, thirst is relative to drink.

And a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink ; but thirst taken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any particular kind of drink, but of drink only ?

Certainly.

Then the soul of the thirsty one, in that he thirsts, desires only drink, and feels an impulse towards drink ?

That is plain.

And if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that must be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to drink ; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the same part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.

Impossible.

No more than you can say of the archer that his hands push and pull the bow at the same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.

Exactly, he replied.

And might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink ?

Yes, he said, that often happens.

And in such a case what is one to say ? Would you not say that there is something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than that which bids him ?

I should say so.

And the principle which forbids is derived from reason, and that which bids and attracts proceeds from passion and disease ?

Clearly.

Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one another ; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions ?

Yes, he said, we shall not be far wrong in that.

Then let us say definitely that these are two principles which exist in the soul.

And what shall we say of passion, or spirit ? Is that a third, or akin to one of the preceding ?

I should be inclined to say—akin to desire.

Well, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and on which I rely. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground by the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them, and also a disgust and abhorrence of them ; for a time he turned away and averted his eyes, and then, suddenly overcome by the impulse, forced them open, and ran up, saying (to his eyes), Take your fill, ye wretches, of the lovely sight. 440

I have heard the story myself, he said.

The moral is, that anger differs from the desires, and is sometimes at war with them.

Yes ; that is the meaning, he said.

And are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man's desires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at the violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle of factions in a

State, his spirit is on the side of his reason ;—but for the passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason decides that she should not be opposed¹, is a sort of thing which I believe that you never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I think, in any one else?

Certainly not.

Suppose, I said, that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the less able he is to feel indignant ; his anger refuses to be excited at the hunger or cold or other suffering, which he deems that the injured person may justly inflict upon him?

True, he said.

But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice ; and because he suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere and conquer ; he must do or die, and will not desist, until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark no more.

The illustration is perfect, he replied ; and in our State, as we were saying, the auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are their shepherds.

I perceive, I said, that you quite understand me ; there is, however, a further point which I would wish you to consider.

What point?

You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of desire, but now we should say the contrary ; for in the conflict of the soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.

Most assuredly.

But a further question arises : Is spirit different from reason also, or only a kind of reason ; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul, there will be only two, the rational and the concupiscent ; or rather, as the State was composed of
441 three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may there not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit, and when not corrupted by education is the auxiliary of reason?

Yes, he said, there must be a third.

¹ Reading *μη δειν αντιπαρτεω*, without a comma after *δειν*.

Yes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from desire, turn out also to be different from reason.

But that is easily proved by the case of young children, who are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them never seem to attain to the use of reason, and all men late enough.

Excellent, I said, and the same thing is seen in brute animals, which is a further proof of the truth of what you are saying. And Homer, whose words we have already quoted, may be again summoned as a witness, where he says,

‘He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul¹;

for in those lines Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the better and worse to be different from the unreasoning principle which is the subject of the rebuke.

Very true, he said.

And so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that the principles which exist in the State, like those in the individual, are three in number, and the same with them.

Exactly.

And must we not infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in virtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?

Certainly.

And the same quality which constitutes bravery in the State constitutes bravery in the individual, and the same is true of all the other virtues?

Assuredly.

And the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way that the State was just?

That will also follow of course.

And the justice of the State consisted, as we very well remember, in each of the three classes doing the work of its own class?

We are not very likely to forget, he said.

And we must also remember that the individual whose several principles do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?

¹ Od. xx. 17.

Yes, he said, we must remember that too.

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Certainly.

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and
442 soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion, by harmony and rhythm?

Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule¹ over the concupiscent part of every man, which is the largest and of all things most insatiable; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, and no longer confined to her own sphere, the concupiscent soul should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?

Very true, he said.

The two will be the defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels.

True.

And he is to be deemed courageous in whom the element of spirit holds fast in pain and in pleasure the command of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?

Right, he replied.

And he is wise who has in him that little part which rules and gives orders; that part being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each and all of the three other parts?

Assuredly.

And would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in friendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule, and do not rebel?

¹ Reading *προστατήσεων*.

Certainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State or individual.

And surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by what means a man will be just.

That is very certain.

And is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she the same which we found in the State?

There is no difference in my judgment, he said.

Because, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace instances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.

What sort of instances do you mean?

If the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who is trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the unjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny this? 443

No one, he replied.

Will the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery either to his friends or to his country?

That will be far from him.

Neither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?

Impossible.

No one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father and mother, or to fail in his religious duties?

No one.

And the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in ruling or being ruled?

Very true.

Are you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is justice, or do you hope to discover some other?

Not I, indeed.

Then our dream has been realized; and as we were saying at the beginning of our work of construction, some divine power must have conducted us to a primary form of justice—that suspicion of ours has been now verified?

Yes, certainly.

And the division of labour which required the carpenter and

the shoemaker and the rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not another's, was a shadow of justice, and therefore of use?

Clearly.

And justice was the reality and was concerned not with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and concernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others, but he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals—when he has bound together all these, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he will begin to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; in all which cases he will think and call that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time destroys this condition, he
444 will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.

You have said the precise truth, Socrates.

Very good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the just State, and the place of justice in each of them, we should not be telling a falsehood?

Most certainly not.

May we say so, then?

Let us say so.

And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.

Clearly.

Must not injustice be a quarrel which arises between the three parts of the soul—a meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part against the whole of the soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal,—what is this confusion and error but injustice and intemperance and cowardice and ignorance, and in general all vice?

Exactly so.

And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly clear?

What do you mean? he said.

Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what disease and health are in the body.

How so? he said.

Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy causes disease.

Yes.

And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?

That is certain.

And the creation of health is the creation of a natural order and government of one another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the creation of a state of things in which they are at variance with this natural order?

True.

And is not the creation of justice the creation of a natural order and government of one another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of injustice the opposite?

Exactly so, he said.

Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul?

True.

And good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?

Assuredly.

Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice 445 and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and do justly and practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and do unjustly, if only unpunished and unimproved?

In my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that, when the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though pampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all power; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle

is undermined and corrupted, even though a man be allowed to do whatever he pleases, life is still worth having to him, if he be forbidden to escape from vice and injustice, and to attain justice and virtue ; for we now see the true nature of each.

Yes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are near the spot at which we may see the truth with our own eyes, let us not faint by the way.

Certainly not, he replied.

Come hither then, I said, ascend the hill which overhangs the city, and see the various forms of vice.

I am following you, he replied : proceed.

I said, We seem to have reached a height from which a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that the forms of vice are innumerable ; there being four special ones which are deserving of note.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there are forms of the State.

How many?

There are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.

What are they?

The first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said to have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised by one or by many.

True, he replied.

But I regard the two names as describing one form only ; for whether the government is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained in the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be maintained.

That is true, he replied.

BOOK V.

SUCH is the good and true State, and the good and true man 449 is of the same pattern ; and if this is right every other is wrong ; and the evil is one which affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of the individual soul, and exists in four forms.

What are they? he said.

I was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me to succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting just beyond Adeimantus on the further side, began to whisper to him. Stretching forth his hand, he took hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him towards him, leaning forward himself and saying something, of which I only caught the words, ' Shall we let him off, or what? '

Certainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.

What is it, I said, which you refuse to let off?

You, he said.

Still I asked for an explanation¹.

Why, he said, we think that you are lazy and mean to cheat us out of a whole chapter which is a very important part of the story ; and you fancy that we shall not notice your airy way of proceeding ; as if it were self-evident to everybody, that in the matter of women and children ' friends have all things in common. '

And was I not right, Adeimantus?

Yes, he said ; but what is right, in this as in every other case, has to be explained ; for a community may be of many kinds. Please, therefore, to say which you mean ; for we have been ex-

¹ Reading ἔτι ἐγὼ εἶπον.

pecting that you would tell us something about their family life—how they would bring children into the world, and rear them when they had arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of women and children—as we are of opinion that the right or wrong management of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the State for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined, and you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, as you heard,
450 not to let you go until you give a satisfactory explanation of all this, as of the rest.

To that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed.

And without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be equally agreed.

I said, You do not know what you are doing in thus assailing me. What an argument are you raising! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was only too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting how fortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you begin again, ignorant of what a hornet's nest of words you are arousing. Now I foresaw this coming trouble, and avoided it.

For what do you think that we are here? said Thrasymachus,—to find the philosopher's stone, or to hear discourse?

Yes, but discourse should have a limit.

Yes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise men assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us; only get on and in your own way answer the question: What sort of community of women and children is this which is to prevail among the guardians? and how shall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require the greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.

Yes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more doubts arise about this than about our previous speculations. For the practicability of what is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point of view, whether the scheme, if ever so practicable, will be for the best, is also doubtful. Hence there arises a fear, as we draw near, lest our aspiration should be a dream only.

Fear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you ; they are not sceptical or hostile.

I said : My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.

Yes, he said.

Then let me tell you that you are doing just the contrary ; the consolation would have been good had I believed myself that I knew what I was talking about : for to know and to declare the truth in matters of high interest which a man loves among wise men who love him is a safe thing and gives confidence ; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself only a doubting enquirer, which is my case, is a dangerous and 451 slippery thing ; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear would be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to be sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray Nemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do indeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a deceiver about the beauty or goodness or justice of institutions. And that is a risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore you do well to console me¹.

Glaucon laughed and said : Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do us any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide, and shall not be held to be a deceiver ; take courage then and speak.

Well, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt, and what holds in the one case may hold in the other.

Then why should you mind ?

Well, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps ought to have said before. The men have played out their part, and now comes the women's turn ; of whom I will proceed to speak, and the more readily as I am invited by you.

For men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, of arriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and children is to follow the path on which

¹ Reading ὥστε εἶ με παραμυθεῖ.

we originally started, when we said about the men that they were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.

True.

Let us proceed now to give the women a similar training and education, and see how far that accords with our design.

What do you mean?

What I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said : Do we divide dogs into hes and shes, and take the masculine gender out to hunt, or have them to keep watch and ward over the flock, while we leave the females at home, under the idea that the bearing and suckling their puppies hinder them from sharing in the labours of the males?

No, he said, they share alike ; the difference between them is in degrees of strength.

But can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred and fed in the same way?

You cannot.

Then, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must
45² have the same education?

Yes.

The education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.

Yes.

Then women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, which they must practise like the men?

That is the inference, I suppose.

I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are carried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.

No doubt of it.

Yes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in the palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they get old ; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the wrinkled old men who have anything but an agreeable appearance when they take to gymnastics—this, however, does not deter them.

Yes, indeed ; he said : according to present notions the proposal would appear ridiculous.

But then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear the jests of the wits which will be directed

against this sort of innovation; how they will talk of women's attainments in music as well as in gymnastic, and above all about their wearing armour and riding upon horseback!

Very true, he replied.

Yet having begun we must go on and attack the difficulty; at the same time begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. Not long ago, as we shall remind them, the Greeks were of the opinion, which is still generally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was ridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians introduced naked exercises, the wits of that day might have ridiculed them equally.

No doubt.

But when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better than to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished before the approval of reason, then the man was seen to be a fool who laughs or directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that of folly and vice, or seriously inclines to measure the beautiful by any other standard but that of the good.

Very true, he replied.

First, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us ask about the nature of woman: Is she capable 453 of sharing either wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art of war one of those arts in which she can or can not share? That will be the best way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest conclusion.

That will be best.

Suppose that we take the other side and begin by arguing against ourselves, and so the adversary's position will be fairly defended.

Why not? he said.

Then let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say: 'Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves, at the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that every one was to do his own work according to his nature.' And certainly, if I am not mistaken there was such an admission made by us. Then he will proceed

to say: 'Is there not the greatest difference between the natures of men and women?' And we shall reply: Of course, there is. And he will ask 'whether men and women ought not to have different tasks imposed upon them, such as are agreeable to their different natures?' Certainly they ought. 'Have you not then fallen into a great inconsistency in saying that men and women, who are entirely different, ought to perform the same actions?'—What defence will you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these objections?

That is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I do beg of you to draw out the case on our side.

There, Glaucon, is the difficulty which made me unwilling to take in hand any law about women and children; and this is not the only difficulty.

Why yes, he said, there is something of a difficulty.

Yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether he has fallen into a swimming bath or into the ocean, he has to swim all the same.

Very true.

And must not we swim and make for some haven, in the hope that Arion's dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?

I suppose so, he said.

Well then, let us see if we can discover any way of escape. Our principle was that different natures ought to have different pursuits, and that men's and women's natures are different. And now what are we saying?—that different natures ought to have the same pursuits,—this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.

Precisely.

454 Verily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!

Why do you say so?

Because I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion.

Yes, he replied, such is very often the case ; but what has that to do with us and our argument ?

A great deal ; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally into a verbal opposition.

In what way ?

Why we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different natures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what was the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished them when we assigned different pursuits to different natures.

Why, no, he said, that was never considered by us.

I said : Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether there is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men ; and if there is, then, if bald men are cobblers, forbid the hairy men, or if the hairy men are cobblers, then forbid the bald men to be cobblers ?

That would be a jest, he said.

Yes, I said, a jest ; and why ? because we never meant when we constructed the State, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but only to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is engaged ; we should have said, for example, that a man and a woman when they both have the soul¹ of a physician may be said to have the same nature.

True.

Whereas the physician and the carpenter are different ?

Certainly.

And if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for any art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned to one or the other of them ; but if the difference consists only in women bearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a woman differs from a man in that respect of which we are speaking ; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits.

Very true, he said.

The next step will be to desire our opponent to show how, in

¹ Reading *ιατρικὸν μὲν καὶ ἰατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὄντας.*

455 reference to any of the pursuits or arts of citizens, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?

That will be fair.

And perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give an answer on the instant is not easy; a little reflection is needed.

Yes, perhaps.

Suppose then that we invite him to come along with us in the argument, and then we may hope to show him that there is no special function which a woman has in the administration of the State.

By all means.

Let us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:—when you said that one man has natural gifts and another not, was this your meaning?—that the former will acquire a thing easily which the latter will have a difficulty in acquiring; a little learning will lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, after a great deal of learning and application, will only forget what he has learned; or again, you may mean, that the one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the other is at war with his mind;—would these be the sort of differences which distinguish the man of capacity from the man who is wanting in capacity?

The existence of such differences, he said, will be universally allowed.

Can you mention any pursuit of man in which the male sex has not all these qualities in a far higher degree than the female? Need I waste time in speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and preserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for her to be beaten is the most absurd of all things?

You are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of the female sex; at the same time many women are in many things superior to many men, though, speaking generally, what you say is true.

And so, I said, my friend, in the administration of a State neither a woman as a woman, nor a man as a man has any special function, but the gifts of nature are equally diffused in both sexes; all the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, and in all of them a woman is only a weaker man.

Very true.

Then are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?

That will never do.

One woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another is not a musician?

Very true.

And one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is unwarlike and hates gymnastics?

Beyond question.

And one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has spirit, and another is without spirit?

That is also true.

Then one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not; for was not the selection of the male guardians determined by these sort of differences?

Very true.

Then the woman has equally with the man the qualities which make a guardian; she differs only in degrees of strength?

Obviously.

And those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions and colleagues of our guardians, since they resemble them in ability and character?

Very true.

And being of the same nature with them, ought they not to have the same pursuits?

They ought.

Then, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music and gymnastic to the wives of the guardians: to that point we come round again.

Very good.

The law which thus enacted, instead of being an impossibility or mere aspiration, was agreeable to nature, and the contrary practice, which prevails at present, is in reality a violation of nature.

That appears to be true.

There was, first, the possibility, and secondly, the advantage of our proposed arrangement, which had to be considered?

Yes.

And the possibility has been allowed?

Yes.

The very great advantage has next to be acknowledged?

Clearly.

You will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will make a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?

Yes.

I should like to ask you a question: Would you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than another?

The latter.

And in our imaginary commonwealth which do you reckon the better, the guardians who have been brought up on our model system or the cobblers whose education has been cobbling?

What a ridiculous question!

You have answered me, I replied. Well, and may we not further say that our guardians are the best of our citizens?

Far the best.

And will not their wives be the best women?

Yes, again I say the very best.

And can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the men and women of a State should be as good as possible?

There can be nothing better.

457 And our course of music and gymnastic will accomplish this? Certainly.

Then we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree advantageous to the State?

True.

Then let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe, and let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country; only in the distribution of labour the lighter labours are to be assigned to the women, who are the weaker vessels, but in other respects their duties are to be the same. And as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the best of motives, his laughter is

‘A fruit of unripe wisdom,’

and he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he

is about ;—for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, *That the useful is the noble and the hurtful is the base.*

Very true.

Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women which we have escaped ; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common ; to the utility and possibility of this the argument is its own witness.

Yes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.

Yes, I said, but a much greater is coming ; you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Go on ; let me see.

The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to the following effect,—‘that the wives of these guardians are to be common, and their children also common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.’

Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other ; and the utility as well as the possibility of such a law is far more doubtful.

I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common ; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.

I think that a good many doubts may be raised about both questions.

You insist on joining the two questions, I replied. Now I meant that you should admit the utility ; and in this way, as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.

But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a defence of both.

Well, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour : let me feast my mind as day dreamers are in the habit of feast- 458
ing themselves with their own dreams when they are walking alone ; for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities ; but assuming that what they desire is already theirs, they pursue

their plan, and delight in detailing what they are going to do when their wish has come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. I too am beginning to lose heart, and would wish to reserve the question of possibility, which, for the present only, I will assume, if you will allow me, and so proceed to enquire what measures the rulers will take for the execution of the plan, which, if executed, I will prove to be of the greatest use to the State and to the guardians. I will ask you, if you have no objection, to assist me, first of all, in considering the advantages of the measure, and then I will return to the question of possibility.

I have no objection ; proceed.

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other ; the guardians must themselves obey the laws and imitate their spirit in the details which are entrusted to them.

That is right, he said.

You, I said, in the capacity of their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women who as far as may be are of like natures with them, and give them to them, and they will live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own ; they will be together, and will be brought up together, and will associate at gymnastic exercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other—necessity is not too strong a word, I think ?

Yes, he said ;—necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.

True, I said ; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion,—in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.

Yes, he said, and so they ought.

Then clearly our plan will be to make matrimony as holy as possible, and the most beneficial marriages will be the most holy ?

459 Exactly.

And how can marriages be made most beneficial?—that is a question which I put to you, because I observe in your house hunting dogs, and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, do tell me, have you not attended to their pairing and breeding?

In what particulars?

Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?

True.

And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?

From the best.

And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age.

And if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would deteriorate?

Certainly.

And the same principle holds of horses and of animals in general?

Undoubtedly.

Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve such a high requirement?

Because, I said, our rulers will have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.

That is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that they might be used with advantage as medicines.

Very true.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.

How so?

Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often as possible, and the inferior with the inferior; and that they should rear the offspring of the one sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in first-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.

Very true.

Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which the brides and bridegrooms will be brought together and sacrifices will be
460 offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population? There are many other things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order to prevent the State becoming either too large or too small.

Certainly, he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse their own ill-luck and not the rulers.

To be sure, he said.

And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honours and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

True.

And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men—

Yes.

The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as decency requires.

Yes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognises her own child ; and other wet-nurses may be had if any more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be tedious to them ; and they will have no trouble or getting up at night, but will hand over all this to the nurses and attendants.

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.

Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. As we were saying, the parents should be in the prime of life.

Very true.

And what is the prime of life? May not that be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman, I said, may begin to bear children to the State at twenty years of age, and continue to bear until forty ; a man may begin at five-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats quickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.

Certainly, he said, both in men and women those years are 461 the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigour.

Any one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing ; the child of which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived under other auspices than those of sacrifice and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents, whereas his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.

Very true, he replied.

And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age, who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers ; for we shall

say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.

Very true, he replied.

This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to them to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, they must understand that the offspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.

That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?

They will never know. The way will be this:—dating from the day of the hymenical, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born in the seventh and the tenth month afterwards his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children's children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the same time with them will be called their brothers and sisters, and these will be forbidden to intermarry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of such marriages; if the lot favours them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will allow them.

Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument prove that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity, and also that nothing can be better—would you not?

462 Yes, certainly.

Shall we begin by asking of ourselves what we conceive to be the greatest good, and what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in the organization of a State, and what is the greatest

evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the evil?

By all means.

Can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

There cannot.

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—where all the citizens are glad or sorry on the same occasions?

No doubt.

Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling, a State is disorganized—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other sorrowing at the same events happening to the city and the citizens?

Certainly.

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms 'meum' and 'tuum,' mine and his.

Exactly.

And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same thing?

True, very true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual—as in the body, when but a finger is hurt, the whole frame, drawn towards the soul and forming one realm under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same expression is used about any other part, which has a sensation of pain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.

Very true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Yes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.

It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and

see whether this or some other form is most in accordance with these principles.

Very good.

463 Our State like every other has rulers and subjects?

True.

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.

But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call them rulers.

And in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers?

They are called saviours and helpers, he replied.

And what do the rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and foster-fathers.

And what do they call them in other States?

Slaves.

And what do the rulers call one another in other States?

Fellow-rulers.

And what in ours?

Fellow-guardians.

Did you ever know an example in other States of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as a friend and of another as not a friend to him?

Yes, very often.

And the friend he describes and regards as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as one in whom he has no interest?

Exactly.

But would any of your guardians speak of one of their fellows as a friend and of another as not a friend to him?

Certainly not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.

Capital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name only; or shall they always act as if they were a family? For example, in the use of the word 'father,' would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and

duty and obedience to him which the law commands ; and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either from the hands of God or man? Are these to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about their parents and kindred when they are pointed out to them?

These, he said, and none other ; for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act upon them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be 'mine is well' or 'mine is ill.'

Most true.

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And agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying also that they will have their pleasures and pains in common?

Yes, and so they will.

And they will have a common interest in the same which they will call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Yes, they will have a far greater community of feeling.

And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians have a community of women and children?

That will be the chief reason.

And this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?

That we acknowledged, and very rightly.

Then the community of wives and children is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?

Certainly.

And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,—that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property ; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were to have

no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their true character of guardians.

Right, he replied.

Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about 'meum' and 'tuum;' the one dragging any acquisition which he has made into a house of his own, where he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains, and another into another; but all will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore all tend towards a common end.

Certainly, he replied.

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be free from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.

Of course they will.

Neither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall surely maintain to be fair and right; and make
465 the protection of the person a matter of necessity.

That is good, he said.

Yes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has cause of offence against another he will satisfy his resentment and be less likely to make a commotion in the State.

Certainly.

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.

Clearly.

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.

That is true, he replied.

Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep peace with one another?

Yes, there will be no want of peace.

And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

None whatever.

I hardly like to speak of the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath mention. Such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs of bringing up a family, finding the money to buy the necessaries of their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep—what people suffer in this way is mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.

And from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.

How?

The Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the happiness which is the lot of our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown with which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and after death have an honourable burial.

Yes, he said, they are indeed glorious rewards.

Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion¹ some one who shall be nameless accused us of 466 making our guardians unhappy—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom we replied that on some future occasion we might perhaps consider the question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were fashioning the State not with a view to the happiness of any particular class, but of the whole?

Yes, I remember.

¹ Pages 419, 420 St.

And what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors; will you compare such a life with that of shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen?

Certainly not.

At the same time I must repeat what I was before saying, that if any of our guardians shall get into his head the youthful conceit, that he ought to have a happiness which would make him no longer a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in our judgment, is of all lives the best, but shall proceed to monopolize the State, then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he said, 'half is better than the whole.'

If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, having the promise of such a life.

And you agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described—common education, common children; and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to guard together, and to hunt together like dogs; and always and in all things women are to share with the men? And in so doing they will act for the best and will not violate, but preserve the natural relation of the sexes.

I agree with you, he replied.

The enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community will be found possible—as among other animals, so also among men—and if possible, in what way possible?

That, he said, is just the question which I was going to ask.

There is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.

How?

Why, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them any of their children who are strong enough, that, like the children of artisans in general, they may look on at the work which they will have to do when they are grown
467 up; and besides looking on they will be able to help and be of use in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe in the arts how the potters' boys look on and help, long before they touch the wheel?

Certainly.

And shall potters be more careful than our guardians in educating their children and giving them the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties?

The notion would be ridiculous, he said.

There is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the presence of their cubs will be the greatest incentive to valour.

That is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often happen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as their parents, and the State will never recover.

True, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?

I am far from saying that.

Well, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not run the risk when there is a chance of their improvement?

Clearly.

Whether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is a very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be incurred.

Yes, very important.

Our first requirement will be that the children should see war, and we must also contrive that they shall see in safety; then all will be well.

True.

Their parents may be supposed to have ordinary common sense and understanding of the risks of war; they will know what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?

That may be assumed.

And they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the dangerous ones?

True.

And they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be their leaders and teachers?

Very properly.

Still, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal of chance about them?

True.

Then against such chances the children must be at once

furnished with wings, in order that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they have learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses must not be spirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be had. In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be their
468 business; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder leaders and escape.

I believe you are right, he said.

Next, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another and to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who leaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of cowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do you think?

By all means, I should say.

And he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may even be made a present of to his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and they may do as they like with him.

Certainly.

But the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the first place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful comrades; every one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?

I approve.

And what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?

To that too, I agree.

But you will hardly agree to my next proposal.

What is your proposal?

That he should kiss and be kissed by them?

Most certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one whom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition lasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or maiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour.

That is good, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been already determined; and he is to

have first choices in such matters more than others, in order that he may have as many children as possible.

Agreed.

Again, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths should be honoured ; for he tells how Ajax¹, after he had distinguished himself in battle, was rewarded with long chins, which seems to be a complement appropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of honour but also a very strengthening thing.

Very true, he said.

Then in this, I said, Homer will be our teacher ; and we too, at sacrifices and on the like occasions, will honour the brave, whether men or women, with hymns

‘and seats of precedence, and meats and flowing goblets²;

and in honouring them, we shall also be training them.

That, he replied, is excellent.

Yes, I said ; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the first place, that he is of the golden race ?

To be sure.

Nay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead

‘They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of ill, the 469 guardians of speech-gifted men ?’

Yes ; and we believe him.

We must enquire of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic personages, and do as he bids ?

By all means.

And in ages to come we will do service to them and worship at their shrines as heroes. And not only they but any who are pre-eminently good, whether they die from age, or in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.

That is very right, he said.

Next, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies ? What do you say about this ?

In what respect do you mean ?

¹ Iliad, vii. 321.

² Ibid. viii. 162.

Probably Works and Days, 121 foll.

I mean, shall they be made slaves? Do you think that Hellenes ought to enslave Hellenes, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help? Should not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is that the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?

To spare them is infinitely better.

Then no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they will observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.

Certainly, he said; that is the way to unite them against the barbarians and make them keep their hands off one another.

Next as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their armour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not facing the battle? They skulk about the dead, pretending that they are fulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of plunder.

Very true.

And is there not illiberality and avarice, and a degree of meanness and womanishness, in robbing a corpse and making an enemy of the dead body when the real enemy has walked away and left only his fighting gear behind him,—is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant, quarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?

Exactly like a dog, he said.

Then we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?

Yes, he replied, we must.

Neither, as our object is to preserve good feeling among the
470 Hellenes, shall we offer up the arms of Hellenes at any rate, at the temples of the gods; nay, we have some reason to be afraid that such an offering may be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?

Very true.

Again, as to the devastation of an Hellenic territory or the burning of houses, what is to be the practice?

Will you let me have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?

Both should be forbidden, in my judgment ; I would take the annual produce and no more. Shall I tell you why ?

Pray do.

Why, you see, there is a difference in the names 'discord' and 'war,' and I imagine that there is also a difference in their natures ; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of what is external and foreign ; and the first of the two is properly termed discord, and only the second, war.

That is a very just distinction, he replied.

Shall I further add that the Hellenic race is all united together by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the barbarians.

Very good, he said.

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war ; but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends ; and such enmity is to be called discord.

I agree.

Consider then, I said, when that which is now acknowledged by us to be discord occurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the houses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear—how can either of them be a lover of his country ? for no true lover of his country would tear in pieces his nurse and mother : there might be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but still they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and not go on fighting for ever.

Yes, he said, a better temper than the other.

And when you found a state, will it not be an Hellenic state ?

It ought to be, he replied.

Then will not the citizens be good and civilized ?

To be sure.

And will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land, and share in the common temples ?

Most certainly.

And any difference that arises among Hellenes will be re-

471 garded by them as discord only—a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?

Certainly not.

Then they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?

Certainly.

They will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their opponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?

Just so.

And as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will they burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a city—men, women, and children—are equally their enemies, for they know that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the many are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to waste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them will only last until the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give satisfaction?

I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic enemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.

Then let us enact this law for our guardians:—that they are neither to devastate the ground nor to burn houses.

Agreed; and we may agree also that these, like all our previous enactments, are excellent.

But still, Socrates, I must say, that if you are allowed to go on you will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this discussion you thrust aside:—Is such an order of things possible, and how, if at all? For, admitting the possibility, I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan has every advantage. I will add, what you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and will never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will call the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their armies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the enemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be made altogether invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might be mentioned as well, and these also I fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these

advantages and as many more as you please, if this State of yours were to come into being, say no more of them; let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways and means—all the rest may be left.

If I loiter¹ for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, 472 I said, and have no mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you seem not to be aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural, considering the extraordinary character of the proposal which I have to offer.

The more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are we that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and at once.

Let me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after justice and injustice.

True, he replied; but what of this?

I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require that the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may we be satisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree of justice than is to be found in other men?

The approximation will be enough.

And we enquired into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of the perfectly just and the possibility of his existence, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, only that we might have an ideal. We were to look at them in order that we might judge of our own happiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we resembled them, not with any view of showing that they could exist in fact.

True, he said.

How would a painter be the worse painter because, after having painted with consummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show that any such man could ever have existed?

He would not.

¹ Reading *στραγγενομένω*.

Well, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?

To be sure.

And is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility of a city being ordered in the manner described?

Surely not, he replied.

That is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how and under what condition the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having this in view, to repeat your former admissions.

What admissions?

473 I want to know whether ideas are ever realized in fact? Is not speech more than action, and must not the actual, whatever a man may think, fall short of the truth? What do you say?

I agree.

Then you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every respect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city may be governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the possibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am sure that I should be contented—will not you?

Yes, I will.

Then let me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the cause of their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will enable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if possible, be of one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few and slight as possible.

Certainly, he replied.

I think then, I said, that there might be a revolution if there were just one change, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.

What is it? he said.

Now then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves, yet shall the word be spoken, even though the overflowing of the laughing wave shall drown me in laughter and dishonour; and do you attend to me.

Proceed.

I said: Until, then, philosophers are kings, or the kings and

princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who follow either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never cease from ill—no, nor the human race, as I believe—and then only will our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of day. This was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I was wanting to utter if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no other State can there be private or public happiness is indeed a hard thing.

Socrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you have spoken, is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons too, pulling off their coat in a moment, and seizing any weapon that comes to 474 hand, will run at you might and main, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don't prepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be 'pared by their fine wits,' and no mistake.

You got me into the scrape, I said.

And I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out; but I can only give you wishes and exhortations, and also, perhaps, I may be able to fit answers to your questions better than another—that is all. And now, having such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that you are right.

I ought to try, I said, since you offer me such valuable assistance. And I think that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must define who these philosophers are who, as we say, are to rule in the State; then we shall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be some natures who ought to rule and to study philosophy; and others who are not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than leaders.

Then now for a definition, he said.

Follow me, I said, and I hope that I may somehow or other be able to give you a satisfactory explanation.

Proceed.

I dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a lover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his

love, not to some one part of that which he loves, but to the whole.

I believe that I must ask you to explain, for I really do not understand.

Another, I replied, might fairly answer thus; but a man of pleasure like you ought to know that all who are in the flower of their youth do somehow or other raise a pang or emotion in a lover's breast, and are thought by him to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have with the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his pleasant face; another's beak, as you say, has a royal look; while he who is neither snub nor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, and the fair are angels; and as to the sweet 'honey pale,' as they are called, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who uses these pet names, and is not averse to paleness on the cheek of youth? In a word, there is no excuse which
475 you will not make, and nothing which you will not say, in order to preserve for your use every flower that has the bloom of youth.

If you will make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument, I assent.

And what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They are glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.

Very good.

And the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot be generals, they are willing to be captains; and if they cannot be honoured by really great and important persons, they are glad to be honoured by inferior people,—but honour of some kind they must have.

Exactly.

Once more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole class or a part only?

The whole.

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?

True.

Then he who dislikes knowledge, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such an

one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?

There we are right, he said.

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not right?

Glaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange being claiming the name. For all the lovers of sights have a delight in learning, and will therefore have to be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk wonderfully out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the world who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could help, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out their ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or country—that makes no difference—they are there. Now are we to maintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the professors of minor arts, are philosophers?

Certainly not, I replied, they are only an imitation.

He said: But who are the true philosophers?

Those, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.

That is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?

To another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.

What proposition?

That since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?

Certainly.

And inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?

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True again.

And of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same remark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various combinations of them with things and persons and with one another, they are seen in various lights and appear many?

Very true.

And this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-

loving, art-loving, busy class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of the name of philosophers.

How do you distinguish them? he said.

The lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine tones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out of them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.

True, he replied.

Few are they who are able to attain the sight of this.

Very true.

And he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty, or who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to follow—of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is not the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who puts the resemblance in the place of the real object?

I should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.

But take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute beauty and is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the place of the objects—is he a dreamer, or is he awake?

He is wide awake.

And may we not say that the mind of the one has knowledge and that the mind of the other has opinion only?

Certainly.

But suppose that the latter quarrels with us and disputes our statement, can we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to him that there is sad disorder in his wits?

Good advice is what he certainly wants, he replied.

Come, then, and let us think of something to tell him. Suppose we begin by assuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge he may have, and that we are rejoiced at his having any. But we should like to ask him a question: Does he who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)

I answer that he knows something.

Something that is or is not?

Something that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?

And are we assured, after looking at the matter in every point 477 of view, that absolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that not-being is utterly unknown and unknowable?

Nothing can be more certain.

Good. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to be, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being?

Yes, between them.

And, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance to not-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be discovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if there be such?

Certainly.

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly.

As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes.

And knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed I will make a division.

What division?

I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in us, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for example, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I mean?

Yes, I quite understand.

Then let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the distinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to discern the differences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I think only of the end and the operation; and that which has the same end and the same operation I call the same faculty, but that which has another end and another operation I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?

Yes.

To return. Would you place knowledge among faculties, or in some other class?

Certainly knowledge is a faculty, and the most powerful of all faculties.

And is opinion also a faculty?

Certainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an opinion.

And yet you were surely admitting a little while ago that knowledge is not the same as opinion?

478 Why, yes, said he: for how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is infallible with that which errs?

That is very good, I said, and clearly shows that we are conscious of a distinction between them?

Yes.

Then knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct ends or subject-matters?

That is certain.

Being is the end or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is the knowledge of being?

Yes.

And opinion is to have an opinion?

Yes.

And is the subject-matter of opinion the same as the subject-matter of knowledge?

Nay, he replied, that is already disproven; if difference in faculty implies difference in the end or subject-matter, and opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, the subject-matter of knowledge cannot be the same as the subject-matter of opinion.

Then if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be the subject-matter of opinion?

Yes, something else.

Well then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can there be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an opinion, has he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an opinion about nothing?

Impossible.

He who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?

Yes.

And not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?

True.

Of not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being, knowledge?

True, he said.

Then opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?

Not with either.

And can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?

That seems to be true.

Then is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater clearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?

Neither.

Then I suppose that opinion appears to you darker than knowledge, but lighter than ignorance?

Both; and in no small degree.

And also to be within and between them?

Yes.

Then you would infer that opinion is intermediate?

No question.

But were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being; and that the corresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in the interval between them?

True.

And in that interval there has now been discovered a thing which we call opinion?

There has.

Then what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the nature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and simple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of opinion, and assign to each their due—to the extremes the faculty of the extreme and to the mean the faculty of the mean.

True.

479 This being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is no absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty—in whose opinion the beautiful is the diverse—he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot bear to be told that the just is one, and the beautiful is one, or that anything is one—to him I would appeal, saying, Best of men, of all these beautiful things is there one which will not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of the holy, which will not also be unholy?

No, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and the same is true of the rest.

And may not the many which are doubles be also halves?—doubles, that is, of one thing, and halves of another?

Yes.

And things great and small, heavy and light, will not be denoted by these any more than by the opposite names?

True; both those and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.

And can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be said to be this rather than not to be this?

He replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the children's puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit him, as they say in the puzzle, and what the bat was sitting upon; for these immediate objects of which I am speaking are a riddle also, and have a double sense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or not-being, or both or neither.

Then what do you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than between being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or negation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being.

That is quite true, he said.

Thus then we seem to have discovered that the many things which are esteemed beautiful or good by the multitude, are tossing about in some region which is half-way between pure being and pure not-being?

We have.

Yes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind

which we might find was to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being the intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.

Granted.

Then those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see, nor can be taught to see, absolute beauty; who see the many just, and not absolute justice, and the like,—such persons may be said to have opinion but not knowledge?

That is certain.

But those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know, and not to have opinion only?

Neither can that be denied.

The one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion? The latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet sounds and gazed 480 upon fair colours, but would not tolerate the existence of absolute beauty.

Yes, I remember.

Shall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion rather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus describing them?

I shall tell them that they ought not to be angry at a description of themselves which is true.

But those who love the truth of each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom and not lovers of opinion.

Assuredly.

BOOK VI.

484 AND thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the false philosophers have at length appeared in view.

I do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.

I suppose not, I said ; and yet I believe that we might have a nearer view of both of them if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to see in what the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must consider.

And what question is next in order ? he asked.

Surely, I said, there can be no doubt about that. Inasmuch as philosophers only are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in the region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which of the two kinds should be the rulers of our State ?

And how can we truly answer that question ?

Ask yourself, I replied, which of the two are better able to guard the laws and institutions of our State ; and let them be our guardians.

Very good.

Neither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep anything should have eyes rather than no eyes ?

There can be no question of that.

And are not those who are truly and indeed without the knowledge of the true being of each thing, and have in their souls no clear pattern, and are unable as with a painter's eye to look at the very truth and to that original to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the laws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to guard and preserve the order of them—are they not, I say, simply blind ?

Assuredly, he replied, that is very much their condition.

And shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their equals in experience and not inferior to them in any particular of virtue, have also the knowledge of the truth?

There can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this great and pre-eminent quality, if they do not fail in any ⁴⁸⁵ other respect.

Suppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the other excellences.

By all means.

In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher was to be ascertained; about which, if we are agreed, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also be agreed that such an union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in the State. Let us assume that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.

Agreed.

And further, I said, let us admit that they are lovers of all true being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.

True.

There is another quality which they will also need if they are to be what we were saying.

What quality?

Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.

Yes, that may be affirmed of them.

'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather, 'must be affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.

Right, he said.

And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?

How can there be?

Or can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?

Never.

The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth?

Assuredly.

But then again, he whose desires are strong in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.

True.

He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure—I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.

That is most certain.

Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the motives which make another man desirous to have and to spend, are no part of his character.

Very true.

486 Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.

What is that?

There should be no secret corner of meanness; for littleness is the very opposite of a soul which is ever longing after the whole of things both divine and human.

Most true, he replied.

Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time and all existence, think much of human life?

He cannot.

Or can such an one account death fearful?

No indeed.

Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?

Certainly not.

Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean, or a boaster, or a coward—can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his dealings?

Impossible.

Then you will note whether a man is just and gentle, or rude

and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.

True.

And there is another point which should be remarked.

What point?

Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.

Certainly not.

And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he not be an empty vessel?

That is certain.

Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?

Yes.

Then the forgetful soul cannot be ranked among philosophers; a philosopher ought to have a good memory?

Certainly.

Yet again, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to disproportion?

Undoubtedly.

And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?

To proportion.

Then, besides other qualities, let us seek for a well-proportioned and gracious mind, whose own nature will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything.

Certainly.

Well, and do not all these qualities go together, and are they not necessary to a soul, which is to have a full and perfect participation of being?

They are absolutely necessary, he replied.

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And must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has a good memory, and is quick to learn, noble, gracious, the friend of truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his brethren?

The god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.

And to these, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to these only you will entrust the State.

Here Adeimantus interposed and said: To this, Socrates, no one can offer a reply; but there is a feeling which those who hear you talk as you are now doing often experience, and which I may describe in this way: they fancy that they are led astray a little at each step in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering questions; these little accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are found to have sustained a mighty overthrow and reversal of their first notions. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut up by their skilled adversaries and have no piece to move, so they find themselves at last shut up and have no word to say in this new game of which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right. The observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us might say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step in the argument, as a fact he sees that the votaries of philosophy who carry on the study, not only in youth with a view to education, but as the pursuit of their maturer years, for the most part grow into very strange beings, not to say utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them, are made useless to the world by the very study which you extol.

Well, I said; and do you think that they are wrong?

I cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.

Hear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.

Then how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be of no use to them?

You ask a question, I said, to which I can only reply in a parable.

Yes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all accustomed, I suppose.

I perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a hopeless discussion; and now you shall
488 hear the parable in order that you may judge better of the meagreness of my imagination: for the treatment which the

best men experience from their States is so grievous that no single thing on earth can be compared with them; and therefore if I would defend them I must have recourse to fiction, and make a compound of many things, like the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures. Imagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and stronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar infirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. Now the sailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering; every one is of opinion that he ought to steer, though he has never learned and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will even assert that the art of navigation cannot be taught, and is ready to cut in pieces him who says the contrary. They throng about the captain, and do all that they can to make him commit the helm to them; and if he refuses them and others prevail, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having first chained up the noble captain's senses with drink or some narcotic drug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make themselves at home with the stores; and thus, eating and drinking, they continue their voyage with such success as might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and zealous in the design of getting the ship out of the captain's hands into their own, whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor, pilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man and call him a good-for-nothing; but they have not even a notion that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and seasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if he intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship; while at the same time he must and will be the steerer, whether other people like or not; and they think that to combine the exercise of command with the steerer's art is impossible¹. Now in vessels which are thus circumstanced and among sailors of this class, 489 how will the true pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by the mutineers a prater, a star-gazer, a good-for-nothing?

¹ Or, applying ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει to the mutineers, 'But only understanding (ἐπαίοντας) that he (the mutinous pilot) must rule in spite of other people, never considering that there is an art of command which may be practised in combination with the pilot's art.'

Of course, said Adeimantus.

I do not suppose, I said, that you would care to hear the interpretation of the figure, which is an allegory of the true philosopher in his relation to the State; for you understand already.

Certainly.

Then suppose you now take the parable to the gentleman who is surprised at finding that philosophers have no honour in their cities, and explain to him and try to convince him that their having honour would be far more extraordinary.

I will.

Say to him, that, in deeming the best of the votaries of philosophy to be useless to the rest of the world, he is right; but he ought to attribute their uselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves. The pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him—that is not the order of nature; neither are the wise to go to the doors of the rich (the ingenious author of this saying told a lie), for the truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, he must go to the physician's door—the physician will not come to him—and he who is asking to be governed, to the door of him who is able to govern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to ask his subjects to obey him; he is not like the present governors of mankind, who may be compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true helmsman to those whom they call good-for-nothings and star-gazers.

Precisely, he said.

For these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of all, is not likely to be much esteemed by her adversaries; not that the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by them, but by her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to say, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are useless; in which opinion I agreed.

Yes.

And the reason why the good are useless has been now explained?

True.

Then shall we now endeavour to show that the corruption of

the greater number is also unavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any more than the other?

By all means.

And let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the gentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his captain, whom he followed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor, and had no part or lot in true philosophy.

Yes, that was said.

Well, and is not this quality alone greatly at variance with our present notions of him?

Certainly, he said.

And have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge is always striving after being—that is his nature; he will not rest in the multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go on—the keen edge will not be blunted, neither the force of his desire abate until he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and mingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and truth, he will know and live and grow truly, and then, and not till then, will he cease from his travail.

Nothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.

And will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher's nature? Will he not utterly hate a lie?

He will.

And when truth is thè captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he leads?

Impossible.

Justice and health will be of the company, and temperance will follow after?

True, he replied.

Neither is there any reason why I should again set in array the philosopher's virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage, magnanimity, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected that, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words and look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them manifestly useless,

and the greater number wholly depraved ; we were then led to enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and we had arrived at the point of asking why are the many bad, which question of necessity brought us back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.

Exactly.

And now we have to consider the corruptions of the philosophical nature, why so many are spoiled and so few escape spoiling—I am speaking of those whom you call useless but not
491 wicked—and after that we will consider the imitators of philosophy, what manner of natures are they who aspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy, and then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon all philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak.

What are these corruptions, he said?

I will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature having in perfection all the qualities which make a philosopher, is a plant that rarely grows among men—there are not many of them.

They are very rare.

And what numberless causes may tend utterly to destroy these rare natures!

What causes?

In the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and the rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most singular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is the possessor of them.

That is very singular, he replied.

Then there are all the ordinary goods of life—beauty, wealth, strength, rank, and great connections in the State—which I have described generally, and therefore need not enlarge upon them ; —these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.

I know the goods which you mean, and I should like to know more precisely what you mean about them.

Grasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way ; you will then have no difficulty in understanding the preceding remarks, and they will no longer appear strange to you.

And how am I to do so? he asked.

Why, I said, we know that when any germ or seed, whether vegetable or animal, fails to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, the greater the vigour, the more will it lack its proper qualities, for evil is a greater enemy to good than to the not-good.

Very true.

There is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien conditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is greater.

Very true.

And may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are ill-educated, become the worst? Do not great crimes and the spirit of pure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than from any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very great good or very great evil?

There I think that you are right.

And our philosopher follows the same analogy—he is like a ⁴⁹² plant which, having proper nurture, grows and matures into all virtue, but, if sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds, unless saved by some divine help. Do you really think, as people are fond of saying, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers of the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection alike young and old, men and women, and fashion them after their own hearts?

When is this accomplished? he said.

When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or at some other place of resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating in both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart leap within him? Will the influences of education stem the tide of praise or blame, and not rather be carried away in the stream? And will he not

have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?

Yes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.

And yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been mentioned.

What is that?

The gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are aware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their words are powerless.

Indeed they do: of that there can be no doubt.

Now what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private man, can be expected to overcome in such an unequal contest?

None, he replied.

No, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a piece of folly; for there neither is, has been, nor ever can be, as I think, a better type of character, trained to virtue in despite of them¹—I speak, my friend, of man only; what is more than man, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you ignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and comes to good is saved by the power of God, as
493 you may truly say.

I quite assent, he replied.

Then let me crave your assent also to a further observation.

What are you going to say?

Why, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the world calls Sophists and esteems rivals, do but teach the collective opinion of the many, which are the opinions of their assemblies; and this is their wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and desires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him—he would learn how to approach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is dangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by what sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may suppose further, that when, by constantly living with him, he has become perfect in all this he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes a system or art, which he proceeds to teach, not that he has any real notion of what he

¹ Or, taking *παρὰ* in another sense, 'trained to virtue on their principles.'

is teaching, but he names this honourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in accordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute, when he has learnt the meaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good he pronounces to be what pleases him and evil what he dislikes; and he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the necessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to others the nature of either, or the immense difference between them. Would not he be a rare educator?

Indeed he would.

And in what respects does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the tastes and pleasures of the assembled multitude, whether in painting or music, or, finally, in politics, differ from such an one? For I suppose you will agree that he who associates with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges, except under protest¹, will also experience the fatal necessity of producing whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give in confirmation of their notions about the honourable and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?

No, nor am I likely to hear.

You recognise the truth of what has been said? Then let me ask you to consider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the existence of absolute beauty rather than 494 of the many beautiful, or of the absolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?

Certainly not.

Then the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?

Impossible.

And therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?

They must.

And of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?

That is evident.

¹ Putting a comma after τῶν ἀναγκαίων.

Then, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his calling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have knowledge and memory and courage and magnanimity—these were admitted by us to be the true philosopher's gifts.

Yes.

Now, will not such an one be, from the first, in all things first among all, especially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?

Certainly, he said.

And his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for their own purposes?

No question.

Falling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour and flatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which he will one day possess.

That often happens, he said.

And what will he do under such circumstances, especially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall proper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself able to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and therefore will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of vain pomp and senseless pride?

To be sure he will.

Now, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and tells him that he is without sense, which he must have, but can only get it by slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will be easily induced to listen?

He would be very unlikely to listen.

But suppose further that there is one person who has feeling, and who, either from some excellence of disposition or natural affinity, is inclined or drawn towards philosophy, and his friends think that they are likely to lose the advantages which they were going to reap from his friendship, what will be the effect upon them? Will they not do and say anything to prevent his learning and to make his teacher powerless, using to this end private intrigues as well as public prosecutions?

495 There can be no doubt of it.

And how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?

Impossible.

Then were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man a philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, serve to divert him from philosophy, no less than riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life?

We were quite right.

Thus, my excellent friend, is brought about the ruin and failure of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits, who, as we assert, are rare at any time; and this is the class out of whom come those who are the authors of the greatest evil to States and individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in the direction of good; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to individuals or States.

That is most true, he said.

They fall away, and philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her own have forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and unbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no protector, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon her the reproaches which her reprovers utter, who say of her votaries that some of them are good for nothing, and the greater number deserving of everything that is bad.

That is certainly said.

Yes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny creatures who, seeing this land open to them—a land well stocked with fair names and showy titles—like prisoners who run away out of prison into a sanctuary, take a leap out of the arts into philosophy; those who do so being probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, although philosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which is not found in the other arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose natures are imperfect and whose souls are marred and disfigured by their meannesses, as their bodies are by their arts and crafts. Is not that true?

Yes.

Are they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just

got out of durance and come into a fortune; he washes the dirt off him and has a new coat, and is decked out as a bridegroom going to marry his master's daughter, who is left poor and desolate?

496 The figure is exact.

And what will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?

There can be no question of it.

And when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an alliance with her who is in a rank above them, what sort of ideas and opinions are likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear, yet having nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?

No doubt, he said.

Then there is a very small remnant, Adeimantus, I said, of worthy disciples of philosophy: perchance some noble nature, brought up under good influences, and detained by exile in her service, who in the absence of temptation remains devoted to her; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns or neglects; and perhaps there may be a few who, having a gift for philosophy, leave other arts, which they justly despise, and come to her;—and peradventure there are some who are restrained by our friend Theages' bridle (for Theages, you know, has had everything to draw him away; but his ill-health keeps him from politics). My own case of the internal sign is indeed hardly worth mentioning, as very rarely, if ever, has such a monitor been vouchsafed to any one else. Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen and been satisfied of the madness of the multitude, and known that there is no one who ever acts honestly in the administration of States, nor any helper who defends the cause of the just, by whose aid he may be saved. Such a defender may be compared to a man who has fallen among wild beasts—he would not join in the wickedness of his fellows, but neither would he be able alone to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and would have to throw away his life before he had done any good to himself or others. When

he reflects upon all this, he holds his peace, and does his own business. He is like one who retires under the shelter of a wall in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along; and when he sees the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.

Yes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.

A great work—yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable to him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he 497 will have a larger growth and be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.

Enough, then, of the causes why philosophy is in such an evil name; how unjustly, has been explained: and now is there anything more which you wish to say?

Nothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which of the governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.

Not any of them, I said; and that is the very accusation which I bring against them—not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and hence that nature is warped and deformed;—as the exotic seed which is sown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is vanquished and degenerates into the native stock, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of persisting, receives another character. But if philosophy ever finds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that she is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or institutions, are but human;—and now, I know, that you are going to ask what that State is.

No, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another question—whether it is the State of which we are the founders and inventors, or some other?

Yes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember our saying before that some living authority would always be required in the State whose idea of the constitution would be the same which guided you originally when laying down the laws.

That was said, he replied.

Yes, but imperfectly said; you frightened us with objections,

which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and difficult ; and even what remains is the reverse of easy.

What is that ?

The question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as to be consistent with the preservation of the State ; for all great things are attended with risk ; as the saying is, 'hard is the good.'

Still, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be complete.

I shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want of power : of my zeal you shall have ocular demonstration ; and please to remark in what I am about to say how courageously and unhesitatingly I affirm that a State ought not to have philosophy studied in the present fashion.

In what fashion ?

498 At present, I said, even those who study philosophy in early youth, or in the intervals of money-making and house-keeping, do but make an approach to the most difficult branch of the subject, and then take themselves off—(I am speaking of those who have the most training, and by the most difficult branch I mean dialectic) ; and in after-life they perhaps go to a discussion which is held by others, and to which they are invited, and this they deem a great matter, as the study of philosophy is not regarded by them as their proper business : then, as years advance, in most cases their light is quenched more truly than Heracleitus' sun, for they are never lighted again ¹.

But what ought to be their course ?

Just the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they learn, should be suited to their tender age : let their bodies be taken care of during the period of growth, to be hereafter the servants of philosophy ; as the man advances to mature intelligence, he should increase the gymnastics of the soul ; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past civil and military duties, then let them range at will and have no other serious employment, as we intend them to live happily here, and, this life ended, to have a similar happiness in another.

¹ Heracleitus said the sun was extinguished every evening and relighted every morning.

How truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet most of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest in their opposition to you, and will never be converted; Thrasymachus least of all.

Do not raise a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have just become friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on using every effort until I either convert him and other men, or do something which avails against the day when they live again, and hold the like discourse in another state of existence.

You are speaking of a long time hence.

Rather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity. Nevertheless, I do not wonder at the many refusing to believe; for they never saw that of which we are now speaking realized; what they saw was a conventional imitation of philosophy, which consisted of words artificially brought together, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who in word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion and likeness of virtue—such an one ruling in a city which bears the same image, they have never yet seen, in the case of a single man any more than of many— 499
do you think that they ever did?

No indeed.

No, my friend, nor have they often heard free and noble words; such as men use when they are earnestly and in every way seeking after truth, for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the subtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they meet with them in the courts of law or in society.

They are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.

And this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to admit that there is no chance of perfection, either in cities or governments or individuals, until a necessity was laid upon the second small class of philosophers (not the rogues, but those whom we termed useless), that they should take care of the State and obey the call of the State; or until kings themselves, or the sons of kings or potentates, were inspired with a true love of philosophy. Now I maintain that there is no reason in saying that either of these alternatives, or

both of them, is impossible; if they were, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and visionaries. Am I not right?

Quite right.

If then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some foreign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher is or has been or shall be hereafter compelled by a superior power to have the charge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our constitution has been, is, yea, and will be at any time, when the Muse of Philosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; the difficulty of it is not denied by us.

I agree with you, he said.

But you will say that mankind in general are not agreed?

I should, he replied.

O my friend, I said, do not have such a bad opinion of mankind: they will surely be of another mind, if gently and with the view of soothing them and removing the evil name of too much learning, you show them the philosopher whom we have
500 just described, according to his true character and profession, and then they will see that you are not speaking of those whom they supposed; if they view him in this light, they will surely change their mind, and answer in another strain¹. Who can be at enmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy will be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for you, that a few such there may be, but not many who have so harsh a temper.

I entirely agree with you, he said.

And do you not think with me that the harsh feeling which the many entertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in where they are not invited, and are always reviling them, and finding fault with them, who make persons instead of things the theme of their conversation; and nothing can be more unbecoming in philosophers than this.

It is most unbecoming.

For he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has

¹ Reading ἢ καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται without a question, and ἀλλοίαν τοι: or, retaining the question and taking ἀλλοίαν δόξαν in a new sense: 'Do you mean to say really that, viewing him in this light, they will be of another mind from yours, and answer in another strain?'

no time to look down upon earthly affairs, or to be filled with malice and envy, warring against men; his eye is ever directed towards fixed and immutable principles, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all in order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will, as far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he holds reverential converse?

Impossible.

And the philosopher holding converse with the divine and immutable, becomes a part of that divine and immutable order, as far as nature allows; but all things are liable to be misunderstood.

Certainly.

And if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human nature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds elsewhere, think you that he will be an unskilful artificer of justice, temperance, and every civil virtue?

Anything but unskilful.

And if the world perceives that we are speaking the truth about him, will they be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that the State can only be happy which is planned by artists who make use of the heavenly pattern?

They will not be angry if they only understand, he replied. But what do you mean by the heavenly pattern?

501

I mean, that they will take the State for their tablet, and begin by making a clean surface, wiping out the manners of men, which is no easy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them and every other legislator,—they will have nothing to do either with individual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found, or themselves made, a clean surface.

They will be very right, he said.

Having effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the constitution.

No doubt.

And in the course of the work, as I conceive, they will often turn their eyes up and down: I mean that they will look at

absolute justice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will inscribe the image of a man, selecting from and mingling the various elements of life; and this they will conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

Very true, he said.

And one feature they will erase, and another they will insert, until they have made the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?

Indeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.

And now, I said, do you think that we are beginning to persuade those whom you described as rushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such an one as we were praising,—he, I mean, at whom they were so much infuriated, because into his hands we committed the State, or are they growing calmer at what they hear?

Much calmer, if there is any sense in them.

Why, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that the philosopher is a lover of truth and being?

They would not be so unreasonable.

Or that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest good?

Neither can they doubt that.

But again, will they tell us that such a nature, when properly trained, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will they prefer those whom we have set aside?

Surely not.

Then will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear rule in States, the evils of States and individuals will never cease, nor will this our imaginary State ever be realized?

I think that they will be less angry.

Shall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite 502 gentle, and that they have been converted and for very shame cannot refuse to come to terms?

By all means, he said.

Then now we may assume that they have been converted. And will any one deny the other point, that there may be sons of kings who are philosophers?

No one, he said.

And when they have come into being will any one say that they must of necessity be destroyed ; for that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us, but all will allow that, in the whole course of ages, peradventure a single one may be saved ?

Surely.

But, said I, one is enough ; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his will, and he might bring the ideal polity into being.

Yes, one is enough.

When the ruler has framed these laws and institutions, the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them ?

Certainly.

And that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or impossibility ?

I think not.

But we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only possible, is assuredly for the best.

We have.

The conclusion is then, that our laws are best, and, though difficult of attainment, are not wholly unattainable.

Very good.

And now having arrived at the end of one difficulty, we have to discuss another ;—how and by what studies and pursuits will saviours of the constitution be formed, and at what ages are they to apply themselves to their several studies ?

Certainly.

I omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the procreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that the perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment ; but that piece of cleverness was not of much use to me, for I had to discuss them all the same. The women and children are done with, but there remains the further question of the rulers which I must now investigate from the beginning. We were saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their country, tried by 503 the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in labours, nor fears, nor any other change of circumstances were to lose their patriotism—he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came

forth pure, like gold tried in the refiner's fire, was to be made a ruler, and to receive honours and rewards in life and after death. That was the sort of thing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her face ; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.

I perfectly remember, he said.

Yes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word ; but now let me dare to say—that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.

Yes, he said, let that be proclaimed.

And do not suppose that there will be many of them ; for the gifts which we said were essential rarely grow together ; they are mostly found in shreds and patches.

What do you mean ? he said.

You are aware, I replied, that persons who have quick intelligence, memory, sagacity, shrewdness, and similar gifts, are not often of a nature which is willing at the same time to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled manner ; and this is equally true of the high-spirited and magnanimous ; they are driven any way by their impetuosity, and all solid principle goes out of them.

Very true, he said.

On the other hand, those steadfast, immovable, reliable natures which in a battle are impregnable to fear and can better be depended on, are equally immovable when there is anything to be learned ; they seem to be in a torpid state, and are apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.

Quite true.

And yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the higher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or command.

Certainly, he said.

And will they be a class which is rarely found ?

Yes, indeed.

Then the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and pleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation which we did not mention—he must be exercised also in many kinds of knowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all, or will faint under them, as many do amid the toils of the games.

Yes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the highest of all knowledge?

You may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and distinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?

Indeed, he said, if I had forgotten that, I should not deserve to hear more.

And do you remember, I said, what preceded the discussion of them?

To what do you refer?

We spoke, if I am not mistaken, of another longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which they were to appear in perfect beauty; we could, however, as we said, give an exposition of a popular sort, of a piece with what had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was continued in what appeared to me to be a very inexact manner; but whether you were satisfied or not is for you to say.

Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth.

But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further.

Not an uncommon case when people are indolent.

Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and the laws.

True.

The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer road, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the height of that knowledge which is his proper calling.

What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than these—higher than justice and the other virtues?

Yes, I said, there is. And of these too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present—nothing short of the most finished work should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear

in full clearness and precision, how ridiculous that the highest truths should not be held worthy of the greatest exactness!

A right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you which are the highest?

Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have often heard the answer, and now you either do not understand me or you mean to be troublesome; I incline to think the latter, 505 for you have been often told that the *idea* of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. You must have already guessed that of this I am about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know so little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of the whole world is of any value without the good? or of all knowledge without the beautiful and good?

Assuredly not.

You are doubtless aware that most people call pleasure good, and the finer sort of wits say knowledge? And you are aware too that the latter cannot explain the nature of knowledge, but are obliged after all to say that knowledge is of the good?

How ridiculous!

Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the good, and then presume our knowledge of it—for good, they say, is the knowledge of the good, which implies that we understand them when they use the term ‘good’—is certainly ridiculous.

Most true, he said.

And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.

Certainly.

And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?

True.

There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved.

There can be none.

Further, do we not see that many are willing to appear to

have or to do or to be the just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with the appearance of good—the reality is what they seek; in the case of the good appearance is despised by every one.

Very true, he said.

This then, which every man pursues and makes his end, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same sure proof of this as of other things, and therefore ⁵⁰¹ having no profit in other things,—is this, I would ask, a principle about which the best men in our State, to whom everything is to be entrusted, ought to be in darkness?

Certainly not, he said.

I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will not be worth much as a guardian of them; and I suspect that no one will have a true knowledge of them not having this knowledge.

That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.

And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered?

Of course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either?

Aye, I said, I knew quite well that a fine gentleman ¹ like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other men.

True, Socrates; and I must say that you who have passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others, and never telling your own.

Well, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?

Not, he said, with the assurance of positivè certainty; he has no right to do that: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.

And do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men who find their way along the road?

Very true.

¹ Reading *ἀνὴρ καλός*.

And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when brightness and beauty are within your reach?

Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal—if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we shall be satisfied.

Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that in my zeal I shall make a fool of myself. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is in my thoughts now is too much for me in my present mood. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear—otherwise, not.

By all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our debt for an account of the parent.

507 I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, an account of the parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this by way of interest¹, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.

Yes, we will take all the care that we can : proceed.

Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times.

What?

The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term 'many' is applied.

True, he said.

And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to which the term 'many' is applied there is an absolute; for they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.

Very true.

The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen.

Exactly.

¹ A play upon *τόκος*, which means both 'child' and 'interest.'

And what is the organ with which we see the visible things?
The sight, he said.

And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the other objects of sense?

True.

But have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of workmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?

No, I never have, he said.

Then reflect: does the ear hear, and is the voice heard by virtue of some other nature which is required as a third condition before they can meet?

Nothing of the sort.

No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other senses—you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?

Indeed not.

But you see that without such an addition there is no seeing or being seen?

How do you mean?

Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and colour being also present in them, there is still required a third nature having a distinct use, without which the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the colours will be invisible.

Of what nature are you speaking?

Of that which you term light, I replied.

True, he said.

Noble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great beyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble thing?

Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.

And which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this element? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the visible to appear?

You mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.

May not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?

How?

Neither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?

No.

Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is likest the sun?

Far the likest.

And the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed from the sun?

Exactly.

Then the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by sight?

True, he said.

And this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his own likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things of sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and the things of mind?

Will you be a little more explicit? he said.

Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person no longer directs them towards those objects on the colours of which the light of day is shining, but the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision in them?

Very true.

But when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see clearly and there is sight in them?

Certainly.

And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence; but when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of another, and seems to have no intelligence?

Just so.

Now, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and that you will regard as the cause of science¹ and of truth, as known by us; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will be right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as in the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun, and yet not

¹ Reading *διανοοῦ*.

to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be deemed like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour yet higher.

What a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science and truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say that the good is pleasure?

Speak not profanely, I replied; but please to consider the image in another point of view.

How?

Why, you would say that the sun is not only the author of visibility in all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he himself is not a generation?

Certainly.

In like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge in all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.

Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how amazing!

Yes, I said, and it all comes of you, for you have made me utter my fancies.

Nay, he said, but do not leave off; at any rate let us hear if there is anything more to be said about the similitude of the sun.

Yes, I said, there is a great deal more.

Then omit nothing, however slight.

I will do my best; but I fancy, I said, that a great deal will have to be omitted.

I hope not, he said.

You have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of them is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name (*οὐρανός, ὄρατός*). May I suppose that you have this distinction of the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?

I have.

Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal¹ parts,

¹ Reading *ἄνισα*.

and divide each of them again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions as to their relative clearness and want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of 510 images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like : Do you understand ?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include ourselves and the animals, and everything in nature and everything in art.

Very good.

Would you not admit that this latter section has a different degree of truth, and that the copy is to the object which is copied as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of knowledge ?

Most undoubtedly.

Next proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is to be divided.

In what manner ?

As thus :—There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former divisions as images ; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other end ; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images¹ as in the former case, but proceeding only in and by the ideas themselves.

I do not quite understand your meaning, he said.

Then I will try again ; for you will understand me better when I have made some preliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three kinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science ; these are their hypotheses, which everybody is supposed to know, and of which therefore they do not deign to give any account either to themselves or others ; but they begin with these, and go on

¹ Reading ὧν περ ἐκείνο εἰκόνων.

until they arrive at last, and in a consistent manner, at their conclusion?

Yes, he said, I know.

And do you not know also that although they use and reason about the visible forms, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they resemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and the absolute diameter, and so on—the forms which they draw or make, and which have shadows and images in the water of their own, are in turn used by them as images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which can only be seen with the eye of the mind?

That is true.

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And of this kind I still spoke as intelligible, although in enquiring into it the soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not proceeding to a first principle because she is unable to ascend above hypotheses, but employing the objects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images, they having in relation to the shadows a greater distinctness, and therefore a higher value¹.

I understand, he said, that you are speaking of geometry and the sister arts.

And when I speak of the other division of the intellectual, you will also understand me to speak of that knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a region which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on this, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object, beginning and ending in ideas.

I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be describing a task far from easy; but, at any rate, I understand you to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic contemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed, which proceed from hypotheses

¹ Or, they 'when viewed in connexion with the ideas, being honoured and valued for their distinctness.'

only: these are also contemplated by the understanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses and do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not to exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is added to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is concerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term understanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.

You have quite conceived me, I said; and now, corresponding to these four sections, let there be four faculties in the soul—reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith or persuasion to the third, and knowledge of shadows to the last—and let there be a scale of them, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same degree that their objects have truth.

I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and have arranged them as you say.

BOOK VII.

AND now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature 514 is enlightened or unenlightened :—Behold ! human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den ; they have been here from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them ; for the chains are arranged in such a manner as to prevent them from turning round their heads. Above and behind them the light of a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way ; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

I see.

And do you see, I said, men passing along the wall, some apparently talking and others silent, carrying vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various 515 materials, which appear over the wall ?

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied ; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave ?

True, he said ; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads ?

And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows ?

Yes, he said.

And if they were able to talk with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them ¹ ?

Very true.

¹ Reading *παρόντα*.

And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would they not be sure to fancy that the voice which they heard was that of a passing shadow?

No question, he replied.

Beyond question, I said, the truth would be to them just nothing but the shadows of the images.

That is certain.

And now look again, and see how they are released and cured of their folly. At first, when any one of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to turn his neck round and go up and look at the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then imagine some one saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now he is approaching real being and has a truer sight and vision of more real things,—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,—will he not be in a difficulty? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

Far truer.

And if he is compelled to look at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

Truc, he said.

And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself, do you not think that he
516 will be pained and irritated, and when he approaches the light he will have his eyes dazzled, and will not be able to see any of the realities which are now affirmed to be the truth?

Not all in a moment, he said.

He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the

moon and the stars ; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day ?

Certainly.

And at last he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him as he is in his own proper place, and not in another ; and he will contemplate his nature.

Certainly.

And after this he will reason that the sun is he who gives the seasons and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold ?

Clearly, he said, he would come to the other first and to this afterwards.

And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them ?

Certainly, he would.

And if they were in the habit of conferring honours on those who were quickest to observe and remember and foretell which of the shadows when they moved went before, and which followed after, and which were together, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them ? Would he not say with Homer,

‘ Better to be a poor man, and have a poor master,’

and endure anything, rather than to think and live after their manner ?

Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than live after their manner.

Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation ; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness ?

To be sure, he said.

And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be

needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that there was no use in even thinking of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

No question, he said.

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append to the previous argument; the prison is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, the ascent and vision of the things above you may truly regard as the upward progress of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed — whether rightly or wrongly God only knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this world, and the source of truth and reason in the other; and is the power upon which he who would act rationally either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

Yes, very natural.

And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen the absolute justice?

Anything but surprising, he replied.

518 Any one who has common sense will remember that the

bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets the other coming from above into the den.

That, he said, is a very just remark.

But if I am right, then certain professors of education must be mistaken in saying that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

Nevertheless they do say so, he replied.

Whereas, our argument shows that the power is already in the soul; and that as the eye may be imagined unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too, when the eye of the soul is turned round, the whole soul must be turned round from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

Very true.

And there must be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting eyes, for they exist already, but giving them a right direction, which they have not.

Yes, he said, such an art may be assumed.

And whereas the other so-called virtues seem to be akin to the body, being infused by habit and exercise and not originally innate, the virtue of wisdom has a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable, and is also capable of becoming hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flash- 519
ing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is,

how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end ; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye-sight is forced into the service of evil, and he is dangerous in proportion to his cleverness ?

Very true, he said.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth ; and they had been severed from those leaden weights, as they may be called, which were attached to them at their birth, and clinging to sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from them and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in these persons would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

Very likely.

Yes, I said ; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State ; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of their actions, private as well as public ; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already in the islands of the blest.

Very true, he replied.

Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which has been already declared by us to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good ; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

What do you mean ?

I mean that they remain in the upper world : but this must not be allowed ; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.

But is not this unjust ? he said ; ought we to give them an inferior life, when they might have a superior one ?

You have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest ; the happiness was to be in the

whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not ⁵²⁰ that they should please themselves, but they were to be his instruments in binding up the State.

True, he said, I had forgotten.

Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Now the wild plant which owes culture to nobody, has nothing to pay for culture. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark; for all is habit; and by accustoming yourselves you will see ten thousand times better than the dwellers in the den, and you will know what the images are, and of what they are images, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth. And thus the order of our State, and of your's, will be a reality, and not a dream only, as the order of States too often is, for in most of them men are fighting with one another about shadows and are distracted in the struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth is that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most willing, the worst.

Quite true, he replied.

And will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to share in turn the toils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time with one another in the heaven of ideas?

Impossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we impose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will take office as a stern necessity, and not like our present ministers of State.

Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must
 521 contrive for your future rulers another and a better life than
 that of a ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered State;
 for only in the State which offers this, will they rule who are
 truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom,
 which are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the
 administration of public affairs, poor and hungering after their
 own private advantage, thinking that hence they are to snatch the
 good of life, order there can never be; for they will be fighting
 about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise
 will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State.

Most true, he replied.

And the only life which looks down upon the life of political
 ambition is that of true philosophy? Do you know of any
 other?

No, indeed, he said.

And those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task?
 For if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight.

No question.

Whom then would you choose rather than those who are
 wisest about affairs of State, and who at the same time have
 other honours and another and a better life?

They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.

Would you like us then to consider in what way such guardians
 may be called into existence, and how they are to be brought
 from darkness to light,—as some are said to have ascended from
 the world below to the gods?

Certainly I should, he replied.

The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell¹,
 but the turning round of a soul from darkness visible to the
 upward path of truth and being².

Very true.

And should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the
 power of effecting such a change?

Certainly.

What sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul
 from becoming to being? And another consideration has just

¹ See note on Phaedr. 241 B.

² Reading οὐρανὸν ἐπάνωθεν.

occurred to me : You will remember that our young men are to be warrior athletes ?

Yes, that was said.

Then this new kind of knowledge must have another quality ?

What quality ?

Usefulness in war.

Yes, if possible.

There were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not ?

True.

There was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and may therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption ?

True.

Then that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover ?

No.

But what do you say of music, for that also entered to a certain extent into our scheme ?

That, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, and trained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them harmonious, and by rhythm rhythmical, although not giving them science ; and the words, whether fabulous or partly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony in them. But musical knowledge was not of a kind which tended to that good which you are now seeking.

You are most accurate, I said, in your recollection ; for in music there certainly was nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear friend, which is of the desired nature ; since all the useful arts were reckoned mean by us ?

Undoubtedly ; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also excluded, what remains ?

Well, I said, there may be nothing left ; and then we shall have to take something which is of universal application.

What may that be ?

A something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and which every one ought to learn among the elements of education.

What is that ?

The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three—in a word, number and calculation:—do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Yes.

Then the art of war partakes of them?

To be sure.

Then Palamedes, when he appears in the play, proves Agamemnon ridiculously unfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had invented number, and had numbered and set in array the ranks of the army at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and Agamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own feet—how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what sort of general must he have been?

I should say a very strange one, certainly.

Must not a warrior, then, I said, in addition to his military skill, have a knowledge of arithmetic?

Certainly he must, if he is to have the least understanding of military tactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.

I should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this study?

What is your notion?

It appears to me to be a study which leads naturally to reflection, and is of the kind which we are seeking, but has never been rightly used; for it is really of use in drawing us towards being.

Will you explain your meaning? he said.

I will try, I said; and I wish you would consider and help me, and say 'yes' or 'no' when I attempt to distinguish in my own mind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we may have clearer proof that arithmetic is one of them.

Explain, he said.

I mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not invite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the case of other objects there is a mistrust of the senses which imperatively demands enquiry.

You must be referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are imposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.

No, I said, that is not my meaning.

Then what is your meaning?

When speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one sensation to another; inviting objects are those which give opposite sensations; in this latter case the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no more vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration will make my meaning clearer:—here are three fingers—a little finger, a second finger, and a middle finger.

Very good.

You may suppose that they are seen quite close. And here comes the point.

What is that?

Each of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the extremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin—it makes no difference; a finger is a finger all the same. And in all these cases the ordinary soul is not compelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight never intimates to her that a finger is other than a finger.

True.

And therefore, I said, there is nothing here which invites or excites intelligence.

There is not, he said.

But is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can sight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance that one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in like manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or thinness, or softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give perfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation rather on this wise—the sense which is concerned ⁵²⁴ with the quality of hardness is necessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to the soul that the same thing is felt to be hard and soft?

Very true, he said.

And must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation of a hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if that which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?

Yes, he said, these intimations are very curious and have to be explained.

Yes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid calculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects announced are one or two.

True.

And if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one, and different?

Certainly.

And if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state of division, for if they were undivided they could only be conceived of as one?

True.

The eye certainly did behold both small and great, not divided but confused.

Yes.

Whereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to reverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.

Very true.

And was not this the beginning of the enquiry 'What is great?' and 'What is small?'

Exactly so.

Here began the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.

Most true.

And that is an illustration of my meaning in describing impressions as inviting to the intellect, or the reverse—the inviting impressions are simultaneous with opposite impressions.

I understand, he said, and agree with you.

And to which class do unity and number belong?

I do not know, he replied.

Think a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer; for if simple unity, and that only, can be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the fingers, there will be nothing

to attract towards being ; but when there is some contradiction always present, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of plurality, then thought begins to be aroused within, and the soul perplexed and wanting to arrive at a decision asks 'What is absolute unity?' And this is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and converting the ⁵²⁵ mind to the contemplation of true being.

And surely, he said, this occurs notably when we look at one, for the same thing is seen by us as one and as infinite in multitude?

Yes, I said ; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?

Certainly.

And all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?

Yes.

And they are conductors to truth?

Yes, in an eminent degree.

Then this is the sort of knowledge of which we are in search, having a double use, military and philosophical ; for the man of war must learn the art of number that he may know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also, because he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, if he would be an arithmetician.

That is true.

And our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?

Certainly.

Then this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe ; and we must endeavour to persuade the principal men of our State to go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study until they see the nature of numbers in the mind only ; nor again, in the spirit of merchants or traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake of their military use, and of the soul herself ; and because this will be the easiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.

That is excellent, he said.

Yes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science is ! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the spirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper !

How do you mean?

I mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect, compelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the introduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how steadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to divide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply¹, taking care that one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.

—That is very true.

526 Now, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these wonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is a unity such as you require, and each unit is equal, invariable, indivisible,—what would they answer?

They would answer, as I suppose, that they were speaking of those numbers which are only realized in thought.

Then you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, necessitating as it does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure truth?

Yes; that is a marked characteristic of it.

And have you further remarked, that those who have a natural talent for calculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training, gain in quickness, if not in any other way?

Very true, he said.

And indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many as difficult.

You will not.

And, for these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best natures should be trained, and which must not be given up.

I agree.

Let this then be made one of our subjects of education.

¹ Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because they deny the possibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process of multiplication, and thus the unity and indivisibility of one is still maintained.

And next, shall we enquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?

You mean geometry?

Yes.

Certainly, he said; that part of geometry which relates to war is clearly our concern; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or extending the lines of an army, or any other military manœuvre, whether in actual battle or on a march, there will be a great difference in a general, accordingly as he is or is not a geometrician.

Yes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or calculation will be enough; the question is rather of the higher and greater part of geometry, whether that tends towards the great end—I mean towards the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things tend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is the full perfection of being, of which she ought, by all means, to attain the vision.

True, he said.

Then if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it does not concern us?

Yes, that is what we assert.

Nevertheless, such a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary language of geometricians, as will hardly be denied by those who have any acquaintance with their study: for they speak of squaring and applying and adding, having in view use only, and absurdly confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life; whereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.

Certainly, he said.

Then must not a further admission be made?

What admission?

The admission that this knowledge at which geometry aims is of the eternal, and not of the perishing and transient.

That, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.

Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to fall down.

Nothing will be more effectual.

Then nothing should be more effectually enacted than that the inhabitants of your fair city should learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect effects, which are not small.

Of what kind are they? he said.

There are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all departments of study, as experience proves, any one who has studied geometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not studied it.

Yes, he said, the difference between a geometrician and one who is not a geometrician is very great indeed.

Then shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will study?

Let us make the proposal, he replied.

And suppose we make astronomy the third—what do you say?

I am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of months and years is quite essential to husbandry and navigation, and not less essential to military tactics.

I am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against the appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the difficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which, when by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and re-illuminated; and is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by this alone is truth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class who will agree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class who have no understanding of them, and to whom they will naturally seem to be idle tales. And you had better decide at once with which of the two you are arguing; or, perhaps, you will say with neither, and that your chief aim in carrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time not grudging to others any benefit which they may derive.

I think that I should prefer to carry on the argument on my own behalf.

Then take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.

What was the mistake? he said.

After plane geometry, I said, we took solids in revolution, instead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension the third, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have followed.

That is true, Socrates; but these subjects seem to be as yet hardly explored.

Why, yes, I said, and for two reasons:—in the first place, no government patronises them, which leads to a want of energy in the study of them, and they are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they have a teacher. But then a teacher can hardly be found, and even if he could, as matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not mind him. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State patronised and honoured these studies; then they would find disciples, and there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be made; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their fair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them, still these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely they may emerge into light.

Yes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly understand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane surfaces?

Yes, I said.

And you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?

Yes, and I have delayed you by my haste; the ludicrous state of solid geometry made me pass over this branch and go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.

True, he said.

Then assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if encouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.

The right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar manner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be more worthy of your own spirit. For every one, as I think, must feel that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.

I am an exception then, for I should rather say that those

who elevate astronomy into philosophy make us look downwards and not upwards.

What do you mean? he asked.

You, I replied, have in your mind a sublime conception of how we know the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head back and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the percipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a simpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the unseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens or blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would deny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul is looking, not upwards, but downwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or by land, in whichever element he may lie on his back and float.

I acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to ascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that knowledge of which we speak?

I answered: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by sight.

True, he replied.

The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures wrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometer who saw them would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of
530 any other proportion.

No, he said, to think so would be ridiculous.

And will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not think that

heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator in the most perfect manner? But when he reflects that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the month to the year, or of the other stars to these and to one another, are of the visible and material, he will never fall into the error of supposing that they are eternal and liable to no deviation—that would be monstrous; he will rather seek in every possible way to discover the truth of them.

I quite agree now that you tell me so.

Then, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should use problems, and let the heavens alone if we desire to have a real knowledge of the science, and to train the reasoning faculty by the aid of it.

That, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.

Yes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar extension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any use.

Can you tell me of any other suitable study?

No, he said, not without thinking.

Motion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious enough; and there are others, as I imagine, which may be left to wiser heads than ours.

But where are the two?

There is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named.

And what may that be?

The second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is to the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the stars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions, and these are sister sciences—as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?

Yes, he replied.

But this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and learn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications of these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher object.

What is that?

There is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and

which our pupils ought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did in astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, they are equally empirical.

53¹ The sounds and consonances which they compare are those which are heard only, and their labour, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.

Yes, by heaven! he said; and 'tis as good as a play to hear them talking about their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears alongside of their neighbours as if to get a sound out of them—one set of them declaring that they catch an intermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of measurement; the others maintaining the opposite theory that the two sounds have passed into the same—either party setting their ears before their understanding.

You mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack them on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and speak after their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations against the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this would be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, but that I am speaking of the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to enquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they investigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain to problems—that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of number, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.

That, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.

A thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if pursued with a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit, useless.

Very true, he said.

Now, when all these studies reach the point of intercommunion and connection with one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I think, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our objects; otherwise they are useless.

I suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.

What do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you

not know that all this is but the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely would not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?

Assuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning.

But do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have the knowledge which we require of them? 53²

Neither can this be said any more than the other.

And so, Glaucon, we have at last arrived at dialectic. This is that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight will nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was finally imagined by us to behold real animals and the stars, and last of all the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the discovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any assistance of sense, if he perseveres by pure intelligence, he attains at last to the idea of good, and finds himself at the end of the intellectual world, as in the other case at the end of the visible.

Exactly, he said.

Then this is the progress which you call dialectic?

True.

But the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the shadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den to the sun, while their eyes are weak and in his presence are vainly trying to look on animals and plants and the light of the sun, but are able to look upon the divine images¹ in the water, which are the shadows of true existence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with the sun is only an image)—this power of elevating the highest principle in the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which we may compare the raising of the most luminous of the senses to the sight of that which is brightest in the visible world—this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit of the arts which has been described.

I agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet, from another point of view, is harder still to deny.

¹ Omitting *ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς φαντάσματα*.

But whether denied or not, let us assume all this, which may be the theme of many another discussion; and now proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain¹, and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is the nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths which lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.

533 Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do my best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth, according to my notion. Although I am not confident that I could tell you the exact truth, I am certain that you would behold something like the truth.

Doubtless, he replied.

But I must add, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.

Of that assertion you may be as certain as of the last.

And certainly no one will argue that there is any other method or way of comprehending all true existence; for the arts in general are concerned with the wants or opinions of men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and construction, or for the care of such productions and constructions; and as to the mathematical arts which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true being—geometry and the like—they only dream about being, but never can they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man knows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such a conventional statement will ever become science?

Impossible, he said.

Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make certain of them; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough, is by her taught to look upwards; and she uses as handmaids, in the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name,

¹ A play upon the word νόμος, which means both 'law' and 'strain.'

implying greater clearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our previous sketch, was called understanding. But there is no use in our disputing about names when we have realities of such importance to consider.

No, he said; any name will do which expresses the thought clearly.

At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for intellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief, and the fourth knowledge of shadows, opinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make a pro- 534
portion—

As being : becoming : : pure intellect : opinion.

As science : belief : : understanding : knowledge of shadows.

But let us leave the further distribution and division of the objects of opinion and of intellect, which will be a long enquiry, many times longer than this has been.

As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

And do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who has a conception of the essence of each thing? And may he who is unable to acquire and impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails, in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit that?

Yes, he said; how can I deny it?

And you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until a person is able to abstract and define the idea of good, and unless he can run the gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals to opinion, but to true existence, never faltering at any step of the argument—unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither absolute good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, which is given by opinion and not by knowledge;—dreaming and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world below, and has his final quietus.

In all that I should most certainly agree with you.

And surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are nurturing and educating—if the ideal ever becomes a reality—you would not allow the future rulers to be

like posts¹, having no reason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?

Certainly not.

Then you will enact that they shall have such an education as will enable them to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?

Yes, he said, I will, with your help.

Dialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is placed over them; no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can no further go?

I agree, he said.

535 But to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be assigned, is a question which remains to be considered.

Yes, plainly.

You remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?

Certainly, he said.

The same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the surest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble and manly tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate their education.

And what are they?

Such gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often faints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics: the toil is more entirely the mind's own, and is not shared with the body.

Very true, he replied.

Further, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an unwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line, or he will never be able to undergo the double toil and trouble of body and mind.

Certainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.

The mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation, and this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into disrepute: her true sons should study her and not bastards.

How do you mean?

¹ γραμμάς, literally 'lines,' probably the starting-point of a race-course.

In the first place, her votary should not have a lame or one-legged industry—I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle: as, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other bodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or hearing or enquiring. Or he may have the other sort of lameness, and the love of labour may take an opposite form, and the man may be lame in another way.

Certainly, he said.

And as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which hates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at himself and others when they tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind wallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at being detected?

To be sure.

And, again, as to temperance and courage and magnanimity, 536 and every other virtue, should they not discern between the ways of the true son and of the bastard? for wherever States and individuals fail in discrimination, they unconsciously make a friend or perhaps a ruler of one who is in a figure a lame man or a bastard, from a defect in some one of these qualities.

That is very true, he said.

All these things, then, will have to be carefully considered, and those whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training must be sound in limb and mind, and then justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we shall be the saviours of the State; but, if our pupils are men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still greater flood of ridicule on philosophy.

That would be discreditable.

Yes, certainly, I said; and yet, perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am equally ridiculous.

In what respect?

I had forgotten, I said, that we were not in earnest, and spoke with too much excitement. For when I saw philosophy trampled under foot of men I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her disgrace: and my anger made me vehement.

Indeed! I did not observe that you were more vehement than was right.

But I felt that I was. And now let me remind you that, although in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this. Solon was under a delusion when he said that a man as he is growing older may learn many things—for he can no more learn than he can run; youth is the time of toil.

Very true.

And, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of instruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the mind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing them.

Why not?

Because a freeman ought to be a freeman in the acquisition of knowledge. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm; but knowledge which is acquired under compulsion has no hold on the mind.

Very true.

Then, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let
537 early education be a sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.

You are right there.

Do you remember our saying that the children, too, must be taken to see the battle on horseback; and that if there were no danger they might be led close up and, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?

Yes, I remember.

The same practice may be followed, I said, in other things—labours, lessons, dangers—and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be enrolled in a select number.

At what age?

At the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of two or three years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other purpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of who is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which they are subjected.

Certainly, he replied.

After that time those who are selected from the class of

twenty years old will be promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they learned without any order in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be able to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.

Yes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which is everlasting.

Yes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of dialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.

I agree with you, he said.

These, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who have most of this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their learning, and in their military and other public duties, when they arrive at the age of thirty will have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher honour; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to learn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and other senses, and in company with truth to attain absolute being. And here, my friend, great caution is required.

Why great caution?

Do you not remark, I said, how great the evil is which dialectic has introduced?

What evil? he said.

The lawlessness of which the professors of the art are full.

Very true, he said.

Do you think that there is anything unnatural in their case? or may I ask you to make some allowance for them?

What sort of allowance?

I want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is brought up in great wealth; he is one of a large and numerous family, and has many flatterers. When grown up he learns that his alleged are not his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you guess how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed parents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false relation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?

If you please.

Then I guess, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to honour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the flatterers; he will be less willing to see them in want, or to do any violence to them, or say anything evil of them, and he will be less willing to disobey them in important matters.

He will.

But when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his honour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers; their influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their ways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good disposition, he would think no more of his parents or other supposed friends.

Well, all that is extremely probable. But how is the image applicable to the disciples of philosophy?

In this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and honour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority we have been brought up, obeying and valuing them.

That is true.

There are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract our soul, but do not influence those who have any sense of right, and they continue to obey and value the maxims of their fathers.

True.

Now, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair or honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then arguments come again and again and refute his words, and he is driven into believing that nothing is fair any more than foul, or just and good any more than the opposite, and the same of all his time-honoured notions, do you think that he will still obey and value them?

Impossible.

And when he ceases to think them honourable and natural
539 as heretofore, and he fails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than that which flatters his desires?

He cannot.

And from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?

Unquestionably.

Now all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have described, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.

Yes, he said ; and, I may add, pitiable.

Therefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who are thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to dialectic.

Certainly.

There is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early ; for young men, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their mouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others in imitation of those who refute them ; like puppy-dogs, they delight to tear and pull at all who come near them.

Yes, he said, there is nothing of which they are fonder.

And when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of many, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything that they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy generally, has a bad name with the rest of the world.

Too true, he said.

But when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such insanity ; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement ; and the greater moderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honour of the pursuit.

Very true, he said.

And did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples of philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any chance aspirant or intruder?

Very true.

Suppose, I said, that the study of philosophy be continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of years which were passed in bodily exercise—will that be enough?

Would you say six or four years? he asked.

Say five years, I replied; at the end of that time they must be sent down into the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men are qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and there will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.

540 And how long is this stage of their lives to last?

Fifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then let those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every deed and in all knowledge come at last to their consummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the soul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute good; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State and the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also, making philosophy their chief pursuit; but, when their turn comes, toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good, not as if they were doing some great thing, but of necessity; and when they have brought up others like themselves and left them in their place to be governors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and dwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and honour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, and at any rate as blessed and divine.

You are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors quite faultless.

Yes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that what I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their natures can go.

There you are right, he said, if, as we described, they are to have all things in common with the men.

Well, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said about the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult not impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is to say, when the true philosopher kings, one or more of them, are born in a State, despising the honours of this present world which they deem mean and worthless, above all esteeming right and the honour

that springs from right, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things, whose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when they set in order their own city?

How will they proceed?

They will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city who are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children, who will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; they will then train them in their own habits and laws, that is to say, in those which we have given them: and in this way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and most easily succeed, and the nation which has such a constitution will be most benefited.

Yes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well described how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.

And have we not said enough of the State, and of the man who corresponds to the State, for there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him?

There is no difficulty, he replied, and I say with you, enough.

BOOK VIII.

543 AND so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State wives and children are to be in common; and education and the arts of war and peace are also to be common, and the best philosophers and the bravest warriors are to be their kings?

That, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.

Yes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when appointed themselves, would take their soldiers and place them in houses such as we were describing; nor would any one say that anything which he had was his own—their houses were to be common; and about their property, you remember what we agreed?

Yes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of mankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the other citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they were to take care of themselves and of the whole State.

True, I said; and now that this division of our work is concluded, let us find the point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path.

There is no difficulty in returning, he replied; you were speaking then as now, as if you had finished the description of the State; and you said that such a State was good, and that the man was good who answered thereto, although you had more
544 excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you said further, that if this was the true form, then the others were false; and of the false forms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones, and that their defects and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were worth examining. Having seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to who was

the best and who was the worst of them, we might then consider, as you said, whether the best was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. And when I asked you what the four forms of government were of which you spoke, then Polemarchus and Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way to the point at which we have now arrived.

Your recollection, I said, is most exact.

Then, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same position; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer which you were about to give me then.

Yes, if I can, I will, I said.

I shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you were speaking.

That, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I spoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, the Cretan and Spartan, which are generally applauded: next, there is oligarchy; this is not equally approved, and is a form of government which has many evils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although different: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which is different from them all, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know of any other constitution which can be said to have a distinct form. There are lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other intermediate forms of government. But these nondescripts are oftener found among barbarians than among Hellenes.

Yes, he replied, there are said to be many curious forms of government among them.

Do you know, I said, that governments vary as the characters of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For you cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock,' and not out of the human natures which are in them, and which turn the scale and draw other things after them?

Nay, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.

Then if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual minds will also be five?

Certainly.

Him who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call
545 just and good, we have already described; and now we have to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the contentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the oligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the side of the most unjust, and then we shall be able to compare the relative happiness or unhappiness of pure justice and pure injustice. And we shall know whether we are to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or justice in accordance with the conclusions of the argument.

Certainly, he replied, we must do as you say.

Shall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of taking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with the government of honour (I know of no name for such a government other than timocracy, or perhaps timarchy)? We will compare with this the like character in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and the oligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and the democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and once more take a look into the tyrant's soul, and try to arrive at the final decision.

That way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very rational.

First, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of honour) arises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political changes originate in divisions of the actual governing power; for a government which is united, however small, cannot be moved.

Very true, he said.

In what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two classes of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one another? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us 'how discord first arose?' Shall we imagine them in mockery, playing with us as if we were children, to speak to us in a lofty tragic vein, pretending to be in earnest?

How would they address us?

546 After this manner:—A city which is thus constituted can

hardly be shaken; but, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even our constitution will in time perish and come to dissolution. And this is the dissolution:— In plants that grow in the earth, as well as in animals that move on the earth's surface, fertility and sterility of soul and body occur when their circles are completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in long-lived ones over a long space. But, to the knowledge of human fecundity and sterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain; the laws which regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed with sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world when they have no business. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is contained in a perfect number¹, but that which is of human birth is contained in a number in which first² increments by involution and evolution giving three intervals and four terms of approximating and differentiating and increasing and waning numbers make all agreeable and commensurable³. The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when joined with a figure of five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies; ⁴ the first a square which is a hundred times as great ($400 = 4 + 100$), and the other a figure having one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred numbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i. e. omitting fractions), the side of which is five ($7 \times 7 = 49 \times 100 = 4900$), each of them being less by one (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by⁵ two perfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five $= 50 + 50 = 100$); and a hundred cubes of three ($27 \times 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 = 8000$). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over the good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the

¹ i. e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which is equal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle or time represented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations represented by 1, 2, 3 are also completed.

² i. e. declining from the perfect cycle.

³ Perhaps 3, 9, 27, 81; or $1 + 2 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 2 + 1 = 30$.

⁴ Or the first a square which is $100 \times 100 = 10,000$. The whole number will then be $17500 =$ a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.

⁵ Or, 'and consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational diameters,' &c. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see Introduction.

right seasons, and unite bride and bridegroom out of due time, the children will not be goodly or happy. And though only the best of them will be appointed by their predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers' places, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found to fail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by undervaluing music, and secondly gymnastic; and hence our young men will be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed who have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races, which, like Hesiod's, are of gold and silver and
 547 brass and iron. And so iron will be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will arise inequality and irregularity, which always and in all places are causes of enmity and war. Such is the origin of discord, wherever arising; and this is the answer of the Muses to us.

Yes, and we may assume that they answer truly.

Why, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; the Muses cannot do otherwise.

And what do the Muses say next?

When discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and brass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; but the gold and silver races, having the true riches in their own nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things. There was a battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and houses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and maintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and made of them subjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in fighting and keeping watch against them.

I believe that you have rightly conceived the nature of the change.

And the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between oligarchy and aristocracy.

Very true.

And now, after the change has been made, what will be their way of life? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the perfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have some peculiarities.

True, he said.

In the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from agriculture, handicrafts, and trades, in the institution of common meals, attention to gymnastics and military training—in all these the citizen will resemble the perfect State.

True.

But in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning from them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted for war rather than peace; and in the value which they set upon military stratagems and contrivances, and in their everlasting wars—this State will be for the most part peculiar. 548

Yes.

Yes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who live in oligarchies; they will have a fierce secret longing after gold and silver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries of their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are just nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their wives, or on any others whom they please.

That is most true, he said.

And they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money which they prize; they will spend that which is another man's in their lust, stealing their pleasures and running away like children from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle influences but by force, caring nothing about the Muse, the companion of reason and philosophy, and honouring gymnastic before music.

Undoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of good and evil.

Why, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen,—the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.

Assuredly, he said.

Such is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been described in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a sketch is enough to show the type of the

most perfectly just and unjust ; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men, omitting none of them, would be an interminable labour.

Very true, he replied.

Who answers to this form of government—how did he come into being, and what is he like?

I think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterises him, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.

Perhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point ; but there are other respects in which he is very different.

In what respects?

He should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a friend of culture ; and he should be a good listener, but 549 not a speaker. A person of this character is likely to be rough with slaves, not like the educated man, who is too proud for that ; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to authority ; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour ; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is a speaker, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms ; he is also a lover of gymnastic exercises and of the chase.

Yes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.

Such an one will despise riches only when he is young ; but as he gets older he will be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the avaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost his best guardian.

Who was that ? said Adeimantus.

Philosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode in a man, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.

Good, he said.

Such, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.

Exactly.

His origin is as follows :—He is often the son of a brave father, who dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and offices, and will not go to law, but is ready to waive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.

And how does the son come into being ?

The character of the son begins to develop when he hears his mother grumbling at her husband for not having a seat in the government, of which the consequence is that she loses her precedence among other women. Further, when she sees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and railing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly; and when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, while he treats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her son that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going: not to mention other similar complaints which women love to utter.

Yes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and in their own characteristic style.

And you know, I said, that the old servants of the family, who are supposed to be attached, talk privately in the same strain to the sons; and if they see any one who owes money to their father, or is wronging him in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when he grows up he must retaliate upon his injurers, and be more of a man than 550 his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort of thing: those who do their own business in the city are called simple, and held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The result is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these things—hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a nearer view of his way of life, and making comparisons of him and others—is drawn opposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational principle in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and appetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad company, is brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and gives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of contentiousness and passion, and becomes proud and ambitious.

You seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.

Then we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of character?

We have.

Next, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,

‘Is set over against another State ;

or rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.

By all means.

I believe that oligarchy follows next in order.

And what manner of government do you term oligarchy?

A government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power and the poor are deprived of power.

I understand, he replied.

Ought I not to describe, first of all, how the change from timocracy to oligarchy arises ?

Yes.

Well, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the other.

How ?

The accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of timocracy ; they invent illegal modes of expenditure, but what do they or their wives care about the law ?

Very true.

And then one seeing another prepares to rival him, and thus the whole body of the citizens acquires a similar character.

Likely enough.

After that they get on in trade, and the more they think of making a fortune the less they think of virtue ; for when riches and virtue are placed together in the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.

True.

551 And in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, virtue and the virtuous are dishonoured.

Clearly.

And what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is neglected.

That is the case.

And so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of trade and money, and they honour and reverence the rich man, and make a ruler of him, and dishonour the poor man.

They do so.

Whereupon they proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification of citizenship; the money is more or less accordingly as the oligarchy is more or less exclusive; and any one whose property is below the amount fixed is not allowed to share in the government; which changes in the constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already done their work.

Very true.

And this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.

Yes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and what are the supposed defects?

First of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think what would happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a poor man refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?

You mean that they would shipwreck?

Yes; and is not this true of the government of anything¹?

Yes, I should imagine so.

And would you say the same of a city too, or do you make an exception in favour of a city?

Nay, he said, the case of a city is still stronger, in proportion as the rule of a city is greater and more difficult.

This, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?

Clearly.

And here is another defect which is quite as bad.

What defect?

The inevitable division; such a State is not one, but two States, the one of poor men, the other of rich men, who are living on the same spot and ever conspiring against one another.

Yes, that is equally bad.

Another discreditable feature is the impossibility of carrying on any war. Either they arm and use the multitude, and then they are more afraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not use them in the hour of battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And at the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.

How discreditable!

¹ Omitting ἡ τιμος.

And, as we said before, under such a constitution, the same 552 persons are busy at many things, and are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does that seem well?

Anything but well.

There is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this State first begins to be liable.

What?

A man may sell all that he has, and another may possess his property, yet after the sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being neither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only poor and helpless.

Yes, that evil likewise begins first in this State.

The evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the extremes of great wealth and utter poverty.

True.

But think again. In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a man of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of which we were just now speaking? Or did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, being really no more a ruler than he was a subject, but just a spendthrift?

As you imply, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.

May we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the honeycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the hive?

Just so, Socrates.

And God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of the walking drones he has made some without stings and others with dreadful stings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.

Most true, he said.

Clearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that neighbourhood there are hidden away thieves and cut-purses and robbers of temples, and other malefactors.

Clearly.

Well, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?

Yes, he said ; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.

And may we be so bold as to suppose that there are also many criminals to be found in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful to restrain by force?

Certainly, we may be so bold.

The existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education, ill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?

True.

Such, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy ; and there may be other evils.

Very likely.

Then now oligarchy, or the form of government in which 553 the rulers are elected for their wealth, may be regarded as dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the nature and origin of the individual who answers to this State.

Yes, by all means.

Is not the manner of the change from the timocratical to the oligarchical man as follows? Suppose the representative of timocracy to have a son : at first he begins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he sees him founder in a moment on a sunken reef, and he and all that he has are lost ; he may have been a general or some other high officer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and either put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and all his property taken from him.

Nothing more likely.

And the son has seen and known all this—he is a ruined man, and his fear has taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his bosom's throne ; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean and miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one likely to seat the concupiscent and covetous elements on the vacant throne? They will play the great king within him, and he will array them with tiara and collar and scimitar.

Most true, he replied.

And when he has made reason and spirit sit on the ground obediently on either side, and taught them to know their place, he compels the one to think only of the method by which lesser

sums may be converted into larger ones, and schools the other into the worship and admiration of riches and rich men, and to be ambitious only of wealth and of the pursuits which lead to it.

Of all conversions, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as when the ambitious youth changes into the avaricious one.

And the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?

Yes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State out of which oligarchy came.

Let us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.

554 Very good.

First, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?

Certainly.

Also in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies his necessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he subdues, under the idea that there is no use in them?

True.

He is a shabby fellow, I said, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse for himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not like the State which he represents?

That would be my view of him, he replied; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as by the State.

Why, he is not a man of cultivation, I said.

I imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a blind god director of his chorus, or given him chief honour¹.

Excellent! I said. Yet consider: Will there not be found in him, owing to his want of cultivation, dronelike desires as of pauper and rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?

True.

Do you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?

Where must I look?

¹ Reading *καὶ ἐτίμα μάλιστα*. *Εὖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ*, according to Schneider's excellent emendation.

Let him be guardian of an orphan, or have some other great opportunity of acting dishonestly, and then he will show that in sustaining the reputation of uprightness which attaches to him in his dealings generally, he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; not making them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity and fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.

To be sure.

Yes, indeed, my dear friend, you will find that the natural desires of the drone commonly exist in him all the same, whenever he has the spending of another's goods.

Yes, and they will be strong in him too.

The man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not one; but, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior ones.

True.

For these reasons such an one will be more decent than many are; yet the true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will be far out of his reach.

I should expect so.

And surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for any prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition; he is so afraid of awakening his expensive appetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle; in true oligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the result commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.

Very true.

Can we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to the oligarchical State?

There can be no doubt.

Next comes democracy and the democratical man; the origin and nature of them we have still to learn, that we may compare the individual and the State, and so pronounce upon them.

That, he said, is our method.

Well, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is it not on this wise?—The end which such a State desires is to become as rich as possible; and the rulers, who are aware that their own power rests upon property, refuse

to curtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they will gain by their ruin ; they lend them money and buy their land and grow more wealthy and honourable than ever?

Exactly.

There can be no doubt that you cannot have in citizens of the same State the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation ; one or the other will be disregarded.

That is tolerably clear.

And in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and extravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?

Yes, often.

And still they remain in the city ; there they are, ready to sting and fully armed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship ; a third class are in both predicaments ; and they hate and conspire against those who have got their property, and anybody else, and are eager for revolution.

That is true.

On the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending not even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert the sting—that is, their money—into some one else who is not on his guard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into a family of children : and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.

556 Yes, he said, there are plenty of them, that is certain.

The evil is like a fire which is blazing up and which they will not extinguish either by placing restrictions on the disposition of property or—

What is the other remedy?

One which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to look to their characters :—Let there be an ordinance that every one shall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of this scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were speaking will be greatly lessened in the State.

Yes, they will be greatly lessened.

At present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat their subjects badly ; while they and their adherents, especially the young men of the governing class, lead a life

of luxury and idleness both of body and mind ; they do nothing, and are incapable of holding out against pleasure and pain.

Very true.

They care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the pauper to the cultivation of virtue.

Yes, quite indifferent.

Now in this state of things the rulers and their subjects come in one another's way, whether on a journey or some other occasion of meeting, or on a pilgrimage or a march as fellow-soldiers or fellow-sailors ; they observe each other in the moment of danger (and where danger is there is no fear that the poor will be despised by the rich), and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man may be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh—when he sees such an one puffing and at his wits'-end, can he avoid drawing the conclusion that men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them? And when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another 'our warriors are not good for much?'

Yes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.

And, as where a body is weak the addition of a touch from without may bring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a commotion may arise within, in the same way where there is weakness in the State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very slight, one party introducing their democratical, the other their oligarchical allies, and the State falls sick, and is at war with herself ; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause?

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Yes, surely.

And then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their opponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they give an equal share of freedom and power ; and this is the form of government in which the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.

Yes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been effected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.

And now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they? for as the government is such will be the man.

Clearly, he said.

In the first place, are they not free? and the city is full of freedom and frankness—a man may do as he likes.

They say so, he replied.

And where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order his own life as he pleases?

Clearly.

Then in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?

There will.

This, then, is likely to be the fairest of States, and will appear the fairest, being spangled with the manners and characters of mankind, like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and children think variety charming, so there are many men who will deem this to be the fairest of States.

Yes.

Yes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a government.

Why?

Because of the liberty which reigns there: they have a complete assortment of constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been doing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them, and pick out one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may found his State.

He will be sure to have patterns enough.

And there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if you have the capacity, or to be governed unless you like, or to go to war when the others go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are disposed—there being no necessity also because some law forbids you to hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a
558 dicast, if you take a fancy—is not that a way of life which for the moment is supremely delightful?

For the moment, yes.

And is not their humanity to the condemned¹ often charming? Under such a government there are men who, when they have been sentenced to death or exile, stay where they are and walk about the world; the gentleman parades like a hero, as though nobody saw or cared.

Yes, he replied, many and many a one.

See too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the 'don't care' about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine principles which we were solemnly affirming at the foundation of the city—as when we said that, except in the case of some rare natures, never will there be a good man who in his early youth has not made things of beauty a delight and a study—how grandly does she trample our words under her feet, never giving a thought to the pursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one who professes to be the people's friend.

Yes, she is of a noble spirit.

These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing equality to equals and unequals alike.

We know her well.

Consider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider, as in the case of the State, how he is created.

Very good, he said.

Is not this the way—he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father who has trained him in his own habits?

Exactly.

And, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the spending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary.

Obviously.

Would you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the necessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?

I should.

Necessary pleasures are those of which we cannot get rid, and which benefit us when they are satisfied; both kinds are

¹ Or, 'the equanimity of the condemned.'

rightly called necessary, because our nature is necessarily attracted to them.

559 True.

And therefore we are not wrong in calling them necessary?

We are not.

Again, as to the desires which a man may get rid of, if he takes pains when young—of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases the reverse of good—shall we not be right in saying that all these are unnecessary?

Yes, certainly.

Suppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a general notion of them?

Very good.

Will not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, as far as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?

That is what I should suppose.

The pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and is also needful to the continuance of life?

Yes.

But the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?

Certainly.

And the desire which goes beyond this of viands of a less simple kind, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in youth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of wisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?

Very right.

May we not say that these desires spend and the others make money because they conduce to production?

Certainly.

And of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?

True.

And the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and desires of this sort, and was governed by the unnecessary desires, whereas he who was governed by the necessary was miserly and oligarchical?

Very true.

Again, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical: the following, as I suspect, is commonly the process.

What?

When a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a vulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones' honey and has come to associate with fierce and dangerous natures who are able to provide for him all sorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure—then, as you may imagine, the change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the democratical.

Inevitably.

And as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an alliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so the young man also changes by a class of desires from without assisting the unsatisfied desires within him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and alike.

Certainly.

And if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him, whether the influence of friends or kindred, advising or rebuking him, then there arises a faction and an ⁵⁶⁰ opposite faction, and the result is a civil war.

It must be so.

And there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the oligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of reverence enters into the young man's soul and order is restored.

Yes, he said, that sometimes happens.

And then, again, after the old desires have been driven out fresh ones spring up, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not know how to educate them, wax fierce and numerous.

Yes, he said, that is apt to be the way.

They draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with them, breed and multiply in him.

Very true.

At length they seize upon the citadel of the young man's soul, which they perceive to be void of all fair accomplishments and

pursuits and of every true word, which are the best guardians and sentinels in the minds of men who are dear to the gods.

None better.

False and boastful words and conceits mount upwards instead of them, and occupy the vacant post.

They are sure to do so.

And so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and takes up his abode there in the face of all men ; and if any help be sent by his friends to the oligarchical part of him, the same vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness ; they will not allow the new allies to pass. And if private individuals venerable for their age come and parley they do not receive them ; there is a battle and they win : then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into exile by them. They affirm temperance to be unmanliness, and her also they contemptuously eject ; and they pretend that moderation and orderly expenditure are vulgarity and meanness ; and, by the help of a rabble of evil appetites, they drive them beyond the border.

Yes, with a will.

And when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their power, and is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is to bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in bright array, having garlands on their heads, with a great company, while they hymn their praises and call them by sweet names ; insolence they term breeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage. And so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in the school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and unnecessary pleasures.

Yes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.

After this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary pleasures quite as much as on necessary ones ; but if he be fortunate, and is not too much intoxicated with passion, when he gets older, after the great tumult has passed away—supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part of the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their successors—in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of equilibrium, putting the government of

himself into the hands of the one which comes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into the hands of another, and is very impartial in his encouragement of them all.

Very true, he said.

Neither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice; if any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and noble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour some and curtail and reduce others—whenever this is repeated to him he shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as honourable as another.

Yes, he said; that is the way with him.

Yes, I said, he lives through the day indulging the appetite of the hour; and sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he is for total abstinence, and tries to get thin; then, again, he is at gymnastics; sometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a philosopher; often he is at politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither order nor law; so he goes on continually, and he terms this joy and freedom and happiness.

Yes, his life is all liberty and equality.

Yes, I said; and multiform, and full of the most various characters;—he answers to the State, which we described as fair and spangled. And many a man and many a woman will emulate him, and many a constitution and many an example of life is contained in him.

That is true.

Let him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be 562 called the democratic man.

Let that be his place, he said.

And now comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny and the tyrant; these we have to consider.

Quite true, he said.

Say then, my friend, how does tyranny arise—out of democracy of course?

Clearly.

And does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same way as democracy from oligarchy—I mean, after a sort?

How?

The good which oligarchy proposed and in which it originated, was excess of wealth. Am I not right?

Yes.

And the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the sake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?

True.

And democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to an end?

What good?

Freedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the State—and, that therefore in a democracy only will the freeman of nature deign to dwell.

Yes; the saying is often enough repeated.

I was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of other things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for tyranny.

How so?

When a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers presiding over the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then, unless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls them to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.

Yes, he replied, a very common thing.

Yes, I said; and loyal citizens are insulted by her as lovers of slavery and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers, and rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart, whom she praises and honours both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can liberty have any limit?

Certainly not.

By degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting among the animals and infecting them?

How do you mean?

I mean that the father gets accustomed to descend to the level

of his sons and to fear them, and the son to be on a level with his father, he having no shame or fear of either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and the metic is equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger on a level with either.

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Yes, he said, that is true.

That is true; and there are other slight evils, such as the following: the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the scholars despise their masters and tutors; and, in general, young and old are alike, and the young man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word or deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and gaiety; they do not like to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore they adopt the manners of the young.

Quite true, he said.

The last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money, whether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I forget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each other.

Why not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?

By all means, I replied—I say it then; and I must add that no one who does not know would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are under the dominion of men have in a democracy than in any other State: for truly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses, and the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at any body whom they meet in the street if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty.

You tell me, he said, my own dream; for that is what often happens to me when I am taking a country walk.

And above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens become; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length, as you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; for they will have no one over them.

Yes, he said, I know it too well.

Such, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which springs tyranny.

Glorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?

The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disorder intensified by liberty dominates over democracy, the truth being that the excessive increase of anything often causes
564 a reaction in the opposite direction; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and animal forms, but above all in forms of government.

True.

For the excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass into excess of slavery.

Yes, the natural order.

Then tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and a most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty.

As we might expect.

That, however, was not, as I believe, your question—you rather desired to know what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy, and is the ruin of both?

True, he replied.

Well, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the more courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom we were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.

A very just comparison.

These two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated, being what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver of the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and prevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way in, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.

Yes, indeed, he should.

Then, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine democracy to be divided into three classes, which exist in fact; for in the first place freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in the oligarchical State.

That is true.

But in the democracy they are more intensified.

How so?

Because in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from power, and therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they are almost the entire ruling power, and the keener sort speak and act, while the rest sit buzzing about the bema and will not suffer a word to be said on the other side; and hence there is hardly anything in these States which is not their doing.

Very true, he said.

Then there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.

What is that?

They are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the richest.

Naturally so.

They are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to the drones.

Why, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.

And this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.

That is pretty much the case, he said.

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There is also a third class of men who work for themselves, not politicians, and having little to live upon. And this, when assembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.

True, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to meet unless they get a little honey.

And do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders take as much as they can of the estates of the rich, and give to the people as much as they can consistently with keeping the greater part themselves?

Why, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.

And the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend themselves before the people as they best can?

Of course.

And then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them with plotting against the State and being friends of oligarchy?

True.

And the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but through ignorance, and because they are deceived by slanderers, seeking to do them wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality whether they wish or no; they are driven to it by the stings of the drones goading them?

Exactly.

Then come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.

True.

The people have always some champion whom they nurse into greatness.

Yes, that is their way.

This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears above ground he is a protector.

Yes, that is quite clear.

How then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does what the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.

What tale?

The tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced up with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you never hear it?

O yes.

And the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his disposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the favourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders them, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips tasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some of whom he kills and others he banishes, at the same time proclaiming abolition of debts and partition of lands: and after this, what can be his
566 destiny but either to perish at the hands of his enemies, or from being a man to become a wolf—that is, a tyrant?

Inevitably.

This, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich.

The same.

And then he is driven out and comes back, in spite of his enemies, a tyrant full grown.

That is clear.

And if they are unable to drive him out, or get him condemned to death by public opinion, they form the design of putting him out of the way secretly.

Yes, he said, their usual way.

Then comes the famous request of a body-guard, which is made by all those who have got thus far in their career—'Let not the people's friend,' as they say, 'be lost to them.'

Exactly.

The people readily assent; all their fears are for him—they have no fear for themselves.

Very true.

And when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the people sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,

'By pebbly Hermus' shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed to be a coward.'

And quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.

But if he is caught he dies.

Of course.

And he, the protector of whom we spoke, is not fallen in his might, but himself the overthrower of many, is to be seen standing up in the chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but tyrant absolute.

No doubt, he said.

And now let us talk of the happiness of the man, and also of the State, in which a creature like him is generated.

Yes, he said, let us talk of that.

At first, in the early days of his power, he smiles upon every one and salutes every one;—he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the people and to his followers, and wanting to be kind and good to every one.

Of course, he said.

But when he has disposed of foreign enemies, having reconciled himself with some of them and having destroyed others,

567 and there is nothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader.

To be sure.

Has he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by payment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants and therefore less likely to plot against him?

Clearly.

Yes, and if he suspects any of them of having notions of freedom, and of being disloyal to him, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by giving them up to the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant must be always getting up a war.

He must.

Now he begins to grow unpopular.

A necessary result.

Then some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power—that is to say, the most courageous of them—speak their minds to him and to one another, and cast in his teeth the things which are being done.

Yes, that may be expected.

And the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while he has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.

He cannot.

And therefore he must use his eyes and see who is valiant, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them all, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has made a purgation of the State.

Yes, he said, and a rare purgation.

Yes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body; for they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the opposite.

If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.

What a blessed alternative, I said, to be compelled to dwell only with the many bad, and hated by them, or not to live at all.

Yes, that is the alternative.

And the more detestable he is in his actions the more satellites and the greater devotion in them will he require?

Certainly.

And who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?

They will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.

By the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land.

Yes, he said, there are.

But will he not desire to get them on the spot?

How do you mean?

He will rob the citizens of their slaves and set them free; he will then enrol them in his body-guard?

To be sure, he said, and he will be able to trust them best of all.

What a blessed fellow, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the others and has these only for his trusted friends. 568

Yes, he said; they are his friends.

Yes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence, who admire him and live with him, while the good hate and avoid him.

Of course.

Verily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.

Why so?

Why, because he is the author of that rare saying,

‘Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;’

and he clearly meant to say that the wise are¹ the companions of the tyrant.

Yes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other things of the same kind are said by him and by the other poets.

And therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and others who have the perfect form of government, if we object to having them in our State, because they are the eulogists of tyranny.

¹ Or, ‘and now behold these wise men, who are.’

Yes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.

But still, I said, they go about to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices fair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and democracies.

Very true.

Moreover, they are paid for this and receive honour—the greatest honour from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies; but the higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails, and seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.

True.

But we are digressing. Let us therefore return and enquire how the tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever-changing army of his.

If, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate them, and spend the proceeds; that is obvious. And in so far as they suffice, he will be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose.

And when these fail?

Why, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female, will be maintained out of his father's estate.

I see your meaning, I said. You mean that the people from whom he has derived his being will maintain him and his companions?

Yes, he said; he must be maintained by them.

569 But what if the people go into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son ought not to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by the son? He did not bring him into the world in order that when he was grown up he himself should be the servant of his own servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions; but that, having such a protector, he might be emancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are termed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father might drive out of the house a riotous son and his party of revellers.

By heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been fostering in his bosom; and, when he

wants to drive him out, he will find that he is weak and his son strong.

Why, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his father if he opposes him?

Yes, he will; and he will begin by taking away his arms.

Then he is a parricide, and a cruel unnatural son to an aged parent whom he ought to cherish; and this is real tyranny, about which there is no mistake: as the saying is, the people, who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has fallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out of all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of slavery.

True, he said.

Very well; and may we not say that we have discussed enough the nature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?

Yes, quite enough, he said.

B O O K IX.

57¹ LAST of all comes the tyrannical man ; about whom we have once more to ask, how is he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in misery?

Yes, he said, he is the only one remaining.

There is, however, I said, a previous question which I should like to consider.

What question?

I do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the appetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be perplexed.

Well, but you may supply the omission.

Very true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand. Certain of the unnecessary pleasures and appetites are deemed to be unlawful; every one appears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and by reason, and the better desires prevail over them—either they are wholly banished or they are few and weak; while in the case of others they are stronger, and there are more of them.

Which appetites do you mean?

I mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; when the wild beast in our nature, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and leaps about and seeks to go and satisfy his desires, there is no conceivable folly or crime, however shameless or unnatural—not excepting incest or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food—of which at such a time, you know, a man may not believe himself to be capable.

Most true, he said.

But when a man's pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to sleep he has awakened his rational powers, and

fed them on noble thoughts and enquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first indulged his appetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to sleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with the higher principle—which he leaves in the solitude 572 of pure abstraction, free to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in past, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element, if he has a quarrel against any one—I say, when, after pacifying the two irrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes his rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely to be the sport of fanciful and lawless visions.

I quite agree.

In saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I desire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a latent wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right, and you agree with me.

Yes, I agree.

Remember then the character which we assigned to the democratic man. He was supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly parent, and to have encouraged the saving appetites, and discountenanced the lighter and more ornamental ones?

True.

And then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people, and he took to their fashions, and began to have a dislike of his father's narrow ways. At last, being a better man than his corruptors, he was drawn in opposite directions and coming to a mean led a life, not of lawless and slavish passion, but of what he deemed moderate indulgences in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

Yes, he said; that is and always has been our view of him.

And now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must imagine this man, such as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father's principles; and then further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has already happened to the father:—he is seduced into a perfectly lawless life, which is termed perfect liberty; and while his father and friends take part with

his moderate desires, the corruptors assist the opposite ones. These dire magicians and tyrant-makers at length begin to fear
573 that they will be unable to hold the youth, and then they contrive to implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift desires—like a monstrous winged drone—that is the only image which will adequately describe him.

Yes, he said, that is the only image of him.

And while the other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and wines, and all the dissoluteness of social life, are buzzing around him and flattering him to the utmost, there is implanted in him the sting of desire, and then this lord of his soul is in a frenzy; madness is the captain of the guard; and if he finds in himself any good opinions or appetites in process of formation, which have a sense of shame remaining, he puts an end to them, and casts them forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full.

Yes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.

And is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?

I should not wonder.

Further, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?

He has.

And you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will fancy that he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?

That he will.

And the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate?

Exactly.

Such is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?

That, as people facetiously say, you may as well tell me.

I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts and carousals and revellings, and courtezans, and all that sort of thing; Love is the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.

That is certain.

Yes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and their demands are many.

They are indeed, he said.

His revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.

True.

Then he borrows, and part of his estate is taken from him.

Of course.

When he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young ravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by love himself on whom they dance attendance, is at his wits' end to discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he may gratify them? 574

Yes, that is sure to be the case.

He must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pangs and pains.

He must.

And as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the better of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to have more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of the property, he will take a slice of theirs.

No doubt he will.

And if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat and deceive them.

Very true.

And if he cannot, then he will plunder and force them.

Yes, probably.

And if the old man and woman struggle and fight, will the creature be very careful not to do anything which is tyrannical?

Nay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.

But, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a harlot, who is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he would strike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very existence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is brought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he would do the same to his withered old father, first and most indis-

pensable of friends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of indispensable?

Yes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.

Truly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.

He is indeed, he replied.

He first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning to swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the garments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to rob a temple; and while all this is going on, the old opinions about good and evil which he had when a child, and which were tending to¹ right, are overthrown by those others which have just been emancipated, and are now the guard and associates of love, and share his empire. These in former days, when he was a partisan of democracy and subject to the laws and to his father, were only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the tyranny of love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very rarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden food, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives lordly in him, and being
575 himself a king emancipated from all control, leads him on as a State is led into the performance of any reckless deed in order to maintain himself and his rabble, which evil communications have brought in from without, or which he himself has allowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in himself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?

Yes, indeed, he said.

And if there are only a few of them, and the rest of the people are well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or mercenary soldiers of some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no war, they stay at home and do mischief in the city.

What sort of mischief?

For example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, robbers of temples, man-stealers of the community; and if they are able to speak they turn informers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.

¹ Reading τὰς δεικνύσας ποιοῦν, ἕτας.

A small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.

Yes, I said ; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things, in the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a thousand miles of the tyrant ; the people are such fools, and this noxious class and their followers grow numerous and become aware of their numbers, and then they choose him who has most of the tyrant in his soul, and make him their leader.

Yes, he said, they will choose him because he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.

If the people yield, well and good ; but if they resist him, as he began by beating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them, and will maintain his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and masters. Such is the end of his passions and desires.

Exactly.

Even in early days and before they get power, this is their character ; they associate only with their own flatterers or ready tools ; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally ready to bow down before them : there is no attitude of kindness which they will not assume ; but when they 576 have gained their point they know them no more.

Yes, truly.

They are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of anybody ; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or true friendship.

Certainly not.

And may we not call such men treacherous ?

No question.

Also they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice ?

Yes, he said, and we were perfectly right.

Let us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man : he is the waking reality of what we dreamed.

Most true.

And this is he who being most of a tyrant by nature bears rule, and the longer he lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.

That is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.

And will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most miserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and truly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?

Yes, he said, inevitably.

And must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the democratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?

Certainly.

And as State is to State in virtue and happiness, man is to man?

To be sure.

Then comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is under a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?

They are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other is the very worst.

There can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at once enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their relative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be panic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may perhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go into every corner and look all over the city, and then we will give our opinion.

A fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a tyranny is the wretchedest form of government, and monarchy the happiest.

And in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like
577 request, that I should have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature; he must not be a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous aspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let him be one who has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is given in the hearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place with him, and been present at his daily life and known him in his family, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in the hour of public

danger; he shall tell us about the happiness and misery of the tyrant when compared with other men?

That again, he said, is a very fair proposal.

Let us now assume this able and experienced judge to be ourselves, and then we shall have some one who will answer our enquiries.

By all means.

Let me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State; bearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will you tell me their respective conditions?

In what points? he asked.

Beginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is governed by a tyrant is free or enslaved?

Nothing, he said, can be more completely enslaved.

And yet, as you see, there are masters and freemen in such a State?

Yes, he said, I see that there are—a few; but the people (speaking generally) and the best of them are disgracefully and miserably enslaved.

Then if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same hold of the man? his soul is full of meanness and serfdom—the best elements in him are enslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and maddest.

Inevitably.

And would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman or of a slave?

He has the soul of a slave, in my judgment.

And the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is very far from acting voluntarily?

Very far, indeed.

And also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a whole) is very far from doing as she desires; there is a gadfly which goads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?

Certainly.

And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?

Poor.

And the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable? 578

True.

And must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?

Yes, indeed.

Is there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?

Certainly not.

And is there any man in whom you will find more misery of the same kind than in the tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?

Impossible.

Reflecting then upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be the most miserable of States?

And I was right, he said.

Certainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what do you say of him?

I say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.

There, I said, I think that you are wrong.

What do you mean?

I do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.

Then who is more miserable?

One of whom I am about to speak.

Who is that?

He who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life is cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.

From what has been said, I gather that you are right.

Yes, I replied, but in this high argument of good and evil you should be a little more certain, and should not conjecture only.

That is very true, he said.

Let me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, have an application to this subject.

What is your illustration?

The case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you may form an idea of the tyrant's condition, for they both have slaves; the only difference is that he has more slaves.

Yes, that is the difference.

You know that they live securely and have no fear of their servants?

What should they fear?

Nothing. But do you observe the reason of this?

Yes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection of each individual.

Very true, I said. But imagine that one of these owners is carried off by a god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him—he and his household, and he is the master say of about fifty slaves—will he not be in an agony of apprehension lest he and his wife and children should be put to death by his slaves?

Yes, he said, he will be in the utmost alarm.

579

Will he not be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves, and make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his will?—he will become the servant of his servants.

Yes, he said, that will be the only way of saving his life.

And suppose that the same god who carries him off puts him down among neighbours who will not allow a man to be the master of another, and, if they catch him, are ready to inflict capital punishment upon him?

His case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be surrounded and watched by enemies.

And is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound?—he being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears and lusts. His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet he only, of all men, is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other freemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the house, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees anything of interest.

Very true, he said.

Such being his evil condition, am I not right in saying that the tyrannical man, ill-governed in his own person, whom you just now decided to be the most miserable of all, will be yet more miserable in a public station, when, instead of leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a tyrant? He has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a

diseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement, but fighting and combating with other men.

Yes, he said, the similitude is certainly most exact.

Is not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse life than him whom you determined to be worst?

Certainly.

He who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is obliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable to satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know how to inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles; and surely the resemblance holds?

True, he said.

580 Moreover, as we said before, he grows worse from having power: he becomes of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more friendless, more impious, than he was at first; he entertains and nurtures every evil sentiment, and the consequence is that he is supremely miserable, and he makes everybody else equally miserable.

No man of any sense will dispute that.

Come then, I said, and as the general umpire in the games proclaims the result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of happiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow: there are five of them in all—they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical, democratical, tyrannical.

The judgment will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses entering on the stage, and I will award their places in the order in which they come in, by the criterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.

Need we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of the best (Ariston) is of opinion that the best and justest man is also the happiest, and that this is he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the worst and most unjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State?

Make the proclamation, he said.

And shall I proclaim further, 'whether seen or unseen by gods and men'?

Do so.

Then this, I said, will be the first proof; and there is another, which may also have some weight.

What is that?

The second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the individual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles, the division may furnish a new demonstration.

Of what nature?

There are three pleasures which correspond to the three principles, and also three desires and governing powers.

How do you mean? he said.

There is one principle with which a man learns, another with which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no single name, but is termed appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and vehemence of the pleasures of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites; also money loving, because desires of this class are generally gratified by the help of money. 581

That is true, he said.

If we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part of the soul were concerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion; and might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain or money.

I agree.

Again, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and getting fame?

True.

Suppose we call it the contentious or ambitious—would the term be suitable?

Extremely suitable.

On the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly directed to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or fame?

Far less.

'Lover of wisdom,' 'lover of knowledge,' are titles which are rightly applicable to that part of the soul?

Certainly.

One principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as may happen?

Yes.

Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men—lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasures, which are their several objects?

Very true.

Now, if you examine the three classes, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?

True, he said.

And the lover of honour—what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, which has no meed of honour, he regards as all smoke and nonsense?

Very true.

But may we not suppose¹, I said, that the philosopher estimates other pleasures as nothing in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth², and in that abiding, ever learning, in the pursuit of truth, not far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? He calls the other pleasures necessary, meaning that if there were no necessity for them, he would not have them.

There can be no doubt of it, he replied.

Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless—how shall we know?

I cannot tell, he said.

Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason?

¹ Or, reading with Grasere and Hermann *τὴν οἰώμεθα*, and omitting *οὐδέν*, which is not found in the best MSS., 'How shall we say that the philosopher estimates the pleasures in comparison,' &c.

² Or, taking *τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πᾶν πόρρω* after *νομίξεν*, 'to go but a short way in pleasure;' i. e. to be shallow pleasures only in comparison.

There cannot be a better, he said.

Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge which is imparted by the truth than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has always known the taste of the other pleasures from his youth upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted—or, I should rather say, even if he desired could hardly have tasted by any process of learning truth—the sweetness of intellectual pleasures.

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?

Very great indeed.

Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?

Nay, he said, they are all honoured in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of worshippers, and as they all receive honour they all have experience of the pleasures of honour, but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.

His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?

Far better.

And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Certainly.

Further, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed by the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?

What faculty?

Reason, which, as we were saying, ought to have the decision.

Yes.

And reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?

Certainly.

If wealth and gain were the criterion, then what the lover of gain praised and blamed would surely be truest?

Assuredly.

Or if honour or victory or courage, in that case the ambitious or contentious would decide best?

Clearly.

But since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges, the inference of course is, that the truest pleasures are those which are approved by the lover of wisdom and reason. And so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent
583 part of the soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the ruling principle has the pleasantest life?

Unquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of his own life.

And what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure which is next?

Clearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to himself than the trader.

Last comes the lover of gain.

Very true, he said.

Twice, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust; and now comes the third trial, which, after Olympic fashion, is sacred to Zeus the saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise is quite true and pure—all others are a shadow only; and surely this will prove the greatest and most decisive of falls?

Yes, the greatest; but will you explain how?

If you will answer, I will think, I said, while you are answering.

Put your questions.

Say, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?

True.

And there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?

There is.

A state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about either—that is what you mean?

Yes.

You remember what people say when they are sick?

What do they say?

That after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this to be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.

Yes, I know, he said.

And when persons are suffering from acute pain you must have heard them say that there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?

I have.

And there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and cessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the greatest pleasure?

Yes, he said, at the time rest is pleasant and delightful to them.

Again, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest will not be pleasant but painful?

Doubtless, he said.

Then the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?

So it would seem.

But can that which is neither become both?

I should say not.

And both pleasure and pain are motions in the soul, are they not?

Yes.

But that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and 584 not motion, and in a mean between them?

Yes.

How, then, can we be right in saying that the absence of pain is pleasure, or that the absence of pleasure is pain?

Impossible.

Then this is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is pleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in comparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by the test of true pleasure, are unsound and a species of imposition?

That is the inference.

Look at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you will no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

What are they, he said, and where shall I find them?

There are many of them: take as an example the pleasures

of smell, which are very great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when they depart leave no pain behind them.

Most true, he said.

Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.

No.

Still, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the body are generally of this sort—they are reliefs of pain.

That is true.

And the same is true of the anticipations of pleasure and pain which precede them and are followed by them?

Yes.

Shall I give you an illustration of them?

Let me hear.

You would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle region?

I should.

And if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not imagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and sees whence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he has never seen the true upper world?

To be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?

But if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he was descending?

No doubt.

All that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and lower regions?

Yes.

Then can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they have wrong ideas about many other things, should have wrong ideas about pleasure and pain and the intermediate; so that when drawn towards the painful they are 585 really pained and know the truth, but when drawn away from pain to the neutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the goal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in comparing pain with the absence

of pain, which is like comparing black with grey instead of white—can you wonder, I say, at this?

No, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite. .

Look at the matter thus:—Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of the bodily state?

Yes.

And ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?

True.

And food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?

Certainly.

And is the satisfaction truer of that which has less, or of that which has more existence?

Clearly, of that which has more.

Which classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your judgment—those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of sustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and mind and, in general, all virtue? Put the question in this way:—Which has a more pure being—that which is concerned with the invariable, the immortal, and the true, and is found in the invariable, immortal, true; or that which is concerned with the variable and mortal, and is found in the variable and mortal?

Far purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the invariable.

And does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree as of essence?

Yes, of knowledge in the same degree.

And of truth in the same degree?

Yes.

And, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?

Necessarily.

Then, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body have less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?

Far less.

And has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?

Yes.

What is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real existence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real existence and is less real?

Of course.

And if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to nature, that which is more really filled with more real being will have more real and true joy and pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in a less true and real pleasure?

Unquestionably.

586 Those then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony and sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region they move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper world; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are they truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of true and abiding pleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads stooping, not indeed to the earth, but to the dining table, they fatten and feed and breed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at one another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one another by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that which is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also unsubstantial and incontinent.

Verily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an oracle.

Their pleasures are mixed with pains. How can they be otherwise? For they are mere images and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, which exaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools insane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the truth.

Something of that sort must inevitably happen.

And must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the soul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in the like case, whether he is envious

and ambitious, or violent and contentious, or angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and the satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?

Yes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.

Then may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, when they seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will also have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to them, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will also have those which are natural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to him?

Yes, certainly; the best is the most natural.

And when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business, and enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable? 587

Exactly.

But when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its own pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a shadow of a pleasure which is not their own?

True.

And the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason, the more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?

Yes.

And is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law and order?

Clearly.

And the lustful and tyrannical desires are at the greatest distance?

Yes.

And the royal and orderly desires are nearest?

Yes.

Then the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural pleasure, and the king at the least?

Certainly.

But if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most pleasantly?

Of course.

Would you know the measure of the interval which separates them?

Will you tell me?

There appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the transgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run away from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain slave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority can only be expressed in a figure.

How do you mean?

I assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; and the democrat was in the middle?

Yes.

And if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of pleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch.

He will.

And the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and aristocratical?

Yes, he is third.

Then the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is three times three [$3 \times 3 = 9$]?

Manifestly.

The shadow then¹ [or unreality] of tyrannical pleasure, when determined by the number of length [that is, when calculated in simple numbers] will be a superficial figure [a square of three.]

Exactly.

And if you go on squaring and cubing the number of the figure there is no difficulty in seeing how vast the interval becomes.

Yes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.

And if a person, instead of going from the tyrant to the king, inverts the order, and tells the measure of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find him, when the multiplication is completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the tyrant more painfully by this same interval.

¹ The square number suggests a square figure which is called a shadow.

What a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which separates the just from the unjust in regard to 588 pleasure and pain!

Yet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human life, if human life is concerned with days and nights and months and years¹.

Yes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.

Then if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and unjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in beauty and virtue?

Immeasurably greater.

Well, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may return and consider how we came hither: Was not some one saying that injustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?

Yes, that was said.

Now then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let us have a word with him.

What shall we say to him?

Let us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented before his eyes.

Of what sort?

An ideal image of the soul, like the creations of ancient mythology, such as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, or any other in which two or more different natures are said to grow into one.

There are said to have been such unions.

Then do you now model the form of a multitudinous, polycephalous beast, having a ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to generate and metamorphose at will.

You suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable than wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.

Suppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the second smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.

That, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.

¹ 729 *nearly* equals the number of days and nights in the year.

Then now join them, and let the three grow into one.

That has been accomplished.

Now fashion the outside into a single image. as of a man, so that he who is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the beast to be a single human creature.

I have done so, he said.

And now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to be unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and strengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the man; who is consequently at the mercy of either of the other two, and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with one another—he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour one another.

Certainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.

To him the supporter of justice makes answer that he ought rather to aim in all he says and does at strengthening the man within him, in order that he may be able to govern the many-headed monster. Like a good husbandman he should be watching and tending the gentle shoots, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making a treaty with the lion-heart, and in common care of them all uniting the several parts with one another and with himself.

Yes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice will say.

And from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or advantage, the approver of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong and false and ignorant?

Yes, from every point of view.

Come, now, and let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. 'Sweet Sir,' we will say to him, 'what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast?' He can hardly avoid saying Yes—can he now?

Not if he has any regard for my opinion.

But, if he admit this, we may ask him another question: How would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the

condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who sells his own divine 590 being to that which is most atheistical and detestable, and has no pity? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.

Yes, said Glaucon, far worse—I will answer for him.

Has not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform monster is allowed to be too much at large?

Clearly.

And men are blamed for pride and sullenness when the growth and increase of the lion and serpent are out of proportion?

Yes.

And luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same creature, and make a coward of him?

Very true.

And is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the spirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he can never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled in the mud, and from being a lion to become a monkey?

True, he said.

And why are mean employments and handicraft arts a reproach? Only because they imply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to control the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his only study is how to flatter them?

Such appears to be the reason.

And therefore, that he may be under the same rule as the best, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine rules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because every one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if that be impossible,

then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as far as possible, under the same government, friends and equals?

True, he said.

And this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of the whole city; and is seen also in the authority which is exerted over children, and the refusal to allow them to be free until the time when, as in a State, we have given them
591 a constitution, and by cultivation of the higher element have established in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is done they may go their ways.

Yes, he said, that is a further proof.

From what point of view, then, and on what ground shall a man be profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, even though he acquire money or power?

From no point of view at all.

What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected? for he who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.

Certainly, he said.

On this higher end then the man of understanding will concentrate the energies of his life. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these qualities on his soul, and will disregard others?

Clearly, he said.

In the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit, and so far will he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will regard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not that he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain temperance, but he will be always desirous of preserving the harmony of the body for the sake of the concord of the soul?

Certainly he will, he replied, if he has true music in him.

And there is a principle of order and harmony in the acquisition of wealth; this also he will observe, and will not allow

himself to be dazzled by the opinion of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?

I should think not, he said.

He will look at the city which is within him, and take care to avoid any change of his own institutions, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and with a view to this only he will gain or spend in so far as he is able?

Very true.

And, for the same reason, he will accept such honours as he deems likely to make him a better man; but those which are 59² likely to disorder his constitution, whether private or public, he will avoid?

Then, if that is his motive, he will not be a politician?

By the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own, though in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless by some providential accident.

I understand; you mean in that city of which we are the founders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is such an one anywhere on earth?

In heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it methinks, which he who desires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether such an one exists, or ever will exist in fact is no matter; for he will live after the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other?

True, he said.

BOOK X.

595 OF the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is none which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.

What rule?

The rule about rejecting imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received; as I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished.

What do you mean?

Speaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the tragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe—but I do not mind saying to you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the hearers, and that the knowledge of what they are is the only antidote to them.

Explain the purport of your remark.

Well, I will tell you: although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe and love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is the great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but a man is not to be reverenced before the truth, and therefore I will speak out.

Very good, he said.

Listen to me then, or rather, answer me.

Put your question.

Can you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.

A likely thing, then, that I should know.

596 Why not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.

Very true, he said; but in your presence I could not muster

courage to say even what I might have to say. Will you enquire yourself?

Well then, shall we begin as usual by assuming that whenever a number of individuals have a common name, they have also a corresponding idea or form :—do you understand me?

I do.

Let us take any instance; there are beds and tables in the world and many of them, are there not?

Yes.

But there are only two ideas or forms of them—one the idea of a bed, the other of a table.

True.

And the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in accordance with the idea—that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances—but no artificer makes the ideas themselves.

Certainly not.

And there is another artist,—I should like to know what you would say of him.

Who is he?

One who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.

What an extraordinary man!

Wait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he who makes not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals, himself and all other things—the earth and heaven, and the things which are in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.

He must be a rare master of his art.

Oh! you are unbelieving, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or creator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but not in another? Do you not see that there is a way in which you could make them yourself?

What way?

An easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror round and round—you would soon make the sun and the heavens, and the earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other creations of art as well as nature in the mirror.

Yes, he said ; but that is an appearance only.

Very good, I said, you are coming to the point now ; and the painter, as I conceive, is just a creator of this sort, is he not ?

Of course.

But then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there is a sense in which the painter also creates a bed ?

Yes, he said, but not a real bed.

597 And what of the maker of the bed ? did you not say that he does not make the idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a particular bed ?

Yes, I did.

Then if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence ; and if any one were to say that the work of the maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could hardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.

At any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the truth.

No wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.

No wonder.

Suppose that we enquire into the character of this imitator as illustrated by what has now been said ?

If you please.

Well then, here are three beds ; one existing in nature, which, as I think that we may say, is made by God,—no one else can be the maker ?

No.

There is another which is the work of the carpenter ?

Yes.

And the work of the painter is a third ?

Yes.

Beds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend them : God, the maker of the bed, and the painter ?

Yes, there are three of them.

God, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed

in nature and one only; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been or ever will be made by God.

Why is that?

Because even if he had made but two, a third would still appear behind them which both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed and not the two others.

Very true, he said.

God knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a particular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which by nature is one only.

So we believe.

Shall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?

Yes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the author of this and of all other things.

And what shall we say of the carpenter—is not he also the maker of the bed?

Yes.

But would you call the painter a creator and maker?

Certainly not.

Yet if he is not the maker what is he in relation to the bed?

I think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that which the others make.

Good, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an imitator?

Certainly, he said.

And the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth?

That appears to be the case.

Then about the imitator we are agreed. And now about the painter, I would like to know whether he imitates that which 598 originally exists in nature, or only the creations of artists?

The latter.

As they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.

What do you mean?

I mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or directly or from any other point of view, and

the bed will appear different, but there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.

Yes, he said, the difference is only apparent.

Now let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting—an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear—of appearance or of reality?

Of appearance.

Then the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For example: a painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive children or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from a distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.

Certainly.

And whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts, and all things else that everybody knows, and every single thing, with a higher degree of accuracy than any other man—whoever tells us this, I think that we can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing, because he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation.

Most true.

And so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at their head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and divine things too, for that the good poet must know what he is talking about, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we ought to consider whether here also there is not a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have been deceived by imitators, and may never have remembered when they saw their works
599 that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not real substances? Or, after all, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which they seem to the many to speak well?

Yes, he said, by all means let the question be considered.

Now do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as the image, he would devote himself to the image-making branch? Would he allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as though he could do nothing better?

I should say not.

The real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in realities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of himself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he would prefer to be the theme of them.

Yes, he said, that would bring him much greater honour and profit.

Then I think that we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of the arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask him, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left behind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only talks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right to know respecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and noblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them. 'Friend Homer,' then we say, 'if you are only in the second remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the third—not an image maker or imitator—and if you are able to discern what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what State was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is due to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly benefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them and have done them any good? Italy and Sicily can tell of Charondas, and there is Solon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about you?' Is there any city which he might name?

I think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homeridae themselves pretend that he was a legislator.

Well, but is there any war on record which was carried on ⁶⁰⁰ successfully by him, or aided by his counsels, when he was alive?

There is not.

Or is there any invention¹ of his applicable to the arts, or to human life, such as Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have made, which is attributed to him?

There is nothing at all of the kind.

But, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher of any? Had he in his lifetime friends and associates who loved him, and handed down to posterity an Homeric way of life, as Pythagoras was beloved, and his successors, who at this day call their way of life by his name, do appear to have a certain distinction above other men?

Nothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the companion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh, might be more justly ridiculed for his want of education, if, as is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?

Yes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if Homer had really been able to educate and improve mankind, if he had possessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator—can you imagine, I say, that he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by them? Protagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to suggest to their contemporaries that they will never be able to manage either their own house or their State unless they are made by them presidents of education; and for this wisdom of theirs they are so much beloved that their companions all but carry them about on their heads. And are we to believe that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of Hesiod, would have allowed either of them to beg their way as rhapsodists, if they had really been able to improve mankind? Would they not have been as unwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at home with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have followed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?

Yes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.

Then must we not infer that all the poets, beginning with

² Omitting *εἰς*.

Homer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the truth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as has already been observed, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of cobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he does, and judge only by colours and figures. And so the poet lays over his words and expressions certain colours taken from the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to imitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only from his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics, or of anything else in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very well—such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have. And I think that you must know, for you have often seen what a poor appearance the tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon them, and recited in prose?

Yes, he said.

They are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and now the bloom of youth has passed away from them?

Exactly.

Here is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true existence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?

Yes.

Then let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an explanation.

Proceed.

Of the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bridle?

Yes.

And the worker in leather and brass will make them?

Certainly.

But does the painter know the right form of the bridle and reins? Nay, hardly even the maker; only the horseman who knows how to use them—he knows their right form.

Most true.

And may we not say the same of all things?

What?

That there are three arts which are concerned with all things : one which uses, another which makes, a third which imitates them?

Yes.

And the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them.

True.

Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use ; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes answer in playing ; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to him?

Of course.

The one knows and therefore speaks about the goodness and badness of flutes, and the other believes and obeys him?

True.

The instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker will only attain belief ; and this he will gain from him who knows, by talking to him and being
602 compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the user will have knowledge?

True.

But will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his drawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being compelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions?

Neither.

Then he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the goodness or badness of his imitations?

I suppose not.

The imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own creations?

Nay, rather the reverse.

And yet he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or bad, but he will imitate that which appears to be good to the ignorant and to the vulgar?

Just so.

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Thus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge worth mentioning. Imitation is only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic and epic poets are imitators in the highest degree?

Very true.

And now tell me, I beseech you, has not imitation been shown by us to be concerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?

Certainly.

And what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?

What do you mean?

I will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen at a distance?

True.

And the same objects appear straight when looked at out of the water, and crooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the illusion about colours to which the sight is liable. An utter confusion thus arises in the mind; and there is a similar deception about painting in light and shade, and juggling, and other ingenious devices, which impose upon our weakness with all the arts of magic.

True.

And the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the human understanding—there is the beauty of them—and the apparent greater or less, or more or heavier, no longer reign in us, but give way before calculation and measure and weight?

Most true.

And this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in the soul?

To be sure.

And when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or that some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent contradiction?

True.

But were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible—the same cannot have contrary opinions at the same 603 time about the same?

Very true.

Then that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the same with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?

True.

But the best part of the soul is that which trusts to measure and calculation?

Certainly.

And that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the soul?

No doubt.

That was the conclusion at which I wanted to arrive when I said that painting or drawing and imitation in general are engaged in a work which is remote from truth, and the companion and friend and associate of a principle which is remote from reason, and has no true or healthy aim.

Exactly.

The imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior offspring.

Very true.

And is this confined to the sight only, or applicable to the hearing also, in reference to what is termed poetry?

Probably the same holds of poetry.

Do not rely, I said, on the analogy of painting; but let us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical imitation is concerned is good or bad.

By all means.

Let us state the question:—Imitation imitates the actions of men, whether voluntary or involuntary, on which a good or bad event has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything more?

No, there is nothing else.

But in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with himself—or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and opposition, so here also is there not strife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question again, for, if I remember rightly, all this has been already admitted; and the soul has been acknowledged by us to

be full of these and ten thousand similar oppositions occurring at the same moment ?

And we were right, he said.

Yes, I said, thus far we were right ; but there was an omission which must now be supplied.

What was the omission ?

Were we not saying that a good man, when he loses his son or anything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more equanimity than another ?

Yes.

But will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help sorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow ?

Yes, he said, the latter is the truer statement.

Tell me : will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow when he is seen by his equals, or when he is by himself alone ? 604

He will be more likely to hold out when he is in company.

But when he is left alone he will not mind saying or doing many things which he would be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing ?

True.

There is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, while passion is urging him to indulge his sorrow ?

True.

But when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same object, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him ?

Certainly.

One of them is obedient to the law ?

How do you mean ?

The law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we should not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things are good or evil ; and nothing is gained by impatience ; also, because no human thing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at the moment is most required.

What is most required ? he asked.

That we should take counsel about the past, and when the

dice have been thrown order our affairs accordingly by the advice of reason ; not, like children who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time in setting up a howl, but accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a remedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow by a real cure.

Yes, he said, there is no better way of meeting the attacks of fortune.

Yes, I said ; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of reason ?

Clearly.

And the other principle which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and to lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational, indolent, and cowardly ?

Indeed, we may.

And does not the latter—I mean the rebellious principle—furnish a great variety of materials for imitation ? Whereas the wise and calm temperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to appreciate when imitated, especially at a theatre in which all sorts of men are gathered together. For the feeling represented is one to which they are strangers.

Certainly.

605 Then the imitative poet is not by nature made, nor his art intended, to affect or please the rational principle in the soul, that is if he aims at being popular ; but he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated ?

Clearly.

And now we may fairly take him and set him by the side of the painter, for he is like him in two ways : first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior degree of truth—in this, I say, he is like him ; and he is also like him in being concerned with an inferior part of the soul ; and therefore we shall be right in not receiving him in a well-ordered State, because he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city we cannot allow the evil to have authority and the good to be put out of the way, even so in the city which is within us we refuse to allow the imitative poet to create an evil constitution indulging the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, and thinks the same thing at one time great

and at another small; and is a manufacturer of images very far removed from the truth¹.

Very true.

But we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our accusation:—the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and there are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?

Yes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.

Hear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or one of the tragedians in which he represents some pitiful hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or possibly singing, and smiting his breast—the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and are in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Yes, of course I know.

But when any sorrow happens to ourselves, then you may observe that we pride ourselves on the opposite quality of quietness and endurance; this is the manly part, and that which delighted us when recited is now deemed to be the part of a woman.

I know, he said.

Now can we be right in praising that in another which a man would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?

No, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.

Nay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.

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What point of view?

If you consider, I said, that when we are in misfortune there is in us a natural hunger after sorrow and weeping, and that this feeling which is tamed and kept under control in our own calamities, is satisfied and delighted by the poets;—the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently trained by reason or habit, is then taken unawares because the sorrow is another's; and the spectator fancies that there can be no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him what a good man he is, and making unseasonable lamentations; he thinks that the pleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the poem too? For

¹ Reading ἀφειστῶτι.

the reflection is not often made that from the evil of others the fruit of evil is reaped by ourselves, or that the feeling of pity which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others, will not be repressed in our own misfortunes.

A very just remark.

And does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or again in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, instead of being disgusted at their unseemliness;—the case of compassion recurs;—there is a principle within which is disposed to raise a laugh, and this was once kept in order by you because you were afraid of being thought a buffoon, but is now let out again and inspired by the theatre, and you are apt to be betrayed unconsciously to yourself into playing the comic poet in your own person.

Quite true, he said.

And the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of desire and pain and pleasure which are held to be inseparable from every action—in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of drying them up; she lets them rule instead of ruling them as they ought to be ruled, with a view to the happiness and virtue of mankind.

I cannot deny it.

Therefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of Homer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is profitable for the management and administration of human things, and that you should take him
607 up and get to know him and regulate your whole life according to him, we may love and honour the intentions of these excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we are ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of tragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the gods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted into our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by common consent has ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State.

That is most true, he said.

Let this then be our excuse for expelling poetry, that the argument constrained us; but let us also make an apology to her, lest she impute to us any harshness or want of politeness. We will tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of 'the yelping hound howling at her lord,' or of one 'mighty in the vain talk of fools,' and 'the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,' and the 'subtle thinkers who are beggars after all'; and there are ten thousand other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this, let us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she will only prove her title to existence in a well-ordered State we shall be delighted to receive her, knowing that we ourselves are very susceptible of her charms; but we may not on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much charmed by her as I am, especially when you see her in the garb of Homer?

Yes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.

Shall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, on this condition—that she is to make a defence of herself in lyrical or some other metre?

Certainly.

And to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and yet not poets, I think that we may grant a further privilege—they shall be allowed to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not only that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life and we will gladly listen, for if this can be proved we shall surely be the gainers, I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?

Certainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.

If her defence fails, then, my dear friend, though much against our will we must give her up, after the manner of lovers who abstain when they think that their love is not good for them; for we too are inspired by that love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us, and therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as she is unable to make good her defence, even though our ears may listen, this argument of ours will be like a charm to us, and into the childish love which the many have of her we shall take care not to fall again, for we see that poetry being such as she is,

is not to be pursued in earnest or regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to her will be on his guard against her seductions, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, and he will take heed to our words.

Yes, he said, I quite agree with you.

Yes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than appears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited if under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the excitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?

Yes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one else would have been.

And yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards of virtue.

What, are there any greater still? if there are, they must be of an inconceivable greatness.

Why, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three score years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?

Say rather 'nothing,' he replied.

And should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than of the whole?

Of the whole certainly. But why do you ask?

Are you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?

He looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven; surely you are not prepared to affirm that?

Yes, I said, I ought to be, and you too, for there is no difficulty.

I see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of which you make so light.

Listen then.

I am attending.

You speak of good and of evil?

Yes, he replied.

Would you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element is the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?

609 Yes.

And you admit that everything has a good and also an evil ; as ophthalmia is the evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body ; as mildew is of corn, and rot of timber, or rust of iron and steel : in everything, or in almost everything, there is an inherent evil and disease ?

Yes, he said.

And anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last wholly dissolves and dies ?

True.

The vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each ; and if this does not destroy them there is nothing else that will, for good certainly will not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.

Certainly not.

If, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be dissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no destruction ?

That may be assumed.

Well, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul ?

Yes, he said, there are all the evils of which we were speaking : unrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.

But does any of these dissolve or destroy her ?—and here do not let us fall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish, when they are detected, perish through their injustice, which is an evil of the soul. Take the analogy of the body : The evil of the body is a disease which wastes and reduces and annihilates the body ; and all the things of which we were just now speaking come to annihilation through their own inherent evil clinging to them and destroying them. Is not this true ?

Yes, he said.

Now consider the soul in the same way. Does the injustice and other evil of the soul waste and consume the soul ? do they by inhering in her and clinging to her at last bring her to death, and separate her from the body ?

Certainly not.

And yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from without through external affection of evil, which could not be destroyed from within by an internal corruption ?

It is, he replied.

Consider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness, decomposition, or any other kind of badness, when confined to the actual food, is not supposed to destroy the body; although, if the corruption of food communicates corruption to the body, then the body also suffers from internal
 610 corruption or disease and perishes; but that the body, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is another, without any internal infection—that will never be admitted by us?

Very true.

And, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the soul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved by any external evil which belongs to another?

Yes, he said, there is reason in that.

Either, then, let us refute this argument, or, while this argument of ours remains unrefuted, let us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the throat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can destroy the soul, until the soul also is proved to become more unholy or unrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the soul, or anything else which is not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed by an external one, is not to be supposed.

No one, he replied, will ever show that the souls of men become more unjust in consequence of death.

And if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly denies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and unrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like disease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take this disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has, and which kills them sooner or later in quite another way from that in which, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the penalty of their deeds?

Nay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so very terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect the opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which murders others keeps the murderer alive—aye, and

unsleeping too ; so far removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.

True, I said ; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to kill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction of the body, destroy a soul or anything which is not a body.

Yes, that can hardly be.

But the soul which cannot be destroyed by evil, whether inherent or external, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, 611 must be immortal ?

Certainly.

That is the conclusion, I said ; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must always be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number. Neither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come from something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.

Very true.

But the argument will not allow us to believe this, nor yet to believe that the soul, in her true nature, is full of variety and difference and dissimilarity.

What do you mean ? he said.

The soul, I said, as is now proven, being immortal, must be the fairest of compositions and cannot be compounded of many elements ?

Certainly not.

Her immortality may be proven by the previous argument and by many other arguments ; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred by communion with the body and other miseries, you should look upon her with the eye of reason, in her original purity ; and then her beauty would be discovered, and in her image justice would be more clearly seen, and injustice, and all the things which we have described. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning her as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her only in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose original image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken off and crushed and in many ways damaged by the waves, and incrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he is liker to

some sea-monster than to his natural form. And the soul is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But not there, Glaucon, not there must we look.

Where then?

At her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what converse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal and divine; also how different she would become if wholly following this superior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she now is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock which in wild variety grow around her because she feeds
612 upon earth, and is crusted over by the good things of this life as they are termed: then you would see her as she is, and know whether she have one form only or many, or what her nature is. Of her character and affections in this present life I have said enough.

True, he said.

Thus, I said, we have fulfilled our obligations to the argument,¹ putting aside the rewards and glories of justice, such as you were saying that Homer and Hesiod introduced; and justice in her own nature has been shown to be best for the soul in her nature: let her do what is just, whether she have the ring of Gyges or not, and besides the ring of Gyges, the helmet of Hades.

Very true.

And now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how great are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul from gods and men, both in life and after death?

Certainly not, he said.

Will you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument? What did I borrow?

The assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for you were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly escape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the sake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure injustice. Do you remember?

¹ Reading ἀπελυσάμεθα.

You would have reason to complain of me if I had forgotten.

Then, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the glory which she receives from gods and men be also allowed to her by you ; having been shown to have reality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, she may now have appearance restored to her, and thus obtain the other crown of victory which is her's also.

The demand, he said, is just.

In the first place, I said—and this is the first point which you will have to give up—the nature both of just and unjust is truly known to the gods?

Granted.

And if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the enemy of the gods, as we admitted at first?

True.

And the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from ⁶¹³ them every good, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins?

Certainly.

Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death : for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the divine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?

Yes, he said ; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.

And of the unjust may not the opposite be assumed ?

Certainly.

Such, then, is the prize of victory which the gods give the just ?
Such is my conviction.

And what do they receive of men ? Look at things as they really are, and you will see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from the starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal : they go off at a great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears down on their shoulders, and without a crown ; but the true runner comes to the finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the just ; he who endures to the end of

every action and occasion of his entire life has a good report and carries off the prize which men bestow.

True.

And now you must allow me to repeat the blessings which you attributed to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of the just as you were saying of them, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if they care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whomsoever they like; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other hand, I say of the unjust that the greater number, even though they escape in their youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course, and when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and citizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as you truly term them; they will be racked and burned, as you were saying—but I shall ask you to imagine that I have repeated your tale of horrors. Will you let me assume all this?

Certainly, he said, what you say is true.

614 These, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the just by gods and men in this present life, in addition to other good things which justice of herself provides.

Yes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.

And yet, I said, all these things are as nothing either in number or greatness in comparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after death. And you ought to hear them, and then they will both have received from our lips a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.

Speak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.

Well, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells to the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a brave man, Er the son of Armenius, a Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when the bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption his body was found unaffected by decay, and carried home to be buried. And on the twelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral

pile, he returned to life and told them what he had seen in the other world. He said that when he left the body his soul went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a mysterious place at which there were two chasms in the earth; they were near together and over against them were two other chasms in the heaven above. In the intermediate space there were judges seated, who bade the just, after they had judged them, ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand, having the signs of the judgment bound on their foreheads; and in like manner the unjust were commanded by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also had the symbols of their deeds fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either chasm of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And always on their arrival they seemed as if they had come from a long journey, and they went out into the meadow with joy, and encamped as at a festival; and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from heaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things 615 which they had endured and seen in their journey under the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing heavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. There is not time, Glaucon, to tell all; but the sum was this:—He said that for every wrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; that is to say once in every hundred years—the thousand years answering to the hundred years which are reckoned as the life of man. If for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of these

they received punishment ten times over, and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I need hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon as they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers¹, there were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned that he was present when one of the spirits asked another, 'Where is Ardiaeus the Great?' (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the time of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered his aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many other abominable crimes.) The answer was: 'He comes not hither and will never come. For,' said he, 'this was one of the dreadful sights which was witnessed by us. We were approaching the mouth of the cave, and, having seen all, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals: they were just at the mouth, being, as they fancied, about to return into the upper world, but the opening, instead of receiving them, gave forth a sound, when any of these incurable or unpunished sinners tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and knew
616 what that meant, seized and carried off several of them, and Ardiaeus and others they bound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the passers by what were their crimes, and that² they were being taken away to be cast into hell.' And of all the many terrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror which each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and when there was silence, one by one they ascended with joy. These, said Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great.

Now when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the eighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and on the fourth day after he said that they came to

¹ Reading *ἀνθρώπιτος*.

² Reading *καὶ ὄτι*.

a place where they could see a line of light, like a column let down from above, extending right through the whole heaven and through the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer; another day's journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst of the light, they saw reaching from heaven the ends by which it is fastened: for this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the universe, like the undergirders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the spindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of this spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also partly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on earth; and you are to suppose, as he described, that there is one large hollow whorl which is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and another, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like boxes which fit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the spindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and outermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower, in the following proportions—the sixth is next to the first in size, the fourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the fifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The largest [or fixed stars] is spangled, and the seventh [or sun] is brightest; the eighth [or moon] coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second and fifth ⁶¹⁷ [Saturn and Mercury] are in colours like one another, and yellower than the preceding; the sixth [Venus] has the whitest light; the fourth [Mars] is reddish; the third [Jupiter] is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle has the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven inner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the eighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move together; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this reversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The spindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each circle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single

sound and note. The eight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is another band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the Fates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white raiment and have crowns of wool upon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their voices the harmony of the sirens—Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of the present, Atropos of the future; Clotho now and then assisting with a touch of her right hand the motion of the outer circle or whorl of the spindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones, and Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with the other.

When Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but first of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from the knees of Lachesis lots and samples of life, and going up to a high place, spoke as follows: 'Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of mortal life. Your genius will not choose you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot first choose a life, which shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will have more or less of her; the chooser is answerable—God is justified.' When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots among them, and each one took up the lot which
618 fell near him, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot perceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the ground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than the souls present, and there were all sorts of lives—of every animal and of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some continuing while the tyrant lived, others which broke off in the middle and came to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous men, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their strength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of their ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite qualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite character in them, because the soul must of necessity be changed according

to the life chosen. But there was every other quality, and they all mingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and disease and health. And there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon, is the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should be taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and follow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find some one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and so to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He should consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned severally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of beauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what are the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and public station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of all the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when conjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the consideration of all he will be able to determine which is the better and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil to the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which will make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and know that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take with 619 him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that there too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements of evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villanies, he do irremediable wrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose the mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in this life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.

And according to the report of the messenger this was exactly what the prophet said at the time: 'Even for the last comer, if he chooses wisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable existence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last despair.' And while he was speaking he who had the first choice came for-

ward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been darkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter, and did not see at first that he was fated, among other evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and saw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his choice, not abiding by the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing the blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and everything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven, and in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a matter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And one might say of others who were similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven; and therefore they had never known trouble, whereas the pilgrims who came from earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer were not in a hurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the lot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an evil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate in the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here, and also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough and underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the spectacle of the election—sad and laughable and strange; the souls generally
 620 choosing with a reference to their experience of a previous life. There he saw the soul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to the race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his murderers; he saw also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians, choosing to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth¹ lot chose the life of a lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a man, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment of the arms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life

¹ Reading *εἰκοστήν*.

of an eagle, because, like Ajax, he hated human nature on account of his sufferings. About the middle was the lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to resist the temptation: and after her there came the soul of Epeus the son of Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on the form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a choice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection of former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a considerable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he had some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been neglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have done the same had he been first instead of last, and that he was delighted at his choice. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention that there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into corresponding human natures—the good into the gentle and the evil into the savage, in all sorts of combinations. All the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their choice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally chosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this genius led the soul first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then, when they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads and made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath the throne 621 of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a scorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste destitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the river of Unmindfulness, the water of which no vessel can hold; of this they were all obliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom drank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now after they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a thunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven all manner

of ways like stars shooting upwards to their birth. He himself was hindered from drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the body he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he saw himself lying on the pyre.

And thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save us if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the river of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel is, that we hold fast to the heavenly way and follow after justice and virtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and to the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games who go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with us both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have been reciting.

T I M A E U S.

INTRODUCTION.

OF all the writings of Plato the *Timaeus* is the most obscure and repulsive to the modern reader, and has nevertheless had the greatest influence over the ancient and mediaeval world. The obscurity arises in the infancy of physical science, out of the confusion of theological, mathematical, and physiological notions, out of the desire to conceive the whole of nature without any adequate knowledge of the parts, and from a greater perception of similarities which lie on the surface than of differences which are hidden from view. To bring sense under the control of reason; to find some way through the labyrinth or chaos of appearances, either the high way of mathematics, or more devious paths suggested by the analogy of man with the world, and of the world with man; to see that all things have a cause and are tending towards an end—this is the spirit of the ancient physical philosopher. But we neither appreciate the conditions of knowledge to which he was subjected, nor have the ideas which fastened upon his imagination the same hold upon us. For he is hovering between matter and mind; he is under the dominion of abstractions; his impressions are taken almost at random from the outside of nature; he sees the light, but not the objects which are revealed by the light; and he brings into juxtaposition things which to us appear wide as the poles asunder, because he finds nothing between them. He passes abruptly from persons to ideas and numbers, and from ideas and numbers to persons; he confuses subject and object, first and final causes, and is dreaming of geometrical figures lost in a flux of sense. And an effort of mind is required on our parts in order to understand his double language, or to apprehend the twilight character of this knowledge, and the genius

of ancient philosophers, which under such conditions seems by a divine power in many instances to have anticipated the truth.

The influence which the *Timaeus* has exercised upon posterity is partly due to a misunderstanding. In the supposed depths of this dialogue the Neo-Platonists found hidden meanings and connections with the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and out of them they elicited doctrines quite at variance with the spirit of Plato. Believing that he was inspired by the Holy Ghost, or had received his wisdom from Moses, they seemed to find in his writings the Christian Trinity, the Word, the Church, the creation of the world in a Jewish sense, as they really found the personality of God or mind, and the immortality of the soul. All religions and philosophies met and mingled in the schools of Alexandria, and the Neo-Platonists had a method of interpretation which could elicit any meaning out of any words. They were really incapable of distinguishing between the opinions of one philosopher and another, or between the serious thoughts of Plato and his passing fancies. They were absorbed in his theology, and under the dominion of his name, while that which was truly great and truly characteristic of him, his effort to realize and connect abstractions, was not understood by them at all. And yet the genius of Plato and Greek philosophy reacted upon the East, and a Greek element of thought and language overlaid the deeper and more pervading spirit of Orientalism.

There is no danger of the modern commentators on the *Timaeus* falling into the absurdities of the Neo-Platonists. In the present day we are well aware that an ancient philosopher is to be interpreted from himself, and by the contemporary history of thought. We know that mysticism is not criticism. The fancies of the Neo-Platonists are only interesting to us because they exhibit a phase of the human mind which prevailed widely in the first centuries of the Christian era, and is not wholly extinct in our own day. But they have nothing to do with the interpretation of Plato, and in spirit they are opposed to him. They are the feeble expression of an age which has lost the power not only of creating great works, but even of understanding them. They are the spurious birth of a marriage between philosophy and tradition, between Hellas and the East—*εἰκὸς γεννᾶν νόθα καὶ φαῦλα* (*Rep.* vi. 496 A). Whereas the so-called mysticism of Plato is purely Greek, arising out of his imperfect knowledge and high aspirations,

and is the growth of an age in which philosophy is not wholly separated from poetry and mythology.

A greater danger with modern interpreters of Plato is the tendency to regard the *Timaeus* as the centre of his system. We do not know how Plato would have arranged his own dialogues, or whether the thought of arranging any of them, besides the two 'Trilogies' which he has expressly connected, was ever present to his mind. But, if he had arranged them, there are many indications that this is not the place which he would have assigned to the *Timaeus*. We observe, first of all, that the dialogue is put into the mouth of a Pythagorean philosopher, and not of Socrates. And this is required by dramatic propriety; for the investigation of nature was expressly renounced by Socrates in the *Phaedo*. Nor does Plato himself attribute any importance to his guesses at science. He is not at all absorbed by them, as he is by the *idea* of good. He is modest and hesitating, and confesses that his words partake of the uncertainty of the subject. Again, the dialogue is primarily concerned with the animal creation, including under this term the heavenly bodies, and with man only as one among the animals. But we can hardly suppose that Plato would have preferred the study of nature to man, or that he would have deemed the formation of the world and the human frame to have the same interest which he ascribes to the mystery of being and not being, or to the great political problems which he discusses in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. There are no speculations on physics in the other dialogues of Plato, and he himself regards the consideration of them as a rational pastime only. He is beginning to feel the need of further divisions of knowledge; and is becoming aware that besides dialectic, mathematics, and the arts, there is another field which has been hitherto unexplored by him. But he has not as yet defined this intermediate territory which lies somewhere between medicine and mathematics, and he would have felt that there was as great an impiety in ranking theories of physics first in the order of knowledge, as in placing the body before the soul.

Thus we are led by Plato himself to regard the *Timaeus*, not as the centre or inmost shrine of the edifice, but as a detached building in a different style, framed, not after the Socratic, but after some Pythagorean model. As in the *Cratylus* and *Parmenides*, we are uncertain whether Plato is expressing his own opinions, or appropriating and perhaps

improving the philosophical speculations of others. In all three dialogues he is exerting his dramatic and imitative power; in the *Cratylus* mingling a satirical and humorous purpose with true principles of language; in the *Parmenides* overthrowing Megarianism by a sort of ultra-Megarianism, which discovers contradictions in the one as great as those which have been previously shown to exist in the ideas. There is a similar uncertainty about the *Timaeus*; while in the first part of the dialogue Plato is filled with a Pythagorean contemplation of the heavens, in the latter part he treats in a bald and superficial manner of the functions and diseases of the human frame, which he vainly attempts to connect with his astronomical theories.

If we allow for the difference of subject, and for some growth in Plato's own mind, the discrepancy between this and the other dialogues will not appear to be great. The relation of the ideas to God or of God to the world was differently conceived by him at different times of his life. In all his later dialogues we observe a tendency in him to personify mind or God, and he therefore naturally inclines to view creation as the work of design. The creator is like a human artist who frames in his mind a plan which he executes by the help of his servants. Thus the language of philosophy which speaks of first and second causes is crossed by another sort of phraseology: 'God made the world because he was good, and the demons ministered to him.' The *Timaeus* is cast in a more theological and less philosophical mould than the other dialogues, but the same general spirit is apparent; there is the same dualism or opposition between the ideal and actual—the soul is prior to the body, the intelligible and unseen to the visible and corporeal. There is the same distinction between knowledge and opinion which occurs in the *Theaetetus* and *Republic*, the same enmity to the poets, the same combination of music and gymnastics. The doctrine of transmigration is still held by him as in the *Phaedrus*; and the soul has a view of the heavens in a prior state of being. The ideas also remain, but they have become types in nature, forms of men, animals, birds, fishes. And the attribution of evil to physical causes accords with the doctrine which he maintains in the *Laws* respecting the involuntariness of vice.

The style and plan of the *Timaeus* differ greatly from that of any other of the Platonic dialogues. The language is weighty, abrupt, and in some passages sublime. But Plato has not the same mastery over his instrument which he exhibits in the *Phaedrus* or *Symposium*. Nothing

can exceed the beauty or art of the introduction, in which he is using words after his accustomed manner. But in the rest of the dialogue the power of language seems to fail him. He could write in one style, but not in another, and the Greek language had not as yet been fashioned by any poet or philosopher to describe physical phenomena. The early physiologists had generally written in verse; Democritus and Anaxagoras never attained to a connected or periodic style. And hence we find the same sort of clumsiness in the *Timaeus* of Plato which characterizes the philosophical poem of Lucretius. There is a want of flow and often a defect of rhythm; the connection is frequently obscure, and there is a greater use of apposition and more of repetition than occurs elsewhere in Plato. His employment of the particles is sometimes unmeaning; and he places sentences side by side, leaving the relation between them to be inferred. The narrative portion of the *Timaeus* retains several characteristics of the first Greek prose composition; for the great master of language was speaking on a theme with which he was imperfectly acquainted, and had no words to express his meaning. The rugged grandeur of the opening passage of the speech of *Timaeus* (*Tim.* 28-31) may be compared with the more harmonious beauty of a similar passage in the *Phaedrus* (245).

To the same cause we may attribute the want of plan. Plato had not the command of his materials which would have enabled him to produce a perfect work of art. And he warns his reader, that as is the nature of the subject so will the style be—as his knowledge is fragmentary and unconnected, his style partakes of the same character (*Tim.* 29 B). His speculations about the Eternal, his theories of creation, his mathematical anticipations, are supplemented by desultory remarks on the one immortal and the two mortal souls of man, on the functions of the bodily organs in health and disease, on sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. He soars into the heavens, and then, as if his wings were suddenly clipped, he walks ungracefully and with difficulty upon the earth. The greatest things in the world, and the least things in man, are brought within the compass of a short treatise. But the intermediate links are missing, and we cannot be surprised that there should be a want of unity in a work which embraces astronomy, theology, physiology, and natural philosophy in a few pages.

It is not easy to determine how Plato's cosmos may be presented to the reader in a clearer and shorter form; or how we may supply a

thread of connection to his ideas without giving greater consistency to them than they possessed in his mind, or adding on consequences to which he would have been a stranger. For he has glimpses of the truth, but no comprehensive or perfect vision. There are isolated expressions which have a wonderful depth and power; but we are not justified in assuming that they are the keynotes of the whole, or had any greater significance to his mind than remarks which to us appear trivial; they were, perhaps, truer than he knew. With a view to the illustration of the *Timaeus* I propose to divide this Introduction into sections, of which the first will contain an outline of the dialogue: (2) I shall consider the aspects of nature which presented themselves to Plato and his age: (3) the theology and physics of the *Timaeus*, including the soul of the world, the conception of time and space, and the composition of the elements: (4) in the fourth section I shall consider the Platonic astronomy, and the position of the earth. There will remain, (5) the psychology, (6) the physiology of Plato, and (7) his analysis of the senses to be briefly commented upon: (8) lastly, we may examine in what points Plato approaches or anticipates the discoveries of modern science.

§ I.

Socrates begins the *Timaeus* with a summary of the *Republic*. He touches on the composition of the State, and the double nature of the guardians, on the community of property and of women and children. But he makes no mention of the second education, or of the government of philosophers.

And now he desires that the ideal State should be realized in life and action; he would like to see how she behaved in some great struggle. But he is unable to invent such a narrative himself; and he is afraid that the poets are equally incapable; for, although he has nothing to say against them, he remarks that they are a tribe of imitators, who can only describe what they have seen. And he fears that the Sophists, who are plentifully supplied with graces of speech, in their erratic way of life having never had a city or house of their own, may err in their ideas of philosophy and statesmanship. And therefore to you I turn, *Timaeus*, citizen of *Locris*, who are at once a philosopher and a statesman, and to you, *Critias*, whom all Athenians know to be similarly accomplished, and to *Hermocrates*, who is also fitted by nature and education to share in our discourse. *Hcr.* 'We

will do our best, and have been already preparing; for on our way home, Critias told us of an ancient tradition, which I wish, Critias, that you would repeat to Socrates.' 'I will, if Timaeus approves.' 'I approve.' Listen then, Socrates, to a tale of Solon's, who, being the friend of Dropidas my great grandfather, told it to my grandfather Critias, and he told me. The narrative related to ancient famous actions of the Athenian people, and one special one, which I will rehearse in honour of you and of the goddess. Critias when he told this tale of the olden time, was ninety years old, I being not more than ten. The occasion was the festival of the Apaturia or registration of youth, at which our parents gave prizes for recitation. Some poems of Solon were recited by the boys. They had not at that time gone out of fashion, and the recital of them led some one to say, perhaps in compliment to Critias, that Solon was not only the wisest of men but also the best of poets. The old man brightened up at hearing this, and said: Had Solon only had the leisure which was required to complete the great poem which he brought with him from Egypt he would have been as distinguished as Homer and Hesiod. 'And what was the subject of the poem?' said the person who addressed him. The subject was a very noble one; he described the most famous action in which the Athenian people were ever engaged. But the memory of their exploits has passed away owing to the lapse of time and the extinction of the actors. 'Tell us,' said the other, 'the whole story, and where Solon heard the story.' He replied—There is at the head of the Egyptian Delta, where the river Nile divides, a city and district called Sais; the city was the birthplace of King Amasis, and is under the protection of the goddess Neith or Athene. The citizens have a friendly feeling towards the Athenians, believing themselves to be related to them. Hither came Solon, and was received with honour; and here he first learnt, by conversing with the Egyptian priests, how ignorant he and his countrymen were of antiquity. Perceiving this, and with the view of eliciting information from them, he told them the tales of Phoroneus and Niobe, and also of Deucalion and Pyrrha, and he endeavoured to count the generations which had since passed. Thereupon an aged priest said to him, 'O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are ever young, and there is no old man who is a Hellene.' 'What do you mean?' he asked. 'In mind,' replied the priest, 'I mean to say that you are children; there is no opinion or tradition of knowledge among you which is white with age; and I will tell you

why. Like the rest of mankind you have suffered from convulsions of nature, which are chiefly brought about by the two great agencies of fire and water. The latter is symbolized in the Hellenic tale of young Phaëthon who drove his father's horses the wrong way, and having burnt up the earth was himself burnt up by a thunderbolt. For there occurs at long intervals a derangement of the heavenly bodies, and then the earth is destroyed by fire. At such times, and when fire is the agent, those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore are safer than those who dwell upon high and dry places, who in their turn are safer when the danger is from water. Now the Nile is our saviour from fire, and rising only from below never does any harm to us by water; whereas, when a deluge comes, the inhabitants of other cities and countries are swept by the rivers into the sea. The memorials which your own and other nations have once had of the famous actions of mankind perish in the waters at certain periods; and the rude survivors in the mountains begin again, knowing nothing of the world before the flood. But in Egypt the traditions of our own and other lands are by us registered for ever in our temples. The genealogies which you have recited to us out of your own annals, Solon, are a mere children's story. For in the first place, you remember one deluge only, and there were many of them, and you know nothing of that fairest and noblest race of which you are a seed or remnant. The memory of them was lost, because there was no written voice among you; for in the times before the great flood Athens was the greatest and best of cities and did the noblest deeds and had the best constitution of any under the face of heaven.' Solon marvelled, and desired to be informed of the particulars. 'You are welcome to hear them,' said the priest, 'both for your own sake and for that of the city, and above all for the sake of the goddess who is the common foundress of both our cities. Nine thousand years have elapsed since she founded yours, and eight thousand since she founded ours, as our annals record. Many laws exist among us which are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. I will briefly describe them to you, and you shall read the account of them at your leisure in the sacred registers. In the first place, there was a caste of priests among the ancient Athenians, and another of artisans; also castes of shepherds, hunters, and husbandmen, and lastly of warriors, who, like the warriors of Egypt, were separated from the rest, and carried shields and spears, a custom which the goddess first taught you, and

then the Asiatics, and we among Asiatics first received from her. Observe again, what care the law took in the pursuit of wisdom, searching out the deep things of the world, and applying them to the use of man. The spot of earth which the goddess chose had the best of climates, and produced the wisest men; in no other was she herself, the philosopher and warrior goddess, so likely to have votaries. And there you dwelt as became the children of the gods, excelling all men in virtue, and many famous actions are recorded of you. The most famous of them all was the overthrow of the island of Atlantis. This was a continent lying over against the Pillars of Heracles, in extent greater than Libya and Asia put together, and was the passage to other islands and to a great ocean of which the Mediterranean sea was only the harbour; and within the Pillars the empire of Atlantis reached in Europe to Tyrrhenia and in Libya to Egypt. This mighty power was arrayed against Egypt and Hellas and all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Then did your city bravely, and won renown over the whole earth. For at the peril of her own existence, and when the other Hellenes had deserted her, she repelled the invader, and of her own accord gave liberty to all the nations within the Pillars. A little while afterwards there was a great earthquake and your warrior race all sank into the earth; and the great island of Atlantis also disappeared in the sea. This is the explanation of the shallows which are found in that part of the Atlantic ocean.'

Such was the tale, Socrates, which Critias heard from Solon; and I noticed when listening to you yesterday, how close the resemblance was between your city and citizens and the ancient Athenian State. But I would not speak at the time, because I wanted to refresh my memory. I had heard the old man when I was a child, and though I could not remember the whole of our yesterday's discourse, I was able to recall every word of this, which is branded into my mind; and I am prepared, Socrates, to rehearse to you the entire narrative. The imaginary State which you were describing may be identified with the reality of Solon, and our antediluvian ancestors may be your citizens. 'That is excellent, Critias, and very appropriate to a Panathenaic festival; the truth of the story is a great advantage.' Then now let me explain to you the order of our entertainment; first, Timaeus, who is a natural philosopher, will speak of the origin of the world, going down to the creation of man, and then I shall

receive the men whom he has created, and some of whom will have been educated by you, and introduce them to you as the lost Athenian citizens of whom the Egyptian record spoke. As the law of Solon prescribes, we will bring them into court and judge them ourselves. I see, replied Socrates, that I shall be well entertained; and do you, Timaeus, offer up a prayer and begin:

Tim. All men who have any right feeling at the beginning of any enterprise call upon the Gods; and he who is about to speak of the origin of the universe has a special need of their aid. May my words be acceptable to them, and may I speak in the manner which will be most intelligible to you and will best express my meaning!

First, I must distinguish between endless being which has no becoming and is apprehended by reason and reflection, and endless becoming which has no being and is conceived by opinion with the help of sense. All that becomes and is created is the work of a cause, and that is fair which the artificer makes after an eternal pattern, but whatever is fashioned after a created pattern is not fair. Is the world then created or uncreated? that is the first question. Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and if sensible, then created; and if created, made by a cause, and the cause is the ineffable father of all, who had in view an eternal archetype. For to imagine that the archetype was created would be blasphemy, seeing that the world is the noblest of creations, and God is the best of causes. And the world being thus created according to the eternal pattern is the copy of something; and we may assume that words and ideas are akin to the matter of which they speak. The unchanging or intelligible has permanent forms of expression, the created image likely or probable ones; being is to becoming what truth is to belief. And in the variety of opinions which have arisen about God and the nature of the world we must be content to take probability for our guide, considering that I who am the speaker, and you who are the judges are only men, and to probability we may attain but no further.

Soc. Excellent, Timaeus, I like your manner of approaching the subject—proceed.

Tim. Why did the Creator make the world? He was good, and therefore not jealous, and being free from jealousy he desired that all things should be like himself. Wherefore he set in order the visible

world, which he found in disorder. Now he who is the best could only create the fairest, and reflecting that of visible things the intelligent is superior to the unintelligent, he put intelligence in soul and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature, and the world became a living soul through the providence of God.

In the likeness of what animal was the world made? That is the third question. The form of the animal was a whole, and contained all intelligible beings, and the visible animal, made after the pattern of this, included all visible creatures.

Were there many heavens or one only? That is the fourth question. One only, having no other. For if there had been more than one they would have been the parts of a third which would have been the true pattern of the world, and therefore there is, and will ever be, one only-begotten and created heaven. Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal and visible and tangible, visible and therefore lighted by fire, tangible and therefore solid and made of earth. But two terms must be united by a third, which is a mean between them, and had the earth been a surface only, three would have sufficed, but four terms are required in the construction of a solid. And as the world was to be solid, between the elements of fire and earth God placed two other elements of air and water, and arranged them in a continuous proportion,

fire : air :: air : water, and as air : water :: water : earth,

and so put together a visible heaven, which was perceptible to sight and touch, having harmony and friendship in the union of the four elements, and being at unity with itself was indissoluble except by the hand of the framer. Each of the elements was taken into the universe whole and entire; for he considered that the animal should be perfect, and one, leaving no remnants out of which another animal could be created, and should also be free from old age and disease, which are produced by external forces. And as he was to contain all, he was himself made in the all-containing form of a sphere, round as from a lathe and every way equidistant from the centre, as was natural and suitable to him. He was finished and smooth, having neither eyes, ears, nor hands; for there was nothing without him which he could see or hear, and he had no need to carry food to his mouth,

or breathe the outer air, and he did not require hands, for there was nothing without him of which he could take hold. All that he did was done rationally in and by himself; and he moved in a circle turning within himself; which is the most intellectual of motions, but the other six motions were wanting to him; wherefore the universe had no feet or legs.

And so the thought of God made a God in the image of a perfect body, having intercourse with himself and needing no other, but in every part harmonious and self-contained and truly blessed. The soul was first made by him—the elder to rule the younger; not in the order in which our wayward fancy has led us to describe them, but the soul first and afterwards the body. God took of the unchangeable and indivisible essence and also of the divisible and corporeal, and out of the two he made a third nature, which was in a mean between them, and partook of the same and the other, the intractable nature of the other being compressed into the same. He then began to divide into portions the mass which he had compounded, in the ratios of 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, and proceeded to fill up the double and triple intervals

$$\left[\bar{1}, \frac{4}{3}, \frac{3}{2}, \bar{2}, \frac{8}{3}, 3, \bar{4}, \frac{16}{3}, 6, \bar{8} \right]$$

$$\left[\bar{1}, \frac{3}{2}, 2, \bar{3}, \frac{9}{2}, 6, \bar{9}, \frac{27}{2}, 18, \bar{27} \right]$$

in which double series of numbers are two kinds of means; the one exceeds and is exceeded by equal parts of the extremes, e. g. $1 \frac{4}{3} 2$; the other kind of mean is one which is equidistant from the extremes—2, 4, 6. Between the former intervals he introduced ratios of thirds, 3 : 2; of fourths, 4 : 3; of ninths, 9 : 8; and the interval of a fourth he filled up with a ninth, leaving a remnant which is in the ratio of 256 : 243. The entire compound was divided by him lengthways into two parts, which he united at the centre like the letter X, and bent them into an inner and outer circle or sphere, cutting one another again at a point over against the point at which they cross. The outer circle or sphere was named the sphere of the same—the inner the sphere of the other or diverse, and the one revolved horizontally to the right, the other diagonally to the left. To the sphere of the same which was undivided he gave dominion, but the sphere of the other or manifold was distributed into seven unequal orbits, having intervals in ratios

of twos and threes, three of either sort, and he bade them move in opposite directions to one another—three of them, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, with equal swiftness, and the remaining four—the Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter, with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another, but all in due course.

When the Creator had made the soul he made the body within her, and the soul interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumference of heaven, herself turning in herself, began a divine life of rational and everlasting motion. The body of heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of reason and harmony, and is the best of creations, being the work of the best. And being composed of the same, the other, and the essence, these three, and also divided and bound in harmonical proportion, and revolving backwards and forwards in herself—the soul when touching anything which has essence, whether divided or undivided, is stirred to utter the sameness or diversity of one thing with another, and to tell how and when and where individuals are affected or related, whether in the world of change or of essence. When reason is in the neighbourhood of sense, and the circle of the other or manifold is also moving truly, then arise true opinions and beliefs; when reason is in the sphere of thought, and the circle of the same runs smoothly, then intelligence is perfected.

When the Father who begat the world saw the image which he had made of the Eternal Gods moving and living, he rejoiced; and in his joy resolved, since the archetype was eternal, to make the creature eternal as far as this was possible. Wherefore he made an image of eternity which is time, having an uniform motion according to number, parted into months and days and years, and also having greater divisions of past, present, and future. These all apply to becoming in time, and have no meaning in relation to the eternal nature, which ever is and never will be, for the unchangeable is never older or younger, and when we say that he was or will be, we are mistaken, for we are speaking of becoming, and not of true being; and equally wrong are we in saying that what has become has become and that what is becoming is becoming, and that what is not is not. These are the forms of time which imitate eternity and move in a circle measured by number.

Thus was time made in the image of the eternal nature and together with the heavens, in order that if they were dissolved time might perish

with them. And God made the sun and moon and five other wanderers, as they are called, seven in all, and to each of them he gave a body moving in an orbit, being one of the seven orbits into which the circle of the other was divided. He put the moon in the orbit which was nearest to the earth, the sun in that next, the morning star and Mercury in the orbits which move opposite to the sun, but with equal swiftness, and this is the reason why they overtake and are overtaken by one another. All these bodies became living creatures, and learnt their appointed tasks, and began to move, the nearer more swiftly, the remoter more slowly, according to the diagonal movement of the other, which was controlled by the movement of the same. And by reason of the control of the same, as the movement of the other was in an opposite direction, that appeared fastest which was slowest, and that which overtook others appeared to be overtaken by them. And God lighted a fire in the second orbit which is called the sun, to give light over the whole heaven, and to teach intelligent beings that knowledge of number which is derived from the revolution of the same. Thus arose day and night, which are the periods of the most intelligent nature; a month was created by the revolution of the moon, a year by that of the sun. Other periods of wonderful length and complexity are not observed by men in general, although there is a cycle or perfect year at the completion of which they all meet and coincide. To this end the stars came into being, that the created heaven might imitate the eternal nature.

Thus far the universal animal was made in the divine image, but the other animals were not as yet included in him. And God created them according to the patterns or species of them which existed in the divine image. There are four of them, one of gods, another of birds, a third of fishes, and a fourth of animals. The gods were made in the form of a circle, which is the most perfect figure and the figure of the universe. They were created chiefly of fire, that they might be bright, and were made to know and follow the best, and to be scattered over the heavens, whose glory they were to be. Two kinds of motion were assigned to them—first, the revolution in the same and around the same, in peaceful unchanging thought of the same; and to this was added a forward motion which was under the control of the same. Thus then the fixed stars were created, being divine and eternal animals, revolving on the same spot, and the wandering

stars, in their courses, were created after their likeness. The earth, which is our nurse, clinging around the pole extended through the universe, he made to be the guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the labour of telling about all the figures of them, moving as in dance, and their conjunctions and oppositions, and when and where and behind what other stars they appear or disappear and give signs of the future terrible to man—to tell of all this without looking at the plan of them would be labour in vain.

The knowledge of the other gods is beyond us, and we can only accept the traditions of the ancients, who were the children of the gods, as they said, and surely they must have known their own ancestors. Although they give no proof of their words they seem to be speaking of matters familiar to them, and we must believe them as the law requires. They tell us that Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and Heaven; Phorcys, Cronos, and Rhea are in the next generation, and are followed by Zeus and Herè, whose brothers and children are known to everybody.

When all of them, both those who show themselves in the sky, and those who retire from view, had come into being, the Creator addressed them thus:—‘Gods, and sons of gods, my works, if I will, are indissoluble. That which is bound may be dissolved, but only an evil being would dissolve that which is harmonious and happy. And although you are not immortal you shall not die, for I will hold you together. Hear me, then:—Three tribes of mortal beings have still to be created, and if created by me they might become like gods. Do ye therefore make them, as I have made you; I will implant in them the seed of immortality, and you shall weave together the mortal and immortal, and provide food for them, and receive them again in death.’ Thus he spake, and poured the remains of the elements into the cup in which he had mingled the soul of the universe. They were no longer pure as before, but diluted; and out of the mixture which he had made he distributed souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each to a star—then having mounted them, as in a chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe, and told them of their future birth and human lot. They were to be sown in the planets which are the vessels of time, and out of them was to come forth the most religious of animals, which, as human nature was of two kinds, would hereafter be called

man. The souls were implanted in bodies, which were in a perpetual flux, whence, he said, arose, first, sensation; secondly, love, which is a mixture of pleasure and pain; thirdly, fear and anger, and the opposite affections: and if they conquered these, they would live righteously, but if they were conquered by them, unrighteously. He who lived well would return to the habitation of his star, and would there have a blessed existence; but, if he lived ill, he would pass into the nature of a woman, and if he did not then alter his evil ways, into the likeness of some animal, until he returned to the courses of the like and the same, and the reason which was in him reasserted her sway over the elements of fire, air, earth, water, which had engrossed her, and he regained his first and better nature. Having given this law to his creatures, that so he might be guiltless of their future evil, he sowed them, some in the earth, some in the moon, and some in the other vessels of time; and he ordered the younger gods to frame human bodies for them and to make the necessary additions to them, and to avert from them all but self-inflicted evil.

Meanwhile he remained in his own nature, and his children fulfilled his commands. Receiving from him the immortal principle, they borrowed portions of earth, air, fire, water, hereafter to be returned, which they fastened together, not with the adamantine bonds which bound themselves, but by little invisible pegs, making the body one, subject to influx and efflux, and containing the courses of the soul. These swelling and surging as in a river moved irregularly and irrationally in all the six possible ways, forwards, backwards, right, left, up and down. But violent as were the internal and alimentary fluids, the tide became still more violent when the body came into contact with the flaming fire, or the solid earth, or the gliding waters, or the stormy wind; the motions produced by these impulses pass through the body to the soul and have the name of sensations. They accompany the ever-flowing current, and shake the courses of the soul, binding fast the principle of the same and twisting in all sorts of ways the nature of the other, and the harmonical ratios of twos and threes and the mean terms which connect them, until the circles are bent and disordered and their motion becomes irregular—these are greatly affected by them, though they cannot be wholly dissolved except by the creator. You may imagine a motion of the body in which the head is knocking against the ground, and the legs striking out in the air, and the top is bottom

and the left right. This is what happens when the motions of the soul come into contact with any external thing; they say the same or the other in a manner which is the very opposite of the truth, and they become false and foolish, and have no guiding principle in them. And when external impressions enter into them, they are really conquered, though they seem to conquer.

By reason of these affections the soul is at first without sense, but as time goes on the stream of nutriment abates, and the circles return to their natural figure and the courses of the soul have a regular motion, which apprehends the same and the other and gives the use of reason. The soul of him who has education is whole and perfect and escapes the worst disease, but, if education be neglected, he walks lamely through life and returns good for nothing to the world below. This, however, is an after-stage—at present, we are only concerned with the creation of the body and soul.

The two divine courses were encased by the gods in a sphere which is called the head, and is the god and lord of us. And to this they gave the body to be a vehicle, and the members to be instruments, having the power of flexion and extension. Such was the origin of legs and arms. In the next place, the gods gave a forward motion to the human body, because the front part of man was the more honourable and had authority. And they put in a face in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the providence of the soul. They first contrived the eyes, into which they conveyed the gentle light of everyday life, making the fire which is within us to flow pure through the pupil of the eye and meet the light of day. When the light of the eye is surrounded by the light of day then like falls upon like, and there is a union of them formed in any direction in which the visual ray strikes upon the light coming from an object. And as like is affected by like, whatever touches or is touched by this stream of vision is diffused over the whole body and finds a way into the soul. But when the visual ray goes forth into the darkness, then like falls upon unlike—the eye no longer sees, and we go to sleep. The fire, or light which is kept in by the eyelids, equalizes the inward motions, and there is rest accompanied by few dreams; only when the greater motions remain they engender in us corresponding visions of the night. And now we shall be able to understand the nature of reflections in mirrors. The fires from within and from without meet about the smooth and bright surface of the

mirror; and when they meet in a manner contrary to the usual mode of meeting, the objects seen in them are inverted in various ways, according to the form and position of the mirrors.

These are the second causes which God used as his ministers in fashioning the world. They are thought by many to be the prime causes, but they are not so; for they are destitute of mind and reason, and the lover of mind will not allow that there are any prime causes other than the rational and invisible ones—these he investigates first, and afterwards those which are visible and are moved by others, and work by chance and without order. Of the second or concurrent causes of sight I have already spoken, and I will now speak of the higher purpose of God in giving us eyes. Sight is the source of the greatest benefits to us; for if our eyes had never seen the sun, stars, and heavens, the very words which we are using would not have been uttered. The sight of them and their revolutions has given us the knowledge of number and time, and the power of enquiry, and we have derived philosophy from them, which is the great blessing of human life; not to speak of the lesser benefits which even the vulgar can appreciate. God gave us the faculty of sight that we might behold the order of the heavens and create a corresponding order in our own erring minds. To the like end the gifts of speech and hearing were bestowed upon us; not for the sake of irrational pleasure, but in order that we might harmonize the courses of the soul by sympathy with the harmony of sound, and reconcile man to himself, and cure him of his irregular and graceless ways.

Thus far we have spoken of the works of mind; and there are other works done from necessity, which we must now place beside them; for the creation is made up of both, mind persuading necessity as far as possible to work out good. Before the heavens there existed fire, air, water, earth, which we suppose men to know, though no one has explained their nature, and we erroneously maintain them to be the letters or elements of the whole, although they cannot reasonably be compared even to the syllables or first compounds. I am not now speaking of the first principles of things, because I cannot discover them by our present mode of enquiry. But as I observed the rule of probability at first, I will begin anew, seeking by the grace of God still to observe the same rule.

In our former discussion I made two kinds of being—the un-

changing or invisible, and the visible or changing. These were sufficient for my purpose at the time, but now a third kind is required, which I shall call the receptacle or nurse of generation. There is a difficulty in arriving at an exact notion of this third kind, because the four elements themselves are of inexact natures and easily pass into one another, and are too transient to be detained by any one name; wherefore we are compelled to speak, not of water or fire, but of natures such as water or fire. They may be compared to images made of gold, having many forms. Somebody asks what they are?—if you do not know, the safest answer is to reply that they are gold. In like manner there is a universal nature out of which all things are made, and which is like none of them; but they enter into and pass out of her, and are made after patterns of the true in a wonderful and inexplicable manner. The containing principle may be likened to a mother, the source or spring to a father, the intermediate nature to a child; and we may also remark that the matter which receives every variety of form must originally be formless, like the inodorous liquids which are prepared to receive scents, or the smooth and soft materials on which figures are impressed. In the same way the original or material substance is neither earth nor fire nor air nor water, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things, and in an incomprehensible manner attains to a portion of the intelligible. But we may say, speaking generally, that fire is that part of this nature which burns, water that which is moist, and the like.

Let me ask a question in which a great principle is involved: Is there an essence of fire and the other elements, or are there only fires visible to sense, and is the rest a mere name? I answer in a word: If mind is one thing and true opinion another, then there are self-existent essences; but if mind is the same as opinion, then the visible and corporeal is the reality. But they are not the same, and they have a different origin and nature. The one comes to us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is rational, the other is irrational; the one is movable by persuasion, the other immovable; the one is possessed by every man, the other by the gods and by very few men. And we must acknowledge that as there are two kinds of knowledge, so there are two kinds of being corresponding to them; the one uncreated, indestructible, immovable, which is seen by intelligence only; the other created, which is always becoming in place and vanishing out of place,

and is apprehended by opinion and sense. There is also a third nature—that of space, which is indestructible, and is perceived by a kind of spurious reason without the help of sense. This is presented to us in a dreamy manner, and yet has a kind of necessity, for we say that all things must be somewhere in space. But these, although they are the waking realities of nature, are seen by us in a dream only, and therefore we are unable to describe them. For they are the images of other things and exist in others, and true reason assures us that while two things are different they cannot inhere in one another, so as to be one and two at the same time.

To sum up, being and generation and space, these three, existed before the heavens, and the nurse or vessel of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and taking the forms of air and earth, assumed all their qualities. When the vessel was shaken, the elements were divided, like grain winnowed by fans, the close and heavy particles settling in one place, the light and airy ones in another. At first all things were without reason or measure, until God by the help of figure and number fashioned the four elements, which in their original state had only certain faint traces of themselves, and the world began to get into order. In this, as in every other part of creation, I suppose God to have made things, as far as was possible, fair and good, out of other things which were not fair and good.

And now I will explain to you the generation of the world by a method with which your scientific training will have made you familiar. Fire, air, earth, and water are bodies and therefore solids, and solids are contained in planes, and the plane rectilinear figure is made up of rectangular triangles. They are originally of two kinds, one kind having the opposite sides equal (isosceles), the other unequal (scalene). These we may fairly assume to be the original elements of fire and the other bodies; what principles are prior to these God only knows, and he of men whom God loves. Next, we must determine what are the four most beautiful figures which are unlike one another and yet sometimes capable of resolution into one another. Of the two kinds of triangles the equal-sided has but one form, the unequal-sided has an infinite variety of forms; and there is none more beautiful than that which forms the half of an equilateral triangle. Let us then choose two triangles; one, the triangle which has equal sides, the other having a longer side of which the square is three times as great as the square of the lesser

side; and affirm that, out of these, fire and the other elements have been constructed.

I was wrong in imagining that all the four elements were generated from one another. For they are really generated, three of them from the triangle which has the sides unequal, the fourth from the triangle which has equal sides; and the three can be resolved into one another, but not the fourth. So much for their passage into one another: I must now speak of their combinations. From the triangle of which the hypotenuse is twice the lesser side the three first regular solids are formed—first, the equilateral pyramid or tetrahedron; secondly, the octahedron; thirdly, the icosahedron; and from the isosceles triangle is formed the cube; and there is a fifth figure which is made out of twelve pentagons, the dodecahedron—this God also employed in the construction of the universe.

Let us now assign the geometrical forms to their respective elements. The cube is the most stable of them because resting on a quadrangular plane surface, and the isosceles triangle is more stable than the scalene. To the earth then, which is the most stable of bodies and the most easily modelled of them, may be assigned the form of a cube; to fire the form of a pyramid, and the remaining forms to the other elements; to air the octahedron, and to water the icosahedron, according to their degrees of lightness or heaviness or power, or want of power, of penetration. The single particles of any of the elements are not seen by reason of their smallness; they only become visible when collected. The ratios of their motions, numbers, and other properties, are ordered by the God, who harmonized them as far as necessity permitted.

The probable result is as follows:—Earth, when dissolved by the more penetrating element of fire, whether acting immediately or through the medium of air and water, is dispersed but not changed. Water, when divided by fire or air, becomes one part fire, and two parts air. The volume of air divided becomes a double volume of fire. On the other hand, when condensed, two volumes of fire make a volume of air; and two and a half parts of air condense into one of water. Any element which is fastened upon by fire is cut by the sharpness of the triangles, and at length, coalescing with the fire, is at rest; for similars are not affected by similars, but inferiors are conquered by their superiors, and only cease from their tendency to extinction when they combine with them. When two kinds of bodies quarrel with one

another, then the tendency to decomposition continues until the smaller either escape to their kindred element or become one with their conquerors. And this tendency in bodies to condense or escape is the source of motion. For where there is motion there must be a mover, and where there is a mover there must be something to move. These cannot be in equipoise, and therefore motion is the want of equipoise. But then why, when things are divided after their kinds, do they not cease from motion? The answer is, that the circular motion of all things compresses them, and as 'nature abhors a vacuum,' the finer and more subtle particles of the lighter elements, such as fire and air are thrust into the larger interstices of the heavier, each of them penetrating according to their rarity, and thus all the elements are on their way up and down everywhere into their own places. Hence there is a principle of inequality, and therefore of motion, pervading all nature.

In the next place, we may observe that there are different kinds of fire—(1) flame, (2) light that burns not, (3) the red heat of the embers of fire. And there are varieties of air, as for example, the pure aether, the opaque mist, and other nameless forms which are caused by the inequalities of the triangles. Water, again, is of two kinds, liquid and fusile. The liquid is composed of small and unequal particles, the fusile is composed of larger and more equal particles and is more solid, but nevertheless melts at the approach of fire, and then spreads upon the earth. When the substance cools, the fire passes into the air, which is displaced, and forces together the liquid mass into the place quitted by the fire. This process is called cooling and congelment. Of the fusile kinds the fairest and heaviest is gold; this is hardened by filtration through rock, and is of a bright yellow colour. A shoot of gold which is darker and denser than the rest is called adamant. There is another kind called copper, which is harder and yet lighter because the interstices are larger than gold. This is mingled with a fine and small portion of earth which comes out in the form of rust. These are a few of the conjectures which philosophy forms, when, leaving the eternal nature, she turns for innocent recreation to consider the truths of generation only.

The water which is mingled with fire is called liquid because it rolls upon the earth, and soft, because its bases give way. This becomes more equable when separated from fire and air, and is compressed into hail or ice, or the looser forms of hoar frost or snow. There are other

waters which are called juices and are distilled through plants, first, wine, which warms the soul as well as the body; secondly, the oily substance, as for example, oil or pitch, which glistens; thirdly, honey, which diffuses sweetness and spreads to the passages of the mouth; fourthly, there is vegetable acid, which is frothy and has a burning quality and dissolves the flesh. Of the kinds of earth, that which is filtered through water passes into stone; the water which is broken up by the earth rises into the air—this in turn presses upon the mass of earth, and the earth, compressed into an indissoluble union with the remaining water, becomes rock. The rock which is made up of equal particles is fair and transparent, but the reverse when of unequal. Earth is converted into pottery when the watery part is suddenly drawn away; or if the moisture remains, the earth which has been fused by fire, when cooled, turns into a stone of a black colour. When the earth is finer and of a briny nature then a half-solid body is formed, soluble in water,—either nitre or salt. The strong compounds of earth and water are not soluble by water, but only by fire. Earth, when not consolidated, is dissolved by water; when consolidated, by fire only. The cohesion of water, when strong, is dissolved by fire only; when weak, either by air or fire, the former entering the interstices, the latter penetrating even to the triangles. Air when strongly condensed is indissoluble by any power which does not penetrate to the triangles, and even when not strongly condensed is only resolved by fire. Dense substances which are compounded of earth and water are unaffected by water while the water occupies the interstices, but begin to liquefy when fire enters into the interstices of the water. They are of two kinds, some of them, like glass, having more earth, others, like wax, having more water in them.

Having considered the classes of bodies, we have now to consider how we are affected by them. For they are objects of sense; and we cannot explain sense without explaining the nature of flesh and of the mortal soul. But as we cannot explain both of them together, in order that we may proceed at once to the sensations we must assume the existence of body and soul.

What makes fire burn? The fineness of the sides, the sharpness of the angles, the smallness of the particles, the quickness of the motion. Moreover, the pyramid is the original figure of fire, and is more cutting than any other figure. The feeling of cold is produced by the larger particles of moisture in the body trying to eject the smaller ones which

they only compress, and so coagulate. Shivering is caused by the conflict of things naturally at war which are brought together. That is hard to which the flesh yields, and soft which yields to the flesh, and these two terms are relative to one another. The yielding matter is that which has the slenderest base, whereas that which has a rectangular base is the most compact and repellent. Light and heavy are wrongly explained with reference to a lower and higher in place. For in the universe, which is a sphere, there is no opposition of above or below, and that which is to us above would be below to a man standing at the antipodes. The effort to detach any element from its like is the real cause of heaviness or of lightness. If you draw the earth into the dissimilar air, the particles of earth cling to their native element, and you more easily detach a small portion than a large. There would be the same difficulty in drawing down any of the upper elements to the lower. The smooth and the rough are severally explained by the union of evenness with compactness, and of hardness with inequality.

The cause of pleasure and pain is the most important enquiry which remains. According to our general doctrine of sensation the body which is easily moved communicates motion, and this is widely diffused and at last reaches the mind, but a body which is not easily moved and does not diffuse motion has no effect upon the patient. The first is true of the bones and hair, the second of sight and hearing. The ordinary affection is not accompanied by pleasure or pain, but a violent impression, if contrary to nature, causes pain, or if congenial to nature, pleasure. The impressions of sight are an example of the ordinary affections which are unattended either with pleasure or pain, because they are not violent or sudden. The replenishments of the body, on the other hand, cause pleasure, and cuttings and burnings have the opposite effect.

These are the general affections of the body: I will now proceed to the particular ones. The affections of the tongue appear to be caused, like most others, by composition and division, but they have more of roughness or smoothness than is found in others. Earthy particles, entering into the small veins about the tongue and reaching to the heart, when they melt into and dry up the little veins are astringent if they are rough, or if not so rough, like potash and soda, they are only harsh and abstergent, and are termed bitter. Purgatives of a weaker sort are called salt and, having no bitterness, are rather agreeable.

Light and inflammatory bodies, which are soluble in the mouth and get up into the head, cutting all that comes in their way, are termed pungent. But when these are refined by putrefaction and enter the narrow veins, and meet the earthy or airy elements, two kinds of globules are formed—one of earthy and impure liquid, which boils and ferments, the other of pure and transparent water, which are called bubbles; of all these affections the cause is termed acid. When, on the other hand, the composition of the deliquescent particles is congenial to the tongue, and disposes the parts according to their nature, this remedial power in them is called sweet.

Smells are not divided into kinds; all of them are transitional, and arise out of the decomposition of one element into another, for the simple air or water is without smell. They are mists or smoke, thinner than water and thicker than air: and hence in drawing in the breath, when there is an obstruction, the air passes, but there is no smell. They have no names, but are distinguished as pleasant and unpleasant, and their influence extends over the whole region from the head to the navel.

Hearing is the effect of a stroke which is transmitted through the ears by means of the air, brains, and blood to the soul, beginning at the head and extending to the liver. The sound which moves swiftly is acute; that which moves slowly is grave; that which is uniform is smooth, and the opposite is harsh. Loudness depends on the quantity of the sound. Of the harmony of sounds I will hereafter speak.

Colours are a flame which emanates from all bodies, having particles corresponding to the sense of sight. Some of the particles are less and some larger, and some are equal to the parts of the sight. The equal particles are transparent, the larger contract, and the lesser dilate the sight; white is produced by the dilatation, black by the contraction, of the particles of sight. There is also a swifter motion of another sort of fire which forces a way through the passages of the eyes, and elicits from them a union of fire and water which we call tears. The inner fire flashes forth, and the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the tear-drop, and all sorts of colours are generated by the mixture. This affection is termed by us dazzling, and the object which produces it is called flashing. There is yet another sort of fire which mingles with the moisture of the eye without flashing, and produces a colour like blood—to this we give the name of red. A bright element mingling

with the red and white produces a colour which we call auburn. The law of proportion, however, in which the several colours are formed, cannot be determined scientifically or even probably. Red, when mingled with black and white, gives a purple hue, which becomes umber when the colours are burnt and the black is more thoroughly mixed with them. Flame-colour is a mixture of auburn and dun; dun of white and black; yellow of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue; dark blue mingling with white becomes a light blue; the union of flame-colour and black makes leek-green. There is no difficulty in seeing how other colours are probably composed. But he who should attempt to test the truth of this by experiment, would forget the difference of the human and divine nature. God only is able to compound and resolve substances; such experiments are impossible to man.

These are the elements of necessity which the Creator received in the world of generation when he made the all-sufficient and perfect creature, using the secondary causes as his ministers, but himself fashioning the good in all things. For there are two sorts of causes, the one divine, the other necessary; and we should seek to discover the divine first, and afterwards the necessary, because without them the higher cannot be attained by us.

Having now before us the causes out of which the rest of our discourse is to be framed, let us go back to the point at which we began, and add a fair ending to our tale. As I said at first, all things were originally a chaos in which there was no order, and nothing had any kind or name. The elements of this chaos were arranged by the Creator, and out of them he made the world. Of the divine he himself was the author, but he committed to his offspring the creation of the mortal. They in imitation of him received from him the immortal soul, and made the body to be a vehicle of the soul, and constructed within another soul which was mortal, and subject to terrible affections—pleasure, the inciter of evil; pain, which deters from good; rashness and fear, foolish counsellors; anger hard to be appeased; hope deceived by sense, and by all-daring love. These they mingled according to necessary laws and framed man. But, fearing to pollute the divine element, they gave the mortal soul a separate habitation in the breast, parted off from the head by a narrow isthmus. And as in a house the women are divided from the men, the cavity of the thorax or

breast-plate was further divided into two parts, a higher and a lower. The higher of the two, which is the seat of courage and anger, is in the neighbourhood of the head between the midriff and the neck, and assists the reason in restraining the desires. The heart is the house of guard in which all the veins meet, and through them reason sends her commands to the extremity of her kingdom. When the passions are in revolt, or danger approaches from without, then the heart beats and swells; and the creating powers, knowing this, implanted in the body the soft and bloodless substance of the lung, having a porous and springy nature like a sponge, and receiving and cooling the heated streams, and they cut the passages which lead from the trachea to the lung.

The desire of the soul for meat and drink was placed by them between the midriff and the navel—there to dwell like a wild animal feeding in a manger, out of the way of the council chamber, and leaving the better principle to advise quietly for the good of the whole. For the Creator knew that the belly would not listen to reason, and was under the power of idols and fancies. Wherefore God framed the liver to connect with the lower nature, contriving that it should be compact, and bright, and sweet, and also bitter, and smooth, in order that the power of thought which originates in the mind might there be reflected, terrifying the belly with the elements of bitterness and gall, and the suffusion of bilious colours when the liver is contracted, and causing pain and misery by twisting out of their place the lobe and other vessels. And the converse happens when some gentle inspiration coming from intelligence mirrors the opposite fancies, giving rest and sweetness and freedom, and at night, moderation and peace accompanied with prophetic insight, when reason and sense are asleep. For the authors of our being, in obedience to their Father's will and in order to make men as good as they could, gave them prophecy, which never acts when men are awake or in health; but when they are under the influence of some disorder or enthusiasm then their livers supply intimations which are interpreted by others who are called prophets, but should rather be called interpreters of prophecy; these intimations after death become unintelligible. The spleen which is situated in the neighbourhood, on the left side, keeps the liver bright and clear as a napkin does a mirror, and the evacuations of the liver are received into the spleen, which for a time waxes with impurity, and after the body is purged returns to a natural size.

The truth concerning the soul can only be established by the word

of God. Still, we may venture to assert what is probable both concerning soul and body.

The creative powers were aware of our tendency to excess. And so when they made the belly to be a receptacle for food, in order that men might not perish by disease, they formed the convolutions of the intestines, in this way retarding the passage of food through the body, lest mankind should be absorbed in eating and drinking, and the whole race become impervious to divine philosophy.

The creation of bones and flesh was on this wise. The root of mortal life is the marrow which binds together body and soul, and the marrow is made out of the triangles of the first formation specially adapted to produce all the four elements. These God took and mingled them in due proportion, making as many kinds of marrow as there were hereafter to be kinds of souls. The receptacle of the divine seed he made round, and called that portion of the marrow brain, intending that the vessel containing this substance should be the head. The remaining part he divided into long and round figures, and from these as from anchors, casting the bonds of the whole soul, he proceeded to make the rest of the body, first forming for them a covering of bone. The bone was formed by sifting pure smooth earth and wetting it with marrow. It was then thrust alternately into fire and water, and thus rendered insoluble by either. Of bone he made a globe which he placed around the brain, leaving a narrow opening, and around the marrow of the neck and spine he formed the vertebrae like hinges which extended from the head through the whole of the trunk. And as the bone was brittle and liable to mortify and destroy the marrow by too great rigidity and susceptibility to heat and cold, he contrived sinews and flesh—the first to give united motion and flexibility, the second to guard against heat and cold, and to be a protection against falls, containing a moisture which in summer exudes in the form of dew, and in winter is a defence against cold. Having this in view, the Creator mingled earth with fire and water and put them together, making a ferment of acid and salt which he mingled with them, so as to form a pulpy flesh. But the sinews he made of an unfermented mixture of bone and flesh, giving them a mean nature between the two, and a yellow colour. Hence they were more glutinous than flesh, but softer than bone. The bones which have most of the living soul within them he covered with the thinnest film of flesh, those which have least he

lodged deeper. At the joints he diminished the flesh in order not to impede the flexure of the limbs, and also to avoid their clogging the perceptions of the mind. About the thighs and arms, which have no sense because the soul of the marrow does not reach them, and about the inner bones for the same reason, he laid the flesh thicker. For where the flesh is thicker there is less feeling, except in certain parts which the Creator has made solely of flesh, as for example, the tongue. Had the combination of solid bone and thick flesh been consistent with acute perceptions, the Creator would have given man a sinewy and fleshy head, and then he would have lived twice as long. But our creators were of opinion that a shorter life which was better was preferable to a longer which was worse, and therefore they covered the head with thin bone, and placed the sinews at the extremities of the neck, and fastened the cheeks to them below the face. And they framed the mouth, having teeth and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good, for food is a necessity, and the river of speech is the best of rivers. Still, the head could not be left a bare globe of bones on account of the extremes of heat and cold, nor be allowed to become dull and senseless by the overgrowth of flesh. Wherefore it was covered by a peel or skin which met and grew by the help of the cerebral humour. The sutures of the head were watered and closed up by the moisture, which sprang up within, and the diversity of them was caused by the struggle of the food against the courses of the soul. The skin was pierced by fire, and out of the punctures came forth a moisture, part liquid and part of a skinny nature, which was hardened by the pressure of the external cold and became hair. And God gave the head of man hair to be a shade in summer and shelter in winter, but not to interfere with his perceptions. The union of sinews, skin, and bone in the structure of the finger, and the nails which are found in many creatures, were formed by the creators with a view to the future when, as they knew, women and other animals would be framed out of us.

The gods also mingled natures akin to that of man with other forms and perceptions. These are the trees and plants, which were originally wild and have been adapted by cultivation to our use. They partake of that third kind of life which is seated between the midriff and the navel, and is altogether passive and incapable of reflection.

When the creators had furnished all these natures for our sustenance, they cut channels through our bodies as in a garden, watering them with

a perennial stream. Two were cut down the back, along the back bone, where the skin and flesh meet, one on the right and the other on the left, and between them flowed the marrow of generation. In the next place, they divided the veins about the head and interlaced them with each other in order that they might form an additional link between the head and the body, and that the sensations from both sides might be diffused throughout the body. In the third place, they contrived the passage of liquids, which may be explained in this way:—Finer bodies contain coarser, but not the coarser the finer, and the belly is capable of containing food, but not fire and air. God therefore formed a network of fire and air to irrigate the veins, having two passages or openings, one of which he made with two heads, and stretched cords reaching from both the openings to the extremity of the network. The inner parts of the net were made by him of fire, the openings and the hollow of air. One of the openings he made to pass into the mouth; this he divided into two, one part descending by the air-pipes into the lungs, the other by the side of the air-pipes into the belly. The first opening he divided into two parts, and both of these he made to communicate with the channels of the nose, that the mouth when closed might still be fed with air. The other hollow of the network he caused to flow around the hollows of the body, making the entire receptacle which was composed of air to flow into and out of the passages of the network, the tissue of the lung finding a way into and out of the pores of the body, and the rays of fire following them. These, as we affirm, are the phenomena of respiration. And all this process took place in order that the body might be watered and cooled and nourished, and the meat and drink digested and liquefied and carried into the veins.

The causes of respiration have now to be considered. The exhalation of the breath displaces the external air, and at the same time leaves a vacuum into which through the pores the air which is displaced enters like a wheel going round and round. The explanation may be supposed to be as follows: Every animal has within him a fountain of fire, which has been compared by us to a net of fire extended through the centre of the body, and having an outer envelopment of air. The fire seeks the place of fire, and in doing so finds a way in through the body or out at the nostrils, accordingly as the body is either hot or cold. When the body is hotter the particles of fire find their way out, when cooler the

hot element finds a way in, and thus by action and reaction, inspiration and expiration are produced.

The phenomena of medical cupping-glasses and of swallowing, and the hurling of bodies, are to be explained on a similar principle; as also sounds, which are sometimes discordant on account of the inequality of them, and again, harmonious by reason of equality. The slower sounds reaching the swifter, when they begin to pause, by degrees assimilate with them: whence arises a pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which to the wise becomes a higher sense of delight, being an imitation of divine harmony in mortal motions. Streams flow, lightnings play, amber and the magnet attract, not by reason of attraction, but because 'nature abhors a vacuum.'

I will now return to the phenomena of respiration. The fire minces the food and in the process of respiration fills the veins out of the belly by drawing from thence the divided portions of food, and thus the streams of food are diffused through the body. The fruits or grass which are our daily food are of different colours when newly cut, but the colour of red or fire predominates in them, and hence the liquid which we call blood is red, being the nurturing principle of the body whence all parts are watered and the empty places filled.

The process of repletion and depletion is produced by the attraction of like to like, after the manner of the universal motion. The external elements are always entering into the body which is akin to them, and causing us to consume away: the particles of blood, too, to which the body is a sort of world, are attracted towards their kindred nature. When more is taken away than flows in, then we decay; and when less, we grow and increase.

The young of every animal has the triangles new and closely locked together, and yet the entire frame is soft and delicate, as if made of marrow and nurtured on milk. These triangles are sharper than those which enter the body from without in the shape of food, and therefore they cut them up. But as life advances, the triangles which enclose the marrow wear out and are no longer able to assimilate their food; and at length getting unfixed they unloose the bonds of the soul, which is released and in the order of nature joyfully flies away. For the death which is natural is pleasant, but that which is caused by wounds or violence is painful. And so without pain, and even with pleasure, man passes away.

Every one may understand the origin of diseases. They are occasioned by the disarrangement of the elements out of which the body is framed; and they arise in a variety of ways. The dry may become moist, the light heavy, the hot cold, and any addition or subtraction or undue proportion may produce an estrangement and perturbation of nature. This is the origin of many of them, but the worst of all owe their severity to the following causes: There is a natural order in the human frame according to which the flesh and sinews are made of blood, the sinews out of the fibres which are akin to them, and the flesh out of the congealed substance which is formed by separation from the fibres. The glutinous matter which comes away from the sinews and the flesh, not only binds the flesh to the bones, but nourishes the bones and waters the marrow, being composed of the smoothest and oiliest of the triangles which alone find their way through the solid bone; and when these processes take place in regular order the body is in health. But when the flesh wastes and returns into the veins there is discoloured blood as well as air in the veins, having acid and salt qualities from which are generated all sorts of phlegm and bile. All things go the wrong way and cease to give nourishment to the body, no longer preserving the natural order of the courses, but at war with themselves and destructive of the constitution of the body. The oldest part of the flesh which refuses to assimilate blackens from long burning, and from being corroded grows bitter, and as the bitter element refines away, becomes acid; and when tinged with blood the bitter substance has a red colour, or when mixed with black the hue of grass; or again, has an auburn colour, when the new flesh is decomposed by the internal flame. To all which phenomena some physician or philosopher who was able to see the one in many has given the name of bile. Now there are various kinds of bile which have names answering to their colours. Lymph is of two kinds: first, the whey of blood, which is gentle; secondly, that which is of a fiercer nature and is produced by dark and bitter bile mingled under the influence of heat with any salt substance; thirdly, there is the white phlegm, which is a decomposition of young and tender flesh when accompanied by air encased in moisture, which emits little invisible bubbles. The water of tears and perspiration and other similar bodies is also the watery part of fresh phlegm. All these humours arise when the blood is replenished in irregular ways and not by food or drink, and they are

the sources of disease. The danger, however, is not so great when the foundation remains, for then there is a possibility of recovery. But when the bond which unites the flesh and bones is diseased, and the blood which is made out of the fibres and sinews separates from them, and from being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes rough and salt and dry, then the substance which is detached crumbles away under the flesh and sinews, and the fleshy part leaves the sinews bare and full of brine, and the flesh gets back again into the circulation of the blood, and makes the previously mentioned disorders worse. There are other and worse diseases which precede this; as when the bone through the density of the flesh does not receive sufficient air, and becomes stagnant and gangrened, and the bone crumbling passes into the food, and the food into the flesh, and the flesh returns again into the blood. Worst of all and most fatal is the disease of the marrow, by which the whole course of the body is reversed. There is a third class of diseases which are produced, some by wind and some by phlegm and some by bile. When the lung, which is the steward of the air, is obstructed by rheums, and in one part no air, and in another too much, enters in, then the parts which are unrefreshed by the air corrode, and other parts are distorted by the excess of air; and in this manner painful diseases are produced. The most painful are generated when the wind gets about the sinews, and especially when the pressure is upon the great sinews of the shoulder—these are termed tetanus. The cure of them is difficult, and they generally end in fevers. The white phlegm—though dangerous if kept in, by reason of the air bubbles—is not equally dangerous, because capable of relief, although it variegates the body, generating divers kinds of leprosy. When phlegm mingling with black bile only disturbs the courses of the head in sleep, there is not so much danger, but when assailing those who are awake, then the attack is far more dangerous, and is called epilepsy or the sacred disease. An acid and salt phlegm is the source of catarrh, and is called by various names, according to the places into which the phlegm finds a way.

Inflammations originate in bile, which is sometimes relieved and finds an exit in boils and swellings, but when detained, and above all when mingled with pure blood, generates many inflammatory disorders, disturbing the order of the fibres which are scattered about in the blood in order to maintain the balance of rare and dense which is necessary to its regular circulation. The just temperament of these things is preserved

by the fibres, which after death are left to themselves and congeal. They are the cause of bile, which is only stale blood, and from being flesh is liquefied again, and coming in little by little, warm and moist, if forcibly congealed by the power of the fibres produces internal cold and shuddering. But when it enters with more of a flood it overcomes the fibres by heat and reaches the spinal marrow, and then the cables of the ship are cut and the soul is set free from the body. When on the other hand the body, though wasted, still holds out, then the bile is expelled, like an exile from an insurgent state, causing diarrhoeas and dysenteries and similar disorders. The body which is diseased from the effects of fire is in a continual fever; when air is the agent, the fever is quotidian; when water, the fever intermits a day; when earth, which is the most sluggish of agents, the fever intermits three days and is with difficulty shaken off.

Of mental disorders there are two sorts, one madness, the other ignorance, and they may be justly attributed to disease. Excessive pleasures or pains are one of the greatest diseases, and literally take away the power of sense. When the seed about the spinal marrow is too fruitful or productive, the body has too great pleasures and pains; and during a great part of his life a man is more or less mad. He is often thought bad, but this is a mistake; for the truth is that the intemperance of lust is produced by the flux of a single element in the moist and relaxed state of the bones. And this is true of vice in general, which is commonly regarded as disgraceful, whereas all vice is really involuntary and arises from a bad habit of the body and evil education. In like manner the soul is often made vicious by the influence of pain; the briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humours wander over the body and find no exit, but are compressed within, and blend with the motions of the soul, and are carried to the three places of the soul, creating infinite varieties of trouble and melancholy, of tempers rash and cowardly, and also of forgetfulness and stupidity. When men are in this evil plight of body, and evil forms of government and evil discourses are superadded, and there is no education to save them, all men turn to evil, through these two causes; but of neither of them are they really the authors. For the planters are to blame rather than the plants, the educators and not the educated. Still, we should endeavour to attain virtue and avoid vice; but this is a part of another subject.

Enough of disease—I have now to speak of the means by which the mind and body are to be preserved, a higher theme than the other. The good is the beautiful, and the beautiful is the symmetrical, and there is no greater or fairer symmetry than that of body and soul, as the contrary is the greatest of deformities. A leg or an arm too long or too short is at once ugly and unserviceable, and the same disproportion is discernible in the relation of soul and body. For the soul may ‘fret the pigmy body to decay,’ and so produce diseases and convulsions. The violence of controversy, or the earnestness of enquiry, will often generate inflammations and rheums which are not understood, or assigned to their true cause by the professors of medicine. And in like manner the body may be too much for the soul, obscuring the rational, and quickening the animal desires. The only security is to preserve the balance of the two, and to this end the mathematician or philosopher must practise gymnastics, and the gymnast must practise music, and allow the movements of the soul to inform the body. And as the whole body should be treated in relation to the whole soul, so are the parts of the body to be treated in relation to each other. For the body is liable to be heated and cooled by the elements which enter in, and again is dried up and moistened by external things, and is therefore injured, if given up to motion when at rest. But on the other hand, the use of exercise, as in the world, so also in the human body, restores harmony and divides the hostile powers from one another. The best exercise is the spontaneous motion of the body, as in gymnastics, because most akin to the motion of the mind; not so good is the motion of which the source is in another, as in sailing or riding; least good when the body is at rest and the motion is in the parts only, which is a species of motion produced by physic. This should only be resorted to by men of sense in extreme cases; lesser diseases are not to be educated by medicine. For every disease is akin to the living being and has an appointed term, just as life has, which depends on the form of the triangles, and cannot be protracted when the triangles are worn out. And he who, instead of accepting his destiny, endeavours to prolong his life by medicine is likely to multiply and magnify his diseases. Regimen and not medicine is the true cure, when a man has time at his disposal.

Enough of the nature of man and of the body, and of rational education, and of self education. The subject is a great one and

cannot be adequately treated as an appendage to any other. To sum up all in a word: there are three kinds of souls located within us, and any one of them, if remaining inactive, becomes very weak; if exercised, very strong. Wherefore we should train and exercise the three parts of the soul.

But there is also a divinity within us whom God has lodged in our heads, to raise us, like plants which are not of earthly origin, from earth to our kindred which is in heaven; for the head is the root in which the generation of the soul began, and on which the whole body hangs. He who is intent upon the gratification of his desires, has all his ideas mortal, and is himself mortal in the truest sense. But he who seeks after knowledge and exercises the divine part of himself in godly and immortal thoughts, attains to truth and immortality, as far as is possible to man, and also to happiness, while he is training up within him the divine principle and indwelling power of order. There is only one way in which one person can benefit another; and that is by assigning to him his proper nurture and motion. To the motions of the soul answer the motions of the universe, and by the study of these the individual is restored to his original nature.

Thus we have finished the discussion of the universe, which, according to our original intention, has now been brought down to the creation of man. Completeness seems to require that something should be briefly said about other animals: first of women, who are probably degenerate or effeminate men. And when they degenerated, the gods implanted in men the desire of union with them, distributing in the two sexes the living being in the following manner:—The passage for liquid they connected with the living principle of the spinal marrow, which the man has the desire to emit into the fruitful womb of the woman; this is like a fertile field in which the seed is quickened and matured, and at last brought to light. When this desire is unsatisfied the man is overmastered by the power of the generative organs, and the woman is subjected to disorders from the obstruction of the passages of the breath, until the two meet and pluck the fruit of the tree.

The race of birds was created out of innocent, light-minded men, who thought to pursue the study of the heavens by sight; these were transformed into birds, and grew feathers instead of hair. The race of wild animals were men who had no philosophy, and never looked up to heaven or used the courses of the head, but followed only the in-

fluences of the heart. Naturally they turned to their kindred earth, and put their forelegs to the ground, and had their heads crushed into strange oblong forms. Some of them have four feet, and some of them more than four; the latter, who are the more senseless, drawing closer to their native element; the most senseless of all have no limbs and trail their whole body on the ground. The fourth kind are the inhabitants of the waters; these are made out of the most senseless and ignorant and impure of men, whom God placed in the uttermost parts of the world in return for their utter ignorance, and caused them to respire water instead of the purer element of air. These are the laws by which animals pass into one another, according to their degrees of knowledge and ignorance.

And so the world received animals, mortal and immortal, and was fulfilled with them, and became a visible God, comprehending the visible, made in the image of the Creator, being the one perfect only-begotten heaven.

§ 2.

Nature in the aspect which she presented to a Greek philosopher of the fourth century before Christ is not easily reproduced to modern eyes. The associations of mythology and poetry have to be added, and the unconscious influence of science has to be subtracted, before we can behold the heavens or the earth as they appeared to the Greek. The philosopher himself was a child and also a man—a child in the range of his attainments, but also a great intelligence having an insight into nature, and often anticipations of the truth. He was full of original thoughts, and yet liable to be imposed upon by the most obvious fallacies. He occasionally confused numbers with ideas, and atoms with numbers; his *a priori* notions were out of all proportion to his experience. He was ready to explain the phenomena of the heavens by the most trivial analogies of earth. The experiments which nature worked for him he sometimes accepted, but he never tried experiments for himself which would either prove or disprove his theories. His knowledge was unequal; while in some branches, such as medicine and astronomy, he had made considerable proficiency, there were others, such as chemistry, of which the very names were unknown to him. He was the natural enemy of mythology, and yet mythological ideas still retained their hold over him. He was endeavouring to form a conception of principles, but these principles or ideas were regarded by

him as real powers or entities, to which the world had been subjected. He was always tending to argue from what was near to what was remote, from what was known to what was unknown, from man to the universe, and back again from the universe to man. While he was arranging the world, he was arranging the forms of thought in his own mind; and the light from within and the light from without often helped to cross and confuse one another. He might be compared to a builder engaged in some great design, who was obliged to dig with his hands because he was unprovided with the commonest tools.

The Hesiodic and Orphic cosmogonies were a phase of thought intermediate between mythology and philosophy and had a great influence on the beginnings of physical science. They made men think of the world as a whole; they carried the mind back into the infinity of past time; they suggested the first observation of the effects of fire and water on the earth's surface. To the ancient physics they stood much in the same relation which geology does to modern science. The mind of the Greek was not confined to a period of four or six thousand years; he was able to speculate freely on the effects of infinite ages in the production of physical phenomena. He could imagine cities which had existed time out of mind, laws or forms of art and music which had lasted, 'not in word only but in very truth, for ten thousand years;' he was aware that natural phenomena like the Delta of the Nile might have slowly accumulated in myriads of years. But he seems to have supposed that the course of events was recurring rather than progressive. To this he was probably led by the lateness of Greek history, when compared with the primeval antiquity of Egypt.

The ancient philosophers found in mythology many ideas which, whether originally derived from nature or not, were easily transferred to her—such, for example, as love or hate, corresponding to attraction or repulsion; or the conception of necessity allied both to the regularity and irregularity of nature; or of justice, symbolizing the law of compensation; or of the Fates and Furies, typifying the fixed order or the extraordinary convulsions of nature. Their own interpretations of Homer and the poets were supposed by them to be the original meaning. Musing in themselves, they were relieved at being able to utter the thoughts of their hearts in figures of speech which to them were not figures, and were already consecrated by tradition. Hesiod and the

Orphic poets moved in a region of half-personification in which the meaning or principle appeared through the person. In their vaster conceptions of Chaos, Erebus, Aether, Night, and the like, the first rude attempts at generalization are dimly seen.

Under the influence of such ideas, perhaps also deriving from the traditions of their own or of other nations scraps of medicine and astronomy, men came to the observation of nature. The Greek looked upon the blue circle of the heavens and conceived that all things were one; the tumult of sense abated, and the mind found repose in the thought which former generations had been striving to realize. The first expression of this was some element, rarefied by degrees into a pure abstraction, and purged from any tincture of sense. Soon an inner world of ideas began to be created, more absorbing, more overpowering, more abiding than the brightest of visible objects, which to the eye of the philosopher looking inward, seemed to pale before them, retaining only a faint and precarious existence. At the same time, the minds of men parted into the two great divisions of those who saw only a principle of motion, and of those who saw only a principle of rest, in nature and in themselves; there were born Heracliteans or Eleatics, as there have been in later ages born Aristotelians or Platonists. Like some philosophers in modern times, who are accused of making a theory first and finding their facts afterwards, the advocates of either opinion never thought of applying either to themselves or to their adversaries the criterion of fact. They were mastered by their ideas and not masters of them. Like the Heraclitean fanatics whom Plato has described in the *Theaetetus*, they were incapable of giving a reason of the faith that was in them, and had all the animosities of a religious sect. Yet, doubtless, there was some first impression derived from external nature, which, as in mythology, so also in philosophy, worked upon the minds of the first thinkers. Though incapable of induction or generalization in the modern sense, they caught an inspiration from the external world. The most general facts or appearances of nature, the circle of the universe, the nutritive power of water, the air which is the breath of life, the destructive force of fire, the seeming regularity of the greater part of nature and the irregularity of a remnant, the solid earth and the impalpable aether, were always present to them.

The great source of error and also the beginning of truth to them

was reasoning from analogy; they could see resemblances, but not differences; and they were incapable of distinguishing illustration from argument. Analogy in modern times only points the way, and is immediately verified by experiment. The dreams and visions, which pass through the philosopher's mind, of resemblances between different classes of substances, or between the animal and vegetable world, are put into the refiner's fire, and the dross and other elements which adhere to them are purged away. But the contemporary of Plato and Socrates was incapable of resisting the power of any analogy which occurred to him, and was drawn into any consequences which seemed to follow. He had no methods of difference or of concomitant variations, by the use of which he could distinguish the accidental from the essential. He could not isolate phenomena, and he was helpless against the influence of any word which had an equivocal or double sense.

Yet without this crude use of analogy the ancient physical philosopher would have stood still; he could not have made even 'one guess among many' without comparison. The course of natural phenomena would have passed unheeded before his eyes, like fair sights or musical sounds before the eyes and ears of an animal. Even the fetichism of the savage is the beginning of reasoning; the assumption of the most fanciful of causes indicates a higher mental state than the absence of all enquiry about them. The tendency to argue from the higher to the lower, from man to the world, has led to many errors, but has also had an elevating influence on philosophy. The conception of the world as a whole, a person, an animal, has been the source of hasty generalizations; yet this general grasp of nature led also to a spirit of comprehensiveness in early philosophy, which has not increased, but rather diminished, as the fields of knowledge have become more divided. The modern physicist confines himself to one or perhaps two branches of science. But he comparatively seldom rises above his own department, and often falls under the narrowing influence which any single branch, when pursued to the exclusion of every other, has over the mind. Language, too, exercised a spell over the beginnings of physical philosophy, leading to error and sometimes to truth; for many thoughts were suggested by the double meanings of words, and the accidental distinctions of words often caused the ancients to make corresponding differences in things. 'If they are the same, why have they different names; or if they are different, why have they the same name?'—is an

argument not easily answered in the infancy of knowledge. The modern philosopher has always been taught the lesson which he still imperfectly learns, that he must disengage himself from the influence of words. Nor are there wanting in Plato, who was himself too often the victim of them, many admonitions that we should regard not words but things. But upon the whole, the ancients, though not entirely dominated by them, were much more subject to the influence of words than the moderns. They had no clear divisions of colours or substances; even the four elements were undefined; the fields of knowledge were not as yet parted off. They were bringing order out of disorder, having a small grain of experience mingled in a confused heap of *a priori* notions. And yet, probably, their first impressions, the illusions and mirages of their fancy, created a greater intellectual activity and made a nearer approach to the truth than any patient investigation of isolated facts, for which the time had not yet come.

There was one more illusion to which the ancient philosophers were subject, and against which Plato in his later dialogues seems to be struggling—the tendency to mere abstractions; not perceiving that pure abstraction is only negation, they thought that the greater the abstraction the greater the truth. Behind any pair of ideas a new idea which comprehended them began at once to appear. Two are truer than three, one than two. The words ‘being,’ or ‘unity,’ or ‘essence,’ or ‘good,’ became sacred to them. They did not see that they had a word only, and in one sense the most unmeaning of words. They did not understand that the content of notions is in inverse proportion to their universality—the element which is the most widely diffused is also the thinnest; or, in the language of the common logic, the greater the extension the less the comprehension. But this vacant idea of a whole without parts, of a subject without predicates, a rest without motion, has been also the most fruitful of all ideas. It is the beginning of *a priori* thought, and indeed of thinking at all. Men were led to conceive it, not by a love of hasty generalization, but by a divine instinct, a dialectical enthusiasm, in which the human faculties seemed to yearn for enlargement. We know that ‘being’ is the verb of existence, the copula, the most general symbol of relation, the first and most meagre of abstractions; but, to some of the ancient philosophers, this little word appeared to attain divine proportions and to comprehend all truth. Being or essence, and similar words, represented

to them a supreme or divine being, in which they thought that they found the containing principle of the universe. In a few years the human mind was peopled with abstractions; a new world was called into existence to give law and order to the old. But between them there was still a gulph, and no one could pass from one to the other.

Number and figure were the greatest instruments of thought which were possessed by the Greek philosopher; having the same power over the mind which was exerted by abstract ideas, they were also capable of practical application. Many curious and, to the early thinker, mysterious properties of them came to light when they were compared with one another. They admitted of infinite multiplication and construction; in Pythagorean triangles or in proportions of $1 : 2 : 4 : 8$ and $1 : 3 : 9 : 27$, or compounds of them, the laws of the world seemed to be more than half revealed. They were not like being or essence, mere vacant abstractions, but admitted of progress and growth, while at the same time they confirmed a higher sentiment of the mind, that there was order in the universe. Now, there was a real sympathy between the world within and the world without. The numbers and figures which were present to the mind's eye became visible to the eye of sense; the truth of nature was mathematics; the other properties of objects seemed to reappear only in the light of number. An instrument of such power and elasticity could not fail to be 'a most gracious assistance' to the first feeble efforts of human intelligence.

There was another reason why numbers had so great an influence over the minds of early thinkers—they were verified by experience. Every use of them, even the most trivial, assured men of their truth; they were everywhere to be found, in the least things and the greatest alike. One, two, three, counted on the fingers was a 'trivial matter,' a little instrument out of which to create a world; but from these and by the help of these all our knowledge of nature has been developed. They were the measure of all things, and seemed to give law to all things; nature was rescued from chaos and confusion by their power; the notes of music, the motions of the stars, the forms of atoms, the recurrence and evolutions of days, months, years, the military divisions of an army, the civil divisions of a state, seemed to afford a 'present witness' of them: what would have become of man or of the world if deprived of number? The mystery of number and the mystery of music were akin. There was a music of rhythm and of harmonious motion

everywhere; and to the real connection which existed between music and number, a fanciful or imaginary relation was superadded.

Two other points strike us in the use which the ancient philosophers made of number. First, they applied to external nature the relations of them which they found in their own minds; and where nature seemed to be at variance with number, as for example in the case of fractions, they protested against her (Rep. vii. 525, Arist. Metaph. i. 6). Having long meditated on the properties of $1 : 2 : 4 : 8$, or $1 : 3 : 9 : 27$, or of 3, 4, 5, they were disposed to find in them the secret of the universe. Secondly, they applied number and figure equally to those parts of physics, such as astronomy or mechanics, in which the modern philosopher expects to find them, and to those in which he would never think of looking for them, as for example, physiology. For the sciences were not yet divided, and there was nothing really irrational in arguing that the same laws which regulated the heavenly bodies were partially applied to the erring limbs or brain of man. Astrology was the form which the lively fancy of ancient thinkers almost necessarily gave to astronomy. The observation that the lower principle, e. g. mechanics, is always seen in the higher, e. g. in the phenomena of life, further tended to perplex them. Plato's doctrine of the same and the other ruling the courses of the heavens and of the human body is not a mere vagary, but is a natural result of the state of knowledge and thought at which he had arrived.

When in modern times we look up at the heavens, a certain amount of scientific truth imperceptibly blends, even with the cursory glance of an unscientific person. He knows that the earth is revolving round the sun, and not the sun around the earth. He does not imagine the earth to be the centre of the universe, and he has some conception of chemistry and the cognate sciences. A very different aspect of nature would have been present to the mind of the early Greek philosopher. He would have beheld the earth a surface only, not mirrored, however faintly, in the glass of science, but indissolubly connected with some theory of one, two, or more elements. He would see the world pervaded by number and figure, animated by a principle of motion, immanent in a principle of rest. He would try to construct the world on a quantitative principle, seeming to find in endless combinations of geometrical figures a sufficient account of the variety of phenomena. To these *a priori* speculations he would add a rude conception of matter and his own immediate experience of the supposed causes of

health and disease. His cosmos would necessarily be imperfect and unequal, being the first attempt to impress form and order on the primaeval chaos of human knowledge.

The ancient physical philosophers have been charged by Dr. Whewell and others with wasting their fine intelligences in wrong methods of enquiry; and their progress in moral and political philosophy has been sometimes contrasted with their supposed failure in physical investigations. 'They had plenty of ideas,' says Dr. Whewell, 'and plenty of facts; but their ideas did not accurately represent the facts with which they were acquainted.' No doubt they often fell into strange and fanciful errors: the time had not yet arrived for the slower and surer path of the modern inductive philosophy. But it remains to be shown that they could have done more in their age and country; or that the contributions which they made to the sciences with which they were acquainted are not as great upon the whole as those made by their successors. There is no single step in astronomy as great as that of the nameless Pythagorean who first conceived the world to be a body moving round the sun in space: there is no truer or more comprehensive principle than the application of mathematics alike to the heavenly bodies, and to the particles of matter. The ancients had not the instruments which would have enabled them to correct or verify their anticipations, and their opportunities of observation were limited. Plato probably did more for physical science by asserting the supremacy of mathematics than Aristotle by his collection of facts. When the thinkers of modern times, following Bacon, undervalue or disparage the speculations of ancient philosophers, they seem wholly to forget the conditions of the world and of the human mind, under which they carried on their investigations. When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion? When we remark that Greek physics soon became stationary or extinct, may we not observe also that there have been and may be again periods in the history of modern philosophy which have been barren and unproductive? We might as well maintain that Greek art was not real or great, because it had *nihil simile aut secundum*, as say that Greek physics were a failure because they made no subsequent progress.

The charge of premature generalization which is often urged against ancient philosophers is really an anachronism. For they can hardly

be said to have generalized at all. They rather cleared up and defined by the help of experience ideas which they already possessed. The beginnings of thought about nature must always have this character. A true method is the result of many ages of experiment and observation. At first men personify nature, then they form impressions of nature, at last they conceive the laws of nature. They pass out of mythology into philosophy. Early science is not a process of discovery in the modern sense; but rather a process of correcting by observation, and to a certain extent only, the first impressions of nature, which mankind, when they began to think, had received from poetry or language. Of all scientific truths the greatest and simplest is the uniformity of nature; of this, amid many appearances to the contrary, the ancient physical philosophers had always an unshaken conviction.

§ 3.

Plato's account of the soul is partly mythical or figurative, and partly literal. Not that either he or we can draw a line between them, or say, 'This is poetry, this is philosophy'; for the transition from the one to the other is imperceptible. There is a further difficulty in explaining this part of the *Timaeus*—the natural order of thought is inverted. We begin with the most abstract, and proceed from the abstract to the concrete, although at p. 34 (cp. 53 D) Plato acknowledges that this order cannot always be maintained. But the abstract is unmeaning to us until brought into relation with man and nature. That which is spoken of first is really last, and is on the uttermost verge of human knowledge. And yet the priority of this abstract God, and the world which he is imagined to have created, gives a kind of awe to them. As in other systems of theology and philosophy, that of which we know least has the greatest interest to us.

There is no use in attempting to define or explain the first God in the Platonic system, who has sometimes been thought to answer to God the Father; or the first world or eternal soul, in whom the Fathers of the Church seemed to recognize 'the firstborn of every creature.' Nor need we discuss at length how far Plato agrees in the later Jewish conception of creation, according to which God made the world out of nothing. For the original conception of matter having no qualities is really a negation, and might as well be represented by nothing. According to Plato in the *Timaeus*, God took of the same and the

other, of the divided and undivided, of the finite and infinite, and made the world, according to certain mathematical ratios. As far as any meaning can be attached to these words, they only imply that God imparted determinations of thought, or, as we might say, gave order and variety to the material universe. The elements are moving in a disorderly manner before the work of creation begins (30 A); and there is an eternal pattern of the world which like the 'idea of good' is not the Creator himself, nor yet separable from him. The pattern too though eternal is a creation, a world of thought prior to the world of sense, which may be compared also to the wisdom of God in the book of Ecclesiasticus, or to the 'God in the form of a globe' of the old Eleatic philosophers. The visible which already exists, is fashioned in the likeness of this eternal pattern. On the other hand, there is no truth of which Plato is more firmly convinced than of the priority of the soul to the body, both in the universe and in man. So inconsistent are the forms in which he describes the works which no tongue can utter—his language, as he himself says, partaking of his own uncertainty about the things of which he is speaking.

We may remark in passing, that the Platonic compared with the Jewish description of the process of creation has less of freedom or spontaneity. The Creator in Plato is still subject to a remnant of necessity which he cannot wholly overcome. When his work is accomplished he remains in his own nature. Plato is more sensible than the Hebrew prophet of the existence of evil, which he seeks as far as possible to put away from God. And he can only suppose this to be accomplished by leaving man to himself and by committing the lesser works of creation to inferior powers. (Compare, however, Laws x. 903 for another solution of the difficulty.)

Nor can we attach any intelligible meaning to his words when he speaks of the visible being in the image of the invisible. For how can that which is divided be like that which is undivided? or that which is changing be the copy of that which is unchanging? All the old difficulties about the ideas come back upon us in a slightly altered form. We can imagine two worlds, one of which is the mere double of the other, or one of which is the vanishing ideal of the other; but we cannot imagine an intellectual world which has no qualities—'a thing in itself'—a point which has no parts or magnitude, which is nowhere, and nothing. This cannot be the archetype according to which God made the world,

and is in reality, whether in Plato or Kant, a mere negative residuum of human thought.

There is another aspect of the same difficulty which appears to have no satisfactory solution. In what relation does the archetype stand to the Creator himself? For the idea or pattern of the world is not the thought of God, but a separate, self-existent nature, of which creation is the copy. We can only reply, (1) that to the mind of Plato the distinction between the subject and the object as yet hardly existed; (2) that he supposes the process of creation to take place in accordance with his own theory of ideas; and as we cannot give an intelligible account of the one, neither can we of the other. He means (3) to say that the creation of the world is not a material process of working with legs and arms, but ideal and intellectual; according to his own fine expression, 'the thought of God made God.' He means (4) to draw an absolute distinction between the invisible and unchangeable which is the place of mind or being, and the world of sense or becoming which is visible and changing. He means (5) that the idea of the world is prior to the world, just as the other ideas are prior to sensible objects; and like them may be regarded as eternal and self-existent, and also like the *idea* of good, may be viewed apart from the divine mind.

There are several other questions which we might ask and which can receive no answer, or at least only an answer of the same kind as the preceding. How can matter be conceived to exist without form? Or, how can the essences or forms of things be distinguished from the eternal ideas? Or, how could there have been motion in the chaos when as yet time was not? Or, how did chaos come into existence, if not by the will of the Creator? Or, how could there have been a time when the world was not, if time was not? Or, how could the Creator have taken portions of an indivisible same? Or, how could space or anything else have been eternal when time is only created? Or, how could the surfaces of geometrical figures have formed solids? We must reply again that we cannot follow Plato in all his inconsistencies, but that the gaps of thought are probably more apparent to us than to him. He would, perhaps, have said that 'the first things are known only to God and to him of men whom God loves.' And we may say that only by an effort of metaphysical imagination can we hope to understand Plato from his own point of view; we must not ask for consistency. Everywhere we find traces of the Platonic theory of knowledge expressed

in an objective form, which by us has to be rendered back into the subjective, before we can attach any meaning to it. And this theory is exhibited in so many different points of view, that we cannot with any certainty interpret the statements of one dialogue by those of another; e.g. the *Timaeus* by the *Parmenides* or *Philebus*.

The soul of the world may be conceived as the personification of the numbers and figures in which the heavenly bodies move. Imagine these as in a Pythagorean dream, stripped of qualitative difference and reduced to mathematical abstractions. They are what Plato calls the principle of the same, and may be compared with the modern conception of laws of nature. They are in space, but not in time, and they are the makers of time. They are represented as constantly thinking of the same; for thought in the view of Plato is equivalent to truth or law, and is not inseparably bound up with a human consciousness. To this principle of the same is opposed the principle of the other—the principle of irregularity and disorder, of necessity and chance, which is only partially impressed by mathematical laws and figures. (We may observe by the way, that the principle of the other, which is the principle of plurality and variation in the *Timaeus*, has nothing in common with the ‘other’ of the *Sophist*, which is the principle of determination.) The element of the same dominates to a certain extent over the other—the fixed stars keep the ‘wanderers’ of the inner circle in their courses, and a similar principle of fixedness or order appears to regulate the bodily constitution of man. But there still remains a rebellious seed of evil derived from the original chaos, which is the source of disorder in the world, and of vice and disease in man.

Before they are immersed in matter the same and the other are blended in a third nature which Plato terms the essence. By essence he seems to mean existence with which the Creator first filled up the interval between the same and the other; and out of all the three natures formed a new essence or soul of the world. This which is framed on the analogy of the soul of man is twice mixed, first with a portion of the same and other, and the mixture with the remainder of them. These are the modes or connecting links by which the soul partaking both of order and of variety is impressed on matter. The entire compound was divided by the Creator into certain proportions which he comprehended in a uniform motion around a centre in two circles, of which the outer contained the fixed, the inner the wandering stars.

Thus the essence or soul of the world was diffused everywhere from the centre to the circumference. To this God gave a body, consisting at first of fire and earth, and afterwards receiving an addition of air and water; because solid bodies, like the world, are always connected by two middle terms and not by one. The world was made in the form of a globe, and all the elements, both material and immaterial, were exhausted in the work of creation.

The proportions in which the soul is divided answer to a series of numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27, composed of the two Pythagorean progressions 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27. This series, of which the intervals are afterwards filled up, probably represents (1) the diatonic scale according to Plato; (2) the order and distances of the heavenly bodies; and (3) may possibly contain an allusion to the music of the spheres, which has been already referred to in the myth at the end of the Republic. The meaning of the words that 'solid bodies are always connected by two middle terms' has been much disputed. The most received explanation is that of Martin, who supposes that Plato is only speaking of surfaces and solids made up of prime numbers (i.e. of numbers not made up of two factors, or only measurable by unity). The product of two such numbers represents a surface, of three a solid. The squares of numbers which are primes (e.g. 2^2 , $3^2=4$, 9), have always a single mean proportional (e.g. 4 and 9 have the single mean 6), whereas cubes which are primes (e.g. 3^3 and 5^3) have always two mean proportionals, e.g. $27 : 45 : 75 : 125$. But to this explanation of Martin's we may object, (1) that Plato nowhere says that his proportion is to be limited to prime numbers; (2) that the limitation of surfaces to squares is also wanting; (3) that the figures and the ratios afterwards assigned to the elements do not correspond to the proportions between solid numbers which are thus obtained; (4) that Plato's doctrine of a mean is supposed by him to apply to any powers whatever (*εἴτε δυνάμεων ὀντινωνούν, 32 A*); and he must have known, if Martin's explanation be correct, that there was no single mean between two cubes. What Plato chiefly intends to express is that a solid requires a stronger bond than a surface; and that the double bond which is given by a proportion of four terms is stronger than the single bond of three terms. The proportion $2 : 4 :: 4 : 8$ and the like, of which he delights to remark that the three terms admit of transposition, is the symbol of a surface; the proportion $2 : 4 :: 8 : 16$, &c., is the symbol

of a solid; and the four terms answer to the four elements, which are capable of being multiplied into one another in the same manner as the terms. The vagueness of his language does not allow us to determine whether anything more than this was intended by him.

Leaving the further explanation of details, which the reader will find discussed at length in Boeckh and Martin, we may now return to the main argument: Why did God make the world? Like man, He must have a purpose; and his purpose is the diffusion of that goodness or good which He himself is. The term 'goodness' is not to be understood in this passage as meaning benevolence or love, in the Christian sense of the term, but rather law, order, harmony, like the idea of good in the Republic. The ancient mythologers, and even the Hebrew prophets, had spoken of the jealousy of God; and the Greek had imagined that there was a Nemesis attending always the prosperity of mortals. But Plato delights to think of God as the author of order in his works, who, like a father, lives over again in his children, and can never have too much of good or friendship among his creatures. Only, as there is a certain remnant of evil inherent in matter which he cannot get rid of, he detaches himself from them and leaves them to themselves, that he may be guiltless of their faults and sufferings.

Between the ideal and the sensible Plato interposes the two natures of time and space. Time is conceived by him to be only the shadow or image of eternity, which ever is and never has been or will be, but is described in a figure only as past or future. This is one of the great thoughts of early philosophy, which are still as difficult to our minds as they were to the early thinkers; or perhaps more difficult, because we more distinctly see the consequences which are involved in such an hypothesis. All the objections which may be urged against Kant's doctrine of the ideality of space and time at once press upon us. If time is unreal, then all which is contained in time is unreal—the succession of human thoughts as well as the flux of sensations; there is no connecting link between *φαινόμενα* and *ὄντα*. Yet, on the other hand, we are conscious that knowledge is independent of time, that truth is not a thing of yesterday or to-morrow, but an 'eternal now.' To the 'spectator of all time and all existence' the universe remains at rest. The truths of geometry and arithmetic in all their combinations are always the same. The generations of men, like the leaves of the forest,

come and go, but the mathematical laws by which the world is governed remain, and seem as if they could never change. The ever-present image of space is transferred to time—succession is conceived as extension. (We may remark that Plato has done away with the above and below in space, as he has done away with the past and future in time.) The course of time, unless regularly marked by divisions of number, partakes of the indefiniteness of the Heraclitean flux. By such reflections we may conceive the Greek to have attained the metaphysical conception of eternity, which to the Hebrew was gained by meditation on the Divine Being. No one saw that this objective was really a subjective, and involved the subjectivity of all knowledge. 'Non in tempore sed cum tempore finxit Deus mundum,' says St. Augustine, repeating a thought derived from the *Timaeus*, but apparently unconscious of the results to which his doctrine would have led.

The conception of space is scarcely distinguishable from what Plato terms the 'containing vessel or nurse of generation.' Reflecting on the simplest kinds of external objects, which to the ancients were the four elements, Plato was led to a more general notion of a kind out of which they were all fashioned. He would not have them too precisely distinguished. Thus seems to have arisen the first dim perception of *ἄληθ* or matter, which has played so great a part in the metaphysical philosophy of Aristotle and his followers. Akin to this, for we can hardly distinguish between such extreme abstractions, is space, which Plato affirms to be eternal. He seems more willing to admit of the unreality of time than of the unreality of space; because, as he says, all things must necessarily exist in space. We, on the other hand, are disposed to fancy that even if space were annihilated time might still survive. He admits indeed that our knowledge of space is of a dreamy kind, and is given by a spurious reason without the help of sense. (Cp. the hypotheses and images of *Rep.* vi. 511.) It does not attain to the clearness of ideas. But like them it seems to remain, even if all the objects contained in it are supposed to have vanished away. Hence it was natural for Plato to conceive of it as eternal. We must remember further that in his attempt to conceive of either space or matter the two abstract ideas of weight and extension, which are familiar to us, had never passed before his mind.

Thus far God, working according to an eternal pattern, out of his

goodness has created the same, the other, and the essence (compare the three principles of the Philebus—the finite, the infinite, and the union of the two), and out of them has formed the outer circle of the fixed stars and the inner circle of the planets, divided according to certain musical intervals; he has also created time, the moving image of eternity, and space, existing by a sort of necessity and hardly distinguishable from matter. The matter out of which the world is formed is not absolutely void, but retains in the chaos certain germs or traces of the elements. These Plato, like Empedocles, supposed to be four in number—fire, air, earth, and water. They were at first mixed together, and in the process of creation parted company from each other, the more volatile elements of fire and air propelling water and earth. They are called elements, but they are so far from being elements or letters in the higher sense that they are not even syllables or first compounds. The real elements are the simplest forms of triangles; for all solids are terminated by surfaces, and all surfaces are resolvable into triangles. These are of two kinds: the rectangular scalene, which is the half of an equilateral triangle and has the hypotenuse double the lesser side—this from the greater regularity of its proportions is conceived by Plato to be the most beautiful of scalene triangles, and is therefore chiefly employed in the creation of the world, having, moreover, an infinite variety of forms. There is also the rectangular isosceles triangle, which has one form only, and is less adapted for construction.

Out of these triangles Plato proceeds to generate the four first of the five regular solids, perhaps forgetting that he is only constructing surfaces which have no solidity. The first solid is a regular pyramid, of which the base and sides are formed by four equilateral or twenty-four scalene triangles. Each of the four solid angles in this figure is a little larger than the largest of obtuse angles. The second solid is composed of the same triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles, and make one solid angle out of four plane angles—six of these angles form a regular octahedron. The third solid is a regular icosahedron, having twenty triangular equilateral bases, and therefore 120 rectangular scalene triangles. The fourth regular solid, or cube, is formed by the combination of four isosceles triangles into one square and of six squares into a cube. The fifth regular solid, or dodecahedron, cannot be formed by a combination of either kind of triangle, but each of its

faces may be regarded as composed of thirty triangles of another kind. Probably Plato notices this as the only remaining regular polyhedron, which from its approximation to a globe, and possibly because, as Plutarch remarks, it is composed of $12 \times 30 = 360$ scalene triangles (Platon. Quaest. 5), representing thus the signs and degrees of the Zodiac, as well as the months and days of the year, God may be said to have 'used in the delineation of the universe.' According to Plato the earth was composed of cubes, the air of regular octahedrons, the water of regular icosahedrons, the fire of regular pyramids. The stability of the three last increases with the number of figures.

The elements are supposed to pass into one another. We must remember that these transformations are not the transformations of real solids, but of imaginary geometrical figures; in other words, we are composing and decomposing the faces and not the substances of the triangles. Yet perhaps Plato may regard them as only the forms which are impressed on pre-existent matter. It is remarkable that he should speak of each of these solids as a possible world in itself, though upon the whole he inclines to the opinion that they are one. To suppose that these forms are infinite, as Democritus had said, would be, as he satirically observes, 'the mark of a very indefinite mind.'

The twenty triangular faces of an icosahedron form the faces or sides of two regular octahedrons and of a regular pyramid ($20 = 8 \times 2 + 4$); and therefore, according to Plato, a particle of water when decomposed is supposed to give two particles of air and one of fire. So because an octahedron gives the sides of two pyramids ($8 = 4 \times 2$), a particle of air is resolved into two particles of fire.

The transformation is effected by the superior power or number of the conquering elements. The manner of the change is (1) a separation of portions of the elements from the mass in which they are collected; (2) a resolution of them into their own original triangles; and (3) a reunion of them in new forms. The finer natures are those which have the fewest bases, and being the most cutting have the advantage in any disturbances of matter; they force their way in, but are sometimes crushed by the weight or hardness of the surrounding element. Plato himself proposes the question, why does motion continue at all when the elements are settled in their places? The answer is, that although the world has been reduced to order by the Creator,

the circular motion still retains a condensing power, and thrusts three of the elements into each other and into the fourth. Changes can only be effected by the greater number or power of dissimilars ; when there is assimilation there is rest. Fire, air, water have a decomposing effect on all the four, but earth has no similar power over them. No single particle of the elements is visible, but only the aggregates of them are seen. The different subordinate species which are formed out of them depend upon the sizes of the original triangles. The obvious physical phenomena from which Plato has gathered his views of the relations of the elements seem to be the effect of fire upon air, water, and earth, and the effect of water upon earth. The particles are supposed by him to be in a perpetual process of circulation caused by inequality. This process of circulation does not admit of a vacuum. Yet he appears to be inconsistent with himself. For in some of his remarks, e. g. in his strange account of the phenomena of respiration, he supposes air to be incompressible, as water really is, while in other places he supposes air to be condensed. And even the most penetrating element, fire, like all the rest, is composed of angles, and therefore cannot find a way into other geometrical figures without leaving a void, however small.

Of the phenomena of light and heavy he speaks afterwards, when treating of sensation, but they may be more conveniently considered by us in this place. They are not, he says, to be explained by 'above' and 'below,' which in the universal globe have no existence, but by the attraction of similars towards the great masses of similar substances ; fire to fire, air to air, earth to earth. Plato's doctrine of attraction implies not only (1) the attraction of smaller bodies to larger ones, but (2) of similar elements to one another. Had he stopped at the first he would have arrived, though, perhaps, without any further result or any sense of the greatness of the discovery, at the modern doctrine of gravitation. He does not observe that water has an equal tendency towards both water and earth. So easily did the most obvious facts which were inconsistent with his theories escape him.

The general physical doctrines of the *Timaeus* may be summed up as follows: (1) Plato supposes the greater masses of the elements to have been settled in their places at the creation: (2) they are four in number, and are formed of rectangular triangles variously combined into regular solid figures: (3) three of them, fire, air, and water, admit of transformation into one another; the fourth, earth, cannot be similarly

transformed: (4) different sizes of the same triangles form the lesser species of each element: (5) there is an attraction of the lesser to the greater, and of like to like: (6) there is no void, but the particles of matter are ever pushing one another round and round in a circle. Like the atomists, Plato attributes the differences of substances to differences in the forms of atoms. But he does not explain the process by which geometrical surfaces become solids; and he characteristically ridicules Democritus for not seeing that the good and the true 'are of the nature of the finite.'

§ 4.

The astronomy of Plato is based on the two principles of the same and the other, which God combined in the creation of the world. The soul, which is compounded of the same, the other, and the essence, is diffused from the centre to the circumference of the heavens. We speak of a soul of the universe; but more truly regarded, the universe of the *Timæus* is a soul, governed by mind, and holding in solution a residuum of matter or evil, which the author of the world is unable to expel, and of which Plato cannot tell us the origin. The creation, in Plato's sense, is really the creation of order in the world; and the first step in giving order is the division of the heavens into an inner and outer circle of the same and the other, of the indivisible and the divisible, answering to the spheres of the fixed stars and of the planets, all together moving around the earth, which is their centre. To us there is a difficulty in apprehending how that which is indivisible can be divided by the courses of the fixed stars, or how that which is at rest can also be in motion. But the whole description is so ideal and imaginative, that we can hardly venture to attribute to many of Plato's words in the *Timæus* any more meaning than to his mythical account of the heavens in the *Republic* and in the *Phædrus*. The stars are also gods, and the original habitations of the souls of men, from which they come and to which they will hereafter return. In attributing to the fixed stars only the most perfect motion—that which is on the same spot or circling around the same—he might perhaps have said that to 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' to borrow once more his own grand expression, or viewed, in the language of Spinoza, 'sub specie æternitatis,' they were still at rest, but appeared to move in order to teach men the periods of time. Although absolutely in motion, they

are relatively at rest; or we may conceive of them as resting, while the space in which they are contained, or the whole *anima mundi*, revolves.

The universe revolves around a centre once in twenty-four hours, but the orbits of the fixed stars take a different direction from those of the planets. The inner and the outer sphere cross one another and meet again at a point opposite to that of their first contact; the first moving in a circle from left to right along the side of a parallelogram which is supposed to be inscribed in it, the second also moving in a circle along the diagonal of the same parallelogram from right to left; or, in other words, the first describing the path of the equator, the second, the path of the ecliptic. The motion of the second is controlled by the first, and hence the oblique line in which the planets are supposed to move becomes a spiral. The motion of the same is said to be undivided, whereas the inner motion is split into six portions or intervals containing seven unequal orbits—three in ratios of two, and three in ratios of three:—the Sun, moving in the opposite direction to Mercury and Venus, but with equal swiftness; the remaining four, Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter, with unequal swiftness to the former three and to one another. Thus arises the following progression:—Moon 1, Sun 2, Venus 3, Mercury 4, Mars 8, Jupiter 9, Saturn 27. This series of numbers is the compound of the two Pythagorean ratios, having the same intervals, though not in the same order, as the mixture which was originally divided in forming the soul of the world.

Plato was struck by the phenomenon of Mercury, Venus, and the Sun appearing to overtake and be overtaken by one another. The true reason of this, namely, that they lie within the circle of the earth's orbit, was unknown to him, and the reason which he gives—that they move in opposite directions to the four other planets—is far from explaining the appearance of them in the heavens. All the planets, including the sun, revolve upon their axis; they are also carried round in the daily motion of the circle of the fixed stars, and they have a third or oblique motion which gives the explanation of the different lengths of the sun's course in different parts of the world. The fixed stars have only two movements—a movement on the same spot around an axis, which Plato calls the movement of thought about the same; and the forward movement in their orbit which is common to the whole circle. In this respect they are more perfect than the

wandering stars, as Plato himself terms them, although in the *Laws* (vii. 821 C) he condemns the appellation as blasphemous.

The revolution of the world around the earth, which is accomplished in a single day and night, is described as being the most perfect. Yet Plato also speaks of an 'annus magnus' or cyclical year, in which periods wonderful for their complexity are found to coincide in a perfect number, i. e. a number which equals the sum of its factors. This, although not literally contradictory, is in spirit irreconcilable with the perfect revolution of twenty-four hours. The same remark may be applied to the complexity of the appearances and occultations of the planets, which, if the fixed stars are supposed to be moving around the centre once in twenty-four hours, must be confined to the effects produced by the seven planets. The truth is that Plato seems to confuse the actual observation of the heavens with his desire to find in them mathematical perfection. The same spirit is carried yet further by him in the *Laws*, in which, after refusing to allow the planets or wandering stars to be called by this name, he affirms their wanderings to be an appearance only, which a little knowledge of mathematics would enable men to correct.

We have now to consider the much discussed question of the rotation or immobility of the earth. Plato's doctrine on this subject is contained in the following words:—'The earth which is our nurse clinging (*or* circling) around the pole which is extended through the universe, he made to be the guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven.' There is an unfortunate doubt (1) in this passage about the meaning of the Greek word which is translated 'clinging' or 'circling,' and is equally capable of either sense. A doubt (2) may also be raised as to whether the words 'artificer of day and night' are consistent with the mere passive causation of them, produced by the immobility of the earth in the midst of the circling universe. We must admit, further, (3) that Aristotle attributed to Plato the doctrine of the rotation of the earth. Yet the reasons which may be urged on the opposite side of the argument are far stronger. For, in the first place, if the earth goes round with the outer heaven and the planets, including among them the sun, in twenty-four hours, there is no possibility of accounting for the alternation of day and night, or for any movement of the heavens; since the equal motion of the earth and heavens would have

the effect of absolute immobility. Nor, secondly, can we suppose with Mr. Grote, that Plato has fallen unawares into this enormous contradiction; for though he was ignorant of many things which are familiar to us, and often confused in his ideas where we have become clear, we have no right to attribute to him a childish want of reasoning about very simple facts, or an inability to understand the necessary deductions from geometrical figures or movements. Of the causes of day and night the pre-Socratic philosophers, and especially the Pythagoreans, gave various accounts, and therefore the question can hardly be imagined to have escaped him. Thirdly, Mr. Grote supposes, not that *ἰλλομένην* means 'circling,' or that this is the sense in which Aristotle understood the word, but that the rotation of the earth is necessarily implied in its adherence to the cosmical axis. But (a) if, as Mr. Grote assumes, Plato did not see that the rotation of the earth on its axis and of the heavens around the earth in equal times was inconsistent with the alternation of day and night, neither need we suppose that he would have seen the immobility of the earth to be inconsistent with the rotation of the axis. And (β) what proof is there that the axis of the world revolves at all? (γ) The comparison of the two passages quoted by Mr. Grote (see p. 19 of his pamphlet on 'The Rotation of the Earth') from Aristotle *De Coelo* (c. 13, *ἔνιοι—γέγραπται*, and c. 14, *ἡμεῖς—μέσον*) clearly shows, although this is a matter of minor importance, that Aristotle, as Proclus and Simplicius supposed, understood *ἰλλεσθαι* in the *Timaeus* to mean circling or revolving. For the second passage, in which motion on an axis is expressly mentioned, refers to the first, but this would be unmeaning unless *ἰλλεσθαι* in the first passage meant rotation on an axis. (4) The immobility of the earth is more in accordance with Plato's other writings than the opposite hypothesis. For in the *Phaedo* the earth is described as the centre of the world, and is not said to be in motion. In the *Republic* the pilgrims appear to be looking out from the earth upon the motions of the heavenly bodies; in the *Phaedrus*, Hestia, who remains immovable in the house of Zeus while the other gods go in procession, is called the first and eldest of the gods, and is probably the symbol of the earth. The silence of Plato in these and in some other passages (cp. *Laws* x. 893 C) in which he might be expected to speak of the rotation of the earth, is more favourable to the doctrine of its immobility than to the opposite. If

he had meant to say that the earth revolves on her axis, he would probably have expressed this in distinct words, and have explained the relation of her movements to those of the other heavenly bodies. (5) The meaning of the words 'artificer of day and night' is literally true according to Plato's view. For the alternation of day and night is not produced by the motion of the heavens alone, or by the immobility of the earth alone, but by both together; and that which has the inherent force or energy to remain at rest when all other bodies are moving, may be truly said to act, equally with them. (6) We should not lay too much stress on Aristotle having adopted the other interpretation of the words, although Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks that he could not have been ignorant either of the doctrine of Plato or of the sense which he intended to give to the word *ἄλλομένην*. For the citations of Plato in Aristotle are frequently misinterpreted by him; and he seems hardly ever to have had in his mind the connection in which they occur. In this instance the allusion is very slight, and there is no reason to suppose that the diurnal revolution of the heavens was present to his mind. Hence we need not attribute to him the error from which we are defending Plato.

§ 5.

The soul of the world is framed on the analogy of the soul of man, and many traces of anthropomorphism blend with Plato's highest flights of idealism. The heavenly bodies are endowed with thought, the principle of the same is the true law of the human mind as well as of the fixed stars. The soul of man is made out of the remains of the cup which contained the same, the other, and the essence; these remains, however, are diluted to the third degree; or, speaking still in a figure, there are dregs of necessity which are mingled with them. The human soul, like the cosmical, is framed before the body, as the mind is before the soul of either—this is the order of the divine work—and the finer parts of the body, which are more akin to the soul, such as the spinal marrow, are prior to the bones and flesh. The brain, which is the vessel of the soul, is (nearly) in the form of a globe, which is the image of the gods and the figure of the fixed stars and of the universe.

There is, however, an inconsistency in Plato's manner of conceiving

the soul of man ; he cannot get rid of the element of necessity which is allowed to enter. He does not, like Kant, attempt to vindicate for men a freedom out of space and time ; but he acknowledges him to be subject to the influence of external causes, and leaves hardly any place for freedom of the will. The lusts of men are caused by their bodily constitution, though they may be increased by bad education and bad laws, which implies that they may be decreased by good education and good laws. He appears to have an inkling of the truth that to the higher nature of man evil is involuntary. Still, in the *Timaeus*, as well as in the *Laws*, he regards vices and crimes as simply involuntary ; they are diseases analogous to the diseases of the body, and arising out of the same causes. If we draw together the opposite poles of Plato's system, we find that, like Spinoza, he combines idealism with fatalism (see *infra*, p. 595).

The soul of man is divided by him into three parts, answering roughly to the charioteer and steeds of the *Phaedrus*, and to the *λόγος*, *θυμός*, and *ἐπιθυμία* of the *Republic* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. First, there is the immortal part which is seated in the brain, and is alone divine, and akin to the soul of the universe. This alone thinks and knows and is the ruler of the whole. Secondly, there is the higher mortal soul which, though liable to perturbations of her own, takes the side of reason against the lower appetites. The seat of this is the heart, in which courage, anger, and all the nobler affections are supposed to reside. There the veins all meet ; it is their centre or house of guard whence they carry the orders of the thinking being to the extremities of his kingdom. There is also a third or appetitive soul, which receives the commands of the immortal part, not immediately but mediately, through the higher mortal nature, which reflects in the liver the admonitions and threats of the reason.

The liver is imagined by Plato to be a smooth and bright substance, having a store of sweetness and also of bitterness, which reason freely uses in the execution of her mandates. Thither as to a second centre the courses of the blood return. In this region, as ancient superstition told, were to be found intimations of the future. But Plato is careful to observe that such knowledge is only given to the inferior parts of man, and then requires to be interpreted by the superior. Reason, and not enthusiasm, is the true guide of man ; he is only inspired when he is demented by some distemper or possession. The ancient

saying, 'that only a man in his senses can judge of his own actions,' is approved by modern philosophy too. The same irony which appears in Plato's remark, 'that the men of old time must surely have known the gods who were their ancestors, and we must believe them as the law requires,' is also manifest in his account of divination.

The appetitive soul is seated in the belly, and there imprisoned like a wild beast, far away from the council chamber, as Plato graphically calls the head, in order that the animal passions may not interfere with the deliberations of reason. Though the soul is independent of the body, yet we cannot help seeing that Plato has really modelled the soul on the body—this threefold division in fact springing from the head and heart and belly. The human soul differs from the soul of the world in this respect, that she is enveloped and finds her expression in matter, whereas the soul of the world is the element in which matter moves. The breath of man is within him, but the air or aether of heaven is the element which surrounds him and all things.

Pleasure and pain are attributed in the *Timæus* to the suddenness of our sensations—the first being a sudden restoration, the second a sudden violation, of nature (cp. *Philebus*). The sensations become conscious to us when they are exceptional. Sight is not attended either by pleasure or pain, but hunger and the appeasing of hunger are pleasant and painful because they are extraordinary.

§ 6.

I shall not attempt to connect the physiological speculations of Plato either with ancient or modern medicine. What light I can throw upon them will be derived from the comparison of them with his general system.

There is no principle so apparent in the physics of the *Timæus*, or in ancient physics generally, as that of continuity. The world is conceived of as a whole, and the elements are formed into and out of one another; the variety of substances and processes are hardly known or noticed. And in a similar manner the human body is conceived of as a whole, and the different substances of which, to a superficial observer, it appears to be composed—the blood, flesh, sinews, and bone—like the elements out of which they are formed, are supposed to pass into one another in regular order, while the infinite complexity of the human frame remains unobserved. And diseases arise from the opposite process—

when the natural proportions of the four elements are disturbed, and the secondary substances which are formed out of them, namely, blood, flesh, sinews, bone, are generated in an inverse order.

Plato found heat and air within the human frame, and the blood circulating in every part. He assumes, in language almost unintelligible to us, that an inner network of fire, having openings and an exterior envelopment of air, commencing at the passages of the throat encased a great part of the human frame. This case, or network, of fire is a figure or fancy, under which Plato describes the internal heat of the body, and which he made the containing vessel of some of the organs, because fire was composed of the finest particles, and was therefore impenetrable by the other elements. The entire net has two lesser nets or openings, one leading to the stomach, the other to the lungs; and the latter is forked or divided at the upper end into the passages which lead to the nostrils and to the mouth.

Of the anatomy and functions of the body he was almost entirely ignorant; he knew nothing of the uses of the nerves in conveying motion and sensation, which he attributes to the veins; he was also ignorant of the distinction between veins and arteries;—the latter term he applies to the vessels which conduct air from the mouth to the lungs;—he supposes the lung to be empty and bloodless; the spinal marrow he conceives to be the seed of generation; he has absolutely no idea of the phenomena of respiration, which he attributes to a law of equalization in nature, the air which is breathed out displacing other air which finds a way in through the pores; he is wholly unacquainted with the process of digestion. Except the general divisions into the spleen, the liver, the belly, and the lungs, and the obvious distinctions of flesh, bones, and the limbs of the body, we find nothing that reminds us of anatomical facts. But we find much which is derived from his theory of the universe, and transferred to man, as there is much also in his theory of the universe which is suggested by man. The microcosm of the human body is the lesser image of the macrocosm. The courses of the same and the other affect both; they are made in the same proportions; both of them have an equator and an ecliptic, though in the human body displaced and distorted by the flux and reflux of particles of matter. Both are intelligent natures endued with the power of self-motion, and the same equipoise is maintained in both. The animal is a sort of 'world' to the particles of the blood which circulate

in it. All the four elements entered into the original composition of the human frame; the bone was formed out of smooth earth; liquids of various kinds pass to and fro; an inner network of fire and an outer network of air irrigates the veins. Childhood is the chaos or first turbid flux of sense prior to the establishment of order; the intervals of time which may be observed in some intermittent fevers correspond to the intervals of the elements. The spinal marrow, including the brain, is formed out of the finest sorts of triangles, and is the connecting link between body and mind. Health is only to be preserved by imitating the motions of the world in space, which is the mother and nurse of generation. The process of digestion is carried on by the superior sharpness of the triangles of the substances of the human body to the substances which are introduced into it in the shape of food. The freshest and acutest forms of triangles are those that are found in children, but they become more obtuse with advancing years; and when they finally wear out and fall to pieces, old age and death supervene.

As in the Republic, Plato is still the enemy of the purgative treatment of physicians, which, except in extreme cases, no man of sense will ever adopt. For, as he adds, perhaps with an insight into the truth, 'every disease is akin to the nature of the living being and is only irritated by stimulants.' He is of opinion that nature should be left to herself, and is inclined to think that physicians are in vain. As in the Charmides he tells us that the body cannot be cured without the soul, so in the Timaeus he strongly asserts the sympathy of soul and body; any defect of either is the occasion of the greatest discord and disproportion in the other. We cannot deny that his conception of the human body falls under the condemnation which Hippocrates, or some one writing in his spirit ('On Ancient Medicine'), has passed upon hypothetical medicine; and yet, amid all his extravagance, he is not deserted by a true tact.

§ 7.

In Plato's explanation of sensation we are struck by the fact that he has not the same distinct conception of organs of sense which is familiar to ourselves. The senses are not instruments, but rather passages, through which external objects strike upon the mind. The eye is the aperture through which the stream of vision passes, the ear is

the aperture through which the vibrations of sound pass. But that the complex structure of the eye or the ear is in any sense the cause of sight and hearing he seems hardly to be aware.

The process of sight is the most complicated (cp. Rep. vi. 507, 508), and consists of three elements—the light which is supposed to reside within the eye, the light of the sun, and the light emitted from external objects. When the light of the eye meets the light of the sun, and both together meet the light issuing from an external object, this is the simple act of sight. When the particles of light which proceed from the object are exactly equal to the particles of the visual ray which meet them from within, then the body is transparent. If they are larger and dilate the visual ray which mingles with them, a white colour is produced by them; if they are smaller, a black. Other phenomena are produced by the variety and motion of light. A sudden flash of fire at once elicits light and moisture from the eye. A more subdued light of fire, which touches the surface and mingles with the moisture of the eye, produces a red colour. Out of these elements all other colours are supposed to be derived. All of them are combinations of light and fire with white and black. Plato himself tells us that he does not know in what proportions they combine, and he is of opinion that such knowledge is granted to the gods only. To have seen the affinity of them to each other and their connection with light, is not a bad basis for a theory of colours. We must remember that they were not distinctly defined to his, as they are to our eyes; he saw them, not as they are divided in the prism, or artificially manufactured for the painter's use, but as they exist in nature, blended and confused with one another.

We can hardly agree with him when he tells us that smells do not admit of kinds. He seems to think that no definite qualities can attach to bodies which are in a state of transition or evaporation; he also makes the subtle observation that smells must be denser than air, though thinner than water. The proof of this is that air can percolate without any accompanying smell.

The affections peculiar to the tongue are of various kinds, and, like many other affections, arise out of composition and division. Some of them are produced by astringent, others by abstergent substances, stronger or weaker,—these act upon the testing instruments of the tongue, and produce a more or less disagreeable sensation, while other

particles congenial to the tongue soften and harmonize them. The instruments of taste reach from the tongue to the heart. Plato has a lively sense of the manner in which sensation and motion are communicated from one part of the body to the other, though he confuses the affections with the organs. Hearing is a blow which passes through the ear and ends in the region of the liver, being transmitted by means of the air, the brains, and the blood to the soul. The swifter sound is acute, the sound which moves slowly is grave. A great body of sound is loud, the opposite is low. Discord is produced by the swifter and slower motions of two sounds, and is converted into harmony when the swifter motions begin to pause and are overtaken by the slower.

The general phenomena of sensation are partly internal, but the more violent are caused by conflict with external objects. Proceeding by a method of superficial observation, Plato remarks that the more sensitive parts of the human frame are those which are least covered by flesh, as is the case with the head and the elbows. Man, if his head had been covered with a thicker pulp of flesh, might have been a longer lived animal than he is, but could not have had as quick perceptions. On the other hand, the tongue is one of the most sensitive of organs; but then this is made, not to be a covering to the bones which contain the marrow or source of life, but with an express purpose, and in a separate mass.

§ 8.

We have now to consider how far in any of these speculations Plato approximated to the discoveries of modern science. The modern physical philosopher is apt to dwell exclusively on the absurdities of ancient physical science, on the hap-hazard fancies and *a priori* assumptions of the ancient physical teacher, on his ignorance and regardlessness of facts. He measures him not by what preceded him, but by what followed him. He hardly allows to his notions the merit of being 'the dead men's bones' out of which he has himself risen to a higher knowledge. He never reflects, how great a thing it was to have formed a conception, however imperfect, either of the human frame as a whole, or of the world as a whole. According to the view taken in these volumes the errors of ancient physicists were hardly separable from the intellectual conditions under which they lived; their genius

was their own. They were not the rash and hasty generalizers which, since the days of Bacon, we have been apt to suppose them. But general notions were necessary to the discovery of the particular facts, the metaphysical to the physical. Before men could observe the world, they must be able to conceive the world.

To do justice to the subject, we should consider the physical philosophy of the ancients as a whole; we should remember, (1) that the nebular theory was the received belief of the early physicists; (2) that the development of animals out of frogs who came to land, and of man out of the animals, was held by Anaximenes in the sixth century before Christ; (3) that even by Philolaus and the early Pythagoreans, the earth was held to be a body like the other stars revolving in space around the sun or a central fire; (4) that the beginnings of chemistry are discernible in the 'similar particles' of Anaxagoras. Also they knew or thought (5) that there was a sex in plants as well as in animals; (6) they were aware that musical notes depended on the relative length or tension of the strings from which they were emitted, and were measured by ratios of number; (7) that mathematical laws pervaded the world; and even qualitative differences were supposed to have their origin in number; (8) the annihilation of matter was denied by several of them, and held to be a transformation only. For, although one of these discoveries might have been supposed to be a happy guess, we can hardly attribute them all to mere coincidences.

Such reflections, although this is not the place in which to dwell upon them at length, lead us to take a favourable view of the speculations of the Timaeus. We should consider not how much Plato actually knew, but how far he has contributed to the general ideas of physics, or supplied the notions, which, whether true or false, have stimulated the minds of thoughtful men in the path of discovery. Some of them may seem old-fashioned, and may nevertheless have had a great influence in promoting system and assisting enquiry, while in others of them we hear the latest word of physical or metaphysical philosophy. There is also a third class, in which Plato falls short of the truths of modern science, though he can hardly be said to be wholly unacquainted with them. (1) To the first class belongs the teleological theory of creation. Whether all things in the world can be explained as the result of natural laws, or whether we must not admit of tendencies and marks of design also, has been a question much disputed of late years. And even if

all phenomena are the result of natural forces, we must admit that there are many things in heaven and earth which are as well expressed under the image of mind or design as under any other. At any rate, the language of Plato has been the language of natural theology down to our own time, nor can any description of the world wholly dispense with it. The notion of first and second or co-operative causes, which originally appears in the *Timaeus*, has likewise survived to our own day, and has been a great peace-maker between theology and science. Plato also approaches very near to our doctrine of the primary and secondary qualities of matter, p. 22. (2) Another popular notion which is found in the *Timaeus*, is the feebleness of the human intellect—'God knows the original qualities of things; man can only hope to attain to probability.' We speak in almost the same words of human intelligence, but not in the same manner of the uncertainty of our knowledge of nature. The reason is that this is assured to us by experiment, and is not contrasted with the certainty of ideal or mathematical knowledge. But the ancient philosopher never experimented: in the *Timaeus* Plato seems to have thought that there would be impiety in making the attempt; he, for example, who tried experiments in colours would 'forget the difference of the human and divine natures' (68 D). Their indefiniteness is probably the reason why he singles them out, as especially incapable of being tested by experiment.

The greatest 'divination' of the ancients was the supremacy which they assigned to mathematics in all the realms of nature. For in all of them there is a foundation of mechanics; even physiology partakes of figure and number; and Plato is not wrong in attributing them to the human frame, but in the omission to observe how little could be explained by them. Thus we may remark in passing that the most fanciful of ancient philosophies is also the most nearly verified in fact. The fortunate guess that the world is a sum of numbers and figures has been the most fruitful of anticipations. The 'diatonic' scale of the Pythagoreans and Plato suggested to Kepler that the secret of the distances of the planets from one another was to be found in mathematical proportions. The doctrine that the heavenly bodies all move in a circle is known by us to be erroneous; but without such an error how could the human mind have comprehended the heavens? Astronomy, even in modern times, has made far greater progress by the high *a priori* road than could have been attained by any other.

Yet, strictly speaking (and the remark applies to ancient physics generally), this high *a priori* road was based upon *a posteriori* grounds. For there were no facts of which the ancients were so well assured by experience as facts of number. Having observed that they held good in a few instances, they applied them everywhere; and in the complexity, of which they were capable, found the explanation of the equally complex phenomena of the universe. They seemed to see them in the least things as well as in the greatest; in atoms, as well as in suns and stars, in the human body as well as in external nature. And now a favourite speculation of modern chemistry is the explanation of qualitative difference by quantitative, which is at present verified to a certain extent and may hereafter be of far more universal application. What is this but the atoms of Democritus and the triangles of Plato? The ancients should not be wholly deprived of the credit of their guesses because they were unable to prove them. May they not have had, like the animals, an instinct of something more than they knew?

Besides general notions we seem to find in the Timaeus some more precise approximations to the discoveries of modern physical science. First, the doctrine of equipoise. Plato affirms, almost in so many words, that nature abhors a vacuum. Wherever there is a void the elements are pushing and thrusting one another until equality is restored. We must remember that these ideas were not derived from any definite experiment, but were the original reflections of man, fresh from the first observation of nature. The latest word of modern philosophy is continuity and development, but to Plato this is the beginning and foundation of science; there is nothing that he is so strongly persuaded of as that the world is one, and that all the various existences which are contained in it are only the transformations of the same soul of the world acting on the same matter. He would have readily admitted that out of the protoplasm all things were formed by the gradual process of creation; but he would have insisted that mind and intelligence—not meaning by this, however, a conscious mind or person—was prior to them, and could alone have created them.

Lastly, there remain two points in which he seems to touch great discoveries of modern times—the law of gravitation, and the circulation of the blood. (1) The law of gravitation, according to Plato, is a law, not only of the attraction of lesser bodies to larger ones, but of similar

bodies to similar, having a magnetic power as well as a principle of gravitation. He observed that the earth, the water, and the air, had settled down to their places, and he imagined the fire or exterior aether to have a place beyond the air. When air seemed to go upwards and fire to pierce through air—when water and earth fell to the ground, they were seeking their native elements. He did not remark that his own explanation did not suit all phenomena; and the simpler explanation, which assigns to bodies degrees of heaviness and lightness proportioned to the mass and distance of the bodies which attract them, never occurred to him. Yet the affinities of similar substances have some effect upon the composition of the world, and of this Plato may be thought to have had an anticipation. He may be described as confusing the attraction of gravitation with the attraction of cohesion. The influence of such affinities and the chemical action of one body upon another in long periods of time has become a recognized principle of geology. Whether in the doctrine of Plato, that the motion of the planets is controlled by the motion of the fixed stars, there is any further trace of the true theory of gravitation is uncertain; the reverse is more probable. When he speaks of the sphere of the same controlling the sphere of the other he seems to be expressing the more general truth of the reign of law amid the diversity of phenomena. (2) Plato is perfectly aware—and he could hardly be ignorant—that blood is a fluid in constant motion. He also knew that blood is partly a solid substance consisting of several elements, which, as he might have observed in the use of ‘cupping-glasses’ (79 E), decompose and die, when no longer in motion. But the specific discovery that the blood flows out on one side of the heart through the arteries and returns through the veins on the other, which is commonly called the circulation of the blood, was absolutely unknown to him.

A further study of the *Timaeus* suggests some after-thoughts which may be conveniently brought together in this place. The topics which I propose briefly to reconsider are (*a*) the relation of the *Timaeus* to the other dialogues of Plato and to the previous philosophy: (*b*) the nature of God and of creation: (*c*) the morality of the *Timaeus*:—

(*a*) The *Timaeus* is more imaginative and less scientific than any

other of the Platonic dialogues. It is conjectural astronomy, conjectural natural philosophy, conjectural medicine. The writer himself is constantly repeating that he is speaking what is probable only. The dialogue is put into the mouth of Timaeus, a Pythagorean philosopher, and therefore here, as in the *Parmenides*, we are in doubt how far Plato is expressing his own sentiments. Hence the connection with the other dialogues is comparatively slight. We may fill up the lacunae of the *Timaeus* by the help of the *Republic* or *Phaedrus*: we may identify the same and other with the *πέραις* and *ἄπειρον* of the *Philebus*. We may find in the *Laws* or in the *Politicus* parallels with the account of creation and of the first origin of man. There would be no difficulty in constructing a scheme in which all these various elements might have a place. But such a mode of proceeding would be unsatisfactory, because we have no reason to suppose that Plato intended his scattered thoughts to be collected in a system. There is a common spirit in his writings, and there are certain general principles, such as the opposition of the sensible and intellectual, and the priority of mind, which run through all of them; but he has no single form of words in which he consistently expresses himself. While the determinations of human thought are in process of creation he is necessarily tentative and uncertain. And there is least of definiteness, whenever either in describing the beginning or the end of the world, he has recourse to myths. These are not the fixed modes in which spiritual truths are revealed to him, but the efforts of imagination, by which at different times and in various manners he seeks to embody his conceptions. The clouds of mythology are still resting upon him, and he has not yet pierced 'to the heaven of the fixed stars' which is beyond them. It is safer then to admit the inconsistencies of the *Timaeus*, or to endeavour to fill up what is wanting from our own imagination, inspired by a study of the dialogue, than to refer to other Platonic writings, (and still less should we refer to the successors of Plato,) for the elucidation of it.

More light is thrown upon the *Timaeus* by a comparison of the previous philosophies. For the physical science of the ancients was traditional, descending through many generations of Ionian and Pythagorean philosophers. Plato does not look out upon the heavens and describe what he sees in them, but he builds upon the foundations of others, adding something out of the 'depths of his own self-consciousness.' Socrates had already spoken of God the creator, who made all things

for the best. While he ridiculed the superficial explanations of phenomena which were current in his age, he recognised the marks both of benevolence and of design in the frame of man and in the world. The apparatus of winds and waters is contemptuously rejected by him in the *Phaedo*, but he thinks that there is a power greater than that of any Atlas in the 'Best.' Plato too, following in the footsteps of his master, affirms this principle of the best, but he acknowledges that the best is limited by the conditions of matter. In the generation before Socrates, Anaxagoras had brought together 'Chaos' and 'Mind'; and these are connected by Plato in the *Timæus*, but in accordance with his own mode of thinking he has interposed between them the idea or pattern according to which mind worked. The circular impulse (*περίωσις*) of the one philosopher answers to the circular movement (*περιχώρησις*) of the other. But unlike Anaxagoras, Plato made the sun and stars living beings and not masses of earth or metal. The Pythagoreans again had framed a world out of numbers, which they first constructed into figures. Plato adopted their speculations and improved upon them by a more exact knowledge of geometry. The Atomists too made the world, if not out of geometrical figures, at least out of different forms of atoms, and these atoms resembled the triangles of Plato in being too small to be visible. But though the physiology of the *Timæus* is partly borrowed from them, they are either ignored by Plato or referred to with a secret contempt and dislike. The Pythagorean intervals of number applied to the distances of the planets reappear in the *Timæus*, but in the fragments of Philolaus the heavenly bodies are revolving around the central fire and not around the earth. It is probable however that Plato was not the first who taught that the stars moved round the earth, but that among the Pythagoreans living in the fourth century B.C., there were already some who made the earth their centre. Whether he obtained his circles of the same and other from any previous thinker is uncertain; there is a faint reflection of them in the *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον* of Philolaus, in whose metaphorical language we find a confusion like that of the *Timæus* between the human frame and the Universe. The four elements are taken from Empedocles, but the geometrical figures out of which they are constructed are also found in Philolaus. The passage of one into another is common to Heraclitus and several of the Ionian philosophers. So much of a syncretist is Plato, though not after the manner of the Neoplatonists. For the

elements which he borrows from others are fused and transformed by his own genius. On the other hand we find fewer traces in Plato of early Ionic or Eleatic speculation. He does not imagine the world of sense to be made up of opposites or to be in a perpetual flux, but to vary within certain limits which are controlled by what he calls the principle of the same. Unlike the Eleatics, who relegated the world to the sphere of not being, he admits creation to have an existence which is real and even eternal, although dependent on the will of the creator. Instead of maintaining the doctrine that the void has a necessary place in the existence of the world, he rather affirms the modern thesis that nature abhors a vacuum, as in the Sophist he also denies the reality of not being. But though in these respects he differs from them, he is deeply penetrated by the spirit of their philosophy; he differs from them with reluctance, and gladly recognises the 'generous depth' of Parmenides.

That there is a degree of confusion and indistinctness in Plato's account both of man and of the Universe has been already acknowledged. We cannot tell (nor could Plato himself have told) where the figure or myth ends and the philosophical truth begins; we cannot explain (nor could Plato himself have explained to us) the relation of the ideas to appearance, which mutually imply each other, and yet of all things in the world are the most opposed. This opposition is presented to us in many forms, as the antithesis of the one and many, of the finite and infinite, of the intelligible and sensible, of the unchangable and the changing, of the indivisible and the divisible, of the fixed stars and the planets, of the creative mind and the primeval chaos. These pairs of opposites are so many aspects of the great opposition between ideas and phenomena—they easily pass into one another; and sometimes the two members of the relation differ in kind, sometimes only in degree. As in Aristotle's matter and form the connexion between them is really inseparable; for if we attempt to separate them they become devoid of content and therefore indistinguishable; there is no difference between the idea of which nothing can be predicated, and the chaos which has no perceptible qualities—between Being in the abstract and Nothing. Yet we are frequently told that the one class of them is the reality and the other appearance; and one is often spoken of as the double or reflection of the other. For Plato never clearly saw that both elements had an equal place in mind and in nature; and

hence, especially when we argue from isolated passages in his writings, or attempt to draw what appear to us to be the natural inferences from them, we are full of perplexity. There is a similar confusion about necessity and free will, and about the state of the soul after death. These contradictions may be softened or concealed by a judicious use of language, but they cannot be wholly got rid of. That an age of intellectual transition must also be one of inconsistency; that the creative is opposed to the critical or defining habit of mind or time, has been often repeated by us. But, as Plato remarks, 'there is no harm in repeating twice or thrice' what is important for the understanding of a great author.

It has not, however, been observed, that the confusion partly arises out of the elements of opposing philosophies which are preserved in him. He holds these in solution, he brings them into relation with one another, but he does not perfectly harmonize them. They are part of his own mind, and he is incapable of placing himself outside of them and criticising them. They grow as he grows. In early life he fancies that he has mastered them: but he is also mastered by them; and in language (cp. *Sophist*) which may be compared with the hesitating tone of the *Timaeus*, he confesses in his later years that they are full of obscurity to him. He attributes new meanings to the words of Parmenides and Heracleitus; but at times the old Eleatic philosophy appears to go beyond him; then the world of phenomena disappears, but the doctrine of ideas is also reduced to nothingness. The finite and infinite of *Philolaus* have become logical determinations in the *Philebus*; they are there used by Plato in a new sense, and yet they remain at variance with the earlier representations of the ideas and phenomena. He has never reconciled the first causes of the pre-Socratic philosophers with the final causes of Socrates himself. There is no intelligible account of the relation of numbers to the universal ideas, or of universals to the idea of good. The fact was that he found them all three, in the Pythagorean philosophy and in the teaching of Socrates and of the Megarians respectively; and, because they all furnished modes of explaining and arranging phenomena, he is unwilling to give up any of them, though he is unable to unite them in a consistent whole.

Lastly, Plato, though an idealist philosopher, is Greek and not Oriental in spirit and feeling. He is no mystic or ascetic seeking absorption in the divine nature, or in the Soul of the Universe. And therefore we are

not surprised to find that his philosophy in the *Timaeus* returns at last to a worship of the heavens, and that to him, as to other Greeks, nature, though containing a remnant of evil, is still glorious and divine. He takes away or drops the veil of mythology, and presents her to us in what appears to him to be the form—fairer and truer far—of mathematical figures. It is this element in the *Timaeus*, no less than its affinity to certain Pythagorean speculations, which gives it a character not wholly in accordance with the other dialogues of Plato.

(*b*) The *Timaeus* contains an assertion more distinct than is found in any other dialogue of the goodness of God; and the attributes of a person are more clearly assigned to him. 'He was good himself, and he fashioned the good everywhere.' He was not a jealous God, and therefore he desired that all other things should be equally good. He is the *idea* of good who has now become a person, and speaks and is spoken of as God. Yet his personality seems to appear only in the act of creation. In so far as he works with his eye fixed upon an eternal pattern he is like the human artificer in the *Republic*. Here the theory of Platonic ideas intrudes upon us. God, like man, is supposed to have an ideal of which Plato is unable to tell us the origin. He may be said, in the language of modern philosophy, to resolve the divine mind into subject and object. The first work of creation is perfected, and the second begins under the direction of inferior ministers. The supreme God is then withdrawn from the world and returns to his own nature. As in the *Politicus*, he retires to his place of view. So early did the Epicurean doctrine take possession of the Greek mind, and so natural is it to the heart of man, when he has once passed out of the stage of mythology into that of rational religion. For he sees the marks of design in the world; but he no longer sees or fancies that he sees God walking in the garden or haunting stream or mountain. He feels also that he must put God as far as possible out of the way of evil, and therefore he banishes him from an evil world. Plato is sensible of the difficulty; and he often shows that he is desirous of justifying the ways of God to man. Yet on the other hand, in the Tenth Book of the *Laws*, he passes a censure on those who say that the Gods have no care of human things.

The creation of the world is the impression of order on a previously existing chaos. The formula of Anaxagoras—'all things were in a chaos or mixture, and then mind came and disposed them' is a summary

of the first part of the *Timaeus*. It is true that of a chaos without differences no idea could be formed. All was not mixed but one; and therefore it was not difficult for the later Platonists to draw inferences by which they were enabled to reconcile the narrative of the *Timaeus* with the Mosaic account of the creation. Neither when we speak of mind or intelligence, do we seem to get much further in our conception than circular motion, which was deemed to be the most perfect. Plato, like Anaxagoras, while commencing his theory of the universe with ideas of mind and of the best, is compelled in the execution of his design to condescend to the crudest physics.

(c) The morality of the *Timaeus* is singular, and it is difficult to adjust the balance between the two elements of it. The difficulty which Plato feels, is that which all of us feel, how the responsibility of man is to be reconciled with his dependence on natural causes, and sometimes, like other men, he seems to feel more strongly one aspect of human life, sometimes the other. In the *Republic* he represents man as freely choosing his own lot in a state prior to birth—a conception which, if taken literally, would still leave him subject to the dominion of necessity in his after life; in the *Politicus* he supposes the human race to be preserved in the world only by a divine interposition; while in the *Timaeus* the supreme God commissions the inferior deities to avert from him all but self-inflicted evils—words which imply that all the evils of men are really self-inflicted. And here, like Plato (54 B;—the insertion of a note in the text of an ancient writer is a literary curiosity worthy of remark), we may take occasion to correct an error which occurred at p. 582. For there we too hastily said that Plato in the *Timaeus* regarded all ‘vices and crimes as involuntary.’ But the fact is that he is inconsistent with himself; for in another passage he seems to attribute sensuality wholly to the relaxation of the bodily constitution—vice is but a kind of disease which is natural to man, and for which he is not to be held responsible. The evil is said to be increased by bad laws and bad institutions; yet here is a further inconsistency: for that which is increased by bad laws, may clearly be diminished by good ones. All punishment and all education, and therefore all writers who treat of them, imply that the human will and character are in some sense free and capable of being formed by them. Plato in one part of his writings is taking one view of the subject, while in another he takes another, or rather in the same passage (87 B) may be said to unite both. He

had learned from Socrates that vice is ignorance, and suddenly the doctrine seems to him to be confirmed by observing how much of the good and bad in human characters depends on their bodily constitution. So in modern times the speculative doctrine of necessity has often been supported by physical facts.

The *Timaeus* also contains an anticipation of the stoical life according to nature. Man contemplating the heavens is to order his erring life according to them. He is to partake of the rest of nature, to bring the variable principle in himself into harmony with the principle of the same. The ethics of the *Timaeus* may be summed up in the single idea of 'law.' To feel habitually that he is part of the order of the universe, is one of the highest ethical motives of which man is capable. Something like this is what Plato means when he speaks of the soul 'moving about the same in unchanging thought of the same.' He does not explain how man is acted upon by the lesser influences of custom or of opinion; or how the commands of the soul watching in the citadel are conveyed to the bodily organs. But this perhaps, as he himself remarks, 'is part of another subject.'

There is no difficulty, by the help of Aristotle and later writers, in criticising the *Timaeus* of Plato, in pointing out the inconsistencies of the work, in dwelling on the ignorance of anatomy shown by the author, in showing fancifulness or unmeaningness of some of his reasons. But the *Timaeus* still remains the greatest effort of the human mind to conceive the world as a whole which the genius of antiquity has bequeathed to us.

NOTE.

The *Timaeus* of Plato, like the *Protagoras* and several portions of the *Phaedrus* and of the *Republic*, was translated by Cicero into Latin. About a fourth, comprehending with lacunae the first portion of the dialogue, is preserved in several MSS. These generally agree, and therefore may be supposed to be derived from a single original. The version is very faithful, and is a remarkable monument of Cicero's skill in managing the difficult and untractable Greek. In his treatise *De Naturâ Deorum*, i. 8. 12, ii. 12, he also refers to the *Timaeus*, which, speaking in the person of Velleius the Epicurean, he severely criticises.

TIMAEUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

CRITIAS.

TIMAEUS.

HERMOCRATES.

Steph.

17 *Socrates.* ONE, two, three; and where, my dear Timaeus, is the fourth of those who were yesterday our guests and are to be our entertainers to-day?

Timaeus. He has been taken ill, Socrates, or he certainly would not have been absent at such a meeting as this.

Soc. Then, if he is not coming, you and the two others must supply his place.

Tim. Assuredly we will do all that we can; having been handsomely entertained by you yesterday, we or those of us who remain ought gladly to entertain you in return.

Soc. Do you remember all the points of which I required you to speak?

Tim. We remember some of them, and you will be able to remind us of what we may have forgotten: or rather, if we are not troubling you, will you briefly recapitulate the whole, and then we shall be more certain?

Soc. To be sure I will; the chief theme of our discourse was the State—how and of what citizens it would be best composed.

Tim. Yes, Socrates; and I am sure that what you said of it was very much to our mind.

Soc. Do you remember the part about the husbandmen and the artisans; and how we began by separating them from the class of defenders of the State?

Tim. Yes.

Soc. And when we had given to each one that single employment and particular art which were suited to his nature, we spoke of those who were intended to be our warriors, and said that they were to be guardians of the city against the attacks of enemies internal as well as external, and to have no other employment; they were to be merciful in judging their subjects, 18 of whom they were by nature friends, but when they came in the way of their enemies in battle they were to be fierce with them.

Tim. Exactly.

Soc. We said, if I am not mistaken, that the guardians should be doubly gifted, with a passionate and also with a philosophical temper; and that then they would be as they ought to be, gentle to their friends and fierce with their enemies.

Tim. Certainly.

Soc. And what did we say of their education? Were they not to be trained in gymnastic, and music, and all other sorts of knowledge which were proper for them?

Tim. Very true.

Soc. And being thus trained they were not to think of gold and silver, or any other possession as their own private property; they were to be hired troops, receiving pay for keeping guard from those who were protected by them—the pay was to be no more than would suffice for men of simple life; and they were to spend in common, and to live together in the continual practice of virtue, which was to be their sole pursuit.

Tim. So it was declared.

Soc. Neither did we forget the women, of whom we said, that their natures should be made as nearly as possible like those of men, and that they should share with them in their military pursuits and in their general way of life.

Tim. That, again, was as you describe.

Soc. And what about the procreation of children? The proposal was too singular to be forgotten, for all wives and children were to be in common; and we devised means that no one should ever know his own child; they were to imagine that they were one family, and to regard those who were within a certain limit of age as brothers and sisters; and again those who were of an elder generation as parents and grandparents,

and those who were of a younger generation as children and grandchildren.

Tim. Yes, indeed, such a proposal is not easily forgotten.

Soc. And do you also remember how, with a view of having as far as we could the best breed, we said that the chief magistrates, male and female, should contrive secretly, by the use of certain lots, so to arrange the nuptial meeting, that the bad of either sex and the good of either sex might pair with their like, and there was to be no quarrelling on this account, for they were to imagine that the union was a mere chance, and was to be attributed to the lot?

Tim. I remember.

Soc. And you remember how we said that the children of the
19 good parents were to be educated, and the children of bad parents secretly dispersed among the inferior citizens; when they grew to manhood the rulers were to be on the look out, and to bring up from below in their turn those who were worthy, and those among themselves who were unworthy were to take the places of those who came up?

Tim. True.

Soc. Then have I now given you all the heads of our yesterday's discussion? Or was there anything else, dear Timaeus, which has been omitted?

Tim. Nothing, Socrates; it was just as you have said.

Soc. I should like before proceeding further, to tell you how I feel about the State which we have described. I might compare myself to a person who, on beholding beautiful animals either created by the painter's art or really alive, but at rest, is seized with a desire of beholding them in motion or engaged in some struggle or conflict to which their forms appear suited; this is my feeling about the State which we have been describing. There are conflicts which all cities undergo, and I should like to hear some one tell of our own city carrying on a struggle against her neighbours, and how she went out to war in a fitting manner, and when at war showed a result answerable to her training and education, and how her modes of action and fashions of speech in dealing with other cities were alike worthy of herself. Now I, Critias and Hermocrates, am conscious that I myself should never be able to set forth the city and her citizens

in proper terms of praise, and I am not surprised at my own incapacity ; to me the wonder is rather that the poets present as well as past are no better—not that I mean to depreciate them, but every one can see that they are a tribe of imitators, and will imitate best and most easily the ways of life amid which they have been brought up ; whereas that which is beyond the range of a man's education can hardly be imitated by him in action, and with still more difficulty in speech. I am aware that the Sophists have plenty of brave words and fair devices, but I am afraid that being only wanderers from one city to another, and having never had homes of their own to manage, they may err in their ideas of philosophers and statesmen, and may not know how they behave in their dealings with mankind, and what they say and do in going to war and in making peace. And thus people of your class are the only ones remaining who are fitted by nature and education to take part at once in politics and philosophy. Here is Timaeus, of Locris in Italy, a city which has admirable laws, and who is himself ²⁰ in wealth and rank the equal of any of his fellow-citizens ; he has held the most important and honourable offices in his own State, and, as I believe, has scaled the heights of philosophy ; and here is Critias, whom every Athenian knows to be no novice in the matters of which we are speaking ; and as to Hermocrates, I am assured by many witnesses that his talents and education are adequate to any speculation. And therefore yesterday when I saw that you wanted me to discuss the formation of the State I readily complied, being very well aware, that, if you only would, none were better qualified to carry the discussion further, and that when you had engaged our city in a suitable war, you of all men living could best exhibit her playing her part in that situation. Having now completed my task, I in return impose this other task upon you. There was an agreement that you were to entertain me as I have entertained you. Here am I in festive array, and no man can be more ready for the promised banquet.

Her. And we too, Socrates, as Timaeus says, will do all that we can ; what excuse have we for not complying with your request ? As soon as we arrived yesterday at the guest-chamber of Critias, with whom we are staying, or rather on our

way thither, we talked the matter over, and he told us an ancient tradition, which I wish, Critias, that you would repeat to Socrates, and then he will be able to judge whether his requirements are likely to be fulfilled.

Crit. That I will, if Timaeus, who is our partner, approves.

Tim. I approve.

Crit. Then listen, Socrates, to a strange tale which is, however, certainly true, as Solon, who was the wisest of the seven sages, declared. He was a relative and a great friend of my great-grandfather, Dropidas, as he himself says repeatedly in his poems; and Dropidas told Critias, my grandfather, who remembered and told us:—That there were of old great and marvellous actions of the Athenians, which have passed into oblivion
21 through time and the destruction of the inhabitants, and one in particular, greater than all the rest, which we now call to mind and will recite as a suitable testimony of our gratitude to you, and also as a hymn of praise true and worthy of the goddess, which we sing at her festival.

Soc. Very good. And what is this ancient famous action of which Critias spoke not as a mere legend, but as a veritable action of the Athenian state, which Solon recounted?

Crit. I will tell an old-world story which I heard from an aged man; for Critias was, as he said, at that time nearly ninety years of age, and I was about ten. Now the day was that day of the Apaturia which is called the registration of youth, at which, according to custom, our parents gave prizes for recitations, and the poems of several poets were recited by us boys, and many of us sang the poems of Solon, which at that time had not gone out of fashion. One of our tribe, either because he thought so or to please Critias, said that in his judgment Solon was not only the wisest of men, but also the noblest of poets. The old man, as I very well remember, brightened up at hearing this and said, smiling: Yes, Amynander, if Solon had only, like other poets, made poetry the business of his life, and had completed the tale which he brought with him from Egypt, and had not been compelled, by reasons of the factions and troubles which he found stirring in his own country when he came home, to attend to other matters, in my opinion he would have been as famous as Homer or Hesiod, or any poet.

And what was the poem about, Critias? said the person who addressed him.

About the greatest action which the Athenians ever did, and which ought to have been the most famous, but which, through the lapse of time and the destruction of the actors, has not come down to us.

Tell us, said the other, the whole story, and how and from whom Solon heard this veritable tradition.

He replied:—At the head of the Egyptian Delta, where the river Nile divides, there is a certain district which is called the district of Sais, and the great city of the district is also called Sais, and is the city from which Amasis the king was sprung. The citizens have a deity who is their foundress; she is called in the Egyptian tongue Neith, and is asserted by them to be the same whom the Hellenes called Athene; they are great lovers of the Athenians, and say that they are in some way related to them. To this city came Solon, who was received there with great honour; and he asked the priests who were ²² most skilful in such matters, about antiquity, and made the discovery that neither he nor any other Hellene knew anything worth mentioning about the times of old. On one occasion, when he was drawing them on to speak of antiquity, he began to tell about the most ancient things in our part of the world—about Phoroneus, who is called ‘the first,’ and about Niobe; and after the Deluge, to tell of the lives of Deucalion and Pyrrha; and he traced the genealogy of their descendants, and attempted to reckon how many years old were the events of which he was speaking, and to give the dates. Thereupon, one of the priests, who was of a very great age said: O Solon, Solon, you Hellenes are but children, and there is never an old man who is a Hellene. Solon in return asked him what he meant. I mean to say, he replied, that in mind you are all young; there is no old opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition; nor any science which is hoary with age. And I will tell you why. There have been, and will be again, many destructions of mankind arising out of many causes; the greatest have been brought about by the agencies of fire and water, and other lesser ones by innumerable other causes. There is a story, which even you have preserved, that once upon a time

Phaëthon, the son of Helios, having yoked the steeds in his father's chariot, because he was not able to drive them in the path of his father, burnt up all that was upon the earth, and was himself destroyed by a thunderbolt. Now, this has the form of a myth, but really signifies a declination of the bodies moving in the heavens around the earth, and a great conflagration of things upon the earth recurring after long intervals; at such times those who live upon the mountains and in dry and lofty places are more liable to destructions than those who dwell by rivers or on the seashore. And from this calamity the Nile, who is our never-failing saviour, saves and delivers us. When, on the other hand, the gods purge the earth with a deluge of water, among you the survivors are herdsmen and shepherds who dwell on the mountains, whereas those who, like you, live in cities are carried by the rivers into the sea. But in this country, neither then nor at any other time, does the water come down from above on the fields, having always a tendency to come up from below, for which reason the things preserved here are said to be the oldest. The fact is, that wherever the extremity of winter frost or of summer sun does not prevent, the human race is always tending to increase, though at times also diminishing in
23 numbers. And whatever happened either in your country or in ours, or in any other region of which we are informed—any action which is noble or great or in any other way remarkable has all been written down by us of old, and is preserved in our temples; whereas you and other nations are just beginning to be provided with letters and the other requisites of civilized life when at the usual period, the stream from heaven descends like a pestilence, and leaves only those of you who are destitute of letters and education; and thus you have to begin all over again as children, and know nothing of what happened in ancient times, either among us or among yourselves. As for those genealogies of yours which you have recounted to us, Solon, they are no better than the tales of children; for in the first place you remember one deluge only, and there were many of them; in the next place, you do not know that there formerly dwelt in your land the fairest and noblest race of men which ever lived, of whom you and your whole city are but a seed or remnant. And this was unknown to you, because for

many generations the survivors of that destruction died and made no sign. For there was a time, Solon, before the great deluge of all, when the city which now is Athens, was first in war and in every way the best governed of all cities, and is said to have performed the noblest deeds and to have had the fairest constitution of any of which tradition tells, under the face of heaven. Solon marvelled at his words, and earnestly requested the priest to inform him exactly and in order about these former citizens. You are welcome to hear about them, Solon, said the priest, both for your own sake and for that of your city, and above all, for the sake of the goddess who is the common patron and parent and educator of both our cities. She founded your city a thousand years before ours, receiving from the Earth and Hephaestus the seed of your race, and then she founded ours, of which the constitution is recorded in our sacred registers to be 8000 years old. As touching your citizens of 9000 years ago, I will briefly inform you of their laws and of the noblest of their actions; and the exact particulars of the ²⁴ whole we will hereafter go through at our leisure in the sacred registers themselves. If you compare these very laws with your own you will find that many of ours are the counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. In the first place, there is the caste of priest, which is separated from all the others; next there are the artificers, who exercise their several crafts by themselves and without admixture of any other; and also there is the class of shepherds and that of hunters¹, as well as that of husbandmen; and you will observe, too, that the warriors in Egypt are separated from all the other classes, and are commanded by the law only to engage in war; moreover, the weapons with which they are equipped are shields and spears, and this the goddess taught first among you, and then in Asiatic countries, and we among the Asiatics first adopted. Then as to wisdom, do you observe what care the law took from the very first, searching out and comprehending the whole order of things including prophecy and medicine (the latter with a view to health; and out of the divine elements of these drawing what was needful for human life, and adding every sort of

¹ Reading τὸ τῶν θηρευτῶν.

knowledge which was connected with them. All this order and arrangement the goddess first imparted to you when establishing your city; and she chose the spot of earth in which you were born, because she saw that the happy temperament of the seasons in that land would produce the wisest of men. Wherefore the goddess, who was a lover both of war and of wisdom, selected and first of all settled that spot which was the most likely to produce men likest herself. And there you dwelt, having such laws as these and still better ones, and excelled all mankind in all virtue as became the children and disciples of the gods.

Many great and wonderful deeds are recorded of your State in our histories. But one of them exceeds all the rest in greatness and valour. For these histories tell of a mighty power which was aggressing wantonly against the whole of Europe and Asia, and to which your city put an end. This power came forth out of the Atlantic Ocean, for in those days the Atlantic was navigable; and there was an island situated in front of the straits which you call the pillars of Heracles; the island was larger than Libya and Asia put together, and
 25 was the way to other islands, and from the islands you might pass to the whole of the opposite continent which surrounded the true ocean; for this sea which is within the Straits of Heracles is only a harbour, having a narrow entrance, but that other is a real sea, and the surrounding land may be most truly called a continent. Now in this island of Atlantis there was a great and wonderful empire which had rule over the whole island and several others, as well as over parts of the continent, and, besides these, they subjected the parts of Libya within the columns of Heracles as far as Egypt, and of Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. The vast power which was thus gathered into one endeavoured to subdue at a blow our country and yours and the whole of the land which is within the straits; and then, Solon, your country shone forth, in the excellence of her virtue and strength, among all mankind; for she was first in courage and military skill, and was the leader of the Hellenes. And when the rest fell off from her, being compelled to stand alone, after having undergone the very extremity of danger, she defeated and triumphed over the invaders, and

preserved from slavery those who were not yet subjected, and freely liberated all the others who dwelt within the limits of Heracles. But afterwards there occurred violent earthquakes and floods; and in a single day and night of misfortune all your warlike men in a body sank into the earth, and the island of Atlantis in like manner disappeared, and was sunk beneath the sea. And that is the reason why the sea in those parts is impassable and impenetrable, because there is such a quantity of shallow mud in the way; and this was caused by the subsidence of the island.

I have told you shortly, Socrates, the tradition which the aged Critias heard from Solon. And when you were speaking yesterday about your city and citizens, the tale which I am repeating to you came into my mind, and I could not help remarking how, by some coincidence not to be explained, you agreed in almost every particular with the account of Solon; but I did not like to speak at the moment. For as a long time had elapsed, I had forgotten too much, and I thought ²⁶ that I must first of all run over the narrative in my own mind, and then I would speak. And for this reason I readily assented to your request yesterday, considering that I was pretty well furnished with a theme such as the audience would approve, and to find this is generally the difficulty.

And therefore, as Hermocrates has told you, on my way home yesterday I at once communicated the tale to my companions in order to refresh my memory; and afterwards during the night by trying to recollect I recovered nearly the whole of it. Truly, as is often said, the lessons which we have learned as children make a wonderful impression on our memories; for I am not sure that I could remember all the discourse of yesterday, but I should be much surprised if I forgot any of these things which I have heard very long ago. When a child, I listened with great interest to the old man's narrative at the time; he was very ready to teach me, and I asked him again and again to repeat his words, so that they were branded into my mind in ineffaceable letters. As soon as the day broke I rehearsed them as he spoke them to my companions, that they as well as myself might have a material of discourse. And now, Socrates, I am ready to tell you the whole tale of which

this is the introduction. I will give you not only the general heads, but the minute details. And as to the city and citizens, which you yesterday described to us in fiction, let us transfer them to the world of reality; this shall be the ancient city of Athens, and we will suppose that the citizens whom you imagined, were our veritable ancestors—the same of whom the priest was telling; they will perfectly agree, and there will be no inconsistency in saying that the citizens of your republic are these ancient Athenians. Let us distribute the discussion amongst us, and all endeavour as far as we can to comply with your requirements. Consider then, Socrates, if this narrative is suited to the purpose, or whether we should seek for some other instead.

Soc. And what other, Critias, can we find that will be better than this, which is natural and suitable to the festival of the goddess, and has the very great advantage of being a fact and not a fiction? How or where shall we find others if we abandon this? There are none to be had, and therefore you must tell
27 the tale, and good luck to you; and I in return for my yesterday's discourse will now rest and be a listener.

Crit. Let me proceed to explain to you, Socrates, the order in which we have arranged our entertainment. Our intention is, that Timaeus, who is the most of an astronomer amongst us, and has made a special study of the nature of the universe, should speak first, beginning with the generation of the world and going down to the creation of man; next, I am to receive the citizens of whom he is the imaginary parent, and some of whom will have profited by the excellent education which you have given them; and then, in conformity with the law of Solon, we will bring the heroes of his tale into court and judge them ourselves, as if they were those very Athenians whom the sacred Egyptian record has recovered from oblivion, and we shall thenceforward be entitled to speak of them as Athenians and fellow-citizens.

Soc. I see that I shall receive in my turn a perfect and splendid feast of reason. And now, Timaeus, you, I suppose, are to follow, first offering up a prayer to the gods according to custom.

Tim. All men, Socrates, who have any degree of right feeling,

at the beginning of every enterprise whether small or great always call upon God. And we, too, who are going to discourse of the nature of the universe, how created or how existing without creation, if we be not altogether out of our wits, must invoke and pray the gods and goddesses that we may say all things in a manner pleasing to them above all and likewise consistent with ourselves. Let this, then, be our invocation of the gods, to which I add an exhortation of myself that I may set forth this high argument in the manner which will be most intelligible to you, and will most accord with my own intent.

First, if I am not mistaken, we must determine, What is that which always is and has no becoming; and what is that which is always becoming and never is. That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason always is, and is the same; but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation²⁸ and without reason, is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is. Now everything that becomes or is created must of necessity be created by some cause, for nothing can be created without a cause. The work of the artificer who looks always to the abiding and the unchangeable, and who designs and fashions his work after an unchangeable pattern, must of necessity be made fair and perfect; but that of an artificer who looks to the created only, and fashions his work after a created pattern, is not fair or perfect. Was the heaven then or the world, whether called by this or any other more acceptable name—assuming the name, I am asking a question which has to be asked at the beginning of every enquiry—was the world, I say, always in existence and without beginning? or created and having a beginning? Created, I reply, being visible and tangible and having a body, and therefore sensible; and all sensible things which are apprehended by opinion and sense are in a process of creation and created. Now that which is created must of necessity be created by a cause. But how can we find out the father and maker of all this universe? And when we have found him to speak of his nature to all men is impossible. Yet one more question has to be asked about him, Which of the patterns had the artificer in view when he made the world, the pattern which

29 is unchangeable, or that which is created? If the world be indeed fair and the artificer good, then, as is plain, he must have looked to that which is eternal. But if what cannot be said without blasphemy is true, then he looked to the created pattern. Every one will see that he must have looked to the eternal, for the world is the fairest of creations and He is the best of causes. And having been created in this way the world has been framed with a view to that which is apprehended by reason and mind and is unchangeable, and must if this be admitted of necessity be the copy of something. Now that the beginning of everything should be according to nature is a great matter. And in speaking of the copy and original we may assume that words are akin to the matter which they describe; when they relate to the lasting and permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unailing, and as far as in their nature is irrefutable and immovable—nothing less. But when they express only the copy or image and not the eternal, things themselves they need only be probable and analogous to the real words. As being is to becoming, so is truth to belief. If then, Socrates, amid the many opinions about the gods and the generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are in every way exact and consistent with one another, do not be surprised. Enough, if we adduce probabilities as likely as any others, for we must remember that I who am the speaker, and you who are the judges, are only mortal men, and we ought to accept the tale which is probable and not enquire further.

Soc. Excellent, Timæus; and you may be assured that we will: The prelude is charming, and is already accepted—may we beg of you to proceed to the strain?

Tim. Let me tell you then why the creator created and made the universe. He was good, and no goodness can ever have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired that all things should be as like himself as possible.

30 This is the true beginning of creation and of the world, as we shall do well in believing on the testimony of wise men: God desired that all things should be good and nothing bad in so far as this could be accomplished. Wherefore also finding the whole visible sphere not at rest, but moving in an irregular

and disorderly manner, out of disorder he brought order, considering that this was far better than the other. Now the deeds of him who is the best can never be or have been other than the fairest; and the creator reflecting upon the visible work of nature, found that no unintelligent creature taken as a whole was fairer than the intelligent taken as a whole; and that intelligence could not exist in anything which was devoid of soul. For these reasons he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in the order of nature. And therefore using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living soul and truly rational through the providence of God.

This being supposed, let us proceed to consider the further question, in the likeness of what animal did the Creator make the world? Certainly we cannot suppose that the form was like that of any being which exists in parts only; for nothing can be beautiful which is like any imperfect thing; but we may regard the world as the very likeness of that whole of which all other animals both individually and in their tribes are portions. For the original of the universe contains in itself all intelligible beings, just as this world comprehends us and all other visible creatures. For the Deity intending to make this world like the fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed one visible animal comprehending all other animals of a kindred nature. Are we right in saying that there is one heaven, or ³¹ shall we rather say that there are many and infinite? There is one, if the created heaven accords with the original. For that which includes all other intelligible creatures cannot have a second or companion; in that case there would be need of another living being which would include those two, and of which they would be parts, and the likeness would be more truly said to resemble not those two, but that other which included them. In order then that the world might be like the perfect animal in unity, he who made the worlds made them not two or infinite in number; but there is and ever will be one only-begotten and created heaven.

Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal, and also visible and tangible. And nothing is visible where there is no fire, or tangible which is not solid, and nothing is solid

without earth. Wherefore also, God in the beginning of creation made the body of the universe to consist of fire and earth. But two things cannot be held together without a third; they must have some bond of union. And the fairest bond is that which most completely fuses and is fused into the things which are bound; and proportion is best adapted to effect such a fusion. For whenever in three numbers, or magnitudes or powers of any kind, there is a mean, and the mean is to the last term what the first term is to the mean; and again, when the mean is to the first term as the last term is to the mean, then the mean becoming first and last, and the first and last both becoming means, all things will of necessity come to be the same, and being the same with one another will all be one. If the universal frame had been created a surface only and having no depth, one mean would have sufficed to bind together itself and the other terms; but now, as the world must be solid, and solid bodies are always compacted not by one mean but by two, God placed water and air in the mean between fire and earth, and made them to have the same proportion so far as was possible (as fire is to air so is air to water, and as air is to water so is water to earth), and thus he bound and put together a visible and palpable heaven. And for these reasons, and out of such elements which are in number four, the body of the world was created in harmony and proportion, and therefore having the spirit of friendship; and being at unity with itself, was indissoluble by the hand of any other than the framer.

Now the creation took up the whole of each of the four elements; for the Creator compounded the world out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any power of them outside. He intended, in the first place, that the animal should be as far as possible a perfect whole and of perfect parts, and should be one, leaving no remnants out of which another such world might be created: and also that he should be free from old age and unaffected by disease. Considering that hot and cold and other powerful forces which unite bodies are apt to surround and attack them from without when they are unprepared, and by bringing diseases and old age upon them, make them to

dissolve and die—for this cause and on these grounds he fabricated the world whole and of all the elements entire, and therefore perfect and not liable to old age and disease. And he gave to the world the figure which was suitable and also natural. Now to the animal which was to comprehend all animals, that figure was suitable which comprehends within itself all other figures. Wherefore he made the world in the form of a globe, round as from a lathe, in every direction equally distant from the centre to the extremes, the most perfect and the most like itself of all figures; for he considered that the like is infinitely fairer than the unlike. This he finished all round, and made the outside quite smooth for many reasons; in the first place, because eyes would have been of no use to the living being when there was nothing remaining without him, or which could be seen; and there would have been no use in ears when there was nothing to be heard; nor was there any surrounding atmosphere to be breathed; nor would there have been any use of implements by the help of which he might receive his food or get rid of what he had already digested; for there was nothing which went from him or came to him, since there was nothing at all beside him. Nourishment was provided by him to himself through his own waste, and all that he did or suffered was done in himself and by himself, according to art. For the Creator conceived that a being which was self-sufficient would be far more excellent than one which lacked anything; and, as he had no need to take anything or defend himself against any one, he had no need of hands, and the Creator did not think necessary to furnish him with them when he did not want them: nor had he any need of feet, nor of the whole apparatus of walking; but he assigned 34 to him the motion appropriate to his spherical form, being of all the seven that which is most appropriate to mind and intelligence; and so he made him move in the same manner and on the same spot, within his own limits revolving in a circle. All the other six motions he took away from him, and made him not liable to be affected by them. And as this circular movement required no feet, he made the universe without feet or legs.

Such was the whole scheme of the eternal God about the

god that was to be, to whom he for all these reasons gave a body, smooth, even, and in every direction equi-distant from a centre, entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect bodies. And in the centre he put the soul, which he diffused through the whole, and also spread over all the body round about; and he made one solitary and only heaven, a circle moving in a circle, having such excellence as to be able to hold converse with itself, and needing no other friendship or acquaintance. Having these purposes in view he created the world a blessed god.

Now God did not make the soul after the body, although we have spoken of them in this order; for when he put them together he would never have allowed that the elder should serve the younger, but this is a random manner of speaking which we have, because we ourselves too are very largely affected by chance. Whereas he made the soul in origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the subject. And he made her
35 out of the following elements and on this manner: of the unchangeable and indivisible, and also of the divisible and corporeal, he made a third sort of intermediate essence, partaking of the same and of the other or diverse, and this compound in like manner he placed in a mean between the indivisible and the divisible or corporeal. He took the three elements of the same, the other, and the essence, and mingled them all together, compressing the reluctant and unsociable nature of the other into the same. And when he had mixed them and out of all the three made one, he again divided this whole into as many portions as was fitting, each of them containing an admixture of all three. And he began to divide on this wise:—first of all, he took away one part of the whole, and then he separated

[1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27,]

a second part which was double the first, and then he took away a third part which was half as much again as the second and three times as much again as the first, and then he took a fourth part which was twice as much as the second, and a fifth part which was three times as much as the third, and a sixth

part which was eight times as much as the first, and a seventh part which was twenty-seven times as much as the first. After this he filled up the double and triple intervals [i. e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 3⁶ and 1, 3, 9, 27], cutting off portions from the whole and placing them between the intervals, so that in each interval there were two kinds of means—

$$\begin{aligned} & [\overline{1}, \frac{4}{3}, \frac{3}{2}, \overline{2}, \frac{8}{3}, 3, \overline{4}, \frac{16}{3}, 6, \overline{8},] \\ & [\overline{1}, \frac{3}{2}, 2, \overline{3}, \frac{9}{2}, 6, \overline{9}, \frac{27}{2}, 18, \overline{27},] \end{aligned}$$

the one exceeding and exceeded by equal parts of the respective extremes [as for example 1, $\frac{4}{3}$, 2, in which the mean $\frac{4}{3}$ is one-third of 1 more than 1 and one-third of 2 less than 2], the other being that kind of mean which exceeds and is exceeded by an equal number. Where there are intervals of $\frac{3}{2}$ and of $\frac{4}{3}$ and of $\frac{9}{8}$, made by the connecting terms in the former intervals, he filled up all the intervals of $\frac{4}{3}$ with the intervals of $\frac{9}{8}$, leaving of each a part whose interval was in the ratio of 256 to 243¹. And thus the whole mixture out of which he cut these portions was all exhausted by him. This entire compound he divided lengthways into two parts, which he joined to one another at the centre like the figure of a X, and bent them into a circular form, connecting them with themselves and each other at the point opposite to their original meeting point; and, comprehending them in an uniform motion on the same spot around a centre, he made the one the outer and the other the inner circle. Now the motion of the outer circle he called the motion of the same, and the motion of the inner circle the motion of the other or diverse. The motion of the same he carried round by the side to the right, and the motion of the diverse diagonally to the left. And he gave dominion to the motion of the same and the like, for that he left single and undivided; but the inner motion he split into six portions and made seven unequal orbits having their intervals in ratios of two and three, three of each, and bade the orbits proceed in a direction opposite to one another; and three [Sun, Mercury, Venus] he made to move

¹ E.g. 243 : 256 :: $\frac{81}{64} : \frac{4}{3} :: \frac{243}{128} : 2 :: \frac{81}{32} : \frac{8}{3} :: \frac{243}{64} : 4 :: \frac{81}{16} : \frac{16}{3} ::$

²⁴²₃₂ : 8. (MARTIN.)

with equal swiftness, and the remaining four [Moon, Saturn, Mars, Jupiter] to move with unequal swiftness to the three and to one another, but all in order and reason.

Now when the Creator had framed the soul according to his will, he formed within her the corporeal universe, and brought them together, and united them centre to centre. The soul, interfused everywhere from the centre to the circumference of heaven, of which she is the external envelopment, herself turning in herself, began a divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational life enduring throughout all time. The body of
 37 heaven is visible, but the soul is invisible, and partakes of reason and harmony, and being made by the best of intellectual and everlasting natures, is the best of things created. And because she is composed of the same and of the other and of the essence, these three, and divided and bound together in proportion, and is revolving backwards and forwards in herself, the soul, when touching anything which has essence, whether dispersed in parts or undivided, is stirred through all her powers, to declare the sameness or difference of that and some other thing; and in relation to what and in what way and how and when individuals are connected or affected, both in the world of generation and in the world of immutable being. And when reason, which works with equal truth both in the circle of the diverse and of the same,—in the sphere of the self-moved in voiceless silence moving,—when reason, I say, is hovering around the sensible world and the circle of the diverse also moving truly¹ imparts the intimations of sense to the whole soul, then arise fixed and true opinions and beliefs. But when reason is dwelling in the rational, and the circle of the same moving smoothly indicates this, then intelligence and knowledge are of necessity perfected. And if any one affirms that in which these are found to be other than the soul, he will say the very opposite of the truth.

When the father and creator saw the creature which he had made moving and living, the created glory of the eternal gods, he was delighted, and in his joy determined to conform his work to the original still more, and as this was eternal, he sought

¹ Reading αὐτό.

to make the universe eternal, as far as might be. Now the nature of the intelligible being is eternal, but to attach eternity to the creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have an image of eternity, which he made when he set in order the heaven moving according to number, while eternity rested in unity; and this image we call time. For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven was created, but when he created the heaven he created them also. They are all parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say indeed that he was, he is, he will be, but the truth is that 'he is' alone truly expresses him, and that ³⁸ 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time, nor ever did or has become, or hereafter will be, older, nor is subject at all to any of those states of generation which affect the movements of sensible things. These are the forms of time when imitating eternity and moving in a circle measured by number. Moreover, when we say that what has become has become, and what is becoming is becoming, and that what will become will become, and that what is not is not,—all these are inaccurate modes of expression. But perhaps this is not the place in which we should discuss minutely such matters.

Time, then, was created with the heaven, in order that being produced together they might be dissolved together, if ever there was to be any dissolution of them; and was framed after the pattern of the eternal nature, that it might, as far as possible, resemble it, for that pattern exists throughout all ages, and the created heaven has been, and is, and will be in all time. Such was the mind and thought of God in the creation of time: He made the sun and moon and five other stars, which are called the planets, in order to distinguish and preserve the numbers of time, and when he made them he assigned to them the orbits in which the circle of the other revolved (cp. 36 D). There were seven orbits, as the stars were seven; first, there was the moon which is the planet nearest the earth, and then the sun next nearest beyond the earth, and the morning star and the star sacred to Hermes, moving in their orbits as swiftly as the sun,

but with an opposite motion; and this is the reason why the sun and Hermes and Lucifer meet or overtake and are met or overtaken by each other. To enumerate the places which he assigned to the other stars, and the reasons of them, if they were all to be gone through, although secondary matters, would give more trouble than the primary. These things at some future time, when we are at leisure, may have the consideration which they deserve, but not at present.

Now, when all the stars which were needed to make time had attained a motion suitable to them, and their bodies fastened by vital chains, had become living creatures and learnt their appointed task according to the motions of the diverse, which is
39 diagonal, and passes through and is overruled by the motions of the same, they revolved, some in a larger and some in a lesser orbit,—those which had the lesser orbit revolving faster, and those which had the larger moving more slowly. Now by reason of the motion of the same, those which revolved fastest appeared to be overtaken by those which moved slower although they really overtook them; for the motion of the same made them turn in a spiral, and, because some went one way, and some another, that which receded most slowly from the sphere of the same, which was the swiftest, appeared to follow it most nearly. That there might be some visible measure of their relative swiftness and slowness as they proceeded in their eight courses, God lighted a fire, which we now call the sun, in the second from the earth of these orbits, that it might give light to the whole of heaven, and that the animals whom nature intended might participate in number, and learn arithmetic from the revolutions of the same and the like. Thus, then, and for this reason the night and the day were created, being the period of the one most intelligent revolution. And the month is accomplished when the moon has completed her orbit and overtaken the sun, and the year when the sun has completed his own orbit. The periods of the other stars have not been understood by men in general, but only a few, and they have no name for them, and do not estimate their comparative length by the aid of number, and hence they are hardly aware that their wanderings, being infinite in number and admirable for their variety, make up time. And yet there is no

difficulty in seeing that the perfect number of time completes the perfect year when all the eight revolutions, having their relative degrees of swiftness, are accomplished together, governed by the circle of the same moving equally, and begin again at their original points of departure. After this manner, and to this end, came into being such of the stars as in their heavenly progress had times of change, in order that the created heaven might be as like as possible to the perfect and intelligible animal, and imitate the eternal nature.

Thus far and until the birth of time the created universe was made in the likeness of the original, but inasmuch as all animals were not yet included in it, there was a difference. What remained, the creator then proceeded to fashion after the nature of the pattern. Now as in the ideal animal the mind perceives ideas or species of a certain nature and number, so he thought that this created animal ought to have species of a like nature and number making the copy complete. There are four such; one of them is the heavenly race of the gods; another, the race of birds moving in the air; the third, the watery species; and the fourth, the pedestrian and land creatures. Of the divine, he made the greater part out of fire, that they might be the brightest of all things and fairest to the sight, and he made them after the likeness of the universe in the form of a circle, and gave them to know and follow the best, distributing them over the whole circumference of the heaven, which was to be a true cosmos or glory spangled with them. And he bestowed on each of them two motions; first, the motion in the same, because they ever continue thinking consistently the same thoughts about the same things, and also a forward motion, in that they are controlled by the revolution of the same and the like; but by the other five motions they were unaffected (cp. 43 B), in order that each of them might be the best possible. And for this reason the fixed stars were created as they are, being divine and eternal animals, ever-abiding and revolving after the same manner and on the same spot; and the other stars which change their motions and wander, were created in the manner already described after their image. The earth, which is our nurse, clinging¹ around the pole which is extended through the

¹ Or 'circling.'

universe, he made to be the guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven. Vain would be the labour of telling about all the figures of them moving as in dance, and their meetings with one another, and the return of them in their revolutions towards each other, and their approximations, and to say which of them in their conjunctions meet, and which of them are in opposition, and in what order, and when, they get behind and before one another, and are severally eclipsed to our sight and again reappear, sending terrors and intimations of things about to happen to those who can calculate them—to attempt to tell of all this without looking at the models of them would be labour in vain. Let what we have said about the nature of the created and visible gods be deemed sufficient and have an end.

To tell of other divinities, and to know their origin, is beyond us, and we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods, and they must surely have known the truth about their own ancestors. How can we doubt the word of the children of the gods? although they give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare that they are speaking of what took place in the family, we must believe them in obedience to the law. In this manner, then, according to them, the genealogy of these gods is to be received and narrated :—

Oceanus and Tethys were the children of Earth and Heaven, and from these sprang Phorcys and Cronos and Rhea, and many more with them ; and from Cronos and Rhea sprang Zeus and
 41 Herè, and all those whom we know as their brethren, and others who were their children.

Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear in their revolutions as well as those other gods who are of a more retiring nature, had come into being, the creator of the universe spoke to them as follows : ‘ Gods and sons of gods who are my works, and of whom I am the artificer and father, my creations are indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be dissolved, but only an evil being would wish to dissolve that which is harmonious and happy. And although being created, ye are not altogether immortal and indissoluble, ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable to the fate of death ;

having in my will a greater and mightier bond than those which bound you at the time of creation. And now listen to my instructions :—Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created,—without them the universe will be incomplete, for it will not contain every kind of animal which a perfect world ought to contain. On the other hand, if they were created and received life from me, they would be on an equality with the gods. In order then that there may be mortals, and that this universe may be truly universal, do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves to the formation of animals, imitating the power which I showed in creating you. The divine and immortal part of them, which is the guiding principle of those who are willing to follow justice and the gods—of that divine part I will myself give you the seed and beginning. And do you then weave together the mortal and immortal, and make and beget living creatures, and give them food, and make them to grow, and receive them again in death.

Thus he spake, and once more and in the same manner poured the remains of the elements into the cup in which he had previously mingled the soul of the universe, no longer, however, pure as before, but diluted to the second and third degree. And having made it he divided the whole mixture into souls equal in number to the stars, and assigned each soul to a star ; and having there placed them as in a chariot, he showed them the nature of the universe, and the appointment of destiny, telling them that their first birth would be one and the same for all, and that no one should suffer at his hands ; and that when they were sown in the vessels of time severally adapted to them, from them would come forth the most religious of animals ; and as human nature was of two kinds, the superior ⁴² race would hereafter be called man. Now, as they were implanted in bodies by necessity, and were always gaining or losing some part of their bodily substance, in the first place there was a necessity that they should have sensation and be all affected in the same manner by external force ; in the second place, they must have love, which is a mixture of pleasure and pain ; also fear and anger, and the feelings which are akin or opposite to them ; if they conquered these they would live righteously, and if they were conquered by them, unrighteously.

He who lived well during his appointed time was to return to the star which was his habitation and there he would have a blessed and suitable existence. But if he failed in attaining this, in the second generation he would pass into a woman, and should he not desist from evil in that condition, he would be changed into some brute who resembled him in his evil ways, and would not cease from his toils and transformations until he followed the original principle of sameness and likeness within him, and overcame by the help of reason the later accretions of turbulent and irrational elements composed of fire and air and water and earth, and returned to the form of his first and better nature. Having given all these laws to his creatures, that he might be guiltless of their future evil, the creator sowed some of them in the earth, and some in the moon, and some in the other stars which are the vessels of time; and when he had sown them he committed to the younger gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired them to furnish what was still lacking to the human soul, and make all the suitable additions, and rule and pilot the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner which they could, and avert from him all but self-inflicted evils.

When the creator had given all these commands he remained as befitted him in his own nature, and his children heard and were obedient to their father's word, and receiving from him the immortal principle of a mortal creature, in imitation of their
 43 own creator they borrowed portions of fire, and earth, and water, and air from the world, which were hereafter to be returned—these they took and welded them together, not with the indissoluble chains by which they were bound themselves, but with numerous little invisible pegs, making up out of all the four elements each separate body, subject to influx and efflux, and fastened the courses of the immortal soul in the body. Now these courses, detained as in a vast river, neither overcame nor were overcome; but bore and were borne along violently, so that the whole animal was moved and progressed, irregularly however and irrationally, and in any direction, wandering and coursing according to the six kinds of motion backwards and forwards, and right and left, and up and down, and in all the six divisions of place. For great as was the advancing and retreating flood which provided nourishment, the affections produced

by external contact caused still greater tumult—when the body of any one met and came into collision with external fire, or with the solid earth or the gliding waters, or was caught in the whirlwind hurried along by the air; and the motions produced by any of these impulses were carried through the body to the soul. All such motions have consequently received the general name of ‘sensations,’ which they still retain. And these at the moment occasion a very great and mighty movement; they accompany the ever-flowing current, and stir and shake the courses of the soul, and altogether bind fast the courses of the same with their opposing flux and hinder them from ruling and moving onward; and the nature of the other or diverse they so disturb, that the three intervals which formed a progression of doubles (1, 2, 4, 8), and also of triples (1, 3, 9, 27), together with the mean terms and connecting links which are formed by the ratios of 3:2, and 4:3, and of 9:8,—these although they cannot be wholly dissolved except by him who tied them together, they twist in all sorts of ways, and bend and disorder the circles as far as they can, so that they are tumbling to pieces, and when they move, move irrationally, at one time straightforward, and then again obliquely, and then upside down, as you might imagine a person who is upside down and has his head leaning upon the ground and his feet up against something in the air; and when he is in such a condition, both he and the spectator fancy that the right of either is his left, and the left right. This and the like of this is what violently moves the courses when they meet with some external thing, either of 44 the class of the same or of the other; and they speak of it as the same with something, or the other of something, in a manner which is the very opposite of the truth; and they become false and foolish, and there is no course or revolution in them which has a guiding or directing power; and if again any sensations enter in violently from without and drag after them the whole vessel of the soul, then though they seem to conquer they are really conquered.

And by reason of all these affections, the soul when enclosed in a mortal body is at first without intelligence; but when the stream of growth and nutriment flows in with diminished speed, and the courses of the soul attaining a calm go their

own way and become steadier as time advances, then the revolutions of the several circles return to their natural figure, and call the same and the other by their right names, and make the possessor of them a rational being. And if these combine in him with any true nurture or education, he attains the fulness and health of the perfect man, and escapes the worst disease of all; but if he neglects education he walks lame while alive to the end of his journey, and returns imperfect and good for nothing to the world below. This, however, is a later stage; at present we must treat more exactly the subject before us, which involves a preliminary enquiry into the generation of the body and its members, and as to how the soul was created, and from what causes and by what foreknowledge of the gods, and still holding fast to probability, pursue our way.

First, then, the gods, imitating the spherical shape of the universe, enclosed the two divine courses in a spherical body, that, namely, which we now term the head, being the most divine part of us and the lord of all that is in us: to this the gods who put together the body gave all the other members to be servants, contriving that it should partake of every sort of motion; in order then that it might not tumble about among the deep and high places of the earth, but might be able to get out of the one and over the other, they provided the body to be its vehicle and means of locomotion; which consequently had length and was furnished with four limbs extended and jointed; these the gods contrived as instruments of locomotion with which it might take hold and find support, and
 45 so be able to pass through all places, carrying on high the dwelling-place of the most sacred and divine part of us. Such was the origin of legs and arms, which were therefore attached to every man; and the gods, esteeming the front part of man as more honourable and having more authority than the hinder part, they gave men mostly a forward motion. Now it was necessary that man should have his front part distinguished and unlike the rest of his body. Wherefore also about the vessel of the head, they first of all put in a face in which they inserted organs to minister in all things to the providence of the soul, and to this anterior part they assigned a share

of authority. And of the organs they first contrived the eyes to give light, inserting them by a cause in the following manner: they contrived that as much of fire as would not have the power of burning, but would only give a gentle light, the light of every-day life, should be formed into a body; and the pure fire which is within us and akin thereto they made to flow through the eyes in a smooth uninterrupted and undivided stream, especially at the centre of the eye, which was hardened and therefore allowed nothing to pass of a coarser nature but only this pure element. When the light of day surrounds the stream of vision, then like falls upon like, and there is a union, and one body is formed by natural affinity in the line of vision, wherever the light that falls from within meets that which comes from an external object. And all things being affected by likeness, whenever they are touching or touched by the stream of vision, their motions are diffused over the whole body, and reach the soul, producing that perception which we call sight. But when the external and kindred fire passes away in night, then the stream of vision is cut off; for going forth to the unlike element it is changed and extinguished, being no longer of one nature with the surrounding atmosphere which is now deprived of fire: and so the eye no longer sees, and we go to sleep. When the eyelids are closed, which the gods invented for the preservation of sight, they keep in the internal fire; and the power of the fire diffuses and equalizes the inward motions; and when they are equalized there is rest, and when the rest is profound, sleep comes undisturbed by dreams; but where the greater motions still remain, whatever may be their nature and situations, they engender corresponding visions within us, which are remembered by us when we are awake and in the external world. And now there is no longer any difficulty in understanding the creation of images in mirrors and in all smooth and bright surfaces. The fires from within and from without communicate about the smooth surface, and form one image which is variously refracted. All which phenomena necessarily arise by reason of the fire or light about the eye combining with the fire or ray of light about the smooth and bright surfaces. And when the parts of the light within and the light without meet and touch in a manner contrary to the usual mode

of meeting, then the right appears to be left and the left right ; but the right again appears right, and the left left, when the position of one of the two concurring lights is inverted ; and this happens when the smooth surface of the mirror, which is concave, repels the right stream of vision to the left side, and the left to the right¹. Or if the mirror be turned vertically, then the face appears upside down, and the upper part of the rays are driven downwards, and the lower upwards.

These are the works of the second and co-operative causes which God, carrying into execution the idea of the best as far as possible, uses as his ministers. They are thought by most men not to be the second, but the prime causes of all things, because they freeze and heat, and contract and dilate, and the like. But they are not so, for they are incapable of reason or intellect ; the only being which can properly have mind is the invisible soul, whereas fire and water, and earth and air, are all of them visible bodies. The lover of intellect and knowledge ought to explore causes of intelligent nature first of all, and, secondly, of those things which are moved by others and of necessity move others. And this we too must now do. Both kinds of causes should be considered by us, but a distinction should be made between those which are endowed with mind and are the workers of things fair and good, and those which are deprived of intelligence and accomplish their several works by chance and without order. Of the second or concurrent causes of sight, which give to the eyes the power which they now possess, enough has been said. I will therefore now proceed to speak of the higher use and purpose for which
 47 God has given them to us. The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had the eyes never seen the stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, and the revolution of the months and years, have given us the invention of number, and a conception of time, and the power of enquiring about the nature of the whole ; and from this source we have

¹ He is speaking of two kinds of mirrors, first the plane, secondly the concave ; and the latter is supposed to be placed, first horizontally, and then vertically.

derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal man. This is the greatest boon of sight: and of the lesser benefits why should I speak? even the ordinary man if he were blind would in vain bewail the loss of them. Thus much let me say however: God invented and gave us sight to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the perturbed; and that we, learning them and being partakers of the true computations of nature, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries. The same may be affirmed of speech and hearing; they have been given by the gods to the same end and for a like reason. For this is the principal end of speech, and there is a similar use of musical sound, which is given to the hearing for the sake of harmony. And harmony, which has motions akin to the revolutions of our souls, is not regarded by him who intelligently uses the Muses as given by them with a view to irrational pleasure, which is the prevailing opinion in our day, but with a view to the inharmonic course of the soul, and to be our ally in reducing this into harmony and agreement with itself; and rhythm was given by them for the same reason, on account of the irregular and graceless ways which prevail among mankind generally, and to help us against them.

Thus far in what we have been saying, with small exceptions, the works of intelligence have been set forth; and now we must place by the side of them the things done from necessity—for the creation is mixed, being made up of necessity and mind. 48 Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity to bring the greater part of created things to perfection, and thus in the beginning, when the influence of reason got the better of necessity, the universe was created. But if a person will truly tell of the way in which the work was accomplished, he must include the other influence of the variable cause as well. Wherefore, we must return again and find another suitable beginning, as about the former matters, so also about these. To which end we must consider the nature of fire, and water, and air, and earth, which were prior to the creation of the heavens, and what happened

before there were elements; for no one has as yet explained them, but we speak of fire and the rest of them, whatever they mean, as though men knew their natures, and we maintain them to be the letters or elements of the whole, when they cannot reasonably be compared by a man of any sense even to the syllables or first compounds. And let me say thus much: I will not speak of the first principle or principles of all things, or by whatever name they are to be called, for this reason,—because it is difficult to set forth my opinion according to the mode of discussion which we are at present employing. Do not imagine, any more than I can bring myself to imagine, that I should be right in undertaking so difficult a task. I will observe the rule of probability with which I began, not less but more than others, and especially when I speak of the beginning of each and all¹. Once more, then, I call upon God, at the beginning of my discourse, and beg him to be our saviour out of a strange and unwonted enquiry, and to bring us to probability. So now let us begin again.

This new beginning of our discussion of the universe requires a fuller division than the former; for then we made two classes, now a third must be added. The two sufficed for the former discussion: one assumed by us to be a pattern intelligible and always the same; and there was a second, which was only
49 the imitation of the pattern, generated and visible; the third kind we did not distinguish at the time, conceiving that the two would be enough. But now the argument seems to require that we should show forth another kind, which is difficult of explanation and dimly seen. What natural power are we to attribute to this new kind of being? We reply, that it is the receptacle, and in a manner the nurse, of all generation. I have said the truth; but I must give a clearer explanation, and this will be an arduous task for many reasons, and in particular because I must first raise questions concerning fire and the other elements, and say what each of them is; for example, which of them is properly called water as distinct from fire, and by what name any element is called as dis-

¹ Putting the comma after *μᾶλλον δὲ*; but *καὶ ἔμπροσθεν* (?): Or, laying the stress on *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, 'but above all, I will begin at the beginning of each and all.'

tinguished from any other or from all of them ; and to give a certain or satisfactory proof of this is not easy. How, then, and in what way can we reason, and at what probable conclusion can we arrive ?

In the first place, that which we are now calling water, when congealed becomes stone and earth, as our sight seems to show us ; and this same element, when melted and dispersed, passes into vapour and air. Air, again, when burnt up, becomes fire ; and again fire, when condensed and extinguished, passes once more into the form of air ; and once more, air, when collected and condensed, produces cloud and vapour ; and from these, when still more compressed, comes flowing water, and from water comes earth and stones once more ; and thus generation appears to be transmitted from one to the other in a circle. Thus, then, as the elements never appear the same, how can any one have the assurance to maintain strongly that any of them is one thing rather than another ? No one can. But much the safest plan is to speak of them as follows:—Let us not call that which we see to be continually changing ‘fire,’ but rather say, ‘that some such nature is fire;’ and let us not speak of that other thing as water, but rather say that some such nature is water ; and let us not speak of objects at all as having stability, or erroneously imagine ourselves to indicate any of them by the term ‘this’ or ‘that,’ for they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as ‘this,’ or ‘the nature of this,’ or ‘the nature belonging to this,’ or any other form of language which implies their permanence. We must not speak of them as individual things, but rather say, of each and all of them, ‘such ;’ which word expresses the similar principle circulating in all of them ; for example, of fire we should say that the general principle is of such a nature always, and so of everything that has generation. That in which these principles severally grow up, and appear, and decay, is alone to be called by the name ‘this’ or ‘that;’ but that which is of a certain nature, 50 hot or white, or their opposites, and all that proceeds from them, ought not to be so denominated. Let me make one more attempt to explain my meaning more clearly. Suppose a person to make all kinds of figures of gold and never to cease transforming them out of one form into all the others ;—somebody

points to one of them and asks, What is that? By far the safest and truest answer is, That is gold; and not to speak of the triangle or of any other figures which are formed in the gold as having real existence, inasmuch as they are in process of change while he is making the assertion; but if he be willing to take the safe and general answer, we should be satisfied. And the same may be said of the universal nature which receives all bodies—that must be always called the same; for, while receiving all things, she never departs at all from her own nature, and never in any way, or at any time, assumes a form like that of the things which enter into her, being in fact the natural recipient of all impressions, moved and fashioned by them, and varying in appearance from time to time because of them. The bodies which enter into and go out of her are the images of realities modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner, which shall be hereafter investigated by us. But for the present we have only to conceive of three natures: first, that which is in process of generation; secondly, that in which the generation takes place; and thirdly, that of which the thing generated is the natural resemblance. Moreover, we may liken the receiving principle to a mother, and the source or spring to a father, and the intermediate nature to a child; and may remark further, that if the model is to take every variety of form, then the matter in which the model is fashioned, when duly prepared, must be formless, and the forms must come from without. For if the matter were like any of the supervening forms, then when any opposite or entirely different nature was impressed the representation would be a bad one, because the matter would shine through. Wherefore, that which is to receive all forms should have no form; as in making perfumes they first contrive that the liquid substance which is to receive the scent shall be as inodorous as possible; or as those who wish to impress figures on soft substances do not allow any previous impression
 51 to remain, but make the surface as even and smooth as possible. In the same way that which is to receive perpetually and through its whole extent the resemblances of eternal beings ought to be destitute of any particular form. Wherefore, the mother and receptacle of all created and visible and in any

way sensible things, is not to be termed earth, or air, or fire, or water, or any of their compounds, or any of the elements out of which they are composed, but is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and attains in a mysterious way a portion of the intelligible, and is most incomprehensible. In saying this we shall not be far wrong; as far, however, as we can attain to a knowledge of her from the previous considerations, we may truly say that fire is that part of her nature which is inflamed, and water that which is moist, earth and air being also parts, in so far as the mother substance receives the impressions of them.

Let us consider this question more precisely. Is there any self-existent fire? and are all those things of which we speak self-existent? or are only those things which we see, or in some way perceive through the bodily organs, truly existent, and no others besides them? And is all that which we call an intelligible essence nothing at all, and only a word? Here is a question which we must not leave unexamined or undetermined, or affirm too confidently that there can be no decision; neither must we interpolate in our present long discourse a digression as long, but if there be a way in which a great principle may be set forth in a few words, that will be what we want.

Thus I state my view:—If mind and true opinion are two distinct classes, then I say that there certainly are these self-existent ideas unperceived by sense, and apprehended only by the mind; if, however, as some say, true opinion differs in no respect from mind, then everything that we perceive through the body is to be considered as most real and certain. But we must affirm them to be distinct, for they have a distinct origin and are of a different nature; and the one is implanted in us by instruction, and the other by persuasion, and the one is always accompanied by true reason, and the other is without reason: the one is not to be moved by persuasion, but the other may be moved; and lastly, every man may be said to share in true opinion, but mind is the attribute of the gods only and of very few men. Wherefore, also, we must acknowledge that there is one kind of being which is always the same, uncreated and indestructible, never receiving anything into itself ⁵² from without, nor itself going out to any other, but invisible

and imperceptible by any sense, and of which the sight is granted to intelligence only. And there is another nature of the same name with it, and like to it, perceived by sense, created, always in motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place, which is apprehended by opinion and sense. And there is a third nature, which is space, and is eternal, and admits not of destruction, and provides a home for all created things, and is perceived without the help of sense, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly matter of belief ; which we beholding as in a dream, say of all existence that it must of necessity be in some place and occupy a space, but that what is neither in heaven nor in earth has no existence. These and other things of the same kind, relating to the true and waking reality of nature, we, having only such a dreamlike sense of them, are unable to arouse ourselves truly to describe or to determine. For an image, not possessing that of which the image is, and existing ever as the changing shadow of some other, must be inferred to be in another [i. e. in space], and in some way or other take hold of essence, or not be at all. But true and exact reason vindicating the nature of true being, maintains that while two things (i. e. the idea and the image) are different they cannot exist one of them in the other so as to become one and also two at the same time.

Thus have I concisely given the result of my thoughts ; and my opinion is that being and space and generation, these three, in their three manners existed before the heaven ; and that the nurse of generation, moistened by water and inflamed by fire, and receiving the various forms of earth and air, and experiencing all the other accidents that attach to them, took a variety of shapes ; and being full of powers which were neither similar nor equally balanced, was never in any part in a state of equipoise, but swaying unevenly to and fro, was shaken by them, and by its motion again shook them ; and the elements when moved were divided like the grain shaken and winnowed by fans and other instruments used in the threshing of corn,
 53 when the close and heavy particles are borne away and settle in one direction, and the loose and light particles in another. In this manner the four kinds or elements were then shaken by the recipient vessel, which, moving like a winnowing machine,

scattered far away from one another the elements most unlike, and forced the most similar elements into the closest contact. Wherefore also the elements had different places before the universe that was arranged out of them came into being. And at first all things were without reason and measure. But when the world began to get into order, first fire and water and earth and air, having only certain faint traces of themselves, and being altogether such as everything may be expected to be in the absence of God—this, I say, being their nature, God fashioned them by form and number. Let us always, and in all that we say, hold that God made them as far as possible the fairest and best, out of things which were not fair and good. And now I will endeavour to show you the disposition and generation of them by an unaccustomed argument, which I am compelled to use; but I believe that you will be able to follow me, for your education has made you familiar with the methods of science.

In the first place, then, as is evident to all, fire and earth and water and air are bodies. And every sort of body possesses solidity, and every solid must necessarily be contained in planes; and the plane rectilinear figure is composed of triangles; and all triangles are originally of two kinds, both of which are made up of one right and two acute angles; one of them has at either end of the base the half of a right angle which is divided by equal sides (of the triangle), while in the other unequal parts of a right angle are divided by unequal sides. These, then, proceeding by a combination of probability with demonstration, we assume to be the original elements of fire and the other bodies; but the principles which are prior to these God only knows, and he of men whom God loves. And next we have to determine what are the four most beautiful bodies which are unlike one another, and of which some are capable of resolution into one another; and having discovered thus much, we shall know the true origin of earth and fire and the proportionate and intermediate elements. And then we shall not be willing to allow that there are any distinct kinds of visible bodies fairer than these. Wherefore we must endeavour to construct the four forms of bodies which excel in beauty, and then we shall be able to say that we have sufficiently apprehended their

54 nature. Of the two triangles, the isosceles has one form only; the scalene or unequal-sided has an infinite number. Of the infinite forms we must select the most beautiful, if we are to proceed in due order, and any one who can point out a more beautiful form than ours for the construction of these bodies, shall carry off the palm, not as an enemy, but as a friend. Now, the one which we maintain to be the most beautiful of all the many figures of triangles (and we need not speak of the others) is that of which the double forms an equilateral triangle; the reason of this would be long to tell; he who disproves what we are saying, and proves that we are mistaken, may claim a friendly victory. Then let us choose two triangles, out of which fire and other bodies have been constructed, the one isosceles, the other having a longer side of which the square is three times as great as the square of the lesser side.

Now is the time to explain what was before obscurely said: there was an error in imagining that all the four elements might be generated by and into one another; this, I say, was wrong, for there are generated from the triangles which we have taken four kinds—three from the one which has the sides unequal; the fourth alone is framed out of the isosceles triangle. Hence they cannot all be resolved into one another, or compounded into larger out of smaller bodies, or the reverse. But three of them can be thus resolved and compounded, for they all spring from one, and when the greater bodies are dissolved, many small bodies will spring up out of them and take their own proper figures; or, again, when many small bodies are distributed in triangles, a single number will unite them into one large mass of another kind. So much for their passage into one another. I have now to speak of their several kinds, and show out of what combinations of numbers each of them was formed. The first will be the simplest and smallest compound, and its element is that triangle which has its hypotenuse twice the lesser side. When two such triangles are joined at the diagonal, and this is repeated three times, and the triangles rest their diagonals and shorter sides on the same point as a centre, a single equilateral triangle is formed out of six triangles; and four equilateral triangles, if put together, make out of every three plane angles one solid angle [=two right angles], which is

nearest to the most obtuse of plane angles ; and out of the 55 combination of these four angles arises the first solid form which distributes into equal and similar parts the entire sphere. The second species of solid is formed out of the same triangles, which unite as eight equilateral triangles and form one solid angle out of four plane angles, and out of six such angles the second body is completed. And the third body is made up of 120 triangular elements, forming twelve solid angles, each of them included in five plane equilateral triangles, having altogether twenty bases, each of which is an equilateral triangle. The one element [that is, the triangle with unequal sides] having generated these figures, generates no more ; but the triangle which has equal sides produces the fourth elementary figure, which is compounded of four such triangles, joining their right angles in a centre, and forming one equilateral quadrangle. Six of these united form eight solid angles, each of which is made by the combination of three plane right angles ; the figure of the body thus composed is a cube, having six plane quadrangular equilateral bases. There was yet a fifth combination which God used in the delineation of the universe.

Now, he who, duly reflecting on all this, enquires whether the worlds are to be regarded as infinite or finite, will be of opinion that the notion of their infinity is characteristic of a very indefinite and ignorant mind. There is, however, more reason in doubting whether they are to be truly regarded as one or five. Arguing from probabilities, I am of opinion that they are one ; another, regarding the question from another point of view, may be of another mind. But, leaving this enquiry, let us proceed to distribute the elementary forms, which have now been created in idea, among the four elements.

To earth, then, let us assign the cubical form ; for earth is the most immoveable of the four and the most easily modelled of all bodies, and that which has the most stable bases must of necessity be of such a nature. Now, of the triangles which we mentioned at first, that which has two equal sides is by nature more firmly based than that which has unequal sides ; and of the compound figures which are formed out of either, the plane equilateral quadrangle has necessarily a more stable basis than the equilateral triangle, both in the whole and in the parts. Where-

56 fore, in assigning this figure to earth, we adhere to probability ; and to water we assign that one of the remaining forms which is the most immoveable ; and the most moveable of them to fire ; and to air that which is intermediate between them. Also we assign the smallest body to fire, and the greatest to water, and the intermediate body to air ; and, again, the acutest body to fire, and the next in acuteness to air, and the third to water. Of all these elements, that which has the fewest bases must necessarily be the most moveable and the acutest and most penetrating in every direction ; and must also be the lightest as being composed of the smallest number of similar particles : and the second body has similar properties in a second degree, and the third body in the third degree. Let it be agreed, then, both according to strict reason and according to probability, that the pyramid is the solid which is the original element and seed of fire ; and let us assign the element which was next in the order of generation to air, and the third to water. We must imagine all these to be so small that no single particle of any of the four kinds is seen by us on account of their smallness : but when many of them are collected together the aggregate is seen. And the ratios of their numbers, motions, and other properties, everywhere the God, as far as necessity consented and allowed, has exactly perfected, and harmonized them all in due proportion.

From all that we have just been saying, the most probable conclusion is as follows :—earth, meeting with fire and dissolved by its sharpness, is borne hither and thither, either by dissolution in the fire itself or in the air or in the water, until its parts, meeting together and mutually harmonizing, again become earth, for they can never take any other form. But water, when divided by fire or by air, on reuniting, becomes one part fire and two parts air ; and a single volume of air divided becomes two of fire. Again, when a small body of fire is contained in a larger body of air or water or earth, and both are moving, and the fire struggling is overcome and decomposed, then two volumes of fire form one volume of air ; and when air is overcome and cut up into small pieces, two and a half parts of air are condensed into one part of water. Let us consider the matter in another way. When one of the other elements is

fastened upon by the fire, and is cut by the sharpness of its 57 angles and sides, it coalesces with the fire, and then ceases to be cut by them any longer. For among bodies which are similar and uniform, none can change or be changed by another of the same class and in the same state. But in the process of transition, and during the conflict of the weaker with the stronger, the dissolution continues. Again, smaller bodies detained in larger ones, the few encompassed by the many, are in process of decomposition and extinction, and only cease from their tendency to extinction when they consent to pass into the conquering nature, and fire becomes air and air water. But if bodies of one kind go and do battle against bodies of another kind, the process of dissolution continues until they are completely ejected and dissolved, and make their escape to their own kindred, or else, being overcome and assimilated to the conquering power, they remain and dwell with their victors, and from being many become one. And owing to these affections, all things are changing their place, for the motion of the receiving vessel distributes the multitude of classes into their natural places; but those things which become unlike themselves and like other things are hurried by the shaking into the place of the things which they resemble.

Now all unmixed and primary bodies are produced by these causes. As to the subordinate species which are included in the greater kinds, they are to be attributed to the various constitutions of the two original triangles. For these differ in magnitude, and are larger and smaller and have as many sizes as there are differences of species. Hence when mingled with themselves and with one another they are infinite in their diversity, which those who would arrive by reasoning at the probable truth of nature ought duly to study.

Unless a person comes to an understanding about the nature and conditions of rest and motion, he will meet with many difficulties in the discussion which follows. Something has been said of this matter already, and something more remains to be said, which is, that motion never exists in equipoise. For to conceive that anything can be moved without a mover is hard or indeed impossible, and equally impossible to conceive that there can be a mover unless there be something which can be moved ;—

58 motion cannot exist where either of these are wanting, and for these to be in equipoise is impossible; wherefore we must assign rest to equipoise and motion to the want of equipoise. Now inequality is the cause of the nature which is wanting in equipoise; and of this we have already described the origin. But there still remains the further question—why things when divided after their kinds do not cease from motion and transition into one another—which we will now proceed to explain. In the revolution of the universe are comprehended all natures, and this being circular and having a tendency to unite with itself, compresses all things and will not allow any place to be left void. Wherefore, also, fire above all things penetrates everywhere, and air next, as being next in rarity of the elements; and the two other elements in like manner penetrate according to their degrees of rarity. For those things which are composed of the largest particles have the largest void left in their compositions, and those which are composed of the smallest particles have the least. And the tendency towards condensation thrusts the smaller particles into the interstices of the larger. And thus, when the small parts are placed side by side with the larger, and the lesser divide the greater and the greater unite the lesser, all the elements are borne up and down and every way towards their own places; for the change in the size of each changes their position in space. And these causes generate an inequality which is always maintained, and is continually creating a perpetual motion of the elements in all time.

In the next place we have to consider that there are divers kinds of fire. There are, for example, first, flame; and secondly, those emanations of flame which do not burn but only give light to the eyes; thirdly, the remains of fire, which are seen in things red-hot after the flame has been extinguished. There are similar differences in the air; of which the brightest part is called the aether, as the most turbid sort of air is called mist and darkness; and there are various other nameless kinds which are formed by the inequality of the triangles. Water, again, admits in the first place of a division into two kinds; the one liquid and the other fusile. The liquid kind is composed of the small and unequal particles of water; and moves itself and is moved by other bodies because of the inequality of the particles

and the shape of the figure; whereas the fusile kind being formed of large and equal particles is more stable than the other, and is solid and compact by reason of its equability. But when fire gets in and dissolves and destroys the equability, it becomes more movable, and when capable of motion is thrust forth by the neighbouring air and spreads upon the earth; and this dissolution of the solid masses is called melting, and the spreading out upon the earth is called flowing. When the 59 fire goes out again it does not pass into a vacuum, but into the neighbouring air; and the air which is displaced forces together the liquid and still moveable mass into the place which was occupied by the fire, and mingles it with itself. Thus compressed the mass resumes its equability, and is again at unity with itself, because the fire which was the author of the inequality has retreated; and this departure of the fire is called cooling, and the coming together which follows upon it is termed congelment. Of all the kinds termed fusile, that which is the densest and is formed out of the finest and most equable parts is that most precious possession which is called gold, and is hardened by filtration through rock; this is unique in kind, and has a bright and yellow colour. A shoot of gold, which is so dense as to be very hard, and is blackened, is termed adamant. There is also another kind which has parts nearly like gold, and of which there are several species; it is denser than gold, and contains but a small and fine portion of earth, and is therefore harder, yet also lighter because of the great interstices within, and this substance, which is bright and also fusile, when solidified is called copper. There is an alloy of earth mingled with it, which, when the two parts grow old and are disunited, comes out in the form of rust. The remaining phenomena of the same kind there will be no difficulty in reasoning out by the method of probabilities. A man may sometimes set aside the arguments about eternal things, and for recreation turn to consider the truths of generation which are probable only; thus he attains a pleasure not to be repented of, and makes for himself during his life a wise and moderate pastime. Let us grant ourselves this indulgence, and go through the series of probabilities which follows next in order.

The water which is mingled with fire being of that sort

which is fine and liquid, is called liquid, because of its motion and the way in which it rolls upon the earth; and soft, because its bases give way and are less stable than those of earth. This, when separated from fire and air and isolated, becomes more equable, and by their retirement is compressed into itself; and when thus compressed above the earth is called hail, and when on the earth, ice; and that which is congealed in a less degree and is only half solid, when above the earth is called snow, and when upon the earth, and condensed from dew, hoar-frost. Then, again, there are the numerous kinds of water which have been mingled with one another, and are distilled through plants which grow in the earth; and this class is called by the general
 60 name of juices or saps. The unequal admixture of these fluids creates a variety of species; most of which are nameless, but four which are of a fiery nature are clearly distinguished and have names. First, there is wine, which warms the soul as well as the body;—secondly, there is the oily nature, which is smooth and divides the light of vision, and for this reason is bright and shining and of a glistening appearance, including pitch, the juice of the castor berry, oil itself, and other things of a like nature; also, thirdly, there is the diffusive class, which spreading to the combinations of food in the mouth produce sweetness;—these are included under the general name of honey: and, lastly, there is a vegetable acid (*ὄπρος?*), which differs from all other juices, and is a frothy liquid having a burning quality which dissolves the flesh.

As to the kinds of earth, that which is filtered through water passes into stone in the following manner:—the water which mixes with the earth and is broken up in the process passes into air, and taking this form mounts into its own place. And as there is no vacuum the neighbouring air is thrust out, and this being heavy and when thrust forth diffused and coagulated around the mass of earth, violently compresses it and drives it into the vacant space from whence the new air had come up; and the earth when compressed by the air into an indissoluble union with water becomes rock. The fairer sort is that which is made up of equal and similar parts and is transparent; that which has the opposite qualities is inferior. But when all the watery part is suddenly drawn out by fire, a more brittle

substance is formed, to which we give the name of pottery. Sometimes also the moisture may remain, and the earth which has been fused by fire becomes, when cool, a stone of a black colour. A like separation of the water may occur in substances composed of finer particles of earth, and of a briny nature, and then a half-solid body is formed, soluble in water—either nitre which is used for purging away oil and earth, or else salt, which harmonizes so well in combinations pleasing to the palate, and is, as the law testifies, a substance dear to the gods. The compounds of earth and water are not soluble by water, but by fire only, and for this reason:—neither fire nor air melt masses of earth, owing to the smallness of their particles, which enables them easily to penetrate the larger interstices of earth without violence; and they leave the earth unmelted and undissolved, but the particles of water, being larger, force a passage and dissolve and melt the earth. Wherefore earth 61 when not consolidated by force is dissolved by water only; when consolidated, by nothing but fire; this is the only body which can find an entrance. The cohesion of water again when very strong is dissolved by fire only—when weaker, then either by air or fire—the former entering the interstices, and the latter penetrating even to the triangles. But nothing can dissolve air when strongly condensed, which does not reach the elements or triangles; or if not strongly condensed, then only fire can dissolve it. As to bodies composed of earth and water, while the water occupies the vacant interstices of the earth and holds them compacted together, the circumfluent particles of water finding no entrance leave the entire mass unaffected; but the particles of fire entering into the interstices of the water, do to the air as the water does to the earth, and are the sole causes of the compound body of earth and water liquefying and becoming fluid. Now these bodies are of two kinds; some of them, such as glass and the fusible sort of stones, have less water than they have earth; on the other hand, substances of the nature of wax and incense have more of water entering into their composition.

I have thus set forth the various forms and classes of bodies as they are diversified by their combinations and changes into one another, and now I must endeavour to show what are the

causes of the affections which proceed from them. In the first place, the bodies which I have been describing are necessarily objects of sense. But we have not yet considered the origin of flesh, or what belongs to flesh, or of that part of the soul which is mortal. And these things cannot be explained without also explaining the affections which are concerned with sensation; nor the latter without the former: and yet to explain them together is hardly possible, for which reason we must assume first one or the other and go back to that which is assumed. In order, then, that the affections may come next in order to the elements, let us presuppose the existence of body and soul.

First, let us enquire why we say that fire is hot; and about this we may reason from the dividing or cutting power which it exercises on our bodies. We all of us feel that fire is sharp; and we may further consider the fineness of the sides, and the sharpness of the angles, and the smallness of the particles, and the swiftness of the motion; all this makes the action of fire violent and sharp, and enables it to cut whatever it meets.

62 And we must not forget that the original figure of fire [i. e. the pyramid], more than any other form, has a dividing power which cuts (*κερματίζει*) our bodies into small pieces, and thus naturally produces that affection which we call heat, whence also the origin of the name (*θερμὸς, θερρίζω*). Now, the opposite of this is sufficiently manifest, yet for the sake of completeness may here be added. For in the case of moist natures which have to do with the body, the larger particles entering in and driving out the lesser, but not being able to take their places, compress the moist principle in us, which, from being unequal and disturbed, is forced by them into a state of rest and equability, and made to coagulate by pressure. Whereas things brought together contrary to nature are naturally at war, and repel one another; and to this war and convulsion the name of shivering and trembling is given; and the whole affection and the cause of the affection are both termed cold. That is called hard to which our flesh yields, and soft which yields to our flesh; and things are also termed hard and soft relatively to one another. That which yields has a small base; but that which rests on quadrangular bases is firmly posed and

offers the greatest resistance, and is also that which is the most compact and therefore repellent. The nature of the light and the heavy will be best understood when examined in connection with our notions of above and below; for it is quite wrong to suppose that the universe is parted into two regions, separate from and opposite to each other, the one a lower to which all things tend which have any bulk, and an upper to which things only ascend against their will. For as the universe is a globe, all the extremities being equidistant from the centre are equally extremities, and the centre which is equidistant from them is equally to be regarded as the opposite of them all. Such being the nature of the world, when a person says that anything is above and below, may he not be justly charged with using an improper expression? For the centre of the world cannot be rightly called either above or below, but is the centre and nothing else; and the circumference is not the centre, and has in no one part a greater tendency to the centre than in any of the opposite parts. Indeed, when the parts are in every direction similar, how can one rightly give them names which imply opposition? For if there were any solid body in equipoise at the centre of the 63 universe, there would be nothing to draw it to this extreme rather than that on account of their perfect similarity; and if a person were to go round it in a circle, he would often, when standing at the antipodes of his former position, speak of the same as above and below; for, as I was saying just now, to speak of the whole which is in the form of a globe as having one part above and another below is not like a sensible man. The reason why these terms are used, and the cases in which they are ordinarily applied by us to the division of the heavens, may be elucidated by the following supposition:— If a person were to stand in that part of the universe which is the appointed place of fire, and where there is the great mass of fire to which fiery bodies gather—if, I say, he were to ascend thither, and, having the power to do this, were to abstract particles of fire and put them in scales and weigh them, and then, raising the balance, were to draw the fire by force towards the uncongenial element of the air, it would be very evident that the smaller mass would yield more readily

than the larger; for when two things are simultaneously raised by one and the same power, the smaller body must necessarily yield to the superior power with less reluctance than the larger; and the larger body is called heavy and said to tend downwards, and the smaller body is called light and said to tend upwards. And we may detect ourselves who are upon the earth doing precisely the same thing. For we often separate earthy natures, and sometimes we draw the earth itself into the uncongenial element of air by force and contrary to nature, both clinging to their native element. But that which is smaller yields to the impulse given by us towards the dissimilar elements more easily than the larger; and the former we call light, and the place towards which it is impelled we call above, and the contrary state and place we call heavy and below respectively. These must necessarily differ from one another, because the principal masses of the different elements hold opposite positions; for that which is light in the one place is opposed to that which is light in the other, and the heavy to the heavy, and that which is below to that which is below, and that which is above to that which is above; and in their various states of being and becoming they will all be found to be contrary and transverse and in every way diverse in relation to one another. And about all of them this has to be considered:—that the tendency of each towards the kindred elements makes the body which is moved heavy, and the place towards which the motion tends below, but of things which are in a contrary position the contrary is true. Such are the causes which we assign to these phenomena. As to the soft and the rough, any one who sees them can explain the reason of them. For roughness is hardness mingled with inequality, 64 and smoothness is produced by the joint effect of equality and density.

The most important of the affections which concern the whole body remains to be considered. This is the cause of pleasure and pain in the things which we have mentioned, and in all other things which are perceived by sense through the parts of the body, and have pleasures and pains consequent upon them. Let us imagine the causes of every affection, whether of sense or not, to be of the following nature, remembering

that we have already distinguished between the nature which moves and that which is immoveable; for this is the direction in which we must hunt the prey which we mean to take. A body which is easily moved on receiving any slight impression communicates this to the parts affected, and these to other parts in an ever widening circle, until at last reaching the principle of mind they announce the power of the producing cause. But a body of the opposite kind, being at rest, and having no circular motion, is alone affected, and does not move any of the neighbouring parts; and thus the parts not distributing their first impression to other parts, having no effect of motion on the whole animal, produce no effect on the patient. This is true of the bones and hair and other more earthly parts of the human body; whereas what was said above relates mainly to sight and hearing, because they have in them the greatest force of fire and air. Now, we must conceive of pleasure and pain in this way. An impression produced in us contrary to nature and violent, if sudden, is painful; and, again, the sudden return to nature is pleasant, and that which is gentle and gradual is imperceptible and *vice versa*. But the impression which is most easily produced is most readily felt, and is not accompanied by pleasure or pain; such, for example, are the affections of the sight itself, which has been already said to be a kindred body communicating with us in the day-time (45); for cuttings and burnings and other affections which happen to the sight do not give pain, nor is there pleasure when the sight returns to its natural state; but the impressions are clearest and strongest according to the manner of the affection and the number of the objects perceived; for there is no violence either in the contraction or dilation of the eye. But bodies which are formed of larger particles yield to the agent only with a struggle; and then they impart their motions to the whole and cause pleasure and pain—pain when alienated from their natural conditions, and pleasure when restored to them. Things which experience gradual withdrawals and emptyings ⁶⁵ of their nature, and great and sudden replenishments, fail to perceive the emptying, and do perceive the replenishment; these occasion no pain, but the greatest pleasure to the mortal part of the human soul, as is manifest in the case of perfumes.

But things which are changed all of a sudden, and only gradually and with difficulty return to their own nature, have all the opposite effects, as is evident in the case of burnings and cuttings of the body.

Thus have we discussed the general affections of the whole body, and the names of the agents which produce them. And now I will endeavour to speak of the affections of particular parts, and the causes and agents of them, as far as I am able. In the first place let us add what was omitted when we were speaking of juices, concerning the affections peculiar to the tongue. These, like most of the other affections, appear to be caused by certain contractions and dilations, but they have also more of roughness and smoothness than is found in other affections; for whenever earthy particles enter into the small veins which are the testing instruments of the tongue, reaching to the heart, and fall upon the moist, delicate portions of flesh—when by the process of melting they contract and dry up the little veins, they are astringent if they are rougher, but if not so rough then only harsh. Those of them which are of an abstergent nature, and wash the parts about the tongue, if they do so in excess, and take up into themselves and consume away a part of its nature, like potash and soda, are all termed bitter. Those, again, which are of a weaker sort, and which purge only moderately, are called salt, and having no bitterness or roughness, are regarded as rather agreeable than otherwise. Bodies which share in and are softened by the heat of the mouth, and which are inflamed, and again in turn inflame that which heats them, and whose lightness is such that they are carried upwards to the sensations of the head, and cut all that comes in their
66 way, by reason of these qualities in them, are all termed pungent. But when these same particles, refined away by putrefaction, enter into the narrow veins, and there meet the earthy and airy particles, and set them whirling, and while they are in a whirl cause them to interpenetrate with one another and form new hollows exterior to the particles which enter—as happens with the hollow drop surrounding the air—forming hollow watery vessels of air of a circular shape, which are sometimes mixed with earth and sometimes pure, in the latter case pure and transparent, which are called bubbles, while

those composed of the earthy liquid which is in a state of general agitation and rising, are called boiling or fermentation ; —of all these affections the cause is termed acid. And there is the opposite affection arising from an opposite cause, when the composition of the particles which enter dissolved in liquid is congenial to the tongue, and smoothes and oils over the roughness, and relaxes the parts which are unnaturally contracted, and contracts the parts which are relaxed, and disposes them all according to their nature ; that sort of remedy of violent affections is pleasant and agreeable to every man, and has the name sweet. Enough of this.

The faculty of smell does not admit of differences of kind ; for all smells are but half-formed substances, and no element is so proportioned as to have any smell. The veins about the nose are too narrow to admit the various kinds of earth and water, and too wide to detain those of fire and air ; and for this reason no one ever smells any of them, but smells always proceed from bodies that are damp, or putrefying, or liquefying, or smoking, and are perceptible only in the intermediate state, when water is changing into air and air into water, and all of them are either smoke or mist. That which is passing out of air into water is mist, and that which is passing from water into air is smoke ; and hence all smells are thinner than water and thicker than air. The proof of this is, that when there is any obstruction to the respiration, and a man draws in his breath by force, then no smell filters through, but the air only by itself and without the smell penetrates ; and hence there are only two varieties of smell, because they are not composed ⁶⁷ of many or of simple elements, and they have no name, but are distinguished as painful and pleasant, the one irritating and disturbing the whole cavity which is situated between the head and the navel, the other having a soothing influence, and restoring this same region to an agreeable and natural condition.

And now we have to speak of hearing, which is a third kind of sense, and of the causes in which this affection originates. We may assume speech to be a blow which passes through the ears, and is transmitted by means of the air, the brain, and the blood, to the soul, and that hearing is the

vibration of this blow, which begins in the head and ends in the region of the liver. The sound which moves swiftly is acute, and the sound which moves slowly is grave, and that which is uniform is equable and smooth, and the reverse is harsh. A great body of sound is loud, and the opposite is low. Respecting the harmony of sounds I must hereafter speak.

There is a fourth class of sensible things, having many varieties, which have now to be distinguished. They are called by the general name of colours, and are a flame which emanates from all bodies, and has particles corresponding to the sense of sight. I have spoken already, in what has preceded, of the generation of sight, and this will be a natural and suitable place in which to give some account of colours.

Of the particles coming from other bodies which fall upon the sight, some are less and some are larger, and some are equal to the parts of the sight itself. Those which are equal are imperceptible, or transparent, as they are called by us; whereas the larger produce contraction, the smaller dilation, in the sight by the exercise of a power akin to that of hot and cold bodies on the flesh, or of astringent bodies on the tongue, or of those heating bodies which are termed pungent by us. White and black, although they are found in another class of objects, and for this reason are imagined to be different, are affections of the same kind. Wherefore, we ought to term white that which dilates the visual ray, and the opposite of this black. There is also a swifter motion and impact of another sort of fire which dilates the ray of sight and reaches the eyes, forcing a way
 68 through their passages and melting them, and eliciting from them a union of fire and water which we call tears, being itself an opposite fire which comes to them from without—the inner fire flashes forth like lightning, and the outer finds a way in and is extinguished in the tear-drop, and all sorts of colours are generated by the mixture. This affection is termed dazzling, and the object which produces it is called bright and flashing. There is another sort of fire which is intermediate, and which reaches and mingles with the moisture of the eye without flashing; and in this, the fire mingling with the ray of the tear-drop produces a colour like blood, to which we give the

name of red. A bright hue mingled with red and white gives the colour called auburn (*ξανθόν*). The law of proportion, however, according to which the several colours are formed, even if a man knew he would be foolish if he attempted to tell, as he could not give any necessary reason, nor even any tolerable or probable account of them. Again, red, when mingled with black and white, gives a purple hue, which becomes umber (*ὄρφνυρον*) when the colours are burnt as well as mingled and the black is more thoroughly mixed with them. Flame colour (*πυρρόν*) is produced by a union of auburn and dun (*φαιόν*), and dun by an admixture of black and white; yellow (*ὠχρόν*) by an admixture of white and auburn. White and bright meeting, and falling upon a full black, become dark blue (*κυανοῦν*), and when dark blue mingles with white, a light blue (*γλαυκόν*) colour is formed, as leek green (*πράσιον*) is formed also out of the union of flame colour and black. There will be no difficulty in seeing how the colours derived from these are mingled and assimilated in accordance with probability. He, however, who should attempt to verify all this by experiment, would forget the difference of the human and divine nature. For God only has the knowledge and also the power which are able to combine many things into one and again dissolve the one into many. But no man either is or ever will be able to accomplish either the one or the other operation.

These are the elements, thus of necessity then subsisting, which the creator of the fairest and best received in the world of generation, when he made the self-sufficing and most perfect God, using the secondary causes as his ministers in the accomplishment of his work, but himself fashioning the good in all his creations. Wherefore we may distinguish two sorts of causes, the one divine and the other necessary, and may seek for the divine in all things, as far as our nature admits, with a view to the blessed life; but the necessary kind only for the sake of the 69 divine, considering that without them and when isolated from them, these higher things for which we look cannot be apprehended or received or in any way attained by us.

Seeing, then, that we have now before us the various classes of causes which are the material out of which the remainder of our discourse is to be framed, just as wood is the material of the

carpenter, let us recur for a moment to the point at which we began, and then endeavour to add on a suitable ending to the beginning of our tale.

As I said at first, when all things were in disorder God created in each thing, both internally in relation to itself and externally in relation to other things, certain harmonies in which were included all possible harmonies and proportions. For in those days nothing had any order except by accident; nor did any of the things which now have names deserve to be named at all—as, for example, fire, water, and the rest of the elements. All these the creator first arranged, and out of them he constructed the universe, which was a single animal comprehending all other animals, mortal and immortal, in itself. Now of the divine, he himself was the creator, but the creation of the mortal he committed to his offspring. And they, imitating him, received from him the immortal principle of the soul; and around this they fashioned a mortal body, and made the whole body to be a vehicle of the soul, and constructed within a soul of another nature which was mortal, subject to terrible and irresistible affections,—first of all, pleasure, the greatest incitement of evil; then, pain, which deters from good; also rashness and fear, two foolish counsellors, anger hard to be appeased, and hope easily deceived by sense without reason and by all-daring love;—these they mingled together according to necessary laws, and framed man. Wherefore, fearing to pollute the divine any more than is necessary, they separated the mortal nature and to that gave a habitation in another part of the body, placing the neck between them to be the isthmus and boundary, which they constructed between the head and breast, in order that they might be kept distinct. And in the breast, and in what is termed the thorax, they encased the mortal soul, and as one part of this was superior and the other inferior they divided the
70 cavity of the thorax into two parts, as the women's and men's apartments are divided in houses; and placed the midriff to be a wall of partition between them. That part of the inferior soul which is endowed with courage and passion and loves contention they settled nearer the head, in the interval between the midriff and the neck, in order that it might be under the rule of reason and might join with it in controlling and restraining

the desires when they are no longer willing of their own accord to obey the word of command issuing from the citadel.

The heart, which is the knot¹ of the veins and the fountain of the blood flowing rapidly through all the limbs, was set in the place of guard, that when passion was roused by reason making proclamation of any wrong assailing them from without or being perpetrated by the desires within, quickly the whole power of feeling in the body, perceiving these commands and threats, might obey and follow through every turn and alley, and thus allow the principle of the best to have the command in all of them. But as the gods foreknew that the palpitation of the heart in the expectation of danger and the swelling and excitement of passion was caused by fire, they formed and implanted as a supporter to the heart, the lung, which was, in the first place, soft and bloodless, and also had within hollows like the pores of a sponge, in order that, receiving the breath and the drink and cooling them, it might give the power of respiration and alleviate the heat. For which reason they cut the arteries or air vessels as passages to the lung, and placed the lung about the heart as a soft spring, that, when passion was rife within, the heart, beating against the yielding body, might be refreshed and suffer less, and might thus become more ready to enlist passion in the service of reason.

The part of the soul which desires meats and drinks and such things as the bodily frame needs, they placed between the midriff and the navel, contriving in all this region a sort of manger for the food of the body; and there they bound the desires down as a wild animal which was chained up with man, and must be nourished if man was to exist. They appointed this lower creation his place here in order that he might be always feeding at the manger, and have his dwelling as far as possible from the council chamber, making as little noise and disturbance as possible, and permitting the best part to advise quietly for the 71 good of the whole. And knowing and considering that this lower principle in man would not listen to reason, and even if attaining to some degree of perception would never naturally care for any arguments, and was liable to be led away by phantoms and

¹ Reading ἄμμα.

visions of the night and also by day, God framed the liver, to dwell in the same house with the lower nature, contriving that it should be solid and smooth, and bright and sweet, and also bitter, in order that the power of thought, which originates in the mind, might be reflected as in a mirror which receives figures and gives back images of them to the sight. And this power, making use of the bitter part of the liver, to which it is akin, inspires terror, and comes threatening and invading, and suddenly mingling with the entire liver produces colours like bile, and contracts every part and makes it wrinkled and rough; or, on the other hand, twisting out of their right place and contracting the lobe and receptacles and gates, or again, closing and shutting them up—in these and other ways creates pain and disgust. And the converse happens when some gentle inspiration of the understanding pictures images of an opposite character, and allays the bile and bitterness by not stirring them, and refuses to touch the nature opposed to itself, but by making use of the natural sweetness of the liver, corrects all things and makes them to be right and smooth and free, and makes the portion of the soul which resides about the liver happy and joyful, having in the night a time of peace and moderation, and the power of divination in dreams, inasmuch as it does not share in mind and reason. For the authors of our being, remembering the command of their father when he bade them make the human race as good as they could, thus ordered our inferior parts in order that they too might obtain a measure of truth, and in the liver placed their oracle. And herein is a proof that God has given the art of divination not to the wisdom, but to the foolishness of man; for no man, when in his wits, attains prophetic truth and inspiration; but when he receives the inspired word, either his intelligence is enthralled by sleep, or he is demented by some distemper or possession. And he who would understand what

72 he remembers to have been said, whether in a dream or when he was awake, by the prophetic and enthusiastic nature, or what he has seen, must first recover his wits; and then he will be able to explain rationally what all such words and apparitions mean, and what indications they afford to this man or that, of past present or future good and evil. But, while he continues demented, he cannot judge of the visions which he sees or the

words which he utters ; the ancient saying is very true that ‘only a man who has his wits can act or judge about himself and his own affairs.’ And for this reason it is customary to appoint diviners or interpreters to be judges of the true inspiration. Some persons call them prophets ; they do not know that they are only repeaters of dark sayings and visions, and are not to be called prophets at all, but only interpreters of prophecy.

Such is the nature and position of the liver, which is intended to give prophetic intimations. During the life of each individual these intimations are plainer, but after his death the liver becomes blind, and delivers oracles too obscure to be intelligible. The neighbouring bowel (the spleen) is situated on the left-hand side, and is constructed with a view of keeping the liver bright and pure, like a napkin, always ready prepared and at hand to clean the mirror. And hence, when any impurities arise by reason of disorders of the body affecting the liver, the loose nature of the spleen, which is composed of a hollow and bloodless tissue, receives them all and purges them away, and when filled with the unclean matter, becomes enlarged and diseased, but, again, when the body is purged, settles down into the same place as before, and is humble.

Concerning the soul, as to which part is mortal and which divine, and where they exist, and what are their conditions, and why they are separated, the truth can only be established, as we have acknowledged, by the word of God ; still, we may venture to assert that what has been said by us is probable, and will be rendered more probable by investigation. Let us assume thus much.

The creation of the body followed next in order, and this we may investigate in a similar manner. And it appears to be very meet that the body should be framed on the following principles :—

The authors of our race were aware that we should be intemperate in eating and drinking, and take a good deal more than was necessary or proper, by reason of gluttony. In order then that disease might not quickly destroy us, and lest our mortal race should perish and fail of fulfilling its end—intending to 73 provide against this, the gods made a receptacle for the superfluous meat and drink, which is called the lower belly, and formed the convolution of the bowels, so that the food might be pre-

vented from passing quickly through and compelling the body to require more food, thus producing insatiable gluttony, and making the whole race an enemy to philosophy and music, and rebellious against the divinest element within us.

The bones and flesh, and other similar parts of us, were made as follows. The first principle of all of them was the generation of the marrow. For the bonds of life which unite the soul with the body are made fast there, and they are the root and foundation of the human race. The marrow itself is created out of other elements: God took such of the triangles as were of the first formation, straight and smooth, and specially adapted by their perfection to produce fire and water, and air and earth—these, I say, he separated from their kinds, and mingling them in due proportions with one another, made the marrow out of them to be a universal seed of the whole race of mankind; and in this seed he then planted and enclosed the souls, and in the original distribution gave the marrow as many and various forms as there were hereafter to be kinds of souls. That which, like a field, was to receive the divine seed, he made round every way, and called that portion of the marrow, brain, intending that, when an animal was perfected, the vessel containing this substance should be the head; but the vessels which were intended to contain the remaining and mortal part of the soul he divided into round and long figures, and he called them all by the name ‘marrow’; and to these, as to anchors, fastening the bonds of the whole soul, he proceeded to fashion around them the entire framework of our body, constructing for the marrow, first of all, a complete covering of bone.

The bone was composed by him in the following manner. Having sifted pure and smooth earth he kneaded it and wetted it with marrow, and after that he put it into the fire and then into the water, and once more into the fire and again into the water—in this way by frequent transfers from one to the other he made it insoluble by either. With this bone he fashioned, as in
74 a lathe, a globe made of bone, which he placed around the brain, and in the globe he left a narrow opening; and around the marrow of the neck and back he formed the vertebrae like hinges, beginning at the head and extending through the whole of the trunk. Thus he preserved the entire seed, which he enclosed

in a case like stone, inserting joints, and using in the formation of them the power of the diverse as an intermediate nature, in order to obtain motion and flexion. Then again, considering that the bone would be too brittle and inflexible, and when heated and again cooled would soon mortify and destroy the seed within—having this in view, he contrived the sinews and the flesh, that so binding all the members together by the sinews, which admitted of being stretched and relaxed about the vertebrae, he might thus make the body capable of flexion and extension, while the flesh would serve as a protection against the summer heat and against the winter cold, and also against falls, like articles made of felt, softly and easily yielding to external bodies, and containing in itself a warm moisture which in summer exudes in the form of dew, and imparts to the body a natural coolness; and again in winter by the help of its own fire would form a very tolerable defence against external and surrounding cold. The great moulder and creator considering this, mingled earth with fire and water and put them together, making a ferment of acid and salt which he mingled with them and formed a soft and pulpy flesh; and as for the sinews, he made them of an unfermented mixture of bone and flesh, attempered so as to be in a mean, and gave them a yellow colour, and hence the sinews have a firmer and more glutinous nature than flesh, but a softer and moister nature than the bones. With these God covered the bones and marrow, which he bound together with sinews, and then enshrouded them all in an upper covering of flesh. The more living and sensitive of the bones he enclosed in the smallest film of flesh, and those which had the least life within them he enclosed in the most solid flesh. So again on the joints of the bones, where reason indicated that no more was required, he placed only a small quantity of flesh, that it might not interfere with the flexion of our bodies and make them uneasy because difficult to move; and also that they might not by being crowded and pressed and matted in one another, lose the power of sensation by reason of their hardness, and make the parts which have to do with the mind dull of remembering and hearing. Wherefore also the thighs and the legs 75 and the loins, and the bones of the arms and the forearms and other parts which have no joints, and the inner bones, which on

account of the rarity of the soul in the marrow are destitute of reason—all these are filled up with flesh ; but such as have mind in them are in general less fleshy, except where the creator has made some part solely of flesh in order to give sensation ; as, for example, the tongue. But commonly this is not the case. For the composite nature, developing by a law of necessity, does not admit of the combination of solid bone and much flesh with acute perceptions. More than any other part the framework of the head would have had them, if they could have co-existed, and the human race, having a strong and fleshy and sinewy head, would have had a life twice and many times as long, and also more healthy and free from pain. But our creators, considering whether they should make a long-lived race which was worse, or a short-lived race which was better, came to the conclusion that every one ought to prefer a shorter span of life which was better, to a longer one which was worse ; and therefore they covered the head, which has no joints, with thin bone, but not with flesh and sinews ; and thus the head was added, having more wisdom and sensation than the rest of the body, but also being in every man far weaker. And for a like reason God placed the sinews at the extremity of the head, in a circle round the neck, and glued them together and fastened the extremities of the cheeks to them at the lower part of the face, and other sinews he dispersed throughout the body, fastening limb to limb. The framers of us framed the mouth, as now arranged, having teeth and tongue and lips, with a view to the necessary and the good, contriving the way in for necessary purposes, the way out for the best purposes ; for that is necessary which enters in and gives food to the body ; but the river of speech which goes out of a man and ministers to the intelligence is the fairest and noblest of all streams. Still the head could neither be left a bare frame of bones, on account of the extremes of heat and cold in the different seasons, nor be allowed to be wholly covered, and so become dull and senseless by an overgrowth of flesh. The fleshy nature was not
 76 therefore wholly dried up, but a large sort of peel was parted off and remained over, which is now called the skin. This met and grew by the help of the cerebral moisture, and became the circular envelopment of the head. And the moisture beneath the sutures rising up watered and closed them upon the

crowns, forming a sort of knot; the diversity of the sutures was caused by the power of the courses of the soul and of the food, and the more these struggled against one another the greater the diversity became, and was less if the struggle were less violent. This skin the divine power pierced all round with fire, and out of the punctures which were thus made the moisture issued forth, part liquid and hot which came away pure, and a mixed part which was composed of the same material as the skin, and, having a fineness equal to the punctures, shot up and extended to a great length, but being too slow to escape wholly, was thrust back and condensed by the external air, and took root underneath the skin. And so the hair sprang up in the skin, being of a skinny and stringy nature, but rendered harder and closer through the pressure of the cold, by which each hair separated from the skin is compressed and cooled. In this manner the creator formed our head all hairy, making use of the causes which I have mentioned, and reflecting also that instead of flesh the part about the brain needed the hair to be a light covering or guard, which would give shade in summer and shelter in winter, and at the same time would not impede our quickness of perception. From the combination of sinew, skin, and bone, in the structure of the finger, there arises a triple compound which, when dried up, takes the form of one hard skin partaking of all three natures, and was fabricated by these second causes, but designed by the principal mind or cause with an eye to the future. For our creators well knew that women and other animals would some day be framed out of men, and they further knew that many animals would require the use of nails for many purposes; wherefore also they stamped in men at their first creation the form of nails. From this cause and for these reasons they fashioned skin, hair, and nails at the extremities of the limbs.

And now that all the parts and members of the mortal animal had come together, and their life of necessity consisted of fire 77 and spirit, and was liable therefore to melt away and perish from exhaustion, the gods contrived the following remedy for this: they mingled a nature akin to that of man with other forms and perceptions, and thus created another kind of living being. These are the trees and plants and seeds, which cultivation has educated and domesticated; anciently there were

only the wild kinds, which are older than the cultivated. For everything that partakes of life may be truly called a living being, and this animal of which we are now speaking partakes of the third nature of the soul, which is said to be seated between the midriff and the navel, having no part in opinion or reason or mind, but only in the feelings of pleasure and pain and the desires which accompany them. For this nature is always in a passive state, revolving in and about itself, repelling the motion from without and using its own, and accordingly is not endowed with the power of seeing or reflecting on its own concerns. Wherefore it lives and is a living being, but is fixed and rooted in the same spot, and has no power of self-motion.

Now, after the superior powers had created all these natures to be food for us who are of the inferior nature, they cut various channels through our bodies, as in a garden, watering them with a perennial stream. In the first place, they cut two secret channels or veins down the back where the skin and the flesh join, corresponding severally to the right and left side of the body. These they let down along the backbone, and placed the marrow of generation between them, where it was most likely to flourish, and in order that the stream coming down from above, might flow freely to the other parts, and equalize the irrigation. In the next place, they divided the veins about the head, and, interlacing them, they sent them in opposite directions; those coming from the right side they sent to the left of the body, and those from the left they turned towards the right, that they and the skin might bind the head to the body, since the head was not enclosed at the top by the sinews, and also that the sensations from both sides might be distributed over the whole body. And next, they ordered the course of liquids in a manner which I will describe, and which we shall more readily
78 understand if we begin by admitting that all things which have lesser parts retain the greater, but those which have greater cannot retain the lesser. Now, of all natures fire has the smallest parts, and therefore penetrates through earth and water and air and their compounds, nor can anything hold it; and a similar principle applies to the belly; for that is able to retain meats and drinks which have passed into it, but is not able to retain

air and fire, because they consist of smaller particles than those of which it is composed.

These elements, therefore, God employed for the sake of distributing moisture from the belly into the veins, weaving together a network of fire and air like basket nets, at the entrance of which he made two lesser nets or openings, the one of which he further formed with two branches, and from the openings he extended a sort of cord reaching all round to the extremity of the network. All the inner parts of the network he made of fire, but the openings and the cavity he made of air. The network he took and spread over the newly-formed animal in the following manner:—he let one of the openings pass into the mouth; and of this opening he let one part descend by the air-pipes into the lungs, the other by the side of the air-pipes into the belly. The second opening he divided into two branches, both of which he made to communicate with the channels of the nose, so that when there was no way through the mouth the streams of the mouth were replenished from the nostril. But the remainder of the network he placed around the hollow parts of the body, and the entire receptacle he made to flow into the openings of the net, quite gently, for they are composed of air; and they then flowed back again and the net found a way in and out of the pores of the body, and the rays of fire which were interlaced followed the passage of the air either way, never at any time ceasing so long as the mortal being holds together. These, as we affirm, are the phenomena which the imposer of names called respiration and expiration. And all this process of cause and effect took place in order that the body might be watered and cooled, and thus have nourishment and life; for when the respiration is going in and out, and the fire, which follows it, is moving to and fro, and, entering through the belly, reaches the meat and drink, ⁷⁹ it liquefies them, and, dividing them into small portions and guiding them through the passages where it goes, draws them as from a fountain into the channels or veins, and makes the stream of the veins flow through the body as through a conduit.

Let us further consider the phenomena of respiration, and enquire what are the real causes of it. They are as follows:—

Seeing that there is no such thing as a vacuum into which any of those things which are moved can enter, and the breath is carried from us into the external air, the next point is, as will be clear to every one, that it does not go into a vacant space, but pushes its neighbour out of its place, and that which is thrust out again thrusts out its neighbour; and in this way everything of necessity at last comes round to that place from whence the breath came forth, and enters in there, and follows with the breath, and fills up the place; and this goes on like the circular motion of a wheel, because there can be no such thing as a vacuum. Wherefore also the breast and the lungs, which emit the breath, are again filled up by the air which surrounds the body and which enters in through the pores of the flesh and comes round in a circle; and, again, the air which is sent away and passes out through the body forces the breath within to find a way round through the passage of the mouth and the nostrils. Now, the origin of this may be supposed to be as follows. Every animal has his inward parts about the blood and the veins as warm as possible; he has within him a fountain of fire, which we compare to the texture of a net of fire extended through the centre of the body, while the outer parts are composed of air. Now, we must admit that heat naturally proceeds outward to its own place and to its kindred element; and as there are two exits for the heat, the one through the body outwards, and the other through the mouth and nostrils, when it moves towards the one, it drives round the other air, and that which is driven round falls into the fire and is warmed, and that which goes forth is cooled. But when the condition of the heat changes, and the particles at the other exit grow warmer, the hotter air inclining in that direction and carried towards its native element, fire, pushes round the other; and thus, by action and reaction, there being this circular agitation and alternation produced by the two—by this double cause, I say, inspiration and expiration are produced.

The phenomena of medical cupping-glasses and of the swallowing of drink and of the hurling of bodies, whether discharged in the air or moving along the ground, are to be investigated on a similar principle; as also the nature of sounds, whether

swift or slow, sharp or flat, which are sometimes discordant on account of the inequality, and then again harmonical on account of the equality of the motion which they excite in us ; for when the motions of the antecedent swifter sounds begin to pause and the two are equalized, the slower sounds first come up with them and then overtake and propel them. When they overtake them they do not introduce another or discordant motion, but they make the slower motion by degrees correspond with the swifter ; and when the latter ceases, they assimilate the swifter sounds and cause a single mixed expression to be produced from sharp and flat, whence arises a pleasure which even the unwise feel, and which to the wise becomes a higher sort of delight, being an imitation of divine harmony in mortal motions. Moreover, as to the flowing of water, the fall of the thunderbolt, and the marvels that are observed about the attraction of amber and the Heracleian stones,—in none of these cases is there any attraction ; but he who investigates truly, will find that such wonderful phenomena are attributable to the non-existence of a vacuum, taken in combination with the fact that these substances are forced round and round and are changed and pass severally into their own place by composition and division.

Such too is the nature and such are the causes of respiration, the subject in which our discourse originated. As I before said, the fire cuts the food and following the breath rises up within, fire and breath rising together and filling the veins by drawing out of the belly the cut portions of the food ; and so the streams of food are diffused through the whole body in all animals. And fresh cuttings from kindred substances, whether the fruits of the earth or herb of the field which God planted to be our daily food, acquire all sorts of colours when mixed ; but for the most part the red prevails, being made by the fire dividing and leaving its mark upon the moisture ; and hence the liquid which circulates in the body has a colour such as we have described, which we call blood, being the nurturing principle of the flesh and of the whole body, whence all parts are watered ⁸¹ and the empty places filled.

Now the process of repletion and depletion is effected after the manner of the universal motion of all things, which is due to the tendency of kindred natures towards one another. For

the external elements which surround us are always causing us to consume away, and distributing and sending away like to like; the particles of blood, too, which are divided and contained within the frame of the animal, which is a sort of heaven to them, are compelled to imitate the motion of the universe. Each, therefore, of the divided parts within us, being carried to its kindred nature, replenishes the void. When more is taken away than flows in, then we decay, and when less, we grow and increase.

The frame of every animal when young has the triangles new, and may be compared to the keel of a vessel which is just off the stocks; they are locked closely together and yet the whole is soft and delicate, being freshly formed of marrow and nurtured on milk. Other triangles out of which meats and drinks are composed, come in from without and are taken up into the body; but these being older and weaker than the triangles already there, the frame of the body gets the better of them and they are cut up by the new triangles, and so the animal grows and is nourished by the assimilation of particles. But when the roots of the triangles are loosed by having undergone many conflicts with many things in the course of time, they are no longer able to cut or assimilate the food which enters into them, but are easily separated by the new bodies which come in from without. In this way the whole animal is overcome and decays, and this affection is called old age. And at last, when the bonds of the triangles which enclose the marrow no longer hold, and get unfixed by the toil of which I spoke, they unfix also the bonds of the soul, and she, being released, in the order of nature joyfully flies away. For that which is not in the order of nature is painful, but that which takes place according to nature is pleasant. And thus, too, death, if caused by disease or produced by wounds, is painful and violent; but that sort of death which comes after old age and fulfils the debt of nature is the easiest of deaths, and is accompanied with pleasure rather than with sorrow.

Now, every one can see whence diseases arise. There are 82 four natures out of which the body is compacted, earth and fire and water and air, and the unnatural excess and defect of

these, or the change of any one of them from their own natural place into another, (for there are more kinds than one,) and the assumption of that which does not belong to them, or any similar irregularity, produces diseases and disorders; for each being produced or changed in a manner contrary to nature, the elements which were previously cool grow warm, and those which were dry become moist, and the light become heavy, and the heavy light; all sorts of changes occur. For we affirm that only the same, in the same and like manner and proportion added or subtracted to or from the same, will allow the body to remain in the same state, whole and sound, and that, whatever comes or goes away in violation of these rules causes all manner of changes and infinite diseases and disorders. But as there are secondary compositions which are also natural, he who will understand diseases may also have another or second notion of them. For whereas marrow and bone and flesh and sinews are composed of the four elements, as the blood, though after another manner, likewise springs from them, most diseases are caused as I have already described; but the worst of all owe their severity to the following causes. When the generation of the elements of the body proceeds in an order contrary to nature, they are destroyed. For the natural order is that the flesh and sinews are made of blood, the sinews out of the fibres to which they are akin, and the flesh out of the congealed substance which is formed by separation from the fibres. And the glutinous and rich matter which comes away from the sinews and the flesh, not only binds the flesh to the bones, but nourishes and imparts growth to the bone itself which surrounds the marrow, and by reason of the solidity of the bones, that which is filtered through consists of the purest and smoothest and oiliest sort of triangles, dropping like dew from the bones and watering the marrow. And when these are the conditions, health usually ensues; when the conditions are of an opposite nature, disease. For when the flesh becomes decomposed and sends back the wasting substance into the veins, then there is a great deal of blood of different kinds as well as of air in the veins, having various degrees of colour and bitterness: and also from its acid and salt qualities it generates all sorts of bile and serum and phlegm.

83 For all things go the wrong way and are corrupted, and first of all destroy the blood, and then ceasing to give nourishment to the body are carried along the veins in all directions, no longer preserving the order of their natural courses, but at war with themselves, because they receive no good from themselves, and are hostile to the abiding constitution of the body, which they destroy and waste. The oldest part of the flesh which wastes away, refuses to be assimilated, and from long burning grows black, and from being corroded in every direction becomes bitter, and is injurious to every part of the body which is not yet corrupted. And then instead of bitterness the black part assumes an acidity from the bitter element refining away; or, again, the bitter substance being tinged with blood has a redder colour; or, when mixed with black, has the¹ hue of grass; and once again, an auburn colour is mingled with the bitter matter when the new flesh is decomposed by the fire which surrounds the internal flame;—to all which some physician, or some philosopher, who had the power of seeing many dissimilar things and recognising in them one nature common to them all and deserving of a name, has assigned the common name of bile. But the kinds of bile have also their peculiar names corresponding to their several colours. As for serum, that sort which is the watery part of blood is gentle, but that which is produced by black and bitter bile is of a fierce nature when mingled by the power of heat with any salt substance, and is then called acid phlegm. Again, the substance which is formed by the decomposition of new and tender flesh when air is present and that which is decomposed is inflated and encased in liquid producing bubbles which separately are invisible owing to their small size, but collected together are of a bulk which is visible, and have a white colour arising out of the generation of foam—all this decomposition of tender flesh when intermingled with air is termed by us white phlegm. And the whey or sediment of phlegm when just formed is sweat and tears, and includes the various secretions which arise daily out of the purgation of the body. Now all these become the instruments of disease when the blood is not replenished

¹ Reading *χλωδδες*.

according to nature by meats and drinks but gains bulk from contraries in violation of the laws of nature. When the several parts of the flesh are separated by disease, if the foundation remains, the trouble is only half as great, and recovery is still ⁸⁴ possible; but when that which binds the flesh to the bones is diseased, and the blood, which is made out of the fibres and sinews, separates from them, and no longer gives nourishment to the bone, or unites flesh and bone, and from being oily and smooth and glutinous becomes rough and salt and dry, owing to bad regimen, then the substance which is detached crumbles away under the flesh and the sinews, and separates from the bone, and the fleshy parts fall away from their foundation and leave the sinews bare and full of brine, and the flesh again gets into the circulation of the blood and makes the previously-mentioned disorders still greater. And if these bodily affections be severe, still worse are the prior disorders; as when the bone itself, by reason of the density of the flesh, does not receive sufficient air, but becomes stagnant and hot and gangrened and receives no nutriment, and the natural process is inverted, and the bone crumbling passes into the food, and the food into the flesh, and the flesh again falling into the blood causes maladies yet more violent than those already mentioned. But the worst of all is when the marrow is diseased, either from excess or defect; and this is the cause of the very greatest and most fatal disorders, in which the whole course of the body is reversed. There is a third class of diseases which may be conceived of as arising in three ways; for they are produced sometimes by wind, and sometimes by phlegm, and sometimes by bile. When the lung, which dispenses the air to the body, is obstructed by rheums and has the passages stopped up, having no egress in one part, while in another part too much air enters, then the parts which are unrefreshed by the air corrode, while in other parts the excess of air forcing its way through the veins distorts them and decomposing the interior of the body is there shut in and occupies the midriff; thus numberless painful diseases are produced, accompanied by copious sweats. And oftentimes when the flesh is dissolved in the body, wind, generated within and unable to get out, is the source of quite as much pain as the air coming in from

without; but the greatest pain is when the wind gets about the sinews and the veins connected with them, and swells them up, especially when it presses upon the great sinews of the shoulder and twists back the ligaments that fasten them. These are called tetanus and opisthotonus by reason of the tension which accompanies them. The cure of them is difficult, 85 and they generally end in fevers. The white phlegm, though dangerous when detained within by reason of the air-bubbles, yet being capable of relief by expiration, is less severe, and only discolours the body, generating leprous eruptions and similar diseases. When the phlegm is mingled with black bile and dispersed about the courses of the head, which are the divinest element in us, and disturbs them in sleep, the attack is not so severe; but when assailing those who are awake it is hard to be got rid of, and, being an affection of a sacred part, is most justly called sacred. An acid and salt phlegm, again, is the source of all those diseases which are of a catarrhal nature, but they have many names because the places into which they flow are manifold.

Inflammations of the body come from burnings and inflamings, and all of them originate in bile. When bile finds a means of discharge, it boils up and sends forth all sorts of tumours; but when kept down within, it generates many inflammatory diseases, above all when mingled with pure blood; as it then disturbs the order of the fibres which are scattered about in the blood and are designed to maintain the balance of rare and dense, in order that the blood may not by reason of heat perspire through the pores of the body, nor again become too dense and thus find a difficulty in circulating through the veins. The fibres are so constituted as to maintain this balance; and if any one collects them together when the blood is dead and congealed, then the blood that remains in them flows out, and thus left to themselves they also soon congeal with the surrounding cold. Such power have the fibres of acting upon the blood. From them arises bile, which is only stale blood, and from being flesh is liquefied again, and at the first influx coming in little by little warm and moist is congealed by the power of the fibres; but if violently extinguished in the process, produces internal cold and shuddering. When it enters

with more of a flood and overcomes the fibres by its heat, and makes them boil and bubble in a disorderly manner, if it have power enough completely to get the better, it passes into the marrow and burns up and unmoors what may be termed the cables of the ship, and frees the soul; but when there is not so much of it, and the body though wasted still holds out, it is either mastered and utterly banished, or is thrust through the veins into the lower or upper belly, and is driven out of the body like an exile out of an insurgent state; and hence arise 86 diarrhoeas and dysenteries, and all sorts of similar disorders. When the constitution is disordered by excess of fire, then the heat and fever are continued; when air is the cause, then the fever is quotidian; when water, which is a more sluggish element than either fire or air, then the fever is a tertian; when earth is the cause, which is the most sluggish of the four, and is only purged away in a four-fold period, the result is a quartan fever, which can with difficulty be shaken off.

Such is the course of the diseases of the body; the disorders of the soul which originate in the body are as follows. We must acknowledge disease of the mind to be a want of intelligence; and of this there are two kinds; to wit, madness and ignorance; and whatever affection gives rise to either of them may be called disease. Excessive pains and pleasures are justly to be regarded as the greatest diseases of the soul, for a man who is in great joy or in great pain, in his irrational eagerness to attain the one and to avoid the other, is not truly able to see or to hear anything; but he is mad, and is at the time quite incapable of any participation in reason. He who has the seed about the spinal marrow too plentiful and overflowing, like a tree overladen with fruit, has many throes, and also obtains many pleasures in his desires and their gratifications, and is for the most part of his life mad, because his pleasures and pains are so very great; his soul is rendered foolish and disordered by his body; and he is regarded not as one diseased, but as one who is voluntarily bad, which is a bad mistake. For the truth is that the intemperance of love for the most part grows into a disease of the soul owing to the moisture and fluidity which is produced in one of the elements by the loose consistency of the bones. And in general, all that which is termed the intem-

perance of pleasure is unjustly charged upon those who do wrong, as if they did wrong voluntarily. For no man is voluntarily bad ; but the bad become bad by reason of an ill disposition of the body and bad education, things which to every man are an involuntary evil ; and in like manner the soul is often hurt by bodily pain. For where the sharp and briny phlegm and other bitter and bilious humours wander over the body, and find no exit or escape, but are compressed within and mingle their own vapours with the motions of the soul, and are blended
87 with them, they produce an infinite variety of diseases in all sorts of degrees, and being carried to the three places of the soul on which any of them may severally chance to alight, they create infinite varieties of trouble and melancholy, of tempers rash and cowardly, and also of forgetfulness and stupidity. Further, when to this evil constitution of body evil forms of government are added and evil discourses are uttered in private as well as in public, and no sort of instruction is given in youth which may heal these ills, here is another source of evil ; and so the bad become bad, through two things which are wholly out of their power. In such cases the planters are to blame rather than the plants, the educators rather than the educated. Still we should endeavour as far as we can by education, and studies, and learning, to avoid vice and attain virtue ; this, however, is part of another subject.

There is a corresponding enquiry concerning the mode of treatment by which the mind and the body are to be preserved, on which I may and ought to enter ; for it is more our duty to speak of the good than of the evil. Everything that is good is fair, and the fair is not without measure, and the animal who is fair may be supposed to have measure. Now we perceive lesser symmetries and comprehend them, but about the highest and greatest we have no understanding ; for there is no symmetry or want of symmetry greater than that of the soul to the body, or more productive of health and disease, and virtue and vice. This however we do not perceive, nor do we allow ourselves to reflect that when a weaker or lesser frame is the vehicle of a great and mighty soul, or conversely, when a little soul is encased in a large body, then the whole animal is not fair, for it is defective in the most important of all symmetries ; but the

fair mind in the fair body will be the fairest and loveliest of all sights to him who has the seeing eye. Just as a body which has a leg too long, or some other disproportion, is an unpleasant sight, and also, when undergoing toil, has many sufferings, and makes violent efforts, and often stumbles through awkwardness, and is the cause of infinite evil to its own self—in like manner we should conceive of the double nature which we call the living being; and when in this compound there is an impassioned soul more powerful than the body, that soul, I say, convulses and disorders the whole inner nature of man; and when too eager in the pursuit of knowledge, causes wasting; or again, when teaching or disputing in private or in public, and strifes and controversies arise, inflames and dissolves the composite frame of man and introduces rheums; and the nature of this phenomenon is not understood by most professors of medicine, who ascribe it to the opposite of the real cause. And once more, when a body large and too strong for the soul is united to a small and weak intelligence, then inasmuch as there are two desires natural to man,—one of food for the sake of the body, and one of wisdom for the sake of the diviner part of us—then, I say, the motions of the stronger, getting the better and increasing their own power, but making the soul dull, and stupid, and forgetful, engender ignorance, which is the greatest of diseases. There is one protection against both kinds of disproportion:—that we should not move the body without the soul or the soul without the body, and thus they will aid one another, and be healthy and well balanced. And therefore the mathematician or any one else who devotes himself to some intellectual pursuit, must allow his body to have motion also, and practise gymnastic; and he who would train the limbs of the body, should impart to them the motions of the soul, and should practise music and all philosophy, if he would be called truly fair and truly good. And in like manner should the parts be treated, and the principle of the whole similarly applied to them; for as the body is heated and also cooled within by the elements which enter in, and is again dried up and moistened by external things, and experiences these and the like affections from both kinds of motions, the result is that the body if given up to motion when in a state of quiescence is overmastered and destroyed; but if

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any one, in imitation of that which we call the foster-mother and nurse of the universe, will not allow the body to be at rest, but is always producing motions which counteract the natural motions both within and without, and by shaking moderately the various affections and wandering particles of the body, brings them into order and affinity with one another according to the theory of the universe which we were maintaining—he will not allow enemy placed by the side of enemy to create wars and disorders of the body, but he will place friend by the side of friend, producing health. Now of all motions that is the best which
 89 is produced in a thing by itself, for it is most akin to the motion of the intelligent and to the motion of the universe; but that motion which is caused by others is not so good, and worst of all is that which moves the body, when at rest, in parts only and by external means. Wherefore also the best of the purifications and adjustments of the body is that which is effected by gymnastic; next is that which is effected by carrying the body, as in sailing or any other mode of conveyance which is not fatiguing; the third sort of motion may be of use in a case of extreme necessity, but in any other will be adopted by no man of sense: I mean the purgative treatment of physicians; for diseases unless they are very dangerous should not be irritated by medicines, since every form of disease is in a manner akin to the living being, whose complex frame has an appointed term of life. For not the whole race only, but each individual comes into the world, having an appointed time when not interrupted by violence, and the triangles are originally framed with power to last for a certain time, beyond which no man can prolong his life. And this holds also of diseases, and if any one regardless of the intention of nature would get the better of their complications by medicine, he only increases and multiplies them. Wherefore we ought always to manage them by regimen, as far as a man can spare the time, and not provoke a disagreeable enemy by medical treatment. Let thus much be said of the general nature of man, and of the body which is a part of him, and of the manner in which a man may govern himself and be governed best, and live most according to reason: and we must begin by providing that the governing principle shall be the fairest and best possible for the purpose of government. But to discuss

such a subject accurately would be a sufficiently long business of itself. I may supplement my observations by a short recapitulation.

Having often said that there are three kinds of soul located within us, each of them having their own proper motions, I must now say in the fewest words possible, that the one part, if remaining inactive and ceasing from the natural motion, must necessarily become very weak, but when trained and exercised, then very strong. Wherefore we should take care that the movements of the different parts of the soul should be in 90 due proportion.

Now we should consider that God gave the sovereign part of the human soul to be the divinity of each one, being that part which dwells, as we say, at the extremity of the body, and inasmuch as we are a plant not of an earthly but of a heavenly growth, raises us from earth to our kindred which is in heaven. And this is most true; for the divine power suspended the head and root of us from that place where the generation of the soul first began, and thus made erect the whole body. He, therefore, who is always occupied with the cravings of desire and ambition, and is eagerly striving after them, must have all his opinions mortal, and, as far as man can be, must be all of him mortal, because he has cherished his mortal part. But he who has been earnest in the love of knowledge and true wisdom, and has been trained to think that these are the immortal and divine things of a man, if he attain truth, must of necessity, as far as human nature is capable of attaining immortality, be all immortal, for he is ever attending on the divine power, and having the divinity within him in perfect order, he has a life perfect and divine. Now there is only one way in which one being can attend on another, and this is by giving him his natural food and motion. And the motions which are naturally akin to the divine principle within us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These each man should follow, and correct those corrupted courses of the head which have to do with generation, and by learning the harmonies and revolutions of the whole, should assimilate the perceiver to the thing perceived, according to his original nature, and by thus assimilating them, attain that final perfection of life, which the gods set before mankind as best, both for the present and the future.

Thus the discussion of the universe which, according to our original proposition, was to reach to the origin of man, seems to have an end. A brief mention may be made of the generation of other animals, but there is no need to dwell upon them at length; in this manner our argument will best attain a due proportion. On the subject of animals, then, the following remarks may be offered. Of the men who came into the world, those who were cowards or led unjust lives may be fairly supposed to change into the nature of women in the second generation. Where-
 91 fore also in the beginning the gods created in us the desire of generation, contriving in man one animated substance, and in woman another, which they formed respectively in the following manner. The passage for the drink by which liquids pass through the lung under the kidneys and into the bladder, and which receives and emits them by the pressure of the breath, was so fashioned as to penetrate also into the body of the marrow, which passes from the head along the neck and through the back, and which in our previous discussion we have named the seed. And the seed having life, and becoming endowed with respiration, produces, in that part in which it respire, a lively desire of emission, and thus creates in us the love of procreation. Wherefore also in men the organ of generation becoming rebellious and masterful, like an animal disobedient to reason, seeks, by the raging of the appetites, to gain absolute sway; and the same is the case with the so-called womb or matrix of women; the animal within them is desirous of procreating children, and remaining unfruitful long beyond its proper time, gets discontented and angry, and wandering in every direction through the body, closes up the passages of the breath, and, by obstructing respiration, drives them to extremity, causing all varieties of disease, until at length the desire and love of the man and the woman, as it were producing and plucking the fruit from the tree, cause the emission of seed into the womb, as into a field, in which they sow animals unseen by reason of their smallness and without form; these they again separate and mature them within, and after that, bring them out into the light, and thus perfect the generation of animals.

Thus were created women and the female sex in general. But the race of birds was created out of innocent light-minded

men who, although their minds were directed toward heaven, imagined, in their simplicity, that the clearest demonstration of the things above was to be obtained by sight; these were transformed into birds, and they grew feathers instead of hair. The race of wild pedestrian animals, again, came from those who had no philosophy in any of their thoughts, and never considered at all about the nature of the heavens, because they had ceased to use the courses of the head, and followed the guidance of those parts of the soul which surround the breast. In consequence of these habits of theirs they had their forelegs and heads trailing upon the earth to which they were akin; and they had also the crowns of their heads oblong, and in all sorts of curious shapes, into which the courses of the soul were compressed by reason of disuse. And this was the reason why quadrupeds and polypods ⁹² were created: God gave the more senseless of them the more support that they might be more attracted to the earth. And the most foolish of them, who trail their bodies entirely upon the ground and have no longer any need of feet, he made without feet to crawl upon the earth. The fourth class were the inhabitants of the water: these were made out of the most entirely ignorant and senseless beings, whom the transformers did not think any longer worthy of pure respiration, because they possessed a soul which was made impure by all sorts of transgression; and instead of allowing them to respire the subtle and pure element of air, they thrust them into the water and gave them a deep and muddy medium of respiration; and hence arose the race of fishes and oysters, and other aquatic animals, which have received the most remote habitations as a punishment of their outlandish ignorance. These are the laws by which animals pass into one another, both now and ever changing as they lose or gain wisdom and folly.

And so we may say that our discourse about the nature of the universe has come to an end. The world has received animals, mortal and immortal, and is fulfilled with them, and has become a visible animal containing the visible—the sensible God who is the image of the intellectual, greatest, best, fairest, and most perfect—the one only-begotten universe.

CRITIAS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Critias is a fragment which breaks off in the middle of a sentence. It was designed to be the second part of a trilogy, which, like the other great Platonic trilogy of the Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher, was never completed. Timaeus had brought down the origin of the world to the creation of man, and the dawn of history was now to succeed the philosophy of nature. The Critias is also connected with the Republic. Plato, as he has already told us, intended to represent the ideal state engaged in a patriotic conflict. This mythical conflict is prophetic or symbolical of the struggle of Athens and Persia, perhaps in some degree also of the wars of the Greeks and Carthaginians, in the same way that the Persian is prefigured by the Trojan war to the mind of Herodotus; or as the narrative of the first part of the Aeneid foreshadows the wars of Carthage and Rome. The small number of the primitive Athenian citizens (20,000), 'which is about their present number,' is evidently designed to contrast with the myriads and barbaric array of the Atlantic hosts. The passing remark in the Timaeus (25 C) that Athens was left alone in the struggle, in which she conquered and became the liberator of Greece, is also an allusion to the later history. Hence we may safely conclude that the entire narrative is due to the imagination of Plato, who could easily invent 'Egyptians or anything else' (Phaedr. 275 B), and who has used the name of Solon (of whose poem there is no trace in antiquity) and the tradition of the Egyptian priests to give verisimilitude to his story. To the Greek such a tale, like that of the earth-born men, would have seemed perfectly accordant with the character of his mythology, and not more marvellous than the wonders of the East narrated by Herodotus and others. The fiction has exercised a great influence over the imagination of later ages. As many attempts have been made to find the great island, as to discover the country of the lost tribes. Without regard to the description of Plato,

and without a suspicion that the whole narrative is a fabrication, interpreters have looked for the spot in every part of the globe, America, Palestine, Arabia Felix, Ceylon, Sardinia, Sweden. The story had also an effect on the early navigators of the sixteenth century.

Timaeus concludes with a prayer that his words may be acceptable to the God whom he has revealed, and Critias, whose turn follows, begs that a larger measure of indulgence may be conceded to him, because he has to speak of the men whom we know and not of the gods whom we do not know. Socrates readily grants this indulgence to him, and anticipating that Hermocrates will make a similar request, is ready to grant a like indulgence to him.

Critias returns to his story, professing only to repeat what Solon was told by the priests. The war of which he was about to speak had occurred 9000 years ago. (This is slightly inconsistent with the Timaeus, which gives the same date for the foundation of the city—Tim. 23 E.; the mistake may indicate that the Critias was not written until some time afterwards.) One of the combatants was the city of Athens, the other was the great island of Atlantis. Critias proposes (after the manner of Herodotus and others) to give an account of the various tribes of Greeks and barbarians who took part in the war, as they successively appear on the scene. But first of all he will speak of the antediluvian Athens, and then of the island of Atlantis.

In the beginning the gods agreed to divide the earth by lot in a friendly manner, and when they had made the allotment (cp. Polit. 271 foll.) they settled their several countries, and were the shepherds or rather the pilots of mankind, whom they guided by persuasion, and not by force. Hephaestus and Athena, brother and sister deities, in mind and art united, obtained as their lot the land of Athens, a land suited to the growth of virtue and wisdom; and there they settled a brave race of children of the soil, in whom they implanted a spirit of law and order. The names of some of them remain, although the memory of their deeds has passed away, for there have since been many deluges, and the remnant who survived in the mountains lost the art of writing, and during many generations were wholly devoted to acquiring the means of life.

But the Egyptian priests had preserved the actions as well as the names of the kings before Theseus, such as Erechtheus and Erichthonius,

and of women in like manner. And the armed image of the goddess which was dedicated by the ancient Athenians is an evidence to other ages that men and women had in those days, as they ought always to have, common virtues and pursuits. There were various classes of citizens, including handicraftsmen and husbandmen and a superior class of warriors who dwelt alone, and were educated, and had all things in common like your guardians. The country in those days extended southwards to the Isthmus, and inland as far as the heights of Parnes and Cithaeron, but a single night of excessive rain washed away the earth and left the rock of the Acropolis bare; and at the same time there were earthquakes and a flood. The traces of this catastrophe are still discernible in the form of the shore, which is a lofty cliff, and goes down sheer into the deep sea. The soil was then and still is in some places the most fertile in the world, and abounded in rich plains and pastures. And the inhabitants of this fair land were endowed with intelligence and love of beauty.

The Acropolis of the ancient Athens extended to the Ilissus and Eridanus, and included the Pnyx and the Lycabettus on the opposite side to the Pnyx having a level surface and deep soil. The side of the hill was inhabited by the craftsmen and husbandmen; and the warriors dwelt by themselves on the summit, around the temples of Hephaestus and Athene, in an enclosure which was like the garden of a single house. In winter they retired into houses on the north of the hill, in which they held their *syssitia*. These were modest dwellings, which they bequeathed to their children and grandchildren. The south side was inhabited by them in summer time, and then they left their gardens and gymnasia; and in the midst of the Acropolis was a fountain, which gave an abundant supply of cool water in summer as well as in winter; of this there are still some traces. They were careful to preserve the number of fighting men and women at 20,000, which is about the present number, and so they passed their lives as guardians of the citizens and leaders of the Hellenes. They were a just and famous race, celebrated for their beauty and virtue all over Europe and Asia.

And now I will speak to you of their adversaries, but first I ought to explain that the Greek names were translated by Solon from the Egyptian record; he wrote them down and left them with my grandfather in a writing which I still possess. In the division of the earth Poseidon obtained as his portion the island of Atlantis, and there he begat

children whose mother was a mortal. On the side towards the sea and in the centre of the island there was a very fair and fertile plain, and near the centre, about fifty stadia from the plain, there was a low mountain in which dwelt a man named Evenor and his wife Leucippe and their daughter Cleito, of whom Poseidon became enamoured. He to secure his love enclosed the mountain with rings or zones at equal distances, two of land and three of sea, which his divine power readily enabled him to excavate and fashion, and, as there was no shipping in those days, no man could get into the place. To the interior island he conveyed under the earth springs of water hot and cold, and supplied the land with all things needed for the life of man. Here he begat a race with five pairs of twins, of whom the eldest was Atlas, and him he made king of the centre island, while to his twin brother, Eumelus, or Gadeirus as he was called in the national language, he assigned that part of the country which was nearest the Straits. The other brothers he made chiefs of the adjacent islands. And their kingdom extended as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia. Now Atlas had a fair posterity, and abundance of treasures, derived from mines of gold and silver and orichalcum, and there was abundance of wood, and herds of elephants, and pastures for animals of all kinds, and fragrant herbs, and grasses, and trees bearing fruit. These they used, and employed themselves in constructing their temples, and palaces, and harbours, and docks, in the following manner:—First, they bridged over the zones of sea, and made a way to the royal palace which they built in the sacred island. This ancient palace was ornamented by successive generations; and they dug a canal which passed through the zones of land from the island to the sea. The zones of earth were surrounded by stone walls of divers colours, black and white and red, which they sometimes intermingled for the sake of ornament; the outermost wall was coated with brass, the second with tin, and the third, which was the wall of the citadel, flashed with the red light of orichalcum, and as they quarried they hollowed out double docks having roofs of rock. In the interior of the citadel was a holy temple, dedicated to Cleito and Poseidon, and surrounded by an enclosure of gold, and there was Poseidon's own temple, which was covered with silver, and the pinnacles with gold. The roof was of ivory, adorned with gold and silver and orichalcum, and the rest of the interior lined with orichalcum. In the centre was the god standing in a chariot drawn by six winged horses, and touching the roof with his head; around him were the

hundred Nereids, riding on dolphins. Outside the temple were placed golden statues of all the ten kings and their wives, and other offerings; there was an altar too, and there were palaces, corresponding to the greatness and glory both of the kingdom and of the temple.

Also there were fountains of hot and cold water, and suitable buildings surrounding them, and trees, and there were baths both of the king and of private individuals, and separate baths for women, and also for cattle. The water from the baths was carried to the grove of Poseidon, and from thence by aqueducts over the bridges to the outer circle. And there were temples in the zones, and in the larger of the two there was a racecourse for horses, which ran all round the island. The guards were distributed in the zones according to the trust reposed in them; the most trusted of them were stationed in the citadel. The docks were full of triremes and naval stores. The citadel was surrounded by a wall, and was densely crowded with dwellings, and the canal resounded with the din of human voices.

The plain around the city was highly cultivated and sheltered from the north by mountains; it was encompassed by a foss of a hundred feet in depth and a stadium in breadth, and ten thousand stadia in length. The foss received the streams which came down from the mountains, as well as the canals of the interior, and found a way to the sea. The entire country was divided into sixty-thousand lots, each of which was a square of ten stadia; and the owner of a lot was bound to furnish the sixth part of a war-chariot, so as to make up ten thousand chariots, two horses and riders upon them, a light chariot without a seat, and an attendant and charioteer, two hoplites, two archers, two slingers, three stone-shooters, three javelin-men, and four sailors, to make up the complement of twelve hundred ships.

Each of the ten kings was absolute in his own city and island. The relations of the different governments to one another were determined by the injunctions of Poseidon, which had been inscribed by the first men on a column of orichalcum in the temple of Poseidon, at which the people were gathered together and held a festival every fifth and every sixth year. Around the temple ranged the bulls of Poseidon, whom the ten kings offered in sacrifice, shedding the blood of the victim over the inscription, and vowing not to transgress the laws of their father Poseidon. When night came, they put on azure robes and gave judgment against offenders. The most important of their laws related to their dealings

with one another. They were not to take up arms against one another, and were to come to the rescue if any of their brethren were attacked. They were to deliberate in common, and the king was not to have the power of life and death over his kinsmen, unless he had the assent of the majority.

For many generations, as tradition tells, the people of Atlantis were obedient to the laws and to the gods, and practised gentleness and wisdom in their intercourse with one another. They knew that they could only have the true use of riches by not caring about them. But gradually the divine portion of their souls became diluted with too much of the mortal admixture, and they began to degenerate, though to the outward eye they appeared glorious as ever at the very time when they were filled with all iniquity. The all-seeing Zeus, wanting to punish them, held a council of the gods, and when he had called them together, he spoke as follows:—

No one knew better than Plato how to invent 'a noble lie.' Observe (1) the innocent declaration of Socrates, that the truth of the story is a great advantage: (2) the manner in which traditional names and indications of geography are intermingled ('Why, here be truths!'): (3) the extreme minuteness with which the numbers are given, as in the Old Epic poetry: (4) the ingenious reason assigned for the Greek names occurring in the Egyptian tale: (5) the remark that the armed statue of Athena indicated the common warrior life of men and women: (6) the particularity with which the last deluge before that of Deucalion is affirmed to have been the great destruction: (7) the happy guess that great geological changes had been effected by water: (8) the indulgence of the prejudice against sailing beyond the Columns, and the popular belief of the shallowness of the ocean in that part: (9) the confession that the depth of the ditch in the Island of Atlantis, made by the hand of man, was not to be believed, and 'yet he could only repeat what he had heard'; while the triple zones of water in the midst of the country are attributed with greater appearance of probability to the supernatural power of the god: (10) the mention of the old rivalry of Poseidon and Athene, and the creation of the first inhabitants out of the soil. Plato here, as elsewhere, ingeniously gives the impression that he is telling the truth which mythology had corrupted.

The world, like a child, has readily, and for the most part unhesi-

tatingly, accepted the tale of the Island of Atlantis. In modern times we hardly seek for traces of the submerged continent; but even Mr. Grote (Plato, vol. iii. p. 295, note) is inclined to believe in the Egyptian poem of Solon of which there is no evidence in antiquity; while others, like Martin, discuss the Egyptian origin of the legend, or like M. de Humboldt, whom he quotes, are disposed to find in it a vestige of a widely-spread tradition. Others, adopting a different vein of reflection, regard the Island of Atlantis as the anticipation of a still greater island—the Continent of America. ‘The tale,’ says M. Martin, ‘rests upon the authority of the Egyptian priests; and the Egyptian priests took a pleasure in deceiving the Greeks.’ He never appears to suspect that there is a greater deceiver or magician than the Egyptian priests, that is to say, Plato himself, from the dominion of whose genius the critic and natural philosopher of modern times are not wholly emancipated. Although worthless in respect of any result which can be attained by them, discussions like those of M. Martin (*Timeè*, vol. i. 257–332) have an interest of their own, and may be compared to the similar discussions regarding the Lost Tribes (2 Esdras xiii. 40), as showing how the chance word of some poet or philosopher has given birth to endless religious or historical enquiries.

In contrasting the small Greek state numbering about twenty thousand inhabitants with the barbaric greatness of the island of Atlantis, Plato had evidently intended to show that such a state, though ‘consisting of only a thousand citizens,’ was invincible when matched with the hosts of Xerxes. Even in a great empire there might be a degree of virtue and justice, such as the Greeks believed to have existed under the sway of the first Persian kings. But all such empires were liable to degenerate, and soon incurred the anger of the gods. Their Oriental wealth, and splendour of gold and silver, and variety of colours, seemed also to be at variance with the simplicity of Greek notions. In the island of Atlantis, Plato is describing a sort of Babylonian or Egyptian city, to which he opposes the frugal life of the true Hellenic citizen. It is remarkable that in his brief sketch of them, he idealizes the husbandmen ‘who are lovers of honour and true husbandmen,’ as well as the warriors, who are his sole concern in the Republic; and that though he speaks of the common pursuits of men and women, he says nothing of the community of wives and children.

It is singular that Plato should have prefixed the most detested of

Athenian names to this dialogue, and even more singular that he should have put into the mouth of Socrates a panegyric on him. Yet we know that his character was accounted infamous by Xenophon, and that the mere acquaintance with him was made a subject of accusation against Socrates. We can only infer that in this, and perhaps in some other cases, Plato's characters have no reference to the actual facts. The desire to do honour to his own family, and the connection with Solon, may have suggested the introduction of his name. Why the Critias was never completed, whether from accident, or from advancing age, or from a sense of the artistic difficulty of the design, cannot be determined.

CRITIAS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CRITIAS.
HERMOCRATES.

TIMAEUS.
SOCRATES.

Timaeus. How thankful I am, Socrates, that I have arrived at last, and, like a weary traveller after a long journey, may be at rest! And I pray the being who always was of old, and has now been by me declared, to grant that my words may endure in so far as they have been spoken truly and acceptably to him; but if unintentionally I have said anything wrong, I pray that he will impose upon me a just retribution, and the just retribution of him who errs is that he should be set right. Wishing, then, to speak truly in future concerning the generation of the gods, I pray them to give me knowledge, which of all medicines is the most perfect and best. And now having offered my prayer I deliver the argument into the hands of Critias, according to our agreement.

Critias. And I, Timaeus, accept the trust, and as you at first said that you were going to speak of high matters, and begged
Steph. that some allowance might be extended to you, I ask the
107 same or greater allowance for what I am about to say. And although I very well know that my request may appear to be somewhat ambitious and impertinent, I must make it nevertheless. For will any man of sense deny that you have spoken well? I can only attempt to show that I ought to have more indulgence than you, because my theme is more difficult; and I shall argue that to seem to speak well of the gods to men is far easier than to speak well of mortals to one another: for the

inexperience and utter ignorance of his hearers about divine matters is a great assistance to him who has to speak of them, and we know how ignorant we are concerning the gods. But I should like to make my meaning clearer, if you will follow me. All that is said by any of us can only be imitation and comparison. For if we consider how the works of the painter represent bodies divine and heavenly, and the different degrees of gratification with which the eye of the spectator receives them, we shall see that we are satisfied with the artist who is able in any degree to imitate the earth and its mountains, and the rivers, and the woods, and the universe, and the things that are and move therein, and further, that knowing nothing precise about such matters, we do not examine or analyse the painting; all that is required is a sort of indistinct and deceptive mode of shadowing them forth. But when a person endeavours to paint the human form we are quick at finding out defects, and our familiar knowledge makes us severe judges of any one who does not render every point of similarity; and we may observe the same thing to happen in discourse; we are satisfied with a picture of divine and heavenly things which has very little likeness to them; but we are more precise in our criticism of mortal and human things. Wherefore if at the moment of speaking we cannot suitably express what we mean, you must excuse us, considering that to form approved likenesses of human things is the reverse of easy. This is what I want to suggest to you, and at the same time to beg, Socrates, that I may have not less, but more indulgence conceded to me in what I am about to say. Which favour, if I am right in asking, I hope that you will be ready to grant. 108

Socrates. Certainly, Critias, we will grant your request, and we will grant the same by anticipation to Hermocrates, as well as of Timaeus; for I have no doubt that when his turn comes a little while hence, he will make the same request which you have made. In order, then, that he may provide himself with a fresh beginning, and not be compelled to say the same things over again, let him understand that the indulgence is already extended by anticipation to him. And now, friend Critias, I will announce to you the judgment of the theatre. They are of opinion that the last performer was wonderfully

successful, and that you will need a great deal of indulgence if you are to rival him.

Hermocrates. The warning, Socrates, which you have addressed to him, I must also take to myself. But remember, Critias, that faint heart never yet raised a trophy; and therefore you must go and attack the argument like a man. First invoke Apollo and the Muses, and then let us hear you sing the praises of your ancient citizens.

Crit. Friend Hermocrates, you who are stationed last and have another in front of you, have not lost heart as yet; the gravity of the situation will soon be revealed to you; meanwhile I accept your exhortations and encouragements. But besides the gods and goddesses whom you have mentioned, I would specially invoke Mnemosyne; for all the important part of my discourse is dependent on her favour, and if I can recollect and recite enough of what was said by the priests and brought hither by Solon, I doubt not that I shall satisfy the requirements of this theatre. And now, making no more excuses, I will proceed.

Let me begin by observing first of all, that nine thousand was the sum of years which had elapsed since the war which was said to have taken place between all those who dwelt outside the pillars of Heracles and those who dwelt within them; this war I am going to describe. Of the combatants on the one side, the city of Athens was reported to have been the ruler and leader throughout the war; the combatants on the other side were led by the kings of the island of Atlantis, which, as I was saying, once had an extent greater than Libya and Asia; and when afterwards sunk by an earthquake, became an impassable barrier of mud to voyagers sailing from hence to the ocean.

109 The progress of the history will unfold the various tribes of barbarians and Hellenes which then existed, as they successively appear on the scene; but I must describe first of all the Athenians of that day, and their enemies who fought with them; and then proceed to speak of the respective powers and governments of the two kingdoms. Let us give the precedence to Athens:

In the days of old, the gods had the whole earth distributed among them by allotment; there was no quarrelling; and you

cannot suppose that the gods did not know what was proper for each of them to have ; or, knowing this, that they would seek to procure for themselves by contention that which more properly belonged to others. Each of them by just apportionment obtained what they wanted, and peopled their own districts ; and when they had peopled them they tended us human beings who belonged to them as shepherds tend their flocks, excepting only that they did not use blows or bodily force, as shepherds do, but governed us like pilots from the stern of the vessel, which is an easy way of guiding animals, holding our souls by the rudder of persuasion according to their own pleasure ;—thus did they guide all mortal creatures. Now different gods had their inheritance in different places which they set in order. Hephaestus and Athene, who were brother and sister, and sprang from the same father, having a common nature, and being united also in the love of philosophy and art, both obtained as their allotted region this land, which was naturally adapted for wisdom and virtue ; and there they implanted brave children of the soil, and put into their minds the order of government ; their names are preserved, but their actions have disappeared by reason of the destruction of those who had the tradition, and the lapse of ages. For when there were any survivors, as I have already said, they were men who dwelt in the mountains ; and they were ignorant of the art of writing, and had heard only the names of the chiefs of the land, but very little about their actions. The names they were willing enough to give to their children ; but of the virtues of those who preceded them and of their laws, they knew only by obscure traditions ; and as they themselves and their children were for many generations in want of the necessaries of life, they directed their attention to the supply of their wants, and of them they conversed, to the neglect of events that had happened in times long passed ; for mythology and the enquiry into antiquity are introduced into cities when they have leisure, and when they see that the necessaries of life have already been provided, but not before. And this is the reason why the names of the ancients have been preserved to us without their deeds. This I infer because Solon said that the priests in their narrative of that war mentioned most of the names which are recorded prior to the time of Theseus, such as

Cecrops, and Erechtheus, and Erichthonius, and Erysichthon, and the names of the women in like manner. Moreover, the figure and image of the goddess show that military pursuits were then common to men and women, and that they consecrated the armed image of the goddess in accordance with the custom of the time and as a testimony that all animals which associate together may, if they please, practise in common the virtue which belongs to them without distinction of sex.

Now the country was inhabited in those days by various classes of citizens;—there were artisans, and there were husbandmen, and there was also a warrior class originally set apart by divine men; these dwelt by themselves, and had all things suitable for nurture and education; neither had any of them anything of their own, but they regarded all things as common property; nor did they require to receive of the other citizens anything more than their necessary food. And they practised all the pursuits which we yesterday described as those of our imaginary guardians. Concerning the country the Egyptian priests said what is not only probable but manifestly true, that the boundaries were fixed by the Isthmus, and that in the other direction they extended as far as the heights of Cithaeron and Parnes; the boundary line came down towards the plain, having the district of Oropus on the right, and the river Asopus on the left, as the limit towards the sea. The land was the best in the world, and was therefore able in those days to support a vast army, raised from the surrounding people. Even the remnant of Attica which now exists may compare
 111 its fruits and the suitability of its pastures to every sort of animal, and here is an evidence of what I am saying; but in those days the country was as fair as now and yielded far more abundant produce. How shall I prove my words? and what is the remnant? I would have you observe the present aspect of the country, which is only a promontory extending far into the sea away from the rest of the continent, while the surrounding basin of the sea is everywhere deep in the neighbourhood of the shore. Many great deluges have taken place during the nine thousand years, for that is the number of years which have elapsed since the time of which I am speaking: and in all the ages and

changes of things, there has never been any considerable accumulation of the soil coming down from the mountains, as in other places, but the earth has fallen away all round and sunk out of sight. The consequence is, that in comparison of what then was, there are remaining only the bones of the wasted body, as they may be called, discernible in small islands; all the richer and softer parts of the soil having fallen away, and the mere skeleton of the land being left. But in former days, and in the primitive state of the country, what are now mountains were only regarded as high hills; and the plains, as they are termed by us, of Phelleus were full of rich earth, and there was abundance of wood in the mountains. Of this last the traces still remain, for although some of the mountains now only afford sustenance to bees, not so very long ago there were to be seen roofs of timber cut from trees growing there, which were of a size sufficient to cover the largest houses; and there were many other high trees, bearing fruit and abundance of food for cattle. Moreover, the land enjoyed rain from heaven year by year, not as now losing the water which flows off the bare earth into the sea, but, having an abundance in all places, and receiving and treasuring up in the close clay soil the streams which descended from the heights, it let them off into the hollows, providing everywhere abundant fountains and rivers, of which there may still be observed indications in ancient sacred places, where fountains once existed; and this proves the truth of what I am saying.

Such was the natural state of the country, which was cultivated, as we may well believe, by true husbandmen, who did the work of husbandmen, and were lovers of honour, and of a noble nature, and had a soil the best in the world, and abundance of water, and in the heaven above an excellently tempered climate. Now the city in those days was arranged on this wise. In the first place the Acropolis was not as now. For the fact is that 112 a single night of excessive rain washed away the earth and laid bare the rock; at the same time there were earthquakes, and then occurred the third extraordinary inundation, which immediately preceded the great destruction of Deucalion. But in primitive times the hill of the Acropolis extended to the Eridanus and Ilissus, and included the Pnyx on one side, and

the Lycabettus as a boundary on the opposite side to the Pnyx, and was all well covered with soil, and level at the top, except in one or two places. Outside the Acropolis and on the sides of the hill there dwelt artisans, and such of the husbandmen as were tilling the ground near; at the summit the warrior class dwelt by themselves around the temples of Athene and Hephaestus, in one enclosure which was like the garden of a single house. On the north side they had dwellings in common and had erected halls for dining in winter, and had all the buildings which they needed for the public use, besides temples, but there was no adorning of them with gold and silver, for they made no use of these for any purpose; they took a middle course between meanness and extravagance, and built moderate houses in which they and their children's children grew old, and handed them down to others who were like themselves, always the same. But in summer-time they left their gardens and gymnasia and dining halls, and then the southern side of the hill was made use of by them in like manner. Where the Acropolis now is there was a single fountain, which was extinguished by the earthquake, and has left only a few small streams which still exist, but in those days the fountain gave an abundant supply of water, which was of equal temperature in summer and winter. In such fashion they lived, being the guardians of their own citizens and the leaders of the Hellenes, who were their willing followers. And they took care to preserve the same number of men and women for military service, which was to continue through all time, and is still preserved,—that is to say, about twenty thousand. Such were the ancient Athenians, and after this manner they righteously administered their own land and the rest of Hellas; they were renowned all over Europe and Asia for the beauty of their persons and for the many virtues of their souls, and were more famous than any of their contemporaries. And next, if I have not forgotten what I heard when I was a child, I will impart to you the character and origin of their adversaries. For friends should not keep their stories to themselves, but have them in common.

113 Yet, before proceeding further in the narrative, I ought to warn you, that you must not be surprised if you should hear Hellenic names given to foreigners. I will tell you the reason

of this : Solon, who was intending to use the tale for his poem, made an investigation into the meaning of the names, and found that the early Egyptians in writing them down had translated them into their own language, and he recovered the meaning of the several names and re-translated them, and copied them out again in our language. My great grandfather, Dropidas, had the original writing, which is still in my possession, and was carefully studied by me when I was a child. Therefore if you hear names such as are used in this country, you must not be surprised, for I have told how they came to be introduced. The tale, which was of great length, began as follows :—

I have before remarked in speaking of the allotments of the gods, that they distributed the whole into portions differing in extent, and made themselves temples and sacrifices. And Poseidon, receiving for his lot the island of Atlantis, begat children by a mortal woman, and settled them in a part of the island, which I will proceed to describe. On the side towards the sea and in the centre of the whole island, there was a plain which is said to have been the fairest of all plains and very fertile. Near the plain again, and also in the centre of the island at a distance of about fifty stadia, there was a mountain not very high on any side. In this mountain there dwelt one of the earth-born primeval men of that country, whose name was Evenor, and he had a wife named Leucippe, and they had an only daughter who was called Cleito. The maiden was growing up to womanhood, when her father and mother died ; Poseidon fell in love with her and had intercourse with her, and breaking the ground, inclosed the hill in which she dwelt all round, making alternate zones of sea and land larger and smaller, encircling one another ; there were two of land and three of water, which he turned as with a lathe, out of the centre of the island, equidistant every way, so that no man could get to the island, for ships and voyages were not as yet heard of. He himself, as he was a god, found no difficulty in making special arrangements for the centre island, bringing two streams of water under the earth, which he caused to ascend as springs, one of warm water and the other of cold, and making every variety of food to spring up abundantly in the earth. He also begat and brought up five pairs of twin male children ; and

114 dividing the island of Atlantis into ten portions, he gave to the first-born of the eldest pair his mother's dwelling and the surrounding allotment, which was the largest and best, and made him king over the rest; the others he made princes, and gave them rule over many men, and a large territory. And he named them all; the eldest, who was the king, he named Atlas, and from him the whole island and the ocean received the name of Atlantic. To his twin brother, who was born after him, and obtained as his lot the extremity of the island towards the pillars of Heracles, as far as the country which is still called the region of Gades in that part of the world, he gave the name which in the Hellenic language is Eumelus, in the language of the country which is named after him, Gadeirus. Of the second pair of twins he called one Ampheres, and the other Evaemon. To the elder of the third pair of twins he gave the name Mneseus, and Autochthon to the one who followed him. Of the fourth pair of twins he called the elder Elasippus, and the younger Mestor. And of the fifth pair he gave to the elder the name of Azaes, and to the younger that of Diaprepes. All these and their descendants were the inhabitants and rulers of divers islands in the open sea; and also, as has been already said, they held sway in the other direction over the country within the pillars as far as Egypt and Tyrrhenia. Now Atlas had a numerous and honourable family, and his eldest branch always retained the kingdom, which the eldest son handed on to his eldest for many generations; and they had such an amount of wealth as was never before possessed by kings and potentates, and is not likely ever to be again, and they were furnished with everything which they could have, both in the city and country. For because of the greatness of their empire many things were brought to them from foreign countries, and the island itself provided much of what was required by them for the uses of life. In the first place, they dug out of the earth whatever was to be found there, mineral as well as metal, and that which is now only a name and was then something more than a name, orichalcum, was dug out of the earth in many parts of the island, and with the exception of gold was esteemed the most precious of metals among the men of those days. There was an abundance of wood for carpenter's work, and sufficient

maintenance for tame and wild animals. Moreover, there were a great number of elephants in the island, and there was provision for animals of every kind, both for those which live in lakes and marshes and rivers, and also for those which live in mountains and on plains, and therefore for the animal which is the largest and most voracious of them. Also whatever fragrant things there are in the earth, whether roots, or herbage, or woods, or essences which distil from fruit and flower, grew and thrived in that land; and again, the cultivated fruit of the earth, both the dry edible fruit and other species of food, which we call by the general name of legumes, and the fruits having a hard rind, affording drinks and meats and ointments, and good store of chestnuts and the like, which may be used to play with, and are fruits which spoil with keeping, and the pleasant kinds of dessert, with which we amuse ourselves after dinner, when we are tired of eating — all these that sacred island which then beheld the light of the sun, brought forth fair and wondrous and in infinite abundance. All these things they received from the earth, and they employed themselves in constructing their temples and palaces and harbours and docks; and they arranged the whole country in the following manner:—

First of all they bridged over the zones of sea which surrounded the ancient metropolis, and made a road into and out of the royal palace. At the same time they built the palace in the habitation of the god and of their ancestors, which they continued to ornament in successive generations, every king surpassing the one who came before him to the utmost of his power, until they made the building a marvel to behold for size and for beauty. And beginning from the sea they bored a canal of three hundred feet in width and one hundred feet in depth, and fifty stadia in length, which they carried through to the outermost zone, making a passage from the sea up to this, which became a harbour, and leaving an opening sufficient to enable the largest vessels to find ingress. Moreover, they divided the zones of land which parted the zones of sea, leaving room for a single trireme to pass out of one zone into another, and constructing bridges; the bridges were covered, and there was a way underneath for the ships; for the banks were raised considerably above the water. Now the largest of the zones into which a

passage was cut from the sea was three stadia in breadth, and the zone of land which came next of equal breadth ; but the next two zones, the one of water, the other of land, were two stadia, and the one which surrounded the central island was
 116 a stadium only in width. The island in which the palace was situated had a diameter of five stadia. All this including the zones and the bridge, which was the sixth part of a stadium in width, they surrounded by a stone wall on all sides, placing towers and gates on the bridges where the sea passed in. The stone which was used in the work they quarried from underneath the centre island, and from underneath the zones, on the outer as well as the inner side. One kind of stone was white, another black, and a third red, and as they quarried, they at the same time hollowed out double docks, having roofs formed out of the native rock. Some of their buildings were simple, but in others they put together different stones, varying the pattern to please the eye, and to be a natural source of delight. The entire circuit of the wall, which went round the outermost zone, they covered with a coating of brass, and the circuit of the next wall they coated with tin, and the third, which encompassed the citadel, flashed with the red light of orichalcum. The palaces in the interior of the citadel were constructed on this wise:—In the centre was a holy temple dedicated to Cleito and Poseidon, which remained inaccessible, and was surrounded by an enclosure of gold ; this was the spot where the family of the ten princes first saw the light, and thither the people annually brought the fruits of the earth in their season from all the ten portions, and performed sacrifices to each of the ten. Here, too, was Poseidon's own temple which was a stadium in length, and half a stadium in width, and of a proportionate height, having a strange Asiatic look. All the outside of the temple, with the exception of the pinnacles, they covered with silver, and the pinnacles with gold. In the interior of the temple the roof was of ivory, adorned everywhere with gold and silver and orichalcum ; and all the other parts of the walls and pillars and floor they lined with orichalcum. In the temple they placed statues of gold : there was the god himself standing in a chariot—the charioteer of six winged horses—and of such a size that he touched the roof of the buildings with his head ; around him there were a hundred Nereids riding on dolphins, for

such was thought to be the number of them in that day. There were also in the interior of the temple other images which had been dedicated by private individuals. And around the temple on the outside were placed statues of gold of all the ten kings and of their wives, and there were many other great offerings of kings and of private individuals, coming both from the city itself and from the foreign cities over which they held sway. There was an altar too, which in size and workmanship corresponded to the rest of the work, and there were palaces, in like 117 manner, which answered to the greatness of the kingdom and the glory of the temple.

In the next place, they had fountains both of cold and hot springs; these were very abundant, and both kinds¹ wonderfully adapted to use by reason of the sweetness and excellence of their waters. They constructed buildings about them and planted suitable trees; also cisterns, some open to the heaven, others roofed over, to be used in winter as warm baths; there were the king's baths, and the baths of private persons, which were kept apart; also separate baths for women, and others again for horses and cattle, and to each of them they gave as much adornment as was suitable for them. The water which ran off they carried, some to the grove of Poseidon, where were growing all manner of trees of wonderful height and beauty, owing to the excellence of the soil; the remainder was conveyed by aqueducts which passed over the bridges to the outer circles; and there were many temples built and dedicated to many gods; also gardens and places of exercise, some for men, and some set apart for horses in both of the two islands formed by the zones; and in the centre of the larger of the two there was a race-course of a stadium in width, and in length allowed to extend all round the island, for horses to race in. Also there were guard-houses at intervals for the body-guard, the more trusted of whom had their duties appointed to them in the lesser zone, which was nearer the Acropolis; while the most trusted of all had houses given them within the citadel, and were about the persons of the kings. The docks were full of triremes and naval stores, and all things were quite ready for use. Enough of the plan of the royal palace.

¹ Reading *ἐκατέρου πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν.*

Leaving the palace and crossing the three harbours outside, you came to a wall which began at the sea and went all round: this was everywhere distant fifty stadia from the largest zone or harbour, and enclosed the whole, the ends meeting at the mouth of the channel towards the sea. The entire area was densely crowded with habitations; and the canal and the largest of the harbours were full of vessels and merchants coming from all parts, who, from their numbers, kept up a multitudinous sound of human voices, and din of all sorts night and day.

I have described the city and the parts about the ancient palace nearly in the words of Solon, and now I must endeavour
118 to describe the nature and arrangement of the rest of the country. The whole country was said by him to be very lofty and precipitous on the side of the sea, but the country immediately about and surrounding the city was a level plain, itself surrounded by mountains which descended towards the sea; it was smooth and even, and of an oblong shape, extending in one direction three thousand stadia, but when measured through the centre island, two thousand stadia; the whole region of the island was situated towards the south, and sheltered from the north. He celebrated the surrounding mountains for their number and size and beauty, in which they exceeded all that are now to be seen anywhere; having in them also many wealthy inhabited villages, and rivers, and lakes, and meadows supplying food enough for every animal, wild or tame, and wood of various sorts, abundant for every kind of work.

I will now describe the plain, which had been cultivated during many ages by many generations of kings. It was for the most part rectangular and oblong, and where falling out of the straight line followed the circular ditch. The depth, and width, and length of this ditch were incredible, and gave the impression that such a work, in addition to so many others, could hardly have been wrought by the hand of man. Nevertheless I must say what I was told. It was excavated to the depth of a hundred feet, and its breadth was a stadium everywhere; it was carried round the whole of the plain, and was ten thousand stadia in length. It received the streams which

came down from the mountains, and winding round the plain and at various points touching the city, was there let off into the sea. Above, likewise, straight canals of a hundred feet in width were cut from it through the plain, and again let off into the ditch towards the sea: these canals were at intervals of an hundred stadia, and by them they brought down the wood from the mountains to the city, and conveyed the fruits of the earth in ships, cutting transverse passages from one canal into another, and to the city. Twice in the year they gathered the fruits of the earth—in winter having the benefit of the rains, and in summer introducing the water of the canals.

As to the population, each of the lots in the plain had an appointed chief over the men who were fit for military service, and the size of the lot was a square of ten stadia each way, 119 and the total number of all the lots was sixty thousand. And of the inhabitants of the mountains and of the rest of the country there was also a vast multitude having leaders, to whom they were assigned according to their dwellings and villages. The leader was required to furnish for the war the sixth portion of a war-chariot, so as to make up a total of ten thousand chariots; also two horses and riders for them, and a light chariot without a seat, accompanied by a fighting man on foot carrying a small shield, and having a charioteer mounted to guide the horses; also, he was bound to furnish two heavy armed soldiers, two archers, two slingers, three stone-shooters, and three javelin-men, who were skirmishers, and four sailors to make up the complement of twelve hundred ships. Such was the military order of the royal city—the order of the other nine governments was different in each of them, and would be wearisome to recount.

As to offices and honours, the following was the arrangement from the first. Each of the ten kings in his own division and in his own city had the absolute control of the citizens, and, in many cases, of the laws, punishing and slaying whomsoever he would. Now the relations of their governments to one another were regulated by the injunctions of Poseidon which the law had handed down. These were inscribed by the first men on a column of orichalcum, which was situated in the middle of the island, at the temple of Poseidon, whither the

people were gathered together every fifth and every sixth year alternately, thus giving equal honour to the odd and to the even number. And when they were gathered together they consulted about public affairs, and enquired if any one had transgressed in anything, and passed judgment on him accordingly, and before they passed judgment they gave their pledges to one another on this wise:—There were bulls who had the range of the temple of Poseidon; and the ten kings, who were left alone in the temple, after they had offered prayers to the gods that they might take the sacrifices which were acceptable to them, hunted the bulls, without weapons, but with staves and nooses; and the bull which they caught they led up to the column; the victim was then laid on the top of it and his blood shed over the sacred inscription. Now on the column, besides the law, there was inscribed an oath invoking mighty curses on the disobedient. When therefore, after offering sacrifice according to their customs, they had
 120 burnt the limbs of the bull, they filled a bowl of wine and cast in a clot of blood for each of them; the rest of the victim they put in the fire, after having made a purification of the column all round. Then they drew from the bowl in golden cups, and pouring a libation on the fire, they swore that they would judge according to the laws on the column, and would punish any one who had previously transgressed, and that for the future they would not, if they could help, transgress any of the inscriptions, and would neither command others nor obey any ruler who commanded them, to act otherwise than according to the laws of their father Poseidon. This was the prayer which each of them offered up for himself and for his family, at the same time drinking and dedicating the cup of which he drank in the temple of the god; and after spending some necessary time at supper, when darkness came on, and the fire about the sacrifice was cool, all of them put on most beautiful azure robes, and, sitting on the ground, at night, near the embers of the sacrifices over which they had sworn, and extinguishing all the fire about the temple, they received and gave judgment, if any of them had any accusation to bring against any one; and when they had given judgment, at day-break they wrote down their sentences on a golden tablet,

and deposited them together with their robes that they might be a testimony.

There were many special laws which the several kings had inscribed about their temples, but the most important was the following: That they were not to take up arms against one another, and that they were all to come to the rescue if any one in any city attempted to overthrow the royal house; like their ancestors, they were to deliberate in common about war and other matters, giving the supremacy to the family of Atlas. And the king was not to have the power of life and death over any of his kinsmen unless he had the assent of the majority of the ten kings.

Such was the vast power which the god settled in the lost island of Atlantis; and this he afterwards directed against our land for the following reasons, as tradition tells: For many generations, as long as the divine nature lasted in them, they were obedient to the laws, and well-affectioned towards the gods, whose seed they were; for they possessed true and in every way great spirits, practising gentleness and wisdom in the various chances of life, and in their intercourse with one another. They despised everything but virtue, caring little for their present state of life, and thinking lightly of the possession of gold and other property, which seemed only a burden to them; neither were they intoxicated by luxury; nor did wealth deprive them of their self-control; but they were sober, and saw clearly that all these goods are increased by virtue and friendship with one another, whereas by too great regard and respect for them, they are lost and friendship with them. By such reflections and by the continuance in them of a divine nature, all that which we have described waxed and increased in them; but when this divine portion began to fade away, and became diluted too often and with too much of the mortal admixture, and the human nature got the upper hand, they then, being unable to bear their fortune, became changed, and to him who had an eye to see, began to appear base, having lost the fairest of their precious gifts; but to those who had no eye to see the true happiness, they still appeared glorious and blessed at the very time when they were filled with love of gain and unrighteous power. Zeus, the god of gods, who

rules with law, and is able to see into such things, perceiving that an honourable race was in a woeful plight, and wanting to inflict punishment on them, that they might be chastened and improve, collected all the gods into his most holy habitation, which, being placed in the centre of the world, beholds all created things. And when he had called them together, he spake as follows :—

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THE
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THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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
*REVISED AND CORRECTED THROUGHOUT, WITH ADDITIONS
AND AN INDEX OF SUBJECTS AND PROPER NAMES*

Oxford

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PHILEBUS.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras or the Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the earlier dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages (pp. 15, 16, 63); instead of the ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may venture to term them (17 E, 23 A, 24 B, 29 B, 30 E, 34 D, 43 A, 36 C, 46 B). We may observe also an attempt at artificial ornament (43 E, 53 D, E), and far-fetched modes of statement (48 D), as well as other defects of style, which remind us of the Laws. The connexion is often abrupt and inharmonious (24 C, etc.), and at 42 D, E, 43 A, 48 A, B, 49, 50, far from clear. Many points require further explanation; e. g. the reference of pleasure to the indefinite class (31 A), compared with the assertion which almost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain naturally have their seat in the third or mixed class: these two statements are unreconciled. In like manner, the table of goods does not clearly distinguish between the two heads of measure and symmetry; and though a hint is given that the divine mind has the first place (22 C), nothing is said of this in the final summing up¹. The relation of the goods to the sciences does not appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond to the highest good, the sciences

¹ See however p. 11 a.

and arts and true opinions are enumerated in the fourth class. At p. 50 D, 67 B, we seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, in which some topics lightly passed over were to receive further consideration. The various uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, the mixed class of elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and pain, are a further source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions which Plato is attacking, is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a controversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended to refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has not told us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them, the relation in which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we able to say how far Plato in the *Philebus* conceives the finite and infinite (which occur both in the fragments of Philolaus (?) and in the Pythagorean table of opposites) in the same manner as contemporary Pythagoreans.

There is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The Socrates of the *Philebus* is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony, though here, as in the *Phaedrus* (235 C), he twice attributes the flow of his ideas to a sudden inspiration (20 B, 25 B, C). The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, who has been a hearer of Gorgias (58 A), is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans of pleasure, but is soon drawn over to the opposite side by the arguments of Socrates. The instincts of youth are easily induced to take the better part. *Philebus*, who has withdrawn from the argument, is several times brought back again (pp. 18, 19, 22, 28), that he may support pleasure, of which he remains to the end the uncompromising advocate. On the other hand, the youthful group of listeners by whom he is surrounded, '*Philebus*' boys' as they are termed, whose presence is several times intimated (16 A, B, 19 D, 67 B), are described as all of them at last convinced by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a very faded resemblance to the interested audiences of the *Charmides*, *Lysis*, or *Protagoras*. Other signs of relation to external life in the dialogue, or mention of contemporary things and persons, with the single exception of the allusion to the anonymous enemies of pleasure (44 B, C), and the teachers of the flux (43 A), there are none.

The omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous state of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato. The

transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by him in the *Meno*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Phaedrus*, has given way to a psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant by his having occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas at all, he treats in the same sceptical spirit (15 A, B) which appears in his criticism of them in the *Parmenides* (131 ff.) He touches on the same difficulties and he gives no answer to them. His mode of speaking of the analytical and synthetical processes may be compared with his manner of discussing the same subject in the *Phaedrus*; here he dwells on the importance of dividing the genera into all the species, while in the *Phaedrus* he conveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks of carving the whole, which is described under the image of a victim, into parts or members, 'according to their natural articulation, without breaking any of them.' There is also a difference, which may be noted, between the two dialogues. For whereas in the *Phaedrus*, and also in the *Symposium*, the dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or lover, in the *Philebus*, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element of love is wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the *Republic*, by way of illustration (cp. 53 D, *Rep.* v. 474 D, E). On other subjects of which they treat in common, such as the nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of the good, the order and relation of the sciences, the *Republic* is less advanced than the *Philebus*, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical truth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here, as he expressly tells us, Plato is 'forging weapons of another make,' i. e. new categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old ones might do again.'

But if superior in thought and dialectical power, the *Philebus* falls very far short of the *Republic* in fancy and feeling. The development of the reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which Plato aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to the greater feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry in Plato's own mind; or perhaps, in some degree, to a carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract ideas, we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety of indications, derived from style as well as subject, that the *Philebus* belongs to the later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as in all the later

writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and expressions in which he rises to his highest level (15, 17, 63, 67).

The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of good. These are only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly entitled 'concerning pleasure' or 'concerning good,' but should rather be described as treating of the relations of pleasure or knowledge, after they have been duly analysed, to the good. (1) The question is asked: Whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some nature higher than either? and if the latter, how are pleasure and wisdom related to this higher good? (2) Before we can reply with exactness, we must know the kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge: (3) But still we may affirm generally, that the combined life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has more of the character of the good than either of them when isolated: (4) To determine which of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must know under which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall. These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, the union of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is of the first, wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while reason or mind is akin to the fourth or highest.

(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed pleasures there are three classes—(a) those in which both the pleasures and pains are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (β) those in which there is a remembered opposite of the actual bodily affection, as when you are hungry and remember some former repast; (γ) those in which the pleasure and pain are both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are also three classes: (α) those of sight and hearing; (β) those of smell; (γ) those of mathematics.

(6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, of mixed and unmixed, creative and theoretical; and in each of them there is an architectonic element. This in the creative arts is arithmetic and mensuration; and arts like carpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher than music, which for the most part is mere guess-work and imitation. But there is also a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively theoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the truest and purest knowledge.

(7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life. First, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences. Secondly, the impure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover what element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three criteria of goodness—beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more akin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of both of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the second place is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; the fourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures; and here the Muse says ‘Enough.’

‘Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,’ we may now proceed to consider the metaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are, (I) the paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or elements; (III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge; (V) the conception of the good; (VI) we may examine the relation of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues.

I. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic of Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by showing the contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence of the many (cp. Parm. 128 ff.) Zeno illustrated the contradiction by well-known examples taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems to intimate that the time had arrived for discarding these hackneyed illustrations; such difficulties had long been solved by common sense (*solvitur ambulando*), as the mere familiarity with the fact was a sufficient answer to them. He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics; the youth of Athens may discourse of them to their parents. To no rational man could the circumstance that the body is one, but has many members, be any longer a stumbling-block.

Plato’s difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot understand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic being, can be broken up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at once. Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or being, by the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no longer imagine ‘being’ as in a state of change or division. To say that the verb of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is to us easy; but to the Greek such an analysis involved the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God existing both in and out of the world

would to ourselves. Nor was he assisted by the analogy of sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark and mysterious to him; but instead of being illustrated by sense, the greatest light appeared to be thrown on the nature of ideas when they were contrasted with sense.

Both here and in the *Parmenides* (129 ff.), where similar difficulties are raised, Plato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the relation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he transfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds to lay down practical rules for their application to different branches of knowledge. As in the *Republic*, he supposes the philosopher to proceed by regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, he insists that in dividing the whole into its parts we should bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species; as in the *Phaedrus* (see above), he would have 'no limb broken' of the organism of knowledge;—so in the *Philebus*, he urges the necessity of filling up all the intermediate links which occur (compare Bacon's *media axiomata*) in the passage from unity to infinity. With him the idea of science may be said to anticipate science; at a time when the sciences were not yet divided, he wants to impress upon us the importance of classification; neither neglecting the many individuals, nor attempting to count them all, but finding the genera and species under which they naturally fall. Here, then, and in the parallel passages of the *Phaedrus* and of the *Sophist*, is found the germ of the most fruitful notion of modern science.

At p. 15 Plato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by the one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of metaphysical enthusiasm (cp. *Rep.* 539). But they are none the less an everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in us. At first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the eyes blinking at the light in the *Republic*. To this Plato opposes the revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some Prometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have imparted to us. Plato is speaking at pp. 15, 16 of two things—(1) the crude notion of the one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first beginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of dialectic (16 C—E).

To us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and perplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that

the continuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is a one and many, and that a like principle may be applied by analogy to purely intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the words, we are compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are true. But the antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us. Our sense of the contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher sphere, when we speak of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of Three Persons and One Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge is always dividing more and more; every truth is at first the enemy of every other truth. Yet without this division there can be no truth; nor any complete truth without the reunion of the parts into a whole. And hence the coexistence of opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded by Hegel as the supreme principle of philosophy; and the law of contradiction, which is affirmed by logicians to be an ultimate principle of the human mind, is displaced by another law, which asserts the coexistence of contradictories as imperfect and divided elements of the truth. Without entering further into the depths of Hegelianism, we may remark that this and all similar attempts to reconcile antinomies have their origin in the old Platonic problem of the 'One and Many.'

II. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This is the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable; of which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded distinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression of sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having certain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which in the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good. To a Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would have been an absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good was of the nature of the finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which is on the level of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that there was a distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely small, but he would have equally denied the claim of either to true existence. Of that positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we attribute to God, he had no conception.

The Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in our way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity is subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute vacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which we suppose to exist not before, but after we have already set bounds

to thought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different points of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon respectively both as positive and negative (cp. *Omnis determinatio est negatio*); and the conception of the one determines that of the other. The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite poles in their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when they make the discovery, as Plato has done in the *Sophist*, how large an element negation forms in the framework of their thoughts.

2. 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite is best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all things and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their natural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition. This is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and the like. All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which are for the most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be wrong in attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived from observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction as any modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But observing that the wonderful construction of number and figure which he had within himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained a part of the phenomena of the external world, he extended their principles to the whole, finding in them the true type both of human life and of the order of nature.

Two other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that Plato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates the finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees working in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty with which he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be divided among many individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of themselves,' and the like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find the idea of beauty. Good, when exhibited under the aspect of measure or symmetry, becomes beauty (64 E). And if we translate his language into corresponding modern terms, we shall not be far wrong in saying that here, as well as in the *Republic*, Plato conceives beauty under the idea of proportion.

4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements, is the cause of the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the order of the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that as there

is a mind in one, there must be a mind in the other, which he identifies with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of whom 'our ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the Philebus as well as in the Timaeus. The 'one and many' is also supposed to have been revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not altogether disappeared.

Some characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the ancient from the modern mode of conceiving God.

a. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal. Nor in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in speaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem to himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and impersonal was not marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental distinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of various intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear almost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without any reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time of God or Gods, and at another time of the good. So in the Phaedrus he seems to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception of the ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to show in what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme principle of measure.

β. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first cause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause with God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But Plato, though far from being a Pantheist, or confounding God with the world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause of the union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher law; the final measure which is the highest expression of the good may also be described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are realized chiefly by the help of the material world; and therefore when we pass into the sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished.

The four principles are required for the determination of the relative places of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should proceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before assigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first find out and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind is ascertained to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is

found in the infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide pleasure and knowledge after their kinds:

III. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a generation, and in all these points of view in a category distinct from good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of the nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly allied to, knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the indefinite is equally real with the definite. Health and mental qualities are in the concrete undefined; they are nevertheless real goods, and Plato rightly regards them as falling under the finite class. Again, we are able to define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are in the mind, but in so far as they are manifested externally, and can therefore be reduced to rule and measure. And if we adopt the test of definiteness, the pleasures of the body are more capable of being defined than any other pleasures. As in art and knowledge generally, we proceed from without inwards, beginning with facts of sense, and passing to the more ideal conceptions of mental pleasure, happiness and the like.

2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as absolute. But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode of regarding them; the abstract idea of the one is compared with the concrete experience of the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may be viewed either abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind (cp. Arist. Nic. Ethics, x. 3, 4). The first is an idea only, which may be conceived as absolute and unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of pleasure will be equally unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when we come to view either as phenomena of consciousness, the same defects are for the most part incident to both of them. Our hold upon them is equally transient and uncertain; the mind cannot be always in a state of intellectual tension, any more than capable of feeling pleasure always. The knowledge which is at one time clear and distinct, at another seems to fade away, just as the pleasure of health after sickness, or of eating after hunger, soon passes into a neutral state of unconsciousness and indifference. Change and alternation are necessary for the mind as well as for the body; and in this, not any element of evil, but a law of nature, is rather to be acknowledged. The chief difference between the subjective pleasure and subjective knowledge in respect of permanence is that the latter, when our feeble faculties are able to grasp it, still conveys to us an idea of unchangeableness which cannot be got rid of.

3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of pleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to being or essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the Heracleitean flux in contrast with the Eleatic being; from another, as the transient enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the supposed permanence of intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction is unmeaning, and belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. Plato himself seems to have suspected that the continuance or life of things is quite as much to be attributed to a principle of rest as of motion (cp. *Charm.* 159, 160; *Cratyl.* 437). A later view of pleasure is found in Aristotle, who agrees with Plato in many points; e. g. in his view of pleasure as a restoration to nature, in his distinction between bodily and mental, between necessary and non-necessary pleasures: but is also in advance of him. For he affirms that pleasure is not in the body at all; hence even the bodily pleasures are not to be spoken of as generations, but as accompanied with generation. (*Nic. Eth.* x. 3, 6.)

4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error, and insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he appears to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine, that virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no distinction between the pleasures and the erroneous opinions, whether arising out of the illusion of distance or not, on which they are founded. But to this we naturally reply with Protarchus, that the pleasure is what it is, although the calculation may be false, or the after effects painful. It is difficult to acquit Plato, in his own language, of being a tyro in dialectics, when he overlooks such a distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things differently from ourselves.

5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs both here and in the *Gorgias*, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily pleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not free from doubt, that the feeling of pleasurable hope or recollection is, or rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But there is no such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures of drinking; they are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the other. Nor does Plato seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures, except in certain extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few philosophers will deny that a degree of pleasure attends eating and drinking; and yet

surely we might as well speak of the pains of digestion which follow, as of the pains of hunger and thirst which precede them. Plato's conception is derived partly from the extreme case of a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst; partly from the image of a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, that while the gratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some degree of pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, being almost done away with by use and regularity.

6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by antecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of smell and sight, as well as those derived from simple sounds of music and from mathematical figures. He would have done better to connect the pleasures of smell through the medium of taste with the bodily appetites to which they seem to minister. The pleasures of sight and sound might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas. But this higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred to Plato. He has no distinction between the fine arts and the mechanical; and neither here nor anywhere has he an adequate conception of the beautiful in external things.

7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious' philosophers, as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence of pain. They are also described as eminent in physics. There is unfortunately no school of Greek philosophy known to us which combined these two characteristics. Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure, was not a physical philosopher; the atomists, who were physical philosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. Yet such a combination of opinions is far from being impossible. Plato's omission to mention them distinctly has created the same uncertainty respecting them which also occurs respecting the friends of the ideas and the materialists in the Sophist.

On the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the dialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely considered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed, too much weight is given to ideas of measure and number as the sole principle of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really a comparison of two elements, which have no common measure, and which cannot be excluded from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge, and in all consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract kinds of knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure

or pain which accompanies the acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable to grow weary of them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy is not granted to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is inseparable from the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who, to borrow Plato's illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence (by his own confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the real interest lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate pleasure from knowledge in the *Philebus* than we can separate justice from happiness in the *Republic*.

IV. An interesting account is given in the *Philebus* of the rank and order of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme of knowledge in the sixth Book of the *Republic*. The chief difference is, that the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided into an empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere guess-work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more empirical arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed to be necessary to human life, is depreciated; and no attempt is made, as in the *Republic*, to base harmony on scientific principles, but a preference is expressed for simple melodies, and flute music is especially condemned. According to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted, music is rightly placed lower in the scale than carpentering, because the latter is more capable of being reduced to measure.

The theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract science, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and unmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as that between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the modern formula—science is art theoretical, art is science practical. In the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of number over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He says that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same, whereas the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes or quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different quantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect of numbers, and is due to their abstract nature;—although we admit of course what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and impure knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the applications of them.

Above the other sciences, as in the *Republic*, towers dialectic, which is

the science of eternal being, and has the purest mind and reason. The lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion rather than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of goods. The relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the Republic, and is not cleared up in the Philebus.

V. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of the good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding essence, which, like Glaucon in the Republic (p. 509), we find a difficulty in apprehending. This good is now to be exhibited to us under various aspects and gradations. The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge has been determined; but they have not yet received their exact position in the scale of goods. Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration: First, how are we to distinguish the first from the second class of goods; or the second from the third. Secondly, why is there no mention of the supreme mind? Thirdly, the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly, the seeming allusion to a sixth class, which is not further investigated.

Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract to the less abstract; from the objective to the subjective; until at the lower end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action and feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth, and he is always tending to see abstraction within abstraction; like the ideas in the Parmenides, which are always appearing one behind another. Hence we find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of thought which he is seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he places measure, in which he finds the eternal nature: this would be more naturally expressed in modern language as eternal law, and seems to be akin both to the finite and to the mind or cause, which were two of the elements in the former table. Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus, like the ideal beauty in the Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the ideal good in the Republic, this is the absolute and unapproachable being. But (2) this being is manifested in symmetry and beauty everywhere, in the order of nature and of mind, in the relations of men to one another. For the word 'measure' he now substitutes the word 'symmetry,' as if intending to express measure conceived as relation. (3) He proceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective form, but as the human reason seeking to attain truth by the aid of dialectics; such at least we naturally infer to be his meaning, when we consider that both here and in the Republic, the sphere of *νοῦς* or mind is assigned

to dialectic. It is remarkable (see above) that this personal conception of mind is confined to the human mind, and not, as at p. 22 C, extended to the divine. (4) If we may be allowed to interpret one dialogue of Plato by another, the sciences of figure and number are probably classed with the arts and true opinions, because they proceed from hypotheses; cp. Rep. 511. (5) The mention of a sixth class is merely due to the quotation from Orpheus; that Plato had no intention of filling up this class either with the necessary pleasures or any other, is evident from the brief recapitulation which follows (67 A), in which he speaks of pleasure as holding the fifth rank.

VI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the *Philebus* to the other dialogues. Here appears the same polemic against the ideas which is carried farther in the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks, is illustrated by examples in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*. Notwithstanding the differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the *Philebus* and *Gorgias*. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure and pain is common to both of them; there is also a common tendency in them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of the *Philebus*, which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is the more moderate. At p. 46 A, B, there seems to be an allusion to the passage in the *Gorgias* (494), in which Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and scratching. Nor is there any real discrepancy in the manner in which *Gorgias* and his art are spoken of in the two dialogues. For Socrates, at p. 58, is far from implying that the art of rhetoric has a real sphere of practical usefulness: he only means that the refutation of the claims of *Gorgias* is not necessary for his present purpose. He is saying in effect: 'Admit, if you please, that rhetoric is the greatest and usefulest of sciences:—this does not prove that dialectic is not the purest and most exact.' From the *Sophist* and *Politicus* we know that his hostility towards the sophists and rhetoricians was not mitigated in later life; and yet both in the *Politicus* and *Laws* he admits of a higher use of rhetoric.

Reasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the *Philebus*. That the date is probably later than that of the *Republic*, may be further argued on the following grounds: 1. The general resemblance to the later dialogues and to the *Laws*. 2. The more complete account of the nature of good and pleasure. 3. The distinction between

perception, memory, recollection, and opinion (pp. 34, 38) indicates a great progress in psychology; also between understanding and imagination, described under the figure of the scribe and the painter (p. 39). A superficial notion may arise that Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as the *Philebus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Politicus*, as studies or preparations for longer ones. This view may be natural, but on further reflection is seen to be fallacious; because these three dialogues are found to make an advance upon the metaphysical conceptions of the *Republic*. And we can more easily suppose that Plato composed shorter writings after longer ones, than suppose that he lost hold of further points of view which he had once attained.

It is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, Cynics, and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the *Philebus*, than to say how much is to be ascribed to each of them. Had we fuller records of those old philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray attempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to find a truth beyond either being or number; setting up his own concrete conception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics, or the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians; and his own idea of classification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also attributed to them: warring against the Eristics as destructive of truth, as he had formerly fought against the Sophists, taking up a middle position between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of pleasure, asserting with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence of an intelligent mind and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said by Aristotle to have cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the *Philebus*, as in the *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus*, with irony and contempt. But we have not the knowledge which would enable us to pursue further the line of reflection here indicated; nor can we expect to find perfect clearness or order in the first efforts of mankind to understand the working of their own minds. The ideas which they are attempting to analyse, they are also in process of creating; the abstract universals of which they are seeking to adjust the relations have been already excluded by them from the category of relation.

The *Philebus*, like the *Cratylus*, is supposed to be the continuation of a previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already

carried on between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to Protarchus, the son of Callias (19 B), a noble Athenian youth, sprung from a family which had spent more on the Sophists than all the rest of the world (cp. *Apol.* 20 A, B; *Cratylus*, 391 C). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher (16 B, 36 D), or elder friend, and perhaps the lover (53 D), of Protarchus, takes no further part in the discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his adherence, under all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure.

Socrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of victory. For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom, and then neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the two is more akin to this higher good will have a right to the second. They agree, and Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diverse and multiform nature of pleasure. For there are pleasures of all kinds, good and bad, wise and foolish—pleasures of the temperate as well as of the intemperate. Nay, replies Protarchus, pleasure is pleasure, and therefore in some sense one. Yes, retorts Socrates, pleasure is one, and also many, just as figure is one, and colour is one, and yet there are many colours and many figures. Protarchus is unable to understand him, and insists that, at any rate, all pleasures are good. But how, retorts Socrates, can Protarchus have a right to attribute to them a new predicate, when he cannot deny that they are different? What common property in all of them does he mean to indicate by the term 'good'? If he continues to assert that there is some trivial sense in which pleasure is one, Socrates may retort by saying that knowledge is one, but the result will be that such merely verbal and trivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or pleasure, will spoil the discussion, and will prove the incapacity of the two disputants. In order to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall beat a retreat, and, before they proceed, come to an understanding about the 'high argument' of the one and the many.

Protarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the impression that Socrates means to discuss the common question—how an individual can be one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as great and small, light and heavy, or how there can be many members in one body? and the like wonders. Socrates has long ceased to see any wonder in these phenomena; his difficulty begins with the application of number to abstract ideas, e.g. when we say that man is one, or that good is one.

For have these unities of idea any real existence? Are they always the same? And if the same, how can they be dispersed in others? Or do they remain entire? or both? These difficulties are but imperfectly answered by Socrates in what follows.

We speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and about all things, concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first metaphysical enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his father and mother and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This 'one in many' is a revelation of the order of the world, which some Prometheus first made known to our ancestors; and they, who were better men and nearer the gods than we are, have handed down to us. To know how to proceed by regular steps from one to many, and from many to one, is just what makes the difference between eristic and dialectic. And the right way of proceeding is to look for one idea or class in all things, and when you have found one to look for more than one, and all that there are, and when you have found them all and regularly divided a particular field of knowledge into classes, you may leave the further consideration of individuals. But you must not pass at once either from unity to infinity, or from infinity to unity. In music, for example, you may begin with the most general notion, but this alone will not make you a musician: you must know also the number and nature of the intervals, and the systems which are framed out of them, and the rhythms of the dance which correspond to them. And when you have a similar knowledge of any other subject, you may be said to know that subject. In language again there are infinite varieties of sound, and some one who was a wise man, or more than man, comprehended them all in the classes of mutes, vowels, and semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, and assigned them to the art of grammar.

'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?' Socrates replies, that before we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number and kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer that question himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two preliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of hearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for the good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure perfect and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness, anticipation? Would not that be the life of an oyster? Or is the life

of mind sufficient, if devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of the two be higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not the element which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than to pleasure? Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet there may be a life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still.

But, if we are to pursue this argument further we shall require some new weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1) There is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the union of the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if they are wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the infinite or indefinite:—That is the class which is denoted by the terms more or less, and is always in a state of comparison. All words or ideas to which the words ‘gently,’ ‘extremely,’ and other comparative expressions are applied, fall under this class. The infinite would be no longer infinite, if limited or reduced to measure by number and quantity. The opposite class is the limited or finite, and includes all things which have number and quantity. And there is a third class of generation into essence by the union of the finite and infinite, in which the finite gives law to the infinite;—under this are comprehended health, strength, temperate seasons, harmony, beauty, and the like. The goddess of beauty saw the universal wantonness of all things, and gave law and order to be the salvation of the soul. But no effect can be generated without a cause, and therefore there must be a fourth class, which is the cause of generation; for the cause or agent is not the same as the patient or effect.

And now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our conqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in which the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to find a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone, as Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the infinite with the superlative), gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes, retorts Socrates, and also to pain the character of absolute evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the nature of the good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very serious and awful question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind or chance the lord of the universe? All philosophers will say the first, and yet, perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves. And for this reason

I should like to consider the matter a little more deeply, even though some lovers of disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt.

Now the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in the cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in us, and they come to us from thence. And as we have a soul as well as a body, in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union of the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they, like the elements, exist in us, and the three first exist in the world, must not the fourth or cause which is the noblest of them, exist in the world? And this cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who is the king of all, as there are other Gods who have other noble attributes. Observe how well this agrees with the testimony of men of old, who affirmed mind to be the ruler of the universe. And remember that mind belongs to the class which we term the cause, and pleasure to the infinite or indefinite class. We will examine the place and origin of both.

What is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class, in which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and pleasure the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite and infinite, which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired—this is painful, and the return to nature, in which the elements are restored to their normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of pleasures. And another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears; these are in the mind only. And inasmuch as both these classes are free from any actual admixture of pain, the examination of them may show us whether all pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire desirableness is not rather the attribute of another class. But if pleasures and pains consist in the violation and restoration of limit, may there not be a neutral state, in which there is neither dissolution nor restoration? That is a further question, and admitting, as we must, the possibility of such a state, there seems to be no reason why the life of wisdom should not exist in this neutral state, which is, moreover, the state of the gods, who cannot, without indecency, be supposed to feel either joy or sorrow.

The second class of pleasures involves memory. There are pleasures which are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there is no consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are pleasures which the body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed consciousness. And memory is the preservation of consciousness, and reminiscence is the recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of

pleasure is the memory of a state opposite to that which the person who has the desire actually feels, and is therefore in the mind. And there may be also an intermediate state, in which the person desiring is balanced between pleasure and pain, or has two pains, when he is in pain of body as well as in despair of being satisfied. But also he may be quite sure that he will be satisfied, and then he has an actual pain, but a hope and recollection of pleasure. Here arises another question: May not pleasures, like opinions, be true and false? In the sense of being real, both must be admitted to be true: nor can we deny that to both of them qualities may be attributed; for pleasures as well as opinions may be described as good or bad. And though we do not all of us allow that there are true and false pleasures, we all acknowledge that there are some pleasures associated with right opinion, and others with falsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to analyse the nature of this association.

Opinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You may see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,' and then say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you may affirm this in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark mentally to yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not, on such occasions there is a scribe within who registers them, and a painter who paints the images of them, which he abstracts from sense, in the soul,—at least that is my own notion of the process; and the words and images which are inscribed by them may be either true or false; and they may represent either past, present, or future. And, representing the future, they must also represent the pleasures and pains of anticipation—the visions of gold and other fancies which are never wanting in the mind of man. Now these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions, which are sometimes true, and sometimes false; for the good, who are the friends of the gods, see true pictures of the future, and the bad false ones. And as there may be opinion about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is opinion still, so there may be pleasure about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which is pleasure still,—that is to say, false pleasure; and only when false can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. Against this conclusion Protarchus reclaims.

Leaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that some pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we admitted, the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and

pains are often simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them belonged to the infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we not liable, or rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived by distance? Observe, that in this case not only are the pleasures and pains based upon false opinion, but they are themselves false. And there is another illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out of the derangement—pleasure out of the restoration—of our nature. But in passing from one to the other, do we not experience neutral states, which although they appear pleasurable or painful are really neither? For even if we admit, with the wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only a wise man could have ever entertained such a notion), that all things are in a perpetual flux, still these changes are often unconscious, and devoid either of pleasure or pain. We assume, then, that there are three states—pleasurable, painful, neutral, which we may embellish a little by calling them gold, silver, and that which is neither.

But there are other philosophers who regard these three states as two only. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that pleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and, although we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who will indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of anything is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e. g. the nature of hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that the nature of pleasure will be best understood from an examination of the most intense pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not of the mind; the pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures of the intemperate and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the frequency or continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures, and this is given them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body which precedes them. Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser instances of itching and scratching, respecting which I swear that I cannot tell whether they are a pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these arise out of a transition from cold to hot, from bitter to sweet, and the like; (2) others are partly pains, and are caused by the contrast of different bodily feelings, in which pain predominates, as in scratching or tickling when the pleasure on the surface contrasts with some internal pain; (3) others again are produced by other kinds of violent excitement;—both these and the last are accompanied by all sorts of unutterable feelings—there is a death of delights in them. But there are also mixed pleasures

which are in the mind only. For are not love and sorrow as well as anger, sweeter than honey, and also full of pain? Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator of tragedy? and of comedy also? 'I do not understand that last.' Well, then, with the view of lighting up the obscurity of these mixed feelings, let me ask whether envy is painful? 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds something pleasing in the misfortunes of others? 'True.' And ignorance is a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And the ignorant is entirely devoid of self-knowledge—he may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than he is? 'Yes.' And he may be strong or weak in his ignorant superiority? 'He may.' And if he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh at him, and yet we envy him, and like to see him suffer? These mixed feelings are the rationale of tragedy and comedy, and equally the rationale of the greater drama of human life¹. Having explained sorrow, fear, anger, envy, I will reserve the analysis of the remainder for another occasion.

Next follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of whom I was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are: (1) The pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell, which are absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with pain: (2) The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which in themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection, which is not to be included in them. At the same time, we admit that the latter pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and unmixed pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the class of the infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And here several questions arise for consideration:—What is the meaning of pure and impure; of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question by an illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or quality of the white, and this is distinct from the quantity or

¹ There appears to be some confusion in this passage. There is no difficulty in seeing that in comedy, as in tragedy, the spectator may view the performance with mixed feelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty in understanding that envy is a mixed feeling, which rejoices not without pain at the misfortunes of others, and laughs at their ignorance of themselves. But Plato seems to think further that he has explained the feeling of the spectator in comedy sufficiently by a theory which only applies to comedy in so far as in comedy we laugh at the conceit or weakness of others. He has certainly given a very partial explanation of the ridiculous.

amount of white paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which is impure. But there is another question:—Pleasure is affirmed by ingenious philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are two natures—one self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble and majestic, the other failing in both these qualities.—‘I do not understand.’ There are lovers and there are loves. ‘Yes, I know, but what is the application?’ The argument is in play, and desires to intimate that there are relatives and there are absolutes, and that the relative is for the sake of the absolute; and generation is for the sake of essence. Under relatives I class all things done with a view to generation; and essence is of the class of good. But if essence is of the class of good, generation must be of some other class; and our friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at the notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure is satisfied in generation, which is only the alternative of destruction. Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure thought? Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in affirming that good is of the soul only, and at the same time declaring that the best of men, if he be in pain, is bad?

And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of knowledge. Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge—the one creative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical. Of the creative arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge than the other. There is an element of guess-work and an element of number and measure in them. In music, for example, especially in flute-playing, the conjectural element prevails; while in carpentering there is more application of rule and measure. Of the creative arts, then, we may make two classes—the less exact and the more exact. And the exacter part of all of them is really arithmetic and mensuration. But arithmetic and mensuration again may be subdivided with reference either to their use in the concrete, or to their nature in the abstract—as they are applied popularly to various magnitudes, or by philosophers to one only. And, borrowing the analogy of pleasure, we may say that the philosophical use of them is purer than the other. Thus we have two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And truest of all in the estimation of every rational man is dialectic, or the science of being, which will forget and disown us, if we forget and disown her.

‘But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest and usefulest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with him or you.’ Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with his statement in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that dialectic is the greatest or usefulest, but only the truest of arts; my remark is not quantitative but qualitative, and has reference not to advantage or reputation, but to the love of knowledge and truth, in which Gorgias will not care to compete; these are what we affirm to be possessed in the highest degree by dialectic. And do not let us appeal to Gorgias or Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of the argument, what are the highest truths which the soul has the power of attaining. And is not this the science which has a firmer grasp of them than any other? For the arts generally are only occupied with matters of opinion, and with the production and action and passion of this sensible world. But the highest truth is that which is eternal and unchangeable. And reason and wisdom are concerned with this; and they are the very claimants, if not for the first, at least for the second place, whom I propose as rivals to pleasure.

And now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them—first recapitulating the question at issue.

Philebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be one nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that knowledge was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two together were more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we adhere. Reason intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not in the unmixed life, but in the mixed.

The cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and there are two fountains, one of honey, the other of pure water, out of which we make the fairest possible mixture. There were pure and impure pleasures—pure and impure sciences. And first, let us take the pure pleasures, and pour them in, not allowing the impure to enter, for that would be dangerous. Next, let us take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the impure—the art which uses the false rule and the false measure? That we must, if we are any of us to find our way home; man cannot live upon pure mathematics alone. And must I include music, which is admitted to be guess-work? ‘Yes, you must, if human life is to have any humanity.’ Well, then, I will open the door and let them all in; they shall mingle in an Homeric meeting of the waters. And now we turn to the pleasures;

shall I admit them? 'Admit first of all the pure pleasures; secondly, the necessary.' And what shall we say about the rest? First, ask the pleasures—they will be too happy to dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask the arts and sciences—they reply that the excesses of intemperance are the ruin of them; and that they would rather only have the pleasures of health and temperance, which are the handmaidens of virtue. But still we want truth? That is now added; and so the argument is complete, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, holding fair rule over a living body. And now we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three chief elements—truth, symmetry, and beauty. These will be the criterion of the comparative claims of pleasures and wisdom.

Which has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed into a proverb.

Which of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than pleasure.

Which of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and the greatest pleasures are put out of sight.

Not pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good; but measure, and eternal harmony.

Secondly: The symmetrical and beautiful and perfect.

Thirdly: Mind and wisdom.

Fourthly: Sciences and arts and true opinions.

Fifthly: Painless pleasures.

Of a sixth class, I have nothing to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may both renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand times nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and not first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary.

From the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature of pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is pleasure an evil? a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry assumed among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the controversy another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind? and are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are bodily and there are mental pleasures, which were

at first confused but afterwards distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary and unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had not corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking, in the language of their age, Was pleasure a 'becoming' only, and therefore transient and relative, or did some pleasures partake of truth and being? To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a further question:— 'Whose pleasure?' 'The pleasure of yourself, or of your neighbour, of the individual, or of the world?' This little addition has changed the whole aspect of the discussion: the same word is now supposed to include two principles as widely different as benevolence and self-love. Some modern writers have also distinguished between pleasure the test, and pleasure the motive of actions. For the universal test of the rightness of actions (how I know them) may not always be the highest or best motive of them (why I do them).

Socrates, as we learn from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, first drew attention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to act rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of the Gorgias, did what they would. He seems to have been the first who maintained that the good was the useful (Mem. iv. 6, 8). In his eagerness for generalization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in Ethics (Metaph. i. 6), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action which occurred to him. He meant to emphasize not pleasure but the calculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the chief good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not intend to oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the Platonic ideal, but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues the same vein of thought in the Protagoras (351 foll.), where he argues against the so-called sophist that pleasure and pain are the final standards and motives of good and evil, and that the salvation of human life depends upon a right estimate of pleasures greater or less when seen near and at a distance. The testimony of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of Plato, and we are therefore justified in calling Socrates the first utilitarian; as indeed there is no side or aspect of philosophy which may not with reason be ascribed to him—he is Cynic and Cyrenaic, Platonist and Aristotelian in one. But in the Phædo the Socratic has already passed into a more ideal point of view (pp. 68, 69); and he, or rather Plato speaking in his person expressly repudiates the notion that the

exchange of a less pleasure for a greater can be the exchange of virtue. Such virtue is the virtue of ordinary men who live in the world of appearance; they are temperate only that they may enjoy the pleasures of intemperance, and courageous from fear of danger. Whereas the philosopher is seeking after wisdom and not after pleasure, whether near or distant: he is the mystic, the initiated, who has learnt to despise the body and is yearning all his life long for a truth which will hereafter be revealed to him. In the Republic (ix. 582) the pleasures of knowledge are affirmed to be superior to other pleasures, because the philosopher so estimates them; and he alone has had experience of both kinds. (Compare a similar argument urged by one of the latest defenders of Utilitarianism, Mill on Utility, p. 12.) In the Philebus, Plato, although he regards the enemies of pleasure with complacency, still further modifies the transcendentalism of the Phaedo. For he is compelled to confess, rather reluctantly, perhaps, that some pleasures, i. e. those which have no antecedent pains, claim a place in the scale of goods.

There have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general have been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.' Either they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or the life and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts of right and wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been associated in their mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not believe that what they were always striving to overcome, and the power or principle in them which overcame, were of the same nature. The pleasure of doing good to others and of bodily self-indulgence; the pleasures of intellect and the pleasures of sense, are so different:—Why then should they be called by a common name? Or, if the equivocal or metaphorical use of the word is justified by custom (like the use of other words which at first referred only to the body, and then by a figure have been transferred to the mind) still, why should we make an ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To many the Utilitarian or hedonistic mode of speaking has appeared to be at variance with religion and with any higher conception both of politics and of morals. It has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended their taste. To elevate pleasure the most fleeting of all things into a general idea seems to them a contradiction. They do not desire to bring down their theory to the level of their practice. The simplicity

of the 'greatest happiness' principle has been acceptable to philosophers, but the world in general has been slow to receive it.

Before proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the field of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices, which intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed to discard.' We admit then that Utility is co-extensive with right, and that no action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind; we acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong by their consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too mindful, but that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that they need to have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them. We recognize the simplicity of the principle which supplies a connecting link between Ethics and Politics, and under which all human actions are or may be included. The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference of expediency to right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by which human nature can be animated. Neither in referring actions to the test of utility have we to make a laborious calculation, any more than in trying them by other standards of morals. For long ago they have been classified sufficiently for all practical purposes by the thinker, by the legislator, by the opinion of the world. Whatever may be the hypothesis on which they are explained, or which in doubtful cases may be applied to the regulation of them, we are very rarely, if ever, called upon at the moment of action to determine their effect upon the happiness of mankind.

There is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and others—the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong innate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those speculations which intelligent men might 'agree to discard.' For it has been worn threadbare; and either alternative is equally consistent with a transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with a greatest happiness principle or with Kant's law of duty. Yet to avoid misconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of our moral ideas may be shortly summed up as follows:—To each of us individually our moral ideas come first of all in childhood through the medium of education, from parents and teachers, assisted by the unconscious influence of language; they are impressed upon a mind which at first is like a waxen tablet, adapted to receive them; but they soon become fixed or set, and in after life are strengthened, or perhaps weakened by the force of

public opinion. They may be corrected and enlarged by experience, they may be reasoned about, they may be brought home to us by the circumstances of our lives, they may be intensified by imagination, by reflection, by a course of action likely to confirm them. Under the influence of religious feeling or by an effort of thought, any one beginning with the ordinary rules of morality may create out of them for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. They slumber in the minds of most men, yet in all of us there remains some tincture of affection, some desire of good, some fear of the law. Something like this is the state or process which each individual is conscious of in himself, and if he compares his own experience with that of others he will find to be the same in them. All of us have entered into an inheritance which we have the power of appropriating and making our own. No great effort of mind is required on our part; we learn morals, as we learn to talk, instinctively, from conversing with others, in an enlightened age, in a civilized country, in a good home. A well-educated child of ten years old already knows the essentials of morals: 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'thou shalt speak the truth,' 'thou shalt love thy parents,' 'thou shalt fear God.' What more does he want?

But whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas? Their beginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and is the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society originated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in their rude attempts at self-preservation:—Man is not man in that he resembles, but in that he differs from them. We have passed into another cycle of existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence accessible to us even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of the world, which viewed from within is the history of the human mind, they have been slowly created by religion, by poetry, by law, having their foundation in the natural affections and in the necessity of some degree of truth and justice in a social state; they have been deepened and enlarged by the efforts of great thinkers who have idealized and connected them—by the lives of saints and prophets who have taught and exemplified them. The schools of ancient philosophy which seem so far from us—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, a few modern teachers such as Kant and Bentham have each of them supplied 'moments' of thought to the world. The life of Christ has embodied a divine love, wisdom, patience, reasonableness.

From his image, however imperfectly handed down to us, the modern world has received a standard more perfect in idea than the societies of ancient times, but also further removed from practice. For there is certainly a greater interval between the theory and practice of Christians than between the theory and practice of the Greeks and Romans; the ideal is more above us, and the aspiration after good has often lent a strange power to evil. And sometimes, as at the Reformation, or French Revolution, when the upper classes of a so-called Christian country have become corrupted by priestcraft, by casuistry, by licentiousness, by despotism, the lower have risen up and re-asserted the natural sense of religion and right.

We may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older, perhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in us by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or infected by the corruption of society, or by some moral disorder in the individual, are constantly assuming a more natural and necessary character. The habit of the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes them to us; and they take more and more the form of immediate intuition. The moral sense comes last and not first in the order of their development, and is the instinct which we have inherited or acquired, not the nobler effort of reflection which created and which keeps them alive. We do not stop to reason about common honesty. Whenever we are not blinded by self-deceit, as for example in judging the actions of others, we have no hesitation in determining what is right and wrong. The principles of morality, when not at variance with some desire or worldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of the public, are hardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and passion they assert their authority and are not overcome without remorse.

Such is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to distinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the world from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of us. We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless ocean of language and thought, in little rills which convey them to the heart and brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the theories or aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas. These are not the roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts of reflection, the lights in which the whole moral world has been regarded by different thinkers and successive generations of men. If we

ask Which of these many theories is the true one? we may answer All of them—moral sense, innate ideas, *a priori*, *a posteriori* notions, the philosophy of experience, the philosophy of intuition—all of them have added something to our conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole truth. But to decide how far our ideas of morality are derived from one source or another; to determine what history, what philosophy has contributed to them; to distinguish the original, simple elements from the manifold and complex applications of them, would be a long enquiry too far removed from the question which we are now pursuing.

Bearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish between our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now proceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but in the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters¹:—‘That which alone makes actions either right or desirable is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of mankind, or, in other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the world. But all pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as well as in quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality is incommensurable with the inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness which we seek, our own pleasure, but that of others,—of our family, of our country, of mankind. The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of our own interest to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly educated nature. The Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this virtue and for every other.’

Good or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end of human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and in accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be explained. Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do not cast their eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the greater end of happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general they had been found to lead to it. The existence of such an end is proved, as in Aristotle’s time, so in our own, by the universal fact that men desire it. The obligation to promote it is based upon the social nature of man, a feeling which is shared by all of us in some degree, and is capable of being greatly fostered and strengthened. So far from being inconsistent with religion, the greatest happiness principle is in the highest degree

¹ Mill on Utility.

agreeable to it. For what can be more reasonable than that God should will the happiness of all his creatures? and in working out their happiness we may be said to be 'working together with him.' Nor is it inconceivable that a new enthusiasm of the future, far stronger than any old religion, may be based upon such a conception.

But then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle,' it seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle,' 'the happiness of others principle'—the principle not of the greatest, but of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own immediate interest than is required by the law of self-preservation. Transfer the thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external circumstances which form so large a part of our idea of happiness in this, and the meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from holiness, harmony, wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others,' all the associations of the word are altered; we seem to have passed over from one theory of morals to the opposite. For allowing that the happiness of others is reflected on ourselves, and also that every man must live before he can do good to others, still the last limitation is a very trifling exception, and the happiness of another is very far from compensating for the loss of our own. According to Mr. Mill, he would best carry out the principle of utility who sacrificed his own pleasure most to that of his fellow men. But if so, Hobbes and Butler, Shaftesbury and Hume, are not so far apart as they and their followers imagine. The thought of self and the thought of others are alike superseded in the more general notion of the happiness of mankind at large. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected, the friend of man himself has generally the least share, and may be a great sufferer.

And now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral philosophy so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time so practical,—so Christian, as without exaggeration we may say,—and which has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle intelligible to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates and Plato grew old in seeking for? Are we not desirous of happiness, at any rate for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as is natural, we begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led on to think of others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what is right for us is the right and inheritance of others. We feel the advantage of an abstract principle wide enough and strong enough to override

all the particularisms of mankind; which acknowledges a universal good, truth, right, which is capable of inspiring men like a passion, and is the symbol of a cause for which they are ready to contend to their life's end.

And if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would certainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days of Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics, x. 2) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of pleasure have gained belief for their principles by their practice. Two of the noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this century, Bentham and J. S. Mill, have been the most conspicuous advocates of the doctrine. Their lives were a long devotion to the service of their fellow-men; while among their contemporaries, some who were of a more mystical turn of mind, have ended rather in aspiration than in action, and have been found unequal to the duties of life. Looking back on them now that they are removed from the scene, we feel that mankind has been the better for them. The world was against them while they lived; but this is rather a reason for admiring than for depreciating them. Nor can any one doubt that the influence of their philosophy on politics, especially on foreign politics, on law, on social life, has been upon the whole beneficial. Nevertheless, they will never have justice done to them, for they do not agree either with the better feeling of the multitude or with the idealism of more refined thinkers. Without Bentham, a great word in the history of philosophy would have remained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to hear his name received with any mark of respect such as would be freely granted to the ambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium which attached to him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he shocked the prejudices of mankind, perhaps from a certain egotism and want of taste; and this generation which has reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the feeling of the last.

While acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle has conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for denying its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with other principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics. Any one who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor to the world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he may not recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is subjected; he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or how

far that which is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world, or may become so to the next generation. He believes that to be the whole which is only a part,—to be the necessary foundation which is really only a valuable aspect of the truth. The systems of all philosophers require the criticism of ‘the morrow,’ when the heat of imagination which forged them has cooled, and they are seen in the temperate light of day. All of them have contributed to the thoughts of the civilized world; none of them occupy that supreme or exclusive place which their authors would have assigned to them.

We may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:—

Mr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others, in their eagerness to maintain the doctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a lamentable state of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge have made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by them to be no better than children, and with few exceptions—that is to say, Bentham and his admirers—to be no further advanced than men were in the age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to be as backward in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this, though often asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same writers who speak thus depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy. For they are the first to acknowledge that we have not now to begin classifying actions under the head of utility; they would not deny that about the general conceptions of morals there is a practical agreement. There is no more doubt that falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls to the ground, although the first does not admit of the same ocular proof as the second. There is no greater uncertainty about the duty of obedience to parents and to the law of the land than about the properties of triangles. Unless we are looking for a new moral world which has no marrying and giving in marriage, there is no greater disagreement in theory about the right relations of the sexes than about the composition of water. These and a few other simple principles, as they have endless applications in practice, so also may be developed in theory into counsels of perfection.

To what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often entertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,—that philosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the casuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There is an uncertainty about details,—whether, for example, under given circumstances

such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or whether in some cases there may not be a conflict of principles: these are the exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but not extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human actions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under which the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are many and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active in thinking about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right, freedom, benevolence, self-love, have all of them seemed to some philosopher or other the truest and most comprehensive expression of morality. There is no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of opinion about the right and wrong of actions, but only about the general notion which furnishes the best explanation or gives the most comprehensive view of them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere of the metaphysic of ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end, *ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καθόλου* and *ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα*, leave space enough for an intermediate principle which is practically certain.

The rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers: we know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about them. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already know, but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general, to strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm one another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they are not many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in reducing morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths. And not unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices and misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow men in a larger and more generous spirit.

The two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of ethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts, (2) that they should inspire the mind,—should harmonize, strengthen, settle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle such as 'act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'act so that the rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational beings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem to open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or the spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not suffer ourselves to be distracted between different points of view.

But to maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be psychologically true—they must agree with our experience, they must accord with the habits of our minds.

When we are told that actions are right or wrong only in so far as they tend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.' For the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent commensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good man could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics, i. 11), or place a bad man in the first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the measure of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert. And if we insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be using the term in some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with well-being. We have already seen that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as our own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well as conscious happiness under the same word. There is no harm in this extension of the meaning, but a word which admits of such an extension can hardly be made the basis of a philosophical system. The exactness which is required in philosophy will not allow us to comprehend under the same term two ideas so different as the subjective feeling of pleasure or happiness and the objective reality of a state which receives our moral approval.

Like Protarchus in the *Philebus*, we can give no answer to the question, 'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call happiness?' which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness, and is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind. If we say Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which we can abstract from these—what then? After seeming to hover for a time on the verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism.

Let us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes happiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth, pleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we answer, 'the subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from being coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the whole of which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question recurs, 'In what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we are unable to distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of the goods of life.

Again, while admitting that in all right actions there is an element

of happiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies a much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many patriotic or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by their tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on the other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant with a thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an immeasurable interval between a crime against property or life, and the omission of an act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the utilitarian theory takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle strengthens our sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens our recognition of their rights. To promote in every way possible the happiness of others may be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems to offer any ground for a theory of obligation. For admitting that our ideas of obligation are partly derived from religion and custom, yet they seem also to contain other essential elements which cannot be explained by the tendency of actions to promote happiness. Whence comes the necessity of them? Why are some actions rather than others which equally tend to the happiness of mankind imposed upon us with the authority of law? 'You ought' and 'you had better' are fundamental distinctions in human thought; and having such distinctions, why should we seek to efface and unsettle them?

Bentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes the happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions can be more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect state of the world my own happiness and that of all other men would coincide, in the imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly bridge over the difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure in sacrificing themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest happiness principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in consistency I should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of my neighbour. But who can decide what proportion should be mine and what his, except on the principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my own favour, and had therefore better give the larger share, if not all, to him?

Further, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in particular instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not distracting to the conscience of a man to be told that in the particular case they are

opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral obligation, yet he must not do what clearly conduces to his own happiness if it is at variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further, he will be taught that when utility and right are in partial conflict any amount of utility short of the greatest (for then the useful would be the good) does not alter a hair's-breadth the morality of the action; and that the non-detection of an immoral act, say of telling a lie, which may often make the greatest difference in the consequences, not only to himself, but to all the world, makes none whatever in the act itself.

Again, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes of actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon which we can classify them? There is a universal law which declares the same acts to be right or wrong in all men:—can there be any universality in the law which measures actions by their tendencies towards happiness? For an act which is the cause of happiness to one person may be the cause of unhappiness to another; or an act which if performed by one person may increase the happiness of mankind may have the opposite effect, if performed by another. Right can never be wrong, or wrong right, but there are no actions which tend to the happiness of mankind which may not under other circumstances tend to their unhappiness. Unless we say not only that all right actions tend to happiness, but that they tend to happiness in the same degree in which they are right (and in that case the word 'right' is plainer), we weaken the absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce differences in kind to differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp which the authority of ages has set upon human actions.

Once more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of retaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth, justice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become sacred to us,—'the word of God' written on the human heart: to no other words can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them adequately on principles of utility; in attempting to do so we rob them of their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and distorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common language. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold of morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if virtue and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not contribute to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression

we seem to detect a false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal; we speak of eternal and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable pleasure; nor by any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense adhering to the meaning of the word.

Again: the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose sight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working for a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is not 'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing the will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And this applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices himself for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they may be saved from the persecution which he endures for their sakes, but rather that they in their turn may be able to undergo similar sufferings, and like him stand fast in the truth. To promote their happiness is not his first object, but to elevate their moral nature. Both in his own case and that of others there may be happiness in the distance, but if there were no happiness he would equally act as he does. We are speaking of the highest and noblest natures: and once more the question arises 'Whether that can be the first principle of morals which has been hardly thought of by the greatest benefactors of mankind?'

The admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are already classified; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the happiness of others, as well as of ourselves; the confusion (not made by Aristotle) between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between happiness the energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce uncertainty and inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily and cheerfully from a greatest happiness principle. But the partisans of utility are disagreed among themselves when we ask the meaning of the word. Still less can they impart to others a common conception or conviction of the nature of happiness. The meaning of the word is always insensibly slipping away from us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now appearing as the motive, now as the test of actions, and sometimes varying in successive sentences. And as in a mathematical demonstration an error in the original number disturbs the whole calculation which follows, this fundamental uncertainty about the word vitiates all the applications of it. Must we not admit that a notion so uncertain in meaning, so void of content, so at variance with common language and opinion, does not comply adequately with either of our two requirements? It can neither

strike the imaginative faculty, nor give an explanation of phenomena which is in accordance with our individual experience. It supplies only a partial account of human actions: it is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be compared with other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best expressed to us under the form of a harmony; or with Kant's obedience to law, which may be summed up under the word 'duty'; or with the Stoical 'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these present a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed profess to be, the only principle of morals.

And this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the utilitarian system—its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or Hegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the greatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of moral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and some upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected with one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence with another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more attracted by one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm stoical nature will conceive virtue under the conception of law, the philanthropist under that of doing good, the quietist under that of resignation, the enthusiast under that of faith or love. The upright man of the world will desire above all things that morality should be plain and fixed, and should use words in their ordinary sense. Persons of an imaginative temperament will generally be dissatisfied with the words 'utility' or 'pleasure': their principle of right is of a far higher character, what or where to be found they cannot always distinctly tell;—deduced from the laws of human nature, says one; resting on the will of God, says another; based upon some transcendental idea which animates more worlds than one, says a third;

*Ὅν νόμοι προκείνται ὑψίποδες, οὐρανίαν
δι' αἰθέρα τεκνωθέντες.*

To satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility must be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses all simplicity.

But why, since there are different characters among men, should we not allow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the

great men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of thought? Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or Kantists, no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole of moral philosophy had been excluded. If we regard, not their actions but what they think right, all men are agreed about the essentials of morals. In asserting liberty of speculation we are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong for themselves, but only conceding to them that they may choose the form or aspect under which they prefer to contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these aspects is as true and good as another; but that they all of them, if they are not mere sophisms and illusion, define and bring into relief some part of the truth which would have been obscure without their light. Why should we endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a single metaphysical conception? The necessary imperfection of language seems to require that we should view the same truth under more than one aspect.

We are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of novelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The doctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of Bentham, but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are rubbed off, and the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is softened. The array of the enemy melts away when we approach him. The greatest happiness of the greatest number was a great original idea when enunciated by Bentham, which leavened a generation and has left its mark on thought and civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it had the intensity of genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he would have denied that pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness he meant anything but pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his thoroughness. The 'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other hands; and now we seem to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want of exactness while assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness, its paradoxical explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has ever stood this criticism of the next generation, though the founders of all of them have imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the utilitarian system, like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis. Even in the opinion of its supporters it 'has had a terrible downfall,' and is no longer the only moral philosophy, but one among many which have contributed in various degrees to the intellectual progress of mankind.

But because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,' we must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on the world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic, and he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past. All philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work in their own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth and with instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their glory, they retain their place in the organism of knowledge.

And still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained and more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any other. The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness of myself, my family, my country, the world? may check the rising feeling of pride or honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement, a war. 'How can I contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is another form of the question which will be more attractive to the minds of many than a deduction of the duty of benevolence from *a priori* principles. In politics especially hardly any other argument can be allowed to have weight except the happiness of a people. All parties alike profess to aim at this, which though often used only as the disguise of self-interest has a great and real influence on the minds of statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can more tend to mitigate superstition than the belief that the good of man is also the will of God. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and superstitions of men may be brought:—whatever does not tend to the good of men is not of God. The picture of the greatest happiness of mankind, especially if believed to be the will of God, when compared with the actual fact, will be one of the strongest motives to do good to others.

On the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be dishonest or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of others, the argument that these actions regarded as a class will not conduce to the happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have less force than the feeling which is already implanted in the mind by conscience and authority. To resolve this feeling into the greatest happiness principle takes away from its sacred and authoritative character. The martyr will not go to the stake in order that he may promote the happiness of mankind, but for the sake of the truth: neither will the soldier advance to the cannon's mouth merely because he believes military discipline to be for the good of mankind. It is better and

safer for him to know that he will be shot, that he will be disgraced, if he runs away—he has no need to look beyond military honour, patriotism, ‘England expects every man to do his duty.’ These are to his mind far more definite motives than the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For in human actions men do not always require broad principles: they come home to them with more force when they are limited and defined, and sanctioned by custom and public opinion.

Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our moral ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility to be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see above) that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles of them—the historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he may also truly add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if not the originating, has been the great corrective principle in law, in politics, in religion, leading men to ask how evil may be diminished and good increased—by what course of policy the public interest may be promoted, and to understand that God wills the happiness, not of some of his creatures and in this world only, but of all of them and in every stage of their existence.

‘What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral philosophy?’ is analogous to the question asked in the *Philebus*, ‘What rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?’ Admitting the greatest happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary foundation of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of actions, we still have to consider whether this or some other general notion is the highest principle of human life. We may try them in this comparison by three tests—definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive power.

There are three subjective principles of morals,—sympathy, benevolence, self-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings which differ widely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture one half of our virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The greatest happiness principle, which includes both, has the advantage over all these in comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the expense of definiteness.

Again, there are the legal and political principles of morals—freedom, equality, rights of persons; ‘Every man to count for one and no man for more than one,’ ‘Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the

legislator.' There is also the other sort of political morality, which if not beginning with 'might is right,' at any rate seeks to deduce our ideas of justice from the necessities of the state and of society. According to this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the best human government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which we can form of a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly without regard to law and order. To such a view the present mixed state of the world, not wholly evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a witness. More we might desire to have, but are not permitted. Though a human tyrant would be intolerable, a divine tyrant is a very tolerable governor of the universe. This is the doctrine of Thrasymachus adapted to the public opinion of modern times.

There is yet a third view which combines the two:—freedom is obedience to the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; 'Act so that thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This view is noble and elevating; but it seems to err, like other transcendental principles of ethics, in being too abstract. For there is the same difficulty in connecting the idea of duty with particular duties as in bridging the gulf between *φαινόμενα* and *ὄντα*; and when, as in the system of Kant, this universal idea or law is held to be independent of space and time, such a *μάταιον εἶδος* becomes almost unmeaning.

Once more there are the religious principles of morals:—the will of God revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a sanction equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to the belief in another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of God? How revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness, is a word which has great influence apart from any consideration of its content: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion is the synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine perfection in which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among ideas of holiness, justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in whom they are personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of good. It is the consciousness of the will of God that all men should be as he is. It lives in this world and is known to us only through the phenomena of this world, but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary religion which is alloyed with motives of this world may easily be in excess, may be fanatical, may be interested, may be the mask of ambition, may be perverted in a thousand ways. But of that religion which combines

the will of God with our highest ideas of truth and right there can never be too much. This impossibility of excess is the note of divine moderation.

So then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral philosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the reader of the *Philebus*, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the different aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at which the human passes into the divine.

First, the eternal will of God in this world and in another,—justice, holiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (*οὐχ ἢ γένησιν πρόσεστιν*), which is known to us in part only, and revered by us as divine perfection.

Secondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in this world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and experience, in nature, history, and in our own minds.

Thirdly, the elements of human perfection,—virtue, knowledge, and right opinion.

Fourthly, the external conditions of perfection,—health and the goods of life.

Fifthly, beauty and happiness; the inward enjoyment of that which is best and fairest in this world and in the human soul.

PHILEBUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

PROTARCHUS.

PHILEBUS.

Steph. *Socrates.* OBSERVE, Protarchus, the nature of the position
11 which you are now going to take from Philebus, and what the
other position is which I maintain, and which, if you do not
approve of my argument, is to be controverted by you. Shall
you and I sum up the two sides?

Protarchus. By all means.

Soc. Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and
delight, and the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to
every living being, whereas I contend, that not these, but
wisdom and knowledge and memory, and their kindred, right
opinion and true reasonings, are better and more desirable
than pleasure for all who are able to partake of them, and
that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most
advantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair
statement of the two sides of the argument?

Philebus. Nothing can be fairer, Socrates.

Soc. And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is
assigned to you?

Pro. I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus
has left the field.

Soc. Certainly the truth about these matters ought, by all
means, to be ascertained.

Pro. To be sure.

Soc. Shall we further agree——

Pro. To what?

Soc. That the good which both you and I affirm to have the property of making all men happy is some state and disposition of the soul.

Pro. Yes, by all means.

Soc. And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a state?

Pro. True.

Soc. And what if there be a third state, which is better than either? Then both of us are vanquished—are we not? But if this higher and more lasting state turn out to be more akin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the advantage over the life of wisdom.

12

Pro. True.

Soc. Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to wisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;—do you agree?

Pro. Certainly, I should say as you do.

Soc. And what does Philebus say? for he ought to be consulted.

Phi. I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is the conqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.

Pro. You, Philebus, having handed over the argument to me, have no longer a voice in the matter?

Phi. True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my soul of you, as I hereby call the goddess herself to witness that I now do.

Pro. You may appeal to us, as far as that goes, to be witnesses of your words. And now, Socrates, never mind whether Philebus approves or not, we will regularly finish the argument.

Soc. Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus says that she is called Aphrodite, but that her true name is Pleasure.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of the gods is more than human, and now I would not sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; of her, then, I say nothing. But I will begin with Pleasure which I know to be diverse, and will consider and ask what her nature is. She has one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one, and

yet surely she takes the most various and even unlike forms. For do we not say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has pleasure in his very temperance, and that the fool is pleased when he is full of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in his wisdom; and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these opposite pleasures are severally alike.

Pro. Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring from opposite causes, but they are not in themselves opposite, for must not pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,—that is, like itself?

Soc. Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;—in so far as they are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet we all know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed to white: or again, as figure is like figure, for they are all comprehended under one class; and yet some figures are absolutely opposed to one another, and
13 there is an infinite diversity of them. And we might find similar examples in many other things; therefore do not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of the most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar opposition among pleasures.

Pro. Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?

Soc. Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to them a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now although no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue, as we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call them all good (he would say), and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed, to acknowledge that they are unlike. And he will want to know what is that identical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes you designate all of them as good.

Pro. What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who asserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some pleasures are good and some bad?

Soc. And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one another, and even opposite to one another?

Pro. Not in so far as they are pleasures.

Soc. That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we are to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that they are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do not pierce our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the weakest and most inexperienced reasoners?¹

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like, follow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike are most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will prove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the argument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and return to the old position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding with one another.

Pro. How do you mean?

Soc. Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?

Pro. What question?

Soc. Ask me whether wisdom and the sciences and mind, and those other qualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the good, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures of which you spoke.

Pro. How so?

Soc. The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to present great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures, they are opposite as well as different, should I be 14 worthy of the name of dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say (as you are saying of pleasure), that there is no difference between one science and another;—would not the argument founder and disappear like an idle tale, although we might escape drowning by clinging to a fallacy?

Pro. I agree that we should save ourselves, but not in that way. And I like the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let us assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and different sciences.

Soc. And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences between my good and yours; but let us bring them

¹ Probably corrupt.

to the light in the hope that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether pleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for surely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that yours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting for the truth.

Pro. Certainly we ought.

Soc. Then let us establish this principle of differences by a more definite agreement.

Pro. What principle?

Soc. A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty, and some men sometimes against their will.

Pro. Speak plainer.

Soc. The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel of nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful propositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.

Pro. Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by nature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,' which he distinguishes and opposes as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten thousand other ways?

Soc. Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes about the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time agreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true course of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in which a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided, and then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof of his own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite, and the many are only one.

Pro. But what, Socrates, are those other marvels which, as you imply, have not yet become common and acknowledged,
15 relating to the same principle?

Soc. When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things that are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for in those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as I was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when the assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one, or the good one,

then the interest which attaches to these and similar unities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a controversy.

Pro. Of what nature?

Soc. In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real existence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same, and incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining a permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and multiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still entire and yet derived from itself, which latter would seem to be the greatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at the same time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real difficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate; they are the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right determination of them is very helpful.

Pro. Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.

Soc. That is what I should wish.

Pro. And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear them discussed; Philebus is peaceful and we had better not stir him up with questions.

Soc. Good; and where shall we begin this great and comprehensive battle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus?

Pro. How?

Soc. We say that the one and many are identified by reasoning, and that they run about everywhere together, in and out of every word which is uttered, as they have done in all time past as well as present, and that this union of them will never cease, and is not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of thought itself, which never grows old in us. Any young man, when he first tastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found a treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no stone, or rather no thought unturned, now converting the many into the one, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he puzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his neighbours, whether they are older or younger,

16 or of his own age—that makes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no human being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a barbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could only be found.

Pro. Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us are young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may conspire and attack you, if you speak evil of us? But we understand what you mean; and if there is any better way or manner of quietly escaping out of all this turmoil and perplexity, and arriving at the truth, we hope that you will guide us into that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in which we are engaged, Socrates, is not a small one.

Soc. Certainly not a small one, my boys, as Philebus calls you, and there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite way, which has nevertheless already often deserted me in the hour of need.

Pro. Tell us what that is?

Soc. One which may be easily explained, but is by no means easy of application; and which is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts.

Pro. Say only what.

Soc. A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among men by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light; and the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we, handed down the tradition, that all things of which we say 'they are' draw their existence from the one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in them: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought in every enquiry to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the subject of enquiry; this unity we shall find in everything, and having found, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not, then for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units, until at last the unity with which we began is seen not only as one and many and infinite, but also as a definite number; the infinite must not be suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species intermediate between unity and infinity

has been found out,—then, and not till then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling ourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into infinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning and teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But the wise men of our time are either too quick or 17 too slow in conceiving plurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many anyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity, without thinking of the intermediate steps. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.

Pro. I think that I partly understand you, Socrates, but I should like to have a clearer notion.

Soc. I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet, Protarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.

Pro. How do they afford an illustration?

Soc. The sound which passes through the lips whether of an individual or of all men is one and yet infinite.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound is infinite, are we perfect in the art, but the knowledge of the number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same kind.

Pro. How is that?

Soc. Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And there is a flat and sharp tone, and a third tone which is natural :—may we affirm so much?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you knew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of music.

Pro. Nothing.

Soc. But when you have learned what sounds are flat and what sharp, and the number and nature of the intervals and

their differences, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers discovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under the name of harmonies; and the corresponding principles in the movements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as they say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that there is a similar principle in every one and many;—when, I say, you have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and you may be said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar grasp of it. But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals which there is in each of them, when not classified, makes in each individual a state of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for number in anything, will not himself be looked for in the number of famous men.

18 *Pro.* I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent, Philebus.

Phi. I think so too, but I wish that I could see how his words bear upon us and upon the argument.

Soc. Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus.

Pro. Indeed he is, and you must answer him.

Soc. I will; but you must let me make one little remark first; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual unity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite number, and now I say conversely, that he who begins with infinity should not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number representing a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And now let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of letters.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Some god or sage, who in the Egyptian legend is said to have been Theuth, observing that sound was infinite, first distinguished in the infinity of sound a certain number of vowels, and then other letters which had a measure of vocal sound, but were not pure vowels (i. e. the semivowels) also having a definite number; and lastly, he distinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, and he divided these mutes, and likewise the two other classes of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, and told the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of letters; and observing

that none of us could learn any one of them and not learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond which in a manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he called the art of grammar or letters.

Phi. The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding the original statement, but I still feel the deficiency of which I just now complained.

Soc. Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the argument?

Phi. Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long asking.

Soc. Then assuredly you are very near the answer to the question which you have been long asking?

Phi. How so?

Soc. Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom?

Phi. Certainly.

Soc. And we maintain that they are each of them one?

Phi. True.

Soc. And the precise question to which the previous discussion desires an answer is, how they are one and also many, and not at once infinite [i. e. how they have one genus and many species], and what number of species is to be assigned to either of them before we allow them to drop into infinity.

Pro. That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which 19 Socrates has ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us shall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable to answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have undertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were able to answer, that methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let us consider, then, what we are to do:—Socrates, if I understood him rightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is the number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.

Soc. Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument * showed that if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity, likeness, sameness, or diversity and unlikeness, none of us will be of the smallest use in any enquiry.

Pro. That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates, and

happy would the wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him would be that he should not be ignorant of himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will tell you why. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing with you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best of human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and enjoyment and the like was the chief good, you answered—No, not that, but another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves of what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to examine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are to be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of pursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the like. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully threatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question was settled, and you agreed, and granted our request. And now, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back; cease then to fight against us in this way.

Soc. In what way?

20 *Phi.* Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which at the moment we have no sufficient answer to offer; let us not imagine that a general puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if we are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider, then, whether you will yourself determine the question which you have asked about the kinds of pleasure and knowledge, or whether you can and will find some other mode of clearing up our controversy.

Soc. If you say that, I have nothing to fear, for the words 'can and will' dispel fear; and, moreover, some god appears to have recalled something to my mind.

Phi. What is that?

Soc. I remember to have heard certain discussions about pleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they were to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the good, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better than either. If this be clearly

established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:—Am I not right?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but the truth will appear more clearly as we proceed.

Pro. Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.

Soc. But, let us just agree on some little points.

Pro. What are they?

Soc. Is the good perfect or imperfect?

Pro. The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.

Soc. And is the good sufficient?

Pro. Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.

Soc. And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything of which good is not a part.

Pro. That is undeniable.

Soc. Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them separately in review.

Pro. How do you mean?

Soc. Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good.

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. Shall we administer the question to them through you?

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Then answer.

Pro. Ask.

Soc. Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?

Pro. Certainly I should.

Soc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence

and forethought, and the like? would you not at any rate want sight?

Pro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.

Soc. Living thus always, and all your life, you would have the greatest pleasures?

Pro. I should.

Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of sense.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Can this be imagined otherwise?

Pro. No.

Soc. But is such a life eligible?

Pro. I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken from me the power of speech.

Soc. Well, but you should not faint;—and now let us examine in turn the life of mind.

Pro. And what is this life of mind?

Soc. I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no fraction of a sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings?

Pro. Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.

22 *Soc.* What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two?

Pro. Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?

Soc. Yes.

Pro. There can be no difference of opinion about that; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them.

Soc. But do you see the consequence?

Pro. To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man nor for animal.

Soc. Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able thus to live; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.

Pro. Certainly that seems to be true.

Soc. And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good?

Phi. Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections.

Soc. Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind'; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.

Pro. Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a blow; after having fought for the palm, she has been smitten 23 by the argument, and is fallen. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought wise in not making a similar claim. And certainly pleasure having been deprived not only of the first but of the second place will be

terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for not even to them can she still appear as fair as before.

Soc. Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by applying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?

Pro. Nonsense, Socrates.

Soc. Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure, which is an impossibility?

Pro. Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be aware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the argument.

Soc. Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a long business, and not a very easy one. For in going to war for mind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of another make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old ones may do again. And must I then finish the argument?

Pro. Of course you must.

Soc. Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you do not object, into three classes.

Pro. Upon what principle would you make the division?

Soc. Let us take some of our newly-found notions.

Pro. Which of them?

Soc. Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of existence, and also an infinite?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which is compounded out of them; but I fear that I am very clumsy at these processes of division and enumeration.

Pro. What do you mean my good friend?

Soc. I say still that a fourth class is wanted.

Pro. What will that be?

Soc. Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a fourth class to the three others.

Pro. And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of resolution as well as a cause of composition?

Soc. Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future time you shall allow me to have one.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let us begin with the three first; and as we find two out of the three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite them, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.

Pro. If you would explain to me a little more about them, 24 perhaps I might be able to follow you.

Soc. Well, the two classes are the same, which I mentioned before, one the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the infinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter discussed.

Pro. I agree.

Soc. And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your attention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and colder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more and less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any end? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an end.

Pro. That is most true.

Soc. Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less.

Pro. True.

Soc. Then, says the argument, they have never any end, and being endless must also be infinite.

Pro. Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.

Soc. Yes, my dear Protarchus, and the word which you have just uttered suggests to me that such expressions as 'exceedingly,' and also the term 'mildly,' mean the same as more or less; for whenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity—they are always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison of the more or less violent or more or less mild, and at each creation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now saying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to intrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these last would themselves be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity is once admitted, there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for these are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite quantity is at rest, and

progresses not. Which proves that comparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the class of the infinite.

Pro. Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but these subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I think, however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or twice, there would be a substantial agreement between us.

Soc. Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather not waste time in tedious particulars, let me know whether I may not assume as a note of the infinite——

25 *Pro.* What?

Soc. I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit of more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'mildly,' 'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the infinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous argument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought together, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set upon them; do you remember?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit their opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal, or again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure—all these may, I think, be rightly reckoned in the class of the limited or finite; what do you say?

Pro. Excellent, Socrates.

Soc. And now what shall we say of the third or compound kind?

Pro. That you will also have to tell me, I think.

Soc. Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen to my prayers.

Pro. Offer up a prayer, then, and think.

Soc. I have thought, Protarchus, and I believe that there is a God who has answered my prayer.

Pro. What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what you are saying?

Soc. I will tell you, and do you listen to my words.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?

Pro. True.

Soc. Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower, greater, smaller, and all which in the preceding argument we placed under the unity of more and less.

Pro. In the class of the infinite, that is?

Soc. Yes; and now mingle that with the other.

Pro. What is the other?

Soc. The class of the finite which we ought to have brought together as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same thing if we do so now;—when the two are combined, a third will appear.

Pro. Of what class are you speaking, and what do you mean?

Soc. The class of the equal and the double, and any class which puts an end to difference and opposition, and by bringing the different elements into harmony and proportion creates number.

Pro. I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various opposites, when you mingle these ratios with them, take certain forms.

Soc. Yes, that is my meaning.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. Does not the right participation in these ratios give health—in disease, for instance?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And whereas the sharp and flat, the swift and the slow 26 are infinite or unlimited, does not the addition of them introduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?

Pro. Yes, certainly.

Soc. Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the introduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse moderation and harmony?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the seasons, and all the delights of life?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. I omit to speak of ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health and strength, and of the many beauties and high perfections of the soul: methinks, O my fair Philebus, that

the goddess saw the universal wantonness and wickedness of all things, having no limit of pleasure or satiety, and she devised the limit of law and order, tormenting, as you say, Philebus, or, as I affirm, saving the soul.—But what think you, Protarchus?

Pro. I am quite of your mind, Socrates.

Soc. And you will observe that I have spoken of three classes?

Pro. Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that the infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of existences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain.

Soc. That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too much for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with the infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were sealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one.

Pro. True.

Soc. And the finite or limit had no divisions, and was readily acknowledged to be by nature one?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand me to mean any offspring of the union of these two which is a generation into true being, and is effected by the measure which the limit introduces.

Pro. I understand.

Soc. Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be investigated, and you must assist in the investigation; for does not everything which comes into being of necessity come into being through a cause?

Pro. Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no cause?

Soc. And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name; the agent and the cause may be truly called one?

27 *Pro.* Very true.

Soc. And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall find that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name—shall we not?

Pro. We shall.

Soc. The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or effect naturally follows it?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then the cause and that which obeys the cause in generation are not the same?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of which they were generated, furnish all the three classes?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily proven to be distinct from them,—and may we not call that a fourth principle?

Pro. Surely we may.

Soc. And now, having distinguished the four, I think that we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them in order.

Pro. By all means.

Soc. Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and the second the finite or limited, the third a mixed element generated out of them; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in speaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. And now what was the question, and how came we hither? Were we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or wisdom?

Pro. We were.

Soc. And having determined these points, shall we not be better able to decide about the first and second place, which was the original subject of dispute?

Pro. I dare say.

Soc. We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and wisdom was the conqueror—did we not?

Pro. True.

Soc. And we see to what class this life is to be assigned?

Pro. Beyond a doubt.

Soc. This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class; which is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the elements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be truly said to comprehend the conqueror life.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all sweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed? Perhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?

Phi. Let me hear.

Soc. Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class which admits of more and less?

Phi. They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be the absolute good if she were not
28 infinite in quantity and degree.

Soc. Nor would pain, Philebus, be the absolute evil. And therefore the infinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure anything of good. But now—admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature of the infinite—in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and Philebus, may we reverently place wisdom and knowledge and mind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very serious if we err on this point.

Phi. You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.

Soc. And you, my friend, are also magnifying your goddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.

Pro. Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must obey him.

Phi. And did you not, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?

Pro. Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must entreat you, Socrates, to be our teacher, and then we shall not say anything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite.

Soc. I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose a difficult one; but have I really, as Philebus implies, disconcerted you with my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind and knowledge belong?

Pro. You have, indeed, Socrates.

Soc. Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers are agreed that mind is the king of heaven and earth; in this way truly they magnify themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should like to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.

Phi. Take your own course, Socrates, and do not abridge the length; for we shall be glad to hear you at any length.

Soc. Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking whether all this which they call the universe is left to the guidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence and wisdom.

Pro. Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates, for that which you were just now saying is blasphemy; but the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think otherwise.

Soc. Shall we, then, agree with them of old time in maintaining this doctrine,—nor merely reasserting the notions of others, ²⁹ without risk to ourselves,—but shall we venture also to share in the risk, and bear the reproaches which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that all is disorder?

Pro. That would certainly be my wish.

Soc. Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument.

Pro. Let me hear.

Soc. We see the elements which enter into the nature of the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor cries, 'land ahead,' in the constitution of the world.

Pro. The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm gathers over us, and we are at our wit's end.

Soc. Consider now that each of these elements, as they exist in us, is but a small fraction of any one of them, and of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is a fire within us, and in the universe.

Pro. True.

Soc. And is not our fire small and weak and mean, but the fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power that fire has?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And is that universal element nourished, and generated

and ruled by our fire, or is the fire in you and me, and in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?

Pro. That is a question which does not deserve an answer.

Soc. Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe, and you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?

Pro. Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his senses?

Soc. I do not think that he could—but now go a step further; when we see those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in one, do we not call them a body?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same reason may be considered as a body, because made up of the same elements.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which we were just now speaking?

Pro. That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve to be asked.

30 *Soc.* Well, will you deign to give me an answer to another question?

Pro. What is that?

Soc. May our body be said to have a soul?

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the body of the universe, which contains elements similar to our bodies but fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?

Pro. Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.

Soc. Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the four classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two, and the cause or fourth class, which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease, and operating in other ways to heal and organize;—we cannot, I say, imagine that this last should have all the attributes of wisdom, and that whereas the elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great provinces of the heaven,

only fairer and purer, this should not also in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest of natures?

Pro. The supposition is quite unreasonable.

Soc. Then if that is denied, should we not be wise in adopting the other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty infinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well as a cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years and seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?

Pro. Most justly.

Soc. And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the cause? And other gods have other noble attributes, whereby they love severally to be called.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who said of old time that mind rules the universe.

Pro. True.

Soc. And they furnish an answer to my enquiry (cp. 28 A); for they imply that mind¹ belongs to that class of the four which is the cause of all,—and now I think that you have my answer.

Pro. I have indeed, and yet I did not know that you had answered.

Soc. You are merry, Protarchus, and a jest may sometimes pleasantly interrupt earnest.

Pro. Very true.

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Soc. I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the class to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind?

Pro. True.

Soc. And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been set forth?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And let us remember, too, of both of them, that (1) mind

¹ Reading γένους τοῦ πάντων.

was akin to the cause and of this family ; (2) and that pleasure is infinite and belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.

Pro. I shall be sure to remember.

Soc. And next we must examine when and how they are generated, beginning with pleasure, as her class came first in the enquiry ; and yet pleasure cannot be adequately examined when separated from pain.

Pro. If this is the road, let us take it.

Soc. I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of pleasures.

Pro. What do you mean ?

Soc. I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.

Pro. And would you tell me once more, sweet Socrates, which of the aforesaid classes is the mixed one ?

Soc. I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which is third in the list of four.

Pro. That which followed the infinite and the finite ; and in which you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.

Soc. Capital ; and now will you please to give me your best attention ?

Pro. Proceed ; I am attending.

Soc. I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is also a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.

Pro. That is very probable.

Soc. And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the source of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and shortest words about matters of the greatest moment.

Pro. I believe that you are right, Socrates ; but will you try to be a little plainer ?

Soc. I think that every-day phenomena will furnish the readiest illustration.

Pro. What phenomena do you mean ?

Soc. I should take the case of hunger, which is a dissolution and a pain.

Pro. True.

Soc. Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?

Pro. Yes.

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Soc. Thirst again is a destruction and a pain [and a dissolution,] but the effect of moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure; again, the unnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the natural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in the animal is pain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements to their original state is pleasure. And would not the general proposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural union of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make up the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process and return of all things to their own nature is pleasure?

Pro. Granted; I see in a general way what you mean.

Soc. Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating severally in the two processes which we have described?

Pro. Good.

Soc. Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an antecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and consoling, and an expectation of pain, fearful and anxious.

Pro. Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is of the soul only, and is produced by expectation without the body.

Soc. Right; and I think that the examination of these two kinds, unalloyed as I suppose them to be, and not compounds of pleasure and pain, will most clearly show whether the whole class of pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire desirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes which have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and cold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired and sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.

Pro. You say most truly that this is the track which the investigation should follow.

Soc. Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution,

and pleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will be the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of restoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you are going to say: I ask whether any animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of pleasure or pain, great or small?

Pro. Certainly not.

33 *Soc.* Then here we have a third state, over and above that of pleasure and of pain?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And do not forget that there is such a state, of which the recognition will very considerably affect our judgment of pleasure, and I should like to say a word or two about it.

Pro. What have you to say?

Soc. Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there is no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.

Pro. You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?

Soc. Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared, no degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be necessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.

Pro. Yes, certainly, that was said.

Soc. Then he may live without pleasure; and who knows whether this may not be the most divine of all lives?

Pro. At any rate, the gods cannot be supposed to have either joy or sorrow.

Soc. Certainly not—there would be great impropriety in their having either of them: the indifference, however, of the gods to pleasures, may be considered hereafter if necessary, and may be reckoned to the advantage of mind who will fight for the second place, if she must resign the first.

Pro. Just so.

Soc. The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying, is purely mental, is entirely derived from memory.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. I must first of all analyse memory, or rather perception which is prior to memory, if the nature of these mental states is ever to be properly cleared up.

Pro. How will you proceed?

Soc. Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished before they reach the soul, which remains unaffected by them; and again, other affections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock to both of them.

Pro. Granted.

Soc. And the soul may be said to be oblivious of the first but not of the second?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness in a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in this case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which is not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you see?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Then just be so good as change the terms.

Pro. To what shall I change them?

Soc. Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing the state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say unconsciousness.

Pro. I see.

Soc. And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and motion, may be truly called consciousness?

Pro. Most truly.

Soc. Then now we know the meaning of the word?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the preservation of consciousness?

Pro. Right.

Soc. But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?

Pro. I think so.

Soc. And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul has of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced when in company with the body?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of some consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and reminiscence?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. Why do I say all this?

Pro. Why?

Soc. Because I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and desire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and in these states of the mind they seem to be most clearly displayed.

Pro. Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.

Soc. There are certainly many things relating to the generation and whole complexion of pleasure, which require to be considered; and first, as to the nature and seat of desire.

Pro. Ay; let us enquire into that, for we will lose nothing.

Soc. Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find the answer.

Pro. A fair retort; but let us proceed.

Soc. Do we not speak of hunger, thirst, and the like, as desires?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And yet they are very different; what common nature have we then in view when we call them by a single name?

Pro. By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily answered; but it must be answered.

Soc. Then let us go back to our old illustrations.

Pro. Where shall we begin?

Soc. Do we mean anything when we say he 'thirsts'?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. We mean to say that he is empty?

Pro. Of course.

Soc. And is not thirst desire?

Pro. Yes, of drink.

35 *Soc.* Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?

Pro. I should say, of replenishment with drink.

Soc. Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of what he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?

Pro. That is quite clear.

Soc. But how can he who is empty for the first time, attain either by perception or memory any apprehension of replenishment, which he has never yet experienced, either now or at any former time?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. And yet he who desires, surely desires something?

Pro. Of course.

Soc. Then he does not desire that which he experiences, for he is thirsty, and thirst is emptiness, but he desires replenishment?

Pro. True.

Soc. There must be something in the thirsty man which in some way apprehends replenishment?

Pro. There must.

Soc. And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be emptied?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the replenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way can there be?

Pro. I cannot imagine any other.

Soc. But do you see the consequence?

Pro. What is the consequence?

Soc. That there is no such thing as desire of the body.

Pro. Why so?

Soc. Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every animal is to the reverse of his bodily state.

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of his experience proves that he has a memory of the opposite state.

Pro. True.

Soc. And the argument which proves that memory attracts us towards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the desires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin in the soul.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or thirsts or has any similar experience.

Pro. Quite right.

Soc. Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to me to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these affections.

Pro. Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you speaking?

Soc. I am speaking of emptiness and replenishment, and all that relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, and of the alternations of pain and joy which accompany them in their transitions.

Pro. True.

Soc. And what would you say of the kind of life which is intermediate between them?

Pro. What do you mean by 'intermediate'?

Soc. I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers the pleasures which, if they would only come, would relieve him; but as yet he has them not. May we not say of
36 him, that he is in an intermediate state?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Would you say that he was in pain or in pleasure?

Pro. Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body there is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and expectation.

Soc. What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man who is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other times be quite in despair?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be filled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then man and the other animals have at one time both pleasure and pain?

Pro. I suppose so.

Soc. But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there will be the double experience of pain, and you observing this were led to suppose that the doubling was the single case possible.¹

Pro. Quite true, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we make the enquiry into these feelings the occasion of raising a question?

¹ ἀπλῶς διπλοῦν is an almost untranslatable play of words.

Pro. What question?

Soc. Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which we are speaking are true or false? or partly true and partly false?

Pro. But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?

Soc. And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or true and false expectations, or true and false opinions?

Pro. I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not pleasures.

Soc. What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very serious enquiry.

Pro. There I agree.

Soc. And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys (cp. 16 A), the point to be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.

Pro. Surely.

Soc. No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is said should be pertinent.

Pro. Right.

Soc. I am always wondering at the question which has now been raised.

Pro. How so?

Soc. Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?

Pro. To be sure I do.

Soc. Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping or waking, mad or moonstruck?

Pro. That is what we have always held, Socrates.

Soc. But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth 37 of your opinion?

Pro. I think that we should.

Soc. Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has arisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And such a thing as pleasure?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And there must be something about which a man has an opinion?

Pro. True.

Soc. And something which gives pleasure?

Pro. Quite correct.

Soc. And whether his opinion is right or wrong, makes no difference; he will still always have an opinion?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not, will always have a real feeling of pleasure?

Pro. Yes; that is also quite true.

Soc. Then, how can opinion be true and false, and pleasure only true; and yet the state of being pleased, or holding an opinion, may be both real?

Pro. Yes; that is the question.

Soc. You mean that opinion has the attributes of true and false, and hence becomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this is what you think should be examined?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And further, we must consider, whether admitting the existence of qualities in some objects, pleasure and pain may not be simple and devoid of quality?

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain as well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have various degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And if there is badness in any of them, Protarchus, then we should speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?

Pro. Quite true, Socrates.

Soc. And if there is rightness in any of them, should we not speak of a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse of rightness?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that the opinion is erroneous, and not rightly opined?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of the object of pleasure or pain, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?

Pro. Not if the pleasure is mistaken; we could not.

Soc. And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion which is not true, but false?

Pro. That is quite correct; and in that case, Socrates, we ³⁸ call the opinion false, but no one could call the actual pleasure false.

Soc. How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of pleasure!

Pro. Nay, Socrates, I only say what I hear.

Soc. And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure which is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is often found in us associated with falsehood and ignorance?

Pro. There must be a very great difference between them.

Soc. Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.

Pro. Lead, and I will follow.

Soc. Well, then, my view is—

Pro. What?

Soc. I ask first of all, whether you would not acknowledge that there is such a thing as false, and that there is such a thing as true opinion?

Pro. There is.

Soc. And pleasure and pain, as I was saying, are often consequent upon them,—upon true and false opinion, I mean.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always spring from memory and perception?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Might we imagine the process to be something of this sort? An object, let us say, is seen at a distance not very clearly, and the seer wants to determine what it is which he sees.

Pro. Very likely.

Soc. He asks, first of all—‘what is the image which is standing by a rock under a tree?’ That is the question which he may be supposed to put to himself when he sees such an image.

Pro. True.

Soc. To which he guesses the right answer, and says as if in a whisper to himself—‘this is a man.’

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Or again, he is misled, and then he says—‘No, it is a figure made by the shepherds.’

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in articulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a proposition.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. But if he be alone he keeps the thought in his mind, not unfrequently for a considerable time, as he is walking along.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation of this phenomenon?

Pro. What is your explanation?

Soc. I think that the soul at such times is like a book.

Pro. How so?

39 *Soc.* Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant feelings seem to me almost to write down words in the soul, and when the inscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions grow in our souls—but when the scribe within us writes falsely the result is false.

Pro. I quite assent and agree to your statement.

Soc. I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is busy at the same time in the chambers of the soul.

Pro. Who is that?

Soc. The painter, who paints the images of the words which the scribe or registrar has already written down.

Pro. But when and how does he do this?

Soc. When abstracting from sight, or some other sense, the opinions which he then received or the words which he heard, he retains the image of them in his mind;—that is a very common mental phenomenon.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And the images of true opinions and words are true, and of false opinions and words false; are they not?

Pro. They are.

Soc. If we are right so far, there arises a further question.

Pro. What is that?

Soc. Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only in relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future also?

Pro. I should say in relation to all times alike.

Soc. Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described already as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which we may infer that there is an anticipatory pleasure and pain having to do with the future?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And do all those writings and paintings which a little while ago we were supposing to exist in our minds relate to the past and present only, and not to the future?

Pro. To the future, very much.

Soc. When you say 'very much,' you mean to imply that all these anticipations are hopes, and that mankind are filled with hopes in every stage of existence?

Pro. Exactly.

Soc. Answer me another question.

Pro. What question?

Soc. A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he not?

Pro. Certainly he is.

Soc. And the unjust and the bad man is the reverse?

Pro. True.

Soc. And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled with hopes?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which exist in the minds of each of us?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may often have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the picture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his good fortune.

Pro. True.

Soc. And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods, have generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false pictures?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And yet the bad have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as the good ; but I presume that they are false pleasures ?

Pro. They are.

Soc. The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good in true pleasures ?

Pro. That is most certain.

Soc. Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of men which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains also ?

Pro. There are.

Soc. And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had a real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in the past, present, or future ?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And this was the source of false opinion and opinings ; am I not right ?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real but illusory condition ?

Pro. How do you mean ?

Soc. I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real pleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow ; and he may be pleased about things which neither have nor ever had any real existence, and, more often than not, are never likely to exist.

Pro. Yes, Socrates, that is undeniable.

Soc. And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the like ; are they not often false ?

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are true or false ?

Pro. In no other way.

41 *Soc.* Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as they are false ?

Pro. Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of the truth ; for no one would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by reason of some other corruption to which they are liable.

Soc. Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by

corruption we will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the present I would rather show by another argument that there are many false pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this may assist our final decision.

Pro. Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.

Soc. I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion which should be put to the proof, and not left unsettled by us.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new argument.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires, as they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings apart from the soul—do you remember?

Pro. Yes, I remember that you said so.

Soc. And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily state, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was experienced.

Pro. True.

Soc. Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.

Pro. What am I to infer?

Soc. That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously, and opposite feelings of pleasure and pain are experienced together, as has been already shown.

Pro. Clearly.

Soc. And have we not further agreed that pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that they are of the class of infinites?

Pro. Certainly, that was said.

Soc. But how can we rightly judge of them?

Pro. How can we?

Soc. Is our intention to judge of their comparative quality or intensity, and to measure pleasure against pain, or pain against pain, or pleasure against pleasure?

Pro. Yes that was certainly our intention and mode of judging of them.

Soc. Well, to return to the case of sight. Does not the near-⁴²ness or distance of magnitudes darken their true proportion, and

make us opine falsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of pleasures and pains?

Pro. Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.

Soc. Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were saying before.

Pro. What was that?

Soc. Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the pleasures and pains with their own falsehood.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. But now the pleasures are said to be true or false because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to comparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when compared with the pains, and the pains when compared with the pleasures.

Pro. Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.

Soc. And when you subtract the greater and less amount, which is apparent and not real, you will acknowledge that the appearance is illusory, and you will never say that the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or true.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find pleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are still more false than these.

Pro. What are they, and how shall we find them?

Soc. If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains and afflictions, and aches and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a corruption of nature caused by coagulations, and dissolutions, and repletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?

Pro. Yes, that has been often said.

Soc. And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural state is pleasure?

Pro. Right.

Soc. But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body experiences none of these changes.

Pro. When, Socrates?

Soc. That, Protarchus, does not help the argument.

Pro. Why not, Socrates?

Soc. Because your question does not prevent me from repeating mine. *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

Pro. Which question of yours ?

Soc. Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I may ask what would be the necessary result if there were ?

Pro. You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed either for good or bad ?

Soc. Yes.

Pro. Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be neither pleasure nor pain.

Soc. Very good ; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert 43 that we must always be experiencing one of them ; that is what the wise tell us ; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.

Pro. Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.

Soc. Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves ; and I should like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I mean to escape from them ? And I hope that you will run away with me.

Pro. How ?

Soc. To them we will say : ‘ Good ; but are we, or living things in general, always conscious of what happens to us—for example, of our growth, or the like ? Are we not on the contrary, almost wholly unconscious of this and similar phenomena ? ’ You must answer for them.

Pro. The latter, certainly.

Soc. Then we were not right in saying, just now, that these upward and downward changes cause pleasures and pains ?

Pro. True.

Soc. A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be—

Pro. What ?

Soc. If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains, but that the moderate and lesser ones do neither.

Pro. That, Socrates, is the better and safer mode of statement.

Soc. But if this be true, the life of which I was just now speaking again appears.

Pro. What life ?

Soc. The life which I said was devoid either of pain or of joy.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and the third which is neither; or how would you describe them?

Pro. I should say as you do that there are three of them.

Soc. But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same as pleasure.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live without pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand him to mean by that statement?

Pro. I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.

Soc. Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a little and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a third which is neither.

Pro. Very good.

Soc. Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or reasonably regarded or spoken of as pleasant or painful.

Pro. Certainly not.

44 *Soc.* And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and think thus.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free from pain?

Pro. They say so.

Soc. And they must think or they would not say that they have pleasure.

Pro. I suppose not.

Soc. And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct natures, they are wrong.

Pro. But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.

Soc. Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were just now saying, or two only—the one being a state of pain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of itself a good, and is designated pleasure?

Pro. But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not see the reason why.

Soc. You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies of our friend Philebus.

Pro. And who may they be?

Soc. Certain who are reputed to be masters in natural philosophy, and who deny the very existence of pleasure.

Pro. Indeed!

Soc. They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are all of them only avoidances of pain.

Pro. And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?

Soc. Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who are enabled to divine the truth, not by any rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance and extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of pleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound, and whose seductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not pleasure. This is the use which you may make of them; you shall consider the various grounds of their dislike, and then you shall hear from me what I deem to be true pleasures; and when the nature of pleasures has been examined from both points of view, we will bring her up for judgment.

Pro. True.

Soc. Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers and follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would say something of this sort; they would begin at the foundation, and ask whether, if we wanted to know the nature and qualities of any class, we should be more likely to discover the quality, shall I say of hardness, by looking at the hardest things, or at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall answer these severe gentlemen who address you through me.

Pro. By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at the greatest instances.

Soc. Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a class, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most extreme and most vehement? 45

Pro. In that every one will be ready to agree.

Soc. And the most obvious instances of the greatest pleasures as we have often said are pleasures of the body?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when

we are sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our answer, and not make a mistake.

Pro. How are we likely to mistake?

Soc. Why, because we might be tempted to answer rashly, 'when we are in health.'

Pro. Yes, that is the natural answer.

Soc. Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which mankind have the greatest desires?

Pro. True.

Soc. And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness, feel cold or thirst or other bodily affection more intensely? Am I not right in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the satisfaction of their want?

Pro. That is clear when you say so.

Soc. Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person would wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at health, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:—do not imagine that I am asking whether those who are very ill have more pleasure than those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the intensity of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be most in excess. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and what nature they attribute to her who deny her very existence.

Pro. I believe that I follow you.

Soc. We shall soon see whether you do or not, Protarchus, for you shall answer me; tell me then whether you see I will not say more but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness than in temperance? and please to think before you speak.

Pro. I understand you, and see that there is a great difference between them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorisms of 'never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing the minds of fools and wantons quite maddens and infuriates them.

Soc. Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures and pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body, and not in the right state.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and see what makes them the greatest? 46

Pro. We ought.

Soc. Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain disorders.

Pro. What disorders?

Soc. The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends utterly detest.

Pro. What pleasures?

Soc. Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments by scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's name is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?—Pleasure or pain?

Pro. A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say.

Soc. I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any personal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration of these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the point at issue.

Pro. Then we had better proceed to analyse this family of pleasures.

Soc. You mean the pleasures which have a common mixed nature?

Pro. Exactly.

Soc. There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in the body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while there are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul and body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures and sometimes pains.

Pro. How is that?

Soc. Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature, a man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold and is growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is being cooled, and he wants to have the one and be free from the other;—the sweet has a bitter, as they say, and both together fasten upon him and create irritation and in time drive him to distraction.

Pro. That description is very true to nature.

Soc. And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains

are sometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?

Pro. True.

Soc. Of the greater pain an example is afforded by scratching and tickling, of which we were just now speaking, when the fiery and boiling element is within, and the rubbing and motion¹ only relieves the surface, and does not reach the parts affected; then if you put them to the fire, or in the last resort apply cold to them, you may often give the most intense pleasure; or a contrast of pleasures and pains within and on the surface may be produced, which ever of the two prevail, and this is
47 due to the forcible separation of what is united, and the union of what is separated, causing a juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.

Pro. Quite so.

Soc. Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and the slight underfeeling of pain just tickles him, and causes a gentle irritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an excitement in him, and he will even leap for joy, and display all sorts of colours, attitudes, pantings, and be quite amazed, and utter the most irrational exclamations.

Pro. Yes, indeed.

Soc. He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is dying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing he is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all pleasures he declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who lives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of mankind.

Pro. That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions of the majority about pleasures.

Soc. Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which arise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the body only; but where feelings of the mind mingle with the body² the combination takes place in another way—there is a contrast of pleasure and pain, which ends in a coalition between them. I have already remarked, that when a man is

¹ Reading with the MSS. κινήσει.

² Reading περί δὲ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ σώματι, τὰ πάντα ἐνυβάλλεται.

empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in vacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all these and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they are innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.

Pro. I believe that to be quite true.

Soc. There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures and pains.

Pro. What is that?

Soc. The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences of purely mental feelings.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love, emulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful pleasures? need I remind you of the anger

‘Which stirs even a wise man to violence,
And is sweeter than honey and the honeycomb?’

And you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and bereavement? 48

Pro. Yes, there is a natural connexion between them.

Soc. And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the spectators smile through their tears?

Pro. Certainly I do.

Soc. And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a mixed feeling of pain and pleasure?

Pro. I do not understand you.

Soc. I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in recognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy.

Pro. There is, I think.

Soc. And the greater the difficulty the more desirable is the examination of the case, because the difficulty of examining other cases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of the soul?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of his neighbours at which he is pleased?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an evil?

Pro. To be sure.

Soc. From these considerations learn to know the nature of the ridiculous.

Pro. Explain.

Soc. The ridiculous may be described generally as the name of a state; and is that part of vice in general which is the opposite to the state of which the inscription at Delphi speaks.

Pro. You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.'

Soc. I do, and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.'

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.

Pro. Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.

Soc. Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?

Pro. Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will.

Soc. Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be shown?

Pro. What are they?

Soc. In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy himself richer than he is.

Pro. Yes, that is a very common error.

Soc. And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer than he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he has not really.

Pro. Of course.

Soc. And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods of the mind; they imagine that they are a great deal better than they are.

Pro. Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.

49 *Soc.* And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass of mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit of contention and lying conceit of wisdom?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?

Pro. Very evil.

Soc. But we must pursue the division a step further, Pro-tarchus, if we would find the singular mixture of pleasure and pain;—pain is envy of the playful sort.

Pro. How can we make the further division which you suggest?

Soc. All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of themselves may be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two classes—one having power and might; and the other the reverse.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them who are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at, may be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may be more truly described as strong and formidable, for ignorance in the powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in reality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in truth is, ridiculous.

Pro. That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the admixture of pleasures and pains.

Soc. Well then, let us examine the nature of envy.

Pro. Proceed.

Soc. Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also a pain?

Pro. Most true.

Soc. There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the misfortunes of enemies?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends' misfortunes—is not that envy?

Pro. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?

Pro. True.

Soc. And the vain conceits of our friends about their beauty, wisdom, wealth, of which we made three divisions, are ridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May we not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this state of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?

Pro. They are ridiculous.

Soc. And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a misfortune?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?

Pro. Clearly we feel pleasure.

50 *Soc.* And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at the misfortunes of friends?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our friends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy has been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant, and we envy and laugh at the same instant.

Pro. True.

Soc. And the argument implies that there are combinations of pleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only on the stage, but on the greater stage of human life, and in ten thousand ways.

Pro. I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates, however eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.

Soc. I have laid before you the examples of anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation, envy, and similar emotions, in which, as I was saying, there is a mixture of the two elements so often named; have I not?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. Note, however, that our conclusions hitherto have had reference only to sorrow and envy and anger.

Pro. I perceive.

Soc. But are these all, or are there a great many others remaining?

Pro. Certainly there are many others.

Soc. And why do you suppose that I showed you the admixture which takes place in comedy? In order that I might by an easy example prove to you the mixed nature of these affections of fear and love and the like; and I thought that when I had given you the illustration, you would have let me off, and acknowledged at once that the body without the soul,

and the soul without the body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures and pains, and that further discussion would thus become unnecessary. And now I want to know whether you will let me off: Or must I stay here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release without many words;—if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an account of all of them. But at present I would rather sail in another direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled, preliminary to the judgment which Philebus demands.

Pro. Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course.

Soc. Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their turn; this is the natural and necessary order.

Pro. Excellent.

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Soc. These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to explain; for with the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation of pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, use the maintainers of this opinion as witnesses, that there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and others again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet are intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agonies and distresses, both of body and mind.

Pro. Then which are the true pleasures, Socrates, and what is the right conception of them?

Soc. True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour and form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of sound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and unconscious, and the gratification afforded by them palpable to sense and pleasant and unalloyed with pain.

Pro. Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.

Soc. My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour to be plainer. I do not mean by the beauty of form such beauty as that of animals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but, says the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles, and the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by turning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm to be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are eternally

and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures, quite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which are of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you understand my meaning?

Pro. I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you will try to make the meaning clearer.

Soc. When sounds are smooth and clear, and utter a single pure tone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely beautiful, and have a natural pleasure associated with them.

Pro. Yes, there is such a class.

Soc. The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but inasmuch as they have no admixture of necessary pain, I regard this freedom from pain, wherever and in whatever experienced, as the mark of an analogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.

Pro. I understand.

52 *Soc.* To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if they appear to us to have no hunger of knowledge, and no pain of hunger attaching to them.

Pro. And they have not. } *not true -*

Soc. Well, but are there not pains of forgetfulness, if a man is full of knowledge and his knowledge is lost?

Pro. They are not natural or necessary, but there may be times of reflection, when he feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.

Soc. Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the natural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.

Pro. In that case you are right in saying that the loss of knowledge is not attended with pain.

Soc. These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and they are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and those which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our description of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no measure, but that those which are not in excess have a measure; the great, the excessive, the more or less frequent, and

all which are denoted by such terms, we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite, which is always pouring, with more or less force, through body and soul alike ; and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure.

Pro. That is most true, Socrates.

Soc. Still there is something more to be considered about pleasures.

Pro. What is that ?

Soc. When you speak of pure and clear, or of excessive and much, or of great and enough, how do they stand in reference to the truth ?

Pro. Why do you ask, Socrates ?

Soc. Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and knowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and impure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for judgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and me and all of us.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. Let us consider all the pure kinds ; and for the better consideration of them, let us select a single instance.

Pro. What instance shall we select ?

Soc. Suppose that we take whiteness.

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Pro. Very good.

Soc. How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity ? Is it that which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most unadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours ?

Pro. Clearly that which is most unadulterated.

Soc. True, Protarchus ; the purest and not the greatest or largest quantity of white, is to be deemed the truest and most beautiful white ?

Pro. Right.

Soc. And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white is whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.

Pro. Perfectly right.

Soc. There is no need of adducing many similar examples in illustration of the argument about pleasure ; one such is sufficient to prove to us that a small pleasure, if pure or unalloyed with

pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a great or often-repeated one of another kind.

Pro. Assuredly ; and the instance you have given is quite sufficient.

Soc. But what do you say of another question :—have we not heard that pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not certain ingenious philosophers affirm this, and ought not we to be grateful to them?

Pro. What do they mean?

Soc. Dear Protarchus, I will explain to you what they mean by putting a question.

Pro. Ask, and I will answer.

Soc. I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and the other ever in want of something?

Pro. What manner of natures are they?

Soc. The one eternal and majestic, the other inferior.

Pro. You speak riddles.

Soc. You have seen loves good and gentle, and also brave lovers of them.

Pro. I should think so.

Soc. Find two terms in all correlations which are like these two.

Pro. I wish that you would be a little more intelligible.

Soc. There is no difficulty, Protarchus ; the argument is only in play, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something else (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which something else subserves (absolutes).

Pro. After many repetitions, at last I understand.

54 *Soc.* As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning will become clearer.

Pro. Very likely.

Soc. Here are two new principles.

Pro. What are they?

Soc. One is the generation of all things, and another is essence.

Pro. I readily accept both generation and essence at your hands.

Soc. Very right ; and would you say that generation is for the sake of essence, or essence for the sake of generation?

Pro. You want to know whether that which is called essence is, properly speaking, for the sake of generation?

Soc. Yes.

Pro. By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.

Soc. I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me that ship-building is for the sake of ships, or are ships for the sake of ship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question.

Pro. Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?

Soc. I have no objection, but you must take your part.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial, material, are always used with a view to generation, and that each generation is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence, and that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence.

Pro. Assuredly.

Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, will surely be for the sake of some essence?

Pro. True.

Soc. And that for the sake of which something is done must be placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of another thing, in some other class, my good friend.

Pro. Most certainly.

Soc. Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in some other class than that of good?

Pro. Quite right.

Soc. Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him who first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no true being; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of pleasure being a good.

Pro. Assuredly.

Soc. And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation their highest end.

Pro. Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?

Soc. I am speaking of those who when they cure hunger or thirst or any other defect by some process of generation are as much delighted as if the generation were itself pleasure; and they say that they would not wish to live without these and the like feelings.

Pro. That is certainly what they appear to think.

Soc. And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite of generation ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and destruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were saying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible thought.

Pro. He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good, is involved in great absurdity, Socrates.

Soc. Great, indeed ; and there is yet another of them.

Pro. What is that ?

Soc. Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing good or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in the soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure ; and that courage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul, is not really a good ?—and is there not a further absurdity in our being compelled to say that he who has the feeling of pain and not of pleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be the best of men ; and again, that he who has the feeling of pleasure, at the time when he is pleased, and in as far as he is pleased, excels in virtue ?

Pro. Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this.

Soc. And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let us not appear to spare mind and knowledge : let us ring their metal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we have found out what in them is of the purest nature ; and then the truest elements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment.

Pro. Right.

Soc. Knowledge has two parts ; the one productive, and the other educational ?

Pro. True.

Soc. And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part more akin to knowledge, and the other less ; and may not the one part be regarded as the pure, and the other as the impure ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of them.

Pro. What are they and how do you separate them ?

Soc. I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing be taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much.

Pro. Not much, certainly.

Soc. The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the senses which is given by experience and exercise, in addition to a certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is perfected by attention and practice.

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Pro. Nothing more, assuredly.

Soc. Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism ; as is seen in the harmonising of sounds, not by rule, but by conjecture ; the music of the flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note, and is therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has very little certainty.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and husbandry and piloting and generalship.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. The art of the builder, on the other hand, which has a number of measures and instruments, attains from them a greater degree of accuracy than the other arts.

Pro. How is that ?

Soc. In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of the art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, plummet, level, and a most ingenious machine for straightening wood.

Pro. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into two kinds ; the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results, and those which, like carpentering, are more exact.

Pro. Let us make that division.

Soc. Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which I mentioned at first.

Pro. I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of weighing and measuring.

Soc. Certainly, Protarchus ; but are not these also distinguishable into two kinds ?

Pro. What are the two kinds ?

Soc. In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds ; one of which is popular, and the other philosophical.

Pro. How would you distinguish them?

Soc. There is a wide distinction between them, Protarchus; some arithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two oxen; the one a very large and the other a very small two. The party who are opposed to them insists that every unit in ten thousand must be the same as every other unit.

Pro. Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among the votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be two sorts of arithmetic.

Soc. And what of the arts of computation and mensuration
57 which are used in building and trading,—when we compare them with philosophical geometry and exact calculation, shall we say that they are one or two?

Pro. On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion that they were two.

Soc. Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?

Pro. I think so, but I should like to be told by you.

Soc. The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to pleasure, and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether one sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer than another.

Pro. Clearly; that was the intention.

Soc. And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown that the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degree of certainty?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And just now did not the argument first designate a particular art by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of art; and then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to enquire whether the art as pursued by philosophers, or as pursued by non-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity?

Pro. That is the question which the argument is at this moment asking.

Soc. And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquirer?

Pro. O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference of clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous.

Soc. Then the answer will be the easier.

Pro. Certainly ; and let us say in reply, that those arts into which arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others ; and that of these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic impulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth about measures and numbers.

Soc. Then this is your judgment ; and this is the answer which, upon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of misinterpretation ?

Pro. What answer ?

Soc. That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration ; and also several other arts which in like manner have this double nature, and yet only one name.

Pro. Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you speak, Socrates, and hope for good luck.

Soc. We have explained what we term the most exact arts or sciences ?

Pro. Very good.

Soc. And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us, if we do not acknowledge her to have the first place.

Pro. And what is dialectic ?

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Soc. Clearly the science which knows all that knowledge of which we are now speaking ; for I am sure that all men who have a grain of intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being and reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of all. And would you, Protarchus, say or decide otherwise ?

Pro. I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art of persuasion far surpassed every other ; this, as he says, is by far the best of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you or with him.

Soc. You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not ashamed ?

Pro. As you please.

Soc. May I not have led you into a misapprehension ?

Pro. How ?

Soc. Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best or usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and

accuracy, and the greatest degree of truth, however humble and little useful an art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the advantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you for saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this particular of absolute truth; as in the comparison of white colour, a little whiteness, if that little be only pure, was shown to be superior to a great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best attention and consider well, not the comparative use or estimation of the sciences, but the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul has of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth; let us search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then we shall be able to say whether the science of which I have been speaking is most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be some other which has higher claims.

Pro. Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that any other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this.

59 *Soc.* You mean to say that the arts in general and similar pursuits make use of opinion, and are laboriously engaged in the investigation of matters of opinion. Even he who supposes himself to be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this world, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of enquiry in which his life is spent?

Pro. True.

Soc. He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things which are changing, or will change, or have changed?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor have been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of truth ever become certain?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. How can there be any certainty about that which has no fixedness?

Pro. How indeed?

Soc. Then mind and science when employed about these changing things do not attain the highest truth?

Pro. I should imagine not.

Soc. And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or

me or Philebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point.

Pro. What point?

Soc. Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed, has to do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed, or if not, at any rate with that which is most akin to them; and that all other things are to be placed in a second or inferior class.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest to be given to the fairest things?

Pro. That is natural.

Soc. And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured most?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And these names may be said to have their truest and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And these were the names which I adduced as rivals of pleasure?

Pro. Very true.

Soc. In the next place, as to the task of mixing pleasure and wisdom, here are the ingredients or materials, and we may be compared to artists who have them ready to their hands?

Pro. Yes.

Soc. And now we must begin to mix them?

Pro. By all means.

Soc. But had we not better have a recapitulation and rehearsal first?

Pro. Of what?

Soc. Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb, that we ought to repeat not twice but thrice that which is good.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Well, then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I believe to be a fair summary of the argument.

Pro. Let me hear.

Soc. Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living

beings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief good of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly given to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins by denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are two, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and was not that what we were saying, Protarchus?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And is not and was not this a further point which was conceded between us—

Pro. What was the point?

Soc. That the good differs from all other things?

Pro. In what way?

Soc. In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and in all things, has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of anything else.

Pro. Exactly.

Soc. And did we not endeavour to make an ideal division of them into two distinct lives, so that pleasure was wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part whatever in pleasure?

Pro. We did.

Soc. And did we think that either of them alone would be sufficient?

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take up the enquiry again; and assuming memory and wisdom and knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him consider whether he would desire to possess or acquire, —I will not say pleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception that he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any recollection, however momentary, of the feeling,—but would he desire to have anything at all, if these were wanting to him? And about wisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would choose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than having a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom, rather than having a certain degree of wisdom?

Pro. Certainly not, Socrates ; but why repeat such questions any more ?

Soc. Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good cannot possibly be either of them ?

Pro. Impossible.

Soc. Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less accurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be duly assigned ?

Pro. Right.

Soc. Have we not found a road which leads towards the good ?

Pro. What road ?

Soc. Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover in what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the discovery of the man himself ?

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning that we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed ?

Pro. True.

Soc. There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in the life which is well mixed than in that which is not ?

Pro. Far greater.

Soc. Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering up a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who presides over the ceremony of mixing.

Pro. By all means.

Soc. Are not we the cup-bearers ? and here are two fountains which are flowing at our side : one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a fountain of honey ; the other, which is a sober draught in which no wine mingles, is of water temperate and healthful ; out of these we must seek to make the fairest of all possible mixtures.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Tell me first ;—should we be most likely to succeed if we mingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom ?

Pro. Perhaps we might.

Soc. But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can show a safer plan.

Pro. What is your plan?

Soc. One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and one art to be more certain than another.

Pro. Exactly.

Soc. There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; one science regarding only the transient and perishing, and the other the permanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when judged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, was truer than the former.

Pro. Very good and right.

Soc. If, then, we consider the sections of each which have the most of truth, and begin by mingling them, will not the union suffice to give us the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of another kind?

62 *Pro.* I think that you should do as you say.

Soc. Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason as well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other things.

Pro. Let that be supposed.

Soc. Will such an one have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with the divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and circles, and with a like ignorance uses these or any other figures or rules in the building of a house? ¹

Pro. The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is ridiculous in man.

Soc. What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the cup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false rule and the false circle?

Pro. Yes, that must be done, if any of us is ever to find his way home.

Soc. And must I include music, which, as I was saying just now, is full of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?

Pro. Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at all.

Soc. Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper

¹ Or, supplying *θεϊοῖς*, but uses only these, and other divine rules, &c.

who is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let knowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure and impure mingle?

Pro. I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of having them all, if only you have the first sort.

Soc. Well, then, shall I let them all flow, into what Homer poetically terms 'a meeting of the waters?'

Pro. By all means.

Soc. There—I have let them in, and now I must return to the fountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to mingle first of 'all the portions which had truth in them according to our original intention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the sciences flow out together before the pleasures.

Pro. Quite true.

Soc. And now the time has come for us to consider about the pleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them out all at once, or at first only the true ones.

Pro. Let out the true ones first; that will be far the safer course.

Soc. Let them out, then; and now, if there are any necessary pleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle them?

Pro. Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to mingle.

Soc. And as the knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be 63 innocent and useful always, may I say the same of the pleasures—if they are all of them always good and innocent for all of us, must not all of them mingle?

Pro. What shall we say and do about them?

Soc. Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure and wisdom themselves, and let them answer about one another.

Pro. How?

Soc. Tell us, O beloved—shall we call you pleasures or by some other name?—would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of opinion that they would certainly answer as follows:

Pro. How?

Soc. They would answer, as we said before, that for any class to be alone and in perfect solitude is not good, nor altogether

possible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with another and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of things in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be, of ourselves.

Pro. And our answer will be;—In that ye have spoken well.

Soc. Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and mind;—would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will reply:—What pleasures do you mean?

Pro. Likely enough.

Soc. And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have the greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition to the true ones? Why, Socrates, they will say, how can we? seeing that they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble the souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they prevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of our children when they do come to the birth, causing them to be forgotten and unheeded; but the other true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to be of our kindred, and the pleasures which accompany health and temperance, and are in a manner the handmaidens and inseparable attendants of virtue as of a god,—mingle these and not the others; there would be great want of sense
64 in any one who desires to see the fair and untroubled stream, and to find in the admixture what is the highest good in man and in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good—there would be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are always in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the cup: Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has made, both on her own behalf, as well as on that of memory and true opinion, to the question which has been asked of us?

Pro. Most certainly.

Soc. And still there must be something more added, which is a necessary ingredient in every mixture.

Pro. What is that?

Soc. Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist.

Pro. Certainly not.

Soc. Certainly not; and now you and Philebus must tell me

whether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of thinking the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an incorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.

Pro. I agree with you, Socrates.

Soc. And may we not say truly that we are now at the vestibule of the good, and of the habitation of the good?

Pro. I think that we are.

Soc. What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious, and which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved by all? When we have discovered, we will proceed to ask whether in the order of the universe this highest nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind?

Pro. Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge.

Soc. And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders any mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.

Pro. What do you mean?

Soc. Every man knows.

Pro. What?

Soc. He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and to the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a disorderly jumble disordering the possessor of it.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. And now the power of the good has retired into the region of the beautiful; for measure and symmetry everywhere pass into beauty and virtue.

Pro. True.

Soc. Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only, with three we may take our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the three, and these when united we may regard as the cause of the mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the admixture of them.

Pro. Quite right.

Soc. And now, Protarchus, every one may judge well enough

whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable among gods and men.

Pro. There is no doubt, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued to the end.

Soc. We must take each of them separately in their relation to pleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which of the two they are severally most akin.

Pro. You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?

Soc. Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after a consideration of all three, mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to yourself,—as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.

Pro. There is no need to pause, for the difference between them is palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and the proverb says that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest, perjury is excused by the gods; the pleasures are children, who have not yet attained any degree of reason; whereas mind is either the same as truth, or the most like truth, and the truest.

Soc. Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask whether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?

Pro. Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I imagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of pleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge.

Soc. Very good; but there still remains the third test: has mind a greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the fairer of the two?

Pro. Never, Socrates, were mind or wisdom seen or known to be in aught unseemly, waking or sleeping, at any time, past, present, or future.

Soc. Right.

Pro. But pleasures, and the greatest pleasures, when some
66 ridiculous or foul effect accompanies them, make us ashamed of the sight of them, and we put them out of sight, and consign them to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of day.

Soc. Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere by word

of mouth to this company, and will send messengers of the tidings far and wide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second, but that in measure, and the measured, and the suitable, and the like, the eternal nature has been found.

Pro. Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said.

Soc. In the second class is the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family.

Pro. True.

Soc. And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will not be far wrong, if I divine aright.

Pro. I dare say.

Soc. And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we were affirming to appertain specially to the soul—sciences and arts and true opinions as we called them; these come after the third class, and form the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than to pleasure.

Pro. Surely.

Soc. The fifth class are those which are defined by us painless pleasures, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed them, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses¹.

Pro. Perhaps.

Soc. And in the sixth generation, as Orpheus says,

‘Cease the glory of my song.’

Here, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to put the top on our discourse.

Pro. True.

Soc. Then, by way of a third libation to the saviour Zeus, let us sum up and reassert what has been said.

Pro. How?

Soc. Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the good.

Pro. I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you spoke, meant another recapitulation.

Soc. Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just been saying, and feeling indignant at the argument, which is

¹ Reading ἐπιστήμαις, τὰς δὲ according to Professor Campbell's emendation.

maintained, not by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind was far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than pleasure.

Pro. True.

Soc. But, suspecting that there were other things which were better still, I said also, that if there was anything better than either, then I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure would lose the second place as well as the first.

Pro. You did.

67 *Soc.* Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the insufficiency of both of them.

Pro. Very true.

Soc. The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good have been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both wanting in sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection.

Pro. Most true.

Soc. But, though they must both resign in favour of another, mind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the conqueror than pleasure.

Pro. Certainly.

Soc. And, according to the judgment which has now been given, pleasure will rank fifth.

Pro. True.

Soc. But not first ; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and animals in the world in their pursuit of enjoyment affirm this ; and the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds, determine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts of animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine philosophy.

Pro. And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you have been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.

Soc. And will you let me go ?

Pro. There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you of it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to weary¹ of an argument.

PARMENIDES.

INTRODUCTION.

THE awe with which Plato regarded the character of Parmenides has extended to the dialogue which he calls by his name. There is none of the writings of Plato which has been more copiously illustrated, both in ancient and modern times, and in none of them have the interpreters been more at variance with one another. Nor is this surprising. For the Parmenides is more fragmentary and isolated than any other dialogue, and the design of the writer is not expressly stated. The date is uncertain; the relation to the other writings of Plato is also uncertain; the connection between the two parts is at first sight extremely obscure; and in the latter of the two we are left in doubt as to whether Plato is speaking his own sentiments by the lips of Parmenides, and overthrowing him out of his own mouth, or whether he is propounding consequences which would have been admitted by Zeno and Parmenides themselves. The contradictions which follow from the hypotheses of the one and many have been regarded by some as transcendental mysteries; by others as a mere illustration, taken at random, of a new method. The criticism on his own doctrine of ideas has also been considered, not as a real criticism, but as an exuberance of the metaphysical imagination which enabled Plato to go beyond himself. To the latter part of the dialogue we may certainly apply the words in which he himself describes the earlier philosophers in the Sophist (243 A), 'that they went on their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not.'

The Parmenides in point of style is one of the best of the Platonic writings; the first portion of the dialogue is in no way defective in ease and grace and dramatic interest; nor in the second part, where there was no room for such qualities, is there any want of clearness or precision. Like the Protagoras, Phaedo, and others, it is a narrated dialogue, combining with the mere recital of the words spoken, the observations of the

reciter on the effect produced by them. Thus we are informed by him that Zeno and Parmenides were not altogether pleased at the request of Socrates that they would examine into the nature of the one and many in the sphere of ideas, although they received his suggestion with approving smiles. And we are glad to be told that Parmenides was 'aged but well-favoured,' and that Zeno was 'very good-looking'; also that Parmenides affected to decline the great argument, on which, as Zeno knew from experience, he was very willing to enter. The character of Antiphon, the half-brother of Plato, who had once been inclined to philosophy, but has now shown the hereditary disposition for horses, is very naturally described. He is the sole depositary of the famous dialogue; but, although he receives the strangers like a courteous gentleman, he is impatient of the trouble of reciting it. As they enter, he has been giving orders to a bridle-maker; by this slight touch Plato verifies the description of him. After a little persuasion he is induced to favour the Clazomenians, who come from a distance, with a rehearsal. Respecting the visit of Zeno and Parmenides to Athens, we may observe—first, that such a visit is consistent with dates, and may possibly have occurred; secondly, that Plato is very likely to have invented the meeting ('You, Socrates, can easily invent Egyptian tales or anything else'); thirdly, that no reliance can be placed on the circumstance as determining the date of Parmenides and Zeno.

Many interpreters have regarded the Parmenides as a 'reductio ad absurdum' of the Eleatic philosophy. But would Plato have been likely to place this in the mouth of the great Parmenides himself, who appeared to him, in Homeric language, to be 'venerable and awful,' and to have a 'most generous depth of mind'? It may be admitted that he has ascribed to an Eleatic stranger in the Sophist opinions which went beyond the doctrines of the Eleatics. But the Eleatic stranger expressly criticises the doctrines in which he had been brought up; he admits that he is going to 'lay hands on his father Parmenides.' Nothing of this kind is said of Zeno and Parmenides. How then, without a word of explanation, could Plato assign to them the refutation of their own tenets?

The conclusion at which we must arrive is that the Parmenides is not a refutation of the Eleatic philosophy. Nor would such an explanation afford any satisfactory connection of the first and second parts of the dialogue. And it is quite inconsistent with Plato's own relation to the Eleatics. For of all the pre-Socratic philosophers, he speaks of them

with the greatest respect. But he could hardly have passed upon them a more unmeaning slight than to ascribe to their great master tenets the reverse of those which he actually held.

Two preliminary remarks may be made. First, that whatever latitude we may allow to Plato in bringing together by a 'tour de force,' as in the *Phaedrus*, dissimilar themes, yet he always in some way seeks to find a connection for them. Many threads join together in one the love and dialectic of the *Phaedrus*. We cannot conceive that the great artist would place in juxtaposition two absolutely divided and incoherent subjects. And hence we are led to make a second remark: viz. that no explanation of the *Parmenides* can be satisfactory which does not indicate the connection of the first and second parts. To suppose that Plato would first go out of his way to make *Parmenides* attack the Platonic ideas, and then proceed to a similar but more fatal assault on his own doctrine of Being, appears to be the height of absurdity.

Perhaps there is no passage in Plato showing greater metaphysical power than that in which he assails his own theory of ideas. The arguments are nearly, if not quite, those of Aristotle; they are the objections which naturally occur to a modern student of philosophy. Many persons will be surprised to find Plato criticising the very conceptions which have been supposed in after ages to be peculiarly characteristic of him. How can he have placed himself so completely without them? How can he have ever persisted in them after seeing the fatal objections which might be urged against them? The consideration of this difficulty has led a recent critic (*Ueberweg*), who in general accepts the authorised canon of the Platonic writings, to condemn the *Parmenides* as spurious. The accidental want of external evidence, at first sight, seems to favour this opinion.

In answer, it might be sufficient to say, that no ancient writing of equal length and excellence is known to be spurious. Nor is the silence of Aristotle to be hastily assumed; there is at least a doubt whether his use of the same arguments does not involve the inference that he knew the work. And, if the *Parmenides* is spurious, like *Ueberweg* we are led on further than we originally intended, to pass a similar condemnation on the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, and therefore on the *Politicus* (cp. *Theaet.* 183 E, *Soph.* 217). But the objection is in reality fanciful, and rests on the assumption that the doctrine of the ideas was held by Plato throughout his life in the same form. For the truth is, that the Platonic ideas were in constant process of growth and trans-

mutation; sometimes veiled in poetry and mythology, then again emerging as abstract ideas, in some passages regarded as absolute and eternal, and in others as relative to the human mind, existing in and derived from external objects as well as transcending them. The *anamnesis* of the ideas is chiefly insisted upon in the mythical portions of the dialogues, and really occupies a very small space in the entire works of Plato. Their transcendental existence is not asserted, and is therefore implicitly denied in the Republic and Philebus; and they are mentioned in the Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Laws, much as Universals would be spoken of in modern books. Indeed, there are very faint traces of the transcendental doctrine of ideas, that is, of their existence apart from the mind, in any of Plato's writings, with the exception of the Meno, the Phaedrus, and the Phaedo. The stereotyped form which Aristotle has given to them is not found in Plato.

The full discussion of this subject involves a comprehensive survey of the philosophy of Plato, which would be out of place here. But, without digressing further from the immediate subject of the Parmenides, we may remark that Plato is quite serious in his objections to his own doctrines; this is proved by the circumstance that they are not answered by Socrates. The perplexities which surround the one and many in the sphere of the ideas are also alluded to in the Philebus, and no answer is given to them. Nor have they ever been answered, nor can they be answered by any one else who separates the phenomenal from the real. To suppose that Plato, at a later period of his life, reached a point of view from which he was able to answer them, is a mere groundless assumption. The real progress of Plato's own mind has been partly concealed from us by the dogmatic statements of Aristotle, and also by the degeneracy of his own followers, with whom a doctrine of numbers quickly superseded ideas.

As a preparation for answering some of the difficulties which have been suggested, we may begin by sketching the first portion of the dialogue:—

Cephalus, of Clazomenae in Ionia, the birthplace of Anaxagoras, a citizen of no mean city in the history of philosophy, who is the narrator of the dialogue, describes himself as meeting Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora at Athens. 'Welcome, Cephalus: can we do anything for you in Athens?' 'Why, yes: I came to ask a favour of you. First, tell me your half-brother's name, which I have forgotten—he was a mere child when I was last here; I know his father's, which is Pyrilampes.' 'Yes,

and the name of our brother, Antiphon. But why do you ask?' 'On behalf of some countrymen of mine, who are lovers of philosophy; they have heard that Antiphon remembers a conversation of Socrates with Parmenides and Zeno, of which the report came to him from Pythodorus, Zeno's friend.' 'That is quite true.' 'And can we hear the dialogue?' 'Nothing easier; in the days of his youth he made a careful study of the piece; at present, his thoughts have another direction: he takes after his grandfather, and has given up philosophy for horses.'

'We went to look for him, and found him giving instructions to a worker in brass about a bridle. When he had done with him, and had learned from his brother the purpose of our visit, he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered of old, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first, he complained of the trouble, but he soon consented. He told us that Pythodorus described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they had come to Athens at the great Panathenaea, the former being at the time about sixty-five years old, aged but well-favoured—Zeno, who was said to have been beloved of Parmenides in the days of his youth, about forty, and very good-looking:—that they lodged with Pythodorus at the Ceramicus outside the wall, whither Socrates, who was at that time a very young man, came to see them: Zeno was reading one of his theses, which he had nearly finished, when Pythodorus entered with Parmenides and Aristoteles, who was afterwards one of the Thirty—(Pythodorus himself had heard them before)—and Socrates was requesting that the first thesis of the treatise might be read again.'

'You mean, Zeno,' said Socrates, 'to argue that the many, if they exist, must be both like and unlike, which is a contradiction; and each division of your argument is intended to elicit a similar absurdity, which may be supposed to follow from the assumption of the existence of the many.' 'That is my meaning.' 'I see,' said Socrates, turning to Parmenides, 'that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; you prove admirably that the all is one: he gives proofs no less convincing that the many are nought. To deceive the world by saying the same thing in entirely different forms, is a strain of art beyond most of us.' 'Yes, Socrates,' said Zeno; 'but though you are as keen as a Spartan hound, you do not quite catch the motive of the piece, which was only intended to protect Parmenides against ridicule by showing that the hypothesis of the existence of the many involved greater absurdities than the hypothesis

of the one. The book was a youthful composition of mine, which was stolen from me, and therefore I had no choice about the publication.' 'I quite believe you,' said Socrates; 'but will you answer me a question? I should like to know, whether you would assume an idea of likeness in the abstract, which is the contradictory of unlikeness in the abstract, by participation in either or both of which, things are like or unlike or partly both. For the same things may very well partake of like and unlike in the concrete, though like and unlike in the abstract are irreconcilable. Nor does there appear to me to be any absurdity in maintaining that the same things may partake of the one and many, though I should be indeed surprised to hear that the absolute one is also many. For example, I, being many, that is to say, having many parts or members, am yet also one, and partake of the one, being one of seven who are here present. (Cp. *Philebus* 14, 15.) This is not an absurdity, but a truism. But I should be amazed if there were a similar entanglement in the nature of the ideas themselves, nor can I believe that one and many, like and unlike, rest and motion, in the abstract, are capable either of admixture or of separation.

Pythodorus said that in his opinion Parmenides and Zeno were not very well pleased at the questions which were raised; nevertheless, they looked at one another and smiled in seeming delight and admiration of Socrates. 'Tell me,' said Parmenides, 'was this your own distinction between the abstract ideas of likeness, unity, and the rest, and the individuals which partake of the ideas?' 'I think that there are such ideas.' 'And would you make abstract ideas of the just, the beautiful, the good?' 'Yes,' he said. 'And of human beings like ourselves, of water, fire, and the like?' 'I am not certain.' 'And would you be undecided also about ideas of which the mention will, perhaps, appear laughable: of hair, mud, filth, and other things which are base and vile?' 'No, Parmenides; visible things like these are, as I believe, only what they appear to be: though I am sometimes disposed to imagine that there is nothing without an idea; but I repress any such notion, from a fear of falling into an abyss of nonsense.' 'You are young, Socrates, and therefore naturally regard the opinions of men; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer hold of you, and you will not despise even the meanest things. But tell me, is your meaning that things become like by partaking of likeness, great by partaking of greatness, just and beautiful by partaking of justice and beauty, and so

of other ideas?' 'Yes, that is my meaning.' 'And do you suppose the individual to partake of the whole, or of the part?' 'Why not in the whole?' said Socrates. 'Because,' said Parmenides, 'in that case the whole, which is one, will become many.' 'Nay,' said Socrates, 'the whole may be like the day, which is one and in many places: in this way the ideas may be one and also many.' 'In the same sort of way,' said Parmenides, 'as a sail, which is one, may be a cover to many—that is your meaning?' 'Yes.' 'And would you say that each man is covered by the whole sail, or by a part only?' 'By a part.' 'Then the ideas have parts, and the objects partake of a part of them only?' 'That seems to follow.' 'And would you like to say that the ideas are really divisible and yet remain one?' 'Certainly not.' 'Would you venture to affirm that great objects have a portion of greatness transferred to them; or that small or equal objects become small or equal by the addition of a portion of smallness or equality which is greater than the portion which they originally have?' 'Impossible.' 'But in what other way can individuals participate in ideas, except those mentioned?' 'That is not an easy question to answer.' 'Is not the way in which you are led to conceive ideas as follows: you see great objects pervaded by a common form or idea of greatness, which you abstract?' 'That is quite true.' 'And supposing you add the idea of greatness thus gained to the class of great objects, a further idea of greatness arises, which makes both great; and this may go on to infinity.' Socrates replies that the ideas may be thoughts in the mind only; in this case, the consequence would no longer follow. But must not the thought be of something which is the same in all and is the idea? 'But if the world partakes in the ideas, and the ideas are thoughts, must not all things think? Or can thought be without thought?' 'I acknowledge the unmeaningness of this,' says Socrates, 'and would rather have recourse to the explanation that the ideas are types in nature, and that other things partake of them by becoming like them.' 'But to become like them is to be comprehended in the same idea; and the likeness of the idea and the individuals implies another idea of likeness, and another without end.' 'Quite true.' 'The theory, then, of participation by likeness has to be given up. You have hardly yet, Socrates, found out the real difficulty of maintaining abstract ideas.' 'What difficulty?' 'The greatest of all perhaps is this: an opponent will argue that the ideas are not within the range of human knowledge and you cannot disprove the assertion without a long and

laborious demonstration, which he may be unable or unwilling to follow. In the first place, neither you nor any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas will affirm that they are subjective.' 'That would be a contradiction.' 'True; and therefore any relation in these ideas is a relation which concerns themselves only; and the objects which are named after them, are relative to one another only, and have nothing to do with the ideas themselves.' 'How do you mean?' said Socrates. 'I may illustrate my meaning in this way: one of us has a slave; and the idea of a slave in the abstract is relative to the idea of a master in the abstract; this correspondence of ideas, however, has nothing to do with the particular relation of our slave to us.—Do you see my meaning?' 'Perfectly.' 'And absolute knowledge in the same way corresponds to absolute truth and being, and particular knowledge to particular truth and being.' 'Clearly.' 'And there is a subjective knowledge which is of subjective truth, having many kinds, general and particular. But the ideas themselves are not subjective, and therefore are not within our ken.' 'They are not.' 'Then the beautiful and the good in their own nature are unknown to us?' 'It would seem so.' 'There is a worse consequence yet.' 'What is that?' 'I think we must admit that absolute knowledge is the most exact knowledge, which we must therefore attribute to God. But then see what follows: God, having this exact knowledge, can have no knowledge of human things, as we have divided the two spheres, and forbidden any passing from one to the other:—the gods have knowledge and authority in their world only, as we have in ours. Yet, surely, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.—These are some of the difficulties which are involved in the assumption of absolute ideas; the learner will find them nearly impossible to understand, and the teacher who has to impart them will require superhuman ability; there will always be a suspicion, either that they have no existence, or are beyond human knowledge.' 'I agree in that,' said Socrates. 'Yet if these difficulties induce you to give up universal ideas, what becomes of the mind? and where are the reasoning and reflecting powers? philosophy is at an end.' 'I certainly do not see my way.' 'I think,' said Parmenides, 'that this arises out of your attempting to define abstractions, such as the good and the beautiful and the just, before you have had sufficient previous training; I noticed your deficiency when you were talking with Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. Your enthusiasm is a wonderful gift; but I fear that unless you discipline

enthusiasm is a wonderful gift; but I fear that unless you discipline yourself by dialectic while you are young, truth will elude your grasp.' 'And what kind of discipline would you recommend?' 'The training which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I admire your saying to him that you did not care to consider the difficulty in reference to visible objects, but only in relation to ideas.' 'Yes; because I think that in visible objects you may easily show any number of inconsistent consequences.' 'Yes; and you should consider, not only the consequences which follow from a given hypothesis, but the consequences also which follow from the denial of the hypothesis. For example, what follows from the assumption of the existence of the many, and the counter-argument of what follows from the denial of the existence of the many: and similarly of likeness and unlikeness, motion, rest, generation, corruption, being and not being. And the consequences must include consequences to the things supposed and to other things, in themselves and in relation to one another, to individuals whom you select, to the many, and to the all; these must be drawn out both on the affirmative and on the negative hypothesis,—that is, if you are to train yourself perfectly to the intelligence of the truth.' 'What you are suggesting seems to be a tremendous process, and one of which I do not quite understand the nature,' said Socrates; 'will you give me an example?' 'You must not impose such a task on a man of my years,' said Parmenides. 'Then will you, Zeno?' 'Let us rather,' said Zeno, with a smile, 'ask Parmenides, for the undertaking is a serious one, as he truly says; nor could I urge him to make the attempt, except in a select audience, who will understand him.' The whole party joined in the request.

Here we have, first of all, an unmistakable attack made by the youthful Socrates on the paradoxes of Zeno. He perfectly understands their drift, and Zeno himself is supposed to admit this. But they appear to him, as he says in the *Philebus* also, to be rather truisms than paradoxes. For every one must acknowledge the obvious fact, that the body being one has many members, and that, in a thousand ways, the like partakes of the unlike, the many of the one. The real difficulty begins with the relations of ideas in themselves, whether of the one and many, or of any other ideas, to one another and to the mind. But this was a problem which the Eleatic philosophers had never considered; their thoughts had not gone beyond the contradictions of matter, motion, space, and the like.

It was no wonder that Parmenides and Zeno should hear the novel speculations of Socrates with mixed feelings of admiration and displeasure. He was going out of the received circle of disputation into a region in which they could hardly follow him. From the rude idea of being in the abstract, he was about to proceed to universals or general notions. There is no contradiction in material things partaking of the ideas of one and many; neither is there any contradiction in the ideas of one and many, like and unlike, in themselves. But the contradiction arises when we attempt to conceive ideas in their connection, or to ascertain their relation to phenomena. Still he affirms the existence of such ideas; and this is the position which is now in turn submitted to the criticisms of Parmenides.

To appreciate truly the character of these criticisms, we must remember the place held by Parmenides in the history of Greek philosophy. He is the founder of idealism, and also of dialectic, or, in modern phraseology, of metaphysics and logic. Like Plato, he is struggling after something wider and deeper than satisfied the contemporary Pythagoreans. And Plato with a true instinct recognises him as his spiritual father, whom he 'revered and honoured more than all other philosophers together.' He may be supposed to have thought more than he said, or was able to express. And, although he could not, as a matter of fact, have criticised the ideas of Plato without an anachronism, the criticism is appropriately placed in the mouth of the founder of the ideal philosophy.

There was probably a time in the life of Plato when the ethical teaching of Socrates came into conflict with the metaphysical theories of the earlier philosophers, and he sought to supplement the one by the other. The older philosophers were great and awful; and they had the charm of antiquity. Something which found a response in his own mind seemed to have been lost as well as gained in the Socratic dialectic. He felt no incongruity in the veteran Parmenides correcting the youthful Socrates. Two points in his criticism are especially deserving of notice. First of all, Parmenides tries him by the test of consistency. Socrates is willing to assume ideas or principles of the just, the beautiful, the good, and to extend them to man (cp. *Phaedo* 98); but he is reluctant to admit that there are general ideas of hair, mud, filth, etc. There is an ethical universal or idea, but is there also a universal of physics? of the meanest

things in the world as well as of the greatest? Parmenides rebukes this want of consistency in Socrates, which he attributes to his youth. As he grows older, philosophy will take a firmer hold of him, and then he will despise neither great things nor small, and he will think less of the opinions of mankind. (Cp. *Soph.* 227 A.) Here is lightly touched one of the most familiar principles of modern philosophy, that in the meanest operations of nature, as well as in the noblest, in mud and filth, as well as in the sun and stars, great truths are contained. At the same time, we may note also the transition in the mind of Plato, to which Aristotle alludes (*Met.* 1. 6, 2), when, as he says, he transferred the Socratic universal of ethics to the whole of nature.

The other criticism of Parmenides on Socrates attributes to him a want of practice in dialectic. He has observed this deficiency in him when talking to Aristoteles on a previous occasion. Plato seems to imply that there was something more in the dialectic of Zeno than in the mere interrogation of Socrates. Here, again, he may perhaps be describing the process which his own mind went through when he first became more intimately acquainted, whether at Megara or elsewhere, with the Eleatic and Megarian philosophers. Still, Parmenides does not deny to Socrates the credit of having gone beyond them in seeking to apply the paradoxes of Zeno to ideas; and this is the application which he himself makes of them in the latter part of the dialogue. He then proceeds to explain to him the sort of mental gymnastic which he should practise. He should consider not only what would follow from a given hypothesis, but what would follow from the denial of it, to that which is the subject of the hypothesis, and to all other things. There is no trace in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon of any such method being attributed to Socrates; nor is the dialectic here spoken of that 'favourite method' of proceeding by regular divisions, which is described in the *Phaedrus* and *Philebus*, and of which examples are given in the *Politicus* and in the *Sophist*. It is expressly spoken of (p. 135 E) as the method which Socrates had heard Zeno practise in the days of his youth. (Cp. *Soph.* 217 C.)

The discussion of Socrates with Parmenides is one of the most remarkable passages in Plato. Few writers have ever been able to anticipate 'the criticism of the morrow' on their own favourite notions. But Plato may here be said to anticipate the judgment not only of the morrow, but of all after ages on the Platonic ideas. For in some

points he touches questions which have not yet received their solution in modern philosophy.

The first difficulty which Parmenides raises respecting the Platonic ideas relates to the manner in which individuals are connected with them. Do they participate in the ideas, or do they merely resemble them? Parmenides shows that objections may be urged against either of these modes of conceiving the connection. Things are little by partaking of littleness, great by partaking of greatness, and the like. But they cannot partake of a part of greatness, for that will not make them great, &c.; nor can each object monopolise the whole. The only answer to this is, that 'partaking' is a figure of speech, really corresponding to the processes which a later logic designates by the terms 'abstraction' and 'generalization.' When we have described accurately the methods or forms which the mind employs, we cannot further criticise them; at least we can only criticise them with reference to their fitness as instruments of thought to express facts.

Socrates attempts to support his view of the ideas by the parallel of the day, which is one and in many places; but he is easily driven from this by a counter illustration of Parmenides, who compares the idea of greatness to a sail. He truly explains to Socrates that he has attained the conception of ideas by a process of generalization. At the same time, he points out a difficulty, which appears to be involved—viz. that the process of generalization will go on to infinity. Socrates meets the supposed difficulty by a flash of light, which is indeed the true answer 'that the ideas are in our minds only.' Neither realism is the truth, nor nominalism is the truth, but conceptualism; and conceptualism or any other psychological theory falls very far short of the infinite subtlety of language and thought.

But the realism of ancient philosophy will not admit of this answer, which is vigorously repelled by Parmenides with another half truth of later philosophy, 'Every subject or subjective must have an object.' Here is the great though unconscious truth (shall we say?) or error, which underlay the early Greek philosophy. 'Ideas must have a real existence;' they are not mere forms or opinions, which may be changed arbitrarily by individuals. But the early Greek philosopher never clearly saw that true ideas were only universal facts, and that there might be error in universals as well as in particulars.

Socrates makes one more attempt to defend the Platonic ideas by

representing them as paradigms; this is again answered by the 'argumentum ad infinitum.' We may remark, in passing, that the process which is thus described has no real existence. The mind, after having obtained a general idea, does not really go on to form another which includes that, and all the individuals contained under it, and another and another without end. The difficulty belongs in fact to the Megarian age of philosophy, and is due to their illogical logic, and to the general ignorance of the ancients respecting the part played by language in the process of thought. No such perplexity could ever trouble a modern metaphysician, any more than the fallacy of 'calvus' or 'acervus,' or of 'Achilles and the tortoise.' These 'surds' of metaphysics ought to occasion no more difficulty in speculation than a perpetually recurring fraction in arithmetic.

It is otherwise with the objection which follows: How are we to bridge the chasm between phenomena and ontia, between gods and men? This is the difficulty of philosophy in all ages: How can we get beyond the circle of our own ideas, or how, remaining within them, can we have any criterion of a truth beyond and independent of them? Parmenides draws out this difficulty with great clearness. According to him, there are not only one but two chasms: the first, between individuals and the ideas which have a common name; the second, between the ideas in us and the ideas absolute. The first of these two difficulties mankind, as we may say, a little parodying the language of the Philebus, have long agreed to treat as obsolete; the second remains a difficulty for us as well as for the Greeks of the fourth century before Christ, and is the stumblingblock of Kant's critic, and of the Hamiltonian adaptation of Kant, as well as of the Platonic ideas. It has been said that 'you cannot criticise Revelation.' 'Then how do you know what is Revelation, or that there is one at all,' is the immediate rejoinder,—'You know nothing of things in themselves.' 'Then how do you know that there are things in themselves?' In some respects, the difficulty pressed harder upon the Greek than upon ourselves. For conceiving of God more under the attribute of knowledge than we do, he was more under the necessity of separating the divine from the human, as two spheres which had no communication with one another.

It is remarkable that Plato, speaking by the mouth of Parmenides, does not treat even this second class of difficulties as hopeless or

insoluble. He says only that they cannot be explained without a long and laborious demonstration: 'the teacher will require superhuman ability, and the learner will be hard of understanding.' But an attempt must be made to find an answer to them; for, as Socrates and Parmenides both admit, the denial of abstract ideas is the destruction of the mind. We can easily imagine that among the Greek schools of philosophy in the fourth century before Christ a panic might arise from the denial of universals, similar to that which arose in the last century from Hume's denial of our ideas of cause and effect. Men do not at first recognise that thought, like digestion, will go on much the same, notwithstanding any theories which may be entertained respecting the nature of the process. Parmenides attributes the difficulties in which Socrates is involved to a want of comprehensiveness in his mode of reasoning; he should consider every question on the negative as well as the positive hypothesis, with reference to the consequences which flow from the denial as well as from the assertion of a given statement.

The argument which follows is one of the most singular in Plato. It appears to be an imitation, or parody, of the Zenonian dialectic, just as the speeches in the Phaedrus are an imitation of the style of Lysias, or as the derivations in the Cratylus, or the fallacies of the Euthydemus are a parody of some contemporary Sophist. The interlocutor is not supposed, as in most of the other Platonic dialogues, to take a living part in the argument; he is only required to say 'Yes' and 'No' in the right places. A hint has been already given that the paradoxes of Zeno admitted of a higher application (p. 129, 135 E). This hint is the thread by which Plato connects the two parts of the dialogue.

The paradoxes of Parmenides seem trivial to us, because the words to which they relate have become trivial; their true nature as abstract terms is perfectly understood by us, and we are inclined to regard the treatment of them in Plato as a mere straw-splitting, or legerdemain of words. Yet there was a power in them which fascinated the Neoplatonists for centuries afterwards. Something that they found in them, or brought to them—some echo or anticipation of a great truth or error, exercised a wonderful influence over their minds. To do the Parmenides justice, we should imagine similar ἀπορία raised on themes as sacred to us, as the notions of one or being were to

an ancient Eleatic. 'If God is, what follows? if God is not, what follows?' Or again: If God is or is not the world; or if God is or is not many, or has or has not parts, or is or is not in the world, or in time; or is or is not finite or infinite. Or if the world is or is not; or has or has not a beginning or end; or is or is not infinite, or infinitely divisible. Or again: if God is or is not identical with his laws; or if man is or is not identical with the laws of nature. We can easily see that here are many subjects for thought, and that from these and similar hypotheses questions of great interest might arise. And we also remark, that the conclusions derived from either of the two alternative propositions might be equally impossible and contradictory.

When we ask what is the object of these paradoxes, some have answered that they are a mere logical puzzle, while others have seen in them an Hegelian propaedeutic of the doctrine of ideas. The first of these views derives support from the manner in which Parmenides speaks of a similar method being applied to all ideas. Yet it is hard to suppose that Plato would have furnished so elaborate an example, not of his own but of the Eleatic dialectic, had he intended only to give an illustration of method. The second view has been often overstated by those who, like Hegel himself, have tended to confuse ancient with modern philosophy. We need not deny that Plato, trained in the school of Cratylus and Heracleitus, may have seen that a contradiction in terms is sometimes the best expression of a truth higher than either (Soph. 255 ff). But his ideal theory is not based on antinomies. The correlation of ideas was the metaphysical difficulty of the age in which he lived; and the Megarian and Cynic philosophy was a 'reductio ad absurdum' of their isolation. To restore them to their natural connection, and to detect the negative element in them is the aim of Plato in the Sophist. But his view of their connection falls very far short of the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being. The Being and Not-being of Plato never merge in each other, though he is aware that 'determination is only negation.'

After criticising the hypotheses of others, it may appear presumptuous to add another guess to the many which have been already offered. May we say, in Platonic language, that we still seem to see vestiges of a track which has not yet been taken? It is quite possible that the obscurity of the Parmenides would not have existed to a contemporary

student of philosophy, and, like the similar difficulty in the *Philebus*, is really due to our ignorance of the philosophy of the age. There is an obscure Megarian influence on Plato which cannot wholly be cleared up, and is not much illustrated by the doubtful tradition of his retirement to Megara after the death of Socrates. For Megara was within a walk of Athens (*Phaedr.* 227 E), and Plato might have learned the Megarian doctrines without settling there.

We may begin by remarking that the theses of Parmenides are expressly said to follow the method of Zeno, and that the complex dilemma, though declared to be capable of universal application, is applied in this instance to Zeno's familiar question of the 'one and many.' Here, then, is a double indication of the connection of the Parmenides with the Eristic school. The old Eleatics had asserted the existence of Being, which they at first regarded as finite, then as infinite, then as neither finite nor infinite, to which some of them had given what Aristotle calls 'a form,' others had ascribed a material nature only. The tendency of their philosophy was to deny to Being all predicates. The Megarians, who succeeded them, like the Cynics, affirmed that no predicate could be asserted of any subject; they also converted the idea of Being into that of Good, perhaps with the view of preserving a sort of neutrality or indifference between the mind and things. As if they had said, in the language of modern philosophy: 'Being is not only neither finite nor infinite, neither at rest nor in motion, but neither subjective nor objective.'

This is the track along which Plato is leading us. Zeno had attempted to prove the existence of the one by disproving the existence of the many, and Parmenides seems to aim at proving the existence of the subject by showing the contradictions which follow from the assertion of any predicates. Take the simplest of all notions, 'unity'; you cannot even assert being or time of this without involving a contradiction. But is the contradiction also the final conclusion? Probably no more than of Zeno's denial of the many, or of Parmenides' assault upon the Ideas; no more than of the earlier dialogues 'of search.' To us there seems to be no residuum of this long piece of dialectics. But to the mind of Parmenides and Plato, 'Gott-betrunkene menschen,' there still remained the idea of 'being' or 'good,' which could not be conceived, defined, uttered, but could not be got rid of. Neither of them would have imagined that their disputation ever touched the Divine Being.

(Cp. Phil. 22 C.) The same difficulties about Unity and Being are raised in the Sophist (250 ff); but there only as preliminary to their final solution.

If this view is correct, the real aim of the hypotheses of Parmenides is to criticise the earlier Eleatic philosophy from the point of view of Zeno or the Megarians. It is the same kind of criticism which Plato has extended to his own doctrine of ideas. Nor is there anything inconsistent in attributing to the 'father Parmenides' the last review of the Eleatic doctrines. The latest phases of all philosophies were fathered upon the founder of the school.

Other critics have regarded the final conclusion of the Parmenides either as sceptical or as Heraclitean. In the first case, they assume that Plato means to show the impossibility of any truth. But this is not the spirit of Plato, and could not with propriety be put into the mouth of Parmenides, who, in this very dialogue, is urging Socrates, not to doubt everything, but to discipline his mind with a view to the more precise attainment of truth. The same remark applies to the second of the two theories. Plato everywhere ridicules (perhaps unfairly) his Heraclitean contemporaries: and if he had intended to support an Heraclitean thesis, would hardly have chosen Parmenides, the condemner of the 'undiscerning tribe who say that things both are and are not,' to be the speaker. Nor, thirdly, can we easily persuade ourselves with Zeller that by the 'one' he means the idea; and that he is seeking to prove indirectly the unity of the idea in the multiplicity of phenomena.

We may now endeavour to thread the mazes of the labyrinth which Parmenides knew so well, and trembled at the thought of them.

The argument has two divisions: There is the hypothesis that

i. One is.

ii. One is not.

If one is, it is nothing.

If one is not, it is everything.

But is and is not may be taken in two senses:

Either one is one,

Or, one has being,

from which opposite consequences are deduced,

i. a. If one is one, it is nothing (137 C—142 B).

i. b. If one has being, it is all things (142 B—157 B).

To which are appended two subordinate consequences :

- i. aa. If one has being, all other things are (157 B—159 B).
- i. bb. If one is one, all other things are not (159 B—160 B).

The same distinction is then applied to the negative hypothesis :

- ii. a. If one is not one, it is all things (160 B—163 B).
- ii. b. If one has not being, it is nothing (163 B—164 B).

Involving two parallel consequences respecting the other or remainder :

- ii. aa. If one is not one, other things are all (164 B—165 E).
- ii. bb. If one has not being, other things are not (165 E to the end).

‘I cannot refuse,’ said Parmenides, ‘since, as Zeno remarks, we are alone, though I may say with Ibycus, who in his old age fell in love, I, like the old racehorse, tremble at the prospect of the course which I am to run, and which I know so well. But as I must attempt this laborious game, what shall be the subject? Suppose I take my own hypothesis of the one.’ ‘By all means,’ said Zeno. ‘And who will answer me? Shall I propose the youngest? he will be the most likely to say what he thinks, and his answers will give me time to breathe.’ ‘I am the youngest,’ said Aristoteles, ‘and at your service; proceed with your questions.’—The result may be summed up as follows :

i. a. One is not many, and therefore has no parts, and therefore is not a whole, which is a sum of parts, and therefore has neither beginning, middle, nor end, and is therefore unlimited, and therefore neither round nor straight, because the round has a centre and circumference, and in the straight there is a middle which is between the extremes; and therefore is not in place, whether in another which would encircle and touch the one at many points and in many parts; or in itself, because that which is self-containing is also contained, and therefore not one but two. This being premised, let us consider whether one is capable either of motion or rest. Motion is either change of substance, or motion on an axis, or from one place to another. But the one is incapable of change of substance, which implies change from one to another, or of motion on an axis, because the axis has parts around the axis; and any other motion involves change of place. But existence in place has been already shown to be impossible; and yet more impossible is coming into being, which implies partial existence

in two places at once, or entire existence neither within nor without the same; and how can this be? And more impossible still is the coming into being either as a whole or parts of that which is neither a whole nor parts. The one, then, is incapable of motion. But neither can the one be in anything, and therefore not in the same, whether itself or some other, and is therefore incapable of rest. Neither is one the same with itself or any other, or other of itself or any other. For if other of itself, then other of one, and therefore no longer one; and, if the same with other, it would be other, and other of one. Neither can one while remaining one be other of other; for other, and not one, is the other of other. But if not other by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of itself, not itself other, and if not itself other, not the other of anything. Neither will one be the same with itself. For the nature of the same is not that of the one, but a thing which becomes the same with anything does not necessarily become one; for example, that which becomes the same with the many becomes many and not one. And therefore if the one is the same with itself, the one is not one with itself; and therefore one and not one. And therefore one is neither other of other, nor the same with itself. Neither will the one be like or unlike itself or other; for likeness is sameness of affections, and the one and the same are different. And one having any affection which is other than the one would be more than one. The one, then, cannot be like, or have the same affection with, itself or other; nor can the one have any other affection, that is, be unlike itself or any other, for that would involve more than one. The one, then, is neither like nor unlike itself or other. This being the case, neither can the one be equal or unequal to itself or other. For equality implies sameness of measure, as inequality implies a greater or less number or size of measures. But the one, not having sameness, cannot have sameness of measure; nor a greater or less number of measures, for that would imply parts and multitude. Once more, can one be older or younger than itself? or of the same age with itself? That would imply likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference. Therefore one cannot be in time, because that which is in time is ever becoming older and younger than itself, (for older and younger are relative terms, and he who becomes older becomes younger,) and is also of the same age with itself. None of which, or any other expressions of time, whether

past, future, or present, can be affirmed of one. One neither is, has been, nor will be, nor becomes, nor has, nor will become. And, as these are the only modes of being, one is not, and is not one. But to that which is not, there is no attribute or relation, neither name nor word nor idea nor science nor perception nor opinion appertaining. One, then, is neither named, nor uttered, nor known, nor perceived, nor imagined. But can all this be true? 'I think not.'

i. b. Let us, however, commence the inquiry again. Assume that one is, and what new train of consequences will follow? If one is, one partakes of being, which is, and is not the same with one; the words 'being' and 'one' have different meanings. Observe the consequence: In the one of being or the being of one are two parts, being and one, which form one whole. And each of the two parts is also a whole, and involves the other, and may be further subdivided into one and being, and is therefore not one but two; and thus one is never one, and the one being in this way becomes many and infinite. Again, let us conceive of a one which by an effort of abstraction we separate from being: will this abstract one be one or many? You say one only; let us see. In the first place, the being of one is other of one; and one and being, if separate, mutually exclude each other: and the very term 'each other' implies that both partake of the nature of other, which is therefore neither one nor being; and whether we take being and other, or being and one, or one and other, in any case we have two things which separately are called either, and together both. And both are two and either of two is severally one, and if one be added to any of the pairs, the sum is three;—as two they are even, as three they are odd; and being two units they exist twice, and therefore are twice two; and being three units, they exist thrice, and therefore are thrice three, and taken together they are twice three and thrice two: they are even numbers multiplied into even, and odd into even, and even into odd numbers; But if one is, and both odd and even numbers are included in one, must not every number exist? And number is infinite, and therefore existence must be infinite, for every number partakes of being, and every fraction of every number partakes of being; therefore being has the greatest number of parts, and every part, however great or however small, is equally one. But can one be in many places and yet be a whole? If not a whole it must be divided into parts and represented by a number corresponding

to the number of the parts. And if so, we were wrong in saying that being has the greatest number of parts; for being is coequal and coextensive with one, and has no more parts than one; and the one broken up into parts by being is many and infinite. But the parts are parts of a whole, and the whole is a limit, and the one is therefore limited as well as infinite; and that which is a whole has beginning, middle, and end, and a middle is equidistant from the extremes; and one is therefore of a certain round or straight figure, which being a whole includes all the parts which are the whole, and is therefore self-contained. But then, again, the whole is not in the parts, whether all or some. Not in all, because, if in all, also in one; for, if wanting in any one, how in all?—not in some, because the greater would then be contained in the less. But if not in all, nor in any, nor in some, either nowhere or in other. And if nowhere, nothing; therefore in other. The one as a whole, then, is in another, but regarded as a sum of parts is in itself; and is, therefore, both in itself and in another. This being the case, the one is at once both at rest and in motion: at rest, because resting in itself; in motion, because it is ever in other. And if there is truth in what has preceded, one is the same and not the same with itself and all other. For everything in relation to every other thing is either the same with it or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of part to a whole or whole to a part. But one cannot be a part or whole in relation to one, nor other than one; and is therefore the same with one. Yet this sameness is again contradicted by one being in another place from itself which is in the same place; this follows from one being in itself and in another; one, therefore, is other than itself. But if anything is other of anything, will it not be other of other? And the not one is other of the one, and the one of the not one; therefore one is other of all others. But the same and the other exclude one another, and therefore the other can never be in the same; nor can the other be in anything for ever so short a time, as for that time the other will be in the same. And the other, if never in the same, cannot be either in the one or the not one. And one is not other than not one, either by reason of other or of itself; and therefore they are not other of one another at all. Neither can the not one partake of one, for it would cease to be not one, and therefore it cannot be a part, nor can the not one be number, for that also

involves one. And therefore, not being other or related to other as a whole to parts or parts to a whole, not one is the same as one. Wherefore the one is the same and also not the same with the others and also with itself; and is therefore like and unlike itself and the others, and just as different from the others as they are from the one, neither more nor less. But if neither more nor less, equally different; and therefore the one and the others are in the same relations. This may be illustrated by the case of names: when you repeat the same name twice over, you mean the same thing; and when you say that the other is other of the one, or the one other of the other, this very word other (*ἕτερον*), which is attributed to both, implies sameness. One, then, as being other of others, and other as being other of one, are alike in the relation of other; and likeness is similarity of relations. And everything as being other of everything is also like everything. Again, the like is opposed to the unlike, and the other to the same, and the one has been shown to be the same with the others. Now to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other of the others; and the one, as other of the others, has been shown to be like the others; and therefore, being the same, is unlike. One, then, is both like and unlike the others; like, as being other, unlike, as being the same. Again, one, as having the same relations, has no difference of relation, and is therefore not unlike, and therefore like; or, as having different relations, is different and unlike. Thus, one, as being the same and not the same with itself and others—for both these reasons and for either of them—is also like and unlike itself and the others. Again, how far can one touch itself and the others? As existing in others, it touches the others; and as existing in itself, touches only itself. But in another point of view, that which touches another must be next in order of place; one, therefore, must be next in order of place to itself, and would therefore be two, and in two places. But one cannot be two, and therefore cannot be in contact with itself. Neither can one touch the other; for that which touches another must touch immediately, without any middle or intermediate term. Two objects are required to make one contact; three objects make two contacts; and all the objects in the world have as many contacts as there are objects, less one. But if one only exists, and not two, there is no contact. And the others are other than one, and have no part in one, and therefore none in number, and therefore two has no exist-

ence, and therefore there is no contact. For all which reasons, one has and has not contact with itself and the others.

Once more, Is one equal and unequal to itself and the others? Suppose one and the others to be greater or less than each other or equal to one another, they will not be greater or less or equal in themselves, but by reason of equality or greatness or smallness inhering in them in addition to their own proper nature. Let us begin by assuming smallness to be inherent in one: in this case the inherence is either in the whole or in a part. If the first, smallness is either coextensive with the whole one, or contains the whole, and, if coextensive with the one, is equal to the one, or if containing the one will be greater than the one. But smallness is thus identified with equality or with greatness, which is impossible. Again, if the inherence be in a part, the same contradiction follows: smallness will be equal to the part or greater than the part; therefore smallness will not inhere in anything, and except the idea of smallness there will be nothing small. Neither will greatness; for greatness is relative to smallness. And there will be no great or small in objects, but only greatness or smallness in relation to each other; therefore the others cannot be greater or less than the one, or in any relation of magnitude to the one; also they can neither exceed nor be exceeded by one another, and are therefore equal to one another. And this will be true also of the one in relation to itself: one will be equal to itself and the others (*ἄλλα*). Yet one, being in itself, must also be about itself, containing and contained, and is therefore greater and less than itself. Further, there is nothing beside the one and the others; and as these must be in something, they must therefore be in one another; and as that in which a thing is greater than the thing, the inference is that they are both greater and less than one another, because containing and contained in one another. Therefore the one is equal to and greater and less than itself or other, having also measures or parts or numbers equal to or greater or less than itself or other.

But does one partake of time? This must be acknowledged, if the one partakes of being. For to be is the participation of being, present, past, or future. And as time is ever moving forward, the one becomes older than itself; and in becoming older becomes younger; and is older and also younger when it arrives at the present; and therefore becomes and is not older and younger than itself and all other

things:—for becoming is a progress into the future which cannot leave the past without resting in the present; this is ever the case in all things to which the term ‘is’ or ‘being’ can be applied. Yet ‘one’ being in time is and becomes always in the same time with itself, and is therefore contemporary with itself, and therefore neither older nor younger than itself. And what are the relations of the one to the others? Are they older or younger than one another? At any rate the others are more than one, and one, being the lesser number, must have been prior to the greater, or many. But on the other hand, one must come into being in a manner accordant with its own nature. Now one has parts, and has therefore a beginning, middle, and end, of which the beginning is first and the end last. And the parts come into existence first, and the whole contemporaneously with the end last, and is therefore younger, and the parts older than one. But, again, the one comes into being in each of the parts as much as in the whole, and must be of the same age with them. Therefore one is at once older and younger than the parts, and also contemporaneous with them, for no part can be a part which is not one. Is this true of becoming as well as being? Thus much may be affirmed, that the same things which are older or younger cannot become older or younger by the addition of equal times in a greater degree than they were at first. But, on the other hand, one, if older than other things, has come into being a longer time than they have. And when equal time is added to a longer and shorter, the relative difference between them is diminished. In this way that which was older becomes younger, and that which was younger becomes older, that is to say, younger and older than at first; and they ever become and never have become, for then they would be. Thus the one and others are always in a process of not becoming and becoming younger and also older than one another. And one, partaking of time and also partaking of becoming elder and younger, admits of all time, present, past, and future—was, is, shall be—was becoming, is becoming, will become. And there is a science and opinion and name and definition of the one, as is already implied in the fact of our inquiry.

Yet once more, if one be one and many, and neither one nor many, and also participant of time, must there not be a time at which one as one partakes of being, and a time when one as not being one is deprived of being? But these two contradictory states cannot be experienced by

the one both together; there must be a time of transition. And the transition is a process of generation and destruction, into and from being and not being, the one and the others. For the generation of the one is the destruction of the others, and the generation of the others is the destruction of the one. There is also separation and aggregation, assimilation and dissimilation, increase, diminution, equalization, a passage from motion to rest, and from rest to motion in the one and many. But when do all these changes take place? When does motion become rest, or rest motion? The answer to this question will throw a light upon all the others. Nothing can be in motion and at rest at the same time; and therefore the change takes place 'in a moment'—which is a strange expression, and seems to mean change in no time. Which is true also of all the other changes, which likewise take place in no time.

i. aa. But if one is, what happens to the others, which in the first place are not one, yet may partake of one in a certain way? The others are other of the one because they have parts, for if they had no parts they would be simply one, and parts imply a whole to which they belong; otherwise they would be parts of others, that is, of themselves and of all other parts, which is absurd. For a part, if not a part of one, must be a part of all but this one, and if so not a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, not a part of any one of many, and so not of one; and if of none, how of all? Therefore a part is neither a part of many nor of all, but of an absolute and perfect whole or one. And if the others have parts, they must partake of the whole, and must be the whole of which they are the parts. And each part, as the word 'each' implies, is also an absolute one which is abstracted from the rest. And both the whole and the parts partake of one, for the one is a whole of which the parts are parts, and each one is one part of the whole; and whole and parts as participating in one are other of one, and as being other of one are many and infinite; for however small a fraction you separate from them is many and not one. Yet the fact of their being parts furnishes them with a limit towards other parts and towards the whole; they are finite and also infinite: finite through participation in the one, infinite in their own nature. And as being finite, they are alike; and as being infinite, they are alike; but as being both finite and also infinite, they are in the highest degree unlike. And all other opposites might without difficulty be shown to unite in them.

i. bb. Once more, leaving all this : Is there not also an opposite series of consequences which is equally true of the others, and may be deduced from the existence of one? There is. One is distinct from the others, and the others from one; for one and the others are all things, and there is no third existence besides them. And as they exclude each other, they are not in the relation of whole and parts, nor can the others have any unity, and therefore not plurality, nor duality, nor any other number, nor any opposition or distinction, such as likeness and unlikeness, some and other, generation and corruption, odd and even. For if they had these they would partake either of one opposite, and this would be a participation in one; or of two opposites, and this would be a participation in two. Thus if one exists, one is all things, and likewise nothing, in relation to one and to the others.

ii. a. But, again, assume the opposite hypothesis, that the one is not, and what is the consequence? In the first place, the proposition, that one is not, is clearly opposed to the proposition, that not one is not. In the words 'one is not' there is an assumption of a known difference, which is implied in the word 'one'; for the subject of every proposition is a particular thing, whether the verb of existence is affirmed or denied. If then the one is not, there must be knowledge of the one, or that which is not would be unknown; and the one which is not must be different from other things; moreover, this and that, some and other, may be all attributes of the one which is not, and which though non-existent may and must have many attributes, if the one only is non-existent and not the others; but if all is not-being there is nothing which can be spoken of. Also the one which is not differs, and is different in kind from the others, and therefore unlike them; and they being other than the one, are unlike the one, which is therefore unlike them. But one, being unlike other, must be like itself; for the unlikeness of one to itself is the destruction of the hypothesis of the one; and if like itself, one cannot be equal to the others; for that would suppose being in the one, and the others would be equal to one and like one; both which are impossible, if one does not exist. The one which is not, then, if not equal is unequal to the others, and inequality implies great and small, and equality is in a mean between great and small, and therefore the one which is not partakes of equality. Further, the one which is not has being; for if you deny the being of the non-existent, in that case the not-being of the one would be untruly affirmed; but if truly,

then we must affirm being of the one which is not, for that which is true is. And so the one which is not, if remitting aught of the being of non-existence, would become being. For not being implies the being of not-being, and being the not-being of not being; or more truly being partakes both of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being, and not being of the not being of not-being and of the being of being. And therefore the one which is not has being and also not-being. And the union of being and not being involves change or motion. But how can not-being, which is nowhere, move or change, either from one place to another or in the same place? And whether it is or is not, it would cease to be one if experiencing a change of substance. The one which is not, then, is both in motion and at rest, is changed and unchanged, and created and destroyed, and uncreated and undestroyed.

ii. b. Once more, let us ask the question, If one is not, what happens in regard to one? The expression 'is not' implies negation of being:—do we mean by this to say that a thing, which is not, in a certain sense is? or do we mean absolutely to deny being to one? The latter. Then the one which is not can neither be nor become nor perish nor experience change of substance or place. Neither can rest, or motion, or greatness, or smallness, or equality, or unlikeness, or likeness either to itself or other, or of or to another, or this or that, or any other relation, or now or hereafter or formerly, or knowledge or opinion or perception or name or anything else be attributed to that which is not.

ii aa. Once more, if one is not, what becomes of the others? If we speak of them they must be, and their very name implies difference, and difference implies relation, not to the one, which is not, but to one another. And they are others of each other not as units but as infinities, the least of which is also infinity, and capable of infinitesimal division, as in a dream the single image multiplies, and the least things when you approach them, grow large. And they will have no unity or number, but only a semblance of unity and number; and the least fraction of them will appear large and manifold in comparison with the infinitesimal fractions into which they may be divided. Further, each of them will have the appearance of being equal with the fractions. For in passing from the greater to the less there is an intermediate point, which is equality. Moreover, each particle in relation to itself and to some other is also infinite; there is a beginning before the beginning, and a middle of the middle, and an end beyond the end, because the

infinitesimal division is never arrested by the one. Thus all being is one at a distance, and broken up when near, and like at a distance and unlike when near; and also the particles which compose being seem to be like and unlike, in rest and motion, in generation and corruption, in contact and separation, if one is not.

ii. bb. Once more, let us inquire, If the one is not, and the others of the one are, what follows? In the first place, the others will not be the one, nor the many, for in that case the one would be contained in them; neither will they appear to be one or many; because they have no communion or participation in that which is not, nor semblance of that which is not. If one is not, the others neither are, nor appear to be one or many, like or unlike, in contact or separation. In short, if one is not, nothing is.

The result of all which is, that whether one is or is not, one and the others, in relation to themselves and to one another, are and are not, and appear and appear not, in all manner of ways.

I. On the first hypothesis we may remark: first, That one is one is an identical proposition, from which we might expect that no further consequences could be deduced. The train of consequences which follows, is inferred by altering the predicate into 'not many.' Yet, perhaps, if a strict Eristic had been present, οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, he might have affirmed that the not many presented a different aspect of the conception from the one, and was therefore not identical with it. Such a subtlety would be very much in character with the Zenonian dialectic. Secondly, we may note, that the conclusion is really involved in the beginning. For one is conceived as one, in a sense which excludes all predicates. When the meaning of one has been reduced to a point, there is no use in saying that it has neither parts nor magnitude. Thirdly, The conception of the same is, first of all, identified with the one; and then by a further analysis distinguished from, and even opposed to, the one. Fourthly, We may detect notions, which have reappeared in modern philosophy, e. g. the bare abstraction of undefined unity, answering to the Hegelian 'Seyn,' or the identity of contradictions 'that which is older is also younger,' etc., cp. 152, or the Kantian conception of an *a priori* synthetical proposition 'one is.'

II. In the first series of propositions the word 'is' is the copula; in the second, the verb of existence. As in the first series, the negative consequence followed from one being affirmed to be equivalent to the not many; so here the affirmative consequence is deduced from one being equivalent to the many.

In the former case, nothing could be predicated of the one, but now everything—multitude, relation, place, time, transition. One is regarded in all the aspects of one, and with a reference to all the consequences which flow, either from the combination or the separation of them. The notion of transition involves the singular extra temporal conception of 'suddenness.' This idea of 'suddenness' is a mere fiction, and yet we may observe that similar antinomies have led modern philosophers to deny the reality of time and space. It is not the infinitesimal of time, but the negative of time. By the help of this invention the conception of change, which sorely exercised the minds of early thinkers, seems to be, but is not really at all explained.

The processes by which Parmenides obtains his remarkable results may be summed up as follows: (1) Compound or correlative ideas which involve each other, such as, being and not being, part and whole, one and others, are conceived sometimes in a state of composition, and sometimes of division: (2) The division or distinction is heightened into total opposition, e.g. between one and same: or (3) The idea, which has been already divided, is regarded, like a number, as capable of further infinite subdivision: (4) The idea of being or not-being is identified with existence or non-existence in place or time: (5) The same ideas are regarded sometimes as in process of transition, sometimes as alternatives or opposites: (6) There are no degrees of sameness, likeness, difference, nor any conception of motion or change: (7) One, being, etc., like space in Zeno's puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, are regarded sometimes as continuous and sometimes as discrete: (8) In some parts of the argument the abstraction is so rarefied as to become not only fallacious, but almost unintelligible, e.g. in the process by which odd numbers are multiplied into even numbers, or even numbers into odd ones (143 E); or in the contradiction which is elicited out of the relative terms older and younger at p. 152: (9) Words are used through long chains of argument, sometimes loosely, sometimes with the precision of numbers or geometrical figures.

In all this we seem to breathe the spirit of the Megarian philosophy.

Plato has gone beyond his Megarian contemporaries; he has split their straws over again, and admitted more than they would have desired. He is indulging the analytical tendencies of his age, which can divide but not combine. And he does not stop to inquire whether the distinctions which he makes are shadowy and fallacious, but 'whither the argument blows' he follows.

III The negative series of propositions contains the first conception of the negation of a negation. Two minus signs in arithmetic or algebra make a plus. Two negatives destroy each other. This subtle notion is the foundation of the Hegelian logic. The mind must not only admit that determination is negation, but must get through negation into affirmation. Whether this process is real, or in any way an assistance to thought, or, like some other logical forms, a mere figure of speech transferred from the sphere of mathematics, may be doubted. That Plato and the most subtle philosopher of the nineteenth century should have lighted upon the same notion, is a singular coincidence of ancient and modern thought.

IV. The one and the many or others are reduced to their strictest arithmetical meaning. That one is three or three one, is a proposition which has, perhaps, given rise to more controversy in the world than any other. But no one has ever meant to say that three and one are to be taken in the same sense. Whereas the one and many of the Parmenides have precisely the same meaning; there is no notion of one personality or substance having many attributes or qualities. The truth seems to be rather the opposite of that which Socrates implies at p. 129: There is no contradiction in the concrete, but in the abstract, and the more abstract the idea, the more palpable will be the contradiction. For just as nothing can persuade us that the number one is the number three, so neither can we be persuaded that any abstract idea is identical with its opposite, although they may both inhere together in some external object, or some more comprehensive conception. Ideas, persons, things may be one in one sense and many in another, and may have various degrees of unity and plurality. But in whatever sense and in whatever degree they are one they cease to be many; and in whatever degree or sense they are many they cease to be one.

Two points remain to be considered: 1st, the connection between the first and second parts of the dialogue; 2ndly, the relation of the Parmenides to the other dialogues.

I. In both divisions of the dialogue the principal speaker is the same, and the method pursued by him is also the same, being a criticism on received opinions: first, on the doctrine of ideas; secondly, of being. From the Platonic ideas we naturally proceed to the Eleatic one or being which is the foundation of them. They are the same philosophy in two forms, and the simpler form is the truer and deeper. For the Platonic ideas are mere numerical differences, and the moment we attempt to distinguish between them, their transcendental character is lost; ideas of justice, temperance, and good, are really distinguishable only with reference to their application in the world. If we once ask how they are related to individuals or to the ideas of the divine mind, they are again merged in the aboriginal notion of being. No one can answer the questions which Parmenides asks of Socrates. And yet these questions are asked with the express acknowledgment that the denial of ideas will be the destruction of the human mind. The true answer to the difficulty here thrown out is the establishment of a rational psychology; and this is a work which is commenced in the Sophist. Plato, in urging the difficulty of his own doctrine of ideas, is far from denying that some doctrine of ideas is necessary, and for this he is paving the way.

In a similar spirit he criticises the Eleatic doctrine of being, not intending to deny ontology, but showing that the old Eleatic notion, and the very name 'being,' is unable to maintain itself against the subtleties of the Megarians. He did not mean to say that Being or Substance had no existence, but he is preparing for the development of his later view, that ideas were capable of relation. The fact that contradictory consequences follow from the existence or non-existence of one or many, does not prove that they have or have not existence, but rather that some different mode of conceiving them is required. Parmenides may still have thought that 'Being was,' just as Kant would have asserted the existence of 'things in themselves,' while denying the transcendental use of the Categories

Several lesser links also connect the first and second parts of the dialogue: (1) The thesis is the same as that which Zeno has been already discussing: (2) Parmenides has intimated in the first part, that the method of Zeno should, as Socrates desired, be extended to ideas: (3) The difficulty of participating in greatness, smallness, equality is urged against the ideas as well as against the one.

II. The Parmenides is not only a criticism of the Eleatic notion of

being, but also of the methods of reasoning then in existence, and in this point of view, as well as in the other, may be regarded as an introduction to the Sophist. Long ago, in the Euthydemus, the vulgar application of the 'both and neither' Eristic had been subjected to a similar criticism, which there takes the form of banter and irony, here of illustration.

The germs of the attack upon the ideas, and the transition to a more rational philosophy, have also been discernible in the Philebus. The perplexity of the one and many has there been confined to the region of ideas, and replaced by a theory of classification; the good arranged in classes is also contrasted with the barren abstraction of the Megarians. The war is carried on against the Eristics in all the later dialogues, sometimes with a playful irony, at other times with a sort of contempt. But there is no lengthened refutation of them. The Parmenides belongs to that stage of the dialogues of Plato, in which he is partially under their influence, using them as a sort of 'critics or diviners' of the truth of his own, and of the Eleatic theories. In the Theaetetus a similar negative dialectic is employed in the attempt to define science, which after every effort remains undefined still. The same question is revived from the objective side in the Sophist: being and not being are no longer exhibited in opposition, but are now reconciled; and the true nature of not being is discovered and made the basis of the correlation of ideas. Some links are probably missing which might have been supplied if we had trustworthy accounts of Plato's oral teaching.

To sum up: the Parmenides of Plato is a critic, first, of the Platonic ideas, and secondly, of the Eleatic doctrine of being. Neither are absolutely denied. But certain difficulties and consequences are shown in the assumption of either, which prove that the Platonic as well as the Eleatic doctrine must be remodelled. The negation and contradiction which are involved in the conception of the one and many are preliminary to their final adjustment. The Platonic ideas are tested by the interrogative method of Socrates; the Eleatic one or being is tried by the severer and perhaps impossible method of hypothetical consequences, negative and affirmative. In the latter we have an example of the Zenonian or Megarian dialectic, which proceeded not 'by assailing premises but conclusions'; this is worked out and improved by Plato. When primary abstractions are used in every conceivable sense, any or every conclusion may be deduced from them. The words 'one,' 'other,'

'being,' 'like,' 'same,' 'whole,' and their opposites, have slightly different meanings, as they are applied to objects of thought or objects of sense—to number, time, place, and to the higher ideas of the reason;—and out of their different meanings this 'feast' of contradictions 'has been provided.'

The *Parmenides* of Plato belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed away. At first we read it with a purely antiquarian or historical interest; and with difficulty throw ourselves back into a state of the human mind in which Unity and Being occupied the attention of philosophers. We admire the precision of the language, in which, as in some curious puzzle, each word is exactly fitted into every other, and long trains of argument are carried out with a sort of geometrical accuracy. We doubt whether any abstract notion could stand the searching cross-examination of *Parmenides*; and may at last perhaps arrive at the conclusion that Plato has been using an imaginary method to work out an unmeaning conclusion. But the truth is, that he is carrying on a process which is not either useless or unnecessary in any age of philosophy. We fail to understand him, because we do not realize that the questions which he is discussing could have had any value or importance. We suppose them to be like the speculations of some of the schoolmen, which end in nothing. But in truth he is trying to get rid of the stumbling-blocks of thought which beset his contemporaries. Seeing that the Megarians and Cynics were making knowledge impossible, he takes their 'catch-words' and analyses them from every conceivable point of view. He is criticising the simplest and most general of our ideas, in which, as they are the most comprehensive, the danger of error is the most serious; for, if they remain unexamined, as in a mathematical demonstration, all that flows from them is affected, and the error pervades knowledge far and wide. In the beginning of philosophy this correction of human ideas was even more necessary than in our own times, because they were more bound up with words; and words when once presented to the mind exercised a greater power over thought. There is a natural realism which says, 'Can there be a word devoid of meaning, or an idea which is an idea of nothing?' In modern times mankind have often given too great importance to a word or idea. The philosophy of the ancients was still more in slavery to them, because they had not the experience of error, which would have placed them above the illusion.

The method of the Parmenides may be compared with the process of purgation, which Bacon sought to introduce into philosophy. Plato is warning us against two sorts of 'Idols of the Den': first, his own ideas, which he himself having created is unable to connect in any way with the external world; secondly, against two idols in particular, 'Unity' and 'Being,' which had grown up in the pre-Socratic philosophy, and were still standing in the way of all progress and development of thought. He does not say with Bacon, 'Let us make truth by experiment,' or 'from these vague and inexact notions let us turn to facts.' The time has not yet arrived for a purely inductive philosophy. 'The instruments of thought must first be forged, that they may be used hereafter by modern inquirers. How, while mankind were disputing about universals, could they classify phenomena? How could they investigate causes, when they had not as yet learned to distinguish between a cause and an end? How could they make any progress in the sciences without first arranging them? These are the deficiencies which Plato is seeking to supply in an age when knowledge was a shadow of a name only. In the earlier dialogues the Socratic conception of universals is illustrated by his genius; in the Phaedrus the nature of division is explained; in the Republic the law of contradiction and the unity of knowledge are asserted; in the later dialogues he is constantly engaged both with the theory and practice of classification. These were the 'new weapons,' as he terms them in the Philebus, which he was preparing for the use of some who, in after ages, would be found ready enough to disown their obligations to the great master, or rather, perhaps, would be incapable of understanding them.

Numberless fallacies, as we are often truly told, have originated in a confusion of the 'copula,' and the 'verb of existence.' Would not the distinction which Plato makes between 'one is' and 'one has being' have saved us from this and many similar confusions? We see again that a long period in the history of philosophy was a barren tract, not uncultivated, but unfruitful, because there was no inquiry into the relation of language and thought, and the metaphysical imagination was incapable of supplying the missing link between words and things. The famous dispute between nominalists and realists would never have been heard of, if, instead of transferring the Platonic ideas into a crude Latin phraseology, the spirit of Plato had been truly understood and appreciated. Upon the term substance at least two celebrated theological

controversies appear to hinge, which would not have existed, or at least not in their present form, if we had 'interrogated' the word substance, as Plato has the notions of Unity and Being. These weeds of philosophy have struck their roots deep into the soil, and are always tending to reappear, sometimes in new-fangled forms; while similar words, such as development, evolution, law, and the like, are constantly put in the place of facts, even by writers who profess to base truth entirely upon fact. In an unmetaphysical age there is probably more metaphysics in the common sense (i. e. more *a priori* assumption) than in any other, because there is more complete unconsciousness that we are resting on our own ideas, while we please ourselves with the conviction that we are resting on facts. We do not consider how much metaphysics are required to place us above metaphysics, or how difficult it is to prevent the forms of expression which are ready made for our use from outrunning actual observation and experiment.

In the last century the educated world were astonished to find that the whole fabric of their ideas was falling to pieces, because Hume amused himself by analysing the word 'cause' into uniform sequence. Then arose a philosophy which, equally regardless of the history of the mind, sought to save mankind from scepticism by assigning to our notions of 'cause and effect,' 'substance and accident,' 'whole and part,' a necessary place in human thought. Without them we could have no experience, and therefore they were supposed to be prior to experience—to be incrusting on the 'I'; although in the phraseology of Kant there could be no transcendental use of them, or, in other words, they were only applicable within the range of our knowledge. But into the origin of these ideas, which he obtains partly by an analysis of the proposition, partly by development of the 'ego,' he never enquires—they seem to him to have a necessary existence; nor does he attempt to analyse the various senses in which the word 'cause' or 'substance' may be employed.

The philosophy of Berkeley could never have had any meaning, even to himself, if he had first analysed from every point of view the conception of 'matter.' This poor forgotten word (which was 'a very good word' to describe the simplest generalization of external objects) is now superseded in the vocabulary of physical philosophers by 'force,' which seems to be accepted without any rigid examination of its meaning, as if the general idea of 'force' in our minds furnished an explanation of the infinite variety of forces which exist in the universe. A similar ambiguity

occurs in the use of the favourite word 'law,' which is sometimes regarded as a mere abstraction, and then elevated into a real power or entity, almost taking the place of God. Theology, again, is full of undefined terms which have distracted the human mind for ages. Mankind have reasoned from them, but not to them; they have drawn out the conclusions without proving the premises; they have asserted the premises without examining the terms. The passions of religious parties have been roused to the utmost about words of which they could have given no explanation, and which had really no distinct meaning. One sort of them, faith, grace, justification, have been the symbols of one class of disputes; as the words substance, nature, person, of another, revelation, inspiration, and the like, of a third. All of them have been the subject of endless reasonings and inferences; but a spell has hung over the minds of theologians or philosophers which has prevented them from examining the words themselves. Either the effort to rise above and beyond their own first ideas was too great for them, or there might, perhaps, have seemed to be an irreverence in doing so. About the Divine Being himself, in whom all true theological ideas live and move, men have spoken and reasoned much, and have fancied that they instinctively know Him. But they hardly suspect that under the name of God even Christians have included two characters or natures as much opposed as the good and evil principle of the Persians.

To have the true use of words we must place ourselves above them; and in using them we must acknowledge their imperfection. In like manner, after having interrogated our ideas, to many of them we return and acknowledge their value and truth, though not always in the sense which we supposed. And Plato, while he criticises the inconsistency of his own doctrine of universals and draws out the endless consequences which flow from the assertion either that 'Being is' or that 'Being is not,' by no means intends to deny the existence of universals or the unity under which they are comprehended. There is nothing further from his thoughts than scepticism. (Cp. 135 B, C.) But before proceeding he must examine the foundations which he and others have been laying; there is nothing true which is not from some point of view untrue, nothing absolute which is not also relative. (Cp. Rep. vi. 507.)

And so, in modern times, because we are called upon to analyse our ideas and to come to a distinct understanding about the meaning of words; because we know that the powers of language are very unequal

to the subtlety of nature or of mind, we do not therefore renounce the use of them; but we replace them in their old connexion, having first tested their meaning and quality, and having corrected the error which is involved in them; or rather always remembering to make allowance for the adulteration or alloy which they contain. We cannot call a new metaphysical world into existence any more than we can frame a new universal language; in thought, as in speech, we are dependent on the past. We know that the words 'cause' and 'effect' are very far from representing to us the continuity or the complexity of nature or the different modes or degrees in which phenomena are connected. Yet we accept them as the best expression which we have of the correlation of forces or objects. We see that the term 'law' is a mere abstraction, under which laws of matter and of mind, the law of nature and the law of the land are included, and some of these uses of the word are confusing, because they introduce into one sphere of thought associations which belong to another; for example, order or sequence is apt to be confounded with external compulsion and the internal workings of the mind with their material antecedents. Yet none of them can be dispensed with; we can only be on our guard against the error or confusion which arises out of them. So in the use of the word 'substance' we are far from supposing that there is any mysterious substratum apart from the objects which we see, and we acknowledge that the negative notion is very likely to become a positive one. Still we retain the word as a convenient generalization, though not without a double sense, substance, and essence, derived from the two-fold translation of the Greek *οὐσία*.

So the human mind makes the reflection that God is not a person like ourselves—is not a cause like the material causes in nature, nor even an intelligent cause like a human agent—nor an individual, for He is universal, and that every possible conception which we can form of Him is limited by the human faculties. We cannot by any effort of thought or exertion of faith be in and out of our own minds at the same instant. How can we conceive Him under the forms of time and space, who is out of time and space? How can we imagine His relation to the world or to ourselves? Innumerable contradictions follow from either of the two alternatives 'that God is' or 'that He is not.' Yet we are far from saying that we know nothing of Him, because all that we know is subject to the conditions of human thought. To the old belief in Him we return, but with corrections. He is a person, but not like ourselves; a mind, but

not a human mind; a cause, but not a material cause, nor yet a maker or artificer. The words which we use are imperfect expressions of His true nature; but we do not therefore lose faith in what is best and highest in ourselves and in the world.

‘A little philosophy takes us away from God; a great deal brings us back to Him.’ When we begin to reflect, our first thoughts respecting Him and ourselves are apt to be sceptical. For we can analyse our religious as well as our other ideas; we can trace their history; we can criticise their perversion; we see that they are relative to the human mind and to one another. But when we have carried our criticism to the furthest point, they still remain, a necessity of our moral nature, better known and understood by us, and less liable to be shaken, because we are more aware of their necessary imperfection. They come to us with ‘better opinion, better confirmation,’ not merely as the inspirations either of ourselves or of another, but deeply rooted in history and in the human mind.

PARMENIDES.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

CEPHALUS.
ADEIMANTUS.
GLAUCON.
ANTIPHON.
PYTHODORUS.

SOCRATES.
ZENO.
PARMENIDES.
ARISTOTELES.

Cephalus rehearses a dialogue which is supposed to have been narrated in his presence by Antiphon, the half-brother of Adeimantus and Glaucon, to certain Clazomenians.

Steph.

126 WE went from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, Cephalus, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?

Why, yes, I said, I am come to ask a favour of you.

What is that? he said.

I want you to tell me the name of your half-brother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago; his father's name, if I remember rightly, was Pylilampes?

Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?

Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was in the habit of meeting Pythodorus, the friend of Zeno, and remembers certain arguments which Socrates and Zeno and Parmenides had together, and which Pythodorus had often repeated to him.

That is true.

And could we hear them? I asked.

Nothing easier, he replied ; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the pieces ; at present his thoughts run in another direction ; like his grandfather, Antiphon, he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him ; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.

Accordingly we went to look for him ; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a smith to be fitted. When he had done with the smith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit ; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorus had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno ; they came to Athens, he said, at the great Panathenaea ; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, of a noble figure and fair aspect ; and in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved of Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorus in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates, then a very young man, and others came to see them ; they wanted to hear some writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens by them for the first time. These Zeno himself read to them in the absence of Parmenides, and had nearly finished when Pythodorus entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty ; there was not much more to hear, and Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first thesis of the first argument might be read over again, and this having been done, he said : What is your meaning, Zeno ? Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like ; is that your position ?

Just so, said Zeno.

And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then according to you, the many could not be, and their being would

be an impossibility. Is the design of your argument only to disprove the being of the many? and is each part of your discourse intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being in all as many proofs of the non-being of the many as you have composed arguments? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?

128 No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purpose.

I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and would feign deceive us into believing that he is telling us what is new. For you, in your poems, say All is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs; and he on the other hand says There is no many; and on behalf of this he offers overwhelming evidence. To deceive the world, as you have done, by saying the same thing in different ways, one of you affirming the one, and the other denying the many, is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not quite apprehend the true motive of the composition, which is not really such an ambitious work as you imagine; for what you speak of was an accident; I had no serious intention of deceiving the world. The truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who scoff at him and show the many ridiculous and contradictory results which they suppose to follow from the affirmation of the one. My answer is an address to the partisans of the many, whose attack I return with interest by retorting upon them that their hypothesis of the being of many if carried out appears in a still more ridiculous light than the hypothesis of the being of one. A love of controversy led me to write the book in the days of my youth, and some one stole the copy; and therefore I had no choice whether it should be published or not; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an old man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one. *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in itself, and another idea of unlikeness, which ¹²⁹ is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate; and that the things which participate in likeness are in that degree and manner like; and that those which participate in unlikeness are in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And all things may partake of both opposites, and be both like and unlike themselves, by reason of this participation. So far there is nothing wonderful. If a person could prove the absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would be a real wonder; but what is there extraordinary, Zeno, in showing that the things which partake of likeness and unlikeness experience both? Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very wonderful. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed. And so of other things: I should be surprised to hear that the natures or ideas themselves had these opposite qualities; but not if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand, he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one, and in saying both he speaks truly. So again, if a person shows that such things as wood, stones, and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the coexistence of the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a paradox but a truism. If, however, as I just now suggested, taking the simple notions of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, we could show that these in their abstract form admit of admixture and separation, I should be very much astonished. This part of the argument appears to be treated

by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; nevertheless, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the
 130 ideas themselves which are apprehended by reason, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects.

While Socrates was speaking, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides expressed these feelings in the following words:—

Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between ideas in themselves and the things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, and of the one and many, and of the other notions of which Zeno has been speaking?

I think that there are such ideas, said Socrates.

Parmenides proceeded: And would you also make ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class?

Yes, he said, I should.

And would you make an idea of man apart from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.

And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things of which the mention may provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else that is foul and base; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the actual objects with which we come into contact, or not?

Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and so I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and occupy myself with them.

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, if I am not mistaken, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to regard the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they are therefore named; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great, because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty? 131

Yes, certainly, said Socrates, that is my meaning.

Then each individual partakes either of the whole of the idea or else of a part of the idea? Is any third way possible?

Impossible, he said.

Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet being one, is in each one of the many?

Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.

Because one and the same whole existing in many separate individuals, will thus be in a state of separation from itself.

Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all at once.

I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, there would be one whole in or on many—is not that your meaning?

I think so.

And would you say that the whole sail is over each man, or a part only?

A part only.

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and the individuals will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them?

That seems to follow.

Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said.

Suppose that you divide greatness, and that of many great things each one is great by having a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness—is that conceivable?

No.

Or will each equal thing, taking some portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other thing by virtue of that portion?

Impossible.

Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the small is greater; and while the absolute small is greater, that to which the part of the small is added, will be smaller and not greater than before.

Impossible.

Then in that way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Indeed, he said, you have asked a question which is not easily answered.

Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?

What question?

I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume one
 132 idea of each kind is as follows:—You see a number of great objects, and when you look at them together there seems to you to be one and the same idea (or nature) in them all; hence you conceive of greatness as one.

Very true, said Socrates.

And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to embrace in one view the idea of greatness and of great things which are not the idea, and to compare them, will not another greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of all these?

That is true.

Then another kind of greatness now comes into view over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, over and above all these, by virtue of which they will all be great, and so each idea instead of being one will be infinitely subdivided.

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be thoughts only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case each idea may still be one, and not experience this infinite subdivision.

And can there be individual thoughts which are thoughts of nothing?

That is impossible, he said.

The thought must be of something?

Yes.

Of something that is or is not?

Of something that is.

Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognises as attaching to all, being a single form or nature?

Yes.

And will not the something so apprehended which is always the same in all, be an idea?

From that, again, there is no escape.

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that everything else participates in the ideas, must you not say either that everything is made up of thoughts, and that all things think; or that they are thoughts having no thought?

But that, Parmenides, is no more rational than the other. The more probable view is, that the ideas are, as it were, patterns fixed in nature, and that other things are like them, and resemblances of them; and that what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in so far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other than the like of like.

Impossible.

And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea?

They must.

And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the idea itself?

Certainly.

Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the indi-

vidual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea
 133 of likeness will always be coming to light, and if that be like
 anything else, another and another; and new ideas will be
 always arising, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?

Quite true.

The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas
 by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of
 participation devised?

That is true.

Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of
 affirming the ideas to be absolute?

Yes, indeed.

And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a
 small part of the difficulty which is involved if you make the
 idea a single entity apart from things.

What difficulty? he said.

There are many, but the greatest of all is this:—If an oppo-
 nent argues that these ideas, being such as we affirm them to be,
 are by their nature unknown, no one can prove to him that he is
 wrong, unless he who is disputing their existence be a man of
 great ability and knowledge, and is willing to follow a long and
 laborious demonstration—he will remain unconvinced, and still
 insist that they cannot be known.

How is that, Parmenides? said Socrates.

In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who
 maintains the existence of absolute ideas, will admit that they
 cannot exist in us.

No, said Socrates; for then they would be no longer absolute.

True, he said; and therefore any relation of the absolute ideas
 is a relation which is among themselves only, and has nothing to
 do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed,
 which are in our sphere, and from which we receive this or that
 name when we participate in them. And the objects which are
 within our sphere and have the same names with them, are like-
 wise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which
 have the same names with them, and belong to themselves, and
 not to them.

What do you mean? said Socrates.

I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:—

A master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them, which is simply a relation of one man to another. But there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract. These natures have nothing to do with us, nor we ¹³⁴ with them; they are concerned with themselves only, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.

And will not knowledge—I mean absolute knowledge—answer to absolute truth?

Certainly.

And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of absolute being?

Yes.

But the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly.

But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?

No, we cannot.

And the absolute ideas or natures are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Yes.

And we have not got the idea of knowledge?

No.

Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

I suppose not.

Then the beautiful itself, and the good itself, and all other absolute ideas, as we suppose them to be, are unknown to us?

That appears to be true.

I think that there is a stranger consequence still.

What is it?

Would you, or would you not, say, that absolute knowledge, if there is such a thing, must be a far more exact knowledge than our knowledge; and the same of beauty and of all other things? *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

Yes.

And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge, no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

Certainly.

But then, will God, having absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?

Why not?

Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas are not relative to human things, nor human things to them; the relations of either are in their respective spheres.

Yes, that has been admitted.

And if God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing; just as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters, neither do they know the things of men.

Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.

135 These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few, of the difficulties which arise on the hypothesis that there are ideas of things, and that each idea is an absolute and determinate unity; they will lead him who is told of them to doubt the very existence of ideas—he will say that even if they do exist, they must of necessity be unknown to man; and he will seem to have reason on his side, and as we were remarking just now, will be very difficult to convince; a man must be a man of very considerable ability before he can learn that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself, and can teach another to understand them thoroughly.

I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much to my mind.

And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his mind on these and the like difficulties, refuses to allow that there are ideas of things, and that every individual thing has its determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest, and so he will utterly

destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted.

Very true, he said.

But, then, what is to become of philosophy? What resource is there, if the ideas are unknown?

I certainly do not see my way at present.

Yes, said Parmenides; and I think that this arises, Socrates, out of your attempting to define the beautiful, the just, the good, and the ideas generally, without sufficient previous training. I noticed your deficiency, when I heard you talking here with your friend Aristoteles, the day before yesterday. The impulse that carries you towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine; but still there is an art which is called by the vulgar idle talking, and is often imagined to be useless; in that you must train and exercise yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your grasp.

And what is the nature of this exercise, Parmenides, which you would recommend?

That which you heard Zeno practising; at the same time, I give you credit for saying to him that you did not care to solve the perplexity in reference to visible objects, or to consider the question in that way; but only in reference to thought, and to what may be called ideas.

Why, yes, he said, there appears to me to be no difficulty in showing that visible things experience likeness or unlikeness or anything else.

Quite true, he said; but I think that you should go a step further, and consider not only the consequences which flow from a given hypothesis, but also the consequences which flow from 136 denying the hypothesis; and that will be still better training for you.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean, for example, that in the case of this very hypothesis of Zeno's about the many, you should inquire not only what will be the consequences to the many in relation to themselves and to the one, and to the one in relation to itself and the many, on the hypothesis of the being of the many, but also what will be the consequences to the one and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other, on the opposite hypothesis. Or,

again, if likeness is or is not, what will be the consequences in either of these cases to the subject of the hypothesis, and to other things, in relation both to themselves and to one another, and so of unlikeness; and the same principle applies to motion and rest, to generation and destruction, and even to being and not-being. In a word, when you suppose anything to be or not to be, or to be in any way affected, you must look at the consequences in relation to the thing itself, and to any other things which you choose,—to each of them singly, to more than one, and to all; and so with the other things, you must look at them in relation to themselves and to anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be, if you would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth.

That, Parmenides, is a tremendous work of which you speak, and I do not quite understand you; will you take some hypothesis and go through the steps, and then I shall apprehend you better?

That, Socrates, is a serious task to impose on a man of my years.

Then will you, Zeno? said Socrates.

Zeno answered, with a smile:—Let us make our petition to Parmenides himself, who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the extent of the task which you are imposing on him, and if there were more of us I should not ask him, for these are not subjects which any one, especially at his age, can well speak of before a large audience; most people are not aware that this roundabout progress through all things is the only way in which the mind can attain truth. And therefore, Parmenides, I join in the request of Socrates, that I may hear the process again which I have not heard for a long time.

When Zeno had thus spoken, Pythodorus, according to Antiphon's report of him, said, that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process. I cannot refuse, said Parmenides; and yet I
 137 feel rather like Ibycus, who, when in his old age, against his will, he fell in love, compared himself to an old racehorse, who was about to run in a chariot race, shaking with fear at the course he knew so well—this was his simile of himself. And

I also experience a trembling when I remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of life. But I must indulge you, as Zeno says that I ought, and we are alone. Where shall I begin? And what shall be our first hypothesis, if I am to attempt this laborious pastime? Shall I begin with myself, and take my own hypothesis of the one? and consider the consequences which follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not-being of one?

By all means, said Zeno.

And who will answer me? he said. Shall I propose the youngest? He will not raise difficulties and will be the most likely to say what he thinks; and his answers will give me time to breathe.

I am the one whom you mean, Parmenides, said Aristoteles; for I am the youngest, and at your service. Ask, and I will answer.

Parmenides proceeded: i. a. If one is, he said, the one cannot be many?

Impossible.

Then the one cannot have parts, and cannot be a whole?

How is that?

Why, every part is part of a whole; is it not?

Yes.

And what is a whole? would not that of which no part is wanting be a whole?

Certainly.

Then, in either case, the one would be made up of parts; both as being a whole, and also as having parts?

Certainly.

And in either case, the one would be many, and not one?

True.

But, surely, it ought to be one and not many?

It ought.

Then, if the one is to remain one, it will not be a whole, and will not have parts?

No.

But if it has no parts, it will have neither beginning, middle, nor end; for if it had they would be parts of it?

Right. *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

But then, again, a beginning and an end are the limits of everything?

Certainly.

Then the one, neither having beginning nor end, is unlimited?

Yes, unlimited.

And therefore formless, as not being able to partake either of round or straight.

How is that?

Why, the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre?

Yes.

And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view of the extremes?

True.

Then the one would have parts, and would be many, whether
138 it partook of a straight or of a circular form?

Assuredly.

But having no parts, it will be neither straight nor round?

Right.

And, being of such a nature, it cannot be in any place, for it cannot be either in another or in itself.

How is that?

If it were in another, it would be encircled by that in which it was, and would touch it at many points; but that which is one and indivisible, and does not partake of a circular nature, cannot be touched all round in many places.

Certainly not.

But if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also contain and be itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it.

Impossible.

But then, that which contains must be other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot act and be acted upon at once; and so one will be no longer one, but two?

True.

Then one cannot be anywhere, either in itself or in another?

No.

Further consider, whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion.

Why not?

Why, because the one, if it were moved, would be either moved in place or altered; for these are the only kinds of motion.

Yes.

And the one, when altered and ceasing to be itself cannot be any longer one.

It cannot.

And therefore cannot experience this sort of motion or change?

Clearly not.

Then can the motion of the one be in place?

Perhaps.

But if the one moved in place, must it not either move round and round in the same place, or from one place to another?

Certainly.

And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre; and that which goes round upon a centre must have parts which all move round the centre; but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre?

Impossible.

But perhaps the motion of the one consists in going from one place to another?

Perhaps so, if it moves at all.

And have we not already shown that it cannot be in anything?

Yes.

Then its coming into being in anything is still more impossible; is it not?

I do not see why.

Why, because anything which comes into being in anything, can neither as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being, nor be altogether out of it, if already coming into being in it.

Certainly not.

And therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts, and then the one part may be in, and the other part out of that other; but that which has no parts must always be at one and the same time either wholly within or wholly without anything.

True.

And is there not a still greater impossibility in that which has no parts, and is not a whole, coming into being anywhere
139 either as a part or as a whole?

Clearly.

Then, as it does not change by going round in the same place, so neither does it change by going somewhere and coming into being in something; nor again, by change in itself?

True.

The one, then, is incapable of any kind of motion?

Incapable.

But neither can the one be in anything, as we affirm?

Yes, that is affirmed by us.

Then it is never in the same?

Why not?

Because being in the same is being in something which is the same.

Certainly.

But we said that it could not be in itself, and could not be in other?

True.

Then one is never in the same?

It would seem not.

But that which is never in the same is never quiet or at rest?

Never.

One then, as would seem, is neither at rest nor in motion?

Clearly not.

Neither will it be the same with itself or other; nor again, other of itself or other.

How is that?

If other of itself it would be other of one, and would not be one.

True.

And if the same with other, it would be that other, and not itself; so that upon this supposition too, it would not have the nature of one, but would be other than one?

It would.

Then it will not be the same with other, or other of itself?

It will not.

Neither will it be other of other, while it remains one; for not one, but only other, can be other of other, and nothing else.

True.

Then not by virtue of being one will it be other?

Certainly not.

But if not by virtue of being one, not by virtue of itself; and if not by virtue of itself, not itself, and itself not being other at all, will not be other of anything?

Right.

Neither will one be the same with itself.

Why not?

Surely the nature of the one is not the nature of the same.

Why is that?

Because when anything becomes the same with anything, it does not become one.

Why not?

That which becomes the same with the many, necessarily becomes many and not one.

True.

But, if there were no difference between the one and the same, when a thing became the same, it would always become one; and when it became one, the same?

Certainly.

And, therefore, if one be the same with itself, it is not one with itself, and will therefore be one and also not one.

Surely that is impossible.

And therefore the one can neither be other of other, nor the same with itself.

Impossible.

And thus the one can neither be the same, nor other, either in relation to itself or other?

No.

Neither will the one be like or unlike itself or other.

Why not?

Because likeness is sameness of affections.

Yes.

And sameness has been shown to be of a nature distinct from oneness?

That has been shown.

140 But if the one had any other affection than that of being one, it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one; which is impossible.

True.

Then the one can never be so affected as to be the same either with another or with itself?

Clearly not.

Then it cannot be like another, or like itself?

No.

Nor can it be affected so as to be other, for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one.

It would.

That which is affected otherwise than itself or another, will be unlike itself or another, if sameness of affections is likeness.

True.

But the one, as appears, never being affected otherwise than itself, is never unlike itself or other?

Never.

Then the one will never be either like or unlike itself or other?

Plainly not.

Again, being of this nature, it can neither be equal or unequal either to itself or to other.

How is that?

Why, because the one if equal must be of the same measure as that to which it is equal.

True.

And if greater or less than things which are commensurable with it, the one will have more measures than that which is less, and fewer than that which is greater?

Yes.

And so of things which are not commensurate with it, the one will have greater measures than that which is less and less than that which is greater.

Certainly.

But how can that which does not partake of sameness, have either the same measures or have anything else the same?

Impossible.

And not having the same measures, the one cannot be equal either with itself or with another?

Clearly not.

But again, whether it have fewer or more measures, it will have as many parts as it has measures; and thus again the one having as many parts as measures will be no longer one.

Right.

And if it were of one measure, it would be equal to that measure; and it has been shown to be incapable of equality.

It has.

Then it will neither partake of one measure, nor of many, nor of few, nor of the same at all, nor be equal to itself or another; nor be greater or less than itself, or other?

Certainly.

Well, and do we suppose that one can be older, or younger than anything, or of the same age with it?

Why not?

Why, because that which is of the same age with itself or other, must partake of equality or likeness of time; and we said that the one did not partake of equality or likeness?

We did say so.

And we also said, that it did not partake of inequality or unlikeness.

Very true.

141

How then can one being of this nature be either older or younger than anything, or have the same age with it?

In no way.

Then one cannot be older or younger, or of the same age, either with itself or with another?

Clearly not.

Then the one, being of this nature, cannot be in time at all; for must not that which is in time, be always growing older than itself?

Certainly.

And that which is older, must be always older than something which is younger?

True.

Then, that which becomes older than itself, also becomes at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something to become older than.

What do you mean? - Digitized by Microsoft®

I mean this:—A thing does not need to become different from another thing, when the difference already exists; the difference of that which is, is,—of that which has become, has become,—of that which will be, will be; but of that which is becoming, there cannot have been, or be about to be, or be, any difference;—the only difference possible is one that is becoming.

Certainly.

But, surely, the elder is a difference relative to the younger, and to no other.

True.

Then that which becomes older than itself must also, at the same time, become younger than itself?

Yes.

But again, it is true that it cannot become for a longer or for a shorter time than itself, but it must become, and be, and have become, and be about to be, the same time with itself?

Yes, inevitably.

Then things which are in time, and partake of time, must be inferred in every case, I suppose, to be of the same age with themselves; and must also become older and younger than themselves?

That must be inferred.

But the one did not partake of those affections?

Not at all.

Then it does not partake of time, and is not in any time?

That is what the argument proves.

Well, but do not the expressions ‘was,’ and ‘has become,’ and ‘was becoming,’ signify a participation of past time?

Certainly.

And do not ‘will be,’ ‘will become,’ ‘will have become,’ signify a participation of future time?

Yes.

And ‘is,’ or ‘becomes,’ signifies a participation of present time?

Certainly.

And if the one is absolutely without participation in time, it never has become or was becoming, or was at any time, or

has now become or is becoming, or is, or will become, or will have become, or will be, hereafter.

Most true.

But are there any modes of partaking of being other than these?

There are none.

Then the one cannot possibly partake of being?

That is the inference.

Then the one is not at all?

Clearly not.

Then the one has no existence as one, for in that case it would be, and would partake of being; but if the argument is to be believed, the one neither is nor is one?

That appears to be true.

142

But that which is not admits of no attribute or relation?

Surely not.

Then there is no name, nor description, nor sense, nor conception, nor knowledge of it?

Clearly not.

Then it is neither named, nor uttered, nor conceived, nor known, nor does anything that is perceive it.

That is the inference.

But can all this be true about the one?

I think not.

i. b. Suppose, now, that we once more resume the hypothesis, and see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears.

I shall be very happy to do so.

We say that we have to work out all the consequences that follow, if the one is?

Yes.

Then we will begin at the beginning:—If one is, can one be, and not partake of being?

Impossible.

Then the one will have being, and being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the one have participated in being, for the two propositions—that one is, and that one is one—would have been

identical; but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is:—am I not right?

Certainly.

And we mean to say, that one has not the same significance as being?

Of course.

And when we put them together, and say 'one is,' that is equivalent to saying, 'partakes of being'?

Quite true.

Once more then let us ask, if one is what will follow? Consider whether this hypothesis does not involve that one is of such a nature as to have parts.

How so?

Why, in this way:—If being is predicated of one which is, and one is predicated of being which is one; and being and one are not the same, but belong to that same one of which we have assumed the being, must not this one which is be a whole, and the one and the being its parts?

Certainly.

And is each of these parts—one and being—to be simply called a part, or must the word 'part' be relative to the word 'whole'?

The latter.

Then that which is one is both a whole and has a part?

Certainly.

Again, of the parts of the one which is—I mean being and one—is either wanting to the other? is the one wanting to being, or being to the one?

Impossible.

Once more, then each of the parts has both one and being, and is at the least made up of two parts; and the same principle goes on for ever, and every part whatever has always these two parts; for being always involves one, and one being; so that two are always appearing, instead of one.

143 Certainly.

And so the one which is must be infinite in multiplicity?

That appears to be true.

Let us take another direction.

What direction?

We say that the one partakes of being because it is?

Yes.

And in this way, the one which is turns out to be many?

True.

But now, let us abstract the one which, as we say, partakes of being, and try to imagine it apart from that of which we say that it partakes—will this abstract one be one or many?

One, I think.

Let us see:—Must not the being of one be other of one, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, only partakes of being?

Certainly.

If being and the one be two different things, it is not because the one is one that it is other of being; nor because being is being that it is other of the one; but they differ from one another by being other and different.

Certainly.

So that the other is not the same—either with the one or with being?

Certainly not.

And therefore whether we take being and the other, or being and the one, or the one and the other, in every such case we take two things, which may be rightly called both.

How is that?

In this way—you may speak of being?

Yes.

And also of one?

Yes.

Then, now we have spoken of either of them?

Yes.

Well, and when I speak of being and one, I speak of them both?

Certainly.

And if I speak of being and the other, or of the one and the other,—in any case do I not speak of both?

Yes.

And must not that which is correctly called both, be also two?

Undoubtedly. *Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

And must not either of two be one?

Certainly.

Then, if the individuals of the pair are together two, they must be severally one?

Clearly.

And if each of them is one, then by the addition of any one to any pair, the whole becomes three?

Yes.

And three are odd, and two are even?

Of course.

And if there are two they must also be twice, and if there are three they must be thrice; that is, if twice one makes two, and thrice one three?

Certainly.

There are two, and there is twice, and therefore there is twice two; and there are three, and there is thrice, and therefore there is thrice three?

Of course.

If there are three and there is twice, and there are two and there is thrice, then you have twice three and thrice two?

Undoubtedly.

Here, then, we have even taken even times, and odd taken odd times, and even taken odd times, and odd taken even times.

True.

144 And if this is true, is any number left out or not necessarily included?

Assuredly not.

Then if one is, number must also be?

It must.

But if there is number, there must also be many and infinite multiplicity; for number is infinite in multiplicity and part also of being: am I not right?

Certainly.

And if all number participates in being, every part of number will also participate?

Yes.

Then being is distributed over the multitude of things, and nothing that is, however small or however great, is devoid of

it? And, indeed, the very supposition of this is absurd, for how can that which is, be devoid of being?

In no way.

And it is divided into the greatest and into the smallest, and into all kinds of being, and is broken up more than all things; the divisions of it have no limit.

True.

Then it has the greatest number of parts?

Yes, the greatest number.

Is there any of these which is a part of being, and yet no part?

Impossible.

But if it is at all and so long as it is, it must be one, and cannot be none?

Certainly.

Then the one attaches to every single part of being, and does not fail in any part, whether great or small?

True.

But reflect:—Can one be in many places at the same time, and still be a whole?

No; I see the impossibility of that.

And if not a whole, then it is divided; for it cannot be present with all the parts of being, unless divided.

True.

And that which has parts will be as many as the parts are?

Certainly.

Then we were wrong in saying just now, that being was distributed into a very great number of parts. For it is not distributed into parts more than the one, but into parts equal to the one; the one is never wanting to being, or being to the one, but being two they are co-extensive and co-equal.

Certainly that is true.

The one itself, then, having been broken up into parts by being, is many and infinite?

True.

Then not only the one which has being is many, but the one itself distributed by being, must also be many?

Certainly.

Further, inasmuch as the parts are parts of a whole, the one,

145 as a whole, will be limited; for are not the parts contained by the whole?

Certainly.

And that which contains, is a limit?

Of course.

Then the one which has being is one and many, whole and parts, limited and yet unlimited in number?

Clearly.

And because limited, also having extremes?

Certainly.

And if a whole, having beginning and middle and end. For can anything be a whole without these three? And if any one of them is wanting to anything, will that any longer be a whole?

No.

Then the one, as appears, will have beginning, middle, and end?

It will.

But, again, the middle will be equidistant from the extremes; that is the nature of the middle?

Yes.

Then the one will partake of figure, either rectilinear or round, or a union of the two?

True.

And if this is the case, it will be both in itself and in another too.

How is that?

Every part is in the whole, and none is outside the whole.

True.

And all the parts are contained by the whole?

Yes.

And the one is all its parts, and neither more nor less than all?

No.

Then the one is the whole?

Of course.

But if all the parts are in the whole, and all of them are the one and the whole and they are all contained by the whole, the one will be contained by the one; and thus the one will be in itself.

That is true.

But then, again, the whole is not in the parts — neither in all the parts, nor in some of them. For if it were in all, it would necessarily be also in one; for if there were any one in which it was not, it could not be in all the parts; for the part in which it is wanting is one of all, and if the whole is not in this, how can it be in them all?

It cannot.

Nor can the whole be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some of the parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible.

Yes, impossible.

But if the whole is neither in one, nor in more than one, nor in all of the parts, it must be in something else, or cease to be anywhere at all?

Certainly.

If it were nowhere, it would be nothing; but being a whole, and not being in itself, it must be in another.

Very true.

The one then, regarded as a whole, is in another, but regarded as being all its parts, is in itself; and therefore the one must be itself in itself and also in another.

Certainly.

The one then, being of this nature, is, of necessity, both at rest and in motion?

How is that?

The one is at rest since it is in itself, for being in one, and not passing out of this, it is in the same, which is itself.

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True.

And that which is ever in the same, must be ever at rest?

Certainly.

Well, and must not that, on the contrary, which is ever in other, never be in the same place; and if never in the same place, never at rest, and if not at rest, in motion?

True.

Then the one being always itself in itself and other, must always be both at rest and in motion?

Clearly.

And must be the same with itself, and other of itself; and

also the same with the other, and other of the other; this follows from its previous affections.

How so?

Everything in relation to every other thing, is either the same or other; or if neither the same nor other, then in the relation of a part to a whole, or of a whole to a part.

That is clear.

And is the one a part of itself?

Certainly not.

Then it cannot be a whole in relation to itself regarded as a part of itself?

Impossible.

But is the one other of one?

No.

And therefore not other of itself?

Certainly not.

If then it be neither other, nor a whole, nor a part in relation to itself, must it not be the same with itself?

Certainly.

But then, again, that which is in another place from itself remaining in the same place with itself, must be other of itself, if it is to be in another place?

True.

Then the one has been shown to be at once in itself and in another?

Yes.

Thus, then, as appears, the one will be other of itself?

True.

Well, then, if anything be other of anything, will it not be other of other?

Certainly.

And will not all things that are not one, be other of the one, and the one other of the not one?

Of course.

Then the one will be other of all others?

True.

But, consider:—Are not the absolute same, and the absolute other, opposites to one another?

Of course.

Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same?

They will not.

If then the other is never in the same, there is nothing in which the other is during any space of time; for during that space of time, however small, the other would be in the same. Is not that true?

Yes.

And since the other is never in the same, it can never be in anything that is.

True.

Then the other will never be either in the not one, or in the one?

Certainly not.

Then not by reason of the other is the one other than the not one, or the not one other than the one.

No.

Nor by reason of themselves will they be other than one another, if not partaking of the other.

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How can they be?

But if they are not other, either by reason of themselves or of the other, there will be no possibility of their being other of one another at all.

There will not.

Again, the not-one cannot partake of the one; otherwise it would not have been not-one, but would have been one.

True.

Nor can the not-one be number; for having number, it would not have been not-one at all.

It would not.

Again, is the not-one part of the one; or rather, would it not in that case partake of the one?

It would.

If then, in every point of view, the one and the not-one are distinct, then neither is the one part or whole of the not-one, nor is the not-one part or whole of the one?

No.

But we said that things which are neither parts nor wholes

of one another, nor other than one another, will be the same with one another:—that was what we said?

Yes.

Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the not-one, is the same with it?

Let us say so.

Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other of itself and the others.

That appears to be the inference.

And it will also be like and unlike itself and the others?

Perhaps.

Since the one was shown to be other of the others, the others will also be other of one.

Yes.

Other of the one in the same degree that the one is other of the others, and neither more nor less?

True.

And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?

Yes.

In so far then as its condition is to be other of others, and theirs in like manner to be other of it, the condition of the one is the same as that of the others, and that of the others the same as that of the one.

How do you mean?

I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name to a thing?

Yes.

And you may say the name once or oftener?

Yes.

And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention? or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you utter the name once or more than once?

Of course it is the same.

And is not 'other' a name given to a thing?

Certainly.

Whenever, then, you use the word 'other,' whether once or

oftener, you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the name?

True.

Then when we say that the others are other of the one, and the one other of the others, in repeating the word 'other' we speak of that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?

Quite true.

Then the one which is other of others, and the other which is other of the one, in that the word 'other' is applied to both, 148 will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition is like?

Yes.

In so far then as the one is other of the other, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is the other of every thing.

True.

Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?

Yes.

And the other to the same?

True again.

And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?

Yes.

And to be the same with the others is the opposite of being other of the others?

Certainly.

And in that it was other it was shown to be like?

Yes.

But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the opposite affection to that which made it like; and this was the affection of the other.

Yes.

The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the opposite of the other.

True.

Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is same.

Yes, that argument may be used.

And there is another argument.

What? *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft* ®

In so far as it is affected by the same it is not affected otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.

True.

Then because the one is the same with the others and other than the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it will be both like and unlike the others?

Certainly.

And in the same way as being other than itself and the same with itself, on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will be like and unlike?

Of course.

Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and others?—consider.

I am considering.

The one was shown to be in itself as a whole?

True.

And also in other things?

Yes.

In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things, and in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching other things, and would touch itself only.

Clearly.

Then the inference is that it would touch both?

It would.

But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is to touch another be next in place or position to that which it touches?

True.

Then the one if it is to touch itself ought to be situated next to itself, and have the place next to the place in which itself is?

It ought.

And that would require that the one should be two, and be
149 in two places at once, and this, while it is one, it will not be.

No.

Then the one cannot touch itself any more than it can be two? *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft* ®

It cannot.

Neither can it touch others.

Why not?

The reason is, that whatever touches another is in separation from, and must be next to, that which it is to touch, and have no third or intermediate.

True.

Two things, then, at the least are necessary to make contact possible?

They are.

And if to the two a third be added, the number of terms will be three, and the contacts two?

Yes.

And every additional term makes one additional contact, whence it follows that the contacts are one less in number than the terms; the first two terms exceeded the number of contacts by one, and the whole number of terms exceeds the whole number of contacts in like ratio; and for every one which is afterwards added to the number of terms, one contact is added to the contacts.

True.

Whatever is the whole number of things, the contacts will be always one less.

True.

But if there be only one, and not two, there will be no contact?

Clearly not.

And do we not say that the others being other of the one are not one and have no part in the one?

True.

Then they have no number, if they have no one in them?

Of course not.

Then the others are neither one nor two, nor are they called by any number?

No.

One, then, alone is one, and there are not two?

Clearly not.

And if there are not two, there is no contact?

No. *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft* ®

Then neither does the one touch the others, nor the others the one, if there is no contact?

Certainly not.

For all which reasons the one touches and does not touch itself and the others?

True.

Further—is the one equal and unequal to itself and others?

How do you mean?

If the one were greater or less than the others, or the others greater or less than the one, they would not be greater or less than each other in virtue of their being the one and the others, but, if in addition to their being what they are they had equality, they would be equal to one another, or if the one had smallness and the others greatness, or the one had greatness and the others smallness—whichever kind had greatness would be greater, and whichever had smallness would be smaller?

Certainly.

Then greatness and smallness too have a being of their own; for if they had not they could not be opposed to each other and be present in that which is.

They could not.

150 If, then, smallness is present in the one it will be present either in the whole or in a part of the whole?

Certainly.

Suppose the first; it will be either coequal and coextensive with the whole one, or will contain the one?

Clearly.

If it be coextensive with the one it will be equal with the one, or if containing the one it will be greater than the one?

Of course.

But can smallness be equal to anything or greater than anything, and have the functions of greatness and equality and not its own functions?

Impossible.

Then smallness cannot be in the whole of one, but, if at all, in a part only?

Yes.

And surely not in all of a part, for then the difficulty of the

whole will recur ; it will be equal to or greater than any part in which it is ?

Certainly.

Then smallness will not be in anything, whether in a whole or in a part ; nor will there be anything small but actual smallness.

True.

Neither will greatness be in the one, for if greatness be in anything there will be something greater, other and besides greatness itself, namely, that in which greatness is ; and this too when the small itself is not there, which it, if it is great, must exceed ; this, however, is impossible, seeing that smallness is wholly absent.

True.

But greatness is only greater than absolute smallness, and smallness is only smaller than absolute greatness.

Very true.

Then other things are not greater or less than the one, for they have neither greatness nor smallness ; nor have greatness or smallness any power of exceeding or being exceeded in relation to the one, but only in relation to one another ; nor will the one be greater or less than them or others, because having neither greatness nor smallness.

Clearly not.

Then if the one is neither greater nor less than the others, it cannot either exceed or be exceeded by them ?

Certainly not.

And that which neither exceeds nor is exceeded, must be on an equality ; and being on an equality, must be equal.

Of course.

And this will be true also of the relation of the one to itself ; having neither greatness nor smallness in itself, it will neither exceed nor be exceeded by itself, but will be on an equality and equal to itself.

Certainly.

Then the one will be equal both to itself and the others ?

That is evident.

And yet the one, being itself in itself, will also surround and be without itself ; and, as containing itself, will be greater than

151 itself; and, as contained in itself, will be less; and will thus be greater and less than itself.

It will.

Now there cannot possibly be anything which is not included in the one and the others?

Of course not.

But, surely, that which is must always be somewhere?

Yes.

But that which is in anything will be less, and that in which it is will be greater; in no other way can one thing be in another.

True.

And since there is nothing other of, or separated from, the one and the other, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the one in the others and the others in the one, if they are to be anywhere?

That is clear.

But inasmuch as the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, and contain the one, which will be less than the others, and will be contained in them; and inasmuch as the others are in the one, the one on the same principle will be greater than the others, and the others less than the one.

True.

The one, then, will be equal to and greater and less than itself and the others?

Clearly.

And if it be greater and less and equal, it will be of equal and more and less measures than itself and the others, and if of measures also of parts?

Of course.

And if of equal and more and less measures, it will be in number more or less than itself and the others, and likewise equal in number to itself and to the others.

How is that?

It will be of more measures than those things which it exceeds, and of as many measures as parts; and so with that to which it is equal, and that than which it is less.

True.

And being greater and less than itself, and equal to itself,

it will be of equal measures with itself and of more and fewer measures than itself; and if of measures then also of parts?

Certainly.

And being of equal parts with itself, it will be numerically equal to itself; and being of more parts, more, and being of less, less than itself.

Certainly.

And the same will hold of its relation to other things; inasmuch as it is greater than them, it will be more in number than them; and inasmuch as it is smaller, it will be less in number; and inasmuch as it is equal to other things, it will be equal to them in number.

Certainly.

Once more, then, as would appear, the one will be in number both equal to and more and less than both itself and all other things.

It will.

Does the one also partake of time? And is it and does it become older and younger than itself and others, and again neither younger nor older than itself and others by virtue of participation in time?

How do you mean?

If one is, being must be predicated of it?

Yes.

But to be (*εἶναι*) is only participation of being in company with present time, and to have been is the participation of being in company with past time, and to be about to be is the participation of being in company with future time? 152

Very true.

Then the one if it partakes of being partakes of time?

Certainly.

And is not time always moving forward?

Yes.

Then the one is always becoming older than itself, if it moves forward in time?

Certainly.

And do we remember that the older becomes older than that which becomes younger?

Yes, we remember that.

Then since the one becomes older than itself, it is becoming older while itself is becoming younger?

Certainly.

Thus, then, the one becomes older as well as younger than itself?

Yes.

And it is older (is it not?) when in becoming, it gets to the point of time between 'was' and 'will be,' which is 'now': for surely in going from the past to the future, it cannot pass over the present?

No.

And when it arrives at the present it stops from becoming older, and no longer becomes, but is older, for if it went on it would never be reached by the present, for it is the nature of that which goes on, to touch both the present and the future, letting go the present and seizing the future, while in process of becoming between them.

True.

But that which is becoming cannot pass the present; when it reaches the present it ceases to become, and is then whatever it may happen to become.

That is clear.

And so the one, when in becoming older it reaches the present, ceases to become, and then is older.

Certainly.

And it is older than that which it was becoming older than, and it was becoming older than itself.

Yes.

And that which is older is older than that which is younger?

True.

Then the one is younger than itself, when in becoming older it reaches the present?

Certainly.

But the present is always present with the one during all its being; for whenever it is it is always now.

Certainly.

Then the one always both is and becomes older or younger than itself?

Truly.

And is it or does it become a longer time than itself or an equal time with itself?

An equal time.

But that which becomes or is for an equal time is of the same age?

Of course.

And that which is of the same age, is neither older nor younger?

No.

The one, then, becoming and being the same time with itself, neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself? 153

I should say not.

And what are its relations to other things? Is it older or younger than they are?

I cannot tell you.

You can at least tell me that the others are more than the one—other would have been one, but the others have multitude, and are more than one?

True.

A multitude implies a number larger than one?

Of course.

And shall we say that the lesser or the greater is the first to come or to have come into existence?

The lesser.

Then the least is the first? And that is the one?

Yes.

Then the one of all things that have number is the first to come into being; but all other things have also number, being plural and not singular.

They have.

And that which came into being first must be supposed to have come into being prior to the others, and the others later; and the things which came into being later, are younger than that which preceded them? And so the other things will be younger than the one, and the one older than other things?

True.

What would you say of another question? Can the one have

come into being contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?

Impossible.

And yet, surely, the one was shown to have parts; and if parts, then a beginning, middle and end?

Yes.

And a beginning is the first of everything to come into being, both of the one itself and of all other things; and after the beginning, the others follow, until you reach the end?

Certainly.

And all these others we shall affirm to be parts of the whole and the one, which, as soon as the end is reached, has become whole and one?

Yes; that is what we shall say.

But the end comes last, and the one is by nature so constituted as to come into being with the end; so that if the one cannot come into being except in accordance with its own nature, its nature will require that it should come into being after the others, simultaneously with the end.

Clearly.

Then the one is younger than the others and the others older than the one.

That also is clear in my judgment.

Well, and must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything, if it be a part and not parts, being a part, be also of necessity one?

Certainly.

And will not the one come into being together with each part—together with the first part as it comes into being, and together with the second part and with all the rest, and will not be wanting to any part which is added until it has reached the last and become one whole; it will be wanting neither to the middle, nor to the first, nor to the last, nor to any of them, while the process of becoming is going on?

True.

Then the one is of the same age with all the others, so that if the one is to come into being in a manner not contrary to its nature, it will be neither prior nor posterior to the others, but simultaneous; and according to this argument the one will be

neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others than the one, but according to the previous argument the one will be older and younger than the others and the others than the one.

Certainly.

After this manner then the one is and has become. But as to its becoming older and younger than the others, and the others than the one, and neither older nor younger, what shall we say? Shall we say as of being so also of becoming, or otherwise?

I cannot answer.

But I can venture to say, that even if the one is older or younger than another, it will not become older or younger in a greater degree than it was at first; for equals added to unequals, whether to time or to anything else, leave the difference between them the same as at first.

Of course.

Then that which is, cannot become older or younger than that which is, if the difference of age is always the same; the one is and has come to be older and the other younger; but they do not become so.

True.

And the one which is does not therefore become either older or younger than the others which are.

No.

But consider whether they may not become older and younger in this way.

In what way?

Inasmuch as the one was proven to be older than the others and the others than the one.

And what of that?

If the one is older than the others, it has come into being a longer time than the others.

Yes.

But consider again; if we add equal time to a greater and a less time, will the greater differ from the less time by an equal or by a smaller portion?

By a smaller portion.

Then the difference between the age of the one and the age of the others will not be afterwards so great as at first, but if

an equal time be added to both of them they will differ less and less in age?

Yes.

And that which differs in age from some other less than formerly, from being older will become younger in relation to that other?

Yes, younger.

And if the one becomes younger the others will become older than they were before in relation to the one.

Certainly.

Then that which has become younger becomes older relatively to that which previously was and has become older, but never is older, for the one is always growing on the side of youth and the other on the side of age. And in like manner the older is always in process of becoming younger than the younger; for as they are always going in opposite directions they become the opposite of one another, the younger older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. They cannot, however, have become; for if they had already become they would be and not merely become. But that is impossible; for they are always becoming both older and younger than one another: the one becomes younger than the others because it was seen to be older and prior, and the others become older than the one because they came into being later; and in the same way the others are in the same relation to the one, because they were seen to be older and prior to the one.

That is clear.

Inasmuch then, as one thing does not become older or younger than another, in that they differ from each other by an equal number, the one cannot become older or younger than the others, nor the others than the one; but inasmuch as that which came into being earlier and that which came into being later must continually differ from each other by a different portion—in this point of view the others must become older and younger than the one, and the one than the others.

Certainly.

For all these reasons, then, the one is and becomes older and younger than itself and the others, and neither is nor becomes older or younger than itself or the others.

Certainly.

But since the one partakes of time, and partakes of becoming older and younger, must it not also partake of the past, the present, and the future?

Of course.

Then the one was and is and will be, and was becoming and is becoming and will become?

Certainly.

And there is and was and will be something which is in relation to it and belongs to it?

True.

And if we at this moment have opinion and knowledge and perception of the one, then there is opinion and knowledge and perception of it?

Quite right.

Then it has name and definition, and is named and described, and everything of this kind which appertains to other things appertains to the one.

Certainly, that is true.

Yet once more and for the third time, let us consider: If the one is both one and many, as we have described, and is neither one nor many, and participant of time, must it not, in as far as it is one, at times partake of being, and in as far as it is not one, at times not partake of being?

Certainly.

But can it partake of being when not partaking of being, or not partake of being when partaking of being?

Impossible.

Then the one partakes and does not partake of being at different times, for that is the only way in which it can partake and not partake of the same.

True.

And is there not also a time at which it assumes being and 156 relinquishes being—for how can it have and not have the same thing unless it receives and also gives it up at some time?

Impossible.

And the assuming of being is what you would call becoming?

I should.

And the relinquishing of being you would call destruction?
I should.

The one then, as would appear, becomes and is destroyed by taking and giving up being.

Certainly.

And being one and many and in process of becoming and being destroyed, when it becomes one the being of the many is destroyed, and when many, the being of the one is destroyed?

Certainly.

And as it becomes one and many, must it not inevitably experience separation and aggregation?

Inevitably.

And whenever it becomes like and unlike it must be assimilated and dissimilated?

Yes.

And when it becomes greater or less or equal it must grow or diminish or be equalised?

True.

And when being in motion it rests, and when being at rest it changes to motion, it can surely be in no time at all?

How can it?

But that a thing which is previously at rest should be afterwards in motion, or previously in motion and afterwards at rest, without experiencing change, is impossible.

Impossible.

And surely there cannot be a time in which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest?

There cannot.

But neither can it change without changing.

True.

When then does it change; for it cannot change either when at rest, or when in motion, or when in time?

It cannot.

And perhaps this strange thing in which it is at the time of changing is—

Is what?

The moment. For the moment seems to imply a something out of which change takes place into either of two states; for the change is not from the state of rest as such,

nor from the state of motion as such; but there is this curious nature which we call the moment lying between rest and motion, not being in any time; and into this and out of this what is in motion changes into rest, and what is at rest into motion.

So it appears.

And the one then, if it is in rest and also in motion, will change to either, for only in this way can it be both. And in changing it changes in a moment, and when it is changing it will be in no time, and will not then be either in motion or at rest.

True.

And it will be in the same case in relation to the other 157 changes, when it passes from being into destruction, or from not being into becoming—then it passes between certain states of motion and rest, and neither is nor is not, nor becomes nor is destroyed.

Very true.

And on the same principle, in the passage from one to many and from many to one, the one is neither one nor many, neither separated nor aggregated; and in the passage from like to unlike, and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, neither in a state of assimilation nor of dissimilation; and in the passage from small to great and equal and back again, it will be neither small nor great, nor equal, nor in a state of increase, or diminution, or equalisation.

True.

All these, then, are the affections of the one, if the one is. Of course.

i. aa. But if one is, what will happen to the others—is not that to be considered?

Yes.

Let us show then, if one is, what will be the affections of that which is other than the one.

Let us do so.

Inasmuch as there are things other than the one, the others are not the one; for if they were they could not be other than the one.

Very true.

Nor are the others altogether without the one, but in a certain way they participate in the one.

How so?

Because the others are other than the one inasmuch as they have parts; for if they had no parts they would be simply one.

Right.

And parts, as we affirm, have relation to a whole?

That is what we say.

And a whole must necessarily be one made up of many; and the parts will be parts of the one, for each of the parts is not a part of many, but of a whole.

How do you mean?

If anything were a part of many, being itself one among many, it will surely be a part of itself, which is impossible, and it will be a part of each one of the other parts, if of all; for if not a part of some one, it will be a part of all the others but this one, and thus will not be a part of each one; and if not a part of each one, it will not be a part of any one of the many; and not being a part of any one, it cannot be a part or anything else of all those things of none of which is it anything.

That is clear.

Then the part is not a part of the many, nor of all, but is of a certain single form, which we call a whole, being one perfect unity framed out of all—of this the part will be a part.

Certainly.

If, then, the others have parts, they will participate in the whole and the one.

True.

Then the others of the one must be one perfect whole, having parts.

Certainly.

And the same argument holds of each part, for the part 158 must participate in the one; for if each of the parts is a part, this means, I suppose, that it is one separate from the rest and self related; otherwise it is not each.

True. *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

But when we speak of the part participating in the one, it must clearly be other than one; for if not, it would not merely have participated, but would have been one; whereas only the one itself can be one.

Very true.

Both the whole and the part must participate in the one; for the whole will be one whole, of which the parts will be parts; and the part in each case will be one part of the whole which is the whole of the part.

True.

And will not the things which participate in the one, be other than it?

Of course.

And the things which are other of the one will be many; for if the things which are other of the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.

True.

But, seeing that the things which participate in the one as a part, and in the one as a whole, are more than one, must not those very things which participate in the one be infinite in number?

How is that?

Let us look at the matter thus:—Is it not a fact that in partaking of the one they are not one, and do not participate in the one at the very time when they are partaking of it?

Clearly.

They do so then as multitudes in which the one is not present?

Very true.

And if we were to abstract from them in idea the very smallest fraction, must not that least fraction, if it does not partake of the one, be a multitude and not one?

Certainly.

And if we continue to look at the others, regarded simply, and in themselves, will not they, as far as we see them, be unlimited in number?

Certainly.

And yet, when each several part becomes a part, then the

parts have a limit in relation to the whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the parts.

No doubt.

The result to the others than the one is that the union of themselves and the one appears to create a new element in them which gives limitation in relation to one another; whereas in their own nature they have no limit.

That is clear.

Then the others of the one, both as whole and parts, are infinite, and also partake of limit.

Certainly.

Then they are both like and unlike one another and themselves.

How is that?

Inasmuch as they are unlimited in their own nature, they are all affected in the same way.

True.

And inasmuch as they all partake of limit, they are all affected in the same way.

Of course.

But inasmuch as their state is both limited and unlimited, they are affected in opposite ways.

Yes.

159 And opposites are the most unlike of things.

Certainly.

Considered, then, in regard to either one of their affections, they will be like themselves and one another; considered in reference to both of them together, most opposed and most unlike.

That appears to be true.

Then the others are both like and unlike themselves and one another?

True.

And they are the same and also different from one another, and in motion and at rest, and experience every sort of opposite affection, as may be proved without difficulty of them, and as, in the case of the affections aforesaid, has been already proved?

True. *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft* ®

i. bb. Suppose, now, that we leave the further discussion of these matters as evident, and consider again upon the hypothesis that the one is, whether the opposite of all this is or is not equally true of the others.

By all means.

Then let us begin again, and ask, If one is, what must be the affections of the others?

Let us ask that question.

Must not the one be distinct from the others, and the others from the one?

Why so?

Why, because there is nothing else beside them which is distinct from both of them; for the expression 'one and the others' includes all things.

Yes, all things.

Then we cannot suppose that there is anything different from them in which the one and the others might exist?

There is nothing.

Then the one and the others are never in the same?

True.

Then they are separated from each other?

Yes.

And we surely cannot say that what is truly one has parts? Impossible.

Then the one will not be in the others as a whole, nor the parts of the one, if it be separated from the others, and has no parts?

Impossible.

Then there is no way in which the many can partake of the one, if they do not partake either in whole or in part?

It would seem not.

Then there is no way in which the others are one, or have in themselves any unity?

No.

Nor are the others many; for if they were many, each part of them would be a part of the whole; but now the others, not partaking in any way of the one, are neither one nor many, nor whole, nor part.

True. *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft* ®

Then the others neither are nor contain two or three, if entirely deprived of the one?

True.

Then the others are neither like nor unlike the one, nor is likeness and unlikeness in them; for if they were like and unlike, or had in them likeness and unlikeness, they would have two natures in them opposite to one another.

That is clear.

But for that which partakes of nothing to partake of two things was held by us to be impossible?

Impossible.

160 Then the others are neither like nor unlike nor both, for if they were like or unlike they would partake of one of those two natures, which would be one thing, and if they were both they would partake of the opposites which would be two things, and this has been shown to be impossible.

True.

Therefore they are neither the same, nor other, nor in motion, nor at rest, nor in a state of becoming, nor of being destroyed, nor greater, nor less, nor equal, nor have they experienced anything else of the sort; for, if they are capable of experiencing any such affection, they will participate in one and two and three, and odd and even, and in these, as has been proved, they do not participate, seeing that they are altogether and in every way devoid of the one.

Very true.

Therefore if one is, the one is all things, and also nothing, both in relation to itself and to other things.

Certainly.

ii. a. Well, and ought we not to consider next what will be the consequence if the one is not?

Yes; we ought.

What is the meaning of the hypothesis—If the one is not; is there any difference between this and the hypothesis—If the not one is not?

There is a difference, certainly.

Is there a difference only, or rather are not the two expressions—if the one is not, and if the not one is not, entirely opposed?

They are entirely opposed.

And suppose a person to say:—If greatness is not, if smallness is not, or anything of that sort, does he not mean by using this expression that ‘not being’ is other than other things?

To be sure.

And so when he says ‘If one is not’ he clearly means, by what is not, what is other of all others; we know what he means—do we not?

Yes, we do.

When then he says one, he says firstly something which is known, and secondly something which is other of all other things; it makes no difference whether he predicate of it being or not-being, for that which is said ‘not to be’ is known all the same, and is distinguished from all other things.

Certainly.

Then I will begin again, and ask: If one is not, what are the consequences? In the first place, as would appear, there is a knowledge of it, or the very meaning of the words, ‘if one is not,’ would not be known.

True.

Secondly, the others differ from it, or it could not be described as different from the others?

Certainly.

Difference, then, belongs to it as well as knowledge; for in speaking of the one as different from the others, we do not speak of a difference in the others, but in the one.

That is clear.

Moreover, the one that is not partakes of ‘that,’ and ‘some,’ and ‘this,’ and ‘relation to this,’ and ‘these,’ and the like; for the one, or the others of the one, could not have been spoken of, nor could any attribute or relative of the one be or be spoken of, if the one did not partake of ‘some,’ or of the other attributes just now mentioned.

True.

Being, then, cannot be ascribed to the one, if the one is not; but the one that is not may or rather must participate in many, 161 if the one only and nothing else is not; if, however, neither the one nor anything else is not, and we are speaking of some-

thing else, we can predicate nothing of it¹. But supposing that one and nothing else is not, then it must participate in the predicate 'that,' and in much besides.

Certainly.

And it will have unlikeness in relation to the others, for the others being different from the one will be of a different kind.

Certainly.

And are not things of a different kind also other in kind?

Of course.

And are not things other in kind unlike?

They are unlike.

And if they are unlike the one, they will be clearly unlike that which is unlike?

That is clear.

Then the one will have unlikeness in respect of which the others will be unlike it?

That would seem to be true.

And if unlikeness to other things is attributed to it, it must have likeness to itself.

How is that?

If the one have unlikeness to the one, it cannot be anything of the nature of the one which is spoken of; nor will the hypothesis relate to the one; but it will relate to something other than one?

Quite so.

But that cannot be.

No.

Then the one must have likeness to itself?

True.

Again, it is not equal to the others; for if it were equal, then it would at once be and be like them in virtue of the equality; but if one has no being, then it can neither be nor be equal?

Impossible.

But if it is not equal to the others, neither are the others equal to it?

Certainly not.

And things that are not equal are unequal?

True.

And they are unequal by reason of inequality?

Of course.

Then the one partakes of inequality, and in respect of this the others are unequal to it?

Very true.

And inequality implies greatness and smallness?

Yes.

Then, on this supposition, the one has greatness and smallness?

That appears to be true.

And greatness and smallness always stand apart from one another?

True.

Then there is always something between them?

There is.

And can you think of anything else which is between them other than equality?

No, it is equality.

Then that which has greatness and smallness also has equality, which lies between them?

That is clear.

Then the one, which is not, partakes, as would appear, of greatness and smallness and equality?

Clearly.

Further, it must surely in a sort partake of being?

How so?

It must be as we say, for if not, then we should not say the truth in saying that the one is not. But if we say the truth, we must suppose ourselves to say what is. Am I not right?

Yes.

And since we affirm that we speak truly, we must also be supposed to be saying that which is.

Certainly.

Then, as would appear, the one is not, for if it were not to be not being, but¹ to admit something of being into not being, it would at once become being.

Quite true.

Then not being, if it is to maintain itself, must have the

¹ Or, to admit something of the existence of not-being.

being of not-being as the bond of not-being, just as being must have as a bond the not-being of not-being in order to perfect its own being; for the truest assertion of the being of being and of the not-being of not-being is when being partakes of the being of being, and of the not-being of the being of not-being—that is, the perfection of being; and when not-being as not-being partakes both of the not-being of not-being and of the being of being—that is the perfection of not-being.

Most true.

Since then what is partakes of not-being, and what is not of being, must not the one also partake of being in order not to be?

Certainly.

Then the one, if it is not, clearly has being?

Clearly.

And not-being also, if it is not?

Of course.

But can anything which is in a certain state not be in that state without changing?

Impossible.

Then everything which is and is not in a certain state, implies change?

Certainly.

And change is motion—we may say that?

Yes, motion.

And the one has been proved both to be and not to be?

Yes.

And therefore is and is not in the same state?

Yes.

And thus also the one that is not has been shown to have motion, because it changes from being to not-being?

That appears to be true.

But surely if it is nowhere among what is, as is the fact, since it is not, it cannot change from one place to another?

Impossible.

Then it cannot move by changing place?

No.

Nor can it turn on the same spot, for it nowhere touches the

same, for the same is being, and that which is not cannot be in any being?

It cannot.

Then the one, if it is not, cannot turn in that in which it is not?

No.

Neither can the one, whether it is or is not, be altered into other than itself, for if it altered from itself, then we should not be speaking of the one, but of something else, if it changed from itself?

True.

But if the one is neither altered from itself, nor turns round in the same place, nor changes place, can it still be capable of motion?

Impossible.

Now that which is unmoved must surely be at rest, and that which is at rest must stand?

Certainly.

Then the one that is not, stands, and is also in motion?

That seems to be true.

But if it be in motion it must necessarily undergo alteration, for anything which is moved, in so far as it is moved, is no longer in the same state, but in another? 163

Yes.

Then the one, being moved, is altered?

Yes.

And, further, if not moved in any way, it will not be altered in any way?

No.

Then, in so far as the one that is not is moved, it is altered, but in so far as it is not moved, it is not altered?

Right.

Then the one that is not is altered and is not altered?

That is clear.

And must not that which is altered become other than it previously was, and lose its former state and be destroyed; but that which is not altered can neither come into being nor perish?

Very true.

And the one that is not, being altered, becomes and is destroyed; and not being altered, neither becomes nor is destroyed; and so the one that is not becomes and is destroyed, and neither becomes nor is destroyed?

True.

ii. b. And now, let us go back once more to the beginning, and see whether any new consequences will follow.

Let us do as you say.

If one is not, we ask what is to follow in respect of one? That is the question.

Yes.

Do not the words 'is not,' imply absence of being in that of which we say 'is not'?

Just so.

And when we say that a thing is not, do we mean that it is not in one way but is in another? do we not mean, absolutely, that what is not has in no sort or way or kind, participation of being?

In the most absolute sense.

Then, that which is not cannot be, or in any way participate in being?

It cannot.

And did we not mean by becoming, and being destroyed, the assumption of being and the loss of being?

Nothing but that.

And can that which has no participation in being, either assume or lose being?

Impossible.

The one then which in no way is cannot have or lose or assume being in any way?

True.

Then the one that is not, since it in no way partakes of being, neither perishes nor becomes?

No.

Then it is not altered at all; for if it were it would become and be destroyed?

True.

But if it be not altered it cannot be moved?

Certainly not.

Nor can we say that it stands, if it is nowhere ; for that which stands must always be in some place which is the same ?

The same of course.

Then we must say, once more, that what is not neither stands nor is in motion ?

Neither.

Nor has it anything related to it ; for if it had, it would partake of being ?

164

That is clear.

Neither can smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, be attributed to it ?

No.

Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other ?

Clearly not.

Well, and if it has no attribute or relation, can other things be related to it ?

Certainly not.

And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the same, or different in relation to it ?

They cannot.

No more can of or to, or some, or this, or of this, or of or to another, or past or future or present, or knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or description, or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with not being ?

They have none.

Then the one that is not in no way is ?

That appears to be the conclusion.

ii. aa. Yet once more ; if one is not, what becomes of the others ? Let us determine that.

Yes ; let us determine that.

They must surely be, for if they were not, we could not speak of them ?

True.

But if we speak of the others, that implies difference—the terms 'other' and 'different' are synonymous ?

True.

Other means other of other, and different, different from the different?

Yes.

Then, if the others are supposed to be, there must be something of which they will be others?

Certainly.

And what can that be?—for if the one is not, they will not be others of the one.

They will not.

Then they will be others of each other; for failing of that, they are others of nothing.

True.

Then they are each the others of one another, in the plural and not in the singular; for if one is not, they cannot be singulars, but every particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being very small becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions of it?

Very true.

And in such particles the others will be the others of one another, if others are, and not the one?

Exactly.

And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be and not being one, if one is not?

True.

And there will seem to be a number of them, if each of them is one, and they are many?

Yes, there will.

And there will be odd and even among them, which will also have no reality, if one is not?

No.

And they will appear to have a least fraction; and even this
165 will seem large and manifold in comparison with the littleness of each of the fractions into which it is divided?

Certainly.

And each particle will appear equal to the many and little;

for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the less without having appeared to arrive at the middle ; and thus would arise the appearance of equality.

Yes.

And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.

How is that ?

Because, when a person conceives of any one of these, prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another end, remaining after the end, and in the middle a truer middle within but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, if the one is not.

Very true.

And so all being which any one can possibly conceive, must be broken up into fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity ?

Certainly.

And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears to be one ; but when seen near and with keen vision, every single thing appears to be infinite, if deprived of the one which is not ?

That is most certain.

Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and one and many, if the others of the one exist and not the one.

They must.

Then will they not appear to be like and unlike ?

How is that ?

Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike ?

True.

But when you approach them, they appear to be many and different ; and because of the appearance of the other different in kind, and unlike themselves ?

True.

And so must the particles appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other.

Certainly.

And must they not be the same and yet different from another, and in contact and also in separation, and having every sort of motion, and every sort of rest, and becoming and being destroyed, and in neither state, and the like, all which things may be easily enumerated if the one is not and the many are?

Most true.

ii. bb. Once more, let us go back to the beginning, and ask if the one is not, and the others of the one are, what will follow.

Let us ask that question.

In the first place, the others will not be one?

Impossible.

Nor will they be many; for if they were many one would be contained in them. But if no one of them is one, all of them are nought, and therefore they will not be many.

True.

If there be no one in the others, the others are neither many nor one.

166 They are not.

Nor do they appear either as one or many.

Why is that?

Because the others have no sort or manner or way of communion with any sort of not-being, nor can anything which is not be connected with any of the others; for that which is not has no parts.

True.

Nor is there an opinion or any appearance of not-being in connection with the others, nor is not-being ever in any way attributed to the others.

No.

Then if one is not, there is no conception of the others either as one or many; for you cannot conceive the many without the one.

You cannot.

Then if one is not, the others neither are, nor can be conceived to be either one or many?

It would seem not.

Nor as like or unlike?

No.

Nor as the same or different, nor in contact or separation, nor in any of those states which we spoke of as apparent;—the others neither are nor appear to be any of these, if one is not?

True.

Then may we not sum up the argument in a word and say truly: If one is not, then nothing is?

Certainly.

Then now that is said; and let us say further, as seems to be the truth, that, whether one is or is not, one and the others in relation to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, are and are not, and appear and appear not.

Most true.

THEAETETUS.

INTRODUCTION.

THERE are some dialogues of Plato whose place in the series and relation to the other dialogues cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. The Theaetetus, like the Parmenides, has points of similarity both with his earlier and his later writings. The perfection of style, the humour, the dramatic interest, the complexity of structure, the fertility of illustration, the shifting of the points of view, are characteristic of his best period of authorship. The vain search, the negative conclusion, the figure of the midwives, the constant profession of ignorance on the part of Socrates, also bear the stamp of the early dialogues, in which the original Socrates is not yet Platonized. Had we no other indications, we should be disposed to range the Theaetetus with the Apology and the Phaedrus, and perhaps even with the Protagoras and the Laches.

But when we pass from the style to an examination of the subject, we trace a connexion with the later rather than with the earlier dialogues. In the first place there is the connexion, indicated by Plato himself at the end of the dialogue, with the Sophist, to which in many respects the Theaetetus is so little akin. The same persons reappear (1) including the younger Socrates, whose name is just mentioned in the Theaetetus, 147 C; (2) the theory of rest, which at p. 133 D, Socrates has declined to consider, is resumed by the Eleatic Stranger; (3) there is a similar allusion in both dialogues to the meeting of Parmenides and Socrates, Theaet. 183 E, Soph. 217; and (4) the inquiry into not-being in the Sophist supplements the question of false opinion which is raised in the Theaetetus. (Compare also Theaet. 168 A, 210, and Soph. 230 B; Theaet. 174 D, E, and Soph. 227 A; Theaet. 188 E, and Soph. 237 D; Theaet. 170 A, and Soph. 233 B; Theaet. 172 D, Soph. 253 C, for parallel

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turns of thought). Secondly, the later date of the dialogue is confirmed by the absence of the doctrine of recollection and of any doctrine of ideas except that which derives them from generalization and from reflection of the mind upon itself. The general character of the Theaetetus is dialectical, and there are traces of the same Megarian influences which appear in the Parmenides, and which later writers, in their matter of fact way, have explained by the residence of Plato at Megara. Socrates disclaims the character of a professional eristic, 164 C, and also, with a sort of ironical admiration, expresses his inability to attain the Megarian precision in the use of terms, 197 A. Yet he too employs a similar sophistical skill in overturning every conceivable theory of knowledge.

The direct indications of a date amount to no more than this: the conversation is said to have taken place when Theaetetus was a youth, and shortly before the death of Socrates. At the time of his own death he is supposed to be a full-grown man. Allowing nine or ten years for the interval between youth and manhood, the dialogue could not have been written earlier than 390, when Plato was about thirty-nine years of age. No more definite date is indicated by the engagement in which Theaetetus is said to have fallen or to have been wounded, and which may have taken place any time during the Corinthian war, between the years 390-387. The later date which has been suggested, 369, when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, would make the age of Theaetetus at his death forty-five or forty-six. This a little impairs the beauty of Socrates' remark, 'that he would be a great man if he lived.'

In this uncertainty about the place of the Theaetetus, it seemed better, as in the case of the Republic, Timaeus, Critias, to retain the order in which Plato himself has arranged this and the two companion dialogues. We cannot exclude the possibility which has been already noticed in reference to other works of Plato, that the Theaetetus may not have been all written at one time; or the still greater probability that the Sophist and Politicus, which differ greatly in style, were only appended after a long interval of time. The allusion to Parmenides at 183, compared with Sophist 217, would probably imply that the dialogue which is called by his name was already in existence; unless, indeed, we suppose the passage in which the allusion occurs to have been inserted afterwards. Again, the Theaetetus may be connected with the Gorgias, either dialogue from different points of view containing an analysis of the real and

apparent (Schleiermacher); and both may be brought into relation with the *Apology* as illustrating the personal life of Socrates. The *Philebus*, too, may with equal reason be placed either after or before what, in the language of Thrasyllus, may be called the Second Platonic Trilogy. Both the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*, and still more the *Theaetetus*, have points of affinity with the *Cratylus*, in which the principles of rest and motion are again contrasted, and the Sophistical or Protagorean theory of language is opposed to that which is attributed to the disciple of Heracleitus, not to speak of lesser resemblances in thought and language. The *Parmenides*, again, has been thought by some to hold an intermediate position between the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*; upon this view, *Soph.* 250 foll. may be regarded as the answer to the problems about One and Being which have been raised in the *Parmenides*. Any of these arrangements may suggest new views to the student of Plato; none of them can lay claim to an exclusive probability in its favour.

The *Theaetetus* is one of the narrated dialogues of Plato, and is the only one which is supposed to have been written down. In a short introductory scene, Euclides and Terpsion are described as meeting before the door of Euclides' house in Megara. This may have been a spot familiar to Plato (for Megara was within a walk of Athens), but no importance can be attached to the accidental introduction of the founder of the Megarian philosophy. The real intention of the preface is to create an interest about the person of Theaetetus, who has just been carried up from the army at Corinth in a dying state. The expectation of his death recalls the promise of his youth, and especially the famous conversation which Socrates had with him when he was quite young, a few days before his own trial and death, as we are once more reminded at the end of the dialogue. Yet we may observe that Plato has himself forgotten this, when he represents Euclides as from time to time coming to Athens and correcting the copy from Socrates' own mouth. The narrative, having introduced Theaetetus, and having guaranteed the authenticity of the dialogue (cp. *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Parmenides*) is then dropped. No further use is made of the device. As Plato himself remarks, who in this as in some other minute points, is imitated by Cicero (*De Amicitia*, c. 1), the interlocutory words are omitted.

Theaetetus, the hero of the battle of Corinth and of the dialogue, is a disciple of Theodorus, the great geometrician, whose science is thus indicated to be the propaedeutic to philosophy. An interest has been

already excited about him by his approaching death, and now he is introduced to us anew by the praises of his master Theodorus. He is a youthful Socrates, and exhibits the same contrast of the fair soul and the ungainly face and frame, the Silenus mask and the god within, which are described in the Symposium. The picture which Theodorus gives of his courage and patience and intelligence and modesty is verified in the course of the dialogue. His courage is shown by his behaviour in the battle, and his other qualities shine forth as the argument proceeds. Socrates takes an evident delight in 'the wise Theaetetus,' who has more in him than 'many bearded men'; he is quite inspired by his answers. At first the youth is lost in wonder, and is almost too modest to speak (151 E), but, encouraged by Socrates, he rises to the occasion, and grows full of interest and enthusiasm about the great question. Like a youth (162 D) he has not finally made up his mind, and is very ready to follow the lead of Socrates, and to enter into each successive phase of the discussion which turns up. His great dialectical talent is shown in his power of drawing distinctions (163 E), and of foreseeing the consequences of his own answers (154 D). The enquiry about the nature of knowledge is not new to him; long ago he has felt the 'pang of philosophy,' and has experienced the youthful intoxication which is depicted in the Philebus (p. 15). But he has hitherto been unable to make the transition from mathematics to metaphysics. He can form a general conception of square and oblong numbers (p. 148), but he is unable to attain a similar expression of knowledge in the abstract. Yet at length (p. 185), he begins to recognise that there are universal conceptions of being, likeness, sameness, number, which the mind contemplates in herself, and with the help of Socrates is conducted from a theory of sense to a theory of ideas.

There is no reason to doubt that Theaetetus was a real person, whose name survived in the next generation. But neither can any importance be attached to the notices of him in Suidas and Proclus, which are probably based on the mention of him in Plato. According to a confused statement in Suidas, who mentions him twice over as a pupil, first of Socrates and then of Plato, he is said to have written the first work on the Five Solids. But no early authority cites the work, the invention of which may have been easily suggested by the division of roots, which Plato attributes to him, and the allusion to the backward state of solid geometry in the Republic (vii. 528 B). At any rate, there is no

occasion to recall him to life again (Muller) after the battle of Corinth in order that we may allow time for the completion of such a work. Such a supposition entirely destroys the pathetic interest of the introduction.

Theodorus, the geometrician, had once been the friend and disciple of Protagoras, and is reluctantly drawn from his retirement to defend his old master. He is too old to learn Socrates' game of question and answer, and prefers the digressions to the main argument, because he finds them easier to follow. The mathematician, as Socrates says in the Republic, is not capable of giving a reason in the same manner as the dialectician (vii. 531 D, E), and Theodorus could not therefore have been appropriately introduced as the chief respondent. But he may be fairly appealed to, when the honour of his master is at stake. He is the 'guardian of his orphans,' although this is a responsibility which he wishes to throw upon Callias, the friend and patron of all Sophists, declaring that he himself had early 'run away' from philosophy, and was absorbed in mathematics. His extreme dislike to the Heraclitean fanatics, (like the dislike of Theaetetus (155 E) to the repulsive materialists,) and his ready acceptance of the noble words of Socrates (175, 176) are noticeable traits of character.

The Socrates of the Theaetetus is the same as the Socrates of the earlier dialogues. He is the invincible disputant, now advanced in years, of the Protagoras and Symposium; he is still pursuing his divine mission, his 'Herculean labours,' of which he has described the origin in the Apology; and he still hears the voice of his oracle, bidding him receive or not receive the truant souls. There he is supposed to have a mission to convict men of self-conceit; in the Theaetetus he has assigned to him by God the functions of a man-midwife, who delivers men from their errors, and under this character he is present throughout the dialogue. He is the true prophet who has an insight into the natures of men, and can divine their future (142 C); and he knows that sympathy is the secret power which unlocks their thoughts. The hit at Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was specially committed to his charge in the Laches, may be remarked by the way. The attempt to discover the definition of knowledge is in accordance with the character of Socrates as he is described in the Memorabilia, asking What is justice? what is temperance? and the like. But there is no reason to suppose that he would have analysed the nature of perception, or traced the connection of Protagoras and Heraclitus, or have raised the difficulty respecting false opinion. The

humorous illustrations as well as the serious thoughts run through the dialogue. The snubnosedness of Theaetetus, which is characteristic both of him and Socrates, and the man-midwifery of Socrates, are not forgotten in the closing words. At the end of the dialogue, as in the Euthyphro, he is expecting to meet Meletus at the porch of the king Archon, but with the same indifference to the result which is everywhere displayed by him, he proposes that they shall reassemble on the following day at the same spot. The day comes, and in the Sophist the three friends again meet, but no further allusion is made to the trial, and the principal share in the argument is assigned, not to Socrates, but to an Eleatic stranger; the youthful Theaetetus also plays a different and less independent part. And there is no allusion in the Introduction to the second and third dialogues, which are afterwards appended. There seems, therefore, reason to think that there is a real change, both in the characters and in the design.

The dialogue is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge, which is interrupted by two digressions. The first is, the digression about the midwives, which is also a leading thought or continuous image, like the wave in the Republic, appearing and reappearing at intervals. Again and again we are reminded that the successive conceptions of knowledge are extracted from Theaetetus, who in his turn truly declares that Socrates has got a great deal more out of him than ever was in him. Socrates is never weary of working out the image in humorous details; discerning the symptoms of labour, carrying the child round the hearth, fearing that Theaetetus will bite him, comparing the argument to a wind-egg, asserting an hereditary right to the occupation. There is also a serious side to the image, which is an apt similitude of the Socratic theory of education (cp. Republic, 518 D, Sophist, 230), and accords with the ironical spirit in which the wisest of men delights to speak of himself.

The other digression is the famous contrast of the lawyer and philosopher. This is a sort of landing-place or break in the middle of the dialogue. At the commencement of a great discussion, the reflection naturally arises, How happy are they who, like the philosopher, have time for such discussions (cp. Rep. v. 450). There is no reason for the introduction of such a digression; nor is a reason always needed, any more than for the introduction of an episode in a poem, or of a topic in conversation. That which is given by Socrates is quite sufficient, viz. that the philosopher may talk and write as he pleases. But though

not very closely connected, neither is the digression out of keeping with the rest of the dialogue. The philosopher naturally desires to pour forth the thoughts which are always present to him, and to discourse of the higher life. The idea of knowledge, although hard to be defined, is realised in the life of philosophy. And the contrast is the favourite antithesis between the world, in the various characters of sophist, lawyer, statesman, speaker, and the philosopher—between opinion and knowledge, between the conventional and the true.

The greater part of the dialogue is devoted to setting up and throwing down definitions of science and knowledge. Proceeding from the lower to the higher by three stages, in which perception, opinion, reasoning, are successively examined, first, we get rid of the confusion of the idea of knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge;—a confusion which has been already noticed in the *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Meno*, and other dialogues. In the infancy of logic, a form of thought has to be invented before the content can be filled up. We cannot define knowledge until the nature of definition has been ascertained. Having succeeded in making his meaning plain, Socrates proceeds to analyse the first definition which *Theaetetus* proposes: 'Knowledge is sensible perception.' This is speedily identified with the Protagorean saying, 'Man is the measure of all things'; and of this again the foundation is discovered in the perpetual flux of *Heraclitus*. The relativity of sensation is then developed at length, and for a moment the definition appears to be accepted. But soon the Protagorean thesis is pronounced to be suicidal; for the adversaries of Protagoras are as good a measure as he is, and they deny his doctrine. He is then supposed to reply that the perception may be true at any given instant. But the reply is in the end shown to be inconsistent with the *Heraclitean* foundation, on which the doctrine has been affirmed to rest. For if the *Heraclitean* flux is extended to every sort of change in every instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an instant? Sensible perception, like everything else, is tumbling to pieces. Nor can Protagoras himself maintain that one man is as good as another in his knowledge of the future; and 'the expedient,' if not 'the just and true,' belongs to the sphere of the future.

II. And so we must ask again, What is knowledge? The comparison of sensations with one another implies a principle which is above sensation, and which resides in the mind itself. We are thus led to look for knowledge in a higher sphere, and accordingly *Theaetetus*, when again

interrogated, replies that 'knowledge is true opinion.' But how is false opinion possible? The Megarian or Eristic spirit within us revives the question, which has been already asked and indirectly answered in the *Meno*. 'How can a man be ignorant of that which he knows?' No answer is given to this not unanswerable question. The comparison of the mind to a block of wax, or to a decoy of birds, is found wanting.

III. But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we have found knowledge? And knowledge is not true opinion, for the Athenian dicasts have true opinion but not knowledge. What then is knowledge? We answer, 'true opinion, with definition or explanation.' But all the different ways in which this statement may be understood are set aside; like the definitions of courage in the *Laches*, or of friendship in the *Lysis*, or of temperance in the *Charmides*. At length we arrive at the conclusion, in which nothing is concluded.

There are two special difficulties which beset the student of the *Theaetetus*: (1) he is uncertain how far he can trust Plato's account of the theory of Protagoras; and he is also doubtful (2) how far, and in what parts of the dialogue, Plato is expressing his own opinion. The dramatic character of the work renders the answer to both these questions difficult. In reply to the first of them, we have only probabilities to offer. There seem to be three main points which have to be decided: (1) Would Protagoras have identified his own thesis, 'man is the measure of all things,' with the other, 'All knowledge is sensible perception'? (2) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (3) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant? Of the work of Protagoras on 'Truth' we know nothing, with the exception of the two famous fragments, which are cited in this dialogue, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and, 'Whether there are gods or not, I cannot tell.' Nor have we any other trustworthy evidence of the tenets of Protagoras, or of the sense in which his words are used. For later writers, including Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, have mixed up the Protagoras of Plato, as they have the Socrates of Plato, with the real person.

1. Returning then to the *Theaetetus*, as the only possible source from which an answer to these questions can be obtained, we may remark, that Plato had 'the Truth' of Protagoras before him, and frequently refers to the book. He seems to say expressly, that in this work the doctrine of the Heraclitean flux was not to be found, p. 152; he told the real

truth' (not in the book, which is so entitled, but) 'privately to his disciples'—words which imply that the connection between the doctrines of Protagoras and Heraclitus was not generally recognised in Greece, but was really discovered or invented by Plato. On the other hand, the doctrine that 'Man is the measure of all things,' is expressly identified by Socrates with the other statement, 'that what appears to each man is to him'; and a reference is made to the books in which the statement occurs;—this Theaetetus, who has 'often read the books,' is supposed to acknowledge (152 A: so Cratylus 385 E). And in the speech attributed to Protagoras, he never says that he has been misunderstood: at p. 166 C he rather seems to imply that the absoluteness of sensation at each instant was to be found in his words (cp. 158 E). He is only indignant at the 'reductio ad absurdum' which Socrates devises of his 'homo mensura'; and in this complaint his friend Theodorus agrees.

The question may be raised, how far Plato in the Theaetetus could have misrepresented Protagoras without violating the laws of dramatic probability. Could he have pretended to cite from a well-known writing what was not to be found there? But such a shadowy enquiry is not worth pursuing further. We need only remember that, in the criticism which follows, on the thesis of Protagoras, we are criticising the Protagoras of Plato, and not attempting to draw a precise line between his real sentiments and those which Plato has attributed to him.

2. The other difficulty is a more subtle, and also a more important one, because bearing on the general character of the Platonic dialogues. On a first reading of them, we are apt to imagine that the truth is only spoken by Socrates, who is never guilty of a fallacy himself, and is the great detector of the errors and fallacies of others. But this natural presumption is disturbed by the discovery that the Sophists are sometimes in the right and Socrates in the wrong. Like the hero of a novel, he is not to be supposed always to represent the sentiments of the author. There are few modern readers who do not side with Protagoras, rather than with Socrates, in the dialogue which is called by his name. The Cratylus presents a similar difficulty: in his etymologies, as in the number of the State, we cannot tell how far Socrates is serious; for the Socratic irony will not allow him to distinguish between his real and his assumed wisdom. No one is the superior of the invincible Socrates in argument (except in the first part of the Parmenides, where

he is introduced as a youth); but he is by no means supposed to be in possession of the whole truth. Arguments are often put into his mouth (cp. Introduction to the Gorgias) which must have seemed quite as untenable to Plato as to a modern writer. In this dialogue great part of the answer of Protagoras is just and sound; remarks are made by him on verbal criticism, and on the importance of understanding an opponent's meaning, which are conceived in the true spirit of philosophy. And the distinction which he is supposed to draw between Eristic and Dialectic (167, 168), is really a criticism of Plato on himself and his own criticism of Protagoras.

The difficulty seems to arise from not attending to the dramatic character of the writings of Plato. There are two, or perhaps many, sides to questions; which are parted among the different speakers. Sometimes one view or aspect of a question is made to predominate over the rest, as in the Gorgias or Sophist; but in other dialogues truth is divided, as in the Laches and Protagoras, and the interest of the piece consists in the contrast of opinions. The confusion caused by the irony of Socrates, who, if he is true to his character, cannot say anything of his own knowledge, is increased by the circumstance that in the Theaetetus and some other dialogues, he is occasionally playing both parts himself, and even charging his own arguments with unfairness. In the Theaetetus he is designedly held back from arriving at a conclusion. For we cannot suppose that Plato conceived a definition of knowledge to be impossible. But this is his manner of approaching and surrounding a question. The lights which he throws on his subject are indirect, but they are not the less real for that. He has no intention of proving a thesis by a cut and dried argument; nor does he imagine that a great philosophical problem can be tied up within the limits of a definition. If he has analysed a proposition or notion, even with the severity of an impossible logic, if half-truths have been compared by him with other half-truths, if he has cleared up or advanced popular ideas, or illustrated a new method, the aim of a Platonic dialogue has been attained.

The writings of Plato belong to an age in which the power of analysis had outrun the means of knowledge; and through a spurious use of dialectic, the distinctions which had been already 'won from the void and formless infinite,' seemed to be rapidly returning to their original chaos. The two great speculative philosophies, which a century earlier had so deeply impressed the mind of Hellas, were now degenerating into Eristic.

The contemporaries of Plato and Socrates were vainly trying to find new combinations of them, or to transfer them from the object to the subject. The Megarians, in their first attempts to attain a severer logic, were making knowledge impossible. (Cp. Theaet. 202.) They were asserting 'the one good under many names,' and, like the Cynics, seem to have denied predication; while the Cynics themselves were depriving virtue of all which made virtue desirable in the eyes of Socrates and Plato. And besides these, we find mention in the later writings of Plato, especially in the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Laws, of certain repulsive godless persons, who will not believe what they 'cannot hold in their hands'; and cannot be approached in argument, because they cannot argue. (Theaet. 155 E; Soph. 246 A). No school of Greek philosophers exactly answers to these persons, in whom Plato may perhaps have blended some features of the Atomists with the vulgar materialistic tendencies of mankind in general. (Cp. Introduction to the Sophist.)

And not only was there a conflict of opinions, but the stage which the mind had reached presented other difficulties hardly intelligible to us, who live in a different cycle of human thought. All times of mental progress are times of confusion; we only see, or rather seem to see things clearly, when they have been long fixed and defined. In the age of Plato, the limits of the world of imagination and of pure abstraction, of the old world and the new, were not yet fixed. The Greeks, in the fourth century before Christ, had no words for 'subject' and 'object,' and no distinct conception of them; yet they were always hovering about the question involved in them. The analysis of sense, and the analysis of thought, were equally difficult to them; and hopelessly confused by the attempt to solve them, not through an appeal to facts, but by the help of general theories respecting the nature of the universe.

Plato, in his Theaetetus, gathers up the sceptical tendencies of his age, and compares them. But he does not seek to reconstruct out of them a theory of knowledge. The time at which such a theory could be framed had not yet arrived. For there was no measure of experience with which the ideas swarming in men's minds could be compared; the meaning of the word 'science' could scarcely be explained to them, except from the mathematical sciences, which alone offered the type of universality and certainty. Philosophy was becoming more and more vacant and abstract, and not only the Platonic ideas and

the Eleatic being, but all abstractions seemed to be at variance with sense and at war with one another.

The want of the Greek mind in the fourth century before Christ, was not another theory of rest or motion, or being or atoms, but rather a philosophy which could free the mind from the power of abstractions and alternatives, and show how far rest and how far motion, how far the universal principle of being, and the multitudinous principle of atoms, entered into the composition of the world; which could distinguish between the true and false analogy, and allow the negative as well as the positive a place in human thought. To such a philosophy Plato, in the *Theaetetus*, offers many contributions. He has followed philosophy into the region of mythology, and pointed out the similarities of opposing phases of thought. He has also shown that extreme abstractions are self-destructive; and, indeed, hardly distinguishable from one another. But his intention is not to unravel the whole subject of knowledge, if this had been possible; and several times in the course of the dialogue he rejects explanations of knowledge which have germs of truth in them; as, for example, 'the resolution of the compound into the simple'; or, 'right opinion with a mark of difference.'

Terpsion, who has come to Megara from the country, is described as looking in vain for Euclides in the Agora; the latter explains that he had been down to the harbour, and on his way thither had met Theaetetus, who was being carried up from the army to Athens. He was scarcely alive, for he had been badly wounded at the battle of Corinth, and had taken the dysentery, which prevailed in the camp. The mention of his condition suggests the reflection, 'what a loss he will be.' 'Yes, indeed,' replies Euclid; 'only just now I was hearing of his noble conduct in the battle.' 'That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?' 'I wanted him to remain, but he would not; so I went with him as far as Erineum; and as I parted from him, I remembered that Socrates had seen him when he was a youth, and had a remarkable conversation with him, not long before his own death; and he then prophesied of him, that he would be a great man if he lived.' 'How true that has been; how like all that Socrates said! And could you repeat the conversation?' 'Not from memory; but I took notes when I returned home, which I afterwards filled up at

leisure, and got Socrates to correct them from time to time, when I came to Athens. Terpsion had long intended to ask for a sight of this writing, of which he had already heard. They are both tired, and agree to rest and have the conversation of Socrates read to them by a servant. Here is the roll, Terpsion; I need only observe that I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words, 'said I,' 'said he'; and that Theaetetus, and Theodorus, the geometrician of Cyrene, are the persons with whom Socrates is conversing.

Socrates begins by asking Theodorus whether, in his visit to Athens, he has found any among the Athenian youth who were likely to attain distinction in science. 'Yes, Socrates, there is one very remarkable youth, with whom I have become acquainted. He is no beauty, and therefore you need not imagine that I am in love with him; and, to say the truth, he is very like you, for he has a snub nose, and projecting eyes, although these features are not so marked in him as in you. He combines the most various qualities, quickness, patience, courage; and he is gentle as well as wise, always silently flowing on, like a river of oil. Look; he is the middle one of those who are coming out of the court into the palestra.'

Socrates, who does not know his name, recognizes the son of Euphronius, who was himself a good man and a rich. He is informed by Theodorus that the youth is named Theaetetus, but the property of his father has disappeared in the hands of trustees; this does not, however, prevent him from adding liberality to his other virtues. At the desire of Socrates, he invites Theaetetus to sit by them.

'Yes,' says Socrates, 'that I may see in you, Theaetetus, the image of my ugly self, as Theodorus declares. Not that his remark is of any importance, for though he is a philosopher he is not a painter, and therefore he is no judge of our faces, though, as he is a man of science, he may be a judge of our minds. And if he were to praise the mental endowments of either of us, in that case the hearer of the eulogy ought to examine into what he says, and the subject should not refuse to be examined.' Theaetetus consents, and is caught in a trap. (Cp. the similar trap which is laid for Theodorus, at p. 166, 168 D.) 'Then now, Theaetetus, you will have to be examined, for he has been praising you in a style of which I never heard the like.' 'He was only jesting.' 'Nay, that is not his way; and I cannot allow you, on that pretence, to retract the assent which you have already

given, or I shall make Theodorus repeat your praises, and swear to them.' Theaetetus, in reply, professes that he is willing to be examined, and Socrates begins by asking him, 'What he learns of Theodorus?' He is himself anxious to learn anything of anybody; and now he has a little question to which he wants Theaetetus or Theodorus (or whichever of the company would not be 'donkey' to the rest) to find an answer. Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his eagerness, he asks, 'What is knowledge?' Theodorus is too old to answer questions, and begs him to interrogate Theaetetus, who has the advantage of youth.

Theaetetus replies, that knowledge is what he learns of Theodorus, i. e. geometry and arithmetic; and that there are other kinds of knowledge—shoemaking, carpentering, and the like. But Socrates rejoins, that this answer contains too much and also too little. For although Theaetetus has enumerated several kinds of knowledge, he has not explained the common nature of them; as if he had been asked, 'What is clay?' and instead of saying, 'Clay is moistened earth,' he had answered, 'There is one clay of image-makers, another of potters, another of oven-makers.' Theaetetus at once divines that Socrates means him to extend to all kinds of knowledge the same process of generalization which he has already learned to apply to arithmetic. For he has discovered a division of numbers into square numbers, 4, 9, 16, &c., which are composed of equal factors, and represent figures which have equal sides, and oblong numbers, 3, 5, 6, 7, &c., which are composed of unequal factors, and represent figures which have unequal sides. But he has never succeeded in attaining a similar conception of knowledge, though he has often tried; and, when this and similar questions were brought to him from Socrates, has been sorely distressed by them. Socrates explains to him that he is in labour. For men as well as women have pangs of labour; and both at times require the assistance of midwives. And he, Socrates, is a midwife, although this is a secret; he has inherited the art from his mother bold and bluff, and he ushers into light, not children, but the thoughts of men. Like the midwives, he has no children—the God will not allow him to bring anything into the world of his own. He also reminds Theaetetus that the midwives are or ought to be the only matchmakers; (this is the preparation for a biting jest, 151 B;) for those who reap the fruit are most likely to know on what soil

the plants will grow. But the midwives avoid this department of practice, because they have a character to lose, and do not want to be called procuresses. There are some other differences between his own art and that of the midwives, and between the two sorts of pregnancy. For women bring forth in due course, never anything but children, whereas the offspring of the brain are often monstrous and capricious. And there is no difficulty in discerning the signs of the coming labour in the one case, but in the other the difficulty is far greater. My patients, he says, are barren and stolid at first, but after a while they 'round apace,' if the gods are propitious to them; and this is due not to me but to themselves; I and the god only assist in bringing their ideas to the birth. Many of them have left me too soon, and the result has been that they have produced abortions; or when I have delivered them of children they have given them an ill bringing up, and have ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of these, and there have been others. The truants often return to me and beg to be readmitted; and then, if my familiar allows me, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. There come to me also those who have nothing in them, and have no need of my art; and I am their matchmaker (see above), and marry them to Prodicus or some other inspired sage who is likely to suit them. I tell you this long story because I suspect that you are in labour. Come then to me, who am a midwife, and the son of a midwife, and I will deliver you. And do not bite me, as the women do, if I abstract your first-born; for I am acting out of good will towards you; the God who is within me is the friend of man, though he will not allow me to dissemble the truth. Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question — 'What is knowledge?' Take courage, and by the help of God you will discover an answer. 'My answer is, that knowledge is perception.' That is the theory of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing the same thing when he says, 'man is the measure of all things.' He was a very wise man, and we should try to understand him. In order to illustrate his meaning let me suppose that there is the same wind blowing in our faces, and one of us may be hot and the other cold. How is this? Protagoras will reply that the wind is hot to him who is cold, cold to him who is hot. And 'is' means 'appears,' and when you say 'appears,' that means 'he feels.' Thus feeling, appearance, perception, coincide with being. I suspect, however, that this was only a 'façon

de parler,' which he imposed on the common herd like you and me ; he told 'the truth' (in allusion to the title of his book, which was called 'the truth') in secret to his disciples. For he was really a votary of that famous philosophy in which all things are said to be relative ; nothing is great or small, or heavy or light, or one, but all is in motion and mixture and transition and flux and generation, not 'being,' as we ignorantly affirm, but 'becoming.' This has been the doctrine, not of Protagoras only, but of all philosophers, with the single exception of Parmenides ; Empedocles, Heracleitus, and others, and all the poets, with Epicharmus, the king of Comedy, and Homer, the king of Tragedy, at their head, have said the same ; the latter has these words—

‘Ocean, the generation of gods, and mother Tethys.’

And many arguments are used to show, that motion is the source of life, and rest of death ; fire and warmth are produced by friction, and living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause ; the bodily frame is preserved by exercise and destroyed by indolence ; and if the sun ceased to move, ‘chaos would come again.’ Now apply this doctrine of ‘all is motion’ to the senses, and first of all to the sense of sight. The colour of white, or any other colour, is neither in the eyes nor out of them, but ever in motion between the object and the eye, and varying in the case of every percipient. All is relative, and, as the followers of Protagoras remark, endless contradictions arise when we deny this ; e. g. here are six dice ; they are more than four and less than twelve ; more and also less—(you would say that, would you not ? ‘Yes’). And Protagoras will retort : ‘But can anything be more or less without addition ?’

‘I should say “no” if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.’

And if you say ‘yes’ the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, as Euripides would say ? ‘True.’ The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known, would have a sparring match over this, but we, who have no professional pride, want only to discover whether our ideas are clear and consistent. And we cannot be wrong in saying, first, that nothing can be greater or less while remaining equal ; secondly, that there can be no becoming greater or less without addition or subtraction ; thirdly, that what is and was not, cannot be without having become. But then how is this reconcilable with the case of the dice, and with similar examples ?—that is the question. ‘I am often perplexed

and amazed, Socrates, by these difficulties.' That is because you are a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder; Iris is the child of Thaumias. Do you know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based? 'No.' Then I will tell you; but we must not let the uninitiated hear, and by the uninitiated I mean the repulsive people who believe in nothing which they cannot hold in their hands. The brethren whose mysteries I am about to unfold to you are far more ingenious. They maintain that all is motion; and that motion has two forms, action and passion, out of which endless phenomena are created also in two forms—sense and the object of sense—which come to the birth together. Motions have various degrees of swiftness; the motions of the agent and the patient are slower, because they move and create in and about themselves, but the things which are born of them have a swifter motion, and pass rapidly from place to place. The eye and the appropriate object come together, and give birth to whiteness and the sensation of whiteness; the eye is filled with seeing, and becomes not sight but a seeing eye, and the object is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white; and no other compound of either with another would have produced the same effect. All sensation is to be resolved into a similar combination of an agent and patient. Of either, taken separately, no idea can be formed, and the agent may become a patient, and the patient an agent. Hence there arises a general reflection that nothing is, but all things become; no name can detain or fix them. Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation? I am offering you specimens of other men's wisdom, because I have no wisdom of my own, and I want to deliver you of something; and presently we will see whether you have brought forth wind or not. Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion 'that all things are becoming'?

'When I hear your arguments, I am marvellously ready to assent.'

But I ought not to conceal from you that there is a serious objection which may be urged against this doctrine of Protagoras. For there are states, such as madness and dreaming, in which perception is false; and half our life is spent in dreaming; and who can say that at this instant we are not dreaming? Even the fancies of madmen are real at the time. But if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the false in such cases? Having stated the objection,

I will now state the answer. Protagoras would deny the continuity of phenomena; he would say that what is different is entirely different, and whether active or passive has a different power. There are infinite agents and patients in the world, and these produce in every combination of them a different perception. Take myself as an instance:—Socrates may be ill or he may be well, and remember that Socrates, with all his accidents, is spoken of. The wine which I drink when I am well is pleasant to me, but the same wine is unpleasant to me when I am ill. And there is nothing else from which I can receive the same impression, nor can another receive the same impression from the wine. Neither can I and the object of sense become separately what we become together. For the one in becoming is relative to the other, but they have no other relation; and the combination of them is absolute at each moment. [In modern language the act of sensation is really indivisible, though capable of a mental analysis into subject and object.] My sensation alone is true, and true to me only. And therefore, as Protagoras says, ‘To myself I am the judge of what is and what is not.’ Thus the flux of Homer and Heracleitus, the great Protagorean saying, ‘that man is the measure of all things,’ the doctrine of Theaetetus, ‘that knowledge is perception,’ have all the same meaning. And this is thy new-born child, which by my art I have brought to light; and you must not be angry if instead of rearing your infant we expose him.

‘Theaetetus will not be angry; he is very good-natured. But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?’

First reminding you that I am not the bag which contains the arguments, but that I extract them from Theaetetus, shall I tell you what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?

‘What may that be?’

I like his doctrine that what appears is; but I wonder that he did not begin his great work on truth with a declaration that a pig, or a dog-faced baboon, or any other monster which has sensation, is a measure of all things; then while we were reverencing him as a god he might have produced a magnificent effect by expounding to us that he was no wiser than a tadpole. For if truth is only sensation, and one man’s discernment is as good as another’s, and every man is his own judge, and everything that he judges is right and true, then what need of

Protagoras to be our instructor at a high figure; and why should we be less knowing than he is, or have to go to him, if every man is the measure of all things? My own art of midwifery, and all dialectic, is an enormous folly, if Protagoras' 'truth' be indeed truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of his book.

Theodorus thinks that Socrates is unjust to his master, Protagoras; but he is too old and stiff to try a fall with him, and therefore refers him to Theaetetus, who is already driven out of his former opinion by the arguments of Socrates.

Socrates then takes up the defence of Protagoras, who is supposed to reply in his own person—Good people, you sit and declaim about the gods, of whose existence or non-existence I have nothing to say, or you discourse about man being reduced to the level of the brutes; but what proof have you of your statements? And yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether probability is a safe guide. Theodorus would be a bad geometrician if he had nothing better to offer. Theaetetus is affected by the appeal to geometry, and Socrates is induced by him to put the question in a new form. He proceeds as follows:—Should we say that we know what we see and hear, e. g. the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign tongue?

'We should say that the figures of the letters, and the pitch of the voice in uttering them, were known to us, but not the meaning of them.'

Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving? 'Very true.' And he who sees knows? 'Yes.' And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees and knows? 'Very true.' But if he closes his eyes does he not remember? 'He does.' Then he may remember and not see; and if seeing is knowing, he may remember and not know. Is not this a 'reductio ad absurdum' of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? Yet perhaps we are crowing too soon; and if Protagoras, 'the father of the myth,' had been alive, the result might have been very different. But he is dead, and Theodorus, whom he left guardian of his 'orphan,' has not been very zealous in defending him.

Theodorus objects that Callias is the true guardian, but he hopes that Socrates will come to the rescue. Socrates prefaces his defence by resuming the attack. He asks whether a man can know and not know at the same time? 'Impossible.' Quite possible, if you maintain that

seeing is knowing. The confident adversary, suiting the action to the word, shuts one of your eyes; and now, says he, you see and do not see, but do you know and not know? And a fresh opponent darts from his ambush, and transfers to knowledge the terms which are commonly applied to sight. He asks whether you can know near and not at a distance; whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge. While you are wondering at his incomparable wisdom, he gets you into his power, and you will not escape until you have come to an understanding with him about the money which is to be paid for your release.

But Protagoras has not yet made his defence; and already he may be heard contemptuously replying that he is not responsible for the admissions which were made by a boy, who could not foresee the coming move, and therefore had answered in a manner which enabled Socrates to raise a laugh against him. But I cannot be fairly charged, he will say, with an answer which I should not have given; for I never maintained that the memory of a feeling is the same as a feeling, or denied that a man might know and not know the same thing at the same time. Or, if you will have extreme precision, I say that man in different relations is many or rather infinite in number. And I challenge you, either to show that his perceptions are not individual, or that if they are, what appears to him is not what is. As to your pigs and baboons, you are yourself a pig, and you make my writings a sport of other swine. But I still affirm that man is the measure of all things, although I admit that one man may be a thousand times better than another, in proportion as he has better impressions. Neither do I deny the existence of wisdom or of the wise man. But I maintain that wisdom is a practical remedial power of turning evil into good, the bitterness of disease into the sweetness of health, and not any greater truth or superiority of knowledge. For the impressions of the sick are as true as the impressions of the healthy; and the sick are as wise as the healthy. Nor can any man be cured of a false opinion, for there is no such thing; but he may be cured of the evil habit which generates in him an evil opinion. This is effected in the body by the drugs of the physician, and in the soul by the words of the Sophist; and the new state or opinion is not truer, but only better than the old. And philosophers are not tadpoles, but physicians and husbandmen, who till the soil and infuse health into animals and plants, and make the good take the place of the evil, both in individuals and

states. Wise and good rhetoricians make the good to appear just in states (for that is just which appears just to a state), and in return, they deserve to be well paid. And you, Socrates, whether you please or not, must continue to be a measure. This is my defence, and I must request you to meet me fairly. We are professing to reason, and not merely to dispute; and there is a great difference between reasoning and disputation. For the disputer is always seeking to trip up his opponent; and this is a mode of argument which disgusts men as they grow older with philosophy. But the reasoner is trying to understand him and to point out his errors to him, whether arising from his own or from his companions' fault; he does not argue from the customary use of names, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways. If you are gentle to an adversary he will follow and love you; and if defeated he will lay the blame on himself, and seek to escape from his own prejudices into philosophy. I would recommend you, Socrates, to adopt this humaner method, and to avoid captious and verbal criticisms.

Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to afford to your friend; had he been alive, he would have helped himself in far better style.

'You have made a most valorous defence.'

Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bid me be serious, and complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy? He meant to intimate that you must take the place of Theaetetus, who may be wiser than many bearded men, but not wiser than you, Theodorus.

'The rule of the Spartan Palaestra is, strip or depart; but you are like the giant Antaeus, and will not let me depart unless I try a fall with you.'

Yes, that is the nature of my complaint. And many a Hercules, many a Theseus mighty in deeds and words has broken my head; but I am always at this rough game. Please, then, to favour me.

'On the condition of not exceeding a single fall, I consent.'

Socrates now resumes the argument. As he is very desirous of doing justice to Protagoras, he insists on citing his own words,—'What appears to each man is to him.' And how, asks Socrates, are these words reconcilable with the fact that all mankind are agreed in thinking themselves wiser than others in some respects, and inferior to them in others? In the hour of danger they are ready to fall down and worship any one who

is their superior in wisdom as if he were a god. And the world is full of men who are asking to be taught and willing to be ruled, and of other men who are willing to rule and teach them. All which implies that men do judge of one another's impressions, and think some wise and others foolish. How will Protagoras answer this argument? For he cannot say that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken. If you form a judgment, thousands and ten of thousands are ready to maintain the opposite. The multitude may not and do not agree in Protagoras' own thesis, 'that man is the measure of all things,' and then who is to decide? Upon his own showing must not his 'truth' depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in proportion as he has more or fewer of them? And he must acknowledge further, that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, which is a famous jest. And if he admits that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, he must admit that he himself does not speak truly. But his opponents will refuse to admit this of themselves, and he must admit that they are right in their refusal. The conclusion is, that all mankind, including Protagoras himself, will deny that he speaks truly; and his truth will be true neither to himself nor to anybody else.

Theodorus is inclined to think that this is going too far. Socrates ironically replies, that he is not going beyond the truth. But if the old Protagoras could only pop his head out of the world below, he would doubtless give them both a sound castigation and be off to the shades in an instant. Seeing that he is not within call, we must examine the question for ourselves; and there are clearly great differences in the understandings of men. Admitting, with Protagoras, that immediate sensations of hot, cold, and the like, are to each one such as they appear, yet this hypothesis cannot be extended to judgments or opinions. And even if we were to admit further, (and this is the view of some who are not thorough-going followers of Protagoras,) that right and wrong, holy and unholy, are to each state or individual such as they appear, still Protagoras will not venture to maintain that every man is equally the measure of expediency, or that the thing which seems is expedient to every one. But this begins a new question. 'Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.' Yes, we have, and, after the manner of philosophers, we are digressing; I have often observed how ridiculous this habit of theirs makes them when they appear in court. 'What do you mean?' I mean to say that a philosopher is a gentleman, but a lawyer is a servant. The one

can have his talk out, and wander at will from one subject to another, as the fancy takes him; like ourselves, he may be long or short, as he pleases. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the clepsydra limiting his time, and the brief limiting his topics, and his adversary is standing over him and exacting his rights. He is a servant disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who holds the cause in his hands; the path never diverges, and often the race is for his life. Such experiences render him keen and shrewd; he learns the arts of flattery, and is perfect in the practice of crooked ways; dangers have come upon him too soon, when the tenderness of youth was unable to meet them with truth and honesty, and he has resorted to counter-acts of dishonesty and falsehood, and become warped and distorted; without any health or freedom or truth in him he has grown up to manhood, and is or esteems himself to be a master of cunning. Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers? or will this be too much of a digression?

‘Nay, Socrates, the argument is our servant, and not our master. Who is the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?’

I will describe the leaders, then; for the inferior sort are not worth the trouble. The lords of philosophy have not learned the way to the dicastery or ecclesia; they are ignorant of the laws and votes of the state, recited or written; societies, whether political or festive, clubs, and singing maidens do not enter even into their dreams. And the scandals of persons or their ancestors, male and female, they know no more than they can tell the number of pints in the ocean. Neither are they conscious of their own ignorance; for they do not practise singularity in order to gain reputation, but the truth is, that the outer form of them only is residing in the city; the inner man, as Pindar says, is going on a voyage of discovery, measuring as with line and rule the things which are under and in the earth, interrogating the whole of nature, only not condescending to what is near them.

‘What do you mean, Socrates?’

I will illustrate my meaning by the jest of the witty maid-servant, who saw Thales tumbling into a well, and said of him, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is applicable to all philosophers. The philosopher is unacquainted with the world; he hardly knows whether his neighbour

is a man or an animal. For he is always contemplating the nature of man, and inquiring what such a nature ought to do or suffer different from any other. Hence, on every occasion in private life and public, as I was saying, when he appears in a law-court or anywhere, he is the joke, not only of maid-servants, but of the general herd, falling into wells and every sort of disaster; he looks such an awkward, inexperienced creature, unable to say anything personal, when he is abused, in answer to his adversaries (for he knows no evil of any one); and when he hears the praises of others, he cannot help laughing from the bottom of his soul at their pretensions; and this also gives him a ridiculous appearance. A king or tyrant appears to him to be a kind of swine-herd or cow-herd, milking away at an animal who is much more troublesome and dangerous than cows or sheep; like the cow-herd, he has no time to be educated, and the pen in which he keeps his flock in the mountains is surrounded by a wall. When he hears of large landed properties of ten thousand acres or more, he thinks of the whole earth; or if he is told of the antiquity of a family, he remembers that every one has had myriads of progenitors, rich and poor, Greeks and barbarians, kings and slaves. And he who boasts of his descent from Amphitryon in the twenty-fifth generation, may, if he pleases, add as many more, and double that again, and our philosopher only laughs at his inability to do a larger sum. Such is the man at whom the vulgar scoff; he seems to them as if he could not mind his feet. 'That is very true, Socrates.' But when he tries to draw the quick-witted lawyer out of his pleas and rejoinders to the contemplation of absolute justice or injustice in their own nature, or from the popular praises of wealthy kings to the view of happiness and misery in themselves, or to the reasons why a man should seek after the one and avoid the other, then the situation is reversed; the little wretch turns giddy, and is ready to fall over the precipice; his utterance becomes thick, and he makes himself ridiculous, not to servant-maids, but to every man of liberal education. Such are the two pictures: the one of the philosopher and gentleman, who may be excused for not having learned how to make a bed, or cook up flatteries; the other a serviceable knave, who hardly knows how to wear his cloak, still less can he awaken harmonious thoughts or hymn virtue's praises.

'If the world, Socrates, were as ready to receive your words as I am, there would be greater peace and less evil among mankind.'

Evil, Theodorus, must ever remain in this world to be the antagonist

of good, out of the way of the gods in heaven. Wherefore also we should fly away from ourselves to them; and to fly to them is to become like them; and to become like them is to become holy, just and true. But many live in the old wives' fable of appearances; they think that you should follow virtue in order that you may seem to be good. And yet the truth is, that God is righteous; and of men, he is most like him who is most righteous. To know this is wisdom; and in comparison of this the wisdom of the arts or the seeming wisdom of politicians is mean and common. The unrighteous man is apt to pride himself on his cunning; when others call him rogue, he says to himself: 'They only mean that I am one who ought to live, and not a mere burden of the earth.' But he should reflect that his ignorance makes his condition worse than if he knew. For the penalty of injustice is not death or stripes, but the fatal necessity of becoming more and more unjust. Two patterns of life are set before him; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and he is growing more and more like the one and unlike the other. He does not see that if he continues in his cunning, the place of innocence will not receive him after death. And yet if such a man has the courage to hear the argument out, he often becomes dissatisfied with himself, and has no more strength in him than a child.—But we have digressed enough.

'For my part, Socrates, I like the digressions better than the argument, because I understand them better.'

To return. When we left off, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans were maintaining that the ordinances of the State were just, while they lasted. But no one would maintain that the laws of the State were always good or expedient, although this may be the intention of them. For the expedient has to do with the future, about which we are liable to mistake. Now, would Protagoras maintain that man is the measure not only of the present and past, but of the future; and that there is no difference in the judgments of men about the future? Would a private person, for example, be as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who attended him? And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be right; or are they both right? Is not a vine-grower a better judge of a vintage which is not yet gathered, or a cook of a dinner which is in preparation, or Protagoras of the probable effect of a speech than any indifferent person? The last example speaks 'ad hominem.' For Protagoras would never have amassed a fortune if every

man could judge of the future for himself. He is, therefore, compelled to admit that he is a measure; but I, who know nothing, am not equally convinced that I am. This is one way of refuting him; and he is refuted also by the authority which he attributes to the opinions of others, who deny his opinions. I am not equally sure that we can disprove the truth of immediate states of feeling. But this leads us to the doctrine of the universal flux, about which a battle-royal is always going on in the cities of Ionia. 'Yes; the Ephesians are downright mad about the flux; they cannot stop to argue with you, but are perpetually moving themselves in obedience to their text-books. Their restlessness is beyond expression, and if you ask any of them a question, they will not answer, but dart at you some unintelligible saying, and another and another, making no way either themselves or with others; for nothing is fixed in them or their ideas,—they are at war with fixed principles.' I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples? 'Disciples! they have none; they are a set of uneducated fanatics, and each of them says of the other that they have no knowledge: we must trust to ourselves, and not to them for the solution of the problem.' Well, the doctrine is old, being derived from the poets, who speak in a figure of Oceanus and Tethys; the truth was once concealed, but is now revealed by the superior wisdom of a later generation, and made intelligible to the cobbler, who, on hearing that all is in motion, and not some things only, as he ignorantly fancied, may be expected to fall down and worship his teachers. And the opposite doctrine must not be forgotten:—

'That is alone unmoved which is named the Universe,'

as Parmenides affirms. Thus we are in the midst of the fray; both parties are dragging us to their side; and we are not certain which of them are in the right, and if neither, then we shall be in a ridiculous position, having to set up our own opinion against ancient and famous men.

Let us first approach the river-gods, or patrons of the flux.

When they speak of motion, must they not include two kinds of motion, change of place and change of nature?—And all things must be supposed to have both kinds of motion; for if not, the same things would be at rest and in motion, which is contrary to their theory. And did we not say, that all sensations of whiteness, heat, and the like arose out of a relation and motion between the patient and agent; the patient

being distinguished from the perception, and the agent not a 'qualitas' but a 'quale,' and neither of them having any absolute existence? But now we make the further discovery, that neither white or whiteness, nor any sense or sensation, can be predicated of anything, for they are in a perpetual flux. And therefore we must modify the doctrine of Theaetetus and Protagoras, by asserting further that knowledge is and is not sensation; and of everything we must say equally, that this is and is not, or becomes or becomes not. And still the word 'this' is not quite correct, for language fails in the attempt to express their meaning.

At the close of the discussion, Theodorus claims to be released from the argument, according to his agreement. But Theaetetus insists that they shall proceed to consider the doctrine of rest. This is declined by Socrates, who has too much reverence for the great Parmenides lightly to attack him. We shall find that he returns to the doctrine of rest in the Sophist; but at present he does not wish to be diverted from his main purpose, which is, to deliver Theaetetus of his conception of knowledge. He proceeds to interrogate him further. When he says, 'That knowledge is perception,' with what does he perceive? The first answer is, 'That he perceives sights with the eye, and sounds with the ear.' This leads Socrates to make the reflection: That nice distinctions of words are sometimes pedantic, but sometimes necessary; and he proposes in this case to substitute the word 'through' for 'with.' For the senses are not like the Trojan warriors in the horse, but have a common centre of perception, from which they spring. This common principle is able to compare them with one another, and must therefore be distinct from them. (Cp. Rep. vii. 523, 524.) And as there are facts of sense which are perceived through the organs of the body, there are also mathematical and other abstractions, such as sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, which the soul perceives by herself. Being is the most universal of these abstractions. The good and the beautiful are abstractions of another kind, which exist in relation and which above all others the mind perceives in herself, comparing within her past, present, and future. For example; we know a thing to be hard or soft by the touch, of which the perception is given at birth to men and animals. But the essence of hardness or softness, or the fact that this hardness is, and is the opposite of softness, is slowly learned by reflection and experience. Mere perception does not reach being, and therefore fails of truth; and therefore has no share in knowledge. But if so, knowledge

is not perception. What then is knowledge? The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion—shall we say that ‘knowledge is true opinion’? But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask ourselves, ‘How is false opinion possible?’ This difficulty may be stated as follows:—

Either we know or do not know a thing (for the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting need not at present be considered); and in thinking or having an opinion, we must either know or not know that which we think, and we cannot know and be ignorant at the same time; we cannot confuse one thing which we do not know, with another thing which we do not know; nor can we think that which we do not know to be that which we know, or that which we know to be that which we do not know. And what other case is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all things? Let us try another answer in the sphere of being: ‘When a man thinks, and thinks that which is not.’ But would this hold in any parallel case? Can a man see and see nothing? or hear and hear nothing? or touch and touch nothing? Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing thing? For if he thinks about nothing he does not think, and not thinking he cannot think falsely. And so the path of being is closed against us, as well as the path of knowledge. But may there not be ‘heterodoxy,’ or transference of opinion;—I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be another? Theaetetus is confident that this must be ‘the true falsehood,’ when a man puts good for evil or evil for good. Socrates will not discourage him by attacking the paradoxical expression ‘true falsehood,’ but passes on. The new notion involves a process of thinking about two things, either together or alternately. And thinking is the conversing of the mind with herself, which is carried on in question and answer, until she no longer doubts, but determines and forms an opinion. And false opinion consists in saying to yourself, that one thing is another. But did you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good? Even in sleep, did you ever imagine that odd was even? Or did any man in his senses ever fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one? So that we can never think that one thing is another; for you must not meet me with the verbal quibble that other is always other (i.e. that both one and other in Greek are called other *ἕτερον, ἕτερον*). He who has both the two things in his mind, cannot misplace them; and he who has only one of them in his mind, cannot

misplace them—on either supposition the notion of transplacement is inconceivable.

But perhaps there may still be a sense in which we can think that which we do not know to be that which we know: e. g. Theaetetus may know Socrates, but at a distance he may mistake another person for him. This process may be conceived by the help of an image. Let us suppose that every man has in his mind a block of wax of various qualities, the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses; and on this he receives the seal or stamp of those sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he succeeds in stamping is remembered and known by him as long as the impression lasts; but that, of which the impression is rubbed out or imperfectly made, is forgotten, and not known. No one can think one thing to be another, when he has the memorial or seal of both of these in his soul, and a sensible impression of neither; or when he knows one and does not know the other, and has no memorial or seal of the other; or when he knows neither; or when he perceives both, or one and not the other, or neither; or when he perceives and knows both, and identifies what he perceives with what he knows (this is still more impossible); or when he does not know one, and does not know and does not perceive the other; or does not perceive one, and does not know and does not perceive the other; or has no perception or knowledge of either—all these cases must be excluded. But he may err when he confuses what he knows or perceives, or what he perceives and does not know, with what he knows, or what he knows and perceives with what he knows and perceives.

Theaetetus is unable to follow these distinctions; which Socrates proceeds to illustrate by examples: first of all remarking, that knowledge may exist without perception, and perception without knowledge. I may know Theodorus and Theaetetus and not see them; I may see them, and not know them. 'That I understand.' But I could not mistake one for the other if I knew you both, and had no perception of either; or if I knew one only, and perceived neither; or if I knew and perceived neither, or in any other of the excluded cases. The only possibility of error is: 1st, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having the impression of both of you on the waxen block—I, seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, put the foot in the wrong shoe—that is to say, put the seal or stamp on the wrong object: or 2ndly, when knowing

both of you I only see one; or when, seeing and knowing you both, I fail to identify the impression and the object. But there could be no error when perception and knowledge correspond.

The waxen block in the heart of a man's soul, as I may say in the words of Homer, who played upon the word *κῆρ κηρός*, may be smooth and deep, and large enough, and then the signs are clearly marked and lasting, and do not get confused. But in the 'hairy heart,' as the all-wise poet sings, when the wax is muddy or hard or moist, there is a corresponding confusion and want of retentiveness; in the muddy and impure there is indistinctness, and still more in the hard, for there the impressions have no depth of wax, and in the moist they are too soon effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jolted together in a little soul, which is narrow and has no room. These are the sort of natures which have false opinion; from stupidity they see and hear and think amiss; and this is falsehood and ignorance. Error, then, is a confusion of thought and sense.

Theaetetus is delighted with this explanation. But Socrates has no sooner found the new solution than he sinks into a fit of despondency. For an objection occurs to him:—May there not be errors where there is no confusion of mind and sense? e. g. in numbers. No one can confuse the man whom he has in his thoughts with the horse which he has in his thoughts, but he may err in the addition of five and seven; and observe that these are purely mental conceptions. Thus we are involved once more in the dilemma of saying, either that there is no such thing as false opinion, or that a man knows what he does not know.

We are at our wit's end, and may therefore be excused for making a bold diversion. All this time we have been repeating the words 'know,' 'understand,' and we do not know what knowledge is. 'Why, Socrates, how can you argue at all without using them?' Nay, but the true hero of dialectic would have forbid me to use them until I had explained them. And I must explain them now. The verb 'to know' has two senses, to have and to possess knowledge, and I distinguish 'having' from 'possessing.' A man may possess a garment which he does not wear; or he may have wild birds in an aviary; these in one sense he possesses, and in another he has none of them. Let this aviary be an image of the mind, as the waxen block was; when we are young, the aviary is empty; after a time the birds are put in; for under this figure we may describe different forms of knowledge;—

there are some of them in groups, and some single, which are flying about everywhere; and let us suppose a hunt after the science of odd and even, or some other science. The possession of the birds is clearly not the same as the having them in the hand. And the original chase of them is not the same as taking them in the hand when they are already caged.

This distinction between use and possession saves us from the absurdity of supposing that we do not know what we know, because we may know in one sense, i. e. possess, what we do not know in another, i. e. use. But have we not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater? For how can the exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion? As well might we suppose that ignorance could make a man know, or that blindness could make him see. Theaetetus suggests that in the aviary there may be flying about mock birds, or forms of ignorance, and we put forth our hands and grasp ignorance, when we are intending to grasp knowledge. But how can he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one to be the other? Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes them? and another, and another? Thus we go round and round in a circle and make no progress.

All this confusion arises out of our attempt to explain false opinion without having explained knowledge. What then is knowledge? Theaetetus once more repeats that knowledge is true opinion. But this seems to be refuted by the instance of orators and judges. For surely the orator cannot convey a true knowledge of crimes at which the judges were not present; he can only persuade them, and the judge may form a true opinion and truly judge. But if true opinion were knowledge they could not have judged without knowledge.

Once more. Theaetetus offers a definition which he has heard: Knowledge is true opinion accompanied by definition or explanation. Socrates has had a similar dream, and has further heard that the first elements are names only, and that definition or explanation begins when they are combined; the letters are unknown, the syllables or combination are known. But this new hypothesis when tested by the letters of the alphabet is found to break down. The first syllable of Socrates' name is SO. But what is SO? Two letters, S and O, a sibilant and a vowel, of which no further explanation can be given. And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet know both of them?

There is, however, another alternative:—We may suppose that the syllable has a separate form or idea distinct from the letters or parts. The all of the parts may not be the whole. Theaetetus is very much inclined to adopt this suggestion, but when interrogated by Socrates he is unable to draw any distinction between the whole and all the parts. And if the syllables have no parts, then they are those original elements of which there is no explanation. But how can the syllable be known if the letter remains unknown? In learning to read as children, we are first taught the letters and then the syllables. And in music, the notes, which are the letters, have a much more distinct meaning to us than the combination of them.

Once more, then, we must ask the meaning of the statement, that ‘knowledge is right opinion, accompanied by explanation or definition.’ Explanation may mean, (1) the reflection or expression of a man’s thoughts. But every man who is not deaf and dumb is able to express his thoughts; or (2) the enumeration of the elements of which anything is composed. A man may have a true opinion about a waggon, but when he is able to enumerate the hundred planks of Hesiod—then, and not till then, he has knowledge of a waggon. Or he may know the syllables of the name Theaetetus, but not the letters—and not until he knows both can he be said to have knowledge as well as opinion. But on the other hand he may know the syllable ‘The’ in the name Theaetetus, yet he may be mistaken about the same syllable in the name Theodorus, and in learning to read we often make such mistakes. And even if he could write out all the letters and syllables of your name in order, still he would only have right opinion. Yet there may be a third meaning of the definition besides (1) the image or expression of the mind; (2) the enumeration of the elements;—to these may now be added (3) perception of difference.

For example, I may see a man who has eyes, nose, and mouth;—that will not distinguish him from any other man. Or he may have a snub-nose and prominent eyes;—that will not distinguish him from myself and you and others who are like me. But when I see a certain kind of snub-nosedness, then I recognise Theaetetus. And having this sign of difference, I have knowledge. But have I knowledge or opinion of this difference? If I have only opinion I have not knowledge; if I have knowledge we assume a disputed term—for knowledge is right opinion with knowledge of difference.

And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true opinion, nor yet definition accompanying true opinion. And I have shown that the children of your brain are not worth rearing. Are you still in labour, or have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? If you have any more thoughts, you will be the better for having got rid of these; or if you have none, you will be the better for not fancying that you know what you do not know. Observe the limits of my art, which, like my mother's, is an art of midwifery; I do not pretend to compare with the good and wise of this and other ages.

And now I go to meet Meletus at the porch of the King Archon; but to-morrow I shall hope to see you again, Theodorus, at this place.

I. The saying of Theaetetus, that 'knowledge is sensible perception,' may be assumed to be a current philosophical opinion of the age. 'The ancients,' as Aristotle (*De Anim.* iii. 3) says, citing a verse of Empedocles, 'affirmed knowledge to be the same as perception.' We may now examine these words, first with reference to their place in the history of philosophy, and secondly, in relation to modern speculations.

(a) In the age of Socrates the mind was passing from the object to the subject. The same impulse which a century before had led men to form conceptions of the world, now led them to frame general notions of the human faculties and feelings, such as memory, opinion, and the like. The simplest of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato seems to mean the generalised notion of feelings and impressions of sense, without determining whether they are conscious or not.

The theory that 'knowledge is sensible perception' is the antithesis of that which derives knowledge from the mind (*Theaet.* 185), or which assumes the existence of ideas independent of the mind (*Parm.* 134). Yet from their extreme abstraction these theories do not represent the opposite poles of thought in the same way that the corresponding differences would in modern philosophy. The most ideal and the most sensational have a tendency to pass into one another; Heracleitus, like his great successor Hegel, has both aspects. The Eleatic isolation of being and the Megarian or Cynic isolation of individuals are placed in the same class by Plato, *Soph.* 251 C, D; and the same principle which is

the symbol of motion to one mind is the symbol of rest to another. The Atomists, who are sometimes regarded as the Materialists of Plato, denied the reality of sensation. And in the ancient as well as the modern world there were reactions from theory to experience, from ideas to sense. This is a point of view from which the philosophy of sensation presented great attraction to the ancient thinker. Amid the conflict of ideas and the variety of opinions, the impression of sense remained certain and uniform. Hardness, softness, cold, heat, &c. are not absolutely the same to different persons (cp. 171 D), but the art of measuring could at any rate reduce them all to definite natures (Rep. X, 602 D). Thus the doctrine that knowledge is perception supplies or seems to supply a firm standing ground. Like the other notions of the earlier Greek philosophy, it was held in a very simple way, without much basis of reasoning, and without suggesting the questions which naturally arise in our own minds on the same subject.

(β) The fixedness of impressions of sense furnishes a link of connection between ancient and modern philosophy. The modern thinker often repeats the parallel axiom, 'that all knowledge is experience.' He means to say that the outward and not the inward is both the original source and the final criterion of truth, because the outward can be observed and analysed; the inward is only known by external results, and is dimly perceived by each man for himself. In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus? Chiefly in this—that the modern term 'experience,' while implying a point of departure in sense and a return to sense, also includes all the processes of reasoning and imagination which have intervened. The necessary connection between them by no means affords a measure of the relative degree of importance which is to be ascribed to either element. For the inductive portion of any science may be small, as in mathematics or ethics, compared with that which the mind has attained by reasoning and reflection on a very few facts.

II. The saying that 'all knowledge is sensation' is identified by Plato with the Protagorean thesis that 'man is the measure of all things.' The interpretation which Protagoras himself is supposed to give of these latter words is, 'Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.' But there remains still an ambiguity both in the text and in the explanation, which has to be cleared up. Did Protagoras merely mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the

human mind? or did he mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth?

These two questions have not been always clearly distinguished; the relativity of knowledge has been sometimes confounded with uncertainty. The untutored mind is apt to suppose that objects exist independently of the human faculties, because they really exist independently of the faculties of any individual. In the same way, knowledge appears to be a body of truths stored up in books, which when once ascertained are independent of the discoverer. Further consideration shows us that these truths are not really independent of the mind; there is an adaptation of one to the other, of the eye to the object of sense, of the mind to the conception. There would be no world, if there neither were, nor ever had been any one to perceive the world. A slight effort of reflection enables us to understand this; but no effort of reflection will enable us to pass beyond the limits of our own faculties, or to imagine the relation or adaptation of objects to the mind to be different from that of which we have experience. There are certain laws of language and logic to which we are compelled to conform, and to which our ideas naturally adapt themselves; and we can no more get rid of them than we can cease to be ourselves. The absolute and infinite, whether explained as self-existence, or as the totality of human thought, or as the Divine nature, if known to us at all, cannot escape from the category of relation.

But because knowledge is subjective or relative to the mind, we are not to suppose that we are therefore deprived of any of the tests or criteria of truth. One man still remains wiser than another, a more accurate observer and relater of facts, a truer measure of the proportions of knowledge. The nature of testimony is not altered, nor the verification of causes by prescribed methods less certain. Again, the truth must often come to a man through others, according to the measure of his capacity and education. But neither does this affect the testimony, whether written or oral, which he knows by experience to be trustworthy. He cannot escape from the laws of his own mind; and he cannot escape from the further accident of being dependent for his knowledge on others. But still this is no reason why he should always be in doubt; of many personal, of many historical and scientific facts he may indeed be absolutely assured. And having such a mass of acknowledged truth in the mathematical and physical, not to speak of the moral

sciences, the moderns have certainly no reason to acquiesce in the statement, that truth is appearance only, or that there is no difference between appearance and truth.

The relativity of knowledge is a truism to us, but was a great psychological discovery in the fifth century before Christ. Of this discovery, the first distinct assertion is contained in the thesis of Protagoras. Probably he had no intention either of denying or affirming an objective standard of truth. He did not consider whether man in the higher or man in the lower sense was a 'measure of all things.' Like other great thinkers, he was absorbed with one idea, and that idea was the absoluteness of perception. Like Socrates, he seemed to see that philosophy must be brought back from 'nature' to 'truth,' from the world to man. But he did not stop to analyse whether he meant 'man' in the concrete or man in the abstract; any man or some men, 'quod semper quod ubique,' or individual private judgment. Such an analysis lay beyond his sphere of thought; the age before Socrates had not arrived at these distinctions. Like the Cynics, again, he discarded knowledge in any higher sense than perception. For 'truer' or 'wiser' he substituted the word 'better,' and is not unwilling to admit that both states and individuals are capable of practical improvement. But this improvement does not arise from intellectual enlightenment, nor yet from the exertion of the will, but from a change of circumstances and impressions; and he who can effect this change in himself or others may be deemed a philosopher. In the mode of effecting it, while agreeing with Socrates and the Cynics in the importance which he attaches to practical life, he is at variance with both of them. To suppose that practice can be divorced from speculation, or that we may do good without caring about truth, is by no means singular, either in philosophy or life. The singularity of this, as of some other (so-called) sophistical doctrines, is the frankness with which they are avowed, instead of being veiled, as in modern times, under ambiguous and convenient phrases.

Plato appears to treat Protagoras much as he himself is treated by Aristotle; that is to say, he does not attempt to understand him from his own point of view. But he entangles him in the meshes of a more advanced logic. To which Protagoras is supposed to reply by Megarian quibbles, which destroy logic, 'Not only man, but each man, and each man at each moment.' In the arguments about sight and memory there is a palpable unfairness which is worthy of the great 'brainless brothers,'

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and may be compared with the ἐγκαλιμμένος ('obvelatus') of Eubulides. For he who sees with one eye only cannot be truly said both to see and not to see; nor is memory, which is liable to forget, the immediate knowledge to which Protagoras applies the term. Theodorus justly charges Socrates with going beyond the truth; and Protagoras has equally right on his side when he protests against Socrates arguing from the common use of words, which 'the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways.'

III. The theory of Protagoras is connected by Aristotle as well as Plato with the flux of Heraclitus. But Aristotle is only following Plato, and Plato, as we have already seen, did not mean to imply that such a connection was admitted by Protagoras himself. His metaphysical genius saw or seemed to see a common tendency in them, just as the modern historian of ancient philosophy might perceive a parallelism between two thinkers of which they were probably unconscious themselves. We must remember throughout that Plato is not speaking of Heraclitus, but of the Heracliteans, who succeeded him; nor of the great original ideas of the master, but of the Eristic into which they had degenerated a hundred years later. There is nothing in the fragments of Heraclitus which at all justifies Plato's account of him. His philosophy may be resolved into two elements—first, change; secondly, law or measure pervading the change: these he saw everywhere, and often expressed in strange mythological symbols. But he has no analysis of sensible perception such as Plato attributes to him; nor is there any reason to suppose that he pushed his philosophy into that absolute negation in which Heracliteanism was sunk in the age of Plato. He never said that 'change meant every sort of change,' and he expressly distinguished between 'the general and particular understanding.' Like a poet, he surveyed the elements of mythology, nature, thought, which lay before him, and sometimes by the light of genius he saw or seemed to see a mysterious principle working behind them. But as has been the case with other great philosophers, and with Plato and Aristotle themselves, what was really permanent and original could not be understood by the next generation, while a perverted logic carried out his chance expressions with an illogical consistency. His simple and noble thoughts, like those of the great Eleatic, soon degenerated into a mere strife of words. And when thus reduced to mere words, they seem to have exercised a far wider influence in the cities of Ionia (where the people 'were mad about them') than in

the life-time of Heraclitus—a phenomenon which, though at first sight singular, is not without a parallel in the history of philosophy and theology.

It is this perverted form of the Heraclitean philosophy which is supposed to effect the final overthrow of Protagorean sensationalism. For if all things are changing at every moment, in all sorts of ways, then there is nothing fixed or defined at all, and therefore no sensible perception, nor any word by which that or anything else can be described. Of course Protagoras would not have admitted the justice of this argument any more than Heraclitus would have acknowledged the 'uneducated fanatics' who appealed to his writings. He might have said, 'The excellent Socrates has first confused me with Heraclitus, and Heraclitus with his Ephesian successors, and has then disproved the existence both of knowledge and sensation. But I am not responsible for what I never said, nor will I admit that my common-sense account of knowledge can be overthrown by unintelligible Heraclitean paradoxes.'

IV. Still at the bottom of the arguments there remains a truth, 'that knowledge is something more than sensible perception;'—that alone would not distinguish man from a tadpole. The absoluteness of sensations at each moment destroys the very consciousness of sensations (cp. Phileb. 21 D), or the power of comparing them. The senses are not mere holes in a 'Trojan horse,' but the organs of a presiding nature, in which they meet. A great advance has been made in psychology when the senses are recognised as organs of sense, and we are admitted to see or feel 'through them' and not 'by them,'—that is a distinction of words which, as Socrates observes, is by no means pedantic. A still further step has been made when the most abstract notions, such as being and not-being, sameness and difference, unity and plurality, are acknowledged to be the creations of the mind herself, working upon the feelings or impressions of sense. In this manner Plato describes the process of acquiring them, in the words (186 D) 'knowledge consists not in the feelings or affections (*παθήμασι*), but in the process of reasoning about them (*συλλογισμῶ*).' Here, as in the Parmenides (132 A), he means something not really different from generalization. As in the Sophist, he is laying the foundation of a rational psychology, which is to supersede the Platonic reminiscence of ideas as well as the Eleatic being and the individualism of Megarians and Cynics.

V. Having rejected the doctrine that 'knowledge is perception,' we

now proceed to look for a definition of knowledge in the sphere of opinion. But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion possible? For we must either know or not know that which is presented to the mind or sense. We of course should answer at once: No; the alternative is not necessary, for there may be degrees of knowledge; and we may know and have forgotten, or we may be learning, or we may have a general but not a particular knowledge, or we may know but not be able to explain; and many other ways may be imagined in which we know and do not know at the same time. But these answers belong to a later stage of metaphysical discussion; whereas the question seems to belong rather to the childhood of the human mind, together with the parallel question of not-being. Men had only recently arrived at the notion of opinion; they could not at once define the true and pass beyond into the false. The very word *δόξα* was full of ambiguity, being sometimes, as in the Eleatic philosophy, applied to the sensible world, and again used in the more ordinary sense of opinion. There is no connection between sensible appearance and probability, and yet both of them met in the word *δόξα*, and could only with difficulty be disengaged in the mind of the Greek. To this was often added, as at the end of the fifth book of the Republic, the idea of relation, which is equally distinct from either of them; also a fourth notion, the conclusion of the dialectical process, the making up of the mind after she has been 'talking to herself' (p. 190).

We are not then surprised that the sphere of opinion and of not-being should be a dusky, half-lighted place (Rep. v. p. 478), belonging neither to the old world of sense and imagination, nor to the new world of reflection and reason. Plato attempts to clear up this darkness. In his accustomed manner he passes from the lower to the higher, without omitting the intermediate stages. This appears to be the reason why he seeks for the definition of knowledge first in the sphere of opinion. Hereafter we shall find that something more than opinion is required.

False opinion is explained by Plato at first as a confusion of mind and sense, which arises when the impression in the mind does not correspond to the impression on the senses. It is obvious that this explanation (supposing the distinction between impressions in the mind and impressions on the senses to be admitted) does not account for all forms of error; and Plato has excluded himself from the consideration of the greater number, by designedly omitting the intermediate processes of

learning and forgetting ; nor does he include fallacies in the use of language or erroneous inferences. But he is struck by one possibility of error, which is not covered by his theory, viz. errors in arithmetic. For in numbers and calculation there is no combination of thought and sense, and yet errors may often happen. Hence he is led to discard the explanation which might nevertheless have been supposed to hold good (for anything that he says to the contrary) as a rationale of error, in the case of facts derived from sense.

Another attempt is made to explain false opinion by assigning to error a sort of positive existence. But error or ignorance is essentially negative—a not-knowing ; if we knew an error, we should be no longer in error. We may veil our difficulty under figures of speech, but these, although telling arguments with the multitude, can never be the real foundation of a system of psychology. The figure of the mind receiving impressions, is one of those images which, whether an assistance to thought or not, have rooted themselves for ever in language. The other figure of the enclosure, is also remarkable as affording the first hint of universal all-pervading ideas, which is further carried out in the *Sophist*. This is implied in the birds, some in flocks, some solitary, which fly about anywhere and everywhere. Plato discards both figures, as not really solving the question which to us appears so simple: ‘How we make mistakes?’ The failure of the enquiry seems to show that we should return to knowledge, and begin with that ; and we may afterwards proceed with a better hope of success, to the examination of opinion.

But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge? The difference between these he seeks to establish by an argument, which to us appears singular and unsatisfactory. The existence of true opinion is proved by the rhetoric of the law courts, which cannot give knowledge, but may give true opinion. The rhetorician cannot put the judge or juror in possession of all the facts which prove an act of violence, but he may truly persuade them of the commission of such an act. Here the idea of true opinion seems to be a right conclusion from imperfect knowledge. But the correctness of such an opinion will be purely accidental ; and is really the effect of one man, who has the means of knowing, persuading another who has not. Plato would have done better, if he had said that true opinion was a contradiction in terms.

Assuming the distinction between knowledge and opinion, Theaetetus,

in answer to Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge:—True opinion, with definite or rational explanation. This Socrates identifies with another and different theory, of those who assert that knowledge first begins with a proposition.

The elements may be perceived by sense, but they are names, and cannot be defined. When we assign to them some predicate, they first begin to have a meaning (*ὀνομάτων συμπλοκὴ λόγου οὐσία*). This seems equivalent to saying, that the individuals of sense become the subject of knowledge when they are regarded as they are in nature in relation to other individuals.

Yet we feel a difficulty in following this new hypothesis. For must not opinion be equally expressed in a proposition? The difference between true and false opinion is not the difference between the particular and the universal, but between the true universal and the false. Thought may be as much at fault as sight. When we place individuals under a class, or assign to them attributes, this is not knowledge, but a very rudimentary process of thought; the first generalisation of all, without which language would be impossible. And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which the analogous word *λόγος* tends to create, of a proposition and a definition? And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous term ‘elements,’ or ‘letters’? For there is no real resemblance between the relation of letters to a syllable, and of the terms to a proposition.

Plato, in the spirit of the Megarian philosophy, soon discovers a flaw in the explanation. For how can we know a compound of which the simple elements are unknown to us? Can two unknowns make a known? Can a whole be something different from the parts? The answer of experience is, that they can; for we may know a compound, which we are unable to analyse into its elements; and all the parts, when united, may be more than all the parts separated: e. g. the number four, or any other number, is more than four units; any chemical compound is more than and different from the simple elements. But ancient philosophy in this, as in many other instances, proceeding by the path of mental analysis, was perplexed by doubts which warred against the plainest facts.

Three attempts to explain the new definition of knowledge still remain to be considered. They all of them turn on the explanation of *λόγος*. The first account of the meaning of the word is the reflection of thought

in speech—a sort of nominalism, ‘La science est une langue bien faite.’ But anybody who is not dumb can say what he thinks; therefore mere speech cannot be knowledge. And yet we may observe, that there is in this explanation an element of truth which is not recognised by Plato; viz. that truth and thought are inseparable from language, although mere expression in words is not truth. The second explanation of λόγος is the enumeration of the elementary parts of the complex whole. But this is only definition accompanied with right opinion, and does not yet attain to the certainty of knowledge. Plato does not mention the greater objection, which is, that the enumeration of particulars is endless; such a definition would be based on no principle, and would not help us at all in gaining a common idea. The third is the best explanation;—the possession of a characteristic mark, which seems to answer to the logical definition by genus and difference. But this, again, is equally necessary for right opinion; and we have already determined, although not on very satisfactory grounds, that knowledge must be distinguished from opinion. A better distinction is drawn between them in the *Timaeus* (p. 51 E). They might be opposed as philosophy and rhetoric, and as conversant respectively with necessary and contingent matter. But no true idea of the nature of either of them, or of their relation to one another, could be framed until science obtained a content. The ancient philosophers in the age of Plato thought of science only as pure abstraction, and to this, opinion stood in no relation.

Like *Theaetetus*, we have attained to no definite result. But an interesting phase of ancient philosophy has passed before us. And the negative result is not to be despised. For on certain subjects, and in certain states of knowledge, the work of negation or clearing out the foundations must go on, perhaps for a generation, before the new structure can begin to rise. Plato saw the necessity of combating the illogical logic of the Megarians and Eristics. For the completion of the edifice, he makes preparation in the *Theaetetus*, and crowns the work in the *Sophist*.

Many (1) fine expressions, and (2) remarks full of wisdom, (3) also germs of a metaphysic of the future, are scattered up and down in the dialogue. Such, for example, as (1) the comparison of *Theaetetus*’ progress in learning to the ‘noiseless flow of a river of oil’; the satirical touch, ‘flavouring a sauce or fawning speech’; or the remarkable expression, ‘full of impure dialectic’; or the lively images under which the

argument is described, 'the flood of arguments pouring in,' the fresh discussions 'bursting in like a band of revellers.' As illustrations of the second head, may be cited the remark of Socrates, that 'distinctions of words, although sometimes pedantic, are also necessary'; or the fine touch in the character of the lawyer, 'that dangers came upon him when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them'; or the description of the manner in which the spirit is broken in a wicked man who listens to reproof until he becomes like a child; or the punishment of the wicked, which is not physical suffering, but the perpetual companionship of evil (cp. Gorgias); or the expression, often repeated by Aristotle and others, that 'philosophy begins in wonder, for Iris is the child of Thaumias.'

(3) Important metaphysical ideas are: *a.* the conception of thought, as the mind talking to herself; *b.* the notion of a common sense, developed further by Aristotle, and the explicit declaration, that the mind gains ideas of being, sameness, number, and the like, from reflection on herself; *c.* the excellent distinction of Theaetetus (which Socrates, speaking with emphasis, 'leaves to grow') between seeing the forms or hearing the sounds of words in a foreign language, and understanding the meaning of them, and the distinction of Socrates himself between 'having' and 'possessing' knowledge, in which the answer to the whole discussion appears to be contained.

There is a difference between ancient and modern psychology, and we have a difficulty in explaining one in the terms of the other. To us the inward and outward sense and the inward and outward worlds of which they are the organs are parted by a wall, and appear as if they could never be confounded. The mind is endued with faculties, habits, instincts, and a personality or consciousness in which they are bound together. Over against these are placed forms, colours, external bodies coming into contact with our own body. We speak of a subject which is ourselves, of an object which is all the rest. These are separable in thought, but united in any act of sensation, volition, or reflection. As there are various degrees in which the mind may enter into or be abstracted from the operations of sense, so there are various points at which this separation or union may be supposed to occur. And within the sphere of mind the analogy of sense reappears; and we distinguish

not only external objects, but objects of will and of knowledge which we contrast with them. These again are comprehended in a higher object, which reunites with the subject. A multitude of abstractions are created by the efforts of successive thinkers which become logical determinations; and they have to be arranged in order, before the scheme of thought is complete. The framework of the human intellect is not the *peculium* of an individual, but the joint work of many who are of all ages and countries. What we are in mind is due, not merely to our physical, but to our mental antecedents which we trace in history, and more especially in the history of philosophy. Nor can mental phenomena be truly explained either by physiology or by the observation of consciousness apart from their history. They have a growth of their own, like the growth of a flower, a tree, a human being. They may be conceived as of themselves constituting a common mind, and having a sort of personal identity in which they coexist.

So comprehensive is modern psychology, seeming to aim at constructing anew the entire world of thought. And prior to or simultaneously with this construction a negative process has to be carried on, a clearing away of useless abstractions which we have inherited from the past. Many erroneous conceptions of the mind derived from former philosophies have found their way into language, and we with difficulty disengage ourselves from them. Mere figures of speech have unconsciously influenced the minds of great thinkers. Also there are some distinctions, as, for example, that of the will and of the reason, and of the moral and intellectual faculties, which are carried further than is justified by experience. For if we reflect on ourselves we see that all our faculties easily pass into one another, and are bound together in a single mind or consciousness; but this mental unity is apt to be concealed from us by the distinctions of language.

A profusion of words and ideas has obscured rather than enlightened mental science. It is hard to say how many fallacies have arisen from the representation of the mind as a box, as a 'tabula rasa,' a book, a mirror, and the like. It is remarkable how Plato in the Theaetetus, after having indulged in the figure of the waxen tablet and the decoy, afterwards discards them. The mind is also represented by another class of images, as the spring of a watch, a motive power, a breath, a stream, a succession of points or moments. As Plato remarks in the Cratylus, words expressive of motion as well as of rest are employed to

describe the faculties and operations of the mind; and in these there is contained another store of fallacies. Some shadow or reflection of the body seems always to adhere to our thoughts about ourselves, and mental processes are hardly distinguished in language from bodily ones. To see or perceive are used indifferently of both; the words intuition, moral sense, common sense, the mind's eye, are figures of speech transferred from one to the other. And many other words used in early poetry or in sacred writings to express the works of mind have a materialistic sound; for old mythology was allied to sense, and the distinction of matter and mind had not as yet arisen. Thus materialism receives an illusive aid from language; and both in philosophy and religion the imaginary figure or association easily takes the place of real knowledge.

Again, there is the illusion of looking into our own minds as if our thoughts or feelings were written down in a book. This is another figure of speech, which might be appropriately termed 'the fallacy of the looking-glass.' We cannot look at the mind unless we have the eye which sees, and we can only look, not into, but out of the mind at the thoughts, words, actions of ourselves and others. What we dimly recognize within us is not experience, but rather the suggestion of an experience, which we may gather, if we will, from the observation of the world. The memory has but a feeble recollection of what we were saying or doing a few weeks or a few months ago, and still less of what we were thinking or feeling. This is one among many reasons why there is so little self-knowledge among mankind; they do not carry with them the thought of what they are or have been. The so-called 'facts of consciousness' are equally evanescent; they are facts which nobody ever saw, and which can neither be defined nor described. Of the three laws of thought the first (all $A=A$) is an identical proposition—that is to say, a mere word or symbol claiming to be a proposition: the two others (Nothing can be A and not A , and Everything is either A or not A) are untrue, because they exclude degrees and also the mixed modes and double aspects under which truth is so often presented to us. To assert that man is man is unmeaning; to say that he is free or necessary and cannot be both is a half truth only. These are a few of the entanglements which impede the natural course of human thought. Lastly, there is the fallacy which lies still deeper, of regarding the individual mind apart from

the universal, or either, as a self-existent entity apart from the ideas which are contained in them.

In ancient philosophies the analysis of the mind is still rudimentary and imperfect. It naturally began with an effort to disengage the universal from sense—this was the first lifting up of the mist. It wavered between object and subject, passing imperceptibly from one or being to mind and thought. Appearance in the outward object was for a time indistinguishable from opinion in the subject. At length mankind spoke of knowing as well as of opining or perceiving. But when the word knowledge was found how was it to be explained or defined? It was not an error, it was a step in the right direction, when Protagoras said that ‘man is the measure of all things,’ and that ‘all knowledge is perception.’ This was the subjective which corresponded to the objective ‘All is flux.’ But the thoughts of men deepened, and soon they began to be aware that knowledge was neither sense, nor yet opinion—with or without explanation; nor the expression of thought, nor the enumeration of parts, nor the addition of characteristic marks. Motion and rest were equally ill adapted to express its nature, although both must in some sense be attributed to it; it might be described more truly as the mind conversing with herself; the discourse of reason; the hymn of dialectic, the science of relations, of ideas, of the so-called arts and sciences, of the one, of the good, of the all:—this is the way along which Plato is leading us in his later dialogues. In its higher signification it was the knowledge, not of men, but of gods, perfect and all-sufficing:—like other ideals always passing out of sight, and nevertheless present to the mind of Aristotle as well as Plato, and the reality to which they were both tending. For Aristotle as well as Plato would in modern phraseology have been termed a mystic; and like him would have defined the higher philosophy, ‘knowledge of being or essence,’—words to which in our own day we have a difficulty in attaching a meaning.

Yet, in spite of Plato and his followers, mankind have again and again returned to a sensational philosophy. As to some of the early thinkers, amid the fleetings of sensible objects, ideas alone seemed to be fixed, so to a later generation amid the fluctuation of philosophical opinions the only fixed points appeared to be outward objects. Any pretence of knowledge which went beyond them implied logical processes, of the correctness of which they had no assurance and which at best were only probable. The mind, tired of wandering, sought to rest on firm ground;

when the idols of philosophy and language were stripped off, the perception of outward objects alone remained. The ancient Epicureans never asked whether the comparison of these with one another did not involve principles of another kind which were above and beyond them. In like manner the modern inductive philosophy forgot to enquire into the meaning of experience, and did not attempt to form a conception of outward objects apart from the mind, or of the mind apart from them. Soon objects of sense were merged in sensations and feelings, but feelings and sensations were still unanalysed. At last we return to the doctrine attributed by Plato to Protagoras, that the mind is only a succession of momentary perceptions. At this point the modern philosophy of experience forms an alliance with ancient scepticism.

The higher truths of philosophy and religion are very far removed from sense. Admitting that, like all other knowledge, they are derived from experience, and that experience is ultimately resolvable into facts which come to us through the eye and ear, still their origin is a mere accident which has nothing to do with their true nature. They are universal and unseen; they belong to all times—past, present, and future. Any worthy notion of mind or reason includes them. The proof of them is, 1st, their comprehensiveness and consistency with one another; 2ndly, their agreement with history and experience. But sensation is of the present only, is isolated, is and is not in successive moments. It takes the passing hour as it comes, following the lead of the eye or ear instead of the command of reason. It is a faculty which man has in common with the animals, and in which he is inferior to many of them. The importance of the senses in us is that they are the apertures of the mind, doors and windows through which we take in and make our own the materials of knowledge. Regarded in any other point of view sensation is of all mental acts the most trivial and superficial. Hence the term ‘sensational’ is rightly used to express what is shallow in thought and feeling.

We propose in what follows, first of all, like Plato in the *Theaetetus*, to analyse sensation, and secondly to trace the connection between theories of sensation and a sensational or Epicurean philosophy.

§ I. We, as well as the ancients, speak of the five senses, and of a sense, or common sense, which is the abstraction of them. The term ‘sense’ is also used metaphorically, both in ancient and modern philo-

sophy, to express the operations of the mind which are immediate or intuitive. Of the five senses, two—the sight and the hearing—are of a more subtle and complex nature, while two others—the smell and the taste—seem to be only more refined varieties of touch. All of them are passive, and by this are distinguished from the active faculty of speech: they receive impressions, but do not produce them, except in so far as they are objects of sense themselves.

Physiology speaks to us of the wonderful apparatus of nerves, muscles, tissues, by which the senses are enabled to fulfil their functions. It traces the connection, though imperfectly, of the bodily organs with the operations of the mind. Of these latter, it seems rather to know the conditions than the causes. It can prove to us that without the brain we cannot think, and that without the eye we cannot see: and yet there is far more in thinking and seeing than is given by the brain and the eye. It observes the 'concomitant variations' of body and mind. Psychology, on the other hand, treats of the same subject regarded from another point of view. It speaks of the relation of the senses to one another; it shows how they meet the mind; it analyses the transition from sense to thought. The one describes their nature as apparent to the outward eye; by the other they are regarded only as the instruments of the mind. It is in this latter point of view that we propose to consider them.

The simplest sensation involves an unconscious or nascent operation of the mind; it implies objects of sense, and objects of sense have differences of form, number, colour. But the conception of an object without us, or the power of discriminating numbers, forms, colours, is not given by the sense, but by the mind. A mere sensation does not attain to distinctness: it is a confused impression, as Plato says (Rep. vii. 524 B, *συγκεχυμένον τι*), until number introduces light and order into the confusion. At what point the confusion becomes distinct is a question of degree which cannot be precisely determined. The distant object, the undefined notion, come out into relief as we approach them or attend to them. Or we may assist the analysis by attempting to imagine the world first dawning upon the eye of the infant or of a person newly restored to sight. Yet even with them the mind as well as the eye opens or enlarges. For all three are inseparably bound together—the object would be nowhere and nothing, if not perceived by the sense, and the sense would have no power of distinguishing without the mind.

But prior to objects of sense there is a third nature in which they are

contained—that is to say, space, which may be explained in various ways. It is the element which surrounds them; it is the vacuum or void which they leave or occupy when passing from one portion of space to another. It might be described in the language of ancient philosophy, as ‘the not being’ of objects. It is a negative idea which in the course of ages has become positive. It is originally derived from the contemplation of the world without us—the boundless earth or sea, the vacant heaven, and is therefore acquired chiefly through the sense of sight: to the blind the conception of space is feeble and inadequate, derived for the most part from touch or from the descriptions of others. At first it appears to be continuous; afterwards we perceive it to be capable of division by lines or points, real or imaginary. By the help of mathematics we form another idea of space, which is altogether independent of experience. Geometry teaches us that the innumerable lines and figures by which space is or may be intersected are absolutely true in all their combinations and consequences. New and unchangeable properties of space are thus developed, which are proved to us in a thousand ways by mathematical reasoning as well as by common experience. Through quantity and measure we are conducted to our simplest and purest notion of matter, which is to the cube or solid what space is to the square or surface. And all our applications of mathematics are applications of our ideas of space to matter. No wonder then that they seem to have a necessary existence to us. Being the simplest of our ideas, space is also the one of which we have the most difficulty in ridding ourselves. Neither can we set a limit to it, for wherever we fix a limit, space is springing up beyond. Neither can we conceive a smallest or indivisible portion of it; for within the smallest there is a smaller still; and even these inconceivable qualities of space whether the infinite or the infinitesimal, may be made the subject of reasoning and have a certain truth to us.

Whether space exists in the mind or out of it, is a question which has no meaning. We should rather say that without it the mind is incapable of conceiving the body, and therefore of conceiving itself. The mind may be indeed imagined to contain the body, in the same way that Aristotle (partly following Plato) supposes God to be the outer heaven or circle of the universe. But how can the individual mind carry about the universe of space packed up within, or how can separate minds have either a universe of their own or a common universe? In such conceptions there seems to be a confusion of the individual and the universal. To say that

we can only have a true idea of ourselves when we deny the reality of that by which we have any idea of ourselves is an absurdity. The earth which is our habitation and 'the starry heaven above' and we ourselves are equally an illusion, if space is only a quality or condition of our minds.

Again, we may compare the truths of space with other truths derived from experience, which seem to have a necessity to us in proportion to the frequency of their recurrence or the truth of the consequences which may be inferred from them. We are thus led to remark that the necessity in our ideas of space on which much stress has been laid, differs in a slight degree only from the necessity which appears to belong to some of our ideas of weight, motion, and the like. And there is another way in which this necessity may be explained. We have been taught it, and the truth which we were taught or which we inherited has never been contradicted in all our experience and is therefore confirmed by it. Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary? The greater part of what is sometimes regarded as the *a priori* intuition of space is really the conception of the various geometrical figures of which the properties have been revealed by mathematical analysis. And the certainty of these properties is immeasurably increased to us by our finding that they hold good not only in every instance, but in all the consequences which are supposed to flow from them.

Neither must we forget that our idea of space, like our other ideas, has a history. The Homeric poems contain no word for it; even the later Greek philosophy has not the Kantian notion of space, but only the definite 'place' or 'the infinite.' To Plato, in the *Timaeus*, it is known only as the 'nurse of generation.' When therefore we speak of the necessity of our ideas of space we must remember that this is a necessity which has grown up with the growth of the human mind, and has been made by ourselves. We can free ourselves from the perplexities which are involved in it by ascending to a time in which they did not as yet exist. And when space or time are described as '*a priori* forms or intuitions added to the matter given in sensation,' we should consider that such expressions belong really to the pre-historic age of philosophy—to the eighteenth century, when men sought to explain the human mind without regard to history or language or the social nature of man.

In every act of sense there is a latent perception of space, of which we only become conscious when objects are withdrawn from it. There are

various ways in which we may trace the connexion between them. We may think of space as unresisting matter, and of matter as divided into objects; or of objects again as formed by abstraction into a collective notion of matter, and of matter as rarefied into space. And motion may be conceived as the union of there and not there in space, and force as the materializing or solidification of motion. Space again is the individual and universal in one; or, in other words, a perception and also a conception. So easily do what are sometimes called our simple ideas pass into one another, and differences of kind resolve themselves into differences of degree.

Within or behind space there is another abstraction in many respects similar to it—time, the form of the inward, as space is the form of the outward. As we cannot think of outward objects of sense or of outward sensations without space, so neither can we think of a succession of sensations without time. It is the vacancy of thoughts or sensations, as space is the void of outward objects, and we can no more imagine the mind without the one than the world without the other. It is to arithmetic what space is to geometry; or, more strictly, arithmetic may be said to be equally applicable to both. It is defined in our minds, partly by the analogy of space and partly by the recollection of events which have happened to us, or the consciousness of feelings which we have experienced. Like space, it is without limit, for whatever beginning or end of time we fix, there is a beginning and end before them, and so on without end. We speak of a past, present, and future, and again the analogy of space assists us in conceiving of them as coexistent. When the limit of time is removed there arises in our minds the idea of eternity, which at first, like time itself, is only negative, but gradually, when connected with the world and the divine nature, like the other negative infinity of space, becomes positive. Whether time is prior to the mind and experience or coeval with them, is (like the parallel question about space) unmeaning. Like space it has been realized gradually: in the Homeric poems, or even in the Hesiodic cosmogony, there is no more notion of time than of space. The conception of being is more general than either, and might therefore with greater plausibility be affirmed to be a condition or quality of the mind. The *a priori intuitions* of Kant would have been as unintelligible to Plato as his *a priori synthetical propositions* to Aristotle. The philosopher of Königsberg supposed himself to be analysing a necessary mode of thought: he was not aware that

he was dealing with a mere abstraction. But now that we are able to trace the gradual development of ideas through religion, through language, through abstractions, why should we interpose the fiction of time between ourselves and realities? Why should we single out one of these abstractions to be the *a priori* condition of all the others? It comes last and not first in the order of our thoughts, and is not the condition precedent of them, but the last generalization of them. Nor can any principle be imagined more suicidal to philosophy than to assume that all the truth which we are capable of attaining is seen only through an unreal medium. If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato, 'What becomes of the mind?'

Leaving the *a priori* conditions of sensation we may proceed to consider acts of sense. These admit of various degrees of duration or intensity; they admit also of a greater or less extension from one object, which is perceived directly, to many which are perceived indirectly or in a less degree, and to the various associations of the object which are latent in the mind. In general the greater the intension the less the extension of them. The simplest sensation implies some relation of objects to one another, some position in space, some relation to a previous or subsequent sensation. The acts of seeing and hearing may be almost unconscious and may pass away unnoted; they may also leave an impression behind them or power of recalling them. If, after seeing an object we shut our eyes, the object remains dimly seen in the same or about the same place, but with form and lineaments decayed. This is the simplest act of memory. And as we cannot see one thing without at the same time seeing another, different objects hang together in recollection, and when we call for one the other quickly follows. To think of the place in which we have last seen a thing is often the best way of recalling it to the mind. Hence memory is dependent on association. The act of recollection may be compared to the sight of an object at a great distance which we have previously seen near. Memory is to sense as dreaming is to waking; and like dreaming has a wayward and uncertain power of recalling impressions from the past.

Thus begins the passage from the outward to the inward sense. But as yet there is no conception of a universal—the mind only remembers the individual object or objects, and is always attaching to them some colour or association of sense. The power of recollection seems to depend on the intensity or largeness of the perception, or on the strength

of some emotion with which it is inseparably connected. This is the natural memory which is allied to sense, such as children appear to have and barbarians and animals. It is necessarily limited in range, and its limitation is its strength. In later life, when the mind has become crowded with names, acts, feelings, images innumerable, we acquire by education another memory of system and arrangement which is both stronger and weaker than the first—weaker in the recollection of sensible impressions as they are represented to us by eye or ear—stronger by the natural connexion of ideas with objects or with one another. And many of the notions which form a part of the train of our thoughts are hardly realized by us at the time, but, like numbers or algebraical symbols, are used as signs only, thus lightening the labour of recollection.

And now we may suppose that numerous images present themselves to the mind, which begins to act upon them and to arrange them in various ways. Besides the impression of external objects present with us or just absent from us, we have a dimmer conception of other objects which have disappeared from our immediate recollection and yet continue to exist in us. The mind is peopled with images which pass to and fro before it. Some feeling or association calls them up, and they are uttered by the lips. This is the first rudimentary imagination, which may be truly described in the language of Hobbes, as 'decaying sense,' an expression which may be applied with equal truth to memory as well. For memory and imagination, though we sometimes oppose them, are nearly allied; the difference between them seems chiefly to lie in the activity of the one compared with the passivity of the other. The sense decaying in memory receives a flash of light or life from imagination. Dreaming is a link of connexion between them; for in dreaming we feebly recollect and also feebly imagine at one and the same time. When reason is asleep the lower part of the mind wanders at will amid the images which have been received from without. And so in the first efforts of imagination reason is latent or set aside; and images, in part disorderly, but also having a unity (however imperfect) of their own, pour like a flood over the mind. And if we could penetrate into the heads of animals we should probably find that their intelligence, or the state of what in them is analogous to our intelligence, is of this nature.

Thus far we have been speaking of men, rather in the points in which they resemble animals than in the points in which they differ from them. The animal too has memory in various degrees, and the elements of

imagination, if, as appears to be the case, he dreams. How far their powers or instincts are educated by the circumstances of their lives or by intercourse with one another, we cannot precisely tell. They, like ourselves, have the physical inheritance of form, scent, hearing, sight, and other qualities or instincts. But they have not the mental inheritance of thoughts and ideas handed down by tradition, 'the slow additions that build up the mind' of the human race. And language, which is the great educator of mankind, is wanting in them; whereas in us language is ever present—even in the infant the latent power of naming is almost immediately observable. And therefore the description which has been already given of the nascent power of the faculties is in reality an anticipation. For simultaneous with their growth in man a growth of language must be supposed. The child of two years old sees the fire once and again, and the feeble observation of the same recurring object is associated with the feeble utterance of the name by which he is taught to call it. Soon he learns to utter the name when the object is no longer there, but the desire or imagination of it is present to him. At first in every use of the word there is a colour of sense, an indistinct picture of the object which accompanies it. But in later years he sees in the name only the universal or class word, and the more abstract the notion becomes, the more vacant is the image which is presented to him. Henceforward all the operations of his mind, including the perceptions of sense, are a synthesis of sensations, words, conceptions. In seeing or hearing or looking or listening the sensible impression prevails over the conception and the word. In reflection the process is reversed—the outward object fades away into nothingness, the name or the conception or both together are everything. Language, like number, is intermediate between the two, partaking of the definiteness of the outer and of the universality of the inner world. For logic teaches us that every word is really a universal, and only condescends by the help of position or circumlocution to become the expression of individuals or particulars. And sometimes by using words as symbols we are able to give a 'local habitation and a name' to the infinite and inconceivable.

Thus we see that no line can be drawn between the powers of sense and of reflection—they pass imperceptibly into one another. We may indeed distinguish between the seeing and closed eye—between the sensation and the recollection of it. But this distinction carries us a

very little way, for recollection is present in sight as well as sight in recollection. There is no impression of sense which does not simultaneously recall differences of form, number, colour, and the like. Neither is such a distinction applicable at all to our internal bodily sensations, which give no sign of themselves when unaccompanied with pain, and even when we are most conscious of them, have often no assignable place in the human frame. Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses them? Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from pains and pleasures of the body? The words 'inward and outward,' 'active and passive,' 'mind and body,' are best conceived by us as differences of degree passing into differences of kind, and at one time and under one aspect acting in harmony and then again opposed. They introduce a system and order into the knowledge of our being; and yet, like many other general terms, are often in advance of our actual analysis or observation.

According to some writers the inward sense is only the fading away or imperfect realization of the outward. But this leaves out of sight one half of the phenomenon. For the mind is not only withdrawn from the world of sense but introduced to a higher world of thought and reflection, in which, like the outward sense, she is trained and educated. By use the outward sense becomes keener and more intense, especially when confined within narrow limits. The savage with little or no thought has a quicker discernment of the track than the civilized man; in like manner the dog, having the help of scent as well as of sight, is superior to the savage. By use again the inward thought becomes more defined and distinct; what was at first an effort is made easy by the natural instrumentality of language, and the mind learns to grasp universals with no more exertion than is required for the sight of an outward object. There is a natural connexion and arrangement of them, like the association of objects in a landscape. Just as a note or two of music suffices to recall a whole piece to the musician's or composer's mind, so a great principle or leading thought suggests and arranges a world of particulars. The power of reflection is not feebler than the faculty of sense, but of a higher and more comprehensive nature. It not only receives the universals of sense, but gives them a new content by comparing and combining them with one another. It withdraws from the seen that it may dwell in the unseen. The sense only presents us with a flat and impenetrable surface: the

mind takes the world to pieces and puts it together on a new pattern. The universals which are detached from sense are reconstructed in science. They and not the mere impressions of sense are the truth of the world in which we live, and (as an argument to those who will only believe 'what they can hold in their hands') we may further observe that they are the source of our power over it. To say that the outward sense is stronger than the inward is like saying that the arm of the workman is stronger than the constructing or directing mind.

Returning to the senses we may briefly consider two questions—first their relation to the mind, secondly, their relation to outward objects:—

1. The senses are not merely 'holes set in a wooden horse' (Theaet. 184 D), but instruments of the mind with which they are organically connected. There is no use of them without some use of words—some natural or latent logic—some previous experience or observation. Sensation, like all other mental processes, is complex and relative, though apparently simple. The senses mutually confirm and support one another; it is hard to say how much our impressions of hearing may be affected by those of sight, or how far our impressions of sight may be corrected by the touch, especially in infancy. The confirmation of them by one another cannot of course be given by any one of them. Many intuitions which are inseparable from the act of sense are really the result of complicated reasonings. The most cursory glance at objects enables the experienced eye to judge approximately of their relations and distance, although nothing is impressed upon the retina except colour, including gradations of light and shade. From these delicate and almost imperceptible differences we seem chiefly to derive our ideas of distance and position. By comparison of what is near with what is distant we learn that the tree, house, river, &c. which are a long way off are objects of a like nature with those which are seen by us in our immediate neighbourhood, although the actual impression made on the eye is very different in the one case and in the other. This is a language of 'large and small letters' (Rep. 368 D), slightly differing in form and exquisitely graduated by distance, which we are learning all our life long, and which we attain in various degrees according to our powers of sight or observation. There is another consideration. The greater or less strain upon the nerves of the eye or ear is communicated to the mind and silently informs the judgment. We have also the use not of one eye only, but of two, which give us a wider

range, and help us to discern, by the greater or less acuteness of the angle which the rays of sight form, the distance of an object and its relation to other objects. But we are already passing beyond the limits of our actual knowledge on a subject which has given rise to many conjectures. More important than the addition of another conjecture is the observation, whether in the case of sight or of any other sense, of the great complexity of the causes and the great simplicity of the effect.

The sympathy of the mind and the ear is no less striking than the sympathy of the mind and the eye. Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes? Yet how small a part of speech or of music is produced by the impression of the ear compared with that which is furnished by the mind!

Again: the more refined faculty of sense, as in animals so also in man, seems often to be transmitted by inheritance. Neither must we forget that in the use of the senses, as in his whole nature, man is a social being, who is always being educated by language, habit, and the teaching of other men as well as by his own observation. He knows distance because he is taught it by a more experienced judgment than his own; he distinguishes sounds because he is told to remark them by a person of a more discerning ear. And as we inherit from our parents or other ancestors peculiar powers of sense or feeling, so we improve and strengthen them, not only by regular teaching, but also by sympathy and communion with other persons.

2. The second question, namely, that concerning the relation of the mind to external objects, is really a trifling one, though it has been made the subject of a famous philosophy. We may if we like, with Berkeley, resolve objects of sense into sensations; but the change is one of name only, and nothing is gained and something is lost by such a resolution or confusion of them. For we have not really made a single step towards idealism, and any arbitrary inversion of our ordinary modes of speech is disturbing to the mind. The youthful metaphysician is delighted at his marvellous discovery that nothing is, and that what we see or feel is our sensation only: for a day or two the world has a new interest to him; he alone knows the secret which has been communicated to him by the philosopher, that mind is all—when in fact he is going out of his mind in the first intoxication of a great thought. But he soon finds that all things remain as they were—the laws of

nature, the properties of matter, the qualities of substances. After having inflicted his theories on any one who is willing to receive them, 'first on his father and mother, secondly on some other patient listener, thirdly on his dog,' he finds that he only differs from the rest of mankind in the use of a word. He had once hoped that by getting rid of the solidity of matter he might open a passage to worlds beyond. He liked to think of the world as the representation of the divine nature, and delighted to imagine angels and spirits wandering through space, present in the room in which he is sitting without coming through the door, nowhere and everywhere at the same instant. At length he finds that he has been the victim of his own fancies; he has neither more nor less evidence of the supernatural than he had before. He himself has become unsettled, but the laws of the world remain fixed as at the beginning. He has discovered that his appeal to the fallibility of sense was really an illusion. For whatever uncertainty there may be in the appearances of nature, arises only out of the imperfection or variation of the human senses, or possibly from the deficiency of certain branches of knowledge; when science is able to apply her tests, the uncertainty is at an end. We are apt sometimes to think that moral and metaphysical philosophy are lowered by the influence which is exercised over them by physical science. But any interpretation of nature by physical science is far in advance of such idealism. The philosophy of Berkeley, while giving unbounded license to the imagination, is still grovelling on the level of sense.

We may, if we please, carry this scepticism a step further, and deny, not only objects of sense, but the continuity of our sensations themselves. We may say with Protagoras and Hume that what is appears, and that what appears appears only to individuals, and to the same individual only at one instant. But then, as Plato asks,—and we must repeat the question,—What becomes of the mind? Experience tells us by a thousand proofs that our sensations of colour, taste, and the like, are the same as they were an instant ago—that the act which we are performing one minute is continued by us in the next—and also supplies abundant proof that the perceptions of other men are, speaking generally, the same or nearly the same with our own. After having slowly and laboriously in the course of ages gained a conception of a whole and parts, of the constitution of the mind, of the relation of man to God and nature, imperfect indeed, but the best we can, we are asked to

return again to the 'beggarly elements' of ancient scepticism, and acknowledge only atoms and sensations devoid of life or unity. Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence of the senses or of all things? We are but 'such stuff as dreams are made of;' for we have left ourselves no instruments of thought by which we can distinguish man from the animals, or conceive of the existence even of a mollusc. And observe, this extreme scepticism has been allowed to spring up among us, not like the ancient scepticism in an age when nature and language really seemed to be full of illusions, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when men walk in the daylight of inductive science.

The attractiveness of such speculations arises out of their true nature not being perceived. They are veiled in graceful language; they are not pushed to extremes; they stop where the human mind is disposed also to stop—short of a manifest absurdity. Their inconsistency is not observed by their authors or by mankind in general, who are equally inconsistent themselves. They leave on the mind a pleasing sense of wonder and novelty: in youth they seem to have a natural affinity to one class of persons as poetry has to another; but in later life either we drift back into common sense, or we make them the starting-points of a higher philosophy.

We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept them;—with what limitations is this true? For we cannot use our senses without admitting that we have them, or think without presupposing that there is in us a power of thought, or affirm that all knowledge is derived from experience without implying that this first principle of knowledge is prior to experience. The truth seems to be that we begin with the natural use of the mind as of the body, and we seek to describe this as well as we can. We eat before we know the nature of digestion; we think before we know the nature of reflection. As our knowledge increases, our perception of the mind enlarges also. We cannot indeed get beyond facts, but neither can we draw any line which separates facts from ideas. And the mind is not something separate from them but included in them, and they in the mind, both having a distinctness and individuality of their own. To reduce our conception of mind to a succession of feelings and sensations is like the attempt to view a wide prospect by inches through a microscope, or to calculate a period of chronology by minutes. The mind ceases to

exist when it loses its continuity, which though far from being its highest determination, is yet necessary to any conception of it. Even an inanimate nature cannot be adequately represented as an endless succession of states or conditions.

§ II. Another division of the subject has yet to be considered: Why should the doctrine that knowledge is sensation, in ancient times, or of sensationalism or materialism in modern times, be allied to the lower rather than to the higher view of ethical philosophy? At first sight the nature and origin of knowledge appear to be wholly disconnected from ethics and religion, nor can we deny that the ancient Stoics were materialists, or that the materialist doctrines prevalent in modern times have been associated with great virtues, or that both religious and philosophical idealism have not unfrequently parted company with practice. Still upon the whole it must be admitted that the higher standard of duty has gone hand in hand with the higher conception of knowledge. It is Protagoras who is seeking to adapt himself to the opinions of the world; it is Plato who rises above them: the one maintaining that all knowledge is sensation; the other basing the virtues on the idea of good. The reason of this phenomenon has now to be examined.

By those who rest knowledge immediately upon sense, that explanation of human action is deemed to be the truest which is nearest to sense. As knowledge is reduced to sensation, so virtue is reduced to feeling, happiness or good to pleasure. The different virtues—the various characters which exist in the world—are the disguises of self-interest. Human nature is dried up; there is no place left for imagination, or in any higher sense for religion. Ideals of a whole, or of a state, or of a law of duty, or of a divine perfection, are out of place in an epicurean philosophy. The very terms in which they are expressed are suspected of having no meaning. Man is to bring himself back as far as he is able to the condition of a rational beast. He is to limit himself to the pursuit of pleasure, but of this he is to make a far-sighted calculation;—he is to be rationalized, secularized, animalized: or he is to be an amiable sceptic, better than his own philosophy, and not falling below the opinions of the world.

Imagination has been called that 'busy faculty' which is always intruding upon us in the search after truth. But imagination is also that higher power by which we rise above ourselves and the common-

places of thought and life. The philosophical imagination is another name for reason finding an expression of herself in the outward world. To deprive life of ideals is to deprive it of all higher and comprehensive aims and of the power of imparting and communicating them to others. For men are taught, not by those who are on a level with them, but by those who rise above them, who see the distant hills, who soar into the empyrean. Like a bird in a cage, the mind confined to sense is always being brought back from the higher to the lower, from the wider to the narrower view of human knowledge. It seeks to fly but cannot: instead of aspiring towards perfection 'it hovers about this lower world and the earthly nature.' It loses the religious sense which more than any other seems to take a man out of himself. Weary of asking 'What is truth?' it accepts the 'blind witness of eyes and ears'; it draws around itself the curtain of the physical world and is satisfied. The strength of a sensational philosophy lies in the ready accommodation of it to the minds of men; many who have been metaphysicians in their youth, as they advance in years are prone to acquiesce in things as they are, or rather appear to be. They are spectators, not thinkers, and the best philosophy is that which requires of them the least amount of mental effort.

As a lower philosophy is easier to apprehend than a higher, so a lower way of life is easier to follow; and therefore such a philosophy seems to derive a support from the general practice of mankind. It appeals to principles which they all know and recognize: it gives back to them in a generalized form the results of their own experience. To the man of the world they are the quintessence of his own reflections upon life. To follow custom, to have no new ideas or opinions, not to be straining after impossibilities, to enjoy to-day with just so much forethought as is necessary to provide for the morrow, this is regarded by the greater part of the world as the natural way of passing through existence. And many who have lived thus have attained to a lower kind of happiness or equanimity. They have possessed their souls in peace without ever allowing them to wander into the region of religious or political controversy, and without any care for the higher interests of man. But nearly all the good (as well as some of the evil) which has ever been done in this world has been the work of another spirit, the work of enthusiasts and idealists, of apostles and martyrs. The leaders of mankind have not been of the gentle Epicurean type; they

have personified ideas; they have sometimes also been the victims of them. But they have always been seeking after a truth or ideal of which they fall short; and have died in a manner disappointed of their hopes that they might lift the human race out of the slough in which they found them. They have done little compared with their own visions and aspirations; but they have done that little, only because they sought to do, and once perhaps thought that they were doing, a great deal more.

The philosophies of Epicurus or Hume give no adequate or dignified conception of the mind. There is no organic unity in a succession of feeling or sensations; no comprehensiveness in an infinity of separate actions. The individual never reflects upon himself as a whole; he can hardly regard one act or part of his life as the cause or effect of any other act or part. Whether in practice or speculation, he is to himself only in successive instants. To such thinkers, whether in ancient or in modern times, the mind is only the poor recipient of impressions—not the heir of all the ages, or connected with all other minds. It begins again with its own modicum of experience having only such vague conceptions of the wisdom of the past as are inseparable from language and popular opinion. It seeks to explain from the experience of the individual what can only be learned from the history of the world. It has no conception of obligation, duty, conscience—these are to the Epicurean or Utilitarian philosopher only names which interfere with our natural perceptions of pleasure and pain.

There seem then to be several answers to the question, Why the theory that all knowledge is sensation is allied to the lower rather than to the higher view of ethical philosophy:—1st, Because it is easier to understand and practise; 2ndly, Because it is fatal to the pursuit of ideals, moral, political, or religious; 3rdly, Because it deprives us of the means and instruments of higher thought, of any adequate conception of the mind, of knowledge, of conscience, of moral obligation.

THEAETETUS.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

SOCRATES.

THEODORUS.

THEAETETUS.

Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant.

Steph

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Euclid. Are you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?

Terpsion. No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking for you, and wondering that I could not find you.

Enc. Why, I was not in the city at all.

Terp. Where then?

Enc. As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus; he was being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth.

Terp. Do you mean that he was alive or dead?

Enc. He was scarcely alive; for he has been badly wounded, and what is worse, the sickness which prevails in the army has fastened upon him.

Terp. Is that the dysentery?

Enc. Yes.

Terp. Alas! what a loss he will be!

Enc. Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some one highly praising his behaviour in this very battle.

Terp. No wonder; I should rather wonder at hearing any-

thing else of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?

Enc. He wanted to get home; for the fact was that I begged and advised him to remain, but he would not; so I set him on his way, and turned back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a youth, and he had a memorable conversation with him, which he repeated to me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived.

Terp. His words have certainly proved true; but what was the conversation? can you tell me?

Enc. No, indeed, not offhand; but I took notes as soon as I got home, which I filled up from memory and wrote out at leisure; and whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; thus I have nearly the whole conversation written down.

Terp. I remember—you told me; and I have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing, but have put off doing so; and now, why not out with the book?—having just come from the country, I should greatly like to rest.

Enc. I too shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the servant shall read to us.

Terp. Very good.

Enc. Here is the roll, Terpsion; I need only observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned—these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words ‘I said,’ ‘I remarked,’ which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, ‘he agreed,’ or ‘disagreed,’ in the answer, lest the repetition of them should be troublesome.

Terp. Quite right, Euclid.

Enc. And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.

Euclid's servant reads.

Socrates. If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our Athenian youth, and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if you have met any one who is good for anything.

Theodorus. Yes, Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you. Seeing, 144 then, that he has no personal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships without ballast, and go darting about, and grow mad rather than courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, are stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; he is full of gentleness, and flows on silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful.

Soc. That is good news; whose son is he?

Theod. The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching

us; he and his companions have been anointing in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him.

Soc. I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a considerable fortune.

Theod. Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal.

Soc. He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me.

Theod. I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.

Soc. By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said so was or was not a musician?

Theaetetus. We should ask.

Soc. And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if not, not?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?

Theaet. Certainly we should.

Soc. And is Theodorus a painter?

Theaet. I never heard that he was.

Soc. Is he a geometrician?

Theaet. Of course he is, Socrates.

Soc. And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?

Theaet. I think so.

Soc. If, then, he remarks on the similarity of our persons, either in the way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him.

Theaet. I should say not.

Soc. But, if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the

mental endowments of either of us, then he who heard the praises will naturally desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to exhibit himself.

Theaet. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been praising you.

Theaet. I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?

Soc. Nay, he is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you to retract your assent on that ground. For if you do, he will have to clear himself on oath, and I am sure that no one will accuse him of false witness. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word.

Theaet. I will do as you wish.

Soc. In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus: something of geometry, I suppose?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And astronomy and harmony and calculation?

Theaet. I do my best.

Soc. Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, and of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little matter which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. And by wisdom the wise are wise?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And is that different from knowledge?

Theaet. What is different?

Soc. Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?

Theaet. Yes.

146 *Soc.* And this is the very difficulty which I can never explain to myself—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What do you say? and which of us will answer

first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say, to the rest of the company; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of asking any questions which he likes.... Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.

Theod. The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am not in the habit of playing at your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will be more apt, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. Having already made a beginning with him, I would advise you to detain Theaetetus, and interrogate him.

Soc. Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? the philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.

Theact. Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.

Soc. We will, if we can.

Theact. Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus—geometry, and those which you just now mentioned—are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, all and each of them, are knowledge.

Soc. Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your own nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing.

Theact. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art of making shoes?

Theact. That is my meaning.

Soc. And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. In both cases you define the subject-matter of each of the two arts?

Theact. True.

Soc. But that, Theaetetus, was not the question: we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?

Theact. Perfectly right.

147 *Soc.* Take the following example: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very common and obvious thing—for example, What is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?

Theact. Truly.

Soc. In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the meaning of the word 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other workers. For how can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know what it is?

Theact. Of course not.

Soc. Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?

Theact. None.

Soc. Nor of any other science?

Theact. No.

Soc. And when a man is asked 'what science or knowledge is,' to give as an answer the name of some art or science, is ridiculous; for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'a knowledge of this and that.'

Theact. True.

Soc. Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have said simply, that 'clay is moistened earth'—whose clay is not to the point.

Theact. Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question. You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like

what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion.

Soc. What was that, Theaetetus?

Theaet. Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such as the roots of three or five feet, showing that in linear measurement (i. e. comparing the sides of the squares) they are incommensurable by the unit: he selected the irrational roots of the numbers up to seventeen, but he went no farther; and as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.

Soc. And did you find such a class?

Theaet. I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.

Soc. Let me hear.

Theaet. We divided all numbers into two classes; those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we represented as squares and called squares or equilateral numbers;—that was one class.

Soc. Very good.

Theaet. The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every other number which is made up of unequal factors, ¹⁴⁸ either of a greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;—all these we represented as oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.

Soc. Capital; and what followed?

Theaet. The lines, or sides, which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the others [i. e. with the so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the value of their squares; and the same about solids.

Soc. Excellent, my boy; I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.

Theaet. But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar

answer about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

Soc. Well, but suppose that you were running a course, and some one said in praise of you, that he had never known any youth who was as good a runner, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner—would his praise be any the less true?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge really a little matter, as I just now said, or one requiring great skill?

Theaet. Requiring the greatest, I should say.

Soc. Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.

Theaet. I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth.

Soc. Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.

Theaet. I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when I heard the questions which came from you; but I can neither persuade myself that I have any answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would have me answer; and I cannot get rid of the desire to answer.

Soc. These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth.

Theaet. I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel.

149 *Soc.* And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?

Theaet. Yes, I have.

Soc. And that I myself practise midwifery?

Theaet. No, never.

Soc. Let me tell you that I do, though, my friend: but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and drive men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. Shall I tell you the reason?

Theact. By all means.

Soc. Bear in mind the whole function of the midwives, and then you will see my meaning better:—No woman, as you are probably aware, who is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who are past bearing.

Theact. Yes, I know.

Soc. The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is not a mother, and she honours those who are like herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear.

Theact. I dare say.

Soc. And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?

Theact. Very true.

Soc. And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing, and if they choose they can smother the embryo in the womb.

Theact. They can.

Soc. Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers, and have an entire knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

Theact. No, never.

Soc. Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited.

Theact. Yes, the same art.

Soc. And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise?

Theact. I should think not.

Soc. Certainly not—but the midwives, who are respectable

women and have a character to lose, avoid this department of practice, because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only match-maker.

Theaet. Obviously.

Soc. Such are the midwives, whose work is a very important one, but not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time idols which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think so?

Theaet. To be sure.

Soc. Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but differs, in that I attend men and not women, and I practise on their souls when they are in labour, and not on their bodies: and the triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just; and the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, yet forbids me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all wise, nor have I anything which is the invention or birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this in the opinion of others as well as in their own. No one can imagine that they have learned anything of me, but they have acquired and discovered many noble things of themselves. The god and I only help to deliver them. And the proof of my words is, that many of them in their ignorance, either in their conceit of themselves despising me, or falling under the influence of others¹, have gone away sooner than they ought; and then they have miscarried through evil communications, and also

¹ Reading with the Bodleian MS: ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες.

have lost the children of which I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up, being fonder of lies and shadows than of the truth; and they have at last ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many others. The truants often return to me, and beg that I would converse with them again—they are ready to go down on their knees—and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who have intercourse with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into marrying some one, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and some to other inspired sages. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labour—great with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife and the son of a midwife, and try to answer the question which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man (that was not within the range of their ideas); neither am I their enemy in all this, but religion will never allow me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, ‘What is knowledge?’—and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. And, accord-

ing to my present notion, he who knows perceives what he knows, and therefore I should say that knowledge is perception.

Soc. Bravely said, boy ; that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now, shall you and I have an examination, and see whether this conception of yours is a true child or a mere wind-egg? And so you say that perception is knowledge?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. I think that you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge, which is indeed that of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing the same thing when he says, that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not :—You have read him?

Theact. Yes, I have, again and again.

Soc. Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and are to me such as they appear to me, for you and I are men?

Theact. Exactly so.

Soc. Such a wise man has doubtless a meaning. Let us try to understand him : the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

Theact. Quite true.

Soc. Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not ; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

Theact. I suppose the last.

Soc. And this is what appears to each of them?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives'?

Theact. True.

Soc. Then appearance and perception coincide in this instance of hot and cold, and in similar instances ; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?

Theact. Clearly.

Soc. Now, I verily and indeed suspect that Protagoras, who was an almighty wise man, spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but he told the truth, 'his Truth¹, in secret to his own disciples.

Theact. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I am about to speak of an illustrious philosophy, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, or heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no one or some or any sort of nature, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, with the exception of Parmenides, and they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of

'Ocean the birth of gods, and mother Tethys,'

does he not mean that all things are the offspring of flux and motion?

Theact. I think so.

Soc. And who could take up arms against such a great army, 153 and Homer who is their general, and not be ridiculous?

Theact. Who indeed, Socrates?

Soc. Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which will show that motion is the source of that which is said to be and become, and rest of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and nurse of all other things, are born of friction, which is a kind of motion²;—is not this the origin of fire?

Theact. Yes.

¹ In allusion to a book of Protagoras' which bore this title.

² Reading τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις.

Soc. And the race of animals is generated in the same way?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time¹ by motion and exercise?

Theact. True.

Soc. And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and improved, and preserved by thought and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul means only want of thought and attention, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?

Theact. True.

Soc. Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, both of the soul and of the body?

Theact. Clearly.

Soc. I may affirm, also, that the breathless calm and stillness and the like are wasting and impairing, and wind and storm preserving; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thus indicating that while the sun and the heavens go round, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if the sun were to be arrested in his course, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, Chaos would come again.

Theact. I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning.

Soc. Then apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, and first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them; nor can you assign any place to it: for if it had position it would be and be at rest, and there would be no process of becoming.

Theact. Then what is colour?

Soc. Let us carry out the principle which has just been affirmed, that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that every colour, white, black, and every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what
 154 we term the substance of each colour is neither the active nor

the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you certain that the several colours appear to every animal—say to a dog—as they appear to you?

Theact. Indeed I am not.

Soc. Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Would you not rather question whether you yourself see the same thing at different times, because you are never exactly the same?

Theact. I should.

Soc. And if that with which I compare myself in size¹, or which I apprehend, were great or white or hot, it could not without actually changing become different by mere contact with another; nor again, if the apprehending or comparing subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. For in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark.

Theact. What sort of contradictions do you mean?

Soc. A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are six dice, which are a third more when compared with four, and fewer by a half than twelve—they are more and also fewer. How can you or any one maintain the contrary?

Theact. Very true.

Soc. Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?

Theact. I should say no, Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.

Soc. By Herè, well and divinely said, my friend. And if you reply 'yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; 'for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind².'

Theact. Very true.

¹ Reading with the MSS. ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα.

² In allusion to the well-known line of Euripides, Hippol. 612:

Soc. The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the real nature of our ideas, and whether they are consistent with each other or not.

Theact. Yes, that would be my desire.

Soc. And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is plenty of time, why should we not gently and patiently review
155 our own thoughts, and examine and see what these appearances in us really are? Concerning which, if I am not mistaken, we shall say:—first, that nothing can be greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself—you would agree?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.

Theact. Quite true.

Soc. Thirdly, that what once was not and afterwards was, could not be, without becoming and having become.

Theact. Yes, truly.

Soc. These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, were fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as this—when I say that I, at my age, who neither gain nor lose in height, may this year be taller than you, who are still a youth, and next year not so tall—not that I have lost, but that you have increased: in such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not; and yet I have not become, for certainly I could not have become shorter without becoming, neither could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you understand me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before.

Theact. Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; indeed I am; and I want to know what is the meaning of them, and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.

Soc. I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true

insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris the messenger of heaven is the child of Thaumás (wonder). But do you know what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?

Theact. Not as yet. †

Soc. Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden truth or wisdom of a famous man or men.

Theact. To be sure, I shall be very much obliged.

Soc. Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can hold fast in their hands, and who will not allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have real existence.

Theact. Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very stubborn and repulsive mortals.

Soc. Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious 156 are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in endless number, and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny endless in number, having two forms, sense and the object of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming to the birth at the same moment. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many more which are named, as well as innumerable others which have no name; with each of them there is born an object of sense,—all sorts of colours born with all sorts of sight and sounds in like manner with hearing, and other objects with the other senses. Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearing of this tale on the preceding argument?

Theact. Indeed I do not.

Soc. Then attend, for I hope to finish the story. The purport is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying,

and that this motion has degrees of swiftness or slowness ; and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and about things near them, and thus beget, but the things begotten are quicker, for their motions are from place to place. Apply this to sense :—When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and the sensation of white, which could not have been given by either of them going to any other [subject or object], then, while the sight is flowing from the eye, whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the colour ; and so the eye is fulfilled with sight, and sees, and becomes, not sight, but a seeing eye ; and the object which combines in forming the colour is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white, whether wood or stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be coloured white¹. And this is true of all sensations, hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I¹⁵⁷ was saying before, not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them generated by motion in their intercourse with one another, according to their kinds ; for of the agent and patient, taken singly, as they say, no fixed idea can be framed, for the agent has no existence until united with the patient, and the patient has no existence until united with the agent ; and that which by uniting with something becomes an agent, by meeting with some other thing is converted into a patient. And from all these considerations, as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, that there is no one or self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation ; and being has to be altogether abolished, although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain the use of the term. But philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word ‘something,’ or ‘belonging to something,’ or ‘to me,’ or ‘this’ or ‘that,’ or any other detaining name to be used ; in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms ; nor can any name fix or detain them ; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of

aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are not these speculations charming? And do you not like the taste of them?

Theact. I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out.

Soc. You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor pretend to know, anything of myself; I am barren, and attend on you as a midwife, and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day: when this has been accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine creation. Therefore, keep up your spirits, and answer like a man what you think.

Theact. Ask me.

Soc. Is your opinion that nothing is but what becomes?—the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were mentioning?

Theact. When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent.

Soc. Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; as there still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of hearing and sight, or of other senses. For you know that in all these cases the theory of the truth of perception appears to be unmistakably refuted, as in dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; 158 and far from saying that everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing is which appears.

Theact. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is perception, or that things are to each one as they appear?

Theact. I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, because you rebuked me just now for saying so; but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or

dreamers think truly, when they imagine some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, and are flying in their sleep.

Soc. Do you know a question which is raised about these illusions, and especially about waking and sleeping?

Theaet. What question?

Soc. A question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask:—How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state?

Theaet. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how you can prove that the one is any more true than the other, for all the phenomena correspond; and there is no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we have been talking to one another in a dream; and when we are actually dreaming and talk in our dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing.

Soc. You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily raised, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as the time is equally divided in which we are asleep or awake, in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other; and are equally confident of both.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the difference is only that the times are not equal.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And are truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?

Theaet. That would be very ridiculous.

Soc. But can you certainly determine in any other way which of these opinions is true?

Theaet. I do not think that I can.

Soc. Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I should imagine—Can that which is

wholly other, have any similar quality or power? and observe, Theaetetus, that the word 'other' means not 'partially,' but 'wholly other.'

Theact. Certainly, that which is wholly other cannot have 159 any power or anything the same.

Soc. And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?

Theact. True.

Soc. If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, that which becomes like we call the same—that which becomes unlike, other?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:—there is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?

Theact. You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?

Soc. Exactly; that is my meaning.

Theact. I answer, they are unlike.

Soc. And if unlike, they are other?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

Theact. I should.

Soc. All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill.

Theact. Of course.

Soc. And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?

Theact. True.

Soc. For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient

and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theact. Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.

Soc. But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon me as if I were another and a different person?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in the wine, which becomes not bitterness but bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?

Theact. True.

Soc. There is no other object of which I shall ever have
160 the same perception, for another object would give another perception, and would make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects me meeting another subject, produce the same or become similar, for that too will produce another result from another subject, and become different.

Theact. True.

Soc. Neither can I for myself, have this sensation, nor the object by or for itself, this quality.

Theact. Certainly not.

Soc. When I perceive I must become percipient of something—there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the quality of the object, whether sweet, bitter, or any other quality, must have relation to a percipient; there cannot be anything sweet which is sweet to no one.

Theact. Certainly not.

Soc. Then the inference is, that we [the agent and patient] are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor yet to ourselves; and therefore we can only be bound to one another, so that whether a person says that a thing

is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else ; but he must not say or allow any one else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely :— such is our conclusion.

Theact. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it ?

Theact. Of course.

Soc. Then my perception is true to me, and inseparable from my own being ; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me.

Theact. I suppose so.

Soc. How then, if 'I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive ?

Theact. You cannot.

Soc. Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception ; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things ; or with Theaetetus, that, granting these premises, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your newborn child, of which I have delivered you—What say you ?

Theact. I cannot but agree, Socrates.

Soc. Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you and I have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that he is born, we must run round the hearth with him, and see whether he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg 161 and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed ? or will you bear to see an assault made upon him, and not get into a passion if I take away your first-born ?

Theod. Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured. But I should like to know, Socrates, by heaven I should, whether all this is true or not ?

Soc. You are fond of an argument, Theodorus, and now you innocently fancy that I am a bag full of arguments, and can easily pull one out which will refute what has been said. But you do not see that in reality none of these arguments come

from me ; they all come from him who talks with me. I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing of myself, but shall endeavour to elicit something from our friend.

Theod. Do as you say, Socrates ; you are quite right.

Soc. Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras.

Theod. What is that ?

Soc. I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his great work on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things ; then, when we were reverencing him as a god, he might have condescended to inform us that he was no wiser than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow men—would not this have produced an overpowering effect ? For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom ? Must he not be talking 'ad captandum' in all this ? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed ; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man they are equally right ; and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.

162 *Theod.* He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when I agree with you ; please, then, to take Theaetetus again ; he seemed to answer very nicely.

Soc. If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theo-

dorus, would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own form?

Theod. Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, in consideration of my age and stiffness; let more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.

Soc. Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus: Tell me, Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not amazed at finding yourself all of a sudden raised to the level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?—for you would assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men?

Theact. Certainly I should, and I am amazed, as you say. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed.

Soc. Why, my dear boy, you are young, and your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, or some one speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply,—Good people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech, or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He or any other ¹⁶³ mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in geometry, would not be worth an ace.

Theact. Neither you nor we, Socrates, would be satisfied with such arguments.

Soc. Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the matter in some other way?

Theact. Yes, in quite another way.

Soc. And the way will be to ask whether sensation is or is not the same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our

argument, and with a view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions.

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear? for example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not know the language of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that hearing them, we also know what they are saying? Or again, if we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we maintain that, seeing them, we must know them?

Theact. We shall say, Socrates, that we know what we actually see and hear of them—that is to say, we see and know the figure and colour of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

Soc. Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no dispute, because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which you will also have to repulse.

Theact. What is it?

Soc. Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?

Theact. Impossible, Socrates; and an absurdity.

Soc. Am I dreaming, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?

Theact. True.

Soc. And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And is memory of something or of nothing?

Theact. Of something, surely.

Soc. Of things learned and perceived, that is?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. Often a man remembers that which he has seen?

Theact. True.

Soc. And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?

Theact. Who, Socrates, would dare to say so?

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Soc. But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be maintained.

Theact. What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you, though I have a strong suspicion that you are right.

Soc. As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same.

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.

Theact. True.

Soc. And seeing is knowing, and therefore not seeing is not knowing?

Theact. Very true.

Soc. Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be an absurdity.

Theact. Most true.

Soc. Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. Then they must be distinguished?

Theact. I suppose that they must.

Soc. Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?

Theact. About what?

Soc. Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory, we walk away from the argument and crow.

Theact. How do you mean?

Soc. After the manner of disputers, we drew inferences from words, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain an

advantage. And, although professing not to be mere Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons.

Theact. I do not as yet understand you.

Soc. Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility, and so the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also, who maintained that knowledge is the same as perception.

Theact. True.

Soc. And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say for himself. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the guardians whom he left, and of whom Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up his cause myself, and see justice done?

165 *Theod.* Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful to you if you assist him.

Soc. Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of the terms which are commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes than these. Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus?

Theod. To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less disgrace if he is discomfited.

Soc. Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:—Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?

Theod. How shall we answer, Theaetetus?

Theact. He cannot, I should say.

Soc. He can, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are caught in a well, as they say, and the self-assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks

whether you can see his cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable man? —

Theact. I should answer, not with that eye but with the other.

Soc. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time.

Theact. Yes, in a certain sense.

Soc. That is not an answer to my question, he will reply; I do not ask 'in what sense you know,' but only whether you know that which you do not know. You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not seeing is not knowing: I leave you to draw the inference.

Theact. Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion.

Soc. Yes, my marvel, and there may be yet worse things in store for you: an opponent will ask whether you can have a sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and so on without end. When you took up the position, that sense is knowledge, there was lying in wait a light-armed mercenary, who argues for pay; he will dart from his ambush, and make his assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses;—he will show you no mercy; and while you are lost in envy and admiration of his wisdom, he will have got you into his net, out of which you will not escape until you have come to an understanding about the sum which is to be paid for your release. Well, you say, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? Shall I answer for him?

Theact. By all means.

Soc. After touching on the points which I have mentioned in defending him, he will close with us in disdain, and say:— 166
The worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing, and the boy said no, because he was frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made a fool of me. The truth is, O slatternly Socrates, that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping, if he has answered as I should have answered, then I am re-

futed, but if he answers what I should not have answered, he is refuted and not I. For do you suppose that any one would admit the memory of a feeling afterwards to be the same as the feeling was at the time? Certainly not. Or that he would hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing at the same time? Or, if he is afraid of making this admission, would he grant that one who has become unlike was the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But O, my good sir, he will say, come to the argument in a more generous spirit; and either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you will have it so, is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself a pig, and you make my writings the sport of other swine, which is not right. For I declare that the truth is as I have written, and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as things are and appear different to him. And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the letter, but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember how I said before, that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the
 167 other: nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education, a change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another think truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one can think

what is not, or think anything different from that which he feels, and which is always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of a kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I do not call wise men tadpoles: far otherwise; I say that they are the physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants—for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations and not merely true ones¹; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to be just and fair to a state, while sanctioned by a state, is just and fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom causes the good to take the place of the evil, both in appearance and in reality. And the sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man, and deserves to be well paid by them. And in this way one man is wiser than another; and yet no one thinks falsely, and you, whether you will or not, must endure to be a measure. On these points the argument stands firm, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by an opposite argument, or if you like you may put questions to me, (no intelligent person will object to the method of questions,—quite the reverse.) But I must beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. The unfairness of which I complain is that you never distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the company which he has previously kept. If you do so, your adversary will lay the blame of his own 168 confusion and perplexity on himself, and not on you. He will follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different

¹ Reading *ἀληθεῖς*, but?

from what he was. But the other mode of arguing, which is practised by the many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, instead of turning philosopher, he will learn to hate philosophy. I would recommend you, therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and congenial spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion, and that what appears is to individuals and states. In this way you will see whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different, but not by arguing, as you are doing, from the customary use of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend¹; had he been living, he would have helped himself in a far grander style.

Theod. You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defence of him has been most valorous.

Soc. Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed Protagoras bidding us be serious, as the text, 'man is the measure of all things,' was a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument; he also complained that we made a joke of him.

Theod. How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates?

Soc. Well, and shall we do as he says?

Theod. By all means.

Soc. But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up his argument in good earnest², and ask and answer one another, for you see that the rest of us are all boys. In no other way can we escape the imputation, that we are making fun of him, and examining his thesis with boys.

Theod. Well, and is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?

Soc. Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please not to imagine that I am to defend by every means in

¹ Reading προσήκεσα. ² Reading αὐτοῦ τῶν λόγων.

my power your departed friend; and that you are to defend nothing and nobody. At any rate, my good man, do not sheer 169 off until we know whether you are the true measure of diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry, and other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them.

Theod. He who is sitting by you, Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument; and I am afraid that when I said that you would excuse me, and not, like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip and fight, I said a stupid thing—I should rather compare you to Scirrhon, who threw travellers from the rocks; for the Lacedaemonian rule is ‘strip or depart,’ but you seem to go about your work more after the fashion of Antaeus: you will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you have stripped him, and he has tried a fall with you in argument.

Soc. I see, Theodorus, that you perfectly apprehend the nature of my complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old, for I have met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in words, has broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough exercise, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to try a fall with me, whereby you will do me good as well as yourself.

Theod. I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are like destiny; nor can any man escape from any argument which you may weave for him; but I am not disposed to go further than you suggest.

Soc. Once will be enough; and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.

Theod. I will try to avoid that error, as far as I am able.

Soc. In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this, some who as he said were the wise excelled others.

Theod. Very true.

Soc. Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself,

instead of our answering for him, there would have been no need of our reviewing or reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here, and some one may accuse us of speaking without authority on his behalf, had we not better come to a clearer agreement on this head, as a great deal may be at stake?

Theod. That is true.

170 *Soc.* Then let us obtain from his own statement, in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement.

Theod. In what way?

Soc. In this way:—His words are, ‘to whom a thing seems, that which seems is.’

Theod. Yes, that is what he says.

Soc. And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that every man thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? And in the hour of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do they not look up to their commanders as gods, and expect salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own opinion.

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion.

Theod. Exactly.

Soc. How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? In either case, the result is the same, and their opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that any friend of Protagoras, or you yourself, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion?

Theod. The thing is incredible, Socrates.

Soc. And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis which declares man to be the measure of all things.

Theod. How so?

Soc. Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he argues, that this is true to you. Now if so you must either say that the rest of us are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms and have an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely?

Theod. Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world of trouble.

Soc. And will you assert, in that case, that what you say is true to you and false to the ten thousand others.

Theod. No other inference is possible.

Soc. And what is to be said of Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of all things, then the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one. But if ¹⁷¹ you suppose that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion his truth is more untrue than true.

Theod. That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion.

Soc. And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his opinion to be false; for in admitting that the opinions of all men are true, he in effect grants that the opinion of his opponents is true.

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?

Theod. Of course.

Soc. But the other side do not admit that they speak falsely.

Theod. They do not.

Soc. And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true.

Theod. Clearly.

Soc. Then all mankind, including Protagoras, will contend, or rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned—am I not right?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself nor to any one else?

Theod. I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard.

Soc. But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would have overthrown both of us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you for assenting to me, and have been off and underground in no time. But as he is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such as they are, and say honestly what we think; and one thing which every man thinks is, that there are great differences in the understandings of men.

Theod. In that opinion I quite agree.

Soc. And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the distinction which we drew on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are in general only such as they appear, but that if judgments are allowed to differ at all, this certainty of sensation cannot be extended to the knowledge of health or disease, which every woman, child, or living creature is by no means able to cure, neither have they any perception of what is wholesome for themselves; and that in this, if in anything, the difference in different men will appear?

Theod. I quite agree.

172 *Soc.* Again, in politics, while affirming that right and wrong, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining the sphere of expediency one counsellor

is better than another, and one state wiser than another—they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city deems expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that these have no natural or essential basis—the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here arises a new question, Theodorus, which is more serious than the last.

Theod. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.

Soc. That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and plead in court. How natural is this!

Theod. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say, that those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal pursuits compared with those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such like places, are in their way of life as freemen are to slaves.

Theod. In what is the difference seen?

Soc. In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always command: he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third, if his fancy prefers a new one, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: and there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the affidavit, which in their phraseology is termed the brief, is recited: and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him

in deed ; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His slavish condition has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence ; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways ; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him ; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood ; or shall we return to the argument ? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

Theod. Nay, Socrates, let us finish what we are about ; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument ; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge ? Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets ?

Soc. Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders ; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly ; they neither see nor hear the laws or votes of the state written or recited ; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing-maidens,—do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation ; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city : his mind, disdainful of the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is ‘flying all abroad’ as Pindar says, measuring with line and rule the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the

whole nature of each and all, but not condescending to anything 174
which is within reach.

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever witty Thracian handmaid made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the essence of man, and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other;—I think that you understand me, Theodorus?

Theod. I do, and what you say is true.

Soc. And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. His awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of imbecility. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, in the simplicity of his heart he cannot help laughing openly and unfeignedly; and this again makes him look like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten

175 thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray a dull and narrow vision in those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, many times over. And when people pride themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-five ancestors, which goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot understand their poverty of ideas. Why are they unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He amuses himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before him, and always at a loss.

Theod. That is very true, Socrates.

Soc. But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of kings to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man is to attain the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering out broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up as a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus, the one of the freeman called by you

useless when he has to perform some menial office, such as packing up a bag, or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech; the other, of the man who is able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like 176 a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn the true life which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven.

Theod. If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

Soc. Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always remain something which is antagonist to good. Having no place among the gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the earthly nature, and this mortal sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy and just and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not in order that a man may seem to be good, which is the reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a repetition of an old wives' fable. Whereas, the truth is that God is never unrighteous at all—he is perfect righteousness; and he of us who is the most righteous is most like him. Herein is seen the true cleverness of a man, and also his nothingness and want of manhood. For to know this is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of this is too plainly folly and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not yield to the illusion that his roguery is clever; for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them, 'these are not mere good-for-nothing persons, burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not know that they are; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, a philosopher, who may be excused for appearing simple and

which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.

Theod. What is that?

Soc. There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched: and they do not see, in their utter folly and infatuation, that they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of
177 their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to fools.

Theod. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown the original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return.

Theod. For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

Soc. Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one had ever yet had the hardihood to contend that the ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good, were really good while they lasted;—he who said this, would only be playing with the name ‘good,’ and would not really touch our question?

Theod. True.

Soc. And I would not have him speak of the name, but of the thing which is intended by the name.

Theod. Right.

Soc. Whatever name he gives to the thing, he would allow that the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and that the state as far as possible imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim?

Theod. Certainly not.

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Soc. But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen?

Theod. Yes, I think that there are mistakes.

Soc. The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognised, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after time; which, in other words, is the future.

Theod. Very true.

Soc. Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question:—O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man, as you declare, is the measure of all things—white, heavy, light: there is nothing of this sort of which he is not the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks what he feels, he thinks what is and is true to himself. Is it not so?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further say) to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not only of what is but of what will be, and do things always happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:—When a private person thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right?—he will have a heat or fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever in the physician's judgment?

Theod. That would be ludicrous.

Soc. And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is likely to be a better prophet of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the harp-player?

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And the musician will be a better judge than the gymnastic-master of the excellence of the music, which the gymnastic-master will himself approve, when he hears the performance?

Theod. Of course.

Soc. And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not now arguing, but of the pleasure which will seem to be and will be to each of us in the future, will every one be to himself the best judge?—nay, would not you, Protagoras, be a better judge of the topics which are likely to produce an effect upon us in a court than any private individual?

Theod. Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.

Soc. To be sure, friend: who would have paid a large sum 179 for the privilege of talking to him, if he had really¹ persuaded his visitors that neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be and seem to be in the future than every one for himself?

Theod. Who indeed?

Soc. And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests?

Theod. Quite true.

Soc. Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure: but I, who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything.

Theod. That is the way, Socrates, in which his argument is best refuted; although he is also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who give the lie direct to his own opinion.

Soc. There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine

that the opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty in proving that momentary states of feeling, out of which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also untrue. And perhaps I may be talking nonsense about them; for very likely they are really unassailable, and those who say that there is evidence of them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in which case our friend Theaetetus has not been far from the mark in identifying perception and knowledge. Here, then, let us approach nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires, and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is raging about this way, and there are many combatants.

Theod. No small war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides; the disciples of Heraclitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine.

Soc. Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the question from the beginning as set forth by themselves.

Theod. Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heraclitus, which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them about them. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely 180 incapable of doing so; or rather, they have no particle of rest in them, and they are in a state of negation of rest which no words can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you enquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; for their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that any such principle would be stationary; and they are at war with the stationary, which they would like, if they could, to banish utterly.

Soc. I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they were fighting and have never stayed with them in

time of peace, for they are no friends of yours ; and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves.

Theod. Disciples! my good sir, they have none ; men of this sort are not one another's disciples, but they grow up anyhow, and get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will ; we must take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as if we were doing a geometrical problem.

Soc. Quite right too ; but as touching the said problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest ; and now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have declared the same openly, that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others in motion—having learned that all is motion, he will duly honour his teachers? I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theodorus,

‘ That is alone unmoved which is named the universe.’

This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers, who stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained, and has no place in which to move. What shall we do, friend, with all these people ; for, advancing step by step, we have imperceptibly got between the combatants, and, unless we can
 181 protect our retreat, we shall pay the penalty of our rashness—like the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are dragged different ways by the two parties. Therefore I think that we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted, ‘ the river-gods,’ and, if we find any truth in them, we will pull ourselves over to their side, and try to get away from the others. But if the partisans of ‘ the whole ’ appear to speak more truly, we will fly off from the party which would move the immovable, to them. And if we find that neither of them have anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a ridiculous

position, having ourselves to assert our own poor opinion and reject that of ancient and famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great?

Theod. Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two parties have to say would be quite intolerable.

Soc. Then examine we must, if you will insist. The first question which, I fancy, has to be determined, is about motion. What do they mean when they say that all things are in motion? Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I incline to think, two? I should like to have your opinion upon the point, that I may err, if I am to err, in your company; tell me, then, when a thing changes from one place to another, or goes round in the same place, is not that motion?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. Here then we have one kind of motion. But when a thing grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, while remaining in the same place, may not that be properly described as motion of another kind?

Theod. I think so.

Soc. Of course, it must be so. I say, then, that of motion there are these two kinds, 'change,' and 'motion in place.'

Theod. You are right.

Soc. And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another only in one way?

Theod. Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think they would say 'that all things are moved in both ways.'

Soc. Yes, my friend; for, if not, then manifestly the same things would be in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest.

Theod. To be sure.

Soc. And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, they must suppose that all things have always every sort of motion?

Theod. Most true.

Soc. Consider a further point: did we not understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as this:—were they not saying that each of them is moving between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and the patient then becomes percipient but not perception, and the agent a quale but not a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange term to you, and that you do not understand the word when thus generalised. Then I will take particular cases: I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but when they come together and generate sensations and sensible things, the one becomes of a certain quality, and the other percipient. You remember?

Theod. Of course.

Soc. We may leave the rest of their theory unexamined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are all things in motion and flux?

Theod. Yes, they will reply.

Soc. And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished; that is to say, they move and are also changed?

Theod. Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

Soc. If they only moved, and were not changed, we should be able to say what are the kinds of things which are in motion and flux?

Theod. Exactly.

Soc. But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and the very whiteness is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, and will not remain white, can the name of any colour be rightly used at all?

Theod. How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this or of any other quality—if while we are using the word the object is escaping in the flux?

Soc. And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?

Theod. Certainly not, if all things are in motion.

Soc. Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not seeing, nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception, if all things have any and every kind of motion?

Theod. Certainly not.

Soc. Yet science is perception, as Theaetetus and I were saying.

Theod. That was said.

Soc. Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?

Theod. I suppose not.

Soc. Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer 183 in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is not this; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' this; and if we say 'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.

Theod. You are right.

Soc. Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'this' and 'not this.' But you ought not to use the word 'this' or 'not this,' for there is no motion in 'this' or 'not this'; the maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that will suit them, except perhaps 'in no way,' which is perfectly indefinite.

Theod. Yes, that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite at home.

Soc. And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend without assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—a wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us.

Theod. Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering, according to the agreement.

Theaet. Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing.

Theod. You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not

instigate your elders to a breach of faith, but prepare yourself to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument.

Theact. Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest.

Theod. Invite Socrates to an argument—invite horsemen to the open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer.

Soc. Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus.

Theod. Not comply! for what reason?

Soc. My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that ‘all is one and at rest,’ as for the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called;—him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not understand his language, and may fall short even more of his meaning; and I fear above all that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse, if they are permitted—besides, the question which we are now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other can be allowed; but I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theact. Very well; do so if you will.

Soc. Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you answered that knowledge is perception?

Theact. I did.

Soc. And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? and with what does he hear sharp and flat sounds?—you would say, if I am not mistaken, ‘With the eyes and with the ears.’

Theact. I should.

Soc. The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and

the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears.

Theaet. I should say, Socrates, 'through,' rather than 'with.'

Soc. Yes, my boy; for no one can suppose that we are Trojan horses, in whom are perched several unconnected senses, not meeting in some one nature, of which they are the instruments, whether you term this soul or not, with which through these we perceive objects of sense.

Theaet. I agree with you in that opinion.

Soc. The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know whether we perceive black and white through the eyes indeed, but with one and the same part of ourselves, and again, other qualities through other organs, and whether, if asked the question, you would refer all such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to answer for yourself. Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?

Theaet. Of the body, certainly.

Soc. And you would admit that what you perceive through ¹⁸⁵ one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing?

Theaet. Of course not.

Soc. If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ?

Theaet. It cannot.

Soc. How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit that they both exist?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And that both are two and each of them one?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one another?

Theact. I dare say.

Soc. But through what do you perceive all this about them? for neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which they have in common. Let me give you an illustration:—if I were to ask whether sounds and colours are saline or not (supposing that there were any meaning in such a question), you would be able to tell me what faculty would determine that—not sight nor hearing, as is evident, but something else?

Theact. Certainly; the faculty of taste.

Soc. Very good; and what power or instrument will determine the general notions which are common, not only to the senses but to all things, and which you call being and not being, and the rest of them, about which I was just now asking—what organs will you assign for the perception of these?

Theact. You are speaking of being and not being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical notions.

Soc. You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I am asking.

Theact. Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that they have no separate organ, but that the soul, by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things.

Soc. You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you have done well in releasing me from a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me.

Theact. I am clear on that head.

186 *Soc.* And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?

Theact. I should say, to that class which the soul aspires to know of herself.

Soc. And would you say this also of like and unlike, some and other?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?

Theaet. These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative, and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and present with the future.

Soc. And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. But their essence and what they are, and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself endeavours to decide for us by the review and comparison of them?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body, are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on these and on their relations to being and use, are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.

Theaet. Assuredly.

Soc. And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

Theaet. Impossible.

Soc. And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?

Theaet. He cannot.

Soc. Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?

Theaet. That would not be right.

Soc. And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

Theaet. I should call all of them perceiving—what other name could be given them?

Soc. Perception would be the collective name of them?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?

Theact. Certainly not.

Soc. And therefore cannot have any part in science or knowledge?

Theact. No.

Soc. Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?

Theact. That is evident, Socrates; knowledge is now most clearly proved to be different from perception.

187 *Soc.* But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being.

Theact. That, Socrates, as I conceive, is called thinking.

Soc. You conceive truly. And now, my friend, please to begin again at this point; and having wiped out of your memory all that has preceded, see if you have arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is knowledge.

Theact. I cannot say, Socrates, that knowledge is all opinion, because there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to say, that knowledge is true opinion: let this then be my answer; and if this is hereafter disproved, I must try to find another.

Soc. That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, and not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are bold we shall gain one of two advantages; either we shall find that which we seek, or we shall be less likely to think that we know what we do not know—and this surely is no mean reward. And now, what are you saying?—that there are two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and you define knowledge to be the true?

Theact. Yes, according to my present view.

Soc. Is it worth while for us to resume the discussion touching opinion?

Theact. To what are you alluding?

Soc. There is a point which often troubles me, and is a great perplexity to me, both in relation to myself and others. I cannot make out the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer.

Theaet. Pray what is it?

Soc. How there can be false opinion—that difficulty still troubles the eye of my mind; and I am uncertain whether I shall leave the question, or begin over again in a new way.

Theaet. Begin again, Socrates,—at least if you think that there is the slightest necessity for doing so. Were not you and Theodorus remarking truly that in discussion of this kind we may take our own time?

Soc. You are right in reminding me, and perhaps there will be no harm in retracing our steps and beginning again. Better a little which is well done, than a great deal imperfectly.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false opinion, and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, as though there were some natural distinction between them?

Theaet. That is what we say.

Soc. All things and everything are either known or not known. I leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of forgetting and learning, because they have nothing to do with our present question.

Theaet. There can be no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these, that there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing.

Soc. And must not he who has an opinion, have an opinion about something which he knows or does not know?

Theaet. He must.

Soc. He who knows, cannot but know; and he who does not know, cannot know?

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. What shall we say then? When a man has a false opinion does he think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows, and knowing both, is he at the same time ignorant of both?

Theaet. That, Socrates, is impossible.

Soc. But perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know as some other thing which he does not know; for example, he knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, or Socrates Theaetetus?

Theaet. How can he?

Soc. But surely he cannot suppose that what he does not know is what he knows, or that what he knows is what he does not know?

Theaet. That would be monstrous.

Soc. Where, then, is false opinion? For if all things are either known or unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under the alternative just offered, and so false opinion is excluded.

Theaet. Most true.

Soc. Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing or not knowing, into that of being and not being.

Theaet. How do you mean?

Soc. May we not suspect that he who thinks of anything which is not, will think what is false, whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind?

Theaet. That, again, I should imagine to be true, Socrates.

Soc. Then suppose some one to say to us, Theaetetus:—Is this possible—can any man think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or a predicate of another? And suppose that we answer, ‘Yes, he can, when he thinks that which is not true.’—That will be our answer.

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And is the like of this to be found anywhere else?

Theaet. What do you mean?

Soc. Can a man see something and yet see nothing?

Theaet. Impossible.

Soc. But if he sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that one thing is ever to be found among non-existing things?

Theaet. I do not.

Soc. He then who sees anything, sees that which is?

Theaet. Clearly.

189 *Soc.* And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that which is?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And he who touches something, touches some one thing which is one and therefore is?

Theaet. That again is true.

Soc. And does not he who thinks, think some one thing?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which is?

Theaet. I agree.

Soc. Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all?

Theaet. Obviously.

Soc. Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance or a predicate of another?

Theaet. Clearly not.

Soc. Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is not?

Theaet. Yes, different.

Soc. Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere of being or of knowledge?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. But may not the following be the description of what we express by this name?

Theaet. What?

Soc. May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his mind, and say that one real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which is, but he misplaces the objects of his thought, and missing of what he is considering, he may be truly said to have false opinion.

Theaet. Now you appear to me to have said the exact truth: when a man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of the base, then he has truly false opinion.

Soc. I see, Theaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you are beginning to despise me.

Theaet. What makes you say so?

Soc. You think, if I am not mistaken, that your 'truly false'

is safe from censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any process of nature which is a contradiction in terms. But I will not insist upon this, because I do not wish to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else?

Theact. I am.

Soc. Then upon your view the mind is able to conceive of one thing as another?

Theact. True.

Soc. But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, have a conception either of both objects or of one of them?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. Either together or in succession?

Theact. Very good.

Soc. And do you mean by thinking the same which I mean?

Theact. What is that?

Soc. I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely
190 know; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken, I mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another.

Theact. True.

Soc. Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying to himself that one thing is another?

Theact. Quite true.

Soc. Now recollect whether you have ever said to yourself that the noble is certainly base, or the unjust just; or, take the primary conception of all—have you ever attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, even in sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or anything of that sort?

Theact. Never.

Soc. And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a horse, or that two are one?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. But if thinking is speaking to oneself, no one speaking and thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that you will have to let the word 'other' alone [i. e. not insist that 'one' and 'other' are both in Greek called 'other,' *ἕτερον*. Cp. Par. 147 C.] I mean to say, that no one thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind.

Theaet. I will give up the word 'other,' Socrates; and I agree in what you say.

Soc. If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that the one of them is the other?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Neither, if he has one of them in his mind and not the other, can he think that one is the other?

Theaet. True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that which is not in his thoughts at all.

Soc. Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects in his mind can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who maintains that false 'doxy' is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for neither in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion exist in us.

Theaet. No.

Soc. But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, then we shall be driven into many strange absurdities.

Theaet. What are they?

Soc. I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the matter in every point of view. For I should be ashamed 191 of us if we were driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak. But if we find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard them only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach to us. On the other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we must be humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea-sick passenger is trampled upon by the sailor, and to

do anything to us. Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty.

Theact. Let me hear.

Soc. I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think what he did not know to be what he knew ; and that there is a way in which such a deception is possible.

Theact. You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know Socrates, and at a distance see some one who is unknown to me, and whom I mistake for him—and then the deception will occur?

Soc. But has not that position been relinquished by us, because involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which we know?

Theact. True.

Soc. Let us make the assertion in another form, which may or may not have a favourable issue ; but as we are in a great strait, every argument should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know?

Theact. Certainly you may.

Soc. And this may happen over and over again?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men ; harder, moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in some of an intermediate quality.

Theact. I see.

Soc. Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses ; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions and thoughts, and in that receive the impression of them as from the seal of a ring ; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long as the image lasts ; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then we forget and do not know.

Theact. Very good.

Soc. Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is con-

sidering something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise in the following manner?

Theaet. In what manner?

Soc. When he thinks what he knows sometimes to be what he knows, and sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the possibility of this.

Theaet. And how would you amend the former statement?

Soc. I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases ¹⁹² which must be excluded. No one can think one thing to be another when he does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the other; nor can he think that what he does not know is what he does not know, or that what he knows is what he does not know; nor that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he perceives, or that a thing which he does not perceive is a thing which he perceives; or that one thing which he does not perceive is another thing which he does not perceive; or that a thing which he perceives is a thing which he does not perceive; nor again, can he think that one thing which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense, is another thing which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression coinciding with sense;—this last case, if possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor can he think that a thing which he knows is any other thing which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the memorial coinciding with sense; nor so long as these agree, can he think that a thing which he perceives is another thing which he knows and perceives; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive, is the same as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive:—nor again, can he suppose that a thing which he does not know is the same as another thing which he does not know and does not perceive; or that a thing which he does not perceive is another thing which he does not know and does not perceive:—All these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion. The only cases, if any, which remain, are the following.

Theaet. What are they? If you tell me, I may perhaps

understand you better ; but at present I am unable to follow you.

Soc. A person may think that some things which he knows and perceives, or which he perceives and does not know, are some other things which he knows ; or that some things which he knows and perceives, are other things which he knows and perceives.

Theact. I understand you less than ever now.

Soc. Hear me once more, then :—I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and what sort of person Theaetetus is, at one time see them, and at another time do not see them, and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way, and at another time not perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own mind.

Theact. Very true.

Soc. Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or may not perceive that which he knows.

Theact. True.

Soc. And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived ?

Theact. That is true again.

193 *Soc.* See whether you can follow me better now : Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does he perceive them in any other way ; he cannot then by any possibility imagine in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I not right ?

Theact. You are quite right.

Soc. Then that was the first case of which I spoke ?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. The second case was, that I, knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and perceiving neither, can never think that he whom I do not know is he whom I know.

Theact. True.

Soc. In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I cannot think that a person whom I do not know is some one else whom I do not know. I need not again go over

the catalogue of excluded cases, in which I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus, either when I know both or when I am in ignorance of both, or as knowing one and not knowing the other. And the same of perceiving: do you understand me?

Theact. I do.

Soc. The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you and Theodorus, and having the seal or impression of both of you in the wax block, but seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, I try to assign the right impression of memory visual to the right impression, and fit this into the proper mould: if I succeed, recognition will take place; but if I fail and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe—that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong seal, or seeing you as in a mirror when the sight flows from right to left—then ‘heterodoxy’ and false opinion ensues.

Theact. Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with wonderful exactness.

Soc. Or again, when I know both of you, and see as well as know one and not the other, and knowledge does not coincide with perception—that was a case which you did not understand just now?

Theact. No, I did not.

Soc. I meant to say, that when a person knows and perceives one of you, and his knowledge coincides with his perception, he will never think him to be some other person, whom he knows and perceives, and the knowledge of whom coincides with his perception—we agreed to that?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. But there was an omission of the further case, in which, as we now say, false opinion may arise, when knowing both, 194 or seeing, or having some other sensible perception of both, I fail in holding the seal over against the corresponding sensation; like a bad archer, I miss and fall wide of the mark—and this is called falsehood.

Theact. Yes, truly.

Soc. When, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or impressions and not to the other, and the mind fits the seal of the absent perception on the one which is present, in any case

of this sort the mind is deceived ; in a word, if our view is sound, there can be no error or deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived, but only in things which are known and perceived ; in these alone opinion turns and twists about, and becomes alternately true and false ;—true when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite—false when they go awry and are crooked.

Theact. And is not that, Socrates, nobly said?

Soc. Nobly ! yes ; but wait a little and hear the explanation, and then you will say so with more reason ; for to think truly is noble and to be deceived is base.

Theact. Assuredly.

Soc. And the explanation of truth and error is as follows :
—When the wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, and smooth and perfectly tempered, then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into the [waxen] heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the likeness of the soul to wax ($\kappa\eta\rho\rho\ \kappa\eta\rho\delta\varsigma$) ; these, I say, being pure and clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting, and minds, such as these, easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable to confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty of room, and having clear impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into their proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. Do you agree?

Theact. Entirely.

Soc. But when the heart of any one is shaggy, as the poet who knew everything says, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind—the soft are good at learning, but apt to forget ; and the hard are the reverse ; the shaggy and rugged and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in their com-
195 position, have the impressions indistinct, as also the hard, for there is no depth in them ; and the soft too are indistinct, for their impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul, which has no room. These are the natures which have false opinion ; for when they see or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right objects to the right impressions—in their stupidity they confuse them, and are apt to see

and hear and think amiss—and such men are said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant.

Theact. No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that.

Soc. Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. And of true opinion also?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. We have at length satisfactorily proven that beyond a doubt there are these two sorts of opinion?

Theact. Undoubtedly.

Soc. Alas, Theaetetus, what a tiresome being is a man who is fond of talking!

Theact. What makes you say that?

Soc. Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome garrulity; for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is always arguing on all sides of a question; whose dulness cannot be convinced, and yet he will not leave off?

Theact. But what puts you out of heart?

Soc. I am not only out of heart, but in positive despair; for I do not know what to answer if any one were to ask me:—O Socrates, have you indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither in the comparison of the perceptions with one another nor in the thoughts, but in the union of thought and perception? Yes, I shall say, with the complacency of one who thinks that he has made a noble discovery.

Theact. I see no reason why we should be ashamed of the demonstration, Socrates.

Soc. He will say: You mean to assert that the man whom we only think of and do not see, cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see or touch, but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my meaning, I shall reply.

Theact. Quite right.

Soc. Well, then, he will say, according to that argument, the number eleven, which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is only thought. How would you answer him?

Theact. I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the eleven, or twelve which are seen or handled, but

that no similar mistake can arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind.

Soc. Well, but do you think that no one ever did put before
196 his own mind five and seven,—I am not saying five or seven men or horses, but five or seven in the abstract; and these we affirm to be the actual impressions on the waxen block, in which false opinion is held to be impossible;—I say, did no man ever ask himself how many are the numbers five and seven when added, and answer that they are eleven, while another man thinks that they are twelve, or would all agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve?

Theact. Certainly not; many would think they are eleven, and in the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still; for I assume you to be speaking of numbers in general.

Soc. Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven?

Theact. Yes, that seems to be the case.

Soc. Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who makes such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another thing which he knows; but this, as we said, was impossible, and afforded an irresistible proof of the non-existence of false opinion, because otherwise the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the same time.

Theact. Most true.

Soc. Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought and sense, for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure conceptions of thought; and thus we are obliged to say, either that false opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows;—which alternative do you choose?

Theact. There is no possibility of choosing either, Socrates.

Soc. And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But, as we are at our wits' end, suppose that we do a shameless thing?

Theact. What is it?

Soc. Let us attempt to explain the verb 'to know.'

Theact. And why is that shameless?

Soc. You do not seem to be aware that the whole of our discussion from the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed not to know the nature.

Theact. Nay, I am aware.

Soc. And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb 'to know'? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we repeated the words 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not science or knowledge,' as if we could understand what we are saying to one another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment mark how we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we could still employ them if we were deprived of knowledge or science.

Theact. But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you ever argue at all?

Soc. I could not, unless I ceased to be myself. The case 197 would be different if I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present! for he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same time he would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted. But, seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? for I think that the attempt may be worth making.

Theact. Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with you for using the forbidden terms.

Soc. You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'?

Theact. I do not know that I remember at the moment.

Soc. They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have knowledge.'

Theact. True.

Soc. I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess' knowledge.

Theact. How do the two expressions differ?

Soc. Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like you to hear and help to test my view.

Theact. I will, if I can.

Soc. I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing': for ex-

ample, a man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear; and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the garment.

Theact. That would be the correct expression.

Soc. Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught wild birds—doves or any other birds—and to be keeping them in an aviary which he has constructed at home; and then we might say, in one sense, that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but he has power over them, and has them under his hand in an enclosure of his own, and can take and have them whenever he likes;—he can catch any which he likes, and let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he pleases.

Theact. True.

Soc. Once more, then, as in what preceded we made a sort of waxen figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man there is an aviary of all sorts of birds—some flocking together apart from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and everywhere.

Theact. Let us imagine such an aviary—and what is to follow?

Soc. We may suppose this receptacle to be empty while we are young, and that the birds are kinds of knowledge; when a man has gotten and detained in the enclosure any of those different kinds of knowledge, then he may be said to have learned or discovered the thing of which the knowledge is: and this is to know.

Theact. Granted.

198 *Soc.* And again, when any one wishes to catch any of these knowledges or sciences, and hold any of them after he has taken them, and again to let them go, how will he express himself?—will he describe the 'catching' of them and the original 'possession' in the same words? I will make my meaning clearer by an example:—You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

Theaet. Very good.

Soc. Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd and even in general.

Theaet. I follow.

Soc. Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit them to another.

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And he who transmits them may be said to teach them, and he who receives to learn them, and he who has them in possession in the aforesaid aviary may be said to know them.

Theaet. Exactly.

Soc. Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And he can calculate a sum of numbers in his head, or he can enumerate the things about him?

Theaet. Of course he can.

Soc. And to calculate is simply to consider how much such and such a number amounts to?

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. Then he considers as if he did not know that which he does know, for we have already admitted that he knows all numbers;—you have heard of these perplexing questions?

Theaet. I have.

Soc. May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of his knowledge which he has long ago possessed, but has not at hand in his mind.

Theaet. True.

Soc. That was my reason for asking what is calculation; and how we ought to speak when an arithmetician sets about numbering; or a grammarian about reading? Shall we say,

that although he knows, he comes to learn of himself what he knows?

Theact. That would be too absurd, Socrates.

Soc. Shall we say that he is going to read or number what
199 he does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

Theact. That, again, would be an absurdity.

Soc. Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?—any one may twist and turn the words ‘knowing’ and ‘learning’ in any way which he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using knowledge, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;—when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and he takes out of them a particular one for use, and sometimes the wrong one, that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon.

Theact. A very rational explanation.

Soc. But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. Then now we are rid of the difficulty of a man’s not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, even though we suppose him to be deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window.

Theact. What is that?

Soc. How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion?

Theact. How do you mean?

Soc. In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not

by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;—that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?—you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant.

Theaet. Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and he who sought to take one of them may sometimes have caught a form of knowledge, and then a form of ignorance; and thus he will have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing.

Soc. I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words; let us grant what you say 200—then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion—am I right?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion?

Theaet. Of course not.

Soc. He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. And thus, after a long journey, we come back to our original difficulty. The adversary will retort upon us:—‘O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think that the one which he does not know is the one which he knows? or that the one which he knows is the one which he does not know? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish

the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or waxy blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round and make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus?

Theaet. Indeed, Socrates; I do not know what we are to say.

Soc. Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first sought after, and, afterwards, the nature of false opinion?

Theaet. I cannot but agree with you, Socrates.

Soc. Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?—for we are not going to lose heart as yet.

Theaet. Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not.

Soc. What definition will be most consistent with our former views?

Theaet. I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates.

Soc. What was it?

Theaet. That knowledge was true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good.

Soc. He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'the
201 experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light.

Theaet. Very true; let us go forward and try.

Soc. The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us.

Theaet. How is that, and what profession do you mean?

Soc. The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and do not teach them, but make them think whatever they like. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convey to others the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing?

Theaet. Certainly not, they can only persuade them.

Soc. And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion?

Theact. To be sure.

Soc. When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well.

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts¹ and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same.

Theact. I remember now, Socrates, what I heard some one say, and had forgotten: he said that true opinion, accompanied with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable—such was the singular expression which he used—and that things which have a definition or explanation are knowable.

Soc. Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale.

Theact. I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could follow him.

Soc. Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:—Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation, but are names only, of which not even existence or non-existence can be predicated; you cannot say of them that they 202 are or are not, for either of the two implies existence, which must not be added on, if one means to speak of this or that thing taken by itself alone. You may not say itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, and are distinct from them;

¹ Reading *κατὰ δικαστήρια*: an emendation suggested by Professor Campbell.

whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition suitable to them, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a proposition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the combinations or syllables of them are known and expressed and apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one forms the true opinion of anything without definition, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a definition of a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds the definition, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you?

Theact. Precisely.

Soc. And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition, is knowledge?

Theact. Exactly.

Soc. Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found?

Theact. At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement.

Soc. Which is probably correct—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me.

Theact. What was it?

Soc. What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:—That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known.

Theact. And was that wrong?

Soc. We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used.

Theact. What hostages?

Soc. The letters, which are the elements; and the syllables,

which are the combinations ;—he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet?

Theact. Yes ; he did.

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Soc. Let us examine them, or rather, examine ourselves :—What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a meaning, but that letters have no meaning?

Theact. I think so.

Soc. I think so too ; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the first syllable of my name :—Theaetetus, he says, what is $\Sigma\Omega$?

Theact. I should reply Σ and Ω .

Soc. That is the definition which you would give of the syllable?

Theact. I should.

Soc. I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the Σ .

Theact. But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply, that Σ is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing ; B, and most other letters, again, have no sound, and are not even noises. Letters may be most truly said to be undefined ; and the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all.

Soc. Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about science?

Theact. Yes ; I think that we have.

Soc. Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters?

Theact. I think that we have been right.

Soc. And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or an idea which arises out of the combination of them?

Theact. I should say that we mean all the letters.

Soc. Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first syllable of my own name ; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them?

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. He knows, that is, the S and O?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. But can you say that he is ignorant of either of them, and yet knows both?

Theact. Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning.

Soc. But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed.

Theact. Well, that is very sudden.

Soc. Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them.

Theact. Very true; and a more likely notion than the other.

Soc. Let us consider carefully, and not weakly give up a great and imposing theory.

204 *Theact.* No, indeed.

Soc. Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements—of letters or of any other elements.

Theact. Very good.

Soc. And it must have no parts.

Theact. Why not?

Soc. Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts?

Theact. I should.

Soc. And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different?

Theact. I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different.

Soc. I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer.

Theact. Yes; the approval must be of the answer.

Soc. According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. Well, but is there any difference between all [in the plural] and the all [in the singular]? Take the case of number:

—When we say one, two, three, four, five, six ; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers?

Theact. Of the same.

Soc. That is of six?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six?

Theact. True.

Soc. And in speaking of all [in the plural] do we not speak of all one thing¹?

Theact. Of course.

Soc. And that is six?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a unity of all?

Theact. That is evident.

Soc. Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same ; are they not?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And the army is the number of the army ; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entirety of anything?

Theact. True.

Soc. And the number of each is the parts of each?

Theact. Exactly.

Soc. Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts?

Theact. Clearly.

Soc. But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all?

Theact. True.

Soc. Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts?

¹ Reading, according to Professor Campbell's conjecture, πᾶν δ' οὐδέν.

Theaet. That is the inference.

Soc. But is a part a part of anything but the whole?

Theaet. Yes, of the all.

205 *Soc.* You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And is not a whole that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;—if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature.

Theaet. I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all.

Soc. But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them?

Theaet. You are right.

Soc. And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables which are not letters?

Theaet. No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts.

Soc. Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form?

Theaet. True.

Soc. But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded, nor can one rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and foreign

words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown?

Theact. I remember.

Soc. And is not this also the reason why they are simple and indivisible? I do not see that there is any other.

Theact. No other reason can be given.

Soc. Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or letters, if it has no parts and is one form?

Theact. To be sure.

Soc. If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, the letters as well as the syllables must be intelligible and expressible, since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole?

Theact. True.

Soc. But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason?

Theact. I cannot deny that.

Soc. We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the 206 letters.

Theact. Certainly not; if we may trust the argument.

Soc. Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, when you remember your own experience in learning to read?

Theact. What experience?

Soc. Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their sequence.

Theact. That is very true.

Soc. And is a musical education complete, unless we know what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one would allow, are the elements or letters of music?

Theact. Exactly.

Soc. Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and much more indispensable

to a perfect knowledge of each branch ; and if any one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking nonsense ?

Theact. Exactly.

Soc. And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of knowledge.

Theact. We will not.

Soc. Well, and what is the meaning of the term ‘ explanation ’ ? I think that we have a choice of three meanings.

Theact. What are they ?

Soc. In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one’s thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation or definition appear to be of this nature ?

Theact. Certainly ; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain or define.

Soc. And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or later to manifest what he thinks of anything ; and if so, all those who have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation ; nor will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge.

Theact. True.

Soc. Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word ; for perhaps he only intended to say, that when a person was
207 asked what was the nature of anything, he should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the thing.

Theact. As for example, Socrates ?

Soc. As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them individually ; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke.

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the letters of your name—that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for knowledge is not attained until, combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which anything is composed.

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a waggon; but he who can describe the essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains to the whole through the elements.

Theaet. And do you not agree in that view, Socrates?

Soc. If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger combinations of them to be irrational; what is your view?

Theaet. I quite agree with you.

Soc. Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of something, or says that the same thing is composed of different elements at different times?

Theaet. Assuredly not.

Soc. And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others this often occurred in the process of learning to read?

Theaet. You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the syllables?

Soc. Yes.

Theaet. To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from supposing that they have knowledge who are in this condition.

Soc. When a person at the time of learning writes the name of Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write θ and ϵ ; or, again, meaning to write the name of Theo- 208 dorus, thinks that he ought to write and does write τ and ϵ

—can we suppose that he knows the first syllables of your two names ?

Theact. We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained knowledge.

Soc. And in like manner he may enumerate without knowing them the second and third and fourth syllables of your name ?

Theact. He may.

Soc. And in that case, when he writes out your name, he will write all the letters in order, and will then have right opinion ?

Theact. Clearly.

Soc. But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still be without knowledge ?

Theact. Yes.

Soc. And yet he will have right explanation, as well as right opinion, for he knew the order of the letters when he wrote ; and this we admit to be right explanation.

Theact. True.

Soc. Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowledge ?

Theact. That seems to be true.

Soc. And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be adopted ? And very likely there may be found some one who will not prefer this but the third.

Theact. You are right in reminding me that there is still one remaining. The first was the image or expression of the mind in sound ; the second, which has just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of the elements. But what is the third definition ?

Soc. There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all others.

Theact. Can you give me any example of such a definition ?

Soc. As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that

you may be contented with saying that the sun is the brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth.

Theact. Certainly.

Soc. Understand why:—just now the reason is, as I was saying, that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to which this common quality belongs.

Theact. I understand you, and your account of definition is in my judgment correct.

Soc. But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of which before he had only an opinion.

Theact. Yes; that is what we are maintaining.

Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite disappointed in the picture, which at a distance was not so bad.

Theact. What do you mean?

Soc. I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to ²⁰⁹ have true opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opinion only.

Theact. Yes.

Soc. The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your difference.

Theact. True.

Soc. But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your distinguishing characteristics.

Theact. I suppose not.

Soc. Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature which no more belonged to you than to another.

Theact. True.

Soc. Tell me, now; how in that case could I have formed a judgment of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I knew Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every member complete; how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian?

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. Or if I had further known you, not only as having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen; and your other peculiarities have a like distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow the right opinion will be recalled?

Theaet. Most true.

Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of differences?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.

Theaet. How so?

Soc. We are required to have a right opinion of the differences which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right opinion of them, and so we go round and round;—the revolution of the scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory engine, in the same circles, is as nothing compared to our mode of proceeding; and we may be truly described as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things which we already have, in order that we may learn what we already think, implies a depth of darkness.

Theaet. Tell me, then; what were you going to say just now, when you asked the question?

Soc. If, my boy, the argument, when speaking of adding the definition, had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to get knowledge.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair argument will answer, 'right opinion with knowledge,'

—knowledge, that is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is the explanation or definition to be added.

Theact. That seems to be true.

Soc. But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying true opinion?

Theact. I suppose not.

Soc. And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth?

Theact. I am sure, Socrates, that you have brought a good deal more out of me than ever was in me.

Soc. And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up?

Theact. Very true.

Soc. But if, Theaetetus, you chance to conceive again, you will be all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, not fancying that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, and I deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair.

And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope to see you again at this place.

SOPHIST.

INTRODUCTION.

THE dramatic power of the dialogues of Plato appears to diminish as the metaphysical interest of them increases. (Cp. Introd. to the *Philebus*.) There are no descriptions of time, place or persons, in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*; but we are plunged at once into philosophical discussions; the poetical charm has disappeared, and those who have no taste for abstruse metaphysics will greatly prefer the earlier dialogues to the later ones. Plato is conscious of the change, and in the *Politicus* (p. 286 B) expressly accuses himself of a tediousness in the two dialogues, which he ascribes to his desire of developing the dialectical method. On the other hand, the kindred spirit of Hegel seemed to find in the *Sophist* the crown and summit of the Platonic philosophy—here was the place at which Plato most nearly approached to the Hegelian identity of Being and not-Being. Nor will the great importance of the two dialogues be doubted by any one who forms a conception of the state of mind and opinion which they are intended to meet. The sophisms of the day were undermining philosophy; the denial of the existence of not-being, and of the connection of ideas, was making truth and falsehood equally impossible. It has been said that Plato would have written differently, if he had been acquainted with the *Organon* of Aristotle. But could the *Organon* of Aristotle ever have been written unless the *Sophist* and *Politicus* had preceded? The swarm of fallacies which arose in the infancy of mental science, and which was born and bred in the decay of the pre-Socratic philosophies, was not dispelled by Aristotle, but by Socrates and Plato. The *summa genera* of thought, the nature of the proposition, of definition, of generalization, of synthesis and analysis, of division and cross-division, are clearly described, and the processes of induction and deduction are constantly employed in the dialogues of

Plato. The 'slippery' nature of comparison, the danger of putting words in the place of things, the fallacy of arguing 'a dicto secundum,' and in a circle, are frequently indicated by him. To all these processes of truth and error, Aristotle, in the next generation, gave distinctness; he brought them together in a separate science. But he is not to be regarded as the original inventor of any of the great logical forms, with the exception of the syllogism.

There is little worthy of remark in the characters of the Sophist. The most noticeable point is the final retirement of Socrates from the field of argument, and the substitution for him of an Eleatic stranger, who is described as a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno, and is supposed to have descended from a higher world in order to convict the Socratic circle of error. As in the *Timaeus*, Plato seems to intimate that he is passing beyond the limits of the teaching of Socrates; and in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, as well as in the *Parmenides*, he probably means to imply that he is making a closer approach to the schools of Elea and Megara. He had much in common with them, but he must first submit their ideas to criticism and revision. He had once thought, as he says, speaking by the mouth of the Eleatic, that he understood their doctrine of not-Being; but now he does not even comprehend the nature of Being. The friends of ideas (p. 248) are alluded to by him as distant acquaintances, whom he criticises *ab extra*; we do not recognise at first sight that he is criticising himself. The character of the Eleatic stranger is colourless; he is to a certain extent the reflection of his father and master, Parmenides, who is also the protagonist in the dialogue which is called by his name. Theaetetus himself is not distinguished by the remarkable traits which are attributed to him in the former dialogue. He is no longer under the spell of Socrates, or subject to the operation of his midwifery, though the fiction of question and answer is still maintained; and the necessity of taking Theaetetus along with him, is several times insisted upon by his partner in the discussion. There is a reminiscence of the old Theaetetus in his remark that he will not tire of the argument, and in his conviction, which the Eleatic thinks likely to be permanent, that the course of events is governed by the will of God. Throughout the two dialogues Socrates continues a silent auditor, in the *Politicus* just reminding us of his presence at the commencement, by a characteristic jest about the statesman and the philosopher, and by an allusion to his namesake, with whom on that ground he claims affinity, as he had

already claimed affinity with Theaetetus, grounded on the likeness of his ugly face. But in neither dialogue, any more than in the Timaeus, does he offer any criticism on the views which are propounded by another.

The style, though wanting in dramatic power, in this respect resembling the Philebus and the Laws, is very clear and accurate, and has several touches of humour and satire. The language is less fanciful and imaginative than that of the earlier dialogues; and there is more of bitterness, as in the Laws, though traces of a similar temper may also be observed in the description of the 'great brute' in the Republic, and in the contrast of the lawyer and philosopher in the Theaetetus. The following are characteristic passages: 'The ancient philosophers, of whom we may say without offence, that they went on their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not.' Or, again, the picture of the materialists, or earth-born giants, 'who grasped oaks and rocks in their hands,' and must be improved before they can be reasoned with; and the equally humorous delineation of the friends of ideas, who defend themselves from a fastness in the invisible world; or the comparison of the Sophist to a painter or maker (cp. Rep. x.), and the hunt after him in the rich meadow-lands of youth and wealth. Or, again, the light and graceful touch with which the older philosophies are painted (Italian and Sicilian muses), and the fear of the Eleatic that he will be counted a parricide if he ventures to lay hands on his father Parmenides. Or, once more, the likening of the Eleatic stranger to a god from heaven.—All these passages, notwithstanding the decline of the style, retain the impress of the great master of language. But the equably diffused grace is gone; instead of the endless variety of the early dialogues, traces of the rhythmical monotonous cadence of the Laws begin to appear; and already an approach is made to the technical language of Aristotle, in the frequent use of the words 'essence,' 'power,' 'generation,' 'motion,' 'rest,' 'action,' 'passion,' and the like.

The Sophist, like the Phaedrus, has a double character, and unites two enquiries, which are only in a somewhat forced manner connected with each other. The first is the search after the Sophist, the second is the enquiry into the nature of not-being, which occupies the middle part of the work. For 'not-being' is the hole or division of the dialectical net in which the Sophist has hidden himself. He is the imaginary impersonation of false opinion. But he denies the reality of false opinion; for falsehood is that which is not, and therefore has no existence. At

length the difficulty is solved; the answer, in the language of the Republic, appears tumbling out at our feet. Acknowledging that there is a communion of kinds with kinds, and not merely one being or good having different names, or several isolated ideas or classes incapable of communion, we discover 'not-being' to be the other of 'being.' Transferring this to language and thought, we have no difficulty in apprehending that a proposition may be false as well as true. The Sophist, drawn out of the shelter which Cynic and Megarian paradoxes have temporarily afforded him, is proved to be a dissembler and juggler with words.

The chief points of interest in the Sophist are: (1) the character attributed to the Sophist: (2) the dialectical method: (3) the nature of the puzzle about 'not-being': (4) the battle of the philosophers: (5) the relation of the Sophist to other dialogues.

The Sophist in Plato is the master of the art of illusion; the charlatan, the foreigner, the prince of esprits-faux, the hireling who is not a teacher, and who, from whatever point of view he is regarded, is the opposite of the true teacher. He is the 'evil one,' the ideal representative of all that Plato most disliked in the moral and intellectual tendencies of his own age; the adversary of the almost equally ideal Socrates. He seems to be always growing in the fancy of Plato, now boastful, now eristic, now clothing himself in rags of philosophy, now more akin to the rhetorician or lawyer, now haranguing, now questioning, until the final appearance in the Politicus of his departing shadow in the disguise of a statesman. We are not to suppose that Plato intended by such a description to depict Protagoras or Gorgias, or even Thrasymachus, who all turn out to be 'very good sort of people when we know them,' and all of them part on good terms with Socrates. But he is speaking of a Being as imaginary as the wise man of the Stoics, and whose character varies in different dialogues. Like mythology, Greek philosophy has a tendency to personify ideas. And the Sophist is truly a creation of Plato's in which the falsehood of all mankind is reflected.

A milder tone is adopted towards the Sophists in a well-known passage of the Republic (vi. 492), where they are described as the followers rather than the leaders of the rest of mankind. Plato ridicules the notion that any individuals can corrupt youth to a degree worth speaking of in comparison with the greater influence of public opinion. But there is no real inconsistency between this and other descriptions of the Sophist which occur in the Platonic writings. For Plato is not justifying the

Sophists in the passage just quoted, but only representing their power to be contemptible ; they are to be despised rather than feared, and are no worse than the rest of mankind. But a teacher or statesman may be justly condemned, who is on a level with mankind when he ought to be above them. There is another point of view in which this passage should also be considered. The great enemy of Plato is the world, not exactly in the theological sense, yet in one not wholly different—the world as the hater of truth and lover of appearance, occupied in the pursuit of gain and pleasure rather than of knowledge, banded together against the few good and wise men, and devoid of true education. This creature has many heads : rhetoricians, lawyers, statesmen, poets, sophists. But the Sophist is the Proteus who takes the likeness of all of them ; all other deceivers have a piece of him in them. And sometimes he is represented as the corrupter of the world ; and sometimes the world as the more dangerous corrupter of the two.

Of late years the Sophists have found an enthusiastic defender in the distinguished historian of Greece. He appears to maintain that (1) the term 'Sophist' is not the name of a particular class, and would have been applied indifferently to Socrates and Plato, as well as to Gorgias and Protagoras ; (2) that the bad sense was imprinted on the word by the genius of Plato ; (3) that the principal Sophists were not the corrupters of youth (for that the Athenian youth were no more corrupted in the time of Demosthenes than in the time of Pericles), but honourable and estimable persons, who supplied a training in literature which was generally wanted in their own age. We will briefly consider how far these statements appear to be justified by facts : and,

About the meaning of the word there arises an interesting question :—

1. Many words are used both in a general and a specific sense, and the two senses are not always clearly distinguished. Sometimes the generic meaning has been narrowed to the specific, while in other cases the specific meaning has been enlarged or altered. Examples of the former class are furnished by some ecclesiastical terms : apostles, prophets, bishops, elders, catholics. Examples of the latter class may also be found in a similar field : jesuits, puritans, methodists, and the like. Sometimes the meaning is both narrowed and enlarged ; and a good or bad sense will subsist side by side with a neutral one. A curious effect is produced on the meaning of a word when the very term which is stigmatised by the world is adopted by the obnoxious or derided class ; this

tends to define the meaning. Or, again, the opposite result is produced, when the world refuses to allow to some sect or body of men the possession of some honourable name which they have assumed.

The term 'Sophist' is one of those words of which the meaning has been both contracted and enlarged. Passages may be quoted from Herodotus and the tragedians, in which the word is used in a neutral sense for a contriver or deviser or inventor, without including any ethical idea of goodness or badness. Poets as well as philosophers were called Sophists in the fifth century before Christ. In Plato himself the term is applied in the sense of a 'master in art,' without any bad meaning attaching (*Symp.* 208 C, *Meno* 85 B). In the later Greek, again, 'sophist' and 'philosopher' became almost indistinguishable. There was no reproach conveyed by the word; the additional association, if any, was only that of rhetorician or teacher. Philosophy had become eclecticism and imitation: in the decline of Greek literature there was no original voice lifted up 'which reached to a thousand years because of the god'; and the two words, like the characters represented by them, tended to pass into one another. Yet even here some differences appeared; for the term 'Sophist' would hardly have been applied to the greater names, such as Plotinus, and would have been more often used of a professor of philosophy in general than of a maintainer of particular tenets.

But the question is, not really whether the word 'Sophist' has all these senses, but whether there is not also a specific bad sense in which the term is applied to certain contemporaries of Socrates. Would an Athenian, as Mr. Grote supposes, in the fifth century before Christ, have included Socrates and Plato, as well as Gorgias and Protagoras, under the specific class of Sophists? To this question we must answer, No: wherever the word is so applied, the application is made either by an enemy of Socrates and Plato, or in a neutral sense. Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Aristotle, all give a bad import to the word; and the Sophists are regarded as a separate class in all of them. And in later Greek literature, the distinction is quite marked between the succession of philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, and the Sophists of the age of Socrates, who appeared like meteors for a short time in different parts of Greece. For the purposes of comedy, Socrates may have been identified with the Sophists, and he seems to complain of this in the *Apology*. But there is no reason to suppose that Socrates, differing by so many outward marks, would really have been confounded in the mind of Anytus, or Callicles,

or of any intelligent Athenian, with the splendid foreigners who from time to time visited Athens, or appeared at the Olympic games. The man of genius, the great original thinker, the disinterested seeker after truth, the master of repartee whom no one ever defeated in an argument, was separated, even in the mind of the vulgar Athenian, by an 'interval which no geometry can express,' from the balancer of sentences, the interpreter and reciter of the poets, the divider of the meanings of words, the teacher of rhetoric, the professor of morals and manners.

2. The use of the term 'Sophist' in the dialogues of Plato also shows that the bad sense was not affixed by his genius, but already current. When Protagoras says, 'I confess that I am a Sophist,' he implies that he professes an art denoted by an obnoxious term; or when the young Hippocrates, with a blush upon his face which is just seen by the light of dawn, admits that he is going to be made 'a Sophist,' these words would lose their point, unless the term had been already discredited. There is nothing surprising in the Sophists having an evil name; that, whether deserved or not, was a natural consequence of their vocation. That they were foreigners, that they made fortunes, that they taught novelties, that they excited the minds of youth, are quite sufficient reasons to account for the opprobrium which attached to them. The genius of Plato could not have stamped the word anew, or have imparted the associations which occur in contemporary writers, such as Xenophon and Isocrates. Changes in the meaning of words can only be made with great difficulty, and not unless they are supported by a strong current of popular feeling. There is nothing improbable in supposing that Plato may have extended and envenomed the meaning, or that he may have done the Sophists the same kind of disservice with posterity which Pascal did to the Jesuits. But the bad sense of the word is not and could not have been invented by him, and is found in the earlier dialogues, e.g. the Protagoras, as well as in the later.

3. There is no ground for denying that the principal Sophists, Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, were good and honourable men. The notion that they were corrupters of the Athenian youth has no real foundation, and partly arises out of the use of the term 'Sophist' in modern times. The truth is, that we know little about them; and the witness of Plato in their favour is probably not much more historical than his witness against them. Of that national decline of genius, unity, political force, which has been sometimes described as the corruption of youth, the

Sophists were one among many signs;—in these respects Athens may have degenerated; but, as Mr. Grote remarks, there is no reason to suspect any greater moral corruption in the age of Demosthenes than in the age of Pericles. The Athenian youth were not corrupted in this sense, and therefore the Sophists could not have corrupted them. It is remarkable, and may be fairly set down to their credit, that Plato nowhere attributes to them that peculiar Greek sympathy with youth, which he ascribes to Parmenides, and which is evidently common in the Socratic circle. Plato delights to exhibit them in a ludicrous point of view, and to show them always at a disadvantage in the company of Socrates. But he has no quarrel with their characters, and does not deny that they are respectable men.

The Sophist, in the dialogue which is called after him, is exhibited in many different lights, and appears and reappears in a variety of forms. There is some want of the higher Platonic art in the Eleatic Stranger eliciting his true character by a laborious process of enquiry, when he had already admitted that he knew quite well the difference between the Sophist and the Philosopher, and had often heard the question discussed;—such an anticipation would hardly have occurred in the earlier dialogues. But Plato could not altogether give up his Socratic method, of which another trace may be thought to be discerned in his adoption of a common instance before he proceeds to the greater matter in hand. Yet the example is also chosen in order to damage the ‘hooker of men’ as much as possible; each step in the pedigree of the angler suggests some injurious reflection about the Sophist. They are both hunters after a living prey, nearly related to tyrants and thieves, and the Sophist is the cousin of the parasite and flatterer. The effect of this is heightened by the accidental manner in which the discovery is made, as the result of a scientific division. His descent in another branch affords the opportunity of more ‘unsavoury comparisons.’ For he is a retail trader, and his wares are either imported or home-made, like those of other retail traders; his art is thus deprived of the character of a liberal profession. But the most distinguishing characteristic of him is, that he is a disputant, and higgles over an argument. A feature of the Eristic here seems to blend with Plato’s usual description of the Sophists, who in the early dialogues, and in the Republic, are frequently depicted as endeavouring to save themselves from disputing with Socrates by making long orations. In this character he parts company from the vain and

impertinent talker in private life, and his differentia is, that he makes, while the other loses money.

But there is another general division under which his art may be also supposed to fall, and that is purification; and from purification is descended education, and the new principle of education is to interrogate men after the manner of Socrates, and make them teach themselves. Here again we catch a glimpse rather of a Socratic or Eristic than of a Sophist in the ordinary sense of the term. And Plato does not on this ground reject the claim of the Sophist to be the true philosopher. One more feature of the Eristic rather than of the Sophist is the tendency of the troublesome animal to run away into the darkness of not-being. Upon the whole, we detect in him a sort of Hybrid or double nature, of which, except perhaps in the *Euthydemus* of Plato, we find no other trace in Greek philosophy; he combines the teacher of virtue with the Eristic; while in his omniscience, in his ignorance of himself, in his arts of deception, and in his lawyer-like habit of writing and speaking about all things, he is still the antithesis of Socrates and of the true teacher.

II. The question has been asked, whether this method of 'abscissio infiniti,' by which the Sophist is taken, is a real and valuable logical process. Modern science feels that this, like other processes of formal logic, presents a very inadequate conception of the actual complex procedure of the mind by which scientific truth is detected and verified. Plato himself seems to be aware that mere division is an unsafe and uncertain weapon. First, in the *Politicus*, when he says that we should divide in the middle, for in that way we are more likely to attain species; secondly, in the parallel precept of the *Philebus*, that we should not pass from the most general notions to infinity, but include all the intervening middle principles, until, as he also says in the *Politicus*, we arrive at the infima species; thirdly, in the *Phaedrus*, when he says that the dialectician will carve the limbs of truth without mangling them; or, as he repeats once more in the *Politicus*, if we cannot bisect species, we must carve them as nearly as we can. No better image of nature or truth, as an organic whole, can be conceived than this. So far is Plato from supposing that mere division and subdivision of general notions will guide men into all truth.

Plato does not really mean to say that the Sophist or the Statesman can be caught in this way. But these divisions and subdivisions were favourite logical exercises of the age in which he lived; and while

indulging his dialectical fancy, and making a contribution to logical method, he delights also to transfix the Eristic Sophist with weapons borrowed from his own armoury. As we have already seen, the division gives him the opportunity of making the most damaging reflections on the Sophist and all his kith and kin, and to exhibit him in the most discreditable light.

Nor need we seriously consider whether Plato was right in assuming that no animal so various could be confined within the limits of a single definition. In the infancy of logic, men sought only to obtain a definition of an unknown or uncertain term; the after reflection scarcely occurred to them that the word might have several senses, which shaded off into one another, and were not capable of being comprehended in a single notion. There is no trace of this reflection in Plato. But neither is there any reason to think, even if the reflection had occurred to him, that he would have been deterred from carrying on the war with weapons fair or unfair against the outlaw Sophist.

III. The puzzle about 'not-being' appears to us to be one of the most unreal difficulties of ancient philosophy. We cannot understand the attitude of mind which could imagine that falsehood had no existence, if reality was denied to not-being: How could such a question arise at all, much less become of serious importance? The answer to this, and to all other difficulties of early Greek philosophy, is to be sought for in the history of ideas, and the answer is only unsatisfactory because our knowledge is defective. In the passage from the world of sense and imagination and common language to that of opinion and reflection the human mind was exposed to many dangers, and often

'Found no end in wandering mazes lost.'

The discovery of abstractions was the great source of all mental improvement in after ages. But each one of this company of abstractions, if we may speak in the metaphorical language of Plato, became in turn the tyrant of the mind, the dominant idea, which would allow no other to have a share in the throne. This is especially true of the Eleatic philosophy: while the absoluteness of being was asserted in every form of language, the sensible world and all the phenomena of experience were comprehended under not-being. Nor did this lead to any difficulty or perplexity, so long as the mind, lost in the contemplation of being, asked no more questions, and never thought of applying the categories of being or not-being to mind or opinion or practical life.

But the negative as well as the positive idea had sunk deep into the intellect of man. The effect of the paradoxes of Zeus extended far beyond the Eleatic circle. And now an unforeseen consequence began to arise. If the many were not, if all things were names of the one, and nothing could be predicated of any other thing, how could truth be distinguished from falsehood? The Eleatic philosopher would have replied that 'being was alone true.' But mankind had got beyond his barren abstractions: they were beginning to analyse, to classify, to define, to ask what is the nature of knowledge, opinion, sensation. Still less could they be content with the descriptions which Achilles gives in Homer of the man whom his soul hates—

ὄς ρ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθει ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἄλλο δὲ βιάζει.

For their difficulty was not a practical but a metaphysical one; and their conception of falsehood was really impaired and weakened by a metaphysical illusion.

The strength of the illusion seems to lie in the alternative: If we once admit the existence of being and not-being, as two spheres which exclude each other, no being or reality can be ascribed to not-being, and therefore not to falsehood, which is the image or expression of not-being. Falsehood is wholly false; and to speak of true falsehood, as Theaetetus does, is a contradiction in terms. The fallacy to us is ridiculous and transparent; no better than those which Plato satirizes in the Euthydemus. It is a confusion of falsehood and negation, from which Plato himself is not entirely free. Instead of saying, 'this is not in accordance with facts,' 'this is proved by experience to be false,' and from such examples forming a general notion of falsehood, the mind of the Greek thinker was lost in the mazes of the Eleatic philosophy. And the greater importance which Plato attributes to this fallacy, compared with others, is due to the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exerted over him. He sees clearly to a certain extent; but he has not yet attained a complete mastery over the ideas of his predecessors—they are still ends to him, and not mere instruments of thought. They are too rough-hewn to be harmonised in a single structure, and may be compared to rocks which project or overhang in some ancient city's walls. There are many such imperfect syncretisms or eclecticisms in the history of philosophy. A modern philosopher, though emancipated from scholastic notions of essence or substance, might still be seriously affected by the abstract idea

of necessity; though accustomed, like Bacon, to criticise abstract notions, he might not extend his criticism to the syllogism.

The saying or thinking the thing that is not, would be the popular definition of falsehood or error. If we were met by the Sophist's objection, the reply would probably be an appeal to experience. Ten thousands, as Homer would say (*μάλα μύριοι*), tell falsehoods and fall into errors. And this is Plato's reply, both in the *Cratylus* (429 D) and *Sophist*. 'Theaetetus is flying,' is a sentence in form quite as grammatical as 'Theaetetus is sitting'; the difference between the two sentences is, that the one is true and the other false. But, before making this appeal to common sense, Plato propounds for our consideration a theory of the nature of the negative.

The theory is, that 'not-being is relation.' Not-being is the other of being, and has as many kinds as there are differences in being. This doctrine is the simple converse of the famous proposition of Spinoza, not 'omnis determinatio est negatio,' but 'omnis negatio est determinatio'; —not, all distinction is negation, but, all negation is distinction. Not-being is the unfolding or determining of being, and is a necessary element in all other things that are. We should be careful to observe, first, that Plato does not identify being with not-being; he has no idea of progression by antagonism, or of the Hegelian vibration of moments: he would not have said with Heracleitus, 'All things are and are not, and become and become not.' Secondly, he has lost sight altogether of the other sense of not-being, as the negative of being; although he again and again recognises the validity of the law of contradiction. Thirdly, he seems to confuse falsehood with negation. Nor is he quite consistent in regarding not-being as one class of being, and yet as coextensive with being in general. Before analysing further the topics thus suggested, we will endeavour to trace the manner in which Plato arrived at his conception of not-being.

In all the later dialogues of Plato, the idea of mind or intelligence becomes more and more prominent. That idea which Anaxagoras employed inconsistently in the construction of the world, Plato, in the *Philebus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Laws*, extends to all things; attributing to Providence a care, infinitesimal as well as infinite, of all creation. The divine mind is the leading religious thought of the later works of Plato. The human mind is a sort of reflection of this, having ideas of being, sameness, and the like. At times they seem to be parted by a great gulf

(Parmenides); at other times they have a common nature, and the light of a common intelligence.

But this ever-growing idea of mind is really irreconcilable with the abstract Pantheism of the Eleatics. To the passionate language of Parmenides, Plato replies in a strain equally passionate:—What! has not being mind? and is not being capable of being known? and, if this is admitted, then capable of being affected or acted upon?—in motion, then, and yet not wholly incapable of rest. Already we have been compelled to attribute opposite determinations to being. And the answer to this difficulty may be equally the answer to the difficulty about not-being.

The answer is, that in these and all other determinations of any notion we are attributing to it 'not-being.' We went in search of not-being and seemed to lose being, and now in the hunt after being we recover both. Not-being is a kind of being, and in a sense co-extensive with being. And there are as many divisions of not-being as of being. To every positive idea—'just,' 'beautiful,' and the like, there is a corresponding negative idea—'not just,' 'not beautiful,' and the like.

A doubt may be raised whether this account of the negative is really the true one. The common logicians would say that the 'not just,' 'not beautiful,' are not really classes at all, but are merged in one great class of the infinite or negative. The conception of Plato, in the days before logic, seems to be more correct than this. For the word 'not' does not altogether annihilate the positive meaning of the word 'just': at least, it does not prevent our looking for the 'not just' in or about the same class in which we might expect to find the 'just.' 'Not just is not honourable' is neither a false nor an unmeaning proposition. The reason is that the negative proposition has really passed into an undefined positive. To say that 'not just' has no more meaning than 'not honourable'—that is to say, that the two cannot in any degree be distinguished—is clearly repugnant to the common use of language.

The ordinary logic is also jealous of the explanation of negation as relation, because seeming to take away the principle of contradiction. Plato, as far as we know, is the first philosopher who distinctly enunciated this principle; and though we need not suppose him to have been always consistent with himself, there is no real inconsistency between his explanation of the negative and the principle of contradiction. Neither the Platonic notion of the negative as the principle of difference, nor the Hegelian identity of being and not-being, at all touch the principle of

contradiction. For what is asserted about being and not-being only relates to our most abstract notions, and in no way interferes with the principle of contradiction employed in the concrete. Because not-being is identified with other, or being with not-being, this does not make the proposition 'some have not eaten' any the less a contradiction of 'all have eaten.'

The explanation of the negative given by Plato in the Sophist is a true but partial one; for the word 'not,' besides the meaning of 'other,' may also imply 'opposition.' And difference or opposition may be either total or partial: the not-beautiful may be other than the beautiful, or in no relation to the beautiful, or a specific class in various degrees opposed to the beautiful. And the negative may be a negation of fact or of thought (*οὐ* and *μη*). Lastly, there are certain ideas, such as 'beginning,' 'becoming,' 'the finite,' 'the abstract,' in which the negative cannot be separated from the positive, and 'being' and 'not-being' are inextricably blended.

Plato restricts the conception of not-being to difference. Man is a rational animal, and is not—as many other things as are not included under this definition. He is and is not, and is because he is not. Besides the positive class to which he belongs, there are endless negative classes to which he may be referred. This is certainly intelligible, but useless. To refer a subject to a negative class is unmeaning, unless the 'not' is a mere modification of the positive, as in the example of 'not honourable' and 'dishonourable'; or unless the class is characterised by the absence rather than the presence of a particular quality.

Nor is it easy to see how not-being any more than sameness or otherness is one of the classes of being. They are aspects rather than classes of being. Not-being can only be included in being, as the denial of any particular class of being. If we are to attempt to pursue such airy phantoms at all, the Hegelian identity of being and not-being is a more apt and intelligible expression of the same mental phenomenon. For Plato has not distinguished between the being which is prior to not-being, and the being which is the negation of not-being. (Cf. Par. 162 A, B.)

But he is not thinking of this when he says that being comprehends not-being. Again, we should probably go back for the true explanation to the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exercised over him. Under 'not-being' the Eleatic had included all the realities of the

sensible world. Led by this association and by the common use of language, which has been already noticed, we cannot be much surprised that Plato should have made classes of not-being. It is observable that he does not absolutely deny that there is an opposite of being. He is inclined to leave the question, merely remarking that the opposition, if admissible at all, is not expressed by the term 'not-being.'

On the whole, we must allow that the great service rendered by Plato to psychology in the *Sophist*, is not his explanation of 'not-being' as difference. With this he certainly laid the ghost of 'not-being'; and we may attribute to him in a measure the credit of anticipating Spinoza and Hegel. But his conception is not clear or consistent; he does not recognise the different senses of the negative, and he confuses the different classes of not-being with the abstract notion. As the pre-Socratic philosopher failed to distinguish between the universal and the true, while he placed the particulars of sense under the false and apparent, so Plato appears to identify negation with falsehood, or is unable to distinguish them. The greater service rendered by him to mental science is the recognition of the communion of classes, which, although based by him on his account of 'not-being,' is independent of this. He clearly saw that the isolation of ideas or classes is the annihilation of reasoning. Thus, after wandering in many diverging paths, we return to common sense. And for this reason we may be inclined to do less than justice to Plato, —because the truth which he attains by a real effort of thought is to us a familiar and unconscious truism, which no one would any longer think either of doubting or examining.

IV. The later dialogues of Plato contain many references to contemporary philosophy. Both in the *Theaetetus* and in the *Sophist* he recognises that he is in the midst of a fray; a huge irregular battle everywhere surrounds him (*Theaet.* 153 A). First, there are the two great philosophies going back into cosmogony and poetry: the philosophy of Heracleitus, supposed to have a poetical origin in Homer, and that of the Eleatics, which in a similar spirit he conceives to be even older than Xenophanes (compare *Protagoras*, 316 E). Still older were theories of two and three principles, hot and cold, moist and dry, which were ever marrying and given in marriage: in speaking of these, he is probably referring to Pherecydes and the early Ionians. In the philosophy of motion there were different accounts of the relation of plurality and unity, which were supposed to be joined and severed by love and

hate, some maintaining that this process was perpetually going on (Heracleitus); others (Empedocles) that there was an alternation of them. Of the Pythagoreans or of Anaxagoras he makes no distinct mention. His chief opponents are, first, Eristics or Megarians; secondly, the Materialists.

The picture which he gives of both these latter schools is indistinct; and he appears reluctant to mention the names of their teachers. Nor can we easily determine how much is to be assigned to the Cynics, how much to the Megarians, or whether the 'repulsive Materialists' are Cynics or Atomists, or represent some unknown phase of opinion at Athens. To the Cynics and Antisthenes is commonly attributed, on the authority of Aristotle, the denial of predication, while the Megarians are said to have been Nominalists, asserting the one good under many names to be the true being of Zeno and the Eleatics, and, like Zeno, employing their negative dialectic in the refutation of opponents. But the later Megarians also denied predication; and this tenet, which is attributed to all of them by Simplicius, is certainly in character with their over-refining philosophy. The 'tyros young and old,' of whom Plato speaks, probably include both. At any rate, we shall be safer in accepting the general description of them which he has given, and in not attempting to draw a precise line between them.

Of these Eristics, whether Cynics or Megarians, several characteristics are found in Plato.

1. They pursue verbal oppositions; 2. They make reasoning impossible by their over-accuracy in the use of language; 3. They deny predication; 4. They go from unity to plurality, without passing through the intermediate stages; 5. They refuse to attribute motion or power to being; 6. They are the enemies of sense;—whether they are the 'friends of ideas' who carry on the polemic against sense, is uncertain; probably under this remarkable expression Plato designates those who more nearly approached himself, and may be criticising an earlier form of his own doctrines. We may observe that (1) he professes only to give us a few opinions out of many which were at that time current in Greece; (2) that he nowhere alludes to the ethical teaching of the Cynics; unless the argument in the Protagoras, that 'the virtues are one and not many,' may be supposed to contain a reference to their views, as well as to those of Socrates; and unless they are the school alluded to in

the Philebus, which is described as 'being very skilful in physics, and as maintaining pleasure to be the absence of pain.' That Antisthenes wrote a book called 'Physicus,' is hardly a sufficient reason for describing them as skilful in physics, which appear to have been very alien to the tendency of the Cynics.

The Idealism of the fourth century before Christ in Greece, as in other ages and countries, seems to have provoked a reaction towards Materialism. The maintainers of this doctrine are described in the Theaetetus as repulsive persons who will not believe what they cannot hold in their hands, and in the Sophist as incapable of argument. They are probably the same who are said in the tenth book of the Laws to attribute the course of events to nature, art, and chance. Who they were, we have no means of determining except from Plato's description of them. His silence respecting the Atomists might lead us to suppose that here we have a trace of them. But the Atomists were not Materialists in the grosser sense of the term, nor were they incapable of reasoning; and Plato would hardly have described a great genius like Democritus in the disdainful terms which he uses of the Materialists. Upon the whole, we must infer that the persons here spoken of are unknown to us, like the many other writers and talkers at Athens and elsewhere, of whose endless activity of mind Aristotle in his Metaphysics has preserved an anonymous memorial.

V. The Sophist is the sequel of the Theaetetus, and is connected with the Parmenides by a direct allusion. (Cp. Introduction to Theaetetus and Parmenides.) In the Theaetetus we sought to discover the nature of knowledge and false opinion. But the nature of false opinion seemed impenetrable; for we were unable to understand how there could be any reality in not-being. In the Sophist the question is taken up again; the nature of not-being is detected, and there is no longer any metaphysical impediment in the way of admitting the possibility of falsehood. To the Parmenides, the Sophist stands in a less defined and more remote relation. There human thought is in process of disorganization; no absurdity or inconsistency is too great to be elicited from the analysis of the simple ideas of unity or being. In the Sophist the same contradictions are pursued to a certain extent, but only with a view to their resolution. The aim of the dialogue is to show how the few elemental conceptions of the human mind admit of a natural connection in

thought and speech, which Megarian or other sophistry vainly attempts to deny.

True to the appointment of the previous day, Theodorus and Theaetetus meet Socrates at the same spot, bringing with them an Eleatic Stranger, whom Theodorus introduces as a true philosopher. Socrates, half in jest, half in earnest, declares that he must be a god in disguise, who, as Homer would say, has come to earth that he may visit the good and evil among men, and detect the foolishness of Athenian wisdom. At any rate he is a divine person, one of a class who are hardly recognised on earth, in divers forms appearing—now as statesmen, now as sophists, and they are often deemed madmen. Philosopher, statesman, sophist, says Socrates, repeating the words—I should like to ask our Eleatic friend what his countrymen think of them; do they regard them as one, or three?

The Stranger has been already asked this very question by Theodorus and Theaetetus; and he has no difficulty in replying that they are three; but to explain the difference fully would take time. He is pressed to give the fuller explanation, either in the form of a speech or of question and answer. He prefers the latter, and chooses as his respondent Theaetetus, whom he already knows, and who is recommended to him by Socrates.

We are agreed, he says, about the name Sophist, but we are not equally agreed about his nature. Great subjects should be approached through familiar examples, and, considering that he is a creature not easily caught, I think that, before approaching him, we should try our hand upon some more obvious animal, who may be made the subject of logical experiment; shall we say an angler? 'Very good.'

In the first place, the angler is an artist, and there are two kinds of art;—productive art, which includes husbandry, manufactures, imitations; and acquisitive art, which includes learning, trading, hunting. The angler's is an acquisitive art, and acquisition may be effected either by exchange or by conquest; in the latter case, either by force or craft: conquest by craft is called hunting, and of hunting there is one kind which pursues inanimate, and another which pursues animate objects; and animate objects may be either land animals or water animals, and water animals either fly over the water or live in the water. The hunting of the last is called fishing; and of fishing, one kind uses

enclosures, catching the fish in nets and baskets, and another kind strikes them either with spears by night or with barbed spears or barbed hooks by day; the spears are impelled from above, the hooks are jerked into the head and lips of the fish which is drawn from below upwards. Thus, by a series of divisions, we have arrived at the definition of the angler's art.

And now we may endeavour by a similar process to draw the Sophist from his hiding-place. Like the angler, he is an artist, and the resemblance does not end here. For they are both hunters, and hunters of animals; the one of water, and the other of land animals. But at this point they diverge, the one going to the sea and the rivers, and the other to the rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands, in which generous youth abide. You may hunt tame animals on land, or you may hunt wild animals. And man is a tame animal, and he may be hunted either by force or persuasion;—either by the pirate, man-stealer, soldier, or by the lawyer, orator, talker. The latter use persuasion, and persuasion is either private or public. Of the private practitioners of the art, some bring gifts to those whom they hunt: these are lovers. And others take hire; and some of these flatter, and in return are fed; others profess to teach virtue and receive a round sum. And who are these last? Tell me who? Have we not unearthed the Sophist?

But, 2, he is a many-sided creature, and may still be traced in another line of descent. The acquisitive art had a branch of exchange as well as of hunting, and exchange is either giving or selling; and the seller is either a manufacturer or a merchant; and the merchant either retails or exports; and the exporter may export either food for the body or food for the mind. And of this trade of food for the mind, one kind may be termed the art of display, and another the sale of learning; and learning may be a learning of the arts or of virtue. The seller of the arts may be called an art-seller; the teacher of virtue, a Sophist.

Again, 3, there is a third line, in which a Sophist may be traced. For is he less a Sophist when, instead of exporting his wares to another country, he stays at home, and either buys or manufactures and then retails them?

Or, 4, he may descend from the acquisitive in the combative line, through the pugnacious, the controversial, the disputatious; and he will be found at last in the eristic section of the latter, disputing in private for gain about the general principles of right and wrong.

And still there is a track of him which has not yet been followed out by us. Do not our household servants talk of sifting, straining, scouring? And they also speak of carding, warping, and the like: all these are processes of division, but they are of two kinds; while in the last-mentioned, like is divided from like—whereas in the former, the good is separated from the bad. The former of the two is termed purification; and again, of purification, there are two sorts—first of bodies, whether animate or inanimate, there are purifications both internal and external—medicine and gymnastic are the internal purifications of the animate, and bathing the external; and of the inanimate, fulling and cleaning and other humble processes, some of which have ludicrous names. Not that dialectic is a respecter of names or persons, or a despiser of humble occupations; nor does she think much of the greater or less benefits conferred by them. For her aim is knowledge;—she wants to know how the arts are related to one another, and would quite as soon learn the nature of hunting from the vermin-destroyer as from the general. And she only desires to have a general name, which shall distinguish purifications of the soul from purifications of the body.

Now purification is the taking away of evil; and there are two kinds of evil in the soul; the one answering to disease in the body, and the other to deformity. Disease is the discord or war of opposite principles in the soul; and deformity is the want of symmetry, or failure in the attainment of a mark or measure. The latter arises from ignorance, and no one is voluntarily ignorant; ignorance is only the aberration of the soul moving towards knowledge. And as medicine cures the diseases and gymnastic the deformity of the body, so correction cures the injustice, and education (which differs among the Hellenes from mere instruction in the arts) cures the ignorance of the soul. Again, ignorance is twofold; simple ignorance, and ignorance which is conceited of knowledge. And education is also twofold; there is the old-fashioned moral training of our forefathers, which was very troublesome and not very successful; and another, of a more subtle nature, which proceeds upon a notion that all ignorance is involuntary. The latter convicts a man out of his own mouth, by pointing out to him his inconsistencies and contradictions; and the consequence is that he quarrels with himself, instead of quarrelling with his neighbours, and is cured of prejudices and obstructions by a mode of treatment which is equally entertaining and effectual. The physician of the soul is aware that his patient will receive no nourishment unless he

has been cleared out; and the soul of the great king himself, if he has not undergone this purification, is unclean and impure.

And who are the ministers of the purification? Sophists I may not call them. Yet they bear about the same likeness to Sophists as the dog, who is the gentlest of animals, does to the wolf, who is the fiercest. Comparisons are slippery things; but for the present let us assume the resemblance, which may probably be disallowed hereafter. And so, from division comes purification; and from this, mental purification; and from mental purification, instruction; and from instruction, education; and from education, that glorious art of Sophistry, which is engaged in the detection of conceit. I do not think that we have yet found the Sophist, or that his will ultimately prove to be the desired art of education; but neither do I think that he can long escape me, for every way is blocked. Before we make the final assault, let us take breath, and reckon up the many forms which he has assumed: 1, he was the paid hunter of wealth and birth; 2, he was the trader in the goods of the soul; 3, he was the retailer of them; 4, he was the manufacturer of his own learned wares; 5, he was the disputant; and 6, he was the purger away of prejudices; although this latter point is admitted to be doubtful.

Now, there must surely be something wrong in the professor of any art having so many names and kinds of knowledge. Does not the very number of them imply that the nature of his art is not understood? And that we may not be involved in the misunderstanding, let us observe which of his characteristics is the most prominent: Above all things he is a disputant. He will dispute and teach others to dispute about things visible and invisible—about man, about the gods, about politics, about law, about wrestling, about all things. But can he know all things? ‘He cannot.’ Then how can he give an answer satisfactory to any one who knows? ‘Impossible.’ Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive money from his admirers? ‘Because he is supposed by them to know all things.’ You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them. ‘Yes.’

Suppose a person were to say, not that he would dispute about all things, but that he would make all things, you and me, and all other creatures, the earth and the heavens and the gods, and would sell them all for a few pence—this would be a great jest; but not greater than a man saying that he knows all things, and can teach them in a short time, and at a small cost. For all imitation is a jest, and the most

graceful form of jest. The painter is able to deceive children, who see his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he can make anything; and the Sophist can steal away the hearts of youths, who are still at a distance from the truth, not through their eyes, but through their ears, by the mummery of words; and they, too, are induced to believe that he knows all things. But as they grow older, and come into contact with realities, they learn by experience to see the true proportions of things. The Sophist, then, has not real knowledge; he is only an imitator, or image-maker.

And now, having got him in a corner of the dialectical net, let us divide and subdivide until we catch him. Of image-making there are two kinds; the art of making likenesses, and the art of making appearances. The latter may be illustrated by sculpture and painting, which alter the proportions of figures, and use illusions in order to adapt their works to the eye. And the Sophist also uses illusion, and his imitations are apparent and not real. But how can any thing be an appearance only? Here arises a difficulty which has always beset the subject of appearances. For the argument is asserting the existence of not-being. And this is what the great Parmenides was all his life denying in prose and also in verse. 'You will never find,' he says, 'that not-being is.' And the words prove themselves! Not-being cannot be attributed to any being; for how can any being be wholly abstracted from being? Again, in every predication there is an attribution of singular or plural. But number is the most real of all things, and cannot be attributed to not-being. Therefore not-being cannot be predicated or expressed; for how can we say 'it is,' 'are not,' without number?

And now arises the greatest difficulty of all. If not-being is inconceivable, how can not-being be refuted? And am I not contradicting myself at this moment, in speaking either in the singular or the plural of that to which I deny either plurality or unity? You, Theaetetus, have the might of youth, and I conjure you to exert yourself, and, if you can, to find an expression of not-being which does not imply being and number. 'But I cannot.' Then the Sophist must be left in his hole. We may call him an image-maker if we please, but he will only say, 'And pray, what is an image?' And we shall reply, 'A reflection in the water, or in a mirror'; and he will say, 'Let us shut our eyes and open our minds; what is the common notion of all images?' 'I should answer, Such another, made in the likeness of the true.' Real or not real? 'Not real;

at least, not in a true sense.' And real means 'is,' and not real 'is not'? 'Yes.' Then a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not. Here is a complication of being and not-being, in which the many-headed Sophist has entangled us. He will at once point out that he is compelling us to contradict ourselves, by affirming being of not-being. I think that we must give up looking for him in the class of imitators.

But ought we to give him up? 'I should say, certainly not.' Then I fear that I must lay hands on my father Parmenides; but do not think me a parricide; for there is no way except to show that in some sense not-being is; and if this is not admitted, no one can speak of falsehood, or false opinion, or imitation, without falling into a contradiction. You observe how unwilling I am to undertake the task, because I know that I am exposing myself to the charge of inconsistency in asserting not-being. But if I am to make the attempt, I think that I had better begin at the beginning.

Lightly in the days of our youth, Parmenides and others told us tales about the origin of the universe: one spoke of three principles warring and at peace again, marrying and begetting children; another of two principles, hot and cold, dry and moist, which also formed relationships. There were the Eleatics in our part of the world, saying that all things are one; their doctrine begins with Xenophanes, and is even older. Ionian, and, more recently, Sicilian muses speak of a one and many which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting. Some of them do not insist on the perpetual strife, but adopt a gentler strain, and speak of alternation only. Whether they are right or not, who can say? But one thing we can say—that they went on their way without much caring whether we understood them or not: tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by their assertion of unity, or by their combinations and separations of two or more principles? I used to think, when I was young, that I knew all about not-being, and now being is as great a puzzle to me as not-being.

Let us proceed first to the examination of being. Turning to the dualist philosophers, we say to them: Is being a third element besides hot and cold? or do you identify one of the two elements with being? At any rate, you can hardly avoid resolving them both into one. Let us next interrogate the patrons of the one. To them we say: Are being and one the same? And how can there be two names of one thing? If you admit of two names, that implies two things; or if you identify

them, then the name will be either the name of nothing or of itself, i. e. a name. Again, the notion of being is conceived of as a whole—in the words of Parmenides, ‘like every way unto a rounded sphere.’ And a whole has parts; but that which has parts is not one, for unity has no parts. Is being, then, one, because the parts of being are one, or shall we say that being is not a whole? In the former case, one is made up of parts; and in the latter there is still plurality, viz. being, and a whole which is apart from being. And being, if not a whole, lacks something of the nature of being, and becomes not-being. Nor can being ever have come into existence, for nothing comes into existence except as a whole; nor can being have number, for that which has number is a whole or sum of number. These are a few of the difficulties which are accumulating one upon another in the consideration of being.

We may proceed now to the less exact sort of philosophers. Some of them drag down everything to earth, and carry on a war like that of the giants, grasping rocks and oaks in their hands. Their adversaries defend themselves warily from an invisible world, and reduce the substances of their opponents to the minutest fractions, until they are lost in generation and flux. The last sort are civil people enough; but the materialists are rude and ignorant of dialectics; they must be taught how to argue before they can answer. Yet, for the sake of the argument, we may assume them to be better than they are, and able to give an account of themselves. They admit the existence of a mortal living creature, which is a body containing a soul, and to this they would not refuse to attribute qualities—wisdom, folly, justice and injustice. The soul, as they say, has a kind of body, but they do not like to assert of these qualities of the soul, either that they are corporeal, or that they have no existence; at this point they begin to make distinctions. ‘Sons of earth,’ we say to them, ‘if both visible and invisible qualities exist, what is the common nature which is attributed to them by the term “being” or “existence”?’ And, as they are incapable of answering this question, we may as well reply for them, that ‘being is the power of doing or suffering.’ Then we turn to the friends of ideas: to them we say, ‘you distinguish becoming from being?’ ‘Yes,’ they will reply. ‘And in becoming you participate through the bodily senses, and in being, by thought and the mind?’ ‘Yes.’ And you mean by the word ‘participation’ a power of doing or suffering? To this they answer (I am acquainted with them, Theætetus, and know their ways better than you do), ‘that being can neither

do nor suffer, though becoming may.' And we rejoin: Does not the soul know? And is not 'being' known? And are not 'knowing' and being 'known' active and passive? That which is known is affected by knowledge, and therefore is in motion. And, indeed, how can we imagine that being is a mere everlasting form, devoid of motion and life or soul; for there can be no thought without soul, nor can soul be devoid of motion. But neither can thought nor mind be devoid of some principle of rest or stability. . And as children say entreatingly, 'Give us both,' so the philosopher must include both the moveable and immoveable in his idea of being. And yet, alas! he and we are in the same difficulty with which we reproached the dualists; for motion and rest are contradictions—how then can they both exist? Does he who affirms this mean to say that motion is rest, or rest motion? 'No; he means to assert the existence of some third thing, different from them both, which neither rests nor moves.' But how can there be anything which neither rests nor moves? Here is a second difficulty about being, quite as great as that about not-being. And we may hope that any light which is thrown upon the one may extend to the other.

Leaving them for the present, let us enquire what we mean by giving many names to the same thing, e. g. white, good, tall, to man; out of which tyros old and young derive such a feast of amusement. Their meagre minds refuse to attribute anything to anything; they say that good is good, and man is man; and that to affirm one of the other would be making the many one and the one many. Let us place them in a class with our previous opponents, and interrogate both of them at once. Shall we assume (1) that being and rest and motion, and all other things, are incommunicable with one another; or (2) that they all have indiscriminate communion; or (3) that there is communion of some and not of others? And we will consider the first hypothesis first of all.

If we suppose the universal separation of kinds, all theories alike are swept away; the patrons of a single principle of rest or of motion, or of a plurality of immutable ideas—all alike have the ground cut from under them; and all creators of the universe by theories of composition and division, whether out of or into a finite or infinite number of elemental forms in alternation or continuance, share the same fate. Most ridiculous is the discomfiture which attends the opponents of predication, who have the voice that answers them, like the ventriloquist Eurycles, in their own breast. For they cannot help using the words 'is,' 'apart,' 'from others,'

and the like ; and their adversaries are thus saved the trouble of refuting them. But (2) if all things have communion with all things, motion will rest, and rest will move ; here is a *reductio ad absurdum*. Two out of the three hypotheses are thus seen to be false ; the third (3) remains, which affirms that only certain things communicate with certain other things. In the alphabet and the scale there are some letters and notes which combine with others, and some which do not ; and the laws according to which they combine or are separated are known to the grammarian and musician. And there is a science which teaches not only what notes and letters, but what classes admit of combination with one another, and what not. This is a noble science, on which we have stumbled unawares ; in seeking after the Sophist we have found the philosopher. He is the master who discerns one whole or form pervading a scattered multitude, and many such wholes combined under a higher one, and many entirely apart—he is the true dialectician. Like the Sophist, he is hard to recognise, though for the opposite reasons ; the Sophist runs away into the obscurity of not-being, the philosopher is dark from excess of light. And now, leaving him, we will return to our pursuit of the Sophist.

Agreeing in the truth of the third hypothesis, that some things have communion and others not, and that some may have communion with all, let us examine the most important kinds which are capable of admixture ; and in this way we may perhaps find out a sense in which not-being may be affirmed to have being. Now the highest kinds are being, rest, motion ; and of these, rest and motion exclude each other, but both of them are included in being ; and again, they are the same with themselves and the other of each other. What is the meaning of these words, 'same' and 'other' ? Are there two more kinds to be added to the three others ? For sameness cannot be either rest or motion, because predicated both of rest and motion ; nor yet being, because if being were attributed to both of them we should attribute sameness to both of them. Nor can other be identified with being ; for then other, which is relative, would have the absoluteness of being. Therefore we must assume a fifth principle, which is universal, and runs through all things, for all things are the others of others. Thus there are five principles : (1) being, (2) motion, which is not, (3) rest, and because participating both in the same and other, is and is not the (4) same with itself, and is (5) other than the other. And motion is not being, but partakes of being,

and therefore is and is not in the most absolute sense. Thus we have discovered that not-being is the principle of the other which runs through all things, being not excepted. And 'being' is one thing, and 'not-being' includes and is all other things. And not-being is not the opposite of being, but only the other. Knowledge has many branches, and the other or difference has as many, each of which is described by prefixing the word 'not' to some kind of knowledge. The not-beautiful is as real as the beautiful, the not-just as the just. And the essence of the not-beautiful is to be separated from and opposed to a certain kind of existence which is termed beautiful. And this opposition and negation is the not-being of which we are in search, and is one kind of being. Thus, in spite of Parmenides, we have not only discovered the existence, but also the nature of not-being—that nature we have found to be relation. In the communion of different kinds, being and other mutually interpenetrate; other is, but is other than being, and other than each and all of the remaining kinds, and therefore in an infinity of ways 'is not.' And the argument has shown that the pursuit of contradictions is childish and useless, and the very opposite of that higher spirit which criticises the words of another according to the natural meaning of them. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the denial of all communion of kinds. And we are fortunate in having established such a communion for another reason, because in continuing the hunt after the Sophist we have to examine the nature of discourse, and there could be no discourse if there were no communion. For the Sophist, although he can no longer deny the existence of not-being, may still affirm that not-being cannot enter into discourse, and as he was arguing before that there could be no such thing as falsehood, because there was no such thing as not-being, he may continue to argue that there is no such thing as the art of image-making and phantastic, because not-being has no place in language. Hence arises the necessity of examining speech, opinion, and imagination.

And first concerning speech; let us ask the same question about words which we have already answered about the kinds of being and the letters of the alphabet. To what extent do they admit of combination? Some words have a meaning when combined, and others have no meaning. One class of words describe action, another class agents: walks, runs, sleeps are examples of the first; stag, horse, lion of the second. But no combination of words can be formed without a verb

and a noun, e.g. a man learns; the simplest sentence is composed of two words, and one of these must be a subject. For example, in the sentence, 'Theaetetus sits,' which is not very long, Theaetetus is the subject, or in the sentence 'Theaetetus flies,' Theaetetus is again the subject. And those two sentences differ in quality, for the first says of you that which is true, and the second says of you that which is not true, or, in other words, attributes to you things which are not as though they were. This is false discourse in the shortest form. And thus not only speech, but thought and opinion and imagination are proved to be both true and false. For thought is only the process of silent speech, and opinion is only the silent assent or denial which follows this, and imagination is only the expression of this in some form of sense. All of them are akin to speech, and therefore, like speech, admit of true and false. And we have discovered false opinion, which is an encouraging sign of our probable success in the rest of the enquiry.

Then now let us return to our old division of likeness-making and phantastic. When we were going to place the Sophist in one of them, a doubt arose whether there could be such a thing as a likeness, because there was no such thing as falsehood. At length falsehood has been discovered by us, and we have acknowledged that the Sophist is to be discovered in the class of imitators. All art was divided originally by us into two branches—productive and acquisitive. And now we may divide both on a different principle into the creations or imitations which are of human, and those which are of divine, origin. For we must admit that the world and ourselves and the animals did not come into existence by chance, or the spontaneous working of nature, but by divine reason and knowledge. And there are not only divine creations but divine imitations, such as apparitions and shadows and reflections, which are equally the work of a divine mind. And there are human creations and human imitations too, the art of building and the art of drawing a house. Nor must we forget that image-making may be an imitation of realities or an imitation of falsehoods, which last has been called by us phantastic. And this phantastic may be again divided into imitation by the help of instruments, and impersonations. And the latter may be either dissembling or unconscious, either with or without knowledge. A man cannot imitate you, Theaetetus, without knowing you, but he can imitate the form of justice or virtue if he have a sentiment or opinion about them. Not being well provided with names, the former I will

venture to call the imitation of science, and the latter the imitation of opinion.

The latter is our present concern, for the Sophist has no claims to science or knowledge. But the imitator, who has only opinion, may be divided into two classes—the simple imitator, who thinks that he knows, and the dissembler, who knows and disguises his ignorance. And the last may be either a maker of long speeches, or of shorter speeches which compel the person conversing to contradict himself. The maker of longer speeches is the popular orator; the maker of the shorter is the Sophist, whose art may be traced as being the

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In commenting on the dialogue in which Plato most nearly approaches the great modern master of metaphysics it will be interesting and instructive to compare them chiefly on two points:—1st, the Platonic and Hegelian doctrine of the unity of opposites; 2ndly, their use of the terms *idea* and *dialectic*. Or in other words, the idealism of Plato and of Hegel.

i. The unity of opposites was the crux of ancient thinkers in the age of Plato: How could one thing be or become another? That substances have attributes was implied in common language; that heat and cold, day and night, pass into one another was a matter of experience 'on a level with the cobbler's understanding' (*Theaet.* 180 D). But how could philosophy explain the connection of ideas? how justify the passing of them into one another? The abstractions of one, other, being, not-being, rest, motion, individual, universal, which successive generations of philosophers had recently discovered, seemed to be beyond the reach of

human thought, like stars shining in a distant heaven. They were the symbols of different schools of philosophy; in what relation did they stand to one another and to the world of sense? It was hardly conceivable that one could be other, or the same different. Yet without some reconciliation of these elementary ideas thought was impossible. There was no distinction between truth and falsehood, between the Sophist and the philosopher. Everything could be predicated of everything, or nothing of anything. To these difficulties Plato finds what to us appears to be the answer of common sense—'that not-being is the relative or other of being, the defining and distinguishing principle, and that some ideas combine with others, but not all with all.' It is remarkable however that he offers this obvious reply only as the result of a long and tedious enquiry; by a great effort he is able to look down as 'from a height' on the 'friends of the ideas' (248 A) as well as on the pre-Socratic philosophies.

The Platonic unity of differences or opposites is the beginning of the modern view that all knowledge is of relations; it also anticipates the doctrine of Spinoza that all determination is negation. Plato takes or gives so much of either of these theories as was necessary or possible in the age in which he lived. In the Sophist, as in the Cratylus, he is opposed to the Heraclitean flux and equally to the Megarian and Cynic denial of predication, because he regards both of them as making knowledge impossible. He does not assert that everything is and is not, or that the same thing can be affected and not affected in opposite ways at the same time and in respect of the same part of itself. The law of contradiction is as clearly laid down by him in the Republic, (436 ff, iv. v. 454 C,D), as by Aristotle in his Organon. Yet he is aware that in the negative there is also a positive element, and that oppositions may be only differences. And in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one and not-being from being, and yet shows that the many are included in the one, and that not-being returns to being.

In several of the later dialogues Plato is occupied with the connection of the sciences, which in the Philebus he divides into two classes of pure and applied, adding to them there as elsewhere (Phaedr., Crat., Rep., Polit.) a superintending science of dialectic. This is the origin of Aristotle's Architectonic, which seems, however, to have passed into an imaginary science of essence, and no longer to retain any relation to other branches of knowledge. Of such a science, whether described

as 'philosophia prima,' the science of *οὐσία*, logic or metaphysics, philosophers have often dreamed. But even now the time has not arrived when the anticipation of Plato can be realized. Though many a thinker has framed a 'hierarchy of the sciences,' no one has as yet found the higher science which arrays them in harmonious order, giving to the organic and inorganic, to the physical and moral, their respective limits, and showing how they all work together in the world and in man.

Plato arranges in order the stages of knowledge and of existence. They are the steps or grades by which he rises from sense and the shadows of sense to the idea of beauty and good. Mind is in motion as well as at rest (Soph. 249 B); and may be described as a dialectical progress which passes from one limit or determination of thought to another and back again to the first. This is the account of dialectic given by Plato in the Sixth Book of the Republic (511), which regarded under another aspect is the mysticism of the Symposium (Symp. 211). He does not deny the existence of objects of sense, but according to him they only receive their true meaning when they are incorporated in a principle which is above them (Rep. vi. 511 A, B). In modern language they might be said to come first in the order of experience, last in the order of nature and reason. They are assumed, as he is fond of repeating, upon the condition that they shall give an account of themselves and that the truth of their existence shall be hereafter proved. For philosophy must begin somewhere and may begin anywhere, with outward objects, with statements of opinion, with abstract principles. But objects of sense must lead us onward to the ideas or universals which are contained in them; the statements of opinion must be verified; the abstract principles must be filled up and connected with one another. In Plato we find, as we might expect, the germs of many thoughts which have been further developed by the genius of Spinoza and Hegel. But there is a difficulty in separating the germ from the flower, or in drawing the line which divides ancient from modern philosophy. Many coincidences which occur in them are unconscious, seeming to show a natural tendency in the human mind towards certain ideas and forms of thought. And there are many speculations of Plato which would have passed away unheeded, and their meaning, like that of some hieroglyphic, would have remained undeciphered, unless two thousand years and more afterwards an interpreter had arisen of a kindred spirit

and of the same intellectual family. For example in the Sophist Plato begins with the abstract and goes on to the concrete, not in the lower sense of returning to outward objects, but to the Hegelian concrete or unity of abstractions. In the intervening period hardly any importance would have been attached to the question which is so full of meaning to Plato and Hegel.

They differ however in their manner of regarding the question. For Plato is answering a difficulty; he is seeking to justify the use of common language and of ordinary thought into which philosophy had introduced a principle of doubt and dissolution. Whereas Hegel tries to go beyond common thought, and to combine abstractions in a higher unity: the ordinary mechanism of language and logic is carried by him into another region in which all oppositions are absorbed and all contradictions affirmed, only that they may be done away with. But Plato, unlike Hegel, nowhere bases his system on the unity of opposites, although in the Parmenides he shows an Hegelian subtlety in the analysis of one and being.

It is difficult within the compass of a few pages to give even a faint outline of the Hegelian dialectic. No philosophy which is worth understanding can be understood in a moment; common sense will not teach us metaphysics any more than mathematics. If all sciences demand of us protracted study and attention, the highest of all can hardly be matter of immediate intuition. Neither can we appreciate a great system without yielding a half assent to it—like flies we are caught in the spider's web—and we can only judge of it truly when we place ourselves at a distance from it. Of all philosophies Hegelianism is the most obscure: the difficulty inherent in the subject is increased by the use of a technical language. The saying of Socrates respecting the writings of Heraclitus—'Noble is that which I understand, and that which I do not understand may be as noble; but the strength of a Delian diver is needed to swim through it'—expresses the feeling with which the reader rises from the perusal of Hegel. We may truly apply to him the words in which Plato describes the pre-Socratic philosophers, 'He went on his way rather regardless of whether we understood him or not': or, as he is reported himself to have said of his own pupils, 'There is only one of you who understands me, and he does *not* understand me.'

Nevertheless the consideration of a few general aspects of the Hegelian philosophy may help to dispel some errors and to awaken an interest

about it. (i.) It is an ideal philosophy which, in popular phraseology, maintains not matter but mind to be the truth of things, and this not by a mere crude substitution of one word for another, but by showing either of them to be the complement of the other. Both are creations of thought, and the difference in kind which seems to divide them may also be regarded as a difference of degree. One is to the other as the real to the ideal, and both may be conceived together under the higher form of the notion. (ii.) Under another aspect he views all the forms of sense and knowledge as stages of thought which have always existed implicitly and unconsciously, and to which the mind of the world, gradually disengaged from sense, has become awakened. The present has been the past—the succession in time of human ideas is also the eternal ‘now.’ It is historical and also a divine ideal. The history of philosophy stripped of personality and of the other accidents of time and place is gathered up into philosophy, and again philosophy clothed in circumstance expands into history. (iii.) Whether regarded as present or past, under the form of time or of eternity, the spirit of dialectic is always moving onwards from one determination of thought to another, receiving each successive system of philosophy and subordinating it to that which follows—impelled by an irresistible necessity from one idea to another until the cycle of human thought and existence is complete. It follows from this that all previous philosophies which are worthy of the name are not mere opinions or speculations, but stages or moments of thought which have a necessary place in the world of mind. They are no longer the last word of philosophy, for another and another has succeeded them, but they still live and are mighty—in the language of the Greek poet, ‘There is a great God in them, and he grows not old.’ (iv.) This vast ideal system is supposed to be based upon experience. At each step it professes to carry with it the ‘witness of eyes and ears’ and of common sense, as well as the internal evidence of its own consistency; it has a place for every science, and affirms that no philosophy of a narrower type is capable of comprehending all true facts.

The Hegelian dialectic may be also described as a movement from the simple to the complex. Beginning with the generalizations of sense, (1) passing through ideas of quality, quantity, measure, number, and the like, (2) ascending from presentations, that is pictorial forms of sense, to representations in which the picture vanishes and the essence is detached in thought from the outward form, (3) combining the I and the

not-I, or the subject and object, the natural order of thought is at last found to include the leading ideas of the sciences and to arrange them in relation to one another. Abstractions grow together and again become concrete in a new and higher sense. They also admit of developement from within in their own spheres. Everywhere there is a movement of attraction and repulsion going on—an attraction or repulsion of ideas of which the physical phenomenon described under a similar name is a figure. Freedom and necessity, mind and matter, the continuous and the discrete, cause and effect, are perpetually being severed from one another in thought, only to be perpetually reunited. The finite and infinite, the absolute and relative are not really opposed; the finite and the negation of the finite are alike lost in a higher or positive infinity, and the absolute is the sum or correlation of all relatives. When this reconciliation of opposites is finally completed in all its stages, the mind may come back again and review the things of sense, the opinions of philosophers, the strife of theology and politics, without being disturbed by them. Whatever is, if not the very best—(and what is the best, who can tell?)—is, at any rate, historical and rational, suitable to its own age, unsuitable to any other. Nor can any efforts of speculative thinkers or of soldiers and statesmen materially quicken the ‘process of the suns.’

Hegel was very sensible how great would be the difficulty of presenting philosophy to mankind under the form of opposites. Most of us live in the one-sided truth which the understanding offers to us, and if occasionally we come across difficulties like the time-honoured controversy of necessity and free will, or the Eleatic puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, we relegate some of them to the sphere of mystery, others to the book of riddles, and go on our way rejoicing. Most men (like Aristotle) have been accustomed to regard a contradiction in terms as the end of strife; to be told that contradiction is the life and mainspring of the intellectual world is indeed a paradox to them. Every abstraction is at first the enemy of every other, yet they are linked together, each with all, in the chain of being. The struggle for existence is not confined to the animals, but appears in the kingdom of thought. The divisions which arise in thought between the physical and moral and between the moral and intellectual, and the like, are deepened and widened by the formal logic which elevates the defects of the human faculties into Laws of Thought; they become a part of the mind which

makes them and is also made up of them. Such distinctions become so familiar to us that we regard the thing signified by them as absolutely fixed and defined. These are some of the illusions from which Hegel delivers us by placing us above ourselves, by teaching us to analyse the growth of 'what we are pleased to call our minds,' by reverting to a time when our present distinctions of thought and language had no existence.

Of the great dislike and childish impatience of his system which would be aroused among his opponents, he was fully aware, and would often anticipate the jests which the rest of the world, 'in the superfluity of their wits,' were likely to make upon him. Men are annoyed at what puzzles them; they think what they cannot easily understand to be full of danger. Many a sceptic has stood, as he supposed, firmly rooted in the categories of the understanding which Hegel resolves into their original nothingness. For, like Plato, he 'leaves no stone unturned' in the intellectual world. Nor can we deny that he is unnecessarily difficult, or that his own mind, like that of all metaphysicians, was too much under the dominion of his system and unable to see beyond: or that the study of philosophy, if made a serious business (cp. *Rep.* vii. 538), involves grave results to the mind and life of the student. For it may encumber him without enlightening his path; and it may weaken his natural faculties of thought and expression without increasing his philosophical power. The mind easily becomes entangled among abstractions, and loses hold of facts. The glass which is adapted to distant objects takes away the vision of what is near and present to us.

To Hegel, as to the ancient Greek thinkers, philosophy was a religion, a principle of life as well as of knowledge, like the idea of good in the Sixth Book of the Republic, a cause as well as an effect, the source of growth as well as of light. In forms of thought which by most of us are regarded as mere categories, he saw or thought that he saw a gradual revelation of the Divine Being. He would have been said by his opponents to have confused God with the history of philosophy, and to have been incapable of distinguishing ideas from facts. And certainly we can scarcely understand how a deep thinker like Hegel could have hoped to revive or supplant the old traditional faith by an unintelligible abstraction: or how he could have imagined that philosophy consisted only or chiefly in the categories of logic. For abstractions, though combined by him in the notion, seem to be never really concrete; they are a metaphysical anatomy, not a living and thinking substance.

Though we are reminded by him again and again that we are gathering up the world in ideas, we feel after all that we have not really spanned the gulph which separates *φαινόμενα* from *ὄντα*.

Having in view some of these difficulties, he seeks—and we may follow his example—to make the understanding of his system easier (*a*) by illustrations, and (*b*) by pointing out the coincidence of the speculative idea and the historical order of thought.

(*a*) If we ask how opposites can coexist, we are told that many different qualities inhere in a flower or a tree or in any other concrete object, and that any conception of space or matter or time involves the two contradictory attributes of divisibility and continuousness. We may ponder over the thought of number, reminding ourselves that every unit both implies and denies the existence of every other, and that the one is many—a sum of fractions, and the many one—a sum of units. We may be reminded that in nature there is a centripetal as well as a centrifugal force, a regulator as well as a spring, a law of attraction as well as of repulsion. The way to the West is the way also to the East; the north pole of the magnet cannot be divided from the south pole; two *minus* signs make a *plus* in Arithmetic and Algebra. Again we may liken the successive layers of thought to the deposits of geological strata which were once fluid and are now solid, which have once been uppermost in the series and are now hidden in the earth; or to the successive rinds or barks of trees which year by year pass inward; or to the ripple of water which appears and reappears in an ever widening circle. Or our attention may be drawn to ideas which the moment we analyse them involve a contradiction, such as ‘beginning’ or ‘becoming,’ or to the opposite poles, as they are sometimes termed, of necessity and freedom, of idea and fact. We may be told to observe that every negative is a positive, that differences of kind are resolvable into differences of degree, and that differences of degree may be heightened into differences of kind. We may remember the common remark ‘that there is much to be said on both sides of a question.’ We may be recommended to look within and to explain how opposite ideas can coexist in our own minds; and we may be told to imagine the minds of all mankind as one mind in which the true ideas of all ages and countries inhere. In our conception of God in his relation to man or of any union of the divine and human nature, a contradiction appears to be unavoidable. Is not the reconciliation of mind and body a necessity, not only of

speculation but of practical life? Reflections such as these will furnish the best preparation and give the right attitude of mind for understanding the Hegelian philosophy.

(b) Hegel's treatment of the early Greek thinkers affords the readiest illustration of his meaning in conceiving all philosophy under the form of opposites. The first abstraction is to him the beginning of thought. Hitherto there had only existed a tumultuous chaos of mythological fancy, but when Thales said 'all is water' a new era began to dawn upon the world. Man was seeking to grasp the universe under a single form which was at first only a material element, the most equable and colourless and universal which could be found. But soon the human mind became dissatisfied with the emblem, and after ringing the changes on one element after another, demanded a more abstract and perfect conception, such as one or being, which was absolutely at rest. But the positive had its negative, the conception of being involved not-being, the conception of one, many, the conception of a whole, parts. Then the pendulum swung to the other side, from rest to motion, from Xenophanes to Heraclitus. The opposition of being and not-being projected into space became the atoms and void of Leucippus and Democritus. Until the Atomists, the abstraction of the individual did not exist; in the philosophy of Anaxagoras the idea of mind, whether human or divine, was beginning to be realized. The pendulum gave another swing, from the individual to the universal, from the object to the subject. The Sophist first uttered the word 'man is the measure of all things,' which Socrates presented in a new form as the study of ethics. Once more we return from mind to the object of mind, which is knowledge, and out of knowledge the various degrees or kinds of knowledge more or less abstract were gradually developed. The threefold division of logic, physic, and ethics, foreshadowed in Plato, was finally established by Aristotle and the Stoics. Thus, according to Hegel, in the course of about two centuries by a process of antagonism and negation the leading thoughts of philosophy were evolved.

There is nothing like this progress of opposites in Plato, who in the Symposium denies the possibility of reconciliation until the opposition has passed away. In his own words, there is an absurdity in supposing that 'harmony is discord; for in reality harmony consists of notes of a higher and lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music.' (Symp. 187 A, B.) He does indeed describe objects

of sense as regarded by us sometimes from one point of view and sometimes from another. As he says at the end of the Fifth Book of the Republic, 'There is nothing light which is not heavy, or great which is not small.' And he extends this relativity to the conceptions of just and good, as well as to great and small. In like manner he acknowledges that the same number may be more or less in relation to other numbers without any increase or diminution. (Theæt. 155 A, B.) But this perplexity only arises out of the confusion of the human faculties; the art of measuring shows us what is truly great and truly small. Though the just and good in particular instances may vary, the *idea* of good is eternal and unchangeable. And the *idea* of good is the source of knowledge and also of being, in which all the stages of sense and knowledge are gathered up and from being hypotheses become realities.

Leaving the comparison with Plato we may now consider the value of this invention of Hegel. There can be no question of the importance of showing that two contraries or contradictories may in certain cases be both true. The silliness of the so-called laws of thought ('all $A=A$,' or, in the negative form, 'nothing can at the same time be both A, and not A,') has been well exposed by Hegel himself (Wallace's Hegel, p. 184), who remarks that 'the form of the maxim is virtually self-contradictory, for a proposition implies a distinction between subject and predicate, whereas the maxim of identity, as it is called, $A=A$, does not fulfil what its form requires. Nor does any mind ever think or form conceptions in accordance with this law, nor does any existence conform to it.' Wisdom of this sort is well parodied in Shakespeare¹. Unless we are willing to admit that two contradictories may be true, many questions which lie at the threshold of mathematics and of morals will be insoluble puzzles to us.

The influence of opposites is felt in practical life. The understanding sees one side of a question only—the common sense of mankind joins one of two parties in politics, in religion, in philosophy. Yet, as every body knows, truth is not wholly the possession of either. But the characters of men are one-sided and accept this or that aspect of the truth. The understanding is strong in a single abstract principle and with

¹ Twelfth Night, Act iv. Sc. 2: '*Clovn*. For as the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, "That that is is" . . . for what is "that" but "that," and "is" but "is"?'

this lever moves mankind. Few attain to a balance of principles or recognize truly how in all human things there is a thesis and antithesis, a law of action and of reaction. In politics we require order as well as liberty, and have to consider the proportions in which under given circumstances they may be safely combined. In religion there is a tendency to lose sight of morality, to separate goodness from the love of truth, to worship God without attempting to know him. In philosophy again there are two opposite principles, of immediate experience and of those general or *a priori* truths which are supposed to transcend experience. But the common sense or common opinion of mankind is incapable of apprehending these opposite sides or views—men are determined by their natural bent to one or other of them; they go straight on for a time in a single line, and may be many things by turns but not at once.

Hence the importance of familiarizing the mind with forms which will assist us in conceiving or expressing the complex or contrary aspects of life and nature. The danger is that they may be too much for us, and obscure our appreciation of facts. As the complexity of mechanics cannot be understood without mathematics, so neither can the many-sidedness of the mental and moral world be truly apprehended without the assistance of new forms of thought. One of these forms is the unity of opposites. Abstractions have a great power over us, but they are apt to be partial and one-sided, and only when modified by other abstractions do they make an approach to the truth. Many a man has become a fatalist because he has fallen under the dominion of a single idea. He says to himself, for example, that he must be either free or necessary—he cannot be both. Thus in the ancient world whole schools of philosophy passed away in the vain attempt to solve the problem of the continuity or divisibility of matter. And in comparatively modern times, though in the spirit of an ancient philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, feeling a similar perplexity, is inclined to deny the truth of infinitesimals in mathematics. Many difficulties arise in practical religion from the impossibility of conceiving body and mind at once and in adjusting their movements to one another. There is a border ground between them which seems to belong to both; and there is as much difficulty in conceiving the body without the soul as the soul without the body. To the 'either' and 'or' philosophy ('Everything is either A or not A') should at least be added the clause 'or neither,' 'or both.' The double form

makes reflection easier and more conformable to experience, and also more comprehensive. But in order to avoid paradox and the danger of giving offence to the unmetaphysical part of mankind, we may speak of it as due to the imperfection of language or the limitation of human faculties. It is nevertheless a discovery which, in Platonic language, may be termed a 'most gracious aid to thought.'

The doctrine of opposite moments of thought or of progression by antagonism, further assists us in framing a scheme or system of the sciences. The negation of one gives birth to another of them. The double notions are the joints which hold them together. The simple is developed into the complex, the complex returns again into the simple. Beginning with the highest notion of mind or thought, we may descend by a series of negations to the first generalizations of sense. Or again we may begin with the simplest elements of sense and proceed upwards to the highest being or thought. Metaphysic is the negation or absorption of physiology—physiology of chemistry—chemistry of mechanical philosophy. Or again in mechanics, when we can no further go we arrive at chemistry—when chemistry becomes organic we arrive at physiology: when we pass from the outward and animal to the inward nature of man we arrive at moral and metaphysical philosophy. These sciences have each of them their own methods and are pursued independently of one another. But to the mind of the thinker they are all one—latent in one another—developed out of one another.

This method of opposites has supplied new instruments of thought for the solution of metaphysical problems, and has thrown down many of the walls within which the human mind was confined. Formerly when philosophers arrived at the infinite and absolute, they seemed to be lost in a region beyond human comprehension. But Hegel has shown that the absolute and infinite are no more true than the relative and finite, and that they must alike be negated before we arrive at a true absolute or a true infinite. The conceptions of the infinite and absolute as ordinarily understood are tiresome because they are unmeaning, but there is no peculiar sanctity or mystery in them. We might as well make an infinitesimal series of fractions or a perpetually recurring decimal the object of our worship. They are the widest and also the thinnest of human ideas, or, in the language of logicians, they have the greatest extension and the least compre-

hension. Of all words they may be truly said to be the most inflated with a false meaning. They have been handed down from one philosopher to another until they have acquired a religious character. They seem also to derive a sacredness from their association with the Divine Being. Yet they are the poorest of the predicates under which we describe him—signifying no more than this, that he is not finite, that he is not relative, and tending to obscure his higher attributes of wisdom, goodness, truth.

The system of Hegel frees the mind from the dominion of abstract ideas. We acknowledge his originality, and some of us delight to wander in the mazes of thought which he has opened to us. For Hegel has found admirers in England and Scotland when his popularity in Germany has departed, and he, like the philosophers whom he criticises, is of the past. No other thinker has ever dissected the human mind with equal patience and minuteness. He has lightened the burden of thought because he has shown us that the chains which we wear are of our own forging. To be able to place ourselves not only above the opinions of men but above their modes of thinking, is a great height of philosophy. This dearly obtained freedom, however, we are not disposed to part with, or to allow him to build up in a new form the 'beggarly elements' of scholastic logic which he has thrown down. So far as they are aids to reflection and expression, forms of thought are useful, but no further:—we may easily have too many of them.

And when we are asked to believe the Hegelian to be the sole or universal logic, we naturally reply that there are other ways in which our ideas may be connected. The triplets of Hegel, the division into being, essence, and notion, are not the only or necessary modes in which the world of thought can be conceived. There may be an evolution by degrees as well as by opposites. The word 'continuity' suggests the possibility of resolving all differences into differences of quantity. Again the opposites themselves may vary from the least degree of diversity up to contradictory opposition. They are not like numbers and figures, always and everywhere of the same value. And therefore the edifice which is constructed out of them has only an imaginary symmetry, and is really irregular and out of proportion. The spirit of Hegelian criticism should be applied to his own system, and the terms being, not being, existence, essence, notion, and the

like challenged and defined. For if Hegel introduces a great many distinctions, he obliterates a great many others by the help of the universal solvent 'is not,' which appears to be the simplest of negations, and yet admits of several meanings. Neither are we able to follow him in the play of metaphysical fancy which conducts him from one determination of thought to another. But we begin to suspect that this vast system is not God within us, or God immanent in the world, and may be only the invention of an individual brain. The 'beyond' is always coming back upon us however often we expel it. We do not easily believe that we have within the compass of the mind the form of universal knowledge. We rather incline to think that the method of knowledge is inseparable from actual knowledge, and wait to see what new forms may be developed out of our increasing experience and observation of man and nature. We are conscious of a Being who is without us as well as within us. Even if inclined to Pantheism we are unwilling to imagine that the meagre categories of the understanding, however ingeniously arranged or displayed, are the image of God;—that what all religions were seeking after from the beginning was the Hegelian philosophy which has been revealed in the latter days. The great metaphysician, like a prophet of old, was naturally inclined to believe that his own thoughts were divine realities. We may almost say that whatever came into his head seemed to him to be a necessary truth. He never appears to have criticised himself, or to have subjected his own ideas to the process of analysis which he applies to every other philosopher.

Hegel would have insisted that his philosophy should be accepted as a whole or not at all. He would have urged that the parts derived their meaning from one another and from the whole. He thought that he had supplied an outline large enough to contain all future knowledge, and a method to which all future philosophies must conform. His metaphysical genius is especially shown in the construction of the categories—a work which was only begun by Kant, and elaborated to the utmost by himself. But is it really true that the part has no meaning when separated from the whole, or that knowledge to be knowledge at all must be universal? Do all abstractions shine only by the reflected light of other abstractions? May they not also find a nearer explanation in their relation to phenomena? If many of them are correlatives they are not all so, and the relations which subsist between them, vary from a mere

association up to a necessary connection. Nor is it easy to determine how far the unknown element affects the known, whether, for example, new discoveries may not one day supersede our most elementary notions about nature. To a certain extent all our knowledge is conditional upon what may be known in future ages of the world. We must admit this hypothetical element, which we cannot get rid of by an assumption that we have already discovered the method to which all philosophy must conform. Hegel is right in preferring the concrete to the abstract, in setting actuality before possibility, in excluding from the philosopher's vocabulary the word 'inconceivable.' But he is too well satisfied with his own system ever to consider the effect of what is unknown on the element which is known. To the Hegelian all things are plain and clear, while he who is outside the charmed circle is in the mire of ignorance and 'logical impurity': he who is within is omniscient, or at least has all the elements of knowledge under his hand.

Hegelianism may be said to be a transcendental defence of the world as it is. There is no room for aspiration and no need of any: 'what is actual is rational, what is rational is actual.' But a good man will not readily acquiesce in this aphorism. He knows of course that all things proceed according to law whether for good or evil. But when he sees the misery and ignorance of mankind he is convinced that without any interruption of the uniformity of nature the condition of the world may be indefinitely improved by human effort. There is also an adaptation of persons to times and countries, but this is very far from being the fulfilment of their higher natures. The man of the seventeenth century is unfitted for the eighteenth, the man of the eighteenth for the nineteenth, and most of us would be out of place in the world of a hundred years hence. But all higher minds are much more akin than they are different: genius is of all ages, and there is perhaps more uniformity in excellence than in mediocrity. The sublimer intelligences of mankind—Plato, Dante, Sir Thomas More,—meet in a higher sphere above the ordinary ways of men; they understand one another from afar, notwithstanding the interval which separates them. They are 'the spectators of all time and of all existence'; their works live for ever; and there is nothing to prevent the force of their individuality breaking through the uniformity which surrounds them. But such disturbers of the order of thought Hegel is reluctant to acknowledge.

The doctrine of Hegel will to many seem the expression of an

indolent conservatism, and will at any rate be made an excuse for it. The mind of the patriot rebels when he is told that the worst tyranny and oppression has a natural fitness: he cannot be persuaded, for example, that the conquest of Prussia by Napoleon I. was either natural or necessary, or that any similar calamity befalling a nation should be a matter of indifference to the poet or philosopher. We may need such a philosophy or religion to console us under evils which are irremediable, but we see that it is fatal to the higher life of man. It seems to say to us, 'The world is a vast system or machine which can be conceived under the forms of logic, but in which no single man can do any great good or any great harm. Even if it were a thousand times worse than it is, it could be arranged in categories and explained by philosophers—what more do we want?'

The philosophy of Hegel appeals to an historical criterion: the ideas of men have a succession in time as well as an order of thought. But when we are told that the order of thought in nature is the same as the order of thought in the history of philosophy, is there any sufficient foundation for this statement? In later systems the forms of thought are too numerous and complex to admit of our tracing in them a regular succession. They seem also to be in part reflections of the past, and it is difficult to separate in them what is original and what is borrowed. Doubtless they have a relation to one another—the transition from Descartes to Spinoza or from Locke to Berkeley is not a matter of chance, but it can hardly be described as an alternation of opposites or figured to the mind by the vibrations of a pendulum. Even in Aristotle and Plato, rightly understood, we cannot trace this law of action and reaction. They are both idealists, although to the one the idea is actual and immanent,—to the other only potential and transcendent, as Hegel himself has pointed out (*Wallace's Hegel*, p. 223). The true meaning of Aristotle has been disguised from us by his own appeal to fact and the opinions of mankind in his more popular works, and by the use made of his writings in the Middle Ages. No book, except the Scriptures, has been so much read, and so little understood. The pre-Socratic philosophies are simpler, and we may observe a progress in them, but is there any regular succession? The ideas of being, change, number, seem to have sprung up contemporaneously in different parts of Greece and we have no difficulty in constructing them out of one another—we can see that the union of being and

not-being gave birth to the idea of change or becoming and that one might be another aspect of being. Again, the Eleatics may be regarded as developing in one direction into the Megarian school, in the other into the Atomists, but there is no necessary connection between them. Nor is there any indication that the deficiency which was felt in one school was supplemented or compensated by another. They were all efforts to supply the want which the Greeks began to feel at the beginning of the sixth century before Christ,—the want of abstract ideas. Nor must we forget the uncertainty of chronology:—if, as Aristotle says, there were Atomists before Leucippus, Eleatics before Xenophanes, and perhaps ‘patrons of the flux’ before Heraclitus, Hegel’s order of thought in the history of philosophy would be as much disarranged as his order of religious thought by recent discoveries in the history of religion.

Hegel is fond of repeating that all philosophies still live and that the earlier are preserved in the later; they are refuted, and they are not refuted, by those who succeed them. Once they reigned supreme, now they are subordinated to a power or idea greater or more comprehensive than their own. The thoughts of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle have certainly sunk deep into the mind of the world, and have exercised an influence which will never pass away; but can we say that they have the same meaning in modern and ancient philosophy? Some of them, as for example, the words ‘being,’ ‘essence,’ ‘matter,’ ‘form,’ either have become obsolete, or are used in new senses, whereas ‘individual,’ ‘cause,’ ‘motive,’ have acquired an exaggerated importance. Is the manner in which the logical determinations of thought, or ‘categories’ as they may be termed, have been handed down to us, really different from that in which other words have come down to us? Have they not been equally subject to accident, and are they not often used by Hegel himself in senses which would have been quite unintelligible to their original inventors—as for example, when he speaks of the ‘ground’ of Leibnitz (‘Everything has a sufficient ground’) as identical with his own doctrine of the ‘notion’ (Wallace’s Hegel, p. 195), or the ‘being and not-being’ of Heraclitus as the same with his own ‘becoming’?

As the historical order of thought has been adapted to the logical, so we have reason for suspecting that the Hegelian logic has been in some degree adapted to the order of thought in history. There is unfortunately no criterion to which either of them can be subjected, and not much forcing was required to bring either into near relations with

the other. We may fairly doubt whether the division of the first and second parts of logic in the Hegelian system has not really arisen from a desire to make them accord with the first and second stages of the early Greek philosophy. Is there any reason why the conception of measure in the first part, which is formed by the union of quality and quantity, should not have been equally placed in the second division of mediate or reflected ideas? The more we analyse them the less exact does the coincidence of philosophy and the history of philosophy appear. Many terms which were used absolutely in the beginning of philosophy, such as 'being,' 'matter,' 'cause,' and the like, became relative in the subsequent history of thought. But Hegel employs some of them absolutely, some relatively, seemingly without any principle and without any regard to their original significance.

The divisions of the Hegelian logic bear a superficial resemblance to the divisions of the scholastic logic. The first part answers to the term, the second to the proposition, the third to the syllogism. These are the grades of thought under which we conceive the world first in the general terms of quality, quantity, measure; secondly under the relative forms of ground and existence, substance and accidents, and the like; thirdly in syllogistic forms of the individual mediated with the universal by the help of the particular. Of syllogisms there are various kinds,—qualitative, quantitative, inductive, mechanical, teleological, which are developed out of one another. But is there any meaning in reintroducing the forms of the old logic? Who ever thinks of the world as a syllogism? What connection is there between the proposition and our ideas of reciprocity, cause and effect, and similar relations? It is difficult enough to conceive all the powers of nature and mind gathered up in one. The difficulty is greatly increased when the new is confused with the old, and the common logic is the Procrustes' bed into which they are forced.

The Hegelian philosophy claims, as we have seen, to be based upon experience: it abrogates the distinction of *a priori* and *a posteriori* truth. It also acknowledges that many differences of kind are resolvable into differences of degree. It is familiar with the terms 'evolution' 'development,' and the like. Yet it can hardly be said to have considered the forms of thought which are best adapted for the expression of facts. It has never applied the categories to experience; it has not defined the differences in our ideas of opposition, or development, or cause and effect, in the different sciences which make use of these terms. It rests

on a knowledge which is not the result of exact or serious enquiry, but is floating in the air; the mind has been imperceptibly informed of some of the methods required in the sciences. Hegel boasts that the movement of dialectic is at once necessary and spontaneous: in reality it goes beyond experience and is unverified by it. Further, the Hegelian philosophy, while giving us the power of thinking a great deal more than we are able to fill up, seems also to be wanting in some determinations of thought which we require. We cannot say that physical science, which at present occupies so large a share of popular attention, has been made easier or more intelligible by the distinctions of Hegel. Nor can we deny that he has sometimes interpreted physics by metaphysics, and confused his own philosophical fancies with the laws of nature. The very freedom of the movement is not without suspicion, seeming to imply a state of the human mind which has entirely lost sight of facts. Nor can the necessity which is attributed to it be very stringent, seeing that the successive categories or determinations of thought in different parts of his writings are arranged by the philosopher in different ways. What is termed necessary evolution seems to be only the order in which a succession of ideas presented themselves to the mind of Hegel at a particular time.

The nomenclature of Hegel has been made by himself out of the language of common life. He uses a few words only which are borrowed from his predecessors, or from the Greek philosophy, and these generally in a sense peculiar to himself. The first stage of his philosophy answers to the word 'is,' the second to the word 'has been,' the third to the words 'has been' and 'is' combined. In other words, the first sphere is immediate, the second mediated by reflection, the third or highest returns into the first, and is both mediate and immediate. As Luther's Bible was written in the language of the common people, so Hegel seems to have thought that he gave his philosophy a truly German character by the use of idiomatic German words. But it may be doubted whether the attempt has been successful. First because such words as 'in sich seyn,' 'an sich seyn,' 'an und fur sich seyn,' though the simplest combination of nouns and verbs, require a difficult and elaborate explanation. The simplicity of the words contrasts with the hardness of their meaning. Secondly, the use of technical phraseology necessarily separates philosophy from general literature; the student has to learn a new language of uncertain meaning which he with difficulty remembers. No former

philosopher had ever carried the use of technical terms to the same extent as Hegel. The language of Plato or even of Aristotle is but slightly removed from that of common life, and was introduced naturally by a series of thinkers : the language of the scholastic logic has become technical to us, but in the Middle Ages was the vernacular Latin of priests and students. The higher spirit of philosophy, the spirit of Plato and Socrates, rebels against the Hegelian use of language as mechanical and technical.

Hegel is fond of etymologies and often seems to trifle with words. He gives etymologies which are bad, and never considers that the meaning of a word may have nothing to do with its derivation. He lived before the days of Comparative Philology or of Comparative Mythology and Religion, which would have opened a new world to him. He makes no allowance for the element of chance either in language or thought ; and perhaps there is no greater defect in his system than the want of a sound theory of language. He speaks as if thought, instead of being identical with language, was wholly independent of it. It is not the actual growth of the mind, but the imaginary growth of the Hegelian system, which is attractive to him.

Neither are we able to say why of the common forms of thought some are rejected by him, while others have an undue prominence given to them. Some of them, such as 'ground' and 'existence,' have hardly any basis either in language or philosophy, while others, such as 'cause and effect,' are but slightly considered. All abstractions are supposed by Hegel to derive their meaning from one another. This is true of some, but not of all, and in different degrees. There is an explanation of abstractions by the phenomena which they represent, as well as by their relation to other abstractions. If the knowledge of all were necessary to the knowledge of any one of them, the mind would sink under the load of thought. Again, in every process of reflection we seem to require a standing ground, and in the attempt to obtain a complete analysis we lose all fixedness. If, for example, the mind is viewed as the complex of ideas, or the difference between things and persons denied, such an analysis may be justified from the point of view of Hegel : but we shall find that in the attempt to criticise thought we have lost the power of thinking, and, like the Heracliteans of old, have no words in which our meaning can be expressed. Such an analysis may be useful as a corrective of popular language or thought, but should still allow us to retain the fundamental distinctions of philosophy.

In the Hegelian system ideas supersede persons. The world of thought, though sometimes described as spirit or 'geist,' is really impersonal. The minds of men are to be regarded as one mind, or more correctly as a succession of ideas. Any comprehensive view of the world must necessarily be general, and there may be a use with a view to comprehensiveness in dropping individuals and their lives and actions. In all things, if we leave out details, a certain degree of order begins to appear; at any rate we can make an order which, with a little exaggeration or disproportion in some of the parts, will cover the whole field of philosophy. But are we therefore justified in saying that ideas are the causes of the great movement of the world rather than the personalities which conceived them? The great man is the expression of his time, and there may be peculiar difficulties in his age which he cannot overcome. He may be out of harmony with his circumstances, too early or too late, and then all his thoughts perish; his genius passes away unknown. But not therefore is he to be regarded as a mere waif or stray in human history, any more than he is the mere creature or expression of the age in which he lives. His ideas are inseparable from himself, and would have been nothing without him. Through a thousand personal influences they have been brought home to the minds of others. He starts from antecedents, but he is great in proportion as he disengages himself from them. Moreover the types of greatness differ; while one man is the expression of the influences of his age another is in antagonism to them. One man is borne on the surface of the water; another is carried forward by the current which flows beneath. The character of an individual, whether he be independent of circumstances or not, inspires others quite as much as his words. What is the teaching of Socrates apart from his personal history, or the doctrines of Christ apart from the Divine life in which they are embodied? Has not Hegel himself delineated the greatness of the life of Christ as consisting in his 'shicksallosigkeit' or independence of the destiny of his race? Do not persons become ideas, and is there any distinction between them? Take away the five greatest legislators, the five greatest warriors, the five greatest poets, the five greatest founders or teachers of a religion, the five greatest philosophers, the five greatest inventors,—where would have been all that we most value in knowledge or in life? And can that be a true theory of the history of philosophy which, in Hegel's own language, 'does not allow the individual to have his right'?

Once more, while we readily admit that the world is relative to the

mind, and the mind to the world, and that we must suppose a common or correlative growth in them, we shrink from saying that this complex nature can contain, even in outline, all the endless forms of being and knowledge. Are we not 'seeking the living among the dead' and dignifying a mere logical skeleton with the name of philosophy and almost of God? When we look far away into the primeval sources of thought and belief, do we suppose that the mere accident of our being the heirs of the Greek philosophers can give us a right to set ourselves up as having the true and only standard of reason in the world? Or when we contemplate the infinite worlds in the expanse of heaven can we imagine that a few meagre categories derived from language and invented by the genius of one or two great thinkers contain the secret of the universe? Or, having regard to the ages during which the human race may yet endure, do we suppose that we can anticipate the proportions human knowledge may attain even within the short space of one or two thousand years?

Again we have a difficulty in understanding how ideas can be causes, which to us seems to be as much a 'figure of speech as the old notion of a creator artist who makes the world by the help of the demigods' (Plato, *Tim.*), or with 'a golden pair of compasses' measures out the circumference of the universe (Milton, *P. L.*). We can understand how the idea in the mind of an inventor is the cause of the work which is produced by it; and we can dimly imagine how this universal frame may be animated by a divine intelligence. But we cannot conceive how all the thoughts of men that ever were, which are themselves subject to so many external conditions of climate, country, and the like, even if regarded as the single thought of a divine being, can be supposed to have made the world. We seem to be only wrapping up ourselves in our own conceits—to be confusing cause and effect—to be losing the distinction between reflection and action, between the human and divine.

These are some of the doubts and suspicions which arise in the mind of a student of Hegel, when, after living for a time within the charmed circle, he removes to a little distance and looks back upon what he has learnt, from the vantage ground of history and experience. The enthusiasm of his youth has passed away, the authority of the master no longer retains a hold upon him. But he does not regret the time spent in the study of him. He finds that he has received from him a real enlargement of mind, and much of the true spirit of philosophy, even when he has ceased to believe in him. He returns

again and again to his writings as to the recollections of a first love, not undeserving of his admiration still. Perhaps if he were asked how he can admire without believing, or what value he can attribute to what he knows to be erroneous, he might answer in some such manner as the following :

1. That in Hegel he finds glimpses of the genius of the poet and of the common sense of the man of the world. His system is not cast in a poetic form, but neither has all this load of logic extinguished in him the feeling of poetry. He is the true countryman of his contemporaries Goethe and Schiller. Many fine expressions are scattered up and down in his writings, as when he tells us that 'the Crusaders went to the Sepulchre but found it empty.' He delights to find vestiges of his own philosophy in the older German mystics. And though he can be scarcely said to have mixed much in the affairs of men, for, as his biographer tells us, 'he lived for thirty years in a single room,' yet he is far from being ignorant of the world. No one can read his writings without acquiring an insight into life. He loves to touch with the spear of logic the follies and self-deceptions of mankind, and make them appear in their natural form, stripped of the disguises of language and custom. He will not allow men to defend themselves by an appeal to one-sided or abstract principles. In this age of reason any one can easily find a reason for doing what he likes (Wallace, p. 197). He is suspicious of a distinction which is often made between a person's character and his conduct. His spirit is the opposite of that of Jesuitism or casuistry (Wallace, p. 181). He affords an example of a remark which has been often made, that in order to know the world it is not necessary to have had a great experience of it.

2. Hegel, if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest critic of philosophy who ever lived. No one else has equally mastered the opinions of his predecessors or traced the connection of them in the same manner. No one has equally raised the human mind above the trivialities of the common logic and the unmeaningness of 'mere' abstractions, and above imaginary possibilities, which, as he truly says, have no place in philosophy. No one has won so much for the kingdom of ideas. Whatever may be thought of his own system it will hardly be denied that he has overthrown Locke, Kant, Hume, and the so-called philosophy of common sense. He shows us that only by the study of metaphysics can we get rid of metaphysics, and that those who are in theory most opposed to them are in fact most entirely

and hopelessly enslaved by them: 'die reine Physiker sind nur die thieren.' The disciple of Hegel will hardly become the slave of any other system-maker. What Bacon seems to promise him he will find realized in the great German thinker, a complete emancipation from the influences of the scholastic logic.

3. Many of those who are least disposed to become the votaries of Hegelianism nevertheless recognize in his system a new logic supplying a variety of instruments and methods hitherto unemployed. We may not be able to agree with him in assimilating the natural order of human thought with the history of philosophy, and still less in identifying both with the divine idea or nature. But we may acknowledge that the great thinker has thrown a light on many parts of human knowledge, and has solved many difficulties. We cannot receive his doctrine of opposites as the last word of philosophy, but we may still regard it as a very important contribution to logic. We cannot affirm that words have no meaning when taken out of their connection in the history of thought. But we recognize that their meaning is to a great extent due to association, and to their correlation with one another. We see the advantage of viewing in the concrete what mankind regard only in the abstract. There is much to be said for his faith or conviction, that God is immanent in the world,—within the sphere of the human mind, and not beyond it. It was natural that he himself, like a prophet of old, should regard the philosophy which he had invented as the voice of God in man. But this by no means implies that he conceived himself as creating God in thought. He was the servant of his own ideas and not the master of them. The philosophy of history and the history of philosophy may be almost said to have been discovered by him. He has thrown greater light upon Greek thought than all other writers put together. Many ideas of development, evolution, reciprocity, which have become the symbols of another school of thinkers may be traced to his speculations. In the theology and philosophy of England as well as of Germany and also in the lighter literature of both countries there are always appearing 'fragments of the great banquet' of Hegel.

SOPHIST.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS.

THEAETETUS.

SOCRATES.

AN ELEATIC STRANGER, whom Theodorus and Theaetetus bring with them.

Steph.

216 *Theodorus.* HERE we are, as in duty bound, Socrates, according to the agreement of yesterday, bringing with us a stranger from Elea, who is the follower of Parmenides and Zeno, and a true philosopher.

Socrates. Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the disguise of a stranger? For Homer says that all the gods, and especially the god of strangers, are companions of the meek and just, and visit the good and evil among men. And may not your companion be one of those higher powers, a cross-examining deity, who, seeing our weakness in argument, has come to inspect and cross-examine us?

Theod. Nay, Socrates, he is not one of the disputatious set—he is too good for that. And, in my opinion, he is not a god at all; but I do call him divine, for this is a title which I should give to all philosophers.

Soc. Very true indeed, my friend; and they are certainly as hard to be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, and such as are not merely made up for the occasion, appear in various forms unrecognised by the ignorance of men, and they 'walk to and fro in cities,' as Homer says, looking from above upon human life; and some think nothing of them, and others can never think enough; and sometimes they appear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists; and then, again, they seem to

many to be no better than madmen. I should like to ask our Eleatic friend, if he would tell us, what is thought in his country 217 about them, and to whom the terms are applied.

Theod. What terms?

Soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

Theod. What is your difficulty about them, and what do you want to ask?

Soc. I want to know whether his countrymen regard them as one or two, or whether, as there are three names, there are not also three classes to which they assign them?

Theod. I dare say that the Stranger will not object to discuss them? what do you say, Stranger?

Stranger. I am far from objecting, Theodorus, nor have I any difficulty in replying that they are regarded by us as three. But to define precisely the nature of each of them is anything but a slight or easy task.

Theod. You have happened to light, Socrates, almost on the very question which we were asking our friend before we came hither, and he excused himself to us, as he does now to you; although he admitted that the question had been well discussed, and that he remembered the answer.

Soc. Then do not, Stranger, deny us the first favour which we ask of you: I am sure that you will not, and therefore I shall only beg you to say whether you like and are accustomed to speak at length on the subject which you want to explain to another, or to proceed by the method of questions. I remember hearing a very noble discussion in which Parmenides employed the latter of the two methods, when I was a young man, and he was far advanced in years.

Str. I prefer to talk with another when he responds pleasantly, and is light in hand; if not, I would rather have my own say.

Soc. Any one of the present company will respond kindly to you, and you can choose whom you like of them; I should recommend you to take a young person—Theaetetus, for example—unless you have a preference for some one else.

Str. I feel ashamed, Socrates, at just coming into a new society, instead of talking a little and hearing others talk, to be spinning out a long soliloquy or address, as if I wanted to show

off. For the true answer will be a very long one, and a great deal longer than might be expected from such a simple question. At the same time, I fear that I may seem ungracious if I refuse
 218 your courteous request, especially after what you have said. For I certainly cannot object to your proposal, that Theaetetus should respond, having already myself conversed with him, and having your recommendation of him.

Theaetetus. But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite so acceptable to the rest of the company as Socrates imagines?

Str. You hear them applaud us, Theaetetus; after that, there is nothing more to be said. Well then, I am to argue with you, and if you tire of the argument, you may complain of your friends and not of me.

Theaet. I do not think that I shall tire, and if I do, I shall get my friend, young Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates, to help; he is about my own age, and my partner at the gymnasium, and is constantly accustomed to work with me.

Str. Very good; you can decide about that for yourself as we proceed. Meanwhile you and I will begin together and enquire into the nature of the Sophist, first of the three: I should like you to make him out and bring him to light in an argument; for at present we are only agreed about the name. I dare say that we may both of us have the thing in our minds, but we ought always to come to an understanding about the thing in terms of a definition, and not merely about the name minus the definition. Now the tribe of Sophists which we are investigating is not easily caught or defined; and the world has long ago agreed, that if great subjects are to be adequately treated, they must be studied in the lesser instances of them before we proceed to the greatest of all. And as I know that the tribe of Sophists is troublesome and hard to be caught, I should recommend that we first practise the method of discovery in something easier, unless you can suggest any better plan.

Theaet. Indeed I cannot.

Str. Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will be a pattern of the greater?

Theaet. Good.

Str. What is there which is well known and not great, and is

yet as susceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an angler? He is familiar to all of us, and not a very interesting or important person.

Theact. True.

Str. I suspect that he will supply us with a definition and 219 process of enquiry just such as we want.

Theact. Very true.

Str. Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not having, but having some other power.

Theact. He is clearly a man of art.

Str. And there are two kinds of arts?

Theact. What are they?

Str. There is agriculture, and the tending of mortal creatures, and the art of constructing or moulding vessels, as we term them, and there is the art of imitation—all these may be properly called by a single name.

Theact. What do you mean? And what is the name?

Str. He who brings into existence something that did not exist before is said to be a producer, and that which is brought into existence is said to be produced.

Theact. True.

Str. And all the arts which were just now mentioned are characterised by this power of producing?

Theact. They are.

Str. Then let us sum them up under the name of productive or creative art.

Theact. Very good.

Str. Next follows the whole class of learning and cognition, together with trade, fighting, hunting; since none of these produces anything, but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed, or in preventing others from conquering things which exist and have been already produced—in each and all of these branches there appears to be an art which may be called acquisitive.

Theact. Yes, that is the proper name.

Str. Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?

Theact. Clearly in the acquisitive class.

Str. And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts:

there is voluntary exchange, which is effected by gifts, hire, purchase; and the other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, may be termed forcible exchange?

Theact. That is implied in what has been said.

Str. And may not this forcible exchange be again subdivided?

Theact. How?

Str. Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have the general name of hunting?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And there will be a want of discrimination in not further dividing the art of hunting.

Theact. How would you make the division?

Str. Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey.

Theact. Yes, if both kinds exist.

220 *Str.* Of course they exist; but the hunting after lifeless things having no special name, except in the case of diving, and such small matters, may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called animal hunting.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, land animal hunting, which has many kinds and names, and the other the hunting after animals who swim—water animal hunting?

Theact. True.

Str. And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the other in the water?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all birds is included.

Theact. True.

Str. The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general name of fishing.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two principal kinds?

Theact. What are they?

Str. There is one kind which takes them in nets, the other which takes them by a blow.

Theact. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?

Str. As to the first kind—since all that surrounds and encloses anything to prevent egress, may be rightly called an enclosure—

Theact. Very true.

Str. For which reason twig baskets, casting-nets, nooses, cruives, and the like may all be termed 'enclosures'?

Theact. True.

Str. And therefore this first kind of hunting may be called by us hunting with enclosures, or something of that sort?

Theact. Yes.

Str. The other kind, which is practised with hooks and three-pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called striking, unless you, Theaetetus, can find some better name?

Theact. No matter about the name—that will do very well.

Str. There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by the light of a fire, and is called by the hunters themselves firing, or spearing by firelight.

Theact. True.

Str. And the fishing by day is called by the general name of 'fishing with barbs,' since the spears, too, are barbed at the point.

Theact. Yes, that is the term.

Str. Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below from above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the three-pronged spears are used.

Theact. Yes, so it is often called.

Str. Then now there is only one kind remaining.

Theact. What is that?

Str. When a hook is used, and the fish is not struck as with the spear, in any part, but only about the head and mouth, and is then drawn out from below upwards with reeds and rods:— 221
What is the right name of that mode of fishing, Theaetetus?

Theact. I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our search.

Str. Then now you and I have come to an understanding not only about the name of the angler's art, but about the definition

of the thing. One half of all art was acquisitive—half of the acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force, half of this was hunting, and half of the hunting was hunting animals, half of this was hunting water animals—of this again, the under half was fishing, half of fishing was striking; the first half of striking was fishing with a barb, and one half of this again being the kind which strikes with a hook and draws the fish from below upwards, is the kind which we are now seeking, and which is hence denoted angling (*ἄσπαλιευτική*, *ἀνασπᾶσθαι*).

Theact. The result has been quite satisfactorily brought out.

Str. And now, having this pattern, let us endeavour to find out what a Sophist is.

Theact. By all means.

Str. The first question about the angler was, whether he was a man of art or a private individual?

Theact. True.

Str. And shall we call our new friend a private individual, or a thorough master of his craft?

Theact. Certainly not a private individual, for his name, as you were saying, must surely express his nature.

Str. Then he must be supposed to have some art.

Theact. What art?

Str. By heaven, they are cousins! it never occurred to us.

Theact. Who are cousins?

Str. The angler and the Sophist.

Theact. In what way are they related?

Str. They both appear to me to be hunters.

Theact. How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken.

Str. You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after swimming animals and land animals?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the land animals, saying that there were many kinds of them?

222 *Theact.* Certainly.

Str. Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the art of acquiring, take the same road?

Theact. True.

Str. Their paths diverge when they reach the art of animal

hunting; the one going to the sea-shore, and to the rivers and to the lakes, and angling for the animals which are in them?

Theact. Very true.

Str. While the other goes to land and water of another sort—rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands of generous youth; and he also is intending to take the animals which are in them.

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions.

Theact. What are they?

Str. One is the hunting of tame, and the other of wild animals.

Theact. But are tame animals ever hunted?

Str. Yes, if you include man under tame animals. But if you like you may say that there are no tame animals, or that, if there are, man is not among them; or you may say that man is a tame animal and is not hunted—you shall decide which of these alternatives you prefer.

Theact. I would rather say that man is a tame animal, and I will admit that he is hunted.

Str. Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts.

Theact. How shall we make the division?

Str. Let us define piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, the whole military art—one and all as a hunting by force.

Theact. Very good.

Str. But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator, and the art of conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion.

Theact. True.

Str. And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds?

Theact. What are they?

Str. One is private, and the other public.

Theact. Yes; each of them forms a class.

Str. And of private hunting, one sort receives hire, and the other brings gifts.

Theact. I do not understand you.

Str. Have you never observed the manner in which lovers hunt?

Theact. To what do you refer?

Str. I mean that they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt in addition to other inducements.

Theact. Most true.

Str. Let us admit this, then, to be the amatory art.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing and who baits his hook with pleasure and only exacts his maintenance as the price of his flattery, we should all, if I am not
223 mistaken, describe as possessing an art of sweetening, or making things pleasant.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only for the sake of virtue, and demands payment in money, may be fairly called by another name.

Theact. To be sure.

Str. And what name is it? Will you tell me?

Theact. There is no difficulty; for I believe that we have discovered the Sophist: and this, as I conceive, is his proper name.

Str. Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the appropriative¹, acquisitive family—which hunts living animals,—land animals,—tame animals,—which hunts man,—which hunts private individuals—for hire,—taking money in exchange—having the semblance of education; and this is termed Sophistry, and is a hunt after the souls of rich young men of good repute—that is the conclusion.

Theact. Very true.

Str. Let us take another branch of his genealogy; for he is a professor of a great and many-sided art; and if we look back at what has preceded we see that he presents another aspect, besides that of which we are speaking.

Theact. In what respect?

Str. There were two sorts of acquisitive art; the one concerned with hunting, the other with exchange.

Theact. There were.

Str. And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of giving, and the other of selling.

Theæt. Let us assume that.

Str. Further, we will suppose that the art of selling is divided into two parts.

Theæt. How?

Str. There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a man's own productions; another, which is the exchange of the works of others.

Theæt. Certainly.

Str. And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing?

Theæt. Yes.

Str. And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant?

Theæt. To be sure.

Str. And this exchange of the merchant is partly an exchange of food for the use of the body, and partly of the food of the soul which is bartered and received in exchange for money.

Theæt. What do you mean?

Str. You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul; the other kind you understand.

Theæt. Yes.

Str. Take music in general and painting and marionette playing and many other things, which are purchased in one city, and carried away and sold in another—wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the sake of instruction or amusement;—may not he who takes them about and sells them, be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats and drinks?

Theæt. To be sure he may.

Str. And would you not call by the same name him who goes about from city to city, buying knowledge from all quarters and exchanging his wares for money?

Theæt. Certainly I should.

Str. Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly termed the art of display? And there is another which is certainly not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by some name germane to the matter?

Theæt. Certainly.

Str. There should be distinct names for them, one descriptive of the sale of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of knowledge.

Theact. Of course.

Str. The name of art seller corresponds well enough to the one ; and I hope that you will tell me the name of the other.

Theact. He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking ; no other name can possibly be right.

Str. No other ; and so this trader in virtue again turns out to be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced a second time, through the art of acquisition — exchange — buying and selling,—by the merchant, not forgetting that there is a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and knowledge.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And there may be a third reappearance of him ;—for he may have settled down in a city, and partly fabricate as well as buy these same wares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a Sophist?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, and of exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells knowledge, you would again term Sophistry?

Theact. I must, if I am to keep up with the argument.

Str. Let us consider once more whether there may not be another aspect of sophistry?

Theact. What is that?

225 *Str.* In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the combative or fighting art.

Theact. There was.

Str. Perhaps we had better divide it.

Theact. What shall be the divisions?

Str. There shall be one division of the competitive, and the other of the pugnacious.

Theact. Very good.

Str. That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily strength may be properly called by some such name as violent.

Theaet. True.

Str. And when the war is one of words, may be termed controversy?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And controversy may be of two kinds.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. When long speeches are answered by long speeches, and there is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is forensic controversy.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation?

Theaet. Yes, that is the name.

Str. And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion about contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules of art, is recognised by dialectic to be a distinct class, but has hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one at our hands.

Theaet. No; for the different species are too minute and heterogeneous.

Str. But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about justice and injustice in their own nature, and about things in general, have we not been accustomed to call argumentation (Eristic)?

Str. And of argumentation, one sort wastes money, and the other makes money.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Suppose we try and give to each of these two classes a name.

Theaet. Let us do so.

Str. I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is far from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may, in my opinion, be fairly termed loquacity.

Theaet. Yes, that is the name which is given.

Soc. But who is the other, who makes money out of private disputation? Will you tell me in return?

Theaet. There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful

Sophist, of whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time.

226 *Str.* Yes, and with a fresh pedigree, for he is the money-making species of the Eristic, disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive family, as the argument has proven.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. How true was the observation that he was a many-sided animal, and not to be caught with one hand, as they say!

Theaet. Then you must catch him with two.

Str. Yes, we must, if we can. And therefore let us try another track in our pursuit of him: You are aware that there are certain menial occupations which have names among servants?

Theaet. Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean?

Str. I mean such as sifting, straining, winnowing, threshing¹.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And besides these there are a great many more, such as carding, combing, adjusting the warp and the woof; and there are thousands of others.

Theaet. Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do with them all?

Str. I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of division.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all of them, ought not that art to have one name?

Theaet. And what is the name of the art?

Str. The art of discerning.

Theaet. Very good.

Str. Think whether you cannot divide this.

Theaet. I should have to think a long while first.

Str. In all the previously named processes either like has been separated from like or the better from the worse.

Theaet. I see what you mean.

Str. There is no name for the first kind of separation; of the

¹ Reading *δίψειν*, a conjecture of Professor Campbell's.
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second, which throws away the worse and preserves the better, I do know a name.

Theæt. What is it?

Str. Every discernment or separation of that kind, as I perceive upon consideration, is called a purification.

Theæt. Yes, that is the usual expression.

Str. And any one may see that purification is of two kinds.

Theæt. Perhaps so, if he were allowed time to think; but I do not see at this moment.

Str. There are many purifications of bodies which may with propriety be comprehended under a single name.

Theæt. What are they, and what is the word in which they may be summed up?

Str. There is the purification of living bodies in their inward ²²⁷ and in their outward parts, of which the former is duly effected by medicine and gymnastic, the latter by the less dignified art of the bath-man; and there is the purification of inanimate substances—to this the arts of fulling and in general of furbishing attend in a number of minute particulars, and have a variety of names which are thought ridiculous.

Theæt. Very true.

Str. There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous, Theætetus; but then the dialectical art never considers whether the benefit to be derived from the purge is greater or less than that to be derived from the sponge, and has no more interest in the one than in the other; her endeavour is to know what is and is not kindred in all arts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence; and having this in view, she honours them all alike, and when she makes comparisons, she counts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than another; nor does she esteem him who adduces as his example of hunting, the general's art, at all more decorous than another who cites that of the vermin-destroyer, but only as the greater pretender of the two. And as to the question which you were asking about the name which was to comprehend all these arts of purification, whether of animate or inanimate substances, the spirit of dialectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be only allowed to have a general name for all other purifications, binding them up together and separating them off from the

purification of the soul or intellect. For this is the purification at which she wants to arrive, and this we should understand to be her aim.

Theact. Yes, I understand; and I agree that there are two sorts of purification, and that one of them is concerned with the soul, and that there is another which is concerned with the body.

Str. Excellent; and now attend to what I am going to say, and try to divide the term again.

Theact. Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavour to follow you.

Str. Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And purification was leaving the good and casting out whatever is bad?

Theact. True.

Str. Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly called purification?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And in the soul there are two kinds of evil.

Theact. What are they?

228 *Str.* The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to deformity.

Theact. I do not understand.

Str. Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are the same.

Theact. To this, again, I know not what I should reply.

Str. Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred elements originating in some disagreement?

Theact. Just that.

Str. And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is always unsightly?

Theact. Exactly.

Str. And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure to anger, reason to pain, and that all similar elements are opposed to one another in the souls of bad men?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And yet they must all be akin?

Theæt. Of course.

Str. Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease of the soul?

Theæt. Most true.

Str. And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry?

Theæt. Clearly of the want of symmetry.

Str. But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of anything?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Str. And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?

Theæt. True.

Str. Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and devoid of symmetry?

Theæt. Very true.

Str. Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul—the one which is generally called vice, and is obviously disease?

Theæt. Yes.

Str. And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which, because existing only in the soul, they do not like to admit to be vice¹.

Theæt. I certainly admit what I at first disputed—that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice, intemperance, injustice, and all other vices, to be disease in the soul, and ignorance, of which there are many varieties, to be deformity.

Str. And in the body are there not two arts which have to do with the two bodily states?

Theæt. What are they?

Str. There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and medicine, which has to do with disease.

Theæt. True.

¹ Or, 'although there is no other vice in the soul but this.'

229 *Str.* And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is not correction the art which is most required¹?

Theact. That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.

Str. Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction be said to be the best remedy?

Theact. True.

Str. Of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one or more kinds? Are there not two principal ones? Think.

Theact. I will.

Str. I think that I can see how we are most likely to arrive at the answer to this.

Theact. How?

Str. If we could discover a line which divides ignorance into two halves, we should then find the divisions of instruction; for a division of ignorance into two parts would clearly imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, and answers to the two divisions of ignorance.

Theact. Well, and do you see what you are looking for?

Str. I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale against all other parts of ignorance put together.

Theact. What is that?

Str. When a person thinks that he knows and does not know; this appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect.

Theact. True.

Str. And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which specially earns the title of want of sense.

Theact. True.

Str. What name, then, shall be given to that sort of instruction which gets rid of this?

Theact. The instruction of which you speak, Stranger, is not the teaching of handicraft arts, but is what in this part of the world has been termed education by us.

Str. Yes, Theaetetus, and by all Hellenes. But we have still to consider whether education admits of any further division.

Theact. By all means.

Str. I think that there is a point at which such a division is possible.

Theaet. At what point?

Str. Of education, one method appears to be rougher, and there is another which is smoother.

Theaet. How are we to distinguish the two?

Str. There is the time-honoured mode which our fathers commonly practised towards their sons, and which is still adopted by many—either of roughly reproving their errors, or of gently²³⁰ advising them, which may be called by the general term of admonition.

Theaet. True.

Str. But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much trouble and does little good—

Theaet. There they are quite right.

Str. Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of conceit in another way.

Theaet. In what way?

Str. They cross-examine a man as to what he is saying, when he thinks that he is saying something and is saying nothing; he is easily convicted of inconsistency in his opinions; these they collect, and placing them side by side, show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things, and in the same respect. He seeing this is angry with himself, and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most entertaining to hear, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal obstacles have been removed, so the instructor of the soul is conscious that his patient will receive no benefit from the applications of knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he must be purged of his prejudices and think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

Theaet. That is certainly the best and most temperate state,

Str. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has not been refuted, though he be the great King himself, is in the highest degree impure; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in which he who would be truly blessed ought to be pure and fair.

Theact. Very true.

Str. And who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid to
231 say the Sophists.

Theact. Why?

Str. Lest we should assign them too high an honour.

Theact. Yet the description of the Sophist has a certain likeness to our minister of purification.

Str. Yes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the fiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest. But he who would not be found tripping, ought to be very careful in the matter of likenesses, for they are most slippery things; nevertheless, let us assume that the Sophists are the men. I say this provisionally, for I think that the line which divides them will be very marked when they really have to maintain their position.

Theact. Very likely.

Str. Let us grant, then, that of the discerning art comes purification, of purification mental purification, of mental purification instruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of education, that refutation of vain conceit which has been discovered in the course of the argument; and let us call that the noble art of Sophistry.

Theact. Very well; and yet, considering the number of forms in which he has presented himself, I greatly doubt, after all, how I can with any truth or certainty describe the Sophist.

Str. You naturally feel perplexed; and yet I think that he must be still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb says, when every way is blocked, there is no escape; now, then, is the time of all others to set upon him.

Theact. True.

Str. First let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we are reposing, let us reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In the first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and youth.

Theact. Yes.

Str. In the second place, he was a merchant or trader in the goods of the soul.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. In the third place, he has turned out to be a retailer of the same sort of wares.

Theact. Yes ; and in the fourth place, he sold us the learned wares which he himself manufactured.

Str. Quite right ; I will try and remember the fifth myself, and I believe that I shall be right in saying, fifthly, that he is a hero of dispute, having distinctly the character of an arguer.

Theact. True.

Str. The sixth point was doubtful, and yet we at last agreed that he was a purger of souls, who cleared away notions obstructive to knowledge.

Theact. Very true.

Str. Do you not see that when the professor of any art has ³²² one name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong ; the multiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending, is not understood ?

Theact. I should imagine that this must be the case.

Str. At any rate we will understand him, and no indolence shall stand in the way of that. Let us begin again, then, and re-examine some of our statements concerning the Sophist ; there was one thing which appeared to me especially characteristic of him.

Theact. To what are you referring ?

Str. We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a disputer ?

Theact. We were saying so.

Str. And is he not also a teacher of the art of disputation to others ?

Theact. Certainly he is.

Str. And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute ? To begin at the beginning ; does he make them able to dispute about divine things, which are invisible to men in general ?

Theact. At any rate, that is said of him.

Str. And what do you say of the visible things of heaven and earth and the like?

Theact. Certainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them.

Str. Then, again, in private conversation, when any universal assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that they are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill to others.

Theact. Undoubtedly.

Str. And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law and about politics in general?

Theact. Why, no one would have anything to say to them, if they did not make these professions.

Str. In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to answer on each occasion is written down and popularised, and he who likes may read.

Theact. I suppose that you refer to the precepts of Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts?

Str. Yes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word, is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things?

Theact. Certainly, there does not seem to be much which is left out.

Str. But oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not appear.

233 *Theact.* To what are you referring? for I do not think that I understand your present question.

Str. I ask whether anybody can understand all things.

Theact. That would be too great a happiness for man.

Str. But how can any one who is ignorant give a satisfactory answer to him who knows?

Theact. He cannot.

Str. Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power?

Theact. To what do you refer?

Str. How do they make young men believe in their own supreme and universal wisdom? For if they neither answered nor were thought to answer rightly, or when they answered were

deemed no wiser for their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one would give them money or be willing to learn their art.

Theact. They certainly would not.

Str. But they are willing.

Theact. Yes, they are.

Str. Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And they dispute about all things?

Theact. True.

Str. And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

Theact. Impossible, of course.

Str. Then the Sophist has been shown to have conjectural or apparent knowledge only of all things, and not the truth?

Theact. Certainly; no better description of him could be given.

Str. Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly explain his nature.

Theact. What is it?

Str. I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he could speak or answer, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.

Theact. What do you mean by making all things?

Str. I see that you do not understand the very first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.'

Theact. No, I do not.

Str. Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.

Theact. What do you mean by 'making'? He cannot be a husbandman;—and you have said that he is a maker of animals. 234

Str. Yes ; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things ; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.

Theact. That must be a jest.

Str. And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that to be regarded as a jest ?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And is there any more graceful or artistic form of jest than imitation ?

Theact. Certainly not ; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.

Str. We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes resemblances of them which have the same name with them ; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning ? Is there any impossibility in stealing the hearts of youths through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth, by showing them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things ?

Theact. Yes ; why should there not be another similar art ?

Str. But as time goes on, and they advance in years, and come more into contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are they not compelled to change many opinions which they had, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their seeming speculations are overturned by the facts of life ?

Theact. That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.

Str. And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can ²³⁵ without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?

Theact. But how is that possible, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children's play?

Str. Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.

Theact. Certainly we must.

Str. And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he certainly will not escape:

Theact. What is that?

Str. The inference that he is a juggler.

Theact. Precisely my own opinion of him.

Str. Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and announce the capture of him; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up, until in some subsection of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.

Theact. That is good, and let us do as you say.

Str. Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.

Theact. Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?

Str. One is the art of likeness-making;—generally a likeness is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, and also having colours answering to the several parts.

Theact. But is not this always the case in imitation?

Str. Not always; in works either of sculpture or of painting, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for if the true proportions were given, the upper part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so our artists give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?

Theact. Let that be the name.

Str. And what shall we call that resemblance of the beautiful, which is due to the unfavourable position of the spectator, but if a person had the power of seeing the great works of which I was speaking as they truly are, would appear not even like that to which it professes to be like? May we not call this an appearance, since it appears only and is not really like?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. There is a great deal of this in painting, and in all imitation?

Theact. Of course.

Str. And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, phantastic art?

Theact. That is very fair.

Str. Then there are two kinds of image-making—the art of making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances?

Theact. True.

Str. I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful being who has the art of making himself invisible. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place.

Theact. Yes, he has.

Str. Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away by the current of the argument into giving a hasty assent?

Theact. May I ask to what you are referring?

Str. My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation—there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear and seem and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing ²³⁷ question;—Can any one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, these are very difficult questions.

Theact. Why?

Str. He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being, for that is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson—always repeating both in verse and out of verse:

‘Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is:’

Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?

Theact. Never mind about me; I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with you.

Str. Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter that forbidden word, ‘not-being’?

Theact. Certainly we do.

Str. Seriously then, and considering the question neither in strife nor play; suppose that one of those present were asked ‘to what is the term “not-being” to be applied;’ how and to what would he apply the term, and what answer would he make to the enquirer?

Theact. A difficult question, and one not to be answered by a person like myself.

Str. Well, there is no difficulty in seeing that the predicate ‘not-being’ is not applicable to any being.

Theact. Certainly not.

Str. And if not to any being, then not to something.

Theact. Of course not.

Str. This is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible.

Theact. Impossible.

Str. You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing?

Theact. Yes.

Str. Some ($\tau\acute{\iota}$) in the singular you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual ($\tau\omega\acute{\epsilon}$) of two, some in the plural of many ($\tau\omega\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$).

Theact. Exactly.

Str. Then he who says 'not something' must absolutely say nothing.

Theact. Most assuredly.

Str. And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says 'not-being' does not speak at all.

Theact. The difficulty of the argument can no further go.

238 *Str.* Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter.

Theact. What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak.

Str. To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not?

Theact. Impossible.

Str. And all number is to be reckoned among things which are?

Theact. Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence.

Str. Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural?

Theact. The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so.

Str. But how can a man either express or even conceive not-being or nonentities without number?

Theact. Tell me where is the difficulty.

Str. When we speak of nonentities or not-being ($\mu\eta\ \acute{\omicron}\nu\tau\alpha$) in the plural, are we not attributing plurality to not-being?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. But, on the other hand, when we say not-being in the singular, do we not attribute unity?

Theact. Manifestly.

Str. Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being?

Theact. Most true.

Soc. Do you see, then, that not-being in the abstract is inconceivable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable?

Theact. Quite true.

Str. But I was wrong then in telling you just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all.

Theact. What! is there a greater still behind?

Str. Well, I am surprised that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For the very words which I used imply that he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt.

Theact. What do you mean? Speak more clearly.

Str. Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one. For I say not-being,—do you understand?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable.

Theact. I follow after a fashion.

Str. When I said 'is,' did I not contradict what I said before?

Theact. That is evident.

Str. And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be

defined either as one or many, and should not be called 'it,' for even the mere use of the word 'it' would imply a form of unity.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. How, then, can any one put any faith in me? For I am at a loss, as I have ever been found to be, in the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, you had better not trust to the correctness of my way of speaking about not-being; but let us try the question on you.

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and try with all your might to speak of not-being according to reason, without implying either existence or unity or plurality.

Theact. It would be a strange boldness in me which would make the attempt when I see you thus discomfited.

Str. Say no more of ourselves; but until we find some one or other who can speak of nothing without number, say rather that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole.

Theact. Most true.

Str. And if we say to him that he has some art of making appearances, he will retort our argument upon ourselves, tying our words behind our backs; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, 'Pray what do you mean by an image?' and I should like to know, Theactetus, how we can possibly answer the younker's question?

Theact. We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplicates.

Str. I see, Theactetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist.

Theact. Why do you say so?

Str. He will make believe that his eyes are shut, or that he has none.

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. When you tell him of something existing in a mirror.
240 or of statues, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh at your words, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea.

Theaet. What does he mean?

Str. The common notion which pervades these many objects, which you call by one name, and speak of as one when you pronounce the word 'image.' How will you maintain your ground against him?

Theaet. How can I describe an image except as such another made in the likeness of the true?

Str. When you say such another do you mean another real thing, or what do you mean by 'such'?

Theaet. Certainly not another real thing, but only a resemblance.

Str. And you mean by true or real that which really is?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the not true or not real is that which is the opposite of the true or real?

Theaet. Exactly.

Str. A resemblance, then, is not real if, as you say, not true?

Theaet. Yes, it is in a certain sense real.

Str. But you mean to say not in a true sense?

Theaet. No, only real in being a likeness.

Str. Then what we call a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not.

Theaet. In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved!

Str. Strange! I should think so. See how, by the help of this reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has contrived to make us admit the existence of not-being, much against our will.

Theaet. Yes, indeed, I see.

Str. The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction.

Theaet. How do you mean? And where does the danger lie?

Str. When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, shall we say that our soul is led by his arts to think falsely, or what shall we say?

Theaet. There is nothing else to be said.

Str. Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth. You would assent?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not?

Theact. Of course.

Str. Does false opinion hold that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are?

Theact. Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be admitted.

Str. And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly are, are not?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And this, again, is falsehood?

Theact. Falsehood—yes.

Str. And in like manner, a false proposition will be considered to be one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not.

Theact. There is no other way in which a false proposition can be conceived.

241 *Str.* There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements. And indeed how can any rational man assent to them, seeing that the very expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, inconceivable? Do you see his point, Theaetetus?

Theact. Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not-being, which we have admitted just now to be an utter impossibility.

Str. You remember well; and now I think we had better hold a consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians, you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will arise are very numerous and obvious.

Theact. Very true.

Str. We have gone through a very small portion of them, and they are really infinite.

Theact. If that is the case, we cannot possibly take the Sophist.

Str. Shall we be faint-hearted and give him up?

Theact. Certainly not, I should say, if we can get the slightest hold of him.

Str. Will you then forgive me, and, as your words imply, be contented if I slightly flinch from the grasp of such a sturdy argument?

Theact. To be sure I will.

Str. I have also another request to make.

Theact. Which is — ?

Str. That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide.

Theact. Why do you say that?

Str. Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain sense not-being is, and that being is not.

Theact. Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed.

Str. Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless these questions are decided, no one when he speaks of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or appearances, or about the arts which are concerned with them, can avoid falling into ridiculous contradictions.

Theact. Most true.

Str. And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's argument; if I am to be over scrupulous, I must entirely give the matter up.

Theact. Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so.

Str. I have a third little excuse which I wish to offer.

Theact. What is it?

Str. You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel — that I have no heart for this argument?

Theact. I did.

Str. I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; let me therefore observe to you, that I am examining the question entirely out of regard for you.

Theact. You certainly need not fear my bad opinion, or that I shall impute any impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof; take heart, therefore, and proceed.

Str. And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that the road which I had lately taken is

Theæt. Which?—Let me hear.

Str. I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points which at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we should have fallen into some confusion about them, and be too ready to assent to one another, fancying that we have the means of judging.

Theæt. Say more clearly what you mean.

Str. I think that Parmenides, and all who undertook to determine the number and nature of existences, talked to us in rather a light and easy strain.

Theæt. How did they talk to us?

Str. As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each their own particular mythus or story;—one said that there were three principles at one time warring in a manner with one another, and then at peace again; and they were married and begat children, and brought them up; and another spoke of two principles,—a moist and dry, or hot and cold, which he brought together and gave in marriage to one another. The Eleatics in our part of the world say that all things are many in name, but in nature one; this is their mythus, which begins with Xenophanes, and is even older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, who have conceived the thought that to unite the two principles is safer; and they say that being is one and many, which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as the more potent masters of harmony assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the perpetual strife
243 and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of them; peace and friendship sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, and then again diversity and war, by reason of a principle of strife. Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them without offence—

Theæt. What thing?

Str. That they went on their several ways with a good deal of disdain of people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, or left us behind them.

Theæt. How do you mean?

Str. I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more

clements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of heat mingling with cold, and in some other part of their works assume separations and combinations of them,—tell me, Theætetus, do you understand what they mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term ‘not-being,’ which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in what a perplexity we are.

Theact. I see.

Str. And very likely we have been getting into the same difficulty about ‘being,’ and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we understand him and are in no difficulty, although we still admit that we are ignorant of not-being, when the truth is, that we are equally ignorant of both.

Theact. I dare say.

Str. And the same may be said of all the subjects of the previous discussion.

Theact. True.

Str. Most of them may be deferred for the present; but we had better now consider the chief captain and leader of them.

Theact. I suppose that you are speaking of being, and you want to take this first, and discover what they mean who use the word?

Str. You follow close at my heels, Theætetus. For the right method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence and interrogate the dualistic philosophers. To them we will say, ‘O ye, who speak of hot and cold, or of any other two principles of which the universe consists, what term is this which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean when you say that both and each of them are? How are we to understand the word “are”? Are we to suppose that there is a third principle over and above the other two, and that there are three in all, and not two, according to your notions? For clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other, and so they will be one and not two.’

Theact. Very true.

Str. You mean, then, to call the sum of both of them ‘being’?

Theact. I suppose so.

244 *Str.* 'Then, friends,' we shall reply to them, 'the answer is plainly that the two will thus be resolved into one.'

Theact. Most true.

Str. 'Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.' There will be no impropriety in our thus enquiring either of the dualists or of the pluralists?

Theact. Certainly not.

Str. And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all—must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by 'being'?

Theact. By 'all' means.

Str. Then let us ask a question of them: 'One, you say, alone is? Yes, they will reply.'

Theact. True.

Str. 'And, again, being is?'

Theact. Yes.

Str. 'And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing?'

Theact. What will be their answer, Stranger?

Str. It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.

Theact. Why so?

Str. To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And equally irrational to admit that a name has any real existence¹?

Theact. How so?

Str. To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will

be compelled to say that the name is of nothing, or if he says that the name is of a thing, even then the name will only be the name of a name, and of nothing else.

Theact. True.

Str. The one in the same way will be only one of one, and being unity itself, will not be of a name ¹.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with it?

Theact. To be sure they will, and do say so.

Str. If the one is a whole, as Parmenides sings,—

‘Every way like the fullness of a well-formed sphere,
Equally balanced from the centre on every side,
And must needs be neither greater nor less,
Neither on this side nor on that—’

then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.

Theact. True.

Str. And that which has parts may have the attribute of unity ²⁴⁵ in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity?

Theact. How is that?

Str. Because, according to right reason, that which is absolutely one must be affirmed to be indivisible.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. But this indivisible, if made up of parts, will contradict reason.

Theact. I understand.

Str. Shall we say that being is one and a whole only as having the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all?

Theact. That is a hard alternative to offer.

Str. Most true; for being having in a certain sense the attri-

¹ The text is uncertain; or, reading with Heindorf in the last clause *καὶ τοῦτο ὀνόματος αὐτὸ ἐν ὄν*—‘And one is but the name of one, and that one proves to be a name.’

bute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is therefore more than one.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And yet if being, having the attribute of one, be not a whole, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, then being lacks something of the nature of being?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being?

Theact. True.

Str. And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature.

Theact. Yes.

Str. But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no being, being can never have come into being.

Theact. Why so?

Str. Because that which comes into being always comes into being as a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among beings, cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing.

Theact. Yes, that certainly appears to be true.

Str. Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be of that quantity taken as a whole.

Theact. Exactly.

Str. And there will be innumerable other points, each of them involving infinite perplexity to him who says that being is either one or two.

Theact. The difficulties which are already appearing prove this; for one objection connects with another, and they are always increasing in difficulty and eliciting fresh doubts about what has preceded.

Str. We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less
246 precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being.

Theact. Then now we are to go to the others.

Str. There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting about the nature of essence.

Theact. How is that?

Str. Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and seem determined to grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and are obstinate in maintaining, that the things only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they define being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but body.

Theact. I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they are.

Str. And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the bodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the very truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm them to be generation and not essence. O, Theaetetus, there is an endless war upon this theme which is always being waged between the two armies.

Theact. True.

Str. Let us ask each of them, in turn, to give an account of that which they call essence.

Theact. How shall we get it out of them?

Str. With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in arguing with those who drag everything down to matter. I will tell you what I think that we must do.

Theact. What?

Str. Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men acknowledge has more weight than that which

is acknowledged by inferior men. And we are no respecters of persons, but seekers of the truth.

Theact. Very good.

Str. Then now, on the supposition that they are improved, let us ask them to state their views, and do you interpret them.

Theact. Agreed.

Str. Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

Theact. Of course they would.

Str. And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul?

Theact. Certainly they do.

Str. Meaning to say that the soul is a being?

247 *Theact.* True.

Str. And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, and that one soul is wise, and another foolish?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the opposite?

Theact. Yes, they do.

Str. But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be admitted by them to exist?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And, allowing that these qualities of virtue, justice, and the like all exist, as well as the soul in which they inhere, do they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all invisible?

Theact. None of them surely are invisible.

Str. And would they say that they are corporeal?

Theact. They would distinguish: the soul would be said by them to have a body; but as to the other qualities of justice, wisdom, and the like, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their existence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal.

Str. Verily, Theaetetus, I perceive a great improvement in them; the real aborigines, children of the dragon's teeth, would have been deterred by no shame at all, but would have obstin-

ately asserted that nothing is which they are not able to compress in their hands.

Theact. That is pretty much their notion.

Str. Let us push the question; for if they will admit that any, even the smallest particle of being, is incorporeal, that is enough; they must then say what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and incorporeal, and which they have in their mind's eye when they say of both of them that they 'are.' Perhaps they may be in a difficulty; and if this is the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a notion of ours respecting the nature of essence, having nothing of their own to offer.

Theact. What is the notion? Tell us, and we shall see.

Str. My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort of power to affect another, or to be affected by another even for a moment, however trifling the cause and however slight and momentary the effect, has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply power.

Theact. They accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their own to offer.

Str. Very good; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day change our mind; but, for the present, this may be regarded as 248 the understanding which is established with them.

Theact. Agreed.

Str. Let us now go to the friends of ideas; of their opinions, too, you shall be the interpreter.

Theact. I will.

Str. To them we say—You would distinguish essence from generation.

Theact. Yes; they reply.

Str. And you would allow that we participate in generation with the body, and by perception; but we participate with the soul by thought in true essence, and essence you would affirm to be always the same and immutable, whereas generation varies.

Theact. Yes; that is what we should affirm.

Str. Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation, which you assert of both? Do you agree with our recent definition?

Theact. What definition?

Str. We said that participation is an active or passive energy, which arises out of a certain power of elements meeting with one another. Perhaps your ears, Theaetetus, may fail to catch their answer, which I recognise because I am accustomed to them.

Theact. And what is their answer?

Str. They deny the truth of what we were just now saying to the aborigines respecting essence.

Theact. What was that?

Str. Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was held by us to be the definition of existence:

Theact. True.

Str. They deny this, and say that the power of doing or suffering is confined to generation, and that neither idea accords with being.

Theact. And is there not something in what they say?

Str. Yes, but our reply will be, that we want to ascertain from them distinctly, whether they admit that the soul knows, and that being or essence is known.

Theact. There can be no doubt that they say so.

Str. And is knowing and being known, doing or suffering or both, or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in either?

Theact. Clearly, neither has any share in either; for if they say anything else, they will contradict themselves.

Str. I understand; but still they will allow that if to know is active, then, of course, to be known is passive—And on this view being, as being known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in motion, for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we affirm.

Theact. True.

249 *Str.* And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with absolute being? Can we imagine being to be devoid of life and mind, and to remain in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?

Theact. A terrible admission, Stranger.

Str. But shall we say that being has mind and not life?

Theæt. How can that be?

Str. Or both, but that there is no soul in which they exist?

Theæt. And how else can they exist?

Str. Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed with soul remains entirely unmoved?

Theæt. All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational.

Str. Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is moved.

Theæt. Certainly.

Str. Then, Theætetus, our inference is, that if there is no motion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or belonging to any one.

Theæt. Quite true.

Str. And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are in motion—upon this view too mind has no existence.

Theæt. How so?

Str. Do you think that sameness and permanence and relation to the same could exist not having rest?

Theæt. Certainly not.

Str. Do you suppose that without them mind could exist, or could come into existence anywhere?

Theæt. No.

Str. And surely contend we must in every possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet ventures to speak confidently about anything.

Theæt. Very true.

Str. Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for being, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either in one or many forms: and he will be equally deaf to those who assert universal motion; but as children say entreatingly 'Give us both¹,' so he must include both the moveable and immoveable in his definition of being and all.

Theæt. Most true.

Str. And now, do we not seem to have gained a fair notion of being?

Theæt. Yes truly.

Str. Alas, Theaetetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to see the real difficulty of the enquiry about being.

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good?

Theact. I certainly thought that we were; and I do not at all understand why you assume this desponding tone.

250 *Str.* Reflect: after having made these admissions, may we not be justly asked the same questions which we were asking of those who said that all was hot and cold?

Theact. What were they? Will you recall them to my mind?

Str. To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting the same questions to you which I did to them, and then we shall get on.

Theact. True.

Str. Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another?

Theact. Of course.

Str. And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are?

Theact. I should.

Str. And when you say that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion?

Theact. Certainly not.

Str. Or do you mean that they are both at rest, when you say that they are?

Theact. Of course not.

Str. Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature, under which rest and motion are included; and, observing that they both participate in being, you declare that they are.

Theact. I suspect that we must conceive of being as some third thing, when we say that rest and motion are.

Str. Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but something different from them.

Theact. That seems to be true.

Str. Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor at rest.

Theact. That is very much the truth.

Str. Where, then, is he to look for help who would attain any clear or fixed notion of being in his own mind?

Theact. Where, indeed?

Str. I do not think that he can look anywhere; for that which is not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must be in motion; but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible?

Theact. Utterly impossible.

Str. Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind.

Theact. What?

Str. When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty:—do you remember?

Theact. To be sure.

Str. And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being?

Theact. I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which, if possible, is even greater.

Str. Then let us acknowledge the difficulty, and as being and not-being are involved in a like perplexity, there may be hope that when the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear; and if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of steering our way in between them, without any great discredit.

Theact. Very good.

Str. Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of the same thing.

Theact. Give an example.

Str. I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many names—that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in all of which and in ten thousand other cases, we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having numberless other attributes; and in the same way anything else which we originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many names.

Theact. That is true.

Str. And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether

young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that a man is good; but man, they insist, is man and good is good. I dare say that you have met with persons who take an interest in such matters—they are often elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown into amazement by these discoveries of theirs, which they regard as the highest form of wisdom.

Theæt. Certainly, I have.

Str. Then, not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all upon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well as to our former friends.

Theæt. What questions?

Str. Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or anything to anything, but assume that they do not mingle, and are incapable of participating in one another? Or shall we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things communicable and others not?—Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, will they prefer?

Theæt. I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you take all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are the consequences which follow from each of them.

Str. Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing is capable of participating in anything else; in that

252 case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all.

Theæt. They cannot.

Str. Would either of them exist if devoid of participation in being?

Theæt. No.

Str. Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting kinds, for all these add on a notion of being, some affirming that there is a 'being' of motion, and others that there is a 'being' of rest.

Theæt. Certainly.

Str. Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating infinity or dividing them into finite

elements, and compounding them out of these; whether they suppose the processes of creation to be successive or continuous, would be talking nonsense in all this if there were no admixture.

Theact. True.

Str. Most ridiculous of all will be the men themselves, who forbid us to call anything, because participating in some affection from another, by the name of that other.

Theact. Why so?

Str. Why, because they are compelled to use the words 'to be,' 'apart,' 'from others,' 'in itself,' and ten thousand more, which they cannot give up, but must make the connecting links of discourse; and therefore they do not require to be refuted by others, but their enemy, as the saying is, inhabits the same house with them; like the wonderful ventriloquist, Eurycles, they are always carrying about with them an adversary who out of their own bellies audibly contradicts them.

Theact. That is a very exact illustration of them.

Str. And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another—what will follow?

Theact. Even I can answer that supposition.

Str. How?

Theact. Why, if all things have communion with all, this implies that rest has motion, and motion has rest.

Str. Than which surely nothing can be a greater absurdity?

Theact. Of course.

Str. Then only the third hypothesis remains.

Theact. True.

Str. But, surely, either all things have communion with all, or nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some things and others not.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And two out of these three suppositions have been proved to be impossible.

Theact. Yes.

Str. Every one then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the third or remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some.

Theact. Quite true. Digitized by Microsoft®

253 *Str.* This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, but others do.

Theact. Of course.

Str. And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another.

Theact. True.

Str. But does every one know what letters will unite with what? Or is art required in order to know?

Theact. Art is required.

Str. What art?

Theact. The art of grammar.

Str. And is not this also true of sounds sharp and flat?—Is not he who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who does not know, not a musician?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the absence of art.

Theact. Of course.

Str. And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of admixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the help of reason and science? And will he not ask whether there are any universal classes which bind them all together and make them capable of admixture; and other universals, which are necessary in all division?

Theact. To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences.

Str. And what is the name of this science? Have we not unintentionally fallen upon a gentle art, and in looking for the Sophist have entertained the philosopher unawares?

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science?

Theact. That is what we should say.

Str. Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading many individuals which lie apart,

and many different forms contained under one higher form ; and again, one comprehensive form pervading many such wholes, and many others, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true ?

Theact. Who but he can be worthy ?

Str. This is the region in which we shall always discover the philosopher, both now and hereafter ; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason.

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Theact. For what reason ?

Str. Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered himself because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true ?

Theact. Quite so.

Str. And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light ; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are unable to endure the vision of the divine.

Theact. Yes ; that is quite as true as the other.

Str. Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed ; but the Sophist plainly must not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him.

Theact. Very good.

Str. Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being and not-being we may at least reason about them, as far as the

method of the present enquiry permits, and see whether we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed.

Theact. That is what we must do.

Str. The most important of all the genera are those which we were just now mentioning—being and rest and motion.

Theact. They are by far the most important.

Str. And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion with one another.

Theact. No doubt.

Str. Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are?

Theact. Of course.

Str. That makes up three of them.

Theact. To be sure.

Str. And each of them is other than the two others, and the same with itself.

Theact. True.

Str. But then, what is the meaning of these two words, 'same' and 'other'? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of necessity holding communion with them, and are we to have five kinds instead of three, or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously speaking
255 of one of the three first kinds?

Theact. Very likely we may be.

Str. But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the same.

Theact. How is that?

Str. Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be either of them.

Theact. Why not?

Str. Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either of them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other?

Theact. Yes.

Str. Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is either the same or the other.

Theact. No ; we must not.

Str. But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical ?

Theact. Possibly.

Str. But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same.

Theact. And that surely cannot be.

Str. Then being and the same cannot be one.

Theact. Scarcely.

Str. Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is now to be added to the three others.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. And shall we call 'the other' a fifth class ? Or shall we say that being and other are two names of the same class ?

Theact. Very likely.

Str. But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And the other is always relative of other.

Theact. True.

Str. But this would not be the case unless being and the other entirely differed ; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not other of other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity be in relation to some other.

Theact. That is the true state of the case.

Str. Then we must admit the 'other' as the fifth of our selected classes.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they partake of the idea of the other.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the five.

Theact. How ?

Str. First there is motion, which we affirm to be the absolute 'other' of rest: that is what we should say.

Theact. True.

Str. And therefore is not rest.

Theact. Certainly not.

Str. And yet is, because partaking of being.

256 *Theact.* True.

Str. Again motion is other than the same?

Theact. Quite true.

Str. And is therefore not the same.

Theact. Certainly not.

Str. Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of the same.

Theact. True.

Str. Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms 'same' and 'not the same,' in the same sense; but we call it the same in relation to itself, because partaking of the same, and not the same, because having communion with the other, and being thereby separated from the same, and becoming not that but other, and therefore rightly spoken of as not the same.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest, there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary.

Theact. Right,—that is, on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another, and others not.

Str. That the communion of kinds is according to nature, we had already proved (254 B) before we arrived at this part of our discussion.

Theact. Of course.

Str. Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest?

Theact. That is certain.

Str. Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not other?

Theact. True.

Str. What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is

other than the three and not other than the fourth, as we agreed that there are five classes, which we had undertaken to consider?

Theæt. Surely we cannot suppose that the number is less than appeared just now.

Str. Then we may fearlessly assert that motion is other than being.

Theæt. There is no reason for fear at all.

Str. The plain result is that motion, in partaking of being, is and also is not?

Theæt. Nothing can be plainer.

Str. Then not-being is of necessity attributed to motion and to every other class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so not-being; and therefore of all of them, in like manner, we may say that they are not; and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are.

Theæt. That appears to be true.

Str. Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of not-being.

Theæt. That seems to be true.

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Str. Then being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds.

Theæt. Certainly.

Str. And we infer that being is not—just as many other things as there are; for not being these it is itself alone, and is not the other things, which are infinite in number.

Theæt. That is pretty much the truth.

Str. Neither must we object to this, since the nature of classes is that they participate in one another; and if any one denies our present statement [viz. that being is not, etc.], let him argue with our former arguments [i.e. respecting the communion of ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with us.

Theæt. That is very fair.

Str. Let me ask you to consider a further question.

Theæt. What question?

Str. When we speak of not-being, we speak not of something opposed to being, but only different.

Theæt. How is that?

Str. When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal?

Theact. Certainly not.

Str. The negative particles, οὐ and μή, when prefixed to words, do not necessarily imply opposition, but only difference from the words, or more correctly from the things represented by the words which follow them.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. There is another point about which I should like to know what you think.

Theact. What is it?

Str. The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into fractions like knowledge.

Theact. How so?

Str. Knowledge is one; and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them a particular name, and hence there are many arts and sciences.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. And the other is one and yet has many parts.

Theact. Very likely, but will you tell me how?

Str. There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

Theact. There is.

Str. Shall we say that this has or has not a name?

Theact. That it has; for that which we call not-beautiful is the other of the beautiful.

Str. And now tell me something else.

Theact. What?

Str. Is not the name not-beautiful a description of nature parted off, and attached to a particular class, and, again, opposed to another class of being?

Theact. True.

Str. Then the not-beautiful is the contrast of being with being?

Theact. Very true.

Str. But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence?

Theact. Not at all.

Str. And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the great? 258

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just; and one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other.

Theaet. True.

Str. The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. Then, as would appear, the opposition of the part of the other, and of the part of being, to one another is, if I may venture to say the word, as truly essence as being itself, and signifies not the opposite of being, but only other of being.

Theaet. That is most evident.

Str. What then shall we call this?

Theaet. Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature which the Sophist compelled us to examine.

Str. And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured nature of its own? Just as the great is great and the beautiful is beautiful, and the not-great is not great, and the not-beautiful is not beautiful, in the same manner not-being is not being, and is to be reckoned one among many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, feel any doubt of this?

Theaet. None whatever.

Str. Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us far beyond the range of Parmenides' prohibition?

Theaet. In what?

Str. We have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than he forbid us to investigate.

Theaet. How is that?

Str. Why, because he says—

‘Not-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of enquiry.’

Theaet. Yes, he says so.

Str. Whereas, we have not only shown that things which are not are, but we have also shown what form of being not-

being is ; for we have shown that the nature of the other is, and is distributed over all things in their mutual relations, and when each part of the other is contrasted with being, that is precisely what we have ventured to call not-being.

Theæt. And surely, Stranger, we were right.

Str. Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the being of not-being, we still assert the opposition of not-being to being, for we have long ago given up speaking of an opposite of being ; —that may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of
259 definition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man refute that, and convince us of our error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say, as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and is, by reason of this participation, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but other, and being other than being, is clearly and manifestly not-being. And again, being, through partaking of the other, becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than all of them, is-not each one of them, and is-not all the rest, so that there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which being is not as well as is, and all other things whether regarded individually, or collectively in many respects are, and in many respects, are not.

Theæt. True.

Str. And he who is sceptical of these sort of oppositions, must think how he can find something better to say ; or if he sees a puzzle, and his pleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to him, that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties ; for there is no charm in such puzzles, and there is no difficulty in them ; but we can tell him of something else in the pursuit of which there is a great charm and also a difficulty.

Theæt. What is that ?

Str. A thing of which I have already spoken ;—letting alone these puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and criticise in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute him from his own point of view,

and in the same respect in which he asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or the like unlike; and to delight in always thus bringing forward oppositions in argument, is no true refutation, but only proves that he who uses such arguments is a neophyte who has got but a little way in the investigation of truth.

Theact. To be sure.

Str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all existences from one another is not only tasteless but also illiterate and unphilosophical.

Theact. Why so?

Str. The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation of all reason; for only by the union of conceptions with one another do we attain to discourse of reason.

Theact. True.

Str. And, observe that we were only just in time in making a resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to make the admission that other did mingle with other.

Theact. Why so?

Str. Why, that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of being, since if we were deprived of this we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest of calamities; and not only so, but the necessity for determining the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; whereas if we had allowed that there were no such thing at all we could no longer discourse; and there would have been no such thing if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all.

Theact. Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we must determine the nature of discourse.

Str. Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following explanation.

Theact. What explanation?

Str. Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many classes of being, diffused over all being.

Theact. True.

Str. And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with opinion and language.

Theact. How so? Digitized by Microsoft®

Str. If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false speech are possible, for to think or to say what is not—is falsehood, which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech.

Theæt. That is quite true.

Str. And if there is falsehood there is deceit.

Theæt. Yes.

Str. And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols and images and fancies.

Theæt. To be sure.

Str. Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as not-being did not in any way partake of being.

Theæt. True.

Str. And now, not-being having been shown to partake of being, he will probably not continue fighting in this direction, but he will say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will still deny the existence of the image-making and phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation subsists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and phantasy, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out the connection of them, we may then prove the reality of falsehood; there we will imprison the Sophist, if he can be there detained, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class.

Theæt. Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up, and which must every one of them be stormed before he can be reached himself. And even now, we have hardly got through his first defence, which is the

not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another; for we have still to show that falsehood is concerned with language and opinion, and there will be another and another, and never any end.

Str. Any one, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a little progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and what remains is easier.

Theact. Very true.

Str. Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, in order that we may have better data for determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both always true, and neither of them ever false.

Theact. True.

Str. Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected.

Theact. And what is the question at issue about names?

Str. The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them.

Theact. Clearly the last is true.

Str. I understand you to say that words which have a meaning in their sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning in their sequence cannot be connected?

Theact. What are you saying?

Str. What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent, for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the voice.

Theact. What are they?

Str. One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs.

Theact. Describe them.

Str. That which denotes action we call a verb.

Theact. True.

Str. And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. The succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns.

Theact. I do not understand you.

Str. I see that when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse.

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. I mean that words like 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps,' or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse.

Theact. Of course not.

Str. Or, again, when you say 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' or any other words which denote agents—neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of action or inaction, or of existence or non-existence indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the first combination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least of all discourse.

Theact. Again I ask, what do you mean?

Str. When any one says 'man learns,' should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences?

Theact. Yes.

Str. Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connection of words we give the name of discourse.

Theact. True.

Str. And as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. There is another small matter.

Theact. What is that?

Str. A sentence must and cannot help having a subject.

Theact. True.

Str. And must be of a certain quality.

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And now let us give our best attention.

Theact. By all means.

Str. I will repeat a sentence to you in which an action is combined with an agent, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks.

Theact. I will, to the best of my power.

Str. 'Theaetetus sits': that is not a very long sentence. 263

Theact. Not very.

Str. Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that is what you have to tell.

Theact. Of me, and I am the subject.

Str. Or this sentence, again—

Theact. What sentence?

Str. 'Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.'

Theact. That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one to speak of me, and to apply to me.

Str. We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And what is the quality of each of these two sentences?

Theact. The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true.

Str. The true one says what is true about you?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And the false one says what is other than true?

Theact. Yes.

Str. And therefore speaks of things which are not as though they were?

Theact. True.

Str. And says of you things really other than what really are; for, as we were saying, in regard to each thing, there is much that is and much that is not.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. The second of the two sentences which related to you was in the shortest form that was consistent with our definition.

Theact. In the form which was certainly said by us just now to be the shortest.

Str. And, in the second place, it related to a subject?

Theact. True.

Str. Who must be you, and can be nobody else?

Theact. Unquestionably.

Str. And this would be no sentence if there were no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, that combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse.

Theact. Most true.

Str. And therefore thought, opinion, and phantasy are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false.

Theact. How so?

Str. You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ from one another.

Theact. Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain.

Str. Is not thought the same as speech, with this exception: thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself?

Theact. Quite true.

Str. But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech?

Theact. True.

Str. And we know that in speech there is affirmation and denial?

264 *Theact.* Yes, that we know.

Str. When the affirmation or denial takes place silently and in the mind only, what would you call that but opinion?

Theact. There can be no other name.

Str. And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call it phantasy?

Theact. Certainly.

Str. And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and phantasy or imagination is the union of sense and opinion, the inference is that these also, as they are akin to language, should have an element of false as well as true? *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

Theact. Certainly.

Str. Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than we expected?—For just now we seemed to be undertaking a task which would never be accomplished.

Theact. I perceive.

Str. Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but now having made this discovery, let us go back to our previous classification.

Theact. What classification?

Str. We divided image-making into two sorts; the one likeness-making, the other phantastic.

Theact. True.

Str. And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place the Sophist?

Theact. That was so.

Str. And the twilight deepened into darkness in our minds, when the assertion was made, that there was no such thing as likeness, or image, or appearance, because there was no such thing as falsehood.

Theact. True.

Str. And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, imitations of real existences are possible, and out of this condition of the mind, an art of deception may arise.

Theact. Quite possible.

Str. And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art.

Theact. Yes.

Str. Let me, then, renew the attempt, and divide the proposed class, always proceeding from left to right, and holding fast to that which holds the Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and reached his difference or peculiar, and he stands confessed as he is in his true nature, first by our- 265
selves and then by kindred dialectical spirits.

Theact. Very good.

Str. You may remember that all art was originally divided by us into creative and acquisitive.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive class, in the subdivisions of hunting, and of contests, and of merchandize, and other similar classes.

Theact. Very true.

Str. But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that we must begin by dividing the original art of creation; for imitation is a kind of creation—of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real things.

Theact. Quite true.

Str. In the first place, there are two kinds of creation.

Theact. What are they?

Str. One of them is human and the other divine.

Theact. I do not follow.

Str. Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which is the cause of things afterwards existing which did not exist before, was defined by us as creative.

Theact. I remember.

Str. Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, and at inanimate substances which form within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence—not having existed previously—by the creation of God, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them?

Theact. What is that?

Str. The opinion that nature brings them into being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Shall we say this, or that they come from God, and are created by divine reason and knowledge?

Theact. I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my view, but when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them to God, at present I defer to your authority.

Str. Nobly said, Theactetus, and if I thought that you were one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent; but as I perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argument of man, to that belief which, as you say, attracts you, I will leave time to do the rest. Let me suppose, then, that things which are made by nature are the work of divine art,

and that things which are made by man out of these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, the one human and the other divine.

Theæt. True.

Str. Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have already.

Theæt. How do you mean?

Str. I mean to say that you should make a vertical division ²⁶⁶ of production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one.

Theæt. I have done so.

Str. Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments—two of them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference to the gods and are divine.

Theæt. True.

Str. And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in the other way, one part is the making of the things themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of images; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts.

Theæt. Tell me the divisions once more.

Str. I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out of which they are made—fire, water, and the like—are known by us to be the realities which are the creation and work of God.

Theæt. True.

Str. And there are images of them, which are not them, but which follow them; and these are also the creation of divine skill.

Theæt. What are they?

Str. The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as the shadow which arises from intercepting the light of the fire, or when the light belonging to things bright and smooth meeting in one upon their surface with the light external to them, makes a reflection which is the reverse of that given by our ordinary sight.

Theæt. Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the work of a divine mind.

Str. And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make

a house by the art of building, and then by the art of drawing another house, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake?

Theact. Quite true.

Str. And in other works of human art there are two divisions, the one of creation, the other of imitation?

Theact. Now I begin to understand, and am ready to suppose that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the vertical division there is a divine and human production; in the lateral there are realities and similitudes.

Str. And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part was to have been likeness-making, and the other phantastic, if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real being.

Theact. Yes.

Str. And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two.

Theact. True.

Str. Then, now, let us divide the phantastic art.

267 *Theact.* Where shall we make the division?

Str. There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument.

Theact. What do you mean?

Str. When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art.

Theact. Yes.

Str. Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making and naming the class.

Theact. Let us do as you say—assign a sphere to the one and leave the other.

Str. There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you.

Theact. Let me hear.

Str. There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate,

and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?

Theact. There can be no greater.

Str. Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? He who imitates you would surely know you and your figure?

Theact. He would.

Str. And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many who, having no knowledge of either, have nevertheless a sort of opinion of them, endeavour to make their sentiment or opinion appear to be a reality, which they embody as far as they can in their words and actions?

Theact. Yes, that is very common.

Str. And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Is not the very opposite rather true?

Theact. The very opposite.

Str. Such an one, then, should be described as an imitator who is to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows?

Theact. True.

Str. Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented their rightly dividing genera into species, and no one ever attempted to divide them; wherefore there is no great abundance of names, and yet, for the sake of distinction, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance—that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation.

Theact. Granted.

Str. The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge.

Theact. Very true.

Str. Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see whether he is all of a piece or whether there is any cleft in him.

Theact. Let us examine him.

Str. Indeed, there is a very considerable cleft in him ; for if you unfold him you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple being, who thinks that he knows that which he only fancies ; the other sort has knocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know.

Theact. There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.

Str. Shall we regard one as the simple imitator—the other as the dissembling or ironical imitator ?

Theact. That is good.

Str. And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one or two members ?

Theact. Answer yourself.

Str. Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two ; there is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech, and the dissembler, who in private and in short speeches compels the person who is conversing with him to contradict himself.

Theact. What you say is most true.

Str. And who is the maker of the longer speeches ? Is he the statesman or the public orator ?

Theact. The latter.

Str. And what shall we call the other ? Is he the philosopher or the Sophist ?

Theact. The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is ignorant ; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name which is formed by an adaptation of the word σοφός. What shall we name him ? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true and very Sophist.

Str. Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain from one end to the other ?

Theact. By all means.

Str. He, then¹, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows :—He who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of making contradictions, is an imitator of appearance, and has divided off from the art of image-making which

is a branch of phantastic, that further division of creative art, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine—any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth.

Theaet. Undoubtedly.

STATESMAN.

INTRODUCTION.

IN the Phaedrus, the Republic, the Philebus, the Parmenides, and the Sophist, we have observed the tendency of Plato to combine two or more subjects or different aspects of the same subject in a single dialogue. And in his later writings we have remarked a decline of style, and of dramatic power; the characters excite little or no interest, and the digressions are apt to overlay the main thesis; there is not the 'callida junctura' of an artistic whole. Both the serious discussions and the jests are sometimes out of place. The invincible Socrates is withdrawn from view; and new foes begin to appear under old names. Plato is now chiefly concerned, not with the original Sophist, but with the sophistry of the schools of philosophy, who are making reasoning impossible; and is driven by them out of the regions of transcendental speculation back into the path of common sense. A logical or psychological phase takes the place of the doctrine of ideas in his mind. He is constantly dwelling on the importance of regular classification, and of not putting words in the place of things. He has banished the poets, and is beginning to use a technical language. He is bitter and satirical, and seems to be sadly conscious of the realities of human life. Yet the ideal glory of the Platonic philosophy is not extinguished. He is still looking for a city in which kings are either philosophers or gods. (Cp. Laws, iv, 713.)

The Politicus exemplifies these remarks more than any of the preceding dialogues. The idea of the king or statesman and the illustration of method are connected, not like the love and rhetoric of the Phaedrus, by 'little invisible pegs,' but in a confused and inartistic manner, which fails to produce any impression of a whole on the mind of the reader. Plato apologises for his tediousness, and acknowledges that the improvement of his audience has been his only aim in some of his digressions.

His own image may be used as a motto of his style; like an inexperienced statuary (277 A) he has made the figure or outline too large, and is unable to give the proper colours or proportions; he is always making mistakes and correcting them—this seems to be his way of drawing attention to common dialectical errors. The Eleatic stranger, here, as in the Sophist, has no appropriate character, and appears only as the expositor of a political ideal, in the delineation of which he is frequently interrupted by purely logical illustrations. The younger Socrates resembles his namesake in nothing but a name. The dramatic character is so completely forgotten, that a special reference is twice made to discussions in the Sophist; and this, perhaps, is the strongest ground which can be urged for doubting the genuineness of the work. But, when we remember that a similar allusion is made in the Laws (v. 739) to the Republic, we see that the entire disregard of dramatic propriety is not always a sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of a Platonic writing (*see infra*).

The search after the Statesman, which is carried on, like that of the Sophist, by the method of dichotomy, gives an opportunity for many humorous and satirical remarks. As in the Philebus, several of the jests are mannered and laboured: for example, the turn of the words with which the dialogue opens; or the clumsy joke about man being an animal, who has a power of two-feet—both which are suggested by the presence of Theodorus, the geometrician. There is political as well as logical insight in refusing to admit the division of mankind into Hellenes and Barbarians: 'if a crane could speak, he would in like manner oppose men and animals to cranes.' The pride of the Hellene is further humbled, by being compared to a Phrygian or Lydian. Plato glories in this impartiality of the dialectical method, which places birds in juxtaposition with men, and the king side by side with the bird-catcher; king or vermin-destroyer are objects of equal interest to science. There are other passages which show that the irony of Socrates was a lesson which Plato was not slow in learning—as, for example, the passing remark, that 'the kings and statesmen of our day are in their breeding and education very like their subjects'; or the anticipation that the rivals of the king will be found in the class of servants; or the imposing attitude of the priests, who are the established interpreters of the will of heaven, authorised by law. Nothing is more bitter in all his writings than his comparison of the contemporary politicians to lions, centaurs, satyrs, and

other animals of a feebler sort, who are ever changing their forms and natures. But, as in the Philebus and the Sophist, the play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed, never to return.

Still the Politicus contains a higher and more ideal conception of politics than any other of Plato's writings. The city of which there is a pattern in heaven (Rep. ix), is here described as a Paradisiacal state of human society. In the truest sense of all, the ruler is not man but God; and such a government existed in a former cycle of human history, and may again exist when the gods resume their care of mankind. In a secondary sense, the true form of government is that which has scientific rulers, who are irresponsible to their subjects. Not power but knowledge is the characteristic of a king or royal person. And the rule of a man is better and higher than law, because he is more able to deal with the infinite complexity of human affairs. But mankind, in despair of finding a true ruler, are willing to acquiesce in any law or custom which will save them from the caprice of individuals. They are ready to accept any of the six forms of government which prevail in the world. To the Greek, *nomos* was a sacred word, but the political idealism of Plato soars into a region beyond; for the laws he would substitute the intelligent will of the legislator. Education is originally to implant in men's minds a sense of truth and justice, which is the divine bond of states, and the legislator is to contrive human bonds, by which dissimilar natures may be united in marriage and supply the deficiencies of one another. As in the Republic, the government of philosophers, the causes of the perversion of states, the regulation of marriages, are still the political problems with which Plato's mind is occupied. He treats them more slightly, partly because the dialogue is shorter, and also because the discussion of them is perpetually crossed by the other interest of dialectic, which has begun to absorb him.

The plan of the Politicus or Statesman may be briefly sketched as follows: (1) By a process of division and subdivision we discover the true herdsman or king of men. But before we can rightly distinguish him from his rivals, we must view him, (2) as he is presented to us in a famous ancient tale: this will enable us to distinguish the divine from the human herdsman or shepherd: (3) and besides our fable, we must have an example; for our example we will select the art of weaving, which will have to be distinguished from the kindred arts; and then, following this pattern, we will separate the king from his subordinates or

competitors : (4) But are we not exceeding all due limits ; and is there not a measure of all arts and sciences, to which the art of discourse must conform ? There is ; but before we can apply this measure, we must know what is the aim of discourse : and our discourse only aims at the dialectical improvement of ourselves and others.—Having made our apology, we return once more to the king or statesman, and proceed to contrast him with pretenders in the same line with him, under their various forms of government : (5) His characteristic is, that he alone has science, which is superior to law and written enactments ; these spring out of the necessities of mankind, when they are in despair of finding the true king : (6) The sciences which are most akin to the royal are the sciences of the general, the judge, the orator, which minister to him, but even these are subordinate to him : (7) Fixed principles are implanted by education, and the king or statesman completes the political web by marrying together dissimilar natures, the courageous and the temperate, the bold and the gentle, who are the warp and the woof of society.

The outline may be filled up as follows :

I have reason to thank you, Theodorus, for the acquaintance of Theaetetus and the Stranger. *Theod.* And you will have three times greater reason to thank me when they have delineated the Statesman and Philosopher, as well as the Sophist. *Soc.* Does the great geometer apply the same measure to all three ? Are they not divided by an interval which no geometrical ratio can express ? *Theod.* By the god Ammon, Socrates, you are right ; and I am glad to see that you have not forgotten your geometry. But before I retaliate, I must request the Stranger to finish the argument. . . . The Stranger suggests that Theaetetus shall be allowed to rest, and that Socrates the younger shall respond in his place ; Theodorus agrees to the suggestion, and Socrates remarks that the name of the one and the face of the other give him a right to claim relationship with them. They propose to take the Statesman after the Sophist ; his path they must determine, and part off all other ways, stamping upon them a single negative form (cp. *Soph.* 257).

The Stranger begins the enquiry by making a division of the arts and sciences into theoretical and practical—the one concerned exclusively

with knowledge, and the other with action ; arithmetic and the mathematical sciences are examples of the one, and carpentering and handicraft arts of the other (cp. Philebus, 55 ff.). Under which of the two shall we place the Statesman? Or rather, shall we not first ask, whether the king, statesman, master, householder, practise one art or many? The adviser of a physician may be said to have medical science, and the adviser of a king to have royal science. Hence the Statesman, even if he be a private person, is a king, and there is one science, the science of exercising authority, which embraces all these names and functions. And this science is akin to knowledge rather than to action. For a king rules with his mind, and not with his hands.

But theoretical science may be a science either of judging, like arithmetic, or of ruling and superintending, like that of the architect or master-builder. And the science of the king is of the latter nature, only differing in that he exercises an underived and uncontrolled power, by which he is distinguished from heralds, prophets, and other inferior officers. He is the wholesale dealer in command, and the herald, or other officer, retails his commands to others. Again, a ruler is concerned with the production of some object, and objects may be divided into living and lifeless, and rulers into the rulers of living and lifeless objects. And the king is not like the master-builder, concerned with lifeless matter, but has the task of managing living animals. And the tending of living animals may be either a tending of individuals, or a managing of herds. And the Statesman is not a groom, but a herdsman, and his art may be called either the art of managing the herd, or the art of collective management :—Which do you prefer? ‘No matter.’ Very good, Socrates, and if you are not too particular about words you will be all the richer some day in true wisdom. How would you subdivide the herdsman’s art? ‘I should say, that there is one management of men, and another of beasts.’ Very good, but you are in too great a hurry to get to man. All divisions which are rightly made should cut through the middle ; if you attend to this rule, you will be more likely to arrive at classes. ‘I do not understand the nature of my mistake.’ Your division was like a division of the human race into Hellenes and barbarians, or into Lydians or Phrygians and all other nations ; or like a division of number into ten thousand and all other numbers, instead of dividing number into odd and even, or the human race into male and female. And I should like you to observe further, that though I maintain a class to be a part, there is no similar

necessity for a part to be a class. But to return to your division, you spoke of men and animals as two classes—the second of which you comprehended under the general name of beasts. Now suppose that an intelligent crane were to make a division of animals;—he would put cranes into a class by themselves for their special glory, and jumble together all others, including man, in the class of beasts. An error of this sort can only be escaped by a more regular subdivision. The whole class of animals had been already divided by us into wild and tame, but political science is concerned exclusively with tame animals in flocks: and we forgot this in our hurry to arrive at man, and found by experience, as the proverb says, that ‘the more haste the worse speed.’

And now let us begin again at the art of managing herds. You have probably heard of the fish-preserves in the Nile and in the ponds of the great king, and of the nurseries of geese and cranes in Thessaly. Thus arises a new division into the rearing or management of land-herds or of water-herds:—I need not say with which the king is concerned. And land-herds may be divided into walking and flying; and every idiot knows that the political animal is a pedestrian. At this point we may take a longer or a shorter road, and as we are already near the end, I see no harm in taking the longer, which is the way of mesotomy, and accords with the principle which we were laying down. The tame, walking, herding animal, may be divided into two classes—the horned and the hornless, and the king is concerned with the hornless; and these again may be subdivided into animals having or not having cloven feet, or mixing or not mixing the breed; and the king or statesman has the care of animals which have not cloven feet, and which do not mix the breed. And now, if we omit dogs, who can hardly be said to herd, I think that we have only two species left which remain undivided: and how are we to distinguish them? To geometricians, like you and Theaetetus, I can have no difficulty in explaining that man is a diameter, having a power of two feet; and the power of other animals being the double of two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter. There is another excellent jest which I spy in the two remaining species. Men and birds are both bipeds, and human beings are running a race with the airiest and freest of creation, in which they are far behind their competitors;—this is a great joke, and there is a still better in the juxtaposition of the bird-taker and the king, who may be seen scampering after them. For as we were remarking in the *Sophist*, the dialectical

method is no respecter of persons. But we might have proceeded, as I was saying, by another and a shorter road. Then we should have begun by dividing land animals into bipeds and quadrupeds, and bipeds into winged and wingless; and we might have taken the Statesman and set him over the 'bipes implume,' and put the reins of government into his hands.

Here let us sum up:—The science of pure knowledge had a part which was the science of command, and this had a part which was a science of wholesale command; and this was divided into the management of animals, and was again parted off into the management of animals in herds, and again into land animals, and these into hornless, and these into bipeds; and so at last we arrived at man, and found the political and royal science. And yet we have not clearly distinguished the political shepherd from his rivals. No one would think of usurping the prerogatives of the ordinary shepherd, who on all hands is admitted to be the trainer, matchmaker, doctor, musician of his flock. But the royal shepherd has numberless competitors, from whom he must be distinguished; there are merchants, husbandmen, physicians, who will all claim to be shepherds. I think that we can best distinguish him by having recourse to a famous old tradition, which may amuse as well as instruct us; the narrative is perfectly true, although the scepticism of mankind is prone to doubt the tales of old. You have heard what happened in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes? 'You mean about the golden lamb?' No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells how the sun and stars once arose in the west and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, as a witness to the right of Atreus. 'There is such a story.' And no doubt you have heard of the empire of Cronos and of the earthborn men? The origin of these and the like stories is to be found in the tale which I am about to narrate.

There was a time when God went round with the world, but at the completion of a certain cycle he let go; and the world, of necessity, turned back, and went round the other way. For divine things alone are unchangeable; but the earth and heavens, although endowed with many glories, have a body, and are therefore liable to perturbation. In the case of the world, the perturbation is very slight, and amounts only to a reversal of motion. For the lord of moving things is alone self-moved; neither can piety allow that he goes at one time in one direction

and at another time in another; or that God has given the universe opposite motions; or that there are two gods contending for pre-eminence in the motion of the world. But the truth is, that there are two cycles of the world, and in one of them the universe is governed by an immediate Providence, and receives life and immortality, and in the other is let go again, and has a reverse action during infinite ages. This new action is spontaneous, and is maintained by exquisite perfection of balance—the greatest of bodies moving on the smallest pivot. All changes in the heaven affect the animal world, and this being the greatest of them, is most destructive to men and animals. At the beginning of the cycle before our own very few of them had survived; and on these a mighty change passed. For their life was reversed like the motion of the world, and first of all coming to a stand then quickly returned to youth and beauty. The white locks of the aged became black; the cheeks of the bearded man were restored to their youth and fineness; the young men grew softer and smaller, and, being reduced to the condition of children in mind as well as body, began to vanish away; and the bodies of those who had died by violence, in a few moments underwent a parallel change and disappeared. In that cycle of existence there was no such thing as the procreation of animals from one another, but they were born of the earth, and of this our ancestors, who came into being immediately after the end of the last cycle and at the beginning of this, have preserved the recollection. Such traditions are often now unduly discredited, and yet they may be proved by internal evidence. For observe how consistent the narrative is; as the old returned to youth, so the dead returned to life; the wheel of their existence having being reversed, they rose again in the opposite order: a few only were reserved by God for another destiny. Such was the origin of the earthborn men.

‘And is this cycle, of which you are speaking, the reign of Cronos, or our present state of existence?’ No, Socrates, that blessed and spontaneous life belongs not to this, but to the previous state, in which God was the governor of the whole world, and there were other gods who ruled over parts of the world, as is still the case in certain places. They were shepherds of men and animals, each of them sufficing for those of whom he had the care. And there was no violence among them, or war, or devouring of one another. Their life was spontaneous, because in those days God ruled over man; and he was to man what

man is now to the animals. Under his government there were no estates, or private possessions, or families; but the earth produced a sufficiency of all things, and men were born out of the earth, having no traditions of the past; and as the temperature of the seasons was mild, they took no thought for raiment, and had no beds, but lived and dwelt in the open air.

Such was the life of Cronos, and the life of Zeus is our own. Tell me, which is the happier of the two? Or rather, shall I tell you that the happiness of these children of Cronos must have depended on how they used their time? If having boundless leisure, and the power of discoursing not only with one another but with the animals, they had employed these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of knowledge;—or again, if they had merely eaten and drunk, and told stories to one another, and to the beasts; in either case, I say, there would be no difficulty in answering the question. But as nobody knows which they did, the question must remain unanswered. And here is the point of my tale. In the fullness of time, when the earthborn men had all passed away, the ruler of the universe let go the helm, and became a spectator; and destiny and passion swayed the world. At the same instant all the inferior deities gave up their hold; the whole universe rebounded, and there was a great earthquake, and utter ruin of all manner of animals. After a while the tumult ceased, and the universal creature settled down in his accustomed course, having authority over all other creatures, and following the instructions of his God and Father, at first more precisely, afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the disengagement of a former chaos; ‘a muddy vesture of decay’ was a part of his original nature, out of which he was brought by his Creator, under whose immediate guidance, while he remained in that former cycle, the evil was minimised and the good increased to the utmost. And in the beginning of the new cycle all was well enough, but as time went on, discord entered in; at length the good was minimised and the evil everywhere diffused, and there was a danger of universal ruin. Then the Creator, seeing the world in great straits, and fearing that chaos and infinity would come again, in his tender care again placed himself at the helm and restored order, and made the world immortal and imperishable. Once more the cycle of life and generation was reversed: the infants grew into young men, and the young men

became greyheaded; no longer did the animals spring out of the earth; the parts of the world, like the whole, were in future to be self-created. At first the case of men was very helpless and pitiable; for they were alone among the wild beasts, and had to carry on the struggle for existence without arts or knowledge, and had no food, and did not know how to get any. That was the time when Prometheus brought them fire, Hephaestus and Athene gave them arts, and other gods brought them seeds and plants; and out of these human life was framed, for men were left to themselves, and ordered their own ways; living, like the universe, in one cycle after one manner, and in another cycle after another manner.

Enough of the myth, which may show us two errors of which we were guilty in our account of the king. The first and grand error was in choosing a god, who belongs to the other cycle, instead of a man for our king; there was a lesser error also in our failure to define the nature of the royal functions. The myth gave us only the image of a divine shepherd, whereas the statesmen and kings of our own day very much resemble their subjects in education and breeding. On retracing our steps we find that we gave too narrow a designation to the art which was concerned with the feeding of animals in flocks. This would apply to all shepherds, with the exception of the Statesman; but if we say managing or tending animals, the term would include him as well. Having remodelled the name, we may subdivide as before, first separating the human from the divine shepherd or manager. Then we may subdivide the human art of governing into the government of willing and unwilling subjects—royalty and tyranny—which are the extreme opposites of one another, although we in our simplicity have hitherto confounded them.

And yet the figure of the king is still defective. We have taken up a lump of fable, and have used more than we needed. Like statuaries, we have made some of the features out of proportion, and shall lose time in reducing them. Or our mythus may be compared to a picture, which is well drawn in outline, but is not yet enlivened by colour. And to intelligent persons language is, or ought to be, a better instrument of description than any picture. ‘But what, Stranger, is the deficiency of which you speak?’ No higher truth can be made clear without an example; every man seems to know all things in a dream, and to know nothing when he is awake. And the nature of example can only

be illustrated by an example. Children are taught to read by placing the letters which they do not know side by side with those which they know, until they learn to recognise them in all their combinations. Example comes into use when we identify something unknown with that which is known, and form a common notion of both of them. Like the child who is learning his letters, the soul recognises some of the first elements of things; and then again is at fault and unable to recognise them when they are translated into the difficult language of facts. Let us, then, take an example, which will illustrate the nature of example, and will also assist us in characterising the political science, and in separating the true king from his rivals.

I will select the example of weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool. In the first place, all possessions are either productive or preventive; of the preventive sort are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and also defences, and defences are either arms or screens, and screens are veils and also shields against heat and cold, and shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings, and coverings are blankets or garments, and garments are in one piece or have many parts; and of these latter, some are pierced and others are fastened, and of these again some are made of fibres of plants and some of hair, and of these some are cemented with water and earth, and some are fastened with their own material; the latter are called clothes, and are made by the art of clothing, from which the art of weaving differs only in name, as the political differs from the royal science. Thus we have drawn several distinctions, but as yet have not distinguished the weaving of garments from the kindred and co-operative arts. For the first process to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving—I mean carding. And the art of carding, and the whole art of the fuller and the mender, are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes, as well as the art of weaving. Again, there are the arts which make the weaver's tools. And if we say that the weaver's art is the greatest and noblest of those which have to do with woollen garments,—this, although true, is not sufficiently distinct; because these other arts require to be first cleared away. Let us proceed, then, by regular steps:—There are causal or principal, and co-operative or subordinate arts. To the causal class belong the arts of washing and mending, of carding and spinning the threads, and the other arts of working in wool; these are chiefly of two kinds, falling

under the two great categories of composition and division. Carding is of the latter sort. But our concern is chiefly with that part of the art of wool-working which composes, and of which one kind twists and the other interlaces the threads, whether the firmer texture of the warp or the looser texture of the woof. These are adapted to each other, and the orderly composition of them forms a woollen garment. And the art which presides over these operations is the art of weaving.

But why did we go through this circuitous process, instead of saying at once that weaving is the art of entwining the warp and the woof? In order that our labour may not seem to be lost, I must explain the whole nature of excess and defect. There are two arts of measuring—one is concerned with relative size, and the other has reference to a mean or standard of what is meet. The difference between good and evil is the difference between a mean or measure and excess or defect. All things require to be compared, not only with one another, but with the mean, without which there would be no beauty and no art, whether the art of the statesman or the art of weaving or any other; for all these arts guard against excess or defect, which are real evils. This we must endeavour to show, if the arts are to exist; and the proof of this will be a harder piece of work than the demonstration of the non-existence of not-being which we proved in the Sophist. At present I am content with the indirect proof that the existence of such a standard is necessary to the existence of the arts. The standard or measure, which we are now only applying to the arts, may be some day required with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth.

We may now divide this art of measurement into two parts; placing in the one part all the arts which measure the relative size or number of objects, and in the other all those which depend upon a mean or standard. Many accomplished men say that the art of measurement has to do with all things, but these persons are apt to fail in seeing the differences of classes—they jumble together in one the 'more' and the 'too much,' which are very different things. Whereas the right way is to find the differences of classes, and to comprehend the things which have any affinity under the same class.

I will make one more observation by the way. When a pupil at a school is asked the letters which make up a particular word, is he not asked with a view to his knowing the same letters in all words? And our enquiry about the Statesman in like manner is intended not only to

improve our knowledge of politics, but of philosophy generally. Still less would any one analyse the nature of weaving for its own sake. There is no difficulty in exhibiting sensible images, but the greatest and noblest truths have no outward form adapted to the eye of sense, and are only revealed in thought. And all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. I make these remarks, because I want you to get rid of any impression, that our discussion about weaving and about the reversal of the universe, or the other discussion about the Sophist and not-being, were tedious and irrelevant. Please to observe that they can only be fairly judged when compared with what is meet; and yet not with what is meet for producing pleasure, nor even meet for making discoveries, but for the great end of developing the dialectical method and sharpening the wits of the auditors. He who censures us, should prove that, if our words had been fewer, they would have been better calculated to make us dialecticians.

And now let us return to our king or statesman, and transfer to him the example of weaving. The royal art has been separated from that of other herdsmen, but not from the causal and co-operative arts which exist in states; these do not admit of dichotomy, and therefore they must be carved neatly, like the limbs of a victim, not into more parts than are necessary. And first we have a large class, (1) of instruments, which includes almost everything in the world; from these may be parted off (2) vessels which are framed for the preservation of things, moist or dry, in the fire or out of the fire. The royal or political art has nothing to do with either of these, any more than with the arts of making, (3) vehicles, or (4) defences, whether dresses, or arms, or walls, or (5) with the art of making ornaments, whether pictures or other playthings, as they may be fitly called, for they have no serious use. Then (6) there are the arts which furnish gold, silver, wood, bark, and other materials which should have been put first; these, again, have no concern with the kingly science; any more than the arts, (7) which provide food and nourishment for the human body, and which furnish occupation to the husbandman, huntsman, doctor, cook, and the like, but not to the king or statesman. Besides these seven classes, there are small things, such as coins, seals, stamps, which may with a little violence be comprehended in the class of implements or ornaments. Under the preceding seven heads every species of property may be arranged with the exception of animals,—but these have been already included in the art of tending

herds. There remains only the class of slaves or ministers, among whom I expect that the real rivals of the king will be discovered. I am not speaking of the veritable slave bought with money, nor of the hireling who lets himself out for service, nor of the trader or merchant, who at best can only lay claim to economical and not to royal science. Nor am I referring to government officials, such as heralds and scribes, for these are only the servants of the rulers, and not the rulers themselves. I admit that there may be something strange in any servants pretending to be masters, but I hardly think that I could have been wrong in supposing that the principal claimants to the throne will be of this class. Let us try once more: There are diviners and priests, who are full of pride and prerogative; these, as the law declares, know how to give gifts to the gods which gain a corresponding amount of blessings for men, and in many parts of Hellas the duty of performing solemn sacrifices is assigned to the chief magistrate, as at Athens, to the king Archon. At last, then, we have found a trace of those whom we were seeking. But still they are only servants and ministers.

And who are these who next come into view in various forms of men and animals and other monsters appearing—lions and centaurs and satyrs—who are these? I did not know them at first, for every one looks strange when he is unexpected. But now I recognise the politician and his troop, the chief of Sophists, the prince of charlatans, the most accomplished of wizards, who must be carefully distinguished from the true king or statesman. And here I will interpose a question: What are the true forms of government? Are they not three—monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy? and the distinctions of freedom and compulsion, law and no law, poverty and riches expand these three into six. Monarchy may be divided into royalty and tyranny; oligarchy into aristocracy and plutocracy; and in democracy there is law and no law, two things expressed by one word. But are any of these governments worthy of the name? Is not government a science, and are we to suppose that scientific government is secured by the rulers being many or few, rich or poor, or by the rule being compulsory or voluntary? Can the many attain to science? In no Hellenic city are there fifty good draught players, and certainly there are not as many kings, for by kings we mean all those who are possessed of the political science. A true government must therefore be the government of one, or of a few. And they may govern us either with or without law, and whether

they are poor or rich, and however they govern, provided they govern on some scientific principle,—that makes no difference. And as the physician may cure us with our will, or against our will, and by any mode of treatment, burning, bleeding, lowering, fattening, if he only proceeds scientifically; so the true governor may reduce or fatten or bleed the body corporate, while he acts according to the rules of wisdom, and with a view to the good of the state, whether according to law or without law.

‘I do not like the notion, that there can be good government without law.’

I must explain: Law-making certainly is the business of a king; and yet the best thing of all is, not that the law should rule, but that the king should rule, for the varieties of circumstances are endless, and no simple or universal rule can suit them all, or last for ever. The law is just an ignorant brute of a tyrant, who insists always on his commands being fulfilled, under all circumstances. ‘Then why have we laws at all?’ I will answer that question by asking you whether the training master gives a different discipline to each of his pupils, or whether he has a general rule of diet and exercise which is suited to the constitutions of the majority? ‘The latter.’ The legislator, too, is obliged to lay down general laws, and cannot exact what is precisely suitable to each particular case. He cannot be sitting at every man’s side all his life, and prescribe for him the minute particulars of his duty, and therefore he is compelled to impose on himself and others the restriction of a written law. Let me suppose now, that a physician or trainer, having left directions for his patients or pupils, goes into a far country, and comes back sooner than he intended; owing to some unexpected change in the weather, the patient or pupil seems to require a different mode of treatment: Would he persist in his old commands, under the idea that all others are noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science, would not the continuance of such regulations be ridiculous? And if the legislator, or another like him, comes back from a far country, is he to be prohibited from altering his own laws? The common people say: Let a man persuade the city first, and then let him impose new laws. But is a physician only to cure his patients by persuasion, and not by force? Is he a worse physician who uses a little gentle violence in effecting the cure? Or shall we say, that the violence is just, if exercised by a rich man, and unjust, if by a poor man? May not any man, rich

or poor, with or without law, and whether the citizens like or not, do what is for their good? The pilot saves the lives of his citizens, not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law, and, like him, the true governor has a strength of art which is superior to the law. This is scientific government, and all others are imitations only. Yet no great number of persons can attain to this science. And hence follows an important result. The best course of politicians is to assert the inviolability of the law, which, though not the best thing possible, is best for the imperfect condition of man. I will explain my meaning by an illustration :

Suppose that mankind, indignant at the rogueries and caprices of physicians and pilots, call together an assembly, in which all who like may speak, the skilled as well as the unskilled, and that in their assembly they make decrees for regulating the practice of navigation and medicine which are to be binding on these professions for all time. Suppose that they elect annually by vote or lot those to whom authority in either department is to be delegated. And let us further imagine, that when the term of their magistracy has expired, the magistrates appointed by them are summoned before an ignorant and unprofessional court, and may be condemned or punished for breaking the regulations. They even go a step further, and enact, that he who is found enquiring into the truth of navigation and medicine, and is seeking to be wise above what is written, shall be called no artist, but a dreamer or prating Sophist or corrupter of youth ; and if he try to persuade others to investigate those sciences in a manner contrary to the law, he shall be punished with the utmost severity ; like rules might be extended to any art or science :—now what would be the consequence ?

‘The arts would utterly perish, and human life, which is bad enough already, would become intolerable.’

But suppose, once more, that we were to appoint some one as the guardian of the law, who was both ignorant and interested, and who perverted the law ; would not this be a still worse evil than the other? ‘Certainly.’ For the laws are based on some experience and wisdom. Hence the better course is, that they should be observed, although this is not the best thing of all, but only the second best. And whoever, having skill, should try to improve them, would act in the spirit of the law-giver. But then, as we have seen, no great number of men, whether poor or rich, is capable of making laws. And so, the nearest approach which

we can make to true government is, when men do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs. When the rich preserve their customs and maintain the law, this is called aristocracy, or if they neglect the law, oligarchy. When an individual rules according to law, whether by the help of science or opinion, this is called monarchy, and when he has royal science he is called a king, but when he rules in spite of law, and is blind with ignorance and passion, he is called a tyrant. These forms of government exist, because men despair of the true king ever appearing among them; if he were to appear, they would joyfully hand over to him the reins of government. But, as there is no natural ruler of the hive, they meet together and make laws. And do we wonder, when the foundation of politics are in the letter only, that many evils should arise? Ought we not rather to admire the strength of the political bond? For cities have endured time out of mind, though many of them have been shipwrecked, and some are like ships foundering, because their pilots are absolutely ignorant of the science which they profess.

Let us next ask, which of these untrue forms of government is the least bad, and which of them is the worst? I said at the beginning, that each of the three forms of government, royalty, aristocracy, and democracy might be divided into two, so that the whole number of them, including the best, will be seven. Under monarchy we have already distinguished royalty and tyranny; of oligarchy there were two kinds, aristocracy and plutocracy, and democracy may be divided on a similar principle, for there is a democracy which observes, and a democracy which neglects, the laws. The government of one is the best and the worst—the government of a few is less bad and less good—the government of the many is the least bad and least good of them all, being the best of all lawless governments, and the worst of all lawful ones. But the rulers of all these states, unless they have knowledge, are maintainers of idols, and themselves idols—wizards, and also Sophists; for, after many windings the term ‘Sophist’ comes home to them.

And now enough of centaurs and satyrs: the play is ended, and they may quit the political stage. Still there remain some other and better elements, which adhere to the royal science, and must be drawn off in the refiner’s fire before the gold can be left pure. The arts of the general, the judge, and the orator, will have to be separated from the royal art; when the separation has been made, the nature of the king

will be unalloyed. Now there are inferior sciences, such as music and others; and there is a superior science, which determines whether music is to be learnt or not, and this is different from them, and the governor of them. The science which determines whether we are to use persuasion, or not, is higher than the art of persuasion; the science which determines whether we are to go to war, is higher than the art of the general. The science which makes the laws, is higher than that which only administers them. And the science which has authority over the rest, is the science of the king or statesman.

Once more we will endeavour to view this royal science by the light of our example. We may compare the state to a web, and I will show you how the different threads are drawn into one. You would admit (would you not?) that there are parts of virtue (although this position is sometimes assailed by Eristics), and one part of virtue is temperance, and another courage. These are two principles which are in a manner antagonists of one another; and they pervade all nature; the whole class of the good and beautiful is included under them. The beautiful may be subdivided into two lesser classes: one of these is described by us in terms expressive of motion or energy, and the other in terms expressive of rest and quietness. We say, how manly! how vigorous! how ready! and we say also, how calm, how temperate, how dignified! This opposition of terms is extended by us to all actions, to the tones of the voice, the notes of music, the workings of the mind, the characters of men. The two classes both have their exaggerations; and the exaggerations of the one are termed 'hardness,' 'violence,' 'madness'; of the other 'cowardness,' or 'sluggishness.' And if we pursue the enquiry, we find that these opposite characters are naturally at variance, and can hardly be reconciled. In lesser matters the antagonism between them is ludicrous, but in the State may be the occasion of grave disorders, and may disturb the whole course of human life. For the orderly class are always wanting to be at peace, and hence they pass imperceptibly into the condition of slaves; and the courageous sort are always wanting to go to war, even when the odds are against them, and are soon destroyed by their enemies. But the true art of government, first preparing the material by education, weaves the two elements into one, maintaining authority over the carders of the wool, and selecting the proper subsidiary arts which are necessary for making the web. The royal science is queen of educators, and begins by choosing the natures which she is to train,

punishing with death and exterminating those who are violently carried away to atheism and injustice, and enslaving those who are wallowing in the mire of ignorance. The rest of the citizens she blends into one, combining the stronger element of courage, which we may call the warp, with the softer element of temperance, which we may imagine to be the woof. These she binds together, first taking the eternal elements of the honourable, the good, and the just, and fastening them with a divine cord in a heaven-born race, and then fastening the animal elements with a human cord. The good legislator can implant by education the higher principles; and where they exist there is no difficulty in inserting the lesser human bonds, by which the State is held together; these are the laws of intermarriage, and of union for the sake of offspring. Most persons in their marriages seek after wealth or power; or they are clannish, and choose those who are like themselves,—the temperate marrying the temperate, and the courageous the courageous. The two classes thrive and flourish at first, but they soon degenerate; the one become mad, and the other feeble and useless. This would not have been the case, if they had both originally held the same notions about the honourable and the good; for then they never would have allowed the temperate natures to be separated from the courageous, but they would have bound them together by common honours and reputations, by intermarriage, and by the choice of rulers who combine both qualities. The temperate are careful and just, but are wanting in the power of action; the courageous fall short of them in justice, but are superior to them in action: and no state can prosper in which either of these qualities is wanting. The noblest and best of all webs or states is that which the royal science weaves, combining the two sorts of natures in a single texture, and in this enfolding freeman and slave and every other social element, and presiding over them all.

‘You have made, Stranger, a very perfect image of the king and the statesman.’

The principal subjects in the *Politicus* may be conveniently embraced under six or seven heads:—(1) the myth; (2) the dialectical interest; (3) the political aspects of the dialogue; (4) the satirical and paradoxical vein; (5) the necessary imperfection of law; (6) the relation of the work to the other writings of Plato;—lastly, we may briefly consider the

genuineness of the Sophist and Politicus, which can hardly be assumed without proof, since the two dialogues have been questioned by three such eminent Platonic scholars as Socher, Schaarschmidt, and Uberweg.

I. The hand of the master is clearly visible in the myth. First in the connection with mythology ;—he wins a kind of verisimilitude for this as for his other myths, by adopting received traditions, of which he pretends to find an explanation in his own larger conception (cp. Introduction to Critias). The young Socrates has heard of the sun rising in the west and setting in the east, and of the earth-born men ; but he has never heard the origin of these remarkable phenomena. Nor is Plato, here or elsewhere, wanting in denunciations of the incredulity of ‘ this latter age,’ on which the lovers of the marvellous have always delighted to enlarge. And he is not without express testimony to the truth of his narrative ;—such testimony as, in the Timæus, the first men gave of the names of the gods (‘ they must surely have known their own ancestors’). For the first generation of the new cycle, who lived near the time, are supposed to have preserved a recollection of a previous one. He also appeals to internal evidence ; viz. the perfect coherence of the tale, though he is very well aware, as he says in the Cratylus (436 C, D), that there may be consistency in error as well as in truth. The gravity and minuteness with which some particulars are related also lend an artful aid. The profound interest and ready assent of the young Socrates, who is not too old to be amused ‘ with a tale which a child would love to hear,’ are a further assistance. To those who were naturally inclined to believe that the fortunes of mankind are influenced by the stars, or who maintained that some one principle, like the principle of the same and the other in the Timæus, pervades all things in the world, the reversal of the motion of the heavens seemed necessarily to produce a reversal of the order of human life. The spheres of knowledge, which to us appear wide asunder as the poles, astronomy and medicine, were naturally connected in the minds of early thinkers, because there was little or nothing in the space between them. Thus there is a basis of philosophy, on which the improbabilities of the tale may be said to rest. These are some of the devices by which Plato, like a modern novelist, seeks to familiarize the marvellous.

The myth, like that of the Timæus and Critias, is rather historical than poetical ; in this respect corresponding to the general change in the later writings of Plato, when compared with the earlier ones. It is hardly

a myth in the sense in which the term might be applied to the myth of the *Phaedrus*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedo*, or the *Gorgias*, but may be more aptly compared with the didactic tale in which Protagoras describes the fortunes of primitive man, or with the description of the gradual rise of a new society in the third book of the *Laws*. Some discrepancies may be observed between the mythology of the *Politicus* and the *Timaeus*, and between the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*. But there is no reason to expect that all Plato's visions of a former, any more than of a future, state of existence, should conform exactly to the same pattern. We do not find perfect consistency in his philosophy; and still less have we any right to demand this of him in his use of mythology and figures of speech. And we observe that while employing all the resources of a writer of fiction to give credibility to his tales, he is not disposed to insist upon their literal truth. Rather, as in the *Phaedo*, he says, 'something of the kind is true'; or, as in the *Gorgias*, 'this you will think a myth, but I believe to be a truth'; or, as in the *Politicus*, he describes his work as a 'tolerably credible tale,' or as a 'mass of mythology,' which was introduced in order to teach certain lessons.

The greater interest of the myth consists in the philosophical lessons which Plato presents to us in this veiled form. Here, as in the tale of Er, the son of Armenius, he touches upon the question of freedom and necessity, both in relation to God and nature. For at first the universe is governed by the immediate providence of God,—this is the golden age,—but after a while the wheel is reversed, and man is left to himself. Like other theologians and philosophers, Plato relegates his explanation of the problem to a transcendental world; he speaks of what in modern language might be termed 'impossibilities in the nature of things,' hindering God from continuing immanent in the world. But there is some inconsistency; for the 'letting go' is spoken of as a divine act, and is at the same time attributed to the necessary imperfection of matter; there is also a numerical necessity for the successive births of souls. At first, man and the world retain their divine instincts, but gradually degenerate. As in the Book of Genesis, the first fall of man is succeeded by a second; the misery and wickedness of the world increase continually. The reason of this further decline is supposed to be the disorganisation of matter: the latent seeds of a former chaos are disengaged, and envelope all things. The condition of man becomes more and more miserable; he is perpetually waging an unequal warfare with the beasts. At length

he obtains such a measure of education and help as is necessary for his existence. He is aided by God, but not wholly inspired or controlled by him; he has received from Athene and Hephaestus a knowledge of the arts; other gods give him seeds and plants; and out of these human life is reconstructed. He now eats bread in the sweat of his brow, and has dominion over the animals; subjected to the conditions of his nature, and yet able to cope with them by divine help. Thus Plato may be said to represent in a figure—(1) the state of innocence; (2) the fall of man; (3) the still deeper decline into barbarism; (4) the restoration of man by the partial interference of God, and the natural growth of the arts and of civilised society. Two lesser features of this description should not pass unnoticed, (1) the primitive men are supposed to be created out of the earth, and not after the ordinary manner of human generation—half the causes of moral evil are in this way removed; (2) the arts are attributed to a divine revelation: and so the greatest difficulty in the history of pre-historic man is solved. Though no one knew better than Plato that the introduction of the gods is not a reason, but an excuse for not giving a reason (*Cratylus*, 426), yet, considering that more than two thousand years later mankind are still discussing these problems, we may be satisfied to find in Plato a statement of the difficulties which arise in conceiving the relation of man to God and nature, without expecting to obtain from him a solution of them. In such a tale, as in the *Phaedrus*, various aspects of the ideas were doubtless indicated to Plato's own mind, as the corresponding theological problems are to us. The immanence of things in the ideas, or the partial separation of them, and the self-motion of the supreme idea, are probably the forms in which he would have interpreted his own parable.

He touches upon another question of great interest—the consciousness of evil—what in the Jewish Scriptures is called 'eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.' At the end of the narrative (272 B) the Eleatic asks his companion whether this life of innocence, or that which men live at present, is the better of the two. He wants to distinguish between the mere animal life of innocence, the 'city of pigs,' at the mention of which Glaucon, in the *Republic*, revolts, and the higher life of reason and philosophy. But as no one can determine what prevailed in the world before the Fall, the question must remain unanswered. Similar questions have occupied the minds of theologians in later ages; but they can hardly be said to have found an answer.

Professor Campbell well observes, that the general spirit of the myth may be summed up in the words of the Lysis: 'If evil were to perish, should we hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar sensations? Yet perhaps the question what will or will not be is a foolish one, for who can tell?' As in the Theaetetus, evil is supposed to continue,—here, as the consequence of a former state of the world, a sort of mephitic vapour exhaling from some ancient chaos,—there, as involved in the possibility of good, and incident to the mixed state of man.

Once more (and this is the point of connection with the rest of the dialogue), the myth is intended to bring out the difference between the ideal and the actual state of man. In all ages of the world men have dreamed of a state of perfection, which has been, and is to be, but never is, and seems to disappear under the necessary conditions of human society. The uselessness, the danger, the true value of such political ideals have often been discussed; youth is too ready to believe in them; age to disparage them. Plato's 'prudens quaestio' respecting the comparative happiness of men in this and in a former cycle of existence is intended to elicit this contrast between the golden age and 'the life of Zeus' which is our own. To confuse the divine and human, or hastily apply one to the other, is a 'tremendous error.' Of the ideal or divine government of the world we can form no true or adequate conception; and this our mixed state of life, in which we are partly left to ourselves, but not wholly deserted by God, may contain some higher elements of good and knowledge than could have existed in the days of innocence under the rule of Cronos. So we may venture slightly to enlarge a Platonic thought which admits of a further application to Christian theology. Here are suggested also the distinctions between God causing and permitting evil, and between his more and less immediate government of the world.

II. The dialectical interest of the Politicus seems to contend in Plato's mind with the political; the dialogue might have been designated by two equally descriptive titles—either the 'Statesman,' or 'Concerning Method.' Dialectic, which in the earlier writings of Plato is almost exclusively confined to the Socratic question and answer, is now wholly occupied with classification; there is nothing in which he takes greater delight than in processes of division (cp. Phaedr. 266 B); he pursues them to a length out of proportion to their subject, and as if to value

them as a dialectical exercise, and for their own sake. A poetical vision of some order or hierarchy of ideas or sciences has already been floating before us in the Symposium and the Republic. And in the Phaedrus this aspect of dialectic is further sketched out, and the art of rhetoric is based on the division of the characters of mankind into their several classes. The same love of divisions is apparent in the Gorgias. But in a well-known passage of the Philebus occurs the first criticism on the nature of classification. There we are exhorted not to fall into the common error of passing from unity to infinity, but to find the intermediate classes; and we are reminded that in any process of generalisation, there may be more than one class to which individuals may be referred, and that we must carry on the process of division until we have arrived at the *infima species*.

These precepts are not forgotten, either in the Sophist or in the Politicus. The Sophist contains four examples of division, carried on by regular steps, until in four different lines of descent we detect the Sophist. In the Politicus the king or statesman is discovered by a similar process; and we have a summary, probably made for the first time, of possessions appropriated by the labour of man, which are distributed into seven classes. We are warned against preferring the shorter to the longer method;—if we divide in the middle, we are most likely to light upon species; at the same time, the important remark is made, that ‘a part is not to be confounded with a class.’ Having discovered the genus under which the king falls, we proceed to distinguish him from the collateral species. To assist our imagination in making this separation, we require an example. The higher ideas, of which we have a dreamy knowledge, can only be represented by images taken from the external world. But, first of all, the nature of example is explained by an example. The child is taught to read by comparing the letters in words which he knows with the same letters in unknown combinations; and this is the sort of process which we are about to attempt. As a parallel to the king we select the worker in wool, and compare the art of weaving with the royal science, trying to separate either of them from the inferior classes to which they are akin. This has the incidental advantage, that weaving and the web furnish us with a figure of speech, which we can afterwards transfer to the State.

There are two uses of examples or images—in the first place, they

suggest thoughts—secondly, they give them a distinct form. In the infancy of philosophy, as in childhood, the language of pictures is natural to man: truth in the abstract is hardly won, and only by use familiarised to the mind. Examples are akin to analogies, and have a reflex influence on thought; they people the vacant mind, and may often originate new directions of enquiry. Plato seems to be conscious of the suggestiveness of imagery; the general analogy of the arts is constantly employed by him as well as the comparison of particular arts—weaving, the refining of gold, the learning to read, music, statuary, painting, medicine, the art of the pilot—all of which occur in this dialogue alone: though he is also aware that ‘comparisons are slippery things,’ and may often give a false clearness to ideas. A division of sciences has been made in the *Philebus*, into practical and speculative, and into more or less speculative. To this a new class is now added, of master-arts, or sciences, which control inferior ones. Besides the supreme science of dialectic, ‘which will forget us, if we forget her,’ another master-science for the first time appears in view—the science of government, which fixes the limits of all the rest. This conception of the political or royal science as, from another point of view, the science of sciences, which holds sway over the rest, is not originally found in Aristotle, but in Plato.

The doctrine that virtue and art are in a mean, which is familiarised to us by the study of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, is also first distinctly stated in the *Politicus* of Plato. The too much and the too little are in restless motion: they must be fixed by a mean, which is also a standard external to them. The art of measuring or finding a mean between excess and defect, like the principle of division in the *Phaedrus*, receives a particular application to the art of discourse. The excessive length of a discourse may be blamed; but who can say what is excess, unless he is furnished with a measure or standard? Measure is the life of the arts, and may some day be discovered to be the single ultimate principle in which all the sciences are contained. Other forms of thought may be noted—the distinction between causal and co-operative arts, which may be compared with the distinction between primary and co-operative causes in the *Timæus*, 46 D, or between cause and condition in the *Phædo*, 99; the passing mention of economical science; the opposition of rest and motion, which is found in all nature; the general conception of two great arts of composition

and division, in which are contained weaving, politics, dialectic; and in connection with the conception of a mean, the two arts of measuring.

In the *Theaetetus*, Plato remarks that precision in the use of terms, though sometimes pedantic, is sometimes necessary. Here he makes the opposite reflection, that there may be a philosophical disregard of words. The evil of mere verbal oppositions, the requirement of an impossible accuracy in the use of terms, the error of supposing that philosophy was to be found in language, the danger of word-catching, have frequently been discussed by him in the previous dialogues, but nowhere has the spirit of modern inductive philosophy been more happily indicated than in the words of the *Politicus*:—‘If you think more about things, and less about words, you will be richer as you grow older in wisdom.’ A similar spirit is discernible in the remarkable expressions, ‘the long and difficult language of facts’; and ‘the interrogation of every nature, in order to obtain the particular contribution of each to the store of knowledge.’ Who has described ‘the feeble intelligence of all things’ given by metaphysics better than the Eleatic Stranger in the words—‘The higher ideas can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a kind of dream, and then again nothing when he is awake’? Or where is the value of metaphysical pursuits more truly expressed than in the words,—‘The greatest and noblest things have no outward image of themselves visible to man: therefore we ought to practise ourselves in reasoning’ (286 A)?

III. The political aspects of the dialogue are closely connected with the dialectical. As in the *Cratylus*, the legislator has ‘the dialectician standing on his right hand’; so in the *Politicus*, the king or statesman is the dialectician, who, although he may be in a private station, is still a king. Whether he has the power or not, is a mere accident; or rather he has the power, for what ought to be is (was ist vernünftig das ist wirklich); and he ought to be and is the true governor of mankind. There is a reflection in this idealism of the Socratic ‘virtue is knowledge’; and, without idealism, we may remark that knowledge is a great part of power. Plato does not trouble himself to construct a machinery by which ‘philosophers shall be made kings,’ as in the *Republic*: he merely holds up the ideal, and affirms that in some sense science is really supreme over human life.

He is struck by the observation 'quam parvâ sapientiâ regitur mundus,' and is touched with a feeling of the ills which afflict states. The condition of Megara before and during the Peloponnesian War, of Athens under the Thirty and afterwards, of Syracuse and the other Sicilian cities in their alternations of democratic excess and tyranny, might naturally suggest such reflections. Some states he sees already shipwrecked, others foundering for want of a pilot; and he wonders not at their destruction, but at their endurance. For they ought to have perished long ago, if they had depended on the wisdom of their rulers. The mingled pathos and satire of this remark is characteristic of Plato's later style.

The king is the personification of political science. And yet he is something more than this,—the perfectly good and wise tyrant of the *Laws* (iv. 710), whose will is better than any law. He is the special providence who is always interfering with and regulating all things. Such a conception has sometimes been entertained by modern theologians, and by Plato himself, of the Supreme Being. But whether applied to Divine or to human governors the conception is faulty for two reasons, neither of which are noticed by Plato; first, because all good government supposes a degree of co-operation in the ruler and his subjects,—an 'education in politics' as well as in moral virtue; secondly, because government, whether Divine or human, implies that the subject has a previous knowledge of the rules under which he is living. There is a fallacy, too, in comparing unchangeable laws with a personal governor. For the law need not necessarily be an 'ignorant and brutal tyrant,' but gentle and humane, capable of being altered in the spirit of the legislator, and of being administered so as to meet the cases of individuals. Not only in fact, but in idea, both elements must remain—the fixed law and the living will; the written word and the spirit; the principles of obligation and of freedom; and their applications whether made by law or equity in particular cases.

There are two sides from which positive laws may be attacked: either from the side of nature, which rises up and rebels against them in the spirit of Callicles in the *Gorgias*; or from the side of idealism, which attempts to soar above them,—and this is the spirit of Plato in the *Politicus*. But he soon falls, like Icarus, and is content to walk instead of flying; that is, to accommodate himself to the actual state of human things. Mankind have long been in despair of finding the

true ruler; and therefore are ready to acquiesce in any of the five or six received forms of government as better than none. And the best thing which they can do (though only the second best in reality), is to reduce the ideal state to the conditions of actual life. Thus in the *Politicus*, as in the *Laws*, we have three forms of government, which we may venture to term, (1) the ideal; (2) the practical; (3) the sophistical—what ought to be, what might be, what is. And thus Plato seems to stumble, almost by accident, on the notion of a constitutional monarchy, or of a monarchy ruling by laws.

The divine foundations of a State are to be laid deep in education (*Rep.* iv. 423), and at the same time some little violence may be used in exterminating natures which are incapable of education (cp. *Laws*, x). Plato is strongly of opinion that the legislator, like the physician, may do men good against their will (cp. *Gorgias*, 522 foll.). The human bonds of states are formed by the intermarriage of dispositions adapted to supply the defects of each other. As in the *Republic*, Plato has observed that there are opposite natures in the world, the strong and the gentle, the courageous and the temperate, which, borrowing an expression derived from the image of weaving, he calls the warp and the woof of human society. To interlace these is the crowning achievement of political science. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates was maintaining that there was only one virtue, and not many: now Plato is inclined to think that there are not only parallel, but opposite virtues, and seems to see a similar opposition pervading all art and nature. But he is satisfied with laying down the principle, and does not inform us by what further steps the union of opposites is to be effected.

In the loose framework of a single dialogue Plato has thus combined two distinct subjects—politics and method. Yet they are not so far apart as they appear: in his own mind there was a secret link of connection between them. For the philosopher or dialectician is also the only true king or statesman. In the execution of his plan Plato has invented or distinguished several important forms of thought, and made incidentally many valuable remarks. Questions of interest both in ancient and modern politics also arise in the course of the dialogue, which may with advantage be further considered by us:—

a. The imaginary ruler, whether God or man, is above the law, and is a law to himself and to others. Among the Greeks as among the Jews, law was a sacred-name, the gift of God, the bond of states.

But in the *Politicus* of Plato, as in the New Testament, the word has also become the symbol of an imperfect good, which is almost an evil. The law sacrifices the individual to the universal, and is the tyranny of the many over the few (cp. *Rep.* i. 359). It has fixed rules which are the props of order, and will not swerve or bend in extreme cases. It is the beginning of political society, but there is something higher—an intelligent ruler, whether God or man, who is able to adapt himself to the endless varieties of circumstances. Plato is fond of picturing the advantages which would result from the union of the tyrant who has power with the legislator who has wisdom: he regards this as the best and speediest way of reforming mankind. But institutions cannot thus be artificially created, nor can the external authority of a ruler impose laws for which a nation is unprepared. The greatest power, the highest wisdom, can only proceed one or two steps in advance of public opinion. In all stages of civilisation human nature, after all our efforts, remains intractable; not like clay in the hands of the potter, or marble under the chisel of the sculptor. Great changes occur in the history of nations, but they are brought about slowly, like the changes in the frame of nature, upon which the puny arm of man hardly makes an impression. And, speaking generally, the slowest growths, both in nature and in politics, are the most permanent.

b. Whether the best form of the ideal is a person or a law may fairly be doubted. The former is more akin to us: it clothes itself in poetry and art, and appeals to reason more in the form of feeling: in the latter there is less danger of allowing ourselves to be deluded by a figure of speech. The ideal of the Greek state found an expression in the deification of law, the ancient Stoic spoke of a wise man perfect in virtue, who was fancifully said to be a king; but neither they nor Plato had arrived at the conception of a person who was also a law. Nor is it easy for the Christian to think of God as wisdom, truth, holiness, and also as the wise, true, and holy one. He is always wanting to break through the abstraction and interrupt the law, in order that he may present to himself the more familiar image of a divine friend. While the impersonal has too slender a hold upon the affections to be made the basis of religion, the conception of a person on the other hand tends to degenerate into a new kind of idolatry. Neither criticism nor experience allows us to suppose that there are interferences with

the laws of nature; the idea is inconceivable to us and at variance with facts. The philosopher or theologian who could realise to mankind that a person is a law, that the higher rule has no exception, that goodness, like knowledge, is also power, would breathe a new religious life into the world.

c. Besides the imaginary rule of a philosopher or a God, the actual forms of government have to be considered. In the infancy of political science, men naturally ask whether the rule of the many or of the few is to be preferred—The rule of the few good or of the many bad? To the question put in this form there could be but one answer—The rule of the one good and all the rest bad? To this again there would be one reply, which might be expressed in the words of Heracleitus—‘One is ten thousand, if he be the best.’ Or, putting the question in another form,—The rule of a class, neither better nor worse than other classes, not devoid of a feeling of right, but guided mostly by a sense of their own interests, or the rule of all classes, similarly under the influence of mixed motives? To the question put in this form, no one would hesitate to answer—The rule of all rather than one, because all classes are more likely to take care of all than one of another; and the government has greater power and stability when resting on a wider basis. Both in ancient and modern times the best balanced form of government has been held to be the best; and yet it should not be so nicely balanced as to make action and movement impossible.

The statesman who builds his hope upon the aristocracy, upon the middle classes, upon the people, will probably, if he have sufficient experience of them, conclude that all classes are much alike, and that one is as good as another, and that the liberties of no class are safe in the hands of the rest. The higher ranks have the advantage in education and manners, the middle and lower in industry and self-denial; in every class, to a certain extent, a natural sense of right prevails, sometimes communicated from the lower to the higher, sometimes from the higher to the lower, which is too strong for class interests. There have been crises in the history of nations, as in the Crusades or the Reformation, or the French Revolution, when the same fever or inspiration has taken hold of whole peoples, and permanently raised the sense of freedom and justice among mankind.

But even supposing the different classes of a nation, when viewed

impartially, to be on a level with each other in moral virtue, there remain two considerations of opposite kinds which enter into the problem of government. Admitting of course that the upper and lower classes are equal in the eye of God and of the law, yet the one may be by nature fitted to govern and the other to be governed. A ruling caste does not soon altogether lose the governing qualities, nor a subject class easily acquire them. Hence the phenomenon so often observed in the old Greek revolutions, and not without parallel in modern times, that the leaders of the democracy have been themselves of aristocratic origin. The people are expecting to be governed by representatives of their own, but the true man of the people either never appears, or is quickly altered by circumstances. Their real wishes hardly make themselves felt, although their lower interests and prejudices may sometimes be flattered and yielded to for the sake of ulterior objects by those who have political power. They will often learn by experience that the democracy has become a plutocracy. The influence of wealth, though not the enjoyment of it, has become diffused among the poor as well as among the rich; and society, instead of being safer, is more at the mercy of the tyrant, who, when things are at the worst, obtains a guard—that is, an army—and announces himself as the saviour.

The other consideration is of an opposite kind. Admitting that a few wise men are likely to be better governors than the unwise many, yet it is not in their power to fashion an entire people according to their behest. When with the best intentions the benevolent despot begins his régime, he finds the world hard to move. A succession of good kings has at the end of a century left the people an inert and unchanged mass. The Roman world was not permanently improved by the hundred years of Hadrian and the Antonines. The kings of Spain during the last century were at least equal to any contemporary sovereigns in virtue and ability. In certain states of the world the means are wanting to render a benevolent power effectual. These means are not a mere external organisation of posts or telegraphs, hardly the introduction of new laws or modes of industry. A change must be made in the spirit of a people as well as in their externals. The ancient legislator did not really take a blank tablet and inscribe upon it the rules which reflection and experience had taught him to be for a nation's interest; no one would have obeyed him if he had. But he took the customs—which he found already existing—in a half

civilised state of society: these he reduced to form and inscribed on pillars; he defined what had before been undefined, and gave certainty to what was uncertain. No legislation ever sprang, like Athene, in full power out of the head either of God or man.

Plato and Aristotle are sensible of the difficulty of combining the wisdom of the few with the power of the many. According to Plato, he is a physician who has the knowledge of a physician, and he is a king who has the knowledge of a king. But how the king, one or more, is to obtain the required power, is hardly at all considered by him. He presents the idea of a perfect government, but except the regulation for mixing different tempers in marriage, he never makes any provision for the attainment of it. Aristotle, casting aside ideals, would place the government in a middle class of citizens, sufficiently numerous for stability, without admitting the populace; and such appears to have been the constitution which actually prevailed for a short time at Athens—the rule of the five thousand—characterised by Thucydides as the best government of Athens which he had known. It may however be doubted how far, either in a Greek or modern state, such a limitation is practicable or desirable; for those who are left outside the pale will always be dangerous to those who are within, and the leaven of the mob can hardly affect the representation of a great country. There is reason for the argument in favour of a property qualification; there is reason also in the arguments of those who would include all and so exhaust the political situation.

The true answer to the question is relative to the circumstances of nations. How can we get the greatest intelligence combined with the greatest power? The ancient legislator would have found this question more easy than we do. For he would have required that all persons who had a share of government should have received their education from the state and have borne her burdens, and should have served in her fleets and armies. But though we sometimes hear the cry that we must educate the masses, for they are our masters, who would listen to a proposal that the franchise should be confined to the educated or to those who fulfil political duties? Then again, we know that the masses are not our masters, and that they are more likely to become so if we educate them. In modern politics so many interests have to be consulted that we are compelled to do, not what is best, but what is possible.

d. Law is the first principle of society, but it cannot supply all the wants of society, and may easily cause more evils than it cures. Plato is aware of the imperfection of law in failing to meet the varieties of circumstances: he is also aware that human life would be intolerable if every detail of it were placed under legal regulation. It may be a great evil that physicians should kill their patients or captains cast away their ships, but it would be a far greater evil if each particular in the practice of medicine or seamanship were regulated by law. Much has been said in modern times about the duty of leaving men to themselves, which is supposed to be the best way of taking care of them. The question is often asked, What are the limits of legislation in relation to morals? And the answer is to the same effect, That morals must take care of themselves. There is a one-sided truth in these answers, if they are regarded as condemnations of the interference with commerce in the last century or of clerical inquisition in the middle ages. But *laissez faire* is not the best but only the second best. What the best is, Plato does not attempt to determine; he only contrasts the imperfection of law with the wisdom of the perfect ruler.

Laws should be just, but they must also be certain, and we are obliged to sacrifice something of their justice to their certainty. Suppose a wise and good judge, who paying little or no regard to the law, attempted to decide with perfect justice the cases that were brought before him. To the uneducated person he would appear to be the ideal of a judge. Such justice has been often exercised in primitive times, or at the present day among eastern rulers. But in the first place it depends entirely on the personal character of the judge. He may be honest, but there is no check upon his dishonesty, and his opinion can only be overruled, not by any principle of law, but by the opinion of another judging like himself without law. In the second place, even if he be ever so honest, his mode of deciding questions would introduce an element of uncertainty into human life; no one would know beforehand what would happen to him, or would seek to conform in his conduct to any rule of law. For the compact which the law makes with men, that they shall be protected if they observe the law in their dealings with one another, would have to be substituted another principle of a more general character, that they shall be protected by the law if they act rightly in their dealings with one another. The complexity of human actions and also the

uncertainty of their effects would be increased tenfold. For one of the principal advantages of law is not merely that it enforces honesty, but that it makes men act in the same way, and requires them to produce the same evidence of their acts. Too many laws may be the sign of a corrupt and overcivilised state of society, too few are the sign of an uncivilised one: as soon as commerce begins to grow men make themselves customs which have the validity of laws. Even equity, which is the exception to the law, conforms to fixed rules and lies for the most part within the limits of previous decisions.

IV. The bitterness of the *Politicus* is characteristic of Plato's later style, in which the thoughts of youth and love have fled away, and we are no longer attended by the Muses or the Graces. We do not venture to say that Plato was soured by old age, but certainly the kindness and courtesy of the older dialogues have disappeared. He sees the world under a harder and grimmer aspect: he is dealing with the reality of things, not with visions or pictures of them: he is seeking by the aid of dialectic only, to arrive at truth: he is deeply impressed with the importance of classification. In this alone he finds the true measure of human things; and very often in the process of division curious results are obtained. For the dialectical art is no respecter of persons: king and vermin-taker are all alike to the philosopher. There may have been a time when the king was a god, but he now is pretty much on a level with his subjects in breeding and education. Man should be well advised that he is only one of the animals, and the Hellene in particular should be aware that he himself was the author of the distinction between Hellene and Barbarian, and that the Phrygian would equally divide mankind into Phrygians and Barbarians, and that some intelligent animal, like a crane, might go a step further, and divide the animal world into cranes and all other animals. Plato cannot help laughing (cp. *Theæt.* 174) when he thinks of the king running after his subjects, like the pig-driver or the bird-taker. He would seriously have him consider how many competitors there are to his throne, chiefly among the class of serving-men. A good deal of meaning is lurking in the expression—'There is no art of feeding mankind worthy the name.' There is a similar depth in the remark,—'The wonder about states is not that they are short-lived, but that they last so long in spite of the badness of their rulers.' *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft®*

V. There is also a paradoxical element in the Statesman which delights in reversing the accustomed use of words. The law which to the Greek was the highest object of reverence is an ignorant and brutal tyrant—the tyrant is converted into a beneficent king. The sophist too is no longer as in the earlier dialogues, the rival of the statesman, but assumes his form. Plato sees that the ideal of the state in his own day is more and more severed from the actual. From such ideals as he had once formed, he turns away to contemplate the decline of the Greek cities which were far worse now in his old age than they had been in his youth, and were to become worse and worse in the ages which followed. He cannot contain his disgust at the contemporary statesmen, sophists who had turned politicians, in various forms of men and animals appearing, some like lions and centaurs, others like satyrs and monkeys. In this new disguise the Sophists make their last appearance on the scene: in the *Laws* Plato appears to have forgotten them, or at any rate makes only a slight allusion to them in a single passage (*Laws* x, 908 D).

VI. The *Politicus* is naturally connected with the *Sophist*. At first sight we are surprised to find that the Eleatic stranger discourses to us, not only concerning the nature of being and not-being, but concerning the king and statesman. We perceive, however, that there is no inappropriateness in his maintaining the character of chief speaker, when we remember the close connection which is assumed by Plato to exist between politics and dialectic. In both dialogues the Proteus Sophist is exhibited, first, in the disguise of an Eristic, secondly, of a false statesman. There are several lesser features which the two dialogues have in common. The styles and the situations of the speakers are very similar; there is the same love of division, and in both of them the mind of the writer is greatly occupied about method; to which he had probably intended to return in the projected 'Philosopher.'

The *Politicus* stands midway between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, and is also related to the *Timæus*. The mythical or cosmical element reminds us of the *Timæus*, the ideal of the *Republic*. A previous chaos in which the elements as yet were not, is hinted at both in the *Timæus* and *Politicus*. The same ingenious arts of giving verisimilitude to a fiction are practised in both dialogues, and in both, as well as in the myth at the end of the *Republic*, Plato touches on

the subject of necessity and free-will. The words in which he describes the miseries of states seem to be an amplification of the 'cities will never cease from ill' of the Republic. The point of view in both is the same; and the differences not really important, e. g. in the myth, or in the account of the different kinds of states. But the treatment of the subject in the Politicus is fragmentary, and the shorter and later work, as might be expected, is less finished, and less worked out in detail. The idea of measure and the arrangement of the sciences, supply connecting links both with the Republic and the Philebus.

More than any of the preceding dialogues, the Politicus seems to approximate in thought and language to the Laws. There is the same decline and tendency to monotony in style, the same self-consciousness, awkwardness, and over-civility, 286 B, 293 A, 263 B, 265 B, 277 A, B, 283 C, 286 B; and in the Laws is contained the pattern of that second best form of government, which, after all, is admitted to be the only attainable one in this world. The 'gentle violence,' the marriage of dissimilar natures, the figure of the warp and the woof, are also found in the Laws. Both expressly recognise the conception of a first or ideal state, which has receded into an invisible heaven. Nor does the account of the origin and growth of society really differ in them, if we make allowance for the mythic character of the narrative in the Politicus. The virtuous tyrant is common to both of them; and the Eleatic Stranger takes up a position similar to that of the Athenian Stranger in the Laws.

VII. There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the Sophist and Politicus, if they had been compared with the Laws rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle, as an undoubted work of Plato. The detailed consideration of the genuineness and order of the Platonic dialogues has been reserved for another place: a few of the reasons for defending the Sophist and Politicus may be here given.

1. The excellence, importance, and metaphysical originality of the two dialogues: no works at once so good and of such length, are known to have proceeded from the hands of a forger.

2. The resemblances in them to other dialogues of Plato are such as might be expected to be found in works of the same author, and not in those of an imitator; being too subtle and minute to have been invented by another. The similar passages and turns of thought are generally

inferior to the parallel passages in his earlier writings; and we might *à priori* have expected that, if altered, they would have been improved. But the comparison of the Laws proves that this repetition of his own thoughts and words in an inferior form, is characteristic of Plato's later style.

3. The close connection of them with the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, involves the fate of these dialogues, as well as of the two suspected ones.

4. The suspicion of them seems mainly to rest on a presumption that in Plato's writings we may expect to find an uniform type of doctrine and opinion. But however we arrange the order, or narrow the circle of the dialogues, we must admit that they exhibit a growth and progress in the mind of Plato. And the appearance of change or progress is not to be regarded as impugning the genuineness of any particular writings, but may be even an argument in their favour. If we suppose the Sophist and Politicus to stand halfway between the Republic and the Laws, and in near connection with the Theaetetus, the Parmenides, the Philebus, the arguments against them derived from differences of thought and style disappear or may be said without paradox in some degree to confirm their genuineness. There is no such interval between the Republic or Phaedrus and the two suspected dialogues, as that which separates all the earlier writings of Plato from the Laws. And the Theaetetus, Parmenides, and Philebus, supply links, by which, however different from them, they may be reunited with the great body of the Platonic writings.

S T A T E S M A N .

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

THEODORUS.
SOCRATES.

THE ELEATIC STRANGER.
YOUNG SOCRATES.

Steph. *Socrates.* I OWE you many thanks, indeed, Theodorus, for the
257 acquaintance both of Theaetetus and of the Stranger.

Theodorus. And in a little while, Socrates, you will owe me three times as many; when they have completed for you the delineation of the Statesman and of the Philosopher, as well as of the Sophist.

Soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O, my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and geometrician?

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I mean that you rate them all at the same value, whereas they are really separated by an interval, which no geometrical ratio can express.

Theod. By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.

Stranger. That is my duty, Theodorus; having begun I must go on, and not leave the work unfinished. But what shall be done with Theaetetus?

Theod. In what respect do you mean?

Str. Shall we relieve him, and take his companion, the Young Socrates, instead of him? What do you advise?
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Theod. Let the other be taken instead of him, as you propose. The young always do better when they have intervals of rest.

Soc. I think, Stranger, that both of them may be said to be in some way related to me; for the one bears my name and style, and the other, as you affirm, has the cut of my ugly face. ²⁵⁸ (Cp. Theaet. 143 E.) And we should be always ready to acknowledge relations by holding discourse with them. I myself was discoursing with Theaetetus yesterday, and I have just been listening to his answers; my namesake I have not yet examined, but I must. Another time will do for me; to-day let him answer you.

Str. Very good. Young Socrates, do you hear what the elder Socrates is proposing?

Young Socrates. I do.

Str. And do you agree?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. As you do not object, still less can I. After the Sophist, then, I think that the Statesman naturally follows next in the order of enquiry. And please to say, Whether he, too, should be ranked among those who have science?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Then the sciences must be divided as before?

Y. Soc. I dare say.

Str. But yet the division would not be the same?

Y. Soc. How then?

Str. They will be divided at some other point.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Where shall we discover the path of the Statesman? We must find and separate off, and set a seal upon this, and we will set the mark of another class upon all diverging paths. Thus the soul will conceive of all kinds of knowledge under two classes.

Y. Soc. To find the path is your business, Stranger, and not mine.

Str. Yes, Socrates, but the discovery, when once made, will belong to both of us.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Well, and are not arithmetic and certain other kindred arts, merely abstract knowledge, wholly separated from action?

Y. Soc. That is true.

Str. But the knowledge of which the art of carpentering, or the other handicraft arts are possessed, seems to reside in the operation; they know and bring into existence simultaneously the bodies which are produced by them.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Then let us divide sciences in general into those which are practical and those which are purely intellectual.

Y. Soc. Let us suppose these to be the two principal divisions of the whole of science, which is one.

Str. And is he whom we variously term 'statesman,' 'king,' 'master,' or 'householder,' one and the same; or are there so many different sciences or arts which correspond to these names? Or rather, allow me to put the matter in another way.

259 *Y. Soc.* Let me hear.

Str. If any one who is in a private station has the skill to advise one of the public physicians, must not he also be called a physician?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And if any one who is in a private station has the art to advise the ruler of a country, must not he be said to have the knowledge which the ruler ought to have?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But surely the science of a true king is royal science?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And will not he who possesses this knowledge, whether he happens to be a ruler or a private man, when regarded only in reference to his art, be truly called 'royal'?

Y. Soc. He certainly ought to be.

Str. And the householder and master are the same?

Y. Soc. Of course.

Str. Again, a large household may be compared to a small state:—will they differ at all, as far as government is concerned?

Y. Soc. They will not.

Str. Then, returning to the point which we were just now discussing, do we not clearly see that there will be one science of all of them; and this science may be either royal or political or economical; we will not quarrel with any one about the name.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. This, too, is evident, that the king cannot do much with his hands, or with his whole body, towards the maintenance of his empire, compared with what he does by the intelligence and strength of his soul.

Y. Soc. That is evident.

Str. Then, shall we say that the king has a greater affinity to knowledge than to manual arts or to practical life in general?

Y. Soc. Certainly he has.

Str. Then we may put all together as one and the same—statesmanship and the statesman—kingship and the king.

Y. Soc. Clearly.

Str. And now we shall only be proceeding in due order, if we divide the sphere of knowledge?

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Think whether you can find any joint or parting in knowledge?

Y. Soc. Tell me of what sort.

Str. Such as this ;—you may remember that we made an art of calculation?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Which was, unmistakeably, one of the arts of knowledge?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And which knew the difference of numbers, and would form a judgment on them, and had no other function?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Just as the architect does not work himself, but is the ruler of workmen?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. He contributes knowledge, but not manual labour?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And may therefore be justly said to share in theoretical science? 260

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. But he ought not, when he has formed a judgment, to regard his functions as at an end, like the calculator ;—he must assign to the individual workmen their appropriate task until they have completed their work?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Does not this class of sciences, as well as arithmetic and the other kindred arts, belong to pure knowledge; and is not the difference between them, that the one sort has the power of judging only, and the other of ruling as well?

Y. Soc. That is evident.

Str. May we not truly say, that of all knowledge, there are two divisions—one which rules, and the other which judges?

Y. Soc. That is my view.

Str. And surely, when men have anything to do in common, that they should be of one mind is a pleasant thing?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Then while we ourselves are of one mind, we need not mind about the views of others?

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. And now, in which of these divisions shall we place the king?—Is he a judge and spectator? Or shall we assign to him the art of rule or command—for he is assuredly a ruler?

Y. Soc. The latter, clearly.

Str. Then we must see whether there is any mark of division in the art of command. I am inclined to think that there is a division similar to that of manufacturer and retail dealer, which distinguishes the king from the herald.

Y. Soc. How is that?

Str. Why, does not the retailer receive and sell over again the productions of others, which have been sold before?

Y. Soc. Certainly he does.

Str. And is not the herald under command, and does he not receive orders, and in his turn order others?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Then shall we mingle the kingly art in the same class with the art of the herald, the interpreter, the boatswain, the prophet, and the numerous other arts which exercise command; or, as in the preceding comparison we spoke of manufacturers, or sellers for themselves and retailers,—seeing, too, that the class of supreme rulers, or rulers for themselves, is almost nameless—shall we make a word following the same analogy, and refer kings to a supreme or ruling-for-self science, leaving the rest to receive a name from some one else? For we are seeking

the ruler ; and our enquiry is not concerned with him who is not a ruler.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Thus a very fair distinction has been attained between 261 the man who gives his own commands, and him who gives another's ; and now let us see if the supreme power will allow of any further division.

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. I think that there may be ; and please to assist me in making the division.

Y. Soc. At what point ?

Str. May not all rulers be supposed to command for the sake of producing something ?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Nor is there any difficulty in dividing articles of production into two classes.

Y. Soc. How would you divide them ?

Str. Of the whole class, some have life and some are without life.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And by the help of these differences there may be a subdivision, if we please, of the section of knowledge which commands.

Y. Soc. How is that ?

Str. There may be a division into command of the production of lifeless and of living objects ; and in this way the whole will be divided.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. That division, then, is complete ; and now we may leave one half, and take up the other ; which may also be exhaustively divided.

Y. Soc. What half do you mean ?

Str. Of course that which exercises command about animals. For, surely, the royal science is not like that of a master-workman, a science presiding over lifeless objects ;—the king has a nobler function, which is the management and control of living beings.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And the breeding and tending of living beings may be

observed to be sometimes a tending of the individual ; in other cases, a common care of creatures in flocks ?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But the statesman is not a tender of individuals—not like the driver or groom of a single ox or horse ; he is rather to be compared with the keeper of a drove of horses or oxen.

Y. Soc. That seems to be a true remark.

Str. Shall we call this art of tending many animals together, the art of managing a herd, or the art of collective management ?

Y. Soc. No matter ;—whichever may happen to occur to us in the course of conversation.

Str. Very good, Socrates ; and, if you continue to be not too particular about names, you will be all the richer in wisdom when you are an old man. And now, as you say, without further discussion of the name, can you see a way in which a
262 person, by showing the art of herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number ?

Y. Soc. I will try ;—there appears to me to be one management of men and another of beasts.

Str. You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and manly style ; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter, I think that we had better avoid.

Y. Soc. What is the error ?

Str. I think that we had better not cut off a small portion which is not a species, from many larger portions ; the part should be a species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made ; and you were under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would come to man ; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not chip off too small a piece, my friend ; the safer way is to cut through the middle ; which is also the more likely way of finding classes. Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of enquiry.

Y. Soc. What do you mean, Stranger ?

Str. I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your good parts, Socrates ; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain myself, I will try, as we proceed, to be a little clearer.

Y. Soc. What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty in our division ?

Str. The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this part of the world ; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have no connection or common language, they include under the single name of 'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of them one species, comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name. Whereas you would make a much better and more equal and artistic classification of numbers, if you divided them into odd and even ; or of the human species, if you divided them into male and female ; and only separated off Lydians or Phrygians, or any other tribe, and arrayed them against the rest of the world, when you could no longer make a division into parts which were also classes.

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Y. Soc. Very true ; but I wish that this distinction between a part and a class could still be made somewhat plainer.

Str. O Socrates, best of men, that is not an easy task which you impose. We have already digressed further from our original intention than we ought, and you would have us wander still further away. But we must now return to our subject ; and hereafter, when there is a leisure hour, we will follow up the other track ; at the same time, I wish you to guard against imagining that you ever heard me declare—

Y. Soc. What ?

Str. That a class and a part are distinct.

Y. Soc. What did I hear, then ?

Str. That a class is necessarily a part, but there is no similar necessity that a part should be a class ; that is the sense which I should always wish you to attribute to my words, Socrates.

Y. Soc. Good.

Str. There is another thing which I should like to know.

Y. Soc. What is it ?

Str. The point at which we digressed ; for, if I am not mistaken, the exact place was at the question, Where you would divide the management of herds, to which you appeared rather too ready to answer that there were two species of animals ; man being one, and all other animals making up the other.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. I thought that in taking away a part, you imagined that the remainder equally formed a part, because you were able to call them by the common name of brutes.

Y. Soc. That is also quite true.

Str. Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be, were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the appellation of brutes,—here would be the sort of error which we must try to avoid.

Y. Soc. How can we be safe ?

Str. If we do not divide the whole class of animals, we shall be less likely to fall into that error.

Y. Soc. We had better not take the whole ?

Str. Yes, there lay the source of our error in a former division.

Y. Soc. Of what error ?

Str. You remember how that part of the art of knowledge which was concerned with command, had to do with the rearing of live stock,—I mean, with animals in herds ?

Y. Soc. Yes.

264 *Str.* In that case, there was already implied a division of all animals into tame and wild ; those whose nature could be tamed were called tame, and those which could not be tamed were called wild.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And the political science of which we are in search, is and ever was concerned with tame animals, and is also confined to gregarious animals.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. But then we ought not to divide, as we did, taking the whole class at once. Neither let us be in too great haste to

arrive quickly at the political science; for this mistake has already brought upon us the misfortune of which the proverb speaks.

Y. Soc. What misfortune?

Str. The misfortune of too much haste, which is too little speed.

Y. Soc. And all the better, Stranger.

Str. Very well: But let us begin again, and endeavour to divide the collective rearing of animals; for, probably, if the argument proceeds by regular steps, your object will be better accomplished than by hasty anticipation. Tell me, then—

Y. Soc. What?

Str. Did you ever hear, as you very likely may—for I do not suppose that you ever actually visited them—of the preserves of fishes in the Nile, and in the ponds of the great king, or you may have seen similar preserves in wells at home?

Y. Soc. Yes, to be sure, I have seen them, and I have often heard the others described.

Str. And you may have heard also, and are assured by report, although you have not been in those regions, of the nurseries of geese and cranes which exist in the plains of Thessaly?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. I asked you, because here is a new division of the management of herds, into the management of land and of water herds.

Y. Soc. There is.

Str. And do you agree that we ought to divide the collective rearing of herds into two corresponding parts, the one the rearing of the watery, and the other of the land herds?

Y. Soc. I do.

Str. There is surely no need to ask which of these two contains the royal art, for it is evident to everybody.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Any one can divide the herds which feed on dry land?

Y. Soc. How would you divide them?

Str. I should distinguish between flying and walking.

Y. Soc. Most true.

Str. And where shall we look for the political animal? Might not an idiot know that he is a pedestrian?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. The art of managing the walking animal has to be further divided, just as you might halve an even number.

Y. Soc. That is true.

265 *Str.* Let me note that here appear in view two ways to that part or class to which the argument is going,—the one a speedier way, which cuts off a small portion from a large; the other, which agrees better with the principle which we were laying down, is the way of dividing in the middle; but this is longer. We can take either of them, whichever we please.

Y. Soc. Cannot we have both ways?

Str. Together? What a thing to ask! but, if you take them in turn, you clearly may.

Y. Soc. Then I should like to take them in turn.

Str. There will be no difficulty, as we are near the end; if we had been at the beginning, or in the middle, I should have demurred to your request; but now, in accordance with your desire, let us begin with the longer way; while we are fresh, we shall get on better. And now attend to the division.

Y. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. The tame walking herding animals are distributed by nature into two classes.

Y. Soc. Upon what principle?

Str. The one grows horns; and the other is without horns.

Y. Soc. Clearly.

Str. Suppose that you divide the science which manages pedestrian animals into two corresponding parts, and define them; for if you wish to name them, the complexity will be too great.

Y. Soc. How must I speak of them, then?

Str. In this way: let the science of rearing pedestrian animals be divided into two parts, and one part assigned to the horned class, and the other to the class that has no horns.

Y. Soc. All this has been abundantly proved, and may therefore be assumed.

Str. The king is clearly the shepherd of the polled herd, who have no horns.

Y. Soc. That is evident.

Str. Shall we break up this hornless herd into sections, and see which falls to the king?

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. Shall we distinguish them by their having or not having cloven feet, or by their mixing or not mixing the breed? You know what I mean.

Y. Soc. What?

Str. I mean that the nature of horses and asses is to breed from one another.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. But the remainder of the hornless herd of tame animals will not mix the breed.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And of which has the Statesman charge, of the mixed or of the unmixed?

Y. Soc. Clearly of the unmixed.

Str. I suppose that we must divide this again as before.

Y. Soc. We must.

Str. And now every tame and herding animal has been ²⁶⁶ divided into portions, with the exception of two species; for I hardly think that dogs ought to be reckoned among herding animals.

Y. Soc. Certainly not; but how shall we divide the two remaining species?

Str. There is a measure of difference which may be appropriately employed by you and Theaetetus, who are geometers.

Y. Soc. What is that?

Str. The diameter; and, again, the diameter of a diameter.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. How does man walk, but as a diameter whose power is two feet ¹?

Y. Soc. Just so.

Str. And the power of the remaining kind, being the power of twice two feet, may be said to be the diameter of our diameter ².

Y. Soc. Certainly; and now I think that I pretty nearly understand you.

Str. I descry, Socrates, another famous jest in these divisions.

¹ The diameter of one foot square = $\sqrt{2}$ square feet.

² The diameter of two square feet = the root or side of four square feet.

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. Human beings have come out in the same class with the freest and airiest of creation, and are running a race with them.

Y. Soc. I remark that very singular result.

Str. And would you not expect that, being the slowest, they will arrive last?

Y. Soc. Indeed I should.

Str. And there is a still more ridiculous consequence, that the king is running about with the herd, and in unequal race with the bird-taker, who of all mankind is most of an adept at the airy life¹.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Then here, Socrates, is still clearer evidence of the truth of what was said in the discussion about the Sophist.

Y. Soc. What?

Str. That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and cares not for great or small, but always arrives in her own way at the truest result.

Y. Soc. Clearly.

Str. And now, I will not wait for you to ask me, but will of my own accord take you by the shorter road to the definition of a king.

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. I say that we should have begun at first by dividing land animals into biped and quadruped, and as the winged herd, and that alone, comes out in the same class with man, we should divide bipeds into those which have wings and have no wings, and when that is divided, and the art of the management of mankind is brought to light, the time will have come to produce our Statesman and ruler, and place him as charioteer in the State, and hand over to him the reins, for that is his proper science and vocation.

267 *Y. Soc.* Very good; you have paid me the debt; I mean, that you have completed the argument, and I suppose that you added the digression by way of interest.

¹ Plato is not introducing a new class, but only making a reflection on the two kinds of bipeds. Others refer the passage to pigs and a pig-driver. According to this explanation we must translate the words above, 'freest and airiest of creation,' 'worthiest and laziest of creation.'

Str. Then now, let us go back to the beginning, and join the links, which together make the definition of the name of the Statesman's art.

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. The science of pure knowledge originally had a part which was the science of rule or command, and from this was derived another part, which was called that of command for self, and illustrated by the analogy of wholesale dealing; an important section of this was the management of living animals, and this again was further limited by the management of them in herds, and again in herds of pedestrian animals,—of pedestrian animals who are without horns; here, again, was an important line of demarcation. He who desires to comprehend the right-hand section of this latter class under a single name, must make three folds; he will speak of a science of (1) the shepherding, (2) of animals, (3) who do not mix the breed. The only further sub-division is the art of man-herding,—this has to do with bipeds, and is what we were seeking after, and have now found, being at once the royal and political.

Y. Soc. To be sure we have.

Str. And do you think, Socrates, that we really have found, as you say, the desired end?

Y. Soc. What is the end?

Str. Do you think, I mean, that we have really fulfilled our intention?—There has been a sort of discussion, and yet the investigation seems to me not to be perfectly worked out.

Y. Soc. I do not understand.

Str. I will try to make the thought which is at this moment present in my mind, clearer to us both.

Y. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. There were many arts of shepherding, and one of them was the political, which had the charge of one particular herd?

Y. Soc. There were.

Str. And this the argument defined to be the art of rearing not horses or other animals, but the art of rearing man collectively?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Note, however, a difference which distinguishes the king from all other shepherds.

Y. Soc. To what do you refer?

Str. I want to ask, whether any of the other herdsmen has a rival who assumes that he is joint-manager of the herd¹?

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. I mean to say that merchants, husbandmen, providers of food, and also training-masters and physicians, will all contend with the herdsmen of humanity, whom we call Statesmen, declaring that they themselves have the care of rearing or
268 managing mankind, and that they rear not only the common herd, but also the rulers themselves.

Y. Soc. Is there not truth in that?

Str. Very likely there may be, and we will consider their claim. But I mean to say that no one will raise a similar claim as against the shepherd, who is allowed on all hands to be the sole and only feeder and physician of his flock; he is also their match-maker and accoucheur; no one else knows that department of science. And he is their merry-maker and musician, and no one can console and soothe his own flock better than he can, either with the tones of his voice or with instruments, as far as their nature is susceptible of such influences. And the same may be said of herdsmen in general.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. But if this is true, can our argument about the king be true and unimpeachable? Were we right in selecting him out of ten thousand other claimants to be the shepherd and rearer of the human flock?

Y. Soc. Surely not.

Str. And if not, have we not reason to apprehend, that although we may have described a sort of royal form, we have not as yet accurately worked out the true image of the Statesman? and that we cannot reveal him as he truly is in his own nature, until we have disengaged and separated him from those who hang about him and claim to share in his prerogatives?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And that, Socrates, is what we must do, if we mean not to bring dishonour on the argument.

Y. Soc. We must certainly keep up the credit of the argument.

Str. Then let us make a new beginning, and travel by a different road.

Y. Soc. What road?

Str. I think that we may have a little amusement; there is a famous tale, of which a good portion may with advantage be interwoven, and then we may resume our series of divisions, and proceed in the old path until we arrive at the summit or desired end. Shall we do as I say?

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. Listen, then, to a tale which a child would love to hear, and you are not too old to be amused as a child.

Y. Soc. Let me hear.

Str. There did really happen, and will again happen, like many other events of which ancient tradition has preserved the record, the portent which is traditionally said to have occurred in the quarrel of Atreus and Thyestes. You remember what that was?

Y. Soc. I suppose you to mean the token of the birth of the golden lamb?

Str. No, not that; but another part of the story, which tells ²⁶⁹ how the sun and the stars rose in the west, and set in the east, and that the god reversed their motion, and gave them that which they have at present as a testimony to the right of Atreus.

Y. Soc. Yes; there is such a legend.

Str. Again, we have been often told of the reign of Cronos.

Y. Soc. Yes, very often.

Str. Did you ever hear that the men of former times were earth-born, and not begotten of one another?

Y. Soc. Yes, that is another old tradition.

Str. All these stories, and ten thousand others which are still more wonderful, have a common origin; many of them have been lost in the lapse of ages, or exist only in fragments; but the origin of them is what no one has told, and may as well be told now; for the tale is suited to throw light on the nature of the king.

Y. Soc. Very good; and I hope that you will give the whole story, and leave out nothing.

Str. Listen, then. There is a time when God goes round with the world, which he himself guides and helps to roll; and there is a time, on the completion of a certain cycle, when he lets go, and the world being a living creature, and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator, turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction.

Y. Soc. Why is that?

Str. Why, because only the most divine things of all are unchangeable, and body is not included in this class. Heaven and the universe, as we have termed them, although they have been endowed by the Creator with many glories, partake of a bodily nature, and therefore cannot be entirely free from perturbations. But the heavenly motion is, as far as possible, single and in the same place, and in relation to the same; and is therefore only subject to a reversal, which is the least alteration possible. For the lord of all moving things is alone able to move of himself; and to think that he can go at one time in one direction and at another time in another, is unlawful. Hence we must not say that the world is either self-moved always, or all made to go round by God in two opposite courses; 270 or that two Gods, having opposite purposes make it move round. But as I have already said (and this is the only remaining alternative) the world is governed by an accompanying divine power and receives life and immortality by the appointment of the Creator, and then, when let go again, moves spontaneously, being let go at such a time as to have, during infinite cycles of years, a reverse movement: this is due to exquisite perfection of balance, and the size of the universe; which is the greatest of bodies, and turns on the smallest pivot.

Y. Soc. Your account of the world seems to be very reasonable indeed.

Str. Let us now reflect upon what has been said, and try to comprehend the nature of this great mythological wonder, which has been called by us, and assuredly is, the cause of the other wonders.

Y. Soc. To what are you referring?

Str. To the reversal which takes place from time to time of the motion of the universe.

Y. Soc. How is that the cause of the others?

Str. Of all changes of the heavenly motions, this is the greatest and mightiest.

Y. Soc. I should imagine so.

Str. And may be supposed to result in the greatest changes to the human beings who are the inhabitants of the world at the time.

Y. Soc. Such changes would naturally occur.

Str. And animals, as we know, are seriously affected by great changes of many different kinds happening together.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Hence there necessarily occurs a great destruction of them, which extends also to the life of man; few survivors of the race are left, and those who remain become the subjects of several novel and remarkable phenomena, and of one in particular, which was simultaneous with the revulsion, and took place at the time when the transition was made to the cycle opposite to that in which we live.

Y. Soc. What was it?

Str. The life of all animals first came to a stand, and the mortal nature ceased to be or look older, and was then reversed and grew young and delicate; the white locks of the aged darkened again, and the cheeks of the bearded man became smooth, and he was restored to his original youth; the bodies of the young grew finer and smaller, continually by day and night returning and becoming assimilated to the nature of a newly-born child in mind as well as body; in the succeeding stage they wasted away and wholly disappeared. And the bodies of those who had died by violence quickly passed through the like changes, and in a few days were no more seen.

Y. Soc. Then how, Stranger, were the animals created in those 271 days; and in what way were they begotten of one another?

Str. It is evident, Socrates, that there was no such thing in the then order of nature as the procreation of animals from one another; what we have heard of as the earth-born race was the one which existed in that second cycle—they sprang out of the ground in which they were sown; and of this tradition, which is now-a-days often unduly discredited, our ancestors, who came into being immediately after the end of the last period and at

the beginning of this, are the heralds to us. For mark how consistent the sequel of the tale is; after the return of age to youth, follows the return of the dead, who are lying in the earth, to life; the wheel of their existence has been turned back, and they come together and rise and live in the opposite order, unless God has carried any of them away to some other lot. Such is the tradition of the so-called earth-born men, and so, of necessity they came into being.

Y. Soc. Certainly that is quite consistent with what has preceded; but let me interrupt you to ask whether the life which you said existed in the reign of Cronos was in that cycle of the world, or in this? For the change in the course of the stars and the sun must have occurred in both.

Str. I see that you enter into my meaning;—no, that blessed and spontaneous life does not belong to the present cycle of the world, but to the previous one, in which God superintended the whole revolution of the universe; and the several parts of the universe were distributed under the rule of certain inferior deities, which is the way in some places still. There were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those of whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel among them; and I might tell of ten thousand other blessings, which belonged to that dispensation. The reason why the life of which the tradition speaks was spontaneous, is as follows: In those days God himself was their shepherd, and ruled over them, just as man, who is by comparison a divine being, still rules over the animals. Under him there were no governments or separate
 272 possessions of women and children. For all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of any past events; and they had no property or families, but the earth gave them abundance of fruits, which grew on trees and shrubs unbidden, and were not planted by the hand of man. And they dwelt naked, and mostly in the open air, for the temperature of their seasons was mild; and they had no beds, but lay on soft couches of grass, which grew plentifully out of the earth. Such was the life of man in the days of Cronos, Socrates; the character of our present life, which is said to be under Zeus, you know from your

own experience. Can you, and will you, determine which 'of them you deem the happier?

Y. Soc. I cannot.

Str. Then shall I determine for you as well as I can?

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. Suppose that the children of Cronos, having this boundless leisure, and the power of holding intercourse, not only with men but with the animal creation, had used all these advantages with a view to philosophy, conversing with the animals as well as with one another, and learning of every nature which was gifted with any special power, and was able to contribute some special experience to the store of wisdom, there would be no difficulty in deciding that they would be a thousand times happier than the men of our own day. Or, again, if they had merely eaten and drunk until they were full, and told stories to one another and to the animals—such stories as are now told of them—in this case also, as I should imagine, the answer would be easy. But as there is no satisfactory reporter of the desires and thoughts of those times, I think that we must leave the question unanswered, and go at once to the reason why we have unearthed this tale, and then we will proceed on our journey. In the fulness of time, when the change was to take place, and the earth-born race had all perished, and every soul had fallen into the earth and been sown her appointed number of times, the governor of the universe let the helm go, and retired to his place of view; and then Fate and innate desire reversed the motion of the world. Then also all the inferior deities who share the rule of the supreme power, being informed of what was happening, let go the parts of the world of which they were severally the guardians. And the world turning round with a sudden shock, 273 having received an opposite impulse at both ends, was shaken by a mighty earthquake, producing a new destruction of all manner of animals. After awhile the tumult and confusion and earthquake ceased, and the universal creature, once more at peace, attained to a calm, and settled down into his own orderly and accustomed course, having the charge and rule of himself and of all other creatures, and remembering and executing the instructions of the Father and Creator of the

world, more particularly at first, but afterwards with less exactness. The reason of the falling off was the admixture of matter in the world; this was inherent in the primal nature, which was full of disorder, until attaining to the present cosmos or order. From God, the constructor, the world indeed received every good, but from a previous state came elements of violence and injustice, which, thence derived, first of all passed into the world, and were transmitted to the animals. While the world was producing animals in unison with God, the evil was small, and great the good which worked within, but in the process of separation from him, when the world was let go, at first all proceeded well enough; but, as time went on, there was more and more forgetting, and the old discord again entered in and got the better, and burst forth; and at last small was the good, and great was the admixture of the elements of evil, and there was a danger of universal ruin of the world and the things in the world. Wherefore God, the orderer of all, in his tender care, seeing that the world was in great straits, and fearing that all might be dissolved in the storm, and go to the place of chaos and infinity, again seated himself at the helm; and reversing the elements which had fallen into dissolution and disorder when left to themselves in the previous cycle, he set them in order and restored them, and made the world imperishable and immortal. And this is the whole tale, of which the first part will suffice to illustrate the nature of the king. For when the world returned to the present cycle of generation, the age of man again stood still, and another change was the result. The small creatures which had almost disappeared grew in stature, and the newly-born children of the earth became grey and died and sank into the earth again. All things changed, imitating and following the condition of the universe, and of necessity agreeing with that in their mode of conception and generation and nurture; for no animal was any longer allowed to come into being in the earth through the agency of other creative beings, but as the world was ordained to be the lord of his own progress, in like manner the parts were ordained to grow and generate and give nourishment, as far as they could, of themselves, impelled by a similar movement. And so we have arrived at the real end of this discourse; for although there might be much

to tell of the lower animals, and of the reasons and causes of their changes, about men there is not much, and that little is more to the purpose. Deprived of the care of God, who had possessed and tended them, they were left helpless and defenceless, and were torn in pieces by the wild beasts, who had grown more savage; moreover, in the first ages they carried on the struggle for existence without arts or resources; the food which once grew spontaneously had failed, and they knew not how to procure any more, because no necessity had hitherto compelled them. For all these reasons they were in a great strait; wherefore also the gifts spoken of in the old tradition were imparted to them by the gods, together with the indispensable knowledge and information of their uses; fire was given to them by Prometheus, the arts by Hephaestus and his fellow-worker (Athene), seeds and plants by others. Out of these human life was framed; since the care of the Gods, as I was saying, had now failed men, and they had to order their course of life for themselves, and were their own masters, just like the universal creature whom they imitate and follow, ever living and being born into the world, at one time after this manner, at another time after another manner. Enough of the story, which may be of use in showing us how greatly we erred in the delineation of the king and the statesman in our previous discourse.

Y. Soc. What was this great error of which you speak?

Str. There were two; the first a lesser one, the other was an error on a much larger and grander scale.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. I mean to say that when we were asked about a king ²⁷⁵ and statesman of the present cycle and generation, we told of a shepherd who belonged to the other cycle, and of one who was a god when he ought to have been a man; and this was a great error. Again, in so far as we declared him to be the ruler of the entire State, without explaining the nature of his rule, this was not the whole truth, nor clearly expressed, but still was true, and therefore the second error was not so great as the first.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Before we can expect to have a perfect description of the statesman we must define the nature of his office.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And the mythus was introduced in order to show, not only that all others are rivals of the true shepherd who is the object of our search, but in order that we might have a clearer view of him who is alone worthy to receive this appellation, because he alone of shepherds and herdsmen, according to the image which we have employed, has the care of human beings.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And I cannot help thinking, Socrates, that the form of the divine Shepherd is above even that of a king; whereas the statesmen who are now on earth seem to be much more like their subjects in character, and much more nearly to partake of their breeding and education.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Still they must be investigated all the same, whether, like the divine Shepherd, they are above their subjects or on a level with them.

Y. Soc. Of course.

Str. To resume:—do you remember that we spoke of a supreme art which had the charge of animals, not singly but collectively, which we called the art of the herdsman?

Y. Soc. Yes, I remember.

Str. There, somewhere, lay our error; for we never included or mentioned the Statesman; and we did not observe that he had no place in our nomenclature.

Y. Soc. How was that?

Str. All herdsmen rear their herds, but this is not a suitable term to apply to the Statesman, who should have a more general name.

Y. Soc. True, if there be such a name.

Str. Why, is not care of herds a more general name? For this implies no feeding, or any special duty; if we say either tending the herds, or managing the herds, or having the care of them, that will include all, and then we may wrap up the Statesman with the rest, as the argument seems to require.

276 *Y. Soc.* Quite right; but how shall we take the next step in the division?

Str. As before we divided the art of rearing herds into land and water animals, winged and wingless, mixing or not mixing the breed, horned and hornless, so we may divide by these same

differences the tending of herds, comprehending in one word both the life which now is, and the rule of Cronos.

Y. Soc. That is clear ; but I still ask, what is to follow ?

Str. If the word had been 'managing' herds, instead of feeding or rearing them, no one would have argued that there was no care of them in the case of the politician, although it was justly contended, that there was no human art of feeding them which was worthy of the name, or at least, if there were, many other arts had more right to the name than any king.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But no other art or science will claim or have a better or greater right than the royal science to care for human society and men in general.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. In the next place, Socrates, we must surely notice that a great error was committed at the end of our analysis.

Y. Soc. What was that ?

Str. Why, supposing there to be such an art as the art of rearing or nourishing bipeds, there was no reason why we should call this the royal or political art, as though there were no more to be said.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. Our first duty, as we were saying, was to remodel the name, so as to have the notion of care rather than of feeding, and then to divide, for there may be still considerable divisions.

Y. Soc. How can they be made ?

Str. First, by separating the divine shepherd from the human guardian or manager.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And the art of management which is assigned to man would again have to be subdivided.

Y. Soc. On what principle ?

Str. On the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

Y. Soc. Why ?

Str. Because, if I am not mistaken, there has been an error here ; for our simplicity led us to rank them together, whereas they are utterly different, and their modes of government are different.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Then, now, as I said, let us make the correction and divide human care into two parts, on the principle of voluntary and compulsory.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And if we call the management of violent rulers tyranny, and the voluntary management of voluntary bipeds politics, may we not further assert that he who has this latter art of management is the true king and statesman?

277 *Y. Soc.* I think, Stranger, that we have now completed the account of the Statesman.

Str. Would that we had, Socrates, but I have to satisfy myself as well as you; and in my judgment the figure of the king is not yet perfected; like statuaries who, in their too great haste, having overdone the several parts of their work, lose time in correcting them, so too we, partly out of haste, partly out of a magnanimous desire to detect our former error, and also because we imagined that a king required grand illustrations, have taken up a marvellous lump of fable, and have been obliged to use more than was necessary. This made us discourse at large, and, nevertheless, the story never came to an end. And our discussion might be compared to a picture of some living being which had been fairly drawn in outline, but had not yet attained the life and clearness which is given by the blending of colours. Now to intelligent persons a living being is more truly delineated by language and discourse than by any painting or work of art: to the duller sort by works of art.

Y. Soc. Very true; but what is the imperfection which still remains? I wish that you would tell me.

Str. The higher ideas, my dear friend, can hardly be set forth except through the medium of examples; every man seems to know all things in a kind of dream, and then again to know nothing when he awakes.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. I fear that I have been unfortunate in my attempt to describe our experience of knowledge.

Y. Soc. Why so?

Str. Why, because my 'example' requires the assistance of another example.

Y. Soc. Proceed, I shall be interested to hear.

Str. I will proceed, finding, as I do, such a ready listener in you : when children are beginning to know their letters——

Y. Soc. What are you going to say?

Str. That they easily recognise the several letters in very short and easy syllables, and are able to tell you them correctly. 278

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Whereas in other syllables they do not recognise them, and think and speak falsely of them.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Will not the best and easiest way of guiding them to the letters which they do not as yet know, be to refer them to the same letters in the words which they know, and to compare these with the letters which as yet they do not know, and show them that they are the same, and have the same character in their different combinations, until the letters, which they do not know, have been all placed side by side with the letters which they do know? in this way they have examples, and are made to learn that every letter in every combination is pronounced always either as the same or not the same.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Are not examples formed in this manner? We take that which is the same with something in some other separate thing, and when this is rightly conceived and compared with the first, out of the comparison their arises one true notion, which includes both of them.

Y. Soc. Exactly.

Str. Can we wonder, then, that the soul has the same uncertainty about the alphabet of things, and sometimes and in some cases is firmly fixed by the truth, and then, again, in other cases is all abroad ; having somehow or other a correct notion of certain combinations ; but when the elements are translated into the long and difficult language of facts, is again ignorant of them?

Y. Soc. There is nothing wonderful in that.

Str. Could any one, my friend, who began with false opinion ever expect to attain wisdom, or to arrive even at a small portion of truth?

Y. Soc. Hardly.

Str. Then you and I will not be far wrong in trying to see

in a small and partial instance the nature of example in general ; that lesser instance we shall transfer to the similar nature of the king, and to the royal class which is the greatest of all, and by the help of example endeavour to recognise scientifically his calling ; and then the dream will become a reality to us.

Y. Soc. Very true.

279 *Str.* Then, once more, let us resume the previous argument, and as there were innumerable rivals of the royal race who claim to have the care of states, let us part them all off, and leave him alone ; and, as I was saying, a model or example of this process has first to be framed.

Y. Soc. Exactly.

Str. What model is there which is small, and yet has any analogy with the political occupation ? Suppose, Socrates, that if we have no other example at hand, we choose weaving, or, more precisely, weaving of wool—this will be quite enough, without taking the whole of weaving, to illustrate our meaning ?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Why should we not apply to weaving the same processes of division and subdivision which we have already applied to other classes ; going as rapidly as we can through all the steps until we come to that which is needed for our purpose ?

Y. Soc. How do you mean ?

Str. I shall answer that by actually performing the process.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. All things which we create or possess are either creative or preventive ; of the preventive class are spells and antidotes, divine and human, and also defences ; and defences are either military weapons or protections ; and protections are veils, and also shields against heat and cold ; and shields against heat and cold are shelters and coverings ; and coverings are blankets and garments ; and garments are some of them in one piece, and others of them are made in several parts ; and of these latter some are pierced, others are fastened and not pierced ; and of the not pierced, some are made of the sinews of plants, and some of hair ; and of these, again, some are cemented with water and earth, and others are fastened together by themselves. And these last defences and coverings which are fastened together by themselves are called clothes, and the

art which superintends them is called, from the nature of the operation, the art of clothing, just as before the art of the Statesman was derived from the State; and may we not say 280 that the art of weaving, at least that large portion of it which was concerned with the making of clothes (cp. 279 B), differs only in name from this art of clothing, in the same way that, in the previous case, the royal science differed from the political?

Y. Soc. Most true.

Str. In the next place, let us make the reflection, that the art which we term the weaving of clothes, and which an incompetent person might fancy to have been sufficiently described, has been separated off from several others which are of the same family, but not from the co-operative arts.

Y. Soc. And what arts are of the same family?

Str. I see that I have not taken you with me. I think, therefore, that we had better go back and begin at the end once more. We just now parted off from clothing the making of blankets, which differ from clothes in that one is put under and the other is put around: and these are what I termed arts of the same family.

Y. Soc. I understand.

Str. And we have subtracted the manufacture of all articles made of flax and cords, and all that which we just now metaphorically termed the sinews of plants, and we have also separated off the process of felting and the putting together of materials by piercing and sewing, of which the most important part is the cobbler's art.

Y. Soc. Precisely.

Str. Then we separated off the currier's art, which prepared coverings in entire pieces, and subtracted the various arts of sheltering which are employed in building, and in general in carpentering, the art of making water-tight, and all such arts as furnish impediments to thieving and acts of violence, and are concerned with making the lids of boxes and the mortising of doors, being divisions of the art of joining; and we also cut off the manufacture of arms, which is a section of the great and manifold art of making defences; and we originally began by parting off the whole of the magic art which is concerned with antidotes, and have left, as would appear, the very art

of which we were in search, which is an art of protection against winter cold, and fabricates woollen defences, and has the name of weaving.

Y. Soc. Very true.

281 *Str.* Yes, my boy, but that is not all, for the first process to which the material is subjected is the opposite of weaving.

Y. Soc. How is that?

Str. Weaving is a sort of uniting?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. But the first process is a separation of the clotted and matted fibres?

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. I mean the work of the carder's art; for we cannot say that carding is weaving, or that the carder is a weaver.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. Again, if a person were to say that the art of making the warp and the woof was the art of weaving, he would say what was unmeaning and false.

Y. Soc. To be sure.

Str. Shall we say that the whole art of the fuller or of the mender has nothing to do with the care and treatment of clothes, or are we to regard all these as arts of weaving?

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. And yet surely all these arts will maintain that they are concerned with the treatment and production of clothes; and will dispute the exclusive prerogative of weaving, and though assigning a large sphere to that, will still reserve a considerable field for themselves.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Besides these, there are the arts which make tools for the weaver's use, and which will claim to be co-operators in every work of the weaver.

Y. Soc. Most true.

Str. Well, then, suppose that we define weaving, or rather that part of weaving which has been selected by us, to be the greatest and noblest of arts which are concerned with woollen garments—shall we be right? Is not the definition, although true, wanting in clearness and completeness; for do not all those other arts require to be first cleared away?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Then the next thing will be to separate them, in order that the argument may proceed by regular steps. Let us consider, in the first place, that there are two kinds of arts, which have to do with all processes.

Y. Soc. What are they?

Str. The one is the conditional or co-operative, the other the principal cause.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. The arts which do not manufacture the actual thing, but which furnish the necessary tools for the manufacture, and without which the several arts could not fulfil their appointed work, I call co-operative, but those which make the things themselves I call causal.

Y. Soc. I see the principle.

Str. The arts which make spindles, shuttles, and other instruments of the production of clothes, I call co-operative, and those which treat and fabricate the things themselves, causal.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. To the causal class belong the arts of washing and mending, and the preparatory arts; these may be all comprehended under the art of the fuller, which is a division of the larger sphere of the art of adornment. 282

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Another art has to do with carding and spinning threads, and the various arts of manufacturing a woollen garment; and this is just the common art which is called working in wool.

Y. Soc. To be sure.

Str. Of the wool-working, again, there are two divisions, and both these are parts of two arts at once.

Y. Soc. How is that?

Str. Carding and one half of the use of the shuttle, and the other processes of wool-working which separate the composite, may be said to belong both to the art of wool-working, and also to one of the two great arts which are of universal application—the art of composition and the art of division.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. To the latter belongs carding, and the other processes of which I was speaking; the art of discernment or division

in wool and yarn, which is effected in one manner with the shuttle and in another with the hands, is variously described under all the names which I just now mentioned.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Again, let us take some process of wool-working which is a portion of the art of composition, and, dismissing the elements of division which we found there, make two halves, one on the principle of composition, and the other on the principle of division.

Y. Soc. Let that be done.

Str. And once more, Socrates, you must divide the part, which belongs at once both to wool-working and composition, if we are ever to discover satisfactorily the aforesaid art of weaving.

Y. Soc. That will be requisite.

Str. Yes, certainly, and let us call one part of the art the art of twisting threads, the other the art of combining them.

Y. Soc. Do I understand you, in speaking of twisting, to be referring to the warp?

Str. Yes, and to the woof also; how, if not by twisting, is the woof made?

Y. Soc. There is no other way.

Str. Then suppose that you define the warp and the woof, for I think that the definition will be of use to you.

Y. Soc. How shall I define them?

Str. As thus: A piece of carded wool which is drawn out lengthwise and breadthwise is said to be pulled out.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And the wool thus prepared, which is twisted by the spindle, and made into a firm thread, is called the warp, and the art which regulates these operations may be called the art of spinning the warp.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And the threads which are more loosely spun having a softness proportioned to the intertexture of the warp and relative to the degree of force to be used in dressing the cloth,—the threads which are thus spun are called the woof, and the art which is set over them may be called the art of spinning the woof.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And, now, there can be no mistake about the nature of the part of weaving which we have undertaken to define. For when that part of the art of composition which is employed in working of wool forms a web by the regular intertexture of warp and woof, the entire woven substance is called by us a woollen garment, and the art which presides over this is the art of weaving.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. But why did we not say at once that weaving is the art of entwining warp and woof, instead of making a long and useless circuit?

Y. Soc. I thought, Stranger, that there was nothing useless in what was said.

Str. Very likely, but you may not always think the same; and in case any feeling of dissatisfaction should hereafter arise in your mind, let me lay down a principle which will apply to arguments in general:

Y. Soc. Proceed.

Str. Let us begin by considering the whole nature of excess and defect, and then we shall have a rational ground on which we may praise or blame the too great length or conciseness of speeches in discussions of this kind.

Y. Soc. Let us do so.

Str. The points on which I think that we ought to dwell are the following:—

Y. Soc. What are they?

Str. The points that I mean are length and shortness, excess and defect, with all of which the art of measurement is conversant.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And the art of measurement has to be divided into two parts, with a view to our present purpose.

Y. Soc. Where would you make the division?

Str. As thus: I would make two parts, one which has to do with relative size; and there is another, without which the existence of production would be impossible.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. Does not the greater in the order of nature appear to

you to be only relative to the less, and the less only relative to the greater?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Well, but is there not also a greater and less exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean, both in words and deeds, and is not this a reality, and does not the chief difference between good and bad men consist in this?

Y. Soc. Plainly.

Str. Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason why?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

284 *Str.* If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. But if the science of the Statesman disappears, there will be no possibility of finding out the royal science.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Well, then, as in the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science.

Y. Soc. Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.

Str. But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other.

of which we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort:—

Y. Soc. What?

Str. That we shall some day require this notion of a standard with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither.

Y. Soc. True; and what is the next step?

Str. The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts, and place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness¹, with their opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes.

Y. Soc. Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different spheres.

Str. There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say 285 that the art of measurement is universal, and has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying, for there is certainly a sense in which all things that are within the province of art partake of measure. But these persons, from not being accustomed to distinguish classes according to their real forms, jumble together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the idea that they are the same, and fall into the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right way is, when a man once sees the unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences which exist in distinct classes, nor should he be able to rest satisfied in the contemplation of the innumerable diversities of

kinds until he has comprehended all that have any affinity to each other within the sphere of a single class, notion, or essence. Thus much of excess and defect, and of the art of measurement in general; we have only to keep in mind that the two divisions of the art have been discovered, and not to forget what they are.

Y. Soc. We will not forget.

Str. And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to another question, which will embrace not this argument only but arguments in general.

Y. Soc. What is this new question?

Str. Suppose that some one should desire us to tell him, Whether, when one of the pupils at a school is asked what letters make up a name,—he is asked in order to improve his grammatical knowledge of the particular word, or of all words?

Y. Soc. Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of all words.

Str. And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our knowledge of philosophy generally?

Y. Soc. Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general.

Str. Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of weaving for its own sake. But people seem to forget that some things have sensible images, which may be easily shown, when any one desires to exhibit any of them or explain them to an enquirer, without any trouble or argument; while the greatest and noblest truths have no outward image of themselves visible to man, which he who wishes to satisfy the longing soul of the enquirer can adapt to the eye of sense, and therefore we ought to practise reasoning; for immaterial things, which are the highest and greatest, are shown only in thought and idea, and in no other way, and all that we are now saying is said for the sake of them. Moreover, there is always less difficulty in fixing the mind on small matters than on great.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Let us keep in mind the bearing of all this.

Y. Soc. What is the bearing?

Str. I wanted to get rid of any impression of tediousness which we may have experienced in the discussion about weaving, and the reversal of the universe, and in the discussion concerning the Sophist and the essence of not-being. I know that they were felt to be too long and irrelevant. I reproached myself with this, and all that I have now said is only designed to prevent the recurrence of any such disagreeables for the future.

Y. Soc. Very good. Will you proceed?

Str. Then I would like to observe that you and I, remembering what has been said, would praise or blame the shortness of discussions, not by comparing them with one another, but according to a standard of measure, having in view what is fitting, which, as we were saying, must be borne in mind.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And yet, not everything is to be judged even with a view to what is fitting in all respects; for we do not want such a length as is suited to give pleasure, which is quite a secondary matter; and reason tells us, that we should be contented to make the ease or rapidity with which an enquiry is attained, not the first, but the second object; the first and highest of all being to assert the great method of division according to species,—whether the discourse be shorter or longer is not to the point. No offence should be taken at length, but the longer and shorter are to be employed indifferently, according as either of them is better calculated to sharpen the wits of the auditors. Reason would also say to him who censures the length of discourses and cannot away with their circumlocution, that he should not at once lay them aside or censure them as tedious, but he should ²⁸⁷ prove that if they had been shorter they would have made those who took part in them better dialecticians, and more capable of expressing the truth of things—about any other praise and blame, he need not trouble himself; he need not be supposed to hear them. But we have had enough of this, as you will probably agree with me in thinking. Let us return to our Statesman, and apply to his case the aforesaid example of weaving.

Y. Soc. Very good;—let us do as you say.

Str. The art of the king has been separated from the similar arts of shepherds, and, indeed, from all those which have to do with herds at all. There still remain, however, those causal and co-operative arts which are immediately concerned with States, and which must first be distinguished from one another.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. You know that these arts cannot easily be divided into two halves ; the reason will be evident as we go forward.

Y. Soc. We had better go forward.

Str. Then we must carve them like a victim into members or limbs if we cannot bisect them. For we certainly should divide everything into as few parts as possible.

Y. Soc. How is that to be accomplished in this case ?

Str. As in the example of weaving, all those arts which furnished the tools of weaving were regarded by us as co-operative.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. So now, and with still more reason, all arts which make any implement in a State, whether great or small, may be regarded by us as co-operative, for without them neither State nor Statesman could exist ; and yet we are not inclined to say that any of them is the work of the kingly art.

Y. Soc. No, indeed.

Str. The task of separating this class from others is not an easy one ; for there is plausibility in saying that anything in the world is the instrument of doing something. But there is another class of possessions in a city, of which I have something to say.

Y. Soc. What class ?

Str. A class which may be described as not having this power¹ ; that is to say, not like an instrument, designed for production, but for the preservation of that which is produced.

Y. Soc. What do you mean ?

Str. The class of vessels, as they are comprehensively termed, which are framed for the preservation of things moist and dry, 288 in the fire or out of the fire ; this is a very large class, and has,

¹ Or, taking the words in a different context, 'As not having political power—I say another class, because not like an instrument, &c.'

if I am not mistaken, literally nothing to do with the royal art.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. There is a third class also to be discovered, different from these and very extensive, moving or resting on land or water, honourable and also dishonourable, having a name descriptive of sitting, because always intended to be a seat for something.

Y. Soc. What is that?

Str. A vehicle, which is certainly not the work of the Statesman, but of the carpenter, potter, and brassfounder.

Y. Soc. I understand.

Str. And is there not a fourth class which is again different, and in which most of the things formerly mentioned are contained?—Every kind of dress, most sorts of arms, walls and enclosures, whether of earth or stone, and ten thousand other things; all of which being made for the sake of defence, may be truly called defences, and are for the most part to be regarded as the work of the builder or of the weaver, rather than of the Statesman?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Shall we add a fifth class, of ornamentation and drawing, and of the imitations produced by drawing and music, which are designed for amusement only, and may be fairly comprehended under one name?

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. Plaything is the name.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. That is a name which may be fitly predicated of all of them, for none of these things have a serious purpose—amusement is the aim of them all.

Y. Soc. I understand.

Str. Then, again, there is a class which provides materials for all these; out of which and in which the arts already mentioned fabricate their works,—this manifold class, I say, which is the creation and offspring of many other arts, may I not rank sixth?

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. I am speaking of gold, silver, and other metals, and all

that wood-cutting and every other sort of cutting provides for the art of carpentry and plaiting; and there is the process of barking and stripping the cuticle of plants, and the carrier's art, which strips off the skins of animals, and other similar arts which manufacture corks and papyri and cords, and provide for the manufacture of composite species out of simple kinds—the whole class may be termed the primitive and simple possession of man, and with this the kingly science has no concern at all.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. The provision of food and of all other things which mingle their particles with the particles of the human body, and minister to the body, may form a seventh class, which may be called by the general term of nourishment, unless you have any better name to offer. This, however, appertains rather to the husbandman, huntsman, trainer, doctor, cook, and is not to be assigned to the Statesman's art.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. These seven classes include nearly every description of property, with the exception of tame animals. Consider;—there was the original material, which ought to have been placed first; next came instruments, vessels, vehicles, defences, playthings, nourishment; small things, which may be included under any of these—as for example, coins, seals and stamps, are omitted, for they have not in them the character of any larger kind which comprehends them; but some of them may, with a little forcing, be placed among ornaments, and others may be made to harmonize with the class of implements. The art of herding, which has been already divided into parts, will include all property in animals except slaves.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. The class of slaves and ministers only remains, and, I suspect, that in this the real aspirants for the throne, who are the rivals of the king in the formation of the political web, will be discovered; just as spinners, carders, and the rest of them, were the rivals of the weaver: all the rest were termed co-operators, and have been already got rid of among the occupations already mentioned, and separated from the royal and political science.

Y. Soc. I agree.

Str. Let us go a little nearer, in order that we may be more certain of the complexion of this remaining class.

Y. Soc. Let us do so.

Str. We shall find that the greatest servants, and those who appear to us from our present point of view to be most truly servants, are in a case and condition which is the reverse of what we anticipated.

Y. Soc. Who are they?

Str. Those who are purchased, and who are unmistakably slaves—they certainly do not claim royal science.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. Again, freemen who of their own accord become the servants of the other classes in a State, and who exchange and equalise the products of husbandry and the other arts, some sitting in the market-place, others going from city to city by land or sea, and giving money in exchange for money or for other productions—the money-changer, the merchant, 290 the ship-owner, the retailer, will not put in any claim to statecraft or politics.

Y. Soc. No; unless, indeed, to commercial politics.

Str. But surely men whom we see acting as hirelings and serfs, and too happy to turn their hand to anything, will not profess to share in royal science.

Y. Soc. Certainly not.

Str. But what would you say of some other serviceable officials?

Y. Soc. Who are they, and what services do they perform?

Str. There are heralds and scribes, perfected by practice, and divers others who have great skill in various sorts of business connected with the government of states—what shall we call them?

Y. Soc. They are the officials, and servants of the rulers, as you just now called them, not themselves rulers.

Str. There may be something strange in any servant pretending to be a ruler, and yet I do not think that I could have been dreaming when I imagined that the principal claimants to political science belonged to the class of servants.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Well, let us draw nearer, and try the claims of others who have not yet been sifted: in the first place, there are diviners, who have a portion of servile or ministerial science, and are thought to be the interpreters of the gods to men.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. There are also priests who, as the law declares, know how to give the gods gifts from men in the form of sacrifices, which are acceptable to them, and to ask for us a return of blessings from them. Now both these are branches of the servile or ministerial art.

Y. Soc. Yes, clearly.

Str. And here I think that we seem to be getting on the right track; for the priest and the diviner also are full of pride and prerogative—this is due to the greatness of their employments; and in Egypt, the king himself is not allowed to reign, unless he have priestly powers, and if he should be of another class and has thrust himself in, he must get enrolled in the priesthood. In many parts of Hellas, the duty of offering the most solemn propitiatory sacrifices is assigned to the highest magistracies, and here, at Athens, the most solemn and national of the ancient sacrifices are supposed to be celebrated by the King Archon of the year.

Y. Soc. Precisely.

291 *Str.* But who are these elected kings and priests who now come into view with a crowd of retainers, as the former class disappears and the scene changes?

Y. Soc. Whom can you mean?

Str. How strangely they look!

Y. Soc. Why strangely?

Str. A minute ago I thought that they were all sorts of animals; for many of them are like lions and centaurs, and many more like satyrs and the weak and versatile sort of animals;—Protean shapes ever changing their form and nature; and now, Socrates, I begin to see who they are.

Y. Soc. Who are they? You seem to be gazing on some strange vision.

Str. Yes; every one looks strange when you do not know him; and at first sight, coming suddenly upon him, I did not recognise the politician and his troop.

Y. Soc. Who is he?

Str. The chief of sophists and most accomplished of wizards, who must at any cost be separated from the true king or Statesman, if we are ever to see daylight in the present enquiry.

Y. Soc. That certainly is not a hope to be lightly renounced.

Str. Nay, never, if I can help; and, first, let me ask you a question.

Y. Soc. What are you going to ask?

Str. Is not monarchy a recognised form of government?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And, after monarchy, next in order comes the government of the few?

Y. Soc. Of course.

Str. Is not the third form of government the rule of the multitude, which is called by the name of democracy?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And do not these three expand in a manner into five, producing out of themselves two other names?

Y. Soc. What are they?

Str. There is a criterion of voluntary and involuntary, poverty and riches, law and the absence of law, which men apply to them; the two first they subdivide accordingly, and ascribe to monarchy two forms and two corresponding names, royalty and tyranny.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And the government of the few they distinguish by the names of aristocracy and oligarchy.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Democracy alone, whether respecting the laws or not, ²⁹² and whether the multitude rule over the men of property with their consent or against their consent, always in ordinary language has the same name.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But do you suppose that any form of government which is distinguished by these characteristics of the one, the few, or the many, of poverty or wealth, of compulsion or freedom, of written or unwritten law, is a right one?

Y. Soc. Why not?

Str. Think a little; and let me take you with me.

Y. Soc. In what direction?

Str. Shall we abide by what we said at first, or shall we retract our words?

Y. Soc. To what do you refer?

Str. If I am not mistaken, we said that royal power was a science?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And a science of a peculiar kind, which was selected out of the rest as having at once a judicial and commanding nature?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And there was one kind of command of lifeless things and another of living animals; and so we proceeded in the division step by step up to this point, not losing the idea of science, but unable as yet to determine the nature of the particular science?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Hence we are led to observe that the several forms of government cannot be defined by the words few or many, voluntary or compulsory, poverty or riches; but some notion of science must enter in, if we are to be consistent with what has preceded.

Y. Soc. And we must be consistent.

Str. Well, then, in which of these various forms of States may the science of government, which is among the greatest and most difficult of all sciences, be supposed to reside? That we must discover, and then we shall see who are the false politicians who win popularity and pretend to be politicians and are not, and separate them from the wise king.

Y. Soc. That, as the argument has already intimated, is our duty.

Str. Do you think that the multitude in a State can attain political science?

Y. Soc. Impossible.

Str. But, perhaps, in a city of a thousand men, there would be a hundred, or say fifty, who could?

Y. Soc. In that case political science would certainly be the easiest of all sciences; there could not be found in a city of that number as many really first-rate draught-players, if judged

by the standard of the rest of Hellas, and there would certainly not be as many kings. For kings we may truly call those who possess royal science, whether they rule or not, as was shown in the previous argument.

Str. Thank you for reminding me; and the consequence is ²⁹³ that any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And these, whether they rule with the will, or against the will, of their subjects, with written laws or without written laws, and whether they are poor or rich, and whatever be the nature of their rule, must be supposed, according to our present view, to rule on some scientific principle; just as the physician, whether he cures us against our will or with our will, and whatever be his mode of treatment,—bleeding, burning, or the infliction of some other pain, whether he practises out of a book or not out of a book, and whether he be rich or poor, whether he purges or reduces in some other way, or even fattens his patients, is a physician all the same, while he exercises authority over them according to rules of art, if he only does them good and heals and saves them. And this we lay down to be the only proper test of the art of medicine, or of any other art of command.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. Then that can be the only true form of government in which the governors are found to possess true science, and are not mere pretenders, whether they rule according to law or without law, over willing or unwilling subjects, and are rich or poor themselves,—none of these things can properly be included in the notion of the ruler.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And whether with a view to the public good they purge the State by killing some, or exiling some; whether they lower or increase the body corporate, by sending out or receiving into the hive swarms of citizens, while they act according to the rules of wisdom and justice, whether with or without laws, if they use their power with a view to the general security and improvement, then the city over which they rule, and which has these characteristics, may be described as the only true

State. All other governments are not genuine or real, but only imitations of this, and some of them are better and some of them are worse; the better are said to be well governed, but they are mere imitations like the others.

Y. Soc. I agree, Stranger, in the greater part of what you say; but as to their ruling without laws—the expression has a harsh sound.

294 *Str.* I was just going to ask, Socrates, whether you objected to any of my statements; and now I see that this notion of there being good government without laws will require some further consideration.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. There can be no doubt that legislation is in a manner the business of a king, and yet the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom and royal power. Do you see why this is?

Y. Soc. Why?

Str. Because the law in aiming at what is noblest or most just cannot at once comprise what is best for all. The differences of men and actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not admit of any universal and simple rule. No art whatsoever can lay down a rule which will last for all time.

Y. Soc. Of course not.

Str. But the law is always striving to make one;—like an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked—not even in sudden changes of circumstances, when something happens to be better than what he commanded for some one.

Y. Soc. True; such is the manner in which the law treats us.

Str. A perfectly simple principle can never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse of simple.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Then if the law is not the perfection of right, why are we compelled to make laws at all? The reason of this has next to be investigated.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Let me ask, whether you have not meetings for gymnastic exercises in your city, such as there are in other cities, at which men compete in running, wrestling, and the like?

Y. Soc. Yes; they are very common among us.

Str. And what are the rules which those who are in authority impose on the pupils at such meetings? Can you remember?

Y. Soc. To what do you refer?

Str. The training-masters do not issue minute rules for individuals, or give every individual what is exactly suited to his constitution; they think that they ought to go more roughly to work, and give a general rule for what will benefit the constitutions of the majority.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. And therefore they assign equal amounts of exercise to them all; they send them forth together, and let them rest together from their running, wrestling, or whatever the bodily exercise may be which they prescribe for them.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Let us consider further, that the legislator who has to 295 preside over the herd, and to enforce justice in their dealings with one another, will not be able, in enacting for the general good, to provide exactly what is suitable for each particular case.

Y. Soc. He cannot be expected to do so.

Str. He will lay down laws in a general form for the majority, roughly meeting the cases of individuals; and some of them he will deliver in writing, and others will be unwritten; and these last will be traditional customs of the country.

Y. Soc. That will be right.

Str. Yes; that will be right, for how can he sit at every man's side all through his life, and prescribe for him the exact particulars of his duty? Who, Socrates, would be sufficient for such a task? No one who really had the royal science, if he had been able to do this, would have imposed upon himself the restriction of having a written code of laws.

Y. Soc. So I should infer from what has now been said.

Str. And yet more, my good friend, from what is going to be said.

Y. Soc. What is that?

Str. Let us put to ourselves the case of a physician, or trainer, who is about to go into a far country, and is expecting to be a long time away from his patients ; he leaves written instructions for the patients or pupils, under the idea that they will not be remembered unless they are written down.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. But what would you say, if he came back sooner than he intended, and, owing to an unexpected change of the winds or other celestial influences, some other remedies happened to be better for them,—would he not venture to suggest those other remedies, although differing from his former prescription? Would he persist in observing the original law, neither himself giving any new commandments, nor the patient daring to do otherwise than was prescribed, under the idea that this course only was healthy and medicinal, all others noxious and heterodox? Viewed in the light of science and true art, would not all such regulations be utterly ridiculous?

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. And if he who gave laws, written or unwritten, determining what was good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, just or unjust to the tribes of men who herd in their several cities, and are governed in accordance with them; if, I say, the wise
296 legislator were suddenly to come again, or another like to him, is he to be prohibited from changing them;—would not this prohibition be in reality quite as ridiculous as the other?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Do you know a plausible saying of the common people which is in point?

Y. Soc. I do not recall what you mean at the moment.

Str. They say that if any one knows how the ancient laws may be improved, he must first persuade his own State of the improvement, and then he may legislate, but not otherwise.

Y. Soc. And are they not right?

Str. I dare say. But supposing that he does use some gentle violence for their good, what is this violence to be called? Or rather, before you answer, let me ask the same question in reference to our previous instances.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. Suppose that a skilful physician has a patient, of what-

ever sex or age, whom he compels against his will to do something for his good which is contrary to the written rules, what is this compulsion to be called? Would you ever dream of calling it a violation of the art, or breach of the laws of health? Nothing could be more unjust than for the patient to whom such a gentle violence is applied, to charge the physician who practises the violence with wanting skill or aggravating his disease.

Y. Soc. Most true.

Str. In the political art the error is not called disease, but evil, or disgrace, or injustice.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. And when the citizen, contrary to law and custom, is compelled to do what is juster and better and nobler than he did before, and this sort of violence is blamed, the last and most absurd thing which he could say, is that he has incurred disgrace or evil or injustice at the hands of the legislator who uses the violence.

Y. Soc. That is very true.

Str. And shall we say that the violence, if exercised by a rich man, is just, and if by a poor man, unjust? May not any man, rich or poor, with or without written laws, with the will of the citizens or against the will of the citizens, do what is for their interest? Is not this the true principle of government, in accordance with which the wise and good man will order the affairs of his subjects? As the pilot watches over the interests of the ship, 297 or of the crew, and preserves the lives of his fellow-sailors, not by laying down rules, but by making his art a law—even so, and in the self-same way, may there not be a true form of polity created by those who are able to govern in a similar spirit, and who show a strength of art which is superior to the law? Nor can wise rulers ever err while they regard the one great rule of distributing justice to the citizens with intelligence and art, and are able to preserve, and, so far as that is possible, to improve them.

Y. Soc. No one can deny what has been said.

Str. Neither, if you consider, can any one deny the other statement.

Y. Soc. What was it? Digitized by Microsoft®

Str. We said that no great number of persons, whoever they may be, can have political knowledge, or order a State wisely, but that the true government is to be found in a small body, or in an individual, and that other States are but imitations, as has been already said, some for the better and some for the worse, but all of them imitations of this one.

Y. Soc. What are you saying? I must acknowledge that I did not understand at the time the remark which you made about the imitations.

Str. And yet the mere suggestion thus thrown out, even if the error which men now commit [of not keeping the law] be no further investigated, is highly important.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. The idea which has to be grasped by us is not easy or familiar; but what I mean to say, may be expressed as follows:—Supposing the government of which I have been speaking to be the only true model, then the others must use the written laws of this, which will be their salvation, if they will only do what is now generally approved, although not the best thing in the world.

Y. Soc. What is generally approved?

Str. That no citizen should do anything contrary to the laws, and that any infringement of them should be punished with death and the most extreme penalties; and this is very right and good when regarded as the second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now speaking. Shall I explain the nature of what I call the second best?

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. I must again have recourse to my favourite images; through them, and them alone, can I describe kings and rulers.

Y. Soc. What images?

Str. The noble pilot and the wise physician, who 'is worth many another man'—in the similitude of these let us endeavour to discover some image of the king.

Y. Soc. What sort of an image?

298 *Str.* Well, such as this:—Every man will reflect that he suffers strange things at their hands; the physician saves any whom he wishes to save, and any whom he wishes to injure he injures—cutting or burning them, and at the same time requiring them to

bring him payments, which are a sort of tribute, of which a very small part is spent upon the sick man, and the greater part is consumed by him and his domestics; and the finale is that he receives money from the relations of the sick man or from some enemy of his, and puts him out of the way. And the captains of ships are guilty of numberless evil deeds of the same kind; they play false and leave you ashore when the hour of sailing arrives; or they wreck their vessels and cast away freight and lives; not to speak of other rogueries. Now suppose that we, bearing all this in mind, were to determine, after consideration, that neither of these arts shall any longer be allowed to exercise absolute control either over freemen or over slaves, but that we will summon an assembly either of all the people, or of the rich only, and that anybody who likes, whatever may be his calling, or even if he have no calling, may offer an opinion either about ships or about diseases—whether as to the manner in which physic or surgical instruments are to be applied to the patient, or about the vessels and the nautical instruments which are required in navigation, and how to meet the dangers of winds and waves which are incidental to the voyage, how to behave when encountering pirates, and what is to be done with the old-fashioned galleys, if they have to fight with others of a similar build—and that, whatever shall be decreed by the multitude on these points, upon the advice of persons skilled or unskilled, shall be written down on triangular tablets and columns, or embalmed unwritten as national customs; and that in all future time vessels shall be navigated and remedies administered to the patient after this fashion.

Y. Soc. What a strange notion!

Str. Suppose further, that the admirals and physicians are appointed annually, either out of the rich, or out of the whole people, and that they are elected by lot; and that after their election they navigate vessels and heal the sick according to the written rules.

Y. Soc. Worse and worse.

Str. But hear what follows:—When the year of office has expired, the admiral or physician has to come before a court of review, in which the judges are either selected from the wealthy 299 classes or chosen by lot out of the whole people; and anybody

who pleases may accuse them, and he will lay to their charge, that during the past year they have not navigated their vessels or healed their patients according to the letter of the law or according to the ancient customs of their ancestors; and if either of them is condemned, there must be persons to fix what he is to suffer or pay.

Y. Soc. He who is willing to take a command under such conditions, deserves to suffer any penalty.

Str. Yet once more, we shall have to enact that if any one is detected enquiring into sailing and navigation or health, or into the true nature of medicine, or about the winds, or other conditions of the atmosphere, contrary to the written rules, and has any ingenious notions about such matters, he is not to be called a pilot or physician, but a cloudy talking sophist;—also a corrupter of the young, who would persuade them to follow the art of medicine or piloting in an unlawful manner, as the irresponsible masters of the patients or ships; and any one who is qualified by law may inform against him, and indict him in some court, and then if he is found to be corrupting any, whether young or old, he is to be punished with the utmost rigour of the law; for no one should presume to be wiser than the laws; and as touching healing and health and piloting and navigation, the nature of them is known to all, for anybody may learn the written laws and the national customs. If such were the mode of procedure, Socrates, about these sciences and about generalship, and any branch of hunting, or about painting or imitation in general, or carpentry, or any sort of manufacture, or husbandry, or planting, or if we were to see an art of rearing horses, or tending herds, or divination, or any ministerial service, or draught-playing, or any science conversant with number, whether simple or square or cube, or comprising motion,—I say, if all these things were done in this way according to written regulation, and not according to art, what would be the result?

Y. Soc. All the arts would utterly perish, and could never be recovered, because enquiry would be unlawful. And human life, which is bad enough already, would then become utterly unendurable.

300 *Str.* But what, if while compelling all these operations to be regulated by written law, we were to appoint as the guardian of

the laws some one elected by a show of hands, or by lot, and he caring nothing about the laws, were to act contrary to them from motives of interest or favour, and without knowledge,—would not this be a still worse evil than the former ?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, and the wisdom of counsellors who have persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law ?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. Therefore, as there is a danger of this, the next best thing in legislating is to have the laws observed alike by one and all.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. The laws would be copies of the true particulars of action as far as they admit of being written down from the lips of those who have knowledge ?

Y. Soc. Certainly they would.

Str. And, as we were saying, he who has knowledge and is a true Statesman, will do many things by his art without regard to the laws, when he is of opinion that something other than that which he has written down and enjoined to be observed during his absence would be better.

Y. Soc. Yes, we said so.

Str. And any individual or State, which has fixed laws, would only be acting like the true Statesman, in acting contrary to the laws with a view to something better ?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. If they had no knowledge of what they were doing, they would imitate the truth, and they would always imitate ill ; but if they had knowledge, the imitation would be the perfect truth, and an imitation no longer.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. And the principle that no number of men are able to acquire a knowledge of any art, has been already admitted by us.

Y. Soc. Yes, that has been admitted.

Str. Then the royal or political art, if there be such an art, will never be attained either by the wealthy or by the other mob.

Y. Soc. Impossible.

Str. Then the nearest approach which these lower forms of government can ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. When the rich imitate the true form, such a government is called aristocracy; and when they are regardless of the laws, oligarchy.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Or again, when an individual rules according to law in imitation of him who knows, we call him a king; and if he rules according to law, we give him the same name, whether he rules with opinion or with knowledge.

Y. Soc. To be sure.

Str. And when an individual truly possessing knowledge rules, his name will surely be the same—he will be called a king; and thus the five names of governments, as they are now reckoned, become one.

Y. Soc. That is true.

Str. And when an individual ruler governs neither by law nor by custom, but following in the steps of the true man of science pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance direct the imitation, may not such an one be called a tyrant?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And this we believe to be the origin of the tyrant and the king, of oligarchies, and aristocracies, and democracies; because men are offended at the one monarch, and can never be made to believe that any one can be worthy of such authority, or can unite the will and the power in the spirit of virtue and knowledge to do justly and holily to all; they fancy that he will be a despot who will wrong and harm and slay whom he pleases of us; for if there could be such a despot as we describe, they would acknowledge that we ought to be too glad to have him, and that he alone would be the happy ruler of a true and perfect State.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. But then, as the State is not like a beehive, and has

no natural head who is the recognized superior in body and mind, mankind are obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to approach as nearly as they can to the true form of government.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would be utterly undermined,—there can be no doubt of that. 302 Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Then the question comes:—which of these untrue forms of government is the least oppressive to their subjects, though they are all oppressive; and which is the worst of them? Here is a consideration which is beside our present enquiry, but which we all of us should keep in view in all our actions.

Y. Soc. Certainly we should.

Str. You may say that of the three forms, the same is at once the hardest and the easiest.

Y. Soc. What do you mean?

Str. I mean that there are three forms of government, as I said at the beginning of this discussion—monarchy, the rule of the few, and the rule of the many.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. If we divide each of these we shall have six, from which the true one may be distinguished as a seventh.

Y. Soc. How would you make the distinction?

Str. Monarchy divides into royalty and tyranny; the rule of the few into aristocracy, which has an auspicious name, and

oligarchy ; and democracy or the rule of the many, which before was one, must now be divided.

Y. Soc. On what principle of division ?

Str. On the same principle as before, although the name is equivocal. For the distinction of ruling with law or without law, applies to this as well as to the rest.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. There was no use in having such a division, as we showed before, when we were looking for the true State. But now that this has been separated off, and we spoke of the others as the best which we had, the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all.

Y. Soc. That would seem to follow, from what has been said.

Str. Then monarchy, when bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the best, and when lawless is the most bitter and oppressive to the subject ?

Y. Soc. True.

303 *Str.* The government of the few, which is intermediate between that of the one and many, is also intermediate in good and evil ; but the government of the many is in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil, when compared with the others, because the offices are too much subdivided and too many hold them. And this therefore is the worst of all lawful governments, and the best of all lawless ones. If they are all without the restraints of law, democracy is the form in which to live is best ; if they are well ordered, then this is the last which you should choose, as royalty is the best, with the exception of the seventh, for that excels them all, and is among States what God is among men.

Y. Soc. You are quite right, and we should choose that above all.

Str. The members of all the other States, with the exception of that which has knowledge, may be set aside as being not Statesmen but partisans,—upholders of the most monstrous idols, and themselves idols ; and, being the greatest imitators and magicians, they are also the worst of sophists.

Y. Soc. The name of Sophist after many windings appears to have been most deservedly applied to the politicians, as they are called.

Str. And so the satyric drama has been played out ; and now the troop of centaurs and satyrs, however unwilling to leave the political stage, have taken their departure.

Y. Soc. So I perceive.

Str. There are, however, natures more nearly akin to the king, and more difficult to discern ; the examination of them may be compared to the process of refining gold.

Y. Soc. What is your meaning ?

Str. The workmen begin by sifting away the earth and stones and the like ; they then draw off in the fire, which is the only way of abstracting them, the more precious elements of copper, silver, or other metallic substance, which have an affinity to gold ; these are at last refined away by the use of tests, and the gold is left quite pure.

Y. Soc. Yes, that is the way in which these things are said to be done.

Str. In like manner, all alien and uncongenial matter has been separated from political science, and what is precious and of a kindred nature has been left ; there remain the nobler arts of the general and the judge, and the higher sort of oratory which is an ally of the royal art, and persuades men to do justice, and assists in guiding the helm of States :—What way 304 can be found of taking them away, leaving him whom we seek alone and unalloyed ?

Y. Soc. That is clearly what has to be attempted.

Str. If the attempt is all that is wanting, he shall certainly be brought to light ; and I think that the illustration of music may assist in exhibiting him. Please to answer me a question.

Y. Soc. What question ?

Str. There is such a thing as learning music or other handicraft art ?

Y. Soc. There is.

Str. And is there any other and further science which has to do with judging what sciences are and are not to be learned ;—what do you say ?

Y. Soc. I should answer that there is.

Str. And is this science to be acknowledged as different from the other ?

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. And ought no science to be superior, or ought the other sciences to be superior to this; or ought this science to be the overseer and governor of all the others?

Y. Soc. The latter.

Str. You mean to say that the science which judges whether we ought to learn or not, must be superior to the science which is learned or which teaches?

Y. Soc. Far superior.

Str. And the science which determines whether we ought to persuade or not, must be superior to the science which is able to persuade?

Y. Soc. Of course.

Str. Very good; and to what science do we assign the power of persuading a multitude by a pleasing tale and not by teaching?

Y. Soc. That power, I think, must clearly be assigned to rhetoric.

Str. And to what science do we give the power of determining whether we are to use persuasion or force in relation to any particular thing or person, or whether the use of them is to be allowed at all?

Y. Soc. To that science which governs the arts of speech and persuasion.

Str. Which, if I am not mistaken, will be politics?

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Rhetoric seems to be quickly distinguished from politics, as a different species, which is the handmaiden of the other.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. But what would you think of another sort of power or science?

Y. Soc. What science?

Str. The science which has to do with military operations against our enemies—is that to be regarded as a science or not?

Y. Soc. How can generalship and military tactics be regarded as other than a science?

Str. And is the art which is able and knows how to advise when we are to go to war, or to make peace, the same as this or different?

Y. Soc. If we are to be consistent, we must say different.

Str. And we must also suppose that this rules the other, if 305
we are not to give up our former notion?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And, considering how great and terrible the whole art
of war is, can we imagine any superior art but the truly royal?

Y. Soc. None but that.

Str. The art of the general is only ministerial, and therefore
not political?

Y. Soc. Exactly.

Str. Once more let us consider the nature of the righteous
judge.

Y. Soc. Very good.

Str. Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men
with one another to be just or unjust in accordance with the
standard which he receives from the king and legislator,—
showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not
perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or any sort of love or
hatred, into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary
to the appointment of the legislator?

Y. Soc. No; his office is such as you describe.

Str. Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not
royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which minis-
ters to the royal power?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. The review of all these sciences shows that none of
them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not to
act, but to rule over those who are able to act, and to take
the initiative; the king ought to know when to begin, and
to seize the opportunities of action, whilst others execute his
orders.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as
they have no authority over themselves or one another, but
are each of them concerned with some special action of their
own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding
to their several actions.

Y. Soc. I agree.

Str. And that common science which is over them all, and

guards the laws, and all things that there are in the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of this common nature, most truly we may call politics.

Y. Soc. By all means.

Str. Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State, shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied?

Y. Soc. I greatly wish that you would.

306 *Str.* Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are drawn into one.

Y. Soc. Clearly.

Str. A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, appears to be necessary.

Y. Soc. Certainly the attempt must be made.

Str. To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to common opinion.

Y. Soc. I do not understand.

Str. Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue?

Y. Soc. Certainly I should.

Str. And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and that would also be a part of virtue?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them.

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. That they are two principles which are full of hatred and antagonism to one another, and pervade a great part of nature.

Y. Soc. How singular!

Str. Yes, very—for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be friendly to one another.

Y. Soc. Yes.

Str. Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their kindred in some respect.

Y. Soc. Tell me how we shall consider that question.

Str. We must extend the question to all those things which

we consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes.

Y. Soc. Explain ; what are they ?

Str. Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or speech, and in the imitations of them which painting and poetry supply, you must have often praised, and have observed others to praise them.

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And do you remember the terms in which they are praised ?

Y. Soc. I do not.

Str. I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which is passing in my mind.

Y. Soc. Why not ?

Str. You fancy that this is all so easy : Well, let us consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes¹ of action under which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind or body or speech, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage.

Y. Soc. How ?

Str. We speak of an action as energetic and manly, quick and manly, and vigorous and manly ; which is the common epithet applicable to all persons of this class.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also ? 307

Y. Soc. To be sure.

Str. And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other ?

Y. Soc. How do you mean ?

Str. In speaking of the mind, we say how calm ! how temperate ! These are the terms in which we describe the working of the intellect ; and again we speak of actions as soft and slow, and of the voice as smooth and deep, and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general as having a proper solemnity. Of all such actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order.

¹ Or reading, as Professor Campbell suggests, γενέσσει, 'in their opposite workings.' *Univ Calif - Digitized by Microsoft* ®

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, the names of either are changed into terms of censure.

Y. Soc. How is that?

Str. Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that these qualities, and in general the temperance of one class of characters and the manliness of another, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that the men who have these qualities are at variance with one another.

Y. Soc. How do you mean?

Str. In the instance which I mentioned, and very likely in many others, there are some things which they praise as being like themselves, and other things which they blame as belonging to the opposite characters—and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrels arise among them.

Y. Soc. True.

Str. The difference between the two classes is amusing enough at times; but when affecting really important matters, becomes a most utterly hateful disorder in the State.

Y. Soc. To what do you refer?

Str. To nothing short of the whole course of human life. For the orderly class are always ready to lead a peaceful life, and do their own business; this is their way of living with all men at home, and they are equally ready to keep the peace with foreign States. And on account of this fondness of theirs for peace, which is often out of season where their influence prevails, they become by degrees unwarlike, and bring up their young men to be like themselves; they are at the command of others; and hence in a few years they and their children and the whole city often pass imperceptibly from the condition of freemen into that of slaves.

308 *Y. Soc.* What a cruel fate!

Str. And now think of what happens with the more courageous natures. Are they not always inciting their country to go to war, owing to their excessive love of the military life—

their enemies are many and mighty—and they either utterly destroy their cities or they enslave and subject them to their enemies?

Y. Soc. That, again, is true.

Str. Must we not admit, then, that these two classes are always in the greatest antipathy and antagonism to one another?

Y. Soc. We cannot deny it.

Str. Have we not found, as we said at first, that considerable portions of virtue are at variance with one another, and give rise to a similar opposition in the characters who are endowed with them?

Y. Soc. True.

Str. Let us consider a further point.

Y. Soc. What is it?

Str. I want to know, whether any constructive art will make any, even the smallest thing, out of bad and good materials indifferently, if this can be avoided? whether all art does not rather reject the bad as far as possible, and accept the good and fit materials, and out of these elements whether like or unlike, gathering all into one, work out some form or idea?

Y. Soc. To be sure.

Str. Then the true natural art of statesmanship will never allow any State to be formed by a combination of good and bad men, if this can be avoided; but will begin by testing human natures in play, and after testing them, will entrust them to proper teachers who are her ministers—she will herself give orders, and maintain authority; like weaving, which continually gives orders and maintains authority over the carders and all the others who prepare the material for the work, showing to the subsidiary arts, the works which she deems necessary for making the web.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. In like manner, the royal science appears to me to be the mistress of all careful educators and instructors, and having this queenly power, will not allow any of them to train characters unsuited to the political constitution which she desires to create, but such as are suitable only. Other natures, which have no share of manliness and temperance, or any other

virtuous inclination, and, from the necessity of an evil nature, are violently carried away to godlessness and injustice and violence, she exterminates by death, and punishes them by exile and the greatest of disgraces.

Y. Soc. That is commonly said.

309 *Str.* But those who are wallowing in ignorance and baseness she bows under the yoke of slavery.

Y. Soc. Quite right.

Str. The rest of the citizens, of whom, if they have education, something noble may be made, and who are capable of social science, the kingly art blends and weaves together; taking on the one hand those whose natures tend rather to courage, which is the stronger element and may be regarded as the warp, and on the other hand those which incline to order and gentleness, and which are represented in the figure as spun thick and soft, after the manner of the woof—these, which are naturally opposed, she seeks to bind and weave together in the following manner—

Y. Soc. In what manner?

Str. First of all, she takes the eternal element and binds that with a kindred, that is, with a divine cord, and then the element of life, and binds that with human cords.

Y. Soc. I do not understand what you mean.

Str. The meaning is, that the opinion about the honourable and the just and good and their opposites, which is true and confirmed by reason, is a divine principle, and when implanted in the soul, is implanted, as I maintain, in a nature of heavenly birth.

Y. Soc. Yes; what else should it be?

Str. Only the Statesman and the good legislator, having the inspiration of the royal muse, can implant this opinion, and he, only in the rightly educated, whom we were just now describing.

Y. Soc. Likely enough.

Str. But him who cannot, we will not designate by any of the names which are the subject of the present enquiry.

Y. Soc. Very right.

Str. The courageous soul when attaining this truth, becomes civilized, and rendered more capable of partaking of justice; but when not partaking, is inclined to brutality. Is not that true?

Y. Soc. Certainly.

Str. And again, the peaceful and orderly nature, if sharing in these opinions, becomes temperate and wise, as far as there can be wisdom in States, but if not, is justly styled silly.

Y. Soc. Quite true.

Str. Can we say that such a connection as this will lastingly unite the evil with one another or with the good, or that there is any science which would seriously think of using a bond of this kind to join such materials?

Y. Soc. Impossible.

Str. But in those which were originally noble natures, and 310 have been trained accordingly—in those only may we not say that the bond of union is implanted by law, and that this is the medicine which art prescribes for them, and the divine bond, which, as I was saying, heals and unites dissimilar and contrary parts of virtue?

Y. Soc. Very true.

Str. Where this divine bond exists there is no difficulty in imagining, or when you have imagined, in creating the other human bonds.

Y. Soc. How is that, and of what bonds do you speak?

Str. Those of intermarriage, and those which are formed between States by giving and taking children in marriage, as well as by private betrothals and espousals. For many persons form unions of an improper kind, with a view to the procreation of children.

Y. Soc. In what way?

Str. They seek after wealth and power, which in matrimony are objects not worthy even of a serious censure.

Y. Soc. There is no need to consider them at all.

Str. More reason is there to consider the practice of those who make family their chief aim, and to indicate their error.

Y. Soc. Yes, that is reasonable.

Str. They act on no principle at all; they seek their ease and receive with open arms those who are like themselves, and hate those who are unlike them; and are wholly under the influence of their feelings of dislike.

Y. Soc. How is that?

Str. The quiet orderly class seek for natures like their own,

and as far as they can they marry and give in marriage exclusively in this class, and the courageous do the same; they seek natures like their own, whereas they should both do precisely the opposite.

Y. Soc. How and why is that?

Str. Because courage, when untempered by the gentler nature during many generations, may at first bloom and strengthen, but at last bursts forth into every sort of madness.

Y. Soc. Like enough.

Str. And then, again, the soul which is over-full of modesty and has no element of courage in many successive generations, is apt to grow very indolent, and at last to become utterly paralyzed and useless.

Y. Soc. That, again, is quite likely.

Str. It was of these bonds I said that there would be no difficulty in creating them, if only both classes originally held the same opinion about the honourable and good;—indeed, in this single word, the whole process of royal weaving is comprised—never to allow temperate natures to be separated from the brave, but to weave them together, like the warp and the woof, by
311 common sentiments and honours and opinions, and by the giving of pledges to one another; and out of them forming one smooth and even web, to entrust to them the offices of State.

Y. Soc. How do you mean?

Str. Where one officer only is needed, you must choose a ruler who has both these qualities—when many, you must mingle some of each, for the temperate ruler is very careful and just and safe, but is wanting in thoroughness and go.

Y. Soc. Certainly, that is very true.

Str. The character of the courageous, on the other hand, falls short of the former in justice and caution, but has the power of action in a remarkable degree, and where either of these two qualities is wanting, there cities cannot altogether prosper either in their public or private life.

Y. Soc. Certainly they cannot.

Str. This then, according to our view, is the perfection of the web of political action. There is a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, when the kingly science has drawn the two sorts of lives into communion by unanimity and kind-

ness ; and having completed the noblest and best of all the webs which civic life admits, and enveloping therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in one fabric and governs and presides over them, omitting no element of a city's happiness.

Y. Soc. You have completed, Stranger, a very perfect image of the king and of the Statesman.

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
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THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

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THE
DIALOGUES OF PLATO

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH ANALYSES AND INTRODUCTIONS

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L A W S.

INTRODUCTION.

THE genuineness of the Laws is sufficiently proved (1) by more than twenty citations of them in the writings of Aristotle, who was residing at Athens during the last years of the life of Plato, and who returned to Athens after the death of Plato, at the time when he was himself writing his Politics and Constitutions; (2) by the allusion of Isocrates¹—writing 346 B. C., a year after the death of Plato, and not more than two or three years after the composition of the Laws—who speaks of the Laws and Republics written by philosophers (sophists); (3) by the reference (Athen. 226 A) of the comic poet Alexis, a younger contemporary of Plato (fl. B. C. 356–306), to the enactment about prices, which occurs in Laws, xi. 917 B, viz. that the same goods should not be sold at two prices on the same day²; (4) by the unanimous voice of later antiquity and the absence of any suspicion among ancient writers

¹ Oratio ad Philippum Missa, p. 85: Τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων (sc. speeches in the assembly) ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμένας.

² Οὐ γέγονε κρείττων νομοθέτης τοῦ πλουσίου Ἀριστονίκου· τίθησι γὰρ νυνὶ νόμον τῶν ἰχθυοπωλῶν ὅστις ἂν πωλῶν τινὲ ἰχθὺν ὑποτιμήσας ἀποδῶτ' ἐλάττονος ἧς εἶπε τιμῆς εἰς τὸ δεσμωτήριον εὐθὺς ἀπάγεσθαι τοῦτον, ἵνα δεδοικότες τῆς ἀξίας ἀγαπῶσιν, ἢ τῆς ἐσπέρας σαπροῦς ἅπαντας ἀποφέρωσιν οἰκαδε.

Meincke, Frag. Com. vol. iii. p. 438.

worth speaking of to the contrary; for it is not said of Philippus of Opus that he composed any part of the Laws, but only that he copied them out of the waxen tablets, and wrote the *Epinomis* (*Diog. Laert.* iii. 25). That the longest and one of the most excellent writings bearing the name of Plato should be a forgery, even if the work were unsupported by external testimony, would be a singular phenomenon in ancient literature; and although the critical worth of the consensus of late writers is generally not to be compared with the express testimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be attributed to their consent in the present instance, because the admission of the Laws is combined with doubts about the *Epinomis*, a spurious writing, which seems to stand in nearly the same relation to the larger work in which the *Timaeus* Locrus stands to the *Timaeus*. This shows that the reception of the Laws was not altogether indiscriminating.

The suspicion which has attached to the Laws of Plato in the judgment of some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in the style and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and opinion which they observe in them. Their suspicion is increased by the fact that these differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking to passages in other Platonic writings. They are sensible of a want of point in the dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas, plan, manners, and style. They miss the luminous and poetical flow, 'smoother than a river of oil,' the dramatic verisimilitude, the life and variety of the characters, the dialectic subtlety, the Attic purity, the exquisite urbanity; instead of which they find tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency, sermonizing, rhetorical declamation, uncouth forms of sentences, and peculiarities in the use of words and idioms. They are unable to discover any unity in the patched, irregular structure. The speculative element both in government and education is superseded by a narrow economical or religious vein. The grace and cheerfulness of Athenian life have disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious intolerance has taken their place. There is a cynical levity in them, and a tone of disappointment and lamentation over human things. They seem also to observe in them bad imitations of thoughts which are better expressed in Plato's other writings. Lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived the *Republic* could have left the *Critias*, *Hermocrates*, and *Philosophus* incomplete or unwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the completion of the Laws.

The questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be considered by us under five or six heads: I, the characters; II, the plan; III, the style; IV, the imitations of other writings of Plato; V, the more general relation of the Laws to the Republic and the other dialogues; and VI, to the existing Athenian and Spartan states.

I. Already in the *Philebus* the character of Socrates has disappeared; and in the *Timaeus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus* his function of chief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher *Timaeus*, and to the Eleatic Stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent. More and more Plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character and method of Socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his philosophy. He is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a hesitating enquirer,' but one who speaks with the authority of a legislator. Even in the *Republic* we have seen that the dialogue is unreal, and that the argument which is carried on in the old style with *Thrasymachus* in the first book soon passes into the form of exposition.

The *Laws* are discussed by three representatives of Athens, Crete, and Sparta. The Athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief speaker, while the second place is assigned to the Cretan, who, as one of the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the conversation. At least four-fifths of the answers are put into his mouth. The Athenian talks to the two others, although they are his equals in age, in the style of a master discoursing to his scholars; he frequently praises himself; he entertains a very poor opinion of their understanding. Certainly the boastfulness and rudeness of the *Laws* is the reverse of the refined irony and courtesy which characterize the earlier dialogues. We are no longer in such good company as in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*.

The scene is laid in Crete, and the conversation is held in the course of a walk from *Cnosus* to the cave and temple of *Zeus*, which takes place on one of the longest and hottest days of the year (iii. 683 C). The companions are said to start at dawn, and to arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates the fourth book, about noon (iv. 722 C). The God to whose temple they are going is the lawgiver of Crete, and may be supposed at this very cave to have given his oracles to *Minos*. But the externals of the scene, which are briefly and inartistically described, soon disappear, and we plunge abruptly into the subject of the dialogue. We are reminded by contrast of the higher art of the *Phaedrus*, in which the summer's day, and the cool stream, and the

chirping of the grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the agnus castus, and the legends of the place are present to the imagination throughout the discourse.

The typical Athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen 'to spin a very long discussion out of slender materials,' and in a similar spirit the Lacedaemonian Megillus also apologizes (cp. Thucyd. iv. 17) for the Spartan brevity; he admits that long discourses may be sometimes necessary. The family of Megillus is the proxenus of Athens and Sparta; and he pays a beautiful compliment to the Athenian, significant of a certain Athenian element which is discernible in the Laws. A good Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because he is inspired by nature and not manufactured by law. The love of listening which is attributed to the Timocrat in the Republic (viii. 548 E) is also exhibited in him (iii. 683 C). The Athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to the Lacedaemonian of the struggle in which their ancestors were jointly engaged against the Persians. A connection with Athens is likewise intimated by the Cretan Cleinias. He is the relative of Epimenides, whom, by an anachronism of seventy or eighty years, he describes as coming to Athens, not after the attempt of Cylon, but ten years before the Persian war. The Cretan and Lacedaemonian can hardly be said to contribute to the argument of which the Athenian is the expounder; they only supply information when asked about the institutions of their respective countries. A kind of simplicity or stupidity is ascribed to them (x. 885 ff., 888 E). At first, they are dissatisfied with the free criticisms which the Athenian passes upon the laws of Minos and Lycurgus, but they acquiesce in his greater experience and knowledge of the world. They admit that there can be no objection to the enquiry; for in the spirit of the legislator himself, they are discussing his laws when there is no one present to hear them. They are unwilling to allow that the Spartan and Cretan lawgivers can have been mistaken in honouring courage as the first part of virtue (ii. 667 A), and are puzzled at hearing for the first time (ii. 661 D) 'that goods are only evil to the evil.' Several times they are on the point of quarrelling, and by an effort learn to restrain their natural feeling (cp. Shakespeare, Henry V, act iii. sc. 2). In Book vii. (806 D), the Lacedaemonian expresses a momentary irritation at the accusation which the Athenian brings against the Spartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women, but he is reminded by the Cretan that the permission to criticize them freely has

been given, and cannot be retracted. His only criterion of truth is the authority of the Spartan lawgiver; he is 'dumb-founded' (i. 636 E) at the speculations of the Athenian, but inclines to prefer the ordinances of Lycurgus.

The three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old men, which forms a pleasant bond of union between them. They have the feelings of old men about youth, about the state, about human things in general. Nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they are spectators rather than actors, and men in general appear to the Athenian speaker to be the playthings of the Gods and of circumstances. Still they have a fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed by sentiments of religion. They would give confidence to the aged by an increasing use of wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their tongues and make them sing. The prospect of the existence of the soul after death is constantly present to them; though they can hardly be said to have the cheerful hope and resignation which animates Cephalus in the Republic. We shall not be wrong in supposing that Plato is expressing his own feelings in remarks of this sort. For at the time of writing the first book of the Laws he was at least seventy-four years of age, if we suppose him, at p. 638 A, to allude to the victory of the Syracusans under Dionysius the Younger over the Locrians, which occurred in the year 356. Such a sadness was the natural effect of declining years and failing powers, which make men ask, 'after all, what profit is there in life?' They feel that their work is beginning to be over, and are ready to say, 'all the world is a stage'; or, in the actual words of Plato, 'let us play as many good plays as we can,' though 'we must be sometimes sericus, which is not agreeable, but necessary.' These are feelings which have crossed the minds of reflective persons in all ages. And there is no reason to connect the Laws any more than other parts of Plato's writings with the very uncertain narrative of his life, or to imagine that this melancholy tone is attributable to disappointment at having failed to convert a Sicilian tyrant into a philosopher.

II. The plan of the Laws is more irregular and has less connection than any other of the writings of Plato. As Aristotle says in the Politics, 'The greater part consists of Laws'; in Books v, vi, xi, xii the dialogue almost entirely disappears. They seem to be rather the materials for a work, nearly but not quite complete, than a finished composition which may rank with the other Platonic dialogues. To use

his own image, 'Some stones are regularly inserted in the building; others are lying on the ground ready for use.' There is probably truth in the tradition that the Laws were not published until after the death of Plato. We can easily believe that he has left imperfections, which would have been removed if he had lived a few years longer. The arrangement might have been improved; the connection of the argument might have been made plainer, and the sentences more accurately framed. Something also may be attributed to the feebleness of old age. Even a rough sketch of the *Phaedrus* or *Symposium* would have had a very different look. There is, however, an interest in possessing one writing of Plato which is in the process of creation.

We must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through this comparative disorder. The first four books are described by Plato himself as the preface or preamble. Having arrived at the conclusion that each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at the end of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the preamble of the whole. This preamble or introduction may be abridged as follows:—

The institutions of Sparta and Crete are admitted by the Lacedaemonian and Cretan to have one aim only: they were intended by the legislator to inspire courage in war. To this the Athenian objects that the true lawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not to one only. Better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he who has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils, than he who is a good soldier only. Better, too, is peace than war; the reconciliation than the defeat of an enemy. And he who would attain all virtue should be trained amid pleasures as well as pains. Hence there should be convivial intercourse among the citizens, and a man's temperance should be tested in his cups, as we test his courage amid dangers. He should have a fear of the right sort, as well as a courage of the right sort.

At the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to education, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline imparted by the means of pleasure and pain. The discipline of pleasure is implanted chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance. Of these the forms should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle breath of the multitude. There will be choruses of boys, girls, and grown-up persons, and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that 'virtue is

happiness.' One of them will give the law to the rest; this will be the chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful and the most useful of songs. They, too, will require a little wine, in order to mellow the austerity of age, and make them amenable to our laws.

After having laid down the first principle of politics, and briefly discussed music and festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book Plato makes a digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society. He describes, first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage, which is an aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular cities, like Ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and political system, like that of Sparta, with which he identifies Argos and Messene, dating from the return of the Heraclidae. But the aims of states should be good, or else, like the prayer of Theseus, they may be ruinous to themselves. This was the case in two out of three of the Heracleid kingdoms. They did not understand that the powers in a state should be balanced. The balance of powers saved Sparta, while the excess of tyranny in Persia and the excess of liberty at Athens have been the ruin of both.

This discourse on politics is suddenly discovered to have an immediate practical use; for Cleinias the Cretan is about to give laws to a new colony. The fancy which in the Critias was left incomplete, of locating the ideal state in the island of Atlantis, is partially realized in the Laws.

At the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the circumstances and situation of the colony, the Athenian proceeds to make further reflections. Chance, and God, and the skill of the legislator, all co-operate in the formation of states. And the most favourable condition for the foundation of a new one is when the government is in the hands of a virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be the contemporary of a great legislator. But a virtuous tyrant is a contradiction in terms; we can at best only hope to have magistrates who are the servants of reason and the law. This leads to the enquiry, what is to be the polity of our new state. And the answer is, that we are to fear God, and honour our parents, and to cultivate virtue and justice; these are to be our first principles. Laws must be definite, and we should create in the citizens a predisposition to obey them. The legislator will teach as well as command; and with this view he will prefix preambles to his principal laws.

The fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher preamble about the honour due to the soul, whence are deduced

the duties of a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger. He should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts, forgiving to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary; and he should have a true taste. The noblest life has the greatest pleasures and the fewest pains. Having finished the preamble, and touched on some other preliminary considerations, we proceed to the Laws, beginning with the constitution of the state. This is not the best or ideal state, having all things common, but only the second best, in which the land and houses are to be distributed among 5040 citizens divided into four classes. There is to be no gold or silver among them, and they are to have moderate wealth, and to respect number and numerical order in all things.

In the first part of the sixth book, Plato completes his sketch of the constitution by the appointment of officers. He explains the manner in which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town and country, ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be appointed; and also in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted, and omissions in the law to be supplied. At this point (p. 772) the Laws strictly speaking begin, with enactments respecting marriage and the procreation of children, respecting property in slaves as well as of other kinds, respecting houses, married life, common tables for men and women. The question of age in marriage suggests the consideration of a similar question about the time for holding offices, and for military service, which had been previously omitted.

Resuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the previous book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the seventh book. Education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be continued for a time by mothers and nurses under the inspection of the state; finally, to comprehend music and gymnastics. Under music is included reading, writing, playing on the lyre, arithmetic, and a knowledge of astronomy and mathematics, sufficient to preserve the minds of the citizens from impiety in after life. Gymnastics are to be practised chiefly with a view to their use in war. The discussion of education, which was lightly touched upon in Book ii, is here completed.

The eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with festivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the like. On such occasions Plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together, and hence he takes occasion to discuss the relations of the sexes, the

evil consequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the remedies for them. Then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and trades, of buying and selling, and foreign commerce.

The remaining books of the Laws, ix—xii, are chiefly concerned with criminal offences. In the first class are placed offences against the Gods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples: next follow offences against the state, beginning with thefts. The mention of thefts suggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and incurable offences. Proceeding to the greater crime of murder, he distinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, and murder with malice pre-pense; murders by kindred, murders by slaves, wounds with or without intent to kill, actions done from passion, which are partly voluntary and partly involuntary, crimes of or against slaves, and insults to parents. To these various modes of purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and the terrors of another world are also invoked against them.

At the beginning of Book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege, are summed up in a single law. The law is preceded by an admonition, in which the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act, or said an unlawful word, retaining his belief in the existence of the Gods; but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they took no care of man, or that they might be turned from their course by sacrifices and prayers. The remainder of the book is devoted to the refutation of these three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the means to be taken for their reformation, and the announcement of their punishments if they continue obstinate and impenitent.

The eleventh book is taken up with laws and admonitions relating to individuals, which follow one another without any exact order. There are laws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves and freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments, poisonings, magical arts, and the like. In the twelfth book the same subjects are continued. Laws are passed concerning violations of military discipline, concerning the censorship of magistrates, and of the citizens living and dead; concerning oaths and the violation of them, and the punishments of those who neglect their duties as citizens. Foreign trade is then discussed, and the permission to be accorded to citizens of travelling in foreign parts; the classes of strangers who may visit the city are spoken of, and

the manner in which they are to be received. Laws are added respecting sureties, searches for property, right of possession by prescription, abduction of witnesses, theatrical competition, plots against the state, and bribery in offices. Rules are also given respecting tribute, respecting economy in sacred rites, respecting judges, their duties and sentences, and respecting sepulchral places and ceremonies. Here (at p. 960) the laws end. Lastly, a nocturnal council is instituted for the preservation of the state, consisting of older and younger members, who are to exhibit in their lives that virtue which is the basis of the state, to know the one in many, and to be educated in divine and every other knowledge, which will enable them to fulfil their office.

III. The style of the Laws differs in several important respects from the other dialogues of Plato: (1) in the want of character, power, and lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms (cp. Introduction to the *Philebus*); (3) in the form and rhythm of the sentences; (4) in the use of words. On the other hand, there are many passages (5) which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur; and (6) in which, perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a greater reach of practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of Plato's writings.

i. The discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an old man's game of play, which is compared to a game of draughts. Yet there is little of the liveliness of a game in their mode of treating the subject. They do not throw the ball to and fro, but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is constantly asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge, and apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of speech. He will 'carry them over the stream'; he will answer for them when the argument is too difficult for them to follow; he is afraid of their ignorance of mathematics, but admits that gymnastic is likely to be more intelligible to them;—he has repeated his words several times, and yet they cannot understand him (ii. 664 C). The subject did not properly take the form of dialogue, and also the dramatic vigour of Plato had passed away. The old men speak as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is a touch of dramatic truth, as well as judgment in the treatment of the subject. Plato has given the Laws that form which was most suited to his own powers of writing in the decline of life. There is no regular plan—none of that consciousness

of what has preceded and what is to follow, which makes a perfect style,—but there are several attempts at a plan; the argument is ‘pulled up,’ and frequent explanations are offered why a particular topic was introduced.

The fictions of the Laws have no longer that verisimilitude which we find in the Phaedrus and the Timæus, or even in the Politicus. We can hardly suppose that an educated Athenian would have placed the visit of Epimenides to Athens ten years before the Persian war (i. 642 D); or have imagined that a war with Messene prevented the Lacedæmonians from coming to the rescue of Hellas (iii. 692 D). The narrative of the origin of the Dorian institutions (iii. 685 foll.), said to be due to fear of the growing power of the Assyrians and the assertion that Troy was a part of the Assyrian empire, are evidently audacious inventions, which may be compared with the tale of the island of Atlantis in the poem of Solon, but are not accredited by similar arts of deception. Nor is there anywhere in the Laws that lively *ἐνάργεια*, that vivid *mise en scène*, which is as characteristic of Plato as of some modern novelists.

The old men are afraid of the ridicule which ‘will fall on their heads more than enough’ (vi. 781 D, vii. 790 A, 800 B), and they do not often indulge in a joke. In one of the few which occur, the book of the Laws if left incomplete is compared to a monster wandering about without a head (vi. 752 A). But we no longer breathe the atmosphere of humour which pervades the earlier writings of Plato, and which makes the broadest Aristophanic joke as well as the subtlest refinement of wit possible; and hence an impression of baldness and feebleness is left upon our minds. Some of the descriptions in the Laws, which to us are most amusing, as, for example, of children roaring for the first three years of life; or of the Athenians walking into the country with fighting-cocks under their arms; or of the slave doctor who knocks about his patients finely (iv. 720 C; cp. viii. 857 D), and the gentleman doctor who civilly persuades them; or of the way of keeping order in the theatre, seem not to have been intended to suggest anything ludicrous. The irony of the earlier dialogues, of which some traces occur in the tenth book, is replaced by a severity which hardly condescends to regard human things. ‘Let us say, if you please, that man is of some account; but I was speaking of him in comparison with God.’

The imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not

assisted by the surrounding phraseology. We have seen how in the Republic, and in the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the wave,' 'the drone,' 'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at intervals. Notes are struck which are repeated from time to time, as in a strain of music. There is none of this subtle art in the Laws. The illustrations, such as the two kinds of doctors, 'the three kinds of funerals,' the fear potion, the puppet, the painter leaving a successor to restore his picture, the 'young man standing to consider where three ways meet,' the 'channel of discourse from which he will not divert the water,' can hardly be said 'to do much credit to his invention.' The citations from the poets have lost that fanciful character which gave them their charm in the earlier dialogues. We are tired of images taken from the arts of navigation, or archery, or weaving, or painting, or medicine, or music. Yet the comparisons of life to a tragedy (vii. 817), or of the working of mind to the revolution of the self-moved (x. 897), or of the aged parent to the image of a God dwelling in the house (xi. 931), or the reflection that 'man is made to be the plaything of God, and that this rightly considered is the best of him' (vii. 803 C), have great beauty.

2. The clumsiness of the dialogue leads to frequent mannerisms and repetitions. The perfection of the Platonic dialogue consists in the accuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another, and the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one another. This finish of style is no longer discernible in the Laws. There is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out of the respondents but 'Yes' or 'No'; the insipid form 'What do you mean?' is constantly recurring. Again and again the speaker is charged, or charges himself, with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will explain his views more clearly. In several passages the Athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner, very unlike the irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares 'that the laws are a divine work given by some inspiration of the Gods,' and 'that youth should commit them to memory instead of the compositions of the poets.' The prosopopoeia which is adopted by Plato in the Protagoras and other dialogues is repeated until we are weary of it. The legislator is always addressing the speakers or the young of the state, and the speakers are constantly making addresses to the legislator. A tendency to a paradoxical manner of statement is also observable.

'We must have drinking,' 'we must have a virtuous tyrant,'—this is too much for the duller wits of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who at first start back in surprise. More than in any other writing of Plato the tone is hortatory; the laws are sermons as well as laws; they are considered to have a religious sanction, and to rest upon a religious sentiment in the mind of the citizens. The mannerism of attributing the words of the Athenian to the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who are supposed to have made them their own, is still maintained. Resumptions of subjects which have been half disposed of in a previous passage constantly occur: the arrangement has neither the clearness of art nor the freedom of nature. Irrelevant remarks are made here and there, or illustrations used which are not properly fitted in. The dialogue is generally weak and laboured, and is in the later books fairly given up; apparently, because unsuited to the subject of the work. The long speeches or sermons of the Athenian, often extending over several pages, have never the grace and harmony which are exhibited in the earlier dialogues. For Plato is incapable of sustained composition; his genius is dramatic rather than oratorical; he can converse, but he cannot speak. Even the *Timaeus*, which is one of his most finished works, is full of abrupt transitions. There is the same kind of difference between the dialogue and the continuous discourse of Plato as between the narrative and speeches of *Thucydides*.

3. The perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease, clearness, the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the scale of human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift of language possessed by Plato in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. From this there are many fallings-off in the *Laws*: first, in the structure of the sentences, which are rhythmical and monotonous,—the formal and sophistical manner of the age is superseding the natural genius of Plato: second, they are often of enormous length, and the latter end frequently appears to forget the beginning of them,—they seem never to have received the second thoughts of the author; either the emphasis is wrongly placed, or there is a want of point in a clause; or an absolute case occurs which is not properly separated from the rest of the sentence; or words are aggregated in a manner which fails to show their relation to one another; or the connecting particles are omitted at the beginning of sentences: the use of the relative and antecedent is more indistinct, the changes of person and number more frequent,

examples of pleonasm, tautology, and periphrasis, unmeaning antitheses of positive and negative, and other affectations, are more numerous than in the other writings of Plato; there is also a more common and sometimes unmeaning use of qualifying formulae, *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κατὰ δύναμιν*, and of double expressions, *παντῇ πάντως, οὐδάμως οὐδαμῇ, ὅπως καὶ ὅπη*—these are too numerous to be attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an over-curious adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet—many forms of affected variety in cadence and expression take the place of natural variety: thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is remarkable—the style is not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of a debased rhetorical kind, patched on to instead of growing out of the subject; there is a great command of words, and a laboured use of them; forced attempts at metaphor occur in several passages,—e. g. viii. 844 A, *παροχετεύειν λόγοις*; ix. 858 C, *τὰ μὲν τιθέμενα τὰ δὲ παρατιθέμενα*; vi. 773 D, *οἶνος κολαζόμενος ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ*; the plays on the word *νόμος = νοῦ διανομή*, iv. 714 A, *ᾠδὴ ἑτέρα*, iii. 700 B: fourthly, there is a foolish extravagance of language in other passages, ‘the swinish ignorance of arithmetic,’ vii. 819 D; ‘the justice and suitableness of the discourse on laws,’ vii. 811 C; over-emphasis at ix. 861 D; ‘best of Greeks,’ vii. 820, said of all the Greeks, and the like: fifthly, poor and insipid illustrations are also common, e. g. i. 638 C, 639 A, ii. 644 E: sixthly, we may observe an unmeaning use of climax and hyperbole, vii. 808 A, *αἰσχρὸν λέγειν χρὴ πρὸς αὐτοὺς δοῦλόν τε καὶ δοῦλην καὶ παῖδα καὶ εἴ πως οἶόν τε ὄλην τὴν οἰκίαν*; i. 636 B, *δοκεῖ τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα κατὰ φύσιν τὰς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἡδονὰς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θηρίων διεφθαρκέαι*.

4. The peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the Laws have been collected by Zeller and Stallbaum: first, in the use of nouns, such as *ἀλλοδημία, ἀπειναίτησις, γλυκυθυμία, θρασυξενία, μεγαλόνοια, παιδουργία, διαθέτηρ, κόρος*. Secondly, in the use of adjectives, such as *αἴστωρ, βιόδοτος, ἐχθοδοπὸς, ἡίθεος, χρόμιος*, and of adverbs, such as *ἀνιδιτι, ἀνατεί, νηπουιεί*. Thirdly, in the use of verbs, such as *αἴσσειν (αἴξειεν εἰπεῖν, iv. 709 A), εἰθιμονύεισθαι, παραποδίζεσθαι, τημελεῖν, τητάν*. These words however, as Stallbaum remarks, are formed according to analogy, and nearly all of them have the support of some poetical or other authority.

Zeller and Stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the Laws, differing from the forms of the same words which occur in other places: e. g. *βλάβος* for *βλάβη*, *ἄβιος* for *ἀβίωτος*, *ἀχάριστος* for *ἄχαρις*, *δοῦλειος* for

δουλικός, παιδείος for παιδικός, ἐξαγριῶ for ἐξαγριαίνω, ἰλοῖμαι for ἰλάσκομαι, and the Ionic word σωφρομιστὺς, meaning 'correction.' Zeller has noted a fondness for substantives, ending in *μα* and *σις*, such as γεώργημα, διά-*παυμα*, ἐπιθύμημα, ζημίωμα, κωμώδημα, ὀμίλημα; βλάβις, λοιδορήσις, παρά-*γελσις*, and others; also a use of substantives in the plural, which are commonly found only in the singular, *μανίαι*, ἀθεότητες, φθόνοι, φόβοι, φύσεις. Also, a peculiar use of prepositions in composition, as in ἐνείργω, ἀποβλάπτω, διανομοθετέω, διείρηται, διευλαβεῖσθαι, and others:— also a frequent use of the Ionic datives plural in *αισι* and *οισι*.

To these peculiarities he has added a list of peculiar expressions and constructions. The most characteristic are the following, viii. 841 D, ἄθυτα παλλακῶν σπέρματα; ix. 855 C, ἄμορφοι ἔδραι; iii. 690 D, ὅσα ἀξιώματα πρὸς ἄρχοντας; vi. 744 B, οἱ κατὰ πόλιν καιροί; μῦθος, used in several places of 'the discourse about laws'; and connected with this the frequent use of παραμύθιον and παραμυθεῖσθαι in the general sense of 'addressing'; vii. 823 E, αἰμύλος ἔρωσ; xii. 960 B, ἄταφοι πράξεις; vi. 752 A, μῦθος ἀκέφαλος; vi. 755 D, ἦθος εὐθύπορον. He remarks also on the frequent use of the abstract for the concrete; e. g. ὑπηρεσία for ὑπηρεταί, φυγαὶ for φυγάδες, μηχαναὶ in the sense of contrivers, δουλεία for δοῦλοι, βασιλείαι for βασιλεῖς, μαίνουmena κηδεύματα for γυναικα μαυνομένην; ἡ χρεία τῶν παίδων in the sense of indigent children, and παίδων ἰκανότης; τὸ ἔθος τῆς ἀπειρίας for ἡ εἰωθῆναι ἀπειρία; κυπαρίττων ὕψη τε καὶ κάλλη θαυμάσια for κυπαρίττοι μάλα ὕψηλαι καὶ καλά. He further notes some curious uses of the genitive case, e. g. φιλίας ὁμολογίαι, μανίαι ὀργῆς, λαιμαργίαι ἡδονῆς, χειμῶνων ἀνυποδησίαι; and of the dative, ὀμιλίαι ἔχθροισι, νομοθεσίαι ἐπιτρόποις; and also some rather uncommon periphrases, θρέμματα Νείλου, ξυγγεννήτωρ τέκνων for ἄλοχος, Μούσης λέξις for ποιήσις, ζωγράφων παῖδες, ἀνθρώπων σπέρματα and the like; the fondness for particles of limitation, especially *τις* and *γε*, σύν *τισι* χάρισι, τοῖς *γε* δυναμένοις and the like; the pleonastic use of *τανῶν*, of *ὡς*, of *ὡς* ἔπος εἰπεῖν, of *ἐκάστοτε*; and the periphrastic use of the preposition *περί*. Lastly, he observes the tendency to hyperbata or transpositions of words; and to rhythmical uniformity as well as grammatical irregularity in the structure of the sentences.

For nearly all the expressions which are adduced by Zeller as arguments against the genuineness of the Laws, Stallbaum finds some sort of authority. There is no real ground for suspecting their genuineness, because several words occur in them which are not

found in the other writings of Plato. An imitator will often preserve the usual phraseology of a writer better than he would himself. But, on the other hand, the mere fact that authorities may be quoted in support of most of these uses of words, does not show that the diction is not peculiar. Several of them seem to be poetical or dialectical, and exhibit an attempt to enlarge the limits of Greek prose, by the introduction of Homeric and tragic expressions. Most of them do not appear to have retained any hold on the later language of Greece. Like several 'experiments in language' of the writers of the Elizabethan age, they were afterwards lost; and though occasionally found in Plutarch, and imitators of Plato, they have not passed current in Aristotle or the common dialect of Greece.

5. Unequal as the style of the Laws is, they contain a few passages which are very grand and noble. For example, the address to the poets at vii. 817: 'Best of strangers, we also are poets of the best and noblest tragedy; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.' Or again, the sight of young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another, suggesting the dangers to which youth is liable from the violence of passion (viii. 835-841); or the eloquent denunciation of unnatural lusts in the same passage; or the charming thought that the best legislator 'orders war for the sake of peace and not peace for the sake of war' (i. 628 E, foll.); or the pleasant allusion 'O Athenian—inhabitant of Attica, I will not say, for you seem to me worthy to be named after the Goddess Athene because you go back to first principles' (i. 626 D); or the pithy saying 'many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors, but education is never suicidal' (i. 641 C); or the fine expression that 'the walls of a city should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them' (vi. 778 D); or the remark that 'God is the measure of all things in a sense far higher than any man can be' (iv. 716 C); or that 'a man should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible' (v. 730 C); or the principle repeatedly laid down, 'that the sins of the fathers are not to be visited on the children,' e. g. ix. 856 C; or the description of the funeral rites of those blessed persons who depart in innocence (xii. 947 B, foll.); or the noble sentiment, that we should do more justice to slaves than to equals, (vi. 777 D); or the curious observation, founded, perhaps, on his own experience, that there are

a few 'divine men in every state however corrupt, whose conversation is of inappreciable value' (xii. 951 C); or the acute remark, that public opinion is to be respected, because the judgments of mankind about virtue are better than their practice (xii. 950 B); or the deep religious and also modern feeling which pervades the tenth book (whatever may be thought of the arguments); the sense of the duty of living as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the will of God (x. 903 D, E), who takes care of the smallest things as well as the greatest (x. 900 C); and the picture of parents praying for their children (x. 887 D, foll.) (not as we may say, slightly altering the words of Plato, as if there were no reality in the Gentile religions, but as if there were the greatest), are very striking to us. We must remember that the Laws are not, like the Republic, an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human motives and feelings; hence there is an attempt made to show that the pleasant is also just. But, on the other hand, the priority of the soul to the body, and of God to the soul, is always insisted upon as the true incentive to virtue; especially with great force and eloquence at the commencement of Book v. And the work of legislation is carried back to the first principles of morals.

6. There is none of Plato's writings which shows so deep an insight into the sources of human evil as the Laws. That 'cities will never cease from ill until they are better governed,' is the text of the Laws as well as of the Politicus and Republic. The remark that the balance of power preserves states (iii. 691, 692); the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life in disbelief of the Gods (x. 888 C); the idea, original to the Greek, that the characters of men are best seen in convivial intercourse (i. 649 B); the observation that the people must be allowed to share not only in the government, but in the administration of justice (trial by jury); the desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only but to all virtue; the clear perception that education begins with birth, or even as he would say before birth (vii. 789 A); the attempt to purify religion; the modern reflections, that punishment is not vindictive (ix. 854 E), and that limits must be set to the power of bequest (xi. 922, 923); the impossibility of undeceiving the victims of quacks and jugglers (xi. 933 A); the necessity of sanitary measures (vi. 761 B); above all, perhaps, the distinct consciousness that under the actual circumstances of mankind the ideal cannot be carried out (v. 739 B, 746 B), and yet may be a guiding principle—will appear

to us, if we remember that we are still in the dawn of politics, to show a great depth of political wisdom.

IV. The Laws of Plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble other passages in his writings, as for example, the comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-dog, both in the Republic and in the Laws (Laws, xii. 967 D; Rep. x. 607 C): the remark that no man can practise two trades (Laws, viii. 846 D; Rep. iii. 394 E, etc.): or the advantage of the middle condition (Laws, v. 736 E; Rep. iv. 421 foll.): or the moulds (*τύποι*) of religion (Laws, vii. 800 foll.; Rep. ii. 379 foll.): or the remark (Laws, xii. 945 E) that 'the relaxation of justice makes many cities out of one,' which may be compared with the Republic (Rep. iv. 422 E): or the description of lawlessness 'creeping in little by little in the fashions of music' (Laws, iii. 701 foll.; Rep. iv. 424 E). These are a few out of many examples which may be adduced of resemblances in the Laws to the other writings of Plato. They are far more numerous than the resemblances between other parts of his writings. No dialogues so nearly approach one another in thought as the Republic and the Politicus or the Laws, notwithstanding their differences. And at first sight a suspicion arises that the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator. For why should a writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had already said in his most finished style and manner? And yet it may be urged on the other side that an author whose original powers are beginning to decay will be very liable to repeat himself, as in conversation, so in books. He may have forgotten what he had written before; he may be unconscious of the decline of his own powers. Hence arises a question of great interest, bearing on the genuineness of ancient writers. Is there any criterion by which we can distinguish the genuine from the spurious imitation, or, in other words, the repetition of a thought or passage by an author himself from the appropriation of it by another? The question has, perhaps, never been fully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise answer. A few general considerations on the subject may be offered:—

(a) Is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different times of life or under different circumstances?—There would be nothing surprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own originality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his age. 'What a genius I had when I wrote that book!' was the pathetic exclamation of a famous English author, when in old age he chanced to take up one

of his early works. There would be nothing surprising again in his losing somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less capable of framing language into a harmonious whole. There would also be a strong presumption that if the variation of style was uniform, it was attributable to some natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator. The imitation might be the result of feebleness and of want of activity of mind. As in the well-known instance of Milton's 'Paradise Regained,' the decline of power which impaired the execution of a work might also enfeeble an author's judgment about the child of his old age. In other words, he might be a worse writer and a worse critic of his own writings. But the natural weakness of a great author would be different from the artificial weakness of an imitator; whereas the forger would be unable to maintain this equality in the appearance of his writings. He would fill his work with irregular patches, sometimes taken verbally from the writings of the author whom he personated, but rarely acquiring his spirit. His imitation would be obvious, irregular, superficial. The patches of purple would be easily detected among his threadbare and tattered garments. He would rarely take the pains to put the same thought into other words. Speaking of ancient forgers generally, we may say that they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and had rarely any motive for being so.

(b) But, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of understanding that which is really the most characteristic part of a great writer. In every man's writings there is something like himself and unlike others, which gives individuality. To appreciate this latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study and observation. There are a class of similarities which may be called undesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of being borrowed from one another, and yet when they are compared find a natural explanation in their being the work of the same mind. The imitator might imitate the turns of style—he might repeat images or illustrations, but he could not enter into the inner circle of Platonic philosophy. He would understand that part of it which became popular in the next generation, as for example, the doctrine of ideas or of numbers: he might criticise and condemn communism. But the higher flights of Plato about the science of dialectic, or the unity of virtue, or a person who is above the law, would have been unintelligible to him.

(c) The argument from imitation assumes a different character when

the supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the impress of original genius (cp. *Introd. to Appendix, Vol. II*). Then all the probabilities that can be urged on behalf of similar passages being the work of an original writer are greatly increased by their juxtaposition with other passages which certainly are so. The great excellence, not only of the whole, but even of the parts of writings, is a strong proof of their genuineness—for although the great writer may fall below, the forger or imitator cannot rise much above himself. Whether we can attribute the worst parts of a work to a forger and the best to a great writer,—as for example, in the case of some of Shakespeare's works,—depends upon the probability that they have been interpolated, or have been the joint work of two writers; and this can only be established by a comparison of other writings of the same class. If the interpolation or double authorship of Greek writings in the time of Plato could be shown to be common, then a question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not whether the whole but whether parts of the Platonic dialogues are genuine, and, if parts only, which parts. And although Hebrew prophecies and Homeric poems and *Laws of Manu* may have grown together in early times, there is no proof of any such tendency in the later ages of Greece after authorship had become a regular profession.

It must be admitted that these principles, although real, are difficult of application. Yet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on probabilities or impressions. Great disputes will arise about the merits of different passages, about what is really characteristic and original or trivial and borrowed. Many have thought the *Laws* to be one of the greatest of Platonic writings, while in the judgment of Mr. Grote they hardly rise above the level of the forged epistles. The manner in which a writer would or would not have written at a particular age must be acknowledged to be a matter of conjecture. But enough has been said to show that similarities of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to detect them or not, may be such as must be attributed to an original writer, and not to a mere imitator.

(d) Applying these principles to the case of the *Laws*, we have now to point out that they contain the class of latent refined similarities which are indicative of genuineness. That these are found in a work which contains many beautiful and remarkable passages, will be admitted by any one who refers back to § III, 6. We may therefore begin by claiming this presumption in their favour. Such undesigned coincidences, as

we may venture to call them, are the following. The conception of justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage (Laws, i. 631 C; Rep. iv. 433 foll.): the latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion of dividing laws after their kinds (Laws, i. 630 E); and again (xii. 965 C), the exaggerated approval of the method of looking at one idea gathered from many things, 'than which a truer was never discovered by any man': or again the description of the Laws as parents (Laws, ix. 859 A; Rep. vii. 538 D): the assumption that religion has been already settled by the oracle of Delphi (Laws, v. 738 B; Rep. iv. 427 B), to which an appeal is also made for the decision of disputes: the notion of the battle with self, a paradox for which Plato in a manner apologises both in the Laws and the Republic (Laws, i. 627 B; Rep. iv. 430 E, foll.): the remark (Laws, ix. 859 D) that just men, even when they are deformed in body, may still be perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds (cp. Rep. iii. 402 D, E): the argument that ideals are none the worse because they cannot be carried out (Rep. v. 472 D; Laws, v. 746 B): the near approach to the idea of good in 'the principle which is common to all the four virtues,' a truth which the guardians must be compelled to recognise (Laws, xii. 965 D; cp. Rep. vii. 534 D): or again the recognition by reason of the right pleasure and pain, which had previously been matter of habit (Laws, ii. 653 B; Rep. iii. 402 A): or the blasphemy of saying that the excellency of music is to give pleasure (Laws, ii. 665 D; Rep. vi. 509 A, B): again the story of the Sidonian Cadmus (Laws, ii. 663 E), is a variation of the Phoenician tale of the earth-born men (Rep. iii. 414 C): the danger of altering the modes of music in the Republic (iv. 424 C) may be compared with the danger of altering the plays of children in the Laws (vii. 797 B): the apology for delay and diffuseness which occurs not unfrequently in the Republic, is carried to an excess in the Laws: the remarkable thought (Laws, x. 899 A) that the soul of the sun is better than the sun, agrees with the relation in which the idea of good stands to the sun in the Republic, and with the substitution of mind for the idea of good in the Philebus: the passage about the tragic poets (Laws, vii. 817 A, foll.) agrees generally with the treatment of them in the Republic, but is more finely conceived, and worked out in a nobler spirit. Some lesser similarities of thought and manner should not be omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years old students in the Republic (vii. 539 B), and the fifty years old choristers in the Laws (ii. 670 A); or the image of the wax from which the citizens are to be

made in the Laws as in the Republic ; or the number of the tyrant (729), which is nearly equal with the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the 'slight correction' of the sacred number 5040, which, 'if two families be deducted may be divided by all the numbers from one to twelve' (Laws, vi. 771 C) ; or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid geometry of which he complains in the Republic (vii. 528 C), and the puzzle about fractions (vii. 524 E) with the difficulty in the Laws about commensurable and incommensurable quantities, (Laws vii. 819, 820)—and the malicious emphasis on the word *γυναικεῖος* (Laws, vii. 790 A) with the use of the same word (Rep. v. 469 E.) These and similar passages tend to show that the author of the Republic is also the author of the Laws. They are echoes of the same voice, coincidences too subtle to have been invented by the ingenuity of any imitator. The force of the argument is increased, if we remember that no passage in the Laws is exactly copied,—nowhere do five or six words occur together which are found together elsewhere in Plato's writings.

Several passages in the Laws have parallels with other writings of Plato as well as with the Republic. In general, as we might expect, such resemblances occur chiefly in the dialogues, which, on other grounds, we may suppose to be of later date. The punishment of evil is to be like evil men (Laws, v. 728 B), as he says also in the Theaetetus (176 E). Compare again the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he gives the reason in the Laws (vii. 816 D)—'For serious things cannot be understood without laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either ;' here he puts forward the principle which is the groundwork of the thesis of Socrates (Symp. 223 C), 'that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy, and that the writer of comedy ought to be a writer of tragedy also.' There is a truth and right which is above Law (Laws, ix. 875 C), as we learn also from the Politicus. That men are the possession of the Gods (Laws, x. 902 C), is a reflection which likewise occurs in the Phaedo (62 B). The remark, whether serious or ironical (Laws, xii. 948 C), that 'the sons of the Gods naturally believed in the Gods, because they had the means of knowing about them,' is found in the Timaeus (40 D). The reign of Cronos, who is the divine ruler (Laws, iv. 713 B), is the reminiscence of the Politicus (269 A, foll.). It is remarkable that in the Sophist and Politicus (Soph. 232 E), Plato, speaking in the character of the Eleatic stranger, has already put on

the old man. The madness of the poets, again, is a favourite notion of Plato's, which occurs also in the *Laws* (iv. 719 C), as well as in the *Phaedrus* (245 A) and elsewhere. There are traces in the *Laws* (iii. 685 A, foll.) of the same desire to base speculation upon history which we find in the *Critias*. Once more there is a striking parallel with the paradox of the *Gorgias* (472 E, foll.), that 'if you do evil, it is better to be punished than to be unpunished,' in the *Laws* (ii. 661 D), 'To live having all goods without justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if life be immortal, but not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.'

The point to be considered is whether these are the kind of parallels which would be the work of an imitator. Would a forger have had the wit to select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of Plato; would he have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly borrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed them into a whole such as the *Laws*; would he have given another the credit which he might have obtained for himself? Without pressing such arguments as absolutely certain, we must acknowledge that such a comparison affords a new ground of real weight for believing the *Laws* to be a genuine writing of Plato.

V. The relation of the *Republic* to the *Laws* is clearly set forth by Plato in Book v. 739. The *Republic* is the best state, the *Laws* is the best possible under the existing conditions of the Greek world. The *Republic* is the ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may not have existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some God, or son of a God (who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of all other states and the exemplar of human life. The *Laws* distinctly acknowledge what the *Republic* partly admits, that the ideal is inimitable by us, but that we should lift up our eyes to the heavens and try to regulate our lives according to the divine image. The citizens are no longer to have wives and children in common, and are no longer to be under the government of philosophers. But the spirit of communism or communion is to continue among them; the sexes are to be as nearly on an equality as possible; they are to meet at common tables, and to share warlike pursuits (if the women will), and to have a common education. The legislator has taken the place of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained, who are to fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of life. The addition of younger persons to this council by cooptation is an improvement on

the governing body of the Republic. The scheme of education in the Laws is obviously of a far lower kind than that which he has conceived in the Republic. There he would have his rulers trained in all knowledge meeting in the idea of good, of which the different branches of mathematical science are but the handmaidens or ministers; here he stops short with the preliminary sciences, and they are to be studied partly with a view to their practical usefulness, which in the Republic he holds cheap; and still more with a view to avoiding impiety, of which in the Republic he says nothing. Yet in the Laws there remain traces of the old educational ideas. He is still for banishing the poets; and as he finds the works of prose writers equally dangerous, he would substitute for them the study of his own Laws. He insists strongly on the importance of mathematics as an educational instrument. He is no more reconciled to the Greek mythology than in the Republic, though he would rather say nothing about it out of a pious reverence for antiquity; and he is equally willing to have recourse to fictions, provided they have a moral tendency. He harps back upon a golden age in which the sanctity of oaths was respected and in which men living nearer the Gods were more disposed to believe in them; but we must legislate for the world as it is, now that the old beliefs have passed away (xii. 948 C). Though he is no longer fired with dialectical enthusiasm, he would compel the guardians to 'look at one idea gathered from many things,' and to 'perceive the principle which is the same in all the four virtues' (xii. 965 C). He still recognizes the enormous influence of music, in which every citizen is to be trained for three years; and he seems to attribute the existing degeneracy of the Athenian state and the laxity of morals partly to musical innovation, manifested in the unnatural divorce of the instrument and the voice, and partly to the influence of the mob who ruled at the theatres. He assimilates the education of the two sexes, as far as possible, both in music and gymnastic, and, as in the Republic, he would give to gymnastic a purely military character. In marriage, his object is still to produce the finest children for the state. As in the Politicus, he would unite in wedlock dissimilar natures—the passionate with the dull, the courageous with the gentle. And the virtuous tyrant of the Politicus, who has no place in the Republic, again appears (iv. 709 E). In this, as in all his writings, he has the strongest sense of the degeneracy and incapacity of the rulers of his own time.

In the *Laws*, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are at least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the regulation of human life. It must however be remembered that the religion of Plato is coextensive with morality, and is that purified religion and mythology of which he speaks in the second book of the *Republic*. There is no real discrepancy in the two works. In a popular treatise, he speaks of religion rather than of philosophy; just as he appears to identify virtue with pleasure, and rather seeks to find the common element of the virtues than to maintain his old paradoxical thesis that they are one, or that they are identical with knowledge. The dialectic and the idea of good, which even Glaucon in the *Republic* could not understand, would be obviously out of place in a more popular work.

Some confusion occurs in the passage in which Plato speaks of the *Republic*, occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he proposes (D.V.) hereafter to expound (v. 739 B, foll.). Like many other thoughts in the *Laws*, the allusion is obscure from not being worked out. The passage is explained by Aristotle (*Polit.* iv. 1), who supposes Plato to mean by the third state, neither the best absolutely, nor the best under existing conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior to either, destitute, as he supposes, of the necessaries of life: apparently such a beginning of primitive society as he describes in *Laws* iii. Aristotle, however, had no more power of divining the obscure hint than we have. And it is not improbable that Plato may have meant by his third state an historical sketch, bearing the same relation to the *Laws* which the unfinished *Critias* would have borne to the *Republic*; or he may, perhaps, have intended to describe a state more nearly approximating than the *Laws* to existing Greek states.

The *Politicus* is a mere fragment when compared with the *Laws*, yet combining a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is wanting in the larger work. Several points of similarity and contrast may be observed between them. In some respects the *Politicus* is even more ideal than the *Republic*, looking back to a former state of paradisiacal life, in which the Gods ruled over mankind, as the *Republic* looks forward to a coming kingdom of philosophers. Of this kingdom of Cronos there is also mention in the *Laws* (iv. 713 B). Again, in the *Politicus*, the Eleatic Stranger rises above law to the conception of the living voice of the Lawgiver, who is able to provide for individual cases.

A similar thought is repeated in the *Laws* (ix. 875 C): 'If in the order of nature, and by divine destiny, a man were able to apprehend the truth about these things, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order above knowledge, nor can mind without impiety be deemed the subject or slave of any, but rather the lord of all.' The union of opposite natures, who form the warp and the woof of the political web, is a favourite thought expressed under the same figure of speech in both dialogues.

VI. The Republic may be described as the Spartan constitution appended to a government of philosophers. But in the *Laws* an Athenian element is also introduced. Many enactments are taken from the Athenian; the four classes are borrowed from the constitution of Cleisthenes, which Plato regards as the best form of Athenian government, and the guardians of the law bear a certain degree of resemblance to the archons. Life is to wear, as at Athens, a joyous and festive look; there are to be Bacchic choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged in moderate potations. On the other hand, the common meals, the public education, the *crypteia* are borrowed from Sparta and not from Athens, and the superintendence of private life, which was to be practised by the governors, has also its prototype in Sparta. The extravagant dislike which Plato shows both to a naval power and to democracy is the reverse of Athenian.

The best-governed Hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to individual lawgivers. There can be no doubt that these were real persons, though we are uncertain how far they originated or only modified the institutions which are ascribed to them. But the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea in the mind of the Greek,—as fixed as the Trojan war or the earth-born Cadmus. This was what 'Solon meant or said' was the form in which the Athenian expressed his own conception of right and justice, or argued a disputed point of law. And the constant reference in the *Laws* of Plato to the lawgiver is altogether in accordance with Greek modes of thinking and speaking.

There is also, as in the Republic, a Pythagorean element. The highest branch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly bodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements, is an important part of religion; there is to be measure in the lives of the citizens, and also in their vessels and coins; the great blessing of the state is the number 5040. Plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity of

Egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and dance. And he is also struck by the progress which the Egyptians had made in the mathematical sciences,—in comparison of them the Greeks appeared to him to be little better than swine. Yet he censures the Egyptian meanness and inhospitality to strangers. He has traced the growth of states from their rude beginning in a philosophical spirit; but of any life or growth of the Hellenic world in future ages he is silent. He has made the reflection that past time is the maker of states; but he does not argue from the past to the future, that the process is always going on, or that the institutions of nations are relative to their stage of civilization. If he could have stamped indelibly upon Hellenic states the will of the legislator, he would have been satisfied. The utmost which he expects of future generations is that they should supply the omissions, or correct the errors which younger statesmen detect in his enactments. When institutions have been once subjected to this process of criticism, he would have them fixed for ever.

THE PREAMBLE.

BOOK I. Stranger, let me ask a question of you—Was God or man the author of your laws? ‘God, Stranger. In Crete, Zeus is said to have been the author of them, in Sparta, as Megillus will tell you, Apollo.’ You believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to converse with his Olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from him? ‘Yes; and there was Rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among us to have been the justest of men—he assisted in the work.’ That is a reputation worthy of the son of Zeus. And as you and Megillus have been trained under their laws, I may ask you to give me an account of them. We can talk about them in our walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus. I am told that the distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places under the trees, at which, being no longer young, we may often rest and talk. ‘Yes, Stranger, a little onward there are lofty groves of cypresses which are wonderfully beautiful, and green meadows in which we may repose.’

My first question is, why has the law ordained that you should have common meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms? ‘My answer is, that our common meals are the life of the camp transferred to the

city; and we carry bows and arrows because our island home is rugged, and does not admit of cavalry. The legislator thought that war was the natural state and serious occupation of all mankind, and that peace is only a pretence; no possessions seemed to him to have any value which were not secured against enemies, and hence he arranged all our institutions with a view to war.' And do you think that superiority in war is the true aim of government? 'Certainly I do, and my Spartan friend will agree with me.' And are there wars not only of state against state, but of village against village, of family against family, of individual against individual? 'Yes.' And is a man his own enemy? 'There you come to first principles, like a true votary of the goddess Athene; and this is all the better, for you will the sooner recognise the truth of what I am saying—that all men everywhere are the enemies of all, and each individual of every other and of himself.' What do you mean? 'I mean what I say; and, further, that there is a victory and defeat—the best and the worst—which each man sustains, not at the hands of another, but of himself.' And does this extend to states and villages as well as to individuals? 'Certainly; there is a better in them which conquers the worse.' Whether the worse ever really conquers the better, is a question of words which may be left for the present; but your meaning is, that bad citizens do, under certain circumstances, overcome the good, and that the state is then conquered by herself, and that when they are defeated the state is victorious. Or, again, in a family there may be several brothers, the offspring of a single pair, and the bad may be a majority; and when the bad majority conquer the good minority, the family are worse than themselves. The use of the terms better or worse than him or themselves may be doubtful, but about the thing meant there can be no dispute. 'Very true.' Such a struggle might be determined by a judge. And which would be the better judge, he who destroys the worse and lets the better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the others voluntarily obey; or, thirdly, he who reconciles the two parties, and gives them laws which they mutually observe? 'The last, clearly.' But of such a legislator the object would not be war. 'That is true.' And as there are two kinds of war, one within a state and one without, of which the internal is by far the worse, will not the legislator direct his attention to this latter rather than to the other? He will reconcile the contending parties, and unite them against their external enemies. 'Certainly.' Every legislator will aim at the

greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war, whether civil or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the body, health is preferable to the purgation of disease. And the legislator who makes war his object instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of peace, is not a true statesman. 'And yet I am greatly mistaken, Stranger, if the laws of Crete and Sparta do not exclusively aim at war.' Perhaps so; but that is no reason why we should quarrel with one another about your legislators instead of gently questioning them, for they are in earnest quite as much as we are. The poet Tyrtæus (you have heard of his poems in Crete, and my Lacedæmonian friend is perfectly saturated with them)—he was an Athenian by birth, and a Spartan citizen;—well, he says, 'I sing not, I care not about any man, however rich or happy, unless he is brave in war.' Now I should like, in the name of us all, to ask the poet a question. O Tyrtæus, I would say to him, are there not two kinds of war? Cleinias and Megillus and I are agreed with you in praising those who excel in war; but which kind of war do you mean? that dreadful war which is termed civil, or the milder sort which is waged against foreign enemies? 'It is a milder sort.' You say that you abominate those who are not eager to taste their enemies' blood, and you seem to mean chiefly their foreign enemies? He will assent to this? 'Certainly.' Now we say that there are men better far than the heroes whom you, Tyrtæus, celebrate, concerning whom another poet, Theognis the Sicilian, says that in a civil broil they are worth their weight in gold and silver. For in a civil war, not only courage, but justice and temperance and wisdom are required, and all virtue is better than a part. The mercenary soldier is ready to stand firm and die at his post; but he is a violent, senseless sort of animal. And the inspired legislator, or even the uninspired, will make laws with a view to the highest virtue; and this is not brute courage, but loyalty in the hour of danger. The virtue of Tyrtæus, although needed at the time when he sang, is really of a very fourth-rate description. 'Stranger, you are degrading our legislator to the level of the barbarians.' Nay, I think that we should be degrading not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the laws of Lycurgus and Minos had a view to war only. A divine lawgiver must surely have had regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and he must have arranged his laws in classes corresponding to them, and not in the modern fashion, which only makes them after the want of them is felt, about matters of inheritance, assault,

and the like. As you truly said, virtue is the business of the legislator; but you went wrong when you referred all legislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part. For the object of laws, whether the Cretan or any other, is to make men happy. Now happiness or good is of two kinds—there are divine and there are human goods. And he who has the divine has the human ‘added to him’; but he who has lost the greater is deprived of both. The lesser goods are health, beauty, strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind God, but one who has the eye of sense; for sense or mind is the most divine of all goods. Then, comes temperance, and from the union of these with courage, which is the fourth or last, springs justice. These take precedence, and with a view to them the legislator will arrange all his ordinances, the human going back to the divine, and the divine to their leader mind. There will be enactments about marriage, about education, about all the states and feelings and experiences of men and women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and peace; upon all the law will fix a stamp of praise and blame. There will also be regulations about property and expenditure, about contracts, about rewards and punishments, until the round of life is finished with the funeral rites and honours of the dead. The law will appoint guardians to preside over these things, some who walk by intelligence, others having true opinion only; and mind will harmonize the ordinances of the legislator, and show them to be in unison with the virtues. Now I want to know whether these are the principles observed in the laws of Lycurgus and Minos, or, as I should rather say, of Apollo and Zeus. We must go through the virtues, beginning with courage, and then we will show that what has preceded has relation to virtue.

Megillus, the Lacedaemonian, wishes that the Athenians should criticise Cleinias and the Cretan laws. Yes, is the reply, and I will criticise you and myself, as well as him. Tell me, Megillus, were not the common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator with a view to war? ‘Yes, they were; and hunting comes third in the order of importance, and fourth the endurance of pain in gymnastic exercises and the institution of the *crypteia*. Marvellous is the power of enduring pain among our youth; they go about the country night and day without shoes on their feet, or beds to lie upon, and are their own servants; they wrestle and practise gymnastic exercises under the heat of a blazing sun, and they have many similar practices.’ Well, but

is courage only a combat against fear and pain, and not against pleasure and flattery? 'Against both, I should say.' And which is worse, to be overcome by pain or to be overcome by pleasure? 'The latter.' But did the divine lawgivers of Crete and Sparta legislate for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet the attacks of pain, but not of pleasure, or able to meet both? 'For a courage which is able to meet both, I should say.' But if that is the case, where are the institutions which train your citizens to be equally brave against pleasure and pain, and superior to the enemies which are within as well as without them? 'We confess that neither in Sparta nor in Crete are there any institutions worth mentioning which are of this character.' I am not surprised, and will therefore only request forbearance on the part of us all, in case the love of truth should lead any of us to censure the laws of the others. Remember that I am more in the way of hearing criticisms of your laws than you can be; for in any well-ordered state, although an old man may sometimes speak of them in private to a ruler or elder, a similar liberty is not allowed to the young. But now being alone we shall not offend your legislator by a friendly examination of his laws. 'Take any freedom which you like.'

My first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to abstain from amusements and to endure hardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline would run away from those who had. But he ought to have considered further, that those who had never been taught to resist pleasure would be equally at the mercy of those who could, and who are often among the worst of mankind. Pleasure, like fear, would overcome them, and take away their courage and freedom. 'There seems to be truth in that; but I should not like to be hasty in giving my assent to you.'

Next as to temperance, what institutions have you which are adapted to promote temperance? 'There are the common meals and gymnastic exercises.' These are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine, what is good at one time and for one person, is bad at another time and for another person. Now, although gymnastics and common meals do good, they are also a cause of sedition, and they appear to encourage unnatural love. The evil effect of them may be seen at Miletus, in Boeotia, and at Thurii. And the Cretans, who are supposed to be addicted to such love, are said to have invented the tale of Zeus and Ganymede in order to justify their evil practices by the example of the God who was

their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that all law has to do with pleasure and pain ; these are two fountains which are ever flowing in human nature, and he who drinks of them when and as much as he ought, is happy, and he who indulges in them to excess, is miserable. ‘I do not know how to answer you, but I still incline to think that the Lacedaemonian lawgiver was right in forbidding pleasure, if I may judge from the result. For there is no drunken revelry in Sparta, and any one found in a state of intoxication is severely punished ; he is not excused as an Athenian would be at Athens on account of a festival. I myself have seen the Athenians drunk at the Dionysia—and happening to be at our colony, Tarentum, on a similar occasion, I have beheld the whole city in a state of intoxication.’ Yes, I admit that these festivals should be properly regulated. And I may reply, Yes, Spartans, that is not your vice ; but look at home and remember the licentiousness of your women. And to all such accusations, whether brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, each of us may reply in turn:—‘Wonder not, Stranger ; there are different customs in different countries.’ And this may be a sufficient answer ; but we are speaking about the wisdom of lawgivers and not about the customs of men. To return to the question of drinking : shall we have total abstinence, as you have, or hard drinking, like the Scythians and Thracians, or moderate potations like the Persians ? ‘Give us arms, and we send all these nations flying before us.’ My good friend, be modest ; you know that victories and defeats often arise from unknown causes, and afford no proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. The stronger overcomes the weaker, as the Athenians have overcome the Ceans, or the Syracusans the Locrians, which latter appear nevertheless to be the best governed state in Magna Graecia. People are apt to praise or censure practices without enquiring into the nature of them. This is the way with drink : one person has a cloud of witnesses, who sing the praises of wine ; another declares that sober men defeat drunkards in battle ; and he again is refuted in turn. I should like to conduct the argument on some other method ; for here are two cities on one side, and, if you regard numbers, there are ten thousand on the other. ‘I am ready to pursue any method which is likely to lead us to the truth.’ Let me put the matter thus : Somebody praises the useful qualities of a goat ; another has seen goats running about wild in a garden, and blames a goat or any other animal who happens to be without a keeper. There is no sense in this. ‘Certainly not.’ Is a pilot

who is sea-sick a good pilot? 'No.' Or is a general who is sick and drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general? 'A general of old women he ought to be.' But can any one form an estimate of any society, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees in an unruly and lawless state? 'Not if he has never seen the orderly state also.' There is a convivial form of society—is there not? 'Yes.' And has this convivial society ever been rightly ordered? Of course you Spartans have never seen anything of the kind, but I have had wide experience, and made many enquiries about such societies, and have hardly ever found anything right or good in them. 'We acknowledge our want of experience, and desire to learn of you.' Will you admit that in all societies there must be a leader? 'Yes.' And in time of war he must be a man of courage and absolutely devoid of fear, if this were possible. 'Yes, he would be the right man.' But we are talking now of a general who shall preside at meetings of friends—and this sort of meeting having a tendency to be uproarious, ought above all others to have a governor. 'Very good.' He should be a sober man and a man of the world, who will keep, make, and increase the peace of the society; a drunkard in charge of drunkards would be singularly fortunate if he avoided doing a serious mischief. 'He certainly would.' Suppose the case of a person censuring such meetings—he may be right in his censure, but there is also a possibility that he may have known them only in their disorderly state, when the master of the feast is drunk with the rest; and no one expects a drunken general or pilot to be the saviour of an army or of a ship. 'That remark is true; but although I see the advantage of an army having a good general, I do not equally see the good of a feast being well managed.' If you mean to ask what good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or a single chorus, I should reply, not much; but if you ask what is the good of education in general, I answer, that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly and overcome their enemies in battle. And though victory makes men insolent and is often suicidal to the victors, education is never suicidal. 'You seem to mean that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part of education; how will you prove this?' I will tell you. But first let me offer a word of apology. We Athenians are universally reputed among the Hellenes to be fond of talking, whereas the Lacedaemonian is celebrated for brevity, and the Cretan is considered to be sagacious and reserved. Now, I fear that I may be charged with

eliciting a long discourse out of slender materials. For drinking cannot be rightly ordered without correct principles of music, and music runs up into education generally, and if I am to discuss all these matters, I cannot avoid being tedious; I will, therefore, offer you the alternative of passing on to another part of our subject. 'Do you know, Athenian, that our family is your proxenus at Sparta, and that from my boyhood I have regarded Athens as a second country, and having often fought your battles in my youth, I have become attached to you, and love the sound of the Attic dialect? And now I bethink me of the saying, that the best Athenians are more than ordinarily good, because they are genuinely and naturally good; therefore, be assured that I shall be glad to hear you talk as much as you please.' 'I, too,' adds Cleinias, 'have something to say about the Cretans, Stranger, which may give you confidence. You must have heard of Epimenides; he was a Cretan saint and hero, who came and offered sacrifices in your city by the command of an oracle ten years before the Persian war. The Athenians were in dread of the Persians, and he prophesied to them that the Persian host would not come for ten years, and would go away again, having suffered more harm than they had inflicted. Now, Epimenides was of my family, and when he visited Athens he formed ties of friendship with your forefathers.' I see that you are willing to listen, and I have the will to speak, if I had only the ability. But, first, I must define the nature and power of education, and by this road we will travel on to the God Dionysus. The man who is to be good at anything must have early training;—he who is to be a workman should have his box of tools when he is a child; the future soldier should learn to ride; the young carpenter should be taught to measure and use the rule,—all the thoughts and pleasures of children should bear on their after profession:—Do you agree with me? 'Certainly.' And we must remember further that the education of which we speak is not the education of a trainer, or of the captain of a ship, but of a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and how to obey; and such an education aims at virtue, and not at wealth or strength or mere cleverness. To the good man, education is of all things the most precious, and is also in constant need of renovation. 'We agree.' And we have before agreed that good men are those who are able to control themselves, and bad men are those who are not. Let me offer you an illustration which will assist our argument. Man is one; but in one and the same man are two

foolish counsellors who contend within him—pleasure and pain, and of either he has expectations which may be termed hope and fear; and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason, when affirmed by the state, becomes law. ‘We cannot follow you.’ Let me put the matter in another way: Every creature is the puppet of the Gods—whether he is a mere plaything or has any serious use we do not know; but this we know, that he is drawn different ways by cords and strings: there is a soft golden cord which draws him towards virtue—this is the law of the state. And there are other cords made of iron and hard materials drawing him other ways. The golden reasoning influence has nothing of the nature of force, and therefore requires ministers. I am giving an illustration of the doctrine that cities and citizens both conquer and are conquered by themselves. The individual follows reason, and the city law, which is embodied reason, either derived from the Gods or from the legislator. When this is made plain, education will be more clearly understood, and in particular the relation of education to convivial intercourse. And now let us try the experiment of setting wine before the puppet. ‘Very well.’ You admit that wine stimulates the passions? ‘Yes.’ And does wine equally stimulate the reasoning faculties? ‘No; it brings the soul back to a state of childhood.’ In such a state a man has the least control over himself, and is, therefore, worst? ‘Very true.’ The drunkard is, like the aged, in a second childhood? ‘Good.’ Then, can we ever bring ourselves to believe that drinking is right? ‘If you say so, I suppose that something may be urged on behalf of the paradox.’ And I am ready to maintain my position. ‘We should like to hear you prove that a man ought to make a beast of himself.’ Are you speaking of the degradation of the soul? ‘We are.’ And how about the body? Would any man willingly degrade or weaken that? ‘Certainly not.’ And yet if he goes to a doctor, does he not make himself ill in the hope of getting well, for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or always to be in training? ‘Very true.’ And may not convivial meetings have a similar remedial use? ‘Certainly.’ And if they have any such use, are they not to be preferred to other modes of training because they are painless? ‘But have they any such use?’ Let us see: are there not two kinds of fear—fear of evil and fear of public opinion? ‘There are.’ The latter kind of fear is opposed both to the fear of pain, and also to the love of pleasure. This is called by the legislator reverence, and is greatly encouraged by him

and by every good man; and shamelessness, which is the opposite of this, is the worst fault both of individuals and of states. This sort of fear or reverence is the chief cause of victory and safety in war, or at least one of the two chief causes, fearlessness of enemies being the other. 'True.' Then every one should be both fearful and fearless? 'Yes.' The right sort of fear is infused into a man when he comes face to face with shame, or cowardice, or the temptations of pleasure, and has to conquer them. He learns to take up arms against himself, over whom he must win many victories, if he is ever to be made perfect. 'That is reasonable enough.' And now, suppose that the Gods had given mankind a drug, of which the effect was to exaggerate every sort of evil and danger, so that the bravest man entirely lost his presence of mind and became a coward for a time:—would such a drug have any value? 'But is there such a drug?' No: but suppose that there were; might not the legislator use such a mode of testing courage and cowardice? 'To be sure he might.' You mean to say that the legislator would induce fear in order to implant fearlessness; and would give rewards and punishments to those who behaved well or the reverse, under the influence of the drug? 'Certainly he would.' And this mode of training,—whether practised in the case of one or many, whether in the solitude of the desert, out of sight of man, or in the presence of a large company,—if a man have sufficient confidence in himself to drink the potion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not taking too much,—would equally test his temperance. 'Very true.' Let us return to the lawgiver and say to him, Well, lawgiver, no such fear-producing potion has been given by God or invented by man, for 'witchcraft has no place at our feasts,' but a potion which will make men fearless has been given to men. 'Yes, you mean wine.' Yes; has not wine an effect the contrary of that which I was just now describing? First mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him with brave hopes, making him fearless and ready to say or do anything? 'Certainly.' Let us not forget that there are two qualities which should be cultivated in the soul—first, the greatest fearlessness; and, secondly, the greatest fear. 'Yes; you were saying that both are parts of reverence.' Courage and fearlessness are trained amid fears; but we have still to consider how fear is to be trained. For we desire to attain fearlessness and confidence without the insolence and boldness which commonly attend them. And do not love, ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they stim-

ulate courage, also madden and intoxicate the soul, and are they not the causes of ten thousand crimes? What better and more innocent test of them can be devised than festive intercourse? Would you make a bargain with a man in order to try the experiment whether he is honest? or would you ascertain whether he is licentious by putting your wife or daughter into his hands? Neither Cretan nor any other man would deny that the test proposed is fairer, speedier, and safer than any other. And such a test will be most useful in the political science, which desires to know human natures and characters. 'Very true.'

BOOK II. And are there any other uses of well-ordered potations? There are ; but, in order to explain them, I must repeat what I mean by right education, which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial intercourse. 'A high assumption.' I believe that virtue and vice are originally present to the mind of children in the form of pleasure and pain; later in life only do they arrive at reason and fixed principles, and happy is he who, even when he is old, possesses them, and the blessings which they confer. When pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are rightly implanted in the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment of reason are discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the soul is virtue, and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, I call education. But the finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be impaired in the course of life ; and therefore the Gods, pitying the toils and sorrows of mortals, have allowed them to have holidays, and given them the Muses and Apollo and Dionysus for leaders and playfellows. All young creatures are full of motion and frolic and utterance of the delight which is in them ; but man only is capable of taking pleasure in rhythmical and harmonious movements. With these education begins ; and the uneducated is he who has never known the discipline of the chorus, and the educated is he who has. The chorus is partly dance and partly song, and therefore the educated must sing and dance well. But when we say he sings and dances well, we mean that he sings and dances what is good. And if he thinks that to be good which is really good, he will have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a far greater master of imitation in sound and gesture than he who has not this knowledge. 'Yes, Stranger, he will be far better educated than the other.' Then, if we know what is good and bad in

song and dance, we shall know what education is? 'Very true.' The next enquiry will relate to the figure, melody, song, and dance. Will the same figures or sounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly? 'How can they be, when the very colours of their faces are different?' Figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are adapted to the expression of different feelings (I may remark, by the way, that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters, is not really applicable to music). And one class of harmonies is akin to courage and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice. 'We agree.' And do all men equally like all dances? 'Far otherwise.' How is this? Do some figures appear to be beautiful which are not? For no one will admit that he prefers the forms of vice to the forms of virtue, or that the choice of one or the other of them is a matter of opinion. Yet some persons say that the merit of music is to give pleasure. But this is impiety. There is, however, a more plausible account of the matter given by others, who make their likes or dislikes the criterion of excellence. Sometimes nature crosses habit, or conversely, and then they say that such and such fashions or gestures are pleasant, but they do not like to exhibit them before men of sense, although they enjoy them in private. 'Very true.' And do vicious measures and strains do any harm, or good measures any good to the lovers of them? 'I think that they must.' Say, rather, I am certain that they must have the effect of any indulgence shown to the vices of men, which are often censured by us gently and playfully, and with a sort of suspicion that the indulgence will one day be required by ourselves. And there can be no greater evil than this. 'I know of none.' Then in a city which has good laws, the poet will not be allowed to make the songs of the people just as he likes, or to corrupt the minds of youth as he pleases? 'Such a liberty is not to be thought of.' And yet he may do this anywhere except in Egypt. 'What is the custom of Egypt?' You will wonder when I tell you; ages ago they discovered the great truth which I am now asserting, that the youth of a people should be educated in forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed and consecrated in their temples; and no sculptor or painter is allowed to deviate from them. They are literally the same which they were ten thousand years ago. And this practice of theirs suggests the reflection that legislation about music is not an impossible thing. But the particular enactments must be the work of some divine man, or God, as in Egypt their ancient chants are

said to be the composition of the goddess Isis. The melodies which have a natural truth and correctness should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty is not strong enough to change the old fashions. Is not the origin of music as follows? We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think that we prosper when we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but our young men dance dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have lost the elasticity of youth, regale themselves with the memory of the past, while they contemplate the life and activity of the young. 'Most true.' People say that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals is to be crowned and receive the prize: are they right? 'Possibly.' Let us not be hasty in deciding, but first imagine a festival at which there are no distinct trials or contests; the lord of the festival, having assembled the citizens, makes a proclamation that he shall be crowned victor who gives the most pleasure, from whatever source derived. We will further suppose that there are various exhibitions of rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic poets, and we do not disdain marionette-players,—which of the innumerable pleasure-makers will win? 'I cannot say unless I see them.' Shall I answer for you? 'Very good.' The marionette-players will please the children; youths will be advocates of comedy; young men, educated women, and people in general will prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of Homer and Hesiod. Now which of them is right? If you and I are asked, we must say that the old men are right, and that the Epic recitation which they approve is the best of all. 'Very true.' I am ready to admit that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated, or better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man. And the true judge, who is to lead the theatre and not be led by them, will have need of both wisdom and courage. For out of that mouth which has just appealed to the Gods in proof of his integrity, he ought not to give a false judgment, and he should be the enemy of all pandering to the popular taste. The ancient and common custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, left the judgment to the spectators, but this custom has been the ruin of the poets, and has degraded the theatre. For the spectators have their pleasures lowered to themselves. What is the inference from all this? The inference, at which we arrive for the fourth time, is that education is the training of the young idea in what the law affirms and the elders approve. And as the soul of a child

is too young to be trained in earnest, a kind of education has been invented which tempts him with fair and beautiful words and songs, as the sick are tempted by pleasant meats and drinks. 'But is this the practice of states in general, or only of Crete and Lacedaemon? For in any other state, as far as I know, dances and music are constantly changed at the pleasure of the hearers. Their institutions are the reverse of the Egyptian.' I am afraid that I misled you; not liking to be always finding fault with mankind as they are, I described them as they ought to be. But let me understand: you would say (would you not?) that such customs exist among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and that the rest of the world would be improved by adopting them? 'Much improved.' And you would compel your poets to declare that the righteous are happy, and that the wicked man, even if he be as rich as Midas, is unhappy? Or, in the words of Tyrtæus, 'I sing not, I care not about him' who is a great warrior not having justice; if he be unjust 'I would not have him look calmly upon death or be swifter than the wind'; and may he be deprived of every good. For even if he have the goods which men regard, these are not really goods: first health; beauty next; thirdly wealth; and there are others. A man may have every sense purged and improved; he may be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever: But you and I will maintain that sight and hearing and immortality are goods to the just and evils to the unjust, and that the evil is lessened by the comparative shortness of life. If a man had health and wealth, and the power of a tyrant, and was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he might be fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely, and if basely evilly, and if evilly painfully. 'There I cannot agree with you.' Then may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for I am as convinced of the truth of what I say as of the existence of the island of Crete; and, if I were a lawgiver, I would exercise a censorship over the poets, and I would punish them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that the unjust is the gainful. And these are not the only matters in which I should make my citizens speak in a different strain from the Cretans or Lacedaemonians, or the world in general. 'Tell me,' I would say to your legislators, 'did the Gods who gave you laws, affirm the most just life to be also the pleasantest?' If they say 'no,' which is an answer I should not like to put into the mouth of God, I would again ask the legislator which is the happier, the just or the pleasant life? And if he replies the

pleasanter, then I should say to him, 'O my father, did you not tell me that I should live as justly as possible; and if to be just is to be happy, what is that principle of happiness or good which is superior to pleasure? Is the approval of gods and men to be deemed good and honourable, but unpleasant, and their disapproval the reverse? Or is the neither doing nor suffering evil good and honourable, although not pleasant? But you cannot make men like what is not pleasant, and therefore you must make them believe that the just is pleasant. The business of the legislator is to clear up this mist and confusion which reigns in the minds of men as of children. He will, therefore, show the just and the unjust to be identical with the pleasurable and the painful, from the point of view of the just man. This is the judgment of the better soul and of the truth, and even if not the truth, is the best and most moral of fictions; and the legislator who desires to propagate this fiction, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind have believed the story of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he may be assured that he can make them believe anything, and effect the desired uniformity in hymns and tales, if he pleases, and need only consider what fiction will do the greatest good. That the happiest is also the holiest, this shall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three choruses alike. First will enter the choir of children, who will lift up their voices on high; and after them the young men, who will pray the God Paean to be gracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their words; then will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and fifty or sixty; and, lastly, there will be the old men, preaching the same virtues in tales and discourses, as with the voice of an oracle. 'I do not understand about the third chorus; will you be a little plainer?' You remember how I spoke at first of the restless nature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a disorderly manner, and I said that no other animal attained any perception of rhythm; but that to us the Gods gave Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus to be our playfellows. Of the two first choruses I have already spoken, and I have now to speak of the third, or Dionysian chorus, which is composed of those who are between thirty and sixty years old. 'Will you explain?' We are agreed (are we not?) that men, women, and children should be always charming themselves with strains of virtue, and that there should be a variety in the strains, that they may not weary of them? Now the fairest and most useful of strains will be uttered by the elder men, and therefore we cannot let them off.

But then how can we make them sing? For a discreet elderly man is ashamed to hear the sound of his own voice in private, and still more in public. The only way is to give them drink; this will mellow the sourness of age. Children should be forbidden by law to drink wine; youths may take a little; but when men have reached forty years, they may be initiated into the mystery of drinking, and they will become softer and more impressible. When a man's heart is warm within him, he will be more ready to charm himself with song. And what songs shall he sing? 'At Crete and Lacedaemon we only know choral songs.' Yes; that is because your way of life is military. Your young men are like wild colts feeding in a herd together; no one takes the individual colt and rubs him down, and tries to give him the qualities which would make a man a statesman as well as a soldier. He who was thus trained would be a greater warrior than those of whom Tyrtaeus speaks, for he would be courageous, and yet he would know that courage was not first but fourth in the scale of virtue. 'Once more, I must say, Stranger, that you run down our lawgivers.' Not intentionally, my good friend, but whither the argument leads I follow; and I am trying to find some style of poetry which we may assign to those who are ashamed of the common sort. 'Very good.' In all things which have a charm, either this charm is their good, or they have some accompanying truth or advantage. For example, in eating and drinking there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say, health; and in learning there is a pleasure and also truth. There is a pleasure or charm, too, in the imitative arts, as well as a law of proportion or equality; but the pleasure which they afford, however innocent, is not the criterion of their truth. The test of pleasure can only be applied to that which has no other good or evil, no truth or falsehood. But that which has truth must be judged of by the standard of truth, and therefore imitation and proportion are to be judged of by their truth, and by that only. 'Certainly.' And music is imitative? 'Yes.' Then music is not to be judged by the criterion of pleasure, and the Muse whom we seek is the muse not of pleasure but of truth, for imitation has a truth? 'Doubtless.' And if so, the judge must know what is being imitated before he decides on the quality of the imitation, and he who does not know what is true will not know what is good. 'He will not.' Will any one be able to imitate the human body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or figure of the limbs? 'How can he?' But suppose we know some picture or figure to be an

exact resemblance of a man, should we not also require to know whether the picture is beautiful or not? for not every one can tell in what the beauty of a figure consists. 'Quite right.' The judge of the imitation, then, is required to know, first the original, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution? 'That appears to be the case.' Then let us not weary in the attempt to bring music to the standard of the Muses and of truth. The Muses are not like human poets; they never spoil or mix rhythms or scales, or mingle instruments and human voices, or confuse the manners and strains of men and women, or of freemen and slaves, or of rational beings and brute animals. They do not practise the baser sorts of musical arts, such as the 'matured judgments,' of whom Orpheus speaks, would ridicule. But modern poets separate metre from music, and melody and rhythm from words, and use the instrument alone without the voice. The consequence is, that the meaning of the rhythm and of the time become doubtful. I am endeavouring to show how our fifty-year-old choristers are to be trained, and what they are to avoid. For the multitude are ridiculous judges of the proprieties of these matters; he who is only made to step in time by sheer force cannot be a critic of music. 'He cannot.' Then our newly-appointed minstrels must be trained in music sufficiently to understand the nature of rhythms and systems; and they should select such as are suitable to men of their age, and will enable them to give and receive innocent pleasure. This is a knowledge which goes beyond that either of the poets or of their auditors. For although the poet must understand rhythm and music, he need not necessarily know whether the imitation is good or not, which was the third point required in a judge; but our chorus of elders must know all three, if they are to be the instructors of our youth.

And now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as follows: A convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking proceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and is ready to be an emperor. 'Doubtless.' And did we not say that the souls of the drinkers when fired with wine are made softer and more malleable at the hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them? At times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out of their turn, and interrupting one another. And the business of the legislator is to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame, in opposition to this disorderly boldness. But in order to discipline them

there must be guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals who shall take charge of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in drink as in war, and he who disobeys these Dionysiac commanders will be equally disgraced. 'Very good.' If a drinking festival were well regulated, men would go away, not as they now do, greater enemies, but better friends. Of the greatest gift of Dionysus I hardly like to speak, lest I should be misunderstood. 'What is that?' According to our tradition Dionysus was driven mad by his stepmother Herè, and in order to revenge himself he inspired others with Bacchic madness. But these are stories which I do not like to repeat. However I do acknowledge that all men are born in an imperfect state, and during the first few years of life are mad, irrational, restless, roaring creatures: this, as you will remember, has been already said by us when treating of the origin of music and gymnastic. 'I remember.' And that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony and rhythm? 'Very true.' The other story implies that wine was given to punish us and make us mad; but we say that wine is a balm and a cure; a spring of modesty in the soul, and of health and strength in the body. Again, the work of the chorus is co-extensive with the work of education; rhythm and melody answer to the voice, and the motions of the body correspond to all three, and the sound enters in and educates the soul in virtue? 'Yes.' And the movement of the body which is termed dancing, when studied according to regular rules, becomes gymnastic. Shall we now proceed to speak of this? 'What Cretan or Lacedaemonian would approve of your omitting gymnastic?' Your question implies assent; and you will have no difficulty in understanding a subject which is familiar to you. Gymnastic is based on the natural tendency of every animal to rapid motion; to this man adds a sense of rhythm, which is awakened by music; and music and dancing together form the choral arts. But before proceeding I must add a crowning word about drinking, which may be extended to other pleasures. There is a lawful use of all of them; but if a state or individual is inclined to drink at will, I cannot allow them. I would go further than Crete or Lacedaemon and have the law of the Carthaginians, which is to the effect that no slave of either sex should drink wine at all, and no soldier while he is on a campaign, and no ruler or general or pilot or judge or counsellor while he is on duty, and that no one should drink by daylight or on a bridal night. And there are so many other occasions on which wine ought to

be prohibited, that there will not be many vines grown or vineyards required in the state.

BOOK III. If a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he should behold them from the point of view of time. Thousands and thousands of cities have come into being and passed away again in infinite ages, rising and falling, waxing and waning; and if we could ascertain the cause of these changes in states, that would probably explain their origin. What do you think of ancient traditions about deluges and destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant? 'Every one believes in them.' Then let us suppose the world to have been destroyed by a deluge. The survivors would be shepherds dwelling in the tops of mountains,—small sparks of the human race, who would be isolated, and unacquainted with the arts and vices of civilization. We may further suppose that cities on the plain and on the coast have been utterly destroyed, and that all inventions and implements, and every sort of knowledge, have perished. 'Why, yes, my friend; and if all things were as they now are, nothing would have ever been invented. All our famous discoveries, like those of Daedalus, have been made within the last thousand years, and many of them are but of yesterday.' Yes, Cleinias, and you must not forget the name of your friend Epimenides, who was really of yesterday; he practised the lesson of moderation and abstinence which Hesiod only preached. 'Yes, that is our tradition.' After the great destruction we may imagine that the earth was a vast desert, in which there were a herd or two of oxen and a few goats, hardly enough to support those who tended them; while of politics and governments the survivors would know nothing. And out of this state of things have arisen arts and laws, and a great deal of virtue and a great deal of vice; little by little the world has come to be what the world is. At first, the few inhabitants may be supposed to have had a natural fear of descending into the plains; although they would want to have intercourse with one another, they would have great difficulty in getting about, having lost the arts, and having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or of felling timber; for even if there were any tools found in the mountains, these would have soon been worn out, and they could get no more until in the course of generations the art of metallurgy had been rediscovered. Faction and war would be extinguished among them, for being solitary they would incline to be friendly;

and having abundance of pasture and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have nothing to quarrel about. We may assume that they had also dwellings and abundance of clothing, for the weaving and plastic arts do not require the use of metals. In those days they were neither poor nor rich, and there was no insolence or injustice among them; for they were of noble natures, and lived up to their principles, and believed what they were told; knowing nothing of land or naval warfare, or of legal practices or party conflicts, they were simpler and more temperate, and also more just than the men of our day. 'Very true.' I am showing whence the need of lawgivers arises, for in primitive ages they had none, and did not want them. Men lived according to the customs of their fathers, under a sort of patriarchal government, which still exists both among Hellenes and barbarians, and is described in Homer as existing among the Cyclopes:—

'They have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains, and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves about one another.'

'That is a charming poet of yours, though I know little of him, for in Crete foreign poets are not much read.' 'He is well known in Sparta, though his description of life and manners is Ionian rather than Dorian, and he seems to take your view of primitive society.' May we not suppose that government arose out of scattered families who survived the destruction, and were under the rule of a patriarch, because they had originally descended from a single father and mother? 'That is very probable.' At a later period they increased in number, and tilled the ground, and protected themselves by walls and common households against wild beasts; each family had different laws and customs, which they received from their first parents. They would naturally like their own laws better than those of another family, and would be already formed by them when they met in a common society: thus legislation imperceptibly began among them. In the next stage the associated families would appoint plenipotentiaries or lawgivers, who would review their laws and choose the best of them. They would change the patriarchal or dynastic form into aristocracy or monarchy. 'That would be the next step.' In the third stage various forms of government would arise. This state of society is described by Homer, who in speaking of the foundation of Dardania says:—

'Dardania was built at the foot of many-fountained Ida, for Ilium, the city of the plain, as yet was not.'

Such is the history of primeval society which is given in this passage, and also in the account of the Cyclopes by the inspired writer, who is not only a charming poet but a true prophet. 'Proceed with your tale.' Ilium was built in a fair wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams descending from Ida. This shows that many ages must have passed; for the men who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the mercy of the waters amid numerous streams, trusting to not very high hills either. When mankind began to multiply, many other cities were built in similar but less elevated situations, and even by the shores of the ocean, for the fear of the sea had been lost. These cities carried on a war against Troy which lasted ten years, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army were at Troy, their homes fell into confusion. The youth revolted and refused to receive their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued. Under the new name of Dorians, which they received from their chief Dorieus, the exiles returned: the rest of the story is part of the history of Sparta.

Thus, after a digression which carried us away into the subject of music and drinking, we again come back to the settlement of Sparta which in laws and institutions is the sister of Crete. We have seen the rise of a first, second, and third state, which in infinite time have grown out of each other; and now we arrive at a fourth state, and out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature of laws and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them. 'If,' replies the Spartan, 'the speculations on which we are about to enter are likely to be as profitable as those which have preceded, I would go a long way to hear them, and think the longest day too short for such an employment.'

Let us imagine the time when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messenè, and the countries about them were all subject, Megillus, to your ancestors. Afterwards, they distributed the army into three portions, and made three cities—Argos, Messenè, Lacedaemon. 'Yes.' Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messenè, Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon. 'Just so.' And they all swore to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was subverted? 'Yes.' But did we not say, what we seem now to have forgotten, that kingdoms or governments can only be subverted by themselves? 'That is true.' Yes, and not only true, but proved by facts: there were certain conditions upon which the three kingdoms were to assist one another; the government was to

be mild and the people obedient, and the kings and people were to unite in assisting either of the two others when they were wronged; am I not correct? 'Quite correct.' The condition that the two states should unite against a third which transgressed, was a great source of security. 'Clearly.' Most persons say that lawgivers should make such laws as the people like; but we say that a physician might as well bid his patients to use only such remedies as are agreeable to them, whereas he is often too glad if he can effect a cure at the cost of a considerable amount of pain. 'Very true.' The early lawgivers had a great advantage—they were saved from the reproach which attends a division of land and abolition of debts. No one could quarrel with the Dorians for dividing the territory, and they had no debts of long standing. 'They had not.' Then what was the reason why their legislation signally failed? 'How failed?' Why, there were three kingdoms, and two of them quickly lost their original constitution. 'What was the reason of their failure?' That is a question which we cannot refuse to answer, if we mean to proceed with our old man's game of enquiring into laws and institutions. And the Lacedaemonian institutions are more worthy of enquiry than any other, having been evidently intended to be a protection not only to the Peloponnese, but to all the Hellenes against the Barbarians; for Ilium was a part of the great Assyrian Empire, which was feared in those days just as we now fear the great King. The second capture of Troy was deeply resented by the Assyrians, who sought to retaliate; and, in order to meet this danger, the royal Heraclid brothers devised their military constitution, which was a far better organised plan than the old Trojan expedition; and the Dorian Heraclidae themselves were far superior to the old Achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had been conquered by them. 'Certainly.' Such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared with one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the Delphian oracle, under the guidance of the Heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of permanence. 'Naturally.' And yet this promise of permanence has entirely failed. Instead of the three being one, they have always been at war; had they been united, in accordance with the original intention, they would have been invincible.

And what caused their ruin? Did you ever observe that there are beautiful things of which men often say, 'What wonders they would have effected if rightly used!' and yet, after all, this may be a mistake. And so I say of the Heraclidae and their expedition, which I may

perhaps have been justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me the general reflection,—‘What wonders might not strength and military resources have accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use them!’ Apply this remark to the case which we are considering: if the generals of the army had only known how to arrange their forces, might they not have given their subjects everlasting freedom and dominion, and the power of doing what they would in all the world, and have themselves obtained glory? ‘Very true.’ Suppose a person to express his admiration of wealth or rank, does he not do so under the idea that by the help of these he will attain his desires? All men wish to obtain the control of all things, and what they desire to obtain for themselves they desire to obtain for those dear to them. ‘Certainly.’ We ask for our friends what they ask for themselves. ‘True.’ Dear is the son to the father, and yet the son will pray to obtain what the father will pray that he may not obtain. ‘Before the son has come to years of discretion, you mean?’ Yes; and when the father has passed them, the son, like Hippolytus, may have reason to pray that the vow of his father may not be fulfilled. ‘I understand. You mean to say that a man should pray to have right desires, before he prays that his desires may be fulfilled; and that wisdom is the first thing for which states and individuals ought to pray?’ Yes; and you will remember my saying that this was to be the first object of the legislator; but you said that defence in war came first. And to this I replied, that there were four virtues, whereas you acknowledged one only—courage, and not wisdom which is the guide of all the rest. And I repeat in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, and I would rather that you should receive my words in earnest—that ‘the prayer of a fool is full of danger.’ I will prove to you, if you will allow me, that the ruin of those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war, but by ignorance of human nature and evil ways of another sort. ‘Go on, Stranger: attention will show better than compliments that we prize your words.’ I maintain that ignorance is the ruin of states; and if this be true, the legislator should seek to implant in them wisdom, and banish ignorance; and the greatest ignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of what is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of pleasure and reason in the soul. I say the greatest, because affecting the greater part of the soul. For the passions are in the individual what the people are in a state. And when they become opposed

to reason or law, and instruction is no longer of any use—that is the last and greatest ignorance of states; the errors and faults of craftsmen are more venial. ‘I understand and agree.’ Let this, then, be our first principle:—That the citizen who does not know how to choose between good and evil, must not be entrusted with authority; he may have great quickness and power of calculation, and many accomplishments, and yet be really ignorant. On the other hand, he who has this knowledge may be unable either to read or write; nevertheless, he shall be counted wise and permitted to rule. For how can there be even a shadow of wisdom where there is no harmony?—wisdom is the greatest harmony, and he who is devoid of wisdom is the ruin of states and households: let this be laid down. ‘Very good.’ The first claim of authority will be that of parents to rule over their children; the second, that of the noble to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder must govern the younger; in the fourth place, the slave must obey his master; fifthly, there is the power of the stronger, which is indeed a rule not to be disobeyed, and which the poet Pindar declares to be according to nature; sixthly, there is the rule of the wiser, which is also according to nature, as I must inform Pindar, if he does not know, and is the rule of law over obedient subjects. ‘Most true.’ And there is a seventh kind of rule which the Gods love,—in this the ruler is elected by lot.

Now, turning to the legislator who is fancying that his task is to be an easy one, we playfully say to him:—You see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to authority; here is a spring of troubles which you must stay: And first of all you must help us to consider how the kings of Argos and Messenè destroyed that famous empire of olden time—did they forget the saying of Hesiod, that ‘the half is better than the whole’? And do we suppose that the ignorance of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples? ‘Probably the evil is increased by their way of life.’ The kings of those days transgressed the laws and violated their oaths. Their deeds did not agree with their words, and their folly, which seemed to them wisdom, was the ruin of the state. And what ought the legislator to have done in order to prevent this evil?—The remedy is easy to see now, but was not easy to foresee at the time. ‘What is the remedy?’ The institutions of Sparta may teach you, Megillus. Wherever there is excess, whether the sail has too much wind, or the body too much food, or the mind too much power, there is a probability of a downfall. No man is able to resist the temptation of arbitrary power. The despot is

quickly corrupted, and grows hateful to his dearest friends. In order to guard against this evil, the God who watches over Sparta gave you two kings instead of one, that they might balance and moderate one another; and further to lower the pulse of your body politic, some human wisdom, mingling with the divine power, tempered the strength and self-sufficiency of youth with the moderation of age in the institution of your senate. A third saviour bridled your rising and swelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to officers elected by lot: and thus the kingly power was preserved. Had the constitution been arranged by Cresphontes and Temenus, not even the portion of Sparta would have been preserved; for they had no political experience, and were foolish enough to imagine that a youthful spirit might be bound by oaths. Now that God has instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in seeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event. But if the coming danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then no Persian or other enemy would have dared to despise Hellas; and indeed there was not so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit in our disloyalty to one another. For of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas; and of the two others, one, Argos, which in old days had the precedence, refused to aid; and the other, Messenia, was actually at war with her: and if the Lacedaemonians and Athenians had not united, the Hellenes would have been absorbed in the Persian empire, and mingled with the barbarians. We lay these remarks of ours at the feet of the legislator, and proceed to enquire what else could have been done, reminding him of what we were saying before, that a state can only be free and wise and harmonious where there is a balance of powers. There are many words by which we express the aims of the legislator, who is equally desirous to promote temperance, wisdom, friendship, and the like; but we need not therefore be disturbed, for these names have all the same meaning. 'I should like to hear at which of them in your opinion the legislator should aim.' Hear me, then. There are two mother forms of states—one monarchy, and the other democracy: the Persians have the first, and the Athenians the second. Most other governments are made up of a union of the two; and any good government must include both of them. There was a time when both the Persians and Athenians had more the character of a constitutional state than they now have. In the days of Cyrus the Persians were freemen, as well as lords of others, and their soldiers were

free and equal, and they used and honoured all the talent which they could find, and so the nation waxed in freedom and friendship and communion of soul. But Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, never troubled himself about the education of his family, or the order of his household. He was a soldier from his youth upward, and left his children who were born in the purple to be educated by women, who honoured and flattered them, never allowing any desire which they had to be thwarted. 'A rare education, truly!' Yes, such an education as women, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, might be expected to give in a country where the men were solely occupied with war and danger. 'Likely enough.' Their father had possessions of men and animals, and never considered that he was about to make them over to a race who had been brought up in a very different school, not like the Persian mountaineer, who was well able to take care of himself and his own. He never remembered that his children had been brought up in the Median fashion, under the superintendence of women and eunuchs. The consequence was that the son of Cyrus slew his brother, and lost the kingdom by his own folly. Observe, again, that Darius, who restored the kingdom, was not born a king, and had not received a royal education. He was one of the seven chiefs, and when he came to the throne he divided the empire into seven provinces, of which there yet remain traces; and he made equal laws, and implanted friendship among the people. Hence his subjects were greatly attached to him, and cheerfully extended the borders of his empire. Next followed Xerxes, who had received the same royal education as Cambyses; and this has been the fate of nearly every succeeding sovereign. We are tempted to say to him, 'O Darius, how could you with all your experience, have made such a mistake!' The ruin of Xerxes was not fate or fortune, but the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator has seriously to consider. Justly may the Lacedaemonians be praised for not giving special honour to any one in a state because he surpasses another in wealth any more than because he surpasses him in swiftness, strength, or beauty, if he be without virtue, or have virtue without temperance. 'Explain.' No one would like to live in the same house with a very courageous man who had no control over himself, nor with an artizan who was clever at his profession, but a rogue. Nor can justice and wisdom ever be separated from temperance. But considering these

qualities with reference to the meed of honour and dishonour which is to be assigned to them in states, would you say, on the other hand, that temperance without the other virtues, isolated in the soul of a man, is worth anything or nothing? 'I cannot tell.' You have answered well. It would be absurd to speak of temperance as belonging to the class of honoured or of dishonoured qualities, because all other things in their various classes require temperance to be added to them; having the addition, they are honoured not in proportion to that, but to their own excellence. And ought not the legislator to determine these classes? 'Certainly.' Suppose then, as we are playing at legislation, that, without going into details, we make three great classes of them. 'By all means.' Most honourable are the goods of the soul, always assuming temperance as a condition of them; secondly, those of the body; thirdly, external possessions. Any man who inverts or adds to these classes is no friend to the state.

These remarks were suggested to me by the history of the Persian kings; and to them I will now return. The ruin of their empire was caused by the loss of freedom and the growth of despotism, which destroyed the good-will of the people, and the disinterestedness of the government. Hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the people never fought heartily for their masters; their countless myriads were useless on the field of battle. They resorted to mercenaries as their only salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances to proclaim the stupidest of falsehoods—that virtue is a trifle in comparison of money. 'Very true.'

But enough of the Persians: a different lesson is taught by the opposite extreme of the Athenians, whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than an unlimited. Ancient Athens, at the time of the Persian invasion, had such a limited freedom. They were divided into four classes, arranged according to a property census, and the love of order was their queen; moreover, the fear of the approaching host made them obedient and willing citizens. For, ten years previously, Darius had sent Datis and Artaphernes, commanding them under pain of death to subjugate the Eretrians and Athenians. A report came to Athens that all the Eretrians had been 'netted'; this report, which may or may not have been true, terrified the Athenians, and they sent all over Hellas for assistance. None came to their relief except the Lacedaemonians, who arrived a day too late, when the battle of Marathon

had been already fought. In process of time Xerxes came to the throne, and the Athenians heard of nothing but the bridge of the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the innumerable host and fleet. They knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of Marathon. Their case seemed desperate, for there was no one to help them; no Hellene was likely to assist them by land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand vessels;—their only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they relied upon themselves and upon the Gods. Their common danger, and the influence of their old constitution, greatly tended to promote harmony among them: Reverence and fear—that fear which the coward never knows—made them fight for their country and for their country's shrines and sepulchres. If they had not had such a fear, they would have been dispersed all over the world. 'Your words, Athenian, are worthy of your country.' Yes; and you, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, are worthy to hear them. Let me ask you to take the moral of my tale. The Persians have lost their liberty in absolute slavery, and we in absolute freedom. In ancient times the Athenian people were not the masters, but the servants of the laws. 'Of what laws?' In the first place, there were laws about music, and the music was of various kinds: there was one kind which consisted of hymns, another of lamentations; there was also the pæan and the dithyramb, each of them having their own laws (*νόμοι*) or strains, as they were termed. The regulation of such matters was not left to the whistling and clapping of a tasteless crowd; there was silence while the judges decided, and the boys, and the audience in general, were kept in order by raps of a stick. But after a while there arose a new race of poets, men of genius certainly, however careless of musical truth and propriety, who made pleasure the only criterion of excellence. That was a test which the spectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience instead of being mute became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the place of an aristocracy. Could the judges have been free, there would have been no great harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough—but conceit has been our ruin. Everybody knows everything, and is ready to say anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence and licentiousness has succeeded. 'Most true.' And with this freedom comes disobedience to rulers, parents, elders; in the latter days to the law also: the end returns to the beginning, and the old Titanic nature

reappears—men have no regard for the Gods or for oaths; and the evils of the human race seem as if they would never cease. Whither are we running away? Once more we must pull up the argument with bit and curb, lest, as the proverb says, we should fall off our ass. ‘Good.’ Our purpose in what we have been saying, is to show that the legislator ought to aim at securing for a state three things—freedom, friendship, wisdom. ‘Just so.’ And we chose two states;—one was the type of freedom, and the other of despotism; and we showed that their highest pinnacle of fortune coincided with the greatest moderation of their respective forms of government. In a similar spirit we spoke of the Dorian expedition, and of the settlement in the plains of Troy; and of music, and wine, and of all that preceded.

And now, has all this discussion been of any use? ‘Stranger, I can answer that question; for by a singular coincidence the Cretans are about to send out a colony. And the settlement of this colony has been committed to the Cnosians, who have appointed ten commissioners, of whom I am one, to give laws to the colonists. We may give them any laws which we please—Cretan or foreign. And therefore let us make a selection from what has been said for the benefit of the infant colony.’ I like your proposal, and I place myself at your service. ‘Very good.’

BOOK IV. And now what is this city? I do not ask what is or is to be the name of the place; for a river or some local deity will determine that. But I want to know what the situation is, whether maritime or inland. ‘The new city, Stranger, is about eleven miles from the sea.’ Are there good harbours? ‘Excellent.’ And is the surrounding country self-supporting? ‘Almost.’ Any neighbouring states? ‘No; and that is the reason for choosing the place, which has been deserted from time immemorial.’ And is there a fair proportion of hill and plain and wood? ‘Like the rest of Crete in that, more hill than plain.’ Then there is some hope for your citizens; had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support on other countries, a more than human power would have been required to preserve you from corruption. The distance of eleven miles is not enough, but is better than nothing; and I must be satisfied. For the sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous companion, and a highway of strange morals and manners as well as of commerce. But as the country is moderately fertile there will be no great exports, or imports, or returns of gold and

silver, which are the ruin of states. Is there timber for ship-building? 'There is no pine or fir, and not much cypress; and very little stone-pine or planewood for the interior of ships.' That is good. 'Why?' Because the city will be unable to imitate the bad ways of her enemies. 'What is the bearing of that remark?' To explain my meaning, I would ask you just to remember what I said about the Cretan laws, which, as you and I agreed, had an eye to war only; and I maintained that they ought to have included all virtue. And I hope that you in your turn will retaliate upon me if I am false to my own principle. For I consider that the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue. What further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will illustrate by the story of Minos, which is so ancient that I hope our Cretan friend will not be offended at the mention of it. Minos, who was a great sea king, imposed upon the Athenians a cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they had no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate their enemies'; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for them to have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the tribute than to have turned soldiers into sailors. Naval warfare is not a very praiseworthy art; men should not be taught, after running on shore, to throw away their arms, and to hurry back to their ships, as they do now; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine words. And retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he introduces Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of ships being at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. An army of lions trained in such ways would fly before a herd of deer. Further, the rewards of valour have to be distributed among pilots and oarsmen, who do not deserve such honours, and the undue awarding of honours is the ruin of states. 'Still, in Crete we say that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.' And that is the prevailing opinion. But I and Megillus say that the battle of Marathon began the deliverance, which the battle of Plataea completed; and that these battles made men better, whereas the battles of Salamis and Artemisium made them no better. And we further affirm that not the mere continuance of existence is the great political good of individuals or states, but the continuance of the best existence. 'Certainly.' Let us then endeavour to follow this principle in colonization and legislation.

And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? May any one come from any city of Crete which is overpeopled? for you would surely not send a general invitation to all Hellas. Yet I observe that in Crete there are people who have come from Argos and Aegina and other places. 'Our expedition is drawn from all Crete, and we invite Peloponnesians of Argos to join. As you observe, there are Argives among the Cretans; for example, the Gortynians, who are the best of all Cretans, have come from Gortys in Peloponnesus.'

Colonization is in some ways easier when the colony is drawn from one country, and goes out in a swarm like bees, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or war. There is an advantage in this mode of procedure, and also there are disadvantages. The advantage is, that the new colonists have a common language and laws, and a spirit of friendship diffused among them. But then again, they are less willing to obey the hand of the legislator; they are too fond of the laws and customs which have been the ruin of them at home. A mixed multitude is more tractable, although there is a difficulty in making them pull together. There is nothing, however, which perfects the virtue of men like legislation and colonization. And yet I have a word to say on the other side, which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'What is that?'

I was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all sorts are the true legislators; wars and pestilences and famines and the constant recurrence of bad seasons. He who observes the course of events will be inclined to say that almost all human things are chance; and this may certainly be said about navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. But there is another thing which may equally be said. 'What is it?' That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him. But according to a third view, art has part with them, for surely when there is a storm there must be an advantage in having a pilot. And of legislation we may say the same: however great the coincidence of fortunate circumstances, the hand of the legislator is still required. 'Most true.' All artists would pray for certain conditions under which to exercise their art. 'Certainly.' And the legislator would do the same? 'I believe that he would.' Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the conditions which you would have? Shall we put the conditions into his mouth? 'Yes.' He will say, Grant me a city which is in the possession of a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, thoughtful, teachable, courageous, magnanimous; and

let him have the crowning condition of all virtue, which is temperance—not prudence, but that natural temperance which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly reckoned among goods—with this he must be endowed, if the state is to acquire the form most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner. And I must add one other quality to the tyrant's virtues: he must be fortunate, and his good fortune must consist in his being the contemporary of a great legislator. When the God has done this, he has done the best which he can for a state; not so well if he has given them two legislators instead of one, and less and less well if he has given them a great many. An orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect state; in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, democracy; an oligarchy is worst of all. 'I do not understand.' I suppose that you have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? 'And I have no desire to see one.' You would have seen what I am describing, if you ever had. The tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix the stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the citizens are eager to follow the example which he sets them. And this is the quickest way of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. 'What is that?' The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy of birth or of wealth. Nestor, who was the most eloquent and temperate of mankind, lived in the times of Troy, but there is no one like him now. If there is, has been, or ever shall be again, such an one among us, blessed is he, and blessed are they who listen to his words. And this may be said of power in general; where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one there are the best laws and constitutions. I am endeavouring to show you how easy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other, is the task of giving a city good laws. 'How do you mean?' We shall see, if we try the experiment of giving a constitution to our new state, which will be an excellent amusement for our second childhood. 'Proceed. What constitution shall we give—democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?' To which of these classes, Megillus, do you refer your own state? 'The Spartan constitution seems to me to contain all these elements; our state is a democracy and also an aristocracy; the power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have an ancient monarchy.' 'And the same,' adds Cleinias, 'may be said of Crete.' The reason is that you have politics, but other states are mere aggregations of

citizens, which are named after their several ruling powers; whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should be called a theocracy. A tale of old will explain my meaning. In the primeval world there is a tradition of a golden age, in which all things were spontaneous and abundant. Cronos, the lord of the world, knew that man was not able to endure the temptations of power, and therefore he appointed demons or demi-gods, who are of a superior race, to have dominion over him, as he has dominion over the animals. They took care of us with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us; and the tradition says that only when God, and not man, is the ruler, can the human race cease from ill. This was the way of human life under Cronos, which should be imitated by us as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, and is imitated by us when we live according to law and the dictates of right reason. But in an oligarchy or democracy, when the governing principle is athirst for pleasure, there is no possibility of salvation. The laws are trampled under foot. Are there not often said to be as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they have no concern either with any virtue or with all virtue, but are relative to the state in which you live? Which is as much as to say that 'might makes right.' 'What do you mean?' I mean that governments make their own laws, and that every government regards first of all the law of self-preservation. 'Very true.' And he who transgresses this law is regarded as an evil-doer, and punished accordingly. 'Naturally.' This was the evil of which we were speaking when we said that parents should rule their children, the elder the younger, the noble the ignoble; and there were other principles of government, including 'the law justifying violence' of Pindar. To which of them is our state to be entrusted? For many a government is only a victorious faction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share in the government to the conquered, lest when they return to power they should remember their wrongs. Such governments are not politics, but parties; nor are any laws good which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not of the whole. And in our state I mean to protest against making any man a ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble. But he who is the most obedient to the laws, and who wins the victory of obedience, shall be the minister or servant of them according to the degree of his obedience. When I call the ruler the servant or minister of the law, this is not a mere paradox, but I mean to say that upon a willingness to obey the law the very

existence of the state depends. 'Truly, Stranger, you have a keen vision.' Why, yes; every man when he is old has his intellectual vision most keen. And now shall we call in our colonists and make a speech to them? Friends, we say to them, God holds in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and He moves in a straight line towards the full accomplishment of His will. Justice always follows Him, and punishes those who fall short of His laws. He who would be happy is obedient to Him; but he who is lifted up with pride, or money, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by God, and, being deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about in wild disorder. But in a short time he is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing these things, what ought we to do or think? 'Every man ought to follow God.' There is an old saying, that like agrees with like, and God is the measure of all things in a sense far higher than any man. Those who would be dear to Him must be like Him, and the temperate man is the friend of God because he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not his friend, because he is not like Him. And the inference is, that the best of all things for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but the bad man has a polluted soul, and from one who is polluted neither a good man nor God is right in receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste their service upon the Gods, but the good are accepted of them. I have told you the mark at which we ought to aim. You will say, how? and with what weapons? In the first place we affirm, that after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the state, honour should be given to the Gods below, and to them should be offered everything in even numbers and of the second choice; while the auspicious odd numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved for the Gods above. Next to the Gods, demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and then heroes, and after them family gods, who will have their seats of local worship and their ritual according to law. Further, the honour due to parents should not be forgotten; all that children have is derived from them, and they owe to them a debt of nurture. Their children should never utter an unbecoming word before them; for there is an avenging angel who hears them when they are angry, and the child should consider that the parent to whom he owes life, when he has been wronged has a right to be angry with him. After their death let them have sepulchral rites according to their wealth and rank; as they did to their fathers, so let us do to them; and there shall

be an annual commemoration of them. He does best who preserves their memory without incurring any very great expense. Living on this wise, we shall be accepted of the Gods, and shall pass our days in good hope. The law will determine all our various duties towards relatives and friends and other citizens, and the whole state will be happy and prosperous. If the legislator would persuade as well as command, he will add prefaces to his laws which will predispose our citizens to virtue. I want them to be in the right frame of mind when the legislator speaks to them. Even a little accomplished in the way of gaining the hearts of men is of great value. For most men do not wish to be made good speedily. Their case rather proves the saying of Hesiod :

‘Long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue,
But when you have reached the top the other half is easy.’

‘Those are excellent words.’ Yes; but will you allow me to tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me? I will express my meaning in an address to the lawgiver :—O lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do and say, you can surely tell us—and were not you just now saying that the poet ought not to be allowed to do what he likes? And the poet may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the Muses he is not in his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed to say two opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is true. But this licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver. For example, let us suppose that there are three kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another mean, a third moderate, and you say that the last is always to be approved. Now, if I had a rich wife, and she told me to bury her, and I were to sing of her burial, I should praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would approve a funeral of the meaner sort, and a man of the middle class would find a moderate funeral suited to his resources. But you, as legislator, would have to determine the meaning of the words excessive, mean, moderate. ‘Very true.’ And is our lawgiver to have no preamble or interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice to his subjects, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors are there not two kinds? the one gentle and the other rough, doctors and doctors’ assistants, freemen who learn themselves and teach their pupils, and slaves who learn medicine at the bidding of their masters? ‘Of course there are.’ And did you ever observe that the gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine themselves to slaves? The latter go about the country and wait for the slaves at the

dispensaries. None of them holds any parley with his patients about their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule of thumb, and give their decrees, as if they knew all about the disorder, in a very arbitrary manner. When they have doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with equal assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care of his sick slaves. But the other doctor, who practises on freemen, has quite another mode of proceeding. He takes counsel with his patient and learns from him, and never does anything until he has persuaded him of what he is doing. He trusts to influence rather than force. Now is not the use of both methods far better than the use of either alone? And both together may be advantageously employed by us in legislation.

We may illustrate our proposed way of proceeding by an example. The laws relating to marriage are the first of laws, and will therefore be the best for us to begin with. The simple law would be as follows:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall pay a fitting penalty. The double law would add the reason why: Forasmuch as man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of children, none should deprive himself of his share in this good. He who obeys the law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer by his celibacy; and therefore he shall pay a fine, and shall not be allowed to receive honour from the young. That is an example of what I call the double law, which may enable us to judge how far the addition of persuasion to threats is desirable. ‘Lacedaemonians in general, Stranger, are in favour of brevity; in this case, however, I prefer length. But Cleinias is the real lawgiver, and therefore I think that he should be first consulted.’ ‘Thank you, Megillus.’ Whether words are to be many or few, is a foolish question:—the best and not the shortest forms are always to be approved. And no legislator has ever thought of the advantage which he might derive from the employment of the two sources of power, which answer to the two sorts of doctors, persuasion as well as force. And I have something else to say about the matter. ‘What is that?’ A strange thought arises in my mind. Here have we been from the early dawn until noon, discoursing about laws, and all which we have been saying is only the preamble of them. I tell you this, because I want you to observe that songs and strains have all of them preludes, but that laws, though called by the same name (*νόμοι*), have never any prelude. Now I am disposed to give preludes to

laws, dividing them into two parts—one containing the despotic command, which I described under the image of the slave doctor—the other the persuasive part, which I term the preamble. The legislator should give preludes or preambles to his laws. ‘That shall be the way in my colony.’ I am glad that you agree with me; the law should be clearly explained at the beginning. All laws might have, but will not equally require a preamble; this must be left to the lawgiver, as the preamble of a strain or speech is left to the orator or musician. ‘Most true: and now, having a preamble, let us make a second and better beginning.’ Enough has been said of Gods and parents, and we may proceed to consider persons—their souls, bodies, properties,—their occupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education.

The first word of the Laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought which is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that Law is of divine origin. In the words of a great English writer—‘Her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.’ Though the particular laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim, this is not true of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of human nature, and not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment. They have their natural divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue (i. 630 E); very unlike the discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an English Parliament. Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato’s treatment of the subject: first, a lesser one, inasmuch as he does not clearly distinguish the Cretan and Spartan laws, of which the exclusive aim is war, from those other laws of Zeus and Apollo which are said to be divine, and to comprehend all virtue. Secondly, we may retort on him his own complaint against Sparta and Crete, that he has himself given us a code of laws, which for the most part have a military character; and that we cannot point ‘to obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure.’ The military spirit which is condemned by him in the beginning of the Laws, reappears in the eighth and ninth books.

The mention of Minos the great lawgiver, and of Rhadamanthus the righteous administrator of the law, suggest the two divisions of the laws into enactments and appointments of officers (cp. vi. 751). The legislator and the judge stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly distinguished. For the judge is in some sort a legislator, at

any rate in small matters (cp. ix. 875 E, foll.); and his decisions growing into precedents, must determine the innumerable details which arise out of the conflict of circumstances. These are what Plato proposes to leave to a younger generation of legislators. The action of courts of law in making law seems to have escaped him, probably because the Athenian law courts were popular assemblies; and, except in a mythical form, he can hardly be said to have had before his eyes the ideal of a judge. In reading the Laws of Plato, or any other ancient writing about Laws, we should consider how gradual the process is by which not only a legal system, but the administration of a court of law, becomes perfected.

There are other subjects on which Plato breaks ground, as his manner is, in the first book. First, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws; they are to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from birth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly executed in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of describing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony. Secondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so great an influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers especially to the great offences—on which he afterwards dilates at length, and which he has already condemned in the Republic—of separating the words from the music, and varying the modes and rhythms. Thirdly, he reprobates in energetic terms the prevalence of unnatural loves in Sparta and Crete, which he seems to attribute to the practice of *syssitia* and gymnastic exercises, when not accompanied by any higher training. To this subject he again returns in the sixth book. Fourthly, the virtues are shown to be inseparable from one another, even if not absolutely one; this, too, is a principle which he re-asserts at the conclusion of the work. As in the beginnings of Plato's other writings, we have here several 'notes' struck, which form the preludes of longer discussions, although the hint is less ingeniously given, and the promise more imperfectly fulfilled than in the earlier dialogues.

The distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon Plato's mind. To him, law is still floating in a region between the two. He would have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should have regard to all virtue. But he did not see that politics and law are subject to their own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by natural differences. The actions, of which politics take cognisance are neces-

sarily collective or representative; the actions of which law takes cognisance are necessarily external, and they affect others as well as the agents. But Plato has never made this analysis. He fancies that the life of the state is as plastic, and can be as easily fashioned, as that of the individual. He is favourable to a balance of power, but never seems to have considered that power might be so balanced as to produce an absolute immobility in the state. Nor is he alive to the evils of confounding vice and crime; or to the necessity of governments abstaining from excessive interference with their subjects. He would have set no limits to the power of legislation.

Yet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer side. If unable to grasp some important distinctions, Plato is at any rate seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down the principles of men to their practice, or narrow the ideal of what the state may be to the immediate necessities of politics. Political ideals of freedom and equality, of a divine government which has been or will be in some other age or country, have greatly tended to educate and enoble the human race. And if not the first author of such ideals (for they are as old as Hesiod), Plato has done more than any other writer to impress them on the world. To those who censure his idealism we may reply in his own words—‘He is not the worse painter who draws a beautiful figure, because no such figure ever had a real existence.’

A new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time exercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books of the *Laws* forgotten or overlooked. As true courage is allied to temperance, so there must be an education which shall train mankind to resist pleasure as well as to endure pain. No one can be on his guard against that of which he has no experience. The perfectly trained citizen should have been accustomed to look pleasure in the face, and to measure his strength against her. This education in pleasure is to be given partly by festive intercourse, chiefly by the song and dance. Youth are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained and tested at drinking parties. According to the old proverb, *in vino veritas*, they will then be open and visible to the world in their true characters; and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more easily moulded by the hand of the legislator. The first reason is curious enough, though not important; the second can hardly be thought deserving of much attention. Yet if Plato means to say that society

is one of the principal instruments of education in after life, he has expressed in an obscure fashion a principle which is true, and to his contemporaries was also new. He seems to be carried away by the really original thought which had occurred to him, and which he has not yet learned to present to his mind in an abstract form. He is sensible that moderation is better than total abstinence, and that asceticism is but a one-sided training. He makes the sagacious remark, 'that those who are able to resist pleasure may often be among the worst of mankind.' He is as much aware as any modern utilitarian that the love of pleasure is the great motive of human action. This cannot be eradicated, and must therefore be regulated, and the pleasure must be of the right sort. Such reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly expressed, groundwork of the discussion. As in the juxtaposition of the Bacchic madness and the great gift of Dionysus, or where he speaks of the senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative art, or in the illustration of the failure of the Dorian institutions from the vow of Theseus—we have to gather his meaning as well as we can from the connection.

The feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several other passages of the Laws. Plato has arrived at the time when men sit still and look on at life; and he is willing to allow himself and others the few pleasures which remain to them. Wine is to cheer them now that their limbs are old and their blood runs cold. They are the best critics of dancing and music, but cannot be induced to join in song unless they have been enlivened by drinking. Youth has no need of the stimulus of wine, but age can only be made young again by its healing influence. Total abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing potations for the old, is Plato's principle. The fire, of which there is too much in the one, has to be brought to the other. Drunkenness, like madness, had a sacredness and mystery to the Greek; if, on the one hand, as in the case of the Tarentines (i. 637 B), it degraded a whole population, it was also a mode of worshipping the god Dionysus, which was to be practised on certain occasions. Moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit of the vine was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness which prevail among some modern nations.

The physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine within narrow limits. He would tell us that you cannot restore strength by a stimulus. Wine may call back the vital powers in disease,

but cannot reinvigorate old age. In his maxims of health and longevity, though aware of the importance of a simple diet, Plato has omitted to dwell on the perfect rule of moderation. His commendation of wine is probably a passing fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits or tastes. If so, he is not the only philosopher whose theory has been based upon his practice.

Like the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his depreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue, appears to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated. But he is speaking of courage in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or temperance. He does not insist, as in the Protagoras, on the unity of the virtues; or as in the Laches, on the identity of wisdom and courage. But he endeavours to show how they all depend upon their leader mind, and how, out of the union of wisdom and temperance with courage, springs justice. Elsewhere he is disposed to regard temperance rather as a condition of all virtue than as a particular virtue. He generalizes temperance, as in the Republic he generalizes justice. The nature of the virtues is to run up into one another, and in the Laws Plato makes but a faint effort to distinguish them. He still quotes the poets, somewhat enlarging, as his manner is, or playing with their meaning. The martial poet Tyrtæus, and the oligarch Theognis, furnish him with happy illustrations of the two sorts of courage. The fear of fear, the division of goods into human and divine, the acknowledgment that peace and reconciliation are better than military superiority, the analysis of temperance into resistance of pleasure as well as endurance of pain, the distinction between the education which is suitable for a trade or profession, and for the whole of life, are important and probably new ethical conceptions. Nor has Plato forgotten his old paradox, that to be punished is better than to be unpunished, when he says, that to the bad death is the only mitigation of his evil. He is not less ideal in many passages of the Laws than in the Gorgias or Republic. But his wings are heavy, and he is unequal to any sustained flight.

There is more attempt in the first book to carry out the dramatic interest than in the later parts of the work. The outburst of martial spirit in the Lacedæmonian, at p. 638 A, 'O best of men'; the anger which the Cretan expresses at the supposed insult to his lawgiver; the cordial acknowledgment on the part of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly by those who live under their rule; the diffi-

culty which they alike experience in following the speculations of the Athenian, are highly characteristic.

In the next book, Plato pursues further his notion of educating by a right use of pleasure. He begins by conceiving an endless power of youthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and rhythm. Men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of musical discipline. But music, like all art, must be truly imitative, and imitative of what is true and good. Art and life agree in rejecting pleasure as the criterion of good. True art is inseparable from the highest and most ennobling ideas. Plato is the enemy of songs without words, which he supposes to have some confusing or enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also opposed to the modern degeneracy of tragedy, which he would probably have illustrated, like Aristophanes, from Euripides and Agathon. From this passage we seem to gather a more perfect conception of art than from any other of Plato's writings. He understands that art is at once imitative and ideal, an exact representation of truth, and also a representation of the highest truth. The same double view of art may be gathered from a comparison of the third and tenth books of the Republic, but is here more clearly and pointedly expressed. We are inclined to suspect exaggeration of the influence which is attributed by him to the song and the dance. But we must remember also the susceptible nature of the Greek, and the perfection to which these arts were carried by him.

In speaking of the chorus of elders, Plato takes occasion to revert to his old proposal of the use of wine. There is not much point in this, which may be regarded as an illustration of an illustration. The use of wine was a particular instance of social intercourse, and this is a particular instance of the use of wine.

At the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question, What is the origin of states? The answer is, Infinite time. We have already seen—in the Theætetus, where he supposes that in the course of ages every man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, Greeks and barbarians; or in the Critias, where he says that nine thousand years have elapsed since the ancient Athenian empire passed away—that Plato is no stranger to the conception of long periods of time. He supposes human society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions; and beginning from the last of these, he traces the steps

by which the family has passed into the state, and the original scattered society has received the impress of a military civilization. His conception of the origin of states is far truer in the *Laws* than in the *Republic*; but it must be remembered that here he is giving an historical, there an ideal account of the growth of society.

Modern enquirers, like Plato, have found in infinite ages the explanation not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the world itself; they have also detected in later institutions the vestiges of a patriarchal state still surviving. Thus far Plato speaks as 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' who may be thought by some divine instinct to have guessed at truths which were hereafter to be revealed. He is far above the vulgar notion that Hellas is the civilized world, or that civilization only began when the Hellenes appeared on the scene. But as he approaches more historical times, in preparing the way for his own theory of mixed government, he argues very falsely and imperfectly. He is desirous of showing the imperfection of the Dorian institutions, and hence he is led to attribute them to the Argives and Messenians. The decay of one of these Græek tribes, and the destruction of the other, are adduced by him as a manifest proof of their failure. But there is no more reason to suppose that the Dorian rule of life ever prevailed in Argos and Messene, than to assume that Dorian institutions were framed to protect the Greeks against the power of Assyria; or that the empire of Assyria was in any way affected by the Trojan war (this was not a part of any legend); or that the return of the Heraclidæ was only the return of Achæan exiles, who received a new name from their leader Dorieus. Such fancies were chiefly based, as far as they had any foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great part in the dawn of historical and geographical research. Because there was a Persian empire which was the natural enemy of the Greek, there must also have been an Assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility; and not only the fable of the island of Atlantis, but the Trojan war, derived some features from the Persian struggle. The river Nile answered to the Ister, and the valley of the Nile to the Red Sea (Herod. ii. 119). In the *Republic*, Plato is flying in the air regardless of fact and possibility—in the *Laws*, he is making history by analogy. In the one, he appears to be like some modern philosophers, absolutely devoid of historical sense; in the other, he is on a level not with Thucydides, or the critical historians of Greece, but with Herodotus, or even with Ctesias.

The chief object of Plato in tracing the origin of society, is to show the point at which regular government superseded the patriarchal authority, and laws common to many families took the place of the old customs. The customs were systematized by legislators, and new forms of government began to spring up. According to Plato, the only sound principle on which any of them was based was a mixture or balance of power. The balance of power had saved Sparta, when the two other Heraclid cities fell into disorder. Here, again, is probably the first trace of a great political idea, which has exercised a vast influence both in ancient and modern times. And yet we might fairly ask, a little parodying the language of Plato—O legislator, is unanimity only mutual jealousy; or is the balance of powers in a state better than the harmony of them?

In the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and Plato begins to ascend to the height of his great argument. The reign of Cronos has passed away, and various forms of government have succeeded, which are all based on self-interest and self-preservation. Right and wrong, instead of being measured by the will of God, are created by the law of the state. The strongest assertions are made of the purely spiritual nature of religion—‘Without holiness no man is accepted of God’; and of family duties, ‘Honour thy father and thy mother, if thou wouldst have a family.’ The legislator must teach these precepts as well as command them. He is to be the educator as well as the lawgiver of future ages, and the laws are themselves to form a part of the education of the state. Unlike the poet, he must be definite and rational; he cannot say one thing at one time, and another thing at another—he must know what he is about. And yet legislation has a poetical or rhetorical element, and must find words which will wing their way to the hearts of men. Laws must be promulgated before they are put in execution, and mankind must be reasoned with before they are punished. The legislator will begin by entreating courteously those who are willing to hear his voice. Upon the rebellious only does the heavy blow descend. A sermon and a law in one, blending the secular punishment with the religious sanction, appeared to Plato a new idea which might have a great result in reforming the world. The experiment had never been tried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any preambles, and Plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his discovery.

In these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of morals and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time. They all go back to mind and God, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of all things in His hand. The adjustment of the divine and human elements in the world is conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy, differing not much in the mode of expression. At first sight the legislator appears to be impotent, for all things are the sport of chance. But we admit also that God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him (compare the saying, that chance is the name of the unknown cause). Lastly, while we acknowledge that God and chance govern mankind, and provide the conditions of human action, experience will not allow us to deny a place to art. We know that there is a use in having a pilot, though the storm may overwhelm him; and a legislator is required to provide for the happiness of a state, although he will pray for favourable conditions under which he may exercise his art.

BOOK V. Hear now, all ye who heard the laws about Gods and ancestors: Of all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man's own. For in every man there are two parts—a better which rules, and an inferior which serves—and the ruler is to be preferred to the servant. And I tell every one next after the Gods to honour his own soul, and he can only honour her by making her better. A man does not honour his soul by flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of knowledge, nor when he blames others for his own errors; nor when he indulges in pleasure or refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, because he fears the world below, which, far from being an evil, may be the greatest good: nor when he prefers beauty to virtue—not reflecting that the soul which came from heaven is more honourable than the body which is earth-born; nor when he desires money, of which no amount is equal in value to virtue—in a word, when he counts that which the legislator pronounces evil to be good, he misbehaves towards his soul, which is the divinest part of him. He does not consider the real punishment of evil, which is, that he grows like evil men, and is compelled to fly from the company of the good: and he who is joined to evil men, must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another, which suffering is not justice but retribution. For justice is noble, but retribution is only the

attendant of injustice. And whether a man escapes or whether he is punished, he is equally miserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in the other case he is destroyed that the rest of the world may be saved.

The glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior. And the soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil and dwell with the good. Wherefore also the soul is second only to the Gods in honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which often has a false honour. For honour is not to be given to the fair or the strong, or the swift, or the tall, or the healthy, any more than to the opposite of these, but to the mean states; and the same of property and external goods. No man should heap up riches that he may leave them to his children. The best condition is a middle one, in which there is a freedom without luxury. And the best inheritance of children is modesty. But modesty cannot be implanted by admonition only—the elders must set the example.

He who honours his kindred and family, may fairly expect that the Gods will give him children. He who would have friends must think much of their favours to him, and little of his to them. He who prefers to an Olympic, or any other victory, the service of the laws, is also the best servant of his country. Engagements with strangers are to be deemed most sacred, because the stranger having no law to protect him is immediately under the protection of the God of strangers. A prudent man will avoid sinning against the stranger; and still more careful should he be of sinning against the suppliant, which is an offence never passed over by the Gods.

I will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and blame only, and which, although the law is not cognisant of them, greatly affect the disposition to obey the law. Truth has the first place among the gifts of Gods and men; for truth is faithfulness, and unfaithfulness is the voluntary love as ignorance is the involuntary reception of a lie: and he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. He who would lead a happy life must begin early, that he may partake of truth as long as possible. For he who is untruthful is in old age miserable and desolate, and has not a friend to close his eyes. Good is he who does no injustice—better who prevents others from doing any—best of all who joins the rulers in punishing injustice. And this is true of goods

and virtues in general; he who has and communicates them to others is the best of all; he who would, if he could, is second best; he who has them and is jealous of imparting them to others is to be blamed, but the good or virtue which he has is to be valued still. Let every man contend in the race without envy; for the unenvious man increases the strength of the city; himself foremost in the race, he harms no one with calumny. Whereas the envious man is weak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his slanders, thus depriving the city of proper training for the contest of virtue, and tarnishing her glory. Every man should be gentle, but he should also be passionate; for against incurable and malignant evil he must fight, and to this end passion is required. But there is another kind of evil which is remediable, and ought to be dealt with more in sorrow than anger. He who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for no man does evil or allows evil to exist or continue voluntarily in the highest part of his soul: and we can afford to forgive as well as pity the evil which can be cured: and therefore he who deals with the curable sort has need of gentleness—he should keep his temper, and not get into feminine rages; but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured out upon him. The greatest of all evils is one which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting—that is to say, self-love; which is thought to be natural and enforced as a duty, and yet is the cause of many errors. The lover of himself is blinded about the object of his affections; he is perverted in his judgments about good and evil, and prefers his own interests to the truth; for the truly great man is not a lover of himself but of justice. Self-love is the source of that ignorant conceit of knowledge which is always doing and never succeeding. Wherefore let every man avoid self-love, and condescend to follow the guidance of his betters. There are lesser matters of which a man should remind himself; for wisdom is like a stream, ever flowing in and out, and recollection is the flowing in of failing knowledge. Let no man be given to excess either of laughter or of tears; but let him control his feelings at the crisis of his fate, either when he is on 'sunlit heights' or falling over a precipice, believing that the Gods will diminish the evils and increase the blessings of good men. These are the thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind; he should feel the frailty of human life, and the probability of reverses, and should remember both in play and in seriousness, and remind others of the alternations of fortune, and await the end in hope.

So much of man's relation to God. But man is man, and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true taste respecting either is a great matter. And what is a true taste? This can only be explained by a comparison of one life with another. Pleasure is an object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of pain is to be preferred to pain, but not to pleasure. There are infinite kinds and degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more pleasure and avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life in which the elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced. All the lives which we desire are pleasant, and if we choose any others, our choice is due to inexperience.

Now there are four lives—the temperate, the rational, the courageous, the healthful; and to these let us oppose four others—the intemperate, the cowardly, the foolish, the diseased. The temperate life has gentle pains and pleasures, the intemperate life has violent delights, and still more violent desires. And the pleasures of the temperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed the pleasures. But if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate, but all who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in self-control: for men always choose the life which exceeds in pleasure. The wise, the healthful, the courageous life have a similar advantage—they also exceed their opposites in pleasure. And, generally speaking, the life of virtue is far more pleasurable and honourable, fairer and happier far, than the life of vice. Let this be the preamble of our laws; the strain will follow.

As in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be stronger than their half-educated subjects: in the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment of the rulers, and the rules which are prescribed for them. But, before proceeding to discuss them, there are some preliminary matters which have to be considered.

As of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made. The legislator must purify them, and if he be not a despot he will find even the mildest form of purification a difficult task. This milder process is as follows: When men are poor and show a disposition to attack the property of the rich, the legislator will despatch them to another land, and this is euphemistically termed the sending out of a colony. But our case will not require this remedy. We shall only need to purify the streams before they meet. This may often be a difficult process, but in

theory we may suppose the operation performed, and the desired purity attained. Evil men we will hinder from coming, and receive the good as friends with open arms.

Like the old Heracleid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition of debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous questions; the legislator may pray and hope, and may perhaps lessen the difficulty a little in a long period of years, but only when there is abundance of land. His aim will be to create a kindly spirit between creditors and debtors. Those who have should give to those who are in want; they should deem poverty to be not the diminution of a man's property, but the increase of his desires. Good will is the basis of a state: upon this alone can the political superstructure be safely reared. Among citizens there should be no outstanding quarrels: a legislator of sense will not proceed a step in the arrangements of a state until they are settled. For him to introduce fresh bones of contention would be the height of folly.

Let us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the size of the territory and the number of the allotments. The territory should be sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the population should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes to aid their neighbours. We will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to which the number of houses and portions of land shall correspond. Let the number be divided into two parts and then into three; and again into four and five, and any number of parts up to ten. For the whole number is very convenient for the purposes of distribution, and is capable of fifty-nine divisions; ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten. Here are numbers enough for war and peace, and for all contracts and dealings. These properties of numbers are true, and should be ascertained with a view to use.

No man of sense will make any alterations in religious institutions, when they have been once settled by the oracles of Delphi and Dodona. All sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their origin, whether derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus, or some other place, should remain as they are, and be supported by grants of land. Every division should have a patron God or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated, and at their temples those who are charged with their support should meet together from time to time, in their several divisions, for the sake of mutual help and friendship. All the citizens of

a state should be known to one another ; for when there is darkness and not light in the daily intercourse of life, there can be no justice or right administration. Every man should be true and simple, and should not allow others to take advantage of him.

And now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces. At first sight, our constitution may appear unsuitable to a legislator who has not despotic power ; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be if not the very best, the second best. For there are three forms of government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias has now to choose. The first and highest form is that in which friends have all things in common, including wives and property,—in which they have common fears, hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or their hands their own. This is the ideal state ; than which there never can be a truer or better—a state, whether inhabited by Gods or men, which will make the dwellers therein blessed. Here is the pattern on which we must ever fix our eyes ; but we are now concerned with another, which is next in degree, and we will afterwards proceed to a third.

Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their country, who is their God and parent. Their first care should be to preserve the number of their lots. This may be secured in the following manner : where there is a family the lot shall be left to the best-beloved child, who will become the heir of all the family interests and duties, to Gods, home and country. Of the remaining children, the females must be given in marriage according to the law, to be hereafter enacted ; childless males will have children assigned to them. How to equalize families and allotments will be one of the chief cares of the supreme council. When parents have too many children they may give to those who have none, or couples may abstain from having children, or take special care to obtain them ; or if the number of citizens becomes excessive, we may have recourse to our old plan of a colony. If, on the other hand, a war, or flood, or plague diminish the number of the allotments, new citizens will have to be introduced ; and you certainly ought not to introduce those who are ill-born and ill-educated. Still there may be cases in which you cannot avoid doing so, for even God cannot fight against necessity.

Wherefore we will say to our citizens : Good friends, honour order

and equality, and above all the number 5040. Secondly, respect the original division, which must not be infringed by buying and selling; for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred—God gave him the lot, and He will assuredly punish the alienation of His gift. And those who alienate either house or lot, shall be cursed by priests and priestesses once and again, and their curses shall be written down on tablets of cypress for the instruction of posterity. The all-seeing eye of the chief magistrate will be upon them, and he will punish those who disobey God and the law.

To appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be well educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state. No man will be allowed to exercise any illiberal occupation. The law also provides that no man shall have gold or silver, but only some coin for daily use, which will not pass current in other countries. The common Hellenic currency is to be used in defraying the expenses of expeditions, or of embassies, or when a man is on foreign travels; but he who uses it is to deliver up what is over on his return home to the treasury from which the issue came, on pain of losing the sum in question; and he who does not inform against him is to be mulcted in an equal sum. No money is to be given or taken as a dowry, or to be lent on interest, or lent at all, except to an honest man. The law will not protect a man in recovering either interest or principal. All these regulations imply that the aim of the legislator is not to make the city as rich as possible, or as mighty as possible, but the greatest virtue and the greatest happiness are to be his principles. Now men can hardly be at the same time very virtuous and very rich. Over-much honesty is not consistent with excess of wealth. And why is this? Because he who makes twice as much and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving where he ought not and not spending where he ought, will be at least twice as rich as he who makes money where he ought, and spends where he ought. On the other hand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate and poor, while he who acquires honestly, and spends what he acquires on noble objects, can rarely be very rich. A very rich man is not a good man, and therefore not a happy one. Now the object of our laws is to make the citizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they will be, not when there are the most wrongs and suits, but when there are the fewest. And, therefore, we say that there is to be no silver or gold in the state, nor the meaner sort of trade which is carried on by

usury or the rearing of stock, nor money-making, which will lead men to neglect that for the sake of which money is made, that is to say, the soul first and afterwards the body;—which are not good for much without music and gymnastic. Money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest interests being those of the soul, and in the second class are to be ranked those of the body. This is the true order of legislation, which would be inverted by placing health before temperance, or wealth before health. Let our citizens take the lot upon these conditions.

It might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal property; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes of offence by valuations of properties, and proportionate taxation. To this end, let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed according either to their original property, or to the changes of their fortune. The greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the law will say, is caused by extremes of poverty or wealth. The limit of either shall be the lot, which must not be diminished, and may be increased fourfold, but not more. He who exceeds the limit shall be deprived of the surplus, which shall be divided between the informer and the Gods, and he shall pay as much again out of his own property. All property other than the lot must be inscribed in a register, so that any disputes which arise may be easily determined.

The city shall be in a suitable situation, and in the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards. First, we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which shall be placed the temples of Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene. From this shall be drawn lines dividing the city, and also the entire country, into twelve sections containing 5040 lots. Each lot shall be subdivided into two parts, and there shall be a residence on both. The distance of one part of the lot shall be compensated by the nearness of the other; the badness and goodness by the greater or less size. Twelve of the lots will be assigned to the twelve Gods, and they will give their names to the tribes. The divisions of the country shall correspond to those of the town.

The objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we have been speaking will never concur. The citizens will not tolerate a settlement in which they are deprived of gold and silver, and have the number of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed by law. They will say that our city is a mere image of wax. And the

legislator will answer 'I know it, but I maintain that we ought to set forth an ideal which is as perfect as possible. If difficulties arise in the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the remainder. But the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea without interruption.'

The number twelve, which is the number of division, runs through all parts of the state, phratries, villages, ranks of soldiers, coins and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made commensurable with one another. There is no meanness in requiring that the smallest vessels should have a common measure, which may be used in all measurements of height and depth, as well as of sounds and motions, upwards or downwards, or round and round. And the use of such a measure should be duly imposed by the legislator on all the citizens. No instrument of education is more valuable than arithmetic; nothing more tends to sharpen and improve and inspire the dull intellect. But such an education presupposes a lofty and generous spirit; there must be no meanness in the mind of the student. Otherwise, what should make a wise man will go to the formation of a rogue; and this evil tendency may be actually observed among the Egyptians and Phoenicians, who, notwithstanding their knowledge of arithmetic, are degraded in their general character; whether this defect in them is to be attributed to misfortune or to the disastrous influence of their education. And do not let us be deceived into thinking that we can disregard physical causes, or that there are not great differences in the power of regions to produce good men: heat and cold, and water and food, are certainly productive of many and great effects on the souls and bodies of men; and greater still are the influences of particular places, in which the air is holy, and Gods and demi-Gods have taken up their abode. To all this the legislator must attend, so far as lies within the scope of human prudence.

BOOK VI. And now we are about to consider (1) the appointment of magistrates; (2) the laws by which their powers and rights are to be determined. I may observe by the way that laws, however good, are useless and also ridiculous unless the magistrates are able to execute them. And therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary state should be tested from their youth upwards until the time of their election; and (2) those who are to elect them ought to be trained in habits of law, that they may form a right judgment of good and bad men. But

uneducated colonists who are unacquainted with each other, will not be likely to choose well. What, then, shall we do? I will tell you: The colony will have to be intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you are one, and I will help you and them, which is my reason for inventing this romance. And I cannot bear that the tale should go wandering about the world without a head,—left in this amorphous state, it will be such an ugly monster. ‘Very good.’ Yes; and I will be as good as my word, if God and old age will be gracious to me. And God will be gracious: but let us not forget what a great and daring creation this our city is. ‘Why daring?’ Why, surely our courage is shown in imagining that the new colonists will quietly receive our laws; for no man likes to receive laws when they are first imposed: could we only wait until those who had been educated under them were grown up, and of an age to vote in the public elections, there would be far greater reason to expect permanence in our institutions. ‘Very true.’ The Cnosian founders should take pains to clear themselves in the matter of the colony, and above all in the election of the higher officers. ‘How would you appoint them?’ In this way: The Cnosians who take the lead in the colony, together with the colonists, will choose thirty-seven persons, of whom nineteen will be colonists, and the remaining eighteen Cnosians—you must be one of the eighteen yourself, and become a citizen of the new state. ‘Why do not you and Megillus join us?’ Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But let me proceed with my scheme. As time goes on, the mode of election will be as follows: All who are of full age in the various departments of the military service will be electors; and the election will be held in the most sacred of the temples. The voter will place on the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon his vote, together with the name of his father, tribe, and ward, and his own name; and he may take away the tablet and replace it in the agora within thirty days. The 300 who obtain the greatest number of votes will be publicly announced, and out of them there will be a second election of 100; and out of the 100 a third election of thirty-seven, who have the greatest number of votes: these are to be the rulers; and the last election is to be accompanied by the solemnity of the electors passing through victims: But then who is to arrange all this? There is a common saying, that the beginning is half the whole; and I should say a good deal more than half. ‘Most true.’ The only way of making a beginning is from the parent city; and though in after ages the tie may be broken, and

quarrels may arise between them, yet in early days the child naturally looks to the mother for care and education. And, as I said before, the Cnosians ought to take an interest in the colony, and select 100 elders of their own citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the colonists, to be their rulers; and when the colony has been started, the Cnosians may return home and leave the colonists to themselves. The thirty-seven shall have the following functions: first, they shall be guardians of the law; secondly, of the registers of property in the four classes—not including the two, three, four minae, which are allowed as a surplus. He who is found to possess what is not described in the registers, in addition to the confiscation of such property shall be proceeded against by law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share in the public property or distributions of property; he shall all his life long be confined to the lot; and his sentence shall be inscribed in some public place. The thirty-seven guardians are to continue in office twenty years only, and to commence holding office at fifty years, or if later, they are not to remain after seventy.

Generals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and brigadiers of foot. The generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the guardians of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the age for military service. Any one may challenge the person nominated and start another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better qualified. The three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall be elected. The generals thus elected shall propose the taxiarchs or brigadiers, and the challenge may be made, and the voting taken, in the same manner as in the previous case. Assemblies for elections are to be held in the first instance, and until the prytanes and council come into being, by the guardians of the law in some holy place; and they shall divide the citizens into hoplites and cavalry, placing in a third division all the rest. All are to vote for general and cavalry officers. The brigadiers are to be voted for by those who carry shields. Next, the cavalry are to choose phylarchs in the presence of the army; but captains of archers and other irregular troops are to be appointed by the generals themselves. The generals of cavalry shall be proposed and voted upon by the same persons who vote for generals of the army. The two who have the greatest number of votes shall be leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice, but if oftener the presiding officers shall decide.

The council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into four sections of ninety each, making ninety councillors of each class. In the first place, all the citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; and they all shall be compelled to vote under pain of fine—this shall be the business of the first day. On the second day a similar election shall be made from the second class. On the third day, members of the council shall be elected from the third class; but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the voters of the three first classes, who, if they fail to vote, shall pay a fine according to their class. On the fourth day, members of the council shall be elected from the fourth class; they shall be elected by all, but the compulsion to vote shall only extend to the second class, who shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and to the first class, who shall pay a quadruple fine. On the fifth day, the names shall be exhibited, and out of them every citizen shall choose 180 of each class: these are to be reduced by lot to ninety, and 90×4 will form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state. For servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes friendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality. One of them is the bare external rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher equality, which is the judgment of Zeus. This latter has little place in human affairs, but that little is the source of the greatest good to cities and individuals. This is that equality which gives more to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political justice; to this the legislator looks, and we in our state desire to look, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs. But justice cannot always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to be substituted: and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be endured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which God must be entreated to guide.

These are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual care will also be required. The sailor has to keep a look-out for the ship night and day; and the vessel of state is tossing in a political sea, and therefore watch must succeed watch, and rulers must join hands with rulers, never allowing their vigilance to relax. Of the 360 senators, the greater part may be permitted to go and manage their own affairs,

but a twelfth portion must be set aside in each month for the administration of the state. Their business will be to receive information and answer embassies, also to prevent or heal internal disorders; wherefore they should exercise authority over all assemblies. These matters will be ordered by the monthly division of the council.

Besides the council, there ought to be wardens of ways, buildings, harbours, market-places, fountains, and the like. The temples should have their priests and priestesses, whether hereditary or appointed, and there should be officers having dominion over men and beasts; three kinds will be enough. The first may be called wardens of the city; the second, wardens of the agora; the priests are the third kind, and they will commonly hold family priesthoods; and if these do not exist in the new colony, let priests and priestesses be appointed. Some of our magistrates shall be elected by vote, some by lot; and the upper and lower classes shall be mingled in a friendly manner in the election to offices. The appointment of priests should be left to the God—that is, to the lot in which the God will manifest his will, the person elected undergoing a scrutiny, in proof of his being in his own person sound of body and legitimate, and his family as well as himself free from impurity and homicide. The laws which are to govern the temples should be brought from Delphi, and executed under the direction of the interpreters of them. Priests and priestesses are to be of sixty years of age, and shall hold office for a year only; the twelve tribes shall be formed into bodies of four, who will elect three apiece, making twelve in all. The three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed, and undergo a scrutiny; the remaining nine shall go to Delphi, in order that the God may select one out of each triad—and they shall be appointed for life. When any one dies, another shall be elected from the tribe of the deceased. There shall also be treasurers of the temples and groves, having authority over the produce and the letting of them.

The defence of the city should be committed to the generals, and other officers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora. The defence of the country shall be on this wise: there are twelve districts and twelve tribes, and in each there shall be five wardens of the country, and each of the five shall select twelve others out of their own district, of not more than thirty or less than twenty-five years of age. Every month they shall have one of the twelve portions of the country allotted to them, and go from one to the other, and back again from

west to east, and from east to west, changing the stations in their progress backwards and forwards in different months, that they may know the country at all seasons of the year. Every third year they shall have new wardens of the country, and commanders of the watch. While on service, their first duty will be to see that the country is well fortified, trenching and throwing up works in different places, with the assistance of the inhabitants; they will use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot, taking care however to interfere as little as possible with the regular course of agriculture. They will keep the roads in good order, and render every part of the country as inaccessible as possible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends. They will restrain and preserve the rain which comes down from heaven, making the barren places fertile, and the wet places dry. They will ornament the fountains with plantations and buildings, and guide the streams to the temples and groves of the gods; providing water by irrigation at all seasons of the year. In sacred places the youth should make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged; there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will be kindly received, and experience far better treatment than at the hands of a country doctor.

The duties of the service will be useful as well as ornamental, for the sixty police will be the guardians of the several portions of the country assigned to them; the five monthly rulers shall decide small matters, and the seventeen, composed of the five and the twelve, shall decide greater matters up to three minae. Every judge except the highest of all is to give an account. If the wardens of the country do any wrong to the inhabitants, let them submit to the decision of the villagers in the neighbourhood, where the question is only of a mina; but in suits of a greater amount, or in cases of appeal, the injured party may bring his suit into the common courts, and, if he obtain a verdict, may exact a double penalty.

The wardens, while on their two years' service, shall live and eat together, and he who is absent from the daily meal without permission or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a deserter, and be liable to be punished by any one who meets him. If any of the rulers is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole company of sixty shall have him punished; and he of them who screens him shall be liable to a still heavier penalty. He who is not a good servant will not be a good master; and a man should pride himself more upon serving well than

upon commanding: (1) upon serving the laws and the Gods; and (2) upon serving ancient and honourable men. The twelve and the five should serve themselves and one another, determining not to use the labour of the villagers for their private advantage, but only for the good of the public. Let them search the country through, and acquire a perfect knowledge of every locality; with this view, hunting and field sports should be encouraged. The service to whom these duties are committed, may be called the secret or rural police.

Next we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they shall have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, also of the water supply, which they will provide pure and abundant. They shall be chosen out of the highest class, and when the number of candidates has been reduced to six, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after being tested by a scrutiny, shall be admitted to their office. The wardens of the agora shall be five in number—ten are to be first elected, and every one shall vote for all of them; the ten shall be afterwards reduced to five, as in the former election. The first and second class shall be compelled to go to the assembly, but not the third and fourth, unless they are specially summoned. The wardens of the agora shall have the care of the temples and fountains which are in the agora, and shall punish those who injure them by stripes and bonds, if they be slaves or strangers; and by fines if they be citizens. And the wardens of the city shall have a similar power of inflicting punishment and fines in their own department.

In the next place, there must be ministers of music and gymnastic; one class of them superintending gymnasia and schools, and the education and housing of youth, male and female—the other having to do with contests of music and gymnastic. In musical contests there shall be one set of judges of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists, flute-players, harp-players and the like, and another of choruses. Each chorus of men, and boys, and maidens, must have a leader—one will be enough, and he should not be less than forty years of age; secondly, there must be a master of monody, aged not less than thirty years; he will introduce the competitors to the stage, and refer the judgment of them to the judges. The choregus is to be elected for a year in an assembly at which all who take an interest in music are compelled to attend, and no one else. Anybody may challenge on the

ground that so and so is unfit; and to this the other party may reply that he is fit. One is to be chosen by lot out of ten who are elected by vote. Next shall be elected out of the second and third classes the judges of gymnastic contests, who are to be three in number, chosen, after they have been tested, out of twenty who have been elected by the three highest classes—these being compelled to attend at the election.

One minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of the education of either sex. Let him be not less than fifty years old, and the father of children born in wedlock, of one sex if not of both; and let him and the electors agree in regarding his office as the highest in the state. For the right growth of the first shoot in plants and animals, tame or wild, including man, is the chief cause of matured perfection. Man is supposed to be a tame animal, but he is made either the gentlest or the fiercest of all creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated. Wherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best man possible. He shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected out of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates with the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be held by ballot in the temple of Apollo.

When a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another shall be elected in his place; and, in case the guardian of an orphan dies, another shall be appointed by the relations within ten days; and they shall be fined a drachma a day for every day which they delay.

The city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a judge who is silent and leaves the enquiry wholly to the litigants, as in arbitrations, is not a good judge. For making enquiry, a few judges are better than many, but the few must be good. The matter in dispute should be clearly elicited from the contending parties; time and examination will find out the truth. Before going to law, causes should first be tried among neighbours who know the circumstances, and if they cannot be settled by them, let them be referred to a higher court; and if the two courts do not agree, to a higher still, of which the decision shall be final.

Every magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day on which he is deciding a suit. The best tribunal will be that on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other tribunals, one for public and the other for private causes. The high court of appeal shall be composed of all the officers of state; they shall meet on the last day

of the year, and choose one judge for each court, to be their first-fruits : and those who are elected, after they have undergone a scrutiny, shall decide causes and judge appeals. They shall give their votes openly, in the presence of the magistrates who have elected them ; and if any one charges another with deciding against him unfairly, he shall lay his accusation before the guardians of the law, and if the judge be found guilty he shall pay damages to the extent of half the injury, unless the guardians of the law deem that he is worthy of a severer judgment.

As the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they should share in the trial of them. Such causes should be decided by any three of the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff can agree. Also in private suits all should judge as far as possible, and therefore there should be a court of law in every ward ; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, appears to himself to have no share in the state. The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form possible. And so, having done with the appointment of courts and the election of rulers, we may proceed to make our laws.

‘ I like your way, Stranger, and particularly approve your manner of joining the beginning to the end.’

Then so far our old man’s game of play has gone off well.

‘ Say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.’

Perhaps ; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in which painters put in and rub out colour : I want you to remark that their endless labour will last but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who will restore the picture, and make good the ravages of time. ‘ Certainly.’ And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment ? We are in the evening of life ourselves, and therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved and perfected by the next generation ; not only making laws for them, but making them lawgivers. ‘ We must do our best.’ Let us address them as follows : Beloved saviours of the laws, we give you an outline of legislation which you must fill up, according to a rule which we will prescribe for you : Megillus and Cleinias and I are agreed, and we hope that you will agree with us in thinking, that the whole energies of a man should be devoted to the attainment of manly virtue, whether this is to be gained by study, or habit, or some kind of acquirement, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge. He must admit of no impediments.

And rather than accept institutions which tend to degrade and enslave him, he should fly his country and endure any hardship. These are our principles, and we would ask you to judge of our laws, and praise or blame them accordingly as they are or are not capable of implanting this character.

And first of laws concerning religion. In the consideration of these we shall have to return to the number 5040, of which the twelfth part is $420 = 20 \times 21$; this division corresponds to the number of the twelve tribes, and each tribe may be further subdivided by 12. Every divisor is a gift of God, and corresponds to the months of the year and to the movement of the universe. Every city has a number, but some numbers are more fortunate than others, and nothing can be more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by all numbers up to 12, with the exception of 11, and even by 11, if two families are deducted. The truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. But leaving the proof for the present, we will proceed to assign to each division some God or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them, and sacrifices offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held in their honour, twelve for the tribes, and twelve for the city. The object of them will be first to promote religion, secondly to encourage friendship and family intercourse; for families must be acquainted before they marry; if they are not, great mistakes will arise. Let there be innocent dances of young men and maidens, who may have the opportunity of seeing one another in modest undress. To the details of all this the masters of choruses and the guardians will attend, embodying in laws the results of their experience; and after ten years making the laws permanent, with the consent of the legislator, if he be alive, or, if he be not alive, the guardians of the law shall perfect them and settle them once for all. At least, if any further changes are required, the magistrates must take the whole people into counsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles.

Whenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five wants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which we will address to him —

Son of a virtuous sire: you ought to marry, but not for wealth—even a little inferiority in this respect may be well; nor should you avoid poverty, for your object is to have a well-balanced and harmonious home. A man is commonly disposed to marry some one who

is like himself in property and character. But the interests of the state require that he should do the contrary, for by equal marriages a society becomes unequal. And yet to enact a law that the rich and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the passionate shall be united to the dull, or the dull to the passionate, will arouse anger in some persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand that the state is a cup in which two elements mingle, the one frothing wine, the other sober water,—the admixture of these is an excellent drink. The object at which we aim must therefore be left to the influence of public opinion. And do not forget our former precept, that every one should seek to attain immortality and raise up a fair posterity to serve God:—This is the prelude of the law, to which if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five years of age is still unmarried, let him pay an annual fine: if he be of the first class, 100 drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third, 60; and if of the fourth, 30. This fine shall be consecrated in the temple of Herè; and if he refuse to pay, a tenfold penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of Herè, who shall be responsible for the payment. Further, the unmarried man shall receive no honour or obedience from the young, and he shall not retain the right of punishing others. A man is neither to give nor receive a dowry beyond a certain fixed sum; and in our state he will not grow old in poverty, for every one is provided with the necessaries of life. If the woman is not rich, her husband will not be her humble servant. He who obeys this law does well, and he who disobeys shall pay a fine according to his class, which shall be exacted by the treasurers of Herè and Zeus.

The betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin in various degrees, or if there are none, by the guardians. The offerings and ceremonies of marriage shall be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites. Let the wedding party be moderate, and never exceed a man's means; five male and five female friends, and a like number of kinsmen, are enough. The expense should not exceed, for the first class, a mina; and for the second class, half a mina. Extravagance is to be regarded as vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties. Much wine is only to be drunk at the festivals of Dionysus, and certainly not on the occasion of a marriage. The bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great step in life, ought to have all their wits about them; they should be especially careful of the night on which God may give them the

seed of increase, and which this will be none can tell. Their bodies and souls should be in the most temperate condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of the nature of disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary. There is an original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper respect. He who marries should make the second house the nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father and mother, and then he will have more affection for them; 'there ought to be *desiderium* to get rid of *offensiones*.' He will go forth as to a colony and will beget and bring up his children in another place, handing on the torch of life to another generation.

About property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception of property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful character. The slavery of the Helots is affirmed by some to be the greatest good, and by others the greatest misfortune of Sparta. To a certain extent there is the same doubt about the slavery of the Mariandynians at Heraclea and of the Thessalian Penestae. This makes us ask, What shall we do with our slaves? to which every one would agree in replying, Let us have the best and most attached whom we can get. All of us have heard stories of slaves who have saved the lives and properties of their masters, and been better to them than a son or a brother. 'Certainly.' Yet there is an opposite doctrine, that slaves are good for nothing, and not to be trusted; as Homer says, 'Slavery takes away half a man's understanding.' And different persons treat them in different ways: there are some who never trust them, and beat them like dogs, until they make them not thrice, but many times as slavish as they were before; and others pursue the opposite plan. Man is a troublesome animal, as has been often shown, Megillus, in your Mesenian wars; and great mischiefs have arisen in countries where there are large bodies of slaves who speak a common language. Two rules may be given for their management: first that those of them who come from the same country should be dispersed; and secondly, that they should be treated by their master with perfect justice, even more than equals, and for his own sake quite as much as theirs. For the truly just man is he who hates injustice when easy; and he who is righteous in the treatment of his slaves, or of any inferiors, will sow in them the seed of virtue. Masters should never play with their slaves: this, which is a common practice, is a great piece of folly, and increases

the difficulty and painfulness of managing them to both parties. 'You are quite right.'

Next as to habitations. These ought to have been spoken of before; for no man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house for them to live in. Let us supply the omission. The agora should be in the centre of the city, and the temples in the neighbourhood of the Acropolis. Near them should be the residences of the magistrates, and the courts of law in which capital offences are to be tried. Matters serious in themselves are rendered more serious by their proximity to the Gods. As to walls, Megillus, let them sleep in the earth, as at Sparta; 'cold steel is the best wall,' as the poet tells us. Besides, what an absurdity there would be in sending our youth to dig fosses and raise buildings in defence of the borders of our country, and then to build a city wall, which is very unhealthy, and is apt to make people fancy that they may run there and rest in idleness, not knowing that true rest must always follow toil, and that toil of another sort is the consequence of idleness. If, however, there must be a wall, the private houses had better be so arranged as to form one wall; this will have an agreeable aspect, and the building will be safer and more defensible. The inhabitants will keep the wall in repair under the superintendence of the aediles, who will enforce cleanliness, and preserve the public buildings from the encroachments by buildings or diggings of individuals. The aediles will also take care to let the rains flow off easily, and will regulate other matters concerning the general administration of the city. What remains may be left to the guardians of the law.

And now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens, we will proceed to speak of their mode of life. In a well-constituted state, individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please. Why do I say this? Because I am going to enact that the bridegroom shall not absent himself from the common meals. They were instituted originally on the occasion of some war, and, though deemed singular when first founded, they have tended greatly to the security of states. There was a difficulty in introducing them, but there is no difficulty in them now. There is, however, another institution about which I would speak, if I dared. I may preface my proposal by remarking that disorder in a state is the source of all evil, and order of all good. Now in Sparta and Crete there are common meals for men, and this,

as I was saying, is a divine and natural institution. But the women are left to themselves; they live in dark places, and, being weaker, and therefore wickeder, than men, they are at the bottom of a good deal more than half the evil of states. This must be corrected, and the institution of common meals extended to both sexes. But who can establish them where they are lost; and still more, who can compel women to eat and drink in public? They will dare the legislator to come and take them out of their holes. And in any other state such a proposal would be drowned in clamour, but in our own I think that I can show the attempt to be just and reasonable. 'There is nothing which we should like to hear better.' Listen, then; having plenty of time, we will go back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us. 'Right.' Either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never have an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into being is all but infinite. 'No doubt.' And in this infinity of time there have been constitutions and destructions of states, and all kinds of order and disorder, desires of meats and drinks of all sorts, and vicissitudes of the seasons, affecting animals in numberless ways. 'Certainly.' Vines and olives were at length discovered, and the blessings of Demeter and Persephone, of which one Triptolemus is said to have been the minister; before his time the animals had been eating one another. And there are nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow men, and other nations in which they will not sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow—they offer fruits or cakes moistened with honey; and some have led a sort of Orphic existence, abstaining from everything that has animal life, and eating only that which is without life. Perhaps you will ask me what is the bearing of these remarks? 'That is certainly passing in my mind.' I will endeavour to explain their drift. I see that the virtue of human life depends on the due regulation of three wants or desires: the first is the desire of meat, the second of drink; these begin with birth, and refuse to listen to any voice other than that of pleasure and pain. The third and fiercest and greatest need is felt latest; this is love, which is a madness setting men's whole nature on fire. These three disorders of mankind we must endeavour to restrain by three mighty influences—fear, and law, and reason, which, with the aid of the Muses, and the Gods of contests, may extinguish our lusts.

But to return. After marriage let us proceed to the generation of

children, and then to their nurture and education — thus gradually approaching the subject of *syssitia*. There are, however, some other points which are suggested by the three words — meat, drink, love. ‘Proceed.’ The bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a brave offspring. Now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore the bridegroom ought to take special care of the bride, and the bride of the bridegroom, at the time when their children are about to be born. And let there be a jury of matrons who shall meet at the command of the magistrates, and shall attend at the temple of *Eilithyia* until noon, and inform against any man or woman who does not observe the laws of married life. The time of begetting children and the supervision of the parents shall last for ten years only; if at the expiration of this period they have no children, they may part, with the consent of their relatives and the official matrons, and with a due regard to the interests of either; if a dispute arise, the matrons shall enter the houses of the young people, and advise and threaten them. If their efforts fail, let them go to the guardians of the law; and if they too fail, the offender, if he be a man, shall lose the privileges of citizenship, and both men and women shall be forbidden to be present at all family ceremonies. If when the time for begetting children has ceased, either husband or wife have connection with others who are of an age to beget children, they shall be liable to the same penalties as those who are still having a family. But when both parties have ceased to beget children there shall be no penalties; men and women ought to live soberly and maintain a good reputation; but recourse is to be had to punishment only if there is great disorder of manners.

The first year of children’s lives is to be registered in their ancestral temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed on a whited wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members of the phratry at the side, and to be erased at their decease. The proper time of marriage for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for a man, from thirty to thirty-five (cp. Rep. v. 460 E). The age of holding office for a woman is to be forty, for a man thirty years. The time for military service for a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a woman, from the time that she has ceased to bear children until fifty.

BOOK VII. Now that we have married our citizens and brought their children into the world, we have to find nurture and education

for them. This is a matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely regulated by the legislator. For minute regulations are apt to be transgressed, and frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience to the laws. I speak darkly, but I will try to exhibit my wares in the light of day. Am I not right in saying that a good education tends to the improvement of body and mind? 'Certainly.' And the comeliness of the body ought to begin as soon as possible after birth. 'Very true.' And we observe that the first shoot of every living thing is the greatest, and there are many who contend that man is not at twenty-five twice the height that he was at five. 'True.' And growth without symmetrical exercise of the limbs is the source of endless evils in the body. 'Yes.' The body should have the most exercise when growing most. 'What, the bodies of young infants?' Nay, the bodies of unborn infants. I should like to explain to you the sort of gymnastics which may be used during the process of gestation. The Athenians are fond of cock-fighting, and in our country the people who keep cocks, far from thinking that they have enough movement in fighting one another, take them out for long walks, holding them in their hands or under their arms; this is done for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own health, but the health of the cocks. Here is a proof of the use and glory of motion, whether of rocking, swinging, riding, or tossing upon the wave; for all these kinds of motion have a great effect in increasing strength and the powers of digestion. Hence we infer that our women, when they are with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo; and the children, when born, should be carried by stout nurses—one or more—and not suffered to walk until they are three years old, lest they should grow rickety. Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these rules? The greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty of making the nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves. 'Then why speak of these matters?' In the hope that heads of families may learn that the due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order in the state.

And now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first repeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for all, and especially for the infant; his life should be borne upon the wave. This is proved by the Corybantian cure of motion, and by the practice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at the same time in sweet measures. What is the reason of this? The reason is

obvious. The affections, both of the Corybantes and of the children arise from fear, and this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on within them. Now a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent internal one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving sleep to some, and bringing back others who are awake to their right minds by the help of religious dances and acceptable sacrifices. There seems to be reason in that. 'No doubt.' Observe also that the mind of a child which is habitually in a state of terror will be likely to grow up timorous, and the overcoming of fear in childhood will become courage. 'Very true.' The motion of children will inspire their souls with the virtue of cheerfulness. 'Of course.' Softness enervates and irritates the temper of the young, and violence renders them mean and misanthropical. 'But how is the state to educate them when they are as yet unable to understand the meaning of words?' Why, surely they roar and cry, like the young of any other animal, and the nurse knows the meaning of these intimations of the child's likes or dislikes, and the occasions which call them forth. About three years is passed by children in a state of imperfect articulation, and this is no insignificant portion of human life, quite long enough to make them either good or ill tempered. Now you should contrive that, during these first three years, the infant should be as free as possible from fear and pain. 'Yes, and he should have as much pleasure provided for him as possible.' There I cannot agree with you; for I consider the influence of pleasure in the beginning of education to be fatal. 'Explain.' My principle is that a man should neither pursue pleasure nor wholly avoid pain. He should embrace the mean, and cultivate that state of calm which the religious feeling of mankind, taught by inspiration, attributes to God; and he who would be like God should neither be too fond of pleasure himself, nor should he permit any other, male or female, young or old, to be thus given; above all, not the infant, who in infancy is being fashioned and formed more than at any other time. I shall be laughed at for saying that a woman in her pregnancy should be carefully watched, and not suffered to indulge in excitement; her ways should be gentle and gracious.

'I quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and following the mean.'

Let us now consider a further matter. The unwritten customs or usages of our ancestors are made up of details which are not laws, but they

fill up the interstices of law, and are the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole building depends. Laws without customs never last. No wonder, then, that habit and custom overflow into the domain of law. 'Very true.' And there may be great advantage in the influence exercised by custom upon three-years-old children. From three to six their minds have to be amused; and they must receive gentle chastisement, about which the same rule holds as in the case of slaves — neither to punish them in hot blood, nor by sparing to spoil them. Children at that age invent amusements for themselves when they meet, and the nurses should bring parties of them to their own village temple, and be careful to keep good order among them, being responsible themselves to one of the twelve matrons annually chosen by the women who have authority over marriage. These shall be appointed, one out of each of the twelve tribes, and when appointed, they shall go to the temples, and reprove and chastise offenders; and, in case their authority is disputed, shall bring them before the magistrates. After six years of age there shall be a separation of the sexes; the boys going to learn riding and the use of arms, and the girls may, if they please, also learn. Here I note a practical error in early training. The folly of mammæ and nurses believes that the left hand is by nature different from the right, whereas the left leg and foot are acknowledged to be the same as the right. But the truth is that nature made all things to balance, and the use of the other hand, which is of little importance in the case of the plectrum of the lyre, may make a great difference in the art of the warrior, who should be a sort of pancratiast, in every part of his body whole and perfect, and able to fight and balance himself in any position. If a man were a Briareus, he should be able to hurl a hundred darts with a hundred hands; at any rate, let him make good use of two. To all these matters the magistrates, male and female, should attend; the women superintending the nursing and amusement of their children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound, wind and limb, and not spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches—gymnastic, which is concerned with the body; and music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul. And gymnastic has two parts, dancing and wrestling. Dancing aims at the preservation of stateliness and freedom; wrestling is concerned with

the training of the limbs and parts of the body, and gives the proper flexure and extension to each of them, diffusing harmony throughout the frame. There is no military use in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the names of Antaeus and Cercyon, or in the science of boxing, which is attributed to Amycus and Epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of extricating the neck, hands, and sides, should be diligently learnt and taught; and in our dances imitations of war should be practised, as in the dances of the Curetes in Crete and of the Dioscuri at Sparta, or as in the dances in complete armour which were taught and practised by the goddess Athene, and are still performed in her honour. Youths who are not yet of an age to go to war should take part in religious processions armed and on horseback, moving slower or faster, chanting prayers to the Gods; and there should be games and rehearsals, which, whether in war or peace, are of great political importance.

Next follows music, to which we will once more return; and here I shall venture to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence on laws. He who has been taught to play at the same games and with the same playthings will be content with the same laws. There is no greater evil in a state than the spirit of innovation. Even in external nature change is a dangerous thing; in the changes of the seasons and winds, there is danger to our bodies and the habits of our minds; changes of diet are also dangerous. And in everything but what is bad the same rule holds. Every one venerates and acquiesces in the laws to which he is accustomed; and if they have continued during long periods of time owing to some providential arrangement, and there is no knowledge or memory of any other, people are absolutely afraid to change them. Now by what device shall we create this spirit of immobility in the laws? I say, by not allowing innovations in the plays and games of children. The children who are always changing their plays, when grown up, will change their laws. Changes in mere fashions are not serious evils, but changes in the praise and blame of characters are most serious; and rhythms and music are representations of characters, and therefore we must avoid novelties in dance and song; and no better method can be imagined of securing permanence than that of the Egyptians. 'What is their method?' The consecration of dances and hymns at appointed festivals and in honour of certain Gods; having been first selected by

individuals, they should be solemnly ratified by all the citizens, and an 'act of uniformity' passed. He who introduces other hymns or dances shall be excluded by the priests and priestesses, with the help of the guardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he may be prosecuted. But we must not be too ready to speak about such great matters. Even a young man, when he hears something new and strange, stands and looks this way and that, and, like a traveller in an unknown land, tries to find out where he is and whither he is going; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of his ground in so singular an argument. 'Very true.' Then, leaving the point which we are considering to receive further examination at some other time, let us look forward to the end of our laws about education, for that may probably throw light upon our present difficulty. 'Let us do as you say.' The ancients used the term νόμοι to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they dreamed or fancied that there was a connection between the songs and laws of a country. And we say—Whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a transgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of the law and by the priests and priestesses. 'Let this be as you say.' How can we legislate about them so as to command respect? Moulds or types of them must be first made, and one of the types shall be, Abstinence from evil words at sacrifices. When a son or brother blasphemes at a sacrifice there is a sound of ill omen heard in the family. 'Very true.' Yet this is a common practice. Many a chorus stands by the altar uttering inauspicious words, and he is crowned victor who excites the hearers most with lamentations. Such lamentations should be reserved for evil days, and if they are ever uttered should be uttered only by hired mourners, like those who accompany a funeral with barbarous Carian chants; and let them not have circlets or ornaments of gold. To avoid every evil word shall be the first of our types. 'Agreed.' Our second law or type shall be, that prayers ever accompany sacrifices; and our third, that prayers shall be only for good, for they are requests, and our poets must be made to understand this. 'Certainly.' Were we not saying just now that the golden and silver images of Plutus were not to be allowed in our city? and did not this show that we were dissatisfied with the poets; and may we not reasonably fear that, if they are allowed to compose prayers which are bad prayers, they will bring the greatest misfortunes on the state? And we must therefore make a law that the poet is not to contradict the laws or

ideas of the state; nor is he to show his poems to any private persons until they have first received the *imprimatur* of the director of education. After prayers to the Gods, there naturally follow hymns to the Gods; and after these, prayers and hymns to the heroes and demigods. There will be no danger in praising the dead, but until a man's life is finished we must wait. And men and women may be equally deserving of praise. Many ancient songs, poems, figures of the dance, are excellent, and out of these a selection will be made by judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age. They will choose some, and reject or amend others, sometimes with the aid of the poets themselves, their object being to bring the hymns and dances into accord with the intentions of the legislator. The regular and temperate music is the style in which to educate children, who, if they are used to this, will deem the opposite kind to be illiberal, or, if they are used to the other, will count this to be cold and unpleasing. 'Very good.' Further, a distinction should be made between the melodies of men and women. Nature herself seems to teach that the grand or manly style should be assigned to men, and to women the temperate and orderly. How this is to be carried out in detail is a further consideration. I am only, like the shipwright, laying down the keel of the vessel of the soul in which we are to sail through life. Human affairs are hardly serious, and yet to be serious about them is a disagreeable necessity; and if we can discover how to be serious, that will best beseem us. 'Very true.' I say then, that concerning the serious we should be serious, and that the nature of God is a serious reality. But man is a piece of mechanism and the plaything of the Gods; and therefore his aim should be to pass through life, not in grim earnest, but in play; and he should play as many good plays as he can—man and woman alike—in an opposite way to that which is now in vogue. 'How is that?' The common opinion is, that work is for the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there neither is, nor ever will be, lesson or amusement worth speaking of. The life of peace is that which men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve. They should live sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating Gods and heroes. I have already told you the type which they should follow:—

'Some things,' as the poet says, 'you will devise for yourself—others, God will suggest to you.'

These words of his may be applied to our pupils. They will teach

themselves, and God will teach them the art of propitiating Him; for they are His puppets, and have only a small portion in truth. 'You have no great opinion of human nature.' You must not wonder at my depreciating man when I compare him with God; but, if you are offended, I will place him a little higher.

Next follow the buildings; there will be gymnasia and schools in the midst of the city, and outside the city circuses and open spaces for riding and archery. In all of these there ought to be instructors of the young, drawn from foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music and war. Education shall be compulsory; parents shall not be allowed to send their children to school or not, as they please; for they belong to the state more than to their parents. And I say further, without fear or scruple, that the same education in riding and gymnastic shall be given both to men and women. The ancient traditions about the female hosts of the Sauromatidae, who practise the art of riding as well as archery and the use of arms, is an entirely credible tradition which confirms me in this view; and if I am right, nothing can be more foolish than our modern fashion of training men and women differently, whereby one-half of the power of the city is lost. For reflect—if women are not to have the education of men, some other must be found for them, and what other can we propose? Shall they, like the women of Thrace, tend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin and weave, and take care of the house? or shall they follow the Spartan custom, which is between the two?—there the maidens share in gymnastic exercises and in music; and the grown women no longer engaged in spinning, weave the web of life, although they are not like the Amazons, trained to the use of spear and shield; nor can they imitate the warrior goddess, even in the extremity of their country's need. Compared with our women, the Sauromatian women are like men. But your legislators, Megillus, as I maintain, only half did their work; they took care of the men, and left the women to take care of themselves.

'Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this way?'

'Why, yes; for we cannot retract the liberty which we have already conceded to him.'

What will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed from the toils of agriculture and business, and having common

meals for both sexes; from which they are dismissed by the magistrates, male and female, who will inspect their conversation, and at whose bidding, when libations have been offered, they will return home? Are men who have these institutions only to eat and fatten like beasts? He who lives like a fatted beast will share the fate of a fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other more valiant beast than himself. True, theirs is not the perfect way of life, for they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life also confers great blessings; and those who live in the second state have a work to do far greater, or rather twice as great as the work of any Pythian or Olympic victor; for they indeed work for the body only, but we both for body and soul. And this higher work ought not to be interfered with by any bye-work, but should be pursued night and day; for life is not long enough for the completion of it. The watchman of the city should not sleep, and the master of the household should be up early and before all his servants; and the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens, and not be awakened by them. Much sleep is not required either for our souls or bodies. When a man is asleep, he is no better than if he were dead; and he who loves life and wisdom will have no more sleep than is necessary for health, which is not much. Magistrates who are wide awake at night are terrible to the bad; but they are respected by the wise and good, and useful to themselves and the state.

When the morning dawns, let the boy go to school. As the sheep need the shepherd, so the boy needs a master; he may be called *animal ferae naturae*, and is the most unmanageable and deceitful of all creatures; for he has the springs of intelligence in him not yet regulated. Let him be taken out of the hands of mothers and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a freeman in that he learns and is taught; but as a slave in that he is chastised and smitten by all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to chastise him, shall himself be reprimanded by the director of education.

We must now give instructions to our director of education—him we will address as follows: We have spoken to you, O illustrious teacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial exercises; but of prose writings, and of music, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes we have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning divine things—

such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements of days in months, or of months in years, of which the true calculation is necessary to the knowledge of the order of seasons and festivals, which enliven and wake up a city, rendering to the Gods their due, and making men know them better. There are many things about which we have not as yet instructed you—and first, as to reading and the lyre: Shall the pupil be a perfect scholar and musician, or not even enter on the study? He should certainly enter on the study, and apply himself to letters from the age of ten to thirteen. At thirteen he will begin to handle the lyre, and continue to learn music until he is sixteen, and no longer, however fond he or his parents may be of the pursuit. The study of letters he should carry to the extent of reading and writing, without caring for calligraphy and tachygraphy, if he has no natural taste for them and cannot acquire them in three years. And here arises a question as to the learning of compositions, whether in poetry or prose, when unaccompanied with music. They are a dangerous species of literature. Speak then, O guardians of the law, and tell us what we shall do about them. ‘You seem to be in a difficulty.’ Why, yes; there is a difficulty in setting a single voice against the opinion of all the world. ‘But have we not already disregarded the opinion of the world in many of our enactments?’ Very true. I see that you would marshal me on the unpopular road, which the many hate, and you would have me cast in my lot with the few who are better than the many. ‘Certainly.’ Then I will begin by observing that we have many poets writing in hexameters, trimeters, and various other metres, comic as well as tragic, with whose compositions, as all the world affirms, youth are to be imbued and saturated. Some would have them learn by heart entire poets, while others prefer extracts; and this is supposed to constitute a gentleman’s education. Now I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, everybody would agree with me, that some of the things which they learn are good, and some bad. ‘Then how shall we reject some and select others?’ A happy thought suddenly occurs to me; this discourse, which has lasted the live-long day, is just a sample of what we want, and is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem. I am naturally pleased in looking back at all this creation of mine, which appears to me to have a wonderful propriety, and is just the thing for a young man to hear. I would venture, then, to offer to the legislator this

treatise of laws as a sample of what he wants; and in case he should find any compositions of the same family, written or oral, I would have him preserve them with the utmost care, and commit them in the first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them (he should turn off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate the lesson to the young.

I have said enough of reading and writing; and now we will proceed to the teachers of the lyre. The teacher of the lyre must be reminded of the advice which was given by us to the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive the rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the opposite. With a view to perfecting the imitation, the pupil and his instructor are to use the lyre on account of the distinctness of the notes; the voice and note should coincide note for note: nor should there be harmonies and contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms. Three years' study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these complexities. And when so many subjects of education are necessary, the pupil should not be overwhelmed with the unnecessary. The tunes and hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival, and to be handed down in after ages, have been already determined, and the regulation of them may be left to our director of music.

Let us now proceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and girls by masters and mistresses. Our minister of education will have a great deal to do. Being an old man how will he get through so much work? There is no difficulty; for the law will provide him with assistants, male and female, as many as he pleases; and he will consider how important his office is. For if education prospers, the vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education fails, the very mention of the consequences in an infant state would be ill-omened. Of dancing and gymnastics something has been said already. We include under them the various uses of arms, and the movements and positions of the body corresponding to them, as well as military tactics. There should be public teachers of both arts, paid by the state, and women as well as men should be trained in them. The maidens should learn the armed dance, and the grown-up women be practised in the drill and use of arms, if only in case of extremity, when the men are gone out to battle, and they are left to guard their families. Birds and beasts defend their young, but women instead

of fighting run to the altars, thus degrading man below the level of the animals. There is something unseemly in such cowardice, to say nothing of the real harm. And therefore women are enjoined by law to learn the art of war.

Wrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of this, and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action is combined with words. Next follows dancing, which is of two kinds; imitative, first, of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the ludicrous and grotesque. The first kind may be further divided into the dance of war and the dance of peace; the first of the two is the Pyrrhic, in which the movements of attack and defence are imitated—the postures of hurling, slinging, shooting, striking, or again of escape and guard. Of all these the true style is manly and direct, and indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind. The second is the dance of peace; and is sometimes attended with Dionysiac revelry of a debatable sort, personifications of Pan and Silenus, and of nymphs and satyrs in their cups. This latter is a dance which can hardly be tolerated in a civilized state, and cannot be characterized either as warlike or peaceful. But with this exception the two kinds may be admitted. The first of them is the more violent, being an expression of joy and triumph after toil and danger; the other is more tranquil, symbolizing the continuance and preservation of good. In speaking or singing we naturally move our bodies, and gesture is the imitation of words. As the dancer has more or less courage or self-control the dance becomes more or less violent and excited. Every one must imitate harmonically or inharmonically, and this is the origin of the art of dancing. The warlike kind is appropriately called the Pyrrhic, and the peaceful kind with equal propriety *Emmeleia*, or the dance of order. The types of these dances are to be fixed by the legislator, and the guardians of the law should assign them to the several festivals, and consecrate them to the good of the state.

Thus much of the fair forms and noble souls which are personated in choral dances. Comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered. For the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be understood without opposites. But a man of repute will desire to avoid doing what is ludicrous. He should leave such performances to slaves: they are not serious, and there should be some element of novelty in them. Concerning tragedy, let our law

be as follows: When the inspired poet comes to us with a request to be admitted into our state, we will reply in courteous words—We also are tragedians and your rivals; and the drama which we enact is the best and noblest, being the imitation of the truest and noblest life, with a view to which our state is ordered. You are poets, and we are poets and rivals of yours, and our hope is to perform a play which is the creation of perfect law. And we cannot allow you to pitch your stage in the agora, and make your voices be heard above ours, or suffer you to address our women and young men, and people in general, on opposite principles to our own. Come then, soft sirs, children of the Lydian Muse, and present yourselves first to the magistrates, and if they decide that your hymns are as good or better than ours, you shall have your chorus; but if not, not.

There remain three kinds of knowledge which are to be learnt by freemen—arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly, astronomy. Few can make an accurate study of such sciences; and of special students we will speak at another time. But the many must be content with the study of them which is absolutely necessary, and may be said to be a divine necessity, very unlike our human necessities, being of that sort against which God himself is unable to contend. ‘What are these divine necessities of knowledge?’ Necessities of a knowledge without which neither gods, nor demigods, can govern mankind. Far is he from being a divine man who cannot distinguish one, two, odd and even; who cannot number day and night, and is ignorant of the revolutions of the stars; for to every higher knowledge a knowledge of number is necessary—a fool may see this; how much, is a matter requiring more careful consideration. ‘Very true.’ But the legislator cannot enter into such details, and therefore we must defer the more careful consideration of the subject to a better opportunity. ‘You seem to fear our habitual want of training in these subjects.’ Still more I fear the danger of bad training, which is far worse than none at all. ‘Very true.’ I think that a gentleman and a freeman may be expected to know as much as an Egyptian child. In Egypt, arithmetic is a game which is taught children by a distribution of apples or garlands in numbers which admit of division and subdivision; or a calculation is made of the various combinations which are possible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or gold, brass, and silver are put into vessels, mixed and unmixed, and the child counts

them. The knowledge of arithmetic which is thus acquired is a great help, either in drawing up an army or in the management of a household; and wherever measure is employed, men are more wide-awake in their dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous ignorance. 'What do you mean?' I have observed the existence of this ignorance among my countrymen—they are as bad as pigs—and I am heartily ashamed both on my own behalf and on that of all the Hellenes. 'In what respect?' I will endeavour to explain by asking you a question. You know that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth? 'Yes.' And the Hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1) with themselves, and (2) with each other; whereas they are not always commensurable with themselves, and never with each other. But if this is true, then we are in an unfortunate case, and may well say to our compatriots that not to possess necessary knowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing very grand. 'Certainly.' The discussion of arithmetical problems is a much better amusement for old men than their favourite game of draughts. 'Yes, mathematics and the game of draughts seem to me to have much in common.' These are the subjects in which youth should be trained. They may be regarded as amusements, and will do great good and no harm; I think that we may include them provisionally. 'Yes; they will fill up the details which are wanting in our laws.' The next question is, whether astronomy shall be made a part of education. About the stars there is a strange notion prevalent. 'What is that?' There is said to be an impiety in investigating the nature of God and the world, whereas the very reverse is the truth. 'What do you mean?' The idea may seem absurd and at variance with the usual language of age, and yet if true and advantageous to the state, and pleasing to God, ought not to be withheld. 'Of what knowledge are you going to speak?' My dear friend, what falsehoods we and all the Hellenes tell about the sun and moon. 'What falsehoods?' We are always saying that they and certain of the other stars go different ways, and we term them planets. 'Yes; and I have seen Lucifer and Hesperus go all manner of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we know that they always do. But I wish that you would explain your meaning further.' You will easily understand what I have had no difficulty in understanding myself, though we are both of us past the time of learning. 'True; but what is this marvellous knowledge

which youth are to learn, and of which we are ignorant?' Men say that the sun, moon, and stars are planets or wanderers; but this is the reverse of the fact. Each of them moves in one orbit only, and not in many; nor is the swiftest of them the slowest as appears to human eyes. What a great insult should we offer to Olympian racers if we were to put the first last and the last first! And if that is a ridiculous error in speaking of men, how much more in speaking of the Gods? 'Yes; worse than ridiculous.' Certainly, the Gods cannot be very well pleased at our telling falsehoods about them. 'Certainly not.' Then people should at least learn so much about them as will put a stop to blasphemy.

Enough of education. Similar principles should regulate hunting and other matters. Something of a mixed kind, which is neither law nor yet admonition, has often entered into our discourse, as we found in speaking of the nurture of young children. And therefore the whole duty of the citizen will not consist in mere obedience to the laws. The perfect citizen is he who regards not only the laws but the precepts of the legislator. This may be illustrated by the example of hunting. Now of this there are many kinds—hunting of fish and fowl, man and beast, enemies and friends; but the legislator cannot include in his enactments all these varieties. He must praise and blame hunting, having in view the discipline and exercise of youth. And the young man will regard his praises and censures much more than his penalties; neither the love of pleasure nor the fear of pain will hinder him. The legislator will proceed to express himself in the form of a pious wish—O my young friends, he will say, may you never be induced to hunt for fish in the sea, either by day or night; or for men, whether by sea or land. Never let the wish to steal enter into a corner of your minds; neither be ye fowlers, for this is not a gentlemanlike occupation. Land animals remain, which may be hunted by night in a good-for-nothing way, and also by day, likewise in indolent fashion, resting at intervals, and using snares and nets. The only mode of hunting which the legislator can praise is with horses and dogs, running, shooting, striking at close quarters. There is no other kind which is esteemed by men of courage. The law, then, shall be as follows:

Let no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly hunters who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited. Let the fowler confine himself to waste places and to the mountains. The

fisherman is also permitted, except in harbours and sacred streams, and pools and lakes; but in all other places he may fish, provided he does not defile the waters by the use of poisonous mixtures.

BOOK VIII. Next, with the help of the Delphian Oracle, we will appoint festivals and sacrifices. The times and number of them may be left to us. 'The number, yes.' Then let us determine the number of them to be 365, one for every day in the year. There shall always be one magistrate daily sacrificing according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and interpreters, who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and supply what the legislator has omitted. For the law will only appoint twelve festivals to the twelve Gods after whom the twelve tribes are named. These shall be celebrated every month with musical and gymnastic contests appropriate to the Gods and the seasons. There shall also be female festivals in honour of the goddesses who are worshipped by women only, and a festival of the Gods below. Pluto shall have his own in the twelfth month. He is not the enemy, but the friend of man, who releases the soul from the body, which is at least as good a work as to unite them. Further, consider that our state has leisure and abundance, and wishing to be happy, like an individual, should lead a good life, and a good life is immunity from doing or receiving injury, of which the first is very easy, and the second very difficult of attainment, and is only to be acquired by perfect virtue. A good city has peace, but the evil city is full of wars within and without. Wherefore the citizens should practise war at least one day in every month, and should have contests and sacrifices and hymns in praise of victory—the victory which they celebrate being the victory in the battle of life, as well as the victory of the festival. Let poets celebrate them; not, however, every poet—but he should be a man of fifty years old at least, and himself a distinguished person, who has done great deeds. Of such an one the poems may be sung, even though they are not quite equal to his deeds. To the director of education and the guardians of the law shall be committed the judgment, and no song which has not been licensed by them, even though sweeter than those of Thamyras and Orpheus, shall be recited, but only the praises or censures which they approve. These regulations about poetry, and about military expeditions, apply equally both to men and to women.

The legislator may be conceived to make the following address to

himself:—With what object am I training my citizens? Are they not strivers for mastery in combats? Certainly, will be the reply. And if they were boxers or wrestlers, would any man in his senses think of entering the lists without many days' practice? And would he not as far as possible imitate all the circumstances of the contest, putting on gloves and using the weapons of the contest; and if he had no one to box with, would he not practise on a shadow, heedless of the laughter of the spectators? 'That would be the way to learn.' And shall the soldiers go to the greatest of all contests, and fight for life and kindred and property unprepared, because sham fights are thought to be ridiculous? Will not the legislator require that his citizens shall practice war daily, performing lesser exercises without arms, while the combatants on a greater scale will carry arms, and take up positions, and lie in ambuscade? And let their combats be not without danger, that opportunity may be given for distinction, and the brave man and the coward may receive their meed of honour or disgrace. If occasionally a man is killed, there is no great harm done; the homicide did not mean to kill him. There are others as good as he is, and the state can better afford to lose a few than to lose the only means of testing them.

'We agree, Stranger, that the state should legislate about warlike exercises.' But then, why have such military amusements become obsolete? Do we not all know the reasons, which are (1) the inordinate love of wealth? This absorbs the soul of a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit. Knowledge and action are valued by him only as they tend to the attainment of wealth. All is lost in the desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do anything, right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and the indulgence of his animal passions. 'Most true.' This is one of the causes which prevents a man being a good soldier, or anything else which is good; he becomes a shopkeeper or a servant, and sometimes, if he happens to be brave, a burglar or a pirate. Many of these latter are men of fine character, and greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long. The bad forms of government (2) are another reason—democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which, as I was saying, are not states, but states of discord, in which the rulers are afraid of their subjects, and therefore do not like them to become rich, or valiant, or indeed soldiers at all. Now the state for which we are legislating has escaped these two causes of evil; the society is per-

fectly free, and has plenty of leisure, and is not allowed by the laws to be absorbed in the pursuit of wealth: hence we have an excellent field for a perfect education, and for the introduction of martial pastimes. Let us proceed to describe the character of these pastimes. Activity of body—quickness of foot to escape or take—quickness of hand or arm to grasp—are, in the strictest sense, military qualities; and yet you have not the greatest military use of them unless the competitors are armed. The runner should enter the lists in armour, and in the races which our heralds proclaim, no prize is to be given except to armed warriors. Let there be five courses—first, the stadium; secondly, the diaulos or double course; thirdly, the horse course; fourthly, a long course; fifthly, a race between a heavy-armed soldier, who shall pass over sixty stadia and finish at the temple of Ares, and an archer, who shall go among the mountains across country a distance of a hundred stadia, and his goal shall be the temple of Apollo and Artemis. The contests of each kind shall be in number three—one for boys, another for youths, a third for men in heavy and light armour; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for the youths at two-thirds of the entire length. Women shall join in the races: young girls who are not grown up shall run naked, and shall continue to run from thirteen to eighteen or until marriage; they may run up to twenty, but after thirteen shall be suitably dressed. As to trials of strength, single combats in armour, or battles between two and two, or of any number up to ten, shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy exercises. And there must be experts, as there are now in wrestling, to determine what is a fair hit and who is conqueror. Instead of the pancratium, let there be contests in which the combatants carry bows and wear light shields and hurl javelins and throw stones. The next provision of the law will relate to horses, which, as we are in Crete, need be rarely used by us, and chariots never; our horse-racing prizes will only be given to single horses, whether foals, half-grown, or full-grown. Their riders are to wear armour, and they may also be archers; a Cretan archer or javelin-man does good service. Women, if they have a mind, may join in the exercises of men.

But enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music. All musical contests will take place on holy days, months, and years, whether every third or every fifth year, which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the judges of the games, and the director of education, who for

this purpose shall become legislators and arrange times and persons. The principles on which such contests are to be ordered have been often repeated by the first legislator; no more need be said of them, nor are the details of them important. But there is another subject of the highest importance, which, if possible, should be determined by the laws, not of man, but of God; or, if a direct revelation is impossible, there is need of some bold and sincere man who, alone against the world, having reason for his guide, will speak plainly of the corruption of human nature, and go to war with the passions of mankind. 'I do not know what you mean.' I dare say, and therefore I will make my meaning plainer. In speaking of education, I seemed to see young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another; and there arose in my mind a natural fear about a state, in which, as I reflected, the young of either sex are well fed, and have little to do, and have their time chiefly occupied in festivals and dances. How can the voice of reason be lifted up, as with the force of a law, against those passions which are the ruin of numbers of both sexes? The prohibition of wealth, and the influence of education, and the all-seeing eye of the ruler, have a good effect in promoting temperance; but they will not wholly extinguish the temptation to the unnatural loves of both sexes, which have been the destruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can be devised? Lacedaemon and Crete, excellent as are many of their institutions, afford us no help here; on the subject of love, as I may whisper in your ear, they are against us. Suppose a person were to urge that you ought to follow nature and the example of animals, and restore the natural use which existed before the days of Laius; he would be quite right, but he would not be supported by public opinion in either of your states. Or try the matter by another test, which we always apply to all laws, the test of virtue; who will say that the permission of such things tends to virtue? Will the spirit of courage pass into the soul of him who gives up his person to another? Will the seducer be gifted with temperance? And will any one, who has a notion of law, be found to praise such actions, or to make them legal?

But to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love and friendship, which may take very different forms. For we speak of friendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue; secondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when

in excess, is termed love. The first kind is gentle and communicable; the second is fierce and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is ambiguous, and is under the dominion of opposite principles—the one urging the lover to take his fill of the bloom of youth, the other forbidding him. The one is of the body, and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who is under the influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker rather than a lover, and has a true reverence for the modesty and courage and wisdom of his friend, with whom he would fain associate in holy purity. Here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to prohibit all of them equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain? ‘The latter, clearly.’ I expected to gain your approval, and therefore I need not go out of my way to censure the Spartan custom. I will reserve the task of persuading Cleinias for another occasion. ‘Very good.’ How we are to make right laws on this subject is in one point of view easy, and in another most difficult; for we know that most men do abstain in some cases, and for the most part willingly, from intercourse with the fair. ‘When do they?’ There is an unwritten law which prohibits members of the same family from such intercourse. And this law is willingly obeyed, and no thought of anything else ever enters into the minds of men in general. ‘Very true.’ A little word is enough to put out the fire of their lusts. ‘What is it?’ The declaration that they are hateful to the Gods, and of all abominable things the most abominable and unholy. The reason is that everywhere, in jest and earnest alike, this is the doctrine which is repeated to all from their earliest youth. They see on the stage that such monsters as Oedipus and Thyestes, when detected, are put to death. There is an undoubted power in public opinion when no breath is heard adverse to the law. And the legislator who would enslave these slavish passions must consecrate such a public opinion all through the city. ‘Good: but how will you set about creating this public opinion?’ You are right in asking that question, for I promised to try and find some means of restraining loves to their natural objects. Men should not be the destroyers of their kind, spilling the power of life upon the ground; and they should abstain from the women whom they do not intend to make mothers. A law which would accomplish this as effectually as incest is at present prohibited by law, would be of endless benefit, first, as being in accordance with nature, and getting rid of excesses in meats and drinks and adulteries and frenzies, making men love

their wives, and having other excellent effects. I can imagine that some lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out in abusive terms that we are legislating for impossibilities. And so a person might have said of the *syssitia*, or common meals; but this is refuted by facts, although even now they are not extended to women. 'True.' There is no impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as I shall endeavour to prove. 'Do so.' Will not a man find abstinence more easy when his body is sound than when he is in some peculiar or diseased condition? 'Yes; when he is in good condition he will find abstinence more easy.' Have we not heard of *Iccus* of Tarentum and other famous wrestlers who abstained wholly? And they had not the benefits of education which we bestow on the minds of our citizens, and in their bodies they were far more lusty. 'Yet the fact remains.' And shall they have abstained for the sake of an athletic contest, and our citizens be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a victory which is higher and nobler far—the highest and noblest of all? 'What victory do you mean?' 'The victory over pleasure, which is true happiness; whereas the slavery to pleasure is misery. Will not the fear of impiety enable us to conquer that which many who are inferior to us have conquered? 'It ought to do so.' And therefore the law must say right out, that our citizens should not fall below the other animals, who dwell together in great flocks, and are pure and chaste until the time of procreation comes, when they marry, and are ever after faithful to their contract. Our citizens may be expected to be a little better than the brutes; and if the corruption of public opinion and the practice of lawless love is too great to allow our first law to be carried out, then our guardians of the law must turn legislators, and try their hand at a second law. They must minimize the appetites, diverting the strength of youth into other channels, and making the practice of love secret and shameful. Three higher principles or elements may be brought to bear on the single principle which is corrupt. 'What are they?' Religion, honour, and the love of the higher qualities of the soul. Perhaps this is a dream only, yet the best of dreams; and if not the whole, yet, by the grace of God, a part of what we desire may be realized. Either men may learn to abstain wholly from any loves, natural or unnatural, except of their wedded wives; or, at least, they may give up unnatural loves; or, if detected, may be punished with

loss of citizenship, as aliens from the state in their morals. 'I entirely agree with you,' said Megillus, 'but I should like to hear what Cleinias says.' 'I will give my opinion bye-and-bye.'

We were speaking of the *syssitia*, which will be a natural institution in a Cretan colony. Whether the institution is to follow the model of Crete or Lacedaemon, or one different from either, is not a question of much importance. The manner of them will be determined without difficulty. We may, therefore, proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens, which in other cities will be far more complex, and must at any rate be twice as complex as in this; a state which is inland and not maritime requires only half the number of laws. There is no trouble about retail traders, merchants, hotels, mines, customs, loans, compound interest, or a thousand other things. The legislator has only to regulate the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds, and keepers of bees, and the makers of implements, who will be easily managed, now that the principal questions relating to marriage, education, and government have been settled.

Let us begin with husbandry: First, let there be a law of Zeus, the God of boundaries, against removing a neighbour's landmark, which is the real impiety of 'moving the immovable.' The least stone which marks an agreement is more sacred than the greatest rock which is not a boundary. Zeus, the God of kindred, witnesses to the wrongs of citizens, and Zeus, the God of strangers, to the wrongs of strangers—and their wrath is terrible. The impiety of removing a boundary shall receive two punishments—the first will be inflicted by the God himself; the second will be a fine imposed by the judges. In the second place, the differences between neighbours about encroachments must be guarded against. He who encroaches shall pay twofold the price of the injury; of all such matters the wardens of the country shall be cognizant, or in greater cases the military force of the division. The injury done by cattle, the decoying of bees, the firing of your own wood without thinking of your neighbour, the encroachment on his plantations, shall all be visited with proper damages. Such details have been determined by previous legislators, and need not now be mixed up with greater matters. Ancient husbandmen made excellent rules about streams and waters; and we need not let the stream of our discourse diverge from them. Anybody may take water from the main stream, if he does not cut below the open well of his neighbour; but he must not do any damage or take the

water through a house or temple. If land is without water the occupier shall dig down to the clay, and if at this depth he find no water, he shall have a right of getting water from his neighbours to supply his household; and if their supply is limited, he shall receive from them a measure of water, fixed by the wardens of the country. When two persons live on lands, one above and the other beneath, or one of the two has a common wall, the upper must not turn the heavy falls of rain on the under at his pleasure, or the under refuse an exit. If they cannot agree in the matter they shall go before the wardens of the city or country, and if a man refuses to abide by their decision, he shall pay double the damage which he causes.

In autumn God gives us two boons—one the joy of Dionysus not to be laid up—the other to be laid up. About the fruits of autumn let the law be as follows: He who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of *Aecturus*, shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to Dionysus, if he gathers on his own ground; if on his neighbour's one-third of a mina, and two-thirds of a mina if on that of another. The vine or fig not used for storing a man may gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that of others he must pay the penalty of removing what he has not laid down. If he be a slave who has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig. A metic may purchase the cultivated fruits, and a stranger may pluck for himself and his attendant. This right of hospitality, however, does not extend to storing grapes. A slave who eats of the storing grapes or figs shall receive a stroke for every grape or fig, and the freedman shall receive an admonition. Pears, apples, pomegranates, may be taken secretly, but he who is detected in the act of taking them shall be lightly beaten off, if he be not more than thirty years of age. An exception to this law must be made for the stranger and the elder; the latter, however, if he goes beyond the law, and carries away as well as eats, shall fail in the competition of virtue, if anybody brings up his offence against him.

Water is also in need of protection; being, unlike the other elements—soil, air, and sun—which conspire in the growth of plants, easily corrupted. And therefore he who spoils another's water, whether in springs or reservoirs, either by trenching, or by any sort of pollution or poisonous impurity, shall pay a penalty and repair the damage. At the getting-in of the harvest everybody shall have a right of way over his neighbours' ground, provided he is careful to do no damage beyond the

trespass, unless any damage which he does is attended with three times the benefit to himself. Of all this the magistrates are to take cognizance, and they are to have the power of fining where the injury done is not more than three minae; any greater damage can only be tried in the public courts. A charge against a magistrate is to be referred to the public courts, and any one who is found guilty of deciding corruptly shall pay twofold to the aggrieved person. Matters of detail relating to punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses, and the number of witnesses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged legislator; the younger generation may determine them according to their experience; but when once determined, they shall be unaltered.

The following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts: No citizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them. For the citizen has already a trade and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no man can practise two trades, or practise one and superintend another. For the same reason, no smith should be a carpenter, and no carpenter having many slaves who are blacksmiths should look after them himself; but let each man practise one art which is to be his livelihood. Every man is to be one man and not many. The wardens of the city should see to this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary deprivation of his rights—the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined, exiled. Any disputes about contracts shall be determined by the wardens of the city up to fifty drachmae—above that sum by the public courts. No customs are to be exacted either on imports or exports. Nothing unnecessary is to be imported from abroad, whether for the service of the Gods or for the use of man—neither purple, nor other dyes, nor frankincense,—and nothing needed in the country is to be exported. These things are to be decided on by the twelve guardians of the law who are next in seniority to the five elders. Arms and the materials of arms are to be imported and exported only with the consent of the generals, and then only by the state. There is to be no retail trade in anything. For the distribution of the produce of the country, the Cretan laws afford a rule which may be usefully followed. All shall be required to distribute corn, grain, animals, and other valuable produce, into twelve portions. Each of these shall be subdivided into three parts—one for freemen, another for servants, and the third shall be sold for the supply of artizans, strangers, and others. And where the produce of the land exceeds the average, let what is over be again distributed

into three portions, and let the citizens determine how much they will give to slaves or freemen, and how much they will distribute among the animals.

Next as to houses—there shall be twelve villages, one in the centre of each of the twelve portions ; and in every village there shall be temples and an agora—also shrines for heroes or for any old Magnesian deities who linger about the place. In every division there shall be temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athenè, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the guard-houses of the police. The rest of the country shall be arranged in thirteen portions, corresponding to as many bands of artisans. One of these bands will be settled in the city, and divided into twelve parts, for the town districts ; the remainder will be settled in the country. And the magistrates will fix them on the spots where they will be most serviceable in supplying the wants of the husbandmen.

Next in importance to the regulation of the temples, is the fair dealing and good order of the markets—this will be the care of the wardens of the agora. They will also see that the sales effected by the citizens to strangers are legally made. The law shall be, that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to whom the sale is entrusted shall offer grain ; and at this sale a twelfth part of the whole shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his wants for a month. On the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and on the twenty-third of animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and other things which husbandmen have to sell and foreigners want to buy. None of these commodities, any more than barley or flour, or any other food, may be retailed by a citizen to a citizen ; but foreigners may sell them to one another in the foreigners' market. There must also be butchers who will sell parts of animals to foreigners and craftsmen, and their servants ; and foreigners may buy firewood wholesale of the commissioners of woods, and may sell retail to foreigners. All other goods must be sold in the market, in the presence of the magistrates, and in the place indicated by them, and shall be paid for on the spot. He who gives credit, and is cheated, will have no redress. In buying or selling, any excess or diminution of what the law allows shall be registered. The same rule is to be observed about the property of metics. Anybody who has a handicraft may come and remain twenty years from the day on which he is enrolled, at the expiration of which time he shall

take what he has and depart. The only condition which is to be imposed upon him as the tax of his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay any tax for being allowed to buy or sell. But if he wants to extend the time of his sojourn, and has done any service to the state, and he can persuade the ecclesia to grant his request, he may remain. The children of metics may also be metics; and the period of twenty years, during which they are permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case, from their fifteenth year.

No mention occurs in the Laws of the doctrine of Ideas. The will of God, the standard of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have taken their place in the mind of Plato. If we ask what is that truth or principle which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed him most, like the idea of good in the Republic, or of beauty in the Symposium, or of the unity of virtue in the Protagoras, we should answer the priority of the soul to the body: his later system mainly hangs upon this. In the Laws, as in the Sophist and Politicus, we pass out of the region of metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of psychology.

The opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style, is one of the most elevated passages in Plato. The religious feeling which he seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the blessedness of living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living for himself, the pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil, the kindness due to the suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of Christian philosophy. The remark that elder men, if they want to educate others, should begin by educating themselves; the necessity of creating a spirit of obedience in the citizens; the desirableness of limiting property; the relative nature of political equality, have also the tone of a modern writer. In many of his views of politics, Plato seems to us like some modern politicians, to be half socialist, half conservative.

In the Laws, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure and pain. There are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals may regard them: either like the Stoics, and other ascetics, we may say that pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may affirm that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as Aristotle says, 'to be brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises

a great and paramount influence on human life.' Or as Plato says in the *Laws*, 'A man will recognize the noblest life as having the greatest pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste.' If we admit that pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two modes of speaking is rather verbal than real. The Greek philosopher may speak of the 'contemplation of the ideas,' or the Christian father of the *fruitio Dei*, as the first of pleasures. Throughout the greater part of the writings of Plato, these two views seem to alternate with each other. In the *Republic*, the mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received by Socrates with a cry of abhorrence; but in the *Philebus*, innocent pleasures vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods. In the *Protagoras*, speaking in the person of Socrates rather than in his own, Plato admits the calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics, while in the *Phaedo* he indignantly denies that the exchange of one pleasure for another is the exchange of virtue. So wide of the mark are they who would attribute to Plato entire consistency in thoughts or words.

He acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first—in this, at any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing eyes upon the ideal. Several features of the first are retained in the second: the education of men and women is to be as far as possible the same; they are to have common meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the women with their children; the citizens, if not actually communists, are in spirit communistic; they are to be lovers of equality; only a certain amount of wealth is permitted to them, and their burdens and also their privileges are to be proportioned to this. The constitution in the *Laws* is a timocracy of wealth, modified by an aristocracy of merit. Yet the political philosopher will observe that the first of these two principles is fixed and permanent, while the latter is uncertain and dependent on the opinion of the multitude. Wealth, after all, plays a great part in the *Second Republic* of Plato. Like other politicians, he deems that a property qualification will contribute to the stability of the state. The four classes seem to be derived from the constitution of Cleisthenes, just as the form of the city which is clustered around a citadel set on a hill, is suggested by the Acropolis at Athens. Plato, writing under Pythagorean influences, seems really to have supposed that the well-being of the city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on justice and moderation. But he is not prevented by Pythagoreanism

from observing the effects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of nations.

He was doubtful in the Republic whether the ideal or communistic state could be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that whether it existed or not made no difference (Rep. ix. 592 B). He has now altogether lost faith in the practicability of his scheme—he is speaking to ‘men, and not to Gods or sons of Gods.’ Yet he still maintains it to be the true pattern of the state which we must approach as nearly as possible. As Aristotle says, ‘after having created a more general form of state, he gradually brings it round to the other’ (Pol. ii. 3, 2). He does not seem to be aware, either here or in the Republic, that in such a commonwealth there would be less room for the development of individual character. In several respects the second state is an improvement on the first, especially in being based more distinctly on the dignity of the soul. The standard of truth, justice, temperance, is as high as in the Republic;—in one respect higher, for temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as the condition of all virtue. The treatment of moral questions is less speculative but more human. The idea of good has disappeared; the excellence of individuals—of the true patriot, of the perfect guardian of the law, are the patterns to which the life of the citizens is to conform. Plato is never weary of speaking of the honour of the soul, which can only be honoured truly by being improved. To make the soul as good as possible, and to prepare here for communion with the Gods in another world by communion with them in this, is the end of life (Laws, x. 904 D). If the Republic is far superior to the Laws in form and style, and perhaps in reach of thought, the Laws leave on the mind of the modern reader much more strongly the impression of a struggle against evil, and an enthusiasm for human improvement. When Plato says that he must carry out that part of his ideal which is practicable (Laws, v. 746), he does not appear to have reflected that part of an ideal cannot be detached from the whole.

The great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he seeks to impress upon them. He had seen the Athenian empire, almost within the limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems to have asked himself what would happen if, a century from the time at which he was writing, the Greek character should have as much changed as in the century which had preceded. He fails to perceive that the greater part of the political life of a nation is not that which

is given them by their legislators, but that which they give themselves. He has never reflected that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere order can only be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression. The possibility of a great nation or of an universal empire arising never occurred to him. He sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the Hellenic world in his own later life, and thinks that the remedy is to make the laws unchangeable. The same want of insight is apparent in his judgments about art. He would like to have the forms of sculpture and of music fixed as in Egypt. He does not consider that this would be fatal to the true principle of art, which, as Socrates had himself taught, was to give life (Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 6). We wonder how, familiar as he was with the statues of Pheidias, he could have endured the lifeless and half monstrous works of Egyptian sculpture. The 'chants of Isis,' we might imagine, would have been barbarous in an Athenian ear. But although he is aware that there are some things 'which are not so well among the children of the Nile,' he is deeply struck with the stability of Egyptian institutions. Both in politics and in art Plato seems to have seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by taking a step backwards. Antiquity, compared with the world in which he lived, had a sacredness and authority for him: the men of a former age were supposed by him to have retained a sense of reverence which was wanting among his own contemporaries. He could imagine the early stages of civilization; he never thought of what the future might bring forth. His experience is limited to a century or two, to a few Greek states, and to an uncertain report of Egypt and the East. There are many ways in which the limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the Greeks; above all in depriving them of the power of criticism.

The colony is to receive from the mother-country her first constitution, and some of her guardians of the law. The guardians of the law are to be ministers of justice, and the president of education is to take precedence of them all. They are to take measures for the defence of the country; they are to enforce the education of their children upon unwilling parents; they are to provide for the supply and purity of the waters, and in general for the public health; they are to superintend buildings, to keep the registers of property, to hear appeals from inferior courts; and they are to be superannuated at seventy years of age. Several questions of modern politics seem to be anticipated by Plato in the

functions which he assigns to them. He hopes that in his state will be found neither poverty nor riches ; and therefore neither the legislator, nor his subjects, have any need to consider the danger of falling into poverty. Almost in the spirit of the Gospel he would say, 'how hardly can a rich man dwell in a perfect state.' For he cannot be a good man who is always gaining too much and spending too little (cp. Arist. Eth. iv. 2, 3). Plato, though he admits wealth as a political element, would deny that material prosperity can be the foundation of a really great community. A man's soul, as he often says, is more to be esteemed than his body ; and his body than the things of his body. He repeats the complaint which has been made in all ages, that the love of money is the corruption of states. He has a sympathy with pirates and burglars, 'many of whom are men of fine character and greatly to be pitied, because their souls are hungering and thirsting all their lives long,' but he has no sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers. For traders and artisans a moderate gain was, in his opinion, best. He has never, like modern writers, idealized the wealth of nations, any more than he has worked out the problems of political economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown into a science. The isolation of Greek states, their constant wars, the want of a free industrial population, and of the means of exchange usually termed 'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among them : and so prevented them from forming a theory of the laws which regulate the accumulation and distribution of wealth.

The constitution of the army is democratic ; the soldiers are supposed to be the best judges of their leaders. The way of carrying out the democratic principle is as follows : The guardians of the law nominate generals, and the generals retain the nomination of the inferior officers. But if any one is ready to swear that he knows of a better man, he may put the claims of the candidate for the office of general to the vote either of the whole army, or of the division of the service which he is destined to command. Except at these military elections, in which all who have ever borne arms take part, there is no assembly or general meeting of the people. In the election of the council, the legislator attempts to mix aristocracy and democracy. This is effected first, as in the Servian constitution, by balancing wealth and numbers ; the people are divided into four classes, of whom the first, though inferior in numbers, has an equal vote with the three others. Secondly, all classes are compelled to vote for the first and second class ; but the fourth class is not compelled

to vote for the third, nor the third and fourth for the fourth. Thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus chosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by lot; these form the council for the year.

These political adjustments of Plato's will be criticised by the practical statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual. He will observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy is the division into classes. The second of the three proposals, though ingenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which is often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little power in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most needed. At such political crises, all the lower classes would vote equally with the higher. The subtraction of half the persons chosen at the first election by the chances of the lot would not raise the character of the senators, and is open to the objection of uncertainty, which necessarily attends this and similar double schemes of representative government. The voters cannot be expected to retain the continuous political interest which would be required for carrying them out. Who could select 180 persons of each class, fitted to be senators? And whoever were chosen in the first instance, by a particular vote, his wishes might be neutralized by the action of the lot. Yet the scheme of Plato is not really so extravagant as the actual constitution of Athens, in which all the senators appear to have been elected by lot (*ἀπὸ κλήρου βουλευταί*); at least, after the revolution made by Cleisthenes, for the constitution of the senate which was established by Solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their precise nature is unknown to us. The ancients knew that election by lot was the most democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the objectionable sense, 'that one man is as good as another.' Plato, who is desirous of mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot which he applies to candidates already elected by vote.

The functions of the council are administrative rather than legislative. The whole number of 360, as in the Athenian constitution, is distributed among the months of the year according to the number of the tribes. Not more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once, so that the government would be made up of twelve administrations succeeding one another in the course of the year. They are to exercise a general superintendence, and, like the Athenian counsellors, are to preside in monthly divisions over all assemblies. But neither in Plato's Laws nor in his Republic, is

there any mention of an ecclesia. Nothing is less in his mind than a House of Commons, carrying on year by year the work of legislation. For he supposes the laws to be already provided; what is omitted is to be supplied by the eldest guardians of the law, who are to partake of the spirit of the legislator. As little would he approve of a body like the Roman Senate. The people and the aristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies, but by officers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the law, who are elected for twenty years.

The evils of this system are obvious. If in any state, as Plato says in the *Politicus* (292 E), it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than fifty good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council must be unfitted to rule. The unfitness would be increased by the short period during which they held office. There would be no traditions of government among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no individual would be responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems to have been sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to which all have a turn of ruling and being ruled. In the constitution of the Magnesian state Plato has not emancipated himself from the limitations of ancient politics. His government may be described as a democracy of magistrates elected by the people. He never troubles himself about the political consistency of his scheme. He does indeed say that the greater part of the good of this world arises, not from equality, but from proportion, which he calls the judgment of Zeus (Aristotle's *Distributive Justice*, N. E. v. 6), but he hardly makes any attempt to carry out the principle in practice. There is no body in his commonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole state. The manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the old democratic constitution of Athens, of which it retains some of the worst features, such as the use of the lot, while by the omission of the popular assembly the mainspring of the machine is taken out. The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number, of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the nocturnal council at the end of the twelfth Book, are to be elected by the whole people as in a democracy, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore have the character of an oligarchy. Nothing is said of the manner in which the functions of the council are to be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law.

Similar principles are applied to inferior offices. In the elections to

them, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner 'demus and not demus.' Only the priests are to be directly appointed by God, that is, by the lot. The commonwealth of the Laws, like the ideal state, cannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the oracle of Delphi. To this the choice of some of the higher officers, and the settlement of disputes about ceremonies and purifications, as well as changes in the law, are to be referred. Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts to revive religion in states. For, as he says in the Laws, 'To institute religious rites is the work of a great intelligence only.'

Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boulé, the law courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian dicasteries. Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:—this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a few judges only, but good ones. He is nevertheless aware that both in public and private suits there must be a popular element. This he proposes to supply by an elective judiciary, than which, in the opinion of modern political writers, no form of appointment can be worse. The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of law and fact between a judge and jury did not occur to him or to any other ancient political philosopher. He might thus have combined the popular element with the judicial. Though desirous to have a few good judges, he does not seem to have understood that a body of law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments.

He remarks truly that some cases are better decided on the spot and from local knowledge. But in such cases he would allow an appeal to a superior court; and this seemed to him to involve the necessity, where the two decisions differed, of a further reference to a final court. This final court of appeal is to be composed of three magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and defendant might agree; or if they could not agree, the judges were to be chosen by the council. Plato's judges are not appointed for life, but only for a year, and they are liable to be called to account before the guardians of the law.

Returning to the subject in Book ix, he proposes to leave the modes of procedure to a younger generation of legislators. But he insists that the vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they are to hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. They are then to take evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine witnesses. The eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then the second, and

then the third. They are not to be silent, and he would not prevent them from communicating with one another (cp. Arist. Pol. ii. 5, 8). The interrogatories are to continue for three days, and the evidence is to be written down. Apparently he does not expect the judges to be professional lawyers, any more than he expects the members of the council to be trained statesmen.

In forming marriage connections, Plato supposes that the public interest will prevail over private inclination. There was nothing in this very shocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love towards the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance. Married life is to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the state. The newly married couple are not allowed to absent themselves from their respective *syssitia*, even during their honeymoon; they are to give their whole mind to the procreation of children; their duties to one another at a later period of life is not a matter about which the state is equally solicitous. Divorces are readily allowed for incompatibility of temper. As in the Republic, physical considerations seem almost to exclude moral and social ones. To modern feelings there is a degree of coarseness in his treatment of the subject. Yet Plato also makes some shrewd remarks on marriage, as for example, that he who does not marry for money will not be the humble servant of his wife. And he shows a true conception of the nature of the family, when he requires that the newly married couple 'should leave their father and mother,' and have a separate home. He also provides against extravagance in marriage festivals; which in some states of society, as appears to be the case among the Hindoos, has been a social evil of the first magnitude.

In treating of property, Plato takes occasion to speak of property in slaves. They are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own sake, to be kept at a distance. The motive is not humanity towards the slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although Plato allows that many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than members of their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and citizen owes to himself (cp. Rep. viii. 549 A). If they commit crimes, they are doubly punished; only if they inform against treasonable and illegal practices of their masters, they are to receive a protection, which would probably be ineffectual, from the guardians of the law. Plato still breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in which

slavery was a necessity, because leisure must be provided for the citizen.

The education propounded in the *Laws* differs in several points from the *Republic*. Plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly on the importance of infancy as Rousseau, or Jean Paul (cp. the saying of the latter—‘not the moment of death, but the moment of birth, is probably the more important’). He would fix the amusements of children in the hope of fixing their characters in after-life. In the spirit of the statesman who said, ‘Let me make the ballads of a country, and I care not who make their laws,’ Plato would have said, ‘Let the amusements of children be unchanged, and they will not want to change the laws.’ The ‘Goddess Harmonia’ plays a great part in Plato’s ideas of education. The natural restless force of life in children, ‘who do nothing but roar until they are three years old,’ is gradually to be reduced to law and order. As in the *Republic*, he fixes certain forms in which songs are to be composed: (1) they are to be strains of peace; (2) they are to be hymns or prayers addressed to the Gods; (3) they are to sing only of the lawful and good. The poets are again expelled, or rather ironically invited to depart; and those who remain are required to submit their poems to the censorship of the magistrates. Youth are no longer compelled to commit to memory many thousand lyric and tragic Greek verses; yet, perhaps, a worse fate is in store for them. Plato has no belief in the ‘liberty of prophesying’; and having guarded against the dangers of poetry, he remembers that there is an equal danger in prose writers. He cannot leave his old enemies, the Sophists, in possession of the field; and therefore he proposes that youth shall learn by heart, instead of the compositions of poets or prose writers, his own inspired work on laws. These, and music and mathematics, are the chief staple of his education.

Mathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the *Republic* with a view to the higher science of the idea of good, but rather with a religious and political aim. They are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions of a state, and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not to blaspheme about astronomy. Against three errors Plato is in profound earnest. First, the error of supposing that the three dimensions of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable with one another. The difficulty which he feels is analogous to the difficulty which he formerly felt about the connection of ideas, and

equally characteristic of ancient philosophy: he fixes his mind on the point of difference, and cannot at the same time take in the similarity. Secondly, he is puzzled about the nature of fractions: like the arithmeticians in the Republic, 525 E, he is disposed to deny the possibility of their existence. Thirdly, his optimism leads him to insist (unlike the Portuguese king who thought that he could have improved on the mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect or circular movement of the heavenly bodies. He appears to mean, that instead of regarding the stars as overtaking or being overtaken by one another, or as planets wandering in many paths, a more comprehensive survey of the heavens would enable us to infer that they all alike moved in a circle around a centre (cp. Timaeus, fol. 40; Rep. x. 617). He probably suspected, though unacquainted with the true cause, that the appearance of the heavens did not agree with the reality: at any rate, his notions of what was right or fitting easily overpowered the results of actual observation. To the early astronomers, who lived at the revival of science, as to Plato, there would have seemed to be nothing absurd in *à priori* astronomy, and they would probably have made fewer real discoveries if they had followed any other track. (Cp. Introduction to the Republic, p. 94 foll.)

The science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the Laws, nor is anything said of the education of after-life; the child is to begin to learn at ten years of age: he is to be taught reading and writing for three years from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years more, from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music. The great fault which Plato finds in the contemporary education is the almost total ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the Greeks would do well to take a lesson from the Egyptians. (Cp. Rep. vii. 525 foll.) Dancing and wrestling are to have a military character, and women as well as men are to be taught the use of arms. The military spirit which Plato has vainly endeavoured to expel in the first two books returns again in the seventh and eighth. His genius has evidently a sympathy with the soldier, as he has with the poet, and he is no mean master of the art, or at least of the theory of war (cp. Laws, vi. 760 foll.; Rep. v. 467-470), though inclining rather to the Spartan than to the Athenian practice of it (Laws, iv. 706, 707). Of a supreme or master science which was to be the 'coping stone' of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws. He seems to have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up the outline

which he had sketched. There is no requirement that the guardians of the law shall be philosophers, nor are we told how the leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to be employed. In this respect we note a falling off from the Republic. Their public and family duties were, probably, to be their main business, and they would, no doubt, take up a great deal more time than in the modern world we are willing to allow to either of them. But of any regular training to be pursued under the superintendence of the state from eighteen to thirty, or from thirty to thirty-five, he no longer entertains the idea; he has taken the first step downwards on 'Constitution Hill.' (Rep. viii. 547, 548.)

Few among us are either able or willing to carry education into later life; five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university, or in the preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a lecture to which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare from housekeeping or money-making—these comprise, as a matter of fact, the education even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished 'more truly than Heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again.' (Rep. vi. 497 B.) The description which Plato gives in the Republic of the state of adult education among his contemporaries may be applied almost word for word to our own age. But in the Laws he no longer entertains the idea that the deficiency can be corrected, or that a regular course of study is possible in mature years. He does not, however, go on to remark, that the education of after-life is of another kind, and must consist with the majority of the world rather in the improvement of character than in the acquirement of knowledge. It comes from the study of ourselves and other men: from moderation and experience: from reflection on circumstances: from the pursuit of high aims: from a right use of the opportunities of life. It is the preservation of what we have been, and the addition of something more. The power of abstract study or continuous thought is very rare, but such a training as this can be given by every one to himself.

The singular passage in Book vii. (803 C), in which Plato describes life as a pastime, like many other passages in the Laws, is imperfectly expressed. Two thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind: first, the reflection to which he returns at the end of the passage (804 B), that men are playthings or puppets, and that God only is the serious aim of human endeavours; this suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they are the playthings of the Gods, and that this is the best

of them. The cynical ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious sentiment. Life is a play in the higher sense, as well as a sort of mystery in which we have the Gods for playfellows. Men imagine that war is their serious pursuit, and they make war that they may return to their amusements. But neither wars nor amusements are the true satisfaction of men, which is to be found only in the society of the Gods, in sacrificing to them and propitiating them. Like a Christian ascetic, Plato seems to suppose that life should be passed wholly in the enjoyment of divine things.

In one of the noblest passages of Plato, he speaks of the relation of the sexes (viii. 835-842). Natural relations had been established of old; a 'little word' had put a stop to incestuous connections between members of the same family. But unnatural unions still continued to prevail at Crete and Lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the Gods. They, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy and abominable could sink into the minds of men. The legislator is to cry aloud, and spare not, 'Let not men fall below the level of the beasts.' Plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from 'carrying on war against the mightiest lusts of mankind'; neither does he expect to extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural use and purpose, by the enactments of law, and by the influence of public opinion.

BOOK IX. Punishments of offences, and modes of procedure, will be our next subject. The idea that in a well-ordered state there will be great criminals who require to be punished by the law, is a disgrace to us; but as we are legislating for men and not for Gods, there will be no uncharitableness in apprehending that there may be some rampant citizen, whose heart, like the seed which has touched the ox's horn, will be hardened against the law. None who are well-educated will be guilty of such a crime, but one of their servants may, and with a view to him, and at the same time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity of human nature, I will lay down the law concerning the robbing of temples, beginning with a prelude. To the robber we will say—O sir, the complaint which troubles you is not human; but some curse or plague has fallen upon you, inherited from the crimes of your ancestors, of which you must purge yourself: go and sacrifice to the Gods, frequent the society of the good, avoid the wicked; and if you are cured of the

fatal impulse, well; but if not, acknowledge death to be better than life, and depart.

These are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the criminal. And if he refuse to listen to them, then cry aloud as with the sound of a trumpet: Whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or foreigner shall be branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and then cast naked beyond the border. And perhaps this may improve him: for the law aims either at the reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime, and no punishment is designed to inflict useless injury. But if the offender be a citizen, he must be incurable, and death is the least penalty which he deserves. His iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children; nor is his property to be confiscated, or any fine inflicted upon him or upon any one which will interfere with the integrity or cultivation of the lot: the guardians of the law are to be careful about this.

If a fine is inflicted upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends are unwilling to be security, he shall be imprisoned and chastised, but not exiled or deprived of citizenship; though he may be put to death, or imprisoned, or beaten, or fined, or pilloried, or removed to some temple on the borders. Capital offences shall come under the cognizance of the guardians of the law, and a college of the best of the ex-archons of the previous year. The mode of procedure we shall leave to the lawgivers of the future, and only determine the mode of voting. The votes are to be given openly, in the presence of an audience of the citizens: on the first day the plaintiff and defendant shall make their speeches; and the judges, beginning with the eldest, shall ask questions and collect evidence during three days, which, at the end of each day, shall be deposited in writing on the altar of Hestia; and when they have evidence enough, after a solemn declaration that they will decide justly, they shall vote and end the case.

Next to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first object of the law. The greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to set up a tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in guilt, is a magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to bring the offender to justice. Any one who is good for anything will give information against traitors. The mode of proceeding in such cases will be the same as in cases of sacrilege; the penalty, death. But neither in this case nor in any other is the son to bear the iniquity of the father, unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of them been capitally

convicted, and then the family are to be sent off to the mother country, retaining their property, with the exception of the lot and its fixtures. And ten are to be selected from the second sons of the other citizens—one of whom is to be chosen by the oracle of Delphi to be heir of the lot. This third law about the judges and processes of treason, and the removal of families, shall apply equally to the traitor, the sacrilegious, and the conspirator.

A thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount, if he is able to do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to prison until he either pays or satisfies the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft, the city. 'But should all the different kinds of thefts incur the same penalty?' You remind me of what I know—that legislation is never perfect. The men for whom laws are made may be compared to the slave who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the unscientific doctor. For he, if he chance to meet the educated physician and gentleman talking to his patient, and entering into the philosophy of his disease, would burst out laughing and say, as doctors delight in doing, 'You old fool, instead of curing the patient you are educating him!' And he would be quite right, and not far wrong, if he went on to observe, that he who legislates in our fashion preaches to the citizens instead of legislating for them. 'Perhaps.' There is, however, one advantage which we possess—that being amateurs only, we may either take the most ideal, or the most necessary and utilitarian view. 'But why offer such an alternative? as if all our legislation must be done to-day, and nothing put off until the morrow. Like builders, or other constructors, we may surely rough-hew them first, and shape and place them afterwards.' That will be the best way of getting the most general view of our laws. The writings of legislators are like any other writings in prose or verse, or rather they are the most important of all. The legislator should determine the nature of good and evil, and how they should be studied with a view to our instruction. What these are the legislator should teach, and how they are to be pursued. Are not Solon and Lycurgus as much disgraced as Homer and Tyrtaeus, when they write ill about the institutions of life? The laws of states ought to be the models of writing, and what is at variance with them should be deemed ridiculous. And we may further imagine them to express the affection and good sense of a father or mother, and not to be the fiats of a tyrant? 'Very true.'

Let us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other crimes, for which we have already legislated in part. And this leads us to ask, first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the nature of the honourable and just. 'To what are you referring?' I will endeavour to explain. All are agreed that justice is honourable, whether in men or things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly man who is just, is in his mind fair, would be thought extravagant. 'Very true.' But if honour is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings honourable, or only just actions? 'What do you mean?' Why, our own laws supply a case in point; for we enacted that the robber of temples, and the enemy of our laws, should die; and this was just, but the reverse of honourable. 'That is true.' But are we consistent in holding this language? I have already said that the evil are involuntarily evil; and the evil are the unjust. Now the voluntary cannot be the involuntary; and if you two come to me and say, 'Shall we legislate?' of course, I shall reply—'Then will you distinguish what crimes are voluntary, and what involuntary, and shall we impose lighter penalties on the first, and heavier on the latter? Or shall we refuse to determine what is the meaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain that our words have come down from heaven, and that they should be at once embodied in a law?' All states legislate under the idea that there are two classes of actions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there appears to be great confusion about them reigning in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless they are distinguished. 'That is true, Stranger.' And we must either abstain from affirming that unjust actions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement: for not to speak the truth is impiety. Believing, then, that acts of justice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to show that they must be divided on some other principle. 'Do so by all means.' Hurts may be voluntary, or involuntary; and involuntary hurts, whether great or small, are not injuries: and, on the other hand, a benefit may be an injury. An act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just; but the legislator has to consider the animus of the agent, and to provide satisfaction and retribution with a view to the reconciliation of the parties. 'Excellent.' Where injustice, like disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word or deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and penalties, or any other influence

which may inspire man with the love of justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of law. When the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will consider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself, and in two ways a good to society: first, as he becomes an example to others; secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such a case, but in no other, the legislator will punish with death. 'I think that there is truth in what you say. I wish, however, that you would distinguish more clearly the difference of injury and harm, and the complications of voluntary and involuntary.' I will.—You will admit that anger is of a violent and destructive nature? 'That cannot be denied.' And further, that pleasure is different from anger, and is derived from an opposite source to anger, working by persuasion and the force of deceit? 'Yes.' Ignorance is the third source of error; this the legislator may note as being of two kinds—simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit of knowledge; the latter, when accompanied with power, is a source of terrible errors, but excusable when only weak and childish. We are in the habit of saying that one man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure and anger. 'Just so.' But no one says that one man masters, and another is mastered by ignorance. 'Very true.' All these motives actuate men and sometimes drive them in different ways. 'That is often the case.' Now, then, I am in a position to define the nature of just and unjust. By injustice I mean the dominion of anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and envy and desire in the soul, whether doing harm or not: by justice I mean the rule of the opinion of the best, whether in states or individuals, extending to the whole of life; although actions done in error are often thought to be involuntary injustice. No controversy need be raised about names at present; we are only desirous of fixing in our memories the heads of error. And the pain which is called fear and anger is our first head of error; the second is the class of pleasures and desires; and the third, of hopes which aim at true opinion about the best, the latter falling into three divisions, accordingly as they proceed from anger, desire, ignorance, making in all five. And the laws relating to them may be summed up under two heads. 'What are they?' Deeds of violence and irregularity, deeds of darkness and deceit; to which may be added the combination of both, and these last should be visited with the utmost rigour of the law. 'Very properly.'

Let us now return to the enactment of laws. We have treated of sacrilege, and of treason, and of sedition. Any of these crimes may be committed by a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood of old age. And if this is proved before the select tribunal, the person in question shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be punished further. In case of homicide he shall be exiled for a year, and if he return before the expiration of the year, shall be retained in the public prison two years.

Homicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary: and first of involuntary homicide. He who unintentionally kills another man at games or at gymnastics duly authorized by the archons, whether death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be acquitted, subject only to the purification required by the Delphian Oracle. Any physician whose patient dies against his will shall in like manner be acquitted. Any one who unintentionally kills a slave, with or without weapons, shall bear the master of the slave harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to twice the value of the slave, and to this let him add a purification greater than in the case of the deaths at the games. If a man kill his own slave, a purification only is required of him. If he kill a freeman unintentionally, let him also make purification, not forgetting the ancient tradition which says that the murdered man is indignant at seeing his murderer walk about in his own former haunts, and that he terrifies him with the consciousness of his crime. And therefore the homicide should go into exile for a year, and keep away from his own land or that of the murdered man. If he complies with this condition, the nearest kinsman of the deceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled to him; but if he refuses to remain in exile, or attempts to go and sacrifice before he has been purified, then let the kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double penalty. Or if the kinsman neglects this duty, then he himself shall incur a curse, and any one who likes may proceed against him, and compel him to leave his country for five years. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any one may proceed against him in the same manner: and the homicide, if he be a metic, shall be banished for a year; but if he be an entire stranger, whether he have murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall be banished for ever; and if he return, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall go to the next of kin of the murdered man. If he come back by sea against his will, he

shall be kept with his feet in the water waiting for a vessel to sail; or if he be brought back by land, the magistrates shall send him unharmed beyond the border.

Next follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds—either arising out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or retaliation of an injury, which is unattended with remorse. The cause of both is anger, and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary. The one which is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly involuntary, bears the image of the involuntary, and is therefore the more excusable of the two, and should receive a gentler punishment. The act of him who nurses his wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more culpable. The degree of culpability depends on the presence or absence of intention, to which the degree of punishment should correspond. For the first kind of murder, that which is done from anger, let two years exile be the penalty; for the second, that which is accompanied with malice prepense, three. When the time of exile has expired, the judges shall send twelve of their number to enquire into the manner of life of the exiles; and they shall impose a rule upon them which shall be binding. He who after returning repeats the offence, shall be exiled and return no more. He who in a fit of anger kills his own slave, shall purify himself; and in the case of another man's slave, he shall pay to him double the value. Any one may proceed against the offender if he appear in public places, not having been purified; and may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and the homicide, and shall compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double penalty. If a slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master, in anger, the kindred of the murdered person may do what else they please with him, but they must not spare his life. If a father or mother kill their son or daughter in anger let them remain in exile for three years; and on their return let them separate, and not continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred rites with those whom they have deprived of a brother or sister. The same penalty is decreed against the husband who murders his wife, or the wife who murders her husband. Let them be absent three years, and on their return never join in the sacred rites or meals of their children. Nor is a brother or sister who have lifted up their hands against a brother or sister, ever to partake of the hearth or sacrifices of their parents. If a son feels such violent hatred against his father or

mother as to take the life of either of them, then, if the father forgive him before his death, he shall only suffer the penalty due to involuntary homicide ; but if he be unforgiven, there are many laws against which he has offended ; he is guilty of outrage, impiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put to death many times over. If the law will not allow him to kill the author of his being even in defence of his own life, no other penalty can be inflicted upon him. If a brother kill a brother in self-defence, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger, let them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in battle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide. In all cases, however, the forgiveness of the injured party may acquit the agents ; and then they shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a year.

Enough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger ; let us proceed to voluntary and premeditated actions. The great source of voluntary crime is the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education ; and this arises out of the false praise of riches, common both among Hellenes and barbarians, which, although in the third rank of goods, is placed by them in the first. For the body is not for the sake of wealth, but wealth for the body, as the body is for the soul. If this were better understood, the crime of murder of which avarice is the chief cause, would soon cease among men. Next to avarice, ambition is a source of crime, dangerous to the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief men of the state. And next to ambition, base fear is a motive which has led many an one to commit murder in order that he may get rid of the witnesses of his crimes. Let this be said as a prelude to all enactments about crimes ; there may be added a doctrine of revenge or retaliation in the world below : and if a man is deterred by the fear of a future state of punishment, he will have no need of the law ; but in case he disobey, let the law be declared against him as follows :—He who of malice prepense kills one of his kindred, shall in the first place be outlawed ; neither temple, harbour, nor agora shall be polluted by his presence. And if a kinsman of the deceased refuse to proceed against his slayer, he shall take the curse of pollution upon himself, and also be liable to suffer punishment at the hands of any one who will avenge the dead. Let him who is willing, after due sacrifices and purifications, carry out the process of justice appointed by the legislator. The exact mode will be best determined by a conclave

of prophets and guardians of the law, and the judges of the cause shall be the same as in cases of sacrilege. He who is convicted shall be punished with death, and not be buried within the limits of the country of the murdered person. He who runs away shall undergo perpetual banishment; and if he return, he may be put to death with impunity by any of the citizens, or bound and delivered to the archons. He who brings an accusation shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and if this is not forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison against the day of trial. If a man commit murder by the hand of another, he shall be tried in the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but if the offender be a citizen, he shall not be deprived of burial in the land.

If a slave kill a freeman, or conspire to kill him, let him be taken to the grave of the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand of the public executioner as the person who took him pleases; and if he survive he shall be put to death. If a slave be put out of the way to prevent his informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like that of a citizen. If the putting of him to death have arisen out of some of those horrible crimes which occur in families where there is a bad state of society, of which the legislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will repeat the old saw or myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of such atrocities. The myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he has done: if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children; if his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his offspring in another age of the world. Such a preamble announcing the anger of the Gods may terrify him; but if, notwithstanding, he falls into the recklessness of crime, and murders father or mother or brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as follows:—Him who is convicted, the officers of the judges shall slay, and expose naked without the city in a place where three ways meet; and all the magistrates shall cast a stone upon his head and justify the city, and he shall be thrown unburied beyond the border. But what shall we say of him who deprives destiny of her right, and takes the life which is dearest to him, that is to say, his own; and this not from any disgrace or calamity, but from cowardice and indolence? The manner of his burial and the purification of his crime is a matter for God to decide and for his kinsmen to execute. Let him, at any rate, be buried alone

in some undistinguished spot, and be without name or monument. If a beast kill a man, not in a public contest, let him be slain and carried without the border by the relations of the deceased. Also inanimate things which have caused death, except in the case of lightning and other visitations from heaven, shall be carried without the border. If the body of a dead man is found, and the murderer, after every effort to detect him, remains unknown, the trial shall take place all the same, and the unknown murderer, if found guilty, shall be warned not to set foot in the temples or come within the borders of the land; if discovered, he shall die the death, and his body shall be cast out. A man is justified in taking the life of a thief entering the house by night, of a footpad, of a violator of women or youth; and he may take the life of another in defence of father, mother, brother, or other relations.

The nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men have been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which destroy life. There remain maimings, wounding, and the like, which admit of a similar division into voluntary and involuntary. About this class of actions the preamble shall be: Whereas men would be like wild beasts unless they obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care of the public interests, which unite and preserve states, as private interests distract them. A man may know what is for the public good, but if he be undisciplined, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure instead of virtue, and so darkness will come over his soul and over the state. If he had knowledge, he would have no need of law; for knowledge is the perfection of law. But such a freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is hardly to be found; and therefore law and order are necessary, which are the second best, and they regulate many things, but not everything. For actions have innumerable characteristics, which must be partly determined by the law and partly left to the judge. The judge must determine the fact; nor can the law always prescribe the punishment. What shall the law prescribe, and what shall be left to the judge? A city is unfortunate in which the tribunal is either secret and speechless, or, what is worse, noisy and public, and like a theatre, resounding with the applause and censure of the advocates. Such courts a legislator would rather not have; but if he must have them, he will speak plainly himself, and leave as little as possible in the power of the court. But where the courts are good, and presided over by well-trained judges, the penalties to be inflicted

may be in a great measure left to them; and as there are to be good courts among our colonists, there will be no need for us to determine beforehand the exact proportion of the penalty and the crime. Returning, then, to our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall run as follows:—He who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his object, shall be tried as if he had succeeded. But since God has favoured both him and his victim, instead of being put to death, he shall be allowed to go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to the sufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be the same as would have tried the case if death had ensued. If a child intentionally wound its parent, or a servant his master, or if brother or sister wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty shall be death. If a husband or wife wound one another with intent to kill, the penalty which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile, and if they have children not yet grown up their property shall be placed in the hands of trustees. If they have no children, their kinsmen male and female shall meet, and after a consultation with the priests and guardians of the law, shall appoint an heir of the house; for the house and family belong to the state, being a 5040th portion of the whole. And the state is bound to preserve her families happy and holy; therefore, when the heir of a house has committed a capital offence, or is in exile for life, the house is to be purified, and then the kinsmen of the house and the guardians of the law are to enquire about those who are conspicuous for virtue, and introduce one of them to be the heir and priest of the house. He shall assume the fathers and ancestors of the family, while the first son dies in dishonour and his name is blotted out.

Some actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary, and differ in degree. Those done from anger are of this class. If a man wounds another in anger, let him pay double the value of the injury, if curable; or fourfold, if curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold, if incurable; the payment is to be assessed by the judges. If the wounded person is rendered incapable of military service, besides the other penalties which he undergoes the injurer shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit for refusing to serve. If brother wounds brother, then their parents and kindred, of both sexes, shall meet and judge the crime. The damages shall be assessed by the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is disputed, an appeal

shall be made to the male kindred ; or in the last resort to the guardians of the law. Parents who wound their children are to be tried by judges of at least sixty years of age, who have children of their own ; and they are to determine whether death, or what greater or in any degree less punishment, is to be inflicted upon them—no relatives are to take part in the trial. If a slave in anger smite a freeman, he is to be delivered up by his master to the injured person. If the master suspect collusion between the slave and the injured person, he may try the matter. And if he fail he shall pay three times the injury ; or if he obtain a conviction, the contriver of the conspiracy shall be made his slave. He who wounds another unintentionally, shall pay single and not double damages. The lawgiver cannot control accidents.

In all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded than the younger ; as among the Gods so also among men. An injury done by a younger man to an elder is abominable and hateful ; but the younger man who sustains an injury at the hands of an elder is to bear with him patiently, considering that he who is twenty years older is *loco parentis*. Let him keep his hands, too, from the stranger ; instead of taking upon himself to chastise him when he is insolent, he shall bring him before the wardens of the city, who, not without thought of the God who protects strangers, shall inflict upon him as many blows as he has given ; or if he be innocent, they shall warn and threaten his accuser. When an equal strikes an equal, whether an old man an old man, or a young man a young man, let them use only their fists and have no knives. He who being above forty years of age commences a battle, or retaliates, shall be counted mean and base.

To this preamble, let the law be added : If a man smite another who is his elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be older than the combatants, part them ; or if he be younger than the person struck, or of the same age with him, let him defend him as he would a father or brother ; and let the striker be brought to trial, and if convicted imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of the judges. If he be a stranger, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and if a metic for three. He who is standing by and gives no assistance, shall be punished according to his class in one of four penalties—a mina, fifty, thirty, twenty, drachmas. The generals and other superior officers of the army shall form the court who try this class of offences. Laws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may

be no need of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not be hindered from crime. The uttermost penalty is reserved for the parricide and the matricide, who despise the universal moral sense and tradition of mankind; for such there are reserved tortures worse than death in the world below. These, however, are not believed by them, else there would be no such criminals—wherefore the tortures which will then await them must be anticipated in life. Let the law be as follows:—

If a man, being in his right mind, dares to smite his father and mother, or his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the rescue; and if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he shall have the first place at the games; or if he do not come to the rescue, he shall be a perpetual exile. Let the citizen in the like case be praised or blamed, and the slave receive freedom or a hundred stripes. The wardens of the agora, the city, or the country, shall see to the execution of the law. And he who is an inhabitant of the same place and is present shall help; or if he do not he shall be under a curse.

If a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from sacrificing; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of the country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death. If any freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he return to the city. If a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let the bystander be bound to seize and deliver him into the hands of the injured person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he pleases, and shall then return him safely to his master. The law will be as follows:—The slave who strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master, and not set at liberty without the consent of the person whom he has injured. All these laws apply to women as well as to men.

BOOK X. The greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the greatest of all are committed against public temples: they are in the second degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in the third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree, when they offend against the authority or property of the rulers; in the fifth degree, when the rights of individuals are violated. Most of these offences have been already considered; but there remains the question of admonition and punishment of offences against the

Gods. Let the admonition be in the following terms:—No man who ever did or said anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the Gods; but, either he thought that there were no Gods, or that they did not care about men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and prayers. ‘What shall we say or do to such persons?’ My good sir, let us first hear the jests which they in their superiority will make upon us. ‘What will they say?’ Probably something of this kind:—‘Strangers, you are right in thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of the Gods; while others assert that they do not care for us, and others that they are propitiated by prayers and offerings. But we want you to preach to us before you threaten; you should prove that there are Gods, and that they are too good to be bribed. Poets, priests, prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak to us of atoning for evil, and not of avoiding evil. From gentle legislators we ask for instruction, which may, at least, have the persuasive power of truth, if no other.’ What have you to say? ‘Well, there is no difficulty in proving the being of the Gods. The sun, and earth, and stars, moving in their courses, the recurring seasons, are evidences of their existence; and there is the general opinion of mankind.’ I am afraid that the unbelievers—not that I have any respect for them—will despise us. You do not seem to see that their impiety proceeds, not from sensuality, but from ignorance taking the garb of wisdom. ‘What do you mean?’ At Athens there are current tales, written both in metre and out of metre, of a kind which are not tolerated in a well-regulated state like yours. The oldest of them speak of the origin of the world, and they go on to tell of the birth and life of the Gods. Now these narratives have not a good influence on family relations; but as they are old we will let them pass, and consider another kind of tales, invented by a younger generation of wiseacres, who are fond of repeating that the Gods are earth and stones, which can have no care of human things, and that theology is a cooking-up of words. ‘One such teacher is bad enough, and alas! you imply that there are many of them.’ What shall we say or do? Shall we suppose some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the Gods, and make a defence? Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the laws? ‘No man hurries us, and we have often said that the shorter and worse method should not be preferred to the longer and better. The proof that there are Gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the preamble of all law.’ Come, then, and

let us talk with the impious, who have been brought up from their infancy in the belief of religion, and have heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking with the Gods as if they were convinced of their existence; who have seen mankind prostrate before the rising and setting sun and moon at every turn of fortune, and have despised and disbelieved all this. Can we keep our temper with them, when they compel us to argue on such a theme? We must; or like them we shall go mad, though with more reason. Let us address them as follows:

O my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many of your opinions. Do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the divine nature; and let me mention to you a fact which I know. You and your friends are not the only or the first persons who have held these opinions about the Gods. There are always a considerable number who are infected by them: I have known many of these persons, and can assure you that no one who was an unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in denying the existence of the Gods. The two other opinions, first, that the Gods exist and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for men, but may be propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last through life in a few instances, but even this is not common. I would beg of you to be patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and others; in the mean time abstain from impiety. 'Thus far your address is admirable.'

I will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the crown of philosophy. They say that all things come into being either by art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by nature and chance, and the lesser things by art, which receives from nature the larger creations and fashions them in detail. 'What do you and they mean?' They mean to say that fire, water, earth, and air all exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of these the sun, moon, stars, and earth were afterwards framed, and are inanimate substances, moved by chance, according to a natural kindred of hot and cold, hard and soft.

Thus, in their opinion, the heaven and earth were created, as well as the animals and plants, and by these two causes—nature and chance. Art came later, and is of mortal birth; by her power were invented certain images and partial imitations of the truth, of which kind are music and painting: but they say that there are other arts which combine with nature, and have a deeper truth, such as medicine,

husbandry, gymnastics. Also the greater part of politics they imagine to co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, having more of art, and that legislation is wholly a work of art. 'How do you mean?' In the first place, they say that the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but by the laws of states, which are different in different countries; and that virtue is one thing by nature and another by convention; and that justice is altogether conventional, and made by law. This is repeated to young men, both in prose and verse, and leads to all manner of impieties, and the pretended life according to nature and in disobedience to law; for nobody believes the Gods to be such as the law affirms. 'Too true; and oh! how injurious to states and to families!' But then, what should the lawgiver do? Should he stand up in the state and threaten all mankind with the dire consequences of unbelief, at the same time making no attempt to calm and persuade them? 'Nay, Stranger, a legislator who is worth anything ought never to weary of endeavouring to help the people in their belief that there are Gods; law and art should be affirmed by him to be the creations of mind.' Yes, Cleinias; but we are entering on questions which are difficult and tedious. 'And shall our patience, which was not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, weary now of discoursing about the Gods? Laws may be difficult, but when written down they remain, and time and diligence will decipher them; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor religion in rejecting them on account of their length.' Most true. And the general spread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do something in vindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad men. 'He should.' You agree with me, Cleinias, that the heresy consists in supposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things. These the heretics call nature, and conceive them to be prior to the soul. 'I agree.' You would further agree that natural philosophy is the source of this impiety—the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way. 'In what way do you mean?' The error consists in transposing first and second causes. 'I do not yet understand your meaning.' I mean to say that they err in not knowing that the soul is before the body, and before all other things, and the author and ruler of them all in their vicissitudes. And if the soul is prior to the body, then the things of the soul are prior to the things of the body. 'Certainly.' In other words, opinion, attention, mind, art, law, are prior to sensible qualities; and the first and greater works of creation are the results of art and mind, whereas the works of nature, as

they are improperly termed, are secondary and subsequent. 'Quite true.' When they speak of nature they seem to mean the generation of the first elements. And if the soul is first, and not fire and air, then the soul may be truly said to have a creative power. But this can only be on the supposition that the soul is prior to the body. 'Most true.' Shall I go to the point? 'By all means.' I fear that the greenness of our argument will ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of our ages. But as we must go into the water, and the stream is strong, I will first try the experiment of crossing by myself, and if I arrive at the bank, you shall follow. Remembering that you are not in the habit of answering questions, I will interrogate myself with the view of establishing the priority of the soul to the body. 'Do so.' I must first pray the Gods to assist at the demonstration of their own existence—never was there a more fitting occasion. Let me now hold fast to the rope, and enter into the depths: Shall I put the question to myself in this form?—Are all things at rest, and is nothing in motion? or are some things in motion, and some things at rest? 'The latter.' And are they moving or resting in some place or places? 'Yes.' There may be motion in the same place, as in revolution on an axis, which is imparted swiftly or slowly to the lesser and larger circle; and there may be motion in different places, having sometimes one centre of motion and sometimes more. When bodies in motion come against other bodies which are at rest, they are divided by them, and when they meet other bodies coming from an opposite direction they unite with them; and they grow by union while their constitution remains the same, but are destroyed either by union or division, when their constitution is lost. There is a growth from one dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then becomes perceptible to sense; and these are all the motions possible with the exception of two. 'What are they?' Just the two with which our enquiry is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul. Now there is one kind of motion which is only able to move other things; there is another which can move itself as well. 'Granted.' That which moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of motion; that which is self-moved and moves others is the tenth. And this tenth kind of motion is the mightiest, and is really the first, and is followed by that which was improperly called the ninth. 'How do you mean?' Must not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that which is moved by itself? Nothing can be effected by any transition prior to

self-motion. Then the first and eldest principle in motion, whether in things at rest or not at rest, will be the principle of self-motion; and that which is changed by others and moves others will be the second. 'True.' Let me ask another question :

What is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any material substance? 'Life.' The soul is life? 'Very good.' And are there not three kinds of knowledge — a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2) of the definition, (3) of the name? And sometimes the name leads us to ask the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name; for example, number may be defined as that which is divisible into two equal parts, and when thus divided is termed even, and the definition of even and the word 'even' have the same meaning? 'Very true.' And what is the definition of that which is named 'soul'? Must we not reply the self-moved? And have we not proved that the self-moved is the source of motion in other things? 'That has been proved.' And the motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this? 'True.' And if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior and superior to the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to the soul. 'Quite right.' And we agreed that if the soul was prior to the body, the things of the soul were prior to the things of the body? 'Certainly.' And therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true opinions, and recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and force of bodies. 'Of course.' In the next place, we acknowledge that the soul is the cause of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things. 'Certainly.' And the soul which orders all things must also order the heavens? 'Of course.' One soul or more? More, I will answer for you; less than two are inconceivable, one good, the other evil. 'Most true.' The soul directs all things in heaven and earth and sea by her movements, which we call will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred, love, and similar affections. These are the primary movements, and they receive the secondary movements of the body, and guide all things to increase and decline, separation and union, and to all the qualities which accompany them—cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black, sweet, bitter; and the soul, herself a goddess, uses these and other qualities, and by the help of the divine mind guides all things into truth and happiness, or under the impulse of folly works out an opposite result. For the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the world is

either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul, working in them. 'What do you mean?' If we say that the whole course and motion of heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and reasonings of mind, clearly the best soul must have the care of the heaven, and guide it along that better way. 'True.' But if the heavens move wildly and disorderly, then they must be under the guidance of the evil soul. 'True again.' What is the nature of the movement of the soul? We must not lead people to suppose that they can see and know the soul with their bodily eyes, any more than they can see objects in the midday sun; they had better look at an image only. 'How do you mean?' Let us find in the ten kinds of motion an image of the motion of the mind. You remember, as we said, that all things are divided into two classes; and some of them were moved and some at rest. 'Yes.' And of those which were moved, some were moved in the same place, others in more places than one. 'Just so.' The motion which was in one place was circular, as in the motion of a top; this is akin to the course of mind. 'What do you mean?' The motion of the top in the same place, and in the same relations, is an excellent and ingenious image of the motion of mind. 'Very true.' The motion of the other sort, which has no fixed place or manner or relation or order or proportion, is a species of motion akin to folly and nonsense. 'Very true.' After what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating that, since the soul carries round all things, some soul which is either very good or the opposite, carries round the circumference of heaven. But we cannot suppose that soul to be other than the best. Again, the soul carries round the sun, moon, and stars, and there is good reason for believing that if the sun has a soul, then either the soul of the sun is within and moves the sun as the soul moves the body; or, secondly, the sun is contained in some external air or fire, which the soul provides; or, thirdly, the course of the sun is given by the soul acting in some miraculous manner without the body. 'Yes, in one of those ways the soul must guide all things.' And this soul of the sun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or employing any other agency, is by every man called a God? 'Yes, by every man who has any sense.' And of the seasons, stars, moon, and year, in like manner, it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they derived their excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner of their working, no one can deny that all things are full of Gods. 'No one.'

And now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there are Gods. 'What alternative?' Either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all things, or he must live for the future in the belief that there are Gods.

Next, as to the man who believes in the Gods, but refuses to acknowledge that they take care of human things — let him too have a word of admonition. 'Best of men,' we will say to him, 'some affinity to the Gods leads you to honour them and to believe in them. But there are strokes of fortune, which you have observed; the rewards of wicked men are often praised by poets and approved by the world, and these draw you away from your natural piety. Perhaps you have seen the wicked growing old in prosperity, and leaving great offices to their children; or you have watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of crime; and seeing all these things you were led to believe in an irrational way that the Gods take no care of human things. That your error may not increase, I will endeavour to purify your soul.' Do you, Megillus and Cleinias, make answer for the youth, and when we come to a difficulty, I will carry you over the water. 'Very good.' There is no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care for the small as well as the great, for he heard what was said of their goodness and of their having all things under their hand. 'He certainly heard.' Then now let us enquire what is meant by the virtue of the Gods. To possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice. 'That is what we say.' And is not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 'Certainly.' And to the Gods we ascribe virtues; but are idleness and indolence virtues? 'Of course not.' And is God to be conceived of as a careless, indolent fellow, whom the poet would compare to a drone? 'Impossible.' Can we be right in praising any one who cares for great matters and leaves the small to take care of themselves? Whether God or man, he who does so, must either think the neglect of such matters to be of no consequence, or he is indolent and careless. But no one would say that he neglects them because he is unable to attend to them. 'Certainly not.'

And now we will examine both classes of offenders against the Gods — the one who say that they may be appeased, the other that they take no care of small matters: do they not acknowledge that the Gods know all things, and have all power, human and divine, and that they are best? 'Certainly.' Then they cannot be indolent, for

indolence is the offspring of idleness, and idleness of cowardice, and there is no cowardice in God. 'True.' If they neglect small matters, they must either know or not know that such things are not to be regarded. But of course they know, and knowing they cannot be supposed to neglect their duty, overcome by the seductions of pleasure or pain? 'Impossible.' Have not all human things a soul, and is not man the most religious creature in the earth, and the possession of the Gods, as the heavens are also their possession? And the Gods, being the most provident beings, should take care of their property, whether small or great. Consider further, that the greater the power of perception, the less the power of action. 'What do you mean?' It is harder to see and hear the small than the great, but easier to control them. Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient—would he ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little? 'Impossible.' And is not life made up of littles?—the pilot, general, householder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder will tell you that large stones will not lie without small ones. Let us not then suppose God to be inferior to mortal craftsmen, who in proportion to their skill are careful in the details of their work; or that the best and wisest is a lazy good-for-nothing, who wants a holiday, and thinks small and easy matters to be beneath his notice. 'Never, never!' He who charges the Gods with neglect has been forced to admit that he is in error; but I should like further to persuade him that the author of all has put all together for the preservation of the whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed state of action or passion, and that the least action or passion of any part has a presiding minister. You, we say to him, are a minute fraction of this universe, created with a view to the whole; the blessed world is not made for the sake of you, but you are made to increase the blessedness of the whole; for the good physician and the good artist regard the whole first, and afterwards the parts. And you are annoyed at not seeing how that which is best for you is best also for the universe. The soul has many changes of bodies; and all that the player can do is to put the pieces into their right places. 'What do you mean?' I mean that God acts in the way which is simplest and easiest. Where change is ever going on, and new forms and fashions of life are springing up, the transposition of the Cosmos is endless; and yet there is not much trouble in the government of the world. 'What do you mean?' I mean to

say that when the king saw the actions of the living souls and bodies, and the virtue and vice which were in them, and the indestructibility of them, (although they were not eternal,) he contrived to place them where virtue might conquer and vice be overcome as far as possible; and with this view he gave them a place and seat adapted to them, leaving the direction of their separate actions to men's own wills and characters, which make us to be what we are. 'That is very reasonable.' All things which have a soul are changing, and possess in themselves the principle of change, and so move according to the law and order of fate; when they change gradually they move along the surface of the ground; when they change greatly for the worse, they are weighed down into Hades and the infernal world. And in all great changes in the direction of good and evil which are produced by the will of the soul and the mighty influence of others, there is a change of place. The good soul, which has intercourse with the divine nature, passes into a holier and better place. The evil soul, in like manner, as she grows worse changes her place for the worse. This is the law of the Gods in heaven—the worse to the worse, the better to the better, like to like, in life and in death, and in every state of being or of suffering. You, O youth, who fancy yourself unnoticed by the Gods, shall depart to more unrighteous souls, and shall endure what those who are like you see fit to impose upon you. That is the law which will govern you, and which no man will ever boast that he has escaped. Thou art not so little that thou canst creep into the earth, or so high that thou canst mount to heaven; but either here, or in the world below, or in some yet more savage place, you shall pay the penalty. This is also the explanation of the prosperity of the wicked, in whose actions as in a mirror you seemed to see the neglect of the Gods, not considering the end of these men and their relation to the whole. And yet without knowing these things how can you form any idea of their real happiness? If Cleinias and Megillus and I succeed in persuading you that you know not what you say about the Gods, God will help you; but if there is still any deficiency of proof, hear our answer to the third opponent.

Enough has been said to prove that the Gods exist and care for us; that they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts is not to be allowed or admitted for an instant. 'Let us proceed.' Tell me, by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us? Are they

not rulers, charioteers, pilots, perhaps generals, or physicians healing the strife of bodily disease, husbandmen observing the perils of the seasons, shepherds watching their flocks? To whom shall we compare them? We acknowledged that the world is full both of good and evil, but having more of evil than of good. There is an immortal conflict going on, in which Gods and demigods are our allies; and the most extraordinary care is required to save the property of the Gods, that is to say, the soul of man, which is preserved by justice and virtue, and destroyed by folly and wickedness. There is little of the first to be found on earth; and brutal and unjust natures fawn upon their keepers, who may be dogs or shepherds, as they may be also the best and most perfect of masters. But we affirm that dishonesty is to human souls what disease is to human bodies, what plague or pestilence is to the seasons, what injustice is to states. 'Just so.' And they who maintain that the Gods can be appeased, must say that they forgive the sins of men, if they are allowed to share in their dishonesties; as you might suppose wolves to throw the dogs a bit, and then to be left by them in peace, that they may devour the flock. 'That is the argument.' But let us apply our images to the Gods—are they the pilots who eat and are drunken and wreck their own ships—or the charioteers who are bribed to lose the race—or the generals, or doctors, or husbandmen, who are perverted from their duty—or the dogs who are seduced by wolves? 'God forbid.' Are they not rather our best guardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of a moderate degree of human and canine virtue, which will not pervert justice for reward? 'Impossible.' He, then, who maintains such a doctrine, is the most blasphemous of mankind.

And now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that there are Gods, (2) that they have a care for man, (3) that they are inflexible in justice. I have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this impiety of theirs should lead to a perversion of life. And our warmth will not have been in vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men to abominate themselves, and to change their ways. 'There may be a hope of doing so; and, at any rate, the sermon does credit to the lawgiver.' Then now that the preamble is completed, we will make a proclamation commanding the impious to leave their ways; and in case they refuse, the law shall be added: If a man is guilty of impiety in word or deed, let the bystander inform the rulers, and let the rulers

bring him before the court. If any of the rulers refuse to act, he also shall be tried for impiety; and if he be found guilty, he shall be fined for each offence. All such criminals are to be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons—one for common offences against life and property; another, in connection with the nocturnal council, which is to be called the house of improvement; a third, in some desolate and wild region in the centre of the country, which shall be the house of vengeance. There are three causes of impiety, and from each of them spring two kinds of impiety, six in all. First, there is the impiety of those who deny the existence of the Gods; these may be honest men, haters of evil, who are only dangerous because they talk loosely about the Gods and make converts; but there is also a vicious and self-indulgent class of them, who are full of craft and licentiousness. To this latter belong diviners and enchanters, despots and demagogues, generals, hierophants of private mysteries, and cunning sophists. The first class shall be only imprisoned and admonished. The second class should be put to death, if they could be, many times over. The two other sorts of impiety, first of those who deny the care of the Gods, and secondly, of those who affirm that they may be propitiated, have similar subdivisions, varying in degree of guilt. Those who have learnt to blaspheme from ignorance or evil education, shall be imprisoned in the house of improvement for five years at least, and not allowed to see any one but members of the council, who shall converse with them touching their souls' health. If any of the prisoners come to their right mind, at the end of five years let them be restored to sane company; but he who again offends shall die. As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that the Gods are negligent, or may be propitiated, but pretend to practise on the souls of quick and dead, and promise to charm the Gods, and to effect the overthrow of houses and states—he, I say, who is guilty of these things, shall be bound in the central prison, and shall have no intercourse with any freeman, receiving only his daily rations of food; and if he die, let him be cast beyond the border. But his sins shall not be visited upon his children, who, like other orphans, shall be educated by the state. Further, let there be a general law which will have a tendency to repress actions of impiety. A man shall not be allowed to have religious services in his house, but he shall go with his friends to pray and sacrifice in the temples. The reason of this is, that religious institutions can only be framed by a great intelligence.

But women and weak men are always consecrating the event of the moment; they are under the influence of dreams and visions, and awakenings, and they build altars and temples in every village, and on every open spot. The law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter men from the practice of propitiating the Gods by secret sacrifices, which only multiply their sins. Therefore let the law run—No one shall have private religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been previously noted for any impiety offend in this way, let him be admonished to remove his rites to a public temple; but if he be one of the impious sort, and has offered a sacrifice which is impure, supposing him to be of full age and serious purpose, he shall be brought to trial before the guardians, and if he be found guilty, let him die.

BOOK XI. As to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is simple—Thou shalt not take what is not thine; and may I do to others as I would that they should do to me. First, of treasure trove:—May I never find, or desire to find, or be induced by the counsel of diviners, to lift a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has laid down; for I shall not gain so much in money as I shall lose in virtue. The saying, ‘Move not the immovable,’ may be repeated in a new sense; and there is a common belief which asserts that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. To him who is careless of such consequences, and, despising the word of the wise, reaps where he has not sown, and lifts a treasure which is not his—what will be done by the hand of the Gods, God only knows,—but I would have him who sees the offender, inform the magistrates in town or country; and they, when they have received the information, shall send to Delphi and act upon the decision of the oracle. If the informer be a freeman, he shall be honoured; if a slave, he shall be enfranchised; but if the freeman do not inform, he shall be dishonoured, and the slave if he does not inform, shall be put to death. If a man leave anything great or small, intentionally or unintentionally, in the possession of another, let him who finds the property deem the deposit sacred to the Goddess of ways. And he who appropriates the same, if he be a slave, shall be beaten with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay tenfold, and be held to have done a dishonourable action. If a person says that another has something of his, and the other allows that he

has, but maintains the property in dispute to be his own, let the ownership be proved out of the registers of property; and, if the property is registered as belonging to some one who is absent, possession shall be given to him who offers the best security on behalf of the absentee; or if the property is not registered, let it remain with the three eldest archons, and if the thing be an animal, the defeated party must pay the cost of its keep to the archons. A man may carry off his own runaway slave or the runaway slave of a friend for safe keeping. If any one claims a slave he must produce three responsible persons as securities; and if he do not, he will be liable, if he be cast, to pay double damages for violence. A freedman who does not pay due respect to his patrons, may also be seized. Due respect consists in going three times a month to the house of his patron, and offering to do what he can for him; promising to marry whom he will, and not get any richer than his master; or if he does, giving the excess to his master. He is not to remain in the state, except with the consent of the archons, for more than twenty years; and whenever his census exceeds that of the third class, he must in any case leave the state within thirty days, taking his property with him. If he is convicted of offending against this law he is to die, and his property to be confiscated. All suits about these matters are to be decided in the tribes, unless the parties have made the matter up, or appointed arbiters. If anybody claims a beast, or anything else, let the possessor refer to the seller or giver of the property within thirty days, if in the city, or within five months—of which the middle month is to be reckoned from the summer solstice—if the goods have been received from a stranger. All purchases and exchanges are to be made in the agora, and paid for on the spot; no credit is allowed. If credit is given, or purchases are made elsewhere, no law shall enforce payment. No law shall protect the money subscribed for clubs. He who sells anything of greater value than fifty drachmas, shall abide in the city for ten days, and let his whereabouts be known to the buyer, in case of any reclamation. When a slave is sold who is subject to epilepsy, stone, or any other invisible disorder, the buyer, if he be a physician or trainer, or if he be warned, shall have no redress; but in other cases within six months, or in epileptic disorders within twelve months, he may have a jury of physicians to be agreed upon by both parties; and the seller who loses the suit, if he be an expert, shall pay twice the

price; or if he be a private person the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall refund. If a person knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is informed of his character, there is no redress. But if the judges—who are to be the five youngest guardians of the law—decide that the purchaser was not aware, then the seller is to pay threefold, and to purify the house of the buyer. He who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant either of them to be sound and good. As in the case of other laws, let us have a preamble, relating to all this class of crime. Adulteration is a kind of falsehood about which the many are in the habit of saying, that at proper times the practice is right. But the legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the Gods when he is practising deceit or fraud in word or deed. For he is the enemy of heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the Gods by whom he swears, and secondly, he who lies in the presence of his superiors: and superiors are better in relation to worse, the elders to the younger, parents to children, men in relation to women, and rulers to subjects. The trader who cheats in the agora, outrages the names and presence of Gods and rulers. If after hearing this he will still be dishonest, let him listen to the law: The seller shall not have two prices on the same day, neither must he praise his goods, nor offer to swear about them. If he break the law, any citizen not less than thirty years of age may smite him. If he sell fraudulent goods, the slave or metic who informs against him shall have the goods; the citizen, if he fail in proving the charge, shall be dishonoured; or if he succeed, shall offer up the goods in question to the Gods of the agora. The cheating tradesman, if he is detected, shall be deprived of his goods, and shall have a stripe inflicted upon him for every drachma of their value, after proclamation has been made by a herald of the offence. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall learn of experienced persons the rogueries and tricks of the vendors, and write on a column the laws and regulations of the agora.

Next in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their natural use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a benefactor who reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion. Money is the instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keepers, and merchants, and hotel-keepers do but supply and equalise the wants of mankind. Why, then, does any dishonour attach to a beneficent occupation? Let us consider the fact first, and then

speak of the remedy. 'What is your drift?' Dear Cleinias, there are few men in the world who are so gifted by nature, and improved by education, as to be able to control their desires; or who, when they might have wealth, keep their heads and prefer moderation to accumulation. But the great majority think that they can never have enough, and the consequence is that retail trade has fallen into disrepute and become a reproach. Whereas, however ludicrous the idea may seem, if noble men and noble women could be induced to open a shop, and to trade upon incorruptible principles, then the aspect of things would change, and retail traders would be regarded as nursing fathers and mothers. Now, when the trader goes and settles in remote and distant places, he receives the sea-tossed sailor hospitably at first, but in the end he treats him as an enemy and a captive, whom he only liberates for an enormous ransom. This is what has brought retail trade into disrepute, and against this the legislator ought to provide. Men have said of old, that to fight against two enemies of opposite kinds is beyond the strength of mortals; and the two enemies whom I mean are wealth and poverty—the one corrupting men by luxury; the other, through misery, depriving them of the sense of shame. What remedies are there for this disease in the body politic? The first remedy is, to have as few retail traders as possible; the second is, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption will not injure the state; and the third is, to restrain the insolence and meanness of the retailers.

Let us make the following laws:—(1) In the city of the Magnetes which the God is founding anew, none of the 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to any private persons who are not his equals, except to his father and mother, or to any of his elder kindred, being freemen. He who follows an illiberal calling may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept in bonds for a year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two years; and for every offence his punishment shall be doubled: (2) Every retailer shall be a metic or a foreigner: (3) The guardians of the law shall have a special care of this part of the community, which, not having received the benefit of education, has peculiar temptations. They shall consult with those who have experience in the different trades, as in the similar case of fraud, and find out what prices will yield the traders a moderate profit, and fix them.

When a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or

other impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the tribes, if not previously settled by arbitration. The makers of household implements are sacred to Hephaestus and Athene; the makers of weapons to Ares and Athene: all of whom, remembering that the Gods are their ancestors, should be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft. If any man is lazy in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, like a fool, that the God who gave him the means of life will forgive him because he is an acquaintance, he will be punished by the God; and let the law follow: He who fails in his undertaking shall pay the value, and do the work gratis in a specified time. The contractor, like the seller, is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his work; in a free city, art should be a true thing, and the artist should not be practising on the ignorance of others. If, on the other hand, he who has ordered the work does not pay the workman according to agreement, and, for the sake of making a little money, dishonours Zeus and Athene, and breaks the bonds of society, the law shall punish him. If he does not pay at the time agreed, let him pay double; and although interest is forbidden in other cases, let the workman receive after the expiration of a year compound interest at the rate of an obol a month for every drachma (equal to 200 per cent. per ann.). And we may observe, by the way, in speaking of craftsmen, that if our military craft do their work well, the state will praise those who honour them, and blame those who do not honour them. Not that the first place of honour is to be assigned to the warrior; a higher still is reserved for those who obey the laws.

Most of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the exception of such as relate to orphans and guardianships. These lead us to speak of the intention of the dying, about which we must make regulations. I say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to do absolutely what they will with their own, in opposition to the laws and customs of the living. For a dying person is a strange being, and is not easily managed. 'What do you mean?' He wants to be master of all he has, and is apt to use angry words. 'What does he say?' He says, I ought to be allowed to do what I will with my own, and to give much to those who deserve well of me, and little to those who deserve ill. 'There is reason in that.' O Cleinias, in my judgment the older lawgivers were too softhearted, and wanting in insight into human affairs. 'What do you mean?' I mean to say that they were too ready to listen to the outcry of a dying man, and hence they were induced to give him an

absolute power of bequest. But I would say to him,—O creature of a day, you know neither the nature of your property, nor your own nature. For you are not your own, and your property is not your own, but belongs to your whole family, who have preceded and will follow you, and property and family alike belong to the State. And therefore, fearing that you may make an indiscreet will, I will take out of your hands the charge of what you leave behind you, with a view to the interests of all. And I hope that you will not quarrel with us, for you are going the way of all mankind. Let this be our address to the living and dying, and let the law be as follows:—The father who has sons shall appoint one of them to be the heir of the lot; and the lot of any other son who shall be adopted by another shall also be recorded; and if he has still a son who has no lot, and has a chance of going to a colony, he may give him what is over; or if he has more than one son, he may divide the money between them. A son who has the family inheritance, and a daughter who is betrothed, are not to share in the bequest of money; and the son or daughter who, having inherited one lot, acquires another, is to give back the first inheritance to the next of kin. If a man has only daughters, he may adopt their husbands; or if he have lost a son, he may adopt another in his will. If he have no children, he may give away a tenth of his acquired property to whomsoever he will; but he must adopt an heir to inherit the lot, and leave the remainder to him. Also he may appoint guardians for his children; or if he die without appointing them or without making a will, the nearest kinsmen,—two on the side of the father, and two on the side of the mother, and one friend of the departed,—shall be appointed guardians under the authority of the fifteen eldest guardians of the law, who are to be the special trustees of the orphan. The whole number of fifteen shall be divided into committees of three, who will succeed one another every year for five years. If a man dying intestate have daughters, the dead must not be offended at the law looking, first to relationship, and secondly to the preservation of the lot. The legislator cannot regard the character of the heir, which to the father is the first consideration. The law will therefore run as follows:—If the intestate leave daughters, they are to marry, first, their father's brothers, who shall take possession of the dead man's lot; secondly, the sons of brothers, if they are of suitable age; thirdly, of their sisters; fourthly, their great-uncles; fifthly, their cousins by a paternal uncle; sixthly,

their cousins by a paternal aunt. They will first take the male line and then the female, and they must suit in point of age. Concerning this the judge shall decide, after having made an inspection of the youth naked, and of the maiden naked down to the waist. If the maiden has no relations within the degree of third cousin, she may choose whom she likes, with the consent of her guardians; even a colonist may return home and become heir to her father's lot. If he be a kinsman, he will take the lot by law; if not, he must have her guardian's consent, and also hers. When a man dies without children and without a will, let a young man and a young woman, being the nearest of kin and of the same family, go forth and take up their abode in the desolate house. The legislator foresees that laws such as those about the marriage of relations will sometimes press heavily, and that there may be innumerable obstacles to his intention being fulfilled; as for example, when there are mental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to marry. He is aware of these impediments, and he must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the general principles of public interest with the particular circumstances of individuals; and he is willing to allow the same excuse in the individual, who is not always able to bear the burden which the lawgiver has in ignorance imposed upon him. And then arbiters must be chosen, who will determine equitably the causes which arise under the law. 'How will that be?' A rich cousin may sometimes have an eye to a grander match, or the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a madwoman. To meet such cases let the law run as follows:—If any one comes forward and says of a testamentary law, respecting marriage or any other matter, that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would not have required the carrying out of the law, and that he has left the fifteen eldest guardians of the law to be the trustees for the orphan; to the fifteen let them go; and their decision shall be final in smaller cases, but in the greater causes there shall be an appeal to the court of select judges, and he who fails in his cause shall suffer loss of reputation.

Orphans shall have in a manner a second birth in order to make their sad condition as light as possible. The guardians of the law shall be their parents, who shall be admonished to take care of them. And what admonition can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly gave that the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs? About this there are many tales and ancient traditions, which may be

taken on trust from the legislator. Let men fear, in the first place, the Gods above; secondly, the souls of the departed, who naturally care for their own descendants; thirdly, the aged living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family duties, especially in the case of orphans, who are the holiest and most sacred of all deposits, and the special care of guardians and magistrates. And those who bring them up well will receive a return in the care of themselves and their families. He who listens to the preamble of the law will never know the severity of the legislator; but he who disobeys, and injures the orphan, will pay twice the penalty he would have paid if the parents had been alive. More laws might have been made about orphans, did we not suppose that the guardians have children of their own and property of their own which are protected by the laws; and the duty of the guardian is the same as that of a father, though his honour or disgrace is greater. A legal admonition and threat may, however, be of service: the guardian of the orphan and the guardian of the law who is over him, shall love the orphan as his own child, and take more care of his or her property than of his own. If he neglect his duty the archon shall fine him; and the guardian shall have him tried. And the guardian may also have the archon tried in the court of select judges, and he shall pay, if convicted, a double penalty. Also the guardian of the orphan who is careless may be fined on the information of any of the citizens in a fourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the prosecutor of the suit. When the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he has been ill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five years. Or if the archon has neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have defrauded him, he shall be deposed.

If irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father may want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for imbecility: such violent separations only take place when the family are 'a bad lot'; if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do not grow to so great a height. But here arises a difficulty. Although in any other state a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a citizen, in this he does; for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040. And therefore he who is to suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured, not only by his father, but by the whole family. The law therefore should run as follows:—If any man's evil fortune or temper lead him to disinherit his son, let him not do so lightly or on the instant; but let him

have a council of his relations male and female, including the maternal relations of his son, and set forth to them the propriety of disinheriting him, and allow his son to answer. And if more than half his relations male and female, being of full age, condemn him, let him be disinherited. If any other citizen desires to adopt him, he may, for young men's characters often change in the course of life. But if, after ten years, he remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony. If disease, or old age, or evil disposition drive a man out of his senses, and he is ruining his house and property, and his misfortune is only known to those who live with him, and his son doubts about trying his lunacy, let him lay the case before the eldest guardians of the law, and consult with them. And if, after the cause has been heard, the father is decided to be imbecile, he shall live like a child in the house, and have no more control over his property.

If a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the law and ten of the matrons shall take their case in hand, and reconcile them, if possible. If, however, their swelling souls cannot be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and the husband a new wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and should therefore be joined to milder natures. Married persons may separate and marry again when they have few or no children, or when in old age they require special care. If a woman dies, leaving children male or female, the law would advise, though unwilling to compel, the widower to abstain from a second marriage; but if she leave no children, he shall be compelled to marry. Also a widow, if she is old enough to live honestly without marriage, is not to marry; but in case a widow or widower have no children, they may marry for the sake of them. There is sometimes an uncertainty which parent the offspring is to follow: in unions of a female slave with a male slave, or with a freedman or freeman, or of a freewoman with a male slave, the offspring is to belong to the master; but if the master or mistress be themselves the parent of the child, the slave and the child are to be sent away to another place. Concerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:—We honour the Gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we propitiate them. But he who has an aged father or mother has a far more sacred and living image, of which the cherishing will do him much more good than the worship of any other image. 'What do you mean by cherishing them?' I will tell you. Oedipus and Amyntor and Theseus cursed

their children, and their curses took effect. This proves that the Gods hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we doubt that they hear and fulfil their blessings too, when in the joy of their hearts they pray for their children's good? 'Surely not.' And, as we were saying, we cannot possess any image which the Gods count more honourable than a withered father and mother; and when honour is done to them, the God who hears their prayers is rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of any lifeless image; they pray that good or evil may come to us in proportion as they are honoured or dishonoured, but the image is silent. 'That is excellent.' Every man of sense fears and reverences the prayers of parents, because he knows that they are often fulfilled. Aged relatives are a blessing to the good, whereas the bad fear them. Wherefore let every one honour his parents, and if this preamble fails of influencing him, let him hear the law:—If any one cares not for his parents more than he cares for himself and his children, let the aggrieved person go or send to the three eldest guardians of the law and three of the women who are concerned with marriages. Women up to forty years of age, and men up to thirty, who are found guilty of thus offending, shall be beaten with stripes. After that age they are to be brought before a court composed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict any punishment upon them which they please. If the injured party is unable to inform, some other freeman shall be bound to inform; and if a slave informs he shall be set free,—if the slave of one of the parties, by the magistrate,—if owned by another, at the cost of the state.

The injuries which one person does to another by the use of incantations and magic potions, whether given in food, ointments, or any other form, are of two kinds; they affect either the body or the mind. There is no use in arguing with a man who can be affected by waxen images set at doors or sepulchres, or in places where three ways meet. But to the wizards themselves we must address a solemn preamble, begging them not to treat mankind like children, or compel the legislator to expose their imposture, and show that the doctor who is ignorant of medicine and the wizard who is not a prophet or diviner, are equally quacks. Let the law be as follows:—He who does any injury not fatal to a man or his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not to another's cattle or bees, is to be punished with death if he be a physician, and if he be a private person he is to suffer the punishment awarded by the

court. And the wizard or conjuror, whether he be a diviner or not shall be put to death. Any one who injures another shall pay damages at least equal to the injury; and every one who does wrong is to suffer punishment by way of admonition. The foolish youth who is incited by others is to have a lighter punishment; and he whose folly is occasioned by his own jealousy or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily. Punishment is to be inflicted not for the sake of vengeance, for what is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of prevention and information. And there should be a proportion between the punishment and the crime, in which the judge, having a discretion left him, must, by estimating the crime, second the legislator, who gives the outlines, which he, like a painter, must fill up. That is just the work which remains to be done, if Gods and heroes are propitious to us in our legislation.

A madman is not to be allowed to go about the city, but is to be taken care of by his relatives. Neglect on their part is to be punished in the first class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in the others. Now madness is of various kinds; in addition to that which arises from disease there is the madness of passion. No one is to speak evil of another, but when men differ in opinion they are to instruct one another without speaking evil; for out of a little heat and a few harsh words there often spring up most serious evils. No one should seek to rouse the passions which education has calmed. He who feeds and nurses his wrath is liable to fall into ribald jests at the expense of his opponent, with a loss of character or dignity to himself. And for this reason no one may use any ribald word in a temple, or at sacrifices, or games, or other public places; and he who offends shall be censured by him who has charge of such matters; and the magistrate, if he fail to censure him, shall not claim the prize of virtue. In any other place the reviler who indulges in anger, whether he be the beginner or not, may be chastened by an elder. No man shall use ridicule in anger; and even without anger ridicule is equally culpable. Nor can we allow the comic poet to ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of expulsion from the contest or a fine of three minae. There may be comic fun in which there is no offence; but the question of offence shall be determined by the director of education, who is to be the licenser of theatrical performances.

The righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in

a well ordered city; he will never be a beggar. Therefore let the law be as follows:—No beggar shall be allowed; and he who begs shall be expelled by the magistrates both from town and country.

If a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another, who is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the injury or give up the offending slave. But if the master says that there was complicity in the sufferer of the injury, he may put him on his trial for malpractices, and recover from him twice the value of the slave; or if he is cast he must make good the damage and deliver up the slave. The damage done by a horse or other animal shall be compensated in like manner.

A witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he fail in appearing, he shall be liable to punishment: if he swears that he does not know, he may leave the court. A judge who is called upon as a witness must not vote. A free woman may witness, and plead, and bring her action, if she have no husband, and be more than forty years of age, but while her husband lives, she can only be a witness. A slave, male or female, and a child may witness and plead, but they must give sureties that they will appear at the trial; for they may be charged with false witness. Such charges are to be proceeded with, pending the trial, and the other accusations shall be kept under seal by the archons until the trial for perjury comes off. He who is twice convicted of perjury is not to be compelled, and if three times, is not to be allowed to witness, or, if he persists, is to be punished with death. When more than half the evidence is proved to be false there must be a new trial.

The best things in human life are liable to be defiled and perverted. And justice, which has been the civilizer of mankind, is no exception to this principle. Fair though she be, she has fallen into an evil name. An art has sprung up which is said to make the worse appear the better cause, and only requires money in return for the service of the advocate. Such an art will be banished by the legislator, and requested to depart to another city. To the disobedient let the voice of the law be heard saying:—He who tries to pervert justice in the minds of the judges, or to increase litigation, shall be brought before the supreme court. If he does so from contentiousness, let him be silenced, and, if he offend again, put to death. If he have acted from a love of gain, let him be exiled if he be a foreigner, or if he be a citizen let him be put to death.

BOOK XII. If a false message be taken to or brought from other states, whether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, who are the ministers of Hermes and Zeus, they shall suffer a fixed penalty. Stealing is mean; plundering is shameless. Let no man deceive himself by the example of the Gods, for no God or son of a God ever practised either force or fraud. On this point the legislator is better informed than all the poets and mythologers put together. He who listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen shall have the following law directed against him:—He who steals much, or he who steals little of the public property is deserving of the same penalty; for they are both impelled by the same evil motive. When the law punishes one more lightly than the other, this is done under the idea, not that he is less guilty, but that he is more curable. Now a thief who is a foreigner or slave may be curable; but the thief who is a citizen, and has had the advantages of education, should be put to death, for he is incurable.

Many laws have been made about military expeditions; the great principle of all is that no one, male or female, in war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a commander. Whether a man stands or walks, or exercises, or pursues, or retreats, or washes, or eats, he must do everything according to a common rule. We should practise from our earliest youth every one to obey, every one to command. All dances, relaxations, endurances of meats and drinks, of cold and heat, and of hard beds, should have a view to war, and care should be taken not to destroy the natural covering and use of the head and feet by wearing shoes and caps; for the head is the lord of the body, and the feet are the best of servants. The soldier should have thoughts like these; and let him hear the law:—He who is enrolled shall serve, and if he fail to serve, or return home before the expedition is finished, he shall be indicted for cowardice before his own arm of the service, and if he be found guilty he shall suffer the penalty which the courts award, and never be allowed to contend for any prize of valour, or to accuse another of misbehaviour. After the courts for the failure of service and desertion have been held, the generals shall hold another court, in which the several arms of the service will award prizes for the expedition which has just concluded. The prize is to be a crown of olive, and he who obtains a first, second, or third prize shall offer up the prize at the temple of his favourite war God. Let the indictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an honourable maiden, to whom falsehood is naturally hateful. When

men have lost their arms, care should be taken to distinguish between cases in which they have been lost from necessity and from cowardice. For example, the hero Patroclus, if instead of being dead he had been brought back alive from the field, might have been reproached with having lost the divine armour. And a man may lose his arms in a storm at sea, or from a fall, and under many other circumstances, which should be carefully distinguished. Language has made the distinction for us in the use of the two terms, 'thrower away of a shield' (*ρήψασπις*), and 'loser of arms' (*ἀποβολεὺς ὀπλων*), one being the voluntary, the other the involuntary relinquishment of them. Let the law be as follows:—If any one is overtaken by the enemy, having arms in his hands, and he leaves them behind him voluntarily, choosing base life instead of honourable death, he shall receive an appropriate punishment. The old legend of Caeneus the Thessalian, who was changed by the Gods from a woman into a man, may teach by contraries the right sort of punishment. Let him be changed from a man into a woman—that is to say, let him be all his life out of danger, and never again be admitted by any commander into the ranks of his army; and let him pay a heavy fine according to his class.

All magistrates, whether temporary or permanent, must give an account of their magistracy. But where shall we find the magistrate who is worthy to supervise them, or to judge of the crooked ways into which they may have been driven by the difficulties of their position? For there are many causes of the dissolution of states; which like ships or animals have their cords, and girders, and sinews easily relaxed, and fall into a state of atony. Nothing tends more to the good and preservation of states, than the supervision of them by examiners who are better than the magistrates; failing in this they fall to pieces, and become many states instead of one. Wherefore let the people meet after the summer solstice, in the precinct of Apollo, and in his presence appoint three men of not less than fifty years of age; each citizen voting, not for himself, but for him whom he thinks the best. The persons selected shall be reduced to one half, who have the greatest number of votes, if the number named be an even number; but if an odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes shall be withdrawn. The division shall continue until three only remain; and if the number of their votes be equal, a distinction between the first, second, and third shall be made by lot. The three shall be crowned with an olive wreath, and

proclamation made, that the city of the Magnetes, once more preserved by the Gods, presents her three best men to Apollo and the Sun, to whom she dedicates them as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. They shall choose in the first year of their office twelve examiners, to continue until they are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three a year, who, while they hold office, shall dwell within the precinct of the God. They are to divide all the magistracies into twelve classes, and may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments which they please; in some cases singly, in other cases together, announcing the acquittal or punishment of the magistrate in the agora. There may be an escape from their judgment by an impeachment; but if the appellant is cast, and he is not condemned to death, his punishment shall be doubled. Those who have been selected by the state for their pre-eminence in virtue, shall have the first place at all sacrifices, and in all assemblies and public places, and on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive privilege of wearing a crown of laurel. They are priests of Apollo and the Sun, and he of their number who is chosen first shall be high priest, and give his name to the year. Their manner of burial, too, shall be different from that of the other citizens. The colour of their funeral array shall be white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation, around the bier shall stand a chorus of fifteen youths and fifteen men, chanting hymns in honour of the deceased all day long; and in the morning a band of a hundred youths, to be selected by the relatives from the palaestra, shall carry the bier to the place of sepulture marching in armour, or if they are horsemen, with their horses, and the youths around and in front of the bier shall sing their national hymns, while the maidens and women past child-bearing follow after. Priests and priestesses may also follow, for the funeral rites are pure, unless the Pythian oracle forbids. The sepulchre shall be a long tomb of stone intended to last for ever, and having many resting-places, in one of which they shall deposit the remains of the departed saint, surrounding the place of interment with a mound and with groves of trees, except on one side, where an opening shall be left for other tombs in case they shall be hereafter needed. There shall be annual games—musical, gymnastic, or equestrian, in honour of those who are acquitted by the examiners. But if any one, confident in having been acquitted, begin to show the wickedness of human nature, he may be tried again by any one who pleases in a court composed of the guardians of the law, and of select

judges, and of any of the former examiners who are alive. If he fail he shall be deprived of his honours, and if the accuser fail he shall pay a fine according to his class.

What is called the judgment of Rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of faith,' but not to our days. He knew that his contemporaries believed in the Gods, for there were many of them who were the sons of Gods; and he thought that the easiest and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the decision to Heaven. In our own day, men either deny the existence of Gods or their care of men, or maintain that they may be bribed by attentions and gifts; and this mode of proceeding would therefore be out of date. When the religious ideas of mankind change, their laws should also change. Thus oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff and defendant, instead of simple statements of affirmation and denial. For there is something dreadful in the thought, that nearly half the citizens who meet one another in society are perjured men. There is no objection to an oath, where a man has no interest in forswearing himself; as, for example, in holding an election for a magistracy, or in the judgment of games and contests. But where there would be a premium on perjury, oaths and imprecations should be prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. Let the principles of justice be learned and taught without words of evil omen. The oaths of a stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because they are not likely to breed or become inveterate in our state.

Trials for minor matters are to be regulated by the same rules. The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice, or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first instance remediable, and the defaulter may give security; if the tax remains unpaid, the goods pledged shall be made over to the state. But for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall have the power of inflicting greater penalties.

A city which is without trade or merchandise, must consider the subject of emigration and reception of strangers. For out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state may be a great evil. Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion of strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of mankind. Now public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for mankind are not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. Even the worst of men have often a divine

instinct, which enables them to distinguish good from bad. States are rightly advised when they desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest praise is that of virtue. And a state formed after the model of Crete should, and probably will, have a character for virtue, such as few cities have under the sun. Let this, then, be our law about foreign travel and the reception of strangers:—No one shall be allowed to leave the country who is under forty years of age—of course military service abroad is not included in this—and no one at all on any private occasion. To the Olympic, and Pythian, and Nemean, and Isthmian games, shall be sent the fairest and best and bravest, who shall support the dignity of the city in peace. These, when they come home, shall teach the youth the inferiority of all other governments. And if any citizen have the curiosity to know the manners of other states, no law shall hinder him. For a state which has no experience, and no knowledge of the reason of things, however innocent of evil, will never be perfectly civilized. Moreover, in all states, bad as well as good, there are men of genius who are inspired by heaven; and in the footsteps of these incorruptibles the good citizen should strive to follow, over the water and over the land; and learn from them what laws are good, with a view to their firmer establishment, and what laws are bad, with a view to their improvement. ‘How can these two objects be accomplished?’ In the first place, let the visitor of foreign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him be a citizen of repute, and especially of military repute. On his return he shall appear before the legislative council: this is the council which sits early in the morning, before the sun is high in the heavens, and includes amongst its members the priests who have gained the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the law, and the director and past directors of education; and each of them shall bring with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is between thirty and forty years of age. The assembly thus constituted is to consider the laws of their own and other states, and to gather information which may throw light on the subject of law. The elder senators are to make a selection of extracts, which the younger members may learn by heart. These latter, if they are worthy, shall also be made guardians of the state, and receive reward or punishment according to their merits. This is the assembly to which the visitor of foreign countries shall come and tell anything which he has heard in the course of his travels, or himself observed relative to the laws. If

he be neither improved nor deteriorated, let him be praised for his zeal; and yet more praised if he be improved, and be also honoured after death by the authority of the council. But if he be deteriorated by his travels, let him be prohibited from speaking to any one; and if he submit, he may live as a private individual: but if he be convicted of making innovations in education and the laws, let him die.

Next, as to the reception of strangers. Of these there are four classes: merchants, who find their way over the sea at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their wares. These should be received in markets and public buildings without the city, by proper officers, who shall see that they receive justice, and shall also watch against any political designs which they may entertain; no more intercourse is to be held with them than is absolutely necessary. Secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals, who shall be entertained by hospitable persons at the temples for a reasonable time; the priests and ministers of the temple shall be their judges and protectors. Thirdly, there are ambassadors of foreign states; these are to be honourably received by the generals and prytanes, and placed under the care of the persons with whom they are lodged. Fourthly, there is the philosophical stranger, who will rarely make his appearance; he, like our own foreign commissioners, will come to see whatever is great and noble in our state. Like them he must be fifty years of age: let him be received with honour, and be a welcome guest at the houses of the rich and wise; for example, at the house of the director of education and other noble persons, who are to instruct and be instructed by him. These are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the reception of strangers. Let Zeus, the God of hospitality, be honoured; and let not the stranger be driven away, as in Egypt, by distinctions of meats and sacrifices, and by savage proclamations.

Let guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses. The number of witnesses shall be three when the value is under a thousand drachmas, or five when above. The seller at first and second hand shall be equally liable. He who would search another man's house must swear that he expects to find something there; and he shall enter naked, or having on a single garment. The owner shall place at his disposal all his goods, sealed as well as unsealed; if he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value of the property proved to have been in his possession. If the owner be absent, he may counter-seal

the property which is under seal, and place watchers. In case of prolonged absence, he shall take the magistrates, and open the sealed places, and seal them up again in the presence of the magistrates. The recovery of goods disputed, except in the case of lands and houses, is to be barred by time. The public and unimpeached use of anything for a year in the city, or for five years in the country, or the private possession and domestic use for three years in the city, or for ten years in the country, is to give a right of ownership. But in a foreign country there is no bar as to time. The proceedings of any trial are to be void, in which either the parties or the witnesses, whether bond or free, have been forcibly prevented from attending. In the case of a slave the suit shall be invalid; in the case of a freeman, he who is guilty of this violence shall be made a slave and imprisoned for a year. If one competitor forcibly prevents another from attending at the games, the other may be inscribed as victor in the temples, and the first, whether victor or not, shall be subjected to an action for damages. The receiver of stolen goods is to be punished as well as the stealer. The receiver of an exile shall be put to death. A man shall have the same friends and enemies as his country; and he who makes war or peace for himself shall be put to death. And if a party in the state make war or peace, their leaders shall be put on their trial by the generals, and, if convicted, put to death. The ministers of a country ought not to receive gifts; the doctrine that we may be paid for deciding justly is liable to abuse. He who will not be persuaded let him die.

Taxes may be demanded either upon income or upon property, whether the wardens of the country choose to levy the tax upon an annual return, or upon a proportion of the whole value.

The good man will offer moderate sacrifices to the Gods; every man's land and hearth is consecrated to the Gods, and no second temple is required. Gold and silver, whether in houses or temples, are not the true riches; ivory, which is taken from the dead body of an animal, is unholy; iron and brass are materials of war. Wood and stone of a single piece may be offered, also woven work which has not occupied one person more than a month in making. White colours are always acceptable to the Gods; figures of birds and similar offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the sculptor can make in a day.

Next concerning lawsuits. Judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed upon by the plaintiff or defendant; and if no decision is obtained from them, their fellow-tribesmen or townsmen shall judge, and the court shall consist of a twelfth part of them. At this stage they shall demand an increased penalty, and the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a fifth more than the assessed damages. If he further persist, and appeal a third time, the case shall be heard before a court of select judges; and he shall pay, if beaten, half as much again as the penalty. If the pursuer appeal he shall receive, and if beaten he shall pay, a fifth part; and if he appeal again and fail, he shall pay half of the assessed damages. Other matters relating to trials have been already determined; lesser points, such as the allotment of suits, the times of sitting, the modes of pleading and procedure, may be supplied by younger legislators.

These are to be the rules of private courts; and there are many states which have excellent modes of procedure in their public courts which may serve for a model, and these also, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and made permanent.

Let the judge be accomplished in the laws. He should possess writings about them, that he may learn them; for laws are the highest instrument of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind. They afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in verse or prose, in conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the vain disputes of men and their equally vain assents and agreements. The just judge is he who has imbibed their spirit, and is seeking to establish the continuance of justice for the good, and to change the tempers of the bad, if they can be changed, or to denounce death, which is the only remedy, to the incurable, the thread of whose life cannot be reversed.

After the judgments of the year are over, execution is to follow. The court is to award the property of the defendant who loses to the plaintiff, reserving to him only the bare means of life. If the plaintiff is not satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the property of the defendant. If the defendant fails in payment to the amount of a drachma, he shall lose the use and protection of the court; or if he defraud the court, he who suffers by the fraud shall bring the offender before the guardians of the law, and if he be found guilty, he shall be put to death.

Man having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up

children, and gone to law, is at last gathered to his fathers. The rites which are to be celebrated after death in honour of the Gods above and below shall be determined by the interpreters. Places of sepulture shall be chosen with reference to the convenience of the living; they shall be out of sight and on barren spots. For no one either in life or after death has any right to deprive the living of the sustenance which mother earth provides for them. No sepulchral mound is to be raised higher than the labour of five men in five days can accomplish, and the stone tablet which is placed upon it is not to be larger than will contain an inscription of four heroic verses. The dead are only to be exposed for three days, which is long enough to test the reality of death. The legislator will instruct the people that the body is a mere *eidolon*, and that the soul, which is our true being, is gone to give an account of herself before the Gods below. When they hear this, the good are full of hope, and the evil are terrified, knowing that there will not be much help for them after death. And therefore in life all men's relatives should help them to live innocently and holily, that they may depart in peace. When a man loses a son or a brother, he should consider that the true man has gone away to fulfil his destiny in another life, and not waste money over his lifeless remains. Let the law then order a moderate funeral of five minae for the first class, three for the second, two for the third, one for the fourth. The magistrates, or one of them selected by the relatives, are to assist the relatives in arranging the affairs of the deceased. There would be a want of delicacy in prescribing that there should be or should not be mourning for the dead. But, at any rate, such mourning should be confined to the house, and the dead body should be taken out of the city before daybreak. Other regulations relating to the burial or non-burial of parricides and other sacrilegious persons have already been laid down. The work of legislation is therefore nearly completed, and that work is the preservation of the state.

Do you remember the names of the Fates? Lachesis is the first of them; Clotho the second, Atropos the third and last—she makes the threads of the web irreversible. We too want to make our laws irreversible, for the unchangeable quality in them is the salvation of the State, and the source of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens. 'But can such a quality be implanted?' I think that it may; and at any rate we must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric

which has no foundation would be too ridiculous. 'What foundation would you lay?' Have we not already instituted an assembly which was composed of the ten oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who have received prizes for virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone abroad to enquire into the laws of other countries. These were to form a synod, and each of the members was to choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of age, to be approved by the rest. The meeting was to be held at dawn, when all the world is at leisure—that was our proposal; and this assembly was to anchor the vessel of State, and provide the means of permanence; for the governments of States, like all other things, have their proper saviours, which are to them what the head and soul are to the living being. 'How do you mean?' Mind in the soul, and sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the perfect union of mind and sense, may be justly called every man's salvation. 'Certainly.' Yes; but of what nature is this union? In the case of a ship, for example, are not the senses of the sailors added to the intelligence of the pilot? These together save themselves and the ship. Or, to offer another illustration: The physician and the general have their objects; and the object of one is health, of the other victory. And States have their objects, and the ruler must understand, in the first place, the nature of them, and secondly, the means of attaining them, whether in laws or men. The State which is wanting in this knowledge cannot be expected to be wise when the time for action arrives. Now what class or institution is there in our State which secures the object of the State? 'I suspect that your words have reference to the nocturnal council.' Yes, to that council which is to have all virtue, and whose members are to aim directly at the mark. 'Very true.' The inconsistency of legislation in most States is not surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. One of them makes their rule of justice the government of a class, without regard to good or bad; another aims at wealth, whether with or without freedom; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some who are supposed to be philosophers maintain that you should seek for all of them at once. But our object is unmistakably virtue, and virtue is of four kinds. 'Yes; and we said that mind is the head and ruler of the three other kinds of virtue and of all else.' Yes, Cleinias, and having already declared the object which is present to the mind of the pilot, the general, the physician, we will now interrogate the mind of the statesman. Tell me, I say, as the physician

and general have told us their object, what is the object of the statesman? Can you tell me? 'We cannot.' Did we not say that there are four virtues — courage, wisdom, and two others, which are called by the common name of virtue, and are in a sense one? 'Certainly we did.' The difficulty is not in understanding the differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their unity. Why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names of wisdom and courage? To this I have no difficulty in replying that courage is concerned with fear, and is found in children, and is common to brutes; for the soul may be courageous without reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise without reason. 'That is true.' I have explained to you the difference, and do you explain to me the unity. But first let us consider whether the knowledge of names can be separated from the knowledge of the ideas which they represent. Is not the knowledge of words without ideas a disgrace to a man of sense? and can any subject be more worthy of the attention of our legislators than the four virtues of which we are speaking—courage, temperance, justice, wisdom? And ought not they and all other guardians and interpreters of the law to instruct him who needs instruction in the nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them to be taught by some chance poet or schoolmaster? A city which is without instruction suffers the usual fate of cities in our day. What then shall we do? How shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how shall we give our State a head and eyes? 'Yes; how shall we accomplish what is thus described by you in a figure?' The city will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men will mount into the acropolis and be our eyes; these will look about them, and inform the elders, who are the mind, and will use the younger men as their instruments: together they will save the State. Shall this be our constitution, or shall all be alike, and the special training be given up? 'Impossible; the inequality in their duties requires that they should be differently educated.' Let us then attain to some more exact idea of education. Did we not say that the true artist or guardian ought to have an eye, not only to the many, but to the one, and to order all things with a view to the one? Can there be any more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things which are unlike to one idea? 'Perhaps not.' Say rather, 'Certainly not'; for no more philosophical method was ever attained by the wit of man. And the rulers of our divine State ought to have an exact knowledge of that common

principle in courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, which is called by the name of virtue; and unless we know whether virtue is one or many, we shall hardly know what virtue is. Shall we contrive some means of engrafting this knowledge on our State or give the matter up? 'Anything rather than give up.' But how are we to effect our object? Let us begin by making an agreement. 'By all means, if we can.' Well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought to think that the good and the honourable are not only many, but also one? 'Yes, they are one.' And can we give no account of this? 'If we cannot, we are slaves.' The true guardian ought to know the truth, and should also be able to interpret and execute the truth. 'Certainly.' And is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the existence and power of the Gods? The people may be excused for following tradition only; but the guardian must not be admitted to his office if he is unable to give a reason of the faith which is in him. He who is careless or incapable in such matters is out of the pale of the good. And there are two great evidences of religion — the priority of the soul and the order of the heavens, which, if rightly understood, are far from tending to the substitution of necessity for reason and will. For the truth is diametrically opposed to the opinions of those who maintain that they are inanimate beings. The men of a former generation (Anaxagoras) wondered at them, and a suspicion arose, which later investigations have confirmed, that things inanimate could never without mind have attained such scientific accuracy; and some even in those days ventured to assert that mind had ordered all things in heaven; but they had no idea of the priority of mind, and they turned the world, or more properly themselves, upside down, and filled the universe with stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. This led to great impiety, and the poets said many foolish things against philosophy, which they compared to a yelping she-dog. No man can now be religious who does not believe that the soul is eternal, and prior to the body, and the ruler of all bodies, and does not perceive also that there is mind in the stars; or, who has not heard the connection of them with music, and harmonized them with manners and laws, giving a reason of things which are matters of reason. He who is unable to acquire this knowledge as well as the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can only be a servant, and not a ruler in the State.

Let us then add to our other laws a law respecting the nocturnal council, which has been associated with us in our education. 'Very

good.' To establish this will be my aim, and I hope that you and others will assist me. 'Let us proceed along the road in which God seems to guide us.' We cannot, Megillus and Cleinias, anticipate the details which will hereafter be needed; they must be supplied by experience. 'What do you mean?' First of all a register will have to be made of all those whose aim, character, or education would qualify them to be guardians. The subjects which they are to learn, and the order in which they are to be learnt, are mysteries which cannot be explained beforehand, but not mysteries in any other sense. 'If that is the case, what is to be done?' We must run a risk, in which I am willing to share, in coming to any determination about education. And I would have you, Cleinias, who are the founder of the Magnesian State, and will incur the greatest glory if you succeed, and will be praised for your courage, if you fail, take especial heed of this matter. Soon the State will have to be handed over to the nocturnal council. The dream will then become a reality; and our citizens, if they are carefully chosen and educated, will be saviours such as the world has hitherto never seen.

The want of completeness in the Laws becomes more apparent in the later books. There is less arrangement, and the transitions are more abrupt from one subject to another. The discourse concerning religion is introduced as a prelude to offences against the Gods, and this is the only remaining portion of the work which is fully executed.

In the last four books of the Laws, several questions occur for consideration: (I) the proportion of punishments to offences; (II) the nature of the voluntary and involuntary; (III) the arguments against atheism, and against the opinion that the Gods have no care of human affairs; (IV) the remarks upon retail trade and adulteration of goods; (V) the institution of the nocturnal council.

I. The weakest point in the Laws of Plato is the amount of inquisition into private life which is to be made by the rulers. The magistrate is always watching and waylaying the citizens. He is constantly to inform or to receive informations against improprieties of life. Plato does not seem to be aware that espionage can only have a negative effect. He has not yet discovered the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of morality or social life. Men will not tell of one another; nor will he ever be deemed the most virtuous citizen, who gives the most frequent information about offenders to the magistrates.

As in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe the effect of age. Plato becomes more conservative as he grows older, and he would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are above fifty years of age; for in them he hopes to find a principle of stability. He is like the old man (xi. 922 B, foll.) who insists that he shall 'tie up' his property after his death—all his efforts are directed towards maintaining the institutions of the legislator in after ages. But he does not observe that, in destroying the freedom he is destroying also the life of the State. While he differs from mere conservatives in his love of truth, he is impatient of the extravagances to which the love of truth almost necessarily leads. He seems to have forgotten what he once knew—that the wise man is sure to be in opposition to the rest of mankind; for some degree of eccentricity generally accompanies originality; as Democritus said, 'the philosopher, if we could see him, would appear to be a strange being.' In the Magnesian state all the citizens are to be reduced to rule and measure; there would have been none of those great men 'whose acquaintance is beyond all price;' and Plato would have found that in the worst-governed Hellenic State, there was more of a *carrière ouverte* for extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own. The first principle of Plato's laws, borrowed apparently from the Spartan military system, 'that no one is to be without a commander,' is literally that of the Jesuit order.

Plato's judicial system has several characteristic features. He has an evident dislike of the Athenian dicasteries, and prefers a few good judges who make pertinent remarks on the case, to a great number. He allows of numerous appeals—from the neighbours who are to judge because they know the circumstances, to the magistrates of the town; and from the magistrates of the town to the guardians of the law; in each case exacting a double penalty. Modern jurists would disapprove of the redress of injustice being purchased only at an increasing risk; though indirectly the burden of legal expenses, which seems to have been little felt among the ancients, has a similar effect. The love of litigation, which is a remnant of barbarism quite as much as a corruption of civilization, and was inherent in the Athenian people, is diminished in the new state by references to arbitration.

In the Laws the crime of murder, and indeed almost all offences, have a religious character; they are pollutions rather than crimes. Regarded from this point of view, the heinousness of offences is apt to depend on

accidental circumstances, such as the shedding of blood, and not on the real guilt or injury to society. They are measured by the horror which they arouse in a barbarous age. For there is a superstition in law as well as in religion, and the superstitious feelings of a primitive age have a traditional hold on the mass of the people. On the other hand, Plato is absolutely free from the crime of visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children, and he is quite aware that punishment has an eye to the future, and not to the past. Compared with that of most European nations in the last century his criminal code is reasonable and humane.

A defect in Plato's criminal jurisprudence, is his remission of the punishment when the offender has obtained the forgiveness of the murdered person; as if crime were a personal affair between individuals, and not an offence against the State. There is also a ridiculous disproportion in his punishments. Because a slave may fairly receive a blow for stealing a fig or a bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for defrauding to the amount of a drachma, that is no reason why a slave should receive as many blows as he has taken grapes or figs, or why a tradesman who has defrauded to the amount of a thousand drachmas should receive a thousand blows. The punishments to be inflicted on slaves are suggested by the cruelty of fear. Though Plato is aware that the distinction between Greeks and barbarians is due to Hellenic vanity, he is fully imbued with the Greek spirit about slavery. Yet he makes the acknowledgment, that many a one in the hour of danger has found a slave better to him than a son or a brother.

II. Before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator must determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. The great question of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn threadbare with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by Plato and Aristotle—first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical point of view. Their want of clearness in treating the subject is to be attributed to the difficulty which they experienced in disentangling the abstract from the concrete.

In attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury, Plato says that mere hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit may sometimes injure, e. g. when conferred without regard to right and wrong, or to the good or evil consequences which may follow. He means to say that the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle which characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently

described by the terms voluntary and involuntary. You may hurt another involuntarily, and no one would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him voluntarily, as in inflicting punishment—neither is this injury; but if you hurt him under the impulse of passion or desire, this is injury. In other words, injustice is the victory of desire or passion or self-conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of them to reason. Plato is so far from allowing voluntary hurt to be injury, that he is disposed to affirm, in some paradoxical sense, all injustice to be involuntary; because no man would do injustice who could calculate the consequences of what he is doing. Yet, on the other hand, he admits that the distinction of voluntary and involuntary, taken in another and more obvious sense, is the basis of legislation. His conception of justice and injustice is complicated (1) by the want of a distinction between justice and virtue, that is to say, between the quality which primarily regards others, and the quality in which self and others are equally regarded; (2) by the confusion of doing and suffering justice; (3) by the unwillingness to renounce the old Socratic paradox, that evil is involuntary.

III. The Laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they bear the stamp of primitive legislation. They do not escape the almost inevitable consequence of making irreligion penal. If laws are based upon religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion. Hence the necessity for what in modern language, and according to a distinction which Plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed persecution. But the spirit of persecution in Plato, unlike that of modern religious bodies, arises out of the desire to enforce a true and simple form of religion, and is directed against the superstitions which tend to degrade mankind. Sir Thomas More, in his *Utopia*, is in favour of tolerating all except the intolerant, though he would not promote to high offices those who disbelieved in the existence of the soul after death. Plato has not advanced quite so far as this in the path of toleration. But in judging of his enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of necromancy and divination were far greater than those of intolerance in the ancient world. Human nature is always having recourse to the first; but only when organized into some form of priesthood falls into the other; although in primitive as in later ages the institution of a priesthood may claim probably to be an advance on some form of religion which preceded. The laws would, no doubt,

have rested on a sounder foundation, if Plato had ever distinctly realized to his mind the difference between crime and sin or vice. Of this, as of many other controversies, a clear definition might have been the end. But such a definition belongs to a later age of philosophy.

The arguments which Plato uses for the being of a God, have an extremely modern character: first, the *consensus gentium*; secondly, the argument which has already occurred in the *Phaedrus*, of the priority of the self-moved. The answer to the second class of objectors is, that God governs the world by general laws; but that he who takes care of the great will assuredly take care of the small. Plato did not feel, and has not attempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with the general providence of God. Yet he is unconsciously on the true road to the solution, when he regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together towards the final end.

We are surprised to find that the dangers of scepticism, which are supposed to exist among young men now, existed then (cp. *Rep.* vii. 538); that the Epicureanism expressed in the lines of Horace—

‘*Namque Deos didici securum agere aevum,*’

was already prevalent in the age of Plato; and that the terrors of another world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other men in this. The same objection which struck the Psalmist—‘Then saw I the wicked in great prosperity’—is supposed to lie at the root of the better sort of unbelief. And the answer is substantially the same which the modern theologian would offer:—that the ways of God in this world cannot be justified unless there be a future state of rewards and punishments. Yet this future state of rewards and punishments is not any addition of happiness or suffering imposed from without, but the permanence of good and evil in the soul: here Plato is in advance of many modern theologians. The Greek, too, had his difficulty about the existence of evil, which in one solitary passage, remarkable for being inconsistent with his general system, Plato explains, after the Magian fashion, by a good and evil spirit (896 D; cp. *Theaet.* 176 A, *Polit.* 269). This passage is also remarkable for being at variance with the general optimism of the Tenth Book—not ‘all things are ordered by God for the best,’ but some things by a good, others by an evil spirit.

The Tenth Book of the *Laws* presents a picture of the state of belief among the Greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live.

Plato is disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several causes. First, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he still retains his disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is unwilling, as in the Republic, wholly to proscribe them. Secondly, he remarks the self-conceit of a younger generation of philosophers, who declare that the sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only; and who also maintain that the Gods are made by the laws of the state. Thirdly, he notes a confusion in the minds of men arising out of their misinterpretation of the appearances of the world around them: they do not always see the righteous rewarded and the wicked punished. So in modern times there are some whose infidelity has arisen from doubts about the inspiration of ancient writings; others who have been made unbelievers by physical science, or again by the seemingly political character of religion; while there is a third class to whose minds the difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man' has been the chief stumblingblock. Plato is very much out of temper at the impiety of some of his contemporaries; yet he is determined to reason with the victims, as he regards them, of these illusions before he punishes them. His answer to the unbelievers is twofold: first, that the soul is prior to the body; secondly, that the ruler of the universe being perfect has made all things with a view to their perfection. If we compare the Gods with men at all, we must compare them not with the least but with the highest of human beings. The difficulties arising out of ancient sacred writings were far less serious in the age of Plato than in our own.

We too have our popular Epicureanism, which would allow the world to go on as if there were no God. When the belief in him, whether of ancient or modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate him either in theory or practice into a distant heaven. They do not like expressly to deny God when it is more convenient to forget him; and so the theory of the Epicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general. Nor can we be said to be free from that which Plato justly considers to be the worst unbelief—of those who put superstition in the place of true religion. For the larger half of Christians continue to assert that the justice of God may be turned aside by gifts, if not by the 'odour of fat, and the sacrifice steaming to heaven,' still by another kind of sacrifice placed upon the altar, and by masses for the quick and dead, by dispensations, by building churches, by rites and ceremonies—by the same means which the heathen used, taking other names and

shapes. And the indifference of Epicureanism and unbelief is in two ways the parent of superstition, partly because it permits, and also because it creates a necessity for its development in religious and enthusiastic temperaments. If men cannot have a rational belief, they will have an irrational. And hence the most superstitious countries are also at a certain point of civilization the most unbelieving, and the revolution which takes one direction is quickly followed by a reaction in the other. So we may read 'between the lines' ancient history and philosophy into modern, and modern into ancient. Whether we compare the theory of Greek philosophy with the Christian religion, or the practice of the Gentile world with the practice of the Christian world, they will be found to differ more in words and less in reality than we might have supposed. The greater opposition which is sometimes made between them seems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of the ideal of the one with the practice of the other.

To the errors of superstition and unbelief Plato opposes the simple and natural form of religion; the best and highest, whether in the form of a person or a principle, as the divine mind or the idea of God, is regarded by him as the true basis of human life. That all things are working together for good to the good and evil to the evil in this or in some other world to which human actions are transferred, is the sum of his faith or theology. Unlike Socrates, he is absolutely free from superstition. Religion and morality are one and indivisible to him. He nowhere speaks of omens or of sacrifices. He dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks, was not tolerated at Sparta. He gives no encouragement to individual enthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a mighty intellect.' Like the Hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the avoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the Gods to the public temples. He would not have men and women consecrating the accidents of their good or bad fortune. He trusts to human punishments and not to divine judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition that certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family.' He considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now be recalled. Yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of religion, which he sees to be common to all mankind—Barbarians as well as Hellenes. He remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner or later, experiencing its power. To

which we may add the further remark that the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the religious reaction.

It is remarkable that Plato's account of mind at the end of the *Laws* goes beyond Anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous writings. Aristotle, in a well-known passage (*Met.* i. 3) which is an echo of the *Phaedo* (p. 97), remarks on the inconsistency of Anaxagoras in introducing the agency of mind, and yet having recourse also to the lesser agencies of material causes. But Plato makes the further criticism, that the error of Anaxagoras consisted not in denying the universal agency of mind, but in denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity of it. Yet in the *Timæus* he had himself allowed that God made the world out of pre-existing materials: in the *Politicus* he says that there were seeds of evil in the world arising out of the remains of a former chaos which could not be got rid of; and even in the Tenth Book of the *Laws* he had admitted that there were two souls, a good and evil. In the *Meno*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Phaedo*, he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a former state of existence. But now he has attained to a clearer point of view: he has discarded these fancies. From meditating on the priority of the human soul to the body, he has learnt the nature of soul absolutely. The power of the best, of which he gave an intimation in the *Phaedo* and in the *Republic*, now, as in the *Philebus*, takes the form of an intelligence or person. He no longer, like Anaxagoras, supposes mind to be introduced at a certain time into the world and to give order to a pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the chaos, everlasting and evermoving, and the source of order and intelligence in all things. This appears to be the last form of Plato's religious philosophy, which might almost be summed up in the words of Kant, 'the starry heaven above and the moral law within.' Or rather, perhaps, 'the starry heaven above and the harmony of mind in the world.'

IV. The remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about mendicity, have a very modern character. Greek social life was more like our own than we are apt to suppose. There was the same division of ranks, the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, the same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits. Plato may be claimed as the first free-trader, when he prohibits the imposition of customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly not aware of the importance of the principle which he enunciated. The discredit

of retail trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders, and is inclined to believe that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which heaven forbid! retail trade might become honourable. He has hardly lighted upon the true reason, which appears to be the essential distinction between buyers and sellers, the one being necessarily in some degree dependent on the other. When he proposes to fix prices 'which would allow a moderate gain,' and to regulate trade in several minute particulars, we must remember that this is by no means so absurd in a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which almost every one would know and become known to everybody else, as in our own vast population. Among ourselves we are very far from allowing every man to charge what he pleases. Of many things the prices are fixed by law. Do we not often hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of employers? The objection to regulating them by law and thus avoiding the conflicts which continually arise between the buyers and sellers of labour, is not so much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing so. Wherever free competition is not reconcilable either with the order of society, or, as in the case of adulteration with common honesty, the government may lawfully interfere. The only question is, Whether the interference will be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may not be greater than the evil which is prevented by it.

He would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no one will be allowed to starve. This again is a prohibition which might be easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the poor when the population is small. Among modern nations the difficulty of pauperism is rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by the facility of locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human life and suffering. And the only way of meeting the difficulty seems to be by modern nations subdividing themselves into small bodies having local knowledge and acting together in the spirit of ancient communities.

V. Regarded as the framework of a polity the Laws are deemed by Plato to be a decline from the Republic, which is the dream of his earlier years. He nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation. He is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns to his original idea. His guardians of the law are not expected to have any special training; but he adds to them

a select body, who are supposed to retain the spirit of the legislator dwelling in them. These are the nocturnal council, who, although they are not trained in dialectic, must know the relation of the one to the many in virtue. Plato has been arguing throughout the *Laws* that temperance is higher than courage, peace than war, and that the love of both must enter into the character of the good citizen. And at the end the same thought is summed up by him in an abstract form. The true artist or guardian must be able to reduce the many to the one, than which, as he says with an enthusiasm worthy of the *Phaedrus* or *Philebus*, 'no more philosophical method was ever attained by the wit of man.' But the sense of unity in difference can only be acquired by study; and Plato does not explain to us the nature of this study, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a remarkable omission of the word, to be akin to the dialectics of the *Republic*.

The nocturnal council is to consist of the three citizens pre-eminent in virtue, and the ten eldest guardians of the law; each of whom is to elect for approval a younger coadjutor, making twenty-six in all. This council of twenty-six is not the administrative but the legislative body, who are to make legislation a study; they have an exceptional power, probably suggested by the power which a similar council exercised in the Pythagorean city of Crotona. And they are supposed to share in the education of the State, which is declared to be a great advantage; although Plato has provided no special training for them, alleging that he will not anticipate in detail the previous studies which experience may hereafter show to be best fitted for them.

The *Laws* of Plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in many respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life and the world. His doctrine of ideas passed among his disciples into a theory of numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Of the speculative side of this theory we find no traces in the *Laws*, but doubtless Plato found, or seemed to find, a wonderful confirmation of his arithmetical speculations in the possibility of applying number and measure to the revolution of the heavens, and to the regulation of human life. In this there appears to be rather a retrogression than an advance; for the most barren logical abstraction is of a higher nature than number and figure. Again, there is less enthusiasm for the higher education, which is now confined to the thirty-seven members of the council. The speculative truth which

was the food of the guardians in the Republic, is for the majority of the citizens restricted to practical truth. The law, which is the expression of mind written down, takes the place of the living word of the philosopher. (Compare the contrast of Phaedrus 275 E, and Laws x. 891 A; also the plays on the words νοῦς νόμος νοῦ διανομή.) The State is based on virtue and religion rather than on knowledge; and virtue is no longer identified with knowledge, being of the commoner sort, and spoken of in the sense generally understood. Yet there are many traces of advance as well as retrogression in the Laws of Plato. The attempt to reconcile the ideal with actual life is an advance; to 'have brought philosophy down from heaven to earth,' is a praise which may be justly claimed for him as well as for his master Socrates. And the nocturnal council are to continue students of the 'one in many' and of the nature of God.

Plato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs, and of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an indication not of a narrower, but of a maturer mind, which had become more conversant with realities. Nor can we fairly attribute any want of originality to him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from Sparta and Athens. He has freely intermingled the spirit of the one with the laws of the other, while in many points he has departed equally from both. The praise of obedience, the authority assigned to elders, the prohibition of dowries, the enforcement of marriage, the common meals, the distribution and inalienability of land, the institution of the Crypteia, the freedom of bequest to a favourite son, the dislike of city walls,—all reflect the customs of Sparta. In one or two points he seems to prefer the form which the Dorian institutions had assumed in Crete. The syssitia are to be maintained at the public expense, and the produce of the land to be divided in fixed proportions, which Aristotle (Polit. ii. 7, 4) declares to have been the custom in Crete. Plato denounces the Spartan practice of expelling strangers; he condemns the licentiousness of their women; also their preference of war to peace, and of gymnastic exercises to music, which was characteristic of Cretans as well as Lacedaemonians, while he raises his voice against the unnatural vices allowed by public opinion to exist in both states.

The use of the lot, the scrutiny of the magistrates, the monthly courses of the council, the election of the generals, the pardon of the forgiven

homicide, most of the regulations about testaments and the guardianship of orphans, the degrees of consanguinity recognised by law, correspond with Athenian laws and customs. (Cp. Hermann, 'De Vestigiis Institutorum veterum per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis.') But there seems to be little which we can add with certainty from the Laws of Plato to our knowledge either of Athenian or Spartan institutions. Only the proposed division of land in the city of the Magnetes affords a strong reason for supposing that a similar institution already existed at Sparta, which of late years has been doubted by Mr. Grote and others. Though Plato is smitten with some features of government which he finds in Egypt, and especially with the immutability of their laws, which he vainly hopes to create in the ever-changing minds of his own countrymen, the Laws, like the Republic, and unlike the Cyropedia of Xenophon, are in spirit essentially Greek. They are the correction of the laws of Lycurgus and Solon; in the phraseology of modern times they may also be said to form a code or digest of them. They contain some enactments, as for example the refusal of credit, borrowed from Charondas; and other provisions which at first sight appear singular are probably taken from other ancient legislators. They do not rest, like the lost Politics of Aristotle, on an analysis of three hundred constitutions; but Plato makes good use of three. And although he falls short of Aristotle in the observation of facts, he is superior to him in some other respects, and in two especially: (1) the attempt to raise the female sex by education, and (2) to base politics on morals and religion.

Thus we have arrived at the end of the writings of Plato, and at the last stage of philosophy which was really his. For in what followed, which we chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of Aristotle, the spirit of the master no longer survived. The doctrine of ideas passed into one of numbers—instead of advancing from the abstract to the concrete, the theories of Plato were taken out of their context, and either asserted or refuted with a provoking literalism; the Socratic or Platonic element in his teaching was absorbed into the Megarian or Pythagorean; his poetry was converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial visions were assailed *secundum artem* by the rules of logic. His political speculations lost their interest when the freedom of Hellas had passed away. Of all his writings the Laws were the furthest removed from the traditions

of the Platonic school in the next generation. Both his political and his metaphysical philosophy are for the most part misinterpreted by Aristotle. The best of him—his love of truth, and his ‘contemplation of all time and all existence,’ was soonest lost; and some of his greatest thoughts have slept in the ear of mankind almost ever since they were first uttered.

We have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, from the beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of Socrates in a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character of Socrates had disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of Plato’s own mind upon Hellas and the world. He, who was ‘the last of the poets,’ in his book of *Laws* writes prose only; he has himself fallen under the rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was combating. The progress of his writings is also the history of his life; for we have no other authentic life of him. The great effort which he makes is first to realize abstractions, and secondly to connect them. In the attempt to realize them, he was carried into a transcendental region in which he isolated them from experience, and we pass out of the range of science into poetry or fiction. The fancies of mythology for a time cast a veil over the gulf which divides phenomena from ontia. In his return to earth Plato meets with a difficulty which has long ceased to be a difficulty to us. He cannot understand how these obstinate, unmanageable ideas, residing alone in their heaven of abstraction can be either combined with one another, or adapted to phenomena. That which is the most familiar process of our own minds, to him appeared to be the crowning achievement of the dialectical art. For by his conquests in the world of mind not only are our thoughts widened, but he has furnished us with the instruments of thought. We have endeavoured to see him as he truly was, a great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of knowledge, not prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of dialogues ideas which he had long conceived, but inconsistent, contradictory, enquiring as he goes along, following the argument from one point of view only, and therefore arriving at opposite conclusions, hovering around the light, and sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but always moving in the same element of ideal truth. We have seen him also in his decline, when the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but his experience of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation of the eternal to take a last sad look at human affairs.

L A W S.

BOOK I.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.

AN ATHENIAN STRANGER.

CLEINIAS, a Cretan.

MEGILLUS, a Lacedaemonian.

Steph. *Athenian Stranger.* TELL me, Strangers, is God or man
624 supposed to be the author of your laws?

Cleinias. God, Stranger; nothing truer can be said of them than that they are the work of God: among us Cretans the author of them has been supposed to have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon, as our Lacedaemonian friend will tell you, they say that Apollo is their lawgiver.

Megillus. Just so.

Ath. And do you believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to converse with his Olympian sire, and was inspired by him to make laws for your cities?

Cle. Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhadamanthus, a brother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he also
625 is reputed to have been the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he derived his reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was alive.

Ath. Yes, and a noble reputation too, and worthy of a son of Zeus. As you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions, I dare say that you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government and laws; on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them, for I am told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus is considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under

the lofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun. Being no longer young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and so beguile the walk by conversation.

Cle. Yes, Stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to groves of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are green pastures, in which we may repose and converse.

Ath. Very good.

Cle. Yes, very good, and better still when we see them ; let us move on cheerily.

Ath. I am willing.—And first, I want to know why the law has ordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and wear arms.

Cle. I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily intelligible to any one. Look at the character of our country : Crete is not like Thessaly, a large plain ; and for this reason they have horses there, and we have runners on foot here—the inequality of the ground in our country is more adapted to locomotion on foot ; but then, if you have runners you must have light arms,—no one can run carrying a heavy weight, and the lightness of bows and arrows is convenient for running. Now all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and the legislator appears to me to have looked to war in all his arrangements ; and the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were instituted by him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the field the citizens are compelled to take their meals together for the sake of mutual protection. He seems to me to have thought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always going to war with one another ; and if in time of war there ought to be common meals 626 under military authority, having regular guards for the sake of defence, they should be continued in peace ; for what men in general term peace is, as he said, only a name ; in reality every city is in a natural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds, but everlasting. And if you observe, you will find that this was the intention of the Cretan legislator ; all institutions, private as well as public, were arranged by him with a view to war ; and he gave his laws to be observed with this intent, because he thought that all possessions or

institutions ceased to be of any value if a man was defeated in war; for all the good things of the conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.

Ath. You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained in the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will you tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government which you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a state ought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am I right in supposing this?

Cle. Certainly; and my Lacedaemonian friend also, if I am not mistaken, will say the same.

Meg. Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything else?

Ath. And does what you are saying apply only to states, or also to villages?

Cle. To both alike.

Ath. The case is the same?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And in the village will there be the same war of family against family, and of individual against individual?

Cle. The same.

Ath. And are we to conceive each man as warring against himself: or how is that to be?

Cle. O Athenian Stranger, inhabitant of Attica I will not call you, who seem to me worthy to be named after the goddess Athene, because you go back to first principles; you from the light which you have thrown upon the argument, will more readily recognise the truth of my assertion, when I said just now that all men are the enemies of all other men, both in public and private, and every individual of himself.

Ath. My good sir, what do you mean?

Cle. I mean what I say; and, further, that there is a victory and defeat,—the first and best of victories, the lowest and worst of defeats,—which each man gains or sustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that there is a war against ourselves going on in every one of us.

627 *Ath.* Let us now reverse the order of the argument: Seeing that every individual is either his own superior or his own

inferior, may we say that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the state?

Cle. You mean that in each of them there is a principle of superiority or inferiority to self?

Ath. Yes.

Cle. You are quite right in asking that question, for there certainly is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state in which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the inferior classes, may be truly said to be better than itself, and may be justly praised, where the victory is gained, or censured in the opposite case.

Ath. Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is a question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for the present. But I quite understand your meaning when you say that citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities, may unjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome and enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly called its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated, superior and therefore good.

Cle. Your remark, Stranger, is very singular, and yet must be admitted to be true.

Ath. Here is another case for consideration;—in a family there may be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very possibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a minority.

Cle. Very possibly.

Ath. And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to whether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when they conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of speaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and wrong in laws.

Cle. That, Stranger, is most true.

Meg. Excellent, I say, in my opinion too, as far as we have gone.

Ath. Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom we were speaking?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Now, which would be the better judge,—one who destroyed the bad and required the good to govern themselves; or one who, while allowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily submit? Or lastly, there might be a third excellent judge, who, finding the family distracted, not
628 only did not destroy any one, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave them laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them friends.

Cle. The last would be by far the best sort of judge and legislator.

Ath. And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the reverse of war.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life of man have in view external war, or that sort of intestine war called civil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring in his own state; and when occurring, every one would wish to get rid of as soon as possible.

Cle. He would have the latter chiefly in view.

Ath. And would he prefer that war should be terminated by the destruction of one of the parties, and by the conquest of the other, or that peace and friendship should be re-established among them; for then they would be able to give undivided attention to their foreign enemies?

Cle. Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own state.

Ath. And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the best?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the need of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and good will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be regarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as well say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by medicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs no purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether he aims at

the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only, or first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound legislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace.

Cle. I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of yours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and object of our institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonians.

Ath. I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely 629 quarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently questioning them, seeing that they as well as ourselves are quite in earnest. Let me take you with me; and first we will summon Tyrtaeus, who was an Athenian by birth, and also a Spartan citizen, and who of all men was most eager about war. 'Well,' he says,

'I sing not, I care not, about any man,

even if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and then he gives a list of them), unless he be the bravest in war.' I imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our Lacedaemonian friend has probably heard too much of them.

Meg. Very true.

Cle. And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.

Ath. Come now and let us all join in asking this question of Tyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise which you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves that you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus do, as I believe, entirely agree with you. But we should like to be quite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you agree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would you say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty in replying quite truly, that there are two kinds of war,—one which is universally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all wars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out with other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of warfare.

Cle. Certainly, far milder.

Ath. Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-

flown strain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are you referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to judge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate those

‘Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and strike at their enemies.’

And we shall naturally go on to say to him,—You, Tyrtaeus, certainly appear to praise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and he must admit this.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. They are good; but we say that there are still better
630 men whose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. And we too have a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in Sicily, who says:—

‘Cyrnus,’ he says, ‘he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his weight in gold and silver.’

And such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more difficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance and wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for a man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all virtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary soldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet they are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust, violent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what the conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I maintain that the divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of consideration, will always in making laws have regard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty in the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas, that virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was sung of by the poet in the hour of need, yet in place and dignity may be said to be only fourth-rate.

Cle. Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a very low rank in the scale of legislators.

Ath. Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we imagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and Crete mainly with a view to war.

Cle. What ought we to say then?

Ath. What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not mistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence;—that the legislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this the lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes of laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern inventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer laws of which the want is being felt, and one man has a class of laws about inheritances in part or sole, another about assault; others about ten thousand other matters of a similar nature. But we say that ⁶³¹ the right way of enquiry is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the spirit of your exposition; for you are quite right in beginning with virtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I thought that you went wrong when you added that he referred all to a part, and a most inferior part of virtue, and my subsequent observations had a bearing on this. Will you allow me then to explain how I should have liked to have heard you expound the matter?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. You ought to have said, Stranger,—The Cretan laws are with good reason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws, which is to make those who use them happy, for all goods are derived from them. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine goods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains the greater, at the same time acquires the less, or not having the greater loses both. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the second beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and bodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god [Pluto], but one who is keen of sight, because he has wisdom for his companion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods, and next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with courage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage. The four naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the order in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will enjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens having a view to these, the human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader mind. Some

of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage, which they make one with another, and to the procreation and education of children, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take charge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life, and to give them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their intercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and pleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he should keep a watch over them, and
 632 blame and praise them rightly by the mouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and the other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and the deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences which come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite of these; in all these states he should determine what is the good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the legislator has to watch over the property and expenditure of the citizens, and their mutual contracts and cessations of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should see how they order all this, and consider among whom justice as well as injustice is found or is wanting; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties on those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the time has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and honours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint guardians to preside over these things,—some who walk by intelligence, others by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his ordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice, and not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which I was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to know how all these matters are, and are arranged in the laws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian Apollo which Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is discovered to his eyes, who has experience and skill in laws, although they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind like ourselves.

Cle. How shall we proceed, Stranger?

Ath. I think that we must begin again as before, and first discuss the habit of courage; afterwards we will go through

the other forms of virtue, if you please. Then we shall have a model of the whole; and with these and similar discourses we will beguile the way. And when we have gone through all the virtues, we will show, by the grace of God, that what has preceded has relation to virtue.

Meg. Very good; and suppose that you first criticise this 633
praiser of Zeus and the laws of Crete.

Ath. I will try to criticise you and myself, as well as him, for we are all concerned in the argument. Tell me,—were not the common meals, and secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to war?

Meg. Yes.

Ath. And what comes third, and what fourth, in the order of your legislation? For that, I think, is the sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the parts of virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is, provided the meaning is clear.

Meg. Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is third in order.

Ath. Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.

Meg. I think that I can get as far as the fourth head, which is the frequent endurance of pain, exhibited by them in certain hand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a beating; there is, too, the so-called *Crypteia*, or secret service, in which wonderful endurance is shown,—they wander over the whole country by day and by night, and even in winter have not any shoes on their feet, and are without beds to lie upon, and have no one to attend them. Marvellous, too, is the endurance which our citizens show in their gymnastic exercises, contending against the violent summer heat; and there are many similar practices, to speak of which in detail would be endless.

Ath. Excellent, O Lacedaemonian stranger. But how ought we to define courage? Is that to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax?

Meg. I should say the latter.

Ath. In what preceded, as you well remember, our Cnosian friends spoke of a man or a city being inferior to themselves?

Cle. I did so.

Ath. Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?

Cle. I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is overcome by pain.

Ath. But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have
634 not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right?

Cle. Able to meet both, I should say.

Ath. Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them, and compel or induce him by motives of honour to get the better of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is of this nature among you:—What is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?

Meg. I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there are some lesser parts of laws, however, which I might mention.

Cle. No more can I show anything of that sort which is at all prominent in the Cretan laws.

Ath. No wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our search after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws of the others, we must not take offence, but be gentle to one another.

Cle. You are quite right, Athenian Stranger, and we will do as you say.

Ath. At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feeling of irritation.

Cle. Certainly not.

Ath. I will not at present determine whether he who censures the Cretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. But I believe that I can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For assuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them will be a law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are right or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice, they must all agree that the laws are all good and of divine origin; and any one who says the contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who remarks any defect, may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an equal when no young man is present.

Cle. Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not 635 there at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the legislator, and to say what is most true.

Ath. As there are no young men present, and the legislator has given old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our discussing these matters now that we are alone.

Cle. True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your censure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong; he who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be the better for it.

Ath. Very good; however, I am not going to censure your laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am going to raise doubts about them. For you are the only people known to us, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew all great pleasures and amusements; whereas in the matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he thought that they who from infancy had always avoided the pains and fears and sorrows which must be, when they were compelled to face them would run away from those who were hardened in them and become their subjects. Now the legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of pleasure; he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from their youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasure, and unused to endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined to refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will overcome them just as fear would overcome the former class; and in

another, and even a worse manner, they will be the servants of those who are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of enjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. One half of their souls will be a slave, the other half free; and they will not be worthy to be called in the true sense men and freemen. Tell me whether you assent to my words?

Cle. On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to be hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters, would be very childish and simple.

Ath. Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue which follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after courage comes temperance), what institutions shall we find in our three states about temperance, which like our military institutions we call those of other ordinary states.

636 *Meg.* That is not an easy question to answer; still I should say that the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently devised for the promotion both of temperance and courage.

Ath. There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, in so ordering acts and words in politics, that there should be no dispute about them. As in the human body, the manner of life which does good in one way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that any one course of treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia and common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of evil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of Milesian, and Boeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always to have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love below the level, not only of man, but of the beasts. The charge may be fairly brought against your cities above all others, and is true in general of states which especially cultivate gymnastics. Whether such matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously, I think that the pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse with men and women; but that the intercourse of men with men, or of women with women, is contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was originally due to unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of having invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they

wanted to justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the practice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns almost entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in private characters: these are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from them where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this holds of men and animals—of individuals as well as states; and he who indulges in them ignorantly and in excess, is the reverse of happy.

Meg. I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken: at the same time, I hardly know what to say, and I still think that the Spartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. Of the Cretan laws, I shall leave the defence to my Cnosian friend. But the laws of Sparta in as far as they relate to pleasure, ⁶³⁷ appear to me to be the best in the world; for that which leads mankind in general into the wildest pleasure and licence, and every other folly, the law has clean driven out; and neither in the country nor in towns which are under the control of Sparta, will you find revelries and the many incitements of every kind of pleasure which accompany them; and any one who meets a drunken and disorderly person, will immediately have him most severely punished, and will not let him off on any pretence, not even at the time of a Dionysiac festival; although I have remarked that this may happen at your performances 'on the cart,' as they are called; and among our Tarentine colonists I have seen the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac festival; but nothing of the sort happens among us.

Ath. O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy where there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they are under no regulations. In order to retaliate, an Athenian has only to point out the licence which exists among your women. To all such accusations, whether they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or you, there is one answer which exonerates the practice in question from impropriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of what he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him:—Wonder not, O stranger; this is our custom, and you may very likely have some other custom about the same things.

Now we are speaking, my friends, not about men in general, but about the merits and defects of the lawgivers themselves. Let us then discourse a little more at length about them, and about the nature of intoxication at large, which is a very important matter, and will seriously task the discrimination of the legislator. I am not talking of the mere practice of drinking or not drinking wine in general, but about downright intoxication: are we to follow the custom of the Scythians, and Persians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and Iberians, who are all warlike nations, or, that of your countrymen, who, as you say, wholly abstain? Whereas the Scythians and Thracians, both men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they also pour on their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious institution. The Persians again, are much given to other practices of luxury which you reject, but they have more moderation in them than the Thracians and Scythians.

638 *Meg.* O best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and we drive all these nations flying before us.

Ath. Nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as there always will be, flyings and pursuings of which no account can be given, and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle afford more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of institutions. For when the greater states conquer and enslave the lesser, as the Syracusans have done the Locrians, who appear to be the best-governed people in their part of the world, or as the Athenians have done the Cceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the same sort of thing), all that is not to the point; let us endeavour rather to form a conclusion about the various institutions themselves, and say nothing, at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that such a custom is honourable, and the other not. And first permit me to tell you how good and bad are to be estimated in reference to these very matters.

Meg. How do you mean?

Ath. All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or censure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to proceed in a wrong way. Let me give you an illustration of what I mean:—You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good sort of food, whereupon another person instantly

blames wheat, without ever enquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with what, or in what state, wheat is to be applied. And that is just what we are doing in this discussion. At the very mention of the word intoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the other with their censures, and this is absurd. For either side adduce their witnesses and approvers, and some of us think that we speak with authority because we have many witnesses; and others because they see those who abstain conquering in battle, and this again is disputed by us. Now I cannot say that I approve of such a method of discussing laws. And about this very point of intoxication I should like to speak in another way, which I hold to be the right one; for if number is to be the criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of nations ready to dispute the point with you who are only two cities?

Meg. I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which 639 is right.

Ath. Let me put the matter thus:—Suppose a person to praise the keeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to have, and then some one who had seen goats feeding without a goatherd in cultivated spots, and doing mischief, was to censure a goat or any other animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any sense or justice in such censure?

Meg. Certainly not.

Ath. Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in order to be a good captain, whether he is or is not sea-sick? What do you say?

Meg. I say that he is not a good captain if he is liable to sickness.

Ath. And what would you say of the commander of an army? Will he be able to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward, who, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?

Meg. Impossible.

Ath. And what if besides being a coward he have no skill?

Meg. He is a miserable fellow, who is only fit to be a commander of old women.

Ath. And what would you say of some one who blames or

praises any sort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is well enough when under his presidency? The critic, however, has never seen the society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a president, but always without a ruler or with a bad one:—when observers of this class praise or blame such meetings is what they say of any value?

Meg. Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such a meeting when rightly ordered.

Ath. But think; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute a sort of meeting?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And did any one ever see this convivial meeting rightly ordered? Of course you two will answer at once that you have never seen them at all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country; but I have come across many of them in many different places, and moreover I have made enquiries about them wherever I went, as I may say, and never did I see or hear of anything of the sort which was carried on altogether rightly; in some few particulars they might be right, but in general they were utterly wrong.

Cle. What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark? Explain. For we, as you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely not know, even if we came in their way, what was right or wrong in such societies.

640 *Ath.* Likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor: you would acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of mankind, of whatever sort, there ought to be a leader?

Cle. Certainly I should.

Ath. And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the leader ought to be a brave man?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed by fears?

Cle. That is also true.

Ath. And if there were a possibility of having a general of an army who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all means appoint him?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. Now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is

to command an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who is to regulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of peace.

Cle. True.

Ath. And that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is apt to be unquiet.

Cle. Certainly ; the reverse of quiet.

Ath. In the first place, then, the revellers as well as the soldiers will require a ruler.

Cle. To be sure ; no men more so.

Ath. And we ought, if possible, to provide them such a quiet ruler?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And he should be a man who understands society ; for his duty is to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company at the time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the occasion.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of the revels? For if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and drunken, and not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will he be saved from doing some great evil.

Cle. It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved.

Ath. Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way possible in states, and that some one blames the very fact of their existence—he may very likely be right. But if he blames a practice which he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows clearly that he is not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that everything done in this way will turn out to be wrong, because done without the superintendence of a sober ruler. Do you not see that a drunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot, army—anything, in 641 short, of which he has the direction?

Cle. The last remark is very true, Stranger ; and I see quite clearly the advantage of an army having a good leader—he will give victory in war to his followers, which is a very great advantage, and so of other things. But I do not see any similar advantage which either individuals or states gain from the good management of a feast ; and I want you to tell me

what great good will be effected, supposing that this drinking ordinance is duly established.

Ath. If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus,—when the question is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very great in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of education in general, the answer is easy—that education makes good men, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle, because they are good. Education certainly gives victory, although victory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education; for many have grown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has engendered in them innumerable evils; and many a victory has been and will be suicidal to the victors; but education is never suicidal.

Cle. You seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when rightly ordered, are an important element of education.

Ath. Certainly I do.

Cle. And can you show that what you have been saying is true?

Ath. To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which there are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given to man, Stranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially as we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and constitutions.

Cle. Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now being raised, is precisely what we want to hear.

Ath. Very good; I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning, and you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. But first let me make an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes to be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity, and the Cretans have more wit
642 than words. Now, I am afraid of appearing to elicit a very long discourse out of very small materials. For drinking indeed may appear to be a slight matter, and yet is one which cannot be rightly ordered according to nature, without correct principles of music; these are necessary with a view to any satisfactory treatment of the subject, and music again runs up into education generally, and there will be no end to the discussion. What

would you say then to leaving these matters for the present, and passing on to some other question of law?

Meg. O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not know, that our family is your proxenus. I imagine that from their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the proxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country; and this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from the days of my boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed the Athenians, they used to say to me,—‘ See, Megillus, how ill or how well, as the case might be, has your state treated us;’ and having always had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you assailed, I became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear the Athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a good Athenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is freely and genuinely good by the inspiration of nature, and is not manufactured by the law. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear you say whatever you have to say.

Cle. I can say the same, Stranger; and that you may speak with the greater confidence, let me also remind you of a tie which unites you to Crete. You must have heard the story of the prophet Epimenides, who was of my family, and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war, in accordance with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain sacrifices which the God commanded. The Athenians were at that time in dread of the Persian invasion; and he said that for ten years they would not come, and that when they came, they would go away again without accomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they inflicted. At that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with you; thus ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for you.

Ath. You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ⁶⁴³ ready to perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will nevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the nature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument must travel onwards to the God Dionysus.

Cle. Let us proceed, if you please.

Ath. Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education, will you tell me whether you agree with them?

Cle. Let us hear.

Ath. According to my view, he who would be good at anything must practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and earnest, in the particular manner which the work requires: for example, he who is to be a good builder, should play at building children's houses; and he who is to be a good husbandman, at tilling the ground; those who have the care of their education should provide them when young with mimic tools. And they should learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require for their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure or apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding, or some other exercise for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour to direct the children's inclinations and pleasures by the help of amusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of education is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his play should be trained to that sort of excellence in which when he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree with me thus far?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or ill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about the bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another uneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well educated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship, and the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower sense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which makes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and teaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only education which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of training, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength, or mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and illiberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us not quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition which has just been granted, hold good: to wit, that those who are rightly

educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a slight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the best of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong direction, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is the great business of every man while he lives.

Cle. Very true; and we quite agree with you.

Ath. And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to rule themselves, and bad men who are not.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little further by an illustration which I will offer you.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Do we not consider each of ourselves as one?

Cle. True.

Ath. And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which, the one we call pleasure and the other pain.

Cle. True.

Ath. Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.

Cle. I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.

Meg. I am in the like case.

Ath. Let us look at the matter in this way: May we not regard every living being as a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose—which of the two we cannot certainly know? But this we know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and

of iron, but this is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always to co-operate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not be lost, and the meaning of the expression 'superior or inferior to a man's self' will become clearer; as also that in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, cities as well as individuals should live according to reason; which the individual attains in himself, and the city receives from some god or from the legislator, and makes it her law in her dealings with herself and with other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary.

Cle. Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse.

Ath. Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,—what will be the effect on him?

Cle. With what view do you ask that question?

Ath. I will tell you bye and bye. When the puppet is brought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow? I will endeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am asking is this—Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and pains, and passions and loves?

Cle. Very greatly.

Ath. And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence, heightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man if he becomes saturated with drink?

Cle. Yes, they entirely desert him.

Ath. Does he not return to the state of the soul in which he was when a young child?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?

Cle. The least.

Ath. And will he not be in a most wretched plight?

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Cle. Most wretched.

Ath. Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second time a child?

Cle. Well said, Stranger.

Ath. Will any argument prove to us that we ought to encourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid it?

Cle. I suppose so; at any rate, you said just now that you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.

Ath. True, I did; and I hold to my word, as you both declared that you were ready to hear me.

Cle. To be sure we will hear you, if only for the strangeness of the paradox, which asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter degradation.

Ath. Are you speaking of the soul?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And what would you say about the body, my friend? Are you not surprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity, leanness, ugliness, decrepitude?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and takes medicine, is he not quite aware that soon, and for many days afterwards, he will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept as the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in gymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?

Cle. Yes, all that is well known.

Ath. Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the subsequent benefit?

Cle. Very good.

Ath. And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other practices?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And the same view may be taken of the pastime of

drinking wine, if we are right in supposing that the same effect follows?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. If such convivialities should turn out to have any like advantage equal in importance to the bodily one, they are in their very nature to be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no accompaniment of pain.

Cle. True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any such benefits to be derived from them.

Ath. That is just what I am about to show. And let me ask you a question:—Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very different?

Cle. What are they?

Ath. There is the fear of expected evil.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid
647 of being thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which fear we and all men term shame.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the opposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest and most numerous sort of pleasures.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And does not the legislator and every one who is good for anything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms reverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms insolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both to individuals and to states.

Cle. True.

Ath. Does not this sort of fear preserve us in many important ways? What is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? For there are two things which give victory—confidence before enemies, and fear of disgrace before friends.

Cle. True.

Ath. Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and what we fear or ought not to fear has been determined.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law bring him face to face with many fears.

Cle. Clearly.

Ath. And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not bring him face to face with disgrace, and exercise him in taking up arms against his own pleasures and overcoming them? Or does this principle apply to courage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against and overcome his own natural character,—since if he be unpractised and inexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he might have been—but are we to suppose, that with temperance it is otherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and unrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them, in earnest and in play, and in every sort of way, word, or work, will still be perfectly temperate?

Cle. How unlikely!

Ath. Suppose that some God had given a fear potion to men, and that the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself as a child of misfortune on every occasion of drinking, and that he feared everything happening or to happen to him; and that at last the most courageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and only came to himself again when he had slept off the influence of 648 the draught.

Cle. But do you know of any such draught, Stranger, which is really to be found among men?

Ath. I do not; but, if there were, might not such a draught have been of use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go and say to him, ‘O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretans, or the Spartans, or any other, would you not like to have a touchstone of the courage and cowardice of your citizens?’

Cle. ‘I should,’ will be the answer of every one.

Ath. ‘And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no risk and no great danger than the reverse?’

Cle. From that proposition, again, no one will dissent.

Ath. ‘And, in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them amid such imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear was working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and admonishing them, and also

honouring them, but dishonouring any one who will not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command him; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him go unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or would you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no reason for abstaining?’

Cle. He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.

Ath. This would be a mode of testing and training which would be wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be applied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and he would do well who provided himself with the potion, which alone is of more efficacy than ten thousand other things, whether he preferred to be by himself in the wilderness, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to be seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force of his own nature and habits, and believing that he had been already disciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in company with any number of others, and display his power in conquering the irresistible influence of the draught—his virtue being such, that he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was always himself, and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing that he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion.

Cle. Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show his self-control.

649 *Ath.* Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:—‘Well, lawgiver, there is certainly no such fear potion which man has either received from the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no place at our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test of overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?’

Cle. I suppose that he will say, Yes,—meaning that wine is such a potion.

Ath. Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of the other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with himself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave hopes, and the opinion of his power, and at last the string of his tongue is loosened, and fancying himself

wise, he is brimming over with lawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say anything.

Cl. I think that every one will admit the truth of your description.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two things which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest courage; secondly, the greatest fear—

Cl. Which you described as parts of reverence, if I am not mistaken.

Ath. Thank you for reminding me. But now, as the habit of courage and fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether the opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites.

Cl. I dare say.

Ath. There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more than commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these occasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible, and to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base.

Cl. True.

Ath. Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and shameless such as these?—when we are under the influence of anger, love, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty, strength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us? What is better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to test, and in the second place to train the character of a man, if care be taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more innocent? For do but consider which is the greater risk:—Would you rather test a man of a harsh and uncivil nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts of injustice, by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, or by having him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you, if you wanted to apply a touch-
650
stone to a man who is prone to love, entrust your wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, perilling your dearest interests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might add numberless particulars, in which the advantage would be manifest of getting to know a character in sport, and

without paying dearly for experience. And I do not believe that either a Cretan, or any other man, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and speedier than any other.

Cle. That is certainly true.

Ath. And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls will be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of them; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.

Cle. Certainly.

BOOK II.

Athenian Stranger. AND now we have to consider whether 652
the insight into human nature is the only advantage derived
from well-ordered potations, or whether there are not other
advantages greater and more to be desired still. The argument
seems to imply that there are. But how and in what way
these are to be attained, will have to be considered attentively,
or we may be entangled in an error.

Cleinias. Proceed.

Ath. Let me once more recall our doctrine of right education ;
which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of 653
convivial intercourse.

Cle. You talk rather grandly.

Ath. Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first perceptions of
children, and I say that they are the forms under which virtue and
vice are originally present to them. As to wisdom and true
and fixed opinions, happy is the man who acquires them, even
when declining in years ; and he who possesses them, and the
blessings which are contained in them, is a perfect man. Now,
I mean by education that training which is given by suitable
habits to the first instincts of virtue in children ;—when pleasure,
and friendship, and pain, and hatred, are rightly implanted in
souls not yet capable of understanding the nature of them,
and who find them, after they have attained reason, to be in
harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, when perfected,
is virtue ; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and
pain, which leads you always to hate what you ought to hate,
and love what you ought to love, from the beginning to the
end, may be separated off ; and, in my view, will be rightly
called education.

Cle. I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that you
have said and are saying about education.

Ath. I am glad to hear that you agree with me; for, indeed, the true discipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered, is a principle of education, has been often relaxed and corrupted in human life. And the Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to undergo, have appointed holy festivals, in which men alternate rest with labour; and have given them the Muses and Apollo the leader of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be partners in their revels, that they may improve what education they have, at the festivals of the gods and by their aid. I should like to know whether a common saying is true to nature or not. For what men say is that the young of all creatures cannot be quiet in their bodies or in their voices; they are always wanting to move, and cry out; at one time leaping and skipping, and overflowing with sportiveness and delight at something, and then again uttering all sorts of cries. But, whereas other animals have no perception of order or disorder in their movements, that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are called, to us, the Gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to
654 be our partners in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and rhythm; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them and join hands with one another in dances and songs; and these they call choruses, which is a term naturally expressive of cheerfulness¹. Shall we begin, then, with the acknowledgment that education is first given through Apollo and the Muses? What do you say?

Cl. I assent.

Ath. And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the chorus, and the educated is he who has been well trained?

Cl. Certainly.

Ath. And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?

Cl. True.

Ath. Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance well?

Cl. I suppose that he will.

Ath. Let us see; what are we saying?

Cl. What?

¹ χορὸς, erroneously connected with χαίρειν.

Ath. He sings well and dances well; now must we add that he sings what is good and dances what is good?

Cle. Let us make the addition.

Ath. We will suppose that he knows the good to be good, and the bad to be bad, and makes use of them accordingly: which now is the better trained in dancing and music;—he who is able to move his body and to use his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no delight in good or hatred of evil; or he who is incorrect in gesture and voice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what is good, and is offended at what is evil?

Cle. There is a great difference, Stranger, in the two kinds of education.

Ath. If we know what is good in song and dance, then we know also who is rightly educated and who is uneducated; but if not, then we certainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and whether there is any or not.

Cle. True.

Ath. Let us follow the scent like hounds, and go in pursuit of beauty of figure, and melody, and song, and dance; if these escape us, there will be no use in talking about true education, whether Hellenic or barbarian.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody? When a manly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul ⁶⁵⁵ is in similar case, are they likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give utterance to the same sounds?

Cle. How can they, when the very colours of their faces differ?

Ath. Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, that in music there certainly are figures and there are melodies: and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or figure having rhythm or harmony; the term is correct enough, but you cannot speak correctly, as the masters of choruses have a way of talking metaphorically of the 'colour' of a melody or figure, although you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other. And not to be tedious, the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or

body, or of images of virtue, are without exception good, and those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good.

Cle. You are right in calling upon us to make that division.

Ath. But are all of us equally delighted with every sort of dance?

Cle. Far otherwise.

Ath. And what, then, is the cause of error or division among us? Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them? For no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character. And yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to give pleasure to our souls. But this is intolerable and blasphemous; there is, however, a more plausible account of the delusion.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. There is a way of making our likes and dislikes the criterion of excellence. Choric movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions, chances, characters,—each particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling them beautiful. But those whose natures, or ways, or habits are unsuited to them, cannot delight in them or applaud them, and they call them base. There are others, again, whose natures are right and their habits wrong, or whose habits are right and their natures wrong, and they praise one thing, but are pleased at another. For they say that certain things are pleasant, but not
656 good. And in the presence of those whom they think wise, they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner, or of deliberately lending their countenance to such proceedings; and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs, or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?

Cle. I think that there is.

Ath. 'I think' is not the word, but I would say, rather, 'I am certain.' For must they not have the same effect as when a

man is in evil company, whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes, and only censures them playfully as if he had a suspicion of his own badness? In that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in whom he takes pleasure, even though he be ashamed to praise them. And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?

Cle. I know of none.

Ath. Then in a city which has or in future ages is to have good laws, and where there is a due regard to the instruction and amusement which the Muses give, can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in the dance anything which the poet himself likes, in the way of rhythm, or melody, or words, to the children and youth of well-conditioned parents? Is he to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to virtue or vice?

Cle. That is surely quite unreasonable, and is not to be thought of.

Ath. And yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception of Egypt.

Cle. And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?

Ath. You will wonder when I tell you: Long ago they appear to have recognised the very principle of which we are now speaking—that their young citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples; and no painter or artist is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the traditional forms and invent new ones. To this day, no alteration is allowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will find that their works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years ago;—this is literally true and no exaggeration,—their ancient paintings and sculptures are 657 not a whit better or worse than the work of to-day, but are made with just the same skill.

Cle. How extraordinary!

Ath. I should rather say, how wise and worthy of a great legislator! I know that other things in Egypt are not so good. But what I am telling you about music is true and deserving

of consideration, because showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a natural truth and correctness without any fear of failure. To do this, however, must be the work of God, or of a divine person; in Egypt they have a tradition that their ancient chants are the composition of the Goddess Isis. And therefore, as I was saying, if a person can only find in any way the natural melodies, he may confidently embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love of novelty which arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the old, has not strength enough to vitiate the consecrated song and dance, under the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate, they are far from being antiquated in Egypt.

Cle. Your arguments seem to prove your point.

Ath. May not the true use of music and choral festivities be described as follows: we rejoice when we think that we prosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. And when rejoicing is our good fortune, we are unable to be still?

Cle. True.

Ath. Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who are their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we look on at them. Having lost the agility of youth, we delight in their sports and merry-making; because we love to think of our former selves, and gladly institute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of what we once were.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. People say that we ought to regard him as the wisest of men, and the winner of the palm, who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and mirth. For when mirth is to be the order of the day, he ought to be honoured most, and, as I was saying, bear the palm, who gives most mirth to the greatest
658 number. Now I want to know whether this is a true way of speaking or of acting?

Cle. Possibly.

Ath. But, my dear friend, let us distinguish between different cases, and not be hasty in forming a judgment: One way of considering the question will be to imagine a festival at which

there are entertainments of all sorts, including gymnastic, musical, or equestrian contests: the citizens are assembled, and proclamation is made that any one who likes may enter the lists, and that he is to bear the palm who gives the most pleasure to the spectators—there is to be no regulation about the manner how; but he who is most successful in giving pleasure is to be crowned victor, and is deemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates: What is likely to be the result of such a proclamation?

Cle. In what respect?

Ath. There would be various exhibitions: the Homeric bard would exhibit a rhapsody, another a performance on the lute; one would have a tragedy, and another a comedy. Nor would there be anything astonishing in some one imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a puppet-show. Suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but innumerable others as well, can you tell me who ought to be the victor?

Cle. I do not see how I can answer you, unless I myself hear the several competitors; the question is absurd.

Ath. Well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall I answer this question which you deem absurd?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. If very small children are to determine the question, they will decide for the puppet-show?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. The older children will be advocates of comedy; educated women, and young men, and people in general, will favour tragedy.

Cle. Very likely.

Ath. And I believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure in hearing a rhapsodist recite well the Iliad and Odyssey, or one of the Hesiodic poems, and would award the victory to him? But, who would really be the victor? that is the question.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Clearly you and I will be compelled to reply that the old men are right; their way of thinking is far better than any other which now prevails in the world.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Thus far I too should agree with the many, that the excellence of music is to be measured by pleasure. But the pleasure must not be that of chance persons; the fairest music is that which delights the best and best educated, and especially
659 that which delights the one man who is pre-eminent in virtue and education. And therefore the judges will require virtue—they must possess wisdom and also courage; for the true judge ought not to learn from the theatre, nor ought he to be panic-stricken at the clamour of the many and his own incapacity; nor again, knowing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness carelessly to deliver a lying judgment, out of the very same lips which have just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He is sitting not as the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper place, as their instructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all pandering to the pleasure of the spectators. The ancient and common custom of Hellas, which still prevails in Italy and Sicily, did certainly leave the judgment to the body of spectators, who determined the victor by the show of hands; yet this custom has been the destruction of the poets;—for they are now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste of their judges, and the result is that the spectators instruct themselves, which has been the ruin of the theatre;—when they ought to be having characters put before them better than their own, and so receiving a higher pleasure, they themselves make them inferior. Now what is the inference to be deduced from all this? Shall I tell you?

Cle. What?

Ath. The inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time is, that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason, which the law affirms, and which the experience of the best of our elders has agreed to be truly right. In order, then, that the soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in a manner at variance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may rather follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the aged—in order, I say, to produce this effect, songs appear to have been invented, which are really charms, and are designed to implant that harmony of which we speak. And, because the mind of the child is incapable of enduring serious training, they are called

plays or songs, and are performed in play; just as when men are sick and ailing in their bodies, their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats and drinks, but unwholesome 660 diet in disagreeable things, in order that they may learn, as they ought, to like the one, and to dislike the other. And similarly the true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot persuade, will compel the poet to express, as he ought, by fair and noble words, in his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate and brave and in every way good men.

Cle. But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in which poets generally compose in States at the present day? As far as I can observe there is nothing of the sort, except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, as you now tell me; in other places novelties are always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and these pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the same.

Ath. Most true, Cleinias; and I daresay that I may have expressed myself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of some really existing state of things; whereas I was only saying what regulations I would like to have about music, and hence there occurred a misapprehension on your part. For when evils are far gone and irremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at times necessary. But as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you whether you maintain that such institutions are more prevalent among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians than among the other Hellenes?

Cle. Certainly they are.

Ath. And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would that be an improvement?

Cle. There would be a very great improvement, if the customs which prevailed among them were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such as you were just now saying ought to prevail.

Ath. Let us see whether we understand one another:—Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows: you compel your poets to say that the good

man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong, or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is miserable and lives in pain. As the poet says, and with truth: I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him who 'draws near and smites
661 his enemies be a just man.' But if he be unjust, I would not have him 'look calmly upon bloody death,' nor 'surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas;' and let no other thing that is called good ever be his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and as soon as you are possessed of them to be immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so great, if the bad man lives a very short time. These are the truths of which you must persuade, or if they will not be persuaded, must compel your poets to sing with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these they must train up your youth. Am I not right? For I plainly declare that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?

Cle. I think that in some things we agree, in others not.

Ath. When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts, and is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of immortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature—of such an one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable rather than happy.

Cle. There is my difficulty.

Ath. Once more : Suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still, if he be injurious and insolent, would you not both agree that he will live basely? You will surely grant so much? 662

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And an evil life too?

Cle. I am not equally disposed to grant that.

Ath. Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?

Cle. How can I possibly say so?

Ath. How? Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are of two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is plainer than the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were a lawgiver, I would try to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain; and I would inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who should dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or that the profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another; and there are many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak in another strain from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age, and I may say, indeed, from the world in general. Why, my good friends, if I were to ask Zeus and Apollo, the Gods who were your legislators,—Is not the most just life also the pleasantest? or are there two lives, one of which is the juster and the other the pleasanter?—and they were to reply that there are two; and thereupon I proceeded to ask (that would be the right way of pursuing the enquiry) Which are the happier—those who lead the justest, or those who lead the pleasantest life? and they replied, Those who lead the pleasantest—that would be a very strange answer, which I should not like to put into the mouth of God. The words will come with more propriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore I will repeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again that he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. And to that I rejoin:—O my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as possible? And yet you also never ceased telling me that I should live as justly as possible. Now, here the giver of the rule, whether he be

legislator or father will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavour to be consistent with himself. But if he were to declare that the justest life is also the happiest, every one hearing him would enquire, if I am not mistaken, what is that
 663 good and noble principle in life which the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure and pain? For what good can the just man have which is separated from pleasure? Shall we say that glory and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble, are nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant? Certainly not, sweet legislator. Or shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being no wrong done is good and honourable, although there is no pleasure in it, and that the doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. The view which identifies the pleasant and the just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious tendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of the legislator, and, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he can help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than pleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to be dimly seen, especially in childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and exhibit the truth; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other, by customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are opposed to one another as shadow and light, and that, seen from the point of view of a man's own evil and injustice, the unjust appears pleasant and the just unpleasant; but that, seen from the just man's point of view, the very opposite is the appearance which they wear.

Cle. True.

Ath. And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment—that of the inferior or of the better soul?

Cle. Surely, that of the better soul.

Ath. Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved, but also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?

Cle. That seems to be implied in the present argument.

Ath. And even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the argument has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if he ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not invent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a

better effect in making them do what is right, not on compulsion but voluntarily.

Cle. Truth, Stranger, is a noble thing and a lasting, but a thing of which men are hard to be persuaded.

Ath. And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus, which is so improbable, has been readily believed, and also innumerable other tales.

Cle. What is that story?

Ath. The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth, which the legislator may take as a proof that he can 664 persuade the minds of the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out what belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all his efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in their songs and tales and discourses all their life long. But if you do not agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the other side.

Cle. I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either of us against what you are now saying.

Ath. The next suggestion which I have to offer is, that all our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children, reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken, or are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be, that the life which is by the Gods deemed to be the happiest is the holiest;—we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth; and the minds of our young disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours than any others which we might address to them.

Cle. I assent to what you say.

Ath. First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir composed of children, which is to sing lustily the heaven-taught lay to the whole city. Next will follow the choir of young men under the age of thirty, who will call upon the God Paeon to testify to the truth of their words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn their hearts. Thirdly, the choir of elder men, who are from thirty to sixty years of age, will also sing. There remain those who are too old to sing, and they will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle.

Cle. Who are those who compose the third choir, Stranger; for I do not clearly understand whom you mean?

Ath. And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with a view to them.

Cle. Will you try to be a little plainer?

Ath. I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse, as you will remember, of the fiery nature of young creatures: I said that they were unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called out and jumped about in a disorderly manner; and that no other animal attained to any perception
665 of order, but man only. Now the order of motion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and low are duly mingled, is called harmony; and both together are termed choric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us Apollo and the Muses to be our playfellows and leaders in the dance; and Dionysus, as I daresay that you will remember, was the third.

Cle. I quite remember.

Ath. Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses, and I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of Dionysus.

Cle. How is that arranged? There is something strange, at any rate on first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if you really mean that those who are above thirty, and may be fifty, or from fifty to sixty years of age, are to form a dance in his honour.

Ath. Very true; and I think with you that some reason should be given for the proposal.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Are we agreed thus far?

Cle. About what?

Ath. That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the whole city, should never cease charming themselves with the strains of which we have spoken; and that there should be every sort of change and variation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that the singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never weary of them.

Cle. Every one will agree.

Ath. Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason of age and intelligence, has the greatest influence, sing these fairest of strains, which are to do so much good? Shall we be so foolish as to let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most useful of songs?

Cle. But we cannot let them off; that is already implied.

Ath. Then how can we accomplish our purpose? Let us see.

Cle. How are we to see?

Ath. When a man is advancing in years, he no longer likes to sing;—he has no pleasure in his own performances; and if compulsion is used, he will be more and more ashamed, the older and more discreet he grows;—What do you say?

Cle. Certainly he will.

Ath. Well, and will he not be yet more ashamed if he has to stand up and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?—and if when he is required to do so, like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and have been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry, he will certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make him very unwilling to exhibit.

Cle. No doubt.

Ath. How, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing? Shall we begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they are eighteen years of age; we will tell them that fire must not be poured upon fire, whether in the body or in the soul, until they begin to go to labour (this is a precaution against the excitableness of youth); afterwards they may taste wine in moderation up to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain altogether from intoxication and excess of wine; when, at length, he has reached forty years, and is feasted at public banquets, he may invite not only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all, to the mystery and festivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given them to be the cure of the sourness of old age; that in age we may renew our youth, and forget our sorrows; and also in order that the nature of the soul, like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and more impressible. In the first place, will not any one whose heart is warm within him, be more ready and less ashamed to sing,—I do not say before a large audience, but before a

moderate number ; nor yet among strangers, but among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to chant, and to enchant.

Cle. He will be far more ready.

Ath. There will be no impropriety in using such a method of persuading them to join in song.

Cle. None at all.

Ath. And what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn? The strain should clearly be one suitable to them.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And what strain is suitable for heroes? Shall they sing a choric strain?

Cle. Truly, Stranger, we of Crete and Lacedaemon know no strain other than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our chorus.

Ath. I dare say ; for you have never acquired the knowledge of the most beautiful kind of song in your military way of life, which is modelled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in cities ; and you have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts. No one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows against his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom for him alone, and trains and rubs him down privately, and gives him the qualities in education which will make him not only a good soldier, but also a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one, as we were saying at first, would be a greater warrior than him of whom
667 Tyrtaeus sings ; and he would honour courage everywhere, but always as the fourth, and not as the first part of virtue, either in individuals or states.

Cle. Once more, Stranger, I must complain that you depreciate our lawgivers.

Ath. Not intentionally, if at all, my good friend ; but whither the argument leads, thither let us follow ; for if there be indeed some strain of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public theatres, I should like to impart it to those who, as we say, are ashamed of the ordinary strains, and want to have the best.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. When things have an accompanying charm, either the best thing in them is this very charm, or there is some right or

utility possessed by them;—for example, I should say that eating and drinking, and the use of food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call pleasure; but that their rectitude is that which we term the rightness and utility of the things served up to us, or more precisely their healthful quality.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Thus, too, I should say that learning has a certain accompanying charm which is the pleasure; and that the right and the profitable, the good and the noble, are qualities given to it by the truth.

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. And so in the imitative arts,—if they succeed in making likenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said to have a charm?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not pleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of pleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness, nor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists solely for the sake of the accompanying charm; and the term 'pleasure' is most appropriately used when these other qualities are absent.

Cle. You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not?

Ath. Yes; and this I term amusement, when doing neither harm nor good in any degree worth speaking of.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation is not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is true also of equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical symmetrical, because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to be judged of by the standard of truth, and by no other whatever.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then, when any one says that music is to be judged of by pleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be any music of which pleasure is the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or deemed to have any real excellence, but only that other kind of music which is an imitation of the good.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And those, who seek for the best kind of song and music ought not to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which is true; and the truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the thing imitated according to quantity and quality.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And every one will admit that musical compositions are all imitative and representative. Will not poets and spectators and actors all agree in this?

Cle. They will.

Ath. Surely then he who would judge correctly must know what each composition is; for if he does not know what is the character and meaning of the piece, and what it represents, he will never discern whether the intention is true or false.

Cle. Certainly not.

Ath. And will he who does not know what is true be able to distinguish what is good and bad? My statement is not very clear; but perhaps you will understand me better if I put the matter in another way.

Cle. How is that?

Ath. There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And can he who does not know what the exact object is which is imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed? I mean, for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body, and the true situation of the parts, what those proportions are, and how the parts fit into one another in due order; also their colours and conformations, or whether this is all confused in the execution: do you think that any one can know about this, who does not know what the animal is which has been imitated?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculptured is a man, who has received at the hand of the artist all

his proper parts and forms and colours, must we not also know 669 whether the work is beautiful or in any respect deficient in beauty?

Cle. If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us be judges of beauty.

Ath. Very true; and may we not say that in everything imitated, whether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent judge must possess three things;—he must know, in the first place, of what the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true; and thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and melodies and rhythms?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty of music. Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, and therefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a man makes a mistake here, he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil dispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern, because the poets are artists very inferior in character to the Muses themselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning to the words of men the gestures and songs of women; nor combine the melodies and gestures of freemen with the rhythms of slaves and men of the baser sort; or, beginning with the rhythms and gestures of freemen, assign to them a melody or words which are of an opposite character; nor would they mix up the voices and sounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of noise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond of introducing this sort of inconsistent mixture, and thus make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, 'are ripe for pleasure.' The experienced see all this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make still further havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance from the melody, setting words to metre without music, and also separating the melody and rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute alone. For when there are no words, it is very difficult to recognise the meaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is imitated by them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing, which aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and uses

670 the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the dance and song, is exceedingly rude and coarse. The use of either, when unaccompanied by the others, leads to every sort of irregularity and trickery. This is all true enough. But we are considering not how our choristers, who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be over fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how they are to use them. And the considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these fifty years' old choristers who are to sing, may be expected to be better trained. For they need to have a quick perception and knowledge of harmonies and rhythms; otherwise, how will they ever know which melodies would be rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which the poet has assigned to them?

Cle. Clearly they cannot.

Ath. The common people are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in proper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made to sing and step in rhythm by sheer force; they never consider that they do not know what they are about. Now every melody is right when suitably accompanied, and wrong when unsuitably.

Cle. That is most certain.

Ath. But can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying, know that the thing is right?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. Then now, as would appear, we are making the discovery that our newly-appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and in a manner compel to sing, but of their own free will, must be educated to such an extent as to be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of the song, that they may know the harmonies and rhythms, and be able to select what are suitable for men of their age and character to sing; and may sing them, and have innocent pleasure from their own performance, and also lead younger men to receive with dutiful delight good dispositions. Having such training, they will attain a more accurate knowledge than falls to the lot of the common people, or even of the poets themselves. For the poet need not know the third point, viz. whether the imitation is good or not, though he can 671 hardly help knowing the laws of melody and rhythm. But the aged chorus must know all the three, that they may choose the

best, and that which is nearest to the best ; for otherwise they will never be able to charm the souls of young men in the way of virtue. And now the original design of the argument which was intended to bring eloquent aid to the Chorus of Dionysus, has been accomplished to the best of our ability, and let us see whether we were right :—I should imagine that a drinking assembly is likely to become more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes on : this, as we were saying at first, will certainly be the case.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Every man has a more than natural elevation ; his heart is glad within him, and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody at such a time ; he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all mankind.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the drinkers become like iron heated in the fire, and grow softer and younger, and are easily fashioned by him who knows how to educate and fashion them, just as when they were young, and that this fashioner of them is the same who prescribed for them in the days of their youth, viz. the good legislator ; and that he ought to enact laws of the banquet, which, when a man is confident, bold, and impudent, and unwilling to wait his turn of silence and speech, and drinking and music, will change his character into the opposite—such laws as will infuse into him a just and noble fear, which will take up arms at the approach of insolence, being that divine fear which we have called reverence and shame ?

Cle. True.

Ath. And the calm and sober generals of others who are not sober, are the guardians of these laws and fellow-workers with them ; and without their help there is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting against enemies, when the commander of an army is not himself calm ; and he who is unwilling to obey them and the commanders of Dionysiac feasts who are more than sixty years of age, shall suffer a disgrace as great as he who disobeys military leaders, or even greater.

Cle. Right.

Ath. If, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in

this way, would not the companions of our revels be improved? 672 they would part better friends than they were, and not as now, enemies. Their whole intercourse would be regulated by law, and the sober would be the leaders of those who are not sober.

Cle. I think so too, if drinking were regulated as you propose.

Ath. Let us not then simply censure the gift of Dionysus as bad and unfit to be received into the State. For wine has many excellences, and one pre-eminent one, about which there is a difficulty in speaking to the many, from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what is said.

Cle. To what do you refer?

Ath. There is a tradition or story, which has somehow gone about the world, that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Here, and that out of revenge he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing madneses in others; for which reason he gave men wine. Such traditions concerning the Gods I leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered; I only know that no animal at birth is mature or perfect in intelligence; and in the intermediate period, in which he has not yet acquired his own proper sense, he rages and roars without rhyme or reason; and when he has once got on his legs he jumps about without rhyme or reason; and this, as you will remember, has been already said by us to be the origin of music and gymnastic.

Cle. To be sure, I remember.

Ath. And did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm sprang from this beginning among men, and that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus were the Gods whom we had to thank for them?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. The other story implied that wine was given man out of revenge, and in order to make him mad; but our present doctrine, on the contrary, is, that wine was given him as a balm, and in order to implant modesty in the soul, and health and strength in the body.

Cle. That, Stranger, is exactly what was said.

Ath. Then half the subject may now be considered to have been discussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?

Cle. What is the other half, and how do you divide the subject?

Ath. The whole choral art is also in our view the whole of education; and of this art, rhythms and harmonies, having to do with the voice, form a part.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And the movement of the body and the movement of the voice have a common form which is rhythm, but they differ, in that the one is gesture, and the other song.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. And the sound of the voice which reaches and educates 673 the soul, we have ventured to term music.

Cle. True.

Ath. And the movement of the body, which, when regarded as an amusement, we termed dancing; when pursued with a view to the improvement of the body, according to rules of art, may be called gymnastic.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Music, which was one half of the choral art, may be said to have been completely discussed. Shall we proceed to the other half or not? What would you like?

Cle. My good friend, when you are talking with a Cretan and Lacedaemonian, and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what answer are either of us likely to make to you?

Ath. That question is pretty much of an answer; and I understand and accept what you say both as an answer, and also as a command to proceed with gymnastic.

Cle. You quite understand me; do as you say.

Ath. I will; and there will be small difficulty in speaking intelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more familiar than with music.

Cle. That is very true.

Ath. Is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the tendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals; man, as we were saying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and invented dancing; and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed the choral art?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us, and there remains another part to be discussed?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. I have first to add a crown to my discourse about drink.

Cle. What more would you say?

Ath. I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the practice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the enforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same principle, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory over them—in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes drinking an amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he likes, and with whom
674 he likes, and add to this any other indulgences, I shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should adopt such a usage of drinking. I would go farther than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am disposed rather to the law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is on a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all; but I would say that he should drink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male or female, should ever drink wine; and that no rulers should drink during their year of office, nor pilots of vessels, nor judges while on duty should taste wine at all; nor any one who is going to hold a consultation about any matter of importance, nor in the day-time at all, unless in consequence of exercise or as medicine; nor again at night, when any one, either man or woman, is minded to get children. There are numberless other cases also in which those who have good sense and good laws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is true, no city will need many vineyards. Their husbandry and their way of life in general will follow an appointed order, and their cultivation of the vine will be the most limited and moderate of their employments. And this, Stranger, shall be the crown of my discourse about wine, if you agree.

Cle. Excellent: we agree.

BOOK III.

Athenian Stranger. ENOUGH of this. And what, then, is to 676
be regarded as the origin of government? Will not a man
be able to judge best from a point of view in which he may
behold the progress of states and their transitions to good or
evil?

Cleinias. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that he might watch them from the point of
view of time, and observe the changes which take place in them
during infinite ages.

Cle. How so?

Ath. Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which
has elapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of
them?

Cle. Hardly.

Ath. But you are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. And have there not been thousands and thousands of
cities which have come into being and perished during this
period? And has not every place had endless forms of govern-
ment, and been sometimes rising and at other times falling, and
again improving or waning?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Let us endeavour to ascertain the cause of these
changes; for that will probably explain the first origin and
succession of states.

Cle. Very good. You shall endeavour to impart your thoughts
to us, and we will make an effort to understand you.

Ath. Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient 677
traditions?

Cle. What traditions?

Ath. The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which have been occasioned by deluges and diseases, and in many other ways, and of the preservation of a remnant.

Cle. Every one is disposed to believe them.

Ath. Let us imagine one of them: I will take the famous one which was caused by a deluge.

Cle. What is to be remarked in them?

Ath. I mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill shepherds,—small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of mountains.

Cle. Clearly.

Ath. Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts of those who live in cities, and with the various devices which are suggested to them by interest or ambition, and all the wrongs which they contrive against one another.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the sea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Would not all implements perish and every other excellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom utterly fail at that time?

Cle. Why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as they are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been made even in the least particular? For it is evident that the arts were unknown during thousands and thousands of years. And no more than a thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of Daedalus, Orpheus and Palamedes,—since Marsyas and Olympus invented music, and Amphion the lyre,—not to speak of numberless other inventions which are but of yesterday.

Ath. Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is really of yesterday?

Cle. I suppose that you mean Epimenides.

Ath. The same, my friend; for his ingenuity does indeed far overleap the heads of all your great men; what Hesiod had preached of old, he carried out in practice, as you declare.

Cle. Yes, according to our tradition.

Ath. After the great destruction, may we not suppose that the state of man was something of this sort:—In the beginning of things there was a fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two of oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might be a few goats, hardly 678 enough to support the life of those who tended them.

Cle. True.

Ath. And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we are now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at all?

Cle. They could not.

Ath. And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that we now are and have: cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a great deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those who knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained their full development, whether of virtue or of vice?

Cle. I understand your meaning, and you are quite right.

Ath. But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came to be what the world is.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little by little, during a very long period of time.

Cle. That is to be supposed.

Ath. At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears which would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. The fewness of the survivors would make them desirous of intercourse with one another; but then the means of travelling either by land or sea would have been almost entirely lost, as I may say, with the loss of the arts, and there would be great difficulty in getting at one another; for iron and brass and all metals would have become confused, and would have disappeared; nor would there be any possibility of extracting them; and they would have no means of felling timber. Even if you suppose that some implements might have been preserved

in the mountains, they would quickly have worn out and disappeared, and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy had again revived.

Cle. There could not have been.

Ath. In how many generations would this be attained?

Cle. Clearly, not for many generations.

Ath. During this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts which require iron and brass and the like would disappear.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Faction and war would also have died out in those days, and for many reasons.

Cle. How would that be?

Ath. In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men would create in them a feeling of affection and friendship towards one another; and, in the second place, they would have no occasion to fight for their subsistence, for they would have
679 pasture in abundance, except just at first, and in some particular cases; on this pasture-land they would mostly support life in a primitive age, having plenty of milk and flesh, and procuring other food by the chase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. They would also have abundance of clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils either capable of standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and weaving arts do not require any use of iron: God has given these two arts to man in order to provide him with necessaries, that, when reduced to their last extremity, the human race may still grow and increase. Hence in those days mankind were not very poor; nor was poverty a cause of difference among them; and rich they could not be, if they had no gold and silver, and such at that time was their condition. And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will always have the noblest principles; there is no insolence or injustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envyings among them. And therefore they were good, and also because they were what is called simple-minded; and when they were told about good and evil, they in their simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth and practised it. No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now; but what they

heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and lived accordingly; and therefore they were in all respects such as we have described them.

Cle. That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend here.

Ath. Would not many generations living on in a simple manner, although ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and in particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of other arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts, and including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and deed;—although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the men of our day in these respects, would they not, I say, be simpler and more manly, and also more temperate and in general more just? The reason has been already explained.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. I should wish you to understand that what has preceded and what is about to follow, has been, and will be said, with the intention of explaining what need the men of that 680 time had of laws, and who was their lawgiver.

Cle. And thus far what you have said has been very well said.

Ath. They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet; nothing of that sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no letters at this early stage; they lived by habit and the customs of their forefathers, as they are called.

Cle. Probably.

Ath. But there was already existing a form of government which, if I am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and this still remains in many places, both among Hellenes and barbarians, and is the government which is declared by Homer to have prevailed among the Cyclopes:—

‘They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in hollow rocks on the tops of high mountains, and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not trouble themselves about one another.’

Cle. That must be a charming poet of yours; I have read some other verses of his, which are very clever; but I do not know much of him, for foreign poets are little read among the Cretans.

Meg. But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be the prince of them all; the manner of life, however, which he describes is not Spartan, but rather Ionian, and he seems quite to confirm what you are saying, tracing up the ancient state of mankind by the help of tradition to barbarism.

Ath. Yes; and we may accept his witness to the fact that there was a time when primitive societies had this form.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And did not such states spring out of single habitations and families who were scattered and thinned in the devastations; and the eldest of them was their ruler, because with them government originated in the authority of a father and a mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, forming one troop under the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of their parents, which of all sovereignties is the most just?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. After this they came together in greater numbers, and increased the size of their cities, and betook themselves to husbandry, first of all at the foot of the mountains, and made enclosures of loose walls and works of defence, in order to keep off wild beasts; thus creating a single large and common habitation.

Cle. Yes; at least we may suppose it.

Ath. There is another thing which would probably happen.

Cle. What?

Ath. When these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser original ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in the larger; every family would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their separation from one another, would have peculiar customs in things divine and human, which they would have received from their several parents who had educated them; and these customs would incline them to order, when the parents had the element of order in them; and to courage, when they had the element of courage in them. And they would naturally stamp upon their children, and upon their children's children, their own institutions; and, as we are saying, they would find their way into the larger society, having already their own peculiar laws.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of others not so well.

Cle. True.

Ath. Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of legislation?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. The next step will be that these persons who meet together, must choose some arbiters, who will inspect the laws of all of them, and will publicly present such of them as they approve to the chiefs who lead the tribes, and are in a manner their kings, and will give them the choice of them. These will themselves be called legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort of aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships, and in this altered state of the government they will live.

Cle. Yes, they would be appointed in the order which you mention.

Ath. Then, now let us speak of a third form of the state in which all other forms and conditions of politics and cities concur.

Cle. And what is that?

Ath. The form pointed out by Homer was the third form, which succeeds the second. In speaking of the foundation of Dardania, he says,

‘For not as yet had the holy Ilium been built on the plain to be a city of articulately-speaking men; but they were still dwelling at the foot of many-fountained Ida.’

For indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he speaks the words of God and nature; for the inspiration of poets is divine, and often in their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they attain truth. 682

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale, which will probably be found to illustrate in some degree our proposed design:—Shall we do so?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Ilium was built when they had descended from the mountain, in a large and fair plain, on a sort of low hill, watered by many rivers descending from Ida.

Cle. Such is the tradition.

Ath. And that we must suppose to have taken place many ages after the deluge?

Cle. Yes; many ages must have elapsed.

Ath. A marvellous forgetfulness of the former destruction would appear to have come over them, when they placed their town right under numerous streams flowing from the heights, and trusting for security to not very high hills, either.

Cle. There must have been a long interval, clearly.

Ath. And, as men increased in number, many other cities would begin to be built on the plain?

Cle. Doubtless.

Ath. Those cities made war against Troy—by sea as well as land—for at that time men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea.

Cle. Clearly.

Ath. The Achaeans remained ten years, and overthrew Troy.

Cle. True.

Ath. And during the ten years in which the Achaeans were besieging Ilium, the homes of the besiegers were falling into an evil plight. Their youth revolted; and when the soldiers returned to their own cities and families, they did not receive them properly, and as they ought to have done, and numerous deaths, murders, exiles, were the consequence. The exiles came again, under a new name, no longer Achaeans, but Dorians,—a name which they derived from Dorieus, who was the assembler of them. The rest of the story is told by you Lacedaemonians as part of the history of Sparta.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into music and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to the same point, and presents to us another handle. For we have come to the settlement of Lacedaemon; which, as you truly say, is in laws and in institutions the sister of Crete. And we are all the better for the digression, because we have gone through various states

and settlements, and have been present at the foundation of a first, second, and third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. And now there appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was in process of settlement and has continued to this day. If, out of all these, we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what laws are the salvation or destruction of cities, and what changes would make a state happy, O Megillus and Cleinias, we may now begin again, unless we have some reason to find fault with what has preceded.

Meg. If some God, Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry about legislation would be as good and full as the last, I would go a long way to hear such another, and would think that the longest day—and we are now approaching the summer solstice—was too short for the discussion.

Ath. Then I suppose that we must consider this subject?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Let us place ourselves in thought at the moment, when Lacedaemon and Argos and Messene and the other countries were all in complete subjection, Megillus, to your ancestors; for at a later date, as the legend informs us, they divided their army into three portions, and settled three cities, Argos and Messene and Lacedaemon.

Meg. True.

Ath. Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, Procles and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. To these kings all the men of that day made oath that they would assist them, if any one subverted their kingdom.

Meg. True.

Ath. But can a kingdom be destroyed, or was any other form of government ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves? Surely not. Have we forgotten what has just been laid down?

Meg. No.

Ath. And may we not now further confirm what was then said? For we have come upon facts which have brought us

684 back again to the principle; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not be enquiring about an empty theory, but about events which actually happened. The case was as follows:—Three royal heroes made oath to three cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to the kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed according to the laws which were common to all of them: the rulers promised that as time and the race went forward they would not make their rule more arbitrary; and the subjects said that, if the rulers observed these conditions, they would never subvert or permit others to subvert those kingdoms; the kings were to assist kings and peoples when injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like manner. Is not this true?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And these three states to whom laws were given, whether by their kings or by any others, had a further security for the maintenance of their constitutions?

Meg. What security?

Ath. That the other two states were always to come to the rescue against a rebellious third.

Meg. True.

Ath. Many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as the mass of the people will be ready to receive; but this is just as if one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure their pupils or patients in an agreeable manner.

Meg. Exactly.

Ath. Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore health, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of pain.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that day, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws.

Meg. What advantage?

Ath. The legislators of that day, when they equalized property, escaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a person attempts to disturb the possession of

had only known how to make a right use of it—in some way or other; and yet this mode of looking at things may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature, either in our own case or in any other?

Meg. To what are you referring?

Ath. I was thinking of my own admiration of the afore-said Heraclid expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful results for the Hellenes, if only rightly used; and I was just laughing at myself.

Meg. But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we in assenting to you?

Ath. Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing that any one who sees anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that—‘If the owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy would he be, and what great results would he attain!’

Meg. And would he not be right? 687

Ath. Reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise appear just: First, in reference to the question in hand:—If the then commanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they have attained success? Would not this have been the way? They would have bound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their descendants desired. What other aim would they have had?

Meg. Very good.

Ath. Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.

Meg. He would.

Ath. Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?

Meg. What is it?

Ath. The desire which a man has, that all things may

come to pass in accordance with the will of his soul, things human at any rate, if not things divine.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And having this desire always, and at every time of life, he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it.

Meg. No doubt.

Ath. And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Dear is the son to the father—the younger to the elder.

Meg. Of course.

Ath. And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain.

Meg. When the son is young and foolish, you mean?

Ath. Yes; and when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under the influence of feelings like those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?

Meg. I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or endeavour to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason. Every one of us, whether individual or state, ought to pray and endeavour
688 that he may have wisdom.

Ath. Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom; whereas you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four virtues, whereas your regards were fixed upon one of the four only; but that you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the guide of all the rest—I mean wisdom and mind and opinion united with the affection and desire which waits upon them. And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is

full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of the rulers or of their subjects; but the cause was the corrupting influence of the other vices, and especially their ignorance of the most important human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will be the case, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out and demonstrate to you who are my friends, in the course of the argument.

Cle. Pray go on, Stranger;—compliments are troublesome, but we will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words, for we will give them our best attention; and that is the way in which a gentleman expresses his approval.

Meg. Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say.

Cle. By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.

Ath. Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that now, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the utmost of his power.

Cle. That is evident.

Ath. Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what I am about to say; for my opinion is—

Cle. What?

Ath. That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my opinion, the worst ignorance; and the greatest too, because affecting the great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure and pain in the individual is like the mass or popu-

lace in a state. And when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. I am not speaking, Stranger, as you will understand, of the ignorance of handicraftsmen.

Cle. Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.

Ath. Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant, even though he be skilful in calculation and versed in all sorts of accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense, authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason; whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and the opposite of the saviour of the state: he is ignorant of political wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.

Cle. Let this be laid down.

Ath. I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?

Cle. Certainly.

690 *Ath.* And what are the received principles of rule and obedience in cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are they, and how many in number? Is not one claim of authority which is always just, that of fathers and mothers and in general of progenitors over their offspring?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Next follows the principle that the noble should rule

over the ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters rule?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?

Cle. That is a rule not to be disobeyed.

Ath. Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once said; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply to him, it surely is not contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. There is a seventh kind of rule which is conferred by the arbitrament of the lot, and is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is the subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then now, as we say playfully to any of those who lightly undertake the making of laws, You see before you, legislator, the principles of government, and you see the opposition which is naturally inherent in them. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to which you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us, how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic power of the olden time. Was this because they did not know the truly excellent saying of Hesiod, that the half is often greater than the whole? His meaning was, that when the whole was injurious and the half moderate, then the moderate was more and better than the immoderate.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And are we to suppose that this ignorance is less fatal among kings than among peoples?

691 *Cle.* The probability is that ignorance will be a more prevalent disorder among kings, because they lead a proud and luxurious life.

Ath. Is it not palpable that the kings of that time were guilty of trying to be above the established laws, and that they did not consistently observe what they had agreed to observe by word and oath? This inconsistency of theirs may have had the appearance of wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and utterly overthrew the whole empire through fatal error and perversity.

Cle. Very likely.

Ath. Good; and what ought the then legislator to have done in order to avert this calamity? Truly there is no great wisdom in knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has happened; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a much wiser head than ours.

Meg. What do you mean?

Ath. Any one who looks at what has occurred with you, Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought to have been done at that time.

Meg. Speak a little more clearly.

Ath. Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about to make.

Meg. What is it?

Ath. That if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large a sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the mind, and is regardless of the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in the wantonness of excess, runs in the one case to disorder, and in the other to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say, my dear friends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will be able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power—no one who will not, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of diseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends: when this happens his kingdom is undermined, and, all his power vanishes from him.

And great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger. As far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as follows:—

Meq. What?

Ath. A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave you two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you within the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom mingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your government was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength and pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the power of your twenty-eight elders equal with ⁶⁹² that of the kings in your most important matters. But your third saviour, perceiving that your government was still swelling and foaming, imposed as a curb the power of the Ephori, nearly resembling that of officers elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly office, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was preserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there had been only the original legislators, Temenus, Cresphontes, and their contemporaries, as far as they were concerned, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no proper experience in legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths would moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be converted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of government would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom, as I have already said, in judging after the event; there is no difficulty in learning from an example which has already occurred. But if any one could have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate the government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might have saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived; and no Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would have regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.

Cle. True.

Ath. There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them; and the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not

win many great battles both by land and sea ; but what, in my opinion, brought discredit was, first of all, the circumstance that of the three cities one only fought on behalf of Hellas, and the two others were so utterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against Lacedaemon, and thus prevented her from coming to the rescue, and the city of Argos, which had the precedence at the time of the distribution, when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian, would not answer to the call, or give aid. Many things might be told about Hellas in connection with that war which are far from honourable ; nor, indeed, can we rightly say that Hellas repelled the invader ; for the truth is, that unless the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, in concert, had repulsed the advancing host, all the tribes of Hellas would have been fused in a chaos of barbarians mingling with Hellenes, and Hellenes with barbarians ; just as nations who are now subject to the Persian power, owing to unnatural separations and combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered, and live miserably. These things, Megillus, we lay at the door of statesmen and legislators, as they are called, past and present, in order that we may analyse the causes of them, and find out what else might have been done. We were saying, for instance, just now, that there ought to be no great and unmingled powers ; and this was under the idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that a legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. Nor is there any reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for the legislator which appear not to be always the same ; but we should consider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is to be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these are really the same ; and if so a variety in the modes of expression ought not to disturb us.

Cle. Let us resume the argument in that spirit : And now, speaking of friendship and wisdom and freedom, I wish that you would tell me at what, in your opinion, the legislator should aim ?

Ath. Hear me, then : there are two mother forms of states from which the rest may be truly said to be derived ; and

one of them may be called monarchy and the other democracy: the Persians have the highest form of the one, and we of the other; almost all the rest, as I was saying, are varying mixtures of these. Now, if you are to have liberty and the combination of friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government in a measure; the argument emphatically declares that no city can be well governed which is not made up of both.

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. The state which has become exclusively and excessively attached to monarchy or to freedom, has neither of them in moderation; but your states, the Laconian and Cretan, have a certain moderation; and the Athenians and Persians having had more at first, have now less. Shall I tell you why?

Cle. By all means, if it will tend to the elucidation of our 694 subject.

Ath. Hear, then:—There was a time when the Persians had more of the state which is a mean between slavery and freedom. In the reign of Cyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others: the rulers gave a share of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the soldiers were on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves more ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise councillor among them, he imparted his wisdom to the public; for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of speech, and gave honour to those who were able to be his counsellors in anything, and allowed all men equally to participate in wisdom. And the nation waxed in all respects, because there was freedom and friendship and communion of soul among them.

Cle. That certainly appears to have been the case.

Ath. How, then, was this advantage lost under Cambyses, and again recovered under Darius? Shall I try to divine?

Cle. That question, certainly, has a bearing on the subject of our enquiry.

Ath. I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general, had never given his mind to education, and never attended to the order of his household.

Cle. What makes you say so?

Ath. I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, and entrusted the bringing up of his children to the women; and they brought them up from their childhood as the favourites of fortune, who were blessed already, and needed no more blessings. They thought that they were happy enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in any way, and they compelled every one to praise all that they said or did. This was the manner in which they brought them up.

Cle. A splendid education truly!

Ath. Such an education as women were likely to give them, and especially princesses who had recently grown rich, and in the absence of the men, too, who were occupied in wars and dangers, and too busy to look after them.

Cle. What would you expect?

Ath. Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and 695 many herds of men and other animals; but he did not consider that those to whom he was about to make them over were not trained in his own calling, which was Persian; for the Persians are shepherds—sons of a rugged land, which was a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race able to live in the open air and watch, and to fight also, if fighting was required. He did not observe that his sons were trained differently; through the so-called blessing of being royal they were educated in the corrupt Median fashion by women and eunuchs, which led to their becoming such as people do become when they are brought up unreprieved. And so, after the death of Cyrus, his sons, in the fulness of luxury and licence, took the kingdom, and first one slew the other because he could not endure a rival; and, afterwards, the slayer himself, mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through the Medes and the eunuch, as they called him, who despised the folly of Cambyses.

Cle. That is what is said, and is probably the truth.

Ath. Yes; and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the Persians, through Darius and the seven chiefs.

Cle. True.

Ath. Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius

was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education. When he came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in a law the settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised,—thus creating a feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, and attaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which Cyrus had left behind him. Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes; and he again was brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not justly say: ‘O Darius, why did you not learn wisdom from the misfortunes of Cyrus, instead of bringing up Xerxes in the same way in which he brought up Cambyses?’ For Xerxes being the creation of the same education, met with much the same fortune as Cambyses; and from that time to this there has never been a really great king among the Persians, although they are all called great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance as I maintain; the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and 696 royal persons; for never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated. And this, I say, is what the legislator has to consider, and what at this moment has to be considered by us. Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be praised for this—that you do not give special honour or maintenance to wealth rather than to poverty in particular, or to a royal rather than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally commanded them to be given. For no man ought to have preeminent honour in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because he is swift or fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temperance.

Meg. What do you mean, Stranger?

Ath. I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. Then, now hear and judge yourself:—Would you like

to have for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no control over himself?

Meg. Heaven forbid!

Ath. Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?

Meg. Certainly not.

Ath. And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?

Meg. Impossible.

Ath. Any more than our pattern wise man, whom he exhibited as having his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true reason, can be without temperance?

Meg. No.

Ath. There is a further consideration pointing to the due and undue award of honours in states.

Meg. What is it?

Ath. I should like to know whether temperance without the other virtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be had in honour or dishonour?

Meg. I cannot tell.

Ath. And that is the best answer; for whichever alternative you had chosen, I think that you would have gone wrong.

Meg. I am fortunate.

Ath. Very good; a quality, which is a mere appendage of things honourable and dishonourable, does not deserve an expression of opinion, but is best expressed by silence.

Meg. You are speaking of temperance, when you say this?

Ath. Yes; but of the other virtues, that which having this appendage is also most beneficial, will be most deserving of honour, and next that which is beneficial in the next degree; and so, each of them will be rightly honoured according to a regular order.

Meg. True.

697 *Ath.* And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?

Meg. Certainly he should.

Ath. Suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details. But the general division of laws according to their importance into a first and second and third class, we who are lovers of law may make ourselves.

Meg. Very good.

Ath. We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy, as far as the nature of man allows, must and ought to distribute honour and dishonour in the right way. And the right way is to place the goods of the soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance as a condition of them; and in the second place, the goods of the body; and in the third place, those of money and property. And if any legislator or state departs from this rule by giving money the place of honour, or in any way preferring that which is really last, may we not say, that he or the state is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing?

Meg. Yes; let that be plainly asserted.

Ath. The consideration of the Persian governments led us thus far to enlarge. We remarked that the Persians grew worse and worse. And we affirm the reason of this to have been, that they too much diminished the freedom of the people, and introduced too much of despotism, and so destroyed friendship and community of feeling. And when there is an end of these, no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects or of the people, but on behalf of themselves; and if they think that they can gain ever so little for themselves, they devastate cities, and send fire and desolation among friendly races. And as they hate ruthlessly and horribly, so are they hated; and when they want the people to fight for them, they find no community of feeling or willingness to risk their lives in fighting for them; their untold myriads are useless to them on the field of battle, and they think that their salvation depends on the employment of mercenaries and strangers whom they hire, just as if they were in want of men. And they cannot help being stupid, since they proclaim by their actions that the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong are a trifle, when compared with gold and silver.

Meg. Quite true.

Ath. And now enough of the Persians, and their present maladministration of their government, which is owing to the prevalence of slavery and despotism among them.

Meg. Good.

Ath. Next, we must pass in review the government of Attica

in like manner, and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all superior authority, is not by any means so good as a limited government, which was our ancient Athenian constitution at the time when the Persians made their attack on Hellas, or, speakingly more correctly, on the whole continent of Europe. There were four classes, arranged according to a property census, and reverence was our queen and mistress, and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws. Also the vastness of the Persian armament, both by sea and on land, caused a helpless terror, which made us more and more the servants of our rulers and of the laws; and for all these reasons an exceeding harmony prevailed among us. About ten years before the naval engagement at Salamis, Datis came, leading a Persian host by command of Darius, which was expressly sent against the Athenians and Eretrians, having orders to carry them away captive; and these orders he was to execute under pain of death. Now Datis and his myriads soon became complete masters of Eretria, and a fearful report reached Athens that no Eretrian had escaped him; for the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and netted the whole of Eretria. And this report, whether well or ill founded, was terrible to all the Hellenes, and above all to the Athenians, and they sent embassies in all directions, but no one was willing to come to their relief, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians; and they, either because they were detained by the Messenian war, which was then going on, or for some other reason (for the truth of the matter is not accurately known), came a day too late for the battle of Marathon. After this, the news arrived of mighty preparations being made, and innumerable threats came from the king. Then, as time went on, a rumour reached us that Darius had died, and that his
699 son, who was young and hot-headed, had come to the throne and was persisting in his design. The Athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was directed against them, in consequence of the battle of Marathon; and hearing of the bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the host of ships, considering that there was no salvation for them either by land or by sea, for there was no one to help them, and remembering that in the first expedition, when the

Persons delivered letters, as one day, to the
and the danger of an alliance with the
would happen again, at least in less
to the sea, could they destroy any
were attacked by a thousand vessels
of every manner, slight boats and
etc. They saw that on the other hand
a victory impossible victory, and a
found that their only refuge was
lands. All these things considered in
days there was the immediate but
what present law, which every one
their traditional laws, and which I
proving themselves called enemies,
to do as he might be a willing
noted with it that it apt to be
if they had not been possessed
land and the victory, or
they and their country, and
due to them, as they did, but
have been all captured and
disputed.

My: Your words, I think, are not
enough out of your country.

Mr: They are true, Virginia, and
the nature of your enemies, I may
tell it that day. And I would
consider whether my words have
not done all I can do, only to
but for the opportunity sake. There
times both of ourselves and the
the same. In they had their
own interests, the other will
no question? In I would like
improvements have a good deal
to say for the same.

My: Yes, but I wish that you
expression.

Mr: I will. Under the
you are not as soon the market
of the day.

What laws do you mean?

In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music, to say, such music as then existed: in order that we may see the growth of the excess of freedom from the laws of music was early divided among us into certain different manners. One sort consisted of prayers to the gods, and were called *hymns*: and there was another and more solemn sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and a third called dithyrambs: of which latter the subject, if we are not mistaken, was the birth of Dionysus. And they were not called by that word 'laws,' or *nomoi*, meaning 'song,' only because they used such an instrument, as the harp, for example, which was not thought to denote a particular strain. All these different sorts were duly distinguished, nor were they allowed to be confounded with another. And the authorities were determined and gave judgment, and punished the poets who were not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unbecoming voices of the multitude, as in our days; nor in the clappings of the hands. But the directors of the education insisted that the spectators should listen in silence, and that the women and boys, and their tutors, and the multitude, were kept quiet by the touch of the wand. The multitude of good order which the multitude were willing to follow, would not have dared to give judgment by their applause. And then, as time went on, the poets themselves began to be in the reign of ignorance and misrule. They were ignorant of the laws, but they had no knowledge of what is just and reasonable in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with the same delights — mingling lamentations with hymns, and dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute and making out general confusion: ignorantly saying that the music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, is to be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such licentious poems, and adding to them the same licentiousness, they have inspired the multitude with a boldness, and made them fancy that they can give judgment of themselves about melody and song. And in this manner the dumb, who had been before mute, have become vocal, as if they had understanding of good and bad in music.

Persians destroyed Eretria, no one came to their help, or would risk the danger of an alliance with them, they thought that this would happen again, at least on land; nor, when they looked to the sea, could they descry any hope of salvation; for they were attacked by a thousand vessels and more. One chance of safety remained, slight indeed and desperate, but their only one. They saw that on the former occasion they had gained a seemingly impossible victory, and anchored on this hope, they found that their only refuge was in themselves and in the Gods. All these things created in them the spirit of friendship; there was the immediate fear of the occasion, and that other present fear, which sprang out of the habit of obeying their traditional laws, and which I have several times in the preceding discourse called reverence, to which the good man is, as he ought be, a willing servant, and of which the meaner sort of man is apt to be independent and fearless. If they had not been possessed by this fear, they would never have met the enemy, or defended their temples and sepulchres and their country, and everything that was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they would have been all scattered and dispersed.

Meg. Your words, Athenian, are quite true, and worthy of yourself and of your country.

Ath. They are true, Megillus; and to you, who have inherited the virtues of your ancestors, I may properly speak of the actions of that day. And I would wish you and Cleinias, to consider whether my words have not also a bearing on legislation; for I am not discoursing only for the pleasure of talking, but for the argument's sake. Please to remark that the experience both of ourselves and the Persians was, in a certain sense, the same; for they led their people as we led ours, the one into utter servitude, the other into all freedom. And now, how shall we proceed? for I would like you to observe that our previous arguments have a good deal to say for themselves.

Meg. True; but I wish that you would give us a fuller ⁷⁰⁰ explanation.

Ath. I will. Under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not as now the master, but rather the willing servant of the laws.

Mcg. What laws do you mean?

Ath. In the first place, let us speak of the laws about music; that is to say, such music as then existed; in order that we may trace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning; for music was early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. One sort consisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns; and there was another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed paeans, and another called dithyrambs; of which latter the subject, if I am not mistaken, was the birth of Dionysus. And they used the actual word 'laws,' or νόμοι, meaning 'song,' only adding such and such an instrument, of the harp, for example, when they wanted to denote a particular strain. All these and others were duly distinguished, nor were they allowed to intermingle one sort of music with another. And the authority which determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient, was not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical 'sweet voices' of the multitude, as in our days; nor in applause and clappings of the hands. But the directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators should listen in silence to the end; and boys and their tutors, and the multitude in general, were kept quiet by the touch of the wand. Such was the good order which the multitude were willing to observe; they would not have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time went on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of ignorance and misrule. They were men of genius, but they had no knowledge of what is just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with inordinate delights — mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with dithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making one general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth, and, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure of the hearer. And by composing such licentious poems, and adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the multitude with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they can

701 judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this way the theatres from being mute have become vocal, as though they had understanding of good and bad in music

and poetry; and instead of an aristocracy, an evil sort of theatrocracy has grown up. For if the democracy which judged had only consisted of freemen, there would have been no fatal harm done; but in music there first arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general lawlessness;—freedom came following afterwards, and men, fancying that they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the absence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is shamelessness but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion of the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?

Meg. Very true.

Ath. Consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom of disobedience to rulers; and then the attempt to escape the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when near the end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there is the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the Gods,—herein they exhibit and imitate the old Titanic nature; and thus they return again to the old, and lead a life of evils which have no end. Why do I say so? Because I think that the argument ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not be allowed to run away, but held with bit and bridle, and then we shall not, as the proverb says, fall off our ass. Let us then once more ask the question, to what end has all this been said?

Meg. Very good.

Ath. This, then, has been said for the sake——

Meg. Of what?

Ath. We said that the lawgiver ought to have three things in view: first, that the city for which he legislates should be free; and secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have understanding; these were our principles, were they not?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. With a view to this we selected two kinds of government, the one the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are considering which of them is the right form: we took a mean in both cases, of despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other, and we saw that in a mean they attained their perfection; but that when they were

carried to the extreme of either, slavery or despotism, neither party were the gainers.

702 *Meg.* Very true.

Ath. And that was our reason for considering the settlement of the Dorian army, and of the country at the foot of the Dardanian mountains, and the removal of the city to the plain by the sea, and the first men who were the survivors of the deluge. And all that was said about music and drinking, and what preceded, has been said with the view of seeing how a state might be best administered, and how an individual might best order his own life. And now, Megillus and Cleinias, how can we put to the proof the value of our words?

Cle. Stranger, I think that I see how a proof of their value may be obtained. This discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly fortunate, and just what I at this moment want; most auspiciously have you and my friend Megillus come in my way. For I will tell you what has happened to me; and I regard the coincidence as a sort of omen. The greater part of Crete is going to send out a colony, and they have entrusted the management of the affair to the Cnosians; and the Cnosians to me and nine others. And they desire us to give them any laws which we please, whether taken from the Cretan model or from any other; and they do not mind about their being foreign if they are better. Grant me then this favour, which will also be a gain to yourselves:—Let us make a selection from what has been said, and then let us imagine a State of which we will suppose ourselves to be the original colonizers. Thus we shall proceed with our enquiry, and at the same time I may have the use of the framework which you are constructing, for the city which is in contemplation.

Ath. Good news, Cleinias; if Megillus has no objection, you may be sure that I will do all in my power to please you.

Cle. I agree.

Meg. And I too.

Cle. Excellent; and now let us begin to frame the State.

BOOK IV.

Athenian Stranger. And now, what will this city be? I do ⁷⁰⁴ not mean to ask what is or will be the name of the place; that may be determined by the accident of locality or of the original settlement,—a river or fountain, or some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the newly-founded city; but I do want to know what the situation is; whether maritime or inland?

Cleinius. I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which we are speaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.

Ath. And are there harbours on the seaboard?

Cle. Excellent harbours, Stranger; there could not be better.

Ath. You don't say so! And is the surrounding country productive, or in need of importations?

Cle. Hardly in need of anything.

Ath. And is there any neighbouring state?

Cle. None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place; in days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region has been deserted from time immemorial.

Ath. And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and wood?

Cle. Like the rest of Crete in that.

Ath. You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous: had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an importing rather than a producing country, some mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. But there is comfort in the eighty stadia; although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the harbours are so

705 good. Still we must be satisfied. The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways—making the state unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also to other nations. There is a consolation, therefore, in the country producing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance. Had there been abundance there might have been a great export trade, and a great return of gold and silver; which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal results on a State whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments: this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous discussion.

Cle. I remember, and am of opinion that we both were and are in the right.

Ath. Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber for ship-building?

Cle. There is no pine of any consequence, or fir, and not much cypress; and you will find very little stone-pine or plane-wood, which shipwrights always require for the interior of ships.

Ath. These are also natural advantages.

Cle. Why so?

Ath. Because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies in what is mischievous.

Cle. How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have been speaking?

Ath. Remember, my good friend, what I said at first about the Cretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, as you both agreed, was war; and I replied that such laws, in so far as they tended to promote virtue, were good; but in that they regarded a part only, and not the whole of virtue, I disapproved of them. And now I hope that you in your turn will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view to anything but virtue, or with a view to a part of virtue. For I consider that the true lawgiver, like an archer, aims only at
706 that on which some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything else, whether wealth or any other benefit,

when separated from virtue. I was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad thing; and I was thinking of a case in which a maritime people are harassed by enemies, as the Athenians were by Minos (I do not speak from any desire to recall past grievances); but he, as we know, was a great naval potentate, who compelled the inhabitants of Attica to pay him a cruel tribute; and in those days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the country filled with ship timber, and therefore they could not readily build them. Hence neither could they learn how to imitate their enemy at sea, or become sailors themselves, and in this way directly repel their enemies. Better for them to have lost many times over the seven youths, than that heavy-armed and stationary troops should have been turned into sailors, and accustomed to leap quickly on shore, and again to hurry back to their ships; or should have fancied that there was no disgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying boldly; and that there were good reasons, and plenty of them, for a man throwing away his arms, and betaking himself to flight; which is not dishonourable, as people say, at certain times. This is the language of naval warfare, and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise. For we should not teach bad habits, least of all to the best part of the citizens. You may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom Odysseus is introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he desires to draw down the ships to the sea at a time when the Achaeans are hard pressed by the Trojans,—he gets angry with him, and says:—

‘Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the well-oared ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may be accomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us? For the Achaeans will not maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn into the sea, but they will look behind and will cease from strife; in that the counsel which you give will prove injurious.’

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You see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neighbourhood of fighting men, to be an evil;—lions might be trained in that way to fly from a herd of deer. Moreover, naval powers which owe their safety to ships, do not honour that sort of warlike excellence which is most deserving of

honour. For he who owes his safety to the pilot and the captain, and the oarsman, and all sorts of rather good-for-nothing persons, cannot rightly give honour to whom honour is due. But how can a state be in a right condition which cannot duly award honour?

Cle. It is hardly possible, I admit; and yet, Stranger, we Cretans are in the habit of saying that the battle of Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.

Ath. Why, yes; and that is an opinion which is widely spread both among Hellenes and barbarians. But Megillus and I say, rather, that the battle of Marathon was the beginning, and the battle of Plataea the completion of the great deliverance, and that these battles made the Hellenes better; whereas the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium—for I may as well put them both together—made them no better, if I may say so without offence about the battles which helped to save us. And in estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both the situation of a country and the order of the laws, considering that the mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honourable thing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best life, while we live; and that again, if I am not mistaken, is a remark which has been made already.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Then we have only to ask, whether we are taking the course which we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation of states.

Cle. The best by far.

Ath. And now let me proceed to another question: Who are to be the colonists? May any one come out of all Crete; and is the idea that the population in the several states is too numerous for the means of subsistence? For I suppose that you are not going to send out a general invitation to any Hellene who likes to come. And yet I observe that in your country there are people who have come
708 from Argos and Aegina and other parts of Hellas. Tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present enterprise?

Cle. They will come from all Crete; and of other Hellenes,

Peloponnesians will be most acceptable. For, as you truly observe, there are Cretans of Argive descent; and the race of Cretans which has the highest character at the present day, is the Gortynian, and this has come from Gortys in the Peloponnesus.

Ath. Cities find colonization in some respects easier when the colonists are one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent out from a single country, friends from friends, owing to some pressure of population, or other similar necessity, or because a portion of a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole cities which have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior power in war. This, however, which is in one way an advantage to the colonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty. There is an element of friendship in the community of race, and language, and laws, and in common sacrifices, and the like; but colonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any laws different from their own; and although the badness of their own laws has undone them, yet because of the force of habit they would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin; and the leader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome and rebellious. On the other hand, the conflux of several populations might be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then, to make them combine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult task, and the work of years. And yet there is nothing which perfects the virtue of men like legislation and colonization.

Cle. No doubt; but I should like to know why you say so.

Ath. My good friend, I am afraid that the course of my speculations is leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators; but if the word be to the purpose there can be no harm. And yet, why am I disquieted, for I believe that the same principle applies equally to all human things?

Cle. To what are you referring?

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Ath. I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning governments and changing laws.

And the power of disease has often caused innovations in the state, when there have been pestilences and bad seasons continuing during many years. Any one who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which I was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human affairs chance is almost everything. And this may be said of the arts of the sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may seem to be well said ; and yet there is another thing which may be said with equal truth of all of them.

Cl. What is it?

Ath. That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him in the government of human affairs. There is, however, a third and less extreme view, that art should be there also ; for I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage in having a pilot. You would agree?

Cl. Yes.

Ath. And might not this be also said of legislation as well as of other things : even supposing all other circumstances favourable, the true legislator is still required, from time to time, to provide for the happiness of the state?

Cl. That I admit.

Ath. In each case the artist would be right in praying for certain favourable conditions, under which he would only require to exercise his art?

Cl. Very true.

Ath. And all other artists, if they had to offer up their prayers, would do likewise?

Cl. Certainly.

Ath. And the legislator would do so too?

Cl. I believe that he would.

Ath. ‘Come, legislator,’ we will say to him ; ‘what conditions do you require of us before you organize your state?’ What ought he to answer? Shall I give the answer of the legislator?

Cl. Very good.

Ath. He will say—‘Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant, and let the tyrant be young and have a good memory ; let him be quick at learning, and of a courageous and noble nature ; let him have that which, as I said before, is the

inseparable companion of all the other parts of virtue, if there 710
is to be any good in them.'

Cle. I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the Stranger speaks, must be temperance?

Ath. Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; not that which in the exaggerated language of some philosophers is demonstrated to be prudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, and makes some of them live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated, was, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I think that you must understand my meaning?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities, if the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time the form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there neither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a polity than by a tyranny.

Cle. By what possible arguments, Stranger, can you prove such a monstrous doctrine?

Ath. There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in accordance with the order of nature?

Cle. You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young, temperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a noble nature?

Ath. Yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be that he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy chance brings them together. When this has been accomplished, God has done all that He can ever do for a state which he desires to be eminently prosperous; He has done second best for a state in which there are two such rulers, and third best for a state in which there are three. The difficulty increases with the increase of the number, and diminishes with the diminution of the number.

Cle. You mean to say, I suppose, that the best government is produced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an orderly tyrant, and most easily and rapidly passes out of such a tyranny into a perfect form of government; and, in

the second degree, out of an oligarchy; and, in the third degree, out of a democracy: is not that your meaning?

Ath. Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out of a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of some sort of democracy: fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes oligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such a change, because the government is in the hands of a number of potentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true sort, and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the state; and when he is strongest, and, at the same time, 711 there are the fewest persons concerned, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be easiest and most rapid.

Cle. How? I do not understand.

Ath. And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times; but I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?

Cle. No; I cannot say that I have any great desire to see one.

Ath. And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see that of which I am now speaking.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very long period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners of a state: he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice, whichever he prefers, he himself setting an example in his own person, praising and countenancing some actions, and reproving and setting a note of dishonour upon others.

Cle. But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at once follow the example set to them; or how can he have this power both of persuading and of compelling them?

Ath. Let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker and easier way in which laws act upon states than when the rulers lead: such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass in any other way. The real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is rarely surmounted in the course of ages; but when once it is surmounted, ten thousand or rather all blessings follow.

Cle. Of what are you speaking?

Ath. The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope to reproduce the character of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. This, however, according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy; in our own days there is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has or ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And this may be said of power in general: When the supreme power ⁷¹² in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws and the best constitution come into being; but in no other way. And I would have what I am saying regarded as a sort of divination and declaration that, in one point of view, there may be a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but that there is another point of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected, granting our supposition.

Cle. How do you mean?

Ath. Let us try to put into words the laws which are suitable to your state; like children, framing our lips to utter them.

Cle. Let us proceed without delay.

Ath. Then let us invoke God at the settlement of our state; may He hear and be propitious to us, and come and set in order the State and the laws!

Cle. May he come!

Ath. But what form of polity are we going to give the city?

Cle. Tell me what you mean a little more clearly. Do you mean what form of polity, as, for example, democracy or oligarchy, or aristocracy or monarchy? For I suppose that you would not include tyranny.

Ath. Which of you will answer first, to which of these classes your own government is to be referred?

Meg. Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?

Cle. Perhaps you should.

Meg. And yet, Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more thought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, for it seems to me to be like a tyranny; the

power of our Ephors is marvellously tyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities the most democratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy? We have also a monarchy which is held for life, and is said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most ancient of all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I cannot precisely say which form of government the Spartan is.

Cle. I am in the same difficulty, Megillus, for I do not feel confident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these.

Ath. The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have polities, but the cities of which we were speaking are
713 mere aggregations of citizens who are the subjects and servants of parts of their own state; they are named after their several ruling powers, and are not polities at all. But if states are to be named after their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name of the God who rules over wise men.

Cle. And who is this God?

Ath. May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that I may be better able to answer your question: shall I?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. In the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came into being whose settlements we have described, there is said to have been in the time of Cronos a blessed state and way of life, of which the best-ordered of existing states is a copy.

Cle. It will be very necessary to hear about that.

Ath. I quite agree with you; and therefore I have introduced the subject.

Cle. Most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, you will do well in giving us the whole story.

Ath. I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happy life of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant. And of this the reason is said to have been as follows:—Cronos knew what we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with supreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with insolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but demigods, who

are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and rulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other tame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or goats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over them. In like manner God, in His love of mankind, placed over us the demons, who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us and giving us peace and reverence and order and justice never failing, made the tribes of men happy and peaceful. And this tradition, which is true, declares that cities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler, have no escape from evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the life which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as the principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both in private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses ⁷¹⁴ according to law, meaning by the very term 'law,' the distribution of mind¹. But if either an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul eager after pleasures and desires—wanting to be filled with them, yet retaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and insatiable disorder; and this evil soul, having first trampled the laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or an individual,—then, as I was saying, there is no possibility of salvation. And now, Cleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept my view.

Cle. Certainly we will.

Ath. Do you know that there are often said to be as many forms of laws as there are of governments? And how many there are of these we have already stated. And this you must regard as a matter of very great importance. For what is to be the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men say that the law ought not to regard either peace or war, or virtue in general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the existing form of government; this is thought by them to be the best way of expressing the natural definition of justice.

Cle. How?

¹ νόμος = νοῦ διανομή.

Ath. Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger.

Cle. Speak plainer.

Ath. I will; they surely assume that the governing power makes whatever laws have authority in any state?

Cle. True.

Ath. Well, they would say, and do you suppose that tyranny or democracy, or any other conquering power, does not make the continuance of the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of their laws?

Cle. How can they have any other?

Ath. And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an evil-doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just?

Cle. Naturally.

Ath. This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justice exists?

Cle. Certainly, if we are correct in our view.

Ath. Why, yes, this is one of the evil forms of government to which we were referring.

Cle. What were they?

Ath. Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to govern whom. Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought to govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the ignoble? And there were many other principles, if you remember, and they were not
715 always consistent. One principle was that of Pindar; he spoke of law in the order of nature doing and justifying violence.

Cle. Yes; I remember.

Ath. Consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted. For there is a thing which has occurred times without number in states—

Cle. What?

Ath. That when there has been a contest for power, and the conquerors have monopolized the government, and have refused all share to the defeated party and their descendants, they have lived watching one another, in perpetual fear that some one will come into power who has a recollection of former wrongs, and will rise up against them. Now, according to our view, such governments are not politics at all, nor are laws right which are

passed for the good of particular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States which have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notion of justice is simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert that we must not entrust the government in your state to any one because he is rich, or because he possesses any advantage, such as strength, or stature, or again birth: but he who is most obedient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm; and to him who is victorious in the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry of the gods; and the second to him who bears the second palm; and in a similar ratio shall all the other offices be assigned to their holders. And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of the law, I give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because I certainly believe that upon their service or ministry depends the well- or ill-being of the state. For that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can confer.

Cle. Truly, Stranger, you see with the keen vision of age.

Ath. Why, yes; every man when he is young has that sort of vision dullest, and when he is oldest most keen.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And now, what is to be the next step? May we not suppose the colonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. 'Friends,' we say to them,—'God, as the old tradition declares, holding in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, moves according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always follows Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To that law, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows it in all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or money, or honour, or beauty, who has a soul hot with folly, and youth, and insolence, and thinks that he has no need of a guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being

thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think?'

Cl. Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of the God; there can be no doubt of that.

Ath. Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in his followers? One only, according to the old saying that 'like agrees with like, with measure measure,' but things which have no measure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have measure. Now, God is the measure of all things, in a sense far higher than any man, as they say, can ever hope to be. And he who would be dear to God must, as far as is possible, be like Him and such as He is. Wherefore the temperate man is the friend of God, for he is like Him; and the intemperate man is unlike Him, and different from Him, and unjust. And the same holds of other things, and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and truest of all sayings:—that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. But with the bad man, the opposite of this holds: for the bad man has an impure soul, whereas the good is pure; and from one who is polluted, neither a good man nor God is right in receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste
717 their much service upon the Gods, which, when offered by any holy man, is always accepted of them. Such is the mark at which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and how shall we direct them? In the first place, we affirm that next after the Olympian Gods, and the Gods of the State, honour should be given to the Gods below; they should receive everything in even numbers, and of the second choice, and of evil omen, while the odd numbers and the first choice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by him who would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods,

a wise man will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes, and after them will follow the sacred places of private and ancestral Gods, having their ritual according to law. Next comes the honour of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up, and that he must do all that he can to minister to them: first, in his property; secondly, in his person; and thirdly, in his soul; paying the debts due to them for the care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old, in the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long he ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them; for of all light and winged words he will have to give an account; Nemesis, the messenger of justice, is appointed to watch over them. When they are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed, he should not resist them; for a father who thinks that he has been wronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. At their death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the customary expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been usually shown by the former generation to their parents; and let a man not forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring them chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual remembrance 718 of them, and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to the dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our reward from the Gods and those who are above us; and we shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man ought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and friends and citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by Heaven, and the intercourse which arises out of them, all with a view to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life—these things, I say, the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish, partly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the persuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus render our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy. But of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of my way of

thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be out of place—of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of himself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far as he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed to the work of legislation. Now, what will be the form of such prefaces? There may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a single form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can guarantee one thing.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. I should wish the citizens to be as receptive of virtue as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all his laws.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. What I have been proposing appears to me to have some use; for a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the precepts addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not altogether unprepared to receive them. Even a little done in the way of conciliation gains his ear, and is always worth having. For there is no great inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as good, or as quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the wisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and very short, and there is no need of perspiring:—

‘But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labour, and
719 long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first; but when you have reached the top, then, however difficult, it becomes easy.’

Cle. Yes; and he certainly speaks well.

Ath. Very true: and now let me tell you the effect which the preceding discourse has had upon me.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Suppose that we have a little conversation with the legislator, and say to him—‘O, legislator, speak; if you know what we ought to say and do, you can surely tell.’

Cle. Certainly, he can.

Ath. Did we not hear you just now saying, that the legislator ought not to allow the poets to do what they liked? For that they did not know in which of their words they went against the laws, to the hurt of the state.

Cl. That is true.

Ath. May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets—

Cl. What answer shall we make to him?

Ath. That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever prevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the tripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows the stream of thought to flow freely, and his art being imitative, he is often compelled to represent men under opposite circumstances, and thus to say two different things; neither can he tell whether there is any truth in either of them, or in one more than in the other. But this is not the case in a law; the legislator must give not two rules about the same thing, but one only. Take an example from what you have just been saying. Of three kinds of funerals, there is one which is too extravagant, another is too niggardly, the third in a mean; and you choose and approve and order the last without qualification. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she bade me bury her, and I were to describe her burial in poetry, I should praise the extravagant sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to spend, would approve of the niggardly; and the man of moderate means, who was himself moderate, would praise a moderate funeral. Now you in the capacity of legislator must not barely say 'a moderate funeral,' but you must define what moderation is, and how much; unless you are definite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can become law.

Cl. Very true.

Ath. And is our legislator to have no preface to his laws, but to say at once Do this, avoid that—and then holding the penalty in terrorem, to go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or exhortation to those for whom he is legis- 720
lating, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors, as you doubtless know, there are two kinds, a gentler and a ruder, and two modes of cure; and as children ask the doctor to be gentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders with the gentlest remedies. What I mean to say is, that besides doctors there are their assistants, who are also styled doctors.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference; they acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their masters; empirically and not rationally, as the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves the art which they impart to their pupils. You are aware that there are these two classes of doctors?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And did you ever observe that there are two classes of patients in states, slaves and freemen; and the slave doctors run about and cure the slaves, and wait for them in the dispensaries—practitioners of this sort never talk to their patients individually, or let them talk about their own individual complaints? The doctor prescribes what he thinks good, out of the abundance of his experience, as if he had no manner of doubt; and when he has given his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance to some other servant who is ill; and so he relieves the master of the house of the care of his invalid slaves. But the other doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practises upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; he enters into discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at once getting information from the sick man, and also instructing him as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for him until he has first convinced him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more under his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he attempts to effect a cure. Now, which is the better way of proceeding in a physician and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his ends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder and inferior?

Cle. I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far better.

Ath. Should you like to see an example of the double and single method in legislation?

Cle. Certainly I should.

721 *Ath.* What will be our first law? Will not the legislator, observing the order of nature, begin by making regulations for births?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And in all states the birth of children goes back to the connection of marriage?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Then, according to the true order, the laws relating to marriage should be those which are first determined in every state?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form, which may be as follows:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or shall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. This would be the simple law about marriage. The double law would run as follows:—A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that the human race naturally partakes of immortality, of which all men have the greatest desire implanted in them; for the desire of every man that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name, is only the love of continuance. Now, mankind are coeval with all time, and are ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and so they are immortal, inasmuch as they leave children behind them, and partake of immortality in the unity of generation. And for a man voluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who will not have a wife or children, is impiety. He who obeys the law shall be free, and shall pay no fine; but he who is disobedient, and does not marry, when he has arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a yearly fine of a certain amount, in order that his celibacy may not be a source of ease and profit to him; and he shall not share in the honours which the young men in the state give to the aged. Comparing now the two forms of the law, you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any other laws—whether they should be double in length even when shortest, because they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall only threaten and be of half the length.

Mcg. The Lacedaemonians, Stranger, would generally prefer the shorter form; although, for my own part, if any one were to ask me which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in favour of the longer; and I would have every law 722

made after the same pattern, if I had to choose. But I think that Cleinias is the person to be consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws.

Cle. Thank you, Megillus.

Ath. Whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a very unmeaning question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be approved; nor is length at all to be regarded. In the form of law which has been recited, the one kind is not only twice as good in practical usefulness as the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds of doctors, of whom I was just now speaking. And yet legislators never appear to have considered that whereas they have two instruments which they might use in legislation—persuasion and force, in so far as a rude and uneducated multitude are capable of being affected by them, they use one only; for they do not mingle persuasion with antagonism, but employ force pure and simple. There is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to be, and never is, regarded in our existing laws.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. A point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes into my mind I know not how. All this time, from early dawn until noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat: now we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only the prelude of them. Why do I mention this? For this reason:—Because all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which is to be performed; lyric measures and every other sort of music have preludes framed with wonderful care. But of the truer and higher strain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or composed or published any, as though there was no such thing in nature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there is—these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly double, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of
723 the law. The arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of the physicians, whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple; and that which preceded, and was described by our friend as hortatory only,

was, in fact, an exhortation, and is analogous to the preamble of a discourse. For I imagine that all this language of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the preface of the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom he addressed, in order that, by reason of this good-will, he might more intelligently receive his command, that is to say, the law. And therefore, in my way of speaking, this is more rightly described as the preamble than as the matter of the law. And I must further proceed to observe, that the legislator should not make laws which have no preambles; he should remember how great will be the difference between them, accordingly as they have, or have not, preambles, as in the instance already given.

Cle. The lawgiver, if he asks my opinion, will certainly legislate in the form which you advise.

Ath. I think that you are quite right, Cleinias, in affirming that all laws have preambles, and that throughout the whole of this work of legislation every single law should have a suitable preamble at the beginning; for that which is to follow is most important, and whether this is clearly recorded or not is a very serious matter. Yet we should be wrong in requiring that all laws, small and great alike, should have preambles of the same kind, any more than all songs or speeches; although they may be natural to all, they are not always necessary, and whether they are to be employed or not has to be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician, or, in the present instance, of the lawgiver.

Cle. That I think is most true. And now, Stranger, without delay, let us return to the argument, and, as people say in play, make a second and better beginning, if you please, with the principles which we have been laying down, which we never thought of regarding as a preamble before, but of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider them to be chance topics of discourse. Let us acknowledge, then, that we have a preamble. About the honour of the Gods and the respect of parents, enough has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics which follow next in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be complete: and after that you shall go through the laws themselves.

724 *Ath.* I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient preamble about the Gods and demons, and about parents living or dead; and now you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of day?

Cle. Exactly.

Ath. After this, as is meet and for the general interest, I the speaker, and you the listeners, will try to estimate all that relates to the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens, as regards both their occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies, at the nature of education—that will follow next in order.

Cle. Very good.

BOOK V.

Athenian Stranger. LISTEN, all ye who have just now heard 726
the laws about Gods, and about our dear forefathers:—Of all
the things which a man has, next to the Gods, his soul is the
most divine and most truly his own. Now in every man there
are two parts: the better and superior part, which rules, and
the worse and inferior part, which serves; and the ruler is
always to be preferred to the servant. Wherefore I am right 727
in bidding every one next to the Gods, who are our masters,
and those who in order follow them, to honour his own soul,
which every one seems to honour, but no one honours as he
ought; for honour is a divine good, and no evil thing is
honourable; and he who thinks that he can honour the soul
by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without making
her in any way better, seems to honour her, but honours her
not at all. For example, every man, from his very boyhood,
fancies that he is able to know everything, and thinks that
he honours his soul by praising her, and he is very ready
to let her do whatever she may like. But I mean to say that
in acting thus he only injures his soul, and does not honour
her; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honour her as
second only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that
others are to be blamed, and not himself, for the errors which
he has committed, and the many and great evils which befell
him in consequence, and is always fancying himself to be
exempt and innocent, he is under the idea that he is honour-
ing his soul; whereas the very reverse is the fact, for he is
really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and
approval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again
he is far from honouring her; he only dishonours her, and fills

her full of evil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labours and fears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way before them, then, by yielding, he does not honour the soul, but by all such conduct he makes her to be dishonourable; nor when he thinks that life at any price is a good, does he honour her, but yet once more he dishonours her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all evil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her that, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, instead of being evil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers beauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the soul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honourable than the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth which is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise of the soul has no idea how greatly he under-
 728 values this wonderful possession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to acquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts?—far otherwise; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold; but all the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in exchange for virtue. In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate the base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the legislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise the other with all his might, does not know that he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is the divinest part of man; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing—namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the conversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and follow after the company of the bad. And he who is joined to them must do and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another, a suffering which is not justice but retribution; for justice and the just are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon injustice; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable,—in the former case, because he is not cured; while in the latter, he perishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved.

Speaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve the inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, in the best manner possible. And of all the possessions which a man has, the soul is by nature most inclined to avoid the evil, and search out and find the chief good; and having found, to dwell with the good during the remainder of life. Wherefore the soul also is second in honour; and third, as every one will perceive, comes the honour of the body in natural order. Having determined this, we have next to consider that there is a genuine honour of the body, and that of honours some are and some are not genuine. The legislator, as I suspect, ranks them in the following order:—Honour is not to be given to the fair, or the strong, or the swift, or the tall, or the healthy body (although many may think otherwise), any more than to their opposites; but the mean states of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for the one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other, illiberal and mean; and money, and property, and distinction all go to the same tune. The excess of any of these things is apt to be a ⁷²⁹ source of hatreds and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect of them is commonly a cause of slavery. And, therefore, I would not have any one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order that he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great wealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of youth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of the necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being in accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most entirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children not riches, but the spirit of reverence. We, indeed, fancy that they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they show a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to them by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the young ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather exhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take heed that no young man sees or hears him doing or saying anything base; for where old men have no shame, there young men will most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way

of training the young, is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them, but to be always carrying out your own principles in practice. He who honours his kindred, and reveres those who share in the same Gods, and are of the same blood and family, may fairly expect that the Gods who preside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken his seed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances do to him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them, and his own favours to them less than theirs to him, will have their good-will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the state and his fellow-citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than the Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the palm of obedience to the laws of his country; and who, of all mankind, is the person reputed to have obeyed them best during his whole life. In his relations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a most holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are more directly dependent on the protection of God, than the wrongs done to citizens; for the stranger having no kindred and friends, is more to be pitied by Gods and men. Wherefore, also, he who is most able to assist him is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the divinity and god of the stranger, who follows in the train of Zeus, the
 730 god of strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in him, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against the stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or fellow-countrymen, that against suppliants is the greatest. For the God who witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant, becomes in a special manner the guardian of the sufferer; and he will certainly not suffer unavenged.

Thus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about his parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the state, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own countrymen, and in what concerns the stranger. I will now describe what manner of man he must be who would best pass through life in respect of those other things which are not matters of law, but of praise and blame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and

make him more tractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed.

Truth is the beginning of every good thing, both in heaven and on earth; and he who would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then he can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither condition is to be desired, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend, and as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself isolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane: so that, whether his children or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary. Worthy of honour, too, is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour if he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing any; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men, because he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet more highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in correcting the citizens as far as he can—he shall be proclaimed the great and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same praise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods which may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for himself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he who is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he who is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow 731 others to partake in a friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however, which he has, is not to be undervalued because possessed by him, but to be acquired by us to the utmost of our power. Let every man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be no envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states—he himself contends in the race and defames no man; but the envious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others, is less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his rivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And thus he deprives the whole city of the proper training for the contest of virtue, and diminishes

her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should be valiant, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly curable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done by others, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and conquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not of a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of those who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us remember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no man of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils, and least of all in the most honourable part of himself. And the soul, as we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable. In the soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if he could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils. The unjust and the unfortunate are always to be pitied in any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is curable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not giving way to passion, and continuing wrathful like a woman who has been piqued. But upon him who is incapable of reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured out; wherefore, I say, that good men ought, when occasion arises, to be both gentle and passionate. The greatest evil to men, generally, is one which is innate in their souls, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never correcting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying, 'that every man by nature is and ought to be his own friend.' Whereas the excessive love of self is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover is blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just, the good, and the honour-
732 able, and thinks that he ought always to prefer his own interest to the truth. But he who would be a great man, ought to regard what is just, and not himself or his interests, whether in his own actions, or those of others. Through a similar error, men are induced to fancy that their own ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly said to know nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will not let others act for us in what we do not know, we are compelled to act amiss ourselves. Wherefore, let every man

avoid excess of self-love, and condescend to follow a better man than himself, not allowing any false shame to stand in the way. There are also lesser matters than these which are often repeated, and with good reason; a man should recollect them and remind himself of them. For when a stream is flowing out, there should be water flowing in too; and recollection is the flowing in of failing knowledge. Therefore I say that a man should refrain from excess either of laughter or tears, and should exhort his neighbour to do the same; he should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave with propriety, whether the genius of his good fortune remains with him, or whether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and steep places, the Gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. Still he may hope, that when calamities supervene upon the blessings which the God gives him, he will lighten them and change existing evils for the better; and as to the goods which are the opposite of these evils, he will not doubt that they will be ever present with him, and that he will be fortunate. Such should be men's hopes, and such should be the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never losing an opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves and others, of all these things both in jest and earnest.

Enough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the practices which men ought to follow, and the several characters which they ought to cultivate. But of human things we have not as yet spoken, and we must; for to men we are discoursing and not to Gods. Pleasures and pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them every mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most eager interest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life, not only as the fairest in appearance, but if a man will only taste, and not as in the days of youth run away to another, he will find that this nobler life surpasses also in the very thing which we all of us desire,—I mean in 733 having the greatest pleasure and the least pain during the whole of life. And this will be plain, and will be quickly and clearly seen, if a man has a true taste of them. But what is a true taste? That we have to learn from the argu-

ment,—the point being what is according to nature, and what is not according to nature. One life must be compared with another; the more pleasurable with the more painful, after this manner:—We desire to have pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose pain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not for pleasure but for pain; and we also choose less pain and greater pleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not choose; and an equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should desire. And all these differ or do not differ severally in number and magnitude and intensity and equality, and in the opposites of these when regarded as objects of choice, in relation to the will. And such being the necessary order of things, we choose that life in which there are many great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which the pleasures are in excess, and do not choose that in which the opposites exceed; nor, again, do we choose that in which the elements of either are small and few and feeble, and the pains exceed. And when, as I said before, there is a balance of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be regarded by us as the balanced life; while other lives are preferred by us because they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because they exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be regarded by us as bound up in these, and we must also consider what sort of lives we by nature choose. And if we wish for any others, I say that we choose them only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which actually exist.

Now, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and beheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites, and making of them a law, choosing, I say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and noblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible? Let us say that the temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and the courageous another, and the healthful another; and to these four let us oppose four other lives,—the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate, the diseased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in all things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid desires and
 734 loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous

in all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and stinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life the pleasures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains exceed the pleasures in greatness and number and intensity. Hence one of the two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other more painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to live intemperately. And if this is true, the inference clearly is that no man is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men lack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance or from want of self-control or both. And the same holds of the diseased and healthy life; they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure exceeds the pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now, our intention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed, but the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we determine to be the more pleasant life. And we should say that the temperate life has the elements both of pleasure and pain fewer and minuter and less concentrated than the intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life, and the life of courage than the life of cowardice; the one class exceeding in pleasure and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing the coward, and the wise exceeding the fool. And so in all lives the one class exceed the other class in pleasure; the temperate and courageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and intemperate and diseased lives; and generally speaking, that which has any virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious life, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and excellence and goodness and reputation, and causes him who lives accordingly to be infinitely happier than the opposite.

Enough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak more correctly, an outline of them. As, then, in the case of a web or any other tissue, the warp and the woof cannot be made of the same materials, but the warp is necessarily superior as being stronger, and having a certain character of firmness, whereas the woof is softer and has a proper degree of elasticity;—in a similar manner those who are to hold great offices in states, should be distinguished truly in each

case from those who have been but slenderly proven by education. I say, therefore, that there are two parts in the constitution of a state—one the appointment of officers, the other the rules which are prescribed for them.

But, before all this, comes the following consideration:—The shepherd or herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his animals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in a manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy and unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send away the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest, reflecting that his labours will be vain and without effect, either on the souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted, and that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature and being of every other animal, if he neglect to purge them away. Now, the case of other animals is not so important;—they are only worth mentioning for the sake of illustration, but what relates to man is of the highest importance; and the legislator should make inquiries, and indicate what is proper for each in the way of purification and of any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a city—there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more difficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them, the legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect; but he who without a despotism sets up a new government and laws, even if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if he can complete his work. The best kind of purification is painful, like similar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting death or exile in the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose of great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury of the

736 whole state. But the milder form of purification is as follows:—when men who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to follow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich—these, who are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator in a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and this dismissal of them is euphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to

do this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. For there is no need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the circumstances in which we are placed. But, as when many streams flow together from springs and mountain torrents into a single lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters should be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and draw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there may be trouble and danger. But, seeing that we are discoursing and not acting, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the desired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join and be citizens of our state, we will not allow them to come until we have tested them by persuasion and time; but the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends with open arms.

Another piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were saying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours,—that we have escaped division of land and the abolition of debts; for these are always a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven to legislation upon such matters can neither allow the old ways to continue, nor yet venture to alter them. We must have recourse to prayers, as men say, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously effected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished¹ by those who have abundance of land, and having also many debtors, are willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want, sometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of moderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man's desires and not the diminution of his property. For this is the chiefest foundation of a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected afterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances; but if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the political superstructure which is added will hardly succeed. That is a danger which, as I⁷³⁷ am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better say how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may venture now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow or broad, can be devised but a just contentment—upon

¹ Reading ὑπάρχει.

this rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be no disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long standing among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed a step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that they to whom God has given, as He has to us, to be the founders of a new state free from enmity—that they should create themselves enmities by reason of their mode of dividing lands and houses, would be super-human folly and wickedness.

How can we rightly order our citizens? In the first place, their number has to be determined, and also the number and size of the portions which are to be assigned to them; and the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us as fairly as we can. The number of citizens can only be estimated satisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring states. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of inhabitants in a moderate way of life—more than this is not required; and the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves against the injustice of their neighbours, and also to give them the power of aiding their neighbours when they are wronged. Upon this basis we will define the limits of theirs and their neighbours' territory both in theory and fact. And now, let us proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting the form and outline of our state. The number of our citizens shall be 5040—this will be a convenient number; and these shall be owners of the land and protectors of the ownership. The houses and the land will be divided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let the whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three; and the number is further capable of being divided into four or five parts, or any number of parts up to ten. Every legislator ought to know so much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely
738 to be useful to all cities; and we are going to take that number which contains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions. The whole of number has every possible division, and the number 5040 can be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed without interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for war and peace,

and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions. These properties of number should be ascertained at leisure by those who are bound by law to know them; for they are true, and should be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use. Whether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old and decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples,—the temples which are to be built in each city, and the Gods or demi-gods after whom they are to be called,—if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in anything which the oracle of Delphi, or Dodona, or Ammon, or any ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by apparitions or reputed inspiration of Heaven in obedience to which mankind have established sacrifices in connection with mystic rites, either originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus or some other place, and on the strength of these traditions have consecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and made sacred groves for each of them. The least part of all these ought not to be disturbed by the legislator; but he should assign to the several districts some God, or demi-god, or hero, and, in the distribution of the soil, should give to these first their separate domain and all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the district may meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply their several wants, and entertain one another with sacrifices, and become friends and acquainted; for there is no greater good in a state than that the citizens should be known to one another. When darkness and not light reigns in the daily intercourse of life, no man will receive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the justice to which he is fairly entitled: wherefore, in every state, above all other things, every man ought to take heed of this,—that he have no deceit in him, but that he be always true and simple, and that no other deceitful person take any advantage of him.

And now comes the movement of the pieces from the sacred 739 line as in the game of draughts. The form of constitution being unusual, may excite wonder when mentioned for the first time; but, upon reflection and trial, will appear to us, if not the best, to be the second best. And yet a person may not approve this form, because he thinks that the sort of legislation is ill adapted

to a legislator who has not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of government, the best, the second and third best, which we may just mention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement. Following this method in the present instance, let us speak of that state which is first and second and third in excellence, and then leave to Cleinias, or to some one else, the selection of that form of polity which he approves in his own country.

The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that 'Friends have all things in common.' Whether there is now, or ever will be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions, and the laws unite the city to the utmost,—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who dwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is like this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by the grace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the nature and origin of the second.

740 Let them at once distribute their land and houses, and not till the land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond their proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But in making the distribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular lots also belong to the whole city; and seeing that the earth is their parent, let them tend her more carefully than children do their mother. For she is a goddess and their queen, and they are her mortal subjects. Such also are the feelings which they ought to entertain to the Gods and demi-

gods of the country. And in order that the distribution may always remain, they ought to consider further that the present number of families should be always retained, and neither increased nor diminished. This may be secured for the whole city in the following manner:—Let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is his best beloved, and one only, to be the heir of his dwelling, and his successor in the duty of ministering to the Gods, the family and the state, as well the living as those who are departed; but of his other children, if he have more than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the law to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall distribute as sons to such of the citizens as have no children, and are likely to be thankful; or if there are none, and particular individuals have too many children, male or female, or too few, as in the case of barrenness—in all these cases let the highest and most honourable magistracy created by us, judge and determine what is to be done with the redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040 houses shall always remain the same. There are many ways of regulating numbers; for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain, and, on the other hand, special care may be taken to increase the number of births by rewards and stigmas, and by the instruction and admonition of the younger by their elders—in this way the object may be attained. And if after all there be very great difficulty about the preservation of the 5040 houses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too great love of those who live together, and we are at our wit's end, there is still the old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony, which will part friends with us, and be composed of suitable persons. If, on the other 741 hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague of war, and the inhabitants become much fewer than the appointed number by reason of mortality, you ought not to introduce citizens of spurious birth and education, if this can be avoided; but even God is said not to be able to fight against necessity.

Wherefore let us suppose this 'high argument' of ours to address us in the following terms:—Best of men, cease not to honour in their natural order similarity and equality and

sameness and agreement, as manifested in number and in every quality of goodness and greatness. And, above all, observe the aforesaid number 5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not disparage the small and modest proportions of the inheritances which you received in the distribution, by buying and selling them to one another. For then neither will the God who gave you the lot be your friend, nor will the legislator; and indeed the law declares to the disobedient the terms upon which he may or may not take the lot. In the first place, the earth as he is informed is sacred to the Gods; and in the next place, priests and priestesses will offer up prayers over the sacrifices, once, twice, and thrice, that he who buys or sells the houses or lands which he has received, may suffer the punishment which he deserves; and these their prayers they shall write down in the temples, on tablets of cypress-wood, for the instruction of posterity. Moreover they will set a watch over all these things, that they may be observed—the magistracy which has the sharpest eyes shall keep watch that any infringements of their commands may be discovered and punished as offences both against the law and the God. How great is the benefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which obey and are administered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old proverb says; but only a man of experience and good habits. For in such an order of things, there will not be much opportunity for making money; no man either ought, or indeed will be, allowed to exercise any ignoble occupation, of which the vulgarity deters a freeman, and disinclines him to acquire riches by any such means.

742 Further, the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess gold and silver, but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary in dealing with artisans, and for payment of all those hirelings whose labour he may require, whether slaves or immigrants. Wherefore our citizens, as we say, should have a coin passing current among themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with a view, however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands,—for embassies, or for any other occasion which may arise of sending out a herald, the state must also possess a common

Hellenic currency. If a private person is ever obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of the archons and go; and if when he returns he has any foreign money remaining, let him give the surplus back to the treasury, and receive a corresponding sum in the local currency. And if he is discovered to appropriate it, let it be confiscated, and let him who knows and does not inform be subject to curse and dishonour equally with him who brought the money, and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money which has been brought back. In marrying and giving in marriage, no one shall give or receive any dowry at all; and no one shall deposit money with another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money upon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay either capital or interest. That these principles are best, any one may see who compares them with the first principle and intention of a state. The intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the many declare to be the object of a good legislator; namely, that the state for which he is advising should be as great and as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have the greatest empire by sea and land;—this they imagine to be the true object of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the true legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible. But they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some of them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is possible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish that which is impossible. The citizen must indeed be happy and good, and the legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very good at the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the many speak of riches. For they describe by the term ‘rich’ the few who have the most valuable possessions, 743 although the owner of them be a rogue. And if this is true, I can never assent to the doctrine that the rich man will be happy—he must be good as well as rich. And good in a high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be. Some one will ask, why not? And we shall answer,—because acquisitions which come from sources which

are just and unjust indifferently, are more than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums which are expended neither honourably nor disgracefully, are only half as great as those which are expended honourably and on honourable purposes. Thus, if one acquires double and spends half, the other who is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be wealthier than he. The first—I am speaking of the saver and not of the spender—is not always bad; he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad, but, as I was saying, a good man he never is. For he who receives money unjustly as well as justly, and spends neither justly nor unjustly, will be a rich man if he be also thrifty. On the other hand, the utterly bad is in general profligate, and therefore poor; while he who spends on noble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be remarkable for riches, any more than he can be very poor. The argument then is right, in declaring that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not good, they are not happy. But the intention of our laws was, that the citizens should be as happy as possible, and as friendly as possible to one another. And men who are always at law with one another, and amongst whom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another, but only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight. Therefore, we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the city, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by lending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the produce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us in pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist,—I mean, soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education, will never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once but many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our thoughts. For there are in all three things about which every man has an interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the third and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the body; and, first of all, that of the soul; and the state which we are describing will have been rightly constituted if it ordains

honours according to this scale. But if, in any of the laws 744 which have been ordained, health be preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate habits, that law must clearly be wrong. Wherefore, also, the legislator ought often to impress upon himself the question—‘What do I want?’ and ‘Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?’ In this way, and in this way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of legislation. Let the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have mentioned.

It would be well that every man should come to the colony having all things equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man will have greater possessions than another, for many reasons and in particular for the sake of equality in the various occasions of the state, qualifications of property must be unequal, in order that officers and contributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of each person’s wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or himself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to the measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality, which will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours and offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels and disputes. To which end there should be four different standards appointed: there should be a first and a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will be placed, and they will be called by these and similar names: they may continue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case, on becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. The form of law which I should propose would be as follows:—In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest of all plagues—not faction, but rather distraction—there should exist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excessive wealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator should determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the limit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved, and no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for virtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the legislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire double or triple,

or as much as four times the amount of this. But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has found them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in business, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is
 745 in excess of the measure, if he give them back to the state, and to the Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or loss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, any one who likes may inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the delinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property, and the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every possession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly registered with the archons whom the law appoints, in order that all suits relating to money may be easy and quite simple.

The next thing to be noted is, that the city should be placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the country; we should choose a place which possesses what is suitable for a city, and this may easily be imagined and described. Then we will divide the city into twelve portions, first founding a temple to Hestia and Zeus and Athene, to be termed the Acropolis, which we surround with a circular enclosure, and make the division of the entire city and country radiate from this point. The twelve portions shall be equalized in the following manner:—The smaller portions shall be of good land and the larger of inferior land; and the lots shall be 5040 in number. Further, each of them shall be divided into two, and the two sections shall form one allotment, having a share of the land which is near the city and of the land which is at a distance: let the portion which is close to the city be added to that which is farthest, and form one lot, and the portion which is next nearest be added to the portion which is next farthest, and so on of the rest. Moreover, in the two sections of the lots the same principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the badness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less. And the legislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the rest of their property, as far as possible, so as to form twelve equal parts; and there shall be a description of all. After this they shall

assign twelve lots to twelve Gods, and call them by their names, and dedicate to each God their several portions, and call the tribes after them. And they shall distribute the twelve divisions of the city in the same way in which they divided the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one near the centre of the country, and the other at the extremity. Enough, then, of the manner of settlement.

Now we ought to consider always that there can never be such a happy concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can all things coincide as they are wanted. Men who will not take offence at such a mode of living together, and will endure all their life long to have their property fixed at a moderate limit, and to beget children in accordance with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived of gold and other things which the legislator, as is evident from these enactments, will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the two dwellings, the one centralized in the city and the other round about;—all this is like the legislator telling his dreams, or making a city and citizens out of wax. There is truth in these objections, and therefore every one should take to heart what I am going to say. Once more, then, the legislator shall appear and address us:—‘O, my friends,’ he will say to us, ‘do not suppose me ignorant that there is a certain degree of truth in these words; but I am of opinion that, in matters which are not present but future, he who exhibits a pattern of that at which he aims, should in nothing fall short of the fairest and truest; and that he who finds any part of his work impossible of execution should avoid and not execute that part, but he should contrive to carry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; and he should let the legislator perfect his design, and when it is perfected, he should join with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient and what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to be deemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work self-consistent.’

Having determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve parts, let us now see in what way this is to be accomplished. There is no difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest number of divisions of that which is

included under them, consisting of other parts which agree with them, and are produced out of them up to 5040; and hence the law ought to order phratries and demes and villages, and also military ranks and movements, as well as coins and measures, dry and liquid, and weights, so as to be commensurable and agreeable to one another. Nor should we fear the appearance of minuteness, if the law commands that all the vessels which a man possesses should have a common measure, when we
747 consider that the divisions and variations of numbers have a use in respect of all the variations of which they are susceptible, both in themselves and as measures of height and depth, and in all sounds and motions, as well those which proceed in a straight direction, upwards or downwards, as in those which go round and round. The legislator is to consider all these things, and to bid the citizens, as far as possible, not to lose sight of numerical order; for no single instrument of youthful education has such mighty power, both as regards domestic economy and politics, and in the arts, as the study of arithmetic. Above all, arithmetic stirs up him who is by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to learn, retentive, shrewd, and aided by art divine he makes progress quite beyond his natural powers. All these, if only the legislator, by laws and institutions, can banish meanness and covetousness from the souls of the disciples, and enable them to profit by them, will be excellent and suitable instruments of education. But if he cannot, he will unintentionally create in them, instead of wisdom, the habit of craft, which evil tendency may be observed in the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races, through the general illiberality of their pursuits and possessions, whether some unworthy legislator of theirs has been the cause, or some impediment of chance or nature. For we must not fail to observe, O Megillus and Cleinias, that there is a difference in places, and that some beget better men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly. Some places are subject to strange and fatal influences by reason of diverse winds and violent heats, some by reason of waters; or, again, from the character of that subsistence which the earth supplies them, which not only affects the bodies of men for good or evil, but produces similar results in their souls. And in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is

a divine inspiration, and in which the Gods have their appointed lots, and are propitious to the dwellers in them. To all these matters the legislator, if he have any sense in him, must attend as far as man can, and frame his laws accordingly. And this is what you, Cleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind since you are going to colonize a new country.

Cleinias. Your words, Athenian Stranger, are excellent, and I will do as you say.

BOOK VI.

75¹ *Athenian Stranger.* AND now having made an end of the preliminaries we will proceed to the appointment of the magistrates.

Cleinias. Very good.

Ath. In the government of a state there are two parts : first, the number of the magistrates, and the mode of appointing them ; and, secondly, when they have been appointed, laws will have to be provided for each of them, in nature and number suitable to them. But before electing the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season.

Cle. What have you got to say ?

Ath. This is what I have to say ;—every one can see, that although the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a well-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable officers, there will be no use in having the good laws ; not only are they ridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil accrues from them.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. Then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in the constitution of our intended state. In the first place, you will acknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, and their families, should severally give satisfactory proof of what they are, from their youth upward until the time of their election ; in the next place, those who are to elect should be trained in habits of law, and be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought together for the first time, and are

strangers to one another, and also uneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. The matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn. I will tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as you tell me, with nine others, have offered to settle the state on behalf of the people of Crete, and I am to help you, which is my reason for inventing this romance. ⁷⁵² I certainly should not like to leave the tale wandering all over the world without a head;—a headless monster is such a hideous thing.

Cle. Excellent, Stranger.

Ath. Yes; and I will be as good as my word.

Cle. Let us by all means do as you propose.

Ath. That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit us.

Cle. But God will be gracious.

Ath. Yes; and under His guidance let us consider a further point.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is.

Cle. What had you in your mind when you said that?

Ath. I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance,—then, I think that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent.

Cle. That may be believed.

Ath. Then let us consider if we can find any way of doing as you say; for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the other Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their duty to the colony, but they ought to take

the utmost pains to establish the principal offices of the state in the best and surest manner. Above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the law, who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the others are of less importance.

Cle. What method can we devise of electing them?

Ath. This will be the method:—Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to them, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states, they should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose of themselves a body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the settlers, and the
753 remainder from the citizens of Cnosus. Of these latter the Cnosians shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall be one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state; and if you and the others will not agree, they may fairly use a little violence in order to accomplish their end.

Cle. But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our new city?

Ath. O, Cleinias, Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both a long way off. But you and the other colonists are conveniently situated as you describe. I have been speaking of the way in which the new citizens may be best managed under present circumstances; but in after ages, and when the city is permanently established, let the election be on this wise. All who are horse or foot soldiers, or have taken part in war during the age for military service, shall share in the election of magistrates; and the election shall be held in whatever temple the state deems most venerable, and every one shall carry his vote to the altar of the God, writing down on a tablet the name of his father, and tribe, and ward; and at the side he shall write his own name in like manner. Any one who is dissatisfied with that which he has written may, if he pleases, take away his tablet, and, within a period of not less than thirty days, replace it in the agora. The tablets which are judged to be first, to the number of 300, shall be exhibited by the archons to the whole city, and the city shall in like manner select from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this second selection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to

the citizens; in the third, let any one who pleases select out of the 100, walking through the parts of victims, and let them choose for magistrates and proclaim the seven-and-thirty who have the greatest number of votes. But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for us in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies of them? If we reflect, we shall see that the cities which are thus constituted must originally have some such persons, who cannot possibly be elected before there are any magistrates¹; and yet they must be elected in some way, and they are not to be inferior men, but the best possible. For as the proverb says, 'a good beginning is half the business;' and 'to have begun well' is praised by all, and in my opinion is a great deal more than half the business, and has never been 754 praised by any one enough.

Cle. That is very true.

Ath. Then let us recognise the difficulty, and make clear to our own minds how the beginning is to be accomplished. There is only one proposal which I have to offer, and that is one which, under our circumstances, is both necessary and expedient.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. I maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother, which is no other than the colonizing state. Well, I know that many colonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. But in early days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time later when the tie is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by them, and flies to them for protection, and finds in them his natural defence in time of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnosians, as is shown by their care of the new city; and there is a similar feeling on the part of the young city towards Cnosus. And I repeat what I was saying—for there is no harm in repeating what is good—that the Cnosians should take a public interest in all these matters, and choose, as far as they can, the eldest and best of the colonists, to the number of not less than a hundred; and let there be another hundred of the Cnosians themselves. These, I say, on their arrival, should have a joint

¹ Reading *πρὸ πασῶν*.

care that the magistrates should be appointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should undergo a scrutiny. When this has been effected, the Cnosians shall return home, and the new city do the best she can for her own preservation and happiness. I would have the seven-and-thirty now, and in all future time, chosen to fulfil the following duties : Let them, in the first place, be the guardians of the law ; and, secondly, of the registers in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount of his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of the first class, three to the second, two to the third, and a single mina to the fourth. And if any one, despising the laws, for the sake of gain be found to possess anything more which has not been registered, let all that he has in excess be confiscated, and let him suffer a punishment which shall be the reverse of honourable or fortunate. And let any one who will, indict him on the charge of loving base gains, 755 and proceed against him before the guardians of the law. And if he be cast, let him lose his share of the public possessions, and when there is any public distribution, let him have nothing but the original lot ; and let him be written down a criminal as long as he lives, in some place in which any one who pleases can read about his crimes. The guardian of the law shall not hold office longer than twenty years, and shall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected ; or if he is elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten years only ; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he will continue to hold such an important office as that of guardian of the laws, after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long.

These are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law ; as the work of legislation progresses, there will be laws for each of them, which will assign to them their further duties. And now we may proceed in order to speak of the election of other officers ; for generals have to be elected, and these again must have their ministers, generals, and colonels of horse, and commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called by their popular name of brigadiers. The guardians of the law shall propose generals, who are natives of the city, and a selection from the candidates proposed shall be made by those who are or have been of the age of military

service. And if one who is not proposed is thought by somebody to be better than one who is, let him name him whom he prefers in the place of the other, and make oath that he is better, and propose him; and whichever of them is approved by vote shall be taken; and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall be appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after previously undergoing a scrutiny, like the guardians of the law. And let the generals thus elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe; and there shall be a right of counter-proposal as in the case of the generals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way. Until the prytanes and council are elected, the guardians of the law shall convene the assembly in some holy spot which is suitable to the purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by themselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. All are to vote for the general officers of foot [and horse], but the brigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields. Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs 756 for the generals; but captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the army, shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. There only remains the appointment of officers of cavalry: these shall be proposed by the same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and proposal of other candidates shall be carried out in the same way as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the infantry look on at the election; the two who have the greatest number of votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice; but if the dispute be raised a third time, the presiding officers in each case shall decide.

The council shall consist of 360 members,—this will be a convenient number for sub-division. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety counsellors for each class. First, all the citizens shall vote for members of the council taken from the first class; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. When the candidates have been elected, some one shall mark them down; this shall be the business of the first day. And on the following day, the election shall be made from the second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous

day; and on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may if he likes vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the fourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the fourth and smallest class; they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer no penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote; but he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be punished;—he who is of the second class shall pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple. On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the citizens, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny:—These are to form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described, is in a mean between monarchy and democracy, and such a mean the state
757 ought always to observe; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and bad, merely because they are said to have equal privileges. For to unequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonised by measure; and both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are filled with seditions. The old saying, that 'equality makes friendship,' is witty and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what sort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any state or any legislator in the distribution of honours: this is the rule of measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But there is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not at once recognised. This is the judgment of Zeus, which has little place in human things; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good to individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less always and

in proportion to the nature of each ; and, above all, greater honour to the greater virtue, and to the less less ; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue and education. And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of politics, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the new city which we are founding, and any other city which may be hereafter founded. To this the legislator should look,—not to the interests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to justice always ; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural equality among unequals. But there are times at which every state is compelled to use the words, ‘just’ ‘equal,’ in a secondary sense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For equity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of justice. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality of the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people ; and we invoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will direct the lot with a view to supreme justice. And therefore, although we are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which the element of chance enters as seldom as possible.

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Thus, O my friends, and for the reasons given, should a state act which would endure and be saved. But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults ; and therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands with rulers, and watchers succeed watchers, receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual order. A multitude can never fulfil a duty of this sort with anything like energy ; moreover, the greater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater part of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. They must be arranged in twelve portions, answering to twelve months, and serve as guardians each portion for a single month. Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner or citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to put questions of which other states are to receive the answers ; or when the city desires to ask a question and receive an answer ; or again, when there is a likelihood of internal com-

motions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other, they will, if they can, prevent their occurring; or if they have already occurred, will lose no time in making them known to the city, and healing the evil. Wherefore, also, this which is the presiding body of the state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and the dissolutions of them, regular as well as occasional. All this is to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always to keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one portion of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions.

Thus will the city be fairly ordered. And now, who is to have the superintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement? Seeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of them divided into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed superintendents of the ways of the city, and of the houses, and buildings, and harbours, and the agora, and fountains, and groves, and temples, and the like?

Cle. To be sure there ought.

759 *Ath.* Let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the temples, and priests and priestesses, and three kinds of officers who shall preside over roads and buildings, and the order of them;¹ and over men that they may keep them from crime, and over beasts who are within the enclosure and suburb of the city, according to the requirements of the city. Those who have the care of the city shall be called wardens of the city; and those who have the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and those who have the care of the temples shall be called priests. Those who hold the hereditary office of priest or priestess, shall not be disturbed; but if there be few or none such, as is probable at the foundation of a new city, priests and priestesses shall be appointed to be servants of the Gods who have no servants. Some of them shall be elected, and others appointed by lot, and they shall mingle in a friendly manner those who are of the people and those who are not of the people in every place and city, that the state may be as far as possible of one mind. The officers of the temple shall be appointed by lot; in this way their election will be committed to God, who will do what is agree-

able to Him. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to whether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second place, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not stained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also that his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. Now the laws about all divine things should be brought from Delphi, and they should use them under the direction of the interpreters of them. The tenure of the priesthood should always be for a year and no longer; and he who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the laws of religion, must be not less than sixty years of age,—the laws shall be the same about priestesses; and let the twelve tribes taken by fours appoint interpreters, one out of each tribe, and let this be done thrice; and let the three who have the greatest number of votes undergo a scrutiny, and the remaining nine go to Delphi, in order that the God may return one out of each triad; their age shall be the same as that of the priests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner; let them be interpreters for life, and when any one dies let the tribes, taken as before by fours, select another from the tribe of the deceased: moreover, they shall choose treasurers of the property of the several temples, and of the sacred groves, who shall have authority over the produce and the letting of them; and three of them 760 shall be chosen from the highest classes for the greater temples, and two for the lesser, and one for the least of all; the manner of their election and the scrutiny of them shall be the same as that of the generals. This shall be the order of the temples.

Let everything have a guard as far as possible; and let the defence of the city be committed to the generals, and taxiarchs, and hipparchs, and phylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of the city, and of the agora, when the election of them has been completed. The defence of the country shall be provided for as follows:—The entire land has been already distributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let one tribe, taken by lot, provide annually for each division five wardens of the country and commanders of the watch; and let each of the five have the power of selecting twelve others out of

the youth of their own tribe, — these shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not more than thirty. And let there be allotted to them severally every month one of the twelve portions of the land, in order that they may all acquire knowledge and experience of the whole country. This duty and service of commanders and of watchers shall continue during two years. At first, they will have their stations allotted to them, and will afterwards go from place to place in regular order, making their round from left to right as their commanders direct them; (when I speak of going to the right, I mean that they are to go to the east). And at the commencement of the second year, in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only get a knowledge of the country at any one season of the year, but may also have experience of the manner in which different places are affected at different seasons of the year, their then commanders shall lead them again towards the left, from place to place in succession, until they have completed the second year. In the third year they shall choose other wardens of the country, and commanders of the watch, five in number, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve. While on service at each station, their attention shall be directed to the following points:—In the first place, they shall see that the country is well protected against enemies; they shall trench and dig wherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall confine in fastnesses the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from doing any harm to the country or the property; they shall use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom
761 they find on the spot: these will be their instruments whom they will superintend, taking them, as far as possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular business. They shall make every part of the country inaccessible to enemies, and as accessible as possible to friends; there shall be ways for man and beast, and they shall take care to have them always as smooth as they can; and shall provide against the rains doing harm instead of good to the land, when they come down from the mountains into the hollows; and shall keep them back by the help of works and ditches, in order that they may receive and drink up the rain from heaven, and making fountains

and streams in the fields and places which are underneath, may furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. The fountains of waters, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be ornamented with plantations and buildings for beauty ; and let them bring together the streams in subterraneous channels, and make water plentiful by irrigation at all seasons of the year ; and if there be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in their neighbourhood, they shall let the stream have a way to the actual temples of the Gods. Everywhere in such places the youth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the aged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those labouring under disease—there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with toil, will be kindly received, and experience far better treatment than at the hands of a not over-wise doctor.

The building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental ; they will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a serious employment too ; for the companies of sixty will have to guard their own positions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to professing friends. When a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens, and any one whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the five rulers decide small matters on their own authority ; but where the charge against another relates to greater matters, the seventeen composed of the five and the twelve, shall determine any charges which one man brings against another, not involving more than three minae. Every judge and ruler shall be liable to give an account of his conduct in office, except those who, like kings, have the final decision. Moreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country, if they do any wrong to those of whom they have the care, whether by imposing upon them unequal tasks, or by taking the produce of the soil or implements of husbandry without their consent ; also if they receive anything in the way of a bribe, or decide suits unjustly, or if they yield to the influences of flattery, let them be publicly dishonoured ; and in regard to any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the country, if the question be of a mina, let them submit to the decision of the villagers in the neighbourhood ; but in suits of greater amount, or in case of the lesser if they

refuse to submit, trusting that their monthly removal into another part of the country will enable them to escape—in such cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court, and if he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant who refused to submit a double penalty.

The rulers and the wardens of the country, while on their two years' service, shall have common meals at their several stations, and shall all live together; and he who is absent from the daily meal, or sleeps out at night, unless by order of the rulers, or by reason of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and inscribe his name in the agora as not having kept his guard, let him be deemed to have betrayed the city, and let him be disgraced and beaten with impunity by any one who meets him and is willing to punish him. If any of the rulers is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole company of sixty shall see to it, and he who is cognisant of the offence, and does not bring the offender to trial, shall be amenable to the same laws as the younger offender himself, and shall pay a heavier fine, and be incapable of ever commanding the young. The guardians of the law are to be careful inspectors of these matters, and shall either prevent or punish offenders. Every man should remember the universal rule, that he who is not a good servant will not be a good master; a man should pride himself more upon serving well than upon commanding well: first upon serving the laws, which is also the service of the Gods; in the second place, upon having served ancient and honourable men in the days of his youth. Moreover, during the two years in which he is a warden of the country, his daily food ought to be of a simple and humble kind. When the twelve are gathered
763 together, let them take counsel with the five, and determine that they will serve themselves, and will not have other slaves and servants for their own use, neither will they use those of the villagers and husbandmen for their private advantage, but for the public service only; and in general let them make up their minds to live independently by themselves, servants of the state and their own. Further, at all seasons of the year, summer and winter alike, let them survey minutely the whole country, bearing arms and keeping guard,—at the same time acquiring a perfect knowledge of every locality. There can be

no more important kind of information than the exact knowledge of a man's own country; and for this as well as for more general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and other kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. The service to whom this is committed may be called the secret police or wardens of the country; the name does not much signify, but every one who has the safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this service.

After the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of wardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the country were sixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will divide the twelve parts of the city into three; like the former, they shall have care of the ways, and of the different high roads which lead out of the country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be all made according to law;—also of the waters, which those who superintend and preserve the waters convey to them, care being taken that they may reach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and a benefit to the city. These also shall be men of ability, and at leisure to take care of the public interest. Let every man propose as warden of the city any one whom he likes out of the highest class, and when the vote has been given on them, and the number is reduced to the six who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers choose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a scrutiny let them hold office according to the law appointed for them. Next, let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner, out of the first and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and out of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the wardens of the city; and when they have undergone a scrutiny, they shall be proclaimed wardens of the agora. Every one shall vote for all the ten, and he who will not vote, if he be informed against before the archons, shall be fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. Let any ⁷⁶⁴ one who likes go to the assembly and to the general council; this shall be compulsory on citizens of the first and second class, and they shall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their names at the assembly. But the

third and fourth class shall be under no compulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless the rulers have commanded all to be present, in consequence of some urgent necessity. The wardens of the agora shall observe the order appointed by law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples and fountains which are in the agora; and they shall see that no one injures them, and punish him who does so, with stripes and bonds, if he be a slave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way, they shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to the amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of the city up to double that amount. And let the wardens of the city have a similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own department; and let them impose fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two minae with the consent of the wardens of the agora.

In the next place, it will be proper to appoint ministers of music and gymnastic, two of each kind—one whose business will be education, and the other for the superintendence of contests. In speaking of education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order and instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school and lodging of boys and girls; and in speaking of contests, the law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music; these again are divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other with gymnastic; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of men, shall judge of horses; but in music there shall be one set of judges of solo singing, and of imitation—I mean of rhapsodists, players on the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of choruses. First of all, we must choose leaders for the choruses of boys, and men, and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of the dance, and in our other musical arrangements;—one leader will be enough
765 for them, and he should be not less than forty years of age. One leader of the solo singers will also be enough to introduce them, and to give judgment on the competitors, and he ought not to be less than thirty years of age. The leader and regulator of the choruses shall be elected after the following manner:—Let any persons who commonly take an interest in

such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do not go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those who have no interest shall not be compelled. The elector shall propose as leader some one who understands music, and in the scrutiny he may be challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill, and defended on the other hand by those who say that he has. Ten are to be elected by vote, and he of the ten who is chosen by lot shall undergo a scrutiny, and lead the choruses for a year according to law. And in like manner the competitor who wins the lot shall be leader of the solo and concert music for that year; and he [who is elected] shall refer the judgment of them to the judges. In the next place, we have to choose judges in the contests of horses and of men; these shall be selected from the third and also from the second class of citizens, and the three first classes shall be compelled to go to the election, but the lowest class shall not be compelled; and let there be three elected by lot out of the twenty who have been chosen previously, and they must also have the vote and approval of the examiners. But if any one is rejected in the scrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same manner, and undergo a similar scrutiny.

There remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female; he too will rule according to law, being a single magistrate of fifty years old at least;—the father of children lawfully begotten, of both sexes, or of one at any rate. He who is elected, and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the great offices of state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any plant rightly tending to the perfection of its own nature, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not only true of plants, but of animals wild and tame, and also of men. Man, as we say, is a tame or civilized animal; nevertheless, he requires proper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all animals he becomes the most divine and most civilized; but if he be insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly creatures. Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of children to become a secondary or accidental matter. In the first place, he who would be rightly provident about them, should begin by taking

care that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every respect the best; him they shall do their best to appoint as guardian and superintendent. To this end all the magistrates, with the exception of the council and prytanes, shall go to the temple of Apollo, and elect by ballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally think will be the best superintendent of education. And he who has the greatest number of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all the magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the guardians of the law,—shall hold office for five years; and in the sixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office.

If any one dies while he is holding a public office, and more than thirty days before his term of office expires, let those who are concerned with the matter elect another to the office in the same manner as before. And if any one who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on the father's and mother's side, who are residing at home, including cousins, appoint another guardian within ten days, and be fined a drachma a day for neglect.

A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and again, if a judge is silent and says no more than the litigants in preliminary trials and in private arbitrations, he will never be able to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily judge well, nor a few if they are not good judges. The point in dispute should be made clear by both parties; and time, and deliberation, and repeated examination, greatly tend to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who goes to law with another, should go first of all to his neighbours and friends who know best the questions at issue.

767 And if he be unable to obtain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse to another court; and if the two courts cannot settle the matter, let the third put an end to the suit.

Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some things; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is determining a suit. Regarding

then the judges also as magistrates, let us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme tribunal which the litigants agree to appoint in common for themselves. And let there be two other tribunals: one for private individuals, who desire to have causes of action decided against one another; the other for public causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate the common interests. And we must not forget to mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be. In the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let this be composed as follows: All the officers of state, as well annual as those holding office for a longer period, at the beginning of the new year, in the month which follows the summer solstice, shall meet on the evening before the expiration of the year in some temple, and calling God to witness, shall dedicate one judge of every court to be their first-fruits, choosing the one in each office who seems to them to be the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner. And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. The counsellors and other magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and spectators of the causes; and any one else may be present who pleases. If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and what he ought to pay to the public treasury, or to the party who brought the original suit.

In the judgment of offences against the state, the people 768

ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state they are all wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and they ought also to have the final decision of them, and the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every ward, and the judges shall be chosen by lot;—they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit: this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.

Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been given of them, and some things have been told and others omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation;—let us then expect them at the end. Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices. Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part. At present we have reached the election of rulers, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what has preceded. And now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in making laws.

Cle. I like your way, Stranger, both in what you have said, and still more in what you are going to say. I particularly approve of your manner of joining the beginning to the end.

Ath. Thus far, then, the old man's game of play has gone ⁷⁶⁹ off well.

Cle. I suppose you mean to say rather their serious and noble pursuit?

Ath. Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are agreed about a certain thing?

Cle. What is that?

Ath. You know the endless labour which painters expend upon their pictures—they and their apprentices are always putting in or taking out colours, or performing some operation of this sort; they seem as if they would never cease touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more beautiful.

Cle. I know something of them from report, although I have never had much acquaintance with their art.

Ath. No matter; we may make use of the illustration notwithstanding:—Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in the most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing would always improve as time went on—do you not see that being a mortal, unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time has introduced, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will brighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour will last but a short time?

Cle. True.

Ath. And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First, he desires that his laws should be written down with the requisite exactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an actual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? Do you imagine that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many things are necessarily omitted, which some one coming after him must observe and correct, if the constitution and the order of government is not to deteriorate, but to improve in the state which he is establishing?

Cle. Certainly, that is the sort of thing which every one would desire.

Ath. And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by word or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a person to understand how he can maintain and

amend the laws, he should finish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete.

Cle. Certainly.

770 *Ath.* And is not this what you and I have to do at the present moment?

Cle. What have we to do?

Ath. As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to endeavour to make them both lawgivers and guardians of the law themselves as far as this is possible.

Cle. Certainly ; if we can.

Ath. At any rate, we must do our best.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. We will say to them,—O friends and saviours of our laws, in laying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit, and this cannot be helped ; at the same time, we will do our utmost to describe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall fill up. And I will explain to what principle you are to look in accomplishing this work. Megillus, and I, and Cleinias, have often spoken to one another touching these matters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. And we hope that you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and guardian of the law ought to keep in view. There was one principle in particular about which we were agreed—that a man's whole energies throughout life should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man, whether this was to be gained by study, or habit, or some kind of possession, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge—and this applies equally to men and women, old and young—the aim of all should always be such as I have described ; anything which may be an impediment, the good man ought to show that he utterly disregards. And if at last necessity plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than bow his neck to the yoke and be ruled by inferiors, and he has to fly, he must be an exile and endure all these things rather than accept another form of government,

which is likely to make men worse. These are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought to be, praise and blame the laws—blame those which have not this power of making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with gladness 771 receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different kind.

Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation in religion. And we must first return to the number 5040—the entire number had, or rather has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number of the tribe which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly formed by 21×20 , also has them. And not only is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the number of each tribe is divisible by twelve. Now every portion should be regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months and to the movement of the universe. Every city has a guiding or sacred principle given by nature, but in some the division or distribution has been more right than in others, and has been more sacred and fortunate. In our opinion, nothing can be more right than the selection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from one to twelve with the single exception of eleven, and that admits of a very easy correction; for if two families be deducted from 5040, the division by eleven is restored. And the truth of this may be easily proved when we have leisure. But for the present, trusting to the mere assertion of this principle, let us divide the state; and assigning to each portion some God or son of a God, let us give them altars and sacred rites, and at the altars let us hold assemblies for sacrifice twice in the month—twelve assemblies for the tribes, and twelve for the city, according to their divisions; the first in honour of the Gods and divine things, and the second to promote friendship and ‘better acquaintance,’ as the phrase is, and every sort of good fellowship with one another. For people must be acquainted with those into whose families they marry and to whom they are given in marriage; in such matters, as far as possible to avoid mistakes is all important, and with this serious purpose let games be instituted in which youths and

772 maidens shall dance together, seeing and being seen naked, at a proper age, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modesty. The masters of choruses will be the superintendents and regulators of these games, and they, together with the guardians of the law, will legislate in any matters which we have omitted; for, as we were saying, where there are numerous and minute details, the legislator cannot but fail. And the annual officers who have experience, and know what is wanted, must make arrangements and improvements year by year, until such enactments and provisions are sufficiently determined. A ten years' experience of sacrifices and dances, if extending to all particulars, will be quite sufficient; and if the legislator be alive they shall communicate with him, but if he be dead then the several officers shall bring the omissions which come under their notice before the guardians of the law, until all is perfect; and from that time there shall be no more change, and they shall establish and use the new laws with the others which the legislator originally gave them, and of which they are never, if they can help, to change aught; or, if some necessity overtakes them, the magistrates must be called into counsel, and the whole people, and they must go to all the oracles of the Gods; and if they are all agreed, in that case they may make the change, but in any other case he who objects according to law shall prevail.

Whenever any one of twenty-five years of age, seeing and being seen, believes himself to have found a marriage connection which is to his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let him marry if he be under the age of five-and-thirty years; but let him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable and appropriate. For, as Cleinias says, every law like a strain of music should have a suitable prelude.

Cle. You recollect at the right moment, Stranger, and do not miss the opportunity of saying a word in season.

773 *Ath.* I thank you. We will say to him:—O my son, he who is born of good parents ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now they would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially to desire a rich one; but if other things are equal, always to honour inferiors, and with them to form connections;—this will be for the benefit of the

city and of the families which are united ; for the equable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the unmixed. And he who is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried away more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become the relation of orderly parents ; and he who is of the opposite temper ought to seek the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning all marriages :—Every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is most pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the state. For somehow every one is by nature prone to that which is likest to himself, and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property and in disposition ; and hence there arise in most states results which we least desire to happen. Now, to add to the law an express provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the rich family, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that the slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the quicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken anger as well as laughter in the minds of many ; for there is a difficulty in perceiving that the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which the maddening wine is hot and fiery ; but when chastened by a soberer God, receives a fair admixture and becomes an excellent and temperate drink. Yet in marriage no one is able to see the necessity of this. Wherefore also the law must leave such matters, and try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability of their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality in excessive fortune when they marry ; and him who is too desirous of forming a rich marriage they should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches, not, however, by any compulsion of written law. Let this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, not forgetting what was said before—that man should cling to immortality—and leave behind him posterity who shall be 774 servants of the God in his place. All this and yet more may truly be said about the duty of marrying in the way of prelude. But if a man will not listen, and remains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still unmarried at thirty-five years of age, let him pay a yearly fine ;—he who is of the highest class shall pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he who is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae ; the third class

shall pay sixty drachmae, and the fourth thirty drachmae, and let the money be sacred to Herè; he who does not pay the fine in the year shall owe ten times the sum, which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact; and if he fails in doing so, let him be answerable and give an account of the money at his audit. He who refuses to marry shall be thus punished in money, and also be deprived of all honour which the younger show to the elder; let no young man voluntarily obey him, and, if he attempt to punish any one, let every one come to the rescue and defend the injured person, and he who is present and does not come to the rescue, shall be pronounced by the law to be a coward and a villain. Of the marriage portion I have already spoken; and again I say for the benefit of poor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of poverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our state have the necessaries of life, and their wives will be less likely to be insolent, and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on account of property. And he who obeys this law will do a noble action; but he who will not obey, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the price of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest, or more than a mina, or a mina-and-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes, or two minae if he be of the highest class, shall owe to the public treasury a similar sum, and that which is given or received shall be sacred to Herè and Zeus; and let the treasurers of these Gods exact the money, as was said before about the unmarried—that the treasurers of Herè were to exact the money, or pay the fine themselves.

The betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a grandfather in the second degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by brothers who have the same father; but if there are none of these alive, the betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases of unexampled fatality, the next of kin and the guardians shall have authority. What are to be the rites before marriages, or any other sacred acts, relating either to the future, or the present, or the past, shall be referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice may be
775 satisfied. Touching the marriage festival, they shall assemble not more than five male and five female friends of both families,

and a like number of members of the family of either sex, and no man shall spend more than his means will allow; he who is of the richest class may spend a mina,—he who is of the second, half a mina, and in the same proportion as the census of each decreases: all men shall praise him who is obedient to the law; but he who is disobedient shall be punished by the guardians of the law as a man wanting in true taste, and uninstructed in the hymeneal strains of the Muses. Drunkenness is always improper, except at the festivals of the God who gave wine; and peculiarly dangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of marriage; for at such a crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to have all their wits about them, and they ought to take care that their offspring may be born of reasonable beings; and who can tell on what day or night Heaven will give them increase? Moreover, they ought not to be begetting children when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but their offspring should be compact and solid, quiet and compounded properly; whereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and is beside himself both in body and soul. Wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad and unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget offspring who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected to walk straight either in body or mind. Hence during the whole year and all his life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he ought to take care and not intentionally to do what is injurious to health, or what involves insolence and wrong; for it needs must be that the souls and bodies of the children receive the impress which is stamped upon them at birth, and he begets children in every way inferior. And especially on the day and night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. For there is an original indwelling divinity in man which preserves all things, if used with proper respect by each individual. He who marries is to consider, that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest and nursery of his young, and there he is to marry and make the home of himself and his children, going away from his father and mother. For in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order to cement and bind together diversities of character; but excessive intercourse not having the desire

which is created by time, insensibly dilutes friendships from a feeling of satiety; wherefore a man and his wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own dwelling-places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and visit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up children, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another, and worshipping the Gods according to law for ever.

In the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be most convenient. There is no difficulty either in understanding or acquiring most kinds of property, but there is great difficulty in what relates to slaves. And the reason is, that we speak about them in a way which is right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves is consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them.

Meg. I do not understand, Stranger, what you mean.

Ath. I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae. Looking at these and the like examples, what ought we to do concerning property in slaves? I made a remark, in passing, which naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. I said that we should all agree as to the necessity of having the best and most attached slaves whom we can get. For many a man has found his slaves better in every way than brethren or sons, and many times they have saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole house — such tales are well known.

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly corrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them as a class? And the wisest of our poets, speaking of Zeus, says:

‘Far-seeing Zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day
777 of slavery subdues.’

Different persons have got these two different notions of slaves

in their minds—some of them utterly distrust their servants as a class, and, as if they were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make their lives three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were before ;—and others do just the opposite.

Meg. True.

Cle. Then what are we to do, Stranger, when, in our own country, there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their owners?

Ath. Well, Cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a troublesome animal, and therefore is not, and is not likely to become very manageable when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of slave, and freeman, and master.

Cle. That is obvious.

Ath. He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown in the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves who speak the same language ; and the numerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti, as they are called. A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. Two alternatives are open to us,—not to have the slaves of the same country, or if possible, speaking the same language ; in this way they will more easily be held in subjection : secondly, we should tend them carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of respect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals ; for he who really and naturally reverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them ; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having authority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as they deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will only make them conceited. The language used to a servant ought always to be that of a command, and we ought not to jest with them, whether 778 they are males or females—this is a foolish way which many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life of

servitude more disagreeable both for them and for those who command them.

Cle. True.

Ath. Now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible, with a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he has to do, we may next proceed to describe their dwellings.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. The city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be taken of all the buildings, and the manner of building each of them, and also of the temples and walls. These, Cleinias, were matters which properly came before the marriages;—but, as we are only talking, there is no objection to changing the order. If, however, our plan of legislation is ever carried out, then the house shall precede the marriage if God so will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations about marriage; but at present we are only describing these matters in a general outline.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. The temples are to be placed all round the agora, and the whole city built in a circle on the heights, for the sake of defence and for the sake of purity. Near the temples are to be placed the houses of the magistrates and the courts of law; in these plaintiff and defendant will receive their rights, and the places will be regarded as most holy, partly because they have to do with holy things, and partly because they are the dwelling-places of holy Gods: and in them will be the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials of capital offences may fitly take place. As to the walls, Megillus, I agree with Sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them; there is a poetical saying, which is finely expressed, that ‘walls ought to be of steel and iron, and not of earth;’ besides, how ridiculous of us to be sending out our young men annually into the country to dig and to trench, and to keep off the enemy by fortifications, under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set foot in our territory, and then, that we should surround ourselves with a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means conducive to the health of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy

in the minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither instead of repelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine 779 that their safety is due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they are protected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they were meant not to labour, and did not know that true repose comes from labour, and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind is only the renewal of trouble. If men must have walls, the private houses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may be one wall, having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their uniformity and equality towards the streets. The form of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable aspect, and being easily guarded will have great advantages of security. At the first building of the city these should be principal objects of the inhabitants; and the wardens of the city should see to them, and should further impose a fine on him who neglects them; and in all that relates to the city they should have a care of cleanliness, and no citizen should encroach upon any public property either by buildings or diggings. Further, they ought to take care that the rains from heaven flow off easily, and of any other matters which may have to be administered either within or without the city. The guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which their experience may show to be necessary, and supply any other points in which the law may be deficient. And now that these matters, and the buildings about the agora, and the gymnasia, and places of instruction, and theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars and spectators, let us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of legislation.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Assuming that marriages exist already, Cleinias, the mode of life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will follow next in order. In what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in a city which is to be superior to other cities, is a matter not at all easy for us to determine. There have been many difficulties already, but this will be the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the many. Still I cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true, Cleinias.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. He who imagines that he can give laws for the public conduct of states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take care of itself; who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they please, and that there is no necessity of order in all things; he, I say, who gives up the control of their private lives, and supposes that they will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a great mistake. Why have I made this remark? Why, because I am going to enact that the bridegrooms should live at the common tables, just as they did before marriage. This was a singularity when first enacted by the legislator in your parts of the world, Megillus and Cleinias, as I should suppose, on the occasion of some war or other similar danger, which caused the passing of the law, and which would be likely to occur in thinly-peopled places, and in times of pressure. But when men had once tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience showed that the institution greatly conduced to security; and in some such manner the custom of having common tables arose.

Cle. Likely enough.

Ath. I said that there may have been singularity and danger in imposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same difficulty. There is, however, another institution which is the natural sequel to this, and would be excellent, but nowhere exists at present. The institution of which I am about to speak is not easily described or executed; and would be like the legislator setting the river on fire¹, as people say, or performing any other impossible feat.

Cle. What is the cause, Stranger, of this extreme hesitation?

Ath. You shall hear without any further loss of time. That which has law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that which is disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is well-ordered; and at this point the argument is
781 now waiting. For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weak-

¹ Literally, carding the fire.

ness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better, if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman's nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together. The careful consideration of this matter, and the arranging and ordering on a common principle all our institutions relating both to men and women, greatly conduces to the happiness of the state. But at present, such is the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense will even venture to speak of common tables in places and cities in which they have never been established at all; and how can any one avoid being utterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show how much they eat and drink in public? There is nothing at which the sex is more likely to take offence. For women are accustomed to creep into dark places, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their utmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. And therefore, as I said before, in most places they will not endure to have the truth spoken without raising an outcry, but in this state perhaps they may. And if we may assume that our whole discussion about the state has not been mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you, if you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper; but if you had rather not, I will refrain.

Cle. There is nothing which we should both of us like better, Stranger, than to hear what you have to say.

Ath. Very good: And you must not be surprised if I go back a little, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent us from considering in every point of view the subject of law.

Cle. True.

Ath. Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first. Every man should understand that the human race, either had no beginning at all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; or had a beginning an immense time ago.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Well, and have there not been constitutions and destructions of states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly and disorderly, and diverse desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and all sorts of changes of the seasons in which animals may be expected to have undergone innumerable transformations?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And may we not suppose that vines appeared, which had previously no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of Demeter and her daughter, of which one Triptolemus was the minister, and that, before they existed, animals took to devouring each other as they do still?

Cle. True.

Ath. And the practice of men sacrificing one another still exists among many nations; and, on the other hand, we hear of other human beings who did not even venture to taste¹ the flesh of a cow and had no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits swimming in honey, and similar pure offerings, but no flesh or animals; from these they abstained under the idea that they ought not to eat them, and might not stain the altars of the Gods with blood. In former days men are said to have lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless things, but abstaining from all living things.

Cle. Such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely true.

Ath. Some one might say to me, what is the drift of all this?

Cle. A very pertinent question, Stranger.

Ath. And therefore I will endeavour, Cleinias, if I can, to draw the natural inference.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. I see that among men all things depend upon three wants and desires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led by them, or the opposite if wrongly. Now these are eating and drinking, which begin at birth; every animal has a natural desire for them, and is violently excited, and rebels against him who says that he must not satisfy all his pleasures and appetites, and get rid of the corresponding pains. And the third and

¹ Reading ἔτι and ἐτόλμων.

greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks out last, and is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every species of wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must endeavour to master by the three great principles of fear and law and right reason; turning them away from that which is called pleasantest to the best, using the Muses and the Gods who preside over contests to extinguish their increase and influx.

But to return: After marriage let us speak of the birth of children, and after their birth of their nurture and education. In the course of discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at last arrive at the common tables. Whether such associations are to be confined to men, or extended to women also, we shall see better when we approach and take a nearer view of them; and we may then determine what previous institutions are required and will have to precede them. As I said before, we shall see them more in detail, and shall be better able to lay down the laws which are proper or suited to them.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for hereafter there may be need of them.

Cle. What do you bid us keep in mind?

Ath. That which we comprehended under the three words—first, eating; secondly, drinking; thirdly, the excitement of love.

Cle. I shall be sure to remember, Stranger.

Ath. Very good. Then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach persons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they disobey, with the terrors of the law.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. The bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to produce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which they can. Now all men who are associated in any action always succeed when they attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when they do not give their mind or have no mind, they fail; wherefore let the bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of children, and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom, and

particularly at the time when their children are not yet born.
78+ And let the women whom we have chosen to be the overseers of these matters, whether many or few, in whatever number and at whatever time the magistrates may command, assemble every day in the temple of Eileithyia during a third part of a day, and being there assembled, let them inform one another of any one whom they see, whether man or woman, of those who are begetting children without due regard to the provisions of the law concerning nuptial rites and sacrifices; and let the begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting them continue ten years and no longer, during the time when marriage is fruitful. But if any continue without children up to this time, let them take counsel with their kindred and with the women holding office, and be divorced for their mutual benefit. If, however, any dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either party, they shall choose ten of the guardians of the law and abide by their permission and appointment. The women who preside over these matters shall enter into the houses of the young, and partly by admonitions and partly by threats make them give over their ignorance and error; and if they rebel, let them go and tell the guardians of the law, and they shall prevent them; and if they cannot prevent them, they shall declare the matter to the public assembly; and let them write up their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and such an one; and let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court of law convict those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of the privileges of a citizen in the following respects:—let him not go to weddings nor to the birthday solemnities of children; and if he go, let any one who pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same regulations hold about women: let not a woman be allowed to appear abroad, or receive honour, or go to nuptial and birthday festivals, if she in like manner be written up as acting disorderly and cannot obtain a verdict. And if, when they themselves have done begetting children according to the law, a man or woman have connection with another man or woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be inflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and when the time for procreation has passed let the man or woman who refrain in such

matters be held in esteem, and let those who do not refrain be held in the contrary of esteem—that is to say, disesteem. Now, 785 if the greater part of mankind behave modestly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the enactments having been passed, let them be carried into execution. To every man the first year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to be written down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning of existence to every child, whether boy or girl. Let every phratria have inscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom the years are reckoned. And near to them let the living members of the phratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased. The limit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty years at the longest,—for a man, from thirty to thirty-five years; and let a woman hold office at forty, and a man at thirty years. Let a man go out to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there appear any need to make use of her in military service, let the time of service be after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years of age; and let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each.

BOOK VII.

788 AND now, assuming that children of both sexes have been born, their nurture and education will properly follow next in order ; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be thought rather a subject for precept and admonition than for law. In private life there are many little things, not always apparent, arising out of the pleasures and desires and pains of individuals, which are contrary to the intention of the legislator—these minutiae alter and discompose the characters of the citizens, and cause great evil in states ; for they are so small and of such frequent occurrence, that there would be an unseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law ; and if made penal, they are the destruction of the written law, because mankind get the habit of frequently transgressing in small matters. The result is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you say nothing. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavour also to bring my wares into the light of day, for I acknowledge that at present there is a want of clearness in what I am saying.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that which tends most to the improvement of mind and body ?

Cle. Undoubtedly.

Ath. And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies ought to grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner ?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And do we not further observe that the first shoot of

every living thing is by far the greatest and fullest? Many will even contend that a man at twenty-five does not grow to twice the height which he attained at five.

Cle. True.

Ath. Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant exercise the source of endless evils in the body?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And the body should have the most exercise when 789 growing most?

Cle. But, Stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise upon newly-born infants?

Ath. Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn.

Cle. What do you mean, my good sir? In the process of gestation?

Ath. Exactly. I am not at all surprised that you have never heard of this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little creatures, which, although strange, I will endeavour to explain to you.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you, by reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess at Athens. Not only boys, but often older persons, are in the habit of keeping quails and cocks, which they train to fight one another. And they are far from thinking that the contests in which they stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise; for, in addition to this, they carry them about—each having a big bird tucked in under his arms, and the smaller in his hands, and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake of health, that is to say, not their own health but the health of the birds; and this proves to any one who is capable of understanding, that all bodies are benefited by shakings and movements, when they are moved without weariness, whether the motion proceeds from themselves, or from a swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or is caused by other bodies in whatever way moving, and thus gaining the mastery over food and drink, and being able to impart beauty and health and strength:—admitting all this, what follows? Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman shall walk about and fashion the embryo within as we fashion wax before it hardens, and after birth

swathe it for two years. Suppose that we compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always carrying the children somewhere or other, either into the country, or to the temples, or to their relations' houses until they are well able to stand, and to take care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning on them when they are too young,—they should continue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year; the nurses should be strong, and there should be more than one of them. Shall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect of them? No, no; penalty more than enough will fall upon our own heads.

Cle. What penalty?

Ath. Ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine servant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply.

Cle. Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?

Ath. The reason is, that masters and freemen in states when they hear of it are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without due regulation of private life in cities, stability in the laying down of laws is hardly to be expected; and he who makes this reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and, adopting them, may order his house and state well and be happy.

Cle. Likely enough.

Ath. And therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we have determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young children, in the same manner as we have begun to go through the rules which relate to their bodies.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to the body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and moving about by day and night is good for them all, and that the younger they are, the more they will need it; infants should live, if that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea. This is the lesson which nurses have learned from experience, and which we may also learn from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the Corybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep they do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion—rocking them in their arms; nor

do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap them in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy in the same manner by the use of the dance and of music.

Cle. Well, Stranger, and what is the reason of this?

Ath. The reason is obvious.

Cle. What?

Ath. The affection both of the Corybantes and of the children is an emotion of fear; and fear springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And when some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the motion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent internal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the restless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired, sending some to sleep, and making others who are awake to dance to the pipe with the help of the Gods to whom they offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind, which takes the place of their former agitations. And in this, as I would shortly say, there is a considerable amount of sense.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. But if fear has such a power we ought to consider further, that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with fears, will be made more liable to fear, and every one will admit that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not of courage.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our youth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be an exercise of courage?

Cle. True.

Ath. And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the earliest years of life has a great tendency to create a part of virtue in the soul?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be regarded as having much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cowardice on the other?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. Then now we must endeavour to show how and to what

extent we may, if we please, implant either character in the young.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. There is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition of youth morose and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles; that on the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and abject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable associates.

Cle. But how can the state educate those who do not as yet understand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of appreciating any sort of instruction?

Ath. I will tell you how: Every animal that is born is wont to utter some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also affected with the inclination to weep more than any other animal.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Do not nurses, when they want to know what an
792 infant desires, judge by these signs?—when anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate. Now the time which is thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable portion of life to be passed ill or well.

Cle. True.

Ath. Does not the morose and ill-natured man appear to you to be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?

Cle. Certainly he does.

Ath. Well, but if during these three years every possible care were taken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in general of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood to make his soul more gentle and cheerful?

Cle. To be sure, Stranger,—more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures.

Ath. There I cannot agree with you, sweet Cleinias: to begin educating him in that way would be his utter ruin. Let us see whether I am right.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. The point about which you and I differ is of great importance, and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us. For I maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state, which I just spoke of as gentle or propitious, and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to God. Now, I say, he among us who would be divine ought to pursue after this mean habit—he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow any one, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrained by habit. Nay, more, if I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains; and at that time she should cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness.

Cle. You need not ask Megillus, Stranger, which of us has 793 most truly spoken; for I agree that all men ought to avoid the life of unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course. And having spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?

Ath. Very good, Cleinias; and now let us all three consider a further point.

Cle. What is it?

Ath. That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature. And then arises in our minds the further reflection that we ought not to call these things laws, nor yet to leave them unmentioned; for they are the bonds of the whole state, and come in the intervals of the written laws which are or are hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancient hereditary customs, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, envelope and entirely preserve the previously existing written law; but if they depart from right and fall into disorder, then they are like the props of builders which give way in the

centre and produce a common ruin in which one part drags another down, and the fair superstructure falls because the old foundations are undermined. Reflecting upon this, Cleinias, you ought to bind together the new state in every possible way, omitting nothing, whether great or small, of what are called laws or manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together, and all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another; and, therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently trifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws.

Cle. Very true: we are disposed to agree with you.

Ath. Up to the age of three years, whether of boy or girl, if a person strictly carries out our previous regulations and makes them a principal aim, he will do much for the advantage of the young creatures. But at three, four, five, and six years the childish nature will require sports; now is the time to get rid of self-will in him, punishing him, not so as to disgrace him. As we were saying about slaves, that we ought neither to punish them in hot blood or so as to anger them, nor yet to leave them unpunished lest they become self-willed, a like rule is to be observed in the case of the free-born. Children at that age have certain natural modes of amusement which they find out for themselves when they meet. And all the children who are between the ages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages, the several families of a village uniting on one spot, and the nurses seeing that the children behave properly and orderly,—they themselves and their whole company being under the care of one of the twelve women aforesaid annually appointed out of their number by the guardians of the law to inspect and order each company. Let the twelve be appointed by the women who have authority over marriage, one out of each tribe and all of the same age; and when appointed, let them hold office and go to the temples every day, punishing all offenders, male or female, who are slaves or strangers, by the help of some of the public servants; but if any citizen disputes the punishment, let her bring him before the wardens of the city; or, if there be no dispute, let her punish him herself. After the age of six years the time has arrived for the separation of the sexes,—

let boys live with boys, and girls in like manner with girls. Now they must begin to learn—the boys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow, the javelin, and sling; and if they do not object, let women also go to learn if not to practise; above all, they ought to know the use of arms; for I may note, that the practice which now almost universally prevails is due to ignorance.

Cle. In what respect?

Ath. In this respect, that the right and left hand are supposed to differ by nature when we use them; whereas no difference is found in the use of the feet and the lower limbs; but in the use of the hands we are in a manner lame, by reason of the folly of nurses and mothers; for although our several limbs are by nature balanced, we create a difference in them by bad habit. In some cases this is of no consequence, as, for example, when we hold the lyre in the left hand, and the plectrum in the right, but it is downright folly to make the same distinction in other cases. The custom of the Scythians proves our error; 795 for they not only hold the bow from them with the left hand and draw the arrow to them with their right, but use either hand for both purposes. And there are many similar examples in charioteering and other things, from which we may learn that those who make the left side weaker than the right act contrary to nature. In the case of the plectrum, which is of horn only, and similar instruments, as I was saying, it is of no consequence, but makes a great difference, and may be of very great importance to the warrior who has to use iron weapons, bows and javelins, and the like; above all, when in heavy armour, he has to fight against heavy armour. And there is a very great difference between one who has learnt and one who has not, and between one who has been trained in gymnastic exercises and one who has not been. For as he who is perfectly skilled in the Pancratium or boxing or wrestling, is not unable to fight from his left side, and does not limp and draggle in confusion when his opponent makes him change his position, so in heavy-armed fighting, and in all other things, if I am not mistaken, the like holds—he who has these double powers of attack and defence ought not in any case to leave them either unused or untrained: and if a person had the

nature of Geryon or Briareus he ought to be able with his hundred hands to throw a hundred darts. Now, the rulers, male and female, should see to all these things; the women superintending the nursing and amusements of the children, and the men superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike, may be sound hand and foot, and may not, if they can help, spoil the gifts of nature by bad habits.

Education has two branches,—one of gymnastic, which is concerned with the body, and the other of music, which is designed for the improvement of the soul. And gymnastic has also two parts—dancing and wrestling; and one sort of dancing imitates musical recitation, and aims at preserving dignity and freedom; the other aims at producing health, agility, and beauty in the limbs and parts of the body, giving the proper flexion and extension to each of them, diffusing and accompanying the harmonious motion of the dance everywhere. As 796 regards wrestling, the tricks which Antaeus and Cercyon devised in their systems out of a vain spirit of competition, or the tricks of boxing which Epeius or Amycus invented, are useless for war, and do not deserve to have much said about them; but the art of wrestling erect and keeping free the neck and hands and sides, working with energy and constancy, with a composed strength, and for the sake of health—these are always useful, and are not to be neglected, but to be enjoined alike on masters and scholars, when we reach that part of legislation; and we will desire the one to give their instructions freely, and the others to receive them thankfully. Nor, again, must we omit suitable imitations of war in our dances; in Crete there are the armed sports of the Curetes, and in Lacedaemon of the Dioscori. And our virgin lady, delighting in the sports of the dance, thought it not fit to dance with empty hands; she must be clothed in a complete suit of armour, and in this attire go through the dance; and youths and maidens should in every respect imitate her example, honouring the Goddess both with a view to the actual necessities of war, and to festive amusements: it will be right also for the boys until such time as they go out to war to make processions and supplications to the Gods in goodly array, armed and on horseback, in dances and marches,

fast or slow, offering up prayers to the Gods and to the sons of Gods; and also engaging in contests and preludes of contests, if at all, with these objects. For these sort of exercises, and no others, are useful both in peace and war, and are beneficial both to states and to private houses. But other labours and sports and excessive training of the body are unworthy of freemen, O Megillus and Cleinias.

I have now completely described the kind of gymnastic which I said at first ought to be described; if you know of any better, will you communicate your thoughts?

Cle. It is not easy, Stranger, to put these principles of gymnastic aside and to enunciate better ones.

Ath. Next in order follow the gifts of the Muses and of Apollo: before, we fancied that we had said all, and that gymnastic alone remained to be discussed; but now we see clearly what points have been omitted, and should be first proclaimed; of these, then, let us proceed to speak.

Cle. By all means.

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Ath. Hear me once more, although you have heard me say the same before—that caution must be always exercised, both by the speaker and by the hearer, about anything that is singular and unusual. For my tale is one which many a man would be afraid to tell, and yet I have a confidence which makes me go on.

Cle. What have you to say, Stranger?

Ath. I say that in states generally no one has observed that the plays of childhood have a great deal to do with the permanence or want of permanence in legislation. For when plays are ordered with a view to children having the same plays and amusing themselves after the same manner, and finding delight in the same playthings, the more solemn institutions of the state are allowed to remain undisturbed. Whereas if sports are disturbed and innovations are made in them, and they constantly change, and the young never speak of their having the same likings, or the same established notions of good and bad taste, either in the bearing of their bodies or in their dress, but he who devises something new and out of the way in figures and colours and the like is held in special honour, we may truly say that no greater evil can happen in

a state; for he who changes the sports is secretly changing the manners of the young, and making the old to be dishonoured among them and the new to be honoured. And I affirm that there is nothing which is a greater injury to all states than saying or thinking thus. Will you hear me tell how great I deem it to be?

Cle. You mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states?

Ath. Exactly.

Cle. If you are speaking of that, you will find in us hearers who are disposed to receive what you say not unfavourably but most favourably.

Ath. I should expect so.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Well, then, let us give all the greater heed to one another's words. The argument says that to change from anything except the bad is the most dangerous of all things; this is true in the case of the seasons and of the winds, in the management of our bodies and the habits of our minds—true of all things except, as I said before, of the bad. He who looks at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any sort of meat or drink any drink or do any work which they could get, may see that they are at first disordered, but afterwards, as time goes on, their bodies grow adapted to them, and they learn to know and like variety, and have good health and enjoyment of life; and if ever afterwards they are confined again to a superior diet, at first they are troubled with disorders, and with difficulty become habituated to their new food. A similar principle we may imagine to hold good about the minds of men and the nature of their souls. For when they have been brought up in certain laws, which by some Divine Providence have remained unchanged during long ages, so that no one has any memory or tradition of their ever having been otherwise than they are, then every one is afraid and ashamed to change that which is established. The legislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for antiquity, and I would propose the following way:—People are apt to fancy, as I was saying before, that when the plays of children are altered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and detrimental consequences arise out of the change; and they readily comply

with the child's wishes instead of deterring him, not considering that these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow up to be men will be different from the last generation of children, and, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under the influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws; and no one ever apprehends that there will follow what I just now called the greatest of evils to states. Changes in bodily fashions are no such serious evils, but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners are the greatest of evils, and require the utmost prevision.

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And now do we still hold to our former assertion, that rhythms and music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men? What say you?

Cle. That is the only doctrine which I can admit.

Ath. Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our youth desiring imitations and novelties either in dance or song? nor must any one be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Can any better mode of effecting this object be imagined 799 by any of us than that of the Egyptians?

Cle. What is their method?

Ath. They consecrate every sort of dance or melody, first ordaining festivals,—calculating for the year what they ought to be, and at what time, and in honour of what Gods, sons of Gods, and heroes they ought to be celebrated; and, in the next place, what hymns ought to be sung at the several sacrifices, and with what dances the particular festival is to be honoured. This is to be arranged at first by certain persons, and, when arranged, the whole assembly of the citizens are to offer sacrifices and libations to the Fates and all the other Gods, and to consecrate the several odes to Gods and heroes: and if any one offers any other hymns or dances to any one of the Gods, the priests and priestesses, with the consent of the guardians of the law, shall religiously and lawfully exclude him, and he who is excluded, if he do not submit, shall be liable all his life long to have a suit of impiety brought against him by any one who likes.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. In the consideration of this subject, let us remember what is due to ourselves.

Cle. To what are you referring?

Ath. I mean that any young man, and much more any old one, when he sees or hears anything strange or unaccustomed, does not at once run to embrace the paradox, but he stands considering, like a person who is at a place where three ways meet, and does not very well know his way—he may be alone or he may be walking with others, and he will say to himself and them, ‘Which is the way?’ and will not move forward until he is satisfied that he is going right. And this is our case, for a strange discussion on the subject of law has arisen, which requires the utmost consideration, and we should not at our age be too ready to speak about such great matters, or be confident that we can say anything certain all in a moment.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Then we will allow time for reflection, and decide when we have given the subject sufficient consideration. But that we may not be hindered from completing the natural arrangement of our laws, let us proceed to the conclusion of them in due order; for very possibly, if God will, the exposition of them, when completed, may throw light on our present perplexity.

Cle. Excellent, Stranger; let us do as you propose.

Ath. Let us then affirm the paradox that strains of music are our laws (*νόμοι*), and this latter being the name which the
800
ancients gave to lyric songs, they probably would not have very much objected to our proposed application of the word. Some one, either asleep or awake, must have had a dreamy suspicion of their nature. And let our decree be as follows:—No one in singing or dancing shall offend against public and consecrated models, and the general fashion among the youth, any more than he would offend against any other law. And he who observes this law shall be blameless; but he who is disobedient, as I was saying, shall be punished by the guardians of the laws, and by priests and priestesses: suppose that we imagine this to be our law.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Can any one who makes such laws escape ridicule? Let us see. I think that our only safety will be in first framing certain models for them. One of these models shall be as follows:—If when a sacrifice is going on, and the victims are being burnt according to law,—if, I say, any one who may be a son or brother, standing by another at the altar and over the victims, horribly blasphemes, will he not inspire despondency and evil omens and forebodings in the mind of his father and of his other kinsmen?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. And this is just what takes place in almost all our cities. A magistrate offers a public sacrifice, and there come in not one but many choruses, who stand by themselves a little way from the altar, and from time to time pour forth all sorts of horrible blasphemies on the sacred rites, exciting the souls of the audience with words and rhythms, and melodies most sorrowful to hear; and he who can at the instant the city is sacrificing make the citizens weep most, carries away the palm of victory. Now, ought we not to forbid such strains as these? And if ever our citizens must hear such lamentations, then on some unblest and inauspicious day let there be choruses of foreign and hired minstrels, like those who accompany the departed at funerals with barbarous Carian chants. That is the sort of thing which will be appropriate if we have such strains at all; and let the apparel of the singers be not circlets and ornaments of gold, but the reverse. Enough of the description. And now I will ask once more whether we shall lay down as one of our principles of song—

Cle. What?

Ath. That we should avoid every evil word. I need hardly 801ask again, but shall assume that you agree with me.

Cle. By all means; that law is approved by the suffrage of all of us.

Ath. But what shall be our next musical law or type? Ought not prayers to be offered up to the Gods when we sacrifice?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And our third law, if I am not mistaken, will be to the effect, that our poets understanding prayers to be requests which we make to the Gods, will take especial heed that they do not

by mistake ask for evil instead of good. To make such a prayer would surely be too ridiculous.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Were we not a little while ago quite determined that no silver or golden Plutus should dwell in our state?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And what did this illustration mean? Did we not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what is good or evil? And if one of them utters a mistaken prayer in song or words, he will make our citizens pray for the opposite of what is good in matters of the highest import; than which, as I was saying, there can be few greater mistakes. Shall we then propose as one of our laws and models relating to the Muses—

Cle. What?—will you explain the law more precisely?

Ath. Shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state? nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals, until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges, and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them. As to the persons whom we appoint to be our legislators about music and directors of education, they have been already indicated. Once more then, as I have asked more than once, shall this be our third law, and type, and model—What do you say?

Cle. Yes, by all means.

Ath. Next it will be proper to have hymns and praises of the Gods, intermingled with prayers; and after the Gods prayers and praises should be offered in like manner to demigods and heroes, suitable to their several characters.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. In the third place there will be no objection to a law, that citizens who are departed and have done good and energetic deeds, either with their souls or with their bodies, and have been obedient to the laws, should receive eulogies; this will be very fitting.

802 *Cle.* Quite true.

Ath. But to honour with hymns and panegyrics those who

are still alive is not safe; a man should run his course, and make a fair ending, and then we will praise him; and let praise be given equally to women as well as men who have been distinguished in virtue. The order of songs and dances shall be as follows:—There are many ancient musical compositions and dances which are excellent, and from these the government may freely select what is proper and suitable; and they shall choose judges of not less than fifty years of age, who shall make the selection, and any of the old poems which they deem sufficient they shall include; any that is deficient or altogether unsuitable, they shall either utterly throw aside, or examine and amend, taking into their counsel poets and musicians, and making use of their poetical genius; but explaining to them the wishes of the legislator in order that they may regulate dancing, music, and all choral strains, according to his mind; and not allowing them to indulge, except in some minor matters, their individual pleasures and fancies. Now, the irregular strain of music is always made ten thousand times better by attaining to law and order, and rejecting the honied Muse—not however that we mean wholly to exclude pleasure, which is the characteristic of all music. And if a man be brought up from childhood to the age of discretion and maturity in the use of the orderly and severe music, when he hears the opposite he detests it, and calls it illiberal; but if trained in the sweet and vulgar music, he deems the opposite cold and displeasing. So that, as I was saying before, while he who hears them gains no more pleasure from the one than from the other, the one has the advantage of making those who are trained in it better men, whereas the other makes them worse.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Again, we must distinguish and determine on some general principle what songs are suitable to women, and what to men, and must assign to them their proper melodies and rhythms. It is shocking for a whole harmony to be inharmonical, or for a rhythm to be unrhythmical, and this will happen when the melody is inappropriate to them. And, therefore, the legislator must assign to them also their forms. Now, both sexes have melodies and rhythms which of necessity

belong to them; and those of women are clearly enough indicated by their natural difference. The grand, and that which tends to courage, may be fairly called manly; but that which inclines to moderation and temperance, may be declared both
803 in law and in ordinary speech to be the more womanly quality: This, then, will be the general order of them.

Let us now speak of the manner of teaching and imparting them, and the persons to whom, and the time when, they are severally to be imparted. As the shipwright first lays down the lines of the keel, and draws the design in outline, so do I seek to distinguish the patterns of life, and lay down their keels according to the nature of different men's souls; seeking truly to consider by what means, and in what ways, we may go through the voyage of life best. Now, human affairs are hardly worth considering in earnest, and yet we must be in earnest about them,—a sad necessity constrains us. And having got thus far, there will be a fitness in our completing the matter, if we can only find some suitable means of doing so. But what am I saying? and yet very probably there may be a meaning latent in these very words.

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. I say that about serious matters a man should be serious, and about a matter which is not serious he should not be serious; and that God is the natural and worthy object of a man's most serious and blessed endeavours; who, as I said before, is made to be the plaything of God, and that this, truly considered, is the best of him; wherefore every man and woman should walk seriously, and pass life in the noblest of pastimes, and be of another mind from what they now are.

Cle. In what respect?

Ath. Now they think that their serious pursuits should be for the sake of their sports, for they deem war a serious pursuit, which must be managed well for the sake of peace; but the truth is, that there neither is, nor has been, nor ever will be, either amusement or instruction in any degree worth speaking of in war, which is nevertheless deemed by us to be the most serious of our pursuits. And therefore, as we say, every one of us should live the life of peace as long and as well as he can. And what is the right way of living? Are we to live in sports

always? If so, in what kind of sports? We ought to live sacrificing, and singing, and dancing, and then a man will be able to propitiate the Gods, and to defend himself against his enemies and conquer them in battle. The type of song or dance by which he will propitiate them has been described, and the paths along which he is to proceed have been cut for him. He will go forward in the spirit of the poet:—

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‘Telemachus, some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart, but other things God will suggest; for I deem that thou wast not born or brought up without the will of the Gods.’

And this ought to be the view of our alumni; they ought to think that what has been said is enough for them, and that any other things some God or a demi-God will suggest to them—he will tell them to whom, and when, and to what Gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform dances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to the appointment of nature; being for the most part puppets, but having some little share of reality.

Meg. You have a low opinion of mankind, Stranger.

Ath. Nay, Megillus, I was only comparing them with the Gods; and under that feeling I spoke. Let us grant, if you wish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is worthy of some consideration.

Next follow the buildings for gymnasia and schools open to all; these are to be in three places in the midst of the city; and outside the city and in the surrounding country there shall be schools for horse exercise, and open spaces also in three places, arranged with a view to archery and the throwing of missiles, at which young men may learn and practise. Of these mention has already been made; and if the mention be not sufficiently explicit, let us speak further of them and embody them in laws. In these several schools let there be dwellings for teachers, who shall be brought from foreign parts by pay, and let them teach the frequenters of the school the art of war and the art of music, and the children shall come not only if their parents please, but if they do not please; and if their education is neglected, there shall be compulsory education, as the saying is, of all and sundry, as far as this is possible; and the pupils shall be regarded as belonging to the state rather than to their

parents. My law would apply to females as well as males; they shall both go through the same exercises. I assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic and horsemanship are as suitable to women as to men. Of the truth of this I am persuaded from ancient tradition, and at the present day there are said to be myriads of women in the neighbourhood of the Black Sea, called Sauromatides, who not only ride on
805 horseback like men, but have enjoined upon them the use of bows and other weapons equally with the men. And I further affirm, that if these things are possible, nothing can be more absurd than the practice which prevails in our own country of men and women not following the same pursuits with all their strength and with one mind, for thus the state, instead of being a whole, is reduced to a half, and yet has the same imposts to pay and the same toils to undergo; and what can be a greater mistake for any legislator to make?

Cle. Very true; and much of what has been asserted by us, Stranger, is contrary to the custom of states; still, in saying that the discourse should be allowed to proceed, and that when the discussion is completed, we should choose what seems best, you have spoken very properly, and have made me feel compunction for what I said. Tell me, then, what you would next wish to say.

Ath. I should wish to say, Cleinias, as I said before, that if the possibility of these things were not sufficiently proven in fact, then there might be an objection to the argument, but the fact being as I have said, he who rejects the law must find some other ground of objection; and, failing this, our exhortation will still hold good, nor will any one deny that women ought to share as far as possible in education and in other ways with men, for consider;—if women do not share in their whole life with men, then they must have some other order of life.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is preferable to this community which we are now assigning to them? Shall we prefer that which is adopted by the Thracians and many other races who use their women to till the ground and to be shepherds of their herds and flocks, and to minister

to them like slaves? Or shall we do as we and people in our part of the world do? getting together, as the phrase is, all our goods and chattels into one dwelling—these we entrust to our women, who are the stewards of them; and who also preside over the shuttles and the whole art of spinning. Or shall we take a middle course, as in Lacedaemon, Megillus, letting the 806 girls share in gymnastic and music, while the grown-up women, no longer employed in spinning wool, are actively engaged in weaving the web of life, which will be no cheap or mean employment, and in the duty of serving and taking care of the household and bringing up children in which they will observe a sort of mean, not participating in the toils of war; and if there were any necessity that they should fight for their city and families, unlike the Amazons, they would be unable to take part in archery or any other skilled use of missiles, nor could they, after the example of the Goddess, carry shield or spear, or stand up nobly for their country when it was being destroyed, and strike terror into their enemies, if only because they were seen in regular order? Living as they do, they would never dare at all to imitate the Sauromatides, whose women, when compared with ordinary women, would appear to be like men. Let him who will, praise your legislators, but I must say what I think. The legislator ought to be whole and perfect, and not half a man only; he ought not to let the female sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life, while he takes the utmost care of the male sex, and leaves half of life only blest with happiness, when he might have made the whole state happy.

Meg. What shall we do, Cleinias? Shall we allow a stranger to run down Sparta in this fashion?

Cle. Yes; for as we have given him liberty of speech we must let him go on until we have perfected the work of legislation.

Meg. Very true.

Ath. Then now I may proceed?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. What will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed to have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation, and who have entrusted the practice of the arts

to others, and whose husbandry committed to slaves paying a part of the produce, brings them a return sufficient for men living temperately; who, moreover, have common tables in which the men are placed apart, and near them are the common tables of their families, of their daughters and mothers, which day by day, the rulers, male and female, are to inspect and look to their mode of life and so dismiss them; after which the magistrate and his attendants shall honour with libations those Gods to whom that day and night are dedicated, and then go home? To men whose lives are thus ordered, is there no work to be done which is necessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live fattening like a beast? Such a life is neither just nor honourable, nor can he who lives it fail of meeting his due; and the due reward of the idle fatted beast is that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose fatness is worn down by labours and toils. These regulations, if we duly consider them, will never perfectly take effect under present circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and all other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can attain the second-best form of polity, with that we may be satisfied. And to men living under this second polity there remains a work to be accomplished which is far from being small or insignificant, but is the greatest of all works, and ordained by the appointment of righteous law. For the life which is wholly concerned with the virtue of body and soul may truly be said to be twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble as the pursuit after Pythian and Olympic victories, which debars a man from every employment of life. For there ought to be no bye-work interfering with the greater work of providing the necessary exercise and nourishment for the body, and instruction and education for the soul. Night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their perfection and consummation; and therefore to this end all freemen ought to arrange the time of their employments during the whole course of the twenty-four hours, from morning to evening and from evening to the morning of the next sunrise. There may seem to be some impropriety in the legislator determining minutely the little details of the management of the house, including such particulars as the

duty of wakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city ; for that any citizen should continue during the whole night in sleep, instead of being seen by all his servants, always the first to awake and the first to rise—this, whether the regulation is to be called a law or only a practice, should be deemed base and unworthy of a freeman ; also that the mistress of the house should be awakened by her handmaidens instead of herself first awakening them, is what her slaves, male and female, and her children, and, if that were possible, everything in the house should regard as base. If they rise early, they may all of them do much of their public and of their household business, as magistrates in the city, and masters and mistresses in their private houses, before the sun is up. Much sleep is not required by nature, either for our souls or bodies, or for the actions in which they are concerned. For no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were dead ; but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps awake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is expedient for health ; and much sleep is not required, if the habit of not sleeping be once formed. Magistrates in states who keep awake at night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are honoured and revered by the just and temperate, and are useful to themselves and to the whole state.

A night which is short and devoted to work, in addition to all the above-mentioned advantages, infuses a sort of courage into the minds of the citizens. When the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go to their schoolmasters. Now, neither sheep nor any other animals can live without a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves without masters. And of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inasmuch as he has the fountain of reason in him not yet regulated ; he is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals. Wherefore he must be bound with many bridles ; in the first place, when he gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the control of tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness ; then, again, being a freeman, he must have teachers and be educated by them in anything which they teach, and must learn what he has to learn ; but

he is also a slave, and in that regard any freeman who comes in his way may punish him and his tutor and his instructor, if any of them does anything wrong; and he who comes across
809 him and does not inflict upon him the punishment which he deserves, shall incur the greatest disgrace; and let the guardian of the law, who is the director of education, see to him who coming in the way of the offences which we have mentioned, does not chastise them when he ought, or chastises them in a way which he ought not; let him keep a sharp look-out, and take especial care of the training of our children, directing their natures, and always turning them to good according to the law.

And how can our law sufficiently train the director of education himself; for as yet all has been imperfect, and nothing has been said either clear or satisfactory? Now, as far as possible, the law ought to leave nothing to him, but to explain everything, that he may be the interpreter and tutor of others. About dances and music and choral strains, I have already spoken both as to the character of the selection of them, and the manner in which they are to be improved and consecrated. But we have not yet spoken, O illustrious guardian of education, of the manner in which your pupils are to use those strains which are written in prose, although you have been informed what martial strains they are to learn and practise; what relates in the first place to the learning of letters, and secondly, to the lyre, and also to calculation, which, as we were saying, is needful for them all to learn, and any other things which are required with a view to war and the management of house and city, and, looking to the same object, what is useful in the revolutions of the heavenly bodies—the stars and sun and moon, and the various regulations about these matters which are necessary for the whole state—I am speaking of the arrangements of days in periods of months, and of months in years, which are to be observed, in order that times and sacrifices and festivals may proceed in regular and natural order, and keep the city alive and awake, the Gods receiving the honours due to them, and men having a better understanding about them: all these things, O my friend, have not yet been sufficiently declared by the legislator. Attend, then, to what

I am now going to say: We were telling you, in the first place, that you were not sufficiently informed about letters, and the objection made was to this effect,—‘That you were never told whether he who was meant to be a respectable citizen should apply himself in detail to that sort of learning, or not apply himself at all;’ and the same remark was made about the lyre. But now we say that he ought to attend to them. A fair time for a boy of ten years old to spend in letters is three 810 years; at thirteen years he should begin to handle the lyre, and he may continue at this for another three years, neither more nor less, and whether his father or himself like or dislike the study, he is not to be allowed to spend more or less time in learning music than the law allows. And let him who disobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honours of which we shall hereafter speak. Hear, however, first of all, what the young ought to learn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to teach them. They ought to be occupied with their letters until they are able to read and write; but the acquisition of perfect beauty or quickness in writing, if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these accomplishments in the given number of years, they should let alone. And as to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are unaccompanied by song, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions, compositions in prose, as they are termed, having no rhythm or harmony—seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by many writers of this class—what will you do with them, O most excellent guardians of the law? or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about them? I believe that he will be in great difficulty.

Cle. What troubles you, Stranger? and why are you so perplexed in your mind?

Ath. You naturally ask, Cleinias, and to you, who are my partners in the work of education, I must state the difficulties of the case.

Cle. To what do you refer in this instance?

Ath. I will tell you. There is a difficulty in opposing many myriads of mouths.

Cle. Well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in many important enactments?

Ath. That is quite true ; and you mean to imply that the road which we are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to as many others, or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to the others, and in company with them you bid me, at whatever risk, proceed along the path of legislation which has opened out of our present discourse, and to be of good cheer, and not to faint.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And I do not faint ; I say, indeed, that we have a great many poets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures—some who are serious, others who aim only at raising a laugh—and all mankind declare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up and saturated with them ; they should be constantly hearing them read at recitations, and some would have them learn by heart entire poets ; while others select choice passages and long speeches, and make compendiums of them, saying that these shall be committed to memory, and that in this way only can a man be made good and wise by experience and learning. And you want me to say plainly in what they are right and in what they are wrong.

Cle. Yes, I do.

Ath. But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them ? I am of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, there is a general agreement, that every one of these poets has said many things well and many things the reverse of well ; and if this be true, then I do affirm that much learning brings danger to youth.

Cle. Then how would you advise the guardian of the law to act ?

Ath. In what respect ?

Cle. I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in permitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn others. Do not shrink from answering.

Ath. My good Cleinias, I rather think that I am fortunate.

Cle. In what ?

Ath. I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I consider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now, and which, as I believe, have been inspired by

Heaven, they appear to me to be quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours, I naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which I have ever learnt or heard, either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the justest, and most suitable for young men to hear; I cannot imagine any better pattern than this which the guardian of the law and the educator can have. They cannot do better than advise the teachers to teach the young these and the like words, and if they should happen to find writings, either in poetry or prose, or even unwritten discourses like these of ours, and of the same family, they should certainly preserve them, and commit them to writing. And, first of all, they shall constrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of them who will not, shall not be employed by them, but those whom they find agreeing in their judgment, they shall make use of and shall commit to them the instruction and education of youth. And here and on this wise let my fanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end. 812

Cle. I do not think, Stranger, that we have wandered out of the proposed limits of the argument; but whether we are right or not in the whole design I cannot be very certain.

Ath. The truth, Cleinias, may be expected to become clearer when, as we have often said, we arrive at the end of the whole discussion about laws.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the teacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. I think that we have only to recollect our previous discussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching all this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre.

Cle. To what do you refer?

Ath. We were saying, if I remember rightly, that the sixty years' old choristers of Dionysus were to be specially quick in their perceptions of rhythm and musical composition, that they might be able to distinguish good and bad imitation, or in other words, the imitation of the good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the one and displaying the other

in hymns and songs, charming the souls of youth, and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of imitation.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use the sounds of the lyre because its notes are pure, the player who teaches and his pupil giving note for note in unison ; but complexity, and variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or composer of the melody gives another ; also when they make concords and harmonies in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or high and low notes, are combined ; or, again, when they make complex variations of rhythms, which they adapt to the notes of the lyre,—all that sort of thing is not suited to those who have to acquire a speedy and useful knowledge of music in three years ; for opposite principles are confusing, and create a difficulty in learning, and our young men should learn quickly, and their mere necessary acquirements are not few or trifling, as will be shown in due course. Let our educator attend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. As to the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to teach and the character of them, they have been already described by us, and
813 are the same which we said were to be consecrated as may suit the several feasts, and so furnish an innocent and useful amusement to cities.

Cle. That, again, is true.

Ath. Then let the musical president who has been elected receive these rules from us as the very truth ; and may he prosper in his office ! Let us now proceed to lay down other rules about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. Having said what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak in like manner about gymnastic. For boys and girls ought to learn to dance and practise gymnastic exercises—ought they not ?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. Then the boys ought to have dancing masters, and the girls dancing mistresses to exercise them.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Then once more let us call him who will have the chief trouble, the superintendent of youth ; he will have plenty to do, if he is to have the charge of music and gymnastic.

Cle. But how will an old man be able to attend to such great charges?

Ath. O, my friend, there will be no difficulty, for the law has already given and will give him permission to select as his assistants in this charge any citizens, male or female, whom he desires; and he will know whom he ought to choose, and will be anxious not to make a mistake, from a sense of responsibility, and from a consciousness of the importance of his office, and also because he will consider that if young men have been and are well brought up, then all things go swimmingly, but if not, it is not meet to say, nor do we say, what will follow, lest the regarders of omens should take alarm about our infant state. Many things have been said by us about dancing and about gymnastic movements in general; for we include under gymnastics all military exercises, such as archery, and all hurling of weapons, and the use of the light shield, and all fighting with heavy arms, and military evolutions, and movements of armies, and encampments, and all that relates to horsemanship. Of all these things there ought to be public teachers, receiving pay from the state, and their pupils should be the men and boys in the state, and also the girls and women, who are to know all these things. While they are yet girls they should have practised dancing in arms and the whole art of fighting—when they are grown-up women, applying themselves to evolutions and tactics, and the mode of grounding and taking up arms; if for no other reason, yet in case the whole people should have to 814
leave the city and carry on operations of war outside, that the young who are left to guard and the rest of the city may be equal to the task; and, on the other hand (what is far from being an impossibility), when enemies, whether barbarian or Hellenic, come from without with mighty force and make a violent assault upon them, and thus compel them to fight for the possession of the city, great would be the disgrace to the state, if the women had been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young, as birds will, against any creature however strong, and die or undergo any danger, but must instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the altars and shrines, and bring upon human nature the reproach, that of all animals man is the most cowardly.

Cle. Such a want of education, Stranger, is certainly an unseemly thing to happen in a state, and also a great misfortune.

Ath. Suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that women ought not to neglect military matters, but that all citizens, male and female alike, shall attend to them?

Cle. I quite agree.

Ath. Of wrestling we have spoken in part, but of what I should call the most important part we have not spoken, and cannot easily speak without showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we mean; when word and action combine, and not till then, we shall explain clearly what has been said, pointing out that of all movements wrestling is most akin to the military art, and is to be pursued for the sake of this, and not this for the sake of wrestling.

Cle. Excellent.

Ath. Thus far we have spoken of the palestra, and we will now proceed to speak of other movements of the body. Such motion may be in general called dancing, and is of two kinds: one of nobler figures, imitating the honourable, the other of the more ignoble figures, imitating the mean; and of both these there are two further sub-divisions. Of the serious, one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action, and is the exercise of a noble person and a manly heart; the other exhibits a temperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures, and may be truly called and is the dance of
815 peace. The warrior dance is different from the peaceful one, and may be rightly termed Pyrrhic; this imitates the modes of avoiding blows and darts, by dropping or giving way, or springing aside, or rising up or falling down; also the opposite postures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of archery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows. And when the imitation is of brave bodies and souls, and the action is direct and muscular, giving for the most part a straight movement to the limbs of the body—that, I say, is the true sort; but the opposite is not right. In the dance of peace the consideration is whether a man bears himself naturally and gracefully, and after the manner of well-conditioned men. But before proceeding I must distinguish the dancing about which

there is any doubt, from that about which there is no doubt. How shall we distinguish them? There are dances of the Bacchic sort, in which they imitate, as they say, the Nymphs, and Pan, and drunken Silenuses, and Satyrs, after whom they name them, making purifications and celebrating mysteries,—all this sort of dancing cannot be distinguished as having either a peaceful or a warlike character, or indeed as having any meaning whatever, and may, I think, be most truly described as distinct from the warlike dance, and distinct from the peaceful, and not suited for a city at all. Having left this behind us, we will now proceed to the dances of war and peace, about which there can be no doubt in our state. Now the unwarlike muse, which honours in dance the Gods and the sons of the Gods, is associated with the consciousness of prosperity; and this may be sub-divided into classes, of which one is expressive of an escape from some labour or danger into good, and has greater pleasures; the other expressive of preservation and increase of former good, in which the pleasure is less exciting;—in all these cases, every man when the pleasure is greater, moves his body more, and less when the pleasure is less; and, again, if he be more orderly and disciplined he moves less; but if he be a coward, and has 816 no training or self-control, he makes greater and more violent movements, and in general when he is speaking or singing he is not altogether able to control his body; and so out of the imitation of words in gestures the art of dancing has originated. And in these various kinds of imitation one man moves in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner; and as the ancients may be observed to have given many names which are according to nature and deserving of praise, so there is an excellent one which they have given to those dances of men in their times of prosperity, who are moderate in their pleasures—whoever he was gave them a very true, and poetical, and rational name, when he called them *Emmeleiai*, or dances of order; thus establishing two kinds of dances of the nobler sort, the dance of war which he called the *Pyrrhic*, and the dance of peace which he called *Emmeleia*, or the dance of order; giving to each their appropriate and becoming name. These things the legislator should indicate in general outline, and the guardian of the law should enquire into them and search them out, combining

dancing with music, and assigning to the several sacrificial feasts that which is suitable to them; and when he has consecrated them all in due order, he shall for the future change nothing, whether of dance or song. Thenceforward the city and the citizens shall continue to have the same pleasures, themselves being as far as possible alike, and shall live well and happily.

I have described the dances which are appropriate to noble bodies and generous souls. But it is necessary also to consider and know uncomely persons and thoughts, and those which are intended to produce laughter in comedy, and have a comic character both in respect to style, and song, and dance, whether real or imitated. For serious things cannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either; but he cannot carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of virtue. And for this very reason he should learn them both, in order that he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and out of place—he should command slaves and hired strangers to imitate such things, but he should never take any serious interest in them himself, nor should any freeman or freewoman be discovered learning them; and there should always be some element of novelty in the imitation. Let these then be laid down, both in law and in our narrative, as the regulations of
 817 laughable amusements which are generally called comedy. And, if any of the serious or tragic poets, as they are termed, come to us and say—‘O strangers, may we go to your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our poetry—what is your will about these matters?’ How shall we answer the divine men? I think that our answer should be as follows:—Best of strangers, we will say to them, we also according to our ability are tragic poets, and our tragedy the best and noblest; for our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy. You are poets and we are poets, your rivals and antagonists in the noblest of dramas, which true law will carry out in act, as our hope is. Do not then suppose that we shall all in a moment allow you to erect your stage in the agora, or introduce the fair voice of your actors, speaking above our own, and permit you to harangue our women and children, and the

mass of mankind, about our institutions, in language other than our own, and very often the opposite of our own. For a state would be mad which gave you this licence, until the magistrates had determined whether your poetry might be recited, and was fit for publication or not. Wherefore, O ye sons and scions of the softer Muses, first of all show your songs to the magistrates, and let them compare them with our own, and if they are the same or better we will give you a chorus; but if not, then, my friends, we cannot. Let these, then, be the customs ordained by law about all dances and the teaching of them, and let matters relating to slaves be separated from those relating to masters, if you do not object.

Cle. We can have no hesitation in assenting when you put the matter thus.

Ath. There still remain three studies suitable for freemen. Arithmetic is one of them; the measurement of length, surface, and depth is the second; and the third has to do with the revolutions of the stars in relation to one another. Not every one has need to toil through all these things in a strictly 818 scientific manner, but only a few, and who they are to be, we will hereafter indicate in the proper place; not to know what is necessary for mankind in general, and what is the truth, is disgraceful to every one: and yet to enter into these matters minutely is neither easy, nor at all possible for every one; but there is something in them which is necessary and cannot be set aside, and probably he who made the proverb about God originally had this in view when he said, 'that not even God himself can fight against necessity;'—he meant, if I am not mistaken, divine necessity; for as to the human necessities of which men often speak when they talk in this manner, nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the words.

Cle. And what necessities of knowledge are there, Stranger, which are divine and not human?

Ath. I conceive them to be those of which he who has no use nor any knowledge at all cannot be a God, or demi-god, or hero to mankind, or able to take any serious thought or charge of them. And very unlike a divine man would he be, who is unable to count one, two, three, or to distinguish odd and even numbers; or is unable to count at all, or reckon night and day,

and who is totally unacquainted with the revolution of the sun and moon, and the other stars. There would be great folly in supposing that all these are not necessary parts of knowledge to him who intends to know anything about the highest kinds of knowledge; but which these are, and how many there are of them, and when they are to be learned, and what is to be learned together and what apart, and the whole correlation of them, must be rightly apprehended first; and these leading the way we may proceed to the other parts of knowledge. For so necessity grounded in nature constrains us, against which we say that no God contends, or ever will contend.

Cle. I think, Stranger, that what you have now said is very true and agreeable to nature.

Ath. Yes, Cleinias, I quite agree with you. But it is difficult for the legislator to begin with these studies; at a more convenient time we will make regulations for them.

Cle. You seem, Stranger, to be afraid of our habitual ignorance of the subject: there is no reason why that should prevent you
819 from speaking out.

Ath. I certainly am afraid of the difficulties to which you allude, but I am still more afraid of those who apply themselves to this sort of knowledge, and apply themselves badly. For entire ignorance is not so terrible or extreme an evil, and is far from being the greatest of all; too much cleverness and too much learning, accompanied with ill bringing up, are far more fatal.

Cle. True.

Ath. All freemen, I conceive, should learn as much of these branches of knowledge as every child in Egypt is taught when he learns his alphabet. In that country arithmetical games have been actually invented for the use of children, which they learn as a pleasure and amusement. They have to distribute apples and garlands, using the same number sometimes for a larger and sometimes for a lesser number of persons; and they arrange pugilists and wrestlers as they pair together by lot or remain over, and show the order in which they follow. Another mode of amusing them is by distributing vessels, some in which gold, brass, silver, and the like are mixed, others in which they are unmixed; as I was saying, they adapt to their amusement

the numbers in common use, and in this way make more intelligible to their pupils the arrangements and movements of armies and expeditions, and in the management of a household they make people more useful to themselves, and more wide awake; and again in measurements of things which have length, and breadth, and depth, they free us from that natural ignorance of all these things which is so ludicrous and disgraceful.

Cle. What kind of ignorance do you mean?

Ath. O my dear Cleinias, I, like yourself, have late in life heard with amazement of our ignorance in these matters; to me we appear to be more like pigs than men, and I am quite ashamed, not only of myself, but of all Hellenes.

Cle. About what? Say, Stranger, what you mean.

Ath. I will; or rather I will show you my meaning by a question, and do you please to answer me: You know, I suppose, what length is?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And what breadth is?

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. And you know that these are two distinct things, and that there is a third thing called depth?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. And do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with one another?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. That is to say, length is naturally commensurable with length, and breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth?

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Cle. Undoubtedly.

Ath. But if some things are commensurable and others wholly incommensurable, and you think that all things are commensurable, what is your position in regard to them?

Cle. Clearly, far from good.

Ath. Concerning length and breadth when compared with depth, or breadth and length when compared with one another, are not all the Hellenes agreed that these are commensurable with one another in some way?

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. But if they are absolutely incommensurable, and yet

all of us regard them as commensurable, have we not reason to be ashamed of our compatriots; and might we not say to them:—O ye best of Hellenes, is not this one of the things of which we were saying that not to know them is disgraceful, and of which to know only what is necessary is no great distinction?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And there are other things akin to these, in which there spring up other errors of the same family.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. The natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in their relation to one another. A man who is good for anything ought to be able, when he thinks, to distinguish them; and different persons should compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a far better and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man's game of draughts.

Cle. I dare say; and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game of draughts.

Ath. And these, as I maintain, Cleinias, are the studies which our youth ought to learn, for they are innocent and not difficult; the learning of them will be an amusement, and they will benefit the state. If any one is of another mind, let him say what he has to say.

Cle. Of course you are right.

Ath. Then if these studies are such as we say, we will include them; if not, they shall be excluded.

Cle. Assuredly: but may we not now, Stranger, prescribe these studies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws?

Ath. They shall be regarded as pledges which may be refused hereafter by the state, if they do not please either us who impose them, or you upon whom they are imposed.

Cle. A fair condition.

Ath. Next let us see whether we are willing that the study of astronomy shall or shall not be proposed for our youth.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Here occurs a strange phenomenon, which certainly cannot in any point of view be tolerated.

Cle. To what are you referring?

Ath. Men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme God and the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the causes of things, and that such enquiries are impious; whereas the very opposite is the truth.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Perhaps what I am saying may seem paradoxical, and at variance with the usual language of age. But when any one has any good and true notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way acceptable to God, he cannot abstain from expressing it.

Cle. Your words are reasonable enough; but shall we find any good or true notion about the stars?

Ath. My good friends, at this day all of us Hellenes speak falsely, if I may use such an expression, of those great Gods, the Sun and the Moon.

Cle. What is the falsehood?

Ath. We say that they and divers other stars do not keep the same path, and we call them planets or wanderers.

Cle. Very true, Stranger; and in the course of my life I have often myself seen the morning star and the evening star and divers others not proceeding in their own path, but wandering out of their path in all manner of ways, and I have seen the sun and moon doing what we all know that they do.

Ath. Just so, Megillus and Cleinias, and I maintain that our citizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the Gods in heaven, so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in pious language, and not to blaspheme about them.

Cle. There you are right, if such a knowledge be only attainable; and if we are wrong in our mode of speaking now, and can be better instructed and learn to use better language, then I quite agree with you that such a degree of knowledge as will enable us to speak rightly should, if attainable, be acquired by us. And now do you try to explain to us your whole meaning, and we, on our part, will endeavour to understand you.

Ath. There is some difficulty in understanding my meaning, but not a very great one, nor will any great length of time be required; and of this I am myself a proof; for I did not know

these things long ago, nor in the days of my youth ; and yet I can explain them to you in a brief space of time, whereas if they had been difficult I could certainly never have explained them all, old as I am, to old men like yourselves.

Cle. True ; but what is this study which you describe as
822 wonderful and fitting for youth to learn, but of which we are ignorant ? Try and explain the nature of it to us as clearly as you can.

Ath. I will. For, O my good friends, that other doctrine about the wandering of the sun and the moon and the other stars is not the truth, but the very reverse of the truth. Each of them moves in the same path—not in many paths, but in one only, which is circular, and the varieties are only apparent. Nor are we right in supposing that the swiftest of them is the slowest, nor conversely, that the slowest is the quickest. And if what I say is true, only just imagine that we had a similar notion about horses running at Olympia, or about men who ran in the long course, and that we addressed the swiftest as the slowest and the slowest as the swiftest, and sang the praises of the vanquished as though he were the victor,—in that case our praises would not be true, nor very agreeable to the runners, though they be but men ; and now, to commit the same error about the Gods which would have been ludicrous and erroneous in the case of men,—is not that ludicrous and erroneous ?

Cle. Worse than ludicrous, I should say.

Ath. At all events, the Gods cannot like us to be spreading a false report of them.

Cle. Most true, if such is the fact.

Ath. And if we can show that such is really the fact, then all these matters ought to be learned so far as is necessary for the avoidance of impiety ; but if we cannot, they may be let alone, and let this be our decision.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Enough of laws relating to education and learning. But hunting and similar pursuits in like manner claim our attention. For the legislator appears to have a duty imposed upon him which goes beyond mere legislation. There is something over and above law which lies in a region between admonition and law, and has several times occurred to us in the course of dis-

cussion ; for example, in the education of very young children there were things, as we maintain, which are not to be defined, and to regard them as matters of positive law is a great absurdity. Now, our laws and the whole constitution of our state having been thus delineated, the praise of the virtuous citizen is not complete when he is described as the person who serves the laws best and obeys them most, but the highest form of praise is that which describes him as the good citizen who goes through life undefiled and is obedient to the words of the 823 legislator, both when he is giving laws and when he assigns praise and blame. This is the truest word than can be spoken in praise of a citizen ; and the true legislator ought not only to write his laws, but also to interweave with them all such things as seem to him honourable and dishonourable. And the perfect citizen ought to seek to strengthen these no less than the principles of law which are sanctioned by punishments. I will adduce an example which will clear up my meaning. Hunting is of wide extent, and has a name under which many things are included, for there is a hunting of creatures in the water, and of creatures in the air ; and there is a great deal of hunting of land animals of all sorts, and not of wild beasts only ; the hunting after man is also worthy of consideration ; there is the hunting after him in war, and there is often a hunting after him in the way of friendship, which is praised and also blamed ; and there is thieving, and the hunting which is practised by robbers, and that of armies against armies. Now the legislator, in laying down laws about hunting, can neither abstain from noting these things, nor can he make threatening ordinances which will assign rules and penalties about all of them. What is he to do ? He will have to praise and blame hunting with a view to the discipline and exercise of youth. And, on the other hand, the young man must listen obediently ; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him, and he should regard as his standard of action the praises and injunctions of the legislator rather than the punishments which he imposes by law. This being premised, there will follow next in order moderate praise and censure of hunting ; the praise being assigned to that which will make the souls of young men better, and the censure to that which has the opposite effect. And now let us address young

men in the form of a pious wish for their welfare : O, my friends, we will say to them, may no desire or love of hunting in the sea, or of angling or of catching the creatures in the sea, ever take possession of you, either when you are awake or when you are asleep, by hook or with weels, which latter is a very lazy contrivance ; and let not any desire of catching men and of piracy by sea enter into your souls and make you cruel and lawless hunters. And as to the desire of thieving in town or country, may it never enter into your most passing thoughts ; nor let the insidious fancy of catching birds, which is hardly worthy of freemen, come into the head of any youth. There remains therefore for our athletes only the hunting and catching of land animals, of which the one sort is called hunting by night, in which the hunters sleep in turn and are lazy ; this is not to be commended any more than that which has intervals of rest, in which the wild strength of beasts is subdued by nets and snares, and not by the victory of a laborious spirit. Thus, only the best kind of hunting is allowed at all—that of quadrupeds, which is carried on with horses and dogs and men's own persons, and they get the victory over the animals by running them down and striking them and hurling at them, those who have a care of godlike manhood taking them with their own hands. The praise and blame which is assigned to all these things has now been declared ; and let the law be as follows : Let no one hinder our sacred hunters from following the chase wherever and whithersoever they will ; but the nightly hunter, who trusts to his nets and springs, shall not be allowed to hunt anywhere. The fowler in the mountains and waste places shall be permitted, but on cultivated ground and on consecrated wilds he shall not be permitted ; and any one who meets him may stop him. As to the hunter in waters, he may hunt anywhere except in harbours or sacred streams or marshes or pools, provided only that he do not trouble the water with poisonous mixtures. And now we may say that all our enactments about education are complete.

Cl. Very good.

BOOK VIII.

Athenian Stranger. NEXT, with the help of the Delphian⁸²⁸ oracle, we have to institute festivals and make laws about them; and to determine what sacrifices will be for the good of the city, and to what Gods they shall be offered; but when they shall be offered, and how often, may be partly regulated by us.

Cleinias. The number—yes.

Ath. Then we will first determine the number; and let the whole number be 365—one for every day,—so that one magistrate at least will sacrifice daily to some God or demi-god on behalf of the city, and the citizens, and their possessions. And the interpreters, and priests, and priestesses, and prophets shall meet, and, in company with the guardians of the law, ordain those things which the legislator of necessity omits; and I may remark that they are the very persons who ought to take note of what is omitted. The law will say that there are twelve feasts dedicated to the twelve Gods, after whom the several tribes are named; and that to each of them they shall sacrifice every month, and appoint choruses, and musical and gymnastic contests, corresponding to the several Gods and seasons of the year. And they shall have festivals of women, distinguishing those which ought to be separated from the men's festivals, and those which ought not. Further, they shall not confuse the infernal deities and their rites with the Gods who are termed heavenly and their rites, but shall separate them, giving to Pluto his own in the twelfth month, which is sacred to him, according to the law. To such a deity warlike men should entertain no

aversion, but they should honour him as being always the best friend of man. For the connection of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of them, as I am ready to maintain quite seriously. Moreover, those who would regulate these matters rightly, should consider, that our city among existing cities has indeed no fellow, either in respect of leisure or command of the necessaries of life, but also like an individual ought to live happily. And those who would live happily should in the first place do no wrong to one another, and ought not themselves to be wronged by others; to attain the first is not difficult, but there is great difficulty in acquiring the power of not being wronged. No man can be perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good; and cities are like individuals in this, for a city if good has a life of peace, but if evil, a life of war within and without. Wherefore the citizens ought to practise war—not in time of war, but rather while they are at peace. And every city which has any sense, should go on military expeditions at least for one day in every month, and for more if the magistrates think fit, taking no thought about winter cold or summer heat; and they should go out in one body, including their wives and their children, when the magistrates determine to lead forth the whole people, or in such portions as are summoned by them; and they should always provide that there should be games and sacrificial feasts, and they should have tournaments, imitating in as lively a manner as they can real battles. And they should distribute prizes of victory and valour to the competitors, passing censures and encomiums on one another according to the characters which they bear in the contests and in their whole life; honouring him who seems to be the best, and blaming him who is the opposite. And let poets celebrate the victors,—not however every poet, but only one who in the first place is not less than fifty years of age; nor should he be one who, although he may have musical and poetical gifts, has never in his life done any noble or illustrious action; but those who are good and honourable in the state, poets of noble actions—let their poems be sung, even though they be not very musical. And let the judgment of them rest with the instructor of youth and the other guardians of the laws, who shall give them this privilege, and they alone

shall be free to sing; but the rest of the world shall not have this liberty. Nor shall any one dare to sing a song which has not been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws, not even if his strain be sweeter than the songs of Thamyras and Orpheus; but only such poems as have been judged sacred and dedicated to the Gods, and such as are the works of good men, works of praise or blame which have been deemed to fulfil their design fairly.

The regulations about war, and about liberty of speech in poetry, ought to apply equally to men and women. The legislator may be supposed to argue the question in his own mind:—Who are my citizens for whom I have set in order the city? Are they not competitors in the greatest of all contests, and 830 have they not innumerable rivals? To be sure, is the natural reply. Well, but if we were training boxers, or pancratiasts, or any other sort of athletes, would they never meet until the hour of contest arrived; and should we do nothing to prepare ourselves previously? Surely, if we were boxers, we should have been learning to fight for many days before, and exercising ourselves in imitating all those blows and wards which we were intending to execute in the hour of conflict; and in order that we might come as near to reality as possible, instead of cestuses we should put on boxing-gloves, that the blows and the wards might be practised by us to the utmost of our power. And if there were a lack of competitors, the fear of ridicule would not deter us from hanging up a lifeless image and practising at that. Or if we had no adversary at all, animate or inanimate, should we not venture in the dearth of antagonists to spar by ourselves? In what other manner could we ever study the art of self-defence?

Cle. The way which you mention, Stranger, would be the only way.

Ath. And shall the warriors of our city, who are destined when occasion calls to enter the greatest of all contests, and to fight for their lives, and their children, and their property, and the whole city, be worse prepared than boxers? And will the legislator, because he is afraid that their practising with one another may appear ridiculous, abstain from commanding them to go out and fight; will he not ordain that soldiers shall

perform lesser exercises without arms every day, making dancing and all gymnastic tend to this end; and also will he not require that they shall practise some gymnastic exercises, greater as well as lesser, as often as every month; and that they shall have contests one with another in every part of the country, seizing upon posts and lying in ambush, and imitating in every respect the reality of war; fighting with boxing-gloves and hurling javelins, and using weapons somewhat dangerous, and as nearly as possible like the true ones, in order that the sport may not be altogether without fear, but may have terrors and
831 to a certain degree show the man who has and who has not courage; and that the honour and dishonour which are assigned to them respectively, may prepare the whole city for the true conflict of life? If any one dies in these mimic contests, the homicide is involuntary, and we will make the slayer, when he has been purified according to law, to be pure of blood, considering that if a few men should die, others as good as they will be born; but that if fear is dead, then the citizens will never find a test of superior and inferior in desert, which is a far greater evil to the state than the loss of a few.

Cle. We are quite agreed, Stranger, that we should legislate about such things, and that the whole state should practise them.

Ath. And what is the reason that dances and contests of this sort hardly ever exist in states, at least not to any extent worth speaking of? Is this due to the ignorance of mankind and their legislators?

Cle. Perhaps.

Ath. Certainly not, sweet Cleinias; there are two causes, which are quite enough to account for the deficiency.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. One cause is the love of wealth, which wholly absorbs men, and never for a moment allows them to think of anything but their own private possessions; on this the soul of every citizen hangs suspended, and can attend to nothing but his daily gain; mankind are ready to learn any branch of knowledge, and to follow any pursuit which tends to this end, and they laugh at every other:—that is one reason why a city will not be in earnest about war or any other good and honourable

pursuit. From an insatiable love of gold and silver, every man is willing to endure the practice of any art or contrivance, seemly or unseemly, in the hope of becoming rich; and will make no objection to performing any action, holy, or unholy and utterly base, if only like a beast he have the power of eating and drinking all sorts of things, and procuring for himself in every sort of way the gratification of his lusts.

Cle. True.

Ath. Let this, then, be deemed one of the causes which prevent states from pursuing in an efficient manner the art of war, or any other noble aim, but makes the orderly and temperate part of mankind into merchants, and captains of ships, and servants, and converts the valiant sort into thieves and burglars, and robbers of temples, and violent, tyrannical persons; many 832 of whom are not without ability, but they are unfortunate.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled to pass through life always hungering?

Cle. Then that is one cause, Stranger; but you spoke of another.

Ath. Thank you for reminding me.

Cle. The insatiable lifelong love of wealth, as you were saying, is one cause which absorbs mankind, and prevents them from rightly practising the arts of war:—Granted; and now tell me, what is the other?

Ath. Do you imagine that I delay because I am in a perplexity?

Cle. No; but we think that you are too severe upon the money-loving temper, of which you seem in the present discussion to have a peculiar dislike.

Ath. That is a very fair rebuke, Stranger; and I will now proceed to the second cause.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. I say that governments are a cause—democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, concerning which I have often spoken in the previous discourse; or rather governments they are not, for none of them exercises a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects; but they may be truly called states of discord, in which while the government is voluntary, the subjects always obey against their

will, and have to be coerced; and the ruler fears the subject, and will not, if he can help, allow him to become either noble, or rich, or strong, or valiant, or warlike at all. These two are the causes of almost all evils, and of the evils of which I have been speaking they are the special causes. But our state has escaped both of them; for her citizens have the greatest leisure, and they are not subject to one another, and will, I think, be made by these laws the reverse of lovers of money. Such a constitution may be reasonably supposed to be the only one existing which will accept the education which we have described, and the martial pastimes which have been perfected according to our idea.

Cle. Good.

Ath. Then next we must remember, about all gymnastic contests, that only the warlike sort of them are to be practised and to have prizes of victory; and those which are not military are to be given up. The military sort had better be completely described and established by law; and first, let us speak of running and swiftness.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Certainly the most military of all qualities is general activity of body, whether of foot or hand. For escaping or
833 for capturing an enemy, quickness of foot is required; but hand-to-hand conflict and combat need vigour and strength.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Neither of them can attain their greatest efficiency without arms.

Cle. How can they?

Ath. Then our herald, in accordance with the prevailing practice, will first summon the runner;—he will appear armed, for to an unarmed competitor we will not give a prize. And he shall enter first who is to run the single course bearing arms; next, he who is to run the double course; third, he who is to run the horse-course; and fourthly, he who is to run the long course; the fifth class whom we start, shall be the first who goes forth in heavy armour,—and he shall run a course of sixty stadia to some temple of Ares—him we will call the heavy-armed runner; he shall run over smooth ground, and his competitor shall be an archer, and carry the equipments of an

archer, and he shall run a distance of 100 stadia over the mountains, and across every sort of country, to the temple of Apollo and Artemis; this shall be the order of the contest, and we will wait for them until they return, and will give a prize to the conqueror in each.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Let us suppose that there are three sorts of contests,—one of boys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. For the youths we will fix the length of the contest at two-thirds, and for the boys at half of the entire course, whether they contend as archers or as heavy-armed. Touching the women: let the girls who are not grown up compete naked in the stadium and the double course, and the horse-course and the long course, and let them run on the race-ground itself; those who are thirteen years of age and upwards until their marriage shall continue to share in contests if they are not more than twenty, and shall be compelled to run up to eighteen; and they shall descend into the arena in suitable dresses. Let these be the regulations about contests in running both for men and women.

Respecting contests of strength, instead of wrestling and similar contests of the heavier sort, we will institute conflicts in armour of one against one, and two against two, and so on up to ten against ten. As to what a man ought not to suffer or do, and to what extent, in order to gain the victory—as in wrestling, the masters of the art have laid down what is fair and what is not fair, so in fighting in armour—we ought to call in skilful persons, who shall judge for us and be our assessors in the work of legislation; they shall say who deserves to be victor in combats of this sort, and what he is not to do or suffer, and in like manner what rule determines who is 834 defeated; and let the same ordinances apply to women until they are married as well as to men. The pancration shall have a counterpart in a combat of the light-armed; they shall contend with bows and with light shields and with javelins and with slings and throwing of stones by hand; and laws shall be made about it, and rewards and prizes given to him who best fulfils the ordinances of the law.

Next in order we shall have to legislate about the horse

contests. Now, we do not need many horses, for they cannot be of much use in a country like Crete, and hence we naturally do not take much pains about the rearing of them or about horse races. There is no one who keeps a chariot among us, and any rivalry in such matters would be altogether out of place; there would be no sense nor any shadow of sense in instituting contests which are not after the manner of our country. And, therefore, we give our prizes for single horses and for colts who have not cast their teeth, and for those who are intermediate between the full-grown horses themselves; and thus our equestrian games will accord with the nature of the country. Let them have conflict and rivalry in these matters in accordance with the law, and let the colonels and generals of horse decide together about all courses and about the armed competitors in them. But we have nothing to say to the unarmed either in gymnastic exercises or in these contests. On the other hand, the Cretan bowman or javelin-man who fights in armour on horseback is useful, and therefore we may as well place a competition of this sort among our amusements. Women are not to be forced to compete by laws and ordinances; but if they have acquired the habit and are strong enough and like to share in the contest, let them be allowed, girls as well as boys, and no blame to them.

Thus the competition and the mode of learning gymnastic have been described; and we have spoken also of the toils of the contest, and of daily exercise in the house of the teacher. Likewise, what relates to music has been, for the most part, completed. But as to rhapsodes and their vocation, and the contests of choruses which are to perform at feasts, these shall be arranged when the months and days and years have been appointed for Gods and demi-gods, whether every third year, or again every fifth year, or in whatever way or manner the
 835 Gods may put into men's minds the distribution and order of them. At the same time, we may expect that the musical contests will be celebrated in turn by the command of the judges and the instructor of youth and the guardians of the law meeting together for this purpose, and themselves becoming legislators of the times and nature and conditions of the choral contests and of dancing in general. What they ought severally

to be in language and song, and in the admixture of harmony with rhythm and the dance, has been often declared by the original legislator; and his successors ought to follow him, making the games and sacrifices duly to correspond at fitting times, and appointing public festivals. It is not difficult to determine how these and the like matters may have a regular order; nor, again, is the alteration of them of any serious importance to the state. There is, however, another matter of great importance and difficulty, concerning which God should legislate, if there were any possibility of obtaining from him an ordinance about it. But seeing that divine aid is not to be had, there appears to be a need of some bold man who specially honours plainness of speech, and will say outright what is best for the city and citizens,—ordaining what is good and convenient for the whole state amid the corruptions of human souls, opposing the mightiest lusts, and having no man his helper but himself, standing alone and following reason only.

Cle. What is this, Stranger, that you are saying? For thus far we do not understand your meaning.

Ath. Very likely; I will endeavour to explain myself more clearly. When I came to the subject of education, I beheld young men and maidens holding friendly intercourse with one another. And there naturally arose in my mind a sort of apprehension—I could not help thinking how one is to deal with a city in which youths and maidens are well nurtured, and have nothing to do, and are not undergoing the excessive and servile toils which extinguish wantonness, and whose only cares during their whole life are sacrifices and festivals and dances. How, in such a state as this, will they abstain from desires which thrust many a man and woman into perdition; and from which reason, assuming the functions of law, commands them to abstain? The ordinances already made may possibly get 836 the better of most of these desires; the prohibition of excessive wealth is a very considerable gain in the direction of temperance, and the whole education of our youth imposes a law of moderation on them; moreover, the eye of the rulers is required always to watch over the young, and never to lose sight of them; and these provisions do, as far as human means can effect anything, exercise a regulating influence upon the desires

in general. But how can we take precautions against the unnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come upon individuals and cities? How shall we devise a remedy and way of escape out of so great a danger? Truly, Cleinias, here is a difficulty. In many ways the island of Crete and Lacedaemon furnish a great help to those who make peculiar laws; but in the matter of love, as we are alone, I must confess that they are quite against us. For if any one following nature should lay down the law which existed before the days of Laius, and denounce these lusts as contrary to nature, adducing the animals as a proof that such unions were monstrous, he might prove his point, but he would be wholly at variance with the custom of your states. Further, they are repugnant to a principle which we say that a legislator should always observe, for we are always enquiring which of our enactments tends to virtue and which not. And suppose we grant that these loves are accounted by law to be honourable, or at least not disgraceful, how about virtue? Will such passions implant in the soul of him who is seduced the habit of courage, or in the soul of the seducer the principle of temperance? Who will ever believe this?—or rather, who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures and is unable to hold out against them? Will not all men censure as womanly him who imitates the woman? And who would ever think of establishing such a practice by law? Certainly no one who had in his mind the image of true law. How can we prove
 837 that what I am saying is true? He who would rightly consider these matters must see the nature of friendship and desire, and of these so-called loves, for they are of two kinds, and out of the two arises a third kind, having the same name; and this similarity of name causes all the difficulty and obscurity.

Cle. How is that?

Ath. Dear is the like in virtue to the like, and the equal to the equal; dear also, though after another fashion, is he who has abundance to him who is in want. And when either of these friendships becomes excessive, we term the excess love.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and coarse, and has often no tie of communion; but that which

arises from likeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion, which lasts through life. As to the mixed sort which is made up of them both, there is, first of all, a difficulty in determining what he who is possessed by this third love desires; moreover, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt between the two principles; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of youth, and the other forbidding him. For the one is a lover of the body, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and would feign satisfy himself without any regard to the character of the beloved; the other holds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter, and looking rather than loving with his soul, and desiring the soul of the other in a becoming manner, regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as wantonness; he reverences and respects temperance and courage and magnanimity and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste object of his affection. Now the sort of love which is made up of the other two is that which we have described as the third. Seeing then that there are these three sorts of love, ought the law to prohibit and forbid them all to exist among us? Is it not rather clear that we should wish to have in the state the love which is of virtue and which desires the beloved youth to be the best possible; and the other two, if possible, we should hinder? What do you say, friend Megillus?

Meg. I think, Stranger, that you are perfectly right in what you have been now saying.

Ath. I knew well, my friend, that I should obtain your assent, which I accept and therefore have no need to analyse your custom any further. Cleinias shall be prevailed upon to give me his assent at some other time. Enough of this; and now let us proceed to the laws.

Meg. Very good.

Ath. Upon reflection I see a way of imposing the law, which, in one respect, is easy, but in another is of the utmost difficulty.

Meg. What do you mean?

Ath. We are all aware that most men, in spite of their lawless natures, are very strictly and precisely restrained from intercourse with the fair, and this not at all against their will, but entirely with their will.

Meg. What do you mean?

Ath. When any one has a brother or sister who is fair; and about a son or daughter the same unwritten law holds, and is a most perfect safeguard, so that no open or secret connection ever takes place between them. Nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all into the minds of most of them.

Meg. Very true.

Ath. Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort?

Meg. What word?

Ath. The declaration that they are unholy, hated of God, and most infamous; and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said the opposite, but every one from his earliest days has heard men saying the same about them always and everywhere, whether in comedy or in the graver language of tragedy? When the poet introduces on the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus, or a Macareus having secret intercourse with his sister, he represents him, when found out, ready to kill himself as the penalty of his sin.

Meg. You are very right in saying that tradition, if no breath of opposition ever assails it, has a marvellous power.

Ath. Am I not also right in saying that the legislator who wants to master any of the passions which master man may easily know how to subdue them? He will consecrate the tradition of their evil character among all, slaves and freemen, women and children, throughout the city:—that will be the surest foundation of the law which he can make.

Meg. Yes; but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the same language about them?

Ath. A good objection; but was I not just now saying that I had a way to make men use natural love and abstain from
839 unnatural not intentionally destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in stony places, in which they will take no root; and that I would command them to abstain too from any female field of increase in which that which is sown is not likely to grow? Now, if a law to this effect could only be made perpetual, and gain an authority such as already prevents intercourse of parents and children—such a law extending to other sensual desires, and conquering them, would be the source of

ten thousand blessings. For, in the first place, moderation is the appointment of nature, and deters men from all frenzy and madness of love, and from all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks, and makes them good friends to their own wives. And innumerable other benefits would result if such a law could only be enforced. I can imagine some lusty youth who is standing by, and who, on hearing this enactment, declares in scurrilous terms, that we are making foolish and impossible laws, and fills the world with his outcry. And therefore I said that I knew a way of enacting and perpetuating such a law, which was very easy in one respect, but in another most difficult. There is no difficulty in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way; for, as I was saying, the ordinance once consecrated would master the soul of every man, and terrify him into obedience. But matters have now come to such a pass that the enactment of the law seems to be impossible, and never likely to take place, just as the continuance of an entire state in the practice of common meals is also deemed impossible. And although this latter is partly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, still even in your cities the common meals of women would be regarded as unnatural and impossible. I was thinking of the rebelliousness of the human heart when I said that the permanent establishment of these things is very difficult.

Mcg. Very true.

Ath. Shall I try and find some sort of persuasive argument which will prove to you that such enactments are possible, and not beyond human nature?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Is a man more likely to abstain from the pleasures of love and to do what he is bidden about them, when his body is in a good condition, or when he is in an ill condition, and out of training?

Cle. He will be far more temperate when he is in training.

Ath. And have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum, who, with a view to the Olympic and other contests, in his zeal for his art, 840 and also because he was of a manly and temperate constitution, never had any connection with a woman or a youth during the whole time of his training? And the same is said of Crison and

Astylus and Diopompus and many others; and yet, Cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds than your and my fellow citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty.

Cle. No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by the ancients of these athletes.

Ath. And shall they be willing to abstain from what is ordinarily deemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, running, and the like; and our young men be incapable of a similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory, which is the noblest of all, as from their youth upwards we will tell them, charming them, as we hope, into the belief of this by tales in prose and verse?

Cle. Of what victory are you speaking?

Ath. Of the victory over pleasure, which if they win, they will live happily, or if conquered the reverse of happily. And, further, will not the fear of impiety enable them to master that which other inferior people have mastered?

Cle. I dare say.

Ath. And since we have reached this point in our legislation, and have fallen into a difficulty by reason of the vices of mankind, I affirm that our ordinance should simply run in the following terms: Our citizens ought not to fall below the nature of birds and beasts in general, who are born in great multitudes, and yet remain until the age for procreation virgin and unmarried, and when they have reached the proper time of life are coupled, male and female, and lovingly pair together, and live the rest of their lives in holiness and innocence, abiding firmly in their original compact:—surely, we will say to them, you should be better than the animals. But if they are corrupted by the other Hellenes and the common practice of barbarians, and they see with their eyes and hear with their ears of the so-called illicit love everywhere prevailing among them, and they themselves are not able to get the better of the temptation, the guardians of the law, exercising the functions of lawgivers, shall devise a second law against them.

841 *Cle.* And what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed?

Ath. Clearly, Cleinias, the one which would naturally follow.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. Our citizens should not allow pleasures to strengthen with indulgence, but should by toil divert the aliment and exuberance of them into other parts of the body; and this will happen if no immodesty be allowed in the practice of love. Then they will be ashamed of frequent intercourse, and they will find pleasure, if seldom enjoyed, to be a less imperious mistress. They should not be found out doing anything of the sort. Concealment shall be honourable, and sanctioned both by custom and unwritten law; on the other hand, to be detected shall be esteemed dishonourable, but not, to abstain wholly. In this way there will be a second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable, having a second notion of right. Three principles will comprehend all those corrupt natures whom we call inferior to themselves, which is their common class, and will compel them not to transgress.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. The principle of piety, the love of honour, and the desire of beauty, not in the body but in the soul. These are, perhaps, romantic aspirations; but they are the noblest of aspirations, if they could only be realized in any state, and, God willing, in the matter of love we may be able to enforce one of two things—either that no one shall venture to touch any person of the freeborn or noble class except his wedded wife, or sow the unconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots, or in barren and unnatural lusts; or at least we may abolish altogether the connection of men with men; and as to women, if any man has to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites, whether they be bought or acquired in any other way, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges, and be deemed to be, as he truly is, a stranger. Let this law, then, whether it is one, or ought rather to be called two, be laid down respecting love in general, and the intercourse of the sexes which arises out of the desires, whether rightly or wrongly indulged.

Meg. I, for my part, Stranger, would gladly receive this ⁸⁴² law. Cleinias shall speak for himself, and tell you what is his opinion.

Cle. I will, Megillus, when an opportunity offers; at present,

I think that we had better allow the Stranger to proceed with his laws.

Meg. Very good.

Ath. We had got about as far as the establishment of the common tables, which in most places would be difficult, but in Crete no one would think of introducing any other custom. There might arise a question about the manner of them—whether they shall be such as they are here in Crete, or such as they are in Lacedaemon,—or is there a third kind which may be better than either of them? The answer to this question might be easily discovered, but the discovery would do no good, for at present they are very well ordered.

Leaving the common tables, we may therefore proceed to the means of providing life. Now, in cities the means of life are gained in many ways and from divers sources, and in general from two sources, whereas our city has only one. For most of the Hellenes obtain their food from sea and land, but our citizens from land only. And this makes the task of the legislator less difficult—half as many laws will be enough, and much less than half; and they will be of a kind better suited to free men. For he has nothing to do with laws about shipowners and merchants and retailers and innkeepers and tax-collectors and mines and moneylending and compound interest and innumerable other things—bidding good-bye to these, he gives laws to husbandmen and shepherds and bee-keepers, and the guardians and superintendents of their implements; and he has already legislated for greater matters, as, for example, what relates to marriage and the procreation and nurture of children, and education, and the establishment of offices—and now he must direct his enactments to those who labour in providing food.

Let us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall be called the laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them be the law of Zeus, the god of boundaries. Let no one shift the boundary line either of a fellow-citizen who is a neighbour, or, if he dwells at the extremity of the land, of any stranger who is

is the sworn arbiter of friendship and hatred between neighbours; for Zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the citizen, and Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and when aroused, terrible is their wrath. He who obeys the law will never know the fatal consequences of disobedience, but he who despises the law shall be liable to a double penalty, the first coming from the Gods, and the second from the law. For let no one voluntarily remove the boundaries of his neighbour's land, and if any one does, let him who will, inform the land-owners, and let them bring him into court, and if he be convicted of re-dividing the land by stealth or by force, let the court determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next place, many small injuries done by neighbours to one another through their multiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, and make neighbourhood a very disagreeable and bitter thing. Wherefore a man ought to be very careful of committing any offence against his neighbour, and especially of encroaching on his neighbour's land; for any man may easily do harm, but not every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on his neighbour's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make good the damage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also of his meanness, he shall pay a double penalty to the injured party. Of these and the like matters the wardens of the country shall take cognizance, and be the judges of them and assessors of the damage; in the more important cases, as has been already said, the whole military force belonging to any one of the twelve divisions shall decide, and in the lesser cases the officers: or, again, if any one pastures his cattle on his neighbour's land, they shall see the injury, and adjudge the penalty. And if any one, by decoying the bees, gets possession of another's swarms and draws them to himself by making noises, he shall pay the damage; or if any one sets fire to his own wood and takes no care of his neighbour's property, he shall be fined at the discretion of the magistrates. And if in planting he does not leave a fair distance between his own and his neighbour's land, he shall be punished, in accordance with the enactments of many lawgivers, which we may use, not deeming it necessary that the great legislator of our state should determine all the trifles which might be decided by any

body ; for example, husbandmen have of old had excellent laws about waters, and there is no reason why we should let the stream of our discourse diverge from them : he who likes may draw water from the fountain-head of the common stream on to his own land, if he do not cut off the spring which clearly belongs to some other owner ; and he may take the water in any direction which he pleases, except through a house or temple or sepulchre, but he must be careful to do no harm beyond the channel. And if there be in any place a natural dryness of the earth, which absorbs the rain from heaven, and there is a deficiency in the supply of water, let him dig down on his own land as far as the brick clay, and if at this depth he finds no water, let him carry water from his neighbours, as much as is required for his servants' drinking, and if his neighbours, too, are limited in their supply, let him have a fixed measure, which shall be determined by the wardens of the country. This he shall receive each day, and on these terms have a share of his neighbour's water. If there be heavy rain, and one of those on the lower ground injures some tiller of the upper ground, or some one who has a common wall refuses to give his neighbour an outlet for water ; or, again, if some one living on the higher ground recklessly lets off the water on his lower neighbour, and they cannot come to terms with one another, let him, if he will, summon the offender, if he be in the city, before the warden of the city, or if he be in the country before the warden of the country, and let him obtain a decision determining what each of them is to do. And he who will not abide by the decision shall suffer for his malignant and morose temper, and pay a fine equivalent to double the value of the injury, because he was unwilling to submit to the magistrates.

Now, the participation of fruits shall be ordered on this wise. The goddess of Autumn has two gracious gifts : one, the joy¹ of Dionysus which is not treasured up ; the other, which nature intends to be stored. Let this be the law, then, concerning the fruits of autumn : he who tastes the common or storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before the season of vintage which coincides with Arcturus, either on his own land or on that

¹ Reading *παίδιον*.

of others,—let him pay fifty drachmae, which shall be sacred to Dionysus, if he pluck them from his own land; and if from his neighbour's land a mina, and if from any others two-thirds of a mina. And he who would gather the fresh grapes or the fresh figs, as they are now termed, if he take them off his own land let him pluck them how and when he likes; but if he takes them from the ground of others without their leave, let him in that case be always punished in accordance with the law which ordains that he should not move what he has not laid down. And if a slave touches any fruit of this sort, without the consent 845 of the owner of the land, he shall be beaten with as many blows as there are grapes on the bunch, or figs on the fig-tree. Let a metic purchase the fresh autumnal fruit, and then, if he pleases, he may gather it; but if a stranger is passing along the road, and desires to eat, let him take of the fresh grape for himself and a single follower without price, as a tribute of hospitality. The law however forbids strangers from sharing in the sort which is not used for eating; and if any one, whether he be master or slave, takes of them in ignorance, let the slave be beaten, and the master be dismissed with admonitions, and instructed to take of the other autumnal fruits which are unfit for making raisins and wine, or for laying by as dried figs. As to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and similar fruits, there shall be no disgrace in taking them secretly; but he who is found out, if he be of less than thirty years of age, shall be struck and beaten off, but not wounded; and no freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for such blows. Of these fruits the stranger may partake just as he may of the fruits of autumn. And if an elder who is more than thirty years of age, eat of them on the spot, let him, like the stranger, be allowed to partake of all such fruits, but he must carry away nothing. If, however, he will not obey the law, let him run the risk of failing in the competition of virtue, in case any one takes notice of his actions before the judges.

Water is the greatest element of nutrition in gardens, but is easily polluted. You cannot poison the soil, or the sun, or the air, which are the other elements of nutrition in plants, or divert them, or steal them; but all these things may very likely happen in regard to water, which must therefore be protected by law:

and let this be the law — If any one intentionally pollutes the water of another, whether the water of a spring, or collected in reservoirs, either by poisonous substances, or by digging, or by theft, let the injured party bring the cause before the wardens of the city, and claim in writing the value of the loss; and if he be found guilty of injuring the water by deleterious substances, let him not only pay damages, but purify the stream or the vessel which contains the water, in such manner as the laws of the interpreters order the purification to be made by the parties in each case.

846 With respect to the gathering in of the fruits of the soil, let a man, if he pleases, carry his own fruits through any place in which he either does no harm to any one, or himself gains three times as much as his neighbour loses. Now of these things the archons should be made cognisant, as of all other things in which a man intentionally does injury to another or to the property of another, by fraud or force, in the use which he makes of his own property. All these matters a man should lay before the magistrates, and receive damages, supposing the injury to be under three minae; or if he have a charge against another which involves a larger amount, let him bring the suits into the public courts and have the evil-doer punished. But if any of the magistrates appears to give unjust punishments in the penalties which he imposes, let him be adjudged to pay double to the injured party. Any one may bring the offences of magistrates, in any particular case, before the public courts. There are innumerable little matters relating to the modes of punishment, and applications for suits, and the summonses and witnesses to summons; for example, whether two witnesses should be required for a summons, or how many, and all such details, which cannot be omitted in legislation and are beneath the wisdom of an aged legislator. These lesser matters, as they indeed are, in comparison with the greater ones, let a younger generation regulate by law, after the patterns which have preceded, and according to their own experience of the usefulness and necessity of them; and when they are duly regulated let there be no alteration, but let the citizens live in the observance of them.

Now of artizans, let the regulations be as follows:—In the

first place, let no native or servant of a native be occupied in handicraft arts; for a citizen who is to make and preserve the public order of the state, has an art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, since it does not admit of being made a secondary occupation; and hardly any human being is capable of pursuing two professions or two arts rightly, or of practising one art himself, and superintending some one else who is practising another. Let this, then, be our first principle in the state: No one who is a smith shall also be a carpenter, and if he be a carpenter he shall not superintend the smith's art rather than his own, under the pretext that in superintending many servants who are working for him, he is likely to superintend them better, because more revenue will accrue to him from them than from his own art; but let every man in the state have one art, and get his living by that. Let the wardens⁸⁴⁷ of the city labour to maintain this law, and if any citizen inclines to any other art rather than the study of virtue, let them punish him with disgrace and infamy, until they bring him back into his own right course; and if any stranger profess two arts, let them chastise him with bonds and money penalties, and expulsion from the state, until they compel him to be one only and not many.

But as touching payments for hire, and contracts of work, or in case any one does wrong to any of the citizens, or they do wrong to any other, up to fifty drachmae, let the wardens of the city decide the case; but if a greater amount is involved, then let the public courts decide according to law. Let no one pay any duty either on the importation or exportation of goods; and as to frankincense and similar perfumes, used in the service of the Gods, which come from foreign parts, and purple and other dyes which are not produced in the country, or the materials of any art which have to be imported, and which are not necessary—no one should import them; nor, again, should any one export anything which is wanted in the country. Of all these things let there be inspectors and superintendents, taken from the guardians of the law; and they shall be the twelve next in order to the five seniors. Concerning arms, and all military implements, if there be need of introducing any art, or plant, or metal, either for the purpose of making chains, or

bridles and reins for animals, let the commanders of the horse and the generals have authority over their importation and exportation; the city shall give them out and receive them again, and the guardians of the law shall make fit and proper laws about them. But let there be no retail trade for the sake of moneymaking, either in this or any other article, in the city or country at all.

With respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country, the right and proper way seems to be nearly that which is the custom of Crete; for there all are required to distribute the fruits of the soil into twelve parts, and in this way
848 consume them. Let the twelfth portion of each (as for instance of wheat and barley, which the rest of the fruits of the earth shall follow, as well as the animals which are sold in each of the twelve divisions) be further divided into three parts; one part for freemen, another for their servants, and a third part for craftsmen, and in general for the strangers, and any sojourners who may be dwelling in the city, and like other men must live; and there may be those who come on some business which they have with the state, or with some individual. Let only a third part of all necessaries be required to be sold; out of the other two-thirds no one shall be compelled to sell. And how will they be best distributed? In the first place, we see clearly that the distribution will be of equals in one point of view, and in another point of view of unequals.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that the earth of necessity produces and nourishes the various articles of food, sometimes better and sometimes worse.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. Such being the case, let no one of the three portions be greater than either of the other two;—neither that which is assigned to masters and slaves, nor again that of the stranger; but let the distribution to all be alike, and let every one of the citizens who gets his two portions have power to determine how much, and of what quality, he will distribute to slaves and freemen. And what remains he shall distribute by measure and number among the animals who have to be sustained from the earth, taking the whole number of them.

In the second place, our citizens should have separate houses duly ordered ; and this shall be the order of them. There shall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth lot, and in each hamlet they shall first separate off a market-place, and the temples of the Gods, and of their attendant demi-gods, and if there be any local deities of the Magnetes, or holy seats of other ancient deities, whose memory has been preserved—to these let them pay their ancient honours. But Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene, and whatever other God may preside in each of the twelve portions, shall have temples everywhere. And the first erection of houses shall be around these temples, where the ground is highest, in order to provide the safest and most defensible place of retreat for the guards. All the rest of the country they shall settle in the following manner:—They shall make thirteen divisions of the craftsmen ; one of them shall dwell in the city, and this, again, they shall subdivide into twelve lesser divisions, among the twelve districts of the city, distributed in the outskirts all around ; and in each village they shall settle various classes of craftsmen, with a view to the convenience of the husbandmen. And the chief officers of the 849 wardens of the country shall watch over all these matters, and see how many of them, and which class of them, each place requires ; and fix them where they are likely to give the least inconvenience, and to be most useful to the husbandman. And the officers of the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in the city.

Now the wardens of the agora ought to see to the details of the agora. Their first care, after the temples have been cared for, should be to prevent any one from doing any wrong in dealings between man and man ; in the second place, as being inspectors of temperance and violence, they should chastise him who requires chastisement. Touching articles of sale, they should first see whether the articles which the citizens are under regulations to sell to strangers are sold to them, as the law ordains. And let the law be as follows:—On the first day of the month, the persons in charge, whoever they are, whether strangers or slaves, who have the charge, shall produce to the strangers the portion which falls to them, in the first place, a twelfth portion of the corn ;—the stranger shall purchase corn

for the whole month, and other food, on the first market day ; and on the tenth day of the month the one party shall sell, and the other buy, liquids sufficient to last during the whole month ; and on the twenty-third day there shall be a sale of animals and of utensils, and of other things which husbandmen require, such as skins and all kinds of clothing, either woven or made of felt, and other goods of the same sort ; and strangers shall be compelled to buy and purchase them from others. As to the retail trade in these things, whether of barley or wheat made into flour, or any other kind of food, no one shall sell them to citizens or their slaves, nor shall any citizen buy them ; but let the stranger sell them in the market of strangers, to artisans and their slaves, making an exchange of wine and food, which is commonly called retail trade. And butchers shall likewise offer for sale dismembered animals to the strangers, and artisans, and their servants. Let any stranger who likes buy fuel from day to day wholesale, from those who have the care of it in the country, and let him sell to the strangers as much as he pleases and when he pleases. As to other goods and implements which are likely to be wanted, they shall sell them in the common market, at any place which the guardians of the law and the wardens of the market and city, choosing according to their judgments, shall determine ; at such places they shall exchange money for goods, and goods for money, neither party giving credit to the other ; and he who gives credit, whether he obtain
850 his money or not, must be satisfied, for in such exchanges he will not be protected by law. But whenever property has been bought or sold, greater in quantity or value than is allowed by the law, which has determined within what limits a man may increase and diminish his possessions, let the excess be registered in the books of the guardians of the law ; or in case of diminution, let there be an erasure made. And let the same rule be observed about the registration of the property of the metics. Any one who likes may come and be a metic on certain conditions ; a foreigner, if he likes, and is able to settle, may dwell in the land, but he must practise an art, and not abide more than twenty years from the time at which he has registered himself ; and he shall pay no sojourner's tax, however small, except good conduct, nor any other tax for buying and selling.

But when the twenty years have expired, he shall take his property with him and depart. And if in the course of these years he should chance to distinguish himself by any considerable benefit which he confers on the state, and he thinks that he can persuade the council and assembly, either to grant him delay in leaving the country, or to allow him to remain for the whole of his life, let him go and persuade the city, and whatever they assent to at his instance shall take effect. For the children of the metics being artisans, and of fifteen years of age, let the time of their sojourn commence after their fifteenth year; and let them remain for twenty years, and then go where they like; but any of them who wishes to remain, may remain, if he can persuade the council and assembly. And if he do not remain, let him erase all the entries which have been made by him in the registry kept by the archons.

BOOK IX.

853 NEXT to the matters which have preceded in the natural order of legislation, will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not been described. Having mentioned them severally under their usual names, we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each offence, and who are to be the judges of them.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of virtue. To assume that in such a state there will arise some accomplice in crimes as great as any which are ever perpetrated in other states, and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and threaten and make laws against him if he should arise; in order to deter him, and punish his acts, under the idea that he will arise—this, as I was saying, is in a manner disgraceful. But seeing that we are not like the ancient legislators, who gave laws to demi-gods and sons of Gods, being themselves, according to the popular belief, the offspring of the Gods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine parents, whereas we are only men who are legislating for the sons of men, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, and have a heart which cannot be softened any more than those seeds can be softened by fire. Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be subdued by all the strength of the laws; and for their sake, though an ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about

the robbing of temples, in case such a crime should ever be committed. I do not expect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the infection, but their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants may be guilty of many impieties. And with a view to them especially, and yet not 854 without a provident eye to the weakness of human nature generally, I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar incurable, or almost incurable, criminals. Having already agreed that such enactments ought always to have a short prelude, we may speak to the criminal whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts to go and rob a temple, in words of admonition and exhortation:—O sir, we will say to him, the impulse which moves you to rob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a visitation of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and unexpiated crimes of his race, destroying him when his time is come;—against this you must guard as well as you can, and how you are to guard I will explain to you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you; hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man should honour the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the wicked—fly and turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by these remedies, well and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be nobler than life, and depart hence.

Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy and treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has nothing more to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over, cry with a loud voice—He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if he be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to the judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he suffers this punishment he will probably be corrected and improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil, but always makes him who suffers either better or not so bad. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the

855 Gods, or his parents, or the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering what an education and training he has had from youth upward, and yet has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. The penalty of death is to him the least of evils; and others will be benefited by his example, if he be put away out of the land with infamy. But let his children and family, if they avoid the ways of their father, have glory, and let honourable mention be made of them, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None of them should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots of the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal.

Touching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done anything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have anything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than that he shall not pay. And to secure exactness, let the guardians of the law refer to the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth, in order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money. But if any one seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him be imprisoned for a time and otherwise dishonoured, unless some of his friends are willing to be surety for him, and liberate him by becoming partners in the fine. And let no one be outlawed for any offence whatever, nor be banished beyond the frontier, but let him receive punishment—death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading posts or positions, or removed to some temple on the borders of the land, or let him pay money penalties, as we said before. In cases of death, let the judges be the guardians of the law, and a court selected by merit from last year's magistrates. But how the causes are to be brought into court, and the summonses, and manner of proceeding and the like, may be left to the younger generation of legislators to determine; the manner of voting we must determine ourselves.

Let the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the judges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant, and let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious interest in listening to such causes. First of all the plaintiff shall make one speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after the speeches have been made the

eldest judge shall begin to examine the parties, and proceed to make a satisfactory enquiry into what has been said; and after the oldest has spoken, every one shall proceed in order to examine either party as to what he may have said or omitted to say; and he who has nothing more to ask shall pass over the examination to another. And on so much of what has been said as is to the purpose, they shall put the seals of all the judges with their signatures in writing, and place the writings on the altar of Hestia. On the next day they shall ⁸⁵⁶ meet again, and in like manner put their questions and go through the cause, and again set their seals upon the evidence; and when they have three times done this, and have had witnesses and evidence enough, they shall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by Hestia that they will decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power; and so they shall put an end to the suit.

Next, after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the dissolution of the state:—Whoever by promoting a man to power enslaves the laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the whole state. But he who takes no part in such proceedings, and yet being the chief magistrate of the state, knowing of them or not knowing of them, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on behalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. Every man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change the government. The judges of the traitor shall be the same as of the robbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the same way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. But let there be a general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is not to be visited on the children, except in the case of some one whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have successively undergone the penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with all their possessions, reserving only and wholly their appointed lot to their original city and country. And out of the citizens who have more than one son of not less than ten years of age, they shall select ten whom

their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side shall appoint, and let them send to Delphi the names of those who are selected, and him whom the God appoints they shall establish as heir of the house which has failed; and may he have better fortune than his predecessors!

Cle. Very good.

857 *Ath.* Once more let there be a third general law respecting the judges who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits against those who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as concerning the remaining or departure of their descendants,—there shall be one law for all three, for the traitor, and the robber of temples, and the subverter by violence of the laws of the state. For a thief, whether he steal much or little, let there be one law, and one punishment for all alike; in the first place, let him pay double the amount of the theft if he be convicted, and if he have so much over and above the allotment. If he have not, he shall be bound until he pay the penalty, or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to forgive him. But if a person is convicted of a theft against the state, then if he can persuade the city, or if he will pay back twice the amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds.

Cle. What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one; whether the thief may have taken much or little and either from sacred or secular places—and these are not the only differences in thefts:—seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely different penalties?

Ath. Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you impinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what, indeed, had occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet rightly worked out, as I may say in passing:—Do you remember the image in which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are doctored by slaves? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of those empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentle patient, and using the language almost of philosophy—beginning at the beginning of the disease and dis-

coursing about the whole nature of the body, he would burst into a hearty laugh—he would say what most of those who are called doctors always have at their tongue's end:—Foolish fellow, he would say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him; and he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well.

Cle. And would he not be right?

Ath. Perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens education and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. But we are fortunate.

Cle. In what way?

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Ath. Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into execution; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose what is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary—which shall we do?

Cle. There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such an alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by the grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of some composite work, may collect a heap of materials, and afterwards, at our leisure, select what is suitable for our intended construction. Let us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly putting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie about.

Ath. Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be more in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. Divers other persons, and not legislators only, have composed writings and speeches.

Cle. To be sure.

Ath. Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others, —poets and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have recorded their own notes of life, and not to the writings of legislators, or shall we give heed to them above all?

Cle. Yes; to them above all others.

Ath. And ought not the legislator to have an opinion concerning those who write about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy?

Cle. Certainly he should.

Ath. And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and others who were legislators as well as writers? Of all the writings which there are in cities, are not those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, found to be by far the noblest and the best, and do not other writings either
859 agree with them, or if they disagree, are they not ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws of states ought to have the character of loving and wise parents, or of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we shall take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable, but to which we, at any rate, will show our readiness to give effect, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and by the favour of Heaven it shall be good!

Cle. Excellent; let us do as you say.

Ath. Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts and offences in general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may be some day. Let us, then, if you please, consider these matters.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. Concerning all principles of honour and justice, let us endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves,

and how far we are inconsistent, acknowledging indeed that our aim is to contradict the majority—and we may note how far the many are inconsistent with one another.

Cle. What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?

Ath. I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are agreed that justice and just men and things and actions are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.

Cle. They would be quite right.

Ath. Perhaps; but let us consider further, that even if all things which are just are fair and honourable, there are always passive states deemed by us to be equivalent to the active ones.

Cle. And what is the inference?

Ath. The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and 860 honourable, if the argument is consistently carried out?

Cle. True.

Ath. But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will not the just and the honourable disagree?

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.

Cle. To what?

Ath. We were saying, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature. But we refrained, because we saw that these inflictions of sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings. And if this is true, are not

the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?

Cle. Such appears to be the case.

Ath. In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.

Cle. Very true, Stranger.

Ath. Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we are consistent about these matters.

Cle. Consistent in what?

Ath. I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state——

Cle. What?

Ath. That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference.

Cle. What is it?

Ath. That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will. Now that an action which is done involuntarily should be voluntary is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the evil-doer does evil involuntarily. I admit therefore that all men do evil involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are evil-doers against their will, and yet that many do evil willingly, I certainly cannot agree with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me,—Well, Stranger, and how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes—shall we legislate or not—what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary; or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, 861 under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?

Cle. Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections?

Ath. That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us——

Cle. Do what?

Ath. Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused

and inconsistent. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished—the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and have no explanation or verification? How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible. Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly enacted.

Cle. I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain: either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.

Ath. Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable—not to speak what I know to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction in them.

Cle. Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.

Ath. Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that injuries are of two kinds,—one, voluntary, and the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts are quite as many and as great as the voluntary. . And please to consider 862 whether I am right or not in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and, on the

other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider whether any one does good or harm to another out of a just principle and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must fix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when compensation is given, the law must always seek to win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of enmity to those of friendship.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul, and the cure of injustice will take the following direction—

Cle. What direction?

Ath. When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again, or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must in addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges, by means of penalties or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the just,—this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty. He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to the rest of mankind if they would
863 take their departure, inasmuch as they would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.

Cle. What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference between hurt and injustice, and the various

complications of the involuntary and voluntary which arise in these cases?

Ath. I will endeavour to comply with your request : Concerning the soul, thus much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature is passion ; which may be described either as a state or a part of the soul, and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational force overturns many things.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite power, working by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all things.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes. Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts : there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by conceit of wisdom ; and he who is under the influence of the latter, fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when attended with weakness will only result in the errors of children and old men ; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws.

Cle. Quite right.

Ath. We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them ; and this is true.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and the other inferior to ignorance.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of their will ; although they may often draw an individual in opposite directions at the same time.

Cle. Yes, often.

Ath. And now I can define to you clearly, and without

ambiguity, what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them: When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether
 864 they do any harm or not—I call them all injustice. But when the opinion of the best, whatever states or individuals may suppose that to be, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just; although the action, done in error, is thought by the multitude to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sorts of errors, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory: One kind was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear?

Cle. Quite right.

Ath. There was a second class of pleasures and desires, and a third class of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. This latter being further subdivided into three, there arise five kinds of actions, and for these five kinds we will make laws of two kinds.

Cle. What are the two kinds?

Ath. There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.

Cle. Naturally.

Ath. And now let us return from this digression and complete the work of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the robbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors; and also concerning those who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A man may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of madness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than a child. And if this be made evident to one of the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and

he be judged to have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another; but he shall be exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have on his hands the stain of blood. And in that case he shall go to another land and country, and there dwell for a year; and if he return before the expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot at all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law and shall be the bondsman of the state for two years, and then go free.

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Having begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavour to lay down laws concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all, concerning violent and involuntary homicides. If any one in an athletic contest, and at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and he dies either at the time or afterwards of the blows which he has received; or if the like misfortune happen to any one in war or military exercises, or mimic contests of which the rulers enjoin the practice, whether with or without arms, when he has been purified according to the law brought from Delphi relating to these matters, he shall be innocent. And so in the case of physicians, if their patient die against their will, they shall be held guiltless by the law. And if one slay another with his own hand, but unintentionally, whether he be unarmed or have some instrument or dart in his hand; or if he kill him by giving him food and drink, or by the application of fire or cold, or by suffocating him, whether he do the deed by his own hand, or by the agency of others, he shall be regarded as the agent, and shall suffer the following penalties:—If he kill the slave of another in the belief that he is his own, he shall bear the master of the dead man harmless from loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man, which the judges shall assess; but they must use purifications greater and more than in the case of those who committed homicide at the games;—what they are to be, the interpreters whom the God appoints shall be authorized to declare. And if a man kills his own slave, when he has been purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. And if a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same purification as he did who killed the slave. But let him not

forget also a tale of olden time, which is to this effect : He who has suffered a violent end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in life, is angry with the author of his death ; and being himself full of fear and panic by reason of his violent death, when he sees his murderer walking about in his own accustomed haunts, he is said to become disordered, which disorder of his, aided by the guilty recollection of the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming force to the murderer and his deeds. Wherefore also the doer must avoid the sufferer for the entire period of a year, and must not be found in any of the places that belong to him in the whole country. And if the dead man be a stranger, he shall abstain
 866 from the whole country of the stranger during a like period. If any one voluntarily obey this law, the next of kin to the deceased seeing all that has happened shall take pity on him, and make peace with him, and deal with him as he ought. But if any one is disobedient, and either ventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice unpurified, or will not continue in exile during the appointed time, the next of kin to the deceased shall proceed against him for murder ; and if he be convicted every part of his punishment shall be doubled. And if the next of kin do not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the pollution shall be deemed to fall upon his own head ;— the sufferer shall call for vengeance upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against him may compel him to be absent from his country during five years, according to law. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger who is dwelling in the city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to the same rules. If he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he be an entire stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he slay a stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life from the country which is under the dominion of our laws. And if he return contrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death ; and let them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next of kin to the sufferer. And if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast against his will, he shall take up his abode on the sea-shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing ; but if he be brought by land, and

is not his own master, let the magistrate whom he first comes across in the city, release him and send him unharmed over the border.

If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a distinction. For a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly, and without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and the like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word, men pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry for their deed. And, therefore, we must assume that there are two kinds of homicide, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said to be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same ⁸⁶⁷ time, they are neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow of either. He who treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an interval, is like the voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense, approaches to the involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether involuntary, but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary; wherefore about homicides committed in hot blood, there is a difficulty in determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary or as partly involuntary. The best and truest view is to regard either, as a likeness only of the voluntary or involuntary. We may, however, divide them accordingly as they are done with or without premeditation. And we make the penalties heavier for those who commit homicide with angry premeditation, and lighter for those who do not premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which is like a greater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like a less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of our laws.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Let us proceed: If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation, let the offender suffer in other respects

as the involuntary homicide would have suffered, undergoing an exile of two years, that he may learn to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion, yet with premeditation, shall undergo the same penalty as the former; and to this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years,—his punishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of their return shall be on this wise: (and here the law has difficulty in determining exactly; for in some cases the murder which is judged by the law to be worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged the less cruel may be really the worse, and may have executed the murder in a more savage manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. But in general the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of all these things the guardians of the law must take cognizance):—When either of them has completed his term of exile, they shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the interval shall have been informed of the actions of the criminals, and they shall judge respecting their pardon and 868 reception; and the homicides shall abide by their judgment. But if after they have returned home, either of them in a moment of anger repeats the deed, let him be an exile, and return no more; or if he return, let him suffer as the stranger was to suffer in a similar case. He who kills his own slave shall undergo a purification, but if he kills the slave of another in anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. And if a homicide is disobedient to the law, and without purification pollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples, he who pleases may bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permitting him, and the murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact and the other to suffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and the accuser may himself receive the fine which is imposed by law. If a slave in a fit of passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased man may do with the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they please, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who is not his master, the owners shall give up the slave to the relatives of the deceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death, but this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is a rare occurrence, but does some-

times happen) a father or a mother in a moment of passion slay a son or daughter by blows, or some other violence, they shall undergo the same purification as in other cases, and be exiled during three years; but when they return from exile the wife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and they shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the same roof, or partake of the same sacred rights with those whom they have deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and disobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wife, or the wife her husband, they shall undergo the same purification, and their term of exile shall be three years. And when he who has committed any such crime returns, let him have no communion in sacred rites with his children, neither let him sit at the same table with them, and the father or son who disobeys shall be liable to be brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If a brother or a sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister, they shall undergo a purification and a year's exile, as was the case with parents who kill their offspring: they shall not come under the same roof, or share in the sacred rites of those whom they have deprived of their brethren, or of their children. And he who is disobedient shall be justly liable to the law 869 concerning impiety, which relates to these matters. If any one is so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness of his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the dead man, when dying, of his own accord acquits the murderer, let him undergo the purification which is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide, and do as they do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted, the perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws, for he shall be amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety, and robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life; and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of passion has slain father or mother, undergo many deaths. How can he, whom, even in defence of his life, and when about to suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the legislator will

command to endure any extremity rather than this—how can he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then be the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father or his mother. But if brother kill brother in a civil broil, or under other like circumstances, if the other have begun, and he only defend himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an enemy. And if a citizen kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger; or if a stranger kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have killed a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law as he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other remission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of homicide to another, and declares his act to have been involuntary, let the perpetrator of the deed undergo a purification and remain in exile for a year, according to law.

Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of whatever kind and premeditation, through the influence of pleasures, and desires, and jealousies.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their number and nature. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass of mankind: I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of never-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition, and a miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the false admiration of wealth which is bruited about among Hellenes and barbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which in reality is only the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth about wealth should be spoken in all states—namely, that riches are for the sake of the body as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are good, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the

sake of them, and is therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence. This argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to be rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and then there would be no murders in states, which require to be purged away by other murders. But now, as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest cause and source of voluntary homicide, and hence the worst trials arise. A second cause is ambition: this creates jealousies, which are troublesome companions, above all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree to the chiefs of the state. And a third cause is cowardly and unjust fear, which has been the occasion of many murders. When a man is doing or has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be doing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to inform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them. Let this be said as a prelude concerning crimes in general; and I must not omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by many, and has been received from those who are learned in the mysteries; they say that the crime will be punished in the world below, and also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will suffer what they did by a compensation of nature, and end their lives in like manner by the hand of another. If he who is about to commit a crime believes this, and is induced by the prelude to fear such a penalty, there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. But if he will not listen, let the following law be declared and registered against him:—Whoever shall wrongfully and of 871 design slay with his own hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal privileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the harbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men or not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And he who, being of the kindred of the deceased, whether on the male or female side, does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and proclaim him an outlaw, shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the voices of

men against him ; and in the second place he shall be in the power of any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf of the dead. And he who wishes to punish him shall observe all the precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the Gods command in cases of this kind. Let him make proclamation, and then go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice according to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that these things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods, who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who these Gods are, and what should be the true manner of bringing such trials before the God, the guardians of the law, aided by the interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The cause shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide finally in the case of those who plunder temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for this would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not stand his trial, let him fly for ever ; or, if he set foot anywhere on any part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the deceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him, kill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to the archons who determined the suit, that they may put him to death ; and let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes ; three sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause shall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the trial. But if he is unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the magistrates shall take him and keep him in

872 bonds, and produce him at the day of trial. If a man do not commit the murder with his own hand, but has contrived the death of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design, having his soul not pure of the guilt of murder, and he is dwelling in the city, let him be tried in the same way, except in what relates to the sureties ; and also, if he be found guilty, he shall have burial in his native land, but in all other respects this case shall be as the former ; and whether a stranger shall kill a citizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there

shall be no difference as touching the mere intention and the actual performance, except in the matter of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be required of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation shall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of killing a freeman voluntarily, or of plotting to kill him, let the public executioner take him either to the sepulchre, or to a place at which he can see the sepulchre of the dead, and inflict upon him as many stripes as the person who took him orders, and if he survives, let him put him to death. And if any one kills a slave who has done no wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil deeds of his own, or for some similar reason, in such a case let him pay the penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen. There are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate, but impossible not to legislate. If, for example, there should be murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by their contrivance, and out of malice prepense, which may often happen in ill-regulated states, and perhaps even in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must repeat once more the tale, which we narrated a little while ago, in the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain voluntarily on these grounds from murders, which are utterly abominable. For the tale of tradition, whether under this or some other name, has been plainly set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the justice which inspects and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the law of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act should of necessity suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a father shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children, and if he have slain his mother he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life at the hands of his offspring in after ages; for where a family is polluted with blood there is no other purification, nor can the pollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has given life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath of the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such punishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and any one should be incited by some fatality to

deprive his father, or mother, or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose, for him the earthly lawgiver legislates as follows:—There shall be the same proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties which have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him at an appointed place where three ways meet, and cast him naked out of the city, and all the magistrates on behalf of the whole city shall carry stones, and each of them shall cast a stone upon the head of the dead man, and deliver the city from pollution; and after that, they shall bear him to the borders of the land, and throw him out unburied, according to law. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own best friend? I mean the suicide, who deprives himself by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and inevitable fortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had to suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but from sloth or want of manliness, imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. For him, what ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of the laws, and do according to their injunctions. They who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and nameless, and no column or name shall mark the place of their interment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such, and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the beast when condemned be slain by them, and cast beyond the borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods,—whether a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be a judge, and thereby acquit himself

and the whole family of guilt. And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said about the animals.

If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a diligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation as in the previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and they shall proceed against him, and announce in the agora, that he who has slain such and such a person, and has been convicted of murder, shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all in the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered he shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let us enact this, which shall be one of our laws about murder.

Enough of murder: and now let the cases in and for which the murderer may rightly be deemed pure be recited:—If a man catch a thief coming into his house by night to steal, and he take him and kill him, or if he slay a footpad in self-defence, he shall be guiltless. And any one who does violence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the injured person, or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man find his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be guiltless in the eye of the law; or if a person kill another in warding off death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who are doing no wrong, he shall assuredly be guiltless.

Thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man, having which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without them, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are to be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the nurture and education of the body we have spoken before, and now we have to speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary, which men do to one another; these we will now distinguish according to their nature and number, and determine what will be the suitable penalties of each; assigning them their proper place in the series of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have no difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of wounds should follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided as homicides were divided—into those which

are involuntary, and which are given in passion or from fear, and those which are voluntary and premeditated acts. Concerning all this, we must make some such proclamation as the following:—Mankind must have laws, and conform to
 875 them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for the social state of man; or knowing, always able to do what is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public good;—for public good binds together states, but private only distracts them,—nor do men always see that the gain is greater both to the individual and the state, when the state and not the individual is first considered. In the second place, even if a person know as a matter of science that this is the truth, but is possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never be able to abide in this principle or to persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best. Yet these look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore we make laws.

And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has hurt or wounded another. Any one may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked:—What did he wound, or whom, or how, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine all

these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible. There is one particular which they must determine in all cases—the question of fact. And then, again, that the legislator should not permit them to determine what punishment is 876 to be inflicted in any of these cases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is next to impossible.

Cle. Then what is to be the inference?

Ath. The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of law ; others the legislator must decide for himself.

Cle. And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to leave to the courts of law?

Ath. I may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad and mute, and decide causes secretly and clandestinely ; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy, as in a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator—I say that then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state. Unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts, but where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to ordain the penalties for the smallest offences ; if the state for which he is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into his own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good courts, and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. And we are not to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class of matters which judges far worse educated than our's would be able to determine, assigning to each offence the due proportion of wrong done and suffered. They are best able to judge, and therefore to them the greater part may be left. At the same time, as I have often said, we should exhibit to the judges, as we have done, the outline and form of the punishments to be inflicted, and then they will not transgress the just rule. That was an excellent practice, which we observed before, and now that we are resuming the work of legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us.

Let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms :
If any one has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and whom the law does not permit him to slay,

877 and he wounds him, but is unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be pitied—he should be regarded as a murderer and be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence who in pity to him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an accursed fate and calamity—as a thank-offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his will—in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate to a neighbouring city during his life; where he shall remain in the enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court deciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who would have decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child intentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be the penalty. And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother or a sister, and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. And if a husband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him or her undergo perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are still young, the guardians shall take care of their property, and have charge of the children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they shall possess the property themselves. And if he who meets with such a misfortune has no children, his kindred to the degree of sons of cousins of the exiled man, both on the male and female side, shall meet together, and after consulting with the guardians and the priests, shall appoint a 5040th citizen to be the heir of the house, considering and reasoning that no house of all the 5040 belongs to the inhabitant or to the whole family, but is the public and private property of the state. Now, the state should seek to have its houses as holy and happy as possible. And if any one of the houses be unfortunate, and stained with impiety, and the heir leave no posterity, and dies unmarried, or married and childless, having suffered death as the penalty of murder or some other crime committed against the Gods or against his fellow-citizens, of which death is the penalty distinctly laid down in the law;

or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile, and also childless, that house shall first of all be purified and undergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen of the house, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law, meet and consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest repute for virtue and also for good fortune, in which there are a number of sons; and let them adopt one of them, and introduce him to the father and forefathers of the dead man, and call him their son, for the sake of the omen, that he may be the continuer of their family, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred rites with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made this supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the offending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless when calamities such as these overtake him. 878

Now, there is not in all things a limit which touches limit; many things have a common boundary which is betwixt and between them; and we were saying that what is done from passion is of this nature, and is in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted of having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall pay twice the amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if incurable, four times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be curable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the wounded person, he shall pay fourfold. And whenever any one in wounding another injures not only the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him incapable of defending his country against the enemy, he, besides the other penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has incurred. And the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of service, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take his place in war; or, if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted by law of refusal to serve. The amount of the injury, whether to be paid twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who convict him. And if, in like manner, a brother wounds a brother, the parents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins, whether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have judged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to the parents, as is

natural; and if the estimate be disputed, then the arbitrators on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot, they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. And when similar charges of wounding are brought by children against their parents, those who are more than sixty years of age, having children of their own, not adopted, shall be required to decide; and if any one is convicted, they shall determine whether he ought to die, or suffer some other punishment either 879 greater than death, or, at any rate, not much less. A kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge the cause, not even if he be of the age which is permitted by the law. If a slave in a fit of anger wound a freeman, the owner of the slave shall give him up to the wounded man, who may do as he pleases with him, and if he do not give him up he shall make good the injury. And if any one says that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring together, let him argue the point, and if he is cast, he shall pay the injury three times over, but if he convict the other two, the freeman who conspired with the slave shall be liable to be made a slave. And if any one unintentionally wounds another he shall simply pay for the harm, for no legislator is able to control chance. In such a case the judges shall be the same as those who are appointed in the case of children and their parents; and they shall estimate the amount of the injury.

All the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of violence; and every man, woman, or child ought to consider that the elder has the precedence of the younger in honour, both among the Gods and also among men who would live happily. Wherefore it is a foul thing and hateful to the Gods to see an elder man assaulted by a younger in the city; and it is reasonable that a young man when struck by an elder should lightly endure his anger, laying up in store for himself a like honour when he is old. Let this be the law:—Every one shall reverence his elder in word and deed; he shall respect any one who is twenty years older than himself, whether male or female, regarding him or her as his father or mother; and he shall abstain from laying hands on any one who is of an age to have been his father or his mother out of reverence to the Gods who preside over birth; and in like manner he shall abstain from

a stranger, whether he be an old inhabitant or newly arrived; he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows, either as the aggressor or in self-defence. If he thinks that some stranger has struck him out of wantonness or insolence, and ought to be punished, he shall take him to the wardens of the city, but let him not strike him, that he may be kept far away from the possibility of lifting up his hand against a citizen, and let the wardens of the city take the offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the God of Strangers, and in case the stranger appear to have struck the citizen unjustly, let them inflict upon him as many blows as he has himself inflicted, and quell his insolence. But if he have done no wrong, then they shall threaten and rebuke the accuser, and let them both go. If a person strike another of the same age or somewhat older 880 than himself, who has no children, whether he be an old man who strikes an old man or a young man who strikes a young man, let him defend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands only. He who, being more than forty years of age, dares to fight with another, whether he be the aggressor or in self-defence, shall be regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish;—this will be a disgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. The obedient nature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient, who heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him. If any man smites another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more years, in the first place, he who meets him, not being younger than the combatants, or their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced according to law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is struck or younger, he shall defend the person injured as he would a brother or father or still older relative. Further, let him who dares to smite an elder be tried for assault, as I have said, and if he be found guilty, let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or for a longer period at the pleasure of the judges. But if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or more, the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who is found guilty in such a suit, if he be a stranger and not a sojourner, shall be imprisoned during a period of two years; and let him who is a metic and disobeys

the laws be imprisoned for three years, unless the court assign him a longer time of punishment. And let him who was present in any of these cases and did not assist according to law be punished, if he be of the highest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or if he be of the second class, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class, by a fine of thirty drachmas; or if he be the fourth class, by a fine of twenty drachmas; and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form the court in such cases.

Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are the persons who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter; for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that there may be no need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands upon his father or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear either of the wrath of the Gods above,
 881 or of the punishments that are spoken of in the world below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient and universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them, requires some extreme measure of prevention. Now death is not the worst that can happen to men; far worse are the punishments which are said to pursue them in the world below. But although they are most true tales, they work on such souls no prevention; for if they had any effect there would be no slayers of mothers, or impious hands lifted up against parents, and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted during life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the terrors of the world below. Let our enactment then be as follows:—If a man dare to strike his father or his mother, or their fathers or mothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let any who may be near come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or stranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place in the games; but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of perpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue shall have praise, and if he do not come blame. And if a slave come to the rescue

let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue let him receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of the wardens of the agora, if the occurrence take place in the agora, or if in any place in the city the wardens of the city who are within reach shall punish him; or if in the country then the chief officers of the wardens of the country. But if he who is near at the time be an inhabitant of the land, whether he be a youth, or man, or woman, let him come to the rescue and call upon the impious offender by name; and he who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus, the God of kindred and of ancestry, according to law. And if any one is found guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be for ever banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred rites; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country shall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if he return he shall be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or have any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him has voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into the agora, nor into the city, until he be purified; for he should consider that he has become a partaker of a fatal crime. And if he disobey the law, and pollute the city and the temples contrary to law, the magistrate who sees him and does not indict him, shall have to answer for an offence of the worst kind.

If a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, 882 let any one who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already mentioned; and let the companions of the wounded man bind him, and deliver him up to the injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and inflict on him as many stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he must surrender him to his master according to law, and not deprive him of his property. Let the law be as follows:—The slave who strikes a freeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive bound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the slave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be released and live. And let there be the same laws about women in relation to women, and about men and women in relation to one another.

BOOK X.

884 AND now having spoken of assaults, let us sum up all acts of violence under a single law, which shall be as follows:—No one shall take or carry away any of his neighbour's goods, neither shall he use anything which is his neighbour's without the consent of the owner; for these are the offences which are and have been, and will ever be, the source of all the aforesaid evils. The greatest of them are excesses and insolences of youth, and are offences against the greatest when they are done against religion; and especially great when in violation of public and holy rites, or of those in
885 which tribes and phratries partake; and in the second degree great when they are committed against private rites and sepulchres, and in the third degree (not to repeat the acts formerly mentioned), when insults are offered to parents; the fourth kind of violence is when any one regardless of the authority of the rulers, takes or carries away or makes use of anything which belongs to them, not having their consent; and the fifth kind is when the violation of the civil rights of individual citizens invites retaliation: There should be a common law embracing all these cases. For we have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of sacrilege, whether fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine what is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward the Gods. But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the following terms:—No one ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered any unlawful word, retaining a belief in the existence of the Gods, but he must have supposed one of three things,—either that they did not exist,—which is the first possibility, or secondly, that, if they did, they took no care of man, or thirdly, that

they were easily appeased by sacrifices, or turned from their course by prayers.

Cle. What shall we say or do to these persons?

Ath. My good friend, let us first hear the jests which I suspect that they in their superiority will utter against us.

Cle. What jests?

Ath. They will make some irreverent speech of this sort: O inhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus, they will reply, in that you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the Gods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care about us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts. Now we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of the laws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue with us and convince us—you should first attempt to teach and persuade us that there are Gods by reasonable evidences, and also that they are too good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their course by gifts. For when we hear these and the like things said of them by those who are esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and priests, and innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are not set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and making atonement for them. When lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not stern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and show us the existence of Gods, if not in a better manner than other men, at any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to them? If then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge.

Cle. But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the Gods?

Ath. How would you prove their existence? 886

Cle. How? In the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars and the universe, and the fair order of the seasons, and the division of them into years and months, furnish proofs of their existence; and also there is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians believe in them.

Ath. I am afraid, my sweet friend, though I will not say I am ashamed, of the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us. For you do not understand the nature of

their complaint; and fancy that their minds rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure.

Cle. Why, Stranger, what other reason is there?

Ath. One which you who live in another part of the world would never guess.

Cle. What is it?

Ath. A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the greatest wisdom.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the virtue of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of the Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the origin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning of their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods, and how after they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories have a good or a bad influence, I should not like to be severe upon them, because they are ancient; but I must say that, looking at them with reference to the duties of children to their parents, I cannot praise them, or think that they are useful, or at all true. Of the words of the ancients I have nothing more to say; and I should wish to say of them only what is pleasing to the God. But as to our younger generation and their wisdom, I cannot let them off when they do mischief. For do but mark the effect of their words: when you and I argue for the existence of the Gods, and produce the sun, moon, and stars, claiming for them a divine being, if we¹ would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we should say that they are earth and stones only, which can have no care at all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words and a make-believe.

Cle. One such teacher, O Stranger, would be bad enough, and you imply that there are many of them, which is worse.

Ath. Well, then; what shall we say or do?—shall we assume that some one is accusing us among unholy men, and that they, 887 and not we, are the real defendants in the matter of legislation; they will say of us—How dreadful that we should legislate on the supposition that there are Gods! shall we make a defence? or shall we leave them and return to our laws, lest the preamble

should become longer than the law? For the discourse will certainly extend to great length, if we are to treat the impiously disposed as they desire, partly arguing with them, as they demand, partly frightening them, or inspiring aversion in them, and then proceed to the requisite enactments.

Cle. Yes, Stranger; but then how often have we repeated already that there is no reason why brevity should be preferred to length; for there is nobody to hurry us, and it would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better. It is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove that there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more than men. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest preamble of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without hurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter; summoning up all the power of persuasion which we possess.

Ath. When I see you thus earnest, I feel impelled to offer up a prayer, and can no longer refrain. Who can be calm when he is called upon to prove the existence of the Gods? Who can avoid hating and abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this argument; I speak of those who will not believe¹ the words which they have heard as babes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, repeated by them both in jest and earnest, like charms, who have also heard and seen their parents offering up sacrifices and prayers—sights and sounds delightful to children—sacrificing, I say, in the most earnest manner on behalf of them and of themselves, and with eager interest talking to the Gods, and beseeching them, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence; who likewise see and hear the genuflexions and prostrations which are made by Hellenes and barbarians to the rising and setting sun and moon, in all the various turns of good and evil fortune, not as if they thought that there were no Gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence, and no suspicion of their non-existence; when men, knowing all these things, despise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have any particle of intelli- 888

¹ The text in this sentence is corrupt; we may read *λεγομένους*, or suppose the genitive in construction with *ἀκούοντες* suggested by the sound of the preceding genitive.

gence, and when they force us to say what we are now saying, how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of them, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the Gods? Yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that one-half of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure, and the other half in righteous indignation at them. Our address to these lost and perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; let us suppose ourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason with him, smothering our anger:—O my son, we say to him, you are young, and the advance of time will make you reverse many of the opinions which you now hold. Wait, therefore, until the time comes, and do not attempt to judge of high matters at present; and that is the highest of which you think nothing—to know the Gods rightly and to live accordingly. And in the first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great importance, and of the truth of which I am quite certain:—You and your friends are not the first who have held this opinion about the Gods. There have always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same disorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you, that no one who had taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever continued in the same until he was old; the two other notions certainly do continue in some cases, but not in many; the notion, I mean, that the Gods exist, but take no heed of human things, and also the notion that they do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with sacrifices and prayers. What may be the true doctrine, if you are patient, and take my advice, you will hereafter discover, by the help of the legislator and of others. In the meantime take heed lest you offend about the Gods. For the duty of the legislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these matters.

Cle. Your address, Stranger, thus far, is excellent.

Ath. Most true, Megillus and Cleinias, but I am afraid that we have unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine.

Cle. What doctrine do you mean?

Ath. The wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many.

Cle. I wish that you would speak plainer.

Ath. The doctrine that all things which are or have been or

will be, exist, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance.

Cle. Is not that true?

Ath. Well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as well follow in their track, and examine what is the 889 meaning of them and their disciples.

Cle. By all means.

Ath. They say that the greatest and fairest things are done by nature and chance, and the lesser by art, which receives from nature all the greater and primeval creations, and fashions them in detail; and these lesser works are generally termed artificial.

Cle. What do you and they mean?

Ath. You will understand their meaning better if I take the elements as an example; they mean to say that fire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance, and not by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in order,—earth, and sun, and moon, and stars,—they are created by the help of these absolutely inanimate existences, and that they are severally moved by chance and some inherent influence according to certain affinities of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of soft with hard, and other chance admixtures of opposites which have united of necessity, and that on this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the heaven, including animals and all plants, and that all the seasons come from these elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God, or from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only; and that art sprang up after these and out of them, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced in play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having an affinity to one another, such as music and painting create and their companion arts. And there are other arts which have a serious purpose, and these co-operate with nature, such, for example, as medicine, and husbandry, and gymnastic. And they say that politics co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, and have more of art; also that legislation is entirely a work of art, and is based on assumptions which are not true.

Cle. How do you mean?

Ath. In the first place, my dear friend, they would say that the Gods exist neither by nature nor by art, but only by the

laws of states, which are different in different places, according to the agreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing by nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice have no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always disputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which are made by art and by
 890 law have no basis in nature, but are of authority for the moment and at the time at which they are made: these, my friends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which find a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the highest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties, under the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine them; and hence arise contentions—the philosophers inviting them to lead a true life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over others, and not in legal subjection to them.

Cle. What a dreadful picture, Stranger, have you given of young men, and how great is the injury which they inflict on states and families!

Ath. True, Cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when this evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and threaten all mankind, declaring that if they will not say and think that the Gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be extended generally to the honourable, the just, and all other important principles which have to do with virtue and vice), he will insist on their actions conforming to the copy which the law gives them; and that he who will not submit to the established religion shall die, or suffer stripes and bonds, or privation of citizenship, or in some cases be punished by loss of property and exile? Should he not rather, when he is making laws for men, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words, and mitigate the severity of them as far as he can?

Cle. Why, Stranger, if such persuasion be at all possible, then a legislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of persuading men; he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the ancient opinion that there are Gods, and of all those other truths which you were just now mentioning; he ought to support the law and also art, and acknowledge, that both alike

exist by nature, or by that which is not inferior to nature, if they are the creations of mind in accordance with right reason, as you appear to me to maintain, and I am disposed to agree with you in thinking.

Ath. Yes, my enthusiastic Cleinias ; but are not these things when spoken to a multitude hard to be understood, not to mention that they take up a dismal length of time ?

Cle. Why, Stranger, shall we, whose patience failed not when drinking or music were the themes of discourse, weary now of discoursing about the Gods, and about divine things? And the greatest help to rational legislation is that the laws when once written down are always at rest ; they can be put to the test 891 at any future time, and therefore, if on first hearing they seem difficult, there is no reason for apprehension about them, because any man however dull can understand them, if he go over them often ; nor if they are tedious but useful, is there any reason or religion in any man refusing to maintain the principles of them to the utmost of his power.

Meg. Stranger, I like what Cleinias is saying.

Ath. Yes, Megillus, and we should do as he proposes ; for if impious discourses were not scattered, as I may say, throughout the world, there would have been no need of the argument in support of the existence of the Gods—but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are needed ; and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when they are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself ?

Meg. There is no more proper champion of them.

Ath. Well, then, tell me, Cleinias, for I must ask you to be my partner,—does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? these he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards ; and this is not a vague suspicion of his, but he really means and confidently asserts such to be the case.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators ; and I would have you examine them with the utmost care, for their impicity is a very serious matter ; they not only make a bad

and mistaken use of dialectic, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion of them.

Cle. Very true; but I should like to know how this happens.

Ath. I am afraid that the argument might seem singular.

Cle. Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. But if there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief of the Gods whom the law is now said to approve, let us take this way, my good sir.

Ath. Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first but last, and that which was last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the Gods.

892 *Cle.* Still I do not understand you.

Ath. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin: they do not know that she is among the first of bodies, and before them all, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity before those which appertain to the body?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind.

Cle. But why is the word 'nature' wrong?

Ath. Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to have a natural or creative power: and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise.

Cle. You are quite right.

Ath. Shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our attention should be directed?

Cle. By all means.

Ath. I fear that we may be quite deceived, and that the greenness with which we let the argument escape us, may ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of our ages. Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, and fail of attaining the lesser? Suppose that we three have to pass a rapid river, and I, being the youngest of the three and experienced in rivers, have the duty thrown upon me of making the attempt first by myself; leaving you in safety on the bank, I am to examine whether the river is passable by older men like yourselves, and if such appears to be the case then I will invite you to follow, and help you across by my knowledge; but if the river is impassable by you, then I shall have had all the danger myself,—does not that seem to be a very fair proposal? I mean to say that the argument in prospect is likely to be too much for you, and out of your depth, and I should be afraid that the stream of my ⁸⁹³ questions might create in you who are unaccustomed to dialectics, giddiness and confusion of mind, and hence a feeling of unpleasantness and unsuitableness might arise. I think therefore that I had better first ask and answer the questions myself while you listen in safety; in that way I can carry on the argument until I have completed the proof that the soul is prior to the body.

Cle. Excellent, Stranger, and I hope that you will do as you propose.

Ath. Come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the Gods, let us call upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of their own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will venture upon the depths of the argument. When questions of this sort are asked of me, my safest answer would appear to be as follows: Some one says to me, 'O Stranger, are all things in rest and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at rest?'—To this I shall reply that some are in motion and others at rest. 'And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in

a place?’ Certainly. ‘And some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one?’ You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the centre move in the same place as when the circumference goes round and the circle is said to be at rest? ‘Yes.’ And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. Very true. ‘And when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes several in the course of their revolutions; and sometimes impinging upon each other they come against bodies which are at rest, and are divided by them, or meeting other bodies which are coming violently from an opposite direction unite with them and interpenetrate them:’ I admit the truth of this. Also when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste away,—that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that fails, then there is a second reason of their dissolution. ‘And when are all things created and
894 how?’ Clearly, they are created when the principle of motion receives increase and attains the second dimension, and from this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after reaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is thus changing and moving is in process of generation, and has real existence only when at rest, but when passing into another state is destroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all the kinds of motion, and by the help of number comprehended them under their kinds with the exception, my friends, of two?

Cle. Which are they?

Ath. Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned.

Cle. Speak plainer.

Ath. I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other

things, but not to move itself;—that is one kind; and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution, and generation and destruction,—that is also one of the many kinds of motion?

Cle. Granted.

Ath. And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and has a place in every action and in every passion, and is the true principle of change in all that truly is,—that we shall be inclined to call the tenth.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most efficient?

Cle. I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others.

Ath. Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I have been saying?

Cle. What are they?

Ath. When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite correct.

Cle. What was the error?

Ath. According to the true order, the tenth was really the first in generation and power; then follows the second, which was improperly termed the ninth by us.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean this: when one thing moves another, and that another, will there be any primary changing element? Can there be, considering that what changes first will always have been changed by another? There cannot. And when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus, thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the 895 self-moving principle?

Cle. Very true, and I quite agree.

Ath. Or, to put the question in another way: If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?

Cle. Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause, if there had been no previous change in themselves.

Ath. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin and beginning of motion, as well among things at rest as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. At this stage of the argument let us put a question.

Cle. What question?

Ath. If I were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound—how should we describe it?

Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call the self-moving power life?

Ath. I do.

Cle. Certainly we should.

Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same—must we not admit that this is life?

Cle. We must.

Ath. And now, I beseech you, reflect;—you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things?

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name,—these are the three; and there are two more questions which may be raised about anything.

Cle. How two?

Ath. Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I mean in this way—

Cle. How?

Ath. Number like other things is capable of being divided into equal parts; when thus divided, number is termed 'even,' and the definition of the term 'even' is 'number divisible into two equal parts'?

Cle. True.

Ath. I mean to say, that when we are asked, about the

definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition—in either case we are dividing number into two equal parts, and the name and definition of ‘even’ have the same import.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. And what is the definition of that which is named ‘soul’? Can we conceive of any other than that which has 896 been already given—the motion which is self-moved?

Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is identical with that which we call soul?

Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has been, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things?

Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.

Ath. And is not that motion which takes place in another, or by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned in the second degree, or in any lower degree which you may prefer?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler?

Cle. Nothing can be more true.

Ath. Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body.

Cle. Of course.

Ath. In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that

the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And as the soul orders and inhabits all things moving every way, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?

Cle. Of course.

Ath. One soul or more? More than one—I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two—one the author of good, and the other of evil.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are 897 described by the terms—will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, contentment, and other primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of corporate substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind and disciplining all things rightly to their happiness; but when the companion of folly, doing the very contrary of all this. Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts?

Cle. There is no room at all for doubt.

Ath. Shall we say then that soul is the nature which controls heaven and earth, and the whole world? Is it the principle of wisdom and virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that we make answer as follows:—

Cle. How would you answer?

Ath. If, my friend, we say that the whole path of heaven, and the movement of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path.

Cle. True.

Ath. But when the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil soul guides it?

Cle. True again.

Ath. Of what nature is the movement of mind?—Here we are met by a difficulty, and therefore I ought to assist you in framing the answer.

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Then let us not answer as if we would look right at the sun, making ourselves darkness from excess of light,—I mean as if we were under the impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the nature of mind;—it will be safer to look at the image only.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly resembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then request you to assist me in giving the answer.

Cle. That will be excellent.

Ath. You will surely remember our saying that all things were either at rest or in motion?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And that of things in motion some were moving in one place, and others in more than one?

898

Cle. That is true.

Ath. Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place must move about a centre after the manner of a top, and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation to the same, and according to one law and order, and are like the motion of a top, we invented a fair image, which did no discredit to our ingenuity.

Cle. It did us credit.

Ath. And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly.

Cle. That is most true.

Ath. Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and arrange the revolution of the heaven.

Cle. And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries round the heavens.

Ath. You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now let me ask you another question.

Cle. What are you going to ask?

Ath. If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will apply to all.

Cle. Which will you take?

Ath. Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul, nor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is great reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is circumfused around them all, but is apprehended by mind only; and only by reflection do we ascertain what I am about to mention.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong in supposing one of three alternatives.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides within the circular and visible body, just as the soul in us carries us about every way; or the soul provides herself with 899 an external body of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body; or thirdly, she is without a body, but has some extraordinary and wonderful guiding power.

Cle. Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of these three ways.

Ath. And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed a God.

Cle. Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.

Ath. And of the stars too, and of the moon, and the years, and months, and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them, those souls are divine, whether they are living beings and reside in bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the place and mode of their existence;—and will any one who admits all this venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?

Cle. No one, Stranger, would be such a madman.

Ath. And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer an alternative to him who has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.

Cle. What alternative?

Ath. Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods: Let us see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny that there are Gods.

Cle. Certainly quite enough, Stranger.

Ath. Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address him who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no heed of human affairs: To him we say, O thou best of men, in believing that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts you towards your kindred and makes you honour and believe in them. But the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public life, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in the judgment of men, and are sung or spoken of by poets and prose writers, draw you aside from your natural piety. Perhaps you have seen impious men growing old and leaving their 900 children's children in high offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith; you have known or heard or been yourself an eyewitness of many monstrous impieties, and have beheld men by these criminal means from small beginnings reaching the pinnacle of greatness, and considering all these things you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your

relatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an unwillingness to find fault with them, you are led to believe that they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. Now, that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety, and that we may if possible use arguments which may drive away the pollution of error, we will add another argument to that which we addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do you, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before; and if there is any difficulty or impediment in the way, I will take the word out of your mouths, and carry you over the river as I did before.

Cl. Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we can.

Ath. There will surely be no difficulty in proving to him that the Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was present and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and that the care of all things is most entirely natural to them.

Cl. He certainly heard that.

Ath. Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by this virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice?

Cl. Certainly.

Ath. Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?

Cl. True.

Ath. And the one is dishonourable, and the other honourable?

Cl. To be sure.

Ath. And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?

Cl. No one will deny that.

Ath. But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be virtues? What do you think?

Cl. Certainly not.

Ath. They rank under the opposite class?

Cl. Yes.

Ath. And their opposites would fall under the opposite class? 901

Cle. Yes.

Ath. But can we suppose that one who takes care of great and small will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the poet compares to stingless drones¹?

Cle. And the comparison is a most just one.

Ath. Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which he himself hates?—and if any one dares to say anything of that sort, he must not be allowed for a moment.

Cle. He must not—of course not.

Ath. Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones? Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act from one of two principles.

Cle. What are they?

Ath. Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters is of no consequence to the whole, or if they are of consequence, and he neglects them, his conduct must be attributed to carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect can be explained? For, surely, he will not neglect anything, whether small or great, from any impossibility of taking care of all—or be careless about those things of which an inferior being, who has not the power, whether God or man, might be unable to take care?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike confess that there are Gods, but with a difference,—the one saying that they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to them, In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is matter of sense and knowledge:—do you admit this?

Cle. Yes.

Ath. And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals and immortals can have?

Cle. They will, of course, admit this also.

Ath. And surely we three and they two—five in all—have acknowledged that they are good and perfect.

Cle. Assuredly.

Ath. But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and carelessness of inactivity and indolence.

Cle. Most true.

Ath. Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever negligent; for he has no cowardice in him.

Cle. That is very true.

902 *Ath.* Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such matters—what other alternative is there but their ignorance?

Cle. There is none.

Ath. And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to mean that they are ignorant, and do not know that they ought to take care, or that they know and yet like the meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they are overcome by pleasures and pains?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is not man the most religious of all animals?

Cle. That is certainly true.

Ath. And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to the Gods great or small—in either case the Gods who own us and who are the most careful and the best of owners, are not likely to neglect us. There is also a further consideration.

Cle. What is that?

Ath. Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in respect to their ease and difficulty.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing the small than the great, but more facility in moving them and controlling them and taking care of them than of their opposites.

Cle. Far more.

Ath. Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to cure some living thing as a whole,—how will the whole fare at his hands if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the lesser?

Cle. Certainly not well.

Ath. No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or housholders or statesmen, or any other class, if they neglected the small and regarded only the great;—as the builders say, the larger stones do not lie well without the lesser.

Cle. Of course not.

Ath. Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well as great, by one and the same art; or that God, 903 the wisest of beings, who is willing and able to extend His care to all things, like a lazy good-for-nothing, wants a holiday, and takes no thought of smaller and easier matters, but of the greater only.

Cle. Never, Stranger, let us admit a supposition about the Gods which is both impious and false.

Ath. I think that we have now said enough to him who charges the Gods with neglect.

Cle. Yes.

Ath. He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he still seems to me to need some words of consolation.

Cle. What consolation will you offer him?

Ath. Let us say to the youth: 'The ruler of the universe has ordered all things with a view to the preservation and perfection of the whole, and each part has an appointed state of action and passion; and the smallest action or passion of any part affecting the minutest fraction has a presiding minister. And one of these portions of the universe is thine own, stubborn man, which, however little, has the whole in view; and you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is for the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may

be blessed ; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled artist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort towards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole, and not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because you do not see how that which is best for you is, as far as the laws of the creation admit, best also for the universe.' Now, as the soul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift the pieces ; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion.

Cl. In what way ?

Ath. In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things easy to the Gods. For if any one were to form or fashion¹ all things without any regard to the whole,—if, for example, he formed a living element of water out of fire, instead of forming many things out of one or one out of many in
904 regular order attaining to a first or second or third birth (cp. Tim. 42 B. C.), the transmutation would have been infinite ; but now the ruler of the world has a wonderfully easy task.

Cl. How so ?

Ath. I will explain :—When the king saw that our actions had life, and that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that the soul and body, although not eternal, were, like the Gods of popular opinion, indestructible (for if either of them had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of living beings) ; and when he observed that the good of the soul was by nature designed to profit men, and the evil to harm them—he, seeing all this, contrived so to place them in each of the parts that their position might in the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the defeat of evil in the whole. And he contrived a general plan by which a thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room. But the formation² of qualities he left to the wills of individuals. For every one of us

¹ Reading *μη̄ προς τὸ ὅλον*.

² Reading *τοῦ ποίου*.

is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and the nature of his soul.

Clc. Yes, that is probably true.

Ath. Then all things which have a soul change, and possess in themselves a principle of change, and in changing move according to law and the order of destiny: lesser changes of nature move on level ground, but greater crimes sink into the abyss, that is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, of which the very names terrify men, and about which they dream that they live in them absent from the body. And whenever the soul receives more of good and evil from her own energy and the strong influence of others—when she has communion with divine virtue and becomes divine, she is carried into another and better place, which is also divine and perfect in holiness; and when she has communion with evil, then she also changes the place of her life.

‘For that is the justice of the Gods who inhabit heaven¹.’

O youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the Gods, know that if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if better to the better, and in every succession of life and death you will do and suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. This is a divine justice, which neither you nor any other unfortunate will ever glory in escaping, and which the ordaining powers have specially ordained; take good heed⁹⁰⁵ of them, for a day will come when they will take heed of you. If you say:—I am small and will creep into the depths of the earth, or I am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small or so high but that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either in the world below or in some yet more savage place still whither you shall be conveyed. This is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had done unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had become great, and you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy; and in their actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect of the Gods, not knowing how they make all things work together and contribute to the great whole. And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou needest not to know this?—which he

¹ Hom. Odyss. xix. 43.

who knows not can never have any true idea of happiness or unhappiness, or say any true word respecting them. If Cleinias and this our reverend company succeed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the Gods, then will God help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen to what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding left in you. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence of the Gods, and that they have the care of man,—that they are appeased by wicked men, and take gifts is what I will not allow, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power.

Cle. Very good; let us do as you say.

Ath. Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell me more about them,—if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? Who are they, and what is their nature? Must not the eternal administrators of heaven be at least rulers?

Cle. True.

Ath. And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to them? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they charioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? Perhaps they might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be likened to physicians providing against the strife of bodily disease, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the seasons or the growth of plants; or perhaps to shepherds of flocks. For as we acknowledge the heaven to be full of many goods and also of evils, and of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal conflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and in that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their property. Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us, and justice and temperance and wisdom are the salvation of us; and the place of these latter is in the life of the Gods, and of their virtues some vestige may occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth there dwell souls who have an unjust spirit¹, and they, like brute animals, fawn upon their keepers, who may be dogs

¹ Reading λῆμα.

or shepherds, or may be the best and most perfect masters ; and upon these, as the wicked declare, they prevail by flattery and prayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with impunity. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of the same kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or blight in the seasons, and in cities and governments has another name, which is injustice.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always lenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them? As if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they, mollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. Must not he who maintains that the Gods are to be propitiated argue thus?

Cle. Precisely so.

Ath. And to which of the above-mentioned classes of guardians would any man compare the Gods without absurdity? Will he say that they are like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty by draughts of wine and the savour of fat, and at last overturn both ship and sailors?

Cle. Certainly not.

Ath. And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to give up the victory to other chariots?

Cle. That would be a fearful image of the Gods.

Ath. Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or shepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have been silenced by wolves.

Cle. A thing not to be spoken of.

Ath. And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, 907 and do they not guard our highest interests?

Cle. Yes ; the chiefest.

Ath. And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests, and are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to men even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice, for the sake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them?

Cle. Certainly not ; nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who holds this opinion may be fairly singled out and

characterized as of all impious men the wickedest and most impious.

Ath. Then are the three assertions—that the Gods exist, and that they take care of men, and that they will not be entreated to injustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are?

Cle. You have our entire assent to your words.

Ath. I have spoken with vehemence because I was jealous of evil men; and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, why I am so. I would not have the wicked suppose that they, having the superiority in argument, may do as they like in accordance with their various imaginations about the Gods; and this zeal has led me to speak more vehemently; but if we have at all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and love their opposites, the preamble of our laws about impiety will not have been spoken in vain.

Cle. So let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our argument will not discredit the lawgiver.

Ath. After the preamble shall follow a discourse, which will be the interpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons that they must depart from their ways and go over to the pious. And to those who disobey, let the law about impiety be as follows:—If a man is guilty of any impiety in word or deed, any one who happens to be present shall give information to the rulers, in aid of the law; and let the rulers who receive the information bring them before the appointed court according to the law; and if the magistrate, after receiving information, refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at the instance of any one who is willing to vindicate the laws; and if he be cast, the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of impiety; and let all such criminals be imprisoned. There shall be three prisons in the state: the first of them is to be the common prison in the neighbourhood of the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality of offenders; another is to be in the neighbourhood of the nocturnal council, and is to be called the 'house of reformation'; another, to be situated in some wild and desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by some name expressive of retribution. Now, men fall into impiety from three causes, which have been

already mentioned, and from each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, requiring judicial decision, but differing greatly in their degrees of guilt. For he who does not believe in the gods, and yet has a righteous nature, hates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids unrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who besides believing that the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate, and have at the same time good memories and quick wits, are worse; although both of them are unbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than by the other. The one may talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and perhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself, if he be not punished. But the other unbeliever, who has ability, is full of stratagem and deceit—men of this class are prophets and jugglers of all kinds, and out of their ranks sometimes come tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private mysteries and the ingenuities of so-called Sophists. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but two only for whom legislation is required; one the hypocritical sort, whose crime is deserving of death many times over, while the others need only bonds and admonition. In like manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought of men produces two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may be propitiated produces two more. Assuming these divisions, let those who have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and not from malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the house of reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during 909 a period of not less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no intercourse with the other citizens, except with members of the nocturnal council, and with them let them converse touching the improvement of their souls' health. And when the time of their imprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be restored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second time, let him be punished with death. As to that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that there are no Gods, or that they are negligent, or to be propitiated, but conjure the souls of the living and say that they can conjure the dead and promise to charm the Gods with sacrifices and prayers, and will utterly

overthrow whole houses and states for the sake of money—let him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the judge to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the centre of the land, and let no freeman ever approach him, but let him receive the rations of food appointed by the magistrates from the hands of slaves; and when he is dead let him be cast out of the borders unburied, and if any freeman assist in burying him let him pay the penalty of impiety to any one who is willing to bring a suit against him. But if he leaves behind him children who are fit to be citizens, let the guardians of orphans take care of them, just as they would of any other orphans, from the day on which their father was convicted.

In all these cases there should be one law, which will make men in general less liable to transgress in word or deed, and less foolish, because they will not be allowed to practise religious rites contrary to law. And let this be the simple form of the law:—No man shall have sacred rites in a private house. But when he is disposed to sacrifice, let him place his offerings in the hands of the priests and priestesses, who have under their care the holy rite, and let him pray himself, and let any one who pleases join with him in prayer. The reason of this is as follows:—Gods and temples are not easily established, and to establish them rightly is the work of a mighty intellect. And women especially, and men too, when they are sick or in danger, or in any sort of difficulty, or again on their receiving any good fortune, have a way of consecrating the occasion, offering up prayers and sacrifices, and promising statues to Gods, demigods, and sons of Gods; and when they are awakened by terrible apparitions, and have dreams or remember visions, they find in altars and temples the remedies of them, and will fill every house and village with them, placing them in the open air or in any chance place; and with a view to all these cases we should act as the law enacts. The law has also regard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that by the secret performance of these actions—by raising temples and altars in private houses, they can propitiate the God secretly with sacrifices and prayers, while they are really multiplying their crimes infinitely, bringing guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also upon those who permit them, and who

are better men than they are ; and the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their impiety, which, in a certain sense, is deserved : assuredly God will not blame the legislator.

Let this, then, be the language of the law :—No one shall possess shrines of the Gods in private houses, and he who is found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly authorized,—supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not guilty of any other great and impious crime,—shall be informed against by him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be announced by him to the guardians of the law ; and let them issue orders that he or she shall carry away his private rites to the public temples, and if they do not persuade them, let them inflict a penalty on them until they comply. And if a person be proven guilty of impiety, not merely from childish levity, but such as grown-up men may be guilty of, whether he have sacrificed publicly or privately to any Gods, let him be punished with death, for his sacrifice is impure. Whether the deed has been done in earnest, or only from childish levity, let the guardians of the law determine, before they prosecute the offender for impiety.

BOOK XI.

913 IN the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them is very simple: Thou shalt not touch that which is mine, if thou canst help, or remove the least thing which belongs to me without my consent; and may I, being of sound mind, do to others as I would that they should do to me. First, let us speak of treasure-trove: May I never pray the Gods to find the hidden treasure, which a man has laid up for himself and his family, he not being one of my ancestors, nor lift, if I should find, such a treasure. And may I never have any dealings with the diviners, as they are called, who in any way or manner counsel me to take up the deposit entrusted to the earth, for I should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions, if I take up the prize, as I should grow in justice and virtue of soul, if I abstain; and this will be a better possession to me than the other in a better part of myself; for the possession of justice in the soul is preferable to the possession of wealth. And of many things it is well said,—‘move not the immovables,’ and this may be truly regarded as one of them. And we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says, that such deeds prevent a man from having a family. Now, as to him who is careless about having children and regardless of the legislator, taking up that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his, without the consent of the depositor, violating the simplest and noblest of laws which was the enactment of no mean man: ‘Take not up that which you have not laid down,’—of him, I say, who despises these two legislators, and takes up, not some small matter which he has

not deposited, but perhaps a great heap of treasure, what he ought to suffer at the hands of the Gods, God only knows; but I would have the first person who sees him go and tell the wardens of the city, if the occurrence has taken place in the city, or if the occurrence has taken place in the agora he shall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell the wardens of the country and their officers. When information ⁹¹⁴ has been received they shall send to Delphi, and, whatever the God answers about the money and the remover of the money, that the city shall do in obedience to the oracle; the informer, if he be a freeman, shall have the honour of doing rightly, or if he inform not, the dishonour of doing wrongly; and if he be a slave who gives information, let him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his master the price of him; but if he do not inform he shall be punished with death. Next in order shall follow a similar law, which shall apply equally to matters great and small: If a man happens to leave behind him some part of his property, whether intentionally or unintentionally, let him, who may meet with the left property, suffer it to remain, reflecting that such things are under the protection of the Goddess of ways, and are dedicated to her by the law. But if any one defies the law, and takes the property home with him, let him, if he be a slave of little worth, be beaten with many stripes by him who meets him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age. Or if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and despiser of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of the treasure which he has moved to the leaver. And if some one accuses another of having anything which belongs to him, whether little or much, and the other admits that he has this thing, but says that the property in dispute belongs to him, if the property be registered with the archons according to law, the claimant shall summon the possessor, who shall appear before the magistrates; and when the matter is cleared up, if it be registered in the public registers, to which of the litigants it belonged, let him take it and go his way. Or if the property be registered as belonging to some one who is not present, whoever will give sufficient surety on behalf of the absent person that he will give it up to him, let him take it away as the representative of the other.

But if the property which is deposited be not registered with the archons, let it remain until the time of trial with three of the eldest of the archons; and if that for which bail is given be an animal, then he who loses the suit shall pay the archons for its keep, and the archons shall determine the cause within three days.

Any one who is of sound mind may carry off his own slave, and do with him whatever he will of such things as are lawful; and he may carry off the runaway slave of any of his friends or kindred with a view to his safe-keeping. And if any one takes away him who is being carried off as a slave, intending to liberate him, he who is carrying him off shall let him go; but he who takes him away shall give three sufficient sureties; and if he give them, and not without giving them, he may take him away, but if he take him away after any other manner he shall be guilty of violence, and being convicted shall pay double the
 915 penalty of the loss to him from whom he has taken the slave. Let him also carry off the freedman, if he do not pay respect or not sufficient respect to him who freed him. Now the respect shall be, that the freedman go three times in the month to the house of the person who freed him, and offer to do whatever he can and ought to do, and he shall agree to make such a marriage as his former master pleases. He shall not be permitted to have more property than he who gave him liberty, and what more he has shall belong to his master. The freedman shall not remain in the state more than twenty years, but like other foreigners shall go away, taking his entire property with him, unless he have the consent of the magistrates and of his former master to remain. If a freedman or any other stranger have a property greater than the census of the third class, at the expiration of thirty days from the day on which this comes to pass, he shall take that which is his and go his way, and in this case he shall not be allowed to remain any longer by the archons. And if any one disobeys this regulation, and is brought into court and convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his property shall be confiscated. Suits about these matters shall take place before the tribes, unless the plaintiff and defendant have got rid of the accusation either before their neighbours or before arbitrators. If a man lay claim to any

animal or anything else which he declares to be his, let him who is the possessor refer to some honest and trustworthy person, who has sold or given, or in some legitimate way made over the property to him; if he be a citizen or a metic, sojourning in the city, within thirty days, or, if the property have been delivered to him by a stranger, within five months, of which the middle month shall be the summer solstice. When goods are exchanged by selling and buying, a man shall deliver them, and receive the price of them, at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter; but he shall not buy or sell anywhere else, nor give credit. And if in any other manner or in any other place there be an exchange of one thing for another, and the seller with whom he is dealing give him credit, he must do this on the understanding that the law gives no protection in cases of things sold not in accordance with these regulations. Again, as to contributions, any man who likes may go about collecting contributions as a friend with friends, but if any difference arises about the collection, he is to act on the understanding that the law gives no protection in such cases. He who sells anything up to the value of fifty drachmas shall be required to remain in 916 the city for ten days, and the purchaser shall be informed of the house of the seller, with a view to the sort of charges which are apt to arise in such cases, and the restitutions which the law allows. And let legal restitution be on this wise: If a man sells a slave who is in a consumption, or who has the disease of the stone, or of strangury, or epilepsy, or some other tedious and incurable disorder of body or mind, which is not discernible to the ordinary man, if the purchaser be a physician or trainer, he shall have no right of restitution; nor shall there be any right of restitution if the seller has told the truth beforehand to the buyer. But if a skilled person sells to another who is not skilled, let the buyer appeal for restitution within six months, except in the case of epilepsy, and then the appeal may be made within a year, and shall be determined by such physicians as the parties may agree to choose; and he who loses the suit shall pay double the price at which he sold. If a private person sell to another private person, he shall have the right of restitution, and the decision shall be given as before, but he who loses the suit shall only pay back the price of the slave. If a

person sells a homicide to another, and they both know of the fact, let there be no restitution in such a case, but if he do not know of the fact, there shall be a right of restitution, whenever the buyer makes the discovery; and the decision shall rest with five of the youngest guardians of the law, and if the decision be that the seller was cognisant of the fact, he shall purify the house of the purchaser, according to the law of the interpreters, and shall pay back three times the purchase-money.

He who exchanges either money for money, or anything whatever for anything else, either with or without life, let him give and receive them genuine and unadulterated, in accordance with the law. And let us have a preamble about all this sort of roguery, like the preambles of our other laws. Every man should regard adulteration as a particular kind of falsehood, concerning which the many are too fond of saying that at proper times the practice may often be right. But they leave the time and place and occasion undefined and unregulated, and from this want of definiteness in their language they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. Now, a legislator ought not to leave the matter undefined; he ought to prescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let this, then, be the limit prescribed: No one shall call the Gods to witness, when he says or does anything false or deceitful or dishonest, unless he would be the most hateful of mankind
 917 to them. And he is most hateful to them who takes a false oath, and never thinks of the Gods; and in the second place, he who tells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now, better men are the superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the superiors of the young; wherefore also parents are the superiors of their children, and men of women and children, and rulers of their subjects; for all men ought to reverence any one who is in any position of authority, and especially those who are in state offices. And this is the reason why I have spoken of these matters. For every one who is guilty of adulteration in the agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he invokes the Gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens of the agora, he is perjured, and has no respect either for God or man. Certainly, it is an excellent rule not lightly to profane the names of the Gods, after the fashion of men in general,

who care little about piety and purity in their actions. But if a man will not conform to this rule, let the law be as follows:— He who sells anything in the agora shall not ask two prices of that which he sells, but he shall ask one price, and if he do not obtain this, he shall take away his goods; and on that day he shall not value them, either at more or less; and there shall be no praising of any goods, or oath taken about them. If a person disobeys this command, any citizen who is present, not being less than thirty years of age, may chastise and beat the swearer, and he shall be guiltless, but if he takes no heed and disobeys, he shall be liable to the charge of having betrayed the laws. If a man sell any adulterated goods and will not obey these regulations, he who knows and can prove the fact, and does prove it in the presence of the magistrates, if he be a slave or a metic, shall have the adulterated goods; but if he be a citizen, and do not prove it, he shall be disgraced and deemed to have robbed the Gods of the agora; or if he prove the charge, he shall dedicate the goods to the Gods of the agora. He who is proved to have sold any adulterated goods, in addition to losing the goods themselves, shall be beaten with stripes,—a stripe for a drachma, according to the price of the goods; and the herald shall proclaim in the agora the offence for which he is going to be beaten. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall obtain information from experienced persons about the roguceries and adulterations of the sellers, and shall write up what the seller ought and ought not to do in each case; and let them inscribe their laws on a column in front of the court of the agora, that they may be clear instructors of those who have business in the agora. Enough has been said 918 in what has preceded about the wardens of the city, and if anything seems to be wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of the law, and write down the omission, and place on a column in the court of the city the first and second regulations which are laid down for them about their office.

After the practices of adulteration naturally follow practices of retail trade. Concerning these, we will first of all give a word of counsel and reason, and the law shall come afterwards. Retail trade in a city is not by nature intended to do any harm, but quite the contrary; for is not he a benefactor who

reduces the inequalities and immeasurabilities of goods to equality and measure? And this is what the power of money accomplishes, and the merchant may be said to be appointed for this purpose. The hireling and the tavern-keeper, and many other occupations, some of them more and others less seemly—all alike have this object;—they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our possessions. Let us then endeavour to see what is the accusation brought against retail trade, and wherein lies the dishonour and unseemliness of it in order that if not entirely we may yet partially remove the objection by law. To effect this is no easy matter, and implies a great deal of virtue.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. Dear Cleinias, the class of men is small—they must have been rarely gifted by nature, and trained by education,—who, when compelled by wants and desires, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when they might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and prefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the very opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in moderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates to retail trade and merchandise, and keeping of taverns, is denounced and numbered among dishonourable things. For if what I trust may never be and will not be, we were to compel, if I may venture to say a ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a time, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in consequence of some dire necessity, the best women were compelled to follow a similar calling, then we should know how agreeable and pleasant all these things are; and all such occupations if they were carried on according to pure reason, would be honoured as we honour a mother or a nurse: but now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which
919 can only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and receives strangers who are in need at the desired resting-places, and gives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool shade in the heat; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and showing the duties of hospitality to his guests, treats them as enemies and captives

who are at his mercy, and will not release them until they have paid the highest, most abominable, and dishonest price,—these are the sort of practices, and foul evils they are, which cast a reproach upon the succour of adversity. And the legislator ought always to be devising a remedy for evils of this sort. There is an ancient saying, which is also a true one—‘To fight against two opponents is a difficult thing,’ as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. And in this case also the war is against two enemies—wealth and poverty; one of whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury, while the other drives him by pain into utter shamelessness. What remedy can a city of sense find against this disease? In the first place, they must have as few retail traders as possible; and in the second place, they must assign the occupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least injury to the state; and in the third place, they must devise some way whereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily fall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.

After this preface let our law run as follows, and may fortune favour us:—No landowner among the Magnetes, whose city the God is restoring and resettling—no one, that is, of the 5040 families, shall become a retail trader either voluntarily or involuntarily; neither shall he be a merchant, or do any service for private persons who are not his equals, except for his father or his mother, and their fathers and mothers; and in general for his elders who are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. Now it is difficult to determine accurately the things which are worthy or unworthy of a freeman, but let those who have obtained the prize of virtue give judgment about them in accordance with their feelings of right and wrong. He who in any way shares in the illiberality of retail trades may be indicted by any one who likes for dishonouring his race, before those who are judged to be the first in virtue; and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father’s house by an unworthy occupation, let him be imprisoned for a year and abstain from that sort of thing; and if he repeat the offence, for two years; and every time that he is taken let the time of his imprisonment be doubled. This shall be the second law:—He who engages in retail trade must be either a metic or a stranger. And a third

law shall be : In order that the retail trader who dwells in our city may be as good or as little bad as possible, the guardians of the law shall remember that they are guardians not only of those who may be easily watched and prevented from becoming lawless or bad, because they are well-born and bred ; but still more should they have a watch over those who are of another sort, and follow pursuits which have a very strong tendency to make men bad. And, therefore, in respect of the multifarious occupations of retail trade, that is to say, in respect of such of them as are allowed to remain, because they seem to be quite necessary in a state,—about these the guardians of the law should meet and take counsel with those who have experience of the several kinds of retail trade, as we before commanded concerning adulteration (which is a matter akin to this), and when they meet they shall consider what amount of receipts after deducting expenses will produce a moderate gain, and they shall fix in writing and strictly maintain what they find to be the right percentage of profit ; this should be done by the wardens of the agora, and by the wardens of the city, and by the wardens of the country. And so retail trade will benefit every one, and do the least possible injury to those in the state who practise it.

When a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance, the other party may go to law with him in the courts of the tribe, for not having completed his agreement, if the parties are not able previously to come to terms before arbiters or before their neighbours. The class of craftsmen who have furnished human life with the arts, is dedicated to Hephaestus and Athene ; and there is a class of craftsmen who preserve the works of all craftsmen by arts of defence, the votaries of Ares and Athene ; and they also deserve to be dedicated to the Gods. All these continue through life serving the country and the people ; some of them are leaders in battle ; others make for hire implements and works, and they ought not to deceive

in such matters, out of respect to the Gods who are their ⁹²¹ ancestors. If any craftsman through indolence omit to execute his work in a given time, not reverencing the God who gives him the means of life, but considering, foolish fellow, that he is his own God and will let him off easily; in the first place, he shall suffer at the hands of the God; and in the second place, the law shall follow in a similar spirit. He shall owe to him who contracted with him the price of the works which he has failed in performing, and he shall begin again and execute them gratis in the given time. When a man undertakes a work, the law gives him the same advice which was given to the seller, that he should not attempt to raise the price, but simply ask the value; this the law enjoins also on the contractor; for the craftsman assuredly knows the value of his work. Wherefore, in free states the man of art ought not to attempt to impose upon private individuals by the help of his art, which is by nature a true thing; and he who is wronged in a matter of this sort, shall have a right of action against the party who has wronged him. And if any one lets out work to a craftsman, and does not pay him duly according to the lawful agreement, disregarding Zeus the saviour of the city and Athene, who are the partners of the state, and overthrows the foundations of society for the sake of a little gain, in his case let the law and the Gods maintain the common bonds of the state. And let him who, having already received the work in exchange, does not pay the price in the time agreed, pay double the price; and if a year has elapsed, whereas usury in general is not to be taken on money lent in our state, let him for every drachma which he owes to the contractor pay a monthly interest of an obol. Suits about these matters are to be decided by the courts of the tribes; and by the way, now that we are mentioning craftsmen, we must not forget to speak of generals and tacticians, who are the craftsmen of our art of safety, which is war, and like other craftsmen undertake some public work either of their own accord, or because they are appointed by the state; and if they execute their work well the law will never be tired of praising him who gives them ¹

¹ Reading, according to Schneider, ὅς τούτοις αὖ.

those honours which are the just rewards of the soldier ; but if any one, having already received the benefit of any noble service in war, does not make the due return of honour, the law will blame him. Let this then be the law, having an ingredient ⁹²² of praise, not compelling but advising the great body of the citizens to honour the brave men who are the saviours of the whole state, whether by their courage or by their military skill ;—they should honour them, I say, in the second place ; for the first and highest tribute of respect is to be given to those who are able above other men to honour the words of good legislators.

The greater part of the dealings between man and man have been now regulated by us with the exception of those that relate to orphans and the supervision of orphans by their guardians. These follow next in order, and must be regulated in some way. But to arrive at them we must begin with the testamentary wishes of the dying and the case of those who may have happened to die intestate. When I said, Cleinias, that we must regulate them, I had in my mind the difficulty and perplexity in which all such matters are involved. You cannot leave them unregulated, for individuals would make regulations at variance with one another, and repugnant to the laws and habits of the living and to their own previous habits, if a person were simply allowed to make any will which he pleases, and this were to take effect in whatever state he may be at the end of life ; for most of us lose our senses in a manner, and are prostrated in mind when we think that we are soon about to die.

Cle. What do you mean, Stranger ?

Ath. O, Cleinias, a man when he is about to die is a fearful thing, and may cause a great deal of anxiety and trouble to the legislator.

Cle. In what way ?

Ath. He wants to have the entire control of all his property, and will use angry words.

Cle. Such as what ?

Ath. O ye Gods, he will say, how monstrous that I am not allowed to give, or not to give, my own to whom I will—less to him who has been bad to me, and more to him who has been good to me, and whose badness and goodness has been tested by

me in time of sickness or in old age and in every other sort of fortune?

Cle. Well, Stranger, and may he not very fairly say that?

Ath. In my opinion, Cleinias, the ancient legislators were too good-natured, and made laws without sufficient observation or consideration of human things.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. I mean, my friend, that they were afraid of the testator's reproaches, and so they passed a law to the effect that a man should be allowed to dispose of his property in all respects as he likes, but you and I, if I am not mistaken, will have something better to say to our departing citizens.

923

Cle. What?

Ath. O my friends, we will say to them, hard is it for you, who are creatures of a day, to know what is yours,—hard, too, to know yourselves, as the Delphic oracle says, at this hour. Now I, as the legislator, regard you and your possessions, not as belonging to yourselves, but as belonging to your whole family, both past and future, and yet more do I regard both family and possessions as belonging to the state; wherefore, if some one steals upon you with flattery, when you are tossed on the sea of disease or old age, and persuades you to dispose of your property in a way that is not for the best, I will not, if I can help, allow this; but I will legislate with a view to the whole, considering what is best both for the state and for the family, esteeming as I ought the feelings of an individual at a lower rate; and I hope that you will depart in peace and kindness towards us, as you are going the way of all mankind; and we will impartially take care of all your concerns, not neglecting any of them, if we can possibly help. Let this be our warning and consolation of the living and dying, Cleinias, and let the law be as follows:—He who makes a disposition in a testament, being a father and having children, shall first of all inscribe as his heir any one of his sons whom he may think fit; and if he have given any of his children to be adopted by another citizen, let the adoption be inscribed. And if he has a son remaining over and above who has not had any portion assigned to him, and who may reasonably be expected to go out to a colony according to law, to him his father may give as much

as he pleases of the rest of his property, with the exception of the paternal lot and the property on the lot. And if there are more sons than one, let the father distribute what there is more than the lot in any way that he pleases. And if one of the sons has the family inheritance, he shall not give him of the money, nor shall he give money to a daughter who is betrothed to a husband, but if she is not betrothed he may give her money. And if any of the sons or daughters shall be found to have a lot of land in the country, which has accrued after the testament has been made, he shall leave the lot which he has inherited to the heir of the man who has made the will. If the testator has no sons, but only daughters, let him choose the husband of any one of his daughters, and leave and inscribe him as his son and heir. And if a man have lost his son, when he was a child, and before he came to be reckoned among grown-up men, whether his own or an adopted son, let the testator make mention of the circumstance and
924 inscribe whom he will to be his second son, in hope of better fortune; and if the testator has no children at all, he may select and give to any one whom he pleases the tenth part of the property which he has acquired. Let him, as he ought, give all the rest to his adopted son, and make a friend of him according to the law. If the sons of a man require guardians, and he dies and makes a will appointing guardians who are agreeable and willing to take charge of his children, whoever they are, and as many as he pleases, let the choice of the guardians have force according to what he has written. But if he dies and has made no will, or a will in which he has appointed no guardians, then the next of kin, two on the father's and two on the mother's side, and one of the friends of the deceased, shall have the authority of guardians; whom the guardians of the law shall appoint when the orphans require guardians. And fifteen of the eldest of the guardians of the law, according to seniority, shall have the whole care and charge of the orphans, and shall divide themselves into threes, —a body of three for one year, and then another body of three for the next year, until the cycle is complete, and this, as far as possible, is to continue always. If a man dies, having made no will at all, and leaves sons who require the care of guardians,

they shall share in the protection which is afforded by these laws. And if a man dying by some unexpected fate leave daughters behind him, let him pardon the legislator if he gives his daughter in marriage, having a regard only to two out of three conditions,—nearness of kin and the preservation of the lot, and omits the third condition, which a father would naturally consider, for he would choose out of all the citizens a son for himself, and a husband for his daughter, with a view to his character and disposition—he shall forgive the legislator, I say, if he disregards this, which to him is an impossible consideration. Let the law about these matters where practicable be as follows:—If a man dies without making a will, and leaves behind him daughters, let his brother, being the son of the same mother, having no lot, marry the daughter and have the lot of the dead man. And if he have no brother, but only a brother's son, in like manner let them marry, if they be of a suitable age; and if there be not even a brother's son, but only the son of a sister, let them do likewise, and so in the fourth degree if there be only a father's brother, or in the fifth degree a father's brother's son, or in a sixth degree the child of a father's sister. Let kindred be always reckoned in this way: if a person leaves daughters the relationship shall proceed upwards through brother's and brother's son, and first the males shall come, ⁹²⁵ and after them the females in the same family. The judge shall consider and determine the suitability or unsuitability of age in marriage; he shall make an inspection of the males naked, and of the women naked down to the navel. And if there be a lack of kinsmen in a family extending to grandchildren of a brother, or to the grandchildren of a grandfather's children, the maiden may choose with the consent of her guardians any one of the citizens whom she will, and he shall be the heir of the dead man, and the husband of his daughter. Circumstances vary, and there may sometimes be a still greater lack of relations within the limits of the state; and if any maiden has no kindred living in the city, and there is some one who has been sent out to a colony, and she is disposed to make him the heir of her father's possessions, if he be indeed of her kindred, let him proceed to her lot according to the regulation

of the law ; but if he be not of her kindred, and there be no kinsmen within the pale of the city, and he be chosen by the daughter of the dead man, and empowered to marry by the guardians, let him return home and take the lot of him who died intestate. And if a man has no children, either male or female, and dies without making a will, let the previous law in general hold ; and let a man and a woman go forth from the family and share the deserted house, and let the lot belong absolutely to them ; and let the heiress in the first degree be a sister, and in a second degree a daughter of a brother, and in the third, a daughter of a sister, in the fourth degree the sister of a father, and in the fifth degree the daughter of a father's brother, and in a sixth degree of a father's sister ; and these shall dwell with their male kinsmen, according to the degree of relationship and right, as we enacted before. Now we must not conceal from ourselves that such laws are apt to be oppressive and that there may sometimes be a hardship in the lawgiver commanding the kinsman of the dead man to marry his relation ; he may be thought not to have considered the innumerable hindrances which may arise among men in the execution of such ordinances ; for there may be cases in which the parties refuse to obey, and are ready to do anything rather than marry, when there is some bodily or mental malady or defect among those who are bidden to marry or be married. Persons may fancy that the legislator never thought of this, but there they are mistaken ; wherefore let us make a common prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects, the law begging the latter to forgive the legislator, in that he, having to take care of the common weal, cannot order at the same time the various
936 circumstances of individuals, and begging him to pardon them if they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his ignorance imposes upon them.

Cle. And how, Stranger, can we act most fairly under the circumstances ?

Ath. There must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the subjects of them.

Cle. What do you mean ?

Ath. I mean to say, that a case may occur in which the brother's son, having a rich father, will be unwilling to marry

the daughter of his uncle ; he will have a feeling of pride, and he will wish to look higher. And there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him the greatest calamity, and he will be compelled to disobey the law, if he is required, for example, to take a wife who is mad, or has some other terrible malady of soul or body, such as makes life intolerable to the sufferer. Then let what we are saying concerning these cases be embodied in a law : If any one finds fault with the established laws respecting testaments, both as to other matters and especially in what relates to marriage, and asserts that the legislator, if he were alive, would not compel him to obey,—that is to say, would not compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in marriage, to do either,—and some kinsman or guardian assent to this, let them say that the legislator left the fifteen guardians of the law to be arbiters and fathers of orphans, male or female, and to them let the disputants have recourse, and by their aid determine any matters of the kind, admitting their decision to be final. But if any one thinks that too great power is thus given to the guardians of the law, let him bring his adversaries into the court of the select judges, and there have the points in dispute determined. And he who loses the cause shall have censure and blame from the legislator, which, by a man of sense, is felt to be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money.

Thus will orphan children have a second birth : After their first birth we spoke of their nurture and education, and after their second birth, when they have lost their parents, we ought to take measures that the misfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad as possible to them. In the first place, as we are saying, we appoint them the guardians of the law, to be fathers to them, not inferior to their natural fathers. Moreover, they shall take charge of them year by year as of their own kindred ; and we have given both to them and to the children's own guardians a suitable admonition concerning the nurture of orphans. And we seem to have spoken opportunely in our ⁹²⁷ former discourse, when we said that the souls of the dead have the power after their death of taking an interest in human affairs, about which there are many tales and traditions, long indeed, but true ; and seeing that they are so many and so

ancient, we must believe them, and we must also believe the lawgivers, who tell us that these things are true, if they are not to be regarded as utter fools. But if these things are really so, in the first place men should have a fear of the Gods above, who regard the loneliness of the orphans; and in the second place of the souls of the departed, who by nature incline to take an especial care of their own children, and they are friendly to those who honour them, and unfriendly to those who do not. Men should also fear the living who are aged; wherever a city is well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them, and so live happily; old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to them, and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of these duties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate, considering that they are the greatest and most sacred of deposits. To all which matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind, if he has any, and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans, seeking in every possible way to do them good, and contributing to his own good and that of his children. He who obeys the tale which precedes the law, and does no wrong to an orphan, will never have experience of the wrath of the legislator. But he who is disobedient, and wrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother, shall pay twice the penalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had been alive. As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their relation to orphans, or concerning magistrates and their superintendence of the guardians, if they did not possess¹ examples of the manner in which children of freemen should be brought up in the bringing up of their own children, and of the care of their property in the care of their own; or, if they had not just laws fairly stated about these very things,—there would have been reason in making laws for them, under the idea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make separate rules for the life of those who are orphans and of those who are not orphans. But as the case stands, the condition of orphans with us is not different from the case of those who have a father, though in regard

¹ Reading *εἰ μὲν μή*.

to honour and dishonour, and the attention given to them, the two are not usually placed upon a level. Wherefore, touching the legislation about orphans, the law speaks in serious accents, both of persuasion and threatening, and such a threat as the following will be by no means out of place: He who is the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and he among the guardians of the law who has the care of the guardians, shall love the unfortunate orphan as though he were his own child, and he shall be as careful and diligent as he would be in the management of his possessions, or even more careful and diligent than he would be if they were his own. Let every one who has the care of an orphan observe this law. But if any one acts contrary to the law on these matters, if he be a guardian the archon may fine him, or if he be the archon, the guardian may bring him before the court of select judges, and punish him, if convicted, by a fine of double the amount, which the court shall impose. And if a guardian appears to the relations of the orphan, or to any other citizen, to act negligently or dishonestly, let them bring him before the same court, and whatever penalty is imposed upon him, let him pay fourfold, and let half belong to the orphan and half to him who procured the conviction. If any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and thinks that he has been ill-used by his guardians, let him within five years of the expiration of the guardianship be allowed to bring his guardian to trial; and if he be convicted, the court shall determine what he shall pay or suffer. And if the archon shall appear to have wronged the orphan by his neglect, and he be convicted, let the court determine what he shall suffer or pay to the orphan, and if there be dishonesty in addition to neglect, besides paying the fine, let him be deposed from his office of guardian of the law, and let the state appoint another guardian of the law for the city and for the country in his room.

Greater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise between fathers and sons, on the part either of fathers who will be of opinion that the legislator should enact that they may, if they wish, lawfully renounce their son by the proclamation of a herald in the face of the world, or of sons who will be of opinion that they should be allowed to indict their fathers on the charge of imbecility when they are degraded by disease or old age. These

things only happen as a matter of fact, where the natures of men are very bad ; for where only half is bad, as, for example, if the father be not bad, but the son is bad, or conversely, no bad effect is the offspring of this amount of hatred. In another state, a son disowned by his father would not of necessity cease to be a citizen, but in our state, of which these are to be the laws, the disinherited must necessarily emigrate into another country, for no addition can be made even of a single family to the 5040 households ; and, therefore, he who deserves to suffer these things must be renounced not only by his father, who is a single person, but by the whole family, and what is done in these cases must be regulated by some such law as the following :—He who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly or unjustly, to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and brought up, shall not lightly or at once execute his purpose ; but first of all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to cousins, and in like manner his son's kinsmen by the mother's side, and in their presence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the hands of them all to be dismissed from the family ; and the son shall be allowed to address them in a similar manner, and show that he does not deserve to suffer any of these things. And if the father persuades them, and obtains the suffrages of more than half of his kindred, exclusive of the father and mother and the offender himself—I say, if he obtain more than half the suffrages of all the other grown-up members of the family, of both sexes, the father shall be permitted to put away his son, but not otherwise. And if any other citizen is willing to adopt the son who is put away, no law shall hinder him ; for the characters of young men are subject to many changes in the course of their lives. And if he has been put away, and in a period of ten years no one is willing to adopt him, let those who have the care of the superabundant population that are sent out into colonies, see to him, in order that he may be suitably provided for in the colony. And if disease or age or harshness of temper, or all these together, make a man to be more out of his mind than the rest of the world are,—but this is not observable, except to those who live with him,—and he, being master of his property, is the ruin of the house, and his son doubts and hesitates about indicting his father for insanity, let

the law in that case ordain that he shall first of all go to the eldest guardians of the law and tell them of his father's misfortune, and they shall duly look into the matter, and take counsel as to whether he shall indict him or not. And if they advise him to proceed, they shall be both his witnesses and his advocates; and if the father is cast, he shall henceforth be incapable of ordering the least particular of his life; let him be as a child dwelling in the house for the remainder of his days. And if a man and his wife have an unfortunate incompatibility of temper, ten of the guardians of the law, who are impartial, and ten of the women who regulate marriages shall look to the matter, and if they are able to reconcile them they shall be formally reconciled; but if their souls are too much tossed with passion, they shall endeavour to find other partners. Now, they are not likely to have very gentle tempers; and, therefore, we must endeavour to associate with them deeper and softer natures. Those who have no children, or but a few, at the time of their separation, should choose their new partners with a view to the procreation of children; but those who have a sufficient number of children should separate and form new connections in order that one of the two partners may be able to take care of the other in old age. If a woman dies, leaving children, male or female, the law will advise rather than compel the husband to bring up the children which they have, and not introduce into the house a stepmother. But if he have no children, then he shall be compelled to marry until he have begotten a sufficient number of sons to his family and to the state. And if a man die leaving a sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain with them and bring them up. But if she appears to be too young to live virtuously without a husband, let her relations communicate with the women who superintend marriage, and let both together do what they think best in these matters; if there is a lack of children, let the choice be made with a view to having them; two children, one of either sex, shall be deemed sufficient in the eye of the law. When a child is admitted to be the offspring of certain parents and is acknowledged by them, but there is need of a decision as to which parent the child is to follow,—in case a female slave have intercourse with a male slave, or with a freeman or freedman, the

offspring shall always belong to the master of the female slave. Again, if a free woman have intercourse with a male slave, the offspring shall belong to the master of the slave; but if a child be born either of a slave by her master, or of his mistress by a slave—and this be proven—the offspring of the woman and its father shall be sent away by the women into another country, and the guardians of the law shall send away the offspring of the man and the mother.

Neither God, nor a man who has understanding, will ever advise any one to neglect his parents. To a discourse concerning the honour and dishonour of parents, a prelude such as the following, about the service of the Gods, will be a suitable introduction:—There are ancient customs about the Gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds: some of the Gods we
931 see with our eyes and honour them, of others we honour the images; raising statues of them which we adore; and though they be lifeless, yet we imagine that the living Gods have a good will and gratitude to us on this account. Now, if a man has a father or mother, or their father or mother treasured up in his house stricken in years, let him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests than they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how to show true service to them.

Cle. And what do you call the true mode of service?

Ath. I will tell you, O my friend, for such things are worth listening to.

Cle. Proceed.

Ath. Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonoured by his sons, invoked on them the fulfilment of those curses from the God which every one declares to have been heard and ratified by the Gods, and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son Phoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable others have also called down wrath upon their children, which is a plain proof that the Gods listen to the imprecations of parents; for the curses of a parent are, as they ought to be, mighty against his children as no others are. And shall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially dishonoured by his or her children, are heard by the Gods in accordance with nature; and that if a man is honoured by them, and in the gladness of his heart earnestly entreats the

Gods in his prayers to do them good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not minister to his request? If not, they would be very unjust ministers of good, and that we affirm to be contrary to their nature.

Clc. Certainly.

Ath. May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we can possess no image which is more honoured by the Gods, than that of a father or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? whom when a man honours, the heart of the God rejoices, and he is ready to answer their prayers. And, truly, the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing, far higher than that of a lifeless image. For when they are honoured by us, they join in our prayers, and when they are dishonoured, they utter imprecations against us; but lifeless objects do neither. And, therefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and grandfather and other aged relations, he will have the best of all images which can procure him the favour of the Gods.

Clc. Excellent.

Ath. Every man of understanding fears and respects the prayers of his parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have been accomplished. Now, these things being thus ordered by nature, good men think that they are the gainers by having aged parents living to the end of their life, or 93² if they depart early, they are deeply lamented by them; and to the bad they are very terrible. Wherefore let every man honour with every sort of lawful honour his own parents agreeably to what has now been said. But if this prelude be an unmeaning sound in the ears of any one, let the law follow, which may be rightly imposed in these terms: If any one in this city be not sufficiently careful of his parents, and do not regard and gratify in every respect their wishes more than those of his sons and of his other offspring or of himself,—let him who experiences this sort of treatment either come himself, or send some one to inform the three eldest guardians of the law, and three of the women who have the care of marriages; and let them look to the matter and punish the evildoers with stripes and imprisonment until they are thirty years of age, that is to say, if they be men, or if they be women let them undergo the same punishment up to forty years of age. But if, when they are still more

advanced in years, they continue the same neglect of their parents, and do them any hurt, let them be brought before a court, in which every single one of the eldest citizens shall be the judges, and if the offender be convicted, let the court determine what he ought to pay or suffer, and any penalty may be imposed on him which a man can do or suffer. If the person who has been wronged is unable to inform the archons, let any freeman who hears of his case inform, and if he do not, he shall be deemed base, and shall be liable to pay damages on the requisition of any one who likes. And if a slave informs, he shall be free, and if he be the slave of the injurer or injured party he shall be enfranchised by the magistrates, or if he belong to any other citizen the public shall pay a price on his behalf to the owner, and let the archons take heed, that no one wrongs him out of revenge, and because he has given information.

As to cases in which one injures another by poisons, where they are fatal we have already spoken of them; but about other cases in which a person intentionally and of malice harms another with meats, or drinks, or ointments, nothing has as yet been determined. For there are two kinds of poisons used among men, which cannot clearly be distinguished. There is one kind of poison which injures bodies by the use of other
 933 bodies according to a natural law, and of this we have spoken; but there is another kind which injures by sorceries, and incantations, and magic bonds, as they are termed, and induces one class of men to injure others as far as they can, and persuades others that they above all persons are liable to be injured by the powers of the magician. Now it is not easy to know the nature of all these things; nor if a man do know can he readily persuade others of his belief. And when men are disturbed at the sight of waxen images fixed either at the doors, or in a place where three ways meet, or in the sepulchres of parents, there is no use in trying to persuade them that they should despise all such things, because they have no certain knowledge about them. But we must have a law in two parts, concerning poisoning, in whichever of the two ways the attempt is made, and we must entreat, and exhort, and advise men not to have recourse to such practices, by which they scare the

multitude out of their wits, as if they were children, compelling the legislator and the judge to heal the fears which the sorcerer arouses, and to tell them in the first place, that he who attempts to poison or enchant others knows not what he is doing, either as regards the body (unless he have a knowledge of medicine), or as regards his enchantments, unless he happens to be a prophet or diviner. Let the law, then, run as follows about poisoning or witchcraft: He who employs poison to do any injury not fatal to a man himself, or to his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not, to his cattle or his bees, if he be a physician, and be convicted of poisoning, shall be punished with death; or if he be a private person, the court shall determine what he is to pay or suffer. But he who seems to be the sort of man who injures others by magic knots, or enchantments, or incantations, or any of the like practices, if he be a prophet or diviner, let him die; and if, not being a prophet, he be convicted of witchcraft, as in the previous case, let the court fix what he ought to pay or suffer.

When a man does another any injury by theft or violence, for the greater injury let him pay a greater penalty to the injured man, and a less penalty for the smaller injury; but in all cases, whatever the injury be, as much as will compensate the loss. And besides the compensation of the wrong, let a man pay a further penalty for the chastisement of his offence: he who has done the wrong instigated by the folly of another¹, 934 through the lightheartedness of youth or the like, shall pay a lighter penalty; but he who has injured another through his own folly, when overcome by pleasure or pain, in cowardice and fear, or lust, or envy, or implacable anger, shall endure a heavier punishment. Not that he is punished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be undone, but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him corrected, may utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of their evil-doing. Having an eye to all these things, the law, like a good archer, should aim at the right measure of punishment, and in all cases at the deserved punishment. In the attainment of this the judge shall be a fellow-worker with the legislator,

¹ Putting the comma after ἀλλοτρίῳ.

whenever the law leaves to him to determine what the offender shall suffer or pay; and he, like a painter, shall fill up the outline with suitable details. This is what we must do, Megillus and Cleinias, in the best and fairest manner that we can: saying what the punishments are to be of all actions of theft and violence, and giving laws of such a kind as the Gods and sons of Gods would have us give.

If a man be mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his relations shall keep him at home in any way which they can; or if not, let them pay a penalty,—he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one hundred drachmas, whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects; and he of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina; and he of the third class three-fifths; and he of the fourth class two-fifths. Now, there are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we have already described; and there are other kinds, which originate in an evil and passionate temperament, and are increased by education; out of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of abuse against one another, and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed to exist in a well-ordered state. Let this, then, be the law about abuse, which shall relate to all cases: No one shall speak evil of another; and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and learn of the disputant and the company, but he shall abstain from evil speaking; for out of the imprecations which men utter
 935 against one another, and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another, and using foul names, beginning in words light as air, they proceed to deeds, and the greatest enmities and hatreds spring up. For the speaker gratifies his anger, which is an ungracious element of his nature; and nursing up his wrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts, and exacerbating that part of his soul which was formerly civilized by education, he lives in a state of savageness and moroseness, and pays a bitter penalty for his anger. And in such cases almost all men have a way of saying something ridiculous about their opponent, and there is no man who is in the habit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness altogether, or lose the better half of greatness. Wherefore let no one say anything of that sort at the temple, or at the public sacrifices, or at the

games, or in the agora, or in a court of justice, or in any public assembly. And let him who has the charge of such matters chastise an offender, and he shall be blameless; but if he fail in doing so, he shall not claim the prize of virtue; for he is one who heeds not the laws, and does not do what the legislator commands. And if in any other place any one indulges in these sort of revilings, whether he have begun the quarrel or is only retaliating, let any elder who is present support the law, and control with blows those who give way to passion, which is another great evil; and if he fail, let him be liable to pay the appointed penalty. And we say further, that he who is engaged in the practice of reviling cannot revile without attempting to say what is ludicrous; and this is the use of ridicule, employed in a moment of anger, which we condemn. Again, do we admit into our state the comic writers who are so fond of making mankind ridiculous, if they attempt in a good-natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens? or do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man to make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about any thing or person; but as we were saying, not if he be angry and have a set purpose? We forbid earnest—that is unalterably fixed; but we have still to say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in the employment of innocent humour. A comic poet, or maker of iambic or satirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the citizens, either by word or image, either in anger or without anger. And if any one is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him from the place, or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be dedicated to the God who presides over the contests. Those only who have already received permission 936 shall be allowed to write verses at one another without anger and in jest, but in anger and in serious earnest they shall not be allowed. The decision of this matter shall be left to the superintendent of the general education of the young, and whatever he may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he rejects let neither the poet himself exhibit, nor ever teach any other, slave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonoured, and held disobedient to the laws.

Now, he is not to be pitied who is only hungry, or who

suffers any bodily pain, but he who is temperate, or has other virtues, and at the same time suffers from misfortune, he is to be pitied; and it would be an extraordinary thing if such an one, whether slave or freeman, were utterly forsaken and fell into the extremes of poverty in any tolerably well-ordered city or government. Wherefore the legislator may safely make a law applicable to such cases in the following terms: Let there be no beggars in our state; and if anybody begs, seeking to collect the means of life by perpetual prayers, let the wardens of the agora turn him out of the agora, and the wardens of the city out of the city, and the wardens of the country send him out of any other part of the country over the border, that so the country may be cleared of this sort of animal.

If a slave of either sex injure anything, which is not his or her own, through inexperience, or some improper practice, and the injured person be not in part to blame, the master of the slave who has done the harm shall either make full satisfaction, or give up the person who has done the injury. But if the master argue that the charge has arisen by collusion between the injured party and the injurer, with the view of obtaining the slave, let him sue him who says that he has been injured for malpractices. And if he convict him let him receive double the value which the court fixes as the price of the slave; and if he lose his suit, let him make amends for the injury, and give up the slave. And if an animal, whether horse, or dog, or any other beast, injure a neighbour, the owner shall in like manner pay for the injury.

If any man voluntarily refuses to be a witness, he who wants him shall summon him, and he who is summoned shall come to the trial; and if he knows and is willing to bear witness, let him bear witness, but if he says he does not know let him swear by the three divinities Zeus, and Apollo, and Themis, that he
 937 does not know, and have done with the cause. And he who is summoned to give witness and does not answer to his summoner, shall be liable for the harm which ensues according to law. And if any one summons as witness one who is a judge, let him give his witness, but he shall not afterwards vote in the cause. A free woman may give her witness and plead, if she be more than forty years of age, and may

bring an action if she have no husband ; but if her husband be alive she shall only be allowed to bear witness. A slave of either sex and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and to plead, but they must produce sufficient sureties that they will certainly remain until the trial, in case they should be charged with false witness. And either of the parties in the cause may bring an accusation of false witness against them, touching their evidence in whole or in part, if he asserts that such evidence has been given, previous to the final decision of the cause. The magistrates shall preserve the accusations of false witness, and have them kept under the seal of both parties, and produce them on the day when the trial for false witness takes place. If a man be twice convicted of false witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness ; and if he dare to witness after he have been convicted three times, let any one who pleases inform against him to the magistrates, and let the magistrate hand him over to the court, and if he be convicted he shall be punished with death. And in any case in which the evidence is found to be false, and yet to have given the victory to him who wins the suit, and more than half the witnesses are condemned, the decision which was gained by these means shall be rescinded, and there shall be a discussion and a decision as to whether the suit was determined by that false evidence or not ; and in whichever way the decision may be given, the previous suit shall be determined accordingly.

There are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach evils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not justice noble, which has been the civilizer of humanity? How then can the advocate of justice be other than noble? And yet upon this profession which is presented under the fair name of science has come an evil reputation. In the first place, we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help of an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether just or unjust ; and that both the art and the power 938 of speech which is thereby imparted are at the service of him who is willing to pay for them. Now, in our state this so-called art, whether really an art or only an experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never to come into

existence, or if existing among us should listen to the request of the legislator and go away into another land, and not speak contrary to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more ; but if they disobey let them hear the voice of the law : If any one thinks that he will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the judges, and unseasonably litigate or advocate, let any one who likes indict him for malpractices of law and dishonest advocacy, and let him be judged in the court of select judges ; and if he be convicted let the court determine whether he may be supposed to act from a love of money or from contentiousness. And if he be supposed to act from contentiousness, the court shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute or plead a cause ; and if he be supposed to act as he does from love of money, in case he be a stranger he shall leave the country, and never return under penalty of death ; but if he be a citizen he shall die, because he is a lover of money, however gained ; and equally, if he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness, he shall die.

BOOK XII.

IF any herald or ambassador carry a false message to any 941
other city, or bring back a false message from the city to which
he is sent, or be proved to have brought back, whether from
friends or enemies, in his capacity of herald or ambassador,
what they have never said, let him be indicted for having
offended, contrary to the law, in the sacred office and appoint-
ment of Hermes and Zeus, and let there be a penalty fixed,
which he shall suffer or pay if he be convicted.

Theft is a mean, and robbery a shameless thing ; and none of
the sons of Zeus delight in fraud and violence, or ever practised
either. Wherefore let no one be deluded by poets or mytholo-
gists into a mistaken belief of such things, nor let him suppose
when he thives or is guilty of violence, that he is doing nothing
base, but only what the Gods themselves do. For such tales
are untrue and improbable ; and he who steals or robs contrary
to the law, neither is nor ever was a God or the son of a God ;
of this the legislator ought to be a better judge than all the
poets put together. Happy is he and may he be for ever happy,
who is persuaded and listens to our words ; but he who disobeys
shall have the following law directed against him : If a man
steals anything belonging to the public, whether that which he
steals be much or little, he shall have the same punishment.
For he who steals a little steals with the same wish as he who
steals much, but with less power. He who takes up anything
more than he has deposited is unjust in the highest degree ;
and therefore the law is not disposed to inflict a less penalty on
the one than on the other, because his theft is less, but on the

ground that the thief may possibly be in the one case still curable, and in the other case is incurable. If any one convict in a court of law a stranger or a slave of a theft of public property, let the court determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay, bearing in mind that he is probably not incurable. But the citizen who has been brought up, as our citizens will have been, if he be found guilty of robbing his country by fraud or violence, whether he be caught in the act or not, shall be punished with death ; for he is incurable.

942 Now for expeditions of war much consideration and many laws are required ; the great principle of all is that no one of either sex should be without a commander ; nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to do anything either in jest or earnest of his own motion, but in war and in peace he should look to and follow his leader, and in the least things be under his guidance ; for example, he should stand or move, or exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep guard and deliver messages when he is bidden ; and in the hour of danger he should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior ; and in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand how to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should be in common and together ; there neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more scientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and victory in war. And from youth upwards we ought to practise this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by others ; anarchy should have no place in the life of man or of the beasts who are subject to man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed with a view to military excellence, and agility and ease should be cultivated with a similar view ; and also endurance of the want of meats and drinks, and winter cold and summer heat, and hard couches ; and, above all, care should be taken not to destroy the natural qualities of the head and the feet by surrounding them with extraneous coverings, and so hindering their natural growth of hair and soles. For these are the extremities, and of all the parts of the body, whether they are preserved or not is of the greatest consequence ; the one is the servant of the whole body, and the other the master,

943 in whom all the ruling senses are by nature set. Let the

young man, when I say this, imagine that he hears the praises of the military life; and the law shall be as follows: He shall serve in war who is enrolled or appointed to some special service, and if any one wrongly absents himself, and without the leave of the generals, he shall be indicted before the military commanders for failure of service when the army comes home; and the soldiers shall be his judges; the heavy-armed, and the cavalry, and the other arms of the service shall form separate courts; and they shall bring the heavy-armed before the heavy-armed, and the horsemen before the horsemen, and the others in like manner before their peers; and he who is found guilty shall never be allowed to compete for the prize of valour, or indict another for not serving on an expedition, or be an accuser at all in any military matters. Moreover, the court shall further determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay. When the several suits for failure of service are completed, the generals shall once more hold an assembly, and they shall adjudge the prizes of valour; and he who likes shall give judgment in his own rank of the service, saying nothing about any former expedition, nor producing any proof or witnesses to confirm his statement, but speaking only of the actual expedition. The crown of victory shall be an olive wreath which the victor shall offer up at the temple of any war God whom he likes, adding an inscription for a testimony to last during life, that such an one has received the first, the second, or the third prize. If any one goes on an expedition, and returns home before the appointed time, when the generals have not withdrawn the army, he shall be indicted for desertion before the same persons who took cognizance of failure of service, and if he be found guilty the same punishment shall be inflicted on him. Now, every man who is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false witness against any one, either intentionally or unintentionally, if he can help, for justice is truly said to be an honourable maiden¹, and falsehood is naturally hateful to honour and justice. A witness ought to be very careful not to sin against justice, as for example in what relates to the throwing away of arms—he must distinguish the throwing them away when necessary, and not make that a

¹ Reading αἰδέομαι.

reproach, or bring an action against some undeserving person
944 on that account. To make the distinction may be difficult ;
but still the law must attempt to define the crime in some way.
Let me endeavour to explain my meaning by an illustration :
If Patroclus had been brought to the tent still alive but without
his arms (and this has happened to innumerable persons), the
original arms, which the poet says were given to Peleus by the
Gods as a nuptial gift when he married Thetis, remaining in
the hands of Hector, then the base spirits of that day might
have reproached the son of Menoetius with having cast away
his arms. Again, there is the case of those who have been
thrown down precipices and lost their arms ; and of those who
at sea, and in stormy places, have been suddenly overwhelmed
by floods of water ; and there are numberless things of this kind
which one might adduce by way of consolation, and with the
view of glossing over a misfortune which looks suspicious. We
must, therefore, endeavour to divide to the utmost of our power
the greater and more serious evil from the lesser. And language
admits of a distinction in the use of terms. A man
does not always deserve to be called the thrower away of his
shield ; he may be only the loser of his arms. For there is a
great or rather absolute difference between him who is deprived
of his arms by a sufficient force, and him who voluntarily lets
his shield go. Let the law then be as follows : If a person
having arms be overtaken by the enemy and does not turn
round and defend himself, but lets them go voluntarily or
throws them away, choosing a base life and a swift escape
rather than a courageous and noble and blessed death—in such
a case of the throwing away of arms let justice be done ; but
the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned,
for the bad man ought always to be punished, in the hope that
he may be improved, but not the unfortunate, for there is no
use in that. And what shall be the punishment suited to him
who has thrown away his weapons of defence ? Tradition says
that Caeneus, the Thessalian, was changed by a God from a
woman into a man ; but the converse miracle cannot now be
wrought, or no punishment would be more proper than that
the man who throws away his shield should be changed into
a woman. This however is impossible, and therefore let us

make a law as nearly like this as we can—that he who loves his life too well shall be in no danger for the remainder of his days, but shall live for ever under the stigma of cowardice. And let the law be in the following terms: When a man is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war, no general or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or give him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers; and if he give him any place, he shall suffer a penalty which 945 the public examiner shall exact of him; and the general who gives him any place if he be of the highest class, shall pay a thousand drachmae; or if he be of the second class, five minae; or if he be of the third, three minae; or if he be of the fourth class, one mina. And he who is found guilty, shall not only be dismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his nature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae, if he be of the highest class, and five minae if he be of the second class, and three if he be of the third class, and a mina, like the preceding, if he be of the fourth class.

What regulations will be proper about examiners, seeing that some of our magistrates are elected by lot, and for a year, and some for a longer time and from selected persons? Of such persons who will be a sufficient censor or examiner, if any of them, weighed down by the pressure of office and his own inability to support the dignity of his office, be guilty of any crooked practice—who will be a sufficient examiner of these things? It is by no means easy to find a ruler who excels rulers in virtue, but still we must endeavour to discover some censor or examiner who is more than man. For the truth is, that there are many elements of dissolution in a state, as there are also in a ship, or in an animal; they all have their cords, and girders, and sinews, and one nature diffused in many places, and called by many names; and the office of examiner is a most important element in the preservation and dissolution of states. For if the examiners are better than the magistrates, and their duty is fulfilled justly and without blame, then the whole state and country flourishes and is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on in a wrong way, then by the relaxation of that justice which is the uniting principle of all constitutions, every power in

the state is rent asunder from every other; they no longer incline in the same direction, but fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one, and soon bring all to destruction. Wherefore the censors ought to be admirable in every sort of virtue. Let us invent a mode of creating them, which shall be as follows:—Every year, after the summer solstice, the whole city shall meet in the common precincts of Helios and Apollo, and shall present to the God three men out of their own number in the manner following: Each citizen shall select, not
946 himself, but some other citizen whom he deems in every way the best, and who is not less than fifty years of age. And out of the selected persons who have the greatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they reduce them to one-half, if they are an even number; but if they are not an even number, they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number of votes, and make them an even number, and then take the half which has the greater number of votes. And if two persons have an equal number of votes, and thus increase the number beyond one-half, they shall withdraw the younger of the two and do away the excess; and then including all the rest they shall again vote, until there are left three having an unequal number of votes. But if all the three, or two out of the three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate and fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the third; these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the prize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world that the city of the Magnetes, by the providence of the Gods, is again preserved, and presents to the Sun her three best men as the first-fruits of Apollo, dedicated according to the ancient law to him and to the Sun, as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. And these shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue until each has completed seventy-five years, to whom three shall afterwards be added yearly; and let these divide all the magistracies into twelve parts, and prove the holders of them freely by every sort of test; and let them live while they hold office in the precinct of Helios and Apollo, in which they were chosen, and let each one form a judgment of some things individually, and of others in company with his colleagues; and let him place a writing

in the agora about each magistracy, and what the magistrate ought to suffer or pay, according to the decision of the examiners. And if a magistrate does not admit that he has been justly judged, let him bring the examiners before the select judges, and if he is acquitted by their decision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves; and if he be convicted, and have been condemned to death by the examiners, let him die (and of course he can only die once). But any other penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over.

And now let us pass under review the examiners themselves; when are they to be examined? and what rewards or punishments are to be assigned to them? During the life of these men, whom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of 947 virtue, they shall have the first seat at all public assemblies, and at all Hellenic sacrifices and sacred missions, and other public and holy ceremonies in which they share. The chiefs of each sacred mission shall be selected from them, and they only of all the citizens shall be adorned with a crown of laurel; they shall all be priests of Apollo and Helios; and one of them, who is judged first of the priests created in that year, shall be high priest; and they shall write up his name in each year to be a measure of time as long as the city lasts; and after their death they shall be laid out and carried to the grave and entombed in a manner different from the other citizens. They shall be decked in a robe all of white, and there shall be no cryings or lamentations over them; but a chorus of fifteen youths, and another of men, shall stand around the bier on either side, hymning the praises of the dead in alternate responses, the priests blessing them in song all day long; and in the morning an hundred of the youths who practise gymnastic exercises, and whom the relations of the departed shall choose, shall carry the bier to the sepulchre, the young men marching first, dressed in the garb of warriors, the cavalry with their horses, the heavy-armed with their arms, and the others in like manner. And the youths around the bier and in front shall sing their national hymn, and maidens shall follow behind, and with them the women who have passed the age of child-bearing; next, unless the Pythian Oracle forbid them, shall

follow priests and priestesses, because this burial is free from pollution, although they are interdicted from other burials. The place of burial shall be an oblong vaulted chamber constructed of tufa, which will last for ever, having stone couches placed side by side. And here they will lay the blessed person, and surround the sepulchre with a mound of earth and with a grove of trees on every side but one; and on that side the sepulchre shall be allowed to extend for ever, and will not need a mound. Every year they shall have contests in music and gymnastics, and in horsemanship, in honour of the dead. These are the honours which shall be given to those who are acquitted by the examiners; but if any of them, trusting to the scrutiny being over, should, after the judgment has been given, manifest the wickedness of human nature, let the law ordain that he who
948 pleases shall indict him, and let the cause be tried in the following manner. In the first place, the court shall be composed of the guardians of the law, and to them the surviving examiners shall be added, as well as the court of select judges; and let the pursuer lay his indictment in this form:—He shall say that so-and-so is unworthy of the prize of virtue and of his office; and if the defendant be convicted let him be deprived of his office, and of the burial, and of the other honours given him. But if the prosecutor do not obtain the fifth part of the votes, let him, if he be of the first class, pay twelve minae, and eight if he be of the second class, and six if he be of the third class, and two minae if he be of the fourth class.

The so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He knew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt that there were Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days, because most men were the sons of Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He appears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but to the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided by him. For he made the two parties at issue take an oath respecting the points in dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now that a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence of the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the opinion of most men and of the worst men is that

in return for a small sacrifice and flattering words they will aid them in abstracting a great deal of money, and deliver them from divers and great penalties, the way of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice, for as the opinions of men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also be changed:—In the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do away with the oaths of the parties on either side—he who obtains leave to bring in a lawsuit should write down the charges, but not add an oath; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the magistrates in writing, and not swear; for it is a dreadful thing to know, when many lawsuits are going on in a state, that almost half the people who are in the habit of meeting one another at the public meals and in other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the law, then, be as follows:—A judge who is about to give judgment shall take an oath, and he who appoints the magistrates of the state by oaths or by the giving of votes which he carries from the temple, shall take an oath; and the judge of dances and of all music, and the superintendents and umpires of 949 gymnastic and equestrian contests, and any others in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be gained by a false oath; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by an oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath, shall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the presiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the sake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor to use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. But they shall teach and learn what is just quietly, avoiding words of ill omen; and he who utters them shall be supposed to speak beside the point, and the judges shall again bring him back to the question at issue. On the other hand, strangers in their dealings with strangers shall legally give and receive oaths, for they will not grow old in the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons and heirs of the land.

In minor matters, when the penalty is less than stripes or imprisonment or death, permission shall be given to all persons who wish to prosecute any freeman who disobeys the law. But as regards the attendance at choruses or processions or any other

public shows or services, or the celebration of sacrifice in time of peace, or the payment of contributions in war—in all these cases, first the necessity of providing for the loss has to be met; and by those who will not obey, there shall be security given to those who are empowered by the city and the law to exact the sum due; and if they forfeit their security, let the goods which they have pledged be sold and the money given to the city; but if they ought to pay a larger sum, the several magistrates shall impose upon the disobedient a suitable penalty, and bring them before the court, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.

Now, a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only, and has no foreign trade, must consider what it will do about the emigration of its own people to other countries, and the reception of strangers from elsewhere. About these matters the legislator has to consider, and he will begin by using his influence as far as he can. The intercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of manners; strangers are
 950 always suggesting novelties to strangers. When states are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest possible injury; but seeing that most cities are the reverse of well ordered, the confusion which arises in them from the reception of strangers, and from the citizens themselves rushing off into other cities, whenever any one young or old desires to travel abroad at any time or to go anywhere, is of no consequence. On the other hand, the refusal of states to receive others and to allow their own citizens to go to other places is utterly impossible, and to the rest of the world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilized; we call the practice by the name xenelasia or banishment of strangers, which is a hard word, and is descriptive of hard and morose ways, as men think. And to be thought or not to be thought well of by the rest of the world is no light matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who are bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of virtue in themselves. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses rightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions and judgments about the differences of good and bad. Wherefore also the generality of cities are right in exhorting men to value a good reputation

in the world, for there is no truth greater and more important than this—that he who is really good (I am speaking of him who would be perfect) seeks for reputation with, but not without, the reality of goodness. And our Cretan colony ought also to acquire the fairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men; and there is every reason to expect that, if the reality answers to the idea, there will be few like her among well-ordered cities, beholding the face of the sun and of the other Gods. Wherefore, in the matter of emigration to other countries and the reception of strangers, we enact as follows:— In the first place, let no one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is less than forty years of age; and no one shall go in a private capacity, but only in some public one, as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a sacred mission. Going abroad on an expedition or in war is not to be included among travels of the class authorized by the state. To Apollo at Delphi and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and to the Isthmus citizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games dedicated to these Gods; and they should send as many as possible, and the best and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned at holy meetings in time of peace, procuring a glory which shall be the converse of that 951 which is gained in war; and when they come home they shall teach the young that the institutions of other states are inferior to their own. And they shall send spectators of another sort, if they have the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look a little more at leisure at the doings of other men; and these no law shall hinder. For a city which has no experience of good and bad men or intercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilized, nor, again, can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by habit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them. And there always are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities. And he who lives in a well-ordered city should be ever tracking them out, going forth by sea and land to seek after him who is incorruptible—desiring to establish more firmly institutions which are good already, and amending what is deficient; for without this examination and enquiry a

city will never continue perfect any more than if the examination is ill-conducted.

Cle. How can these two objects be attained?

Ath. In this way: In the first place, our spectator shall be of not less than fifty years of age; he shall be a man of repute, especially in military matters, who will exhibit to other cities a model of the guardians of the law, but when he is more than sixty years of age he shall no longer continue in his office of spectator. And when he has carried on his inspection during as many out of the ten years of his office as he pleases, on his return home let him go to the assembly of those who review the laws. This shall be a mixed body of young and old men, who shall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising of the sun. They shall consist, in the first place, of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue; and, in the second place, of guardians of the law, choosing the ten eldest of them; the general superintendent of education shall also be a member, as well the last of them as those who have been released from the office, and each of them shall take with him as his companion a young man, whomsoever he chooses, between the ages of thirty and forty. These shall compose the assembly, and they shall always discourse about the laws 952 of their own city or any different ones of which they may hear existing elsewhere; also about kinds of knowledge which may appear to be of use, and will throw light upon the examination, or of which the want will make the subject of laws dark and uncertain to them. Any knowledge of this sort which the elders approve, the younger men shall learn with all diligence; and if any one of those who have been invited appear to be unworthy, the whole assembly shall blame him who invited him. The rest of the city shall watch over those among the young men who distinguish themselves, having an eye upon them, and especially honouring them if they succeed, but dishonouring them above the rest if they turn out to be inferior to the rest. This is the assembly to which he who has visited the institutions of other men, on his return home shall straightway go, and if he have discovered any one who has anything to say about the enactment of laws or education or nurture, or if he has himself made any observations, let him communicate his dis-

coveries to the whole assembly. And if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse, let him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm; and if he be much better, let him be much praised; and not only while he lives but after his death let the assembly honour him with fitting honours. Or if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted, pretending to be wise when he is not, let him be prohibited from speaking with any one, whether young or old; and if he will hearken to the rulers, then he shall be permitted to live as a private individual; but if he will not, let him die, if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about education and the laws. And if he deserve to be indicted, and none of the magistrates indict him, let that be counted as a disgrace to them when the rewards of virtue are decided.

Let such be the character of the person who goes abroad, and let him go abroad under these conditions. In the next place, the stranger who comes from abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. Now, there are four kinds of strangers, of whom we must make some mention—the first is, he who comes and stays throughout the summer; this class are like birds of passage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea to other cities, while the season lasts; he shall be received in market-places and harbours and public buildings, near the city but outside, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these matters; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever he be, duly receives justice; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation. They shall hold 953 the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this shall be as little as possible. The second kind is just a spectator who comes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festival of the Muses; such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by hospitable persons, and the priests and ministers of the temple should see and attend to them. But they should not remain more than a reasonable time; let them see and hear that for the sake of which they came, and then go away, neither having suffered nor done any harm. The priests shall be their judges, if any of them receives or does any wrong up to the sum of fifty drachmae, but if any greater charge be brought, in such cases the suit shall come before

the wardens of the agora. The third kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from another land, and is to be received with public honours. He is to be specially received by the commanders of horse and foot, and the host by whom he is entertained, in conjunction with the Prytanes, shall have a special care of what concerns him. There is a fourth class of persons answering to our spectators, who come from another land to look at ours. In the first place, such visits will be rare, and the visitor should be at least fifty years of age; he may possibly be wanting to see something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show something in like manner to another city. Let such an one, then, go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, being himself one of them: let him go, for example, to the house of the superintendent of education, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host, or let him go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue and hold discourse with them, both learning from them, and also teaching them; and when he has seen and heard all, he shall depart, as a friend taking leave of friends, and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable tributes of respect. These are the customs, according to which our city should receive all strangers of either sex who come to them from other countries, and should send forth her own citizens, showing respect to Zeus, the God of hospitality, not driving away strangers at meats and sacrifices and by savage proclamations, as is the manner which prevails among the children of the Nile.

When a man becomes surety, let him give the security in a distinct form, acknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the presence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand drachmae, and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a thousand drachmae. He
 954 who is agent for another who sells dishonestly and is not able to make good the loss, shall himself be responsible; the agent and the principal shall be equally liable. If a person wishes to find anything in the house of another, he shall enter naked, or having only a short tunic and no upper girdle, having first taken an oath by the customary Gods that he expects to find it there; he shall then make his search, and the other shall throw open

his house and allow him to search things both sealed and unsealed. And if a person will not allow the searcher to make his search, he who is prevented shall go to law with him, estimating the value of the goods after which he is searching, and if he be convicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. If the master be absent from home, the dwellers in the house shall let him search the unsealed property, and on the sealed property the searcher shall set another seal, and shall appoint any one whom he likes, to guard them during five days; and if the master of the house be absent during a longer time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city, and so make his search, opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed, and then, together with the members of the family and the wardens of the city, he shall seal them up again as they were before. There shall be a limit of time in the case of disputed things, and he who has had possession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be disturbed. This shall not, however, apply to houses and lands; but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and openly shown in the city and in the agora, and no one has put in a claim to them, and the other says that he was looking for the goods at the time, and the owner is proved to have made no concealment, if they have continued for a year, the one having the goods and the other looking for them, no one shall be permitted to claim them after the expiration of a year; or if he does not use or show the lost property in the market, but only in the country, and no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the expiration of the five years the claim shall be barred for ever after; or if he uses them in the city, where there are houses, then the appointed time of claiming the goods shall be three years, or ten years if he has them in the country in private. And if he has them in another land, there shall be no limit of time or prescription, and whenever any one finds them he may claim them.

If any one prevents another by force from being present at a trial, whether a principal party or his witnesses;—if the witness prevented be a slave, whether his own or belonging to another, the suit shall be incomplete and invalid; but if he who is prevented be a freeman, besides the suit being incomplete

955 the other who has prevented him shall be imprisoned for a year, and may be made a slave by any one who pleases. And if any one hinders by force a rival competitor in gymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present at the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judge, and they shall liberate him who is desirous of competing; and if they are not able, and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize, then they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented, and inscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases, and he who hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or inscription having reference to that contest, and he shall be liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer.

If any one knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall undergo the same punishment as the thief, and if a man receives an exile he shall be punished with death. Every man should regard the friend and enemy of the state as his own friend or enemy; and if any one makes peace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority of the state, he shall in like manner undergo the penalty of death. And if any fraction of the city declare war or peace against any, the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding, and if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. Those who serve their country ought to serve without receiving gifts, and there ought to be no excusing or approving the saying, 'Men should receive gifts as the reward of good, but not of evil deeds'; for to know what is good and to persevere in what we know is no easy matter. The safest course is to obey the law which says, 'Do no service for a bribe,' and let him who disobeys, if he be convicted, simply die. With a view to taxation, and for many reasons, every man ought to have had his property valued: and the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly produce to the wardens of the country, that in this way there may be two valuations; and the public officers may use annually whichever on consideration they deem the best, whether they prefer to take a certain portion of the whole value, or of the annual revenue, after subtracting what is paid to the common tables.

Touching offerings to the Gods, the moderate man should

offer moderate ornaments. Now the land and the hearth of the house of all men is sacred to all Gods; wherefore let no man dedicate a second shrine to the Gods. In other cities, gold and silver, whether possessed by private persons or in temples, is an invidious thing, and ivory, the product of a dead body, is not a proper offering; brass and iron, again, are instruments of war—let a man, therefore, offer what he likes which is made of wood only, and in like manner of stone to the public temples, but of woven work let him not offer more than one woman can execute in a month. White colours are suitable to the Gods, especially in woven works, but dyes should only be used for the adornments of war. The most divine of gifts are figures of birds and similar offerings, and they should be such as one painter can execute in a single day, and let other offerings follow the same rule or pattern.

Now that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature and number have been described, and laws have been given about all the most important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing will be to have justice done. In the first place, there shall be elected judges in the courts, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and defendant in common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in the second place there shall be judges taken from the village and tribe, a twelfth part of whom will be selected, and before these the litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be not decided before the first judges; the defendant, if he be defeated the second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in the indictment; and if he finds fault with his judges and would try a third time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he be again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much again. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he persist in going on to the second, shall, if he wins receive a fifth part of the damages, and if defeated he shall pay a like sum; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will insist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive from the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before, half as much again, but if he lose he shall pay half the assessed damages. Now of the assignation of courts and completion

of the number of the judges and the appointment of servants to the different magistrates, and the times at which the several causes should be heard, and the votings and delays and all the things that necessarily concern suits and the order of causes and the time in which answer is to be given and parties are to appear—of these and other things akin to these we have indeed already spoken, but there is no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice:—All lesser and easier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by the younger
 957 one. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this way, and the public and state courts, and those which the magistrates must use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many other states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have been framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may by reflection derive what is necessary for the order of our new state, considering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of experience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined; and then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible, they shall use them for ever afterwards. As to what relates to the silence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the reverse, and the differences that there are in the notions of the just and good and honourable which exist in other states, they have been partly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned in their place toward the end. To all these matters he who would be an equal judge shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about them that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge of good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner; otherwise there would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing a name akin to mind (*νοῦς, νόμος*). And of all other words, such as the praises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in prose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether men dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent to them, as is often the case—of all these the one sure test is the writings of the legislator, which the righteous judge ought to have in his mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself and the city stand upright, procuring for the good

the continuance and increase of justice, and for the bad, on the other hand, a conversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all unrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those whose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the only remedy for souls in their condition, as I may truly say again and again. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving praise from the whole city. 958

When the suits of the year are completed the following laws shall regulate their execution: In the first place, the judge shall assign to the party who wins the suit the whole property of him who loses, with the exception of mere necessities, after the votes have been announced by the herald in the hearing of the judges, and when the month arrives following the month in which the courts are sitting, (unless the gainer of the suit has been previously satisfied,) the court shall follow up the case, and hand over to the winner the goods of the loser; but if they find that he has not the means of paying, and the sum deficient is not less than a drachma, the insolvent person shall not have any right of going to law with any other man until he have satisfied the debt of the winning party; but other persons shall still have the right of bringing suits against him. And if any one after he is condemned refuses to acknowledge the authority which condemned him, let the magistrates who are thus deprived of their authority bring him before the court of the guardians of the law, and if he be cast, let him be punished with death, as a subverter of the whole state and of the laws.

Thus a man is born and brought up, and after this manner he begets and brings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with other men, and suffers if he has done wrong to any one, and receives satisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at the appointed time, under the dominion of the laws, he grows old, and meets his end in the order of nature. Concerning the dead of either sex, the religious ceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the Gods of the under world or of this, shall be decided by the interpreters with absolute authority. Their sepulchres are to be in places which are not cultivated, and there shall be no monu-

ments to them, either large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country which is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. No man, living or dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth, our mother, is naturally inclined to bear to them. And let not the mound be piled higher than would be the work of five men completed in five days; nor shall the stone which is placed over the spot be larger than would be sufficient to receive the praises of the dead included in four heroic lines. Nor shall the laying
959 out of the dead continue for a longer time than is sufficient to distinguish between him who is in a trance only and him who is really dead, and speaking generally, the third day after death will be a fair time for carrying out the body to the sepulchre. Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we are is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness of each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are rightly said to be our shades or images; for that the true and immortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her way to other Gods, that before them she may give an account—an inspiring hope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our fathers tell us, which also say that not much can be done in the way of helping a man after he is dead. But the living—he should be helped by all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and justest of men, and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the world below. If this be true, a man ought not to waste his substance under the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process of burial is connected with him; he should consider that the son, or brother, or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he is laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfil his own destiny, and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend moderately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. But the legislator does not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of meanness. Let the law, then, be as follows:—The expenditure on the entire funeral, of him who is of the highest class, shall not

exceed five minae, and for him who is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third class two minae, and for him who is of the fourth class one mina, will be a fair limit of expense. The guardians of the law ought to take especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood or manhood, or any other age. And at the end of all, let there be some one guardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of the deceased to superintend, and let it be glory to him to manage with fairness and moderation the affairs of the dead, and a discredit to him if they are not well managed. Let the laying out and other ceremonies be in accordance with the law, but the lawgiver may also concede in some points to the customs of his fellow citizens. It would be monstrous for example that he should command any man to weep or abstain from weeping over the dead ; but he may forbid cries of lamentation, and not allow the voice of the mourner to be heard outside the 960 house ; also, he may forbid the bringing of the dead body into the open streets, or the processions of mourners in the streets, and may require that before daybreak they should be outside the city. Let these, then, be our laws relating to such matters, and let him who obeys be free from penalty ; but he who disobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all in a fitting penalty. Other modes of burial, or again of denial of burial, which is to be refused in the case of robbers of temples and parricides and the like, have been described and embodied in the preceding laws, so that now our work of legislation is pretty near an end ; but in all cases the end does not consist in doing something or acquiring something or building something, but the end will be attained and finally accomplished, when we have provided for the perfect and lasting continuance of our institutions ; until then the work is incomplete.

Cle. That is very good, Stranger ; but I wish you would tell me more clearly what you mean.

Ath. O Cleinias, many things of old time were well said and sung ; and the saying about the Fates was one of them.

Cle. What is it ?

Ath. The saying that Lachesis or the giver of the lots is the first of them, and that Clotho or the weaver is the second of

them, and that Atropos or the unchanging one is the third of them; and that she is the preserver of the things which are woven, [which may be compared in a figure to the welding power of fire,] working¹ the quality of unchangeableness in them. I am speaking of the things which in a state and government give not only health and salvation to the body, but law, or rather preservation of the law, in the soul; and, if I am not mistaken, this seems to be still wanting in our laws: we have still to see how we can implant in them this irreversible nature.

Cle. It will be a great thing if we can only discover how such a nature can be implanted.

Ath. But that is not impossible; so much I can quite clearly see.

Cle. Then let us not think of desisting until we have imparted this quality to our laws; for it is ridiculous, after a great deal of labour has been spent, to place a thing at last on an insecure foundation.

Meg. I approve of your suggestion, and am quite of the same mind with you.

Cle. Very good: And now what, according to you, is to be the salvation of our government and of our laws, and how is it to be effected?

Ath. Were we not saying that there must be in our city a
961 council which was to be of this sort: Ten of the oldest guardians of the law, and all those who have obtained prizes of virtue, were to meet, and the council was also to include those who had visited foreign countries in the hope of hearing something that might be of use in the preservation of the laws, and who, having come safely home, and having been tested in these same matters, had proved themselves to be worthy to take part in the meeting;—each of the members was to select some young man of not less than thirty years of age, he himself judging in the first instance whether the young man is worthy by nature and education, and then introducing him to the others, and if he seem to them also to be worthy he was to be adopted by them; but if not, they are forbidden to elect him, and still more is

¹ Reading ἀπεργαζομένην, as in Stallbaum's note.

he forbidden to accept their nomination. The meeting of the council was to be held early in the morning, when everybody was at leisure from all other business, whether public or private,—something of that sort was said by us before.

Cle. True.

Ath. Then now returning to the council, I would say further,—that this institution having all the required conditions, might save us all, and be the anchor of the state, if let down into the sea.

Cle. How so?

Ath. Now is the time for me to speak the truth in all earnestness.

Cle. Well said, and I hope that you will fulfil your intention.

Ath. Know, Cleinias, that every work has a saviour, as of the animal the soul and the head are the chief saviour.

Cle. Once more, what do you mean?

Ath. The well-being of those two is obviously the preservation of every living thing?

Cle. How is that?

Ath. The soul, besides other things, contains mind, and the head, besides other things, contains sight and hearing; and the mind, mingling with the noblest of the senses, and becoming one with them, may be truly called the salvation of all things.

Cle. Yes, quite so.

Ath. Yes, indeed; but with what is that intellect concerned which, mingling with the senses, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as in fair weather? In the ship, is it not the mind which pilots; and the sailors uniting their perceptions with the piloting mind, preserve themselves and the ship?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. We do not want many illustrations about such matters:—What aim would the general of an army, or what aim would a physician propose to himself, if he were seeking to attain salvation—?

Cle. Very good.

Ath. Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war, and do not the physician and his minister aim at producing health in the body?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And a physician who is ignorant about the body, that is to say, who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general who knows not victory, or any others who are ignorant of the particulars of the arts which we mentioned, cannot be said to have understanding about any of these matters?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. And what would you say of the state, if a person proves to be ignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look? Ought he to be called a ruler at all; and further, will he ever be able to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim?

Cle. Impossible.

Ath. And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as I was saying, will tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or what man will advise us with that view. Any state which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance.

Cle. Very true.

Ath. In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say?

Cle. I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night.

Ath. You have answered rightly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims.

Cle. Quite true.

Ath. Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray—the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of

others, again, is towards freedom, and some legislate with a view to both at once; they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look.

Cle. Then, Stranger, our old assertion will hold, for we were 963 saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.

Ath. Yes.

Cle. And we said that virtue was of four kinds?

Ath. Quite true.

Cle. And that mind was the leader of all four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?

Ath. You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have told you to what the mind of the pilot, the mind of the general and of the physician ought respectively to look; and now we may turn to mind political, of whom, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare yourself to be of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not to able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you?

Cle. We cannot, Stranger.

Ath. Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see in what it is found?

Cle. For example, in what?

Ath. For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that courage is a virtue, and that prudence is a virtue, and the same of two others, as if they were in reality not many but one.

Cle. Quite so.

Ath. There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue.

Cle. How do you mean?

Ath. I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers.

Cle. Once more, what do you mean?

Ath. Do you ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom? I will tell you how that occurs: One of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate, and quite young children,—I mean courage; for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and understanding soul; hence the difference.

Cle. That is true.

Ath. I have now told you in what way the two are different, 964 and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition? Can he who is good for anything be ignorant about great and glorious truths without discredit?

Cle. I suppose not.

Ath. And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has the rewards of virtues, than these very qualities of which we are now speaking,—courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?

Cle. How can there be anything greater?

Ath. And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the law-givers, the guardians of others to excel all other men, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know, or whose evil actions require to be punished and reprov'd, what is the

nature of virtue and vice—shall the teacher be some poet who may find his way into the city, or some chance instructor of youth who professes to be better than him who has won the palm in every virtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?

Cle. Wonder! no.

Ath. Well, then, as I was saying just now, what are we to do? How can we provide our guardians with a more than common virtue in speech or action, or in what way can our city be truly likened to the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?

Cle. What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?

Ath. Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in the city; and those 965 whom we compared to the mind, because they have many wise thoughts—that is to say, the old men—take counsel, and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them,—in this way both together truly preserve the whole state:—Shall this be the order of our state, or shall we have some other order? Shall we say that they are all alike the owners of the state, and not merely individuals among them who have had the most careful training and education?

Cle. That, my good sir, is impossible.

Ath. Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than that which has preceded.

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding?

Cle. Very true.

Ath. Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he should press onward to the one, which he should know, and knowing, order all things with a view to that?

Cle. True.

Ath. And can any one have a more exact way of considering or contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered from many different things?

Cle. Perhaps not.

Ath. Not 'perhaps not,' but 'certainly not,' my good sir, is the right answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered by any man.

Cle. I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the way which you propose.

Ath. Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four—the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly, if you will take our advice, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will.

Cle. We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we must not; for in our opinion you speak most truly, but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose.

966 *Ath.* Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.

Cle. Certainly, if that is possible.

Ath. Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view—that each of them are many, but that our guardians are to regard them as in some sense one?

Cle. We must consider in what sense.

Ath. And are we to consider only, and to be unable to say what we think?

Cle. Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.

Ath. And may not the same be said of all good men—that the true guardians of the laws ought to know their truth, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature?

Cle. Certainly.

Ath. Is not the knowledge of the Gods one of the noblest sorts of knowledge;—to know that they are and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do indeed excuse the majority of mankind, who only follow the voice of the laws, but refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; they are forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not laboured at these things.

Cle. It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things honourable should be put away from him.

Ath. Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?

Cle. What are they?

Ath. One is the argument about the soul, which has been already mentioned—that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an argument from the order of motion of the heavens, and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. If a man look upon the world not lightly or foolishly, there was never any one so godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many imagine. For they think that those who handle these matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become godless; because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.

Cle. But what is the fact?

Ath. Just the opposite of the opinion which once prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in those days men wondered about them, and that which is now

ascertained was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of them—that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they could never have moved according to such exact calculations; and even at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older than the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, I should say, themselves, for what they saw before their eyes in heaven, all appeared to be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless bodies, and to these they assigned the various causes of all things. Such studies gave rise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be abusive,—comparing the philosophers to she-dogs uttering vain howlings, and saying other nonsense of the same sort. But now, as I said, the case is reversed.

Cle. How is that?

Ath. No man can be a true worshipper of the Gods who does not know these two principles—that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover, as I have now said several times, he who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous training, and seen the connection of them with music, and harmonized them all with laws and institutions, is not able to give a reason of such things as have a reason. And he who is unable to acquire this in addition to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, 968 can hardly be a good ruler of a whole state; but he should be the subordinate of other rulers. Wherefore, Cleinias and Megillus, let us consider whether we may not add to all the other laws which we have discussed this further one,—that the nocturnal assembly of the magistrates, which has also been associated with us in our whole scheme of education, shall be a guard set according to law for the salvation of the state. Shall we propose this?

Cle. Certainly, my good friend, we will if the thing is possible.

Ath. Let us strive to the utmost that we may attain this object; you shall have my best assistance. Of these matters

I have had much experience, and have often considered them, and I dare say that I shall be able to find others who will also help.

Cle. I agree, Stranger, that we should proceed along the road in which God is guiding us; and how we can proceed rightly has now to be investigated and explained.

Ath. O, Megillus and Cleinias, about these matters we cannot legislate further until the city is established; when that is done, then we will determine what authority the citizens shall have of their own; but the explanation of how this is all to be ordered would only be given rightly in a long discourse.

Cle. What do you mean?

Ath. In the first place, a list would have to be made out of those who by their ages and studies and dispositions and habits, are well fitted for the duty of a guardian. In the next place, it will not be easy for them to discover themselves what they ought to learn, or become the disciple of one who has already made the discovery. Furthermore, to write down the times at which, and during which, they ought to receive the several kinds of instruction, would be a vain thing; for the learners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the knowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul of each. And so these details, although they could not be truly said to be secret, might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand, because when stated they would have no meaning.

Cle. What then are we to do, Stranger, under these circumstances?

Ath. There is a proverb of universal application which may also be applied to us: We must risk the whole constitution on the chance of throwing thrice six or thrice ace, and I am willing to share with you the danger of stating and explaining 969 to you my views about education and nurture, which is the question coming to the surface again. The danger is not a slight or ordinary one, and I would advise you, Cleinias, in particular, to see to the matter; for if you order rightly the city of the Magnetes, or whatever name God may give it, you will obtain the greatest glory; or at any rate you will be thought the most courageous of men in the estimation of posterity.

Dear companions, if this our divine assembly can only be established, to them we will hand over the city; none of the present company of legislators, as I may call them, would hesitate about that. And the state will be perfected and become a waking reality, which a little while ago we attempted to create as a dream and in idea only, mingling together reason and mind in one image, in the hope that our citizens might be duly mingled and rightly educated; and being educated, and dwelling in the citadel of the land, might become perfect guardians, such as we have never seen in all our previous life, by reason of the saving virtue which is in them.

Meg. Dear Cleinias, after all that has been said, either we must detain the Stranger, and by supplications and in all manner of ways make him share in the foundation of the city, or we must give up the undertaking.

Cle. Very true, Megillus; and you must join with me in detaining him.

Meg. I will.

I N D E X.

The following Index refers to the pages of Stephens, which are given in the margin of the translation. The page of Stephens is divided into five parts by the letters A, B, C, D, E, which are retained in the Index of Proper Names, though they are not given in the margin. Thus the letter A signifies the first portion of the page, the letter B the second, and so on.

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