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Analytical Psychology

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# Contributions to Analytical Psychology

By  
C. G. JUNG

Translated by  
H. G. and CARY F. BAYNES

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## TRANSLATORS' FOREWORD

ONLY a few brief lines of explanation and editorial acknowledgment are necessary in launching this second English collection of Dr Jung's essays. The first paper in the book, "On Psychical Energy," was framed soon after the author had finished the *Psychology of the Unconscious*. It was, however, pressed aside by the greater importance of the type-problem. The author's brilliant study on psychological types intervened, and this paper, originally entitled "The Theory of the Libido", was taken up again only last summer. It is a work of the first importance, and readers who have suffered fatigue in the restricted purlieus of psycho-analytical literature will feel again in this paper the exhilaration of a wide scientific horizon.

The papers immediately following this essay, namely "Spirit and Life, Mind and the Earth", "Analytical Psychology and 'Weltanschauung'", and "Woman in Europe", represent Jung's latest work, and they all reveal how far his psychological outlook has extended beyond the characteristic confines of psycho-analytic theory. Besides these latest contributions, there are included several other papers delivered by Jung to various bodies both in this country and on the Continent, dealing with a variety of problems and aspects of modern life. Since many of these papers were in the nature of an explanatory outline of his ideas to a lay audience, a certain amount of overlapping and repetition was unavoidable. However, what repetition there is will prove to be an asset to all those students who wish to get a thorough grasp of Jung's psychological conceptions.

With regard to the "Love Problem of the Student", it should be borne in mind that this paper was written and



intended for students of Zürich University who sought the author's practical counsel rather than a scientific disquisition.

Two earlier papers, written in 1919-20, namely "Instinct and the Unconscious" and "The Psychological Foundations of the Belief in Spirits", are technical papers of the highest significance; they are magnificent examples of Jung's psychological common sense. Both the fields dealt with in these two essays have for years been the happy hunting-ground of pseudo-scientific speculation, and nowhere was there greater need for a caustic clarity of thought.

The paper on "The Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetic Art" was read before a literary society in Zürich, and this sensitive approach to the intricate problems of art shows that there can be a valuable *liaison* between psychology and art, from which the latter has much to gain and nothing to fear.

The last six papers of this collection belong to a class by themselves. They were delivered at three meetings of the International Congress of Education, 1923-24-25, and deal with the relation of analytical psychology to educational problems. It will be seen from these lectures that analytical psychology has much to contribute towards the solution of these problems. If educationists would accept Jung as a guide the causes of child-neurosis would not be sought by analytical interference in the child's psychology, but rather in the atmosphere engendered in the home by the attitude of the parents, both to the children and to their own problems. In no other field is Jung's wisdom more urgently needed.

We wish to tender acknowledgment to Dr T. W. Mitchell for his kind permission to include the three papers published first in the *British Journal of Psychology (Medical Section)*. We must also acknowledge indebtedness to the Council of the Society of Psychical Research for permission to include the "Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits". We have to thank Messrs Harcourt, Brace and Co., of New York, for

permission to use the essay "Marriage as a Psychological Relationship", which first appeared in English in Keyserling's *Book of Marriage*. The translation of this essay is our own, having been completed before the publication of the *Book of Marriage*. Further acknowledgment is due to Prince Rohan, editor of the *Europäische Revue*, for the privilege of using the article "Die Frau in Europa" (Woman in Europe). We must also thank Mrs Beatrice Ensor who on behalf of the International Congress of Education sanctioned the inclusion of the six lectures in this volume. Of this series, the three delivered in London are not translations, but were drafted in English by the author and revised by Mr Roberts Aldrich.

We are very much indebted to Miss A. M. Bodkin for her valuable help in working over the English of a number of the papers, and to Mr. J. M. Thorburn for suggestions concerning technical terminology in the paper "On Psychical Energy".

Readers of this volume of essays and lectures will find pleasure in the fact that Jung has held resolutely to the task he originally set himself when he first began his training as a psychiatrist. He resolved at that time to make his psychological field cover the full complexity of experience rather than to take advantage of the tempting but illusory simplifications of the laboratory.

H. G. BAYNES.

CARY F. BAYNES.

## ON PSYCHICAL ENERGY

### I. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE ENERGIc VIEW-POINT IN PSYCHOLOGY

#### a. Introduction

THE theory of libido which I have advanced<sup>1</sup> has met with many misunderstandings and, in some quarters, complete repudiation ; it may therefore not be amiss if I again take up the fundamental concepts of this theory.

It is a generally recognized truth that physical events can be looked at in two ways, that is, from the mechanistic and from the energetic standpoint.<sup>2</sup> The mechanistic view is purely causal ; from this standpoint an event is conceived as the result of a cause, in the sense that immutable substances change their relationships to one another according to fixed laws.

The energetic view-point on the other hand is in essence final<sup>3</sup> ; the event is traced from effect to cause on the assumption that energy forms the essential basis of changes in phenomena, that it maintains itself as a constant throughout these changes, and finally leads to an entropy, a condition of general equilibrium. The flow of energy has a definite direction (goal), in that it follows the fall of potential in a way that cannot be reversed. The idea of energy is not that of a substance moved in space ; it is a concept abstracted from

<sup>1</sup> Compare Jung, *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido*. (*Psychology of the Unconscious*. London : Kegan Paul, 1919.)

<sup>2</sup> Compare *Mechanik & Energetik*. Wundt, *Grundz. der Psych.*, Bd. iii, p. 692 ff. With regard to the dynamistic view, see Ed. v. Hartmann, *Weltanschauung der modernen Physik*, pp. 202 ff.

<sup>3</sup> I avoid the expression 'teleological' in order to escape the misunderstanding that attaches to the current conception of teleology, that is, the assumption that teleology contains the idea of an anticipated end or goal.

relations of movement. The concept, therefore, is not founded on substances themselves, but on their relations; while the moving substance itself is the basis of the mechanistic theory.

Both view-points are indispensable for the comprehension of physical phenomena, and therefore both have attained a general recognition. Meanwhile, because of the close juxtaposition of the mechanistic and energetic view-points, a third conception has gradually grown up which is mechanistic as well as energetic; although, logically speaking, the ascent from cause to effect, the progressive causal action, cannot at the same time be the regressive choice of a means to an end.<sup>1</sup> It is not possible to conceive that the same group of facts could be both causal and final in character, for the one view excludes the other. There are the two different standpoints, the one reversing the other; for the principle of finality is the logical reverse of the principle of causality. The concept of finality is not only logically possible; it is also an indispensable, explanatory principle, since no explanation of nature that is purely mechanistic suffices, as the example of modern physics shows. If indeed our concepts were exclusively those of substances moving

<sup>1</sup> "Final causes and mechanical causes are mutually exclusive, because a function having one meaning cannot at the same time be one with many meanings." (Wundt, *Grundz. der Psych.*, Bd. iii, p. 728)

It seems to me inadmissible to speak of final causes, since this is a hybrid concept, born of the mixing of the causal and final view-points. For Wundt the causal series has two parts and one meaning, *i.e.* cause M and effect E, but the final series is threefold and of several meanings, *i.e.* the goal A, the means M', and the achievement of the goal E'. This construction I hold also to be a hybrid notion, in that the idea of the setting of a goal is a causally conceived completion of the actual final series M'-E', which is likewise twofold and with one meaning. In so far as the final standpoint is only the converse of the causal (Wundt), M'-E' is simply the reverse picture of the sequence M-E. The principle of finality recognizes no cause set at the beginning, for the final standpoint is not a causal one and has no concept of causality, just as the standpoint of causality has no concept of a goal, or end to be fulfilled.

in space, then there would be only a causal explanation ; but we have also to deal conceptually with movement relations, which demand an energetic point of view.<sup>1</sup> If this were not so, there would have been no need to invent a theory of energy. The predominance of the one or of the other standpoint depends less upon the objective behaviour of things than upon the psychological attitude of the investigator. The tendency to feel oneself into objects (*Einfühlung*) leads to a mechanistic view, while the tendency to abstract oneself from objects (*Abstraction*) leads to the energetic view. Both tendencies are liable to the error in thought of hypostasizing their principles because of the so-called objective facts of experience. They make the mistake of assuming that the subjective concept is identical with the behaviour of things, that, for example, causality as we experience it in ourselves is also to be found objectively in this behaviour. This error is a very common one and leads to incessant conflicts with the opposite principle ; for, as was said, it is impossible to think of the decisive factor being causal and final both at the same time. But this insupportable contradiction comes about only through the illegitimate and thoughtless projection into the object itself of what is a mere way of looking at things. Our ways of looking at things can only be kept free from contradictions when it is realized that they belong to the psychological sphere, and are only hypothetically projected into the objective behaviour of things. The principle of causality bears without contradiction its logical reverse, but the facts do not ; hence causality and finality must preclude each other in the object. After the well-

<sup>1</sup> The conflict between the energetic concept and the mechanistic concept is a case similar to the ancient problem of the *universalia*. Certainly it is true that the individual thing is all that comes under the observation of the senses, and thus far the universal is only a *nomen*, a word. But at the same time the similarities, that is the connexions of things, have to be taken into account, and thus far the universal is a reality. (Abelard's relative realism) *Psychological Types*, p. 62.

known manner of diminishing differences, it is the custom to effect a theoretically inadmissible compromise by regarding processes as in part causal, in part final<sup>1</sup>—a compromise whereby all sorts of theoretical muddles are produced, but which yields, it cannot be denied, a relatively true picture of reality.<sup>2</sup> We must always bear in mind that, despite the most beautiful coincidence between the facts and our ideas, our explanatory principles are none the less only points of view, that is, phenomena of the psychological and aprioristic conditions under which thinking takes place.

### b. The possibility of measurement of psychic quantity

From what has been said it must be sufficiently clear that every event requires the mechanistic-causal as well as the energetic-final standpoint. Appropriateness, that is to say, possibility of success, alone decides whether the one or the other view is to be preferred. If, for example, the qualitative side of the event comes into question, then the energetic view is of minor importance, because it has nothing to do with the substance itself, but only with its quantitative movement-relations.

It has been much disputed whether or not mental as well as physical events can be submitted to the energetic standpoint.

<sup>1</sup> Finality and causality are two possibilities of understanding that form an antimony. They are progressive and regressive interpretations (Wundt), and as such are contradictory. Obviously this statement is correct only if it is admitted in advance that the concept of energy is an abstraction that expresses relation. ("Energy is relation." Ed. v. Hartmann, *Weltanschauung der mod. Physik.*, p. 196.) But the statement is not correct if an hypostasized concept of energy is assumed, as for example in Ostwald's *Philosophie der Werte*.

<sup>2</sup> "The difference between the teleological and causal view of things is not a real one dividing the contents of experience into two separate realms. The sole difference between the two views is the formal one that a causal connexion belongs as a complement to each final connexion; and also, conversely, every causal connexion can be given, if need be, a teleological form." Wundt, *Grundz. der Psych.*, Bd. iii, p. 737.

*A priori* there is no reason why this should not be possible, since there is no reason for removing mental phenomena from the field of objective experience. Mental events can perfectly well be objects of experience. Yet, as Wundt's example shows, one can question in good faith whether the energetic view is applicable to mental phenomena at all; and, if it is applicable, whether the psyche can be looked upon as a relatively closed system.

As to the first point I am in hearty agreement with von Grot—one of the first to propose the concept of psychic energy—when he says: "The idea of psychic energy is as much justified in science as is that of physical energy, and psychic energy equally with physical energy has quantitative measurements and a variety of forms." <sup>1</sup>

When it comes to the second point, I differ from the previous investigators of this question in that I am practically not at all concerned with the classification of psychic energetic processes. I am not interested in such classification, because we have at best only the vaguest guesses to work upon and no real point of departure. Although I am certain that psychic energy is in some way or other most intimately connected with physical processes, yet, in order to speak with any authority about this connexion, we need far more, and quite other, experience and insight. As to the philosophical side of the question, I accept entirely the ideas worked out in this field by Busse.<sup>2</sup> I also support Külpe when he says in this connexion: "It is in the end quite immaterial whether or not a quantum of mental energy is inserted into the course of a material process: the existing formulation of the law of the conservation of energy would not be in any way disturbed."<sup>3</sup>

According to my view, the psycho-physical relationship is a problem in itself, which perhaps at some time or other

<sup>1</sup> *Arch. f. system. Phil.*, Bd. iv, p. 290.

<sup>2</sup> L. Busse, *Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib*, 1903.

<sup>3</sup> Külpe, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, p. 150.

will be solved. In the meantime, however, it is not necessary for psychology to stop short before this difficulty, for the psyche can be regarded as a *relatively* closed system. But if so, we must certainly break with what seems to me the untenable "psycho-physical" standpoint, since its epiphenomenalist point of view is merely an inheritance of old-fashioned, scientific materialism. Thus, according to the views of Lasswitz, von Grot and others, the phenomena of consciousness would have no functional connexions with one another, for they would be *only* (!) "phenomena, expressions, symptoms, of certain deeper functional conditions". The causal connexion existing between psychic facts, which we can at any time observe, contradicts the epiphenomenon theory, which has a fatal similarity to the materialistic belief that the psyche is secreted by the brain as the gall is by the liver. A psychology that treats the psyche as an epiphenomenon would do better to call itself brain-physiology, and remain satisfied with the meagre results that such a psycho-physiology can yield. The psyche deserves to be taken as a phenomenon in its own right; for there are no apparent reasons why it should be regarded as a mere epiphenomenon, dependent though it may be upon the functioning of the brain. One is as little justified in so regarding it as in conceiving life as an epiphenomenon of the chemistry of carbon compounds.

The immediate experience of quantitative psychic relations on the one hand, and on the other the deep obscurity of a still quite unintelligible psycho-physical connexion, justify at least a provisional view of the psyche as a relatively closed energetic system. I am here in direct opposition to von Grot's conception of psycho-physical energetics. I think that at this point he enters upon very unsure ground, so that his further remarks have little plausibility. None the less, I will set before the reader von Grot's formulation in his own words, since they represent the opinions of a pioneer in this difficult field: "1. Psychic energy is quantity and mass just as



much as is physical energy. 2. As different forms of psychic work and psychic potentiality, they are transmutable the one into the other. 3. Psychic energy can be transformed into physical energy by means of physiological processes, and vice versa." I need scarcely add that statement 3 seems to require a significant question mark. In the last analysis it is only suitability that can decide, not whether the energetic view is possible in itself, but whether practically it promises results.<sup>1</sup>

The possibility of an exact quantitative determination of physical energy has *demonstrated* for physical phenomena the results that can be expected from the energetic standpoint. But it would still be possible to consider physical phenomena as forms of energy even if no exact quantitative measurement were to be had, but merely the possibility of evaluating quantities.<sup>2</sup>

If, however, even such evaluation were altogether impossible, an energetic view-point would have to be given up, since if there is not at least a possibility of evaluating quantities, the energetic view is quite superfluous.

### 1. *The Subjective System of Values*

The applicability of the energetic standpoint to psychology rests, then, exclusively upon the question as to whether a quantitative evaluation of psychic energy is possible. This question is to be met with unconditional affirmation, because our minds possess what is in fact an exceedingly well-developed evaluating system, namely, the *system of psychological values*. Values are indices of amounts of energy. Here it is to be noted that in the collective moral and æsthetic

<sup>1</sup> von Grot even goes so far as to say: "The burden of proof falls upon those who deny such a thing as psychic energy, not upon those who recognize it." *Arch. f. syst. Phil.*, Bd. iv, p. 324.

<sup>2</sup> This was actually the case with Descartes, who first formulated the principle of the conservation of the quantity of movement, but who had not at his command the methods of physical measurement which have been discovered only in modern times.

values we have at our disposal an objective system that is not merely one of values but also of measure. This system of measure is certainly not immediately available for our purposes, for it is a generally established scale of values which takes account, in an indirect way only, of subjective, that is, individual psychological conditions.

What we must first of all consider, then, is the subjective value-system, that is, the subjective estimates of the single individual. We can, actually, compare to a certain degree the subjective values of our psychological content, even though at times it is extraordinarily difficult to measure them with objective accuracy, that is, in comparison with generally established values. Yet, as already observed, this comparison is really superfluous for our purpose. We can weigh our subjective valuations one against the other and determine their *relative* strength. The measure of them is certainly relative to the value of other contents, and therefore not absolute and objective, but it is sufficient for our purpose, inasmuch as different intensities of value within similar qualities can be recognized with confidence, while equal values under the same conditions plainly maintain themselves in equilibrium.

The difficulty begins when we have to do with the comparison of value-intensities of different qualities, for example, the comparison of the value of a scientific concept and a feeling impression. Here the subjective estimate becomes uncertain and therefore untrustworthy. In the same way, subjective evaluation is limited to the content of the conscious; it is therefore useless with respect to unconscious influences, where it is a question of valuations that go beyond the boundaries of consciousness.

• In view of the compensatory relation known to exist between the conscious and the unconscious,<sup>1</sup> however, it is of great

<sup>1</sup> The one-sidedness of the conscious is compensated by an opposition in the unconscious. Primarily it is the facts of psychopathology that show most clearly the attitude of opposition to be

importance to discover a possible way of determining values for the unconscious. If we wish to carry out the energetic view-point for psychic phenomena, it is necessary to bear in mind the extremely important fact that conscious values can apparently disappear without showing themselves again in a correspondingly valued conscious effort. In such a case we should theoretically expect their appearance in the unconscious. But since the unconscious is not directly accessible either in ourselves or in others, the evaluation can only be an indirect one, that is, we must employ auxiliary methods in order to arrive at our estimates of value. In subjective evaluation feeling and insight are of immediate assistance, because feeling is a function that has been developing through an inconceivably long period of time, and has become most finely differentiated. Even the child practises very early the differentiation of its scale of values; it weighs in the balance whether it likes father or mother better, who comes in the second or third place, who is most hated, etc. This conscious set of values not only fails to cover the manifestations of the unconscious, it is actually twisted round in the most conspicuous sort of falsification, which is described as the 'repression' or 'displacement of the affect'. Subjective estimation of value is, then, completely excluded in regard to the discovery of unconscious value-intensities. Therefore we need an objective point of departure that will make an indirect, but objective, evaluation possible.

## 2. *The Objective Measure of Quantity*

In the study of the phenomena of association I have shown that there are certain groupings of psychic elements about emotionally-toned contents, which have been called complexes.

found in the unconscious. There is much material illustrative of this in the writings of Freud and Adler, also in Jung's *Psychology of Dementia Præcox*. The theoretical view is given in Jung's *Collected Papers*, pp. 278 ff. On psychical compensation in its general significance, see A. Maeder, *Regulation psychique et Guérison* (*Arch. Suisses de Neur. et de Psych.*, vol. xvi).

The emotionally-toned content, the complex, consists of a nuclear element and a great number of secondarily constellated associations. The nucleus is made up of two components, first, a condition determined by experience, an event in other words, that is causally related to the environment, and, secondly, a condition innate in the individual character, that is, determined by disposition.

The nuclear element is characterized by the so-called feeling tone, or the emphasis given through affect. This stress, expressed in terms of energy, is a value quantity. In so far as the nuclear element is conscious, the quantity can be subjectively estimated, at least relatively. But if, as frequently happens, the nuclear element is unconscious,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> That a complex, or its essential nucleus, can be unconscious is not a self-evident fact. A complex would not be such at all if it did not possess a certain, even a considerable, affective intensity; and one might expect that this energy would automatically force the complex into consciousness, in short, that the power of attraction contained within it must perforce draw conscious attention. (Fields of power attract one another mutually!) A special explanation is required for the fact revealed by experience that the complex nevertheless often fails to become conscious. The simplest explanation, and the one closest to hand, is given in Freud's theory of repression. This theory pre-supposes a contrary position previously present in the conscious; that is to say, the conscious attitude is hostile to the unconscious complex and does not allow it to become conscious. This theory certainly explains very many cases, but according to my experience there are also many cases not thus explicable. The repression theory takes account only of those cases in which a content, in itself perfectly capable of being conscious, is either quite consciously repressed and made unconscious, or is held *a limine* from consciousness. It does not take into account those other cases in which material of the unconscious, not capable in itself of consciousness, is formed into a content carrying a high energetic intensity, but remaining unable to come to consciousness at all, or doing so only with great difficulty. In such a case the conscious attitude, far from being hostile to the unconscious content, would be most favourable toward it, as in the case of creative imagery, which, as is well known, most frequently has its first beginnings in the unconscious. Just as the mother awaits her child with longing, and yet brings it into the world only with pain and effort, so can a new, creative content, despite the readiness of the conscious, linger for long in the unconscious. It is not repressed; it carries a high energetic value, and still does not

## ON PSYCHICAL ENERGY

or at least unconscious in its psychological significance, then the subjective evaluation is impossible, and one must substitute the indirect method of arriving at the value. This indirect method rests in principle on the following facts: the nuclear element creates a complex automatically in so far as it is affectively toned, that is, possessed of energetic value. I have shown this in detail in the second and third chapters of my *Psychology of Dementia Præcox*. The nuclear element has a constellating power corresponding to its energetic value. From this power there follows a specific constellation of the psychic contents; and thus is developed the complex, which is a constellation of psychic contents dynamically conditioned by the energetic value. The resulting constellation, however, is not a simple irradiation of the stimulus, but a selection of stimulated psychic contents, conditioned by the quality of the nuclear element—a selection which naturally cannot be explained on an energetic basis, because the energetic explanation is quantitative and not qualitative. For a qualitative explanation we must have recourse to the causal view-point.<sup>1</sup> The statement, then, upon which the objective estimation of psychological value-intensities is founded, runs as follows: the constellating power of the nuclear element corresponds to its value intensity, which in turn represents its energy.

become conscious. Such a case is not incapable of explanation. Because the content is new and therefore strange to consciousness, there are no existing associations and connecting bridges by which it can be joined up to the conscious contents. All these connexions must be first carefully laid down, for without them no consciousness is possible. In seeking to explain the unconsciousness of a complex we must, therefore, consider mainly two alternative causes: (1) The repression of a content that could be conscious, and (2) the strangeness of a content that is still incapable of assimilation to consciousness.

<sup>1</sup> Or we might resort to a hypostasized theory of energy, such as Ostwald holds. But the necessity of a concept of matter, such as pertains to a causal-mechanistic method of explanation, can scarcely be evaded in this fashion, since 'energy' is at bottom always a concept concerned with quantity alone.

But what means have we of estimating in its energetic value the constellating power that can enrich a complex with associations? We can estimate this amount of energy in various ways:—

(1) from the relative number of constellations effected by the nuclear element ;

(2) from the relative frequency and intensity of the so-called disturbance- or complex-indices ;

(3) from the intensity of accompanying affect-phenomena.

1. The data required to determine the relative number of constellations effected by the nuclear element may be obtained in part through direct observation, and in part by means of analytical deductions. The rule of our estimate is: the more frequently we come upon constellations that are conditioned by one and the same complex, the greater must be the psychological value that we assign to this complex.

2. By the disturbance- or complex-indices we must not understand merely the indicators that appear in the association experiments. These are really nothing but complex-effects, the form of which is determined by the special situation of the experiment. We are more concerned here with those phenomena that are peculiar to psychological processes outside the experimental conditions. Freud has described the greater part of these phenomena under the head of lapses in speech, in writing, memory slips, failures in apprehension and other symptomatic performances. Added to these are the automatisms described by me, the states of 'abstraction' and of being 'under a spell', 'talking at random', etc. As I have shown in my association experiments, the intensity of these phenomena can be directly determined by a time record ; and this is possible also in an uncontrolled psychological process, where, with watch in hand, we can easily determine the value intensity from the time taken by the patient in speaking about certain things. It might be objected that patients very often waste the better part of their time talking about irrelevancies, in order to evade

the main issue; but that only shows how much more important they consider the so-called irrelevancies. The observer has to guard against an arbitrary judgment, whereby he explains the actual main interests of the patient as irrelevant from the angle of a subjective, theoretical pre-supposition. In estimating values, he must hold strictly to objective criteria. Thus, for example, if a patient wastes hours complaining about her servants instead of coming to the main conflict, which had perhaps been accurately seen by the doctor; this means that the servant-complex has actually a higher energetic value than the still unconscious conflict, which will perhaps reveal itself as the nuclear element only during the further course of treatment. Or it means that the inhibition, arising from the highly valued conscious position, holds the nuclear element in the unconscious through an over-compensation.

3. For the determination of the intensity of affective phenomena we have objective methods which, though not measuring the amount of the affect, still permit an estimation. Experimental psychology has given us a string of such methods. Apart from time measurements, which determine the inhibition in the association-process rather than the actual affect, we have in particular the following means:—

(a) the pulse curve.<sup>1</sup>

(b) the respiration curve.<sup>2</sup>

(c) the psycho-galvanic phenomenon.<sup>3</sup>

The easily recognizable changes in these curves permit estimates to be made concerning the intensity of the disturbing cause. It is also possible, as experience has sufficiently

<sup>1</sup> See H. Berger, *Körperliche Aeusserungen psychischer Zustände*, 1904. A. Lehmann, *Körperliche Aeusserungen psychischer Zustände*, Uebers. Bendixen, 1899.

<sup>2</sup> Peterson and Jung, *Psycho-physical Investigations, etc. Brain*, xxx. Nunberg, in Jung's *Studies in Word Association*. Ricksher and Jung, *Further Investigations on the Galvanic Phenomenon (Journ. of Abnorm. Psych., vol. ii, 1907)*.

<sup>3</sup> Veraguth, *Das psychogalvanische Reflexphaenomen*. Berlin: Karger. Binswanger, in Jung, *Studies in Word Association*.

shown, to induce affect-phenomena in the person experimented upon by means of intentional psychological stimuli, which one knows to be especially stressed with affect for the particular individual in his relation to the experimenter.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from these experimental methods, we have also a highly differentiated subjective system for the recognition and evaluation of the actual affect-phenomena of others. There is present in us a direct instinct for this, which animals also possess in a high degree, not only with respect to their own species, but also with respect to men and other animals. We are aware of the least variations of an emotional character in others, and have a very fine feeling for the quality and quantity of affects in our fellow-men.

## II. THE APPLICATION OF THE ENERGIIC STANDPOINT

### a. The psychological theory of energy

The expression 'psychic energy' has long been in use. We find it, for example, in Schiller<sup>2</sup>; the energetic point of view has also been employed by von Grot,<sup>3</sup> and Th. Lipps.<sup>4</sup> Lipps differentiates psychic energy from physical energy, while Stern<sup>5</sup> leaves the question of their connexion unsettled. We have to thank Lipps for distinguishing between the concepts of psychic energy and psychic power. According to Lipps, the latter term expresses the possibility of processes forming in the mind and of their achieving a certain grade of effectiveness and psychic connexion with life. Psychic energy,

<sup>1</sup> For proof of this I refer to my *Studies in Word Association*, as well as to *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, 2nd edn., chap. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Schiller thinks in terms of energy, so to speak. He works with ideas such as the 'transfer of intensity' (*Verlegung der Intensität*), and the like. *Ueber die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen*, 1795.

<sup>3</sup> Nicholas von Grot, *Die Begriffe der Seele und der psychischen Energie in der Psychologie*. (*Arch. f. syst. Phil.*, Bd. iv, 1898).

<sup>4</sup> Th. Lipps, *Leitfaden der Psychologie*, 1906, vol. ii, pp. 62, 66 ff.

<sup>5</sup> L. W. Stern, *Psych. d. individuellen Differenzen*, 1900, pp. 119 ff.



on the other hand, is regarded by Lipps as the "capacity contained within the processes themselves to make this power actual". In another place Lipps speaks also of "psychic quantities". The distinction between force and energy is indispensable conceptually; for energy is really a concept, and as such, does not exist objectively in phenomena themselves, but exclusively in the specific foundations of experience. In other words, energy, in our experience, is always taken specifically as motion and force, if actual, and as a state or condition, if potential. Psychic energy appears, when actual, in the specific, dynamic phenomena of the mind, such as instinct, wishing, willing, affect, attention, power of work, etc. These in fact make up the psychic forces. When potential, energy appears in specific acquisitions, possibilities, aptitudes, attitudes, etc., which are its conditions.

The distinction between special energies, such as pleasure-energy, sensation-energy, contrast-energy, etc., as advocated by Lipps, seems to me to be theoretically inadmissible, since the specifications of energy are forces and conditions. Energy is a quantitative concept which subsumes forces and conditions under it. Only the latter are qualitatively determined, for they are concepts that express qualities brought into action through energy. The concept of quantity must never at the same time be qualitative, otherwise it would never enable us to represent the relations between forces—which is really the purpose it is meant to serve.

Since, unfortunately, we cannot prove scientifically that a relation of equivalence exists between physical and psychic energy,<sup>1</sup> nothing remains for us but to drop the energetic standpoint altogether, or else to postulate a special

<sup>1</sup> A. Maeder is of opinion that the "creative activity" in the organism, and particularly that of the psyche, "transcends the energy consumed." He advocates the view that in psychological matters, together with the principle of conservation and that of entropy, one must make use of yet a third principle, that of *integration*. *Heilung und Entwicklung im Seelenleben*, 1918, pp. 50, 69 f.

psychic energy. This alternative would certainly be open to us as a hypothetical operation. Psychology, as much as physics, can avail itself of the privilege of building up concepts, as Lipps has remarked. We are justified in so far as an energetic view-point is at all serviceable, and not merely a subsumption under a vague general concept—an objection justly enough raised by Wundt. We, for our part, hold to the view that the energetic standpoint concerning psychical phenomena is a valuable one in so far as it provides a means of recognizing just those quantitative relations, the existence of which in psychology cannot be denied, though from a purely qualitative standpoint they are overlooked.

If, now, the mind consisted, as is contended by 'consciousness psychologists', of conscious processes only (admittedly somewhat 'dark' now and then), we might be satisfied with postulating a 'psychic energy'. But since we are convinced that the unconscious processes belong to psychology, and not merely, as substratum processes, to the physiology of the brain, we are forced to place our concept of energy upon a broader basis. We fully agree with Wundt that there are dimly conscious things. We assume, as he does, a clarity-scale for conscious contents. But the psyche does not cease for us where black begins, but is continued into regions that are wholly unconscious. Moreover, we leave brain physiology its share, since we assume that the unconscious functions finally go over into the substratum processes, to which no psychical quality can be assigned, except in the way of a philosophical hypothesis of pan-psychism.

In delimiting a concept of psychic energy we are faced with certain difficulties, because we are without the means of separating a psychical from a simple biological process. Biology as well as psychology can be approached from the energetic standpoint, in so far as the latter is found to be necessary and profitable to biological research. Whether with psychic processes, or with life processes in general, no exact equivalence-relation to phisic energy is demonstrable.

If we take our stand on a basis of scientific common sense, and avoid too far-reaching philosophical considerations, we may safely conceive a psychic process as simply a life-process. In this way we enlarge the narrow concept of psychic energy to a broader concept of vital energy, which includes so-called psychic energy as a specific part. We thus gain the advantage of being able to follow quantitative relations beyond the narrow limits of what is psychical into the general sphere of the biological functions; we are also in a position to deal, as occasion arises, with the long discussed and ever present problem of the connexion between 'mind and body'.

A concept of life-energy has nothing to do with a so-called life-force, for this latter, as force, would be nothing more than a specific form of a universal energy. To regard life-energy thus, and so bridge over the still yawning chasm between physical and vital processes, would be to do away with the special privilege of bio-energy as opposed to physical energy. In consideration of the psychological use we propose to make of it, I have suggested that we call the hypothetically assumed life-energy, libido. To this extent I have differentiated it from a universal concept of energy, in accordance with my belief in the right of biology and psychology to develop their own concepts. In adopting this usage I do not in any way wish to forestall the workers in the field of bio-dynamics. I only announce my intention to use the term libido for our purposes: for theirs, such a term as bio-energy, or vital energy, may be preferred.

I must at this point guard against a possible misunderstanding. I have not the smallest intention, in the present essay, of entering into a discussion of the disputed question of psycho-physical parallelism and reciprocal action. These theories are speculations about the acting in juxtaposition, or the acting together, of body and mind; they deal with just that point which I leave out of account, namely, the question whether the psychical energy-processes exist

independently of, or are included in, the physical processes. In my opinion we know practically nothing about this. With Busse,<sup>1</sup> I consider the idea of reciprocal action tenable, and therefore can see no occasion for setting against its credibility the hypothesis of a psycho-physical parallelism. Psycho-therapists, whose special field lies in the crucial sphere of physical and mental interaction, are just those to whom it seems most probable that the psychical and the physical are not independent, parallel processes, but are essentially bound up in reciprocal activity, although the actual nature of this relation is still completely beyond our experience. An exhaustive discussion of this question is certainly indispensable to philosophers, but an empirical psychology must confine itself to empirically accessible facts. Although we have not yet succeeded in proving that the processes of psychic energy are included in the physical processes, yet the opponents of such a possibility are equally unsuccessful in separating with certainty the psychical from the physical.

### b. The Conservation of Energy

If we undertake to view the psychical life-processes from the energetic standpoint, we must not be content with mere theory, but must take up the task of testing its applicability to empirical material. An energetic view-point is superfluous if its main principle, that of the conservation of energy, proves inapplicable. We must follow here the recommendation of Busse,<sup>1</sup> and distinguish between the principle of equivalence and that of constancy. The equivalence principle states that "for every energy spent or consumed in bringing about a condition, a similar quantity of the same or other forms of energy shall appear elsewhere"; the constancy principle is to the effect that "the sum total of energy remains constant, and is neither susceptible of

<sup>1</sup> L. Busse, *Geist und Körper*, 1903.

increase, nor of decrease". The constancy principle is therefore a logically necessary but generalized inference from the equivalence principle ; it has no practical significance, since our experience is based only on relative systems.

Thus, for our task, the equivalence principle is the only one of immediate concern. In my work, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, I have shown the possibility of considering certain developmental processes, and similar transformations, under the equivalence principle. I will not now repeat *in extenso* what I said there, but will only emphasize once again that Freud's investigation of the problem of sexuality has provided valuable contributions to our question. No-where more clearly than in the relation of sexuality to the whole psyche, can we see how the disappearance of a quantum of libido is followed by the appearance of a corresponding value in another form. Unfortunately Freud was led, by a quite comprehensible overvaluation of sexuality, to reduce to the latter those transformations which represent other specific forces of the mind co-ordinate with sexuality, and this has brought upon him the justified reproach of pan-sexualism.<sup>1</sup> The defect of the Freudian view consists in the one-sidedness towards which the mechanistic-causal standpoint always tends ; that is, the too great simplification of the *reductio ad causam*, which does the less justice to the meaning of the analysed and reduced structure, the truer, simpler, and more inclusive it is. Whoever reads Freud's works carefully will easily see what a significant rôle the equivalence principle plays in the building up of his conceptions. This appears with especial clearness in those casuistic investigations where he describes repressions and the formation of their surrogates.<sup>2</sup> Whoever has himself practised in this field knows that the equivalence principle has great heuristic value in the treatment of neuroses. Even if its application is not always conscious, it is nevertheless applied instinctively or by feeling. When, for example, a conscious value, such as a transference,

<sup>1</sup> *Samml. Kl. Schriften zur Neurosenlehre.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

diminishes, or even disappears, one looks at once for the surrogate structure, in the expectation of seeing an equivalent value spring up elsewhere. The discovery of the substituted value is not difficult if it appears as a content of consciousness, but cases frequently occur where a sum of libido disappears apparently without the formation of a surrogate. The substituted value is then unconscious, or rather, in most cases, the patient is unconscious that a certain new fact is the corresponding equivalent value. It may be that a considerable sum of libido disappears as though completely swallowed up in the unconscious, no new value-factor appearing in its stead. In such a case it is well to hold strictly to the principle of equivalence, for a careful observation of the patient will soon reveal signs of unconscious activity, as for example in the increase of certain symptoms, or a new symptom, important dreams, or peculiar, fleeting, phantasy-fragments, and the like. If the analyst is successful in tracing back these symptoms to the hidden content of the unconscious, it can usually be shown that the libido-sum which was lost from the conscious has developed a structure in the unconscious which, despite all differences, has not a few features in common with those conscious contents that were deprived of their energy. It is as though the libido dragged with it into the unconscious certain qualities, often so distinct that one can recognize in them the source of the libido that is activating the unconscious.

Of such transformations there are striking and well-known examples. Thus, when a child begins to separate itself subjectively from its parents, there arise phantasies of surrogate parents, and these phantasies are almost always transferred to real people. Transferences of this sort do not long continue, inasmuch as a maturing person must assimilate the parent-complex, that is authority, responsibility, and independence. He or she must become father or mother, as the case may be. Another field rich in striking examples is that of the psychology of the Christian religion, where

the repression of the instincts (that is, of the primitive state of instinctiveness) leads to the formation of religious surrogate structures, such as the mediaeval emotional relation to God ('*Gottesminne*'), the sexual character of which only the blind could fail to see.

These reflections lead us to a further analogy with the ideas of physical energy. The theory of energy recognizes not merely an intensity factor, but also a factor of extensity, the latter being a practically necessary addition to the pure concept of energy. It makes possible the union of the concept of pure intensity with the concept of quantity (*Menge*)—for example, a quantity of light as opposed to the strength of light. "The quantity, or extensity factor, of energy is intimately connected with a structure (matter, ether, or a definite mixture of both), and cannot be transferred to another structure without carrying with it parts of the first; but the intensity factor can pass from one structure to another."<sup>1</sup> The extensity factor, then, gives the dynamic energy-determination always present in the phenomenon. Thus also there is a psychological extensity factor which cannot pass into a new structure without the transference of parts or characteristics of the previous structure with which it was connected. In a previous work,<sup>2</sup> I have particularly called attention to this peculiarity of energy-transformation, and have shown that the libido does not leave a structure as pure intensity, and go over unencumbered into another, but that it takes the character of the old function with it into the new. This peculiarity is so conspicuous that it gives rise to false conclusions—not only to wrong theories, but to self-deceptions full of unfortunate consequences. For example, let us take a libido-sum having a certain sexual form, that goes over into another structure, taking with it some of the special characters of its previous application, then it is readily supposed that the dynamis of the new

<sup>1</sup> Ed. von Hartmann, *Weltanschauung der mod. Physik*, p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious*.

structure is likewise sexual.<sup>1</sup> Or it may be that the libido sum specific to a spiritual activity goes over into an essentially material interest; whereupon the individual erroneously believes that the new structure is again spiritual in character. The falsity of these conclusions is the result of taking into consideration only the relative similarities in the two structures, and ignoring their equally important differences. Practical experience teaches us that a psychic activity can find a substitute only on the basis of equivalence. A pathological interest, for example, can be replaced by another interest only when the latter represents an equally intense value; thus a release of libido from symptoms never takes place unless the equivalent substitute is found. If the substitute is of less energetic value, we know at once that a part of the energy is to be sought elsewhere; if not in the conscious, then in unconscious phantasy structures, or in a disturbance of the 'parties supérieures' of the physiological functions, to borrow a very apt expression of Janet's.

✓ Apart from this practical experience which has long been at our disposal, the energy concept enables us to build up another side of our theory. According to Freud's causal conception, there exists only this same immutable material, the sexual component, to whose activity every interpretation is led back with a monotonous regularity, a fact which Freud himself has found occasion to note. To the idea of final development, of such paramount importance in psychology, the spirit of a *reductio ad causam* can never do justice,

<sup>1</sup> The reduction of a complex structure to sexuality is only a valid causal explanation if it is agreed beforehand that we are interested only in explaining the function of the sexual component in complex structures. But if we accept the reduction to sexuality as valid, this can be only with the tacit presupposition that we are dealing with an exclusively sexual structure. To assume this, however, is to assert *a priori* that a complex psychic structure can only be a sexual structure, a manifest *petitio principii*! It cannot be asserted that sexuality is the only fundamental instinct of the mind, therefore every explanation on a sexual basis can be only a partial explanation, never an all-sufficing psychological theory.



because each change in the conditions is seen as nothing but a 'sublimation' of the fundamental factors, and therefore only an inept expression for the same old thing.

The idea of development is possible only if the concept of immutable material is not hypostasized through so-called objective reality, that is, if causality is not assumed to be identical with the behaviour of things. The developmental idea demands the possibility of change in substances which, from the energetic standpoint, appear as systems of energy susceptible of unlimited exchangeability under the principle of equivalence, and under the obvious presupposition of the possibility of a difference in potential. Here also, just as in examining the connexion between causality and finality, we come upon an insoluble antinomy resulting from the projection of the energetic hypothesis, since an immutable substance cannot at the same time be an energy system. According to the mechanistic view, energy is conceived as dependent on substance. Thus Wundt speaks of an "energy of the psyche", which has increased in the course of time, and this, of course, does not permit the application of the principles of energy. From the energetic standpoint, on the other hand, substance is merely an expression or sign of an energetic system. This antinomy is only insoluble as long as it is forgotten that view-points represent fundamental psychological attitudes, which obviously coincide to some extent with the conditions of the objects—a coincidence that renders the view-points practically applicable. It is intelligible that the causalist as well as the finalist should fight desperately for the objective validity of his principle, since the principle each is defending is also that of his personal attitude to life and the world, and no one will allow without protest that his attitude may have only a conditional validity. This unwelcome admission feels somewhat like a suicidal attempt to saw off the branch upon which one is sitting. But the unavoidable antinomies, to which logically justified principles give rise, force us to a fundamental examination

of our own psychological attitudes. Only thus can we avoid doing violence to the other logically valid principle. The antinomy must resolve itself in an antinomic postulate, however unsatisfactory this may be to the concretism of mankind, and however sorely it afflicts the spirit of natural science to admit that the essence of so-called reality is of a mysterious irrationality, which, however, necessarily follows the acceptance of the antinomic postulate.<sup>1</sup> The final standpoint is essential to the evolutionary theory. Even Darwin, as Wundt points out, worked with final concepts, such as that of adaptation, etc. The visible facts of differentiation and development cannot be completely explained by causality. They require also the final standpoint, which man produced in the course of his mental evolution, as he also produced the causal.

According to the concept of finality causes are understood as means to an end. A simple example is the process of regression. Regarded causally, regression is determined, for example, by 'mother fixation'. But from the final standpoint the libido returns to the mother-imago in order to find there the memory associations by means of which further development can take place, as, for instance, from an emotional system into an intellectual system.

The first explanation exhausts itself in the importance of the cause, and completely overlooks the final importance of the regressive process. From this angle the whole edifice of culture becomes a mere surrogate due to the impossibility of incest. But the explanation offered by the final concept allows us to foresee what will follow from the regression, and at the same time it helps us to understand the significance of the memory images that have been re-activated by the regressive libido. It is natural that to the causalist the latter view seems unbelievably hypothetical, but to the finalist the 'fixation on the mother' is an arbitrary assumption. This assumption, he objects, fails entirely to take note of

<sup>1</sup> Compare Jung, *Psychological Types*, pp. 372 ff.

the aim, which alone can be responsible for the reawakening of the mother-*imago*. Adler, for example, raises numerous objections of this sort against Freud's theory. In my work, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, I tried to do justice to both views, though not explicitly, and met for my pains the accusation from both sides of holding an obscure and dubious position. In this I share the fate of the neutrals in the war, to whom even good faith was often denied. What to the causal view is fact to the final view is symbol; and conversely, what to the one standpoint is essential is to the other inessential.<sup>1</sup> We are therefore forced to resort to the antinomic postulate, and to consider the world also as a psychical phenomenon. Certainly it is indispensable for science to know how things are in themselves, but even science cannot escape the psychological conditions of knowledge; and psychology must be peculiarly alive to these conditions. Since the mind also possesses the final view, to adopt the purely causal attitude to psychical phenomena is psychologically inadmissible, not to mention the all too familiar monotony of its one-sided interpretations.

The symbolical explanation of causes is a necessity for the differentiation of the mind; since the facts, without this conception, have the quality of immutable substances that rigidly and constantly operate, as we can see, for example, in Freud's old trauma-theory. Cause alone makes no development possible. For the mind the *reductio ad causam* is the very opposite of development; it holds the libido fast in the elementary facts. From the standpoint of rationalism this is all that can be desired, but from the standpoint of the mind it is a lifeless and comfortless boredom—though naturally it must never be forgotten that for many people it is absolutely necessary to keep the libido close to facts. But in so far as

<sup>1</sup> Silberer has evolved a similar point of view in his analytical and synthetic interpretation of symbols. Silberer, *Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism*, Kegan Paul & Co. (*Probleme der Mystik und Ihrer Symbolik*, Hugo Heller & Co.)

this demand is fulfilled the mind cannot always remain on this level, but must go on developing further, inasmuch as the causes themselves become transformed into means to an end, into symbolical expressions of a way that lies ahead. The exclusive importance of the cause, *i.e.* its energetic value, thus disappears, and comes to view again in the symbol, the attracting power of which represents the corresponding quantum of libido. The energetic value of a cause is never done away with by the introduction of an arbitrary and rational goal; that is always a makeshift.

Mental development cannot come about through purpose and will alone. There is need of the attracting power of the symbol, the value-quantum of which always transcends the value of the cause. But the formation of a symbol cannot take place until the mind has dwelt long enough upon the elementary facts; that is to say, until the inner or outer necessities of the life-process have brought about a transformation of energy. If man were living altogether instinctively and automatically the transformation could come about through biological laws. Something of this is still to be seen in the mental life of primitives, which at the same time is quite concretistic as well as quite symbolical. In the case of civilized man the rationalism of the conscious, otherwise so useful to him, becomes a most formidable obstacle to a frictionless transformation of energy. The reason, always seeking to avoid what is to it an unbearable antinomy, places itself exclusively on the one side or the other, and seeks to hold with a grip of death to the values it has once established. This attempt continues so long as the fact of human reason passes for an 'immutable substance' from which any symbolical idea is excluded. But reason is only relative, and eventually checks itself in its own antinomy. Also, it is only a means to an end, a symbolical expression for the point of intersection in a path of development.

### c. Entropy

The principle of equivalence is one practically important postulate in the theory of energy; the other necessary complementary proposition is the principle of entropy. Transformations of energy are possible only as a result of differences in intensity. According to the statement of Carnot, heat can be transformed into work only by passing from a warmer to a colder body, but mechanical work is continually being transformed into heat, which on account of its diminished intensity cannot be re-transformed into work again. In this way a closed energetic system gradually reduces its differences in intensity to an even temperature, whereby any further change is prohibited. This is the so-called 'death in tepidity' (*Wärmetod*).

The principle of entropy is known in experience only as a principle of partial processes which make up a relatively closed system. The psyche can be regarded as such a relatively closed system, in which the transpositions of energy also lead to an equalization of differences. According to Boltzmann's formulation,<sup>1</sup> this levelling process corresponds to a transition from an improbable to a probable condition, but with an increasing limitation of the possibilities of further change. We see this process, for example, in the development of a lasting and relatively unchanging attitude. After violent oscillations at the beginning the contradictions balance each other, and gradually a new attitude develops, the final stability of which is the greater in proportion to the magnitude of the initial differences. The greater the tension between the pairs of opposites, the greater will be the energy that comes from them; and the greater the energy, the stronger will be its constellating, attracting power. This greater attracting power represents a wider range of constellated psychical material, and the further this range extends, the less chance there is of later disturbances

<sup>1</sup> *Populäre Schriften*, p. 33.

that might arise from differences with the material not previously constellated. For this reason an attitude that has been formed out of a far-reaching process of equalization is an especially lasting one. Daily psychological experience offers proof of this statement. Most intense conflicts, if overcome, leave behind a sense of security and rest, or a brokenness, that it is scarcely possible to disturb again, or to cure, as the case may be. But on the other hand, it needs just these widely split opposites and their conflagrations for the production of valuable and permanent results. Since our experience is confined to relatively closed systems,<sup>1</sup> we are never in the position to observe an absolute psychological entropy; but the more complete the isolation of the psychological system is, the more clearly is the phenomenon of entropy manifested. We can see this particularly well in those mental disturbances which are characterized by an extreme seclusion from the environment. The so-called 'dulling of affect' of dementia præcox, or schizophrenia, is to be understood as a phenomenon of entropy. The same also applies to all those so-called degenerative phenomena which develop into psychological attitudes that permanently exclude all connexions with the world around. Similarly, such voluntarily directed processes as directed thought or feeling can be viewed as relatively closed psychological systems. These functions are based on the principle of the exclusion of the inappropriate, or unsuitable, which could bring about a deviation from the chosen way. The elements that 'belong' are left to the action of mutual equilibration, and meanwhile are protected from outside, disturbing influences. Thus after some time they reach their 'probable' condition, which manifests its firmness, for example, in a 'lasting' conviction, or in a 'deeply ingrained' view-point, etc. How firmly rooted such things are can be tested by anyone who attempts to dissolve such a structure, for example,

<sup>1</sup> A system is absolutely closed when energy from without can no longer be fed into it. Only in such a case can entropy occur.

to uproot a prejudice, or change a habit of thought. In the history of peoples such changes have cost rivers of blood. But in so far as an absolute closing off is impossible (pathological cases excepted) the energetic process goes on as development, though, because of 'loss by friction', with lessening intensity and decreased potential.

This way of looking at things has long been familiar. Everybody speaks of the 'storms of youth' which yield to the 'tranquility of age'. We speak too of a 'strengthened opinion' after 'battling with doubts', of a 'relief from inner tension', etc. This is the arbitrary energetic standpoint shared by everyone. This standpoint remains valueless to the scientific psychologist as long as he feels no need of estimating psychological values. For physiological psychology the problem does not come into question at all. Psychiatry, on its psychological side, is purely descriptive, and till recently has not concerned itself at all about psychological causality, has in fact even denied it. For analytical psychology, however, it became necessary to take the energetic standpoint into consideration since the causal-mechanistic view of Freudian analysis did not suffice to cover the facts of psychological values. Value demands for its explanation a quantitative theory, and a qualitative concept, as for example sexuality, can never serve as a substitute. A qualitative concept is always the description of a thing, a substance; a quantitative concept, on the other hand, deals with relations of intensity and never with a substance or thing. A qualitative concept that does not designate a substance, a fact, or a thing, is a more or less arbitrary assumption; as such I must count a qualitative, hypostasized energy concept. A scientific causal explanation now and then needs such assumptions, yet they must not be taken up merely in order to make an energy standpoint superfluous. Conversely, the same is true of a theory of energy, which at times shows a tendency to deny substance in order to become purely teleological or finalistic. To substitute a qualitative

concept for energy is inadmissible, for that would mean a specification of energy, which is in fact a force. This would be in biology vitalism, in psychology sexualism (Freud), or some other 'ism', in so far as it could be shown that the investigators reduced the energy of the whole psyche to one definite force or instinct. Instincts are, however, as has been said, specific forms of energy; energy includes these as a higher concept of relation, and it cannot express anything else than the relation between psychological values.

#### d. **Energism and Dynamism**

What has been said above has to do with a pure theory of energy. The concept of energy, like its correlate, the concept of time, is on one side an *a priori*, directly given view-point,<sup>1</sup> but on the other side, an applied, or empirical concept abstracted from experience, like all explanatory concepts.<sup>2</sup> The applied theory of energy always deals with the behaviour of forces, that is, with substances in motion; for energy is accessible to experience in no other way than through the observation of moving bodies. Therefore in practice we speak of electrical energy and the like, as if energy were a

<sup>1</sup> Therefore the idea of it is as old as humanity. We meet it in the fundamental ideas of primitives. Compare Lehmann, *Mana* (Leipzig, 1922), and my discussion in *The Unconscious in the Normal and the Pathological Mind in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (Baillière, 1928). Hubert and Mauss (*Mélanges d'histoire des Religions*, Preface, p. xxix) also call *mana* a category of the reason. I quote their remarks verbatim: "Constamment présentes dans le langage, sans qu'elles y soient de toute nécessité explicites—les catégories—existent d'ordinaire plutôt sous la forme d'habitudes directrices de la conscience, elles-mêmes inconscientes. La notion de *mana* est un de ces principes: elle est donnée dans le langage; elle est impliquée dans toute une série de jugements et de raisonnements, portant sur des attributs qui sont ceux de *mana*, nous avons dit que le *mana* est une catégorie. Mais le *mana* n'est pas seulement une catégorie spéciale à la pensée primitive, et aujourd'hui, en voie de réduction c'est encore la forme première qu'ont revêtue d'autres catégories qui fonctionnent toujours dans nos esprits: celles de substance et de cause," etc.

<sup>2</sup> For further discussion I must refer to *Psychological Types*, pp. 382 ff. and p. 547.



definite force. From this merging of the empirical or applied theory with the way of envisaging the event arises the constant confusing of 'energy' with 'force'. Similarly, the psychological concept of energy is not a pure concept, but also a concrete and applied concept, that appears in the form of sexual, vital, mental, moral 'energy'; in other words it appears in the form of instinct, the undeniably dynamic nature of which justifies us in a conceptual parallelism with physical forces.

Through the application of the pure concept to the material of experience, there necessarily enters into the concept a concretized or illustrative content, so that it appears as if a substance had been posited. This, for example, is the case in the concept of physical ether, which, although a concept, is treated exactly as if it were a substance. This confusion is unavoidable, since we are incapable of imagining a quantum unless it be a quantum of something. This something is the substance. Therefore every applied concept is unavoidably hypostasized, even against our will, and yet we must never forget that what we are dealing with is still a concept.

I have advocated calling the energy-concept used in analytical psychology by the name 'libido'. The choice of the word may not be ideal in some ways, yet it seems to me that this concept merits the name libido as a matter of historical justice; for Freud was the first to follow out these actual, dynamic, psychological relations, presenting them coherently, and making use of this apt term libido, albeit with a specifically sexual definition that corresponded to his general starting-point, which was sexuality. Together with 'libido' Freud used the expression 'instinct' (for example, the 'ego-instinct'), and 'psychic energy' (in *The Interpretation of Dreams*). Since Freud confines himself exclusively to sexuality and its manifold ramifications in the mind, the sexual definition of energy as a specific instinctive force is quite sufficient for his purpose. In a general psychological theory, however, it is impossible to use sexuality, that is, one

specific instinct, as an explanatory concept, since psychical energy-transformation is not merely a matter of sexual dynamics. Sexual dynamics is only a special case in a general theory of the mind. When so regarded its existence is not denied, but merely given its proper place.

Since the applied theory of energy immediately becomes hypostasized on perceptual grounds into the forces of the mind (instincts, affects, and other dynamic processes), the perceived manifestation of psychic energy is in my opinion excellently characterized by the word 'libido'; inasmuch as similar perceptions (*Anschaunungen*) have always made use of like terms, as, for example, Schopenhauer's 'will', the *horme* ( $\delta\rho\mu\eta$ ) of Aristotle, the *eros* ('hate' and 'love') of the elements, or the *élan vital* of Bergson. From these concepts I have taken only the graphic or perceptual character of my term, not the definition of the concept. The omission of a detailed explanation of this in my earlier book is responsible for many misunderstandings, such as the accusation that I have built up a sort of vitalistic concept, or the like.

With the word 'libido' I do not connect, as I said, a sexual definition,<sup>1</sup> yet it must not therefore be inferred that I exclude a sexual dynamism, more than any other dynamism, as, for example, that of the hunger instinct. In my book, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, I called attention to my notion of a general life instinct, termed libido, which replaces the concept 'psychic energy' that I used in the *Psychology of Dementia Præcox*. In this exposition I was guilty of a sin of omission in presenting the concept only in its psychological aspect and leaving out of account the metaphysical side, the discussion of which appears in the present essay. But inasmuch as I left the libido-concept wholly in its figurative

<sup>1</sup> The latin word *libido* has by no means an exclusively sexual meaning, but the general sense of desire, longing, urge. Detailed evidence of this appears in *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 135 ff.

form (*anschaulichkeit*), I treated it as though it were hypostasized. Thus far I am to blame for the misunderstandings. Subsequently I explained at length, in my "*Darstellung der psychoanalytischen Theorie*", 1913 (p. 36), that "the libido with which we work is not only not concrete or recognizable, but is a complete X, a pure hypothesis, a picture or counter, which is just as little concretely conceived as is the energy of the world known to physics". Libido is therefore merely an abbreviated expression for the energetic standpoint. In working with pure concepts we shall never succeed in practical presentation unless we are able to express the phenomena mathematically. So long as this is impossible, the applied concept will always become automatically hypostasized through the empirical material of experience.

We must note yet another possible mistake arising out of the concrete use of the libido-concept and of the energy concept in general, namely the confusion, unavoidable in the sphere of practical experience, of energy with the causal concept of effect, which latter is a dynamic, not an energetic concept at all.

According to the causal-mechanistic view, the fact series a-b-c-d appears as follows: a brings about b, b causes c, etc. Here the concept of effect appears as a qualitative characteristic, a virtue of the cause, or, in other words, a dynamism. On the other hand, the final, energetic view-point presents the series thus: a-b-c- are means toward the transformation of energy, which flows causelessly from a, the 'improbable' condition, over into b-c, the 'probable' condition. A causal effect is thus quite set aside, inasmuch as only the intensities of the effect are taken into account. In so far as the intensities are the same, we could just as well put w-x-y-z instead of a-b-c-d.

The material of experience is in both cases the series a-b-c-d; the difference is that according to the mechanistic view a dynamism is deduced from the causal effect observed,

while the energetic view is concerned with the equivalence of the transformed effect rather than with the causal effect. That is to say, both standpoints have to do with the series a-b-c-d, the one qualitatively, the other quantitatively. The causal mode of thought abstracts the dynamic concept from the material of experience, while the final view applies its pure concept of energy to the field of observation and allows it, as it were, to become a dynamis. Despite their difference from the angle of a theory of cognition, a difference that leaves nothing to be desired in absoluteness, the two views become unavoidably mixed in a concept of force, the causal attitude abstracting the pure perception of the effective *qualitas* into a concept of dynamis, and the final attitude allowing its pure concept to become concretized through application. Thus the mechanist speaks of the 'energy of the psychic'; while the 'energetic' theorist speaks of 'psychic energy'. From what has been said, it is evident that one and the same process takes on different aspects according to the different standpoints from which it is viewed.

### III. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF THE LIBIDO-THEORY

#### a. Progression and Regression

One of the most important energetic phenomena of the psychic life is certainly that of the progression and regression of the libido. We could define progression as the daily advance of the process of psychological adaptation. We know that adaptation is not something that is achieved once and for all, though there is a tendency to believe the contrary. This comes about from mistaking the psychic attitude attained for actual adaptation. We can only satisfy the demands of adaptation by a correspondingly directed attitude. The effort towards adaptation is therefore completed in two stages: (1) attainment of attitude, and (2) completion of the adaptation through the attitude. The attitude to reality is something extremely permanent, but however permanent

the habitus may be, its effective accomplishment in the sphere of adaptation is always impermanent. This is the necessary consequence of constant vicissitudes of the environment and the new adaptations demanded by them.

The progression of the libido might be said to consist in a continuous satisfaction of the demands of environmental conditions. This achievement is possible only by means of an attitude, which as such is necessarily directed and, therefore, tainted with a certain one-sidedness. Thus it can easily happen that the attitude ceases to be adequate because outer changes have occurred that demand a different attitude. For example, an attitude that seeks to fulfil the demands of reality by a process of 'feeling into' (*Einfühlung*) may easily encounter a situation that could be solved only through thinking. In such a case the feeling attitude fails, and the progression of the libido also ceases. The vital feeling that was present before disappears, and in its place the psychic value of certain conscious contents increases in an unpleasant way; subjective contents and reactions press to the fore and the situation becomes full of affect and favourable for explosions. These symptoms mean a damming up of libido, and the situation is always characterized by the breaking-up of the pairs of opposites. During the progression of the libido the pairs of opposites are united in the co-ordinated flow of psychical processes. Their working together makes possible the balanced regularity of these processes, which, without this reciprocal action, would be one-sided and unbalanced. Therefore we are justified in regarding all extravagance and exaggeration as a loss of equilibrium, because obviously there is absent from it the co-ordinating effect of the opposite impulse. Thus it is essential for progression, meaning a successful effort at adaptation, that impulse and counter-impulse, the yea and the nay, should be present as an equal and reciprocal effectiveness. This equalization and unification of the pairs of opposites can be seen, for example, in the process of deliberation, that takes

place before a difficult decision. In the damming up of libido that occurs when progression has become impossible the yea and the nay can no longer unite in co-ordinated action, since yea and nay acquire similar values which hold the balance against one another. The persistence of the damming up brings about a proportionate increase in the value of the opposing positions, which then become enriched with associations and thus acquire an ever increasing range of psychic material. The tension leads to conflict, the conflict leads to alternating efforts at repression, and, if the repression of the opposing force succeeds, a dissociation ensues, *i.e.* a 'splitting of the personality', or lack of union with oneself. Thus the stage is set for a neurosis. The acts that result from such a condition are incoördinated, that is, pathological, and assume the aspect of symptoms. Although the acts are still in part normally determined, they also originate in part from the repressed opposite which, instead of working as an equilibrating force, has an obstructive effect, thus hindering the possibility of further progress.

The struggle between the opposites would persist in this fruitless way if the process of regression, the backward movement of the libido, did not set in with the outbreak of the conflict. Through their collision the opposites are gradually deprived of their value. This loss of value steadily goes on, and is the only thing perceived by the conscious. It is synonymous with regression, for in proportion to the decrease in value of the conscious opposites, increasing value is given to all those psychological processes that are not concerned in outward adaptation and are therefore seldom or never consciously employed. These psychic factors that are excluded from the business of environmental adaptation are primarily unconscious elements. As the value of the conscious background and of the unconscious increases, it is to be expected that it will gain a corresponding influence over the conscious. On account of the inhibiting influence that the conscious exercises over the unconscious, the values

of the latter can gain recognition only indirectly. The inhibition to which they are subjected is a result of the exclusive directedness of the conscious contents. (This inhibition is identical with what Freud calls the "censor".) The indirect manifestations of the unconscious show themselves in the form of disturbances in conscious behaviour. In association experiments they appear as complex-indicators, in daily life as the 'symptomatic actions' first described by Freud, and in neurotic conditions they appear as symptoms.

Since the regression raises the value of those contents that were before excluded from conscious adaptation, and hence are either unconscious or only 'darkly conscious', those psychic elements that are now being forced over the threshold are admittedly useless from the standpoint of adaptation, and for this reason are invariably kept at a distance by the directed psychic functions. The nature of these contents is for all the world to read in the Freudian literature. They are not only infantile-sexual characteristics, but are generally incompatible contents and tendencies, partly immoral, partly unæsthetic, partly again of an irrational, imaginary nature. The inferior character these contents possess in respect to adaptation, has given occasion for that depreciatory judgment concerning the nature of these background processes with which we are familiar in psycho-analytic writings.<sup>1</sup> What the regression brings to the surface certainly seems at first sight to be slime out of the depths; but if one does not stop at a surface impression, and there is a steadfast refusal to judge by appearance on the basis of a preconceived dogma, it will be found that this 'slime' contains not merely incompatible

<sup>1</sup> Somewhat in the fashion of the ancient Hudibras, whose opinion is mentioned by Kant (*Träume eines Geistersehers*, iii, Hauptst.): "If a hypochondriacal wind is roaring in the bowels, it all depends upon what direction it takes; if it goes downwards there comes a flatus, but if it goes upward there is a vision of a divine inspiration." Professional satiety with neurotic unrealities makes the doctor sceptical, but a generalized judgment from the angle of pathology has the disadvantage of being always biased.

and discarded remnants of the daily life, or uncomfortable and objectionable animal tendencies, but also germs of new possibilities of life. Herein lies one of the greatest values of psycho-analysis, namely, that it does not fear to bring to light the incompatible contents. This, no doubt, would be a thoroughly useless and even objectionable undertaking, were it not for the possibilities of a renewal of life that lie in the repressed contents. That this is and must be so is not only freely verifiable in practical experience, but can also be deduced from the following considerations.

The process of adaptation requires a directed conscious function that is characterized by inner consistency and logical continuity. As we have seen, because the function is so directed, everything unsuitable must be excluded in order that the integrity of the direction may be maintained. The unsuitable incurs inhibition and thereby escapes attention. According to experience there is only one consciously directed function of adaptation. If, for example, I have a thinking orientation I cannot at the same time be oriented through feeling, since thinking and feeling are two quite different functions. In fact, I must carefully exclude feeling if I am to satisfy the logical laws of thinking, in order that thinking should not be disturbed by feeling. In this case I withdraw as much libido as possible from the feeling process, so that this function becomes relatively unconscious. Experience teaches us that attitude is in the main habitual; accordingly the other unsuitable functions, in so far as they are incompatible with the prevailing attitude, are relatively unconscious, therefore unused, untrained, and undifferentiated. Furthermore, by reason of co-existence they are necessarily associated with other contents of the unconscious, the inferiority and incompatibility of which I have already alluded to. Accordingly when these functions are activated through regression, thus reaching consciousness, they take on a somewhat incompatible form, to a certain degree covered and disfigured by the slime of the deep.



If we remember that the cause of the damming up of the libido was the failure of the conscious attitude, we can understand what valuable seeds lie in the unconscious contents activated through the regression, since these contain the elements of that other function which was excluded by the conscious attitude and which might complement in an effective way or even replace the inadequate conscious function. If thinking fails as the adapted function, because one is dealing with a situation in which feeling is primarily required, the unconscious material activated by regression will contain the missing feeling function, although still in embryonic form, that is to say, archaic and undeveloped. Similarly, in the opposite type, regression would activate in the unconscious a thinking function that would compensate the inadequate conscious feeling.

Because the regression activates an unconscious factor, it confronts consciousness with the problem of the soul as opposed to the problem of external adaptation. It is natural that the conscious should rise in revolt against taking up the regressive contents; yet it is none the less eventually forced, by the impossibility of further progress, into submitting to the regressive values. In other words, the regression leads to the necessity of an adaptation to the soul, the inner world of the psyche.

Just as the adaptation to the environment may fail through the one-sidedness of the adapted function, so also the adaptation to the inner world may fail through the one-sidedness of the function concerned with it. If, for example, the heaping up of the libido resulted from the failure of the thinking attitude vis-à-vis the demands of external adaptation, and if the unconscious feeling function is activated through regression, there then exists only a 'feeling into' attitude with respect to the inner world. This may at first suffice, but after a time it will cease to be adequate, and the thinking function must likewise be requisitioned, just as was necessary in the reverse way when the outer world was

in question. Thus a complete orientation toward the inner world becomes a necessity until the inner adaptation is attained. Once the adaptation is achieved, progression can begin again.

The principle of progression and regression is reflected in the myth of the whale-dragon,<sup>1</sup> worked out by Frobenius, as I have shown in detail in my book, *The Psychology of the Unconscious*. The hero is the symbolical representative of the libido movement. The entrance into the dragon is the regressive course, while the journey towards the east (the night journey under the sea) with its attendant events symbolizes the effort towards adaptation to the conditions of the psychic inner world. The complete swallowing up and disappearance of the hero in the belly of the dragon represents the complete withdrawal of interest from the outer world. The overcoming of the monster from within is the achievement of adaptation to the conditions of the inner world ; and finally, the escape with the help of a bird from the monster's body, which happens at the moment of sunrise, is the renewal of progression. It is characteristic that while the hero is within its belly the monster begins the night sea journey towards the east, that is to say, towards the sunrise. This seems to me to point to the fact that the regression is not necessarily a backward step in the sense of involution or degeneration, but rather represents a necessary phase in development. The individual has, however, no awareness of this development ; he feels himself to be in a state of compulsion that resembles an early infantile state, or even an embryonic condition within the womb. If he lingers on in this condition, then only can we speak of involution or degeneration.

Similarly, progression is not to be confused with development, since the uninterrupted flow or outpouring of life is not necessarily development or differentiation. From primordial times certain plant and animal species have

<sup>1</sup> L. Frobenius, *Das Zeitalter des Sonnengottes*, 1904.

remained at a standstill without further differentiation, and yet have continued to live. In the same way the mental life of man can be progressive without evolution, and regressive without involution. Evolution and involution have as a matter of fact no immediate relation with progression and regression, inasmuch as these latter are life-movements only which, notwithstanding their movement, actually have a stationary character. They correspond to what Goethe has described as systole and diastole.<sup>1</sup>

Many objections have been raised against conceiving myths as representing psychological facts. We are loth to give up the idea that the myth is some kind of explanatory allegory of astronomical, meteorological, or vegetative processes. The coexistence of explanatory tendencies is certainly not to be denied, since there is abundant proof of the fact that the myth also has an explanatory meaning, but we are still faced with the question: why should the myth explain in this allegorical way? We have to understand whence the primitive derives this explanatory material; for it must not be forgotten that the causal principle is not the powerful factor in the mind of the primitive as it is with us. He is far less interested in explaining things than in weaving fables. We can see almost daily in our patients the way mythical phantasies arise. They are not thought out, but present themselves as pictures, or as a series of representations that

<sup>1</sup> Diastole is the extraversion of the libido that extends into everything. Systole is its concentration upon the individual, the monad. ("Systole, the conscious powerful contraction, which brings forth the individual, and diastole, the yearning to embrace the all." Chamberlain, p. 571.) To remain in one or the other of the two attitudes means death (p. 571), and therefore the one type is insufficient and needs completion through the opposite function. ("If a man holds himself exclusively in the receptive attitude, if diastole persists indefinitely, then there comes into the psychic life, just as into the body, crippling and finally death. Only action can restore life, and the first condition is limitation, that is systole, which creates a sharply defined measure. The more energetic the act, the more resolute must be the enforcing of the limitation." H. St. Chamberlain, *Goethe*, 1912, p. 581.)

force their way out of the unconscious, and when recounted, often have the character of connected episodes which possess the value of mythical presentation. That is how myths arise, and that is why the phantasies from the unconscious have so much in common with primitive myths. But in so far as the myth is nothing else but a projection from the unconscious, and not at all a conscious invention, it is quite understandable that we should everywhere come upon the same motives in myths, and that the myth should actually present typical psychological phenomena.

The question must now be considered as to how the processes of progression and regression are to be understood energetically. That they are essentially dynamic processes is by now sufficiently clear. Progression might be compared to a water-course that flows from a mountain into a valley. The damming up of libido corresponds to a specific obstruction in the direction of the flow, such as a dyke, which transforms the kinetic energy of the flow into the potential energy of position. Through the damming back the water is forced into another channel, if the water behind the dam reaches a height that permits it to overflow in another direction. Perhaps it will flow into a canal where the energy arising from the difference in potential is transformed into electricity by means of a turbine. This transformation might serve as an image for the new progression brought about by the damming up and the regression. The changed character of the progression would be indicated by the new way in which the energy is now manifested. In this process of transformation the principle of equivalence has an especial heuristic value. The intensity of progression reappears in the intensity of regression.

It is not an essential postulate of the energetic view-point that there must be progression and regression of the libido, only that equivalent transformations must exist, for energetics sees only the *quantum*, but makes no attempt to explain the *quale*. Thus progression and regression are specific processes

which one must conceive as dynamic, and which as such are conditioned through the qualities of matter. Progression and regression, therefore, are not in any sense derived from the essential nature of the concept of energy, though in their reciprocal relation they can only be understood energetically. Why progression and regression should exist at all can be explained only from the qualities of matter, that is, by means of a mechanistic, causal hypothesis.

Progression as a continuous process of adaptation to environmental conditions is based upon the vital necessity for such adaptation. Necessity enforces complete orientation to the conditions of the environment, and the suppression of those tendencies and possibilities which serve individuation.

Regression on the other hand as an adaptation to the conditions of one's own inner world is founded upon the vital necessity of satisfying the demands of individuation. Man is not a machine in the sense that he can consistently maintain the same output of work. He can only meet the demands of outer necessity in an ideal way if he is also adapted to his own inner world, that is to say, if he is in harmony with himself. Conversely, he can only adapt to his inner world and achieve unity with himself when he is adapted to the environmental conditions. As experience shows, the one or the other function can be neglected for a time only. If, for example, only a one-sided adaptation to the outer world is attained while the inner is neglected, the value of the inner conditions is gradually increased, and the fact becomes manifest through the irruption of personal elements into the external adaptation. I have seen a drastic case of this in the person of a manufacturer who, having worked his way to a high level of success and attainment, began to remember a certain phase of his youth when he took great pleasure in art. He felt the necessity of returning to these pursuits and began to make artistic patterns for the wares he manufactured. The result was that no one wanted to buy these artistic products and the man became bankrupt after a

few years. His mistake lay in carrying over into the outer world what belonged to the inner, misunderstanding the demands of individuation. Such a striking failure of a previously adequate function of adaptation can be explained only by this typical misapprehension of the inner demands.

Although progression and regression are causally determined by the nature of the life processes on the one side, and by the environmental conditions on the other, none the less, when we look at them energetically, we must think of them only as means, or transitional points, in the flow of energy. Looked at from this angle, progression and its resulting achievement of adaptation become a means to regression, that is, to a manifesting of the inner world in the outer. In this way fresh means are created for attaining a changed mode of progression that represents a better adaptation to the environmental conditions.

#### **b. Extraversion and Introversion**

Progression and regression can be related to extraversion and introversion of the libido; the one as adaptation to outer conditions can be looked upon as extraversion, the other as adaptation to inner conditions can be taken as introversion. However, from this parallelism there might arise a considerable confusion of concepts, since progression and regression are only vaguely analogous to extraversion and introversion. In reality these latter concepts concern dynamisms of a kind different from progression and regression. The two last are dynamisms, or regularly determined transformations of energy, while extraversion and introversion, as their names indicate, are dynamisms, or forms, of progression or regression as the case may be. Progression is a movement of life the direction of which is forward in the same sense as the direction of time is forward. This movement can appear in two different forms, either extraverted when objects, that is, environmental conditions, are the predominant influence upon the character of the progression,

this character being the result of an extraverted attitude on the part of the individual ; or introverted if the progression has to conform with the conditions of the ego, or more strictly with the 'subjective factor'. Similarly, regression can proceed along two lines, either as a retreat from the outer world, introversion, or as a flight into extravagant, external experiences, extraversion. Lack of success makes of the first attitude a condition of dull brooding, while failure in extraversion means the life of the waster. These two different ways of reacting, which I have called extra- and introversion, correspond to two opposite types of attitude, and are described in detail in my book, *Psychological Types*.

The libido moves not only forward and backward, but also outward and inward. I have been at pains to set forth the psychology of the latter movement of the libido in my book on types, and will therefore forego further elaboration of it in this connexion.

### c. The Transposition of the Libido

In the *Psychology of the Unconscious* (Part iii, Chapter iii) I have used the expression 'transformation' of the libido to describe its energetic metamorphosis or conversion. I mean by this expression the shifting of psychic intensities or values from one content to another, a process corresponding to the so-called transformation of energy ; for example, in the steam engine the conversion of heat into the pressure of steam, and then into the energy of motion. Similarly the energy of certain psychological phenomena are transformed by suitable means into other dynamisms. In the work above mentioned I have given examples of this process of transformation, so that I can spare myself the labour of further illustration here.

When nature is left to herself energy is transformed along the lines of natural 'gradients' ; by this means natural phenomena are produced, but not work. So also man when left to himself lives as a natural phenomenon, and, in the

proper meaning of the word, produces no work. It is culture that provides the machine through which the natural potentials are employed for the achievement of work. That man should ever have discovered this machine must be due to something rooted deep in his nature, in the very nature, indeed, of the living creature as such. For living matter is itself a transformer of energy, life participating, in some still unknown fashion, in the transformation process. Life takes place through the fact, that it makes use of natural physical and chemical conditions as a means to its existence. The living body is a machine that converts the amount of energy taken up into its equivalents in other dynamic manifestations. One cannot say that physical energy is converted into life, but only that the transformation is the expression of life.

In the same way that the living body as a whole is a machine, so other adaptations to physical and chemical conditions also have the value of machines that make other forms of transformation possible. Thus, for example, all the means employed by an animal for the safeguarding and furthering of his existence, not to speak of the direct nourishment of his body, can be regarded as machines that make use of natural potential in order to produce work. When the beaver fells trees and dams up the flow of water, this is an effort of work conditioned through his differentiation; and this latter is a natural culture, which, like a machine, functions as a converter of energy. Similarly, human culture, as a natural product of differentiation, is a machine; first of all a technical one that uses natural conditions for the transformation of physical and chemical energy, but also a mental machine using mental conditions for the transformation of libido.

Just as it has been possible for man to discover the turbine, and, by leading a river to it, to convert the latter's energy of motion into electricity capable of manifold applications, so it has been possible for him to convert, through the aid



of a machine, natural energies that would otherwise flow away without accomplishing work into other dynamic forms productive of work.

The transformation of the instinctive energy occurs through its transference to an analogue of the object of the instinct. Just as a power station imitates a waterfall and thereby gets possession of the latter's energy, so the psychic mechanism imitates an instinct and thereby deprives it of its energy. A good example of this is a spring ceremonial of the Watschandies.<sup>1</sup> After digging a hole in the earth they surround it with bushes so that it suggests the female genitals. Around this hole they dance, holding their spears before them in such a way as to simulate the erected penis. While dancing about the hole they thrust their spears into the ground and cry: "Pulli nira, pulli nira, wataka!" (non fossa, non fossa, sed cunnus!) During the ceremony none of the participants is allowed to look at a woman.

By means of the cleft in the ground the Watschandies make an analogue of the female genitals, the object of the natural instinct. By the reiterated shouting and the ecstasy of the dance they suggest to themselves that the hole is really the vulva, and, in order not to have this illusion disturbed by the real object of the instinct, none may look upon a woman. We are dealing here with an indubitable case of canalization of energy, and the transference of it to an analogue of the original object by the imitation of the sexual act<sup>2</sup>; by means of the dance, moreover, which is really a mating-play, as with birds and other animals.

This dance has an extraordinary significance as a ceremony of earth-impregnation and therefore takes place in the spring. It is a magical act which has the purpose of transferring the libido to the earth, whereby the latter receives an especial

<sup>1</sup> Preuss, *Globus*, 86, p. 358, as well as Schultze, *Psychologie der Naturvölker*, p. 168, and Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> Compare this with the observation of Pechuël-Loesche, *Volkskunde von Loango*, 1907, p. 38. The dancers scrape the ground with one foot and carry out specific abdominal movements at the same time.

psychic value, becoming an object of expectation. The mind then busies itself with the earth, and is in turn determined by her, whereby the possibility, and even probability, is given that man will give her his attention, which is the psychological pre-requisite of the cultivation of the earth. Primitive cultivation actually results, although not exclusively, through the forming of sexual analogies. The 'bridal couch in the field' is a transference ceremony of this sort. On a spring night the peasant takes his wife out into the field and has intercourse with her there, in order to fertilize the field. In this way a close connexion and analogy is brought about, which acts like a canal that leads water from a natural river into a power-station. The instinctive energy is closely associated with the field, so that the cultivation of the latter receives the value of the sexual act. This association assures a permanent flow of interest to the field, which accordingly exerts an attraction upon the worker. He is thus led to occupy himself with the field in a way that is obviously favourable to fertility.

As Meringer has very aptly shown, the association of libido (in the sexual sense as well) and the tilling of the earth is expressed in usages of speech.<sup>1</sup> The putting of libido into the earth obviously takes place not through sexual analogies alone, but also through direct magical touch, as when the 'Walens' is used on the field.<sup>2</sup> To the primitive this transference of libido becomes so concrete a thing that he even inclines to regard his fatigue from work as a state of being 'sucked dry' by the dæmon of the field.<sup>3</sup> All great undertakings and efforts such as cultivation of the soil, hunting, war, etc., are entered upon by the primitive with ceremonies of magical analogy, or with preparatory charms, which quite manifestly have the psychological aim of leading over the

<sup>1</sup> Meringer, *Wörter und Sachen. Indogerm. Forsch.*, 16, pp. 179-84, and *The Psychology of the Unconscious*, p. 514.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Mannhardt, *Wald und Feldculte*, i, pp. 480 ff.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i, p. 483.

libido into the necessary activity. In the buffalo dances of the Taos Pueblos, the dancers represent both hunters and game. Through the excitement and pleasure of the dance the libido is brought over into the form of hunting activity. The needful pleasure of the dance is produced by rhythmic drumming, and the stimulating songs of the old men who direct the whole ceremony. It is well known that old people live in their memories and love to speak of their former deeds; this 'warms' them. Warmth 'kindles', and thus the old men in a sense give the first impulse to the dance; *i.e.* the mimetic ceremony the aim of which is to accustom the young men to the chase and to prepare them for it psychologically. Similar '*rites d'entr'ée*' are reported from many primitive tribes.<sup>1</sup> A classical example is the *Atinga* ceremony of the Aruntas. It consists in first stirring to anger the members of the tribe who are summoned for an expedition of revenge. This is accomplished by the leader tying the hair of the man to be avenged to the mouth and penis of the man who is to be made angry. At the same time the leader kneels on the man and embraces him as if performing the sexual act with him.<sup>2</sup> It is understood that by this means "the bowels of the man will be made to burn with desire to avenge the murder". The ceremony obviously serves to bring about an intimate acquaintanceship of each individual with the murdered man, and thus each is made to wish to avenge the dead.

The great circumstantial detail with which such ceremonies are often carried out shows how much is needed to divert the libido from its natural river-bed of daily custom into an unaccustomed activity. Modern reason thinks this can be achieved by a mere decision of the will, and that we thus escape all need of magical ceremonies. This largely explains why

<sup>1</sup> A comprehensive summary is to be found in Lévy-Brühl's *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, pp. 262 ff.

<sup>2</sup> See picture, p. 560, Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*.

for so long we have been at a loss to understand these primitive ceremonies. But when we remember that the primitives are much more unconscious, much nearer to being mere phenomena of nature than we are, and are therefore scarcely aware of what we call 'will', then it is easy to understand why the primitive needs detailed ceremonies where a simple act of will suffices us. We are more conscious, that is, more domesticated. In the course of the centuries we have been fortunate enough to master not only the wild nature about us, but also to subdue our own wildness—at least temporarily and to a certain degree! At all events, we have been acquiring 'will', that is, disposable energy; and, though perhaps not much, it is nevertheless more than the primitive possesses. Therefore we are no longer in need of magical dances in order to make us 'strong' for an undertaking, at least not in ordinary cases. Yet when we have in hand something that exceeds our powers, something that could easily go wrong, then, with the blessing of the church, we solemnly lay the foundation-stone, or we 'baptize' a ship as she slips from the docks; in time of war we assure ourselves of the aid of a patriotic god, the sweat of fear forcing a fervent prayer from the lips of the strongest. Thus there need be only conditions of some insecurity for the 'magical formalities' to be brought to life again in a quite natural fashion. Through these ceremonies the deeper emotional forces are released; conviction becomes blind auto-suggestion and the psychic field of vision is narrowed to one fixed point, upon which the whole weight of the unconscious *vis a tergo* is concentrated. And it is an objective fact that success attends the sure, rather than the unsure.

#### d. Symbol-making

The psychological machine which transforms energy is the symbol. I mean a real symbol and not a sign. The Watschandies' hole in the earth is not merely a sign or substitute for the genitals of the woman, but a symbol that

represents the idea of the earth-woman who is to be fertilized. To mistake it for a human woman would be to interpret the symbol semiotically, and this would fatally disturb the value of the ceremony. It is for this reason that none of the dancers may look upon a woman. The semiotic conception would destroy the machine in just the same way as the destruction of the conduit-pipe would incapacitate a turbine. It would indeed be a very unnatural sort of water-fall that owed its existence to the suppression of natural conditions. Far be it from me to assert that the semiotic interpretation is meaningless; it is not only possible, but also very true. Its usefulness is undisputed in all those cases where nature is merely crippled, without any effective accomplishment coming from it. But the semiotic interpretation becomes meaningless when it is applied exclusively and schematically, when, in short, it ignores the real nature of the symbol and seeks to depreciate it to the level of a mere sign.

The first achievement wrung by the primitive from instinctive energy, through the practice of analogy, is magic. A ceremony is magic so long as it is not carried out in effective work, but preserves the state of expectation. In this latter case the energy is led over into a new object and produces a new dynamism, which, however, remains magical only so long as it creates no effective work. The advantage to be derived from a magical ceremony lies in the fact that the newly-invested object contains an effective possibility in relation to the psyche. Through its value it works in a determining and creative fashion, so that for a long time the mind is gripped and possessed by it. Further action is thus stimulated, and this is carried into effect upon the magical object in half-playful practices and exercises, chiefly rhythmical in character. A good example is found in those South American cliff drawings which consist of furrows deeply graven in the hard stone. They have been made by the Indians in a kind of play going over the furrows again and again with stones, and this practice has been kept up for centuries.

It is hard to ascribe any meaning to the contents of the designs, the activity bound up with them, however, is incomparably significant.<sup>1</sup> The influence exerted upon the mind by the magically effective object brings with it other possibilities. Through a sustained playful interest in the object, a man may make all sorts of discoveries about it which otherwise would have escaped him. Many discoveries have actually been made in just this way. It is not in vain that magic is called the mother of science. Until late in the Middle Ages what we call to-day natural science was nothing else than magic. A striking example of this is alchemy, the symbolism of which shows quite unmistakably the principle of the transformation of energy I have described above. Indeed the later alchemists were actually conscious of this wisdom.<sup>2</sup> But only through the evolution of magic into science, that is, through the progress from a condition of mere expectation to actual work on the object have we come to that mastery of the forces of nature which the age of magic dreamed of. Even the dream of the alchemist about the transformation of the elements has been fulfilled. The magical distant effect has been realized through the discovery of electricity. Therefore we have every reason to value the making of symbols, and to tender our homage to the symbol as the invaluable means by which we are able to use for effective work the merely instinctive flow of the energetic process. A waterfall is certainly more beautiful than a power station, but *diva necessitas* teaches us to value electric lighting and electrical industry more highly than the lovely uselessness of the waterfall that refreshes us only for a quarter of an hour on a holiday walk.

Just as in physical Nature only a very small portion of the natural energy can be transformed into practically useful energy, and by far the greater part must be left to

<sup>1</sup> Th. Koch, *Südamerikanische Felszeichnungen*, 1907.

<sup>2</sup> Compare H. Silberer, *Probleme der Mystik*, and also Chr. Rosencreutz, *Chymische Hochzeit*.

work itself out in natural phenomena, so in our psychical Nature, only a small part of the total energy can be drawn away from the natural flow. An incomparably greater part of the energy cannot be utilized by us, but goes to sustain the regular course of life. Therefore the libido is by nature apportioned out to the various function-systems from which it cannot be wholly withdrawn. The libido is invested in these functions as specific force that is not to be transformed. Only in a case where a symbol offers a greater potential than nature, is it possible to convert the libido into other forms. The history of culture has sufficiently demonstrated that man possesses a relative superfluity of energy which is capable of application over and above the merely natural flow. The fact that the symbol makes this deflection of energy possible shows that not all the libido is bound up in a form determined by natural law whereby a regular course is enforced, but that a certain quantum of energy remains over, and may be termed excess libido. It is conceivable that this excess may be due to failure on the part of the permanently organized functions to compensate sufficiently the differences in intensity. They might be compared to a water system the calibre of which is too small to conduct a sufficient quantity of the water that is being steadily supplied. The water will then overflow in one way or another. From this excess of libido certain psychical processes result which cannot be explained, or only very inadequately explained, by merely natural conditions. How are we to explain the religious processes, for instance, the nature of which is essentially symbolical? In the form of representations, symbols are religious ideas; in the form of action, they are rites or ceremonies. Symbols are the manifestation and expression of the excess libido. At the same time, they are transitions to new activities, which must be specifically characterized as cultural activities in contrast to the instinctive functions that run their course according to natural law.

I have also called the symbol which converts energy a libido analogue.<sup>1</sup> By this I define a representation that is suited to express the libido equivalent, by virtue of which the libido is led over into a form different from the original one. Mythology offers innumerable images of this sort, ranging from sacred objects like *churingas*, fetishes, etc., up to the figures of gods. The rites, with which the sacred objects are surrounded, often disclose very plainly their character as transformers of energy. Thus, for example, the primitive rubs his *churinga* rhythmically and thereby takes into himself the magic power of the fetish, at the same time imparting a fresh 'charge' to the fetish.<sup>2</sup> An example of a higher stage on the same line of development is found in the totem idea, with which the beginnings of tribal formation are intimately bound up, and which leads over directly to the idea of the palladium, the protective and tribal divinity, and to the idea of human community-organization in general. The transformation of libido through the symbol is a process that has been taking place since the beginning of time and its effectiveness continues. Symbols are never thought out consciously; they are always produced from the unconscious in the way of so-called revelation, or intuition.<sup>3</sup> Judging from the close relation of the mythological symbol to the dream symbol, and in view of the fact that, as P. Lejeune says, the dream is "le dieu des sauvages", it is more than probable that the greater part of the historical symbols arise

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology of the Unconscious.*

<sup>2</sup> Spencer and Gillen, *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904, p. 277.

<sup>3</sup> "Man, of course, has always been trying to understand and control his environment, but in the early stages this process was unconscious. The matters, which are problems for us, existed latent in the primitive brain; there undefined lay both problem and answer; through many ages of savagery, first one and then another partial answer emerged into consciousness; at the end of the series, hardly completed to-day, there will be a new synthesis in which riddle and answer are one." A. E. Crawley, *The Idea of the Soul*, 1909, p. 11.



directly from dreams, or at least are inspired by them.<sup>1</sup> As to the choice of the totem, we are quite certain of the part played by dreams, and corresponding evidence as to the choice of the gods is also at hand. This symbol function, existing since the most ancient times, is still present to-day in spite of the fact that for many centuries the tendency of mental development has been toward the forcible suppression of individual symbols. One of the first steps in this direction was the establishing of an official state religion, a further step was the rooting out of polytheism, the first beginnings of which is to be found in the attempt of Amenophis IV. We know how much the Christian era has achieved in the suppression of individual symbol-making. As the intensity of the Christian idea begins to pale, we may anticipate a corresponding renewal of individual symbol-formation. The prodigious increase of Christian sects since the eighteenth century, the century of 'enlightenment', is already a speaking witness to this anticipation. The great spread of 'Christian Science', theosophy, anthroposophy, and Mazdeism are further steps along the same path.

In practical work with our patients we come at every step upon such symbol-formations, the purpose of which is the transformation of libido. At the beginning of treatment we find the symbol-forming process at work, but in a relatively purposeless form, as shown by the fact that it affords too little potential. The libido is not converted into effective work, but flows away unconsciously along the old channel, that is, into archaic sexual phantasies and phantastic activities. Accordingly the patient remains at war with himself, in other words, neurotic. In such a case analysis in the strict sense of the word is indicated—that is, the reductive method inaugurated by Freud, whereby all inappropriate symbols are split up and reduced to their

<sup>1</sup> "Les rêves sont pour les sauvages ce que la Bible est pour nous, a source de la révélation divine." Gatschet, *The Klamath Language contributed to the N. American Ethnological Review*, ii, 1, cit. in Lévy-Brühl, *Les fonctions mentales*.

natural elements. The power-works lying too high and built unsuitably are torn down and separated into their primitive constituents, the original flow of water being thus re-established. Nevertheless the unconscious continues to make symbols which one might obviously continue to reduce to their elements, *ad infinitum*. But man can never rest satisfied with the natural course of things, because he always has an excess of libido that can be offered a more favourable outlet than the merely natural one ; accordingly he inevitably goes in search of it, no matter how often he may be forced by reduction back into the natural channels. We have therefore reached the conviction that when the unsuitable structures have been reduced, and the natural course of things restored, the possibility of a normal life being thus attained, reduction is not to be pushed further. Instead there should be a reinforcement of the symbol-forming tendency in a synthetic direction, so that a more favourable gradient for the excess of libido may be found.

Reduction to the natural condition is for men neither an ideal nor a panacea. If the natural were really the ideal condition, then the primitive would be leading an enviable existence. But that is by no means so, for together with all the other sorrows and fatigues of human life, the primitive is tortured by superstitions, anxieties, and compulsions to such a degree that, if he lived in our civilization, he could not be described as other than profoundly neurotic, if not indeed mad. What would one say of a European who conducted himself in the following fashion? A negro had a dream in which he was pursued by his enemies, caught and burned alive. The next day he got his relatives to make a fire, and had himself laid with his feet in the fire, under the conviction that this apotropæic<sup>1</sup> ceremony would forestall the mishap of which he had dreamed. He was so badly burned that for many months he was unable to stir.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Apotropæic, that which averts.

<sup>2</sup> Lévy-Brühl, *Les fonctions mentales*, p. 54.

Mankind has been freed from these senseless anxieties by the continually progressive symbol-formation which leads to culture. The regression to nature must therefore necessarily be followed by a synthetic building up of the symbol. Reduction leads down to the primitive natural man and his peculiar mentality. Freud has had chiefly in view the ruthless desire for pleasure, Adler the 'psychology of prestige'. These certainly are two quite essential peculiarities of the primitive psyche, but they are far from being the only ones. For the sake of completeness one must also mention other characteristics of primitive mentality, such as the playful, the mystical, the 'heroic', etc.; but above all that conspicuous fact of the primitive mind, its abandonment to supra-personal 'powers', be they instincts, affects, superstitions, phantasies, magicians, witches, spirits, demons, or gods. Reduction leads into the inferiority of the primitive, a position from which civilized man hopes to have escaped. Just as reduction makes a man acquainted with his subservience to 'powers', thereby presenting him with a rather dangerous problem, so the synthetic treatment of the symbol brings him to the religious problem, not so much to the problem of present religious creeds as to the religious problem of the primitive. Against the very real powers that dominate him only an equally real fact can offer help and protection; no thought-system, but direct experience only, can hold the balance against the blind power of the instincts.

In opposition to the polymorphism of the primitive instinctual nature stands the regulating principle of individuation; the multiplicity and inner division of part contradicting part is opposed by a contractive unity, the power of which is just as great as that of the instincts. Taken together, both form one of the self-regulating necessary pairs of opposites, often spoken of as nature and spirit. But the foundations of these conceptions are psychic conditions between

which human consciousness moves to and fro like the pointer of the scales.

Primitive mentality is only given to us as a direct experience in the form of the infantile psyche that still lives in our memories. The peculiarities of this childish psyche are conceived by Freud, and quite justly, as infantile sexuality; for out of this germinal beginning there develops the later, mature sexual being. But Freud deduces all sorts of other mental peculiarities from this infantile germ state, so that it almost begins to look as though the mind also came from a sexual pre-stage, and therefore were nothing else than an offshoot of sexuality. Freud overlooks the fact that the infantile, polyvalent beginnings are not merely a peculiar, perverse pre-stage of a normal and mature sexuality, but that they seem peculiarly perverse just because they are not only the pre-stage to mature sexuality, but also to the mental peculiarities of the individual. The complete adult man grows out of the germinal stage, and therefore the latter is no more exclusively sexual than is the mind of the grown man. There are to be found in these origins not only the beginnings of an adult life, but also the whole ancestral inheritance, unlimited in range. This inheritance includes not only the instincts from the animal stage, but also all those differences of culture which have left behind transmissible memory traces. Thus every child is born with a great split in his make-up; on the one side a more or less animal-like, unconscious nature, on the other, the last embodiment of an ancient and endlessly complicated inheritance. This split causes the tension found in the infantile psyche, and explains in addition many other riddles of infant psychology—which cannot be said to be poor in such riddles. To be sure, every kindergarten teacher ‘understands’ child-psychology. For me it is one of the most difficult psychological questions.

If now, by means of a reductive procedure, we uncover the infantile pre-stages of an adult psyche, we find as the ultimate

foundation the infantile seeds, containing on the one side the later natural sexual creature in *statu nascendi*, and on the other, all those evolved, historical pre-conditions belonging to culture. This is beautifully mirrored in the dreams of children. Many of these are very simple 'childish' dreams, and are immediately understandable, but others contain almost vertiginous possibilities of content and meaning, only revealing their deeper significance in the light of primitive parallels. This other side is the mind *in nuce*. Childhood is therefore not only important because it is the starting point for possible crippling of instinct, but also because this is the time when, terrifying or encouraging, those far-seeing dreams and images come from the soul of the child, which prepare his whole destiny. In childhood, too, those retrospective intuitions first arise, which extend far beyond the limits of childish experience into the life of the ancestors. Thus in the child's soul there is already a 'natural' as opposed to a spiritual condition. It is recognized that man living in the state of nature is in no sense merely 'natural' like an animal, but sees, believes, fears, worships things the meaning of which is not at all discoverable from the conditions of his natural environment. The underlying meaning of these things leads us in fact far away from all that is natural, obvious, or easily intelligible, and not infrequently contrasting most vividly with the instincts of every living creature. We need only remind ourselves of all those gruesome rites and customs of primitives against which every natural feeling rises in revolt, or of all those convictions and ideas which are in indisputable contradiction to the evidence of the facts. These things force us to the assumption that the spiritual principle, whatever that may be, enforces itself against the merely natural conditions with an incredible strength. One might say that this is also 'natural', and that both forces have their origin in one and the same 'nature'. I do not in the least doubt this origin, but I must point out that this 'natural' something presents a conflict between two principles

to which, according to taste, one can give this or that name, and that this opposition is the expression, and perhaps also the foundation, of the tension which we term psychic energy.

From theoretical considerations also we could affirm the existence in children also of such a tension of opposites. Without it there could be no energy, since, as Heraclitus has said, "War is the father of all things."<sup>1</sup> As I have already shown, this conflict can be understood as an opposition between the profoundly natural creature in the new-born man, and a measure of highly differentiated inheritance. The natural man is characterized by unmitigated instinctiveness. He is completely delivered over to the instincts. The heritage that stands in opposition to this condition consists in the memory deposits from all the experiences of his ancestors. One is inclined to approach this assumption with scepticism because one thinks that 'inherited' ideas are meant. That is not the case. What is meant is rather inherited possibilities of ideas, 'paths' that have been gradually developed through the cumulative experience of the ancestors. To deny the inheritance of these paths would be equivalent to denying the inheritance of the brain. To be logical such sceptics would have to maintain that the child is born with an ape's brain. Since, however, it is born with a human brain, this must sooner or later begin to function in a human way, and apparently it will begin at the level of the most recent ancestors. Obviously this functioning remains deeply unconscious to the child. At first he is conscious only of the instincts; and all that opposes them is embodied in his visible parents. Thus the child has no idea that what stands in his way may be within himself. Rightly or wrongly, whatever interferes with him is projected upon the parents or surrogates. This infantile prejudice clings so persistently that we physicians often have the greatest trouble in persuading our patients that the wicked father who forbade everything was far more inside than

<sup>1</sup> πόλεμος πατήρ πάντων.

outside themselves. Everything that works from the unconscious appears projected on others. These others are not wholly guiltless, to be sure, for even the worst projection is at least hung on a hook, perhaps a very small one, but still a hook offered by the other person.

Although our inheritance consists in physiological paths, still it was mental processes in our ancestors that created the paths. If these traces come to consciousness again in the individual, they can do so only in the form of mental processes; and if these processes can become conscious only through individual experience and thus appear as individual acquisitions, they are none the less pre-existing traces, which are merely 'filled-out' by the individual experience. Every 'impressive' experience is such an impression, in an ancient but previously unconscious stream-bed.

The pre-existing paths are hard facts, as indisputable as the historical fact of man having built a city out of his original dwelling-cave. This development was possible only through community culture, and the latter was possible only through the restriction of instinct. The curbing of instinct is maintained through mental processes with the same force and with the same results in the individual as in the history of peoples. The controlling of instinct is a normative or, more accurately, a nomothetical process; and its power comes from the unconscious fact of inherited disposition, the deposits of the mental processes of the ancestors. The mind, as the effective principle in the inheritance, is made up from the sum of the ancestral minds, the unseen fathers,<sup>1</sup> whose authority is born with the child.

The philosophical concept of spirit<sup>2</sup> has never yet been able to free itself as a term from the overpowering bond of

<sup>1</sup> Söderblom, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*, pp. 88 ff. and 175 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Up to this point the German word 'Geist' has been consistently translated as 'mind', similarly 'geistig' as 'mental'; this rendering being manifestly nearer the author's meaning than 'spirit', but here the sense demands the original meaning. [Translator.]

identity with the other concept of spirit, namely, ghost. Religious intuition, on the other hand, has succeeded in getting over the linguistic association with ghosts, by characterizing spiritual (*geistige*) authority as God.

In the course of centuries this intuition has grown into a formulation of that spiritual principle which is opposed to mere instinctiveness. What is specially significant in this concept is the fact that God is also conceived as the creator of nature. He is looked upon as the maker of those incomplete creatures who err and sin, and at the same time he is their judge and educator. Simple logic would say: if I make a creature who falls into error and sin, and is practically worthless through his blind instinctiveness, I am manifestly a bad creator and have not even completed my apprenticeship. (This argument played an important rôle in gnosticism.) But the religious point of view is not overthrown by this criticism; it asserts that the ways and intentions of God are inscrutable. Actually the gnostic argument found little favour in history, since plainly the inviolability of the idea of God corresponded to a vital need before which every sort of logic paled. (It is to be understood that we are speaking here not of God as *Ding an sich*, but only of a human intuition which, as such, is a legitimate object of science.)

Although the concept of God is a spiritual principle *par excellence*, none the less the collective need will have it that it is at the same time an intuition of the first creative cause, out of which proceed all the forces of instinct that resist the spiritual principle. Thus God would be not only the spiritual light, appearing as the latest flower on the tree of evolution, not only the spiritual goal of redemption in which all creation culminates, not only the end and the purpose, but also the darkest, most primordial cause of nature's blackest deeps. This is a tremendous paradox which manifestly corresponds to a profound psychological truth. For it asserts an essential contradictoriness in one and the same being, a being whose innermost nature consists



in the tension between opposites. Science calls this 'being' energy, since energy is that something which is like a moving balance between the opposites. For this reason, an intuition of God, in itself impossibly paradoxical, may be so satisfying to human needs that no logic, however apparently valid, can stand against it. As a matter of fact, even the most profound contemplation could scarcely have discovered a more appropriate formula for this fundamental fact of inner perception.

It is not I believe, superfluous to have discussed in considerable detail the nature of the opposites that underlie psychic energy.<sup>1</sup> The Freudian theory consists in a causal explanation of the psychology of instinct. From this standpoint the spiritual principle can appear only as an appendage, a by-product of the instincts. Inasmuch as its restricting and repressive power cannot be denied, this principle has been ascribed to the influences of education, moral authorities, conventions, and traditions. These higher factors in their turn derive their power, according to the theory, from repression in the manner of a vicious circle. The spiritual principle is not recognized as the corresponding equivalent and opposite of the dynamis of instinct.

The spiritual view-point, on the other hand, has embodied itself in religious intuition, which I can assume to be sufficiently recognized. The Freudian psychology seems to threaten this view-point, but is not more of a menace than materialism in general, whether scientific or practical. The theoretical one-sidedness of the Freudian sexual theory is at least significant as a symptom. Even if it has no scientific justification, it has a moral one. It is doubtless true that instinct in the field of sexuality collides most frequently and most conspicuously with moral views. The

<sup>1</sup> I have treated this same problem from other aspects and in a different way in the *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 193-4, and p. 480; also in *Instinct and the Unconscious*, included in the present volume, and in *Psychological Types*, p. 240.

collision between infantile inactivity and the ethical order can never be avoided. It is, as I believe, the *conditio sine qua non* of psychic energy. It is self-evident, we all agree, that murder, stealing, and ruthlessness of every sort are inadmissible; yet, we speak of a sexual question, not of a murder question, nor of a rage problem. Social reform is never invoked in favour of those who wreak their bad tempers on their fellow men. All these things are examples of instinctive behaviour, yet the necessity for their suppression seems to us self-evident. Only after sexuality do we put the mark of interrogation. This points to a doubt. We begin to wonder whether our present moral concepts and the legal institutions based upon them are really adequate or suitable for their ends. No discerning person would contest the fact that in this field there are sharply divided opinions. No problem of this kind could exist if public opinion were united about it. Manifestly a reaction is taking place against a too rigorous morality. It is not just an outbreak of primitive instinct; such outbreaks, we know, are never concerned with restrictive laws and moral problems. In this reaction, however, the question is seriously raised whether our present moral conceptions have dealt fairly with the nature of sexuality. Out of this doubt there springs a legitimate interest in the attempt to understand sexuality more truly and deeply; and this interest has given birth not only to the Freudian psychology, but also to many other investigations. The special emphasis, therefore, that Freud has given to sexuality could be taken as a more or less conscious answer to the question of the hour; and conversely, the recognition that Freud has received from the public might prove how well-timed his answer was. An attentive and critical reader of Freud's writings cannot fail to remark how eminently comprehensive is his concept of sexuality. In fact it covers so much that one is often moved to wonder why in certain places the author makes use of sexual terminology at all. His concept of sexuality includes not

only the physiological sexual processes, but almost every stage, phase, and condition of feeling and desire. This extraordinary flexibility makes his concept universally applicable, but not to the advantage of the explanations resulting therefrom. By using this inclusive concept one can explain a work of art, or a religious experience in exactly the same terms as a hysterical symptom. The absolute difference between these three things drops entirely out of consideration, and therefore the explanation must be only an apparent one for at least two of the things mentioned. Apart from these inconveniences, however, it is psychologically correct to attack the problem of the instincts directly from the side of sexuality, because just there lies something that stimulates thought in the unprejudiced mind. The conflict between the ethical and the sexual is to-day not just a direct collision between the instincts and morality, it is a struggle to give to an instinct its proper place in existence. We have to recognize in this instinct a power which seeks expression and which apparently may not be trifled with; accordingly it cannot be just made to fit in with our well-meaning moral laws.

Sexuality is not merely instinctiveness, but an indisputable creative power that is not only the fundamental cause of our individual lives, but also an increasingly serious factor in our psychic life. To-day we know all too well the grave results that sexual disorders can bring in their train. We might call sexuality the spokesman of the instincts; therefore the spiritual standpoint sees it as its chief antagonist, not at all because sexual indulgence in and for itself is more immoral than excessive eating and drinking, avarice, tyranny, and other extravagances, but because the spirit senses in sexuality a peer, a counterpart related to itself. For just as the spirit would subordinate sexuality, like every other instinct to its form, so sexuality in its turn has an ancient claim upon the spirit, which once—in begetting, in pregnancy, in birth and childhood—it contained within itself; moreover,

the spirit can never dispense with the passion of sexuality in its creations.

What after all would spirit be, if it had no peer among the instincts to oppose it? It would be an empty form. A reasonable consideration of the other instincts has become for us a self-evident necessity, but with sexuality it is otherwise. Sexuality is for us still problematical; which means that we have not as yet come to that degree of consciousness which would enable us to do full justice to the instinct without a grievous spiritual injury. Freud is not only a scientific investigator of sexuality, but also its champion; and therefore, having regard to the great importance of the sexual problem, I recognize in his concept of sexuality at least a moral justification, although this does not permit me to give it a scientific acceptance.

This is not the place to discuss the possible grounds for the contemporary attitude toward sexuality. It is sufficient to point out that to us sexuality seems the strongest and most immediate instinct,<sup>1</sup> standing out as *the* instinct above all others. On the other hand, I must also emphasize the fact that the spiritual principle does not, strictly speaking, collide with instinct, but only with blind instinctiveness, which really amounts to an unjustifiable preponderance of the instinctive nature over the spiritual. Spirituality appears in the psyche as an instinct also, as a real passion indeed, 'a consuming fire' as Nietzsche has expressed it, an analogy with the miracle of Pentecost. It is not derived from another instinct, as an 'instinct-psychology' would have it; it is definitely a principle *sui generis*, an indispensable form of instinctual power. I have treated this problem in a special investigation, which must absolve me from further treatment here.<sup>2</sup>

In accordance with the way these two possibilities of the

<sup>1</sup> With primitives, where the food question plays a much greater part, this is not the case.

<sup>2</sup> *Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 270, in the present volume.

human mind are presented, the way of symbol-formation goes. Reduction effects the destruction of unsuitable and inappropriate symbols and thereby a regression to the purely natural course, which causes a relative damming up of the libido. Most of the alleged 'sublimations' are compulsory products of this condition. They represent activities by which the unbearable surplus of libido is to some extent disposed of. But the really primitive demands are not covered by this procedure. If the psychology of this dammed up condition is studied carefully and without preconceived opinions, it is easy to discover in it the germs of a primitive religion, and one of a very individual kind which is altogether different from the regnant dogmatic religion of the community.

Since the building up of a religion or the forming of symbols is just as important an interest of the primitive mind as the satisfaction of instinct, the way to further development is logically given. The way that leads out of the primitive condition is the making of a religion of an individual character. In this way the individuality drops the veil of the collective personality, which would be quite impossible in the state of 'reduction', since the instinctive nature is, in its way, thoroughly collective. The development of the individuality is also impossible, or at any rate seriously hindered, if forced sublimations in the direction of cultural or social activities result from the state of 'reduction', inasmuch as these in their way are equally collective. But since human beings are for the greater part collective beings, these forced sublimations are therapeutic results which are not to be depreciated, because they make it possible for many people to bring a certain amount of useful activity into their lives. We must also include in this category of cultural 'activities' the practice of a religion within the existing framework of a collective religion. The astonishing breadth of the Catholic symbolism offers an acceptance to the feeling which for many natures is absolutely satisfying. The immediate relation to God that characterizes Protestantism satisfies the mystical

passion for independence; and theosophy with its unlimited speculative possibilities meets the gnostic need for sublime intuitions.

These organizations, or systems, are symbols (*σύμβολον*=confession of faith), which make it possible for man to erect a spiritual counterpole to primitive instinctive nature; a cultural attitude, as opposed to mere instinctiveness. This has been the function of all religions. For a long time, and for the great majority of mankind, the symbol of a collective religion has sufficed. It is perhaps only for a time, and for relatively few men, that the existing collective religions are inadequate. Wherever the cultural process is moving forward, whether in separate individuals or in groups, the disintegration of collective convictions is to be found. Every forward step in culture is psychologically an extension of consciousness, a coming to consciousness that can take place only through discrimination. An advance, therefore, always begins with individuation, that is to say, through the fact that an individual, conscious of his uniqueness, cuts a new way through hitherto untrodden country. To do this he must first return to the fundamental facts of his own being, quite irrespective of all authority and tradition, and allow himself to become conscious of his distinctiveness. In so far as he succeeds in giving collective validity to his widened consciousness, he creates a tension of the opposites that provides the stimulation needed by culture for its further advance.

It is not true that the development of the individuality is under all circumstances either necessary or opportune. Yet one may well believe, as Goethe has said, that 'the greatest happiness of the children of earth lies only in personality', and that there are relatively many people to whom the development of individuality is the prime necessity, especially in a cultural epoch like ours, that is literally flattened out by collective norms—an epoch where the newspaper is the master of the earth. According to my experience there are,

among people of mature age, very many for whom the development of individuality is an indispensable need. Thus I have formed the private and tentative opinion that it is just the mature man who, in our times, has the greatest need of some further education in individual culture after his youthful education, in school and perhaps in the university, has formed him on exclusively collective lines and soaked him through and through with the collective mentality. It has often been my experience that men of mature age are in this respect actually capable of education to a most unexpected degree, although it is just those ripened and strengthened through the experience of life who resist most vigorously the purely reductive standpoint.

Obviously it is the youthful period of life that has most to gain from the thorough-going recognition of the instinctive side. The timely recognition of sexuality for example can prevent that neurotic suppression which keeps a man unduly withdrawn from life, or which forces him into a wretched and unsuitable way of living with which he is bound to be in conflict. The proper recognition and evaluation of the normal instincts leads a young man into life and entangles him with fate, thus bringing him to life's necessities and the consequent sacrifices and efforts through which his character is developed and his experience matured. For the adult man, however, the continued extension of life is obviously not the right principle, because the descent towards the afternoon of life demands simplification, limitation, and intensification; that is to say, it demands individual culture. The man in the first half of life with its biological orientation, can usually, thanks to the youthfulness of his whole organism, afford to expand his life and make something of it that is generally serviceable. But the man in the second half of life is orientated towards culture, the diminishing powers of his organism permitting him to subordinate his instincts to the view-point of culture. Not a few are wrecked in the transitional phase between the biological and the

cultural sphere. Our collective education provides practically nothing for this transitional period. Concerned solely with the education of youth we disregard the education of the adult man, of whom it is always assumed—on what grounds who can say?—that he needs no more education. There is an almost total lack of guidance for this extraordinarily important change of attitude with its transformation of energy from the biological to the cultural form. The transformation process is individual and cannot be enforced through general rules and maxims. It is achieved by means of the symbol as mentioned above. This most fundamental problem of the formation of symbols cannot be discussed here. I must refer the reader to the fifth chapter of my *Psychological Types*, where the problem is treated very thoroughly.

#### IV. THE PRIMITIVE CONCEPTION OF LIBIDO

The intimate connexion existing between the beginnings of religious symbol-formation and an energetic conception is shown by the most primitive ideas of magical potency, which is regarded as an objective force just as much as a state of subjective intensity.

I will give some illustrations of this. According to the report of McGee,<sup>1</sup> the Dakotas have the following conception of this 'power'. The sun is *wakanda*, not *the wakanda* or *a wakanda*, but simply *wakanda*. The moon is *wakanda*; so also is thunder, lightning, the stars, wind, etc. Men too, especially the shaman, are *wakanda*, also the demons of the elements, and fetishes, as well as other ritual objects; also many animals and places of an especially impressive character. McGee says: "The expression (*wakanda*) can perhaps be rendered by the word 'secret' better than any other, but even this concept is too narrow, because *wakanda* can equally well mean power, holy, old, size, alive, and immortal."

<sup>1</sup>15th Report U.S. Bureau of Ethnology, p. 182. In Lovejoy, *The Fundamental Concept of the Primitive Philosophy (The Monist, vol. xvi, p. 363)*.



Similar to the use of *wakanda* by the Dakotas, is that of *oki* by the Iroquois, and of *manitu* by the A gonquins, with the abstract meaning of 'power', or 'productive energy'. *Wakanda* is the perception of 'a universally extended, invisible, but useable and transferable life energy or universal power'.<sup>1</sup> The life of the primitive with all its interests is centred upon the possession of this power in sufficient amount. Especially valuable is the observation that a concept like that of *manitu* occurs also as an explanation of any astonishing experience. Hetherwick<sup>2</sup> reports the same thing of the Yaos, who cry '*Mulungu*' when they see something that amazes them, or that seems to them incredible. *Mulungu* also means: (1) the soul of man, which is called *lisoka* in life and becomes *mulungu* after death; (2) the entire spirit world; (3) the inherent, magic-working attribute or power of any kind of object, such as life, or the health of the body; (4) the active principle in everything that is magical, mysterious, inexplicable, and unexpected; (5) the great spiritual power that has created the world and all life.

Similar to this is the *wong* concept of the Gold Coast. *Wong* can be a river, a tree, an amulet, or a lake, a spring, an area of land, a termite mound, trees, crocodiles, apes, snakes, birds, etc. Tylor<sup>3</sup> falsely interprets the *wong* force animistically as 'spirit' or 'mind'. But the way in which *wong* is used shows that it is a dynamic relation between man and objects.

The *churinga*<sup>4</sup> concept of the Australians is also a similar

<sup>1</sup> Lovejoy, in *The Monist*, vol. xvi.

<sup>2</sup> Cit. Lévy-Brühl, p. 141.

<sup>3</sup> Edw. B. Tylor, *The Beginnings of Culture*.

<sup>4</sup> Comp. Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, p. 277. The following use of the *churinga* as a ritual object is cited: "The native has a vague, and undefined, but none the less strong conviction that any sacred object such as a *Churinga*, which has been handed down from generation to generation, is not only endowed with the magic power put into it when it was first made, but has gained some kind of virtue from every individual to whom it has belonged. A man who owns a *Churinga* will be seen constantly rubbing it with

energetic perception. It means: (1) the ritual object; (2) the body of an individual ancestor (from whom the life-force is derived); (3) the mystical attribute of certain objects.

There is the similar conception *zogo* of the Torres Straits, the word being used both as substantive and adjective. The Australian *arungquilha* is a parallel idea of similar meaning, only it is the word for bad magic, and for the wicked spirit that likes to swallow the sun in an eclipse.<sup>1</sup> Of a similar character is the Malay *badi*, which also includes evil magical relations.

The investigations of Lumholtz<sup>2</sup> have shown that the Mexican Huichols also have a fundamental intuition of a power that circulates through men, ritual animals and plants (stags, hikuli, grain, feathers, etc.).<sup>3</sup>

The investigations of Alice Fletcher among the North American Indians reveal the fact that the *wakan* concept is an energetic relation similar to the conceptions discussed above. A man may become *wakan* through fasting, prayer, or vision. The weapons of a young man are *wakan*; they must not be touched by a woman (because otherwise the libido becomes regressive). Thus the weapons are prayed to before battle (in order to make them powerful by charging them with libido). *Wakan* represents the connexion between the visible and the invisible, between the living and the dead, between the part and the whole of an object.

his hand, singing the while; and gradually, he comes to feel that there is some official association between him and the sacred object—that a virtue of some kind passes from it to him and from him to it." Fetishes are filled with new power, if left standing for weeks or months near other strong fetishes. Compare also Pechuël-Loesche, *Volkskunde vom Loango*, p. 366.

<sup>1</sup> Spencer and Gillen, *Northern Tribes*, p. 548.

<sup>2</sup> *Unknown Mexico*.

<sup>3</sup> Lévy-Brühl, *l.c.*, p. 139: "When the Huichols assert the identity of grain, stags, hikuli, and feathers, it is really a kind of classification made of their representations, a classification of which the directing principle is the common presence within these things, or rather the circulation among them, of a mystical power that is extremely important for the tribe."

Codrington<sup>1</sup> says of the Melanesian *mana* concept: "The Melanesian mind is completely possessed by the belief in a supernatural power, or influence which is almost universally known as *mana*. By this power everything is effected that transcends the ordinary power of man, and is outside the usual natural processes; it invests persons and things, and manifests itself in effects that could be ascribed to it alone. It is a power or influence of a non-physical, that is to say, of a supernatural nature, but it is manifested in physical strength, or in some sort of power or quality possessed by man. *Mana* is never fixed, and can be transferred to almost anything; it is possessed only by spirits, whether disembodied souls or supernatural beings, and by these it can be imparted. It is actually produced by persons, although it acts through the medium of water, or maybe through a stone, or a bone."

This description shows clearly that in the case of *mana*, as with the other concepts, one is dealing with an idea of psychological energy which alone enables us to interpret the remarkable fact of these primitive representations. Obviously it is not supposed that the primitive would form an abstract idea of energy, but without a doubt the intuition of the primitive is the concretistic pre-stage of the abstract idea of the energetic relation of psychological values.

Other identical intuitions are given us in the *tondi* concept of the Bataks<sup>2</sup>; in *atua* of the Maoris; in *ani* or *han* of the Ponapes; in *kasinge* or *kalit* of the Pelews; in *anut* of the Kusaie; in *yaris* of the Tobis, in *ngai* of the Masai, in *andriamanitra* of the Malagassi, in *njomm* of the Ekoi, etc.<sup>3</sup> Söderblom gives a complete survey of the field in his magnificent book, *Das Werden des Gottesglaubens*.

<sup>1</sup> Codrington, *The Melanesians*, 1891, p. 118. Seligman, in his book (*The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, 1910, p. 446), so rich in valuable observations, speaks of *bariaua*, which belongs also to the *mana* concept.

<sup>2</sup> Compare the extraordinarily illuminating work of Warnecke, *Die Religion der Batak*.

<sup>3</sup> Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*, p. 49, 1912.

Lovejoy has the view, in which I heartily concur, that these concepts are "not names for the supernormal or amazing; and they are certainly not attached to things that call forth reverent wonder, respect, or love—but rather to what is effective, powerful, and creative". The concept in question really concerns the idea of "a diffuse substance or energy, upon the acquisition of which every extraordinary force, or capacity, or fertility depends. This energy, under some conditions, is certainly terrible, and it is secret and inexplicable; but it has this character because of its extraordinary power, not because the things that manifest it are unusual, or supernatural, or else so constituted as to exceed reasonable expectation". The pre-animistic principle is the "belief in a power which warrants the assumption that it works according to definite rules and intelligible laws; a power that can be investigated and mastered". For this conception Lovejoy suggests the expression 'primitive energetics'.

Much that is taken by investigators animistically as spirit or demon, or numen, belongs to the primitive energy concept. As I have already remarked, it is really inaccurate to speak of a 'concept'. "A concept of the primitive philosophy," as Lovejoy expresses it, is an idea obviously born of our mentality, that is, it is taken by us as a psychological concept; but for the primitive it is a psychological phenomenon that is perceived as something inseparable from the object. An abstract idea is not to be found among primitives. As a rule they do not possess a simple concrete concept even, but only representations. Every primitive language offers rich examples of this. Thus *mana* is no concept, but a representation which is founded on the perception of the phenomenal relation. It is the essence of the 'participation mystique' described by Lévy-Brühl. In primitive speech only the fact and the experience of the relation are indicated, as some of the above examples clearly show, not the nature or essence of the relation, that is, the

principle determining it. The discovery of an appropriate symbolic designation of the nature and essence of the uniting force was reserved for a later cultural level.

In his classical work on *Mana*, Lehmann defines *mana* as the "thing that is extraordinarily effective". The psychical nature of *mana* is especially emphasized by Preuse (*Globus*, vols. 86-7), and Röhr (*Anthropos*, xiv-xv).

We cannot escape the impression that the primitive conception of *mana* is a pre-stage of our conception of psychic energy and most probably of the energy-concept in general.<sup>1</sup> The fundamental conception of *mana* goes back to personifications at the animistic level.<sup>2</sup> Here we have souls, demons, gods, which produce the most extraordinary effects. As Lehmann rightly points out, nothing 'divine' attaches to *mana*; accordingly one cannot see in *mana* the primitive form of the idea of god. None the less, it cannot be denied that *mana* is a necessary, or at least a very important, pre-condition of the development of the idea of God; perhaps even the most primitive of all pre-conditions. Another indispensable pre-condition is the factor of personification, for the explanation of which other psychological factors have to be employed.

The almost universal distribution of the primitive energy-concept is a clear expression of the fact that in earlier stages

<sup>1</sup> Compare my discussion of the way in which Robert Mayer discovered the concept of energy. *The Unconscious in the Normal and Pathological Mind in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, Baillière, 1928.

<sup>2</sup> Seligman (*The Melanesians*, pp. 640 ff.) reports observations which show transitions of *mana* into animistic personifications. Such a case is the *labuni* of the Gelaria people. *Labuni* is 'to send out'. It has to do with the dynamic (magic) effects which enter into, or can be applied to, others, and which derive from the ovaries of women who have borne children. *Labuni* look like 'shadows'; they use bridges to cross streams, change themselves into animals, but otherwise possess no personality or definable form. Similar to this is the *ayikh* conception of the Elgoni in N. Kenya. (Personal observation.)

of human consciousness the need was already felt to represent in a visible way, what man perceived of the dynamism of mental events. If therefore in our psychology we lay emphasis on the energetic view-point, this is in agreement with the psychic facts which have been graven upon the mind of man since primordial times.

## SPIRIT AND LIFE

THE connexion between spirit and life is one of those problems the treatment of which involves such very complicated factors, that we have to be on our guard lest we ourselves get caught in the word-nets in which we seek to snare the great riddle. For how can we include within the operations of a thought process those almost limitless complexes of facts we call 'spirit' or 'life', unless we represent them dramatically through verbal concepts (*Wortbegriffe*)—themselves mere counters of the intellect? The mistrust of verbal concepts invites real difficulties, and yet it is particularly appropriate when we undertake to speak of fundamental things. 'Spirit' and 'life' are familiar words with us, very old acquaintances in fact, pawns that for thousands of years have been pushed back and forth on the thinker's chessboard. The problem began in the grey dawn of time, when someone made the bewildering discovery that the living breath, which left the body of the dying man in the last death-rattle, meant more than mere air set in motion. It is scarcely accidental therefore that such onomatopœic words as *ruach*, *ruch*, *roho* (Hebraic, Arabic, Swahili) mean spirit not less clearly than the Greek *pneuma*, and the Latin *spiritus*.

Do we then know, in spite of every possible familiarity with the verbal concept, what spirit really is? Are we sure that when we use this word we all understand one and the same thing? Is not the word 'spirit' a most perplexingly ambiguous term? The same verbal sign, spirit, is used for an inexpressible transcendent idea of most comprehensive meaning; in a commonplace sense it corresponds to the concept 'mind'; it may connote intellectual-wit, or it may mean a ghost; it can also represent an unconscious complex

that causes spiritistic phenomena, like table-tilting, automatic writing, rappings, etc. In a metaphorical sense it may refer to the governing attitude of a certain social group—the 'spirit' that rules there. Finally it is used in a material sense, as spirits of wine, spirits of ammonia, and spirituous liquors in general. This is not a bad joke; on the one hand, it is part of our venerable heritage of language, while on the other it is a paralysing encumbrance to thought; a tragic hindrance to all who hope to scale the ethereal heights of pure ideas on ladders of words. When I utter the word 'spirit' no matter how accurately I may define the meaning which I intend it to carry, the aura of its many other meanings cannot be wholly excluded.

We must therefore ask ourselves the question: What is meant fundamentally by the word 'spirit' used in connexion with the concept 'life'? Under no circumstances can it be tacitly assumed that, at bottom, everybody knows just what is meant by 'spirit' or 'life'.

Not being a philosopher, but an empiricist, I am inclined in all difficult questions to let experience decide. Where it is impossible to find no basis in experience, I prefer to leave most questions unanswered. It is my aim, therefore, always to reduce abstract factors to their empirical basis, in order to be sure that I know what I am talking about. I must confess that I know as little what 'spirit' may be in itself as I know what 'life' is. I only know 'life' in the form of the living body. What, on the other hand, it could be in and for itself as an abstraction, other than a mere word, I cannot even darkly guess. Thus instead of 'life', I must speak of the living body, and instead of spirit, of psychic entities. This does not mean that I want to evade the question as originally put in order to indulge in reflections on body and mind. On the contrary, I hope with the help of an empirical basis to succeed in finding a real existence for spirit, and this not at the expense of life.

The concept of the living body brings fewer difficulties to



our task of explanation than does a general concept of life ; for the body is a visible, empirical thing that aids us in our efforts to form ideas. We can, then, easily agree that the body is a system of material units adapted to the end of life and co-ordinated within itself, and that, as such, it can be grasped by our senses as a phenomenon of the living being. More simply we may say the body is a purposeful arrangement of matter, making possible a living being. To avoid confusion, I wish to say that I purposely introduced into my definition of the body something which I vaguely characterize as a 'living being' (*lebendiges Wesen*). By this delimitation, which I do not care to discuss further here, I mean to indicate that the body cannot be understood merely as a heaping together of dead matter, but must be taken as a material system prepared for life, and making life possible ; though with the condition that, notwithstanding the utmost state of readiness, the system could not live without the addition of the 'living being'. For quite apart from the possible significance of the 'living being', there is lacking to the body by itself something necessary to its life, namely the psychic factor. This we know immediately from our own experience, and mediately from experience in relation with our fellow men ; further through scientific findings in our study of the higher vertebrates and in no way contradicted, at least so far as our evidence goes, in regard to lower animals and plants.

Shall I now assume this 'living being', of which I spoke, to be equivalent with the psychic factor that is immediately experienced by us in human consciousness, and so bring forward again the familiar and ancient duality of mind and body? Or are there any reasons that would justify the separation of 'living being' from the psyche? We should in that case understand the mind as a purposeful system ; not merely as an arrangement of matter ready for life, but as an arrangement of living matter, or, to put it more accurately, of living processes. I am not at all sure that this view will

meet with general acceptance, since we are so accustomed to think of mind and body as of a living duality, that we are not readily inclined to accept the view that the psyche is merely an arrangement of life-processes manifesting themselves in the body.

So far as our experience in general enables us to draw conclusions as to the nature of the psyche, it reveals the psychic process as a phenomenon dependent upon a nervous system. We know with adequate certainty that disturbance of certain portions of the brain determines corresponding psychic defects. The spinal cord and the brain consist essentially of connexions between sensory and motor paths, the so-called reflex arcs. What is meant by this I can best show by means of a simple example. Suppose one touches a hot object with the finger: at once the tactile nerve-endings are stimulated by the heat. This stimulation changes the condition of the whole path of conduction up the spinal cord and thence to the brain. In the spinal cord, the ganglion cells taking up the tactile stimulation pass on the changed condition to the neighbouring motor ganglion cells, which in their turn send out a stimulus to the arm muscles, thereby causing a sudden contraction of the muscles and a withdrawal of the hand. All this occurs with such rapidity that the conscious perception of the pain often comes when the hand has already been withdrawn. The reaction takes place automatically independent of conscious perception. But what happens in the spinal cord is given to the perceiving ego in the form of a record-image which can be named and understood. On the basis of such a reflex arc, that is, a stimulus moving from without inward, followed by an impulse from within outward, one can form an idea of the processes that lie beneath the mind. Let us now take a less simple example: We hear an indistinct sound the initial effect of which is no more than a stimulus to listen in order to grasp what it means. In this case the sound stimulus releases a whole series of ideas, that is, representations which

unite themselves with that of the stimulus. They will be in part sound images, in part visual images, and in part images of feeling. Here I use the word 'image' simply in the sense of a representation. A psychic entity can be a conscious content only if it has the quality of an image. I therefore call all conscious contents images, since they are records of brain processes.

The series of images excited by the sound stimulus suddenly becomes connected with a visual image, the rattle of the rattlesnake. In immediate connexion with this there follows an alarm signal to the body muscles. The reflex arc is complete ; but this case is different from the previous one, in that a brain process, a mental image series is interpolated between the sensory stimulus and the motor impulse. The sudden tension of the body now sets free reaction-phenomena in the heart and blood vessels, processes that are mentally recorded as terror.

In this way one can form an idea of the nature of the psyche. It consists of record-images of simple brain processes, and reproductions of these images in an almost infinite series. These images have the character of consciousness. The essence of consciousness is a riddle the solution of which is beyond me. It is possible to say, however, that anything psychical will take on the aspect of consciousness if it comes into association with the ego. If this connexion does not exist it is unconscious. Forgetfulness shows how often and how easily contents lose their connexion with the ego. Hence we can readily compare consciousness with the rays of a search-light. Only those objects upon which the shaft of light falls enter the field of perception. An object that is by accident in darkness has not ceased to exist, it is merely not seen. So what is unconscious to me exists somewhere, and it is highly probable that it has not changed essentially from what it was when I first saw it.

Consciousness therefore can be understood as the state of association with the ego. But the critical point is the

ego. What do we understand by the ego? Obviously, no matter what the unity of the ego may be, we are dealing here with something in which a great variety of factors is involved. It consists of record-images from the sense functions that transmit stimuli both from within and from without, and, furthermore, of an immense accumulation of images of past processes. All these widely different components need a powerful cohesive force, and this we have already recognized is a property of consciousness. Consciousness seems to be the indispensable pre-condition of the ego. Yet without the ego consciousness is unthinkable. This apparent contradiction may perhaps be resolved by regarding the ego also as a record-image; not of one, but of very many processes and their interplay—in fact of all those processes and contents that make up ego-consciousness. Their manifoldness actually forms a unity, because the relation involved in consciousness acts like a sort of gravitational force in drawing the various parts together in the direction of what may perhaps be called a virtual centre. Therefore, I speak not merely of the ego, but of an ego-complex, on the established presupposition that the ego, having a fluctuating composition, is changeable, and therefore cannot be just simply *the* ego. Unfortunately, it is not possible to discuss here the classical alterations of the ego that are met with in mental diseases or in dreams.

Through this conception of the ego as a composite of mental elements we are brought logically to the question: Is the ego the central image, the exclusive representative of the total human being? Has it related to itself all the mental contents and functions and does it express them all?

We must answer this question in the negative. The ego-consciousness is a complex which does not comprehend the whole human being; it has forgotten infinitely more than it knows. It has heard and seen an infinite amount of which it has never become conscious. There are thoughts that develop beyond its consciousness; they are ready and

complete and it knows nothing of them. The ego has scarcely even the vaguest notion of the incredibly important regulative function of the sympathetic nervous system. What the ego comprehends is perhaps the least part of that which complete consciousness would include within itself.

The ego can therefore be only a partial complex. Is it perhaps that unique complex whose inner cohesion means consciousness? But is not perhaps every interconnexion of psychic elements consciousness? It is not altogether clear why the union of a certain part of the sense functions and a certain part of the memory material should make up consciousness, while this should not be true of the interconnexion of other parts of the psyche. The complex of seeing, or hearing, has a strong and well-organized inner unity. There is no reason to assume that this unity could not be consciousness as well. As the case of the deaf, dumb, and blind Helen Keller shows, the sense of touch and the bodily sensations are sufficient to make consciousness possible, at any rate a consciousness limited to these senses. I therefore think of the ego-consciousness as a synthesis of the various 'sense-consciousnesses' in which the independence of these separate consciousnesses is submerged in the unity of the dominating ego.

Since the ego-consciousness by no means embraces all psychic activities and phenomena, that is to say, since it does not contain all the record-images within itself, and since the will cannot by any effort force itself into certain regions that are closed to it, the question arises whether there may not be a cohesion of all psychic activities similar to that of the ego-consciousness. This might be conceived as a higher or enlarged consciousness, in which our ego would be an objective content; just as, for example, the activity of sight is an object of my consciousness, and as this activity is fused with others, so in the wider consciousness the ego would be fused into a wider coördination with the unconscious activities unknown to me. Our ego-consciousness might be

enclosed within a complete consciousness as a smaller circle within a larger.

As the activities of sight, hearing, etc., produce record-images of themselves which, related to an ego, yield consciousness of the activity in question, so the ego may also be understood as the record-image of the sum of all activities comprehended by it. We might almost expect that all psychic activities produce record-images, and that this is their essential nature without which they could not be comprised by the term 'psychic'. There is no reason to assume that unconscious psychic activities have not the property of yielding images as well as those that we find presented to consciousness. And since man is, as we believe, a living unity in himself, the conclusion would follow that the record-images of all psychic activities are joined together in one total image of the whole man, which if known to him would be regarded as an ego.

I could not gainsay this assumption, but it would be an idle dream if it were not needed as an explanatory hypothesis. Even if the possibility of a higher consciousness should be necessary for the explanation of certain psychic facts, it would still remain a mere assumption; since it would far transcend the powers of our reason to prove the existence of a consciousness other than the one we know. There would always remain the possibility that what lies in the darkness beyond our consciousness might be totally different from anything our most daring speculation could invent.

I shall return to this question in the course of my exposition. We will put it aside for the time being and turn again to the original question of mind and body. From what has been said, we obtain an impression of the nature of the psyche as presenting and synthesizing record-images. The mind is a series of images in the widest sense, not an accidental juxtaposition or sequence, but a structure that is throughout full of meaning and purpose; it is a picturing of vital activities. And just as the material of the body that is ready for life has

need of the psyche in order to be capable of life, so the psyche presupposes the living body in order that its images may live.

Mind and body are indeed a pair of opposites and, as such, they are the expression of one being whose essential nature is not knowable either from material phenomena or from inner, direct perception. We know that, according to an ancient view, man develops from the coming together of a soul and a body. But it is more correct to speak of an unknowable living being, concerning the ultimate nature of which nothing can be said except that our references to it vaguely express an essential notion of life. This living being appears from without as the material body, but viewed from within it is a series of images of life—activities taking place within the body. The one is the other, and we cannot escape the doubt that perhaps this whole separation of mind and body may finally prove to be merely a device of the reason in its pursuit of self-consciousness—a separation, indispensable to cognition, of one and the same fact into two aspects, to which we then illegitimately attribute independent existence.

Science has never been able to seize upon the riddle of life, either in organic matter or in the mysterious trains of mental imagery, consequently we are still in search of the 'living being' whose existence we must postulate in a condition beyond experience. Whoever is familiar with the abysses of physiology will become dizzy at the thought, and whoever has any acquaintance with the mind will feel what a desperate venture is the thought that this amazing mirror-thing should ever attain anything approaching 'knowledge'.

Taking this point of view one might easily abandon hope of ever arriving at anything fundamental concerning that obscure and manifold thing we call 'spirit'. Yet one assertion, I think, may be made: Just as the 'living being' is a summation of life in the body, so is 'spirit' a summation of the essence of the mind; indeed the concept 'spirit' is often used interchangeably with the concept 'mind'. Viewed thus

'spirit' exists in that same transliminal 'beyond' as 'living being', that is, in the same misty state of indistinguishableness. And the doubt, as to whether mind and body are ultimately the same thing, covers also the apparent opposition between 'spirit' and 'living being'. Perhaps they are likewise one and the same thing.

Are these inclusive concepts after all necessary? Can we not acquiesce in the already sufficiently mysterious contrast between mind and body? From the standpoint of natural science, we could not go further. But there is another standpoint, satisfying to the intellectual conscience, that not only allows, but even forces us to go forward and overleap that apparently impassable boundary. This is the psychological standpoint.

In the foregoing discussion I have taken my stand on the realistic view-point of scientific thought, without ever questioning the foundations on which I stood. But in order to be able to explain briefly what I mean by the psychological standpoint, I must show that serious doubt can be cast on the exclusive acceptance of the realistic standpoint. Let us take, for instance, what a simple intelligence would consider as the realest of real things, namely matter. We can make only the dimmest theoretical guesses as to the nature of matter, such guesses being but images made by our minds. The ether-vibrations or sun-emanations which meet my eyes are translated by my perception into light. It is my mind, rich in images, that gives the world colour and sound; and that most real and rational certainty which I call experience is, in its most simple form, a supremely complicated structure of mental images. So in a certain sense there is nothing that is directly experienced except the mind itself. Everything is mediated through the mind, translated, filtered, allegorized, twisted, even falsified by it. We are so enveloped in a cloud of changing and endlessly shifting images, that we might well exclaim with a certain great sceptic, 'Nothing is absolutely true—and even that is not quite certain.'



So thick and deceptive is this fog about us, that we have to discover exact sciences in order to lay hold of at least a glimmer of the 'real' nature of things. To a simple intelligence, this bright world will not seem in the least degree foggy. Let him, however, once dive into the mind of a primitive and compare his image of the world with the consciousness of a civilized man ; he will then have an inkling of the profound twilight in which we still are.

What we know of the world, and what we are aware of within ourselves, are conscious contents that flow from remote, obscure sources. I do not contest the relative validity either of the realistic view, the *esse in re*, or of the idealistic standpoint, the *esse in intellectu solo* ; but I wish to unite these extreme opposites by an *esse in anima*, that is, by a psychological standpoint. Our immediate life is only a world of images.

If we take this standpoint seriously, peculiar results develop. We find that the validity of mental facts cannot be subjected either to the critique of cognition or to scientific experience. We can only put the question : Is a conscious content present or not ? If it is present, then it is valid in itself. Natural science can only be invoked when the content claims to be an assertion about a thing that can be met with in external experience ; the criticism of the intellect need only be invited when an unknowable thing is posited as knowable. Let us take an example familiar to everyone : Natural science has never discovered a god ; the critique of cognition proves the impossibility of knowing god, but the mind steps forward with the assertion of the experience of god. God is a psychic fact of direct experience. If not, there would never have been any talk of god. The fact is valid in itself, independent of any proof and inaccessible to any critique of a non-psychological character. It may be the most immediate and thus the most real experience, which can neither be ridiculed nor disproved. Only people with a poorly developed sense of fact, or of a superstitious wrong-

headedness, could deny this truth. So long as the experience of god does not claim a universal validity, or declare the absolute existence of god, criticism is impossible; since a non-rational fact, such, for instance, as the existence of elephants, cannot be criticized. Nevertheless, the experience of god has general validity inasmuch as almost everyone knows approximately what is meant by the 'experience of god'. As a fact occurring with relative frequency it must be recognized by a scientific psychology. We cannot simply turn aside even from what is decried as superstition. When a person asserts that he has seen spirits, or that he is bewitched, and it means more to him that mere talk—then again we have to do with a fact of experience, and one so general that everyone knows what is meant by 'ghost' or by being 'bewitched'. We can therefore be sure that in such a case also we are dealing with a definite psychic complex which in this sense is just as 'real' as the light I see. I do not know how I could prove the existence of the spirit of a dead person in outer experience, nor can I imagine the logical method whereby I could deduce with certainty continuance of life after death; but, none the less, I have to reckon with the fact that the mind in all times and places lays claim to experience with ghosts. I have to take this into consideration, just as much as the fact that many people absolutely deny this subjective experience.

After this more general exposition I will return to the concept of spirit which, from our former realistic standpoint, we could nowhere grasp. Spirit, as well as god, means an object of psychic experience that cannot be proved externally, nor understood rationally. This is its meaning if we use the word 'spirit' in its best sense. If we have once freed ourselves from the prejudice that we must perforce refer a concept either to objects of outer experience, or to *a priori* categories of the reason—then we can turn our attention and curiosity freely to that particular, and still unknown entity we call 'spirit'. It is always useful in such cases

to glance over the probable etymology of the word, because often it is just the history of a word that throws a surprising light upon the nature of the psychic factor underlying it.

In Old High German and in Anglo-Saxon, in short from ancient times, '*Geist*' or '*Gast*' had the meaning of a supernatural being in contradistinction to the body. According to Kluge, the fundamental meaning of the word is not quite certain, although there seem to be connexions with the old Nordic '*geisa*' to rage, with the Gothic '*Us-gaisyan*', to be beside oneself, with the Swiss-German '*uf-gaista*', beside oneself, and with the English 'aghost'. These connexions are well substantiated through other figures of speech. For a person 'to be seized with rage' means that something falls on him, sits on him, rides him, that he is ridden by the devil, he is possessed, something has been shot into him, etc. In the pre-psychological stage, and still in poetic language which owes its effectiveness to its living primitiveness, affects are often personified as demons. Thus, the state of being in love is described as 'Cupid's arrow has struck him', or 'Eros has thrown the apple of discord among men', etc. If we are 'beside ourselves with rage' we are obviously no longer identical with ourselves, but in the possession of a demon or spirit.

The primordial atmosphere in which the word 'spirit' came to birth lives in us still, though, of course, on a psychic level somewhat below consciousness. As modern spiritualism shows, it needs very little to bring that part of the primitive mentality to the surface. If the etymological derivation, in itself quite plausible, should prove true, then 'spirit' in this sense would be an image of personified affect. When, for example, a person is carried away by imprudent words we say his tongue has run away with him, which is equivalent to saying that his speech has become an independent being that has snatched him up and run off with him. Psychologically we should say, every affect tends to become an autonomous complex, to break away from the hierarchy

of consciousness, and, if possible, to drag the ego after it. No wonder, therefore, that the primitive mind sees in it the work of a strange, invisible being, a spirit. Spirit in this case is the image of an independent affect, and therefore the ancients appropriately called spirits also *imagines*—images.

Let us turn now to other variations of the concept 'spirit'. The phrase 'he acts in the spirit of his dead father' has still a double meaning, for the word 'spirit' in this case applies as much to the spirit of the dead as to a mental attitude. Other idioms are: 'A new spirit has entered into us', or 'one encounters a new spirit', whereby we express a change in mental bias. The fundamental idea is again that of possession by a spirit, that, for instance, which has become the *spiritus rector* of a house. We may also say: 'An evil spirit rules in that family'.

We are now no longer dealing with the personification of affects, but with the making manifest of an entire mental trend, or—to use the psychological phrase—an attitude. A bad attitude, expressed as an evil spirit, has, if naïvely conceived, nearly the same psychological function as a personified affect. This may well be surprising to many, inasmuch as 'attitude' is ordinarily understood as the taking of an attitude toward something, an ego-activity in short, implying purposefulness. However, the attitude or disposition is by no means always the product of volition; it owes its peculiarity perhaps most frequently to mental contagion, that is, to example, and the influence of environment. It is a well-known fact that there are people whose bad attitude poisons the atmosphere; their bad example is contagious; they make others nervous by their intolerableness. In schools a single case of ill-will amongst the pupils can spoil the spirit of a whole class; and conversely, the joyous innocent disposition of a child can lighten and irradiate the otherwise dreary atmosphere of a family, a result which is obviously only possible when the attitude of each individual is bettered by the good example. An attitude can also have effect in opposition to the conscious

will—'bad company spoils good manners.' This is especially evident in crowd suggestion.

An attitude or disposition, then, can obtrude itself upon consciousness from without or from within like an affect, and can therefore be expressed by the same metaphors that apply to the latter. An attitude seems, at the first glance, to be something essentially more complicated than an affect. Closer inspection, however, shows that this is not the case, since most attitudes are consciously or unconsciously based on a maxim, which often has the character of a proverb. There are attitudes in which one can immediately sense the underlying maxim and even discover its source. Often too, the attitude can be characterized by a single word, which as a rule stands for an ideal. Not infrequently, the quintessence of an attitude is neither a maxim nor an ideal, but an honoured and emulated personality.

Educators use these psychological facts and seek to suggest suitable attitudes by maxims and ideals, and some of these may in fact remain effective throughout the whole of life as permanent guiding principles. They have taken possession of the person like spirits. On the primitive level it is even the vision of the master, the shepherd, the *poimén*, or *poimandres*, which personifies the guiding principles and concretizes them into a symbolical figure.

Here we approach a concept of 'spirit' that goes far beyond the animistic etymology. The adage or proverb is, as a rule, the result of much experience and individual striving, a summation of discerning realizations and conclusions; in brief, pregnant words in poetical form. When, for example, the words of the gospel, 'as having nothing, and yet possessing all things' are subjected to a searching analysis in which one seeks to reconstruct all the experiences and reactions that have led to this quintessence of life's wisdom, one cannot but marvel at the completeness and ripeness of the experience behind the saying. These are 'impressive' words, which descend upon the receptive mind with power, and perhaps

retain possession of it for ever. Those sayings or ideals that contain the most comprehensive experience of life, as well as the deepest reflection, make up what we call 'spirit' in the best sense of the word. If a dominating idea of this nature attains undisputed control, we speak of the life lived under its guidance as 'conditioned by the spirit', or as a 'spiritual life'. The more unconditioned and compelling is the influence of the ruling idea, the more has it the nature of an autonomous complex which opposes the ego-consciousness as an impregnable fact.

We must not forget, however, that such sayings or ideals, not excepting even the best, are not magic words of absolute effectiveness, but can gain mastery only under certain conditions; that is, when something within the subject, an affect, is ready to take up the offered form. Only under the ruling of emotion can a concept, or whatever the dominant idea may be, become an autonomous complex; without it, the idea remains a concept subservient to the arbitrary judgment of consciousness, a mere intellectual counter without determining force. An idea as a mere intellectual concept has no influence on life, because in this form it is little more than an empty word. Conversely, however, if the idea achieves the significance of an autonomous complex—then it affects the life of the personality through the emotions.

We must not think of such autonomous attitudes as coming into being through conscious volition and deliberate choice. When I said above that the aid of emotion was needed, I could as well have said that an unconscious readiness, over and above the conscious will, must be present in order to bring about an autonomous attitude. One cannot will to be spiritual so to speak. Those principles that we can select and strive for remain within the sphere of our judgment and under our conscious control; hence they can never become something which dominates the conscious will. Rather it is a matter of fate what principle will rule our attitude.

The question will certainly be raised whether for some

men their own free-will may not be the dominating principle, so that every attitude is purposefully chosen by themselves. I do not believe that any one reaches, or ever has reached this godlikeness; but I know that many strive after this ideal, being possessed with the heroic idea of absolute freedom. In one way or another, all men are dependent—all are in some way limited, since none are gods.

Our consciousness does not express the sum total of our human nature; it is and remains only a part. As you will remember, in the introductory part of my lecture I indicated the possibility that the ego-consciousness was not the only consciousness in our system, but might perhaps be subordinate to a wider consciousness, just as simpler complexes are subordinate to the ego-complex.

I would not know how to prove that a consciousness higher or wider than the ego-consciousness exists in us, but if it does exist, it must necessarily disturb the ego-consciousness acutely. A simple example will make clear what I mean: let us imagine that our optical system had its own consciousness and was therefore a kind of personality which could be called the 'eye-personality'. The 'eye-personality' has, let us say, discovered a beautiful view in the admiration of which it becomes absorbed. Now the auditory system suddenly hears the signal of an automobile. This apperception remains unconscious to the optical system. From the ego there now follows an order to the muscles, again in a way unconscious to the optical system, to move the body to another position in space. Through this movement the object is suddenly taken away from the eye-consciousness. If the eyes could think, they would naturally come to the conclusion that the light-world was subject to all sorts of obscure disturbances.

Something of this sort must happen if a wider consciousness exists, a consciousness which, as I suggested before, would be a record-image of the whole man. Are there in fact such obscure disturbances which no will can control

and no purpose deflect? And is there anywhere in us something intangible which we can suspect as the source of such disturbances? To the first question we can answer yes, without more ado. In normal people, not to speak of neurotics, we can easily observe the most obvious interferences and disturbances from another sphere. A mood may suddenly change, a headache comes upon us unawares, the name of a friend we are about to introduce vanishes into thin air, a melody follows us for a whole day, we want to do something but the desire for it has in some inexplicable way disappeared; we forget what we least wanted to forget, we resign ourselves gladly to sleep and sleep is lured away, we sleep and sleep is disturbed by phantastic, annoying dreams, spectacles resting on our noses are searched for, the new umbrella is left we know not where. This list could be extended indefinitely. If we examine the psychology of neurotics we find ourselves dealing with the most paradoxical disorders. Amazing pathological symptoms develop, and yet no organ is diseased. Without the least organic disorder the temperature may rise above 40° centigrade, or there may be suffocating anxiety conditions without any real foundation, also compulsory ideas the senselessness of which is apparent even to the patient himself, or skin rashes that come and go indifferent both to cause and therapy. Here too the list is endless. For each case an explanation can be found, either good or bad, which, however, fails entirely to explain the next case. Yet there can be no doubt as to the existence of the disturbances.

Coming now to the second question, the source of the disturbances. We know that medical psychology has put forward the concept of the unconscious, and has brought proof that these disturbances depend upon unconscious processes. It is as though the eye-personality in us had discovered that, besides the visible, there must exist invisible determining factors. If the facts do not deceive us, the unconscious processes are far from being unintelligent. The character



of automatism and mechanism is lacking to them, even in a striking degree. They are not in the least inferior to the conscious processes in subtlety; on the contrary, they often far surpass the conscious judgment.

Our imaginary optical personality might doubt that the sudden disturbances of its world of light came from a consciousness. Similarly we can be sceptical about a wider consciousness, with no more ground for scepticism than the optical personality would have. But since we cannot attain to the condition of a wider consciousness and therefore to the comprehension of it, we do well, from our standpoint, to call that dark region the unconscious.

I have returned at this point in the discussion to the previous suggestion of a higher consciousness, because the problem with which we are concerned, namely, the life-ruling power of the spirit, is connected with processes outside the ego-consciousness. I have already observed incidentally that an idea without affect can never become a power that determines life. I have also spoken of the development of a certain spirit as a matter of fate, wishing to emphasize the inability of consciousness to produce an autonomous complex at will. The spirit is never autonomous if it does not thrust itself upon us, showing its manifest superiority to the conscious will. It also is one of those disturbances that arise out of the dark regions. When I said that the idea must meet with a reaction from the emotions, I referred to an unconscious readiness which, because of its affective nature, extends to depths that are quite inaccessible to consciousness. Conscious reason is never able to demolish the roots of our nervous symptoms; emotional processes are needed for this and the same holds good also for the sympathetic nervous system which can be influenced only by emotional processes. We might say, therefore, that when the wider consciousness sees fit, a compelling idea is put before the ego-consciousness as an unconditional command. Whoever is conscious of his guiding principle knows with

what indisputable authority it rules his life. Generally, however, consciousness is too engrossed with the attainment of some beckoning goal ahead ever to take account of the nature of the spirit that determines its course.

From the psychological view-point, the phenomenon of the spirit, like every autonomous complex, appears as a purpose of the unconscious, superior to, or at least on an equality with the ego-consciousness. If we are to do justice to the nature of the thing we call spirit, we must speak of a wider consciousness rather than of the unconscious; because the concept of spirit is such, that we are bound to connect with it the idea of superiority over the ego-consciousness. Superiority is not allotted to spirit by a process of conscious meditation, rather it clings to it as an essential quality of its appearance. This is evident in the chronicles of every age, from the Holy Scriptures down to Nietzsche's Zarathustra. The spirit appears psychologically as a personal being, sometimes with a visionary clarity. In Christian dogma, it is even the third person of the Trinity. These facts show that spirit is not always merely a maxim or an idea that can be formulated, but in its strongest and most immediate manifestations reveals a peculiar, independent life of its own which is felt as a being apart. As long as a spirit can be named or formulated as an intelligible principle or a clear idea, it certainly will not be felt as an independent being. But when the idea or principle involved is inscrutable, when its purposes are obscure as to origin and goal, and yet enforce themselves—then the spirit is necessarily felt as an independent being, as a kind of higher consciousness, and its inscrutable, superior nature can no longer be expressed in the concepts of human reason. Our powers of expression then seek other means: a symbol is created. By a symbol I do not mean an allegory or a mere sign, but rather an image that characterizes in the best possible way the dimly discerned nature of the spirit. A symbol does not define nor explain, but points beyond itself to a meaning darkly divined, belonging

to a world beyond our grasp, and not to be adequately expressed in any words of our current speech. Spirit that can be translated into a concept is a mental complex within the boundaries of our ego-consciousness. It will not bring forth anything, nor will it achieve more than we have put into it. But a spirit that demands a symbol for its expression is a mental complex that contains the creative seeds of boundless possibilities. The most obvious and best example is the effectiveness of the Christian symbol, verifiable both from history and from observation. If one looks without prejudice at the way the spirit of early Christianity worked in the mind of the limited average man of the second century, one can only be amazed. But this spirit was creative as scarcely any other has been. It is no wonder that it was felt to be of a divine superiority.

It is just this clearly felt superiority that lends to the manifestation of spirit the character of revelation and unconditional authority—a dangerous quality to be sure; for what we might perhaps call higher consciousness is by no means always 'higher' in the sense of our conscious values, but often reveals the strongest opposition to our recognized ideals. Strictly speaking, we should only describe this hypothetical consciousness as a 'wider' one, in order not to arouse the prejudice that it is necessarily higher, intellectually or morally. There are many spirits, both bright and dark. One should therefore accept the view that spirit is something relative not absolute, that calls for completion and embodiment in life. We find all too many examples of men so possessed by a spirit that the man no longer lives, but only the spirit, and that not in the sense of a richer and fuller life for the man, but in a way that cripples him. In saying this I do not imply that the death of a Christian martyr was a meaningless and purposeless destruction—on the contrary, such a death can also mean a fuller life than any other—I refer rather to the spirit of certain sects that wholly deny life. What is to become of the spirit when it has destroyed the man? The strict

Montanistic conception corresponded, it is true, to the highest moral demands of those times, but it was destructive of life. I believe, therefore, that a spirit which corresponds to our highest ideals finds its limits set by life. It is certainly indispensable to life, since a mere ego-life is, as we well know, a most inadequate, unsatisfactory thing. Only a life lived in a certain spirit is worth while. It is a remarkable fact that a life lived entirely from the ego usually affects not only the person himself, but observers also, as being dull. The fullness of life requires more than just an ego; it demands spirit, that is, an independent, overruling complex, which is apparently alone capable of calling into living expression all those mental possibilities that the ego-consciousness cannot reach.

But just as there is a passion that strives for blind unrestricted life, so there is also a passion that yearns to bring the whole of life as a sacrifice to the spirit, just because of its creative superiority. This passion makes of the spirit a malignant growth that senselessly destroys human life.

Life is a test of the truth of the spirit. Spirit that drags a man away from all possibility of life, seeking fulfilment only in itself is a false spirit—the guilt resting also on the man, since he can choose whether he gives himself up to the spirit or not.

Life and spirit are two powers or necessities, between which man is placed. Spirit gives meaning to his life, and the possibility of the greatest development. But life is essential to spirit, since its truth is nothing if it cannot live.

## MIND AND THE EARTH

THE phrase, the conditioning of mind by the earth (*Erdbedingtheit der Seele*), has a somewhat poetic ring. Involuntarily we advert to its opposite, the conditioning of mind by heaven; somewhat in the manner of the Chinese who distinguish between a *Schen*- and a *Kwei*-soul, the one belonging to Heaven, the other to earth. But since we western peoples know nothing of the substance of the mind, and therefore cannot venture to say whether within it there is something of a heavenly and something of an earthly nature, we must be content to speak of two different view-points, or aspects, of the complicated phenomenon we call mind. Instead of dealing with a heavenly *Schen*-mind, we can regard the mind as a causeless, creative being; and instead of postulating a *Kwei*-mind, we can regard the mind as something growing out of causes, and built up by effects. In relation to our problem the latter would be the most appropriate view. The mind would then be understood to be a system of adaptation formed by the conditions of an earthly environment.

I need not emphasize the fact that this causal view must be necessarily one-sided if it is to fulfil its purpose because only the one aspect of the mind is properly grasped by it.

In approaching the subject of our discussion, *i.e.* the phenomenon of mind, it will not be amiss to define accurately what is to be understood by 'mind'. There are views that prefer to limit what is 'mental' to consciousness. But to-day such a limitation would scarcely satisfy us. Modern psychopathology has in its possession a wealth of observations regarding mental activities that are entirely analogous to conscious functions, and yet are unconscious. One can perceive, think, feel, remember, decide, and act, unconsciously. All that happens in consciousness can under certain conditions occur

unconsciously. How this is possible can best be seen if one imagines the mental functions and contents as resembling a night landscape over which the beam of a searchlight is playing. Whatever appears in this light of perception is conscious; what lies in the darkness beyond is unconscious, although none the less living and effective. If the beam of light shifts, the contents that were before conscious sink into the unconscious, and new contents come into the lighted area of consciousness. The contents that have disappeared into darkness continue to be active and to make themselves indirectly felt, most commonly as symptoms. Freud has described these symptomatic disturbances in his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. We can also demonstrate experimentally, by means of association tests, the capacities and inhibitions existing in the unconscious.

If then we take the investigations of psychopathology into account, the mind appears as an extended area of so-called psychic phenomena which are partly conscious and partly unconscious. The unconscious portion of the mind is not directly accessible—otherwise it would not be unconscious—but can only be inferred from the effects of its processes on consciousness. Our inferences can never go beyond: 'It is as if.'

I must enter more fully into the nature and structure of the unconscious in order to do justice to the question of the conditioning of mind by the earth. In this question we have to deal with the beginnings and foundations of the mind, that is, with things that from immemorial time have lain buried in the depths, not with the banal facts of sense perception and the conscious adaptation to environment. The latter belong to the psychology of consciousness, and, as I have already said, I do not understand consciousness as being synonymous with mind. The mind is a far more inclusive and obscure field of experience than the sharply-lit, focal field of consciousness. To the mind belongs the unconscious also. By analogy with the different conscious

contents, we could speak also of contents of the unconscious. In doing so we should postulate another consciousness, so to speak, in the unconscious. I will not enter into this delicate point, which I have treated in another connexion, but will confine myself to the question whether we can or cannot differentiate anything in the unconscious. This question can only be answered empirically, that is, by the counter-question, whether or no there are plausible reasons for such a differentiation.

There is no doubt in my mind that all the activities ordinarily taking place in consciousness can also run their course in the unconscious. There are many examples of an intellectual problem attaining no solution during the waking state, but being solved in a dream. I know, for instance, an expert accountant who tried in vain for many days to clear up a fraudulent bankruptcy. One day he was working on it up till midnight without results, and then went to bed. At three in the morning his wife heard him get up and go into his workroom. She followed and saw him industriously making notes at his desk. After about a quarter of an hour he returned. In the morning he remembered nothing. He began again on the work, and found written in his own hand a whole series of notes which straightened out the tangle completely and finally.

In my practical work I have been dealing with dreams for more than twenty years. Countless times I have observed the way in which thoughts that were not thought, or feelings not felt by the waking consciousness came up afterwards in dreams, thus reaching consciousness indirectly. The dream, as such, is certainly a conscious content; otherwise it could not be an object of direct experience. But in so far as it brings up materials that were unconscious before, we are forced to assume that these contents had some kind of psychic existence in an unconscious state from which they emerged into the narrowed field, or remnant of consciousness in the form of the dream. The dream belongs to the normal

contents and should be looked upon as a resultant of the unconscious processes that extends into consciousness.

If on the basis of experience we are inclined to assume that all categories of conscious contents can under certain conditions be unconscious, then we come to the unexpected question as to whether the unconscious also has dreams. Are there, in other words, resultants of yet deeper and, if possible, still more unconscious processes, which penetrate obscure regions of the mind? I should have to set aside this paradoxical question as altogether too adventurous were there not at hand actual grounds which bring such an hypothesis within the sphere of possibility.

We must first see what sort of evidence is required to prove that the unconscious also has dreams. If we want to prove that dreams enter consciousness, we have simply to show that certain contents are present which in character and meaning are strange and unassimilable, in contrast to other contents which can be rationally explained and understood. Now if we are to prove that the unconscious also has dreams, we must treat its contents in a similar way. It will be simplest if I give an actual example.

The case is that of an officer, 27 years of age. He was suffering from severe attacks of pain in the region of the heart and from a choking sensation in the throat, as though a ball were stuck there. He also had acute pains in the left heel. There was nothing organically to account for the symptoms. The attacks had begun about two months before, and the patient had been exempted from military service on account of his occasional inability to walk. Various attempted cures availed nothing. A searching investigation into the previous history of his illness gave no clue, and he himself had no idea as to what the cause might be. He gave the impression of a fresh, somewhat light-hearted nature, perhaps rather theatrically robust, as though his demeanour were saying: 'Do we look like being vanquished?'

Since the anamnesis revealed nothing, I questioned him



about his dreams. Here it immediately became evident what the cause was. Just before the beginning of his neurosis a girl with whom he was in love jilted him, and became engaged to another man. In talking to me he had dismissed this whole story as irrelevant—'a stupid girl; if she doesn't want to marry me, it's easy enough to find somebody else. A man like myself can't be upset by a thing like that.' That was the way he treated his disappointment and his real grief. But now his affects came to the surface. The pains in his heart soon disappeared, and the lump in his throat vanished after a few bouts of weeping. 'Heartache' is a poetical phrase, but here it became a fact, because his pride did not allow him to suffer the pain in his soul. The 'lump' in the throat, the so-called *globus hystericus*, comes, as everyone knows, from swallowed tears. His consciousness had simply withdrawn from the contents that were so painful to it; and these, left to themselves, could only reach consciousness indirectly as symptoms. Rationally these are quite intelligible, and therefore immediately illuminating. Obviously, they could just as well have taken place in consciousness, had it not been for his masculine pride.

But now for the third symptom! The pains in his heel did not disappear. They do not belong in the picture sketched above. The heart is not connected with the heel, and one does not express sorrow through the heel. Rationally, one cannot see why the two other symptom-complexes would not have sufficed. From the theoretical standpoint it would have been quite satisfactory if the bringing to consciousness of the repressed mental pain had resulted in normal grief, and therewith a cure.

Since no clue to the heel symptom could be gained from the patient's consciousness, I turned again to the earlier method—to the dreams. The patient now had a dream in which he was bitten in the heel by a snake and instantly paralysed. This dream plainly offered an interpretation of the heel symptoms. The heel pained him because he had been

bitten there by a snake. This is a strange content, with which one hardly knows how to deal. We could understand at once why his heart ached, but that his heel also should ache passes rational expectation. The patient was at a loss in the face of this fact.

Here, then, we have a content that enters the unconscious zone, in a singular manner from some deeper layer that is no longer rationally explicable. The nearest analogue to this dream is obviously the neurosis itself. When she rejected him the girl gave him a wound that crippled him and made him sick. Further analysis of the dream elicited something from the previous history that now became clear to the patient for the first time; he had been the darling of a somewhat hysterical mother. She had sympathized with him, marvelled at him, and humoured him in such an exaggerated way that he never found his right place in school, where he became almost effeminate. Then later, turning suddenly to the masculine side he went into the army, where he was able to cover his inner weakness by a display of 'manliness'. Thus, in a way, his mother too had lamed him.

Apparently what we are dealing with here is that same old serpent that has always been the especial friend of Eve. "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel," runs the saying in Genesis, which accords with the much more ancient Egyptian hymn that used to be chanted for the cure of snake-bites:—

"With age the mouth of God trembled,  
His spittle fell to the earth,  
And what he spat forth fell upon the ground.  
Isis kneaded it with her hand  
Together with the earth that was on it.  
She made of it a venerable worm,  
And fashioned it like a spear,  
The living snake she wound not around her face,

## MIND AND THE EARTH

But threw it coiled upon the way  
On which the great god wandered  
At his pleasure through his two realms.  
The venerable god stepped forth in splendor ;  
The gods serving Pharaoh bore him company ;  
And he went forth as was each day his wont.  
There the venerable serpent bit him.  
His jaw-bones shook,  
And all his limbs trembled,  
And the poison seized upon his flesh,  
As the Nile seized his land."

The patient's conscious knowledge of the Bible was a lamentable minimum. Apparently he had once heard of the heel-bite of the snake, but he had given it no thought and it was soon forgotten. Yet something in him deeply unconscious heard it and did not forget, bringing it again to the surface at a suitable moment. We can think of it as a part of the unconscious that apparently prefers to express itself mythologically, because this manner of expression corresponds to its nature.

But what sort of mentality is it that leans towards the symbolical or primitive manner of expression? It corresponds to the mind of a primitive whose speech has no abstracts, but consists of natural and 'unnatural' analogies. This mind of venerable age is as foreign to the psyche that produced the heartache and the 'ball' in the throat, as is a brontosaurus to a race-horse. The dream of the snake reveals a fragment of psychic activity that had no connexion with the modern individuality of the dreamer. It lies in a deeper stratum, if we may so express it, and only its resultant reaches the high level where the repressed affects lie. This resultant is just as foreign to the upper layer, as is a dream to waking consciousness. And just as a certain analytical technique is required in order to understand a dream, so a knowledge of mythology is needed in order to grasp the meaning of something rising from a deeper layer.

The serpent motive is certainly no individual acquisition of the dreamer, for snake dreams are frequent enough, even among city people, who may never even have seen a real snake.

The objection could be raised that the snake in the dream is merely a concretized figure of speech. We say of certain women that they are as false as snakes; we speak of the snake of temptation, etc. This objection does not seem to me to hold good in the present instance, but a strict proof would be difficult since the snake is actually a current figure of speech. A more certain proof could only be obtained if we succeeded in finding a case in which the mythological symbolism was neither an ordinary figure of speech, nor yet a case of cryptamnesia—that is, a case where the dreamer has read, seen, or heard the theme somewhere, has forgotten it, and then unconsciously reproduced it again.

This proof seems to me of great importance, since it would show that the rationally intelligible unconscious that consists of materials made unconscious artificially as it were, is only a superficial layer. It would indicate that beneath this layer there is an absolute unconscious that has nothing to do with our personal experience. This latter would then be a psychic activity that exists independent of the conscious mind and even of the surface layers of the unconscious; independent and untouched—perhaps untouchable—by personal experience. It is a kind of supra-individual mental activity, a collective unconscious, as I have termed it, in contrast to a superficial, relative, or personal, unconscious.

But before we go in search of this proof, I should like, for the sake of completeness, to make some further observations upon the serpent dream. It seems as though this hypothetical deeper layer of the unconscious—of the collective unconscious, as I shall now speak of it—had translated experiences with woman into the bite of a snake, and had thereby generalized them into a mythological *motif*. The reason, or rather the purpose of this is at first obscure. But if we remember the fundamental principle that the

syntomatology of an illness represents at the same time a natural attempt at healing—the heartaches, for example, are an attempt at an emotional outburst—then we must regard the heel symptom also as a kind of attempt at a cure. As the dream shows, not only the recent disappointment in love, but all other disappointments, in school and elsewhere, are raised to the level of a mythical occurrence by means of this symptom, as though the patient would in some way be helped thereby.

This seems to us very improbable. But the ancient Egyptian priest-physicians, who chanted the hymn of the serpent of Isis over the snake-bite, held such a belief; and not only these, but the whole ancient world believed, as the primitive world still believes, in magic by analogy.

We are dealing here, then, with the psychological phenomenon at the basis of magic by analogy. We must not think that this is an ancient superstition lying far away behind us. If you read the text of the mass carefully, you will constantly stumble upon that famous *sicut*, which always introduces an analogy by means of which a change is to be brought about. To mention a cogent example I may cite the fire-making of the holy Sabbath. It is well known that in former times the new fire was struck from the stone, and still earlier it was gained by boring in wood, which was a prerogative of the church. Therefore in the prayer of the priest it is said: "*Deus, qui per Filium tuum, angularem scilicet lapidem, charitatis tuæ fidelibus ignem contulisti productum ex silice, nostris profuturum usibus, novum hunc ignem sanctifica.*" "O God, who through thy Son, who is called the cornerstone, hast brought the fire of thy love to the faithful, make holy for our future use this new fire struck from the fire-stone." By the analogy of Christ with the cornerstone, the fire-stone is in a manner raised to the level of Christ himself, who again kindles a new fire.

The rationalist may laugh at this. But something deep is stirred in us; and not in us alone, but in millions of Christian

men, though we may call it only a feeling for beauty. What is stirred in us are those far-away backgrounds, those most ancient forms of the human mind, which we have not acquired, but rather inherited from the dim ages of the past.

If this supra-individual mind exists, everything that is translated into its picture-speech would be depersonalized, and if it became conscious, would appear to us *sub specie æternitatis*. Not as my sorrow, but as the sorrow of the world; not a personal isolating pain, but a pain without bitterness that unites all humanity. That this can help us needs no proof.

But as to whether these supra-individual psychic activities actually exist, I have so far given you no proof that would fulfil all the demands. I should like to do this once more in the form of an example. The case is that of a man in the thirties, who was suffering from the paranoid form of *dementia præcox*. He had always presented a strange mixture of intelligence, wrongheadedness, and phantastical ideas. He was an ordinary clerk, employed in a consulate. Apparently as a compensation to his very modest existence he was seized with megalomania and believed himself to be the Saviour. He suffered from hallucinations and was at times very much disturbed. In his quiet periods he was allowed to go unattended in the corridor. One day I came across him there, blinking through the window up at the sun, and moving his head from side to side in a curious manner. He took me by the arm and said he wanted to show me something. He said I must look at the sun with eyes half-shut, and then I could see the sun's phallus. If I moved my head from side to side the sun-phallus would move in the same way, and that was the origin of the wind.

I made this observation about 1906. In the course of the year 1910, when I was occupied with mythological studies, a book of Dieterich's came into my hands. It was a part of the so-called Paris magic-papyrus and was thought by Dieterich to be a liturgy of the Mithraic cult. It consisted of a series of directions, invocations, and visions. One of these

visions is thus described, word for word: "Similarly there is also to be seen the so-called tube, the origin of the prevailing wind. You will see on the disk of the sun something like a hanging tube. And towards the western regions it is as though a ceaseless east wind were blowing. But when the lot falls to the other wind towards the eastern regions, you will see the turning of the face in a similar way in that direction." The Greek word for tube *αὐλός* means a wind instrument, and in the connexion *αὐλός παχύς* in Homer it is a "jet of blood through the tube of the nostril". Apparently a stream of wind is blowing through the tube out of the sun.

The vision of my patient of the year 1906, and the Greek text first edited in 1910, should be sufficiently separated for the possibility of a cryptamnesia on his side, and of thought transference on mine to be excluded. The obvious parallelism of the two visions cannot be denied, but the assertion might be made that it was a purely accidental similarity. In that case we should expect the vision to have no kind of connexion with analogous ideas nor any inner meaning. This expectation is not justified, for mediæval art has actually pictured this tube as a sort of hose-pipe which in the *conceptio immaculata* reaches from Heaven under the robe of Mary. In it the Holy Ghost flies down in the form of a dove for the fecundation of the Virgin. In the original representation the Holy Ghost is, as we can see in the miracle of Pentecost, a mighty wing, the *pneuma*, "the wind that bloweth where it listeth."

*Animo descensus per orbem solis tribuitur*: "It is true of the spirit that it descends through the orb of the sun." This conception is common to the whole of late classical and mediæval philosophy.

I cannot discover therefore anything accidental, but simply the re-vivification of representations in these visions, or more strictly, the possibilities of such existing from ancient times, and reappearing in the most diverse minds of widely separated epochs.

I have gone into the details of this case in order to give

you a concrete view of that deeper psychic activity, the collective unconscious; for without this it would be impossible for me to throw any light on the connexions of the mind with the conditions of its environment. I may summarize by observing that we must distinguish three mental levels: (1) consciousness; (2) the personal unconscious; (3) the collective unconscious. The personal unconscious consists of all those contents that have become unconscious, either because, their intensity being lost, they were forgotten, or because consciousness has withdrawn from them, *i.e.* so-called repression. Finally, this layer contains those elements—partly sense perceptions—which on account of too little intensity have never reached consciousness, and yet in some way have gained access into the psyche. The collective unconscious, being an inheritance of the possibilities of ideas, is not individual but generally human, generally animal even, and represents the real foundations of the individual soul.

This whole psychic organism corresponds exactly to the body, which, though constantly showing individual variation, is none the less in all essential features the general human body, which in its development and structure still preserves those elements that connect it with invertebrate animals and finally with the protozoa. Theoretically it should be possible to shell out of the collective unconscious not only the psychology of the worm, but even that of the individual cell.

We are all convinced that it is quite impossible to understand the living organism apart from its relation to its environmental conditions. There are innumerable biological facts that can be explained only as phenomena of reaction to the environment, as, for instance, the blindness of cave salamanders, the peculiarities of intestinal parasites, the particular anatomical structure of certain vertebrates that have adapted regressively to marine life.

The same is true of the mind. Its peculiar organization must be related to environmental conditions in the most



intimate fashion. From the collective unconscious as a timeless and universal mind we should expect reactions to the most universal and constant conditions, whether psychological, physiological, or physical. From the conscious, on the other hand, we should expect reactions and adaptation-phenomena relating to the present; for the conscious is that part of the mind that is preferably limited to events of the moment.

The collective unconscious—so far as we can venture a judgment upon it—seems to consist of something of the nature of mythological themes or images. For this reason the myths of peoples are the real exponents of the collective unconscious. The whole of mythology could be taken as a kind of projection of the collective unconscious. This can be illustrated very beautifully in the starry heavens, the chaotic forms of which have been ordered through the projection of images. It is this projection that explains the influence of the stars asserted by astrologers. These influences are merely the unconscious, introspective perceptions of the activity of the collective unconscious and are not due to the stars. The possibility of calculating actual effects from the stars must be discounted by the fact that since Hipparchus (100 B.C.), owing to the precession of the equinox, astrological calculations are no longer correct.

Just as the images of the constellations were projected into the sky, so similar and other figures were projected into legends and fairy tales or upon historical personages. We can therefore investigate the collective unconscious in two ways, either through mythology or through the analysis of the individual. Since I cannot make the latter material accessible to you, I must limit myself to the former. But mythology is such a wide field that we can select from it only a few types. Similarly, the number of environmental conditions is endless, so that here too we can deal with only a few types.

As the living body with its special characteristics is a system of functional adaptation to environmental conditions,

so the mind must show those organs or function-systems that correspond to regular physical events. By this I do not mean the organic constitution of the sense functions, but rather a sort of psychic parallel to physical regularities. Thus, for example, the daily course of the sun, and the change from day to night must impress themselves in the form of an image, stamped upon the mind from primordial times. We could not demonstrate such an image, but we find instead more or less fantastic analogues of the physical process. Every morning a god-hero is born from the sea; he mounts the chariot of the sun. In the west a great mother awaits him and he is devoured by her in the evening. In the belly of a dragon he traverses the depths of the midnight sea. After a frightful combat with the serpent of night he is born again in the morning.

This conglomerate of myth—concerning which Frobenius has written a standard work—contains without a doubt the reflection of physical processes. Indeed this is so obvious that many writers assume, as you know, that primitives devise such myths just to explain physical processes. Certainly it cannot be questioned that natural science and natural philosophy have grown out of this soil. None the less it seems to me more than improbable that the primitive has thought of such things solely out of a need for explanation, producing them as a sort of physical or astronomical theory.

What we can say about the mythical structure is this: the physical process apparently came to be recorded in the psyche in these fantastic and distorted forms, and there they have been preserved, so that the unconscious still reproduces similar images to-day. Naturally the question now arises: Why did the psyche not register the actual process, instead of mere phantasies about the physical process?

If you can place yourself within the mind of a primitive you can at once understand why this is so. He lives in his world in a state of *participation mystique*. (Lévy-Brühl has coined this term to denote the psychological fact,

that between subject and object there is by no means the absolute separation that our rational mind distinguishes.) What happens without, happens also within him; and what goes on within him, also takes place without. I observed a very beautiful example of this when I was among the Elgonyi, a primitive tribe living on Mt. Elgon in East Africa. At sunrise they spit on their hands and then extend the palms towards the sun as it comes over the horizon. "We are happy that the night is past," they say. Since the word *adhista* means both God and the sun I asked: "Is the sun God?" They said "No" to this and laughed, as if I had said something especially stupid. As the sun was just then high in the heavens, I pointed to it and asked: "When the sun is there you say it is not God, but when it is in the East you say it is God?" There was an embarrassed silence till an old chief began to explain. "It is so," he said. "When the sun is up there that is not God, but when it rises, that is God (or then it is God)" (*adhista mungu*). It is immaterial to the primitive mind which of these two versions is correct. Sunrise and its feeling of release are for him the same divine experience, just as night and its anxiety are one and the same. Naturally his affect is more important to him than physics; therefore he registers his affect-phantasies. For him night means snakes and the cold breath of spirits, whereas morning means the birth of a beautiful god—*adhista m'zuri*.

Just as there are mythological theories that seek to explain everything as coming from the sun, so there are lunar theories that do the same with the moon. This comes simply from the fact that there are countless myths about the moon; and among them a whole host in which the moon appears as the wife of the sun. The moon is the changing experience of the night, therefore it coincides with the primitive's sexual experience with woman, who is for him also the experience of the night. But the moon can as well be the injured brother of the sun, for at night affect-laden and evil thoughts of power

and revenge may disturb sleep. The moon is a disturber of sleep; also it is the haven of departed souls; for in dreams of the night the dead return again and phantoms of the past appear to anxious, sleepless men. Thus the moon also means madness (lunacy). It is such experiences as these that become deeply rooted in the mind, rather than the changing image of the moon.

It is not storms, nor thunder and lightning, nor rain and cloud that remain as images in the mind; but the phantasies caused by them. Once I experienced a very violent earthquake, and my first, immediate feeling was, that I no longer stood on the solid and familiar earth, but on the skin of a gigantic animal that was shuddering beneath me. It was this image that impressed itself on me, not the physical fact. The curses of man against destroying thunderstorms, his terror of the unchained elements—these affects humanize the passion of nature, and the purely physical element becomes an angry god.

✓ In a manner resembling the effects of his physical environment, the physiological conditions, the glandular urgencies—these also excite phantasies full of affect. Sexuality appears as a god of fertility, as a fiercely sensual, feminine dæmon, as the devil himself with Dionysian goat's legs and obscene gestures, or as a terrifying, constricting serpent.

Hunger makes food into gods. Certain tribes of Mexican Indians even give annual holidays to these food-gods in order to allow them to recuperate, during which the usual food is not eaten for a given period of time. The ancient pharaohs were honoured as eaters of gods. Osiris is the wheat, the son of the earth, and therefore the host had to consist of wheat-meal, *i.e.* a god to be eaten; thus also, Jacchos, the mysterious god of the Eleusinian mysteries. The steer of Mithra is the edible fruitfulness of earth.

Naturally the psychological conditions of the environment leave similar mythical traces. Dangerous situations, whether bodily dangers or menaces to the mind, arouse affect-

phantasies, and in so far as such situations typically repeat themselves they form similar archetypes—as I have called mythical motives in general.

Dragons make their homes by watercourses, preferably near a ford or some such dangerous crossing; djins and other devils are to be found in waterless deserts or in dangerous gorges; spirits of the dead inhabit the eerie thickets of the bamboo forest; treacherous nixies and sea-serpents live in the depths of the sea and its whirlpools. Mighty ancestor spirits or gods inhabit an important man; deadly fetish-power resides in the strange and unusual. Sickness and death are never due to natural causes, but are always caused by spirits or witches. Even the weapon that has killed someone is *mana*, i.e. endowed with extraordinary power.

How is it then, you may ask, with the most everyday, intimate, and immediate events, with husband, wife, father, mother, child? These customary and eternally repeated facts create the most powerful archetypes of all, the ceaseless activity of which even in our rationalistic times is everywhere immediately evident. Take, for example, the Christian dogma. The Trinity consists of God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; the latter being represented by the bird of Astarte, the dove, and was actually called Sophia in early Christian times, and thought of as feminine. The worship of Mary in the later church is an obvious substitute for this. Here we have the archetype of the family *ἐν οὐρανίῳ τόπῳ* "in a heavenly place" as Plato expresses it, enthroned as the formulation of the ultimate mystery. Christ is the bridegroom; the church is the bride; the baptismal font is the womb of the church, as it is still called in the text of the *Benedictio fontis*. The holy water has salt put into it—with the idea of fertilization or making it like the sea. A *hierosgamos* or holy wedding is celebrated on the holy Sabbath in the service just mentioned, and a burning candle as a phallic symbol is plunged three times into the font, in order to fertilize the baptismal water and lend it the qualities

necessary to give a new birth to the child baptized (*quasi modo genitus*). The *mana* personality, the medicine man, is the *pontifex maximus*, the Papa; the church is the *mater ecclesia*, the *magna mater*, and mankind the helpless children needing grace.

The deposit of all those impressive experiences—so rich in emotional imagery—of the whole human ancestry with father, mother, child, husband, wife, with the magical personality, with dangers to body and soul, has exalted this group of archetypes into supreme governing principles of religious and political life, in unconscious recognition of their tremendous psychic power.

I have found that an intellectual apprehension of these things in no way detracts from their value; on the contrary it helps us, not only to feel, but to comprehend their immense significance. These powerful projections permit the Catholic to experience a considerable portion of his collective unconscious in tangible reality. He has no need to go in quest of some authority, or superior power, some revelation, or connexion with the eternal and the timeless. These are always present and available for him. In the sacred precincts of every altar for him there dwells a god. It is the Protestant and the Jew who have to seek; for the one has, in a sense, destroyed the earthly body of the godhead, and the other has never found it. For both of them, the archetypes, which to Catholic Christianity have become a visible and living reality, lie in the unconscious. Unfortunately I cannot go more deeply here into the notable differences in the attitude of our civilized consciousness towards the unconscious. I would only point out that this question of attitude is controversial, and manifestly belongs to the greatest of human problems.

The greatness of the problem will be grasped if you realize that the unconscious, as the totality of all archetypes, is the deposit of all human experience back to its most remote beginnings. Not merely a dead imprint—a sort of abandoned

field of rubbish—but a living system of reactions and aptitudes determining the individual life in invisible ways ; and because invisible all the more effective. It is not just a gigantic historical prejudice, so to speak, but also the source of the instincts ; since archetypes are merely the forms that the instincts have assumed. From the living fount of the instincts flows all that is creative ; hence the unconscious is not merely a historical conditioning, but also the very source of the creative impulse. The unconscious is like nature with her prodigious conservatism ; but yet in her acts of creation removing her own historical limitation. No wonder, then, that for humanity of all times and regions it was a burning question how best to adapt to these mighty and invisible determinants. If consciousness had never split off from the unconscious—an event eternally repeated, and symbolized as the fall of the angels and the disobedience of the first parents—this problem would never have arisen, nor would there be a question of environmental adaptation. ✓

As a result of the existence of individual consciousness, we become aware of the difficulties of the inner, as well as of the outer life. Just as the world about him takes on a friendly or a hostile guise to the eyes of primitive man, so the influences of the unconscious seem to him like an opposing power, with which he has to come to terms as with his visible world. His numberless magical practices serve this end. On higher levels of civilization religion and philosophy fulfil the same purpose ; and whenever such a system of adaptation begins to fail, a general unrest begins to appear, and efforts are made to find a new, appropriate form for the relation to the unconscious. A striking example of this was shown in the time of the Roman emperors.

These things seem very remote to our modern enlightened eyes. Sometimes, when I speak of the forces of this hinterland of mind, the unconscious, and compare its reality with that of the visible world I encounter incredulous laughter. But then I must ask how many people are there who still

bow the knee to *mana*- and spirit-theories, in other words, how many millions are Christian Scientists and spiritualists? How many people believe in the magic power of the gnosis, that is, how many millions of theosophists are there? I will not extend the list further. I merely want to illustrate the fact that the problem of the invisible factors that determine the mind is as alive to-day as ever it was.

In the preceding discussion I have tried to give you a general view of the structure of the unconscious. Archetypes may be considered the fundamental elements of the conscious mind, hidden in the depths of the psyche, or, to use another comparison, they are the roots of the mind, sunk not only in the earth in the narrower sense, but in the world in general. Archetypes are systems of preparedness that are at the same time images and emotions. They are inherited with the structure of the brain of which they represent the psychic aspect. On the one hand, they make for a very strong instinctive prejudice, and, on the other, they are the most effective means conceivable of instinctive adaptation. They are essentially the chthonic portion of the mind—if we may use this expression—that portion through which the mind is linked to nature, or in which, at least, its relatedness to the earth and the universe seems most comprehensible. In these primordial images the effect of the earth and its laws upon the mind is clearest to us. It would be as well, therefore, if to the foregoing very general presentation of the problem I were to add something further concerning the function of the archetypes.

You will agree that not only is this problem very complicated; it is also very subtle. In the handling of it we shall have to reckon with quite unusual difficulties, and the first of these is that the archetype and its function are to be understood far more as a part of prehistoric irrational psychology than as a rationally conceived system of ideas. I can put it better in an illustration: we have then to describe and to explain a building the upper storey of which was



erected in the nineteenth century; the ground-floor dates from the sixteenth century, and a careful examination of the masonry discloses the fact that it was reconstructed from a dwelling-tower of the eleventh century. In the cellar we discover Roman foundation walls, and under the cellar a filled-in cave, in the floor of which stone tools are found, and remnants of glacial fauna in the layers below. That would be a sort of picture of our mental structure. We live in the upper story, and are only dimly aware that our lower story is somewhat old-fashioned. As to what lies beneath the superficial crust of the earth we remain quite unconscious.

Obviously there is a discrepancy here, as in all similes, for in the mind there is nothing that is just a dead relic, since all is living, and our upper story, the conscious, is under the constant influence of the living and active foundations. It is carried by them, as is the building. And just as the building rises freely above the earth's level, so our consciousness stands in a measure above the earth in space, with a free outlook. But the deeper we descend into the house the narrower the horizon becomes, and in the darkness we come upon the nearest and most intimate things, till finally we reach the naked rock-floor, down to that early dawn of time when reindeer hunters fought for a bare and wretched existence against the elemental forces of wild nature. Those men were still in the full possession of their animal instincts, without which their existence would have been impossible. The free sway of the instincts is not consistent with a powerful and comprehensive consciousness. The consciousness of primitives, as of the child, is of a sporadic nature; his world too, like the child's, is very limited. Our childhood even rehearses, according to the phylogenetic principle, reminiscences of the pre-history of the race and of mankind in general. Phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically we have grown up out of the dark confines of the earth. Hence the factors nearest to us became archetypes, and it is these primordial images which influence us most

directly, and which seem to be also the most powerful. I say 'seem' because what seems to us the most important psychically is not necessarily the most important, or at least need not remain so.

What are relatively the most immediate archetypes? This question leads us directly to the problem of archetypal functioning, and therewith into the heart of the difficulty. From what angle shall we approach the question? From the view-point of the child? Or from that of the primitive? Or from that of adult modern consciousness? How can we recognize an archetype? And when is it necessary to have recourse to this hypothesis? I would like to suggest that every psychic reaction that is out of proportion to its exciting cause should be investigated as to whether it is not in part conditioned by an unconscious archetype.

What I mean by that can best be illustrated by an example. A child let us suppose is afraid of its mother. We have first to assure ourselves that there is no rational cause for this, a bad conscience, for instance, on the child's part, or violence on the mother's, or something else that may have happened to the child. If, however, there is nothing of this kind to explain the fear, then I would suggest that the situation be regarded as an archetypal one. Usually such fears appear at night, and are wont to show themselves in dreams. The child dreams of the mother as a witch who pursues children. The conscious material behind these dreams is often the Hänsel and Gretel fairy-tale. It is often said then that the child should not have been given such a tale, because the tale is thought to be the cause of the terror. That is an erroneous rationalization, but nevertheless it contains a kernel of truth in that the witch motive is certainly the most apt expression for a child's terror, and always has been so. That is why such fairy-tales exist. Infantile night-terrors are a typical event that is always repeating itself, and has always been expressed in certain typical motives of fairy-tales.

Fairy-tales, however, are only infantile forms of legends, myths, and superstitions taken from the 'night-religion' of the primitives. What I call 'night-religion' is the magical religious form, the meaning and aim of which is intercourse with the dark powers, devils, witches, magicians, and spirits. Just as the childish fairy-tale is a phylogenetic repetition, springing from the ancient night-religion, so the childish terror is a re-enacting of primitive psychology, a phylogenetic relic.

That this relic displays a certain vitality is in no sense abnormal, for nocturnal terrors, even in adults under civilized conditions is not necessarily an abnormal phenomenon. Only a special intensity of terror could be taken as abnormal. The question, is, then, under what circumstances will the fear increase? Can the increase be explained solely by the archetype of the witch expressed in the fairy-tale, or must some other explanatory cause be introduced?

We should make the archetype responsible only for a definite, small, normal degree of fear; on the other hand, a pronounced increase, felt to be abnormal, must have special causes. Freud, as we know, explains this terror as the collision of the child's incestuous tendency with the incest prohibition. He explains it from the angle of the child. I have no doubt that children can have 'incestuous' tendencies in the extended sense used by Freud. But I am very doubtful as to whether these tendencies can be ascribed without more ado to child-psychology *sui generis*. There are very good reasons for the view that the psyche of the child remains still within the sphere of the parents' psyche, especially that of the mother, and to such a degree that the child's psyche must be regarded as a functional appendage of that of the parents. The psychic individuality of the child develops only later, after a reliable continuity of consciousness has been established. That the child at first speaks of himself in the third person is, in my opinion, a significant proof of the impersonality of his psychology.

I am therefore inclined to explain possible incestuous tendencies of the child from the psychology of the parents, just as every childish neurosis should be considered first and foremost in the light of the parental psychology. A frequent cause of increased infantile terrors is an especial 'liability to complexes' on the part of the parents, that is, a repression and disregard of certain vital problems. Whatever goes into the unconscious takes on a more or less archaic form. If, for example, the mother represses a painful and terrifying complex, she will feel it as an evil spirit following her—a 'skeleton in the cupboard', as the English say. This formulation shows that the complex has already assumed an archetypal force. It weighs upon her like a mountain, a nightmare torments her. Whether she tells 'night-stories', *i.e.*, terror stories, to the child or not, she none the less infects the child and awakens in its mind archetypal terror images from her own psychology. Perhaps she has erotic phantasies about a man other than her husband; and the child is the visible sign of their marriage tie. Her resistance to the tie is unconsciously directed against the child, who has to be repudiated. On the archaic level this corresponds to child-murder. In this way the mother becomes a wicked witch who devours children.

As in the mother, so in the child, possibilities of archaic representations lie ready to be activated. And it is the same cause to-day as in the days when the archetype was being laid down during the course of human history, that reactivates it ever and again.

This example of the manifestation of an archetype in a child has not been chosen accidentally. We began with the question as to what are the most immediate archetypes. The most immediate primordial image is the mother, for she is in every way the nearest and most powerful experience; and the one, moreover, that occurs in the most impressionable period of a man's life. Since the conscious is as yet only weakly developed in childhood, one cannot speak of an

'individual' experience at all. The mother, however, is an archetypal experience; she is known by the more or less unconscious child not as a definite, individual feminine personality, but as the mother, an archetype loaded with significant possibilities. As life proceeds the primordial image fades, and is replaced by a conscious, relatively individual image, which is assumed to be the only mother-image we have. In the unconscious, on the contrary, the mother always remains a powerful primordial image, determining and colouring in the individual conscious life our relation to woman, to society, and to the world of feeling and fact, yet in so subtle a way that, as a rule, there is no conscious perception of the process. We imagine we are dealing only with metaphors. But it becomes a very concrete fact when a man marries his wife only because in some way she resembles his mother; or else because she does not. Mother Germania is for the Germans, like *la douce France* for the French, an important political background that could be ignored only by intellectuals who are blind to the world as it is. The all-embracing lap of the *mater ecclesia* is far from being a mere metaphor, and the same is true of mother earth, mother nature, and matter in general.

For the child the archetype of the mother is the most immediate one. But with the development of consciousness, the father also comes into the field of vision and activates an archetype, the nature of which is in many ways opposed to that of the mother. As the mother archetype corresponds to the Chinese *yin*, so the father type corresponds to the definition of *yang*. It determines the relations to man, to spirit, and to the dynamis of nature. The 'fatherland' means borders, that is, definite localization, but the soil is mother earth, restful and fertile. The Rhine is a father, as is the Nile, wind, authority, storm, lightning, and thunder. The father is '*auctor*' and authority, therefore law and the state. He corresponds to what is moving in the world, like the wind, that which creates and guides with invisible thoughts

—phantasies. He is the creative breath of wind—*pneuma*, *spiritus*, *atman*.

Thus the father is also a powerful archetype that lives in the mind of the child. The father is also definitely *the father*, an all-embracing image of divinity, a dynamic principle. In the course of life this image too recedes into the background. The father becomes a limited, and often all-too-human, personality. The father-image, on the other hand, broadens out into all its possibilities of meaning. Thus, just as man was late in discovering nature, so he discovered only gradually the state, law, duty, responsibility, and spirit. As the growing consciousness becomes more capable of understanding, the importance of the parental personality diminishes. But in the place of the father there comes the society of men, and in place of the mother, family and clan. Finally, instead of the father, the image of God appears, and in the mother's place, the mysterious abyss of all-being. Not idly did Faust say, "The mothers! the mothers! it sounds so strange."

It would be wrong, in my view, to say that all those things that take the place of the parents are merely a substitute for the unavoidable loss of the primordial parental images. What takes their place is not just a substitute, but a reality that is already bound up with the parents, and that has become impressed upon the mind of the child by virtue of its connexion with the parental image. The warming, protecting, nourishing mother is likewise the hearth, the protecting cave, or hut, and the surrounding vegetation. The mother is also the provident field, and her son the divine grain, the brother and friend of man. The mother is the milk-giving cow and the herd. The father goes about, talks to other men, hunts, wanders, makes war, and lets loose his bad tempers like thunderstorms, and at the behest of invisible thoughts he changes the whole situation like a sudden storm-wind. He is battle and weapons, the cause of all changes; he is the bull provoked to deeds of violence

or prone to apathetic laziness. He is the image of all helpful or harmful elemental powers.

All these things are immediate in the child's early life, affecting him sometimes through the parents, and sometimes with them. As the image of the parents diminishes and becomes human, all those things, which at first seemed only like background or marginal effects, stand out more clearly. The soil of the earth on which the child plays, the fire at which he warms himself, the rain and storms that freeze him, although always realities, were at first, because of his twilight consciousness, seen and understood only as characteristics of the parents. Then, as out of a mist, there emerge the material and dynamic aspects of the earth; these reveal themselves now as real powers, no longer wearing the masks of the parents. Thus they are not a substitute for the parents, but the reality that corresponds to a higher level of consciousness.

Nevertheless something is lost in this development that cannot be replaced—the feeling of direct connexion and unity with the parents. This feeling is not just a sentiment, but an important psychological fact, which, in a quite different connotation, has been termed '*participation mystique*' by Lévy-Brühl. This expression, which by the way does not invite a superficial understanding, denotes a fact that plays a most important rôle, not only in primitive mentality, but also in our analytical psychology. This fact may be briefly characterized as a state of identity in a common unconsciousness. Perhaps I should explain this further. If the same unconscious complex is constellated in two people at the same time there arises a remarkable emotional effect, a projection, which causes either a mutual attraction or a mutual repulsion. When I share with another person an unconscious relation to the same important fact, I become in part identical with him, and because of this I orientate myself to him as I would to the complex in question were I conscious of it.

This *participation mystique* exists between parents and children. A well-known example of it is the stepmother who identifies herself with the daughter, and, through her, marries the son-in-law; or the father who thinks he is considering his son's welfare when he naïvely forces him to carry out his (the father's) wishes, for instance, in marriage, or in the choice of his profession. Conversely, the son who identifies himself with the father is an equally well-known figure. But there is an especially close bond between mother and daughter, which in certain cases is clearly demonstrable by the association method. Although the *participation mystique* is an unconscious fact to the person concerned, he none the less feels the change when it no longer exists. There is always a certain difference between the psychology of a man whose father is still living and one whose father is dead. So long as a *participation mystique* with the parents persists, a relatively infantile mode of life will be maintained. Through the *participation mystique* the person's life is influenced by unconscious motivation, for which, since it is unconscious, no responsibility is felt. Because of the infantile unconsciousness the burden of life is easier or at least seems so. One is not alone, but exists unconsciously within a group of two or three. In imagination the son is in the mother's lap, protected by the father. The father is born again in the son, and is thus at the entrance at least of eternal life. The mother has rejuvenated the father in the youthful husband, and therefore has not lost her youth. I need not cite examples from primitive psychology. A reference to them must suffice.

With the widening and growth of consciousness all this drops away. The extension of the parental *imagines* over the world, or rather, the world breaking in, as it were, upon the mists of childhood, severs the unconscious union with the parents. This process is even carried out consciously in the primitive rites of initiation. The parental archetype is thus driven into the background; it is no longer



'constellated'. But now a certain *participation mystique* begins with the tribe, society, the church, or the nation. This participation is, however; general and impersonal, and, above all, gives very little scope to the unconscious. If a person should incline to be too unconscious and too guilelessly trusting, law and society would quickly shake him into consciousness. As a result of puberty, the possibility of a new personal *participation mystique* comes into existence, and therewith also the possibility of replacing that part of the personality that was lost in the identification with the parents. A new archetype becomes constellated: in the man it is that of woman, in woman it is the archetype of man. These two figures were also hidden behind the mask of the parental images, and now they come forth unveiled, for the most part strongly influenced by the parental images, often overwhelmingly so. To the feminine archetype in man I have given the name 'anima'; the masculine archetype in woman I have called 'animus' for definite reasons which I shall discuss later.

The more a man is unconsciously influenced by the parental image, the more surely will the figure of the loved one be chosen as either a positive or a negative substitute for the parents. Although such a ruling motive in the love-choice of an individual shows that his release from the parental image, and therefore from childhood, is incomplete, yet the far-reaching influence of the parental image should not be considered abnormal. On the contrary, it is a very normal and general phenomenon. It is even important that it should be so, for otherwise the parents are not born again in the children, that is, the parental imago becomes so completely lost that all continuity in the life of the individual ceases. He cannot connect his childhood with his adult life and, therefore, unconsciously remains a child; a situation that is the best possible foundation for a subsequent neurosis. He will suffer from all those ills that beset unhistorical parvenus, be they individuals or social groups.

It is normal that children should in a certain sense marry their parents. This is as important psychologically, as biologically it is necessary that some of the limbs of the family tree should be sacrificed if a good race is to be produced. Through the influence of the parental imago continuity is established, a reasonable prolongation of the past into the present. Either too much or too little of such influence is unhealthy.

In so far as a positive or negative resemblance to the parents is the decisive motive in the love-choice, we cannot speak of a complete release from the parental image and in this respect childhood still persists. Although childhood must, in a sense, be brought along for the sake of continuity, this should not be at the expense of further development. When, towards the middle of life, the last gleam of childish illusion fades—this it must be owned is only true of an almost ideal life, for many go as children to their graves—then the archetype of the mature man emerges from the parental image, an image of man as woman has known him from the beginning of time, and an image of woman that man has carried within him eternally.

There are indeed many men who can describe exactly, even to individual details, the image of woman that they carry in their minds. (Of the masculine archetype I have met few women who could give as exact a picture.) Just as the primordial image of the mother is a composite image of all pre-existing mothers, the image of the anima is similarly a supra-individual image. So true is this that the image reveals closely corresponding features in men of wide individual variation, and one can almost reconstruct a definite type of woman from this image. The most salient fact about this type of woman is that the maternal, in the usual sense of the word, is entirely lacking. She is companion and friend, in her favourable aspect; in her unfavourable rôle, she is the courtesan. You find these types in fantastical romances often very accurately described with all the

paraphernalia of their especial metaphysics. Good examples are to be found in Rider Haggard's *She* and in *Wisdom's Daughter* by the same author; in Benoit's *L'Atlantide*, and, fragmentarily, in Helena in the second part of *Faust*. This anima-type is presented in the briefest and most significant way in the gnostic legend of Simon Magus, the caricature of which also appears in the story of the apostles. Simon Magus was always accompanied on his journeys by a girl whose name was Helena. Simon found her in a brothel in Tyre. She was a re-incarnation of the Trojan Helen. I do not know whether Goethe's Faust-Helena motive was consciously derived from the Simon legend. A similar relationship occurs in Rider Haggard's *Wisdom's Daughter*, where we can be certain that there is no conscious continuity.

The absence of the usual maternal element shows, on the one hand, a complete release from the mother-imagó, and, on the other, the idea of a purely human, individual relationship without the instinctive motive of procreation. The overwhelming majority of men of the present cultural level do not advance beyond the maternal significance of woman; and this is also the reason why the anima seldom develops beyond the infantile, primitive stage of the prostitute. Consequently, prostitution must be regarded, primarily, as a by-product of civilized marriage. In the legend of Simon, however, and in the second part of *Faust* anima symbols of a complete maturity are to be found. This adult development means a growth away from nature. Christian and Buddhist monastic ideals grappled with the same problem, but involving always the sacrifice of the flesh. Demi-goddesses and goddesses took the place of the human personality who should carry the projection of the anima.

Here we touch a highly controversial territory into which I do not wish to venture further. We shall do better to return to the elementary problem as to how we can discover the existence of such a feminine archetype.

As long as an archetype is not projected, and therefore

either loved or hated in an object, it is identical with the individual who is thus forced to express it himself. Under these circumstances a man will exhibit his anima. We have long had a word expressive of this special attitude. It is 'animosity'. This expression is best understood as 'possession by the anima'. It is a condition of uncontrolled emotion. The word 'animosity' applies only to unpleasant emotionality, but actually the anima can induce pleasant feelings as well.

Self-mastery is a typically masculine ideal. It is achieved by repression of feeling. Feeling is a specifically feminine virtue, and because a man in trying to attain his ideal of manhood represses all feminine traits—which are really part of him, just as masculine traits are part of woman's psychology—he also represses certain aspects of feeling, as being a feminine weakness. In so doing he piles up womanishness or sentimentality in the unconscious, and when it breaks out, this betrays in him a feminine being. As is well known it is just the most masculine men who inwardly are most subject to feminine feeling. This circumstance might explain the very much greater number of suicides among men, and its converse, the often extraordinary power and firmness developed by very feminine women. If we study carefully the uncontrolled emotions of a man, and at the same time try to reconstruct the probable personality underlying these emotions, we soon arrive at a feminine figure, which I call, as I said, the anima. On the same grounds the ancient belief conceived of a feminine soul, a 'psyche', or an 'anima'; and not without cause did the ecclesiastical Middle Ages propound the question: *Habet mulier animam?*

In women the case is reversed. When the animus breaks out in a woman feelings do not appear, as was the case with the man, but she begins to discuss and to rationalize; and just as the anima feelings are arbitrary and moody, so these feminine arguments are illogical and unreasonable. One can speak of an animus-thinking that is always right and must

have the last word, and that always ends up with "that's just the reason". The anima is irrational feeling, the animus irrational conceiving.

So far as my experience goes, a man always understands fairly easily what is meant by anima; frequently indeed, he has, as I said, a quite definite picture of her, so that among a collection of varied types of woman of all periods he can single out the one who comes nearest to the anima-type. On the other hand, I have, as a rule, found it very difficult to make a woman understand the animus, and I have never known a case where a woman could give me a definite statement about the animus. I conclude from this that the animus apparently has no definite personality, in other words, he is not so much a unity as a plurality.<sup>1</sup> This fact must be considered in relation to the special psychology of men and women. On the biological level woman's chief interest is to hold a man, whereas the interest of the man is to conquer a woman, and nature does not encourage him to stick to a conquest. Thus one masculine personality plays a determining rôle for the woman; the relation of man to woman, on the other hand, is less definite, inasmuch as he can look on his wife as one among many women. This makes him emphasize the legal and social aspects of marriage, whereas the woman sees it as an exclusively personal relation. Thus, as a general rule, the conscious of a woman is confined to the one man, whereas the conscious of the man has a tendency to go beyond the personal relation, a tendency that can, under certain circumstances, run counter to everything personal. In the unconscious, therefore, we might expect a compensation by the opposite. The relatively sharply defined anima-figure of the man's unconscious fulfils this expectation beautifully, as does also the polymorphism shown by the woman's animus.

The description of the anima and the animus that I am

<sup>1</sup> An excellent example of this is to be found in H. G. Wells' *Christina Alberta's Father*.

able to give here is necessarily curtailed. I should, however, be carrying this restriction too far if I did no more than describe the anima as a primordial image of woman, and as consisting essentially of irrational feeling. It would also be misleading if I represented the animus merely as a primordial image of man, and as consisting only of ideas. Both figures represent far-reaching problems, since they are primordial forms of those especial psychic phenomena which from ancient times have been called the soul. They are also the cause of the deep human necessity to speak of souls or dæmons.

Nothing that is autonomic in the psyche is impersonal in the sense of being factual. The impersonal is a category of consciousness. From the 'voices' of the mentally diseased and the spirit-controls of mediums, right up to the visions of the mystics, all autonomic psychic factors have the character of personality. Thus the anima and the animus have the character of personality that one cannot express better than by the word 'soul'. Here I would guard against a misunderstanding. The concept of soul that I am now using is to be compared with the primitive conception, as, for example, the *ba*- and *ka*- soul of the Egyptians, rather than with the Christian idea of the soul, which is an attempt at an inclusive philosophical idea of a metaphysical individual substance. My conception of the soul has nothing to do with this, since I use it in a merely phenomenological sense. I am not indulging in any psychological mysticism, but am simply trying to grasp scientifically the primordial psychological phenomena which underlie the belief in souls.

Since the complex of facts represented by 'animus' and 'anima' best corresponds to what has been described as soul in all times and by all peoples, it is scarcely surprising that the two complexes should beget an unusually mystical atmosphere whenever we are intimately involved with their content. The projection of the anima is immediately accompanied by a remarkable historical feeling which Goethe

expressed in the words: "Ah! in some far distant spring thou wert my sister or my wife."

Rider Haggard and Benoît go back to Greece and to Egypt in order to do justice to this historical feeling.

Strangely enough, so far as my experience goes, the animus seems to be lacking in this mystical sense of historicity. It might almost be said that he busies himself more with the present and the future. He has nomothetical inclinations; he prefers to speak of things as they should be, or at least to give an apodictic judgment about just the most obscure and controversial things, and, moreover, in such definite terms that the woman is relieved of all further and, possibly, painful reflection.

Once again, I can explain this difference only as a compensatory contrast. Man, in his conscious activity, plans ahead and seeks to create the future; whereas it is specifically feminine to belabour the mind with such questions as, who was somebody's great great aunt. It is just this feminine genealogical tendency, however, that comes out very clearly in Rider Haggard, with English sentiment, while in Benoît the same tendency appears with a piquant admixture of the *chronique familiale et scandaleuse*. The intimation of the idea of re-incarnation in the form of an irrational feeling is very strongly bound up with the anima; while in certain cases a woman will consciously avow such feelings, if she is not too much under the domination of man's rationalism.

The historical feeling has the characteristic of significance and fatefulness; it therefore leads directly to the problems of immortality and divinity. Even the rationalistic, sceptical Benoît describes those who have died of love as being preserved for eternity by a specially effective method of mummification, not to mention the full-blown mysticism of Rider Haggard in *The Return of She*—altogether a psychological document of the first rank.

Since the animus in itself is neither a feeling nor an inclination, the aspect I have here described is completely lacking to

him, and yet in his deepest essence he is also historical. Unfortunately there are no good literary examples of the animus; since women write less than men and, moreover, when they do write, they seem to lack a certain naïve introspection. At least they prefer to preserve the results of their introspection in another drawer, possibly just because there is no feeling connected with it. I know only one unprejudiced document of this sort, a novel by Marie Hay, *The Evil Vineyard*. In this very unpretending story the historical element in the animus comes out in a clever disguise that was assuredly not intended by the author.

The animus consists in an *a priori* unconscious assumption based on unthought judgment. The existence of this judgment can be recognized only by the way in which the conscious is orientated to certain things. I must give you an example: a mother surrounded her son with a certain imposing solicitude, and thereby lent him an importance that did not belong to him. The result was that shortly after puberty he became neurotic. The cause of this senseless attitude on the mother's part was not at once recognizable. A more penetrating investigation, however, revealed the existence of an unconscious dogma that said: my son is the coming Messiah. This is an ordinary case of the universal hero-archetype in women, which is projected either upon the father, the husband, or the son in the form of a conception, which then unconsciously regulates her behaviour. A beautiful and widely known example is provided by Annie Besant, who has also discovered a saviour. ●

In Marie Hay's story the heroine drives her husband insane by her attitude, which is founded upon the unconscious, and never expressed assumption that he is a horrible tyrant who holds her captive in much the same way as — — —. The uncompleted simile she left to the interpretation of her husband, who finally discovered the appropriate figure for it in a cinque-cento tyrant with which he identified himself, and lost his reason in consequence. If the author of this



story had been a man, I would explain it from masculine psychology—this, in parenthesis.

The historical factor then is not essentially lacking to the animus. But he expresses himself in a form fundamentally different from that of the anima. In the religious problems that are centred in the animus, the judging faculties are of primary importance, as contrasted with the feeling faculties in the case of the man.

In closing I would like to observe that the animus and anima are not the only autonomous figures or 'souls' in the unconscious, though in practice they are the most immediate and important. But, since I would like to engage another aspect of the problem of the determining effect of the earth upon mind, perhaps I may now leave this difficult field of subtlest inner experience and turn to that other side where we shall no longer grope laboriously in the dark background of the mind, but pass into the wide world of everyday things.

Just as the human soul has been formed by its earthly conditions in the evolutionary process, so the same process repeats itself to a certain degree under our eyes. Let us, in thought, transplant an important portion of a European race to a strange soil and another climate. We might expect that such a racial group, even without the admixture of foreign blood, would undergo in the course of a few generations certain psychic changes. At our elbow we can observe in the Jews of the various European countries noticeable differences, which can be explained only through the peculiarities of the different peoples they live amongst. It is not difficult to tell the Spanish from the North African Jew, the German Jew from the Russian. One can even distinguish the various types of Russian Jews, the Polish type from the North Russian and Kossack type. Notwithstanding the similarity of race, there exist marked psychological differences the causes of which are very complicated. It must be admitted that it is extremely hard to determine

these differences exactly, yet a student of human nature unmistakably feels them.

The greatest experiment in the transplantation of a race in modern times is the colonization of the North American continent by a predominantly Germanic population. Since the climatic and geological conditions vary very widely, we should expect all sorts of variations of the original racial type. The mixture with Indian blood is so slight as to play no part. American anthropological investigation has now demonstrated that, even in the second generation of immigrants anatomical changes have begun, chiefly in the measurements of the skull. The Yankee type is formed, and is so similar to the Indian type, that on my first visit to the Middle West, while watching a stream of many hundred workers coming out of a factory, I remarked to the American physician who was with me that I should never have thought there was such a high percentage of Indian blood. My companion laughed, and said he was willing to wager that in all these hundreds of men there would not be found a drop of Indian blood. That was many years ago when I had no notion of the mysterious Indianization of the American people. I recognized this secret only through treating many Americans analytically. In comparison with Europeans extraordinary differences were revealed.

I was also struck by the great influence of the negro, a psychological influence, of course, not due to the mixing of blood. The emotional way in which an American expresses himself—especially in the way he laughs—can be studied very well in the society-gossip items in the American newspapers; the inimitable Rooseveltian laugh you can find in its primordial form in the American Negro. The peculiar walk with the relatively loose ankle-joints or the swinging hips so frequently observed in Americans; this comes from the negro. American music draws its main inspiration from the negro; the dance is a negro dance. The expressions of religious feelings, the revival meetings, the Holy Rollers, and

other abnormalities are powerfully influenced by the negro—and the famous American naïveté, in its charming as well as in its more unpleasant form, lends itself to comparison with the childishness of the negro. The remarkable liveliness of the average temperament, which shows itself not only at baseball games, but particularly in an extraordinary desire to talk—of which the ceaseless and boundless stream of talk in the American papers offers a good example—is scarcely to be derived from the Germanic forefathers, but resembles far more the ‘chattering’ of a negro village. The almost complete lack of intimacy, and the all-devouring, voluminous sociability remind one of primitive life in open huts in a state of complete identification with all the members of the tribe. It seemed to me as though American houses had all their doors open all the time, as in American country towns there are to be found no garden hedges. Everything seems to be street.

In dealing with each particular trait it is difficult to decide how much is to be ascribed to the symbiosis with the negro, and how much to the fact that America is still a pioneering nation on virgin soil. But taken all in all, the significant influence of the negro upon the general character of the people is unmistakable.

This infection of the primitive can also be observed in other lands, but not in the same degree. In Africa, for example, the white man is in a vanishing minority, and must therefore defend himself against the negro by observing the strictest social form; otherwise he risks ‘going black’. If he submits to the primitive influence he is already lost. But in America, the negro, because he is in the minority, has a peculiar influence that is not degenerative. In fact, taking it all in all, the negro influence—provided one is not just possessed by a Jazz-phobia—cannot be termed unfavourable.

The remarkable thing is that one notices little or nothing of the Indians, and yet the above-mentioned anatomical facts do not point to Africa, but are specifically American. Does

the body react to America, and the soul to Africa? I must answer this question by saying that only the manners are influenced by the negro, but what happens to the soul must be further investigated.

It is natural that in the dreams of my American patients the negro should play no insignificant rôle as an expression of the inferior sides of their personality. A European might similarly dream of tramps or other representatives of the lower classes. But by far the greater number of dreams, especially those at the beginning of an analytical treatment, are superficial. It was only in the course of a very thorough and deep analysis that I came upon symbols that are connected with Indian symbolism. The progressive tendency of the unconscious, in other words its hero-motive, chooses the Indian as its symbol, just as certain coins in the United States bear an Indian head. This latter fact is perhaps an honourable tribute—though not fully recognized—to the Indian, for whom the hatred once felt has now passed away. But taken in its deeper significance it is an expression of the fact mentioned above that the American hero-motive has chosen the Indian as an ideal symbol. It would certainly never occur to any American administration to place the head of Cetewayo, Booker Washington, or any other negro hero on their coins. Monarchical states prefer the head of the sovereign upon their coins; democratic states employ other symbols of their ideals. In my book, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, I have published a detailed example of an American hero-phantasy—I could add a dozen similar examples.

The hero-motive always contains what a man desires from the bottom of his heart, and what he would most gladly realize. The nature of the phantasy that goes to the building of the hero-motive has, therefore, always a special importance. In the American hero-phantasy the Indian character plays a leading part. The American conception of sport goes far beyond the notions of the easy-going European. Only Indian

initiations can compete with the ruthlessness and brutality of a vigorous American training. Accordingly, the sum-total of America's achievement in sport is quite wonderful. The Indian comes out in all that an American desires. In the extraordinary concentration on a certain goal, in the tenacity of purpose, in the unflinching endurance of the greatest hardships, all the legendary virtues of the Indian find full expression.

The hero-motive is concerned not only with the general attitude to life, but also with vital problems of religion. Whenever a man takes up an absolute attitude, there his religion appears. I have found in my American patients that their hero-figure also represents a characteristic aspect of Indian religion. The most important figure of Indian religion is the Shaman, the doctor and exorcizer of spirits. The first American discovery in this terrain—which has also become important for Europe—was spiritualism, the second was Christian Science and other similar forms of mental healing. Christian Science is an exorcizing ritual. The demons of sickness are denied existence; to the refractory body suitable incantations are sung, and the Christian religion, which corresponds to a high level of culture, is employed as a healing-magic. The poverty of the spiritual content is appalling, but Christian Science is a living force. It possesses a power that links it to the soil, by which it effects those miracles that are sought for in vain in the traditional church.

Thus the American presents a rare picture—a European with negro manners and an Indian soul! He shares the fate of all usurpers of foreign soil. Certain Australian primitives assert that one cannot conquer foreign land, for in foreign soil live strange ancestor spirits, and therefore the strange spirits will inhabit the new-born. There is a great psychological truth in this. The strange land assimilates the conqueror. Unlike the Latin conquerors in Central and South America, North Americans have maintained the European level with the strictest possible puritanism, yet they could not prevent the souls of their Indian enemies becoming theirs.

The virgin earth demands that at least the unconscious of the conqueror sinks to the level of the autochthonic inhabitants. Thus in the American a distance separates the conscious from the unconscious that is not found in Europeans. It is a tension between a high level of culture in the conscious, and an unmediated unconscious primitivity. But this tension provides a psychic potential that endows the American with an indomitable spirit of enterprise and an enviable enthusiasm which we in Europe do not know. The very fact that we are still in possession of our ancestor spirits, and for us everything is historically mediated, certainly gives us a contact with our unconscious, but we are also caught by this contact. In fact, so fast are we in an historical vice that great catastrophes are needed to loosen us from it, and to make us change our political behaviour from what it was 500 years ago. The contact with the unconscious chains us to our earth and makes it hard for us to move, a fact that is to our disadvantage in respect to progressiveness and the many values of a plastic attitude. Nevertheless I would not speak ill of our relation to good mother earth. *Plurimi pertransibunt* ; but whoever is rooted in the soil endures. Remoteness from the unconscious, and therefore from the determining influence of history, means an uprooted state. That is the danger to the conqueror of foreign lands. It is also the danger confronting every individual who through one-sidedness in any kind of *-ism* loses his relation with the dark, maternal, earthy origin of his being.

## ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND *WELTANSCHAUUNG*

THE German word *Weltanschauung* is scarcely translatable into another language. We know at once from this fact that the word must have a peculiar psychological character. It not only expresses a conception of the world—this meaning could be readily translated—but also includes the distinctive way in which one views the world. The word philosophy implies something similar, but narrowed to the intellectual aspect, whereas *Weltanschauung* embraces all sorts of attitudes to the world, including the philosophical. Thus there is an æsthetic, religious, romantic, practical *Weltanschauung*—to mention only a few possibilities. In this sense the concept of *Weltanschauung* has much in common with that of attitude. Thus we could define *Weltanschauung* as a conceptually formulated attitude. ●

What then is to be understood by attitude? Attitude is a psychological concept that designates an especial grouping or ordering of the psychic contents; which grouping is orientated either by a goal, or by a so-called ruling principle. If we compare our psychic contents to an army, expressing the various forms of attitude by particular states of the army, then attention would be represented by a concentrated force standing to arms, surrounded by reconnoitring parties. As soon as the strength and position of the enemy is sufficiently known the position changes; the army begins to move in the direction of a given objective. In a precisely similar manner, the psychic attitude changes. During the state of mere attention, apperception being the ruling idea, the real work of thinking, along with other subjective contents, is suppressed as much as possible. On the other hand in the transition to an active attitude, there appear in consciousness

subjective contents consisting of purposive ideas and impulses to actions. As an army has a leader with a general staff, so the psychic attitude has a general guiding idea, which is founded upon and reinforced by such inclusive material as experiences of all kinds, fundamental principles, affects, and the like. Naturally, no human action is quite simple—like, an isolated reaction to a single stimulus—but each of our actions and reactions is influenced by complicated psychic preconditions. Using the military analogy again, we might compare these processes with the situation at general headquarters. To the man in the ranks it might seem that the army retreated simply because it was attacked, or that an attack were made because the enemy had been seen in the wood. Our conscious function is ever inclined to play the rôle of the common soldier, and to believe in the simplicity of its actions. Whereas in reality battle has been given on this spot, and at this moment, because of a general plan of attack which in its ordered unfolding has for days been marshalling the common soldier to this point. And again this general plan is not a mere reaction to reconnaissance reports, but results from the creative initiative of the leader. Furthermore, it is conditioned by the action of the enemy, and also perhaps by wholly unmilitary, political considerations of which the common soldier is quite unaware. These last factors are of a very complex nature and lie far outside the understanding of the common soldier, though they may be only too clear to the leader of the army. But even to him certain factors are unknown, namely, the preconditions of his own personality, with all their complicated presuppositions. Thus the army stands under a simple and single command, but the latter is the result of the coördinated operation of infinitely complex factors.

Psychic action takes place on the basis of similarly complicated assumptions. No matter how simple an impulse may be, yet every nuance of its special character, its strength and direction, its course in time and space, its purposeful



intention, etc., depends on particular psychic presuppositions, in other words, an attitude ; and the attitude in turn consists of a constellation of contents whose multiplicity is hardly to be measured. The ego is the leader of the army ; his reflections and decisions, his reasons and doubts, his aims and expectations are his general staff, and his dependence on outside factors is the dependence of the leader on the well-nigh incalculable influences that permeate the general headquarters, and the obscure political background.

We do not overload our analogy if we include within its framework the relation of man to the world. We can think of a human being as the leader of a small army in the struggle with his environment ; a war not infrequently on two fronts, before him the battle for existence, in the rear the battle against his own rebellious instinctive nature. Even to those of us who are not pessimists our existence feels more like a battle than anything else. A state of peace is a desideratum and when a man has found peace with himself and the world, it is indeed a noteworthy event. Corresponding to the more or less chronic state of war, we need a carefully organized attitude ; and for anyone to achieve enduring mental peace his attitude must possess a still higher degree of preparedness and detailed elaboration, if his state of peace is to have even a modest duration. It is much easier for the mind to live in a state of movement, in a continuous up and down of events, than in a balanced state of permanency, for in the latter—irrespective of its perhaps marvellous elevation and completeness—one is threatened with suffocation in an unbearable ennui. But we do not deceive ourselves when we assume that peace of mind, that is, moods without conflict, serene, deliberate, and well-balanced, in so far as they endure, always depend upon specially developed attitudes.

You are perhaps surprised that I prefer the word attitude to *Weltanschauung*. In using the concept of attitude, I have simply left the question open as to whether we are dealing with a conscious or an unconscious *Weltanschauung*. One can

be one's own army leader and engage successfully in the struggle for existence both without and within, achieving a relatively secure condition of peace, without possessing a conscious *Weltanschauung*; though one cannot do this without an attitude. We can only properly speak of a *Weltanschauung* when a person has at least made a serious attempt to formulate his attitude conceptually or visibly, that is, when it becomes quite clear to him why and to what purpose he behaves and lives as he does. But of what use is a *Weltanschauung*, you will ask in astonishment, if one can get on just as well without it? But you might just as well ask why have consciousness, if one can do without it? For after all what is *Weltanschauung* but a widened or deepened consciousness? The reason why consciousness exists, and why there is an urge to widen and deepen it is a very simple one. Without consciousness things go less well. This is obviously the reason why mother Nature has allowed consciousness, that most remarkable of all nature's curiosities, to be produced. The well-nigh unconscious primitive can adapt and can make his power felt, but only in his primitive world. Accordingly he falls victim to countless dangers which we on a higher level of consciousness escape without effort. True, a higher consciousness is exposed to dangers undreamed of by the primitive; but the fact remains, that conscious, and not unconscious man has conquered the earth. Whether in the last analysis, and from a superhuman view-point, this is an advantage or otherwise we are not in a position to decide.

Higher consciousness determines *Weltanschauung*. Every increase in experience and knowledge, means a further step in the development of *Weltanschauung*. And with the image the thinking man makes of the world, he also changes himself. The man whose sun still moves round the earth is essentially different from the man whose earth is a satellite of the sun. Not in vain was it that Giordano Bruno's immortal thought represents one of the most important beginnings of modern consciousness. The man whose cosmos hangs in the empyrean

is different from one whose spirit is illuminated by Kepler's vision. The man who is still dubious about the sum of twice two is different from the thinker for whom nothing is less doubtful than the *a priori* truths of mathematics. To sum up—it is not immaterial what sort of *Weltanschauung* we possess; because it is not just a matter of our creating an image of the world, since retroactively it also changes us.

The conception that we make of the world is the image of that sum of experience which we call 'world'. And in accordance with the character of this image we orientate our adaptation. As has been said, this does not happen unconsciously. The common soldier in the trenches has no insight into the activities of the general staff. It is true that we are both general staff and army leader. But nearly always it requires determined resolution to free our consciousness from immediate, perhaps pressing, occupations in order to direct it to the general problem of attitude. If we fail in this, we naturally remain unconscious of our attitude, and in this case we have no *Weltanschauung*, but merely an unconscious attitude. If no account is taken of guiding aims and principles they remain unconscious, that is, it seems as if everything simply happened in such and such a way. In reality, however, complicated processes are working in the background in which principles and aims are involved of well-nigh immeasurable subtlety. There are many scientists who avoid having a *Weltanschauung* because this is supposed not to be scientific. But it is manifestly not clear to these people what they are really doing. For what actually happens is this, by deliberately leaving themselves in the dark as to their guiding ideas they are clinging to a deeper, more primitive level of consciousness than would correspond to their full conscious capacities. A certain critical and sceptical attitude is by no means always the expression of intelligence; often it is just the reverse, especially when a man uses scepticism as a screen to cloak his lack of *Weltanschauung*. Not infrequently, it is a moral rather than an intellectual deficiency. Because to see the

world, also means seeing yourself, and therefore *as you see the world, so you see yourself*, and this demands much in labour and sincerity. Hence it is always fatal to have no *Weltanschauung*. To have a *Weltanschauung* means to make an image of the world and of oneself, to know what the world is and who I am. Taken literally this would be too much. No one can know what the world is, and as little also can he know himself; but *cum grano salis*, it means the best possible knowledge—a knowledge that requires wisdom and the avoidance of unfounded assumptions, arbitrary assertions, and didactic opinions. For such knowledge one must seek the well-founded hypothesis, without forgetting that all knowledge is limited and subject to error.

If the image we make of the world did not have a retro-active effect upon ourselves, we could be content with any sort of beautiful or diverting sham. But such self-deception has its inevitable result, making us unreal, foolish, and incapable. Because we are fighting with a false image of the world, we are overcome by the superior power of reality. Thus experience teaches us the essential need of possessing a carefully founded and constructed *Weltanschauung*. A *Weltanschauung* is a hypothesis, not a creed. The world changes its face—*tempora mutantur et nos in illis*—for the world can only be grasped by us as a psychic image in ourselves, and it is not always easy to decide, when the image changes, whether the world or ourselves, or both, have changed. The image of the world can change at any time, just as our conception of ourselves can change. Every new discovery, every new thought, can put a new face on the world. We must be prepared for this, else we suddenly find ourselves in an antiquated world; a mere old-fashioned survival of a lower level of consciousness. Everyone sooner or later gets his dismissal from life, but our will to live would postpone this moment as long as possible, and to this end we must never allow the image of the world to become rigid. Every new thought must be tested to see whether or not it adds something to our world-image.

When therefore I set out to discuss the relation between analytical psychology and *Weltanschauung*, I do so from the standpoint I have just elaborated. I put this question, "Do the findings of analytical psychology add something new to our *Weltanschauung*, or not?"

In order to treat this question effectively, we must first consider the essentials of analytical psychology. What I call analytical psychology is a special trend in psychology that is concerned with the so-called complex psychic phenomena, in contrast to physiological or experimental psychology that strives to reduce complex phenomena as far as possible to their elements. The term 'analytical' comes from the fact that I developed this branch of psychology from the original Freudian psycho-analysis. Freud has identified psycho-analysis with the theory of sex and repression, and has thereby riveted it into a doctrinaire framework. Therefore I avoid the expression 'psycho-analysis' when I am discussing other than merely technical matters.

The Freudian psycho-analysis consists in a technique that permits us to bring back to consciousness so-called repressed contents that have become unconscious. This technique is a therapeutic method designed to treat and cure neuroses. In the light of this method it seems as if the neuroses came into existence in order that painful memories and tendencies—so-called incompatible contents—should be repressed from consciousness, and made unconscious by a sort of moral resentment arising from educational influences. So regarded, the unconscious psychic activity, the so-called unconscious, appears chiefly as a receptacle of all those contents that are antipathetic to consciousness, as well as all forgotten impressions. But on the other hand one cannot exclude the view that these incompatible contents themselves came from unconscious instincts; that is to say, the unconscious is not just a receptacle, but is the very mother of the things the conscious would be rid of. We can go a step further, and say the unconscious creates new contents. All that the human

spirit has ever created has come from contents which, in the last analysis, existed once as unconscious seeds. While Freud lays special emphasis on the first aspect, I have stressed the latter, without denying the first. Although it is an important fact that man evades everything unpleasant, and therefore gladly forgets whatever does not suit him, yet it seems to me even more important to establish what the nature of the positive activity of the unconscious really is. Regarded from this side, the unconscious appears as the totality of all psychic contents *in statu nascendi*. This indisputable function of the unconscious is, in general, merely disturbed by repressions from the conscious, and this disturbance of the natural activity of the unconscious is the essential source of so-called psychogenetic maladies. The unconscious is perhaps best understood if we take it as a natural organ with an energy specific to itself. If, as a result of repression, its products are not admitted into consciousness a sort of damming up results, an unnatural inhibition of a purposive function; as though the bile, the natural product of the function of the liver, were impeded in its discharge into the bowel. From a damming-back of bile jaundice results. As a result of the repression, false psychic paths are produced. As the bile overflows into the blood, so the repressed content spreads over into other psychic and physiological regions. In the hysterias, physiological functions are disturbed; in other neuroses, such as phobias, obsessions, or compulsions, it is chiefly psychic functions, including dreams, that are disturbed. The activity of the repressed contents can be demonstrated not only in the bodily symptoms of hysteria or in the psychic symptoms of other neuroses (and psychoses also), but these effects can also be shown in the dreams. The dream in itself is a normal function, which can be disturbed like any other function by the results of a process of damming up. The Freudian theory of dreams takes account of the dream, and interprets it even, from this angle alone; namely, that dreams are nothing but symptoms. Other psychic fields are similarly regarded by

psycho-analysis, for example, works of art. Here, however, the weakness of the theory becomes painfully evident, since a work of art is clearly not a symptom, but a genuine creation. A creative achievement can be understood only on its own showing; if it is taken as a pathological misunderstanding that one seeks to explain in the same terms as a neurosis, then the attempted explanation begins to assume a curious and lamentable air.

The same is true of the dream. It is a characteristic creation of the unconscious that is merely deformed and distorted by repression. Hence the explanation of the dream that interprets it merely as a symptom of repression will go very wide of the mark. Let us confine ourselves for the moment to the facts of a Freudian analysis. In the Freudian theory man appears as a creature of instinct who, in various ways, comes into conflict with the law, with certain moral precepts, and with his own insight, and who is therefore forced to repress certain instincts either wholly or partially. The aim of the method is to introduce these instinctive contents to consciousness and to make repression unnecessary by conscious correction. The menace entailed by the liberation of these instincts is counterbalanced by the explanation that they are nothing but infantile wish-phantasies, which can still be repressed, though in a wiser way. It is also assumed that they can be 'sublimated', to use the technical expression, by which is meant a sort of bending of them to a purposeful form of adaptation. If anyone believes this can be done arbitrarily he is sadly mistaken—only absolute need can effectively inhibit a natural instinct. For when there is no commanding necessity the 'sublimation' is merely a self-deception, a new and somewhat more subtle form of repression.

Does this theory and this conception of man contain anything valuable for our *Weltanschauung*? I do not think so. It is the well-known rationalistic materialism of the out-going nineteenth century which is the guiding principle of the interpretive psychology underlying Freud's psycho-analysis.

Out of it can come no other image of the world, and therefore no other attitude of man to the world. But we must not forget that only in rare instances is an attitude influenced by theories. A far more effective influence is that of feeling. I cannot conceive how a dry theoretical presentation can reach the feelings. I could read you a detailed statistical statement concerning imprisonment and you would go to sleep. But if I took you through a prison, or an asylum for the insane, you would not go to sleep. You would receive a profound impression. Was it any teaching that made the Buddha? No, it was the vision of age, sickness, and death that burned into his soul.

Thus the partly one-sided, partly erroneous conceptions of Freud really tell us nothing. But when we take a deep look into the psychology of actual cases of neurosis, and see there what devastation the so-called repressions have wrought, what disturbances have resulted from a disregard of elementary instinctive processes, then we receive—to put it mildly—a lasting impression. There is no form of human tragedy that does not in some measure proceed from this battle between the ego and the unconscious. Anyone who has never seen the horror of a prison, an insane asylum, or a hospital, will surely experience, from the impression these things make upon him, a profound enrichment of his *Weltanschauung*. And he will be no less deeply impressed when he looks into the abyss of human suffering that opens behind a neurosis. How many times have I heard the cry, ‘But that is horrible! Who could ever have thought of such a thing! etc.’ One cannot deny that whoever tries with the necessary conscientiousness and thoroughness to study the structure of a neurosis, receives a tremendous impression of the effectiveness of the unconscious. Likewise, whoever has seen the slums of London has received a real addition to his experience. But that is merely a collision with something stupendous; there remains the eternal question: What is to be done about it?



Psycho-analysis has removed the veil from facts that were known only to a few, and has even made an effort to deal with them. But has it any new attitude to them? In other words, has the deep impression had any lasting or fruitful results? Has it altered our image of the world, and thus advanced our *Weltanschauung*? The *Weltanschauung* of psycho-analysis is a rationalistic materialism, the *Weltanschauung* of an essentially practical natural science—and this view we find to be inadequate. When we trace a poem of Goethe's to his mother-complex, when we seek to explain Napoleon as a case of masculine protest, or St. Francis as a case of sexual repression, there comes upon us a deep dissatisfaction. Such an explanation is insufficient and does not do justice to the significant reality of things. What becomes of beauty, greatness, and holiness? These are most living realities without which human life would be superlatively stupid. What is the right answer to the question of monstrous suffering and conflict? In the true answer there must reverberate something that at least reminds us of the magnitude of the suffering. But the merely reasonable, practical attitude of rationalism, however desirable on many grounds, ignores the real meaning of suffering. It is simply set aside and ingeniously explained away as irrelevant. It was a great noise about nothing. Much may fall into this category, but not everything.

The error, as I said above, lies in the fact that so-called psycho-analysis has albeit a scientific, yet a purely rationalistic conception of the unconscious. When we speak of instincts we imagine we are expressing something about what is known, but in reality we are speaking of something unknown. Actually we know only that from the dark spheres of the psyche effects come to us, which in some way or other must be assimilated to consciousness, if we are to avoid destructive disturbances of other functions. It is quite impossible to say offhand what is the nature of these effects, whether they originate in sexuality, in the power-instinct, or in some other instinct.

They are plainly of double or of many meanings—like the unconscious itself.

I have already explained to you that although the unconscious is a receptacle for all that is forgotten, past, and repressed, it is also that sphere in which all subliminal processes take place. For example, the unconscious contains the sense perceptions that are too weak to reach consciousness, and at the same time it is the matrix out of which all the psychic future grows. Thus, just as we know that man can repress a disquieting wish and can thereby force its energy to mix in with other functions, so we also know that he can remain unconscious of a new idea, one normally remote from his habit of mind, and that consequently its energy flows into other functions in a disturbing way. I have often seen cases where abnormal sexual phantasies disappeared suddenly and completely in the moment when the mind became aware of a new thought or psychic content. I have seen too a migraine suddenly disappear when an unconscious poem became conscious. Just as sexuality can express itself inappropriately in phantasies, so creative phantasy can be inappropriately expressed in sexuality. Voltaire once said of etymology, '*En étymologie n'importe quoi peut designer n'importe quoi,*' we must say the same of the unconscious. In any case we can never know in advance what is what. In relation to the unconscious we have merely the gift of after-knowledge; it is impossible to know *a priori* anything about the conditions within the unconscious. Every conclusion in this respect is avowedly an 'as if'.

Thus the unconscious seems to us a great *X*, concerning which the only thing indisputably known is that important effects proceed from it. A glance at the historical religions of the world shows us how important these effects are in history. A glance at the suffering of modern man shows us the same—we merely express ourselves somewhat differently. Five hundred years ago men said, 'she is possessed of the devil'; now, 'she has a hysteria.' Formerly a sufferer

was said to be bewitched, now the trouble is called a neurotic dyspepsia. The facts are the same ; only the previous explanation taken psychologically is nearly exact, whilst we have rationalistic descriptions of symptoms, which descriptions are really without content. For if I say that someone is possessed by an evil spirit, I imply that the possessed person is not legitimately ill, but suffers from an invisible spiritual influence which he can in no way master. This invisible something is a so-called autonomous complex, an unconscious content that is withdrawn from the reach of the conscious will. When one analyses the psychology of a neurosis, one discovers a so-called complex, *i.e.*, a content of the unconscious, which does not behave as do conscious contents, coming or going at command, but follows its own law, in other words it is independent or autonomous, as it is termed technically. It acts like a goblin always evading one's grasp. And when the complex is made conscious—which is the aim of analysis—the patient says perhaps, with relief, 'Oh was it that that disturbed me so !' Apparently something is actually won, because the symptoms disappear. The complex is released, as we say. We can cry out with Goethe, 'We have explained that !' but we must go on with Goethe to add : 'and yet there are still ghosts in the clay !' The true state of affairs is now for the first time revealed. We become aware that this complex could never have played its part if our nature had not lent it secret instinctive power. What I mean by this I will explain with the help of an example. A patient suffers from nervous stomach-symptoms that consist in painful contractions resembling a state of hunger. Analysis shows an infantile longing for the mother, a so-called mother-complex. The symptoms disappear as a result of this new-won insight, but there remains a longing that refuses to be assuaged by the explanation that it is 'nothing but an infantile mother-complex'. What before was a semi-physical hunger and a physical pain, now becomes psychic hunger and psychic pain. One longs for something and yet one knows that it would be

quite false to mistake this something for the mother. The everpresent, unappeasable longing remains, and the solution of this problem is considerably more difficult than the reduction of the neurosis to a mother-complex. The longing is a constant demand, a tormenting urgent emptiness, which can be forgotten from time to time, but never overcome by strength of will. It always returns. At first it is not known whither the longing is directed. A good deal can be surmised about it; but all that can be said with certainty is that over and beyond the mother-complex, an unconscious something raises this demand independently of our consciousness, and inexplicably to our criticism, continues to push its claim. This something is what I have described as an autonomous complex. From this source comes the instinctive power which originally sustained the infantile demand on the mother, and thereby caused the neurosis; for adult consciousness must set aside and repress such a demand as unassimilable.

All infantile complexes resolve themselves into autonomous contents of the unconscious. The primitive mind has felt these contents to be strange and inexplicable, has personified them as gods and demons, and has sought to fulfil their demands by sacred and magical rites. Recognizing correctly that this hunger or thirst cannot be stilled either by food, or by drink, or by returning into the mother's womb, the primitive mind created images of invisible, jealous, and exacting beings, more potent, strong, and dangerous than man. These are denizens of a world which although invisible is yet so merged and united with the visible world, that spirits even dwell in its cooking pots. Spirits and magicians are almost the sole causes of illness among primitives. The autonomous contents are projected by the primitive upon these supernatural beings. Our world on the other hand is freed of demons to the last trace. The autonomous contents and their demands have remained. They can be expressed partially in religions, but the more the religion is rationalized and watered down—an almost unavoidable fate—the more confused and mysterious are the paths

by which the contents of the unconscious still reach us. One of the commonest ways is the neurosis, which is not what one at first would expect. A neurosis is usually understood as a kind of inferiority, a *quantité négligeable* from a medical point of view. This is a mistake, as we have seen. For behind the neurosis are hidden those powerful psychic influences in which are rooted our spiritual attitude and its guiding principles. Rationalistic materialism, that apparently quite trustworthy spiritual position, is a psychological counter-movement against mysticism. This is the secret antagonist that has to be combatted. Materialism and mysticism are a psychological pair of opposites, just like atheism and theism. They are hostile brothers, two different methods of somehow grappling with the dominating unconscious influences, the one by denial, the other by recognition.

If then I want to name the most essential thing that analytical psychology has added to our *Weltanschauung*, I should say it is the knowledge that there exist certain unconscious contents that make undeniable demands, or send forth influences, which *volens volens* must be met by the conscious.

You would find my analysis somewhat unsatisfactory if I were to leave the something I have described as an autonomous unconscious content in this indefinite state, and made no attempt to tell you what our psychology has discovered empirically about this content.

If, as psycho-analysis assumes, a definitive and satisfactory answer can be given, as for example that the original, infantile dependence on the mother was the cause of the longing, then this knowledge should also provide a solution. There are such infantile dependencies which actually do disappear when they are thoroughly investigated. But from this fact we must not infer that this is true in all cases. In every case something remains unresolved; sometimes it is apparently so little that the case is, for all practical purposes, finished; but again, it may be so much that neither the

patient nor the physician is satisfied with the result, and it seems as though nothing had been accomplished. Moreover, I have treated many patients who were conscious of their causal complexes down to the last detail, without having been helped by this insight in any essential way.

A causal explanation may be relatively satisfactory, but it carries with it something unsatisfactory psychologically, in so far as no essential knowledge is thereby won of the aim of that deep, instinctive urge at the root of the complex—the meaning of the longing, for example. For just as little do we see or know what is to be done about it. If I know that an epidemic of typhus comes from infected drinking water, I am in no way helped by this knowledge in the cleaning of the sources of supply. The question in regard to the illness is only satisfactorily answered if we can learn what the something is that has maintained the infantile dependence on into adult life, and what has been the purpose of this persistence.

If the human psyche came into the world as a complete *tabula rasa* this problem could not exist, for there would then be nothing in the mind that had not been acquired by the mind itself, or that had not been planted in it. But in the individual human psyche there are many things not gained by the individual. For the human mind is not born a *tabula rasa*, nor is every man provided with a wholly new and unique brain. He is born with a brain that is the result of development in an endlessly long chain of ancestors. This brain is produced in each embryo in its differentiated completeness, and when it begins to function, will unfailingly yield the same results as have been produced innumerable times before in the ancestral line. The whole anatomy of man is an inherited system identical with the ancestral constitution, which will unfailingly function in the same way as before. Consequently there is but a slender possibility that anything will be produced that is new and essentially different from what has gone before. All those factors, then, which were essential to our near and remote forbears will be essential to us also,

for they correspond to the inherited organic system. They are actually necessities that will make themselves felt as needs.

Do not fear that I shall speak to you of inherited ideas. Far from it. The autonomic contents of the unconscious, or, as I have also called them, the dominants of the unconscious are not inherited ideas, but inherited possibilities, necessities even, of bringing to birth the ideas by which from time immemorial these dominants have been expressed. It is true that every region of the earth and every time has had its distinctive speech, which can vary infinitely. But it matters little if the mythological hero overcomes now a dragon, now a fish or some other monster ; the fundamental motive remains the same, and that is the common property of mankind, not the transitory formulations of different regions and periods.

Thus man is born with a complicated psychic precondition, that is anything but a *tabula rasa*. Even the boldest phantasies fall within limits determined by psychic inheritance, and through the veil of even the wildest phantasy there shimmer those dominants which have been inherent in the human psyche from the very beginning. It seems remarkable to us when we discover that a mentally diseased person develops phantasies that are to be found among primitives in nearly identical form. But it would be remarkable if it were otherwise.

I have called the sphere of the general psychic inheritance the collective unconscious. The contents of our conscious are all gained by us as individuals. If now the human psyche consisted of the conscious alone, there would be nothing psychical that had not arisen in the course of the individual life. In this case we should seek in vain for any conditions or influences behind a simple parental complex. By reduction to father and mother the last word would be said, for these are the figures which have operated first and exclusively on our conscious psyches. But actually the contents of the conscious have not come into existence merely through the effects of the individual environment ; they are also influenced

and regulated by the psychic inheritance, *i.e.* the collective unconscious. It is true, for instance, that the image of the individual mother is impressive, but its particular impressiveness depends upon the fact that it is fused with an unconscious state of readiness, that is, with an inborn system or image, which results from the symbiotic relation of mother and child that has existed from eternity. Where the individual mother is lacking in this or that respect, a certain loss is felt, which represents a claim of the collective unconscious for fulfilment. One instinct has short measure, so to speak. From this cause neurotic disturbances frequently arise, or at least peculiarities of character. If the collective unconscious did not exist, anything could be accomplished by education. It would be possible with impunity to deform a human being into a psychical machine, or transform him into an ideal. But strict limits are set to any such attempts, because there are dominants of the unconscious which make almost invincible demands for fulfilment. If, then, in the example of the patient with the stomach neurosis, I am asked to name the thing in the unconscious, over and above the personal mother-complex, that keeps alive an indefinite, but painful longing, the answer is: It is the collective image of the mother; not of this particular mother, but of the mother in her universal aspect.

You will ask in astonishment: 'But why should this collective image release such longing?' It is not quite easy to answer this question. Yet if we could get an immediate impression of the nature and meaning of this collective image, which I have also termed an archetype, then it would be easy to understand its effects.

In order to aid us in this understanding, I would present the following reflections. The mother-child relation is certainly the deepest and most penetrating one we know; the child in fact for a long time is, so to speak, a part of the maternal body! Later it is really a continuum of the psychic atmosphere of the mother for years, and in this way, all that is primordial in the child is, so to speak, indissolubly



fused with the mother image. This is true not only of the individual case, but still more in a historical sense. It is the absolute experience of the ancestral line, an organic truth as unequivocal as the relation of the sexes to one another. Thus there naturally exists in the archetype, in the collectively inherited mother-image, that extraordinary intensity of relationship which first impels the child instinctively to cling to its mother. With the passing of years, the man grows naturally away from the mother; provided, of course, that he is no longer in a condition of almost animal-like primitivity, but has attained a certain degree of consciousness and culture, but he does not outgrow the archetype in the same natural way. If he is merely instinctive, his life will run on without choice, since freedom of will always presupposes consciousness. It will proceed according to unconscious laws, and there will be no deviation from the archetype. But if consciousness exists of a certain degree of effectiveness, then the conscious content will always be overvalued at the cost of the unconscious. From this comes the illusion that in separating from the mother nothing has happened except that one has ceased to be the child of this individual woman. The conscious, indeed, only recognizes contents that are individually acquired. Thus it recognizes the individual mother only, and knows nothing of the fact that she is also the eternal mother; the bearer and representative of the archetype. But the release from the mother is adequate only if the archetype also is included. The same of course is true of the liberation from the father.

The development of consciousness, and therewith a relative freedom of the will, naturally conditions the possibility of deviating from the archetype, and, therefore, from instinct. If the deviation begins, a dissociation between the conscious and the unconscious ensues, and then the perceptible and usually very unpleasant activity of the unconscious begins. This takes the form of a symptomatic expression of an inner unconscious fixation. Situations then develop

in which it seems as though one were still not freed from the mother.

The primitive mind, although not understanding this dilemma, sensed it all the more keenly, and accordingly devised highly important rites between childhood and adult age, *e.g.* puberty rites and initiation ceremonies, which unmistakably have the aim of effecting the release from the parents by magical means. This arrangement would be quite superfluous if the relation to the parents were not also felt to be magical. Magic is everything into which unconscious influences enter. But the purpose of these rites is not solely concerned with the release from the parents, since they also have in view the transition to the adult phase. The aim is that none shall remain behind in the backward-looking longing of childhood—which means that the claim of the wounded archetype is covered. This is brought about by opposing the intimate relation with the parents by another relation, namely that with the clan or tribe. The inflicting of certain bodily defacements such as cuts and scars are intended to serve this end, as well as the mystical teaching the young man receives during the initiation. Often these initiations are extremely horrible in character.

This is the way in which the primitive, for reasons unknown to him, believes it necessary to do justice to the claims of the archetype. A simple parting from the parents does not suffice; there must be a drastic ceremony that seems very like a sacrifice to those powers which could hold the young man back. This shows us at a glance the power of the archetype; it forces the primitive to act against Nature, that he may not become her victim. This is indeed the beginning of all culture, the inevitable result of consciousness with the possibility it brings of deviating from unconscious law.

Long have these things been foreign to our world, but nature has not therefore forfeited any of her power over us. We have merely learned to undervalue that power. But we are in somewhat of a quandary when we come to the question :

What is to be our way of meeting the effects of the unconscious contents? For us it can no longer be the performance of primitive rites. That would be an artificial and wholly ineffectual regression. We are far too critical and too psychological for that. If you put the question to me, I too am perplexed. I can say only this much, that for years I have watched in many of my patients the ways they instinctively select in order to meet the demands of the unconscious contents. Obviously I should far overstep the limits of a lecture if I were to report these observations. I must refer you in this connexion to a paper on the relation between the ego and the unconscious, shortly to appear, where this question is thoroughly discussed.<sup>1</sup>

I must be content if in this lecture I have been able to make you recognize, that within our own unconscious psyche those powers are still active which men have always projected into space as gods, and there worshipped them with sacrifices. With this knowledge it might be shown that all the manifold practices and convictions, which from remotest times have played so great a part in human history, do not rest upon arbitrary discoveries and opinions of individual men, but owe their origin far more to the existence of strong, unconscious powers which we cannot neglect without disturbing the psychic balance. The example I have used of the mother-complex is of course only one of many. To the archetype of the mother we could easily add a series of other archetypes.

This multiplicity of the unconscious dominants explains the manifold nature of religious conceptions. All these factors are still active in our psyche. Only their forms of expression, and their evaluations have been outstripped, not their actual existence and effectiveness. The fact that we can now understand them as psychic forces means a new formulation, a new expression, that may perhaps also make it

<sup>1</sup> *The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 1928).

possible to discover ways in which a new relation to these unconscious powers can be established. I believe this possibility to be of immense significance; for the collective unconscious is in no sense an obscure corner of the mind, but the all-controlling deposit of ancestral experience from untold millions of years, the echo of prehistoric world-events to which each century adds an infinitesimally small amount of variation and differentiation. Because the collective unconscious is in the last analysis a deposit of world-events finding expression in brain and sympathetic nerve structure, it means in its totality a sort of timeless world-image, with a certain aspect of eternity opposed to our momentary, conscious image of the world. It means nothing less than another world, a mirror-world if you will. But unlike a mere mirrored image, the unconscious image has an energy peculiar to itself, independent of the conscious. By virtue of this energy powerful psychic effects are produced—effects that do not appear openly on the surface of things, but influence us all the more powerfully from the dark regions within. These influences remain invisible to everyone who has failed to subject the transient world-image to adequate criticism, and who is therefore still hidden from himself. That the world has not only an outer, but an inner aspect; that it is not only outwardly visible, but also acts powerfully upon us in a timeless present, from the deepest and apparently most subjective hinterland of the psyche—this I hold to be knowledge which, in this form (regardless of the fact that it is ancient wisdom) deserves to be evaluated as a new factor in forming a *Weltanschauung*. Analytical psychology is not a *Weltanschauung*, but a science, and as such it offers the building stones or the implements with which a *Weltanschauung* can be either built up, torn down, or reconstructed. There are many to-day who think they discern a *Weltanschauung* in analytical psychology. I wish it were one, for then I should be relieved of the toil of investigation and the pains of doubt, and could besides tell you clearly and simply what is the way

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that leads to Paradise. I merely experiment in a *Weltanschauung* when I try to make it clear to myself what is the meaning and scope of the new knowledge. But this experimentation is in a certain sense a way, for when all is said and done, our own existence is an experiment of nature, an attempted new combination. Whoever experiments lives, and indeed, is it not the meaning of life, that it be lived?

## WOMAN IN EUROPE

A DISCUSSION about the European women of to-day is an enterprise scarcely to be undertaken without a pressing summons. Have we the knowledge that would warrant any fundamental statement about Europe—about the Europe of our time? Can anything be said about it? Is not everyone involved in some programme or experiment, or else caught in some historical retrospect? And in regard to woman, cannot the same question be raised? Moreover, how is a man to write about woman, his exact opposite? I mean of course something accurate, that is outside the sexual programme, not contaminated by resentment, and beyond illusion and theory. Where is the man to be found capable of such superiority? For woman stands just where man's shadow falls. So that he is only too liable to confuse her with his own shadow. Then, when he wishes to repair this misunderstanding, he tends to overvalue the woman and believe in her desiderata. Thus at the outset many scruples assail me in the handling of this theme.

One thing, however, is indubitable, namely, that the woman of to-day is under the same process of transition as man. Whether this transition is a historical turning-point or not, remains to be seen. Sometimes it seems—especially in the light of a historical retrospect—as though the present had an analogue in certain epochs of the past, in which great empires and cultures went beyond their zenith and hurried irresistibly towards decay. But such analogies are deceptive, since there are also renaissances.

Something relatively clear seems to move into the foreground; and this is the intermediate position occupied by Europe between the Asiatic East and the Anglo-Saxon—or shall we say American—West? Europe stands between

two colossi, both immature in their form and yet immeasurably opposed in their already discernible nature. They are fundamentally divorced, both racially and in their ideals. In the West there is as great political freedom as, personally, there is a lack of it; whereas in the East we find just the opposite. In the West there is the immense impetus of a technical and scientific culture-tendency; whereas in the East there is an awakening of all those forces which, in Europe, this cultural urge holds in check. The power of the West is material, that of the East ideal. The struggle of these opposites, which in the world of the European man takes place in the province of applied mind, finding expression in battlefields and bank balances, is a psychic conflict in the woman.

What makes the treatment of the problem of the modern European woman so unusually difficult is the fact that one must necessarily write about a minority only. In this sense there is no 'European woman' properly speaking. Or, perchance, is the peasant's wife of to-day different from her forbears of a hundred years ago? There is, in fact, a quite substantial body of the population that only to a very limited extent lives in the present and participates in the present-day problems. This is true of the overwhelming majority. We speak of the 'battle of the mind', but how many are really occupied with it? And how many understanding, sympathetic lookers-on does it enrol? Or the 'Woman's problem'—how many women have problems? In proportion to the sum-total of European women, it is a dwindling minority of women who really live in the Europe of to-day; and these, moreover, are city dwellers and belong—I say it purposely—to complicated humanity. This must always be so, since it is only the few who express with any distinctness the spirit of a time.

In the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era there were only a very few Christians in the 'Christian' majority who had in some degree comprehended the spirit

of Christianity; the rest were still practically pagan. The cultural process that is characteristic for an epoch operates most intensively in cities, for it always needs great congregations of men to make a culture possible. From these congregations cultural achievements disseminate to the smaller groups that have remained more or less embedded in the past. Thus only in the large centres do we find the spirit of the present, and only there do we find the 'European woman', that is to say, the woman who expresses the present European epoch, both socially and spiritually. The further we go from the influence of the great centres, the more do we find ourselves receding into history. In an out-of-the-way Alpine valley we can find men who have never seen a railway, and in Spain, which is also part of Europe, we can dive into a dark mediæval time without even an alphabet. The people of such regions, or of corresponding levels of the population, do not live in our Europe, but in the Europe of 1400, and their problems correspond to the bygone age in which they exist. I have analysed such people, and have found myself carried back into an atmosphere that lacked nothing in historical romance.

The so-called present is a thin surface-stratum that is produced in the great centres of mankind. But when too thin, as, for instance, in the Russia of the Tzars, it is also irrelevant, as events have shown. When, however, it has attained to a certain strength, we can speak of culture and progress, and then problems arise that are characteristic of an epoch. In this sense Europe possesses a present, and there are women who live in it and suffer its problems. About these, and these only, are we entitled to speak. Those for whom the Middle Ages still offer adequate ways and possibilities demand nothing from the present and its experiments. But the man who belongs to the present—no matter why or how—cannot turn back again to the past without suffering essential loss. Often this turning-back is altogether impossible, even when a man is prepared to make the sacrifice.



The man of the present needs must work towards the future. He has to leave it to others to maintain the past. Hence, he is also a destroyer, not a builder only. To himself, both he and his world are questionable and ambiguous. The ways that the past shows him, and the answers that it gives to his questions are insufficient for the needs of the present. Old and comfortable ways are blocked, new possibilities have been opened up, or new dangers have arisen of which the past knew nothing. It is proverbial, of course, that man never learns from history, and, as a rule, in respect to a problem of the present, it can teach us simply nothing. The new way must be made through untrodden regions, without suppositions, and often, unfortunately, without piety also. Morality is the only thing that cannot be improved, since every modification of habitual morality is, in its application, an immorality. In this *bon mot* there is something more serious, since it also carries an undeniable fact of feeling, against which many a pioneer has stumbled.

All the problems of the present form a knot ; so that it is scarcely permissible to detach a single problem by itself, and treat it independently of the rest. There is, for instance, no problem of the ' woman in Europe ' which omits man and his world. If she is married, then in the great majority of cases she is economically dependent upon man ; if unmarried and earning her livelihood, then she is working in a profession already initiated and established by man. Unless there is a voluntary sacrifice of her whole erotic life, she must again stand in an essential relation to man. In manifold ways woman is indissolubly bound up with the man's world and therefore is exposed, as he is, to all the shocks and concussions of this world. The war, for example, has affected woman just as deeply as it has man, and she has to adapt to its consequences as he must. What the upheavals of the last twenty or thirty years mean for the world of men is displayed roundly on the surface ; it is reported every day in the journals. But what it means for woman is not at first

visible. For woman as woman is neither politically, nor economically, nor spiritually a visible factor of any importance. If she were she would stand more plainly in man's field of vision, and then would be taken into account as a competitor. Sometimes she does do this; but in doing so she becomes visible only as a man who, so to speak, is accidentally a woman. But since, as a rule, she stands on the intimate side of man, on the side where he only feels; that side for which either he has no eyes or will not see, woman appears as a sort of opaque mask, behind which everything possible and impossible can be assumed. Not only does he assume, he thinks he actually sees, and yet he somehow fails to hit upon the essential thing. The elementary fact, that a man always presupposes another's psychology as being identical with his own, aggravates the difficulty and hinders a correct understanding of the feminine psyche. This circumstance finds a purposive accommodation, viewed biologically, in the unconsciousness and indefiniteness of the woman. She allows herself to be convinced by projected masculine feelings. This is; of course, a general human characteristic; but with woman it has an especially dangerous nuance, since in this respect she is not naïve, for only too often her aim is to allow herself to be convinced. It fits in with her nature to remain in the background as an independently willing and responsible ego, in order not to hinder the man, but rather to invite him to make real his aims with respect to herself. This is a sexual pattern, but it has far-reaching ramifications in the feminine mind. By maintaining a passive attitude with an invisible purpose in the background, she aids a man towards his realization, and in that way holds him. At the same time she weaves a web of fate for herself, because whoever digs a pit for others falls himself therein.

I must confess that I am here describing, rather unkindly, a process that might as well be sung in glowing terms. But all things natural have two sides, and when something has to be made conscious, we must see the shadow-side as well as the light.

When we observe the way in which women, since the second half of the nineteenth century, have begun to learn masculine callings, to become active in politics, to found and lead societies, etc., we can see that woman is in the process of breaking with the purely feminine sexual schema in which apparent unconsciousness and passivity play a leading rôle. She begins to concede something to masculine psychology by establishing herself as a visible member of society; not merely hiding behind the mask of Mrs. So-and-So, with the obliging intention of having all her wishes fulfilled by the man, or to make him feel it if things don't go as she wishes.

This step towards social independence is a symptom even though it be only a response to compelling economic facts, and due to causes, other than the actual need itself. The courage and capacity for self-sacrifice of such women is certainly to be marvelled at, and only the blind could fail to see the good that has come out of these efforts. But no one can evade the fact, that in taking up a masculine calling, studying, and working in a man's way, woman is doing something not wholly in agreement with, if not directly injurious to, her feminine nature. She is doing what would be scarcely possible for a man to do, even were he a Chinaman. Could he, for example, take a place as a governess, or be in charge of a kindergarten? When I speak of injury, I do not mean physiological merely, but above all psychic injury. It is a woman's outstanding characteristic that she can do everything for the love of a man. But those women who can achieve something important for the love of a thing are most exceptional, because this does not really agree with their nature. The love of a thing is a man's prerogative. But, since the nature of the human being unites masculine and feminine elements, a man can live the feminine in himself, and a woman the masculine in herself. None the less in man the feminine is in the background, as is the masculine in woman. If one lives out the opposite sex in oneself, one is living in one's own background, and that restricts

too much the essential individuality. A man should live as a man, and a woman as a woman. The part belonging to the opposite sex is always in the dangerous neighbourhood of the unconscious. It is even typical that the effects in consciousness that emanate from the unconscious have the opposite-sex character. Thus, for example, the soul (anima, psyche) is of the feminine sex ; since this concept, as concepts in general, proceeds from the mind of man. (Mystical instruction among primitives is exclusively a masculine concern, corresponding to the prerogative of the Catholic priest.) Direct intercourse with the unconscious exercises an attractive influence upon the conscious processes. This fact explains the timidity, aversion even, that is evinced towards the unconscious. It is a purposeful protective reaction of the conscious. That which pertains to the opposite sex has a mysterious charm that is associated with reserve, and perhaps even repugnance. Yet just for this reason, the charm is especially attractive and fascinating. It is felt as such, even when it comes to us not from without as woman, but from within as a psychic influence, as for instance in the form of a temptation to abandon oneself to a mood or affect. This example is actually not characteristic for woman, however ; for her moods and emotions do not come to her directly from the unconscious, but are peculiar to her feminine nature. They are therefore never naïve, but mixed with unacknowledged purpose. What comes to the woman from the unconscious is a sort of opinion, that only perverts her mood secondarily. These opinions lay claim to being valid truth, and hold their own all the more solidly and durably the less they are subjected to conscious criticism. Like the moods and feelings of man, they are somewhat veiled and often quite unconscious. Hence they are seldom recognized in their true colours. They are in fact collective, having the character of the opposite sex, as though a man, the father for example, had thought them.

Thus it can happen, and does almost regularly, that the mind of a woman who follows a masculine calling is influenced by her unconscious masculinity in a way not noticeable to herself, but quite obvious to her environment. From this there comes a certain rigid intellectuality concerning so-called principles, and a whole host of argumentative biases which always go a little beside the point in the most irritating way, and which, furthermore, always inject a little something into the problem that is not really there. Unconscious assumptions or opinions are the worst enemy of woman; they can even grow into a downright dæmonic passion that irritates and disgusts men, and that does the woman herself the greatest injury by gradually smothering the charm and meaning of femininity, and driving it into the background. Such a development naturally ends in a deep, psychological division, in short, a neurosis.

Naturally, things need not go to this length, but long before this point is reached the mental masculinization of the woman has unwelcome results. She may indeed become a good comrade to the man, without having access to his feelings. The reason is that her animus (that is, her masculine rationalism, assuredly not true reasonableness!) has stopped up the entrance to her own feeling. She can even become frigid, as a defence-reaction to the type of masculine sexuality that corresponds to her masculine type of mind. Or, if the defence-reaction is not successful, instead of the receptive sexuality of woman, there develops an aggressive, urgent form of sexuality that is characteristic of man. This reaction is also a purposeful phenomenon, intended to throw a bridge across by main force to the slowly vanishing man. A third possibility, especially favoured in Anglo-Saxon countries, is a facultative homosexuality in the masculine rôle.

It must therefore be said, that always where the attraction of the animus is perceptible a quite especial need for an intimate relationship with the other sex becomes paramount. Many women in this situation are fully aware of this necessity

and proceed—*faute de mieux*—to stir up another of those problems of the present that harasses us not a little, namely, the marriage problem.

Traditionally, man is regarded as the disturber of marital peace. This legend comes from times long past, when men still had time to pursue all manner of pastimes. But to-day life makes such demands on man, that the noble *hidalgo*, Don Juan, is to be seen nowhere save in the theatre. More than ever man loves his comfort; for ours is an age of neurasthénia, impotence, and easy chairs. There is no longer a surplus of energy for window climbing and duellos. If anything is to happen in the way of adultery it must not be too serious. In no respect must it cost too much, hence the adventure can be only of a transitory kind. The man of to-day is entirely averse to jeopardizing marriage as an institution. In this relation he commonly believes in '*quieta non movere*', and, therefore, maintains prostitution. I would willingly wager that in the Middle Ages with its famous bath resorts, and its almost unrestricted prostitution, adultery was relatively commoner than it is to-day. In this respect marriage should be safer now than ever. But in reality it is beginning to be discussed. It is a bad sign when physicians begin to write books of advice as to how to achieve a 'complete marriage'. Healthy people need no doctors. But marriage to-day has actually become rather unstable. (In America one-fourth of the marriages end in divorce!) And what is noticeable in that connexion is that the scape-goat is not the man this time, but the woman. She is the one who doubts and is uncertain. That this is the case is not surprising; since in post-war Europe there is such a notable excess of women, that it would be inconceivable if there were no reaction from that side. Such a piling up of misery has inescapable results. It is no longer a question of a dozen or so of voluntary or involuntary old maids here and there; it is a matter of millions. Our legal code and our social morality offer no answer to this question. Or can the

church give a satisfactory answer? Should we build gigantic nunneries in order to provide suitable accommodation for these women? Or should police-controlled prostitution be increased? Obviously this is impossible, since we are dealing neither with saints nor with prostitutes, but with normal women who cannot register their spiritual claims with the police. They are decent women who want to marry, and if this is not possible, well—the next best thing. When it comes to the question of love, ideas, institutions, and laws mean far less to woman than ever before. If things cannot take a straight path, it will have to be a crooked one.

At the beginning of our era, three-fifths of the Italian population consisted of slaves; that is, marketable human objects without rights. Every Roman was surrounded by slaves. The slave and his psychology flooded ancient Italy, and every Roman became inwardly, and of course unwittingly, a slave. Because, living constantly in the atmosphere of slaves, he became infected through the unconscious with their psychology. No one can shield himself from such an influence. The European, thoughtless of the spiritual heritage that belongs to him, cannot live unpunished among the negroes in Africa; because, unnoticed, their psychology gets into him, and unconsciously he becomes a negro. There is no fighting against it. There is in Africa a well-known technical expression describing this condition, namely, 'going black.' It is not mere snobbery that an Englishman should rank those born in the colonies, even though the best blood may run in their veins, as 'slightly inferior'. Facts support this view. The strange melancholy and longing for deliverance which characterized imperial Rome, and which found so striking an expression in Virgil's *Eclogue*, was a direct result of slave influence. The explosive spread of Christianity which, so to speak, sprang out of the sewers of Rome—Nietzsche called it a moral slave rebellion—was a sudden reaction that set the soul of the lowest slave side by side with that of the divine Cæsar. Similar, though

perhaps less momentous, psychological compensation-processes have often recurred in the history of the world. Whenever a psychic or social monstrosity is generated, a compensation comes along that overrides all legislation and disregards all expectations.

Something similar is happening in the woman of present-day Europe. Too much that is inadmissible and not brought into life is accumulating, and this has effects. Secretaries, stenographers, modistes—all are agents of this process, and by millions of subterranean channels they create the influence that is undermining marriage. For the desire of all these women is not concerned with sexual adventures—only stupidity could believe that—but with the state of marriage. The *beatae possidentes*, the married women must be driven out; not as a rule by open and forcible means, but by that quiet and obstinate wish, that works as we all know magically, like the fixed eye of the snake. This has always been the way of woman.

What attitude does the married woman of to-day adopt towards this fact? She clings to the old idea that man is the scapegoat, that one can engineer love arbitrarily, etc. On the strength of these outworn conceptions she can wrap her jealousy around her. But all this is merely superficial. There is a deeper effect. Neither the pride of a Roman patrician, nor the thickest walls of the imperial palace availed to keep out the slave infection. Nor can any woman escape the secretly compelling effect of that atmosphere, with which, perhaps, her own sister is enveloping her; the oppressive atmosphere of life un-lived. The result is that the married woman begins to doubt marriage. The unmarried believe in it because they want it. In the same way man believes in marriage. His love of comfort, and a curious, sentimental belief in institutions prompt him to this faith; for with a man institutions always tend to become objects of feeling.

Since women have to be concrete in matters of feeling, a certain fact must not escape our notice. This fact is the



possibility of contraceptive measures. The question of children is one of the main reasons for strictly maintaining a responsible marriage. If this reason disappears, 'impossible' things can happen. This fact, too, counts a good deal with the unmarried woman, who therewith has the possibility of an 'approximate' marriage. But it is important also for those married women, who, as I have shown in my article in Keyserling's *Book of Marriage*,<sup>1</sup> are the 'containers'. With this term I describe those who have individual demands that are unsatisfied, or not wholly satisfied, by the husband. Finally, the possibility of contraception is a fact of tremendous importance for all women, since it does away with the constant liability to pregnancy, and the care of an increasing number of children. This freedom from the bonds of nature means the release of considerable psychic forces that inevitably seek some application. Whenever such a sum of energy finds no appropriate goal, it causes a disturbance in the mental equilibrium. The energy that lacks a conscious goal strengthens the unconscious, giving rise to insecurity and doubt.

Added to this is another circumstance of no small importance, namely, the more or less open discussion of the sexual problem. This territory, once so obscure, now emerges as a brightly lit field of scientific and general interest. Things can be heard and said in society that formerly would have been quite impossible. Many people have learned to think with far greater freedom and honesty, and have come to realize how important these things are.

The discussion of the sexual problem is, of course, only the somewhat crude beginning of a far deeper question, namely, that of the psychic or human relationship between the sexes. Before this latter question the sexual problem pales in significance, and with it we enter the real domain of woman. Her psychology is founded on the principle of

<sup>1</sup> *Marriage as a Psychological Relationship* in the present volume.

eros, the great binder and deliverer ; while age-old wisdom has ascribed logos to man as his ruling principle. In modern speech we could express the concept of eros as psychic relationship and that of logos as objective or factual interest. Whereas in the conception of the ordinary man love, in its real sense coincides with the institution of marriage, beyond which there is for him only adultery or a strictly proper friendship, for the woman marriage is not an institution at all, but a human, erotic relationship, at least she would like to believe it so. (Because eros is not naïve with her, but mixed with other unadmitted motives, such as, the use of marriage as a ladder to social position, etc., so that the principle cannot be applied in any absolute sense.) Marriage means to her an exclusive relationship. She can endure its exclusiveness all the more easily, without dying of ennui, inasmuch as she has children or near relatives, with whom she stands in just as intimate a relationship as she does with the husband. The fact that she has no sexual connexion with these others means nothing ; since the sexual means so much less to her than the psychic relationship. But it suffices that she and her husband both believe that their relation is unique and exclusive. If he happens to be the ' container ' he feels smothered by this so-called exclusiveness, especially when he observes that the exclusiveness of his wife is nothing but a pious fraud. In reality she is distributed among her children, and whenever possible, among the members of her family, thus maintaining many intimate relationships. If her husband had as many of such relations with other people, she would be mad with jealousy. But most men are blind erotically. They commit the unpardonable mistake of confusing eros with sexuality. A man thinks he possesses a woman if he has her sexually. He never possesses her less, for to the woman the erotic relation is the only real and determining factor. To her marriage is a relationship with sexuality as an accompaniment. Since sexuality, because of the consequences, is somewhat formidable, it is also

expedient to have it provided for in a safe place. When less dangerous, however, it is also less relevant; and then the question of relationship comes more into the foreground. But here the woman encounters great difficulties with the man, for the question of relationship touches a field which for him is dark and painful. He is content only when the woman carries the burden of the relationship, that is, when he is contained, or, in other words, when she can conceive herself as also having relations with another man, and as a consequence suffering a division within herself. For then it is she who has the painful problem, and he is not obliged to see his own, which is a great relief to him. In this situation he is not unlike a thief, who, quite undeservedly, finds himself in the enviable position of having been forestalled by another thief, who has been caught by the police. Suddenly he becomes an honourable, impartial onlooker. In any other situation, however, a man always finds the discussion of personal relations troublesome and tedious; just as the woman would find it boring if her husband examined her on the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For the man, eros belongs to a shadowland; it entangles him in his feminine unconscious—the 'psychical'; while to the woman logos is a deadly, boring kind of sophistry, if she is not simply afraid of, and repelled by it.

Just as woman began, towards the end of the nineteenth century, to make a concession to masculinity in establishing herself as an independent factor in the social world, so man has made, albeit somewhat hesitatingly, a concession to femininity in creating a new psychology of complex phenomena inaugurated by the sexual psychology of Freud. What this psychology owes to the direct influence of women!—psychotherapeutic practice is flooded with women—that theme alone would fill a large volume. I am speaking here not of analytical psychology alone, but of the beginnings of pathological psychology in general. By far the greater number of 'famous' cases, as for instance, the 'prophetess

of Prevorst', were women who gave themselves enormous trouble, albeit unwittingly, to demonstrate their psychology in a drastic fashion, and therewith the psychology of complex psychic phenomena in general. Such women as Frau Hauffe, Helén Smith, and Miss Beauchamp have ensured for themselves a kind of immortality in this way. They are rather like the worthy folk who, in submitting themselves to a certain cure, may bring a legendary, 'miraculous' character to the spot.

An astonishing percentage of the material of this complex-psychology comes from women. This is not really so remarkable as it might seem, because woman is far more 'psychological' than man. For the most part he contents himself with 'logic' simply. Everything 'psychical', 'unconscious', etc., is antipathetic to him. It seems to him misty, vague, and pathological. He wants the actual thing, the fact, not the feelings or phantasies that hover around it. To the woman it is often more important to know how a man feels about a thing than to understand the thing itself. All those things which are mere futilities and impedimenta to the man are important to her. Naturally, therefore, it is woman who represents psychology most directly, and with the richest content. A great deal, which can be perceived in her in the clearest possible way is in man a shadowy hinterland process which he is often unwilling to admit. But in contrast to objective understanding and agreement as to facts, human relationship leads into the psychic world, that middle kingdom which reaches from the world of sense and affect to that of the spirit. Something of both is contained in it, yet it never loses its own unique, individual character.

Into this territory man has to venture, if he means to respond adequately to woman. Circumstances have forced her to master a part of masculinity, which alone could save her from remaining embedded in an antiquated, purely instinctive femininity, like a spiritual baby alien and forlorn in the world of men. Similarly, man will find himself forced

to develop within himself some feminine characters, namely, to become observant both psychologically and erotically. It is a task he cannot avoid, unless he prefers to go trailing after woman, in a hopeless boyish fashion, always in danger of finding himself stowed away in her pocket.

For those in love with masculinity or femininity *per se* the traditional mediæval marriage suffices—that thoroughly praiseworthy, practical, and amply-verified institution. The man of to-day, however, finds it extremely difficult to return to it, and in certain cases the way back is simply impossible, since this sort of marriage can exist only by virtue of the exclusion of present-day problems. Doubtless there were many Romans who could close their eyes to the slave-problem as in the days before Christianity, and thus were able to spend their days in a more or less pleasant unconsciousness. This was a possibility for them, because they had no relation to the present, only to the past. All those for whom marriage contains no problem are not living in the present. There are such people, and who can say they are not blessed! But the man of the present finds modern marriage only too problematical. I recently heard a German scholar exclaim before an audience of several hundred people: “Our marriages are sham marriages!” I marvelled at his courage and sincerity. Usually we express ourselves indirectly; we venture perhaps to offer good advice as to what might be done in order that the ideal shall be in no way impaired. To modern woman—let men take note of this—the mediæval marriage is no longer an ideal. She keeps this doubt and her resistance secret, it is true; one woman because she is married and, therefore, finds it highly inconvenient if the door of the safe be not hermetically closed; another because she is unmarried, and too virtuous to make herself quite plainly conscious of her tendencies. But the newly-won masculinity both have achieved makes it impossible for these women to believe in marriage in its traditional form: ‘He shall be thy master.’ Masculinity means, to know one’s goal, and

to do what is necessary to achieve it. When once this has been learned it is so obvious that it is never again forgotten without a tremendous psychic loss. The independence and critical judgment gained by this knowledge are positive values, and are felt as such by the woman. Hence, she can never part with them again. The same is true of the man who, with no small effort, has won that needful feminine insight into his own soul, often at the cost of much suffering. He will never let it go again; for he is far too convinced of the importance of what he has won.

Looked at from afar, one would think that, with so much gained, such a man and woman would be especially likely to succeed in the enterprise of the 'complete marriage'. In reality, however, and viewed at close range, this is not so; but on the contrary a conflict begins immediately. For what the woman out of the newly found consciousness of herself wants to do is not congenial to the man, and the feelings he discovers in himself are by no means agreeable to the woman. What both have discovered are not just virtues, but, compared with what was desired, they are decidedly inferior; something that might be justly condemned if regarded as the product of personal choice or mood. And it usually happens this way. But therewith only partial justice is done. The masculinity of the woman and the femininity of the man are inferior, and it is regrettable that their full value should be contaminated by something that is less valuable. Yet, on the other hand, to the totality we call personality there is also a shaded side; the strong man must somewhere be weak; the clever man somewhere stupid, otherwise he becomes untrustworthy, and pose and bluff come into the picture. Is it not an ancient truth, that woman loves the weaknesses of the strong man more than his strength, and the stupidity of the clever more than his cleverness? The love of woman claims the whole man, not mere masculinity as such, but also just that in him which implies the negation of it. The love of woman is not sentiment—that is only

man's way—but a life-will that at times is terrifyingly unsentimental, and can even force her to self-sacrifice. A man who is loved in this way cannot escape his inferior side, for he can only answer this reality with his own. And the reality of man is no fair semblance, but a true likeness of that eternal human nature which links together all humanity, an image of human life in its heights and depths which is common to all of us. In this reality we are no longer differentiated persons (*persona* = mask), but are conscious of the common human bonds. In this reality we leave aside the social and superficial distinctions of our personalities, and reach down to the real problems of the present-day; problems which do not arise out of myself—or at least so I imagine. But in this reality I can no longer deny the fact that I feel and know myself to be one of many, and what moves the many moves me. In our strength we are independent and isolated, there we can forge our own fates; but in our weakness we are dependent and therefore bound, and here we become, albeit unwillingly, instruments of fate. For here it is not the individual will that commands, but the will of the race.

What the two sexes have won through assimilation, when viewed from the standpoint of the two dimensional, personal façade-world is an inferiority. If interpreted in the light of a personal claim it is even an immoral pretension. But in the essential meaning of life and of human society, what has been won is an overcoming of personal isolation and egotistical withholding, in favour of an active participation in the solution of modern problems.

If the woman of to-day loosens the firm cohesion of marriage, whether consciously or unconsciously, by spiritual or economic independence, this does not come from personal whim, but from the life-will of the many which, by its superior power, makes her, the individual woman, its tool.

The institution of marriage (religion even holding it as a sacrament), represents such indisputable social and moral

value that it is understandable that the weakening of its framework should be felt as undesirable, and even anarchic. The incompleteness of humanity is always a dissonance in the harmony of our ideal. Unfortunately no one lives in the world as it is desired to be, but in the world of actuality, where good and evil wage their war of mutual destruction, and where the hands which are meant for creating and building cannot avoid getting dirty. Whenever there is something really critical or doubtful in question, there is always someone who assures us amid much applause, that nothing has happened and everything is in order. I repeat that anyone who can think and live in this way, does not live in the present. If we submit any marriage to a really critical lens, we shall find that wherever a choking measure of outer need and trouble has not put 'psychology' completely out of account, the symptoms of a more or less secret weakening are present; there are in fact 'marriage problems'. And this term may cover everything from unbearable moods of the wife (only the wife?) to neurosis and adultery. Unfortunately, those who can bear to remain unconscious are as inimitable as ever; their good example does not seem to infect more conscious people to the extent of persuading them to return again to the level of mere unconsciousness.

As to those—and they are many—who are not obliged to live in the present, it is most important that they believe in the ideal of marriage and hold to it. Because nothing is won when an ideal and an undoubted value is merely destroyed, unless something better comes in its place. Therefore, whether married or not, woman hesitates. She cannot go over whole-heartedly to the side of rebellion, but remains suspended in doubt. At least she does not follow the lead of that well-known authoress who, after all sorts of experiments, ran into the safe port of matrimony and lo! marriage then became the best solution, and all those who did not achieve it could brood on their mistakes, and end their days in pious renunciation. For the modern woman marriage is



not as easy as that. Her husband could say something on this subject.

As long as there are legal paragraphs that lay down what adultery is, woman must remain tangled in doubts. But does the legal paragraph really know what adultery is? Is its definition the final embodiment of eternal truth? From the psychological standpoint, which for the woman is the only one that counts, it is in reality an extremely poor piece of bungling, as is everything contrived by man for the purpose of codifying love. For the woman the erotic principle has nothing whatever to do with 'genital connexions', or some such savoury formulæ invented by the erotically blind masculine reason, and which, moreover, the opinionating devil in the woman delights to echo. Neither has it to do with 'episodic adultery', nor 'extra-marital sexual intercourse', nor with 'hoodwinking' the husband; but simply with love. Nobody but the absolute believer in the inviolability of traditional marriage could perpetrate such breaches of good taste; just as no one but a believer in God can really blaspheme. But whoever dares to question marriage cannot break it, and for him the legal definition has no validity; because, like St. Paul, he feels himself beyond the law, in the higher estate of love. But, because all those believers in the law so frequently trespass against their own laws, out of stupidity, temptation, or mere viciousness, the modern woman begins finally to wonder whether she too may not belong to the same category. From the traditional standpoint she does belong there. She has to realize this, so that the idols of respectability in her own psyche can be demolished. To be respectable means, as the word says, to allow oneself to be seen; that is, a respectable person is one who answers to public expectations, one who wears an ideal mask—in short, a fraud. Good form is not a fraud, but when respectability suppresses the soul, that real, divinely-willed essence of man; then one becomes that thing which Christ called a 'whited sepulchre'.

The modern woman has become aware of the undeniable fact that only in the estate of love can she attain her highest and best, and this consciousness brings her to the other realization, that love is beyond and above law ; and against this her personal respectability revolts. There is an instinctive tendency to identify this private reaction with public opinion. This would be the lesser evil ; what is worse is that this opinion is also in her blood. It comes to her like an inner voice, a sort of conscience, and this is the power that holds her in check. She has not made herself conscious of the fact that her most personal, most intimate possession could bring her into collision with history. Such a collision must seem to her most unexpected and absurd. But who, if it comes to that, has finally and fully realized that history, as an effective reality, is not contained in thick books, but lives in our very blood ?

So long as woman lives the life of the past she never collides with history ; but scarcely does she begin to deviate, however slightly, from a cultural tendency that has governed history, than she encounters the full weight of historical inertia, and this unexpected shock can break her, perhaps even fatally. Her hesitation and doubt are understandable, for if she submits to the law of love, not only does she find herself in a most painful and dubious situation, in a neighbourhood where every kind of slime and filth abounds ; but she is actually caught between two world-powers, historical inertia, and the divinely-creative.

Who, then, will find fault with her ? Do not most men prefer the *laudabiliter se subjecit* in a transferable form, to the well-nigh hopeless conflict as to whether or not one is meant to make history ? In the end it resolves itself to nothing less than this : is one willing to be unhistorical and, therefore, to make history, or not ? No one makes history who does not dare to risk everything for it, even his own skin. For he carries through the experiment, which is his own life, to the bitter end ; and in so doing he interprets

his life, not as a continuation but as a beginning. Continuation is a business already provided for in the animal, but to initiate is the prerogative of man; the one thing of which he can boast that transcends the animal.

Without doubt the modern woman is most deeply occupied with this problem. It is her individual expression of something that is general and inherent in our time, namely, a cultural tendency towards a more complete human form; a longing for meaning and fulfilment; an increasing repugnance to a senseless, one-sided attitude, and a dissatisfaction with a life of pure unconscious instinctiveness and blind happenings.

The soul of the European has not forgotten the lesson of the war, however much it may be banished from his consciousness. The woman is increasingly aware that love alone can give her her full stature, just as the man begins to discern that spirit alone can endow his life with its highest meaning. Fundamentally, therefore, both seek a psychic relation one to the other; because love needs the spirit, and the spirit, love, for their fulfilment. The woman feels that there is no longer real security in marriage; for what does the fidelity of the husband signify, when she knows that his feelings and thoughts are running afield, and that he is merely too cautious or too cowardly to follow them? What does her own fidelity amount to, when she knows that, in holding to the bond, she is merely enthralled by a lust for legal possession, by which she allows her soul to be stunted? There is a higher fidelity which she begins to discern, a fidelity to the spirit and to love that can go beyond human weakness and incompleteness. Perhaps she may yet discover that what is weak and incomplete, a painful disturbance, or a by-path beset with anxieties, can be interpreted in a dual way corresponding to its own ambiguous nature. For in these transitions a way leads down to the generally human, ending finally in the swamp of unconsciousness and destruction of personality, if once that hold is lost which everyone

possesses in his own personal distinction. But the man who can keep that hold is able to experience for the first time the true meaning of self-hood; for therewith he can also climb down under himself into the undifferentiated human creature. How else may a man free himself from the inner isolation of personal differentiation? And how else can he make a psychic bridge to mankind? The man who stands on high and distributes his goods to the poor is separated from mankind by the height of his own virtue; and the more he lives for others in a self-forgetting and sacrificing way the more is he inwardly estranged from the human.

The word 'human' that resounds so beautifully means fundamentally nothing beautiful, virtuous, or intelligent, but just a low average. This is the step which Zarathustra could not take, the step to the 'ugliest man', to the real human creature. The struggle and the fear that always mark the recoil from this step show how great is the attraction and seductive power of the underworld. Its power is undeniable, and to deny it is no deliverance; it is merely a sham, an essential misconstruction of its value and meaning. For where is a height without an equal depth, and how can there be light that throws no shadow? No good ever appears that an evil does not oppose. "Thou canst be delivered from no sin thou hast not committed," said Karpokrates, a deep saying for all who wish to understand, and a brilliant opportunity for all who prefer to draw false conclusions. But all that is below, and that longs to take its share in the lives of more conscious and, therefore, more complete men, is not a persuasive prompting to mere pleasure, but something that man fears.

What I am saying now is not for the young man—it is precisely what he ought not to know—but for the more mature man, whose experience of life has made a wider consciousness possible. No one can begin with the present; he must slowly grow into it, for without the past there is no present. The young man has not yet a past, and, therefore, has no

present. Hence he does not create culture, but merely existence. It is the privilege and task of riper age, that has passed the meridian of life, to produce culture.

The soul of Europe is torn by the hellish barbarism of the war. While all men's hands are full in repairing the outer damage, the woman begins—unconsciously as ever—to heal the inner wounds, and to do this she needs, as her most important instrument, the psychic or human relationship. But nothing hinders this more than the exclusiveness of the mediæval marriage, because it makes relationship superfluous. Relationship is only possible where there is a certain psychic distance, just as morality must always presuppose freedom. For this reason the unconscious tendency of woman is towards a weakening of marriage, but not towards the destruction of the marriage and family ideal. That would be not only immoral, but a thoroughly pathological outgrowth.

In what way this goal is to be achieved in the individual case, would take volumes of case-material to describe. It is the way of woman, as of nature, to make use of indirect ways without naming a goal. But the goal is inherent in her reactions. Often she acts in a purposeful way to invisible dissatisfactions, with moods, affects, opinions, and acts, whose apparent senselessness, poisonousness, morbidity, or cold-blooded ruthlessness, is infinitely uncomfortable to the erotically blind man.

The indirect method of the woman is dangerous; it can hopelessly compromise her aim. Therefore the modern woman longs for greater consciousness, for meaning, and the power of naming her goal in order to escape from the blind dynamism of nature. She seeks it in theosophy and in every other possible unreality. In any other age it would have been the prevailing religion that would have shown her her ultimate goal; but to-day religious teaching leads back to the Middle Ages, back to that unrelatedness which resists culture, and out of which came all the fearful barbarities

of the war. This religious teaching reserves the soul too exclusively for God; man receives too little. But God himself cannot thrive in a humanity that is psychically undernourished. The soul of the woman reacts to this hunger; for it is the function of eros to join, whereas logos cuts and clarifies. The modern woman stands before a great cultural task which means, perhaps, the beginning of a new era.

## MARRIAGE AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP

As a psychological relationship marriage is a most complicated structure, made up as it is of a whole series of subjective and objective facts of a very heterogeneous nature. Since in my contribution to this book I wish to confine myself to the psychological problem that marriage entails, I am obliged to exclude the objective factors of a legal and social nature, although these factors often have a pronounced influence upon the psychological relationship of the married pair.

Whenever we speak of a 'psychological relationship' we presuppose *consciousness*, for a 'psychological relationship' between two people who are still unconscious, cannot exist. Looked at from the psychological standpoint two such people would be wholly without relationship. From any other standpoint, the physiological for example, they could be regarded as related, but one could not call their relationship psychological. It must be admitted that such total unconsciousness as I have assumed never appears, but partial unconsciousness of a not insignificant degree does exist. The psychological relationship is limited in the degree to which this unconsciousness exists.

In the child consciousness rises out of the depths of the unconscious psychic life, at first like separate islands which only gradually unite to form a 'continent', a continuous consciousness. Progressive mental development means the extension of consciousness, and when certain 'continents' of consciousness have been evolved, the possibility of a psychological relationship arises. As far as we know, consciousness is always ego-consciousness. In order to be conscious of myself, I must be able to differentiate myself from others. Relationship can only take place where this

differentiation exists. Although the latter may be accomplished in a general way, yet, normally, it remains full of gaps owing to the fact that very extensive areas of psychic life may remain unconscious. With respect to unconscious contents no discrimination can take place, and therefore on this terrain no relationship can be established; here there still reigns the original unconscious condition of a primitive identity of the ego with others, in other words a complete absence of relationship.

It is true that a youth of marriageable age possesses an ego-consciousness (as a rule a girl has more than a man), but since he has only recently emerged as it were from the mists of the original unconsciousness, he necessarily has wide regions which still lie in the shadows of that state. In so far as these regions extend, they do not admit the formation of a psychological relationship. The practical outcome of this is that the young man, (or woman) can have only an incomplete understanding of himself or others, and therefore is only imperfectly informed as to the motives of others and of himself. As a rule he acts almost entirely from unconscious motives. Naturally it appears to him subjectively as though he were very conscious, for one constantly over-estimates the conscious content. It is and remains a great and surprising discovery, when we find out that what we had supposed to be a final peak is in reality nothing but the lowest step of a very long approach. The greater the extent of unconsciousness, the less is marriage a free choice, a fact that shows itself subjectively in the sense of the driving power of fate so clearly felt when one is in love.

The motivations that remain unconscious are of both a personal and a general nature. First of all there are the motives that originate from the parental influence. In this respect the relationship of the young man to his mother, and of the girl to her father is the determining factor. It is the strength of the bond to the parents which is of paramount



influence in furthering or hindering the choice of the husband or wife. A conscious love for the parents favours the choice of a mate similar to the father or mother, while, on the contrary, an unconscious tie (which may be far from finding expression consciously as love) makes such a choice difficult and imposes on it peculiar modifications. In order to understand these one must know first of all whence the unconscious bond with the parents arises, and under what circumstances it forcibly modifies the conscious choice or hinders it. As a rule, all of the life that could have been lived by the parents, but in which they were thwarted because of artificial motives, is bequeathed to the children in a perverted form. This means that the latter are unconsciously forced into a line of life that compensates for what was unfulfilled in the lives of the parents. It is because of this that exaggeratedly moral parents have so-called immoral children, that an irresponsible and vagrant father has a son who is afflicted with a pathological amount of ambition, etc.

The unconsciousness of the parents thus artificially maintained has the most disastrous results. Take the case of a mother who deliberately keeps herself unconscious in order not to disturb the outer appearances of a 'satisfactory' marriage. Such a woman unconsciously binds herself to her son, to some extent as a substitute for her husband; then the son, if not forced directly into homosexuality, is nevertheless restricted in his choice by influences that do not belong to his own nature. He will marry a girl, for example, who is obviously inferior to his mother and, therefore, unable to compete with her; or he will fall a victim to a woman of tyrannical and overbearing character, who should presumably be fitted to free him from his mother. It is true that when the instincts have not been crippled the choice of the partner may remain free from these influences, yet sooner or later they will make themselves felt as inhibitions.

From the standpoint of maintaining the species, a more or less purely instinctive choice might be considered the best,

but from the psychological standpoint it is not always fortunate; since there often exists great disparity between the purely instinctive and the individually differentiated personality. In such a case the race might indeed be invigorated by a purely instinctive choice, but individual happiness may be destroyed. (The concept 'instinct' is of course only a collective concept for a great variety of organic and psychic factors whose nature is mainly unknown.)

If the individual is to be regarded only as an instrument for maintaining the species, then the purely instinctive choice in marriage is by far the best. But since the foundations of such a choice are unconscious, only a kind of impersonal connexion can be founded upon them, connexions such as we can observe very beautifully among primitives. If we can speak here of a 'relationship' at all, it is at best but a pallid and distant connexion of a very impersonal character; one that is wholly regulated by traditional customs and prejudices, a pattern for every conventional marriage.

In so far as the intelligence, or cunning, or the so-called solicitous love of the parents has not arranged the marriages of the children, and in so far as the primitive instinct of the children is not crippled either by false education, or through the secret influence of repressed and neglected parental complexes, the choice in marriage will normally follow instinctive motivations. Unconsciousness brings about non-discrimination or unconscious identity. The practical consequence of this is that one person presupposes in the other a psychological structure similar to his own. Normal sexuality as a common and apparently similarly directed experience, strengthens the feeling of unity and of identity. This condition is described as one of complete harmony, and is extolled as a great happiness ('one heart and one soul'), and with reason, because the return to the original condition of unconscious unity, is like a return to childhood. Hence the childish gestures of all lovers. Even more is it like a return into the mother's womb—into the teeming depths

of a still unconscious fertility. It is indeed a true and undeniable experience of divinity, the transcending power of which blots out and consumes everything individual; it is a real communion with life and with impersonal fate. The individual will holding to its own integrity is broken; the woman becomes a mother; the man a father, and thus both are robbed of freedom and made instruments of onward striving life.

The relationship remains within the boundaries of the biological, instinctive goal, the preservation of the species; and since this goal is of a collective nature, to that degree also, the psychological connexion between the husband and wife is essentially of a collective nature and cannot be regarded as an individual relationship, in the psychological sense. We can only speak of the latter, that is, of an individual relationship, when the nature of the unconscious motivation is recognized and the original identity thoroughly dissolved. Seldom, or perhaps never, does a marriage develop into an individual relationship smoothly and without crises; there is no coming to consciousness without pain.

The ways that lead to consciousness are many, but they follow certain laws. In general, the change begins with the setting in of the second half of life; the middle of life being a time of supreme psychological importance. The child begins its psychological life within very narrow limits, within the magic circle of the mother and the family. With developing maturity, the horizon and the spheres of one's own influence are widened; hope and intention are focused upon increasing the domains of personal power and property; desire reaches out to the world with an ever widening range; the will of the individual becomes more and more identical with the natural goals of the unconscious motivations. Thus to a certain degree man breathes his life into things, until finally they begin to live of themselves and to increase, and imperceptibly he is over-grown by them. Mothers are overtaken by their children, men by their

creations, and what was at first brought into being with labour and even the tensest kind of struggle, can no longer be held in bounds. First it was a passion, then it became a duty, and finally it is an unbearable burden, a vampire which has sucked the life out of its creator into itself. Middle life is the moment of greatest unfolding, when a man still gives himself to his work with his whole power and his whole will. But in this very moment evening is born, and the second half of life begins. Passion now changes her face, and is called duty; what was voluntary becomes inexorable necessity, and the turnings of the way which formerly brought surprise and discovery become dulled by custom. The wine has fermented and begins to settle and clear. Conservative tendencies develop if all goes well; instead of looking forward one looks backward, for the most part involuntarily, and one begins to take account of the manner in which life has developed up to this point. Thus real motivations are sought and real discoveries made. The critical survey of himself and his fate, permits a man to recognize his individuality, but this knowledge does not come to him easily. It is gained only through the severest shocks.

Since the aims of the second half of life are different from those of the first, to linger too long in the youthful attitude means a division of the will. Consciousness still presses forward, in obedience as it were, to its own inertia, but the unconscious lags behind, because the strength and inner will-power needed for further expansion have been sapped. This lack of unity with oneself begets discontent, and since one is not conscious of the real state of things, the causes of it are ordinarily projected upon the married partner. Thus there grows up a critical atmosphere, the indispensable precondition to becoming conscious. This condition does not usually begin simultaneously for each of the married pair. The best of marriages cannot blot out individual differences so completely that the condition of the partners is absolutely identical. In general one will adapt himself to the marriage

more quickly than the other. The one who is grounded on a positive relationship to the parents will find little or no difficulty in adjusting to the partner; the other, on the contrary, may be hindered by a deep-lying unconscious tie to the parents. The latter, therefore, will achieve a complete adaptation only later, and this adaptation, because won with greater difficulty, will perhaps be held longer intact.

The difference in tempo on the one hand, and in the degree of development of the personality on the other, are the chief reasons which cause a typical difficulty to appear at a critical moment. In speaking of the degree of development of the personality, I do not necessarily mean an especially rich or great nature. Such a supposition would not meet the facts at all. I mean rather a certain complexity of the mind comparable to a stone with many facets in contrast to a simple cube. There are many-sided, usually problematical natures bearing hereditary psychical traits that may be more or less difficult to fuse together, and adaptation to such natures, or their adaptation to simpler personalities is always difficult. These people, having a certain predisposition to dissociation, also reveal the capacity to split off unassimilable traits for a considerable length of time, thereby presenting themselves as apparently simple in character. Or again, their 'manysidedness', their facility for quick changes of character often gives them an especial charm. The other partner of simpler character may easily lose himself in such a labyrinthine nature, that is to say, he finds in it such abundant possibilities of experience that his personal interest becomes fully taken up, perhaps not always in an agreeable way, since he becomes preoccupied in tracking the other through every possible highway and byway. The more complicated personality often presents such an horizon of possibilities that the simpler personality is surrounded, even caught up in them; thus he becomes absorbed in his more complex partner and does not see beyond. It is almost a regular occurrence for a woman to be wholly contained

intellectually by her husband; he being wholly contained emotionally by his wife. One can describe this as the problem of the 'contained' and the 'container'.

The one who is contained feels himself to be living essentially entirely within the limits of the marriage; his attitude to the marriage-partner is undivided; outside the marriage there exist no essential obligations and no binding interests. The unpleasant side of this otherwise 'ideal' situation consists in his disquieting dependence on a personality that is somewhat incomprehensible and therefore not wholly to be trusted in or relied upon. But he has the advantage of thereby maintaining his own unity—a factor not to be undervalued in psychic economy!

The one who contains the other—that one who in accordance with his tendency to dissociation has an especial need of unifying himself in an undivided love for another, will be outstripped in this effort, which is naturally very difficult for him, by the simpler personality. While he is seeking in the latter all the subtleties and complexities that might meet his own facets and correspond to them, he is disturbing the simplicity of the other. Since under all ordinary circumstances simplicity has the advantage over complexity, he is soon forced to give up his efforts to induce subtle and problematical reactions in a simpler nature. Soon also his partner, who in accordance with this simpler nature seeks simple answers in him, will give him enough to do. She will constellate his complexities, as it is technically expressed, by just that expectation of simple answers. He must draw back into himself, whether he will or no, before the persuasive power of simplicity. Mental processes, or consciousness in general, involve such an effort for mankind, that simplicity is given the preference under all circumstances, even when it does not at all correspond to the truth. But when it represents at least a half-truth, one is, so to speak, delivered up to it. The simpler nature affects the complicated one like a room that is too small, not allowing him enough space.

The complicated nature, on the other hand, gives to the simpler one too many rooms with too much space, so that she never knows where she really belongs. Thus it comes about quite naturally that the more complicated contains the simpler one. The more complex cannot be absorbed by the simpler one, but encompasses her without being himself contained. Yet, since he has perhaps a greater need for being contained than the other, he feels himself outside the marriage and accordingly always plays the problematical rôle. The more the contained one clings, the more does the container feel forced out of the relationship. The simpler nature in trying to hold fast, pushes inward in the relationship, and the more she does this the less can the complex nature respond.<sup>1</sup>

The container therefore tends to spy out of the window, no doubt unconsciously at first, but when middle life has been reached, there awakens in him a stronger longing for that unity and undividedness which is so especially necessary to him because of his dissociated nature. At this juncture things are apt to occur that bring the conflict to consciousness. He becomes conscious that he seeks a completion, a condition of being contained, of undividedness that has always been lacking to him. For the one who is contained this experience means primarily a confirmation of that insecurity which has always been so painfully felt; she finds that in the rooms, which apparently belonged to her, dwell other unwished-for guests. The hope of security vanishes, and this disappointment forces the contained one back upon herself; unless by means of dubious and violent efforts she can succeed in forcing her partner to capitulate, and in extorting a recognition or admission that the longing for unity was nothing more than a childish or morbid phantasy. If she is not successful

<sup>1</sup> In rendering this into English it was found necessary, for the sake of clarity, to assume that the 'container' in the relation is the man, and the 'contained' the woman. This aspect is due entirely to the exigencies of English grammar, and is not contained in the author's description. Manifestly the situation could be as well reversed. [Trans.]

in this act of violence, her acceptance of the failure may bring her something really good, namely, the knowledge that the security she was so desperately seeking in the other is really to be found within herself. In this way she finds herself, and she begins to discover in her simpler nature all those complexities which the 'container' had vainly been seeking in her.

If the 'container' does not collapse in the face of what we are wont to call 'unfaithfulness', but believes instead in the inner justification of his longing for unity, he must first accept the condition of being torn asunder. A dissociation is not healed by repression, but by a more complete tearing apart. All the healthy desire to be unified will resist the disintegration, and therewith he will realize the possibility of an inner integration which before he had always sought outside himself. He finds as his reward unity within himself.

This is what happens very frequently about the midday of life, and in this way the wonderful nature of man enforces the transition from the first into the second half of life. It is a metamorphosis from a condition in which man is only a tool of instinctive nature, into another condition in which he is no longer a tool, but himself; that is to say, it is a transformation from nature to culture, from instinct to spirit.

One should avoid the interruption of this necessary development by acts of moral violence; for the attempt to create a spiritual attitude by splitting off instincts and repressing them is a falsification. Nothing is more disgusting than a secretly sexualized spirituality; it is just as unclean as an over-prized sensuality. But the way is long, and the great majority remains caught fast in the transitional stages. If one could leave in the unconscious this whole psychological development which marriage involves, as is the case among primitives, these transformations could be more completely achieved and without too great friction. One meets among so-called 'primitives' spiritual personalities for whom one feels the respect we instinctively accord to the fully matured pro-



ducts of an undisturbed destiny. I speak here from personal experience. But where among modern Europeans can we find any figures uncrippled by acts of moral violence? We are still barbaric enough to believe both in asceticism and its opposite. But the wheel of history cannot be turned backward, and we can only strive towards that attitude which permits us to live the unhampered destiny that our primitive nature instinctively directs. Only in this condition can we be sure that we are not perverting spirit into sensuality, and the latter into spirit; for both must live, the one drawing its life from the other.

The essential content of the psychological relationship in marriage is the transformation that I have, with enforced brevity, outlined above. Much could be said of the illusions that serve the ends of nature, and that also bring about those transformations which are characteristic of middle life. The peculiar harmony that characterizes marriage during the first half of life, in those cases in which the adaptation succeeds, is founded essentially upon projections of certain typical images, a fact that becomes manifest when the critical phase arrives.

Every man carries within himself an eternal image of woman, not the image of this or that definite woman, but rather a definite feminine image. This image is fundamentally an unconscious, hereditary factor of primordial origin, and is engraven in the living system of man, a 'type' ('archetype') of all the experiences with feminine beings in the age-long ancestry of man, a deposit, as it were, of all the impressions made by woman; in short, an inherited psychical system of adaptation. Even if there were no women, it would be possible at any time to deduce from this unconscious image how a woman must be constituted psychically. The same is true of the woman; that is, she also possesses an innate image of man—though in fact experience warns us that it would be more accurate to describe it as an image of *men*; whereas in the case of the man, it is rather the image of

*woman.* Since this image is unconscious, it is always unconsciously projected upon the beloved person, and is one of the essential reasons for passionate attraction or aversion. I have called this image the 'anima', and I find an especial interest in the scholastic question: *habet mulier animam?* since in my view this question is intelligible inasmuch as the doubt seems justified. Woman has no anima, but an 'animus'. The anima has an erotic, emotional character, the animus a rationalizing one. Therefore what man has found to say about feminine eroticism, and especially about the feeling life of women is derived for the most part from the projection of his own anima and is accordingly distorted. The astonishing assumptions and phantasies that women have about men come from the activity of the animus, which is inexhaustible in the production of illogical judgments and false explanations of causes.

The anima as well as the animus is characterized by an extraordinary many-sidedness. In a marriage it is always the contained one who projects this image upon the 'container', while the latter is only partially able to project his unconscious image upon his partner. The more unified and simple this partner is, the less complete the projection. In which case, this highly fascinating image hangs, as it were, in mid-air, and to a certain extent waits to be fulfilled by a living person. There are types of women who seem to be made by nature to impersonate anima projections; one could almost speak here of a definite type. The so-called sphinx-like character is indispensable, ambiguity, a sense of being endowed with many possibilities; not an indefiniteness that offers nothing, but an indefiniteness that is full of promises, as, for instance, the speaking silence of a Mona Lisa. A woman of this kind is both old and young, mother and daughter, of somewhat doubtful chastity, child-like, and yet with a naïve cleverness that is disarming to men.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There is an excellent description of this type in Rider Haggard's *She* and in Benott's *L'Atlantide*.

Not every man of real intellectual power can be an animus, for he must be equipped not so much with good ideas as with good words; words full of meaning into which one can read much that is left unexpressed. He must also be somewhat misunderstood, or at any rate in some way or other in opposition to his environment, in order that the idea of sacrifice may come in. He must be a dubious hero, a man with possibilities; and because of this it is by no means certain that an animus projection has not often discovered a real hero long before he is visible to the slow understanding of the so-called intelligent average man.<sup>1</sup>

Whether for man or a woman, in so far as they are 'containers', the fulfilment of this image is a momentous experience; for herein lies the possibility of finding one's own complexity answered by a corresponding manifoldness. Expanding before one a wide spaciousness seems to open, in which one can feel oneself encompassed and contained. I say 'seem' advisedly, for it is a doubtful possibility. Just as the animus projection of a woman can actually discover a man of significance who is unrecognized by the crowd, and moreover can help him by moral support to achieve his true destiny; so also a man can awaken a '*femme inspiratrice*' by his anima projection. But perhaps it is more often an illusion with destructive consequences, a failure because faith was not strong enough. I have to say to pessimists that an extraordinarily positive value lies in these primordial psychic images; to optimists, on the other hand, I must give a warning against the blinding power of phantasy and the possibility of the most absurd errors.

One must not understand this projection as though it were an individual and conscious relationship; it is far from that, for it creates a compulsive dependence on the basis of unconscious motives, but motives other than biological

<sup>1</sup> An exceptionally good description of an animus is in Marie Hay's *The Evil Vineyard*; also in Elinor Wylie's *Jennifer Lorn*, and in Selma Lagerlöf's *Gösta Berling*.

## THE LOVE-PROBLEM OF THE STUDENT

It was, I assure you, with no light heart that I undertook the task of opening your discussion concerning the love-problem of the student with only a general reference to guide me. Such a discussion is an unusual and important occasion if it is taken up in a spirit of seriousness and with a conscious sense of responsibility.

Love is always a problem, whatever the age of life we are concerned with. For the phase of childhood the love of the parents is the problem; for the aged man the problem is, what has he made of his love. Love is one of the great forces of fate that reaches from heaven to hell. We must, I think, understand love in this way, if we are to do any sort of justice to the actual problems it involves. This problem is one of immense scope and intricacy; it is not confined to this or to that special province, but involves every aspect of human life. (It is an ethical, a social, a psychological question, to name only a few of the aspects of this many-sided phenomenon.) The invasion of love into all the aspects of life that are general—that is, collective—is, however, a relatively small difficulty in comparison with the fact that love is also an intensely individual problem. For, regarded from this point of view, it means that every general criterion and rule loses its validity, just as in the matter of religious conviction which, though perpetually recodified through the course of history, yet, as an original phenomenon, is always an individual experience, bending to no traditional ruling.

Moreover, the very word 'love' is itself no small handicap to a clear discussion. What indeed has not been called 'love'! If we begin with the highest mystery of the Christian religion, there is the *amor Dei* of Origen, the *amor*

*intellectualis Dei* of Spinoza, the love of the idea of Plato, the *Gottesminne*<sup>1</sup> of the mystics. When we come to the human sphere there is Goethe's:

“ Entschlafen sind nun wilde Triebe  
Mit jedem ungestümen Tun,  
Es reget sich die Menschenliebe  
Die liebe Gottes regt sich nun.”<sup>2</sup>

Then there is the love of one's neighbour, both in its Christian and Buddhistic characters of compassion, philanthropy, and social service. Next there is love of country, and the love for other ideal institutions as, for instance, the Church, etc. Then comes parental love, above all mother-love, then filial love. When we come to conjugal love we leave the purely spiritual realm behind, and enter that between-world that stretches between mind and instinct, where on the one hand the pure flame of Eros sets fire to sexuality, and where, on the other ideal forms of love, such as parental love, love of country and love for one's neighbour become contaminated with lust for personal power and the will to possess and command. But in saying this we do not mean that every contact with the sphere of instinct necessarily involves deterioration. On the contrary the beauty and truth of the power of love will prove the more perfect, the more the instinct can embrace it. But in so far as instinct dominates love, the animal will come to the surface. The love of bride and bridegroom can be of the kind that Goethe has in mind when he says:

“ Wenn starke Geisteskraft  
Die Elemente  
An sich herangeraft,  
Kein Engel trennte

<sup>1</sup> Romantic love of God.—Editor.

<sup>2</sup> “ They sleep, the wild impetuous instincts  
With every unrestrained deed.  
Human love doth stir and quicken  
The love of God now breaketh seed.”

Geeinte Zwienatur  
 Der innigen beiden,  
 Die ewige Liebe nur  
 Vermags Zu scheiden." <sup>1</sup>

But it is not necessarily such a love. It may also be that love of which Nietzsche says: 'two animals have recognized each other'. The love of the lover goes even deeper. Here the dedication of the betrothal, the pledge of common life are lacking. But in compensation that other beauty, the beauty that clings to what is fateful and tragic, can transfigure this love. However, as a rule, instinct predominates with its dark, slow fire, or its flickering flares.

Yet even here the word 'love' has not reached its limits. We speak of 'love' to cover the sexual act on all possible levels, from officially-sanctioned, wedded cohabitation to the physiological necessity which drives a man to prostitution, even to the mere traffic which the latter makes or is forced to make of love.

We speak also of love of boys (*Knabenliebe*), by which we mean homosexuality, which, ever since the classic period of Greece has been stripped of the appearance of a social and educational institution, and, in so far as men are concerned, ekes out a wretched and anxious existence as a so-called perversity. In Anglo-Saxon countries, on the other hand, homosexuality among women appears recently to have acquired more significance than Sapphic lyricism, inasmuch as it seems to serve the ideas of women's social and political organization as an advantageous undercurrent, much in the same way as the formation of the Greek city had to

<sup>1</sup> "When spirit irresistible  
 Grasps and holds within itself  
 The elements,  
 No angel severeth  
 The twin natures thus joined  
 In their inmost being.  
 Only love eternal  
 Can achieve this sundering.

thank male homosexuality for an essential reinforcement of energy.

Finally the word 'love' must be stretched still further, to cover all the perversions of sexuality. There is an incestuous love, an onanistic self-love, which has won the name narcissism. Besides these, the word love has to include every morbid sexual abomination as well as every greed, that has ever degraded man to the level of the beast and the machine.

Thus we find ourselves in the unprofitable situation of beginning a discussion about a matter and a concept of absolutely unlimited extent and indefiniteness. One feels inclined, at least for the purposes of to-day's discussion, to restrict the concept of love to the problem, for instance, of how youth in its student-days has to come to terms with, and behave towards sexuality. But this restriction is precisely what is impossible, since all the aspects I have mentioned above must be included in this problem, and because all the significations of the word 'love' are also contained as active factors in the love-problems of the student.

We can, of course, agree to discuss the average problem, namely, the question as to how the so-called normal man has to conduct himself under stated circumstances. Disregarding the fact that the normal man does not exist, there is, nevertheless, similarity enough among individuals even of the most diverse kind, to give us that common ground which could warrant the notion of average possibilities. Here, as always, the practical solution of the problem is conditioned by two factors: on the one hand by the demands and capacities of the individual, and on the other by the circumstances of the environment.

A certain obligation falls upon the opener of a discussion to present a general survey of the problem. Naturally this demand can be satisfied, only if, as physician, I restrict myself to an objective account of things that actually occur, and abstain from that stale, moralizing talk which tries to cloak

this subject in a piebald garment of bashfulness and hypocrisy. Moreover, I am not here to tell you what you ought to do. That must be left to the man who always knows what is best for other people.

In the title for our discussion, namely, 'The Love-problem of the Student,' I must assume that this wording—love-problem—refers to the mutual relation of the two sexes one to the other, and therefore must not be construed to mean the 'sexual problem of the student'. This provides us with an essential limitation of the subject. The sexual question would come into the discussion then, only in so far as it concerns the problem of love, or relationship. Hence we can exclude from the discussion all those sexual phenomena that do not concern the problem of relationship, namely, sexual perversions (with the exception of homosexuality), onanism, as well as the sexual traffic with prostitutes. We cannot exclude homosexuality, because very often it is a problem of relationship. But we can exclude prostitution, since as a rule it does not involve relationship; the rare exceptions only serve to confirm the rule.

The average solution of the love-problem is, as of course you know, marriage. But experience shows that this average truth does not hold good for the student. The immediate cause of this is the fact, that from economic reasons the student cannot, as a rule, set up housekeeping. We must also remember the youthful age of most male students, which will not yet bear the degree of social fixation that marriage demands. This is largely due to his unfinished studies, but also to the need of freedom and the liberty to move from place to place as this freedom may decide. There is furthermore the psychological immaturity, the childish clinging to the home and family, the relatively undeveloped capacity for love and responsibility, the lack of any breadth of experience of life and the world, the typical illusions of youth and so forth. There is also a reason that should not be underestimated in the wise reserve of the woman; that is, the girl-



student in the present instance. Her first aim is to complete her studies and to take up a calling. Therefore she abstains from marriage, especially from marriage with a student who so long as he remains a student is for the very reasons just named none too desirable from the point of view of marriage. Another essential cause of the infrequency of these student-marriages is the question of children. As a rule when a woman marries she wants a child; whereas the man can manage well enough for a time without children. A marriage without children has no especial attraction for a woman; hence she prefers to wait.

Recently marriages among students have certainly become rather more frequent. This is due partly to certain psychological changes in our modern consciousness, and partly to a more general dissemination of contraceptive means by which a voluntary postponement of conception is made possible. The psychological changes which, among other things, have brought about the phenomenon of the student-marriage come from the general mental upheavals of the last decade, the total significance of which we, as contemporaries, are scarcely able to grasp in all its depths. We can only substantiate the fact that as a consequence of a more general spread of scientific knowledge and a more scientific way of thinking, a change in the very conception of the love-problem has taken place. For natural science has made it possible to link up man as the species *homo sapiens* to the whole natural system. This change has not merely an intellectual, but also an emotional aspect.

This vitally new perspective influences the feeling of the individual, because he feels released from the chains of that metaphysical determination with its moral categories which was characteristic of the world consciousness of the Middle Ages. He is also delivered from the taboos which those chains had wrought in man's attitude to Nature, namely, the moral judgments which in the last analysis always have their roots in the religious metaphysic of the time. Within the national

moral system everyone knows well enough why marriage is 'right', and why other forms of love are to be condemned. But outside the system, upon the wide playground and battle-field of the natural earth, where a man feels himself to be the most gifted member of the great family of animals, and where perchance he has again forgotten that mediæval contempt of the animals which deprived them of human kinship, here he must begin to orientate himself anew.

The loss of the old standards of value means virtually moral chaos. We feel a doubt about hitherto accepted forms, we begin to dispute about things which long have sheltered behind a moral prejudice. We make intrepid investigations of actual facts, we feel an irresistible need to get clear about the fundamentals of experience, we intend to know and to understand. The eyes of science are fearless and clear; they do not flinch from adventuring into moral obscurities and dirty backgrounds. The man of to-day is no longer just content with a traditional view; he must know why. This spirit of investigation leads him to new standards of value.

One of these modern points of view is the hygienic valuation. Through a franker and more objective discussion of the sexual question a knowledge of the immense mischief and dangers of venereal disease has become far more general. The duty of consciously maintaining one's own health has superseded the guilty fears of the old morality. This moral sanitation has, however, not yet progressed to the point when the public conscience demands that the same civic measures be taken for dealing with venereal diseases as with other infectious diseases. For venereal diseases are still 'improper' maladies, as opposed to small pox and cholera, which are morally fit for the drawing room. In a later and better time mankind will ridicule these distinctions.

Apart from the fact of venereal diseases, the widespread discussion of the sexual question has brought the extraordinary

importance of sexuality in all its psychic ramifications into the field of social consciousness. A good portion of this work has been achieved by the much abused psycho-analytic research of the last twenty-five years. It is no longer possible to-day to brush aside the stupendous psychological fact of sexuality with a bad joke or with a show of moral indignation. We begin to place the sexual question within the constellation of the great human problems, and to discuss it with a seriousness commensurate with its importance. The natural result of this has been that much that was formerly held to be established fact has become open to doubt. There is a doubt, for instance, as to whether officially licensed sexuality is the only form of procedure that is morally possible, and whether every other form should simply be rejected *en bloc*. The arguments for and against gradually lose their moral edge: practical points of view force themselves into the discussion, and finally we begin to discover that traditional legitimacy is not *eo ipso* equivalent with moral elevation. The marriage problem with its usually sombre background has become the object of romantic literature. Whereas the romance of the old style concluded with a happy betrothal or a wedding, the modern romance often begins after marriage. In these literary productions, with which everyone is acquainted, the most intimate problems are often handled with a lack of reticence that is positively painful. Of the veritable flood of more or less undisguised pornographic writings we need hardly speak. A popular scientific book, Forel's *Sexuelle Frage*, not only had an enormous sale, it also found not a few imitators. In scientific literature compilations have been produced, that not in scope alone, but also in the nature of the depths which they attempt to plumb, outstrip Kraft-Ebing's work *Psychopathia Sexualis* in a way which would not have been dreamed of 30 or 40 years ago. These general, and also generally known phenomena are a sign of the times. They make it possible for the youth of to-day to apprehend the problem of sexuality in its whole range

much earlier and more radically than was ever possible before the last two decades. There are not lacking those who maintain that this early preoccupation with the sexual problem is unwholesome, and that it is a symptom of degeneration peculiar to large cities. I remember an article which appeared fifteen years ago in Ostwald's *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, in which an author actually said: 'primitive peoples like the Esquimaux, Swiss, etc., have no sexual question.' It scarcely needs much reflection to understand why primitives have no sexual problem; beyond the concerns of the stomach they have no other problems to worry about. The latter are a prerogative of civilized man. Although in Switzerland we have no great cities, such problems nevertheless exist. Hence I do not hold that discussion of the sexual question is unhealthy, or in the least degenerate; rather do I see in this problem a symptom of the great psychological revolution of our time. On the contrary it seems to me that the more we discuss this question seriously and fundamentally the better, for this problem is surely a pregnant one for the life and happiness of mankind. The fact that many pursue such discussions to the point of abuse does not spring from the nature of the problem, but rather from the inferiority of the people who abuse it. Abuse after all is common to every time and to every kind of activity.

It is doubtless the serious preoccupation with this question that has led to the hitherto unknown phenomenon of the student-marriage. It is a phenomenon of such very recent appearance that from lack of sufficient data it is difficult to form a judgment about it. Early marriages there have been in abundance in former times, marriages also that have seemed very unbalanced from the social standpoint. Thus in itself student-marriage is something perfectly possible. But the question of children is another matter. If both parents are studying, children surely must be excluded. But a marriage that is kept childless by artificial means is always somewhat problematical, since

children are a cement that holds where nothing else could. And it is the concentration upon the children which in innumerable cases sustains that feeling of common life which is so essential for the stability of relationship. Where children are lacking the interests of the married pair are directed upon each other, which in itself might be a good thing. But in practice, unfortunately, this preoccupation with one another is not always of a very amiable character. Each is inclined to hold the other responsible for the lack of satisfaction felt by both. Probably under these circumstances it is better that the wife should also be studying; for otherwise she is apt to suffer from the lack of an object. Moreover, many women when once married cannot tolerate it without children, and become themselves intolerable. But when the wife is also studying, she has at least a life outside of her marriage that is sufficiently satisfying. A woman who is focused on the child, and with whom the meaning of marriage is concerned more with the child than with the husband, should certainly think twice before undertaking a student-marriage. She should also beware of the fact that the maternal feeling often appears in an imperative form only when marriage is an accomplished fact.

Concerning the prematureness of the student-marriage we should note a fact that is relevant to all early marriages, namely, that a woman of twenty is as a rule older than a man of twenty-five, in so far as psychological judgment is concerned. With many men of 25 psychological puberty is not yet completed. But puberty is an epoch of life that is liable to illusion and states of partial accountability. This springs from the fact that the boy, up to the age of sexual maturity, is as a rule quite childish, whereas the girl develops much earlier the psychic subtleties that belong to puberty. Into the childishness of the boy sexuality often breaks with a stormy and brutal entrance; whilst with the girl, in spite of the onset of puberty, it continues to slumber until the passion of love awakes it. There are, however, a surprising number

of women in whom effective sexuality, even in spite of marriage, remains long in the virginal condition, first becoming conscious perhaps only when she falls in love with a man other than the husband. This is the reason why very many women have no understanding at all of masculine sexuality; because to a very great extent they are unconscious of their own. It is different with the man; upon him sexuality forces itself as a brutal fact, filling him with the storm and stress of new struggles and needs. There is scarcely one who escapes the painful and anxious problem of onanism; whereas a girl is often able to masturbate for years without knowing what she is doing.

The inrush of sexuality in a man brings about a powerful change in his psychology. He now has the sexuality of an adult man, yet with it the soul of a child. Often like a devastating tide of filthy water, a flood of obscene phantasies and the disgusting puberty-talk of his school-fellows is poured over every tender, childish feeling, in some cases stifling it for ever. Unsuspected moral conflicts arise, temptations of every kind lie in wait for the youth and engross his phantasy. The psychic assimilation of the sexual-complex is the cause of immense difficulties, even though he may be unaware of the problem.

The onset of puberty also involves a considerable change in the body and its metabolism, as is seen, for example, in the acne of puberty, a common pustular eruption of the face and neck.

In a similar manner his psyche is disturbed and thrown somewhat off its balance. At this age the youth is full of illusions, which are always the expression of a certain loss of equilibrium. For a long time illusions make stability and mature judgment impossible. His taste, his interests, his life-projects undergo many changes. He may suddenly fall mortally in love with a girl, and a fortnight later be no longer able to conceive how it could ever have happened to him. To such a degree is he subject to illusions, that he actually

needs these mistakes before he can become at all conscious of his own taste and individual judgment. At this age he is still experimenting with life. And he must experiment with it, so that he may learn how to form correct judgments. But no experiments are made without failure and mistakes. Hence it comes about that few men have not had sexual experience of some kind before they are married. At the time of puberty there is a leaning towards homosexual experiences, which are much commoner than is usually admitted. Later there are heterosexual experiences, not always of a very beautiful kind. For the less the sexual complex is assimilated to the whole of the personality, the more will it remain independent and instinctive in character. Sexuality is then purely animal, recognizing no psychic distinctions. The most inferior woman may be good enough. It suffices that she is woman with typical secondary sex-attributes. But a false step or two of this sort does not necessarily give us the right to draw conclusions as to the definitive character of the man, since the act can occur at a time when the sexual-complex is still divorced from psychic influences. Nevertheless frequent experiences of this kind have a bad effect upon the formation of personality, inasmuch as they tend to establish sexuality habitually upon too low a level, so that it becomes incompatible with the moral personality. The result is that, morally, such a man although outwardly a so-called respectable married man, is a prey to sexual phantasies of a low kind, or else he represses them and on some festive occasion they will come leaping again to the surface in their primitive form, much to the amazement of the unsuspecting wife, assuming of course, that she observes what is going on. Not infrequently in such cases there is also a premature coldness of feeling for the wife. Often the wife is frigid from the beginning of marriage, because her sensation does not respond to this kind of sexuality in the husband.

The weakness of a man's judgment at the time of psychic

puberty should prompt him to reflect very deeply before risking a premature choice of a wife.

Let us now pass on to consider other forms of relationship between the sexes that are customary during the student-period. There exist, as you know, chiefly in the great universities of other countries, characteristic student liaisons. These relationships have a certain stability and even a certain psychic value, *i.e.*, they exist not only for the sake of sexuality, but also, in many cases, for the sake of love. Instances sometimes occur where a liaison goes on later into marriage. This relationship stands, therefore, considerably higher than prostitution. It is usually limited, however, to those students who were circumspect in their choice of parents. As a rule it is a question of the money-bags, since most of these young women are dependent upon the financial help of their lovers; not that one could say, however, that they sell their love for money. Often such a relationship means for the young woman a beautiful episode in an existence otherwise poor and empty of love. For the man it may be his first intimate acquaintance with a woman, and a memory upon which he looks back in later life with emotion. But often there is nothing valuable in such a connexion, partly as a result of crude sensuality, thoughtlessness, and lack of feeling on the man's part, and partly as a result of foolishness, fickleness, and light-mindedness on the part of the girl.

Always, however, there hangs over these relationships the Damocles sword of transitoriness, which hinders the realization of higher values. They are only episodes, experiments of a very limited validity.

The injurious effect of such connexions on the formation of personality is due to the fact that the man gains the woman too cheaply. Consequently the value of the object is depreciated. It is too easy for the man to dispose of his sexual problem in such a convenient and irresponsible way. He becomes spoiled and luxurious. Furthermore, the fact that he is sexually satisfied deprives him of a certain impetus



which a young man can scarcely dispense with. He becomes blasé. He can wait, and in the meantime can calmly review womanhood passing before him until he discovers the congenial *parti*. Then when the wedding comes along the liaison is thrown over. This procedure is hardly profitable to the character, moreover the lower type of relationship tends to establish sexuality on a low level of development, which can easily produce subsequent difficulties in marriage. Or if the phantasies on this level are repressed, neurotics are the outcome or, worse still, moral-zealots.

Homosexual relations between students of either sex are by no means uncommon. So far as I am able to gauge this phenomenon, I would say that these relationships are less common with us, and upon the continent generally than in certain other countries where the students (male and female) live in colleges. I am now speaking not of actual homosexuals who, as pathological figures are incapable of a real friendship and, therefore, find no particular sympathy among normal individuals, but of more or less normal young people who feel such an enthusiastic friendship for each other that they express their feeling also in a sexual form. In such cases it is not just a matter of mutual masturbation, which in the earlier phases of school and college life is the order of the day, but rather of a higher, more spiritual form that deserves to be called 'friendship' in the classical meaning of the word. When such a friendship exists between an older man and a younger its educational importance is undeniable. A slightly homosexual teacher, for instance, often owes a brilliant educational capacity to his homosexual disposition. Thus the homosexual relation between the older and the younger can be of mutual advantage and have a real value for life. An indispensable condition of the value of such a relation is the loyalty and permanence of the friendship. But only too easily is this the one condition that is omitted. The more homosexual a man is, the more is he liable to disloyalty, and to become a mere seducer of boys. Even

where loyal and true friendship prevails undesirable consequences for the growth of personality may easily ensue. A friendship of this kind naturally involves a particular cult of the feelings, hence, of the womanish element in a man. He becomes '*schwärmerisch*', soulful, æsthetic, 'sensitive', in other words effeminate. And this womanish bearing does not fit a man.

In the friendship between women similar advantages can be brought out; only here the difference of age and the educational factor play a smaller rôle. Its main value lies in the interchange of tender feelings on the one hand, and of ideas on the other. As a general rule it is a high-spirited, intellectual rather masculine type of woman who is seeking in such a relation a defence against and a superiority over man. Her attitude to man often takes on the character of a disconcerting assurance and a certain delicate defiance. The effect upon her character is to emphasize the masculine traits and to diminish womanly charm. Often a man discovers her homosexuality by observing that such a woman leaves him as cold as an ice-house.

The practice of homosexuality does not in normal cases prejudice a later heterosexuality. Indeed occasionally both can exist side by side. I have seen a most intelligent woman who lived her whole life in a homosexual relation, and at fifty entered into a normal relationship with a man.

Among the sexual relations of the student-period another peculiar form must be mentioned, which also falls within the orbit of the normal, namely, the relation of the young man to the elderly woman, who if possible is married or at least widowed. You will perhaps remember Jean Jacques Rousseau and his relation to Madame de Warens. This or a similar kind of relation is what I am referring to. Usually in these cases the man is of a timid nature, unsure of himself and inwardly anxious, in short childish. He naturally seeks a mother. Many women like nothing better than a rather helpless man, especially when they are considerably older than

he; in fact they do not love the strength, the virtue, or the merit in a man, but his weaknesses. They find his infantilities charming; if he stammers a little he is enchanting; or perhaps he is lame, and this excites maternal compassion and a little more besides. As a rule the woman seduces him, and he wraps himself in her maternal atmosphere.

Not always, however, does a timid youth remain half a child. It may be that just this surfeit of maternal solicitude is the thing his undeveloped virility needs in order to bring it to the surface, and the relationship with such a woman will enable him to educate his feeling into full consciousness. He learns to understand a woman who has had experience of life and the world, and who is conscious of herself. Thus he obtains a rare opportunity of a glimpse behind the scenes of the world of men and women. But this advantage is gained only by the man who soon outgrows this type of relationship; for should he stay in it her mothering would ruin him. Maternal tenderness is the most mischievous poison for the man who must prepare himself for the hard and pitiless struggle of life. If he will not let go of her skirts he will eventually become an invertebrate parasite—for as a rule she has money—and gradually sink to the level of parrots, lap-dogs, and old dames' cats.

The natural course of our discussion now leads us to that form of relationship which yields no solution of the sexual question; namely, the asexual or 'platonic' relationship. If an exhaustive statistic of student-relationships could be made, it would probably show, if my judgment be correct, that with us in Switzerland the majority of students favour platonic relations. Naturally, this raises the question of sexual abstinence. One often hears the view that abstaining from sexual intercourse becomes injurious to health. This view is wrong, at least for the student-phase of life. Complete abstention has an injurious effect upon the health, only when the age is reached when the man could win a woman, and when, according to his individual way,

he should win her. The extraordinary intensification of the sexual need that so often accompanies this particular psychological constellation, has the biological aim of clearing forcibly out of the way certain scruples, prejudices, and hesitations. This is at times most necessary, for the need to decide in favour of marriage with all the doubtful possibilities connected with it, has made many a man shy. It is only natural, therefore, that nature tries to push him over the obstacle. Resistance against and abstention from sexual expression under such circumstances may certainly have injurious effects; but this need not be the case of course if no physical or psychological probability and necessity presents itself.

This question has a certain similarity with the question of the injuriousness of onanism. Under circumstances where either from physical or psychical causes normal intercourse is impossible and it is used merely as a safety-valve, masturbation has no ill-effects. Those young people who come to the doctor suffering from the harmful results of masturbation are not by any means excessive onanists—the latter as a rule need no physician because they are not at all ill—but their onanism has bad results because it involves psychic complications. On the one hand through the stings of conscience, and on the other through a riot of sexual phantasies. This latter form is particularly common with women. Onanism that involves psychic complications of this kind is harmful, but not the ordinary uncomplicated masturbation due to necessity. But when onanism is continued into that age of life when the physical, psychical, and social possibilities of normal intercourse are present, and masturbation is indulged in in order to évade the necessities and responsible decisions of mature life—then it is harmful.

Platonic relationship is very important in the student period. Its commonest manifestation is flirting, which springs from an experimental attitude that is quite appropriate at this age. It is voluntary and, by virtue of a tacit but general understanding it is without obligations. That is both its

advantage and its disadvantage. The experimental attitude makes it possible for an acquaintance to be formed without immediately fatal results. Both sexes exercise their judgment and dexterity in reciprocal expression, accommodation, and defence. Innumerable experiences that often prove uncommonly valuable in later life can be included in the category of flirting. But on the contrary, the absence of obligation often tends to seduce a man or a girl into the practice of habitual flirtation, and then they grow shallow, superficial, and heartless. The man becomes a drawing-room hero, a heart-breaker, never dreaming what a dull, insipid figure he presents. The woman becomes a coquette whom a serious man instinctively feels is not to be taken seriously. Hence flirting *à tout prix* is not to be commended.

A phenomenon that is as rare as flirting is common is the genesis and conscious cultivation of a serious love. We might term this phenomenon simply the ideal case, without thereby committing ourselves to traditional romanticism. For the formation of the personality the timely awakening and conscious cultivation of a deep, serious, and responsible feeling is undoubtedly of the highest value in every respect. For the young man such a relationship can be the most effectual shield against all side-tracks and temptations, against all physical and psychic hurts, and can also be a powerful spur to industry, proficiency, loyalty, and reliability.

There is, however, no value so great that it has not also its unfavourable aspect. A relationship that is so ideal easily becomes exclusive. There is before his eyes ever the same object and the same goal. Through his love the young man is too much cut off from the acquaintance of other women; and the girl does not learn the art of erotic achievement, since she already possesses her man. And the possessive instinct of the woman is a dangerous thing. It may easily happen that the man, regretting all those experiences with other women that he omitted to have before marriage, decides to make up for them after.

It must not be concluded from the above that every love-relationship of this kind is ideal. There are cases which are exactly the opposite, where, for instance, a sweetheating begun in schooldays is somehow prolonged by force of habit and for no other intelligible reason. From inertia, lack of spirit, or awkwardness they simply cannot get free of each other. Perhaps the parents on both sides find it quite suitable, and inasmuch as thoughtlessness and habit gave it birth, so passivity rules it to the end. They put up with it as a '*fait accompli*', and simply endure it. Then the disadvantages accumulate without a single advantage. Whatever benefit may be assumed for this state of things is only apparent, since as regards the formation of personality it is merely an unhealthy ease and passivity that entirely frustrates the realization of valuable experiences and the exercise of manly or womanly gifts and virtues. Moral qualities are only won in freedom, and are only proved in situations that are morally dangerous. The thief who refrains from stealing because he is in prison is not a moral personality. The parents of such children may indeed blink fond eyes upon this touching marriage, and add the respectability of their progeny to the tale of their own virtues, but this 'virtue' is only a phantom, not moral strength, but immoral complaisance.

With this very brief survey let us turn from the field of living phenomena to the chapter of desiderata and utopian possibilities.

Nowadays we cannot discuss the love-problem without also speaking of the utopia of free love, including trial-marriage. To anticipate somewhat I must say that I regard these ideas as in the nature of wish-pictures, or attempts to make easy something that in actual life is invariably difficult. Our time is certainly prolific in these attempts. Were there not more than 100,000 Swiss citizens who imagined that the dividing up of property would achieve the goal; whereas every man knows that only the initiative, the

onscientiousness, and the responsibility of the individual maintains the race. Just as there grows no herb which can keep away death, so there exists no simple means which can make a hard thing, as life assuredly is, an easy matter. We can only overcome the force of gravity by a corresponding application of energy. Thus the solution of the love-problem challenges the whole of a man. Satisfactory solutions are found only when a totality is given to the work. Everything else is only patch-work and in the long run unserviceable. Free love would only be thinkable if every man achieved morally his maximum accomplishment. But the idea of free love is not invented for this end, but in order to make what is difficult appear easy. To love belong the depth and loyalty of feeling, without which love is not love but mere caprice. True love will always engage in lasting, responsible ties. It needs freedom only for the choice, but not for its accomplishment. Every true, deep love is a sacrifice. A man sacrifices his possibilities, or, to put it better, the illusion of his possibilities. If this sacrifice is not made his illusions hinder the realization of the deep and responsible feeling, and accordingly the possibility of experiencing real love is also denied him.

Love has more than one element in common with religious conviction; it demands an unconditioned attitude and it expects complete surrender. Only that believer who yields himself wholly to his god partakes in the manifestation of divine grace. Similarly, love reveals its highest mysteries and wonder only to him who is capable of unconditioned surrender and loyalty of feeling. Because this is so hard, few indeed of mortal men can boast of achieving it. But just because the most devoted and truest love is also the most beautiful let no man seek that which could make love easy. He is a sorry knight of his lady who recoils from the difficulty of love. Love is like God: both give themselves only to their bravest knights.

In much the same terms must trial-marriage be criticized.

The very fact that a man enters marriage on trial means that he makes a reservation ; he wishes to insure himself against the chance of burning his fingers ; he means to risk nothing. But thereby he frustrates in the most effective way possible the realization of a real experience. You cannot experience the terror of the polar-ice by perusing a book of travel, nor can you climb the Himalayas in the kinema.

Love is not a cheap matter ; let us therefore beware not to cheapen it. All our evil qualities, our egotism, our cowardice, our so-called worldly-wisdom, our greed—all these things would like to persuade us not to take love seriously. But love will only reward us when we do take it seriously. I must even regard it as a misfortune that nowadays the sexual question is spoken of as something distinct from love. The two problems should not be separated, for when there is a sexual-problem it can only be solved by love. Every other solution would be a harmful surrogate. Sexuality released as sexuality is brutish. But as an expression of love sexuality is hallowed. Never ask therefore what a man does, but how he does it. Does he act from love and in the spirit of love, then he serves a god, and whatever he may do, it is not our business to judge, for it is ennobled.

I trust these remarks will have made it clear that I make no sort of moral judgment about sexuality as a natural phenomenon, but prefer to make moral judgments dependent upon the way it is expressed.



## ON THE RELATION OF ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY TO POETIC ART

NOTWITHSTANDING its manifold difficulties, the task of discussing the relation of analytical psychology to poetic art provides me with a not unwelcome occasion for defining my standpoint in regard to a much debated question ; namely, the relation between psychology and art in general. In spite of their incommensurability both provinces are closely inter-related, and these connexions cannot remain unexplored. For they originate in the fact that art in practice is a psychological activity, and, in so far as this is the case, it actually requires a psychological consideration. Art, like every other human activity proceeds from psychic motives, and from this angle, it is a proper object for psychology. But this conclusion also involves a very obvious limitation in the application of the psychological view-point : only that aspect of art which consists in the process of artistic form can be an object of psychology ; whereas that which constitutes the essential nature of art must always lie outside its province. This other aspect, namely, the problem what is art in itself, can never be the object of a psychological, but only of an æsthetico-artistic method of approach.

A like distinction must also be made in the realm of religion ; there also a psychological consideration is permissible only in respect of the emotional and symbolical phenomena of a religion, where the essential nature of religion is in no way involved, as indeed it cannot be. For were this possible, not religion alone, but art also could be treated as a mere subdivision of psychology. In saying this I do not mean to affirm that such an encroachment has not actually taken

place. But whoever trespasses in this way clearly forgets that a similar fate can easily befall psychology, the specific value and essential quality of which is at once obliterated as soon as it is regarded as a mere brain activity, thus bringing it into line with other glandular activities as a mere subdivision of physiology. In actual fact, this depreciation has already occurred.

Art, by its very nature, is not science, and science is essentially not art; both provinces of the mind, therefore, have a reservation that is peculiar to them, and that can be explained only from themselves. Hence when we speak of the relation between psychology and art, we are treating only of that aspect of art which without encroachment can be submitted to a psychological manner of approach. Whatever psychology is able to determine about art will be confined to the psychological process of artistic activity, and will have nothing whatever to do with the innermost nature of art itself. It is as powerless in this respect as is the capacity of the intellect to present or even apprehend the nature of feeling. Moreover these two things could have no kind of existence as separate entities had not their essential difference long since challenged recognition. The fact that in the child, the 'war of faculties' not yet having declared itself, we find artistic, scientific, and religious possibilities still slumbering tranquilly together; or that with the primitive, dispositions towards art, science, and religion still maintain an undifferentiated co-existence in the chaos of a magical mentality; or that, finally, with animals no trace of 'mind' can as yet be discerned, but merely 'natural instinct',—all these facts hold no shadow of evidence for that essential unity in the nature of art and science which alone could justify a reciprocal subsumption, or in other words, a reduction of the one into the other. For if we go back far enough in the state of mental development for the essential differences of the individual provinces of the mind to have become altogether invisible, we have not thereby reached a deeper principle

of their unity, but merely an earlier evolutionary state of undifferentiation in which neither province has as yet any existence at all. But this elementary state is not a principle from which any conclusion regarding the nature of later and more highly developed states might be inferred, notwithstanding, as is of course always the case, that a direct descent can be demonstrated. The scientific attitude will naturally and constantly tend to overlook the nature of a differentiation in favour of its causal derivation, and will strive to subordinate the former to an idea that is certainly more general, but at the same time more elementary.

These reflections seem to me not inappropriate at the present time, for there have been frequent demonstrations of late of the way in which poetic art-works in particular may be submitted to an interpretation that is neither more nor less than a reduction to elementary conditions. Granted that the determinants of the artistic creation, the material and its individual treatment, for instance, can be traced back to the personal relations of the poet with his parents. Yet nothing is gained by this procedure for the understanding of his art, since we can perform the same reduction in every other possible case, and not the least in cases of pathological disorder. Neuroses and psychoses are also reducible to infantile relations with the parents, as are good and bad habits, convictions, qualities, passions, especial interests and so forth. But we are surely not entitled to assume that all these very different things must, therefore, have one and the same explanation; for were this so, we should be driven to conclude that they were actually one and the same thing. Thus, if a work of art and a neurosis are explained in precisely similar terms, either the art-work must be a neurosis, or the neurosis a work of art. As a paradoxical play upon words such a *façon de parler* might pass muster, but a healthy human reason must assuredly revolt at the notion of art-work and neurosis being placed in the same category. To take the most extreme case, only an analysing physician viewing

a neurosis through the spectacles of a professional bias could come to regard it as a work of art. But it would never occur to a thinking lay mind to confound art with a morbid phenomenon, in spite of the undeniable fact that the origin of a work of art must confess to similar psychological preconditions as a neurosis. This is only natural, since certain psychic preconditions are universally present, and furthermore, because of the relative similarity of human conditions of life these are constantly the same, whether in the case of a nervous intellectual, a poet, or a normal human being. All, doubtless, have had parents, all have a so-called father and mother-complex, all have the onus of sexuality and, therewith, certain general and typical human difficulties. That one poet is influenced more by the relation to the father, another by the tie to the mother, while a third reveals unmistakable traces of repressed sexuality in his works—all this can be said equally well not only of every neurotic, but also of every normal human being. Hence nothing specific is thereby gained for the judgment of a work of art. At most our knowledge of the historic preconditions will have been somewhat broadened and deepened. The school of medical psychology inaugurated by Freud has certainly tended to inspire the literary historian to bring certain qualities of the individual work of art into relation with the personal and intimate life of the poet. But in so doing nothing more has been said than what the scientific treatment of poetic works had long since revealed, namely, the presence of certain threads, woven by the personal and intimate life of the poet—whether with or without conscious intention—into the fabric of his work. But the works of Freud may conceivably enable a more penetrating and exhaustive demonstration of these influences, reaching back even as far as earliest childhood, that so often affect the artistic creation.

When employed with taste and common sense, such treatment often provides an attractive general picture of

the way in which the artistic creation is interwoven in the personal life of the artist, and also in a sense arises from it.

To this extent the so-called psycho-analysis of art-works differs in no essential way from a penetrating and skilfully shaded psychologico-literary analysis. The difference is at most a question of degree, although it may occasionally astound us by indiscreet conclusions and references that a rather more delicate touch, or a certain sense of tact might easily have avoided. This lack of delicacy in dealing with the all-too-human element, which seems to be a professional peculiarity of the medical psychologist, was perfectly understood by Mephistopheles: "So may you finger everything and welcome, round which another prowls for years and years"—although unfortunately not always to his own advantage. The possibility of daring conclusions may easily lead the way to flagrant lapses of taste. A slight touch of scandal often flavours a biography, but a little more becomes a nasty inquisitiveness, a catastrophe of good taste beneath the cloak of science. Our interest is unwittingly diverted from the work of art and gets lost in the mazy, labyrinthine confusion of psychic preconditions, the poet becomes a clinical case, even serving on occasion as a curious example of *psychopathia sexualis*. But therewith the psycho-analysis of the art-work has also turned aside from its objective, and the discussion has strayed into a province that is as broad as mankind, and not in the smallest degree specific for the artist; it therefore possesses even less relevance to his art.

This kind of analysis brings the work of art into the sphere of general human psychology, whence everything else besides art may proceed. An explanation of a work of art obtained in this way is just as great a futility as the statement that 'every artist is a narcissist'. Every man who pursues his own line to the limit of his powers is a 'narcissist'—if indeed it is at all permissible to use a concept so specifically coined for the pathology of neuroses in this wider application

—hence such a statement says nothing; it merely elicits surprise in the style of a *bon-mot*.

Because this kind of analysis is in no sense concerned with the art-work itself, but is always striving with the instinct of a mole to bury itself as quickly as possible in the murky back-ground of the human psyche, it always finds itself in the same common earth that unites all mankind. Accordingly its explanations possess an indescribable monotony—that same tedious recital, in fact, which can daily be heard in certain medical consulting rooms.

The reductive method of Freud is purely a method of medical treatment that has for its object a morbid and unsuitable structure. This morbid structure has taken the place of normal accomplishment, and hence must be broken down before the way can be cleared for a sound adaptation. In this case the process of leading-back to a general human basis is entirely appropriate. But when applied to the work of art this method leads to the results depicted above. From beneath the shimmering robe of art it extracts the naked commonness of the elementary *homo sapiens*, to which species the poet also belongs. The golden semblance of sublime creation we were about to discuss is blotted out; for its essence is lost when we treat it with the corrosive method which has to be used for the deceptive phantasms of hysteria. The product obtained by this mordant technique is, of course, interesting and might conceivably possess the same kind of scientific value as for instance a post-mortem examination of the brain of Nietzsche, which might certainly teach us the particular atypical form of paralysis from which he died. But what would this have to do with Zarathustra? Whatever may have been its subterranean background, is this not a world in itself, beyond the human, all-too-human imperfections, beyond the world of migraine and cerebral atrophy?

I have spoken hitherto of Freud's reductive method without stating with any particularity in what the method consists.

It has to do with a medico-psychological technique for the investigation of morbid psychic phenomena. This technique is exclusively occupied with ways and means for circumventing or peering through the conscious foreground in order to reach the so-called unconscious, or psychic background. It is based upon the assumption that the neurotic patient is repressing certain psychic contents from consciousness because of their incompatibility or inconsistency with conscious values. This incompatibility is regarded as a moral one; accordingly, the repressed contents must bear a correspondingly negative character, namely, infantile-sexual, obscene, or even criminal. It is these qualities that render them so distasteful to consciousness. Since no man is perfect, it is clear that everyone must possess such a background whether the fact be admitted or not. Hence it can be disclosed in all cases if only we apply the technique of interpretation elaborated by Freud.

I cannot, of course, enter here into the details of the technique. A few intimations as to its nature must suffice. The unconscious background does not remain inactive, but betrays itself by certain characteristic effects upon the conscious contents. For example, it creates phantasy-products of a peculiar character, which are in most cases easily referable to certain subterranean sexual representations. Or it effects certain characteristic disturbances of the conscious process, which are likewise reducible to repressed contents. A most important source of the knowledge of unconscious contents is provided by dreams, which are direct products of the activity of the unconscious. The essential factor of Freud's reductive method consists in the fact, that it collects all the circumstantial evidence of the unconscious backgrounds, and, through the analysis and interpretation of this material, reconstructs the elementary, unconscious, instinctive processes. Those conscious contents which give us a clue, as it were, to the unconscious backgrounds are by Freud incorrectly termed symbols. These

are not true symbols, however, since, according to his teaching, they have merely the rôle of signs or symptoms of the background processes. The true symbol differs essentially from this, and should be understood as the expression of an intuitive perception which can as yet, neither be apprehended better, nor expressed differently. When, for example, Plato expresses the whole problem of the theory of cognition in his metaphor of the cave, or when Christ expresses the idea of the Kingdom of Heaven in his parables, these are genuine and true symbols ; namely, attempts to express a thing, for which there exists as yet no adequate verbal concept. If we were to interpret Plato's metaphor in the manner of Freud we should naturally come to the uterus, and we should have proved that even the mind of Plato was deeply stuck in the primeval levels of 'infantile sexuality'. But in doing so we should also remain in total ignorance of what Plato actually created from the primitive antecedents of his philosophical intuition ; we should, in fact, carelessly have overlooked his most essential product, merely to discover that he had 'infantile' phantasies like every other mortal. Such a conclusion could possess value only for the man who regards Plato as a super-human being, and who is therefore able to find a certain satisfaction in the fact that even Plato was also a man. But who would want to regard Plato as a god ? Surely only a man who is afflicted by the tyranny of infantile phantasies, in other words, a neurotic mentality. For such an one the reduction to universal human truths is profitable on medical grounds. But this would have nothing whatever to do with the meaning of the Platonic parable.

I have purposely lingered over the relation between medical psycho-analysis and the work of art, because I want to emphasize the point that this kind of psycho-analysis is, at the same time, also the Freudian doctrine. Freud himself by his rigid dogmatism has seen to it that the two fundamentally different things should be regarded by the public as identical. Yet this technique may be employed with benefit



in certain medical cases without any corresponding necessity to exalt it to the level of a doctrine. Indeed against this doctrine we are bound to raise vigorous objections. The assumptions it rests upon are quite arbitrary. In no sense, for example, are neuroses exclusively based upon sexual repression, and the same holds good for the psychoses. There is no foundation for saying that dreams merely contain repressed wishes the incompatibility of which requires them to be disguised by a hypothetical dream-censor. The Freudian technique, in so far as it remains under the influence of its own one-sided and, therefore, erroneous hypotheses, is patently arbitrary.

Before analytical psychology can do justice to the work of art it must entirely rid itself of medical prejudice ; for the art-work is not a morbidity, and therefore demands a wholly different orientation from the medical. The physician must naturally seek the prime cause of a sickness in order to eradicate it, if possible, by the roots ; but just as naturally must the psychologist adopt an exactly opposite attitude towards the work of art. He will not raise the question, which for the art-work is quite superfluous, concerning its undoubted general antecedents, its basic human determinants ; but he will inquire into the meaning of the work, and will be concerned with its preconditions only in so far as they are necessary for the understanding of its meaning. Personal causality has as much and as little to do with the work of art, as the soil with the plant that springs from it. Doubtless we may learn to understand some peculiarities of the plant by becoming familiar with the character of its habitat. And for the botanist this is, of course, an important component of his knowledge. But nobody will maintain that he has thereby recognized all the essentials relating to the plant itself. The personal orientation that is demanded by the problem of personal causality is out of place in the presence of the work of art, just because the work of art is not a human being, but essentially supra-personal. It is

a thing and not a personality; hence the personal is no criterion for it. Indeed the especial significance of the genuine art-work lies in the fact, that it has successfully rid itself of the restraints and blind alleys of the personal and breathes an air infinitely remote from the transitoriness and short-winded excursions of the merely personal.

I must confess from my own experience that it is by no means easy for the physician to lay aside his professional spectacles when considering the work of art, and at the same time to clear his judgment of the current biological causality. But I have come to learn that although a psychology with a purely biological orientation can with a certain measure of justification be applied to men, it can never be applied to the true work of art, and still less to man as creator. A purely causalistic psychology is only able to reduce every human individual to a member of the species *homo sapiens*, since its entire range is limited to what is either transmitted or derived. But the art-work is not merely transmitted or derived—it is a creative reorganization of those very determinants to which a causalistic psychology must always reduce it. The plant is not a mere product of the soil; but a living creative process centred in itself, the essence of which has nothing to do with the character of the soil. In the same way the art-work must be regarded as a creative formation, freely making use of every precondition. Its meaning and its own individual particularity rests in itself, and not in its preconditions. In fact one might almost describe it as a being that uses man and his personal dispositions merely as a cultural medium or soil, disposing his powers according to its own laws, while shaping itself to the fulfilment of its own creative purpose.

But here I am anticipating somewhat, since I have in mind a particular class of art-work which I must first introduce. For not every work of art is produced under this constellation. There are works, verse as well as prose writings, that proceed wholly from the author's intention

and resolve to produce this or that effect. In this case the author submits his material to a definite treatment that is both directed and purposeful ; he adds to it and subtracts from it, emphasizing one effect, modifying another, laying on this colour here, that there, with the most careful weighing of their possible effects, and with constant observance of the laws of beautiful form and style. To this labour the author brings his keenest judgment, and selects his expression with the most complete freedom. In his view his material is only material, and entirely subject to his artistic purpose ; he wills to present this and nothing else. In this activity the poet is simply identical with the creative process, whether he has willingly surrendered himself as the head of the creative movement, or whether this has so entirely seized upon him as a tool or instrument that all consciousness of the fact has escaped him. He is the creative process itself, standing completely in it and undifferentiated from it with all his aims and all his powers. There is no need, I think, to bring before you examples of this identity, either from the history of literature or from the poets' own confessions.

Doubtless, also, I am saying nothing new when I speak of the other class of art-works, that flow more or less spontaneous and perfect from the author's pen. They come as it were fully arrayed into the world, as Pallas Athene sprang from the head of Zeus. These works positively impose themselves upon the author ; his hand is, as it were, seized, and his pen writes things that his mind perceives with amazement. The work brings with it its own form ; what he would add to it is declined, what he does not wish to admit is forced upon him. While his consciousness stands disconcerted and empty before the phenomenon, he is overwhelmed with a flood of thoughts and images which it was never his aim to beget and which his will would never have fashioned. Yet in spite of himself he is forced to recognize that in all this his self is speaking, that his innermost nature is revealing itself, uttering things that he would never have entrusted to

his tongue. He can only obey and follow the apparently foreign impulse, feeling that his work is greater than himself, and therefore has a power over him that he is quite unable to command. He is not identical with the process of creative formation; he is himself conscious of the fact that he stands as it were underneath his work, or at all events beside it, as though he were another person who had fallen within the magic circle of an alien will.

When we are speaking of the psychology of a work of art, before all else we must bear in mind these two entirely different possibilities of the origin of a work, since much that is of the greatest importance for psychological judgment hangs upon this discrimination. This antithesis was also sensed by Schiller; he sought, as we know, to embrace it with the concept, sentimental and naïve. The choice of his expression is probably based upon the fact that he had mainly the poetic activity in view. Psychologically we term the former kind introverted, the latter extraverted. The introverted attitude is characterized by an upholding of the subject with his conscious ends and aims against the claims and pretensions of the object; the extraverted attitude, on the contrary, is distinguished by a subordination of the subject to the claims of the object. In my view, Schiller's dramas give a good idea of the introverted attitude to material, as do most of his poems. The material is mastered by the aim of the poet. For the opposite attitude the second part of *Faust* gives us a good illustration. Here the material distinguishes itself by its refractory obstinacy. A still more striking example is Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* wherein the author himself observes how 'one became two'.

You will perhaps have discerned in the foregoing presentation that a considerable displacement of psychological standpoint has taken place, for now I am no longer speaking of the poet as a person, but of the creative process that moves him. The accent of interest has been shifted to the latter factor, while the former comes into consideration, as it were, only

as a reacting object. When the consciousness of the author is not identical with the creative process this is at once clear, but in the first-mentioned instance the opposite appears at first to be the case. Here the author is apparently the creator himself, of his own free will and without the smallest compulsion. He is perhaps fully convinced of his own freedom, and will not be disposed to allow that his creation is not also his will, from which, in conjunction with his knowledge, he believes it to be exclusively derived.

Here we are faced with a question that we are quite unable to answer from what the poet himself tells us about the manner of his creating. It is really a scientific problem that psychology alone can solve. For it might also be the case, as I have already hinted, that the poet, while apparently creating consciously and spontaneously out of himself and producing only what he intends, is nevertheless, in spite of his consciousness, so caught up by the creative impulse that he is as little aware of an 'alien' will, as the other type can be said to have any direct appreciation of his own will in the apparently foreign inspiration, and this notwithstanding the fact that it is manifestly the voice of his own self. In this case his conviction of the unconditioned freedom of his creating would be an illusion of consciousness—he fancies he is swimming, whereas an invisible stream bears him along.

In no sense is this doubt an airy phantasy; it is founded upon the experience of analytical psychology. For analytical investigation of the unconscious has disclosed an abundance of possibilities in which consciousness is not only influenced by the unconscious, but is actually led by it. The doubt therefore is justified. Yet where may we find evidence for the possible assumption that a conscious poet may also be taken captive by his work? The proof may be of two kinds, direct or indirect. Direct proof would be found in those cases where the poet, in what he believes he is saying, actually and patently says more than he himself is aware of. Many

such instances could be cited. Indirect proof would be found in cases, where behind the apparent spontaneity of the production there stands a higher 'must', that reveals the imperative nature of its demand if the creative activity is renounced voluntarily, or in those difficult psychic complications which immediately ensue in the event of an arbitrary interruption of the artistic production.

Practical analysis of artists invariably shows not only the strength of the creative impulse springing from the unconscious, but also its splenetic and arbitrary character. We have only to turn to any of the biographies of the great artists to find abundant evidence of the way in which the creative urge works upon them; often it is so imperious that it actually absorbs every human impulse, yoking everything to the service of the work, even at the cost of health and common human happiness. The unborn work in the soul of the artist is a force of nature that effects its purpose, either with tyrannical might, or with that subtle cunning which nature brings to the achievement of her end, quite regardless of the personal weal or woe of the man who is the vehicle of the creative force. The creative energy lives and waxes in the man as a tree in the earth from which it takes its nourishment. It might be well, therefore, to regard the creative process as a living thing, implanted, as it were, in the souls of men. In terms of analytical psychology this is an autonomous complex. It is in fact a detached portion of the psyche that leads an independent psychic life withdrawn from the hierarchy of consciousness, and in proportion to its energetic value or force, may appear as a mere disturbance of the voluntarily directed process of consciousness, or as a superordinated authority which may take the ego bodily into its service. The latter case, therefore, would be the poet who is identified with the creative process and who at once acquiesces whenever the unconscious 'must' threatens. But the other poet to whom the creative element appears almost as a foreign power, is unable for one reason or another

to acquiesce, and is, accordingly, caught by the 'must' unawares.

It might be expected that this heterogeneity in its motivation would also be felt in a work of art. For in one case we have to do with a purposeful production that is accompanied and directed by consciousness, and to the making of which every consideration as to the form and effect intended has been freely given. Whereas in the other we are dealing with an event proceeding from unconscious nature; something that achieves its aim without the smallest contribution from human consciousness, and often imposing its form and effect quite arbitrarily in spite of the latter. Thus we should expect in the former case, that nowhere would the work transcend the limits of conscious understanding, that its effect would, as it were, be spent within the framework of the author's intention, and that in no way would its expression exceed the author's deliberate purpose. In the latter case we should have to conceive of something of a supra-personal character that transcends the range of conscious understanding in the same degree as the author's consciousness is withheld from the development of his work. We should expect a certain strangeness of form and shape, thoughts that can only be apprehended by intuition, a language pregnant with meanings, expressions that would have the value of genuine symbols, because they are the best possible expressions of something as yet unknown—bridges thrown out towards an invisible shore.

These criteria are, on the whole, decisive. Wherever it is a question of an admittedly intended work with consciously selected material it should correspond to the first-named qualities, and similarly in the latter case. The familiar example of Schiller's dramas, on the one hand, and the second part of *Faust*, on the other, or better still *Zarathustra*, should illustrate what has been said. I would not, however, pledge myself to place the work of an unknown poet into either of these classes without previously having made a rather

searching inquiry into the poet's personal relation to his work. The knowledge as to whether a poet belongs to the introverted or to the extraverted type of man is not enough ; since both types have the possibility of creating at one time in the extraverted, and, at another, in the introverted attitude. This can be observed with Schiller, in the difference between his poetical and his philosophical works ; with Goethe in the contrast between his perfectly formed poems and his obvious struggle in the shaping of his material in the second part of *Faust* ; with Nietzsche in the difference between his aphorisms and the coherent stream of *Zarathustra*. The same poet may have quite different attitudes towards his various works, and the particular standard to be applied must be made dependent upon the particular relation prevailing at the time of production.

This question, as we now see, is infinitely complicated. But the complication is still further aggravated when our judgment must also include the above-mentioned considerations concerning the case of the poet who is identical with the creative impulse. Should it chance that the conscious and purposeful manner of production with all its apparent consciousness of intention is nevertheless a mere subjective illusion of the poet, then his work will also possess the same symbolical qualities, passing into the indefinable and thus transcending contemporary consciousness. But in this case these qualities would remain hidden ; for the reader would likewise be unable to reach beyond the limits of the author's consciousness, which are themselves fixed by the spirit of his time. He too moves within the limits of contemporary consciousness, with small hope of availing himself of some Archimedian point outside the orbit of his world by which he could raise, as it were, his contemporary consciousness off its hinges. For nothing short of this would enable him to recognize the symbol in a work of this kind ; the symbol being the possibility and intimation of a meaning higher and wider than our present powers of comprehension can seize.



This question, as we remarked, is somewhat delicate. Indeed, I am raising it only that the possible significance of a work of art might not be fettered or restricted by my typification, even though apparently it intends neither to be nor to say anything except what it obviously is and says. It happens moreover quite frequently that a poet long dead is suddenly rediscovered. This may occur when our conscious development has reached a higher level, from which standpoint the ancient poet can tell us something new. It was always present in his work, but it remained a hidden symbol that only a renewal of the spirit of the time permits us to read and to understand. It demanded other and fresher eyes, just because the old ones could see in it only the things they were accustomed to see. Experiences like these should prompt us to be circumspect, since they give a certain justification for the view I developed above ; whereas the admittedly symbolic work does not demand this subtlety. In its prophetic language it almost seems to say : I am really meaning more than I actually say, my meaning carries further than my words. Here we may lay our hand upon the symbol, although a satisfying solution of the riddle still escapes us. The symbol remains a perpetual reproach to our subsequent thoughts and feelings. Surely this explains the fact that the symbolical work is more stimulating, drives, as it were, more deeply into us, and therefore seldom permits us a purely æsthetic enjoyment of it. Whereas the work that is manifestly not symbolical appeals much more vividly to our æsthetic sensibility, because it offers us an harmonious vision of fulfilment.

But, you may ask, what contribution can analytical psychology make to the root-problem of artistic 'creation', that is, the mystery of the creative energy ? All that we have spoken of hitherto has been merely psychological phenomenology. Inasmuch as 'no created mind can penetrate the inner soul of Nature', you will surely not expect the impossible from our psychology, namely, a valid explanation of that

great mystery of life, that we immediately feel in the creative impulse. Like every other science psychology has only a modest contribution to make towards the better and deeper understanding of the phenomena of life; it is no nearer than its sisters to absolute knowledge.

We have spoken so much of the significance and meaning of the work of art, that one can hardly suppress the theoretical doubt whether in fact art does 'signify'. Perhaps art itself does not intend to 'signify', contains no sort of 'meaning', at least not in the sense in which we are now speaking of 'meaning'. Perhaps it is like nature, which simply is, without any intention to 'signify'. Is 'meaning' necessarily more than mere interpretation 'secreted' into it by the need of an intellect hungry for meaning? Art—one might say—is beauty, and therein it finds its true aim and fulfilment. It needs no meaning. The question of meaning holds nothing productive for art. When I enter the sphere of art I must certainly submit to the truth of this statement. But when we are speaking of the relation of psychology to the work of art we are standing outside the realm of art, and here it is impossible for us not to speculate. We must interpret; we must find meaning in things, otherwise we should be quite unable to think about them. We must resolve life and happenings, all that fulfils itself in itself, into images, meanings, concepts; and thereby we deliberately detach ourselves from the living mystery. As long as we are caught up in the creative element itself we neither see nor understand; indeed we must not begin to understand, for nothing is more damaging and dangerous to immediate experience than cognition. But for the purpose of cognition we must detach ourselves from the creative process and regard it from without; only then does it become a picture that expresses meanings. Then we not only may, but indeed must speak of 'meaning'. And in so doing, what was before pure phenomenon, becomes something that in association with other phenomena has meaning; it plays a definite

rôle, serves certain ends, brings about effects fraught with meaning. And when we can see all this we get the feeling of having understood and explained something. Thus is the need of science recognized.

When just now we likened the art-work to a tree growing from the nourishing earth, we might with equal justice have chosen the still more familiar metaphor of the child in its mother's womb. But there is a certain lameness about all comparisons ; in places of metaphors, therefore, let us make use of the more precise terminology of science. You will remember that I described the work existing *in statu nascendi* as an autonomous complex. This concept is used to distinguish all those psychic formations which at first are developed quite unconsciously, and only from the moment when they attain threshold-value are able to break through into consciousness. The association which they then make with consciousness has not the importance of an assimilation, but rather of a perception ; which means to say, that the autonomous complex, although certainly perceived, cannot be subjected to conscious control, whether in the form of inhibition or of voluntary reproduction. The autonomy of the complex reveals itself in the fact that it appears or vanishes when and in such guise as accords with its own intrinsic tendency ; it is independent of the option of consciousness. The creative complex shares this peculiarity with every other autonomous complex. It is, moreover, at this point that the possibility of an analogy with morbid psychic processes presents itself, for the latter class (and mental disorders in particular) are especially distinguished by the appearance of autonomous complexes. The divine frenzy of the artist has a perilously real relation to morbid states without being identical with them. The analogy consists in the presence of an autonomous complex. The fact of such a presence, however, proves nothing either for or against the morbid hypothesis, since normal men have also to submit either temporarily or permanently to the tyranny of autonomous

complexes. This fact is simply one of the normal peculiarities of the psyche, and for a man to be unaware of the existence of an autonomous complex merely betrays a rather high degree of unconsciousness. For instance every typical attitude that is to a certain extent differentiated shows a tendency to become an autonomous complex, and in the majority of cases actually becomes one. Every instinct too has more or less the character of an autonomous complex. In itself, therefore, there is nothing morbid in an autonomous complex, only its stored-up energy and its disturbing appearance on the scene may often involve suffering or illness.

How does an autonomous complex arise? From some cause or another—a closer investigation of which would at this point lead us too far afield—a hitherto unconscious region of the psyche is thrown into activity, and this activation undergoes a certain development and extension through the inclusion of related associations. The energy employed in this operation is naturally withdrawn from consciousness, unless the latter prefers to identify itself with the complex. But where this is not the case there results what Janet has termed an '*abaissement du niveau mental*'. The intensity of conscious interests and activities gradually fades, whereupon, either an apathetic inactivity—a condition very common with artists—or a regressive development of the conscious functions takes place, namely, a descent to their infantile or archaic prestages; hence something akin to a degeneration. The '*parties inférieures des fonctions*' force themselves to the front, the instinctive rather than the ethical, the naively infantile instead of the deliberated and mature, the unadapted in place of the adapted. This also is shown in the lives of many artists. From the energy thus withdrawn from the conscious control of the personality the autonomous complex develops.

But in what does the autonomous creative complex consist? Of this we can know next to nothing so long as the completed work offers us no insight into its foundations. The work

gives us a finished picture in the widest sense. This picture is accessible to analysis just in so far as we are able to appreciate it as a symbol. But if we are unable to discover any symbolic value in it, we have thereby ascertained that, for us at least, it means no more than what it obviously says—in other words, so far as we are concerned it is no more than it seems. I use the word 'seems', because it is conceivable that our own bias forbids a wider appreciation of it. At all events in the latter case we can find no motive and no point of attack for analysis. In the former case, however, a phrase of Gerhart Hauptmann will come to our minds almost with the force of an axiom: 'Poetry means the distant echo of the primitive word behind our veil of words.' Translated into psychological language our first question should run: to what primordial image of the collective unconscious can we trace the image we see developed in the work of art?

This question demands elucidation in more than one respect. As already observed, the case I have assumed is that of a symbolical art-work; a work, therefore, of which the source is not to be found in the personal unconscious of the author, but in that sphere of unconscious mythology, the primordial contents of which are the common heritage of mankind. Accordingly, I have termed this sphere the collective unconscious, thus distinguishing it from a personal unconscious which I regard as the totality of those psychic processes and contents that are not only accessible to consciousness, but would often be conscious were they not subject to repression because of some incompatibility that keeps them artificially suppressed beneath the threshold of consciousness. From this sphere art also receives tributaries, dark and turbid though they be; but if they become a major factor they make the work of art a symptomatic rather than a symbolical product. This kind of art might conceivably be left without injury or regret to the Freudian purgative method.

In contrast to the personal unconscious, which in a sense

is a relatively superficial layer immediately below the conscious threshold, the collective unconscious is quite unadapted for consciousness under normal conditions, and hence by no analytical technique can it be brought to conscious recollection, being neither repressed nor forgotten. In itself the collective unconscious cannot be said to exist at all; that is to say, it is nothing but a possibility, that possibility in fact which from primordial time has been handed down to us in the definite form of mnemonic images, or expressed in anatomical formations in the very structure of the brain. It does not yield innate ideas, but inborn possibilities of ideas, which also set definite bounds to the most daring phantasy. It provides categories of phantasy-activity, ideas *a priori* as it were, the existence of which cannot be ascertained except by experience. In finished or shaped material they appear only as the regulative principle of its shaping, *i.e.*, only through the conclusion derived *a posteriori* from the perfected work of art are we able to reconstruct the primitive foundation of the primordial image. The primordial image or archetype is a figure, whether it be a *dæmon*, man, or process, that repeats itself in the course of history wherever creative phantasy is freely manifested. Essentially, therefore, it is a mythological figure. If we subject these images to a closer investigation, we discover them to be the formulated resultants of countless typical experiences of our ancestors. They are, as it were, the psychic residua of numberless experiences of the same type. They depict millions of individual experiences in the average, presenting a kind of picture of the psychic life distributed and projected into the manifold shapes of the mythological pandemonium. These mythological forms, however, are in themselves themes of creative phantasy that still await their translation into conceptual language, of which there exist as yet only laborious beginnings. These concepts, for the most part still to be created, could provide us with an abstract scientific understanding of the unconscious processes that are the roots of the primordial

images. Each of these images contains a piece of human psychology and human destiny, a relic of suffering or delight that has happened countless times in our ancestral story, and on the average follows ever the same course. It is like a deeply graven river-bed in the soul, in which the waters of life, that had spread hitherto with groping and uncertain course over wide but shallow surfaces, suddenly become a mighty river. This happens when that particular chain of circumstances is encountered which from immemorial time has contributed to the laying down of the primordial image. The moment when the mythological situation appears is always characterized by a peculiar emotional intensity; it is as though chords in us were touched that had never resounded before, or as though forces were unloosed, of the existence of which we had never even dreamed. The struggle of adaptation is laborious, because we have constantly to be dealing with individual, *i.e.* atypical conditions. No wonder then, that at the moment when a typical situation occurs, we feel suddenly aware of an extraordinary release, as though transported, or caught up as by an overwhelming power. At such moments we are no longer individuals, but the race; the voice of all mankind resounds in us. The individual man is never able to use his powers to their fullest range, unless there comes to his aid one of those collective presentations we call ideals that liberates in his soul all the hidden forces of instinct, to which the ordinary conscious will alone can never gain access. The most effective ideals are always more or less transparent variants of the archetype. This is proved by the fact that these ideals lend themselves so readily to allegorization, *e.g.* the motherland as the mother. In this kind of figurative expression the allegory itself has not the smallest motive-power; this has its source in the symbolic value of the motherland-idea. The corresponding archetype in this case is the so-called '*participation mystique*' of the primitive with the soil on which he dwells, and which alone contains the spirit of his ancestors. Exile spells misery.

Every relation to the archetype, whether through experience or the mere spoken word, is 'stirring', *i.e.* it is impressive, it calls up a stronger voice than our own. The man who speaks with primordial images speaks with a thousand tongues; he entrances and overpowers, while at the same time he raises the idea he is trying to express above the occasional and the transitory into the sphere of the ever-existing. He transmutes personal destiny into the destiny of mankind, thus evoking all those beneficent forces that have enabled mankind to find a rescue from every hazard and to outlive the longest night.

That is the secret of effective art. The creative process, in so far as we are able to follow it at all, consists in an unconscious animation of the archetype, and in a development and shaping of this image till the work is completed. The shaping of the primordial image is, as it were, a translation into the language of the present which makes it possible for every man to find again the deepest springs of life which would otherwise be closed to him. Therein lies the social importance of art; it is constantly at work educating the spirit of the age, since it brings to birth those forms in which the age is most lacking. Recoiling from the unsatisfying present the yearning of the artist reaches out to that primordial image in the unconscious which is best fitted to compensate the insufficiency and one-sidedness of the spirit of the age. The artist seizes this image, and in the work of raising it from deepest unconsciousness he brings it into relation with conscious values, thereby transforming its shape, until it can be accepted by his contemporaries according to their powers.

The nature of the work of art permits conclusions to be drawn concerning the character of the period from which it sprang. What was the significance of realism and naturalism to their age? What was the meaning of romanticism, or Hellenism? They were tendencies of art which brought to the surface that unconscious element of



which the contemporary mental atmosphere had most need. The artist as educator of his time—much could be said about that to-day.

People and times, like individual men, have their peculiar tendencies or attitudes. The very word 'attitude' betrays the necessary one-sidedness that every definite tendency postulates. Where there is direction there must also be exclusion. But exclusion means that certain definite psychic elements that could participate in life are denied their right to live through incompatibility with the general attitude. The normal man can endure the general tendency without much injury. But the man who takes to the by-streets and alley-ways because, unlike the normal man, he cannot endure the broad high-way, will be the first to discover those elements that lie apart from the main streets, and that await a new participation in life.

The artist's relative lack of adaptation becomes his real advantage; for it enables him to keep aloof from the high-ways, the better to follow his own yearning and to find those things of which the others are deprived without noticing it. Thus, as in the case of the single individual whose one-sided conscious attitude is corrected by unconscious reactions towards self-regulation, art also represents a process of mental self-regulation in the life of nations and epochs.

I am aware that I have only been able to give certain intuitive perceptions, and these only in the barest outlines. But I may perhaps hope that what I have been obliged to omit, namely, the concrete application to poetic works, has been furnished by your own thoughts, thus giving flesh and blood to my abstract intellectual frame.

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF IN SPIRITS

IF we look back into the past of mankind, we find—among many other religious convictions—a universally spread belief in the existence of phantoms or ethereal beings dwelling in the neighbourhood of men, and influencing them invisibly, yet very powerfully. These beings are frequently supposed to be the spirits, or souls, of the dead. This belief is to be met with among highly civilized men, as well as among Australian negroes who are still living at the level of the palæolithic age. Among Western peoples, however, belief in the influence of spirits has been counteracted by the development of natural science and intellectual criticism during the last 150 years; so that among educated people of to-day it has been almost completely suppressed, and the same thing applies to other extra-scientific convictions.

But just as these latter beliefs still exist among the masses, belief in spirits also is far from being entirely extinguished. The 'haunted house', for instance, has not yet disappeared from the most reasonable or the most organized cities, nor has the peasant yet ceased to believe in the bewitching of his cattle. On the contrary, a recrudescence of belief in spirits has occurred even in an age of materialism, and this is the inevitable consequence of intellectual enlightenment. It is not a recrudescence of obscure superstitions, but of an interest that is essentially scientific, an intense desire to direct the searchlight of truth on to the dark chaos of facts. The illustrious names of Myers, Sidgwick, Gurney, Wallace Crookes, Zoellner and many other prominent men, are associated with the rebirth and the rehabilitation of the ancient belief in spirits. Even if the real nature of the observed facts

be disputed, even if the explorers may be accused of errors, and sometimes of self-deception, there still belongs to them the immortal merit of having thrown the whole of their authority on to the side of non-material facts, regardless of public disapproval. They faced academic prejudices, and did not shrink from the cheap derision of their contemporaries; even at a time when the intellect of the educated classes was spellbound by the new dogma of materialism they drew public attention to phenomena of an irrational nature that were entirely opposed to the accepted convictions of their time.

These men typify the reaction of the human mind against the senseless and desolating materialistic view. Considered from the standpoint of history it is not to be wondered at that so-called 'spiritual' phenomena should be used as an effective defence against the unenlightened evidence of the senses; because belief in spirits has always been a defence against mere sensationalism. This is the case with the primitive man, whose complete dependence upon nature makes concrete circumstance of the greatest importance for him. One must remember the manifold distresses and needs of his life, placed amongst hostile neighbours and dangerous animals, and often harassed by the pitiless forces of nature. His keen senses, his cupidity, his deficient self-control, all expose him to unfavourable experiences. Hence he is always in danger of losing that mysterious inner power which alone makes man a man. But his belief in spirits, or rather in the spiritual, constantly releases him from the fetters of pure concretism in which his senses would hold him. There is, therefore, an irrational function that forces on him the certainty of spiritual reality, the laws and demands of which are to be followed as carefully and as conscientiously as those which physical nature enforces upon him. Primitive man really lives in two worlds. This concrete world is for him at the same time a spiritual world. The objective world is undeniable, and for him the spiritual world has an equally positive existence. This is not

only his opinion, but rather a naïve perception of spiritual phenomena projected from his unconscious on to the concrete object. Wherever such naïvety is lost through the disillusioning touch of contact with Western civilization and its disastrous 'enlightenment', then also his feelings of awe in relation to the spiritual law disappear, and he accordingly degenerates. Even Christianity cannot save him from degeneration; because in order to have good effects, such a highly developed religion demands a highly differentiated psyche.

Thus 'spiritual' phenomena are for the primitive an immediate experience of an ideal or spiritual reality.

If it be asked, what are primitive 'spirit' phenomena, we may answer that the seeing of apparitions is the most frequent phenomenon. It is generally assumed that this seeing of apparitions is commoner among primitives than among civilized people, and that it is due to nothing but superstition. It is generally held that educated people do not have such visions, unless they are ill. It is quite certain that civilized man makes use of the hypothesis of 'spirits' incomparably less frequently and comprehensively than the primitive. In my view, however, and according to my experience as a physician, the psychological phenomenon which the primitive attributes to a spirit is quite as common among civilized men. The only difference is that where a primitive speaks of ghosts, the European speaks of dreams and phantasies and neurotic symptoms, and attributes less importance to them than the primitive does. He gives them too little weight, and because of this undervaluation the European regards many things as morbid which, under another aspect, would be highly interesting and important. Therefore, owing to this constant rationalization, what are living entities for the primitive become for him morbid symptoms. Men's perceptions are the same as they always were, but we interpret them in a different way, and the modern way enfeebles them, making an incomprehensible illness of them. But the psychological fact is not in itself invalidated by a modern inter-

pretation. . If, indeed, a highly civilized and enlightened European is obliged to live among primitive conditions for a long time it often happens that he has some unusual experiences that defy a rationalistic interpretation.

One of the essential determinants of a belief in spirits is the dream. Persons appear in most dreams, and the primitive believes them to be spirits or souls. The dream has for him an incomparably higher value than it has for a civilized man. He is usually a good deal taken up with his dreams ; he talks much about them and attributes an extraordinary importance to them. When he talks of his dreams he is frequently unable to discriminate between them and actual facts. They are quite real to him. A competent explorer of primitive psychology says : '*Le rêve est le vrai dieu des primitifs.*' To the civilized man dreams as a rule appear valueless ; yet there are some individuals who attribute a high importance to them, at least to particularly weird or impressive dreams. Such impressive dreams make one understand why the primitive should conceive them as inspirations. It is of the essence of an inspiration that there must be something that inspires, viz. a spirit or a ghost, although the modern mind would not draw such a conclusion. The appearance of the dead in a dream is a particularly strong argument for the primitive belief in spirits.

Further grounds for belief in spirits are found in psychogenetic nervous diseases, especially those of a hysterical character, which are not rare among primitives. As such troubles arise out of psychological conflicts, mostly of an unconscious order, they appear to the naive mentality as though caused by certain persons, living or dead, who are in some way connected with the individual's conflict. If the person is dead, the assumption that his spirit is persecuting the living is easily arrived at. As the origin of pathogenetic conflicts frequently goes back to early childhood and is connected with memories of the parents, it naturally follows that the spirits of relatives are particularly revered or feared

by primitives ; hence ancestor worship is universally spread. Worship of the dead is performed in the first place as a protection against their malevolence. Experience in the psychological treatment of nervous patients shows again and again the depth and extent of the parental influence, even when the parents have been long dead. The psychological after-effects of the parents are so important for an individual's fate that one can easily understand the significance of ancestor worship.

Mental diseases have also great influence in causing belief in spirits, particularly those which are accompanied by hallucinations, either of a delirious or katatonic character, belonging chiefly to the *dementia præcox* class, which is the commonest form of mental disorder. Amongst all peoples and in all ages insane persons have been regarded as possessed by evil spirits, and this belief is supported by the patients' hallucinations. The patients are tormented less by their visions than by the voices they hear. The voices are often those of relatives, or at least of people connected with the patient's psychological conflicts. It is also fairly common to hear the voice of God or of the devil. It appears, of course, to the naïve mentality that such voices come from spirits.

When speaking of belief in the spirits of the dead, reference must also be made to belief in the souls of the living, the latter being a correlate of the former. In the primitive conviction the ghost is generally the spirit of a dead person, hence it must before have been the soul of a living person. This at least is held wherever the belief prevails that man has only one soul. But man is frequently supposed to have two or more souls, one of which is more or less independent and relatively immortal. In such a case the 'spirit' of the dead is only one of the several 'souls' of the living. Hence it is only a part of the psyche—a psychic fragment, so to speak. Thus, belief in souls is an almost necessary condition of belief in spirits, at least so far as the spirits of the dead are concerned.

The primitive is also convinced that there are not only these spirits of the dead, but also elementary demons, who are not believed ever to have been human souls, *i.e.* psychic fragments.

Before discussing the grounds for belief in souls I wish to sum up the facts already mentioned. I have pointed out three main sources of the belief in spirits which are accessible to science: *viz.* the seeing of apparitions, the phenomenon of the dream, and the pathological disorders of the psyche.

The commonest of these grounds of belief is the dream. What does modern science know of the dream? A dream is a psychological product originating in the sleeping state without conscious motivation. In a dream consciousness is neither fully awake nor fully extinguished; there is still a small remnant of consciousness. There is, for instance, nearly always some consciousness of the ego, but rarely of the ego as it appears to the consciousness of waking life. It is rather a limited ego, sometimes peculiarly transformed or distorted. The dream-ego is, as a rule, a mere fragment of the conscious ego. The ego is a psychic complex of a particularly 'solid' kind. As sleep is seldom dreamless, we may assume that the complex of the ego rarely ceases to be active. Its activity is only restricted by sleep. The psychic contents of the dream appear to the ego very like those external phenomena which appear to it in the waking state. Hence it happens that we find ourselves in situations like those in real life, but rarely exercise thought or reason about them. As in our waking state things and human beings enter our field of vision, so in the dream, psychic contents, images of different kinds enter the field of consciousness of the dream-ego. We do not feel as if we were producing the dreams, but rather as if they came to us. They do not submit to our direction, but obey their own laws. Obviously they are autonomous complexes, which form themselves by their own methods. Their motivation is unconscious. We may therefore say that they come from the unconscious. Thus, we must admit the existence of

independent psychic complexes, escaping the control of our consciousness and appearing and disappearing according to their own laws. From our waking experience we are convinced that we produce our thoughts and that we can produce them when we wish. We also think we know where our thoughts come from, and why, and to what end we have them. If it should happen that a thought takes possession of us against our will, or if it unexpectedly disappears against our will, we feel as if something exceptional or morbid had happened. It seems as if the difference between the waking and the sleeping states were extraordinary. In the waking state the psyche is apparently controlled by our conscious motivation ; but in the sleeping state it seems to produce strange and incomprehensible ideas which force themselves upon us, sometimes quite against our intention.

The vision comes in much the same way as a dream, only in the waking state. It enters consciousness along with the perception of real objects, since it is an irruption of unconscious ideas into the continuity of consciousness.

The same phenomenon takes place in mental disease. The ear does not only seem to perceive the vibrations of sound ; it also seems to hear thoughts which are not the immediate contents of the conscious mind.<sup>1</sup> Besides the judgments made by intellect and feeling, opinions and convictions arise, as though forcing themselves upon the individual. These are apparently based upon perceptions ; but in reality they are derived from unconscious ideas. They are termed delusions.

These types of phenomena—dreams, waking visions and mental disturbances—depend on the fact that the psyche is not an indivisible unity, but a more or less divided totality. Although the separate parts are connected with each other, they are none the less relatively independent of each other. This independence can be of such a degree that certain of the

<sup>1</sup> There are also some exceptional cases where the voices repeat aloud the conscious thoughts of the individual.



psychic elements are rarely, and perhaps never, associated with the ego. I have called these elements autonomous complexes, and I founded my theory of complexes upon their empirical reality. According to this theory the ego-complex forms the centre of our individuality. But the ego-complex is only one among several complexes. The others are more or less associated with the ego-complex, and thus far they are conscious. But they can also exist for some time without being associated with the ego-complex.

A striking and well-known example of this is the conversion of St. Paul. Although the actual moment of a conversion often seems quite sudden and unexpected, yet we know from experience that such a fundamental occurrence always has a long period of unconscious incubation. It is only when the preparation is complete, that is to say, when the individual is ready to be converted, that the new view breaks forth with great emotion. St. Paul had already been a Christian for a long time, only unconsciously; hence his fanatical resistance to the Christians, because fanaticism is only found in individuals who are compensating secret doubts. The incident of the voice speaking to him from Heaven on his way to Damascus marks the moment when the unconscious complex of Christianity broke through into consciousness. That the auditory phenomenon should represent Christ is explained by the already existing Christian complex in the unconscious. The complex, being unconscious, was projected by St. Paul upon the external world as if it did not belong to him. Unable to conceive of himself as a Christian on account of his resistance to Christ, he became blind, and could only regain his sight through submitting to a Christian, that is to say, through his complete submission to Christianity. Psychogenetic blindness is, according to my experience, always due to an unwillingness to see, *i.e.* to understand and to realize something that is incompatible with the conscious attitude. This was obviously the case with St. Paul. His unwillingness to see corresponds with his fanatical resistance to Christianity.

This resistance was never wholly extinguished, a fact of which we have proof in the epistles. It broke out occasionally in the form of fits. It is certainly a great mistake to call his fits epileptic. There is no trace of epilepsy in him, on the contrary, in his epistles St. Paul himself gives hints enough as to the real nature of his illness. They are clearly psychogenetic fits, which actually mean a return of the old Saul complex, repressed through conversion, in the same way as there had previously been a repression of the complex of Christianity.

Science does not, in a way that satisfies our intellectual conscience, allow us to explain the case of St. Paul on supernatural grounds. We should be compelled to do the same with many similar cases within our medical experience, which would lead to conclusions antagonistic both to our reason and our feeling.

Autonomous complexes appear in dreams and visions, in pathological hallucinations and delusions. Being strange to the ego they always appear as if externalized. In dreams they are often represented as other people, in visions they are visibly projected into space, and the same applies to the voices of the insane in so far as they are not ascribed to persons in the patients' surroundings. Ideas of persecution are very often associated with persons to whom the patient attributes the qualities of certain of his unconscious complexes. The patient feels these persons to be hostile because his ego is hostile to the unconscious complex, just as Saul resented the complex of Christianity which he could not acknowledge. He persecuted the Christians as representatives of his unconscious complex.

'Spirits,' viewed from this standpoint, are unconscious, autonomous complexes that appear as projections because they are not associated with the ego.

I mentioned before that belief in the souls of the living was a logical correlate of belief in the spirits of the dead. Whilst spirits are felt to be strange and incompatible with

the ego, souls seem to belong to it. The primitive feels the proximity or the influence of a spirit as something disagreeable, or dangerous, or uncanny, and he is much easier in his mind when the spirit is banished. It is otherwise with the loss of a soul; for this feels to him like an illness, and he may also attribute physical disease to the loss of a soul. Children may not be beaten, because their souls, if outraged, might withdraw from them. So the soul is something that seems normally to belong to a man, but the spirits seem to be something that normally should not be near him. He avoids visiting 'haunted' places and touching things supposed to be inhabited by spirits, unless he is doing so for purposes of magic.

The plurality of souls is a plurality of relatively autonomous complexes like the plurality of spirits. The soul-complexes seem to belong to the ego and the loss of them appears morbid; on the contrary, the spirit-complexes ought to be separate from the ego. Their association with it means illness, and their dissociation from it means healing. Thus primitive pathology knows two causes of illness, namely, the loss of a soul and the possession by a spirit. According to these primitive beliefs we may postulate the existence of certain unconscious complexes which normally belong to the ego, and certain others which normally do not belong to it, *i.e.* which ought to remain wholly unconscious. The former are the soul-complexes, the latter the spirit-complexes.

This discrimination, current among primitives, corresponds exactly to my theory of the unconscious. According to my view, the unconscious is divided into two spheres. One of these is what I call the personal unconscious. It includes all those psychic contents which are forgotten during the course of life. Their traces still exist in the unconscious, even if their conscious reproduction has become impossible. Moreover, the personal unconscious contains all those subliminal impressions or perceptions which have too little energy to reach consciousness. The unconscious combina-

tions of representations also belong here, in so far as they are too feeble and indistinct to become conscious. Finally, the personal unconscious includes all psychic contents that are incompatible with the conscious attitude. As a rule this involves a whole group of psychic contents. These contents appear to be inadmissible chiefly on account of their moral, æsthetic, or intellectual deficiency. A man cannot always feel and think in a beautiful, good, and true way, and in trying to keep up an ideal attitude everything inconvenient is automatically repressed. If one function, for instance thought, is especially developed, thus dominating the conscious, then the function of feeling is naturally repressed and falls accordingly into the unconscious.

The other part of the unconscious is the super-personal or collective unconscious. The contents of the collective unconscious are not personal but collective; that is, they do not appertain to one individual alone, but at least to a group, and as a rule to a whole nation, and finally to the whole of mankind. The contents of the collective unconscious are not acquired during the life of an individual; they are inherited instinctual forms, primordial forms of apprehension, the so-called archetypes or basic images. Although the child possesses no congenital representations, it possesses nevertheless a highly developed brain with possibilities of functioning in a definite way. The brain is an ancestral inheritance. It is the organic result of the psychic and nervous functioning of the whole human ancestry. Thus the child brings with him an organ ready to function in the same way that it has functioned throughout the history of man. There in the brain are the pre-formed instincts, and also the primordial types or images, the foundations upon which mankind has always formed his thought and feeling, which includes the whole wealth of mythological motives. It is, of course, not easy to prove the existence of the collective unconscious in a normal man, but there are obvious traces of mythological images, at least

in his dreams. The existence of a collective unconscious is more easily disclosed in certain cases of mental derangement especially in *dementia præcox*. There one sometimes meets with an astonishing development of mythological imagery. Certain patients develop symbolical ideas which can never be accounted for by the experience of their individual life, but only by the history of the human mind. A sort of primitive mythological thinking is revealed which, unlike normal thinking that makes use of personal experience, produces its own mythological forms.

The personal unconscious contains complexes that belong to the individual, and that form an indispensable part of his psychic life. When any complexes which ought to be associated with the ego become unconscious, either by repression, or by a marked diminution of potential energy, the individual has a feeling of loss. When a lost complex becomes conscious again, as, for instance, by psychotherapeutic measures, he experiences an increase of psychic energy. The cure of neurosis is often effected in this way.

When, on the contrary, a complex of the collective unconscious, becomes associated with the ego, the individual is impressed by the strangeness of these contents. They are felt to be uncanny, supernatural, and often dangerous. They may sometimes be felt as helpful interventions of supernatural powers, but more often as injurious influences of a morbid nature; and these result in actual physical illness, or psychic alienation from normal life. An individual's consciousness is always altered by the association of contents which ought normally to remain unconscious. If the physician succeeds in removing such a morbid association from consciousness, the patient feels as though relieved of a burden. The sudden intrusion of such alien contents often takes place in the early stages of *dementia præcox*. Patients encounter queer thoughts, the world seems changed, people appear to have strange and distorted faces, etc.

While the contents of the personal unconscious are felt

to belong to one's own psyche, the contents of the collective unconscious appear to be strange to one's own psyche, exactly as though they came from outside. The reintegration of a personal complex has the effect of release and often of healing; whereas the invasion of a complex of the collective unconscious is a disagreeable and even dangerous phenomenon. It appears to have a supernatural quality; in other words, it is accompanied by a feeling of awe.

The parallelism of this theory with the primitive belief in souls and spirits is clear. Souls correspond to the complexes of the personal unconscious, and spirits to those of the collective unconscious. The scientific standpoint merely renders emotion into prose when it calls the awful and revered beings that inhabit the shadows of the primeval forests 'psychological complexes'. But if we consider the extraordinary rôle played by the belief in souls and spirits in the history of mankind, we cannot be content with the mere statement of the existence of such complexes; we must study the nature of these complexes further.

The existence of complexes is easily demonstrated by means of the association experiment. This experiment consists in a very simple procedure: the experimenter calls out a word to the test-person, and the test-person immediately replies with the next association that comes into his mind. The reaction-time, *i.e.* the lapse of time between the stimulus word and the reply, is measured by a stop-watch. One would expect all simple words to be followed by an equally short reaction-time, and all difficult or rare words to cause a prolonged reaction-time. But as a matter of fact the reaction-times differ on this account far less than from other important reasons. Some very long reaction-times are produced unexpectedly by very simple stimulus words, and in the same case there may be no delay in replying to quite unusual stimulus words. Through careful examination of the test-person's individual psychology, I discovered that a prolongation of the reaction-time is usually due to interference by

an emotion connected either with the stimulus word or with the reply. The emotion always depends upon the fact that the stimulus word has struck a complex. Prolongation of the reaction-time is not the only symptom that discloses the existence of a complex. There are many others which I cannot now enumerate.

The complexes revealed by means of the association experiment usually concern things which the test-person would prefer to keep secret ; often things of a painful nature, of whose very existence he is unconscious. When a stimulus word strikes a complex, the test-person may have no associations at all, or a too abundant supply of them, so that choice is momentarily impossible. Hence we see that disturbed reactions are indicated in many ways other than by a prolongation of time. Moreover, if, having completed the series of tests, we ask the test-person to repeat the answers he gave, we find that the normal reactions are remembered, while those connected with the complex are easily forgotten.

The properties of the autonomous complex can be summed up from these facts. The complex creates a disturbance of mental reaction ; it delays or distorts the reply ; it produces an inconvenient reaction, or it suppresses the memory of the former reply. It interferes with the conscious and interrupts its intentions ; therefore we call it autonomous. When we try the experiment on a neurotic or insane person, we discover that the complexes disturbing the reactions belong in fact to the main content of the psychic derangement. These complexes not only disturb the experimental reactions, but are also determinants of the morbid symptoms. I have examined cases where the test-person replied to specific stimulus words with incoherent and apparently meaningless words, breaking out against his conscious intention, as though a strange being had spoken through him. These words belong to the unconscious complex. Complexes when excited by external stimuli can produce sudden confusion, or violent emotion, depression, anxiety-states, and all sorts

of mental disturbances. Complexes behave just like independent beings, so that the primitive theory of spirits seems an excellent formulation for them.

We may carry this parallel further. Certain complexes arise on account of painful experiences in a person's life, causing psychic wounds that may not heal for years. It often happens that a painful experience suppresses certain vital qualities in an individual. Then a personal unconscious complex is originated. The primitive might appropriately regard this as the loss of a soul, for indeed a certain part of the psyche has disappeared. A great number of complexes arise in this way.

But there is another no less important source of complexes ; but while the one just described is easily comprehensible, since it concerns the conscious life, the other is obscure and difficult to understand, since it has to do with perceptions and impressions of the collective unconscious. Usually the individual does not realize that such perceptions are derived from the unconscious ; rather, it seems to him that they are due to external and concrete facts. He thus begins to rationalize these internal impressions of an unknown nature. But they are really irrational and ideational contents of his own mind, of which he has never before been conscious. They are not due to any of his external experiences. Primitive language expresses such facts not inaptly when it describes them as invisible ghosts approaching man from the other side, namely, from the world of shadows. It seems to me that impressions of this kind arise when grave external occurrences shake the individual to his very foundations, so that his whole previous attitude breaks down, or when certain contents of the collective unconscious obtain such an afflux of energy that they are able to influence the conscious.

This may also take place when the life of a nation or of a large social group undergoes a profound change of a political, social, or religious nature. Such a change involves a transformation of the psychological attitude. Changes



in history are generally attributed to external causes. But I hold the view that the greatest changes in human history are to be traced back to internal causal conditions, and that they are founded upon internal psychological necessity. For it often seems that external conditions serve merely as occasions on which a new attitude long in preparation becomes manifest. The development of the Christian era is an example of this. Political, social, and religious conditions influence the unconscious, since all the factors which are suppressed in the conscious religious or philosophical attitude of human society accumulate in the unconscious. This gradual accumulation means a gradual increase of the energy of the unconscious contents. Certain individuals gifted with particularly refined intuition become aware of the change going on in the collective unconscious, and sometimes even succeed in translating their perceptions of it into communicable ideas. The new ideas spread more or less rapidly in accordance with the state of readiness in the unconscious of other people. In proportion to the more or less universal unconscious readiness, people are ready to accept new ideas, or else to show particular resistance to them. New ideas are not only the enemies of old ones; they also appear often in an extremely unacceptable form.

Whenever any contents of the collective unconscious become animated, the conscious feels disturbed, more often apparently, in a disagreeable than in an agreeable way. This may be due to the fact that disagreeable experiences always make a greater impression than agreeable ones. In any case animation of the collective unconscious creates a certain confusion in the conscious. If this animation is due to a complete breakdown of all conscious hopes and expectations, the danger arises that the unconscious may take the place of conscious reality. Such a state is morbid. We actually see something of this kind in the present Russian and German mentality. An outbreak of violent desires and impossible phantasies among the lower strata of the

population is analogous to an outburst from the lower strata of the unconscious in an individual. In the case of Russia and Germany what we see is the visible and concrete collapse of two great nations.<sup>1</sup>

But animation of the unconscious may begin from within, in the absence of a definite external catastrophe. In such a case it is due to the gradual development of a new psychological attitude in the depths of a nation's mentality. Thus, in an epoch of worldliness and materialism an idealistic attitude may slowly develop in the unconscious. For example, the evolution of Christianity was not due to the collapse of the Roman Empire. It originated at the time of the *Pax Romana*, during the epoch of the Empire's greatest splendour and power. Such a new era is conditioned by developments that are taking place in almost everybody, that is, by a process in the collective unconscious. In everybody at such a time, unconscious energies disturb the conscious; but the individual in such a case does not consider himself ill, because he is not different from his fellow beings. He simply takes part in a collective transformation, whose origins and aims remain unconscious. The individual may be unhappy and distressed, and probably has genuine reasons for his sadness; for social and political conditions will suffer greatly from the fundamental changes going on. He will not, however, have the typically morbid feeling of one whose unconscious becomes disturbed on account of painful experiences of an individual nature.

The animation of the collective unconscious does not always create disturbances, for it may also work beneficially; but it always carries with it something of a supernatural character. Owing to this, the effect of the collective unconscious is always beyond the grasp of man. At one time it helps, at another time it destroys him. It is never to be relied upon. Therefore primitive man is especially subject to the fetters of the unconscious. Yet among primitive

<sup>1</sup> This paper was written in the year 1919.—[Ed.]

civilizations we find many attempts to conjure the supernatural powers and influences of the unconscious. Amongst primitives there are peculiarly intuitive individuals, sometimes of superior intelligence, namely, sorcerers. They are supposed to know how to handle demons. In history the primitive tribal sorcerer is the man who originates psychological methods and teachings which aim at the domination of the supernatural. The rites and legends he invents represent qualities of the unconscious as he conceives of them. Thus he translates some inner experiences into human language, and creates the foundations of the history of the human mind. Our intellect is born from mythology and mythology is nothing but a translation of inner experience into the language of pictures. Thus spirits are transformed into mind.

A well-known instance of the spirit translated into language and teaching is the miracle of Pentecost. To the Gentiles the apostles seemed to be in a state of mental confusion, because they were under the influence of the spirit, viz. a phenomenon of the collective unconscious. But from this state they derived the words, the images, and the power to teach the world. Through the translation of unconscious contents into comprehensible language, the power of the spirit, in other words, the energy of the unconscious complex becomes transformed into a powerful idea that enables the human mind to free itself from the fetters of dæmonic influences.

As souls are parts of the individual psyche, so spirits are parts of the collective psyche. Souls are complexes split off from and lost to the conscious; spirits are complexes of the collective unconscious which replace a lost adaptation to reality, or which compensate for the inadequacies of large groups of men.

What are regarded as spirits of the dead are produced psychologically in the following way: When an individual dies, the psychological attachment of his relatives' feelings

is cut off. The attachment represents the application of a certain quantity of psychic energy. When the application of this energy becomes impossible through the death of its object, there remains only the idea or image of the dead. The energy is now applied to this image, and when the attachment has been intense, the image is vividly animated and forms a spirit. As the spirit takes away a certain amount of energy from real life it may be injurious. Primitives, therefore, frequently say that when a man dies he changes his character in an unfavourable way, and seeks to do as much damage as he can to the living. Obviously this opinion originates in the fact that a persistent attachment to a dead person makes life seem less worth living, and consequently, less worthy of effort.

I have given you an outline of a conception of the spirit problem from the view-point of modern psychology. I have confined myself to the limits of science and have purposely avoided the question whether spirits are real or concrete objects, and whether their independent existence can be proved concretely. I avoid this question not because I regard it as futile, but because I am not competent to discuss it from a scientific standpoint, having no evidence in my possession. I think you are as conscious as I am of the fact that it is most difficult to find reliable evidence for the independent and objective reality of a spirit. The usual spiritistic proofs offered are as a rule nothing but psychological products, dependent upon the unconscious of the percipient. Even the so-called physical effects always depend upon the coöperation of the percipient and seem to be exteriorized effects of unconscious complexes. I am personally convinced of the reality of such facts, but I cannot accept them as evidence for the independent reality of spirits.

These phenomena form a special chapter in psychology. Science must, I think, confine itself to the limits of cognition, for science is essentially intellect; it means the application of one undoubted psychological function, namely, thought.

But intellect is only one among several psychological functions, and therefore does not suffice to give a complete picture of the world. Feeling, for instance, which is another psychological function, sometimes arrives at different conclusions from those of the intellect, and we cannot always prove that the conclusions of feeling are necessarily inferior to those of the intellect. We have also subliminal perceptions which are not at the disposal of the intellect, and which, therefore, are missing in a purely intellectual picture of the world. So we must admit that our intellectual conceptions are deficient, so far as a complete comprehension of the world is concerned. But when we make use of the intellect, as in science, we have to adapt ourselves to the demands of intellectual criticism, and we must limit ourselves to the scientific hypothesis so long as there is no reliable evidence against its validity.

## INSTINCT AND THE UNCONSCIOUS<sup>1</sup>

THE theme of this Symposium concerns a problem that is important from the biological as well as from the psychological and philosophical standpoints. If we are to discuss the connexion between instinct and the unconscious it is indispensable to use clearly defined terms. Unfortunately the terms 'instinct' and 'unconscious' belong to those more or less general conceptions, which play an important rôle in different spheres of scientific thought. While the concept of the unconscious chiefly concerns the widely separated faculties of medicine and philosophy, the concept of instinct is equally important in the spheres of biological, medical, psychological, philosophical, and sociological thinking. On account of the wide use of the concept of instinct it is easily intelligible that it has undergone many different interpretations.

As regards the definition of instinct, I recognize that it is characterized by the 'all-or-none' reaction, as maintained by Dr. Rivers, and it seems to me that this peculiarity of instinctive activity must be of great importance for the psychological side of the problem. Naturally, I must confine myself to the psychological aspect of the problem, because I do not feel competent to treat the question of instinct from its biological aspect. But when I attempt to define psychologically the nature of instinctive action, I find it impossible to rely solely on Dr. Rivers's criterion of the 'all-or-none' reaction for the following reason: Dr. Rivers defines the 'all-or-none' reaction as a reaction that is without any

<sup>1</sup> The second contribution, by Dr. C. S. Myers, to this Symposium had not reached me when I wrote mine.

gradation of intensity in respect of the circumstances which call it forth. It is a reaction that takes place with its own intensity under all conditions, and without any proportion to the intensity or nature of the stimulus. But when we examine conscious processes to see whether there are any which likewise manifest an intensity which is inappropriate to the intensity of the stimulus, we easily find a great number of them in everybody: as, for instance, disproportionate emotions and impressions, exaggerated planning and acting, and so on. It seems to be impossible to attribute all these processes to instinct. Therefore it seems necessary to use some other criterion for our psychological definition.

Colloquial language frequently makes use of the word 'instinct'. We speak of 'instinctive' actions, and by this we refer to an action the motive and aim of which are not fully conscious, and which has been excited by a more or less obscure internal necessity. This peculiarity of instinctive activity was pointed out by Reid, who says, "By instinct, I mean a natural impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation and without any conception of what we do."<sup>1</sup> Thus instinctive action is characterized by a certain unconsciousness of the psychological motive behind it, in opposition to the strictly conscious processes that are distinguished by the conscious continuity of their motives. Instinctive activity appears to be a more or less abrupt psychic experience, a sort of intrusion into the continuity of conscious events. On account of this fact we feel instinct as an internal necessity. In the same way Kant defined instinct as an 'internal necessity'.<sup>2</sup> On account of these qualities instinctive activity must be attributed to the realm of unconscious processes, which are accessible to conscious apperception through their results only. But were we to be content with such a definition of instinct, we should soon discover its insufficiency. When we came

<sup>1</sup> *On the active Powers of the Mind*, iii, 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Anthropologie*, i, § 78.

to examine the totality of unconscious processes, we should find it impossible to conceive of them all as instincts, although colloquial language does not differentiate them. If you suddenly meet a poisonous snake and are extremely frightened, then you rightly designate such an impulse instinctive, because there is no difference between your impulse and the instinctive fear of snakes in monkeys. It is just the uniformity and regularity of the phenomenon, which is the most characteristic peculiarity of instinctive action. As Lloyd Morgan justly remarks, it would be as uninteresting to bet on the occurrence of an instinctive reaction as on the rising of the sun to-morrow.

But on the other hand, we must not forget that psychological phenomena are not infrequently met with that are very similar to instinctive activities, although it is impossible to class them as such. It may happen that someone is regularly seized with a terrible fright whenever he meets a harmless hen. Although the mechanism of fright in this case is an unconscious impulse similar to an instinctive impulse, we still have to draw a sharp line between the two kinds of impulse for scientific reasons. In the former case the fear of snakes is a teleological instinct of general occurrence. But the latter case is, when habitual, a 'phobia' and not an instinct, on account of its purely individual occurrence. Whereas instinct is an inherited quality, a phobia is an individual acquisition, even though it may also be the outcome of inherited disposition. There are innumerable unconscious necessities of a similar kind, for instance, thought obsessions, musical obsessions, sudden moods and phantasies, compulsive emotions and tendencies, depression, and feelings of anxiety. These symptoms are met with not only in abnormal persons, but also in so-called normal individuals. In so far as these phenomena occur individually only, and in so far as they are neither uniform nor regular, they must be distinguished from instinctive processes, despite the fact that their psychological mechanism is almost identical



with that of instinct. They share the character of the 'all-or-none' reaction, a fact easy to observe in pathological cases. There are many such cases in which a stimulus excites a wholly disproportionate reaction, comparable to a true instinct.

But all these reactions have to be clearly distinguished from instinct. Only those processes can be called instinctive which are inherited and unconscious, uniformly and regularly occurring everywhere. At the same time, they must show the mark of compelling necessity, comparable to the character of a reflex. Instinctive activity is fundamentally distinguished from a mere sensori-motor reflex by its complicated nature only. William James calls an instinct "a mere excito-motor impulse, due to the pre-existence of a certain 'reflex-arc' in the nerve-centres".<sup>1</sup> Instincts have their unconscious motives, their uniformity and regularity in common with the reflexes.

The question of the origin or primordial acquisition of instinct is a most intricate one. The statement that instincts are always inherited does not explain their origin. It only puts back the problem to our ancestors. The view is widely held that instincts originated from individual and general volitional actions frequently repeated, and that they thus became automatic. This explanation is plausible only in so far as we are able to recognize how certain activities, laboriously acquired, have gradually become automatic through frequent practice. But if we consider some of the most marvellous instincts in certain animals, we must confess that we can hardly imagine how such instincts could have been acquired by trying, learning, and repeating. There are cases where it is almost inconceivable how learning and practice could ever have taken place. Let us take as an example the instinct of propagation in *Pronuba yuccasella*, the Yucca-moth. Each flower of the Yucca plant opens for one night only. The moth fetches the pollen from one

<sup>1</sup> *Principles of Psychology*, ii, 391.

flower, and kneads it into a little clod. Then the moth carries the pollen to another flower, where it cuts open the pistil, lays its eggs between the ovules of the plant and then, climbing to the top of the pistil, stuffs the little clod of pollen into the funnel-shaped opening of the pistil. Only once in its life does the moth carry out this complicated action. If the ovary of the plant were not fertilized at the same time the young insects could not develop; nor would the plant itself get fertilized without the help of the moth. In all such cases a possible explanation seems to be, that a moth once discovered the way by mere accident, and that its descendants became influenced during their embryonic state by the special conditions of their surroundings, so that some of them, at least, acquired an instinct to repeat their mother's accidental experience.

But such an explanation is far from being satisfactory. Bergson's philosophy suggests another way of explanation, where the factor of 'intuition' comes in. Intuition, as a psychological function, is also an unconscious process. Just as instinct is the intrusion of an unconsciously motivated impulse into conscious action, so intuition is the intrusion of an unconscious content, or 'image' into conscious apprehension. Intuition is a process of unconscious perception, either of subjective unconscious contents, or of objective but subliminal facts. Thus colloquial language speaks of intuition as instinctive apprehension (*Erfassung*). The mechanism of intuition is analogous to that of instinct, with this difference that whereas instinct means a teleological impulse towards a highly complicated action, intuition means an unconscious teleological apprehension of a highly complicated situation. In a way intuition is a counterpart of instinct, not more and not less incomprehensible and astounding than instinct itself. But we must never forget that things we call complicated or even miraculous are only so for our human mind, whereas for nature they are just simple and by no means miraculous. We always have a

tendency to project into things the difficulties of our understanding and to call them complicated, while in reality they are very simple and do not partake of our intellectual difficulties. Intellect is not always an apt instrument; it is only one of several faculties of the human mind.

A discussion of the problem of instinct without considering the concept of the unconscious would be incomplete, because instinctive reaction cannot be conceived unless it is understood as a psychic but unconscious process. Thus the concept of the unconscious becomes an integral part of the instinct-problem.

I define the unconscious as the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of consciousness. Instead of being called 'unconscious' those phenomena might equally well be called 'subliminal'. The term 'subliminal' presupposes the hypothesis that each psychic content must possess a certain energetic value in order that it may become conscious. In proportion as the energetic value of a conscious content decreases, the more easily the content disappears below the threshold of consciousness. From this it follows that the unconscious is the receptacle of all lost memories, and of all contents that are as yet too feeble to become conscious. New products originate from the association and combination of unconscious contents; dreams are the commonest instances of such products. In addition to the lost memories, and the combinations not yet conscious, intentional repressions of painful and incompatible thoughts and feelings form an important part of the unconscious. I designate the totality of the contents just mentioned as the 'personal unconscious'. It contains the acquisitions of the individual life, in contradistinction to another stratum or form of the unconscious, containing the 'supra-individual' qualities which were not acquired but inherited, as for instance instincts, *i.e.* impulses to actions without conscious motivation. Moreover, in this stratum we discover the pre-existent forms of apprehension, or the congenital

conditions of intuition, viz. the 'archetypes' of apperception, which are the *a priori* determining constituents of all experience. Just as instincts compel man to a conduct of life that is specifically human, so the archetypes or categories *a priori* compel intuition and apprehension to forms specifically human. I propose to designate the sum of such inherited psychic qualities as instincts and archetypes of apprehension by the term 'collective unconscious'. I call it 'collective' because it does not possess individual contents of sporadic occurrence, but qualities of uniform and general occurrence. Clearly instinctive activity is an essentially collective phenomenon of uniform and regular occurrence and has nothing to do with the individual qualities of man. The archetypes of apprehension have the same uniformity and universality as instincts, and therefore equally deserve denomination as collective phenomena.

I am convinced that from the psychological standpoint the problem of instinct cannot be treated without a consideration of the archetype problem, because at bottom it is the same. But I find it somewhat difficult to discuss these questions, as opinions about the rôle of instinct in human psychology differ widely. Thus, William James held the view that man is filled with instincts, while others have restricted the number of instincts to a very few processes only slightly different from reflexes, namely, to certain more or less complicated movements, *e.g.* of suckling, certain particular motor reactions of the arms, legs, and larynx, the use of the right hand, and the formation of vocal sounds. In my opinion such restriction goes too far, but it is in itself quite characteristic of human psychology. Above all we should never forget that, when discussing human instincts, we are speaking of ourselves and, therefore, are doubtless prejudiced.

We are far more capable of observing and judging instincts in animals or in primitive man than in ourselves. This is due to the fact that we are accustomed to criticize our own actions, to discriminate their presumable motives, and to

seek rational explanations for them. But it is not yet sufficiently proven, and it is even quite unlikely that our rational explanations can stand the test. A superhuman intellect is not needed in order to see through the shallowness of certain of our arguments, and to recognize the true motives, namely natural instincts, behind our rationalistic constructions. It is on account of our rational arguments and our artificial reasoning, that it looks to us as though we were not actuated by instinct, but exclusively by conscious and rational motivation. Of course, I do not mean to say that by careful training man has not sometimes succeeded in transforming instincts into volitional actions. There is no doubt that the instincts of civilized man have become considerably modified; but underneath, instinct remains as the motive nucleus. We have doubtless succeeded in wrapping up a great number of instincts in rational motivations and volitional purposes to such an extent that we are now unable to recognize instinct behind so many veils. Moreover, with regard to civilization, it is perhaps not altogether desirable to see too clearly how powerful instinct is, and how thin is the surface-stratum of civilization. We have reason enough to make us believe that the number and intensity of human instincts have decreased. But if we apply the criterion of the 'all-or-none' reaction to our actions we can find numerous instances of excessive and exaggerated reactions. Exaggeration is a peculiarly common human manifestation although everybody carefully tries to explain his reactions by rational motives. There is, of course, no difficulty in finding good arguments, but they never alter the fact that our reaction was exaggerated and out of proportion to the exciting cause. And why does man not do or say, give or take, just as much as is needed, or reasonable, or justifiable in a given situation, but frequently so much more or less? It is because an unconscious impulse is released and carries the action sometimes far beyond the limits of logical motivation and proportion. This phenomenon is so

uniform and so regular that we can only designate it as instinct, though nobody would immediately recognize the instinctive nature of the reaction.

Thus I feel convinced that human actions are influenced by instinct to a far higher degree than is usually admitted. I also believe that the rational motivation of our actions and reactions is an explanation *a posteriori*, rather than a true motivation in the sense of a rational efficient cause. Our judgment in this respect seems to be biased by an instinctive exaggeration of the raticnalistic standpoint. The instinct of rationalism serves the purpose of civilized life. It conceals the impulsive character of our actions by means of logical arguments, and, as pointed out above, it aids in this way the subjection of other instincts to the real or apparent control of consciousness.

Instincts are typical ways of action and reaction, and whenever it is a matter of uniformity and regularly repeated reactions we are witnessing instinct. It is in so far quite indifferent whether there is an association with conscious motivation or not, and it is also indifferent what the momentary individual form of the action is.

Just as it is questionable whether man possesses many instincts or only a few, so it is doubtful—and this is a problem hitherto little discussed—whether he possesses many primordial forms or archetypes of apprehension or not. We meet here with the same difficulty I have already mentioned. We are so accustomed to the use of self-evident concepts, that we have become quite unaware of the extent to which these concepts are founded upon the archetypes of human apprehension. The primordial forms are concealed, like the instincts, by the extraordinary development and differentiation of our apprehension. Just as certain biological views attribute only a few instincts to man, so theories of cognition reduce the archetypes of human apprehension to relatively few and logically limited categories. Plato's philosophy, however, shows a very high valuation

of the archetypes. They are held to be the metaphysical paradigms or models of the real things. Real things are merely imitations of the model ideas. In spite of certain variations, all immediately succeeding philosophy paid a similar regard to the archetypes. Mediæval philosophy, beginning with St. Augustine (from whom I take the term 'archetype') and ending with Malebranche and Bacon, stood on the same ground of conviction. Thus the notion of archetypes, as being natural images engraved on the mind, entered into scholasticism. These images, understood as primordial forms of judgment, were designated 'instincts'.<sup>1</sup> But since Descartes and Malebranche this metaphysical concept of the archetype or idea has continually decreased in importance. It gave place to thought—a psychological factor, an internal condition of cognition, as was clearly formulated by Spinoza: '*Per ideam intelligo mentis conceptum, quem mens format.*' Finally Kant reduced the archetypes to the limited number of the categories. Schopenhauer went still further in simplifying Kant's categories, but on the other hand, he returned in certain respects to the Platonic standpoint.

This sketch is unfortunately too summary, but nevertheless it may serve to indicate that same psychological development which, as pointed out above, has concealed the instincts under the cloak of rational motivations. Here it has transformed the archetypes of apprehension, over-valued before as metaphysical ideas, into logical categories. It is no longer easy to recognize the archetypes under this veil. But the way in which man conceives the world, is still, in spite of manifold variations in detail, as uniform and as regular as his instinctive actions. Just as we have been compelled

<sup>1</sup> Herbert of Cherbury says: "Instinctus naturales sunt actus facultatum illarum a quibus communes illæ notitiæ circa analogiam rerum internam, cuiusmodi sunt, quæ circa causam, medium et finem rerum bonarum, malum, pulchrum, gratum, etc., per se etiam sine discursu conformantur."

to establish the concept of an instinct determining and regulating our conscious action, we must also have recourse to the correlated concept of a factor determining the uniformity and regularity of our apprehension. It is this factor which I term the archetype, the primordial image. The image might be suitably understood as intuition of the instinct in itself, analogous to the conception of consciousness as an internal image of our objective vital processes. Just as our conscious conception determines the form and purpose of our conscious action, so unconscious apprehension determines through the archetype the form and purpose of instinct. Just as we believe instinct to be thoroughly adapted and sometimes incredibly clever, so we have to assume that intuition, to which instinct owes its existence, must be of extraordinary precision.

The criterion of the 'all-or-none' reaction, pointed out by Dr. Rivers, has helped us to discover the activity of instinct everywhere in concrete human psychology. I hope that my concept of the primordial image may perform a similar service when we try to discover the activity of intuition in practical human psychology. It is quite easy to discover intuitional activity in primitive peoples. There we constantly meet with typical images and motives which are the foundations of their mythologies. Those images are autochthonous and of relatively great uniformity, as, for instance, the idea of magic power or magic substance, of spirits and their behaviour, of demons and gods and their legends. We see the perfection of those images and at the same time their envelopment by rational forms, in the great religions of the world. The archetypes appear even in the exact sciences, where they are at the root of indispensable auxiliary concepts, as of the ether, energy, and the atom. In philosophy Bergson affords an example of the revival of a very old image in his conception of the '*durée créatrice*', already met with in Proclus and, in a still more primitive form, in Heraclitus.



Modern analytical psychology has constantly to deal with disturbances of conscious apprehension due to the admixture of archetypes with rational conscious processes, and this occurs in normal persons as well as in pathological states. Just as the admixture of instinctive impulses with conscious apprehension produces exaggeration and distortion of our actions, so the admixture of primordial images with conscious apprehension produces characteristic misconceptions. Such misconceptions depend upon archaic prototypes simultaneously excited. Their admixture causes too strong, or too weak, or in other ways distorted, impressions, and thus leads to the construction of erratic views. Such views again excite typical instincts because of the close association of instincts and archetypes. War psychology, for instance, has produced innumerable examples of archaic instincts and of archaic misconceptions.

Archetypes are typical forms of apprehension ; indeed, wherever we meet with uniformly and regularly recurring ways of apprehension, they are referable as archetypes.

The collective unconscious consists of the sum of the instincts and their correlates, the archetypes. Just as everybody possesses instincts, so he also possesses archetypes. The most striking evidence for the existence of archetypes is seen in mental derangements that are characterized by an intrusion of the 'collective unconscious' into the conscious, as occurs in all paranoiac and hallucinatory psychoses. Here we can easily observe the occurrence of instinctive impulses associated with mythological images. It is impossible to say which is prior—apprehension, or impulse to action. It seems to me as if both belong to the same vital activity, which we are incapable of imagining as single, and, therefore, dissect into two essentially distinct processes.

## THE QUESTION OF THE THERAPEUTIC VALUE OF 'ABREACTION'

IN the discussion of a paper by William Brown concerning *The Revival of Emotional Memories and its Therapeutic Value*, William McDougall, writing in *The British Journal of Psychology (Med. Sect.)*, vol. i, part 1, gave expression to some important considerations that I wish to underline. The war-neuroses with their primarily traumatic ætiology have revived the whole general question of the trauma-theory of neurosis. During the years of peace this theory was rightly kept in the background of scientific discussion, since it is an inadequate conception of neurotic ætiology.

Breuer and Freud were the originators of the theory. Freud, who went on to explore the neuroses, soon adopted a deeper view that took the real neurotic origins more into account. In by far the greater number of ordinary cases there is no question of a traumatic ætiology.

In order to create the impression that the neurosis is derived from a traumatic moment, inessential, secondary occurrences must, for love of the theory, artificially be brought into prominence. As a rule these traumata, when they are not mere artefacts of medical phantasy, or from other reasons dependent upon the compliancy of the patient, are secondary events, consequences of an already existing neurotic attitude. The neurosis is as a rule a morbid, one-sided development of personality, arising from very slender, indeed ultimately invisible, beginnings, which can be followed back, as it were indefinitely, into the earliest years of childhood. An arbitrary judgment could alone decide where such a neurosis really begins.

If its determination were shifted back into the intra-uterine existence, thereby involving the psychical and physical disposition of the parents at the time of pregnancy and conception—a view which in certain cases seems not at all improbable—such a standpoint would, in any case, have more justification than the arbitrary selection of a definite point of neurotic origin in the individual life of the patient.

Clearly, in the handling of such a question, one must never be influenced too much by the surface appearance of the developed symptoms, even when the patient as well as his family synchronizes the beginning of the neurosis with the first manifestations of declared symptoms. A more thorough investigation will almost invariably demonstrate the presence of a morbid tendency of some kind existing long before the appearance of clinical symptoms.

These obvious facts, long familiar to every specialist, pushed the trauma-theory into the background, until as a result of the war a veritable high-tide of traumatic neuroses was produced.

If we discriminate among the number of war neuroses all those numerous cases where a trauma—an undeniably violent shock—impinged upon an established neurotic history, there remain not a few cases where, even if some sort of neurotic disposition might be distinguished, it was so insignificant that without trauma an actual neurosis could hardly have resulted. In these cases the trauma means more than a mere moment of release. It is actually causative in the sense of the *causa efficiens*, especially when one includes the unique psychical atmosphere of the battle-field as an essential factor in the reckoning.

These cases present a new therapeutic problem which seems to justify a harking-back to the original Breuer-Freud method, just as much as to the theory; for the trauma is concerned either with a single, definite, and violent impact, or with a complex of ideas and emotions which can be directly compared with a psychic wound. Everything that touches

this complex, however slightly, excites a violent reaction, an actual emotional explosion. One can easily, therefore, arrive at the idea of representing the trauma as a complex with a high emotional charge and, because at first glance this enormously effective charge seems to be the actually disturbing and pathological cause, one can accordingly postulate a therapy which shall have as its aim the complete release of this charge. This very simple as well as logical standpoint apparently agrees with the fact that abreaction, *i.e.* the rehearsed experience of the traumatic moment, in the form, for instance, of an affectively animated repetition in the waking or hypnotic state, has often a favourable therapeutic effect. The mechanism is familiar to the popular mind: everyone knows that a man feels an almost compelling need to recount a vivid experience again and again until it has finally lost its affective value. It is indeed proverbial; a man lightens his heart with a confession, 'what filleth the heart, goeth out by the mouth.' By this means an unloading is effected that gradually depotentiates the affective value of the traumatic experience until it no longer has a disturbing influence.

This conception, apparently so clear and simple, is unfortunately—as McDougall rightly objects—like so many other equally simple and therefore delusive explanations, inadequate. Views of this kind must therefore be fanatically and dogmatically maintained, since they cannot hold their own in the face of experience. Again McDougall is right when he points out that a not inconsiderable number of cases occur in which abreaction is not only useless but actually harmful.

In reply to this, it is possible to take the standpoint of the injured theorist and say that the method of abreaction never claimed to be a panacea, and at all events refractory cases occur with every method.

But here I would like to point out, that it is precisely in a careful study of the refractory cases that one gains the most

illuminating insight into the method or theory in question ; more so than through an investigation of its ' successes '. For it is just these cases that disclose where the theory is weak. Naturally the efficacy and justification of the method is not thereby disproved, but at least the way is prepared for an improvement of the theory and, indirectly, of the method.

McDougall, therefore, has laid his finger on the right spot when he argues that the essential factor is the dissociation of the psyche and not the existence of a high-tension affect ; hence the essential problem in the therapy is the integration of the dissociation and not the abreaction. This argument considerably advances the discussion. It entirely corresponds with our experience that a traumatic complex creates a dissociated condition of the psyche : it is removed from the control of the will and therefore possesses the quality of psychic autonomy.

Its autonomy consists in this, that it manifests itself independently of the will and even in frank opposition to conscious tendencies, thus forcing its existence tyrannically upon consciousness. The explosion of the affect invades the individuality completely, pouncing upon it rather like an enemy or a wild beast. Frequently I have observed the typical traumatic affect represented in the dream as an enemy or as a wild and dangerous animal—a striking image of the autonomous nature of the split-off affect.

Considered from this angle abreaction appears in an essentially different light ; it is an attempt to re-integrate once more into consciousness the complex that has become autonomous. The complex is gradually included as an accepted content of consciousness, mainly through the traumatic situation being simply lived over again, either once or repeatedly.

It is of course questionable, to my mind, whether the thing is actually so simple, or whether there may not be other circumstances essential to the process. It must, above all, be emphasized, that it is not merely the rehearsal of experience

that possesses an unconditional curative effect, but the rehearsal of experience in the presence of the physician.

If the healing effect depended merely upon the rehearsal of experience, abreaction could then be performed by the patient alone as an isolated exercise, and would require no human object upon whom it is directed. The intervention of the physician is, however, absolutely essential. One can easily understand what it means to the patient, when he can confide his experience to an understanding and sympathetic doctor. His consciousness finds in the doctor a moral support against the unmanageable affect of his traumatic complex. No longer does he stand alone against these elemental powers, but a trustworthy man reaches out a hand, lending him moral aid in the battle against the tyrannical oppression of the uncontrolled emotion. By this means the power of his integrating consciousness is reinforced until he is able, once more, to bring the rebellious affect under the control of consciousness. This indispensable and absolutely essential influence of the physician may, if preferred, be described as suggestion.

I would rather speak of it as the significance of the human interest and personal devotion of the physician. These belong to no method nor will they ever become one; for they are moral qualities, incontestibly of the highest importance for all methods of psycho-therapy, not for abreaction alone. The rehearsed experience of the traumatic moment can reintegrate the neurotic dissociation, only when the conscious personality of the patient is so far reinforced by the relationship to the physician, that he is consciously able to bring the complex that has become autonomous once more under the control of the will.

These are the conditions of the curative value of 'abreaction'. But the curative effect does not consist solely in the discharge of the affective tension; it depends, as McDougall shows, much more upon the resolution of the dissociation. We now find that those cases, where 'abreaction' has a negative result, assume a different aspect.

Without the coöperation of the other conditions just mentioned, 'abreaction' does not alone resolve the dissociation. When the autonomy of the complex is not re-integrated through the rehearsal of the trauma, the relationship to the physician can so raise the level of the patient's consciousness that he is able to overcome the autonomy of the complex and to assimilate it. But it may easily happen, either that the patient has a particular resistance against the doctor, or that the doctor has not a sufficiently right attitude to the patient. In both cases the method breaks down.

It is self-evident that the cathartic method (abreaction), when dealing with ordinary neuroses which are only in a minor degree traumatically determined, will as a rule meet with poor success. Since, in general, it has nothing whatever to do with the nature of the neurosis, the schematic application of the method is, in such cases, quite ludicrous. Even when apparently partial success is obtained it can have no more significance than would the success of any other method that admittedly had nothing to do with the nature of the neurosis.

The success is due to suggestion; it is usually of very limited duration and clearly accidental. This success arises always out of the transference to the physician, which is established without too great difficulty if only the physician has an earnest belief in his method. Because it has just as little to do with the nature of the ordinary neurosis as, for instance, hypnosis and other such remedies, the cathartic method has, with only a few exceptions, long been abandoned and replaced by psycho-analysis.

It is just where the cathartic method has its blind spot that the analytical method is firmly established, viz. in the relationship to the physician. It matters little that, even to-day, the view prevails in many quarters that analysis consists mainly in the 'digging-up' of the earliest childhood complex in order to pluck out, as it were, the evil by the root. This is the after-effect of the old trauma-theory.

Only in so far as they hamper present adaptation have the historical contents any real significance. The therapeutic effect of the minute and scrupulous pursuit of all the infantile phantasy-roots depends, not so much upon these relatively inessential demonstrations, as upon the labour the physician gives himself to enter into the patient's psyche, whereby a psychologically adapted relationship is established. For the patient is suffering precisely from the absence of such a relationship. Freud himself has long since recognized that the transference is the alpha and omega of psycho-analysis. The transference is an effort of the patient to establish a psychological rapport with the doctor. He needs this relationship wherewith to master his dissociation. The slighter the rapport, *i.e.* the less substantial the mutual understanding, the more intensely will the transference be fostered and striven for and the more sexual will be its form.

The attainment of the goal of adaptation is of such vital importance to the patient that sexuality intervenes as a function of compensation, in order to consolidate a relationship that cannot be won by the ordinary means of mutual understanding. Under such circumstances the transference can well become the most powerful obstacle to a successful treatment. That such vehement sexual transferences to the doctor are especially frequent in the sexually-orientated analysis is not surprising; for a too exclusive concentration of medical interest upon the sexual motive is extraordinarily liable to bar the way to understanding in the crudest fashion for many neurotic cases. An exclusively sexual interpretation of dreams and phantasies is a shocking violation of the patient's psychological material: infantile-sexual phantasy is by no means the whole story, since the material also contains a creative product, the purpose of which is to shape a way for him out of his neurosis. That decent way out is barred for him by the exclusively sexual interpretations. The physician now is the only certain point in a wilderness of sexual



phantasies, so that finally nothing else remains but to cling to him with a convulsive erotic transference, unless indeed he prefers to sever himself from his physician in hatred.

In both cases the result is a spiritual devastation. It is especially deplorable under the circumstances, because the psycho-analytical physicians do not in the least desire such an effect; they nevertheless frequently bring it about through their blind allegiance to the sexual dogma. Naturally, the sexual interpretation is simple and inexpensive of ideas; it concerns itself at the most with a handful of simple basic elements that recur in numberless variations.

One always knows beforehand where the whole matter will finally emerge. '*Inter faeces et urinas nascimur*' remains certainly an eternal truth; but a sterile, a monotonous, and above all, an unsavoury truth. There is absolutely no value in reducing every finest striving of the soul everlastingly back *usque ad uterum*. It is more than a faulty method; it is a gross offence, because such a view, instead of building up, eventually destroys the psychological understanding. Their need of the psychological rapport is, above all, what really concerns the neurotic patients; for it enables them in their dissociated state constantly to orientate themselves to the psyche of the physician. It is by no means a simple matter, this relationship to the human object; it is something that can be built up only with great pains and scrupulous awareness. Though of great interest historically and scientifically, the continual leading-back of all projections—and the transference consists of projections—to their origins, is of no service in the building-up of an adapted attitude to life; for it resolves once again to its elements every attempt on the part of the patient to establish a relationship, thus constantly destroying it.

If, in spite of this, the patient achieves a certain fitness for life, it can only be brought about through the destruction of many moral, intellectual, and æsthetic values, whose loss in a human character one can only deplore. For these are

things that absolutely demand, and must be granted integrity. Irrespective of this principal offence there is the perpetual reduction, the brooding over the past and the ever backward glance to things that cannot now be altered, a morbid tendency very common among neurotics to seek always in the past, in the character of their parents, etc., the cause of their inferiority.

But such a minute research into all the ramifications of minor determinants will affect the existing inferiority as little as the present social conditions could be ameliorated by an equally painstaking investigation into the causes of the great war. For here the moral achievement of the whole individual is in question.

To declare in general that no reductive analysis is needed would certainly be short-sighted; indeed as unintelligent as to deny all value to a research into the causes of the war. A very necessary, and even indispensable, foundation for a further synthesis is created when the physician gains the deepest possible insight into the origin of his patient's neurosis. But the new synthesis must be definitely begun. As a result of the historical examination, *i.e.* through the reductive analysis, the patient is shifted away from adaptation to the present situation through being led back, as it were, to his beginnings. The psyche naturally seeks to make this loss good by an especial strengthening of the hold upon the object; generally of course upon the doctor, but sometimes upon someone else at the same time, as, for instance, the husband, or a friend who figures as the doctor's counter-pole. This may be an opportune balancing of the one-sided transference, but it can also be, as will be readily understood, a most troublesome obstacle to the progress of the work. The intensified tie to the physician is a compensation symptom for the defective relationship to present reality. It is this tie that is described as 'transference'.

The phenomenon of transference is inevitable in every fundamental analysis, for it is absolutely imperative that

the physician should get into close touch with his patient's path of psychological development. Thus only can the physician take into himself his patient's psychic contents so that his reactions gain an effective contact. One could say that in the same measure as the doctor receives into himself the intimate material of the patient, he himself enters as a figure into the psyche of the patient. I say "as a figure", by which I mean, that at first he is seen by the patient not at all as he is, but more or less in the rôle of one of those individuals who figured significantly in the patient's previous history. The physician becomes associated in the patient's psyche with those memory-images, because he makes him divulge all his most intimate material. He becomes charged as it were with these images.

The transference consists therefore of projections which form a substitute for a real psychological relationship. Thus the projections make possible an apparent relationship which, however, at a moment when the patient's habitual failure of adaptation is artificially intensified through his analytical removal into the past, is very important. Hence a sudden rupture of the transference is always accompanied by consequences in the highest degree unpleasant and even dangerous; for it maroons the patient in an impossibly isolated and unrelated condition.

Even should the transference projections be treated as mere projections and be analysed back to their origins—and every form of projection can be thus dissolved and done away with—nevertheless the claim on the relationship still remains and should be conceded; for without the relationship the patient falls into an absolute void.

He must find relationship to an object in the actual present; for without it he can never adequately fulfil the demands that adaptation makes upon him, or at least, only in a very inferior way. Regardless then of all reduction, his claim will still turn towards the doctor, not indeed as an object of sexual desire, but rather as an object of human relationship, of the

relationship of one individuality to another wherein each is guaranteed his proper place. So long as the projections are not all consciously recognized naturally such a relationship cannot be attained. The projections must therefore, before all else, be reductively analysed, provided of course that the legitimacy and importance of the underlying claim to individual relationship is constantly borne in mind.

Once the projections are recognized as such, that particular rapport which is termed the transference is at an end. Here the transference ceases and the problem of individual relationship begins. To this point every student of analysis may come who has perused the literature on the subject, and amused himself in dream-interpretation and unearthing complexes in himself and others. But beyond this point no one has a right to go except the physician who has himself undergone a basic analysis, or else can bring such modesty and such passion for truth to the work that he can also analyse himself through his patient. Let him who has no wish for the former and cannot achieve the latter never touch analysis; for he will not endure the test, even though he may still cling to his lamentable conceit of authority.

In the last resort his work will be intellectual bluff; for how, indeed, can he help his patient out of his morbid inferiority when in the recognition of individual superiority he himself is so manifestly wanting? How can there dawn upon the patient the possibility of relinquishing his devious neurotic ways, when he sees the physician playing hide-and-seek with his own personality, and through fear of his own inferiority, unable to relinquish his eager hold upon an appearance of worth, authority, competence, superiority, etc.?

The touch-stone of every analysis that has neither terminated at some preliminary stage with a more or less satisfactory practical result, nor come to a standstill without result, is individual relationship. By this I mean that psychological situation, where the man in the patient confronts the man in the doctor upon equal terms, and with

the same merciless criticism that he must inevitably learn from the doctor in the course of his treatment.

The individual relationship is the compact that replaces the transference with its often slavish and humanly degrading dependence, and that makes for the patient the first step towards a highly valued human existence possible. The individual relationship is an indispensable bridge for the patient; it must serve as a proof to him that his unique personality is not only acceptable, but is actually accepted, and that he himself is now in a position to build up a fully adapted relationship. Naturally, when the physician tries to conceal his personality and his far-reaching personal influence behind a method, thus allowing himself the power to scold and criticize without question, this can never be the case. So long as this factor is not given its full weight in the reckoning the method is not so very different from suggestion, and the results will correspond to the method. Instead of this the patient should have the right to the freest criticism and a real sense of human equality.

I have said enough, I think, to indicate that analysis, according to my view, makes far higher claims upon the mental and moral nature of the physician than the mere application of a method acquired by routine. And the development of the healing effect lies primarily in this higher and more personal achievement of the physician.

But if it should be concluded from this that little or nothing lay in the method, I would regard that as a total misapprehension of my meaning. A merely personal sympathy can never provide the patient with that objective understanding of his neurosis which makes him independent of the physician and which erects a counter-influence to the transference as depicted above.

For the objective understanding of the disease, as for the building up of a relationship, science is needed; not some purely medical knowledge that embraces only a limited range, but a general knowledge of every side of the human

psyche. The psychological treatment must not only destroy an old, morbid attitude ; it must also build up a new attitude that is sound and healthy. But for this end a change of vision is required. Not only should the patient be able to see from what beginnings his neurosis arose, he needs also to see towards what justifiable aims his psychological tendencies are striving. We cannot simply extract the morbid element as though it were a foreign body, lest we remove something essential along with it, something that is destined for life. This must not be weeded out, but should be transformed until it reaches that form which can be included as an important part in the totality of the human psyche.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES

OF ancient origin indeed are the attempts to solve the problem of types. Some thinkers have tried to establish definite categories in which to catch the manifold differences of human individuals, while others have tried to break down the apparent uniformity of mankind by a sharper characterization of certain typical differences. Without caring to go too deeply into the history and development of such attempts, I would like to call attention to the fact that the oldest categories known originated with physicians. Among the latter, Claudius Galen deserves especial notice, the Greek physician who lived in the second century after Christ. He distinguished four fundamental temperaments, the sanguine, the phlegmatic, the choleric, and the melancholic. But the idea at the root of this differentiation goes back to the fifth century before Christ, to the teachings of Hippocrates who described the human body as composed of the four elements, air, water, fire, and earth. Corresponding to these elements, four substances were to be found in the living body, blood, phlegm, yellow and black bile; and it was Galen's idea that, by virtue of the varying admixture of these four substances, men could be separated into four different classes. When blood predominated the sanguine type resulted; a preponderance of phlegm produced the phlegmatic; yellow bile produced the choleric; and black bile the melancholic. As our modern speech testifies, these differentiations of temperament have become immortal, but their naivety from the standpoint of psychological theory has long since been apparent.

Galen undoubtedly deserves the credit of having created a psychological classification of human individuals which has endured for two thousand years, a classification which

rests upon perceptible differences of emotional or affective constitution. It is interesting to note that the first attempt at classification of types is concerned with the emotional behaviour of men; manifestly because the play of emotion forms the most frequent and obviously striking feature of any behaviour.

But affect is by no means the only thing that is characteristic of mankind; characteristic data can be expected from other functions as well, the only requirement being that we perceive and observe the other functions with the same distinctness that we naturally give to affect. In the earlier centuries, when the concept 'psychology' as we know it to-day was almost entirely lacking, the other psychological functions were veiled in obscurity; as indeed to the great majority of people to-day they seem to be scarcely discernible subtleties. Affects are revealed at once, even to superficial observation, and the unpsychological man, that is, the man to whom his neighbour's mind presents no problem, contents himself with this kind of observation. The perception of affect in his fellow-man is enough for him; if he sees none, then the other person is psychologically invisible to him, because apart from affects, nothing is discernible in another's consciousness. He is, in fact, blind to the other functions.

The primary condition, whereby we can discover functions in our fellow-men other than affects, is secured when we ourselves pass from an 'unproblematical' to a problematical condition of consciousness. By 'unproblematical' I mean the instinctive attitude toward life as exemplified by the primitive, whereas 'problematical' denotes the state of mind in which the easy attitude that takes things for granted has changed into one in which a certain amount of psychological tension exists. In this latter state our fellow-man emerges from invisibility and becomes a factor with which we have to grapple consciously. Resuming the thread of the argument: in so far as we judge others only by affects, we show that our chief, and perhaps only, criterion is affect.



This means that this criterion is also valid for our own psychology, which is equivalent to saying that our psychological judgment in general has neither objectivity nor independence, but is a slave to affect. This is, in fact, a truth which holds good for the majority of people, and upon this fact rests the psychological possibility of a murderous war and its ever probable recurrence, notwithstanding the blind optimism that clings to the opposite view. This must always be, so as long as a man judges those on the 'other side' by his own affect or emotion. I call such a state of consciousness unproblematical, because manifestly it has never been regarded itself as a problem; there is no sense of inadequacy or maladaptation to the facts involved. It only becomes a problem when a doubt arises as to whether the affect, that is one's own affect, offers a satisfactory basis for forming psychological judgments. We cannot deny the fact that we are always inclined to justify ourselves to anyone who holds us responsible for an emotional act, by saying that we acted only on impulse, and that we are not usually in that condition. When it concerns ourselves we are glad to explain affect as an exceptional condition of lessened accountability, but we are loth to make the same allowance for others. Even if this be regarded as an attempt, not altogether admirable perhaps, to exonerate the beloved ego, still in the feeling of justification fostered by this excuse there lies a positive element; namely, the attempt to distinguish oneself from one's own affect, which distinction must also eventually include one's fellow-man. And even if my excuse is only a subterfuge, it is nevertheless an effort to cast a doubt on the validity of affect as the sole index of personality, an effort, furthermore, to make myself aware of other psychological functions that are just as characteristic of the self as the affect, if not more so. If a man judges us by our affect, we readily accuse him of lack of understanding, or even injustice. But this puts us under the obligation of refraining from affect-judgment ourselves.

The primitive, unpsychological man, who regards affect in himself and others as the only essential criterion, must, if he means to cure himself of his affect-judgment, develop in himself a problematical condition of consciousness; that is to say, he must reach a condition in which other factors are appreciated as valid besides affect. In this problematical condition a paradoxical judgment takes place, namely, 'I am this affect,' and 'I am not this affect'. This anti-thesis forces a splitting of the ego, or rather, a splitting of the psychological material which constitutes the ego. By recognizing myself in my affect as well as in something that is not my affect, I differentiate an affective from other psychological factors, and in so doing, I bring the affect from its original heights of unlimited power into its proper place in the hierarchy of psychological functions.

Only when a man has performed this operation on himself, and has thereby produced a discrimination between various psychological factors in himself, is he in a position to summon criteria other than affect in his psychological judgment of others. Only in this way is the development of a really objective psychological critique possible.

What we call 'psychology' to-day is a science that is possible only on the basis of certain historical and moral presuppositions which have been produced by Christian education during nearly two thousand years. Such a saying for example as "Judge not that ye be not judged" has, through its religious connotation, created the possibility of a will which, in the last resort, strives towards a simple objectivity of judgment. And this objectivity, being not merely an attitude of disinterestedness towards others, but resting, as it does, on the fact that we wish others to benefit by the fundamental principles by which we excuse ourselves, this objectivity is the fundamental presupposition by which a just evaluation of our fellow-men can be achieved. You wonder perhaps why I dwell so emphatically on the question of objectivity, but you would cease to wonder if you should

ever try to classify people in practice. A man of pronounced sanguine temperament will tell you that fundamentally he is deeply melancholic ; a ' choleric ', that his only fault consists in his having been always too phlegmatic. But a human classification, in the validity of which I alone believe, is about as helpful as a universal church of which I am the sole member. We have therefore to find criteria which can be fully accepted not only by the judging subject, but also by the judged object.

In complete contrast to the old system of classification according to temperaments, the problem of a new division of types begins with the express convention, neither to allow oneself to be judged by affect, nor so to judge others, since, as a final statement, no one will admit himself to be identical with his affect. If, therefore, affect is used as the criterion, the general agreement which science demands can never be reached. Hence we must cast around for those factors which we call to our aid when we wish to excuse ourselves for an emotional act. We might say, " Granted that I have said this or that in a state of affect, it was of course an exaggeration and no harm was meant. As a matter of fact, what I really mean is thus and so, etc." A very naughty child who has caused his mother a lot of trouble might say, " I didn't mean to do it. I didn't mean to hurt you. I love you very much."

Such explanations refer to the existence of a different kind of personality than the one that appeared in the affect. In both cases the affect-personality appears as something inferior that seized upon and obscured the real ego. But it may be that the personality revealed in such an affect is a higher and a better one, whose heights unfortunately cannot be sustained. There are well-known instances of generosity, altruism, sacrifice, and similar ' beautiful gestures ', for which, as an ironical observer might spitefully remark, one does not care to be held responsible—perhaps a reason why many people do so little good.

But in both cases the affect obtains as an exceptional condition the character of which is represented either as a falsification of the 'real' personality, or as not belonging to it as an authentic attribute. What then is this 'real' personality? Manifestly it is partly that which every man distinguishes in himself as distinct from affect, and partly that in everyone which is regarded as inessential in the judgment of others. Since it is impossible to deny that the condition of affect pertains to the ego, it follows that the ego remains the same in the affect as in the so-called 'real' condition, although in a different attitude toward the existing psychological facts. In the affective state the ego is unfree, driven, in a state of compulsion. In contrast to this the normal state is understood as a condition of free-choice, of disposability of one's mental powers; in other words, the affective state is unproblematical, while the normal state is problematical, that is, it comprises both the problem and the possibility of choice. In the latter state an understanding becomes possible, because only in this state does the possibility of the recognition of motives and self-knowledge exist. Discrimination is indispensable to knowledge. But discrimination means the splitting up of the content of consciousness into distinguishable factors. Therefore, if we wish to define the individuality of a man in terms that will satisfy not our judgment alone, but also that of the man judged, we must take as our criterion that condition or attitude, which is felt by the object to be a conscious, normal state of mind. Accordingly, we must make the conscious motives our chief concern, while abstracting from the situation our own arbitrary interpretations.

Proceeding thus we shall discover, after a time, that in spite of a great variety of motives and tendencies, certain groups of individuals, characterized by an obvious conformity in their manner of motivation, can be differentiated. For example, we shall come upon individuals who in all their conclusions, apperceptions, feeling-valuations, affects

and actions, feel a predominating motive-power in external factors, or, at least, weight is given to these in their conception of the situation, whether causal or final motives are in question. I will give some illustrations of what I mean. St. Augustine says, "I would not believe in the Evangelists if the authority of the church did not compel it." A daughter says, "I could not think something that would be displeasing to my father." A certain person finds a work of modern music beautiful because everybody else acclaims it so. Or there is the case of the man who has married in a way pleasing to his parents, but very much against his own interests. There are those people who make themselves absurd in order to amuse others; they may even prefer to make butts of themselves rather than remain unnoticed. There are, in fact, not a few who in all their reactions, have but one consideration in mind; namely, what do others think of them? Someone has said, "One need not be ashamed of a thing if nobody knows about it." There are those who can realize happiness only when it excites the envy of others; there are also individuals who wish for troubles, and even create them for themselves, in order to enjoy the sympathy of their fellow-men.

Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely. They point to a psychological peculiarity that can be sharply distinguished from another attitude which, in contradistinction to the former, is conditioned chiefly by inner or subjective factors. A man of this type might say, "I know I could give my father the greatest pleasure if I did thus and so, but nevertheless I have a different idea about it"; or, "I see that the weather is vile, but in spite of it I shall carry out the plan I made yesterday." Such a man does not travel for pleasure, but in order to carry out a plan. A man may say, "Apparently my book is incomprehensible, but it is perfectly clear to me." Another typical example is as follows, taken from an actual case, "Everybody believes I could do something, but nothing is more certain to me than the fact that I can do nothing." Such a man can be so ashamed

of himself as literally to isolate himself. Among this group are to be found those individuals who can experience happiness only when they are sure that no one knows about it, and to these people a thing is disagreeable just because it is pleasing to everybody else. Value is sought, as far as possible, where no one would think of finding it. At every step the sanction of the subject must be obtained, and without it nothing can be undertaken or carried out. Such an one would say to St. Augustine, "I would believe in the Evangelists if the authority of the church did not coerce me to it." Constantly he has to prove that everything he does rests entirely upon his own decision and conviction, and never because he is influenced by anyone, or desires to please and conciliate some person or opinion. This attitude decharacterizes a second group of individuals whose motivations are derived chiefly from the subject, *i.e.* from inner necessities.

Finally there is a third group, in which it is hard to say whether the motivation is derived mainly from within or without. This group is the most numerous, and includes the less differentiated normal man, who is normal partly because nothing excessive is allowed, and partly because he is exempt from the need to exceed. According to definition, the normal man is influenced in equal measure from within as from without. He makes up, as has been said, the extensive middle group. On one side of this group are those individuals whose motivations are mainly conditioned by the outer object, and on the other are those who allow themselves to be determined principally by the subject. I have designated the first group as extraverted, the latter as introverted. These terms scarcely need special elucidation, since from what has been said they explain themselves.

Although doubtless there are certain individuals in whom one can recognize the type at a first glance, this is by no means always the case. As a rule, only careful observation and weighing of the evidence permits a sure classification. However clear and simple the fundamental principle of the

opposing attitudes may be, their concrete reality is none the less complicated and obscure, for every individual is an exception to the rule. Therefore one can never give a description of a type, no matter how complete, which absolutely applies to one individual, despite the fact that thousands might, in a certain sense, be strikingly characterized by it. Conformity is one side of a man, uniqueness is the other. The individual soul is not explained by classification, yet at the same time, through the understanding of the psychological types, a way is opened to a better understanding of human psychology in general.

The differentiation of type begins often very early, so early that in certain cases one must speak of it as being innate. The earliest mark of extraversion in a child is his quick adaptation to the environment, and the extraordinary attention he gives to objects, especially to his effect upon them. Shyness in regard to objects is very slight; the child moves and lives among them with trust. He makes quick perceptions, but in a haphazard way. Apparently he develops more quickly than an introverted child, since he is less cautious, and as a rule, has no fear. Apparently, too, he feels no barrier between himself and objects, and hence he can play with them freely and learn through them. He gladly pushes his undertakings to an extreme, and risks himself in the attempt. Everything unknown seems alluring.

Reversing the picture, one of the earliest marks of introversion in a child is a reflective, thoughtful manner, a pronounced shyness, even a certain fear concerning unknown objects. Very early a tendency appears towards a certain self-assertion in relation to the object, with definite attempts to master it. Everything unknown is regarded with mistrust. Outside influence is, in the main, met with emphatic resistance. The child wants his own way, and under no circumstances will he submit to a strange rule that he does not understand. When he questions, it is not from curiosity or desire for sensation, but because he wants names, meanings,

and explanations which could provide him with a subjective security over against the object. I have seen an introverted child who made her first efforts to walk, only after she had learnt the names of all the things in the room with which she might come in contact. Thus very early in an introverted child the characteristic defensive attitude can be noted which the adult introvert shows towards the object; just as, in the case of the extraverted child, one can very early observe a marked assurance and enterprise, and a happy trustfulness in his relations with objects. This then is the basic characteristic of the extraverted attitude: the psychic life is as it were displayed outside the individual in objects and in relationships to objects. In especially marked cases there occurs a sort of blindness for his own individuality. The introvert, on the contrary, always behaves towards the object as though the latter possessed a superior power over him, against which he had to defend himself. But his real world is the inner one, his subject.

It is a sad, but none the less frequent occurrence that the two types are inclined to depreciate each other. This will certainly strike anyone who investigates the problem. It depends upon the fact that the psychic values have a completely opposite disposition in the two types. The introvert sees all that holds value for him in the subject, while the extravert sees it in the object. But this dependence upon the object appears to the introvert as a great inferiority, while to the extravert the inferior condition lies in an unmitigated subjectivity. He can see nothing in such an attitude but infantile auto-erotism.

It is not surprising, then, that the two types are often in conflict. But this fact does not, in the majority of cases, prevent a man from marrying a woman of the opposite type. Such marriages are very valuable as psychological symbioses, so long as the partners do not attempt a mutual 'psychological' understanding. But such a phase belongs to the normal development of every marriage in which the



couple has either the necessary leisure, or the necessary urge to development. Though even if both these requirements are present, a certain real courage is needed to risk the rupture of marital peace. If, however, circumstances favour it, this phase enters automatically into the lives of both types, and for the following reasons: each type is a one-sided development. The one develops only his outer relations, and neglects the inner; while the other develops inwardly, while remaining externally at a standstill. But in time a necessity arises for the individual to develop what has been previously neglected. This development takes the form of a differentiation of certain functions and, because of their importance for the type-problem, I must now take up the question of these functions.

The conscious psyche is an apparatus for adaptation or orientation, and it consists of a number of psychic functions. Of these we can distinguish four fundamental functions, namely, sensation, thinking, feeling, and intuition. Under the heading sensation I include all perception by means of the sense organs; by thinking I understand the function of intellectual cognition, and the forming of logical conclusions; feeling is a function of subjective evaluation, and intuition I hold to be perception by way of the unconscious, or the perception of an unconscious content. As far as my experience goes, these four fundamental functions appear to me to be sufficient to express and represent the ways and means of conscious orientation. For a complete orientation of consciousness all the functions should coöperate equally; thinking should make cognition and the forming of judgments possible; feeling should say to us how and in what way a thing is important or unimportant for us; sensation by means of sight, hearing, taste, etc., should enable us to perceive and grip on to concrete reality; and finally intuition should permit us to divine the more or less hidden possibilities and backgrounds of a situation, since these hidden factors also belong to a complete picture of a given moment. But

in reality it is seldom or never that these fundamental functions are uniformly developed and correspondingly disposable by the will. As a rule one or another function is in the foreground, while the rest remain in the background, relatively or quite undifferentiated. Thus there are many people who restrict themselves to a simple perception of concrete reality, without reflecting much about it, or taking into account the feeling values involved. They bother themselves little about the possibilities which lie hidden in a situation. Such people I describe as sensation types. Others are exclusively influenced by what they think, and simply cannot adapt themselves to a situation which they cannot comprehend intellectually. I term such people thinking types. Again there are others who are guided in everything wholly by their feelings. They merely ask themselves if something is pleasant or the reverse, and orientate themselves by their feeling impressions. These are the feeling types. Finally, intuitives concern themselves neither with ideas nor with feeling reactions, nor yet with the reality of things, but give themselves up wholly to the lure of possibilities, and abandon every situation in which no further possibilities are scented.

Each one of these types presents a different kind of one-sidedness, but one which is complicated in a peculiar way with the generally extraverted and introverted attitudes. Just because of this complication I was forced to mention the existence of these function-types, and, bearing it in mind, let us now return to the question outlined above, that is, the one-sidedness of the extraverted and introverted attitudes. This one-sidedness would indeed lead to a complete loss of balance if it were not psychically compensated by an unconscious counter-position. The investigation of the unconscious has revealed the fact, that in the case of an introvert, for example, there exists alongside, or rather behind his conscious attitude, an unconscious extraverted attitude which automatically compensates his conscious one-sidedness.

Naturally, in practice, one can surmise intuitively the existence of an introverted or extraverted attitude in general, but an exact scientific investigation cannot content itself with an intuition, but must concern itself with the actual material presented. We then discover that no person is simply extraverted or introverted, but that he is so in the form of certain functions. Let us take for example an intellectual type; most of the conscious material which he presents to observation consists of thoughts, conclusions, deliberations, as well as actions, affects, feeling valuations, and perceptions of an intellectual nature, or at least directly dependent on intellectual premises. We must interpret the essence of his general attitude from the peculiarity of this material. The material presented by a feeling type will be of a different kind, that is, feelings and emotional contents of all sorts, thoughts, deliberations, and perceptions dependent upon emotional premises. Therefore, only by reason of the peculiar nature of his feelings shall we be in a position to say whether this individual belongs to this or that general type. For this reason I must again mention the function-types, because in individual cases the extraverted and introverted attitudes can never be demonstrated as existing *per se*; they appear rather as the characteristics of the dominating conscious functions. Similarly, there is no general attitude of the unconscious, but only typically modified forms of unconscious functions, and only through the investigation of the unconscious functions and their peculiarities can the unconscious attitude be scientifically determined.

It is hardly possible to speak of typical unconscious functions, although in the economics of the psyche we must attribute a function to the unconscious. It is best, I think, to express oneself rather cautiously in this respect, and therefore I would rather not go beyond the statement that the unconscious, so far as we can now see, has a compensatory function in respect to consciousness. What the unconscious

is in itself, it is idle to speculate. By its very nature it is beyond our cognition. We can merely postulate its existence from its so-called products, as, for instance, dreams and phantasies. It is an assured finding of scientific experience that dreams, for example, almost invariably have a content which can act as an essential corrective to the conscious attitude. Hence our justification for speaking of a compensatory function of the unconscious.

Besides this general function in relation to the conscious, the unconscious also contains functions which under other circumstances can become conscious. The thinking type, for example, must necessarily always suppress and exclude feeling, since nothing disturbs thinking so much as feeling, and conversely, the feeling type must avoid thinking as far as possible, since nothing is more disastrous to feeling than thinking. Repressed functions lapse into the unconscious. Just as, of the four sons of Horus, only one had a human head, so with the four basic functions, only one as a rule is fully conscious and differentiated, so that it is free and subject to the direction of the will, the other three functions remaining partly or wholly unconscious. By this 'unconsciousness' I do not of course mean that an intellectual, for example, would be unconscious of feeling. He knows his feelings very well, in so far as he has any power of introspection, but he gives them no value and allows them no influence. They happen to him, as it were, against his intention; being spontaneous and autonomous, they finally possess themselves of the validity which consciousness denies. They are activated by unconscious stimulation, forming indeed something like a counter-personality whose existence can only be divined through the analysis of the unconscious products.

When a function has not the character of disposability, when it is felt as a disturbance of the conscious function, when it is moody, now appearing and now vanishing, when it has an obsessive character, or remains obstinately in hiding when most needed—these qualities are characteristic

of a function existing mainly in the unconscious. Such a function has further qualities that are worthy of note; there is something unindividual about it, that is, it contains elements which do not necessarily belong to it. Thus, for example, the unconscious feeling of the intellectual is peculiarly phantastic, often in grotesque contrast to the exaggerated, rationalistic intellectualism of the conscious. In contrast to the purposeful and controlled character of the conscious thinking; his feeling is impulsive, uncontrolled, moody, irrational, primitive, archaic; in fact, very like the feeling of a savage.

The same thing is true of every function that is repressed into the unconscious. It remains there undeveloped, fused with other elements not proper to it. It remains in a certain primordial condition, since the unconscious is the psychic residue of undomesticated nature in us, just as it is also the matrix of our uncreated future. Thus the undeveloped functions are always the fruitful ones, and so it is no wonder that in the course of life the necessity increases for a completion and transformation of the conscious attitude.

Besides these qualities I have mentioned, the undeveloped functions possess the further peculiarity, that when the conscious attitude is introverted they are extraverted in character, and vice versa. In other words, they compensate the conscious attitude. One could expect therefore to discover extraverted feelings in an introverted intellectual, and the idea was wittily expressed by just such a type when he said, "Before dinner I am a Kantian, but after dinner a Nietzschean." In his habitual attitude, that is to say, he is intellectual, but under the stimulus of a good meal a Dionysian wave breaks through his conscious attitude.

Just here we meet a great difficulty in the diagnosis of the types. The outside observer sees the manifestations of the conscious attitude, as well as the autonomous phenomena of the unconscious, and he will be uncertain as to what he should ascribe to the conscious and what to

the unconscious. Under such circumstances the differential diagnosis can only be founded on a careful study of the material. We must try to discover which phenomena proceed from consciously chosen motives and which are spontaneous; we must also determine which manifestations possess an adapted, and which an unadapted, archaic character.

It will be now sufficiently clear that the qualities of the main conscious function, that is, the qualities of the general conscious attitude, are in strict contrast to the qualities of the unconscious attitude. Expressed in other words, we can say that between the conscious and the unconscious there is normally an opposition. This contrast is not perceived as a conflict, however, so long as the conscious is not too remote from the unconscious attitude. But if the latter should be the case, then the Kantian is unpleasantly surprised by his Dionysian antithesis, since it begins to develop impulses that are highly unsuitable. The conscious attitude then sees itself called upon to suppress the autonomous manifestations of the unconscious, and therewith the conflict is staged. The unconscious, in fact, when once it is brought into active opposition to the conscious simply will not permit itself to be repressed. It is true that the particular manifestations against which the conscious especially directs itself, are not especially difficult to repress, but then the unconscious impulses simply seek other less easily recognizable exits.

When once such indirect safety-valves are opened, the way of the neurosis has already been entered upon. It is indeed possible through analysis to make each of these false ways again accessible to the reason, and thus to submit it to conscious repression, but its determining power is not thereby eradicated; it is merely pushed back further into a corner, unless, together with the understanding of the indirect way taken by the suppression, there comes an equally clear realization of the one-sidedness of the attitude. In other words,

along with the understanding of the unconscious impulses there must also come a change of the conscious attitude; because the activation of the unconscious opposition has grown out of this one-sidedness and the recognition of the unconscious impulses is fruitful, only when it can also effect a real compensation of the conscious one-sidedness.

But the transformation of the conscious attitude is no small matter, for the sum total of a general attitude is always more or less of a conscious ideal, sanctified by custom and historical tradition, solidly founded on the rockbottom of innate temperament. The conscious attitude is always in the nature of a philosophy of life, when it is not definitely a religion. It is this fact which makes the problem of the types so important. The opposition between the types is not only an external conflict between men, but also the source of endless inner conflicts; not only the cause of external disagreements and antagonism, but also the inner occasion of nervous illness and psychic disorders. It is this fact also that forces us as physicians to extend the limits of what was originally a purely medico-psychological horizon so as to include within its range not only general psychological view-points, but also the problem of a conceptually formulated view of life (*Weltanschauung*).

Within the limits of a lecture, I am unable, of course, to give you any idea of the depth and extent of these problems. I must needs content myself with a rather formal outline of the main facts, and of the general implications of the problems involved. For the fuller elaboration of the problem I must refer you to its detailed presentation in my book *Psychological Types*.

Recapitulating, I would like to stress certain points: Each of the two attitudes introversion and extraversion appears in the individual through a special kind of predominance of one of the four basic functions. Strictly speaking, there are in reality no unqualified extraverts or introverts, but extraverted and introverted function-types,

such as thinking types, sensation types, etc. Thus there arise a minimum of eight clearly distinguishable types. Obviously one could increase this number at will if each of the function-types were split into three sub-groups, which, empirically speaking, would be far from impossible. One could, for example, easily divide the intellect into its three well-known forms: first, the intuitive-speculative; second, the logical-mathematical; third, the empirical form which rests chiefly on sense perception. Similar divisions could be carried out with the other functions, as, for instance, in the case of intuition, which has an intellectual as well as a feeling aspect. With such a splitting up into component parts a large number of types could be laid down, each new division becoming increasingly subtle.

For the sake of completeness, I must also observe that the classification of types according to extraversion and introversion is by no means to be regarded as the only possible method. Any other psychological criterion could be equally well employed, although, in my view, no other possesses so great a practical significance.

With this I will close, in the hope that I have been able to give you at least a general orientation in regard to one of the latest problems of analytical psychology.



## ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

### LECTURE I

It is with a certain hesitation that I undertake the task of presenting to you, in a brief lecture, the connexion between the findings of analytical psychology and general problems of education. In the first place, it is a large and extensive field of human experience which cannot possibly be covered adequately in a few weighty sentences. Furthermore, analytical psychology deals with a method and a system of thought, neither of which can one assume to be generally known; hence their applicability to educational problems is not easily demonstrated. An historical introduction into the process of development of this, the youngest of the psychological sciences, is almost indispensable; for it enables us to understand many things which, if we met them to-day for the first time, would be most difficult to grasp.

Developing out of therapeutic experiences with hypnotism, psycho-analysis, as Freud termed it, became a specific medical technique for investigating the psychic causes of functional, that is non-organic, nervous disorders. It was primarily concerned with the sexual origins of these disorders, and its value as a method of therapy was based on the assumption that a permanent curative effect would result from bringing the sexual causes to consciousness. The entire Freudian school still takes this view of psycho-analysis and refuses to recognize any causation of nervous disorders other than the sexual. Although originally subscribing to this method, I have, during the course of years, developed the conception of analytical psychology which emphasizes the fact, that psychological investigation along psycho-analytic lines has left the narrow confines of a medical technique, with its restriction to certain theoretical presuppositions, and has passed

over into the general field of normal psychology. Therefore when I speak of the connexion between analytical psychology and education I am leaving Freudian analysis out of the question. Since it is a psychology which deals exclusively with the ramifications of the sexual instinct in the psyche, it would be pertinent to the discussion only if we were dealing exclusively with the sex-psychology of the child. But at the outset I must make it perfectly clear, that I in no way support those views which maintain that the relation of the child to the parents, or to his sisters, brothers, and comrades, is only to be explained as the immature beginnings of the sexual function. Those views, surely not unknown to you, are, in my opinion, premature and one-sided generalizations which have already given rise to the most absurd misinterpretations. When pathological phenomena are present to a degree that would justify a psychological explanation along sexual lines, it is not the child's own psychology that is responsible, but the sexually disturbed psychology of the parents; since the mind of the child is extremely susceptible and dependent, and is held for long in the atmosphere of the parental psychology, only freeing itself from this influence relatively late, if at all.

I will now try briefly to present to you, the fundamental view-points of analytical psychology which are useful in considering the mind of the child, especially at school age. You must not think that I am in the position to give you a list of hints that can be directly applied. All that I can do for you is to give you a deeper insight into the general laws which underlie the psychic development of the child. But I shall be content if, from what I am able to give you, you carry away a sense of the mysterious evolution of the highest of human faculties. The great responsibility which falls upon you as educators of the future generation, will protect you from forming hasty conclusions, for there are certain view-points which need to germinate, often for a long time, before they can profitably be put into practice. The deepened

psychological knowledge of the teacher should not, as unfortunately sometimes happens, be unloaded directly upon the child; rather should it help the teacher to gain an understanding attitude toward the psychic life of the child. This knowledge is definitely for adults, not for children. What is given to the child must be something elementary, appropriate to the immature mind.

Undoubtedly one of the most important achievements of analytical psychology is the recognition of the biological structure of the mind, but it is not easy to cast into a few words what has taken many years to discover. Therefore if at first I seem to go rather far afield, it is only that I may bring certain general reflections to the particular problem of the child-mind.

Experimental psychology, represented at its best by the school of Wundt, has, as you know, hitherto exclusively occupied itself with the psychology of normal consciousness, as though the mind consisted merely of the phenomena of consciousness. But medical psychology, especially the French school, was soon forced to recognize the existence of unconscious psychic phenomena. We realize to-day that the conscious consists only of those ideational complexes that are directly associated with the ego. Those psychic factors that possess only a slight degree of intensity, or those that have had intensity but have lost it again, are under the threshold; that is, they are subliminal, and belong to the sphere of the unconscious. By virtue of its indefinite extension, the unconscious might be compared to the sea, while the conscious is like an island towering out of its midst. This comparison, however, must not be pushed too far; for the relation of the conscious to the unconscious is essentially different from the relation of an island to the sea. It is not in any sense a stable relationship, but a ceaseless welling-up; a constant shifting of content; for, like the conscious, the unconscious is never at rest, never at a standstill. It lives and works in a state of perpetual interaction with the

conscious. Conscious contents that have lost their intensity, or actuality, sink into the unconscious, and this we call forgetting. Conversely, out of the unconscious, there rise new ideas and tendencies which, as they come into consciousness, are known to us as phantasies and impulses. The unconscious is to a certain extent the matrix out of which the conscious grows; for consciousness does not come into the world as a finished product, but is the result of small beginnings.

This development of the conscious takes place in the child. In the early years of life there is in the first place scarcely any conscious, although very early the existence of psychic processes is evident. But these processes are not focused in an organized ego; they have no centrum, and therefore no continuity, without which a conscious personality is impossible. Therefore the child has in our sense no memory, despite the plasticity and impressionability shown by its psychic organ. Only when the child begins to say 'I' is there a perceptible continuity of consciousness. But between whiles, there are still frequent periods of unconsciousness. One can clearly discern how the conscious comes into existence through the gradual unification of fragments. This process continues throughout the whole of life, but from puberty onwards it becomes slower, and less and less frequently are new portions of the unconscious added to consciousness. The greatest and most extensive development of the conscious takes place in the period between birth and the close of psychical puberty, a period that may normally extend, for a man of our climate and race, to the twenty-fifth year; but in the case of a woman usually ends at about nineteen or twenty years of age. This development creates a firm connexion between the ego and the previously unconscious psychic processes, and therewith separates the latter from their source, the unconscious. In this way, the conscious rises out of the unconscious like an island newly risen from the sea. We reinforce this process in children by education

and culture. The school in fact is a means of strengthening in a purposeful way the integration of the conscious. Thus culture is the maximum of consciousness.

Now if we were to ask what would happen if there were no schools, and children were left entirely to themselves, we would have to answer that children would to a great extent remain unconscious. What kind of state would this be? It would be a primitive condition; that is, when such children had come to adult age, they would, despite all degrees of natural intelligence, still be primitive; in fact, savages, somewhat like the members of a tribe of intelligent Negroes or Indians. They would not necessarily be stupid of course, but merely instinctively intelligent. They would be ignorant of knowledge and, therefore, unconscious of themselves and of the world. Beginning life on a very much lower cultural level, they would differentiate themselves only slightly from the primitive races. Such a descent to a lower level can be observed on a large scale among the Spanish and Portuguese immigrants of South America, and also among the Dutch Boers of South Africa. This possibility of a regression to the primitive stage rests on the fact that the fundamental biogenetic law is valid, not only for the development of the body, but also for that of the mind.

According to this law the history of the development of the species repeats itself in the embryonic development of the individual. Thus to a certain degree in his embryonic life man passes through the anatomical forms of primordial times. The same law is valid for the mental development of mankind. Accordingly, the child develops out of an originally unconscious and animal-like condition to consciousness; first to a primitive, and then slowly to a civilized consciousness.

The condition in the first two or three years of his life, when the child is unconscious of himself, can be compared to the animal state. It is a state of complete fusion with the surrounding conditions. Just as the child in the

embryonic state is practically nothing but a part of the mother's body and wholly dependent on her condition, so also the psyche of early infancy is to a large degree a part of the maternal psyche, and soon too, on account of the common atmosphere, a part of the paternal psyche. The first psychological condition is a fusion with the psychology of the parents, and an individual psychology is present only as a possibility. Hence it is that the nervous and psychic disorders of children far into the school age depend almost exclusively upon disturbances in the psychic world of the parents. Difficulties between the parents reflect themselves without fail in the psyche of the child, causing pathological disturbances and symptoms. The content of the dreams of small children also refers far more to the parents than to the child itself.

A certain change occurs when the child develops consciousness of his ego, a fact which is externally recorded by referring to himself as 'I'. This change occurs normally between the third and fifth year, but it can begin earlier. From this moment, we can speak of the existence of an individual psyche, but normally the individual psyche attains a relative independence only after puberty; up to that time it has largely been the plaything of instinct and environment. Up to the time of puberty, therefore, one could say of a child that, so far as its psyche is concerned, it has not yet had an individual existence. The child who enters school at six is still nothing but the product of his parents, endowed, it is true, with the nucleus of an ego-consciousness, but in no way capable of asserting his individuality to any marked degree. One is often tempted to interpret children who are peculiar, obstinate, disobedient, or difficult to handle, as especially individual or self-willed; but this is a mistake. In such cases we should always investigate the parental milieu and its psychological conditions, and almost without exception we would discover in the parents the only valid reasons for the difficulties presented by the child. His

disturbing peculiarities are far less the expression of his own being than the reflection of the disturbing influences on the side of his parents. If a physician has to deal with a nervous disorder in a child of this age, he will achieve the desired end only when he begins to treat the parents. In my book, *Studies in Word-Association*, I have cited a number of examples showing the extraordinary kinship existing in psychological *habitus* of members of a family, amounting in one case almost to identity. This is in fact an expression of the primitive identity, from which the individual consciousness frees itself only gradually. In this battle for freedom the school plays no small rôle ; since it is the first milieu the child finds outside the home. The school comrades take the place of brothers and sisters, the teacher, if a man, is a substitute for the father, if a woman, for the mother. It is not unimportant that the teacher should be conscious of this rôle. He must not be satisfied with a schematic pounding of a certain programme of learning into the child ; he must influence him also through his personality. This latter function is at least as important as the actual teaching, if not more so in certain cases. If, on the one hand, it is a misfortune for a child to have no parents, it is certainly dangerous for his welfare, if, on the other hand, he be too closely bound to the family. A too strong attachment to the parents is a severe handicap in his later adaptation to the world ; for a growing human being is destined for the world, and not to remain forever the child of his parents. There are unfortunately many parents who keep their children children, because they themselves do not wish to become old and give up the parental authority and power. In this way they exercise an extremely bad influence over the children, since they take away from them every opportunity for individual responsibility. These disastrous methods result either in dependent personalities, or in men who can achieve their independence only by furtive means. There are again other parents, who on account of their own weaknesses are

not in a position to meet the child with the authority it needs in order to be able to take its proper place in the world. The teacher then, as a personality, has the delicate task of avoiding the exercise of repressive authority, while at the same time supplying that just degree of authority which belongs to the adult, educated personality over against the child. With the best intentions, no such attitude can be artificially produced; it can only come about in a natural way when the teacher does his duty as man and citizen. He must be himself an upright and healthy man, for a good example remains the best pedagogic method. But it is also true that the very best method avails nothing if the man practising it does not hold his position by virtue of his personality. It would be altogether different if the only thing of importance in school life was the methodical teaching of the curriculum. That, however, is, at the most, only half the meaning of school. The other half is the real, psychological education made possible through the personality of the teacher. What this education involves is the guiding of the child into the larger world, thus widening the scope of the parental training. The latter, no matter how careful it may be, can never escape a certain one-sidedness, for the milieu remains always the same. The school, on the other hand, is the first impact of the greater world which the child has to meet, and it ought to help him to free himself to some extent from the parental environment. The child naturally brings to the teacher a certain manner of adaptation that he has learned from his father; he projects a father-image upon him, as we say technically, with the tendency to assimilate the personality of the teacher into the father-image. It is therefore necessary for the teacher to approach the child personally, or at any rate to leave the door open for such a contact. If the personal relationship of the child to the teacher is a good one, it matters very little whether his method of teaching is altogether the most modern. For the success of teaching does not depend on the method, any more than it is the exclusive aim of school life to stuff the



children's heads with knowledge ; but rather to make them real men and women. We need not concern ourselves so much with the amount of specific information a child brings away with him from school, but the thing of vital importance is that the school should succeed in freeing the young man from his unconscious identity with his family, and make him properly conscious of himself. Without this consciousness of himself, he will never know what he really wants, but will always remain dependent and imitative, with the feeling of being misunderstood and suppressed.

In what I have just said I have sought to give you a general view of the psyche of the child from the standpoint of analytical psychology, but we have remained on the surface of the psychical phenomena. We can go very much deeper if we make use of certain methods of investigation used in analytical psychology. The practical application of these methods would be out of the question for the teacher in general, and a dilettante or half-serious use of them is absolutely to be discouraged, although a knowledge of them on the part of a teacher is certainly desirable. It is by no means desirable, however, in the sense that he should apply them to the education of the children. It is his own education that needs them, and eventually this redounds to the good of the children.

You are perhaps surprised to hear me speak of the education of the educator, but I must tell you that I am far from thinking that a man completes his education when he finishes school, even if the latter be of the college grade. We should have not only continuation courses for youths, but continuation schools for adults. We educate people only to the point where they can earn a livelihood and marry, but then education ceases altogether, as though a complete mental equipment had been achieved. The solution of all the remaining complicated problems of life is left to the discretion and ignorance of the individual. Innumerable ill-advised and unhappy marriages, innumerable professional disappointments exist solely because of this lack of adult education. Vast numbers

of men and women accordingly pass their entire lives in complete ignorance of the most important things. Many childish vices are believed to be ineradicable, largely because they are often present in adults whose education is supposedly finished, and who are therefore thought to be long past the educable period. There was never a greater mistake. The adult is also educable, and can become a grateful object of the art of individual education; but naturally his education cannot be conducted on the same lines as are appropriate to the child. For he has lost the extraordinary plasticity of the child's mind, and has acquired a will of his own, personal convictions, and a more or less definite consciousness of himself, and thus has become far less accessible to schematic influences. To this must be added the fact, that the child in his psychic development passes through the stages represented by his forbears, and is only educated to the point where he approximates to the modern level of culture, that is, of consciousness. But the adult stands on this level and feels himself the bearer of present culture. He is therefore little inclined in the manner of the child, to submit to a teacher. It is important too that he should not so submit, otherwise it would be easy for him to slip back into a childish state of dependence.

The educational method, then, that will best meet the needs of adults must not be a direct one, but indirect; that is, it must put him in possession of that psychological knowledge which will permit him to educate himself. Such an effort could not, and must not be expected from a child, but we must expect it from an adult, especially if he be a teacher. A teacher cannot be a passive sustainer of culture, he must also actively further culture through his own self-education. His culture must never remain at a standstill, otherwise he will begin to correct in the children those faults which he has left untouched in himself. This is manifestly the opposite of education.

Analytical psychology has been not a little concerned

with the methods of aiding the adult in his further psychic growth; but if I speak to you about those methods now, I do it solely for the purpose of showing you the possibilities of a further self-education. I must warn you again most emphatically that it would be altogether unsound to apply such methods directly to children. The indispensable basis of self-education is self-knowledge. We gain self-knowledge partly by a critical survey and judgment of our own actions, and partly through the criticism that comes to us from others. Self-criticism, however, falls too easily under the spell of our personal prejudices, while criticism from others can err or be otherwise displeasing to us. At any rate, the self-knowledge that comes to us from these two sources is incomplete and confused like all human judgments, which are only rarely free from falsification through wish and fear. But is there not an objective critique that will tell us what we actually are, somewhat in the fashion, that is, of the thermometer which holds before the eyes of the fever-patient the indisputable fact that he has a temperature of exactly 39.5 degrees? In the sphere of the body we do not deny the existence of objective criteria. If, for example, we are convinced that we, like all other people, can eat strawberries without ill effects, the body may nevertheless react with a violent rash, showing us unequivocally that, despite our idea to the contrary, we have no tolerance for strawberries.

But in psychological matters it appears to us that everything is voluntary and subject to our choice. This universal prejudice arises from the fact that we tend to identify the whole psyche with the conscious phase of it. But there are innumerable and most important psychic processes which are unconscious, or only indirectly conscious. Of the unconscious we can know nothing directly, but indirectly we can receive effects that come into consciousness. If everything in consciousness appears to us as subject to our will, then apparently we can nowhere discover an objective critique by which we can test our self-knowledge. Yet there is something

independent of wish and fear, something as impersonal as a product of nature which permits us to know the truth about ourselves. This objective statement we find in a product of psychic activity to which we would least of all accord such a meaning. This is the dream.

What is the dream? The dream is a product of unconscious psychic activity that occurs during sleep. In this condition the mind is to a great extent withdrawn from our voluntary control. With the small portion of consciousness that remains to us in the dream state we can apperceive what takes place, but we are no longer in the position to guide the course of psychic events according to our wish and purpose; hence we are also robbed of the possibility of deceiving ourselves. The dream is an automatic process resting upon the independent activity of the unconscious, and is just as much removed from our conscious control as, for example, the physiological action of digestion. In it, therefore, we have an absolutely objective process from the nature of which we can draw objective conclusions about the actual situation.

Let us grant all of this, you will say, but how in the world is it possible to draw a trustworthy conclusion from the accidental and confused chaos of a dream-fiction? To this I make haste to reply that the dream is only apparently confused and accidental. On closer inspection we discover a remarkable sequence in the dream-images, not only as between themselves, but also in relation to the content of the waking consciousness. This discovery was made by a relatively simple procedure. It is as follows: The body of the dream is divided into its separate portions or images, and all the free associations with each portion of the dream are collected. In doing this, we soon become aware of an extraordinarily intimate connexion between the dream-images and the things that occupy us subjectively in the waking state, though the meaning of the connexion may not be immediately clear to us. By gathering the associations we have achieved

the preparatory portion of the dream analysis, or at any rate a most important part of it. We gain through this the so-called context of the dream-image which reveals to us all the manifold connexions of the dream with the conscious content, and shows us how the dream is interwoven in the most intimate way with all the tendencies of the personality.

When we have illuminated all sides of the dream in this way, we can then enter upon the second part of our task, namely, the interpretation of the material before us. Here as everywhere in science, we must divest ourselves as far as possible of prejudices. We must let the material speak. In very many cases the first glance at the dream and the assembled material suffices to give us, at least, an intuition of the meaning of the dream. In such cases it requires no special effort of thought for us to master the sense of the dream, but in other cases considerable labour, and the assistance of scientific experience is necessary to enable us to decipher it. Unfortunately it is impossible in this lecture to enter upon the extraordinarily far-reaching question of dream-symbolism. Massive works have already been written on the subject. In practice we cannot do without the experience stored up within these books, although, as has been said, there are many cases in which good common sense suffices.

In order to illustrate the above I will give you a brief, practical example of a dream together with its meaning.

The dreamer was an academically educated man of about fifty years of age. I knew him rather slightly, and our occasional conversations consisted mostly of humorous gibes on his part at the 'game' of dream interpretation. On one of these occasional meetings, he asked me laughingly if I were still interpreting dreams. I explained to him that he had obviously a very mistaken idea about the nature of dreams. To this he replied that he had just had a dream which I must interpret for him. I promised I would, and he told me the following dream:—

He found himself alone on a trip into the mountains. He wanted to climb a very high, steep mountain he saw towering in front of him. At first the ascent was somewhat tiresome. Then it seemed to him that the higher he climbed the more he felt himself drawn along toward the summit. Faster and faster he climbed, and gradually a sort of ecstasy came over him. It seemed to him as though he actually flew up, and when he reached the top he seemed to weigh nothing at all, and he walked off the summit into the empty air. Here he awoke.

He wanted to know what I thought of this dream. I knew that he was not only an experienced, but an ardent mountain-climber; accordingly I was not surprised to see once more a vindication of the rule, that the dream expresses itself in the language of the dreamer. Since I knew that mountaineering was such a passion with him, I encouraged him to talk about it. He took this up very eagerly and told me how he loved to go alone without a guide, because the very danger of it had a tremendous fascination for him. He also told me about several very dangerous tours in which the daring he displayed made a particular impression upon me. I wondered to myself what it could be that impelled him to seek such dangerous situations, apparently too with an almost morbid enjoyment. Evidently he had a similar thought himself, because he added, becoming at the same time more serious, that he had no fear of danger, since death in the mountains would be something very beautiful to him. This remark threw a significant light upon the dream. Obviously he sought out danger, possibly with the unconfessed idea of suicide. But why should he seek death? Only some special reason could explain this. Therefore I threw in the remark that a man in his position ought not to expose himself to such dangerous situations. To which he replied very emphatically that he would never "give up his mountains", that he had to go to them to get away from the city and his family. "This living at home does not suit me," he said. Here was

a clue to the intimate reasons of his passion. I learned from him that his marriage was a failure, and that nothing bound him to his home. Also he seemed more or less disgusted with his professional work. It occurred to me that his uncanny passion for the mountains must mean an avenue of release from an existence that had become intolerable to him. Accordingly I interpreted his dream as follows:—

Since he still clung to life in spite of his contrary desire, the ascent of the mountain was at first laborious. But the more he gave himself up to his passion, the more it lured him on and lent wings to his feet. Finally, it lured him completely out of himself, he lost all sense of bodily weight and climbed higher even than the mountain, out into empty space. Obviously this meant death in the mountains.

After a silence he said suddenly, "Well, we have talked about all sorts of other things now. You were going to interpret my dream. What do you think of it?" I told him quite frankly what I thought; namely, that he was seeking death in the mountains, and that with such an attitude he ran a great danger of actually finding death.

He replied, laughing, "But that is absurd—on the contrary, I am seeking my health in the mountains."

Vainly I tried to make him see the seriousness of the case. Half a year later in a descent from a very dangerous peak, he literally did walk off into space. He fell upon a companion standing on a ledge below him, and both fell off and were killed.

From this dream we can observe a general function of the dream. It reflects certain vital fundamental tendencies of the personality, either those whose meaning extends over the whole life, or those that are momentarily of most importance. The dream gives an objective statement of these tendencies, a statement which does not trouble itself about conscious wishes and convictions. After hearing this dream, you will, I think, agree with me that the consideration of a dream can under certain circumstances, be of inestimable

value to conscious life, even when it is not, as here, a question of life and death.

How much moral value for his practical life might not the dreamer have taken just from the knowledge of his dangerous lack of restraint !

That is why, as physicians of the mind, we have to turn back to the ancient art of dream interpretation. We have adults to educate who no longer permit themselves to be guided, like children, by authority. We have to do with men and women whose way of life is, moreover, so individual that no counsellor, be he never so competent, could prescribe for them the uniquely right way. Therefore we have to teach a man to listen to his own nature speaking, so that he can understand from within himself what is going on.

As far as the limits of a lecture make it possible, I hope to have given you a certain insight into the thought-world of analytical psychology. I, for my part, shall be satisfied if, from what I have said, you have gained something that will help you in your profession.



## ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

### LECTURE II

PSYCHOLOGY is one of the youngest sciences. The name 'psychology' has been in use for a long time, but it used to be only the title of a certain chapter of philosophy; that chapter, namely, in which the philosophizer more or less laid down the law as to what the human soul had to be, according to the premises of his own particular philosophy. I remember, as a young student, I used to enjoy the privilege of hearing from one professor how little was known about the real nature of the psychic process and from another, the precise nature of the psyche as a logical necessity.

If one studies the origins of modern psychology, one is deeply impressed by the battle that early investigators had to wage against scholastic conceptions which threatened to overwhelm them completely. The almost overpowering tenacity of mediæval dogmatism, and its opposition to the empirical method; the entrenched force of *a priori* assumptions, and the naïve acceptance of ideas solely because they had become sanctified through venerable age, naturally led the modern mind at last to a reaction. This was the materialistic period towards the end of the nineteenth century, from which we are not even yet fully liberated. The success of the empirical principle in natural science was so undeniable that the splendour of its victory extended even into materialistic philosophy, which, in reality, is more a psychological reaction than a justifiable scientific theory. Materialism was an exaggerated recoil from mediæval idealism, and has nothing in common with the empirical method.

Naturally, therefore, modern empirical psychology drew

its first breath in a mental atmosphere permeated by materialistic notions. It became a physiological psychology, thoroughly empirical in its experimental basis, viewing the psychic process exclusively from without, and chiefly in respect to its physiological manifestations. Such a state of things was entirely satisfactory, so long as psychology belonged to the department of philosophy or to that of the natural sciences. So long as it was kept within the confines of the laboratory, psychology could remain purely experimental, and could regard the psychic process entirely from the outside. Thus instead of the old scholastic psychology we had a new psychology no less academical in its origins.

But the tranquillity of the academic laboratory was soon to be disturbed by the demands of those who needed a psychology for the purpose of applying it to human problems. These intruders were the doctors. The neurologist as well as the alienist is concerned with psychical disorders, and therefore feels the urgent need of a psychology applicable to these maladies. Quite independently of academical psychology, medical men had already discovered an avenue to the human mind, and to a psychological treatment of its disorders. This was hypnotism, which evolved out of what had been called 'mesmerism' in the latter part of the eighteenth century, and 'animal magnetism' in the beginning of the nineteenth. The development of hypnotism, represented by such names as Charcot and Bernheim, went on to a medical psychology represented by Pierre Janet. Another pupil of Charcot, Freud in Vienna, applied the hypnotic method at first very much in the same way as Janet, but he soon came to different results. While Janet remained mostly experimental and descriptive, Freud went further and deeper into matters that seemed negligible to the medical science of those days; namely, into the patient's morbid phantasy and its activity in the subconscious strata of the mind. It would be unjust to imply that Janet had overlooked this; indeed, the contrary is the case. It is just his greatest merit that he

showed the existence and importance of subconscious processes in the psychic anatomy of nervous and mental disorders. Freud's particular merit is not the discovery of the fact of subconscious activity, but the revealing of the true nature of those subconscious activities, and, above all, the working out of a practical method of bringing these hidden contents to light.

Working independently, I had approached the problem of a practical psychology *via* the experimental laboratory, applying chiefly the so-called association-method. As Freud made the patient's morbid phantasy, previously neglected, his especial field of research, so I made a particular study of the reasons why the persons tested made certain mistakes in the course of the association-experiments. I discovered that these mistakes and failures on the part of the person tested were due to the operation of unconscious processes, which I called affective complexes. Having thus discovered practically the same psychological mechanisms as Freud, it was natural that I should become his pupil and collaborator during many years. While we agreed as to facts, I did not conceal my doubts regarding the validity of his sex-theory; and, on account of what seemed to me regrettable dogmatism on Freud's part, I had to sever my way from his. My scientific conscience would not allow me to subscribe to an almost fanatical doctrine, based upon a one-sided and, therefore, false interpretation of the facts.

While Freud shares the discovery of the importance of the unconscious in the causation and structure of neuroses and psychoses, his great and unique merit, to my mind, lies in his discovery of a method of dream interpretation—or, rather let us say, in the courage of his attempt to open the secret doors of the dream. I do not believe that the last word about the dream has been said by Freud. But the discovery that the dream has a meaning, and that there exists an avenue to its understanding, is surely the foundation of this remarkable edifice called psycho-analysis. I do not wish to belittle

Freud in any way (as is sometimes assumed), but I should be glad if I could do justice to all who have struggled with the great problems of medical psychology, and who have contributed the fruits of their life work, without which neither Freud nor myself would have been able to accomplish our tasks. Thus Pierre Janet, Auguste Forel, Theodor Flournoy, Morton Prince, Eugen Bleuler, deserve gratitude and remembrance whenever we speak of the origins of the new medical psychology.

The insight we have obtained through the methods and theories of analytical psychology have revealed the remarkable fact that the functional neuroses, as well as many psychoses, are caused by unconscious psychic contents; and when we understand the nature of those contents we can also understand how the disease came about. The value of this discovery is as great as the discovery of the specific microbes of tuberculosis, or other common infectious diseases. Moreover, besides the strictly medical significance of analytical psychology, the psychology of the normal has been enormously enriched. The understanding of dreams has opened up an almost limitless vista of the development of consciousness out of the remotest and darkest depths of the unconscious, and the practical application of the analytic method has enabled us to analyse and discriminate typical functions and attitudes in the conduct of the normal individual. In so far as psycho-analysis is a curative medical method, it concerns itself with abnormal cases and should be reserved for the physician. But dream psychology, studied for the light it throws upon normal human conduct, will be of ever increasing interest to thoughtful people generally, and especially to parents and teachers. Although the latter—if he be conscientious—ought in addition to have enough knowledge of pathology and analytical technique to recognize ordinary types of abnormality among children. Abnormality and disease are not far apart; and while the normal child is easier to understand it is the abnormal who most needs

to be understood and who of course is most often misunderstood.

There are five groups of disorders of which every teacher should be aware.

First, the mentally defective child. The most frequent case is the idiot or imbecile, characterized chiefly by low intelligence and a general incapacity of understanding.

The most obvious type is the phlegmatic, slow, dull, unemotional child. The less obvious and rarer type is the excitable, very active, and irritable child whose mental incapacity is as indubitable as that of the former class, though often markedly one-sided. From these congenital and practically incurable, though not ineducable, forms we must differentiate the child with arrested mental development. The latter's development is very slow, at times almost imperceptible, and it often needs the expert diagnosis of an experienced alienist to distinguish the trouble from idiocy. Very often such children react emotionally like imbeciles. I was once consulted about a boy six years old, who suffered from attacks of terrible rage, during which he destroyed his toys and menaced his nurse and his parents in an almost dangerous way. Moreover, he 'refused to speak', as his parents put it. He was a small child, well-fed, but impossibly suspicious, malicious, obstinate, and self-willed. Obviously he was idiotic, and was simply unable to speak. He never had learned. But his idiocy was not bad enough to explain his inability to speak. His general conduct pointed to a neurosis. Whenever a young child exhibits the symptoms of a neurosis, we should not waste too much time in exploring the child's unconscious mind. We should begin our researches elsewhere, commencing with the mother; for almost invariably the parents are either the immediate cause of the child's neurosis, or they are at least the most important element in the neurosis. Thus in the case just mentioned, I found that the child was the only boy among several girls. The mother was a self-willed and very ambitious woman, and

when a doctor informed her that her only boy was a defective, she took what he said as a piece of outrageous behaviour on the doctor's part. She completely repressed the idea that her boy could be a failure. He simply had to be intelligent; and if he was stupid it must be because of an evil will and malicious obstinacy. Of course the boy learned far less than he would have done had he had the good luck to possess a reasonable mother: in fact, he learned nothing at all. And, moreover, he became precisely what his mother's own stubborn ambition attributed to him; namely, maliciously stubborn and 'bad'. Quite misunderstood, and therefore isolated within himself, he developed his fits of rage out of sheer despair. I saw another boy of fourteen in much the same family environment. He killed his stepfather with an axe during a paroxysm of rage. He also had been overstrained.

. Arrested mental development not infrequently occurs among first-born children, and among children of parents separated by psychic incompatibilities. It may also result from diseases of the mother during pregnancy, from prolonged labour, giving rise to abnormal hæmorrhage and undue compression of the skull in delivery. Mentally arrested children, if not ruined by educational forcing, normally attain a full mental maturity in the course of time, though it may be later than with ordinary children.

The second group comprises the morally defective children. In the case of moral insanity the disorder is as a rule congenital, or due to organic destruction of parts of the brain by trauma or disease. Such cases are incurable. These children often become criminals. They are the 'born criminals'.

From this group you should carefully distinguish the morally arrested child, the pathological, autoerotic type—using the word in the broad sense of unhealthily self-centred, and not in a narrow sexual sense. These cases often show an almost uncanny egotism and premature sex activity; in addition they are untruthful and unreliable, and almost

completely lacking in human feeling and love. Often these are illegitimate or adopted children, who have never been warmed and nourished by the psychic atmosphere of a real father and mother. They suffer from the almost organic lack of something which every child needs as a vital necessity. Many children can adapt themselves to foster parents, but not all; and those who cannot, develop a most self-centred and ruthlessly egotistical attitude, with the unconscious purpose of getting some sort of satisfaction through themselves in place of that which real parents might have given them. Such cases are by no means incurable. I saw a boy who violated his four year old sister when he himself was seven, who tried to kill his father when he was nine, but who at the age of eighteen was developing into satisfactory normality, despite a diagnosis of incurable moral insanity.

The third group consists of epileptic children—unfortunately not rare. It is of course easy to recognize a true epileptic attack; but what is called *petit mal* is often a most obscure and involved condition. For there are no obvious attacks, only very peculiar and often almost imperceptible alterations of consciousness which, nevertheless, lead eventually to the characteristic mentality of the epileptic, with his irritability, ferocity, greediness, his sticky sentimentality, his pathological love of justice, his egotism, and his dire poverty of interests. It is of course impossible to make you acquainted with all the manifold forms of epileptic conditions; but, in order to give you an idea of the symptomatology of such a case, I shall mention a young boy who began to behave strangely when he was about seven years old. The first thing to be noticed was that occasionally he used abruptly to disappear, later to be found hidden in the cellar or some dark corner of the attic. It was impossible to get him to explain why he ran away and hid so suddenly. Sometimes he would run hurriedly from his play and bury his face in his mother's skirts. At first these things happened rarely, and no attention was paid to them. But when he

began to do the same thing in school, where he would suddenly leave his seat and run to the teacher, his family became alarmed. Nobody, however, thought of the possibility of serious disease. Occasionally, he also used to stop short for a few seconds in the course of his playing, or even in the midst of a sentence, without an explanation, and apparently without even knowing that the lapse had occurred. He developed a rather disagreeable and irritable character. Sometimes he had fits of rage, in one of which he threw a pair of scissors at his little sister with such force that one of the points pierced the bone of the skull just above the eyes, almost killing her. As the parents did not think of consulting an alienist, his disease remained unrecognized, and he was treated as a bad boy. In his twelfth year he had his first observed epileptic fit, and it was only then that his case was understood. Despite great difficulties I was able to find out from the boy that when he was about six he began to be seized with fits of panic terror, as if someone unseen were present. Soon he came to see a short man with a beard, a man he had never seen before, but whose features he could describe with great detail. This man appeared abruptly to him and frightened him so much that he ran away. It was quite difficult to discover why this man was so terrifying: the boy was obviously deeply disturbed about something, which he treated as a dreadful secret. It took me many hours to win his confidence, so that he would confess to me. Then he said, "That man was trying to make me take something terrible from him. I can't tell you what it was. It was awful! He came nearer and nearer, and insisted more and more that I must take it. But I was so frightened I always ran away. I did not take it." As he said this he turned pale, and began to tremble with fear. When at last I succeeded in calming him down he said, "It was a sin."

"But what kind of sin?" I asked.

The boy stood up, looked suspiciously all about him, then almost whispered, "It was murder."



When he was nine years old, as I mentioned before, he had nearly killed his sister. Afterwards the attacks of fear continued, but the vision changed. The terrible man did not return. But the figure of a nun appeared, a sort of nurse. At first her face was veiled, but later unveiled, revealing a most terrifying expression, a pale, deathlike face. Between nine and twelve he was haunted by this figure. The fits of rage, despite increased irritability, ceased; but the manifest epileptic attacks began in their stead. Clearly the vision of the nurse meant the conversion of the incompatible criminal tendency, symbolized by the bearded man, into obvious disease.

Occasionally such cases are still mainly functional, *i.e.* non-organic, so that something may be done for them through analytical treatment. That is why I have mentioned this case in some detail. It may show you what sort of things may be going on behind the scenes in a child's mind.

The fourth group is formed by the neurotic children. It is of course quite beyond the scope of a single lecture to give you even an approximate idea of the abundance of symptoms and forms of the neurosis of childhood. Anything may be found between abnormally naughty behaviour and fully declared hysterical states and paroxysms. The disturbance can be apparently physical, as for instance hysterical fever or abnormally low temperature, spasms, lameness, pain, troubles of digestion and so on; or it can be mental and moral, in the form of excitement or depression, lying, sexual perversions, stealing, and so forth. I remember a very young girl who had suffered from the most obstinate constipation since the first year of her life. She had already undergone every imaginable and unimaginable physical treatment. All had been useless, because the doctors had overlooked the one important factor in that child's life, which was a psychical one, namely, her mother. When I saw the mother and realized that she was the effective cause, I suggested treatment for her, advising her at the same time to leave the child alone.

Somebody else replaced the mother, and the very next day the trouble was gone. The solution of this problem was simple. The girl was the youngest child, the pet of a neurotic mother. The mother embodied all her phobias in the child; she surrounded her with so much care and anxiety that the girl was never free from a state of apprehension and tension. And such a condition is, as you know, most unfavourable for the peristaltic function.

The fifth group comprises the various forms of insanity. Although such cases are not frequent among children, there are to be found at least the first stages of that morbid mental disposition that later on, after puberty, develops into *dementia præcox* in all its manifold forms. As a rule these children show a strange and bizarre behaviour: they are incomprehensible, often inaccessible, hypersensitive, shut in, emotionally abnormal in the sense of being either indifferent, or extremely explosive over trifling causes.

I examined a boy of fourteen, in whom sexual activity had begun suddenly and somewhat prematurely in a rather disquieting way, disturbing his sleep and general health. The trouble began when the boy went to a dance where a certain girl refused to dance with him. He was very angry and left the dance. When he reached home he tried to learn his school lessons; but he found that study was impossible on account of an increasing and indescribable emotion in which fear, rage, and despair were combined. More and more this emotion took hold of him, until at last he ran out into the garden, where he rolled upon the ground in an almost unconscious condition. After a couple of hours the emotion passed and the sexual trouble began. This is a typical pathological emotion characteristic of children with a bad inheritance. There were several cases of *dementia præcox* in this boy's family.

It is my conviction that it is absolutely necessary for any teacher, who would like to apply the principles of analytical psychology in dealing with the children in his

charge, to gain first a knowledge of the psychopathology of childhood and of the dangers of such pathological conditions as I have mentioned. Unfortunately, there are books about psycho-analysis that give the reader the impression that it is all very simple, and that the best of results are to be obtained by any tiro. No competent alienist can endorse such superficial notions, and no warning can be too emphatic against unskilled and frivolous attempts to analyse children. It is beyond question, that it is of the greatest value to the teacher to know what modern psychology has contributed to the understanding of the child-mind. But anyone who wishes to apply analytical methods to children should be thoroughly informed of the pathological conditions he may have to deal with. I must confess that I do not see how anyone, except a responsible physician, can dare to analyse children without a specialist's assent and coöperation.

For, to analyse a child is a most difficult and delicate task. The conditions under which we have to work are altogether different from those that govern the analysis of adults. As I pointed out in my lecture at the Territet Congress, the child has a peculiar mentality. As its body during the embryonic period is a part of the mother's body, so its mind is for many years a part of the parents' mental atmosphere. This explains why so many neuroses of children are rather symptoms of the parents' mental condition than a genuine disease of the child. Only a very little of the child's psychic life is independent : most of it is drawn directly from the parents. Such dependence is natural, and the natural growth of the child's mind is injured by any disturbance of it. You can imagine that a premature and indelicate illumination of sexual facts, coming from a stranger, can have a disastrous effect upon a child's relations with his parents. And such an effect is almost inevitable when you apply a strictly Freudian analysis, which—let it be said most emphatically—is exclusively a sex-analysis, based upon the dogma that the relation of mother and child is necessarily sexual.

Of course any Freudian will assure you that he does not mean coarse sexuality, but 'psycho-sexuality'—an unscientific and logically unjustifiable extension of a concept over an area of facts beyond the applicability of sex terminology. A child's regressive tendency can be designated an 'incestuous craving for the mother' only figuratively, just as the primitive mind can express almost anything by a sexual or any other metaphor, and just as we ourselves can designate any strong attachment to anything as a 'marriage'. So too with the term 'Œdipus complex': this is merely figurative, a *façon de parler*, and should never be mistaken for a scientific term. The word 'incest' has a definite meaning, and designates a definite thing, and may be applied—though only metaphorically—to an adult who is psychically unable to link up his sexuality with its proper object. But to apply the same term to a child's difficulties in the development of consciousness is worse than absurd.

My statement does not deny that pathological sex-prematurity exists. But such cases are decidedly morbid exceptions; and nothing can justify the spreading of the concepts of pathology over the area of normal facts. As it is not justifiable to call blushing a skin disease, or joy a maniacal fit, so cruelty is not necessarily sadism, pleasure is not necessarily lust, and firmness is not necessarily sex-repression.

In studying the history of the human mind one is impressed again and again by the fact that the growth of the mind is the widening of the range of consciousness, and that each step forward has been a most painful and laborious achievement. One could almost say that nothing is more hateful to man than to give up even a particle of his unconsciousness. Ask those who have tried to introduce a new idea! Man—even the supposedly mature man—is deeply afraid of the unknown. The *horror novi* is one of the most striking elements of primitive life, and clearly is a normal brake upon adventuring. Why, then, should not a child hesitate to put its

foot forward into the unknown? It is the too close adherence to the parents that is unnatural and morbid, because the child's too great fear of the unknown is itself equally morbid. Therefore it is one-sided reasoning to say that hesitation in the advance is necessarily a sex-dependence on the parents. Often it may be simply a *reculer pour mieux sauter*.

Even in cases where children do exhibit sexual symptoms—where, in other words, the 'incestuous' tendency is obvious—I should advise careful examination of the parents' mentality. One finds astonishing things: for instance, a father unconsciously in love with his own daughter, a mother unconsciously flirting with her own son, thus imparting under cover of unconsciousness their own adult emotions to their children, who, again unconsciously, act the parts attributed to them. Unless diseased, children play these strange and unnatural rôles only when they are unconsciously forced into them by their parents' attitude. Let me illustrate what I mean by a case.

There was a family with four children, three daughters and one son. All four had been neurotic ever since childhood. They showed many symptoms of neurosis even before puberty. I omit unnecessary details, as I propose to describe the fate of that family only in its outlines.

The first daughter, when she was nineteen fell in love with a very nice and decent young man, and intended to marry him. Although she loved him very much, she never allowed him to kiss her. But at the same time, she became fascinated by an uneducated sensual man whom she did not respect at all. In fact, she despised him. Nevertheless she had sexual relations with him. After a couple of months she could no longer stand the tension, and she broke down with a very serious form of neurosis.

The second daughter was rather flirtatious. She declined a serious offer of marriage when she was twenty-two. Then she began a strange career: she flirted particularly with married men, upsetting and seducing them whenever she could.

The son was a typical psychasthenic neurotic, a woman-hater who seriously planned never to marry, meanwhile clinging to his mother in the most sentimental way.

The third daughter accepted an offer of marriage, then instantly fell into a very peculiar state of mental confusion with hallucinations. When, six weeks later, she came out of this state she decided to marry another man whom she already knew. Several months later she married this second man, and thereupon immediately fell in love with her husband's best friend. He felt it, resisted the fact, and avoided being alone with her. But on one occasion, finding herself alone with him, she asked him to kiss her. Instead, he rather awkwardly made for the door, and escaped. Thereupon she immediately became insane and had to be confined in an asylum, where she remained for two years.

I was professionally engaged upon all four cases. The history of every case pointed back unmistakably to a secret of the mother. Eventually I learned the mother's story. When she was a young wife she fell in love with her husband's best friend, and he fell in love with her. They never confessed their love to each other, but kept at a safe and irreproachable distance. Thus it came about that the friend remained a bachelor and she remained with her husband, staying mainly for the sake of the children. Naturally such a condition could not fail to create a very morbid atmosphere in the home; and nothing influences children more than such background facts, of which no word is ever spoken. They have an absolutely contagious effect upon the attitude of the children. In this example the daughters imitated the mother's attitude unconsciously, while the son compensated it by remaining, as it were, an unconscious lover, with a compensatory conscious contempt of women.

You can realize that, in actual practice, it is not quite simple to deal with such cases. It would be a great mistake to assume that a merely intellectual enlightenment could relieve the situation. There is no technique that could

blast away such heavy blocks. The outcome rests with each individual's life philosophy and its supreme ideals, or upon its customary inadequacy, rather than upon any psychotherapeutic technique. Because the treatment of every serious case leads into a supreme conflict beyond the efficacy of any technique whatever, nobody should play with analysis as with an easy tool. Those who write superficial and cheap books about the subject are either unconscious of the far-reaching effects of analytical treatment, or else they are ignorant of the real nature of the human soul.

## ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION

### LECTURE III

Scientific psychology has been either a physiological psychology, or else a rather unorganized accumulation of researches and observations concerning isolated facts and functions. Certainly Freud's exaggerated sex-hypothesis has been a liberating push towards a psychology of psychic complexities. His work is really a psychology of the ramifications of the sex-instinct in the human psyche. But despite the undeniable importance of sex, it should not be assumed that anything and everything depends upon that instinct. Such a broad hypothesis works like coloured spectacles which obliterate every other shade of colour so that you see only red. It is therefore a significant fact that Freud's first pupil, Adler, made an entirely different hypothesis of equally wide applicability. The Freudians usually fail to recognize Adler's merits, as they make a fanatical creed of their sex-hypothesis. But dogmatism and fanaticism are always compensations for hidden doubt. Religious persecutions take place only where heresy is a menace.

There is no instinct in man that is not balanced by another instinct. Sex would be absolutely unchecked in man, if there were not a balancing factor in the form of an equally important instinct destined to counteract an unrestrained and therefore destructive functioning of the sex-instinct. As sex is a force

swaying man with compelling impulses, there is also a natural power of self-assertion and integration in him that helps him to resist any kind of emotional explosion. Even among primitive races we find severe restrictions put upon the sex-instinct as upon other instincts as well. Any restriction of the blind operation of the instinct of sex is derived from the instinct of self-preservation, which is practically Adler's hypothesis. Unfortunately, Adler again goes too far, neglecting Freud's point of view almost entirely, and thus falls into the same error of one-sidedness and exaggeration. His psychology is the psychology of the ramifications of the impulse of self-preservation in the human psyche. It is, I admit, no small undertaking to reconcile Freud and Adler, and I fully understand why, human nature being what it is, a definite, one-sided theory seems preferable to the ever-changing aspect of truth. But nevertheless we should be able to gaze steadfastly upon this changing face of truth; for otherwise we are no psychologists, but mere chemists of the psyche. We ought to be able to recognize and to admit that much in the psyche really depends on sex, at times even everything, but that at other times little depends on sex, and nearly everything comes under the factor of self-preservation, or the power-instinct, as Adler calls it. Freud's mistake, as well as Adler's, lies in this: each naïvely assumes the continuous operation of a single instinct, as though it were a chemical constituent, always there and always of the same quantity, like the two hydrogen atoms in water. If that were the case, certainly man would be sexual, as Freud says he is, and intent upon power, as Adler describes him. But in life one of the two has to give way, as man cannot be both at the same time. That is, they act according to the principle: "*ôte-toi que je m'y mette!*" The two theories would be irreconcilable if we were to regard the instincts as fixed elements in the compound called the psyche. But why should we view the psyche as if it were a chemical body? Everybody knows that instincts vary a great deal



in strength. At times sex is dominant, at other times self-assertion or some other instinct. That is the simple fact, but both explorers have completely overlooked it. When sex prevails, everything becomes sexualized, as everything then either expresses or serves the sexual purpose. When hunger prevails, practically everything has to be explained in terms of desire for food. Why do we say, 'Don't take him seriously—it is his bad day'? Because we know that even a bad mood can alter a man's psychic reactions, at times most profoundly. *A fortiori*, this is even more the case when very powerful instincts are involved. Thus we can easily reconcile Freud with Adler when we consider the psyche not as a rigid and unalterable system, but as an extremely movable or fluid activity, changing kaleidoscopically in accordance with the predominant psychic content. In this way it may happen that we have to explain a certain individual on the basis of Freud's theory before the wedding, and afterwards rather according to Adler, which common sense has done long ago.

Such a reconciliation, however, leaves us in a rather disquieting situation. Instead of enjoying apparent security in a single so-called truth, we feel thrown out into an indefinite sea of ever-shifting basic conditions, where the helpless individual is tossed incessantly from change to change. To recognize the psyche's protean life and constant metamorphoses is to admit a truth less comfortable than a one-sided theory that stands secure in its rigidity. It makes the problems of psychology less simple. Yet we are liberated from the incubus of 'nothing but', which is the inevitable *leitmotif* of each one-sided view. As soon as the discussion becomes entangled with the problem of instinct, things become painfully intricate and involved. How shall we discriminate instincts? How many instincts are there? What are instincts after all? Thus you are involved in biological questions, and become more bewildered than ever. I should, therefore, advise restriction to the psychological sphere,

without any assumptions as to the nature of the underlying biological phenomena. Perhaps the day will dawn when the biologist, and maybe even the physiologist also, will shake hands with the psychologist at the point where those tunnels meet that each is digging through the mountain of the unknown. But that time has not yet come. In the meantime, we should learn to become a little more modest in the face of psychological facts; instead of knowing exactly that certain things are 'nothing but' sexuality, or 'nothing but' will to power, we should take them more on their face value. Take, for instance, a religious experience. Can science be sure that there is no such thing as a religious instinct? Can we safely assume that the religious phenomenon is always a secondary function, based upon the repression of sex? Can anyone show us those 'normal' peoples or races which are free from such a foolish repression. But if it should chance that no one is able to point to that race, or at least to those tribes among whom religious phenomena are entirely absent, then I really do not know whence one derives a justification for the assumption that the religious phenomenon is 'nothing but' a repression of sex? And, moreover, has not history provided us with plenty of instances in which sex is even an integral part of the religious experience? So is it with art, which also is attributed to sexual repression, although even animals have æsthetic and artistic instincts. This ridiculous and almost pathological exaggeration of the importance of sex is in itself a symptom of a contemporaneous mental disturbance, which chiefly consists in the fact that our time has not a correct appreciation of sex. But whenever an important instinct has been undervalued, an abnormal over-valuation is bound to follow. And the more the under-valuation has been unjust, the more the subsequent over-valuation will be unsound. As a matter of fact, no moral condemnation could make sex seem so repulsive and disgusting as the obscenity and blindfold stupidity of the Freudian literature.

It amounts to nothing less than a renewed and still more formidable depreciation of sex ; and its intellectual crudeness makes scientific toleration superfluous. Thus, probably very much against the personal aspirations of Freud himself, his school is carrying on the work of repression in a most efficient way. Before Freud, nothing was allowed to be sexual ; now everything is nothing but sexual. If those who call themselves disciples of Freud were capable of a reasonable, and therefore decent, appreciation of the sex-factor, they certainly would not so depreciate it. But unconsciously they are afraid of the tremendous importance and overwhelming power of instinct, and hope to cut it down by intellectual defamation. Immense damage is done to the feelings through the Freudian doctrine, while it is just through decent feeling, and through this alone, that we can hope to advance towards the solution of the sex-problem. The sex-problem is one of the mental diseases of our time, and just because it is a disease we should not allow its sick phantasies to blindfold the eyes of science. The fact that we are somehow wrong in our present judgment of sex should not cloud our minds to such an extent that we see nothing but sex, and drag down every beauty and every value into the mire of perverted phantasy, though it is well to acknowledge the fact, that our actual mentality is somewhere wrong concerning the sex-problem. To impute to the whole world our specifically western neurosis is more than ridiculous : it is insane.

I am sorry that I have to defend science against the intrusion of a mass-neurosis. But you know as well as I do how great is the confusion of minds in these days. It is so great that even well-meaning people believe it to be their duty to talk of sex incessantly, and even to their children, in order to avoid repression. Analytical psychology has really nothing in common with all that. It is simply concerned with complex mental phenomena and their manifestations in conduct. On the one side, like any other science,

it reduces complexity to its primitive origin or elements, though it refrains from an encroachment upon the field of biology. On the other side, in harmony with the essentially purposive structure of the psyche, it tries to understand the psyche's creative functioning. The reductive or strictly analytical part has the task of establishing the principles of the structure of the human mind, and also of selecting a suitable terminology. The synthetic or constructive part tries to reconstruct conceptually the functioning of mental complexities.

The difference between this and any former psychology lies in the fact that analytical psychology does not avoid dealing with admittedly complex mental phenomena, such as the four main functions of orientation: thinking, feeling, intuition, and sensation. We admit that we do not know what these functions really are. We should like very much to know into what primitive elements feeling, for instance, could be resolved. But despite our ignorance of ultimate principles, we deal with these functions as if they were clearly definable organs of the mind. Another difference is the method of investigation. We have no academic laboratory. Our laboratory is the world. Our tests are real events of daily human life and the persons we test are our patients, relatives, friends, and—last but not least—ourselves. There are no needlepricks, artificial shocks, surprise-lights, or any of the manifold paraphernalia of laboratory experiment; but there are the pains and joys, the terrors and achievements of real life that provide us with our material.

Our method is the understanding of life as represented in the psyche of men. What we learn through understanding will not—it is my sincere hope—petrify into the form of an intellectual theory, but will become a tool which, through practical application, will improve its qualities so that it can serve its purpose as ideally as possible. The adjustment of human conduct is its purpose. Thus analytical psychology is eminently practical. It does not investigate for the sake

of investigation, but for the very immediate purpose of giving help. That is its striking peculiarity. We could as well say that abstract science is its by-product, not its main purpose, which is again a great difference from what one understands by an academic science.

It is obvious that the purpose and innermost meaning of this new psychology is medical as well as educational, and therefore it must be as individual and as experimental as possible. The investigation of truth begins with each case anew, because any living truth is individual and not to be derived from any previously established formula. Each individual is an experiment of everchanging life, and an attempt at a new solution or new adaptation. We miss the most important values of an individual psyche when we interpret it on the basis of any fixed theory, no matter how customary and accepted the theory may be. To the doctor this means the individual study of every case, to the teacher, the individual study of every pupil. I do not mean to say that you should begin each investigation from the very bottom. Inasmuch as you already understand, you need no investigation. I speak of understanding only in so far as your patient or your child can agree with your interpretation; understanding that goes beyond the capacity of your hearer is an unsafe business for both. It might be relatively safe with a child, but with an adult of a certain mental maturity it surely is not. In any case of disagreement you must be ready to drop all your theories for the one purpose of finding the truth. As the truth is often hidden from the patient as much as from you, different techniques have been evolved, to open up any avenue to the unknown psychic contents. I say 'unknown' intentionally; I do not say 'repressed' because I think it is altogether wrong to assume that whenever a content is unknown it is necessarily repressed. The analyst therefore who tries to assume the rôle of one who has foreknowledge of the patient's unknown psychic contents is making a serious mistake. Such an

assumption anticipates the patient and will most likely suppress the truth in him. In any event, anticipation takes the wind out of his sails, and he naturally comes to prefer hearing his truth from you. But thus nobody gains. Moreover, you undermine the patient's mental independence, a most precious quality that should on no account be injured. One really cannot be careful enough, as people are most incredibly eager to get rid of themselves, enslaving themselves to strange gods as soon as occasion offers.

There are four methods of investigating the unknown in a patient :

1. The first and simplest method is the association method. I do not think I need go into details, for this method has been known for twenty years. Its principle is the finding out of the main complexes through irregularities in responding to selected stimulus-words. As an introduction to mental analysis, and to the knowledge of the symptomatology of complexes, the method is to be recommended for a beginner. You will find the necessary details in my book, *Studies in Word Association*.

2. The second method of symptom analysis has a merely historical value and was given up by Freud, its originator, long ago. By means of hypnotic suggestion the attempt was made to get the patient to reproduce the memories underlying certain pathological symptoms. The method works very well in all those cases where a shock, a psychic wound or trauma, is the chief cause of the neurosis. It was on this method that Freud founded his earlier trauma-theory of hysteria. But since most of the cases of hysteria are not of traumatic origin, this theory was soon discarded along with its method of investigation. In a case of shock, the method can have a therapeutic effect through the so-called 'abreaction' of the traumatic contents. During and after the war this method has been of use in the treatment of shell-shock and similar troubles.

3. The third method of anamnestic analysis is of greater

importance, both as a method of investigation and of therapeutics. It practically consists in a careful anamnesis, or reconstruction of the historical development of a neurosis. The material you get in this way is a series of facts, more or less connected, according to the patient's ability to recall the incidents of the story. He naturally omits many details which either seem unimportant to him, or which he has forgotten altogether. The experienced analyst, knowing the general course of neurotic development, puts questions to the patient by the aid of which some of the gaps can be filled up. Often such a procedure alone can be of great practical value, as it enables the patient to understand the main features of his neurosis, and this prepares him for an eventual decisive change of attitude. It is, of course, unavoidable as well as indispensable that the analyst does not only question, but that he gives certain hints and explanations in order to point out the important connexions of which the patient is obviously unconscious. While acting as an officer in the Swiss Army Medical Corps, I often had occasion to apply this kind of analytical method. For instance, a recruit nineteen years old reported sick with pains in the back. When I saw the young man he told me at once that he suffered from inflammation of the kidneys, and that the pain came from that malady. I asked him how he was able to diagnose his illness so definitely, whereupon he said that an uncle of his had the same trouble and the same pains in the back. But further examination revealed no sign of any organic disease whatever. It was obviously a neurosis. I went into a careful investigation of the boy's recollections. The most important facts were that he had lost both his parents at a rather early age, and that he lived with the uncle he had just mentioned. The uncle was his dearly-loved foster-father. The day before he reported sick, he had received a letter from the uncle, telling him that he was laid up again on account of his Bright's disease. The letter affected him unpleasantly and he had thrown it away at once,

without realizing the true character of the emotion he was thus trying to suppress. This emotion was really anxiety, a great fear that his foster-father might die, recalling his grief at the loss of his parents. When this unknown dread had been brought to the surface, the boy relieved his feelings by crying, with the result that the next morning he joined the ranks again. Here was an identification with the uncle, made manifest by careful anamnesis. The realization of the suppressed emotion had a therapeutic effect.

A similar case was that of a boy, who for weeks before I saw him had been under medical treatment for stomach trouble. I suspected that he was neurotic. The anamnesis revealed the fact that his trouble had begun when he heard the news that his aunt, who was like a mother to him, had to undergo an operation for cancer of the stomach. Such simple cases of neurosis are quite frequent, and are very often accessible to this anamnestic analysis, the doctor adding some good advice, or a suggestion, or an admonition, after bringing about the conscious realization.

This is the best practical method for the treatment of neurotic children. With children you cannot very well go into the unconscious through dream-analysis. In most cases you simply have to remove certain obstacles, which can be done without much technical analysis. Generally, the neurosis of a child would be a very simple matter if there were not the almost invariable connexion of the child's neurosis with a wrong attitude of the parents. This complication supports the child's neurosis against all therapeutic attempts.

4. The fourth method is the analysis of the unconscious. Despite the fact that anamnestic analysis can reveal certain facts of which the patient is unconscious, it is not what its originator would have called 'psycho-analysis'. As a matter of fact, there is a remarkable difference between the two methods. The anamnestic method, as I pointed out, deals with conscious contents, or contents ready for reproduction,



while the analysis of the unconscious begins only when the reproducible materials are exhausted. I beg to point out that I do not call this fourth method 'psycho-analysis', as I wish to leave this term entirely to the Freudians. What they understand by psycho-analysis is really sex-analysis. It is not merely a method, but a method dogmatically connected with, and based upon Freud's sex-theory. When Freud publicly declared that only what he called psycho-analysis was psycho-analysis, I had to separate my way from his, as I was unable to endorse his sex-theory. That is also the reason why I prefer to speak of this method as analysis of the unconscious. As I have just said, this method can be applied properly only when the conscious materials are exhausted. By this I mean that an analysis of the unconscious is possible only after the conscious materials have been exhaustively dealt with. The anamnestic method is really an introduction to the analysis of the unconscious. Through a careful examination of the patient's conscious you become acquainted with him, and you establish what the old hypnotists called 'rapport' with him. The personal rapport is of absolutely prime importance: it forms the only basis from which it is safe to tackle the unconscious. This is a fact very frequently neglected, and when neglected, it becomes the source of all the bad effects and dangers of the method. It is exactly like sepsis in surgery. Even the most experienced judge of human psychology cannot possibly know the psyche of another individual; and so he must depend upon goodwill, *i.e.* the good rapport with the patient, who has to inform the analyst when something goes astray. Of course, if you base your analysis upon a fixed dogma that the human mind is so-and-so, and that a neurosis is 'nothing but' this-or-that, you make your task very easy—altogether too easy, as you are most likely to pass by your patient's real mentality or to trample down his individuality. In the former case you have no effect at all, and in the latter a bad one. I have seen a good many patients injured by so-called 'psycho-analysis'.

Without exception it was from the lack of rapport that the evil took its origin. It is only the most scrupulous observation of this rule that can prevent unforeseen catastrophes. As long as you feel the human contact, the atmosphere of mutual confidence, there is no danger ; even if you have to face the terror of insanity, or the menace of death, there is still that sphere of human trust, that certainty of understanding and of being understood, that belief that both will persist, no matter how dark the way. It is by no means simple to establish such a rapport, and you cannot achieve it except by a careful comparison of your conscious standards. Mental resistance or mistrust on either side is a bad beginning. Whenever I discover the slightest trace of mistrust or resistance, I take it very seriously into consideration, in order to give the patient a chance to re-establish his rapport. The patient should always have a firm basis in his conscious relationship with his analyst, who in turn absolutely needs the rapport in order to be sufficiently informed about the patient's actual consciousness. He needs this knowledge for very practical reasons. Without it, he would not be able to understand his patient's dreams correctly. Therefore, not only in the beginning, but during the whole course of an analysis the personal rapport has to be the main object of observation, as it is the personal rapport that prevents very disagreeable surprises, as well as decidedly fatal issues. And not only that, the rapport is, above all else, the medium through which the analyst and the patient come into mental and spiritual contact. The patient gains confidence in the analyst through the rapport, and so is enabled to make the analyst's psychic values his own. He suns himself, as it were, in the analyst's commonsense, poise, and normality.

I want to give you an illustration. A young man of about thirty, obviously clever and very intellectual, came to me, not for treatment (as he said), but only in order to ask me one question. He gave me a rather voluminous manuscript, which, he said, contained the history and analysis

of his case. He called it a compulsion neurosis—quite correctly, as I saw when I read the document. It was a sort of analytical autobiography, most intelligently worked out, and showing really remarkable introspection. It was a scientific paper, based upon wide reading and accurate self-observation. I congratulated him upon his achievement, and asked him what he had really come for. He said, "Well, you have read what I have written. Can you tell me why, with all my insight, I am still as neurotic as ever? According to the theory, having recalled even my earliest experiences, I should now be cured. I have read of many people who, with infinitely less insight than I have, nevertheless were cured. Why should I be an exception? Please tell me what it is that I have overlooked, or still repress."

I was somewhat nonplussed, and admitted that, at the moment, I could see no immediate explanation of why his really marvellous introspection had not touched his neurosis. "But," I said, "allow me to ask you for more information about yourself personally." "With pleasure," he answered. So I went on, "Just a little while ago you mentioned that you passed the winter in Nice, and the summer in the Engadine. I assume you are the son of wealthy parents."

"Oh no," he said, "they are not wealthy at all."

"Then probably you have made your money yourself?"

"No," he replied smilingly.

"But, how is it then?" I asked with some hesitation.

"Oh, that does not matter," he said, "I got the money from a woman; she is thirty-six, a teacher in a public school. It's a liaison, you know," he added.

"Don't you think," I said, "that the fact that you are financially supported by a poor woman might be one of the reasons why you are not yet cured?"

But he laughed at what he called my "absurd moral intimation" which, according to his idea, had nothing to do with the structure of his neurosis.

"Moreover," he said, "I have discussed this point with her, and we both agreed that it did not matter."

Then I said: "You assume then that, on account of the fact of having discussed the situation, the other fact of being supported by a poor woman is entirely abolished? I assume you have not talked her money out of your pocket?" Whereupon he indignantly rose and left the room. He is one of those many people who believe that morality has nothing to do with psychology, and that an intentional sin is no sin, inasmuch as it has been intellectually rationalized. Obviously I had to inform my patient of my views. If we could have agreed upon them, we could have worked together. But if we had started by ignoring the impossible basis of his actual life, our work would have been useless. With such views only a criminal can adapt to life. But this patient was not criminal, he was only a modern intellectual. I believe firmly in the power and the dignity of the intellect, but feeling values count for something too. They are not mere infantile resistances. This example shows you how decisive a factor the rapport is.

When the anamnestic stage of analysis is past, which is when all the conscious material—reminiscences, questions, doubts, conscious resistances, and so on—are sufficiently dealt with, then one can proceed to the analysis of the unconscious. With this one really enters a new sphere. From now on we are concerned immediately with this new sphere, with the living psychic process, namely, with the dreams the unconscious produces.

Dreams are neither merely reproductions of the memories of the past, nor abstractions from experiences. They are the unsophisticated manifestations of the unconscious creative activity. Thus Freud's theory that dreams are wish-fulfillments fits in to a certain extent with the nature of a dream, though not completely, according to my idea. What I have seen of dreams has made me regard the dream as a compensation-function, rather than as a wish-fulfilment.

It is quite intelligible that when one ceases consciously to consider a problem, as a rule with negative result, hitherto unconscious potentialities begin to be animated, and these are the producers of dreams. I will give you an illustration: a woman fifty-four years old, but comparatively youthful in appearance, consulted me about her neurosis, which had begun about one year after her husband's death twelve years before. She suffered from a great many phobias. Of course she had a long tale to tell, from which I select only the facts that, since her husband's death, she had lived in her beautiful country home alone, her only son having lived abroad for several years. She was a narrow-minded, only superficially educated woman, who had learned practically nothing in the last forty years. Her ideals and convictions belonged to the famous period of 1870-80. She was a loyal widow, living, to the best of her ability, as though her dead husband were only temporarily absent. She could not understand in the least what the reason for her phobias could be; certainly it was no moral question, as she was a respectable member of the church! Such people as a rule believe in physical causes only—phobias have to do with the heart, the lungs, or the stomach. Strangely enough the doctors had found nothing wrong with these organs! Thus we came to an impasse, and I told her that from now on we should try to see what her dreams had to contribute to her problem. The dreams were of the snapshot character: a gramophone playing a love song; herself as a young girl, just engaged; her husband a doctor; and so on. Very clearly it was the problem of a second marriage. In the discussion of this problem I was very careful not to call such dreams 'wish-fulfillments', as the patient was already too much inclined to say of her dreams, "Oh yes, they are nothing but phantasies. One dreams such foolish stuff!" It was very important that she should seriously consider the fact that this was her problem. Her dreams were serious and purposeful, and had to be added to the other contents of consciousness, in order

to balance her blind and one-sided conscious attitude. This is a typical example of the compensatory function of dreams.

It is quite obvious that the analyst needs a fair knowledge of the patient's conscious attitude, else he has no foundation for a correct interpretation. The significance of the dreams is always relative to the attitude of the conscious. In the case just given it is of course easy to see what such dreams mean. But if a young girl, just engaged, had such dreams (as she easily might) it is certain that their meaning would be quite different. The analyst, therefore, always needs very good understanding of the patient's conscious, as it may even be that such dreams occur, and yet mean just the contrary of what they seem to suggest. Usually, it is almost impossible to interpret ordinary dreams without personal acquaintance with the dreamer. But nevertheless there are occasionally fairly readable dreams, particularly with persons who are entirely unaware of the existence of dream-interpretation. Once while travelling I was given a seat in a dining-car with two strangers. The one was a fine looking old gentleman, and the other was a middle-aged man, apparently very intelligent. From their conversation I gathered that they were military men, presumably an old general and his adjutant. After a long silence, the old man suddenly said to his companion :

“ Isn't it odd what you dream sometimes ? I had a strange dream last night. I dreamt I stood in the rank and file with many young officers, and our commander-in-chief was questioning us. Eventually he came to me, but instead of a technical question he asked me for a definition of the beautiful. I tried in vain to find a satisfactory answer, and I felt most painfully ashamed when the commander went on to the next man, who was a very young major, and asked him the same question. This man at once gave a very good answer, just the one I should have given if I had not been unable to find it. This was such a shock to me that I woke up.” Then he added suddenly, and unexpectedly

addressing me: "Do you suppose that dreams could have a meaning?"

"Well," I said, "there are certain, meaningful dreams."

"But what do you suppose such a dream could mean?" he asked sharply, with a certain nervous twitch in his face. I said:

"Did you notice anything in particular about this young major? What did he look like?"

"He looked like myself, when I was still a young major," said he.

"Well then," I said, "it looks as if you had forgotten or lost something of which you were still capable when you were a young major. Apparently the dream calls your attention to it."

He thought awhile, then he burst out, "That's it, you have it! When I was a young major, I was interested in the fine arts, but afterwards my interest was swamped in an ever-increasing flood of routine work." Then he kept absolutely silent, and nothing more was said. After dinner I had a chance to converse with the man whom I took to be the adjutant. He confirmed my guess at the old man's rank and he told me, moreover, that I had obviously touched a sore spot, as the general was known and feared as a red-tapist who meddled in even trifling matters with which he should not interfere.

For the general attitude of this man it certainly would have been better if he had kept and cultivated some outside interests, in order not to be drowned in mere routine which was neither in his own interest nor in that of his calling.

If I had analysed this officer, I should have shown him that it would be a wise course to assimilate the dream allegory. He thus would have been enabled to see his mistake, and to correct it. Dreams are of inestimable value in this respect if you can keep away from any theoretical prejudice, as for instance, that they must always have a sexual significance, or other morally incompatible contents. You even defeat your

own purpose by such theoretical anticipations, and you arouse unnecessary resistances in the patient. I do not mean to deny that there are plenty of dreams with sexual contents, but they occur only with people in whom the sex-problem is, either permanently or temporarily, predominant. You know, for instance, that when one is hungry one often dreams of meals, and to explain this otherwise than by hunger would be ridiculous. Any instinct or tendency can be predominant at certain times and can appear accordingly in the dreams.

The material you have to work with in the analysis of the unconscious does not consist of dreams only. There are products of the unconscious which one calls phantasies. Those phantasies which are forms of imaginative activity, are either products of day-dreaming or reverie, or else they are perceived by intuition as a sort of vision or inspiration. You can analyse them in the same way as you analyse dreams. There are two ways of interpreting which you apply according to the nature of the case under treatment. First, there is the so-called reductive method. Its main purpose is to find out the elementary instinctive impulses underlying the dream. Take as an example the dreams of the elderly woman I mentioned just now. Surely in that case it is most important that the dreamer should see and understand the underlying instinctive content. This she must do because she has repressed the realization of the sex-instinct. In the case of the old general, however, it would be rather artificial to speak of repression, as it is quite unlikely that he repressed his interest in the fine arts. He rather drifted away from them in the course of time. The dream interpretation in his case had a constructive purpose, as the dream was trying to add something to his conscious attitude, rounding it out as it were. But in the case of the lady the understanding of the sex-factor will have an almost caustic effect on her conscious, very old-fashioned, and narrow-minded ideals.

Thus we apply a method chiefly reductive in all cases of morbid or otherwise foolish superstructures in the conscious.



Concerning such things you may say 'nothing but'. On the other hand, we must apply a constructive method in all those cases where the conscious attitude is more or less normal, but capable of greater development and refinement. In such cases you need only build up, since pulling down would mean useless destruction. When you interpret reductively you treat the symbol very much in the way that Freud pointed out. But in applying the constructive method you follow just the opposite course. Take, for instance, the serpent symbol, frequent in mythology and in dreams. Reductively, it is nothing but a disguise of the *membrum virile*; constructively it can mean anything else, chiefly danger, as man (like the monkey and the horse) has an instinctive fear of snakes. I had a woman patient who constantly dreamt of snakes for days before she was laid up with an organic malady. It seems to me that most people who are afraid of the sex-instinct are especially likely to dream of the male sex organ under the disguise of the snake. I have often found the serpent symbol to be a direct expression of fear. And fear is, as you know, an elementary affect which cannot be reduced to sex.

Reduction leads to the historical or biological foundations, construction leads to the understanding of the purpose of a symbol. Blind and one-sided reduction can do great harm through depreciation and destruction of vital values. Indiscriminate construction can end in foolish and superstitious phantasies equally injurious to the patient. To decide when to apply the one or the other method rests with the analyst's skill and experience. Practical medicine is, and has always been an art, and the same is true of practical analysis. True art is creation, and creation is beyond all theories. That is why I say to any beginner: Learn your theories as well as you can, but put them aside when you touch the miracle of the living soul. Not theories, but your own creative individuality alone must decide.

## LECTURE IV

Through the analysis and interpretation of dreams and phantasies we try to understand the tendencies of the unconscious. When I say "tendencies of the unconscious" it sounds almost like a personification of the unconscious; that is, as if the unconscious were an autonomous factor centred in itself. But from a scientific point of view the unconscious is simply a quality of various psychic phenomena. One cannot even say what these phenomena are, and whether they are usually unconscious or not; for anything may be or can become unconscious. Anything you forget, anything from which you divert your attention until it is forgotten becomes unconscious. Anything in general that loses a certain energetic intensity becomes subliminal. When you add to your lost memories the many subliminal sense perceptions, the many subliminal and half-subliminal thoughts and feelings, then you get some idea of the upper layers of the unconscious. Such is the material you have to deal with in practical analysis. Some of these unconscious contents have the special quality of being actively repressed by the conscious. Through a more or less wilful act of diversion of attention from certain conscious contents, and through an active resistance against them, they are eventually expelled from consciousness. A continuous resistant mood of the conscious keeps those activated contents artificially below the threshold of consciousness. This particular case is a regular occurrence in hysteria. It is the beginning of the dissociation of the personality which is one of the conspicuous features of a serious case of hysteria. Despite the fact that repressions also occur in a more or less normal mentality, the absolute loss of repressed memories is pathological even when it occurs in an otherwise normal mind. The repression (or rather suppression as I would prefer to call it) is in itself a normal process which we use every day. Whenever you divert your attention in order to concentrate it upon another subject, you have to-

suppress the former contents of consciousness. And when you cannot lose sight of them you are unable to change your subject. Normally you can go back to them at any time, they remain reproducible. If they cannot be recalled, it may be a case of repression. If so, there must be some conscious interest that makes forgetting desirable. But, on the other hand, it might be a case of simple forgetting, which invariably happens when such contents are only loosely connected with other conscious contents. Normal forgetting is by far the most frequent process, while repression is an artificial loss of memory, an autohypnotic amnesia. It is not, according to my opinion, justifiable to assume that the unconscious consists of repressed materials only, or even chiefly. Think of the logical results of the assumption that the unconscious consists of repressed materials only! Then you need only to remove certain conscious resistances to make the lost memories again conscious; and through this procedure the unconscious would be completely deflated, so that it would collapse and cease to exist! More than once have I heard such naïveties.

It is true that repressed memories are very impressive contents of the unconscious, but to derive the nature of the total unconscious from the exceptional fact of repression would be quite arbitrary. You cannot envisage healthy life through the eyes of a pathologist.

The repression-theory of the unconscious is quite inadequate to explain its real nature, as it is based upon abnormal facts. The same thing that has happened to the concept of repression has occurred to the sex-theory: it has been exaggerated out of all proportion. As early as 1904 I had objected to the abuse of this term. Freud has never taken into account the fact that even important contents can disappear from consciousness without the slightest trace of repression. They automatically vanish, very much to the individual's distress, and not at all on account of a conscious interest that rejoices over the loss. I do not speak of normal forgetting which is only a very natural leakage of energetic

intensity, but I am thinking particularly of those cases in which a previously unconscious process begins to have an attractive influence on the conscious. In such a condition, any conscious contents analogous to the underlying unconscious content are liable to disappear suddenly, not by repression from above, but by attraction from below. One may even discover certain contents that were before entirely unconscious through the existence of what we might call 'holes' in the conscious. You cannot call such cases 'repressions'. It would be better to call them 'eclipses'. Naturally if you assume that the unconscious chiefly consists of repressions, then you cannot imagine any creative activity in the unconscious; and you logically arrive at the conclusion that 'eclipses' are nothing but secondary effects following a repression. But then you must also conclude that anything which the unconscious produces is nothing but a result of repression. Thus you arrive at the well-known Freudian absurdity: art and religion are nothing but substitutes for repressed infantile sexuality. It is astonishing how fairly intelligent people can quibble over such sophisticated nonsense. Apply this logic to any human invention which admittedly takes its origin in creative fantasy. Take, for instance, the notion of primitives first taking shelter under bushes and trees. Then they began to repress something, either the idea of their rather humid and airy abodes, or perhaps their infantile sexuality. Thus they found themselves lacking in a certain satisfaction, and they sought to gratify it in building huts. Thus it comes about that Westminster Abbey is nothing but a repressed infantile longing for a bush shelter. Only one does not understand how it came about that the primitive man, when he had such a longing for his dwelling-hole, could ever make up his mind to such a foolish substitution.

Why can we not simply admit as, moreover, experience shows us everyday to be the case, that the unconscious is a living, and therefore creative, process, and that it does not need any pathological repression to release its creative

function! As a matter of fact, neurosis and morbidity are proportionate to the degree of genuine repression. Ought we really to assume that all the beauty and grandeur of the works of man are nothing but poor substitutes for infantile primitiveness? Is there any reason why the Freudians should not take their own creed as such a neurotic substitution? The man who creates is not necessarily a neurotic. The more neurotic he is, the more is he a sick man. Disease never promotes creative work: on the contrary, it is the most serious obstacle to creation. No dissolution of any repression whatsoever can destroy true creativeness. And so you never can deplete the unconscious. It is the ever-creative mother of consciousness. Consciousness, which is the ego's awareness of its relatedness to what goes on within the psyche, has evolved, both in the individual and in the race, out of unconsciousness.

When you ask how consciousness arose from unconsciousness, then I must answer, that we can only infer from present experience an origin far hidden in the gulf of the past, and beyond the reach of science. I do not know whether such a conclusion is permissible, but it may have been that even in those remote times consciousness arose in much the same way as it arises to-day. There are two distinct ways in which we see consciousness come about. The one is a moment of high emotional tension comparable to that scene in Wagner's *Parsifal*, where Parsifal, in the instant of greatest temptation, suddenly realizes the meaning of Amfortas' wound. The other way is a contemplative condition, where representations move like dream-images. Suddenly an association between two apparently disconnected and remote representations takes place, through which a great amount of latent energy may be released. Such a moment is a sort of revelation. In each case it is a concentration of energy, arising from an external or internal stimulus, that brings about consciousness. Many, but not all, of the early infantile memories retain the traces of such sudden flares of consciousness. Like so-called

historical accounts coming down from very ancient times, some are traces of real facts and some are purely mythical. In other words some were of objective, some of subjective origin. The latter are often highly symbolical, and of great importance for the later psychic life of the individual. Most of the early impressions in life are soon forgotten and go to form the infantile layer of what I call the personal unconscious. There are definite reasons why I divide the unconscious into two parts. The personal unconscious contains everything forgotten, or repressed, or otherwise subliminal that has been acquired by the individual consciously or unconsciously. Such materials have an unmistakably personal stamp. But other contents are to be found, often enormously strange to the individual, and bearing scarcely a trace of personal quality. You may discover such materials frequently in insanity, where they contribute not a little to the confusion and disorientation of the patient. In dreams of normal people such strange contents also occasionally appear. When you analyse a neurotic patient, and compare his unconscious material with that of a case of dementia præcox, you at once feel the striking difference. With the neurotic, almost all the material produced is of a personal origin, and his thoughts and feelings move in the sphere of his family and his set. But in a case of insanity very often the personal memories disappear behind collective representations of a most dynamic character. The madman hears the voice of God speaking to him; his vision shows him cosmic revolutions, and it is as though a veil had been drawn away from a world of ideas and emotions hitherto concealed. He suddenly begins to talk of ghosts, demons, witchcraft, and secret magical persecutions. It is not difficult to define what world these belong to: it is the world of the primitive mind which is deeply unconscious in cultured moderns so long as they are normal, but which rises to the surface when something fatal happens to the conscious. This I call the collective unconscious. 'Collective' because it is not an individual acquisition, but rather the

functioning of the inherited brain structure, which, in general, is the same in all human beings, and, in certain respects, is even the same in all mammals. The inherited brain is the result of the ancestral psychic life. It consists of the structural deposits of psychic activities repeated innumerable times in the lives of our ancestors. Our individual conscious is a superstructure upon the collective unconscious, and usually its influence on the conscious is subtle and almost imperceptible. Only at times does it appear in our dreams; and whenever it does, it produces strange and marvellous dreams, remarkable for their beauty, or their demoniacal horror, or for their enigmatic wisdom. People often hide such dreams as precious secrets and they are quite right in doing so, for they have an enormous importance for the individual's psychic balance. Even though they are beyond the individual's mental range, and may never be quite understood, they stand out as spiritual landmarks. It is hopeless to interpret such dreams reductively, as their real value and meaning lies in themselves: they are spiritual experiences that defy any attempt at rationalization. In order to illustrate what I mean, let me tell you the dream of a young theological student. I do not know the dreamer himself, so that my personal influence is excluded.

He dreamt that he stood before a beautiful and shining priestly figure called the white magician, his master, whose disciple he felt himself to be. The master was clad in a long black robe. He was kindly though austere, and the disciple worshipped him. Then there came another figure, the black magician, who wore a white robe. He also was very beautiful and radiant, and the dreamer admired him too. Evidently the black magician wished to talk to the master, but he hesitated to do so in the presence of the disciple. The master said to him: 'Speak, he is an innocent.' Then the black magician began to tell a strange tale of how he had chanced to find the lost keys of paradise, and did not know how to use them. He came, he said, to the white magician,

to ask for an explanation of the secret of the keys. He explained that the king of his country had been seeking a suitable burial monument for himself. By chance some of his subjects had dug up an old sarcophagus, containing the mortal remains of a virgin. The king opened the sarcophagus, threw out the bones, and had the empty sarcophagus reburied to preserve it for later use. But these bones on being exposed to the daylight became reanimated and took the form of a black horse that ran away to the desert. The black magician followed the horse across and beyond the desert; and there, after many vicissitudes and difficulties, he found the lost keys to paradise. Here ended his story. But the white magician remained silent. And here the dream ended.

I think such a dream can help you to realize the difference between the ordinary personal dream and the dream that has the value of an inestimably important spiritual experience. Anybody with an open mind can feel a weighty meaning in this dream without any analysis or interpretation. Such a dream, you will certainly agree, obviously arises from a deeper level than the ordinary, current dreams.

Obviously we are here touching problems of vast importance, and we feel tempted to dwell upon this subject for a while. But as *Candide* says, "*Il faut cultiver notre jardin.*" Our dream is a pure example of the depths below the personal unconscious. In the Freudian doctrine the collective unconscious has no place. But I hold that, in treating the problems of an individual mind, you must not close your eyes to the fact that it consists largely of inherited elements. And it is only heredity that can explain the astonishing analogies between mythology on the one hand, and dreams and delusions on the other. It is true that the collective unconscious becomes apparent only when some unusual condition releases its independent activity. When insanity threatens, or when the way of life forks before us, and we are confronted with the necessity of making an irrevocable choice, and also in moments of great danger, these super-personal figures of our own fate come to tap us gently on the



shoulder. Such a dream from the collective unconscious is in the nature of a *memento mori*. But to many sane people these veiled intimations of eternal things appear in a grotesque light, especially when contrasted with the multitude who are frittering their lives away in the arid futilities of routine work or amusement seeking.

The collective unconscious is a problem that seldom enters into practical work with children. Obviously their problem is adaptation to a very personal reality. They need, above all else, consciousness; and their connexion with primordial unconsciousness has to be severed, because its persistence would be a formidable obstacle to the evolution of consciousness. But if I were discussing the psychology of people beyond middle life, I should have a good deal more to say about the significance of the collective unconscious. You should always bear in mind that our psychology varies not only according to the momentary predominance of a certain impulse, but also according to the individual's phase of life. You should be careful, therefore, not to attribute an adult's psychology to a child. You must not treat a child as you would an adult. Above all, the work can never be as systematic as with the adult; for a real, systematic dream-analysis is hardly possible. Moreover it is undesirable, since manifestations of the unconscious should not be called to the attention of children: one can easily arouse unwholesome curiosity, or create an abnormal precocity and self-consciousness through entering upon psychological details appropriate only to an adult. When you have difficult children to treat, you had better keep your knowledge of analytical psychology to yourself, because simplicity and common sense are what the child needs. Your analytical knowledge ought to serve your own attitude, because it is a well-known fact that children are almost uncannily sensitive to the teacher's personal shortcomings. They know intuitively the false from the true. Therefore the teacher should watch his own psychic condition, so that he can be sure of the source of the trouble when things are going wrong

with a child in his care. He himself may be the unconscious cause of evil.

Of course we should not be naive about that: there are people, analysts, as well as teachers and parents, who secretly think that they have the right to behave as they like, and that it is up to the child to adapt for better or worse, much as he must adapt to the life of the world when the time comes for him to enter it. Such people are convinced at heart (not openly) that the only thing that matters is material success, and that the only convincing moral limitations are those of the penal code. Where unconditioned adaptation to the tangible powers of the world is accepted as the supreme principle, it would of course be vain to expect the person in authority to exercise psychological introspection as a moral obligation. I myself cannot endorse such a philosophy; but since we are not the judges of the world we cannot call such an attitude 'wicked'. But we should know what our convictions are, and stand for them. Upon one's own philosophy, conscious or unconscious, depends one's ultimate interpretation of facts. Therefore it is wise to be as clear as possible about one's subjective principles. As the man is, so will be his ultimate truth.

As each practical analysis is almost exclusively individual, you can hardly picture the treatment of a case from a general description of the process. I should like, therefore, to tell you about the treatment of several cases, the histories of which I owe to the welcome collaboration of my pupil, Mrs. F. Wickes, consulting psychologist at St. Agatha's School, New York.

The first case is that of a boy, seven years old, who showed lack of co-ordination in walking. One eye was slightly crossed, and his speech was defective. He was given to sudden wild tempers, and would keep the house in an uproar with his rages, throwing things about and threatening to kill the family. He liked to tease and to show power. At school he fought other children; he could not read, or take his

place in the class of children of the same age. A physician diagnosed him as mentally defective. After being in school for about six months, the rages increased until there were several each day. He was the first child, a bright, happy baby, and he had continued to be happy and friendly until about five and a half, but between three and four he developed night terrors. He was late in learning to talk. The tongue was found to be tied, and an operation was performed. He still could hardly articulate at five and a half years, and it was found that the ligaments had not been properly cut. This was remedied. When he was five, a small brother was born. He was delighted at first, but as the baby developed he seemed at times to hate him. When the little brother began to walk, which he did unusually early, our patient began to develop wild tempers. He would show great vindictiveness, alternating with moods of affection and remorse. As these rages seemed to be brought on by almost anything, no matter how trifling, no one attributed them to jealousy. As the rages increased, the night-terrors decreased. Intelligence tests showed unusual ability in all thought problems. He was delighted at every success and became friendly when encouraged, but was irritable over failures. The parents were brought to see that the rages were compensatory power manifestations which developed as he realized his own impotence, first in seeing the little brother praised and admired for doing with perfect ease the thing that was impossible to him, then in having to compete on such unequal terms with the other children at school. While he had remained the only child, whose parents lavished special care on him because of his handicaps, he was happy, but when he tried to compete on unequal terms he was like a little animal trying to break a chain. The rages, which the mother said were most apt to occur when "some little bit of a thing went wrong", were found to be often connected with the times when the little brother had been made to talk and to show off before visitors.

The boy developed very friendly relations with the psychologist, whom he called "my friend". He began to talk quite freely of his tempers. He would not tell his dreams, but recounted bombastic phantasies of killing everybody, and of walking round with a big sword to cut off their heads. One day he suddenly stopped such a recital, and said, "And that's what I mean to do. Now what do you think of that?" The psychologist laughed and answered, "I think just what you do—it's bunkum." The psychologist gave him a picture of Santa Claus that he had admired, saying, "You and Santa Claus and I know that's bunkum." His mother hung the picture up for him, and the next day in one of his rages he caught sight of it. Stopping short, he remarked, "Santa Claus, that's bunkum," and did the thing he had refused to do. He then began to think of his rages as something that he made use of for a purpose and enjoyed. He showed remarkable intelligence in seeing through his own motives. His parents and teachers co-operated in praising the efforts and not the attainment. He was made to feel his place as oldest son. Special attention was given to speech training. Slowly the rages began to be controlled. For a time the old night-terrors increased as the rages decreased, but then they became fewer.

An immediate cure of a trouble that began so early, based upon organic inferiorities, is not to be expected. It will take years before a complete adaptation is reached. Obviously, it is a marked feeling of inferiority that is at the bottom of this neurosis. It is a case where the Adlerian psychology of the power complex based upon inferiority applies. The symptomatology clearly shows how the neurosis tries to compensate for the lack of efficiency.

The second case concerns a little girl about nine years old. She ran a low temperature for three months and was unable to attend school. She had no other special symptoms except loss of appetite and languor. The physician could find no cause for the condition. Both the father and mother

were sure that they had the child's full confidence and that she was not worried or unhappy in any way. The mother finally admitted that she and the father were not happy together ; but, she said, they never discussed their difficulties before the child, who was completely unconscious of them. The mother wished for divorce, but could not make up her mind to the changes involved. It remained an open question between the parents, and in the meantime they made no effort to adjust any of the difficulties that caused their unhappiness. Each had an unduly proprietorial, emotional attachment to the child who, in turn, had a strong father-complex. She often slept in his room in a small bed close to his and came into his bed in the morning. She gave the following dreams.

"I went with father to see grandmother. Grandmother was in a boat, a big one. She wanted me to kiss her and wanted to put her arms round me, but I was afraid of her. Father said, 'Why, I want to kiss grandmother!' I did not want him to. I was afraid that something would happen to him. Then the boat went off and I couldn't find anybody, and I was frightened."

Several times she dreamt of the grandmother. Once she was all mouth, wide open. "I dreamt of a big snake. It came out from under my bed and played with me." She often spoke of the snake dream, and had one or two others which were similar. The grandmother dream she told with reluctance, and then confessed that she was afraid whenever her father went away that he would not come back. She had guessed the parents' whole situation, and said that she knew her mother did not like her father ; but she did not want to talk about it, because it "would make them feel badly". Her father went away on business trips, and then she was always afraid he would leave them. She also had noticed that her mother was happier then. The mother came to see that she was not saving the child, but only making her ill by leaving the situation unsolved. The parents had either to attack their difficulties with each other, and

endeavour to work out a real adjustment, or decide to separate. They chose the latter course, and explained the situation to the child. The mother had been sure that a separation would make the child ill, but instead her health improved just as soon as the real situation was brought into the open. She was told that she would not be separated from either parent but would have two homes, and, though the divided time seems a poor arrangement for any child, her relief at no longer being a prey to her vague fears and intuitions was so great, that she returned to normal health and to a real enjoyment of her school and play.

A case like this is often a great puzzle to the general practitioner. He seeks in vain an organic cause for the trouble, and he does not know that he should look further—for no medical textbook would admit the possibility that trouble between father and mother can be made responsible for a child's persistent fever. To the analyst, however, such cases are by no means unknown or strange. The child is so much a part of the psychic atmosphere of the parents, that secret and unsolved trouble between them can influence the child's health profoundly. The '*participation mystique*', that is, the primitive unconscious identity of the child with its parents, causes the child to feel the conflicts of the parents, and to suffer from them as if they were its own troubles. It is hardly ever the open conflict or the manifest difficulty that has the poisonous effect ; it is almost always a disharmony repressed and neglected by the parents. The real first cause of such a neurotic disturbance is, without exception, the unconscious. It is the things vaguely felt by the child, the oppressive atmosphere of apprehension and self-consciousness, that slowly pervade the child's mind like a poisonous vapour.

What this child seemed to feel most, was her father's unconscious. When a man has no real relationship with his wife, then naturally he seeks another love object. If the man is not conscious of this seeking, or if he represses phantasies

of that kind, then the libido on the one side regresses to the memory image of the mother, and on the other, it invariably seeks the daughter, if there is one. This is what might be called unconscious incest. You cannot hold a man responsible for that, as it is an entirely automatic process ; but he should be held responsible for being unconscious. It is morally wrong for him to neglect his love-problem. Unfortunately, it is almost a collective ideal to be as negligent and unconscious of love matters as possible. Behind the mask of respectability and decency the power of neglected love poisons the children. Of course you cannot blame the average man, as he receives no guidance in solving the great problem of love from current ideals and conventions. These, unfortunately, are all in favour of negligence and repression.

The dream of the grandmother shows how the father's unconscious processes are penetrating the child's unconscious. He wishes to kiss his mother, and the child feels forced in the dream to kiss her. The latter, being " all mouth, wide open " suggests swallowing. Obviously the child is in danger of being swallowed by her father's regressive libido. That is why she dreams of a snake ; for the snake, since ancient times, has always been the symbol of danger : of being caught in coils, or swallowed, or poisoned. You will understand such dreams better if you read what I have written about serpent-symbolism in my book, *Psychology of the Unconscious*.

The case also shows how apt children are to see very much more than the parents would suspect. It is of course quite impossible that parents should have no complexes at all : that would be superhuman. But they should deal with them consciously, they should make it a duty to work them out for the sake of their children. They should not evade their troubles, and try to repress them in order to avoid painful discussions. The love-problem is part of mankind's heavy toll of suffering, and nobody should be ashamed that he must pay his tribute. It is a thousand times better in every respect for parents frankly to discuss

their problems, instead of leaving their complexes to fester in the unconscious.

In such a case, what possible good could come from telling a child about incestuous phantasies and father-fixations? Such a procedure would make the child believe that it was all the fault of her own immoral or at least foolish nature, and would heap a burden of responsibility upon her which in reality belongs to her father. She suffers, not because she has unconscious incestuous tendencies, but because her father has them. She is a victim of the wrong atmosphere in the home, and her trouble disappears as soon as her parents settle theirs.

The third case concerns a very brilliant girl of thirteen, reported as anti-social, rebellious, and unable to adapt herself to school conditions, where the other girls were aged sixteen and seventeen. At times she was very inattentive and would even make irrelevant answers, for which she would give no explanation. She was a big, over-developed girl, apparently in the best of health, who had matured when barely eleven. The child was frightened by her strong physical sexual discomforts and desires. Her mother was a brilliant, intellectual woman with an intense will to power, who had early decided that her daughter should enter college very young and be a prodigy. She had stimulated every budding intellectual ability, and had suppressed all emotional growth. The father's business took him from home a great deal, and he seemed to have place in the girl's mind rather as a shadowy ideal than as an actual person. The child suffered from a tremendous urge of pent-up emotion which fed upon homosexual phantasies more real than the objective world. She confessed that she would sometimes long to be caressed by some particular instructor; and then suddenly she would see all her clothes drop off, and that then she would lose track of what was being said, hence her "absurd answer". Here is one of her dreams: "I saw my mother in the bath-tub, which grew big. Then I saw her slip down, and I knew that



she was drowning, but I could not move. Then I was terribly frightened, and began to cry because I had let her drown ; and I awoke crying."

This dream helped her to raise to consciousness her buried resentments at being forced into such an unnatural, precocious existence. She realized her desire for normal companionship. Little could be accomplished in the home ; but a change of surroundings, the understanding of her problem, and the frank discussion helped her a good deal.

This case is very simple, but most typical. The parents' rôle is again conspicuous. It is a typical case of a marriage between a man obviously eaten up by business, and an ambitious woman who projects her own ambition into the child. The child is obliged to be brilliant, in order to satisfy her mother's ambition and to flatter her vanity. Such a mother, as a rule, does not perceive the child's real character, or her individual ways and needs. She embodies herself in the child, swaying her with her accumulated will to power. This kind of marriage is, of course, quite likely to support, or to produce such psychic abnormalities as this child suffered from. There seems to be a considerable distance between husband and wife. A woman with such a masculine will-to-power attitude most successfully crushes a man's real feelings ; a gulf opens up between her and her husband ; and all she gets from him is his money. He pays her, in order to keep her in a fairly tolerable mood ; and, naturally, her love turns into ambition and will to power—that is, if, unconsciously following the example of her own mother, she has not made power her supreme value even in girlhood. As the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children, so such attitudes often are handed down for generations. The children of such mothers have practically the value of puppets, which can be dressed up to play any rôle. They are nothing but pieces on the chessboard of parental egotism and self-centred blindness ; and the maddening thing is, that all is done under the cloak of unselfish devotion to the dear child,

whose happiness is declared to be the only purpose of the parents' lives. But often not a grain of real love is given to the child. The child we are discussing suffers from premature sexual symptoms, like so many other neglected and ill-treated children, while at the same time she is obviously filled to overflowing by the welling-up of maternal passion. Her homosexual tendencies clearly show that her need for real love is unsatisfied, causing her to crave love from her instructors, but in the wrong fashion. Besides love, such a child needs to be understood. The proper thing, of course, would be analytical treatment for the mother, which should include an improvement of her marital relations, in order to divert her passion from the child. If that is not feasible, then one can only try to check the injurious maternal influence by backing up the child against the mother, at least, sufficiently to enable her to appraise the mother's shortcomings, and to become conscious of her own individual needs. Nothing can so stunt a child's individuality as sustained efforts by the mother to embody herself in the child.

The child's dream is quite understandable: it obviously means the death of the mother. This is the answer of the child's unconscious to the ambitions of the mother. If the mother did not try to kill the individuality of the daughter, the daughter's unconscious would not react like that. Practically, the 'death' of the mother only means 'removal'—a greater distance between mother and daughter. The mother must die a little in order to be less overwhelming.

From such a case you should never assume that dreams of the death of a parent (which are not rare) are always founded upon such conditions as those I have just described. You should continually bear in mind that a dream-image has never one and the same significance under different circumstances. That is why you never can be sure of the meaning of a dream unless you know the dreamer's conscious conditions.

The last case that I shall mention concerns Margaret, a

girl of eight, who suffers from a complaint that is not causally rooted in the parents. It is a difficult and long case which it is impossible to deal with fully in a lecture. I have selected only one important step in the development of the case. The child had been in school a year without being able to do any work, except a little reading. She moved awkwardly, went up and downstairs like a child just learning, had little control of hand and arm movements, and spoke in a fretful voice. She would show intense eagerness in conversation, then suddenly bury her face in her hands and refuse to speak. She would begin to talk, and then burst into gibberish and shout disconnected words. She would attempt to draw or write single letters, and then would cover the whole paper with scrawls which she called "funnies". Intelligence tests gave contradictory results. In some thought and reasoning tests she reacted as a child of eleven, in other types of test, as a child of four.

She had never been normal. When ten days old, blood clots had been removed from the brain. She had been watched over and guarded day and night with the greatest care. It was soon apparent that she used her physical disabilities to dominate her parents, and resented any attempt to help her to help herself. The parents had tried to compensate her handicaps by shielding her from reality, and by furnishing her with moral crutches which kept her from struggling to overcome her difficulties. The first disciplinary approach was through the world of imagination. As she was quite imaginative, for the sake of a story she began to learn to read, and, once started, progressed with astonishing rapidity. Too long application produced times of irritability and excitement, but there was a steady gain.

One day Margaret announced: "I have a twin. Her name is Anna. She is just like me, except that she always wears beautiful pink clothes and never wears glasses." (Glasses meant to her weak eyes, which kept her from poring over the books that she now loved.) "If Anna were here,

I should like to work better." It was suggested that Anna should be invited. Margaret went into the hall and returned with the imaginary Anna. Then she tried to write, so as to show Anna. After this Anna was always there. First Margaret would write, then Anna. One day everything went wrong, and at last she burst out, "I shall never learn to write and it is all my mother's fault! I am left-handed, and she never told my first teacher. I had to try to write with my right hand, and now I shall grow up and never write, all because of my mother." The psychologist told her of another child who was also left-handed, and with whom another mother had made the same mistake. Margaret said eagerly, "So he can never write?" "Oh, yes," said the psychologist, "he writes stories and all sorts of things: it was just harder for him, that is all. He generally writes with his left hand now. You may write with your left hand if you like." Margaret replied: "But I like my right hand best." "Oh, then it does not seem to be all mother's fault. I wonder whose fault it is." The child would only answer, "I don't know." Thereupon it was suggested, "You might ask Anna." She left the room, and after a little while she returned, saying, "Anna says it's my own fault and I had better go to work." Before this she had always refused to discuss her responsibility, but now she would go out of the room, talk it over with Anna, and bring back the result. Sometimes she would return with every sign of rebellion, but she would always tell the truth. Once after abusing Anna she said, "But Anna insists, 'Margaret, it is your own fault. You've got to try.'" From this she progressed to an admission of her own projections. One day she had a frightful outburst of temper against her mother. She burst into the room crying, "Mother is horrid, horrid, horrid!" But she was asked, "Who is horrid?" She replied, "Mother!" "You might ask Anna," said the psychologist. There was a long pause, and then she said, "Pooh! I guess I know as much as Anna! I'm horrid. I'll go

and tell Mother." She did this and then returned quietly to work.

I thought it worth while to mention this interesting episode of the twin.

Having been badly injured at birth, the child had not developed properly. She naturally deserved and received a great deal of care from her parents; but it is almost impossible to draw an exact line as to how far one should go with regard to a child's incapacity. Certainly somewhere the limit is reached, and to go further means to spoil the child. As the first case mentioned in this lecture showed, a child feels an actual inferiority and begins to compensate it by assuming an unreal superiority; this in turn is an inferiority, but a moral one; no genuine satisfaction results, and a vicious circle is begun. The more a real inferiority is compensated by a false superiority, the less the initial inferiority is remedied. Moreover, the damaged morale increases the original feeling of inferiority. This demands an increase of wrong superiority, and thus the vicious circle is completed. Obviously, Margaret was involuntarily spoiled, so that she learned to abuse her parents' devotion. Through that she fixed her incapacity and prevented herself from developing out of it; and thus she remained more incapable and more infantile than her actual handicaps warranted.

This is, of course, a condition most favourable to the development of a second personality. The fact that her conscious does not progress with time does not mean at all that her unconscious will also remain at a standstill. This part of the self will advance as time goes on. The more the conscious hangs back, the greater will become the dissociation of the self. Then one day the more developed, and now personified, unconscious will appear on the scene, and challenge the regressive ego. This was the case with Margaret: she was confronted by Anna, the superior twin, who represented for a while her morality and her reasoning power. Later on the two merged into one, which meant a great

improvement. In 1902 I published a study of very much the same psychological structure. The subject was a girl about sixteen years old with quite an extraordinary dissociation of personality. You will find the description of this case in the first chapter of my *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*. The educational use Mrs. Wickes made of the second personality brought excellent results, and was in direct line with the teleological meaning of the figure of Anna. Such a psychic double is more frequent than one would expect. Its frequent occurrence among primitives is one of the psychological origins of their belief in spirits, both good and evil.

This brings us to the close of these lectures. I have been obliged to limit myself to the education of the child through psychological understanding, and to a few only of the more common features of this work. But analytical psychology has a broader application, educationally, than this. Those are fittest to lead the child's mind and spirit toward greater consciousness and responsibility who have themselves attained to the full stature of intellectual and moral manhood or womanhood—who, in the correct sense of the word, have passed the stage of driven, instinctive mechanisms and have become individuals. This is a study and a labour that no one need imagine will be easily completed and brought to an end. For its aim is perfection.

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN INDIVIDUAL EDUCATION

ONE can distinguish in general, three kinds of education :—

1. *Education through Example.*—This kind of education can proceed wholly unconsciously, and is therefore the oldest and perhaps the most effective form of all. The method rests upon the fact that the child is psychologically more or less identical with the parents, and especially with the environment, a peculiarity that is one of the most marked characteristics of the primitive psyche. The French philosopher, Lévy-Brühl, has coined for it the term, '*participation mystique.*' Because unconscious education through example rests on one of the most ancient psychical characteristics this method is still effective where all other direct methods fail, as, for example, among the mentally diseased. Many of these patients must be made to do work in order to keep them from degenerating, but to give them advice, or even commands, would often be quite useless. If, however, one simply sends them among a group of workers, they eventually become infected through the example of the others, and begin to work.

Every educational method rests in the last analysis upon this fundamental fact of psychic identity. The finally effective factor in all cases is the development of this seemingly automatic contagion through example. This factor is so important that even the best educational method can in certain cases, be completely nullified through bad example.

2. *Collective Education.*—By collective education I do not necessarily mean education in large numbers (as, for example, in schools), but education according to rules, principles, and methods. Those three things are necessarily of a

collective nature. It is assumed that they possess validity and applicability for at least a majority of individuals. Besides this, it is also assumed that they are effective instruments in the hands of all those who have learned their manipulation. We can take for granted in this form of education, that it will not produce anything more than, nor anything different from what lay in its premises, that is to say, individuals who are submitted to it will be moulded according to general rules, principles, and methods.

In so far as the individual peculiarity of the pupil responds to the collective nature of the educative influences, there naturally develops a character which appears similar to that of another individual, who, though originally quite different, has nevertheless shown the same amenability. If there is a large number of individuals who possess this degree of conformability, a uniformity develops corresponding to the method applied. The larger the number of individuals similarly, or identically trained, the greater is the unconscious pressure of example exerted on those individuals who rightly or wrongly, have offered successful resistance to the collective method. Since the example of the crowd exerts a compelling influence through unconscious psychic contagion, it can lead, if continued long enough, either to an overwhelming and crushing effect, or at least to a suppression of those individuals who have no more than a normal share of individual strength of character. If the quality of this education is sound, we may naturally expect good results in so far as the collective adaptation of the pupil is concerned. Yet, on the other hand, a collective formulation of character based on too lofty an ideal, may have disastrous consequences for the unique personality of the individual. Certainly the effective education of an individual to the end that he may become a good citizen and a useful member of society is a highly desirable goal. But as soon as a certain maximum of uniformity is overstepped, that is, as soon as certain collective values are formed at the expense of specific



individuality, then an individual is produced, who corresponds to the rules, principles, and methods of his education in what is possibly an ideal manner, and he is for that reason adapted to all those situations and problems contained within the pedagogical premises to which he has been submitted. Such a person, however, will show himself to be insecure in all those matters where individual judgments must be made without recourse to well established rules.

Collective education is indispensable and cannot be replaced by anything else. Man lives in a collective world, and collective forms are as definitely required as is a common language. Under no conditions must we sacrifice the principle of collective education for the sake of the development of specific individuality, no matter how much we desire to prevent valuable types of individuality from being overwhelmed by the necessities of collective education. It must, furthermore, be borne in mind that a specific type of individuality is not in all circumstances to be regarded as an asset, either to the community, or to the person concerned. In studying the types of children who resist collective education, we find for the most part that they are afflicted with various kinds of inherited or acquired forms of psychic abnormality. In this group I must also include spoiled and demoralized children. Many such children actually work out their own salvation by throwing themselves upon the support of the normally functioning group. By thus attaining to a certain degree of uniformity they succeed in protecting themselves against the negative aspects of their own individualities. I do not at all subscribe to the view that fundamentally man is always good, and that evil is merely misunderstood good. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that there are many persons who possess inherited traits so inferior, that it is far better both for society and for the individuals themselves, that they forego the expression of their individual peculiarities. In all good faith then, we may claim that collective education is, at bottom, of

unquestioned utility, and absolutely valid for a large number of people. We must not, however, make it the sole principle of instruction, for there exists a large group of children who require a third type of education, namely, individual education.

3. *Individual Education.*—In applying this method, all the rules, principles, and methods of instruction that hold good for collective education must become subordinated to the one purpose of bringing out the specific individuality of the pupil. This aim is directly opposed to that of collective education, which seeks to level out and to make uniform. All those children or pupils who make a successful resistance to collective education, require individual consideration. Among such children we very naturally encounter many diverse types. We have first to mention those who are not amenable to education as a result of pathological degeneration. These generally belong to the mentally defective group. There are, however, others who are by no means unamenable to education, who, on the contrary, exhibit special aptitudes, but of a very peculiar and one-sided nature. The most frequent of such peculiarities is the incapacity to understand any form of mathematics that is not expressed in concrete numbers. For this reason higher mathematics ought always to be optional in schools, since the development of the capacity for logical thinking is in no way connected with it. For the individuals mentioned above, mathematics is quite meaningless, and only needless torment. The truth is that mathematics presupposes a definite type of psychological make-up that is by no means universal and that cannot be acquired. For those who do not possess this ability mathematics becomes merely a subject to be memorized, just as one memorizes a series of meaningless words. Such persons may, however, be highly gifted in every other way, and may either possess already the capacity for logical thinking, or have a better chance of acquiring it by direct instruction in logic.

Strictly speaking, of course, a deficiency in mathematical capacity is not to be taken as an individual peculiarity.

However, it serves to show in what way a curriculum may sin against the psychological peculiarity of a pupil. In similar fashion, certain widely accepted pedagogic principles may prove to be useless, if indeed not definitely harmful, in those cases where the psychological individuality of the pupil calls for an exclusively individual influence. Fairly frequently we find, not only specific pedagogic rules, but the whole educative influence in general met by an insurmountable antagonism. In such cases we usually have to deal with so-called neurotic children. The teacher or instructor is at first inclined to ascribe the difficulties to the abnormal constitution of the pupil, but more careful inquiry will generally disclose the fact that the child has been brought up in a family *milieu* of a peculiar kind, and of a kind which adequately explains both the maladjustment and the inadaptability of the pupil. Such a child has developed in his home a type of adjustment that is useless in the collective world.

It is, of course, quite outside the province of the teacher to change the conditions in the family environment, although often just a few suggestions to the parents can work wonders. As a rule, however, the malady has to be cured in the child himself, and in such a case the problem resolves itself into finding the proper access to his specific psychology in order to stimulate receptivity. As we have indicated, the first requisite in such a case is a thorough knowledge of the home-life of the pupil. We know a good deal when we understand the causes of a phenomenon, but still more is required. What we must next find out is the effects elicited in the child's mind by external causes.

We obtain this knowledge through the thorough investigation of the psychic life-history of the child, taken both from himself and from his *milieu*. Under certain conditions, a good deal can be done with just this information. Skilful educators have followed this method in all ages, and therefore I need not dwell upon it.

As soon as we realize that the child has gradually developed

from an unconscious, to a conscious state, it will be clear to us that very likely all, certainly the primary and most profound influences of the environment, are unconscious. The first impressions of life are the strongest and most vital, even if they are unconscious, indeed perhaps just for that very reason, for while remaining unconscious they are not susceptible to change. Only what is in our consciousness can be altered, what is unconscious remains unchanged. Consequently, if we wish to bring about any alteration we must bring the unconscious contents into consciousness, and in this way submit them to the possibility of correction. Such a procedure, however, is not necessary in those instances where a careful investigation of the family environment, and of the psychic life-history of an individual has furnished us with the means of influencing him effectively. Since, however, there are cases where, as we pointed out, this does not suffice, we must push our investigation of the psyche still deeper. Such an investigation is analogous to a surgical operation, and can easily lead to disastrous results in the hands of technically unqualified individuals. An extensive medical experience is required if we are to know when and where the treatment is to be applied. Laymen unfortunately often minimize the dangers in the wake of such attempts. In bringing unconscious contents into consciousness one brings about artificially a condition that resembles a psychosis.

The vast majority of mental diseases, in so far as they are not of a definitely organic nature, are due to a disintegration of consciousness caused by an irresistible inundation of unconscious contents. Accordingly we must know where we can apply our treatment without the risk of harm. But even if no danger threatens us on this side, we are still not exempt from certain hazards; for one of the commonest consequences of a preoccupation with unconscious contents, is the development of what Freud calls transference. Strictly speaking, transference is a projection of unconscious contents upon the person who is making the analysis of the unconscious.

The concept of transference, however, is employed in a much wider sense, and practically embraces all those extremely varied processes that bring about an attachment of the person analysed to the analyst. This bond can become an extremely unpleasant interference if incorrectly handled. Indeed there are cases where it has led to suicide. One of the commonest causes for such an issue, is the emergence into consciousness of unconscious contents that throw an entirely new and disturbing light upon the family situation. Facts may come into the foreground that transform a child's love and faith in his parents into antagonism and hatred. Such an individual will, in consequence, find himself in an intolerable state of isolation, and will cling desperately to the analyst, in order to maintain a relation to the world through him at least. If at this critical juncture the physician, through some technical error, destroys the relation of the patient to himself too, suicide may immediately ensue in a case where there exists a congenital lack of balance. I am of the opinion, therefore, that such a treatment as the analysis of the unconscious should at least be under the control and with the assistance of a physician adequately trained in psychiatry and psychology.

In what way then can unconscious contents be brought into consciousness? As you will realize, it is hardly possible within the compass of a lecture to describe all the ways in which this goal can be attained. The best practical method, and at the same time the most difficult one, is the analysis and interpretation of dreams. The dreams are unquestionably products of our unconscious psychic activity. They arise in our sleep without any knowledge or volition on our part; they present themselves to our inward vision, and are then conducted across into our waking life by means of a dim remnant of consciousness. Often their strange, irrational, and incomprehensible nature seems to warrant an attitude of doubt towards them as reliable sources of information.

And indeed our attempts to interpret dreams are scarcely in keeping with known scientific methods, such as counting and exact measurement. Our position is more akin to that of an archæologist deciphering some unknown script. Yet if unconscious contents exist at all our dreams are surely the best possible indication of their nature. To Freud belongs the great honour of having inaugurated this possibility in our day, although in former centuries the mystery of dreams deeply occupied men's thoughts, nor was this interest always of a purely superstitious nature. The work on dream interpretation of Artemidorus of Daldis is in its way not to be underestimated as a scientific document, nor should we dismiss the dream interpretations of the Essenes recorded by Flavius Josephus. Nevertheless, had it not been for Freud, science would probably not have returned so soon to dreams as sources of information, in spite of our knowledge that the physicians of classical times put great trust in them. Even as it is, opinions as to the significance of dreams are still divided. There are, in fact, many psychiatrists who refuse to analyse dreams, partly because the method impresses them as too insecure, arbitrary, and difficult, and partly because they do not feel the necessity of using the unconscious. I am myself of the contrary opinion, and experience has convinced me that in all difficult cases the patient's dreams may prove to be of incalculable value to the physician, both as a source of information and for therapeutic purposes.

As regards the much discussed method of dream-analysis, our procedure is much the same as that employed in the deciphering of hieroglyphs. We first assemble all the available contributions that the dreamer himself can give. We next exclude any statements that depend upon any particular theoretical assumptions, for these are generally quite arbitrary attempts at interpretation. It should be our endeavour, in every case, to inquire into the happenings of the preceding day, as well as into the mood and the general plans and purposes of the dreamer in the days and weeks preceding

the dream. A more or less intimate knowledge of the life and circumstances and character of the dreamer is of course a necessary prerequisite. Great care and attention must be given to this preparatory work if we desire to get at the meaning of the dream. I have no faith in dream interpretations made on the spur of the moment, interpretations manufactured, so to speak, on the basis of a preformed theoretical attitude. It should indeed be a definite aim to guard against imposing any theoretical presuppositions upon the dream. It would in fact be best if we proceeded as though the dream had really no meaning at all, so that we might thus be secured against all possibility of bias. The results of a dream analysis may turn out to be of an entirely unforeseen nature, and facts of an exceedingly disagreeable kind may come to the surface; so unpleasant in fact that we should probably have prevented any discussion of them had we been able to anticipate them. In the same manner we may obtain products the initial appearance of which may seem obscure and unintelligible, because our conscious understanding has not yet plumbed the depth of all psychic mysteries. In all such cases, it is better to adopt a waiting attitude than to attempt a forced explanation. In work of this kind our path is necessarily strewn with question marks.

In the actual work of collecting the above-mentioned material, certain portions of the dream will gradually become clarified, and we shall begin to discern, in the apparently meaningless chaos of images, some glimmerings of a script, first as more or less disconnected sentences, then as an increasingly expanding context. It will perhaps be best if I give you a few examples of dreams that occur in the course of such an individual education undertaken by the physician.

I must first introduce you to the personality of the dreamer, for without this acquaintance you would hardly be able to feel yourselves in the peculiar mental atmosphere of the dreams. There are certain dreams that are like poems,

and consequently can be understood only as a sort of expression of the dreamer's entire mental condition.

The dreamer of whom I shall speak is a youth just above twenty years of age, and quite adolescent in his general bearing. There is, in fact, something girlish in his appearance and in his modes of expression. We can infer from the latter that he is a person of good education and artistic tendencies. His artistic interests are definitely in the foreground of his personality. We perceive his good taste immediately, just as we do his fine appreciation of all forms of art. His emotional life is tender and soft, slightly dreamy, that is, of the type characteristic of puberty, but of a feminine nature. A marked preponderance of the feminine is undeniable. There is no trace of the usual clumsiness of the age of puberty. He is obviously too young for his age, and clearly therefore an example of retarded development. This is corroborated by the fact that he has come to me on account of his homosexuality. The night preceding his visit to me he had the following dream :—

“I am in a large cathedral wrapped in a mysterious dusky light. I have been told that it is the Cathedral of Lourdes. In the middle of it is situated a deep, dark well into which I ought to go.”

The dream is clearly a connected expression of a mood. The dreamer added the following remarks: “Lourdes is the mystic fount of healing. Yesterday I very naturally thought of the fact that I was going to seek a cure. There is supposed to be such a well at Lourdes. Presumably it is not very pleasant to plunge into the water. The well in the church was very deep.”

Now what does this dream tell us? On the surface it seems clear enough, and we might conceivably be content with interpreting it as a kind of poetic formulation of an expectation. We should, however, never allow ourselves to be satisfied with an obvious interpretation, for it is a fact of experience that dreams are much deeper and more significant



than they appear at first sight. Such a dream might lead us to believe that the dreamer had come to the doctor in a very poetical frame of mind ; that he was entering into his treatment as though it were a consecrated religious act to be performed in the mystical half-light of an awe-inspiring sanctuary. But this in no way corresponds to the actual situation.

Our patient has come to the physician in connexion with a very disagreeable matter ; namely, to be treated for homosexuality. That is anything but poetic. In any case, from the actual mood of the preceding day it would hardly be intelligible as to why he should dream so poetically, if we are to assume a direct causation for the origin of the dream. But we may perhaps assume that it was the impression produced by the very unpleasant matter in hand that was the direct occasion of the dream. We might, for instance, hazard the supposition, that it was just because of the unpoetic nature of his mood that he dreamed in such a poetic manner ; just as a person who has fasted in the daytime often dreams of sumptuous meals at night. We must admit that the idea of the treatment, and of the unpleasant procedure connected with it, recurs again in the dream, but in a poetical disguise, that is, in a form which corresponds most effectively to the vivid æsthetic and emotional requirements of the dreamer. He is inevitably lured on by this attractive picture, in spite of the fact that the well is dark, deep, and cold. Something of this dream-mood is likely to survive the dream, and to persist well into the morning of the day on which he has to submit to his unpleasant and unpoetic duty of visiting me. The pale light of reality may thus perhaps become embellished through the golden after-glow of the dream feelings.

Is this perhaps the object of the dream ? This is quite possible, for according to my experience, the vast majority of dreams are of a compensatory nature. They stress the other side in each particular instance, and thus they tend to preserve the psychic equilibrium. But this compensation of mood is not the only purpose served by the dream. It also serves to

correct one's understanding of the actual situation. In this case the patient had of course formed no adequate conception of the nature of the treatment to which he was on the point of submitting himself. The dream, however, furnished him with a picture in which the essence of the treatment was defined in terms of a poetical metaphor. This is clearly apparent if we bear in mind the supplementary associations that came up in connexion with the image of the cathedral. They were as follows: "The word 'cathedral' brings to my mind," he said, "the cathedral at Cologne. I had already been deeply interested in it in my earliest youth. I remember that it was my mother who first told me about it. I also call to mind that, as a child I used to ask my mother, whenever I saw a village church, whether that was the Cologne Cathedral. I hoped to become a priest in such a cathedral."

The patient is here describing a very important experience of his youth. As in most cases of this kind there exists an especially intimate connexion with the mother. We must not, however, picture to ourselves any conscious tie to the mother of a particularly warm and intensive character, but a secret one rather, expressing itself consciously perhaps, only in the retardation of character development and a relative amount of infantilism. In its development, the personality strives to break away from such an unconscious, infantile tie, for nothing hinders development so much as the persistence of an unconscious, one might almost say embryonic, psychic condition. Therefore the earliest opportunity is instinctively taken to substitute some other object for the mother. This object must bear some analogy to the mother if it is to serve as a substitute for her. In the case of our patient this holds true in the fullest sense. The intensity with which his childish phantasy seized upon the symbol of Cologne Cathedral corresponds to his strong unconscious need for finding a substitute for his mother. This unconscious need is naturally intensified in a case where the infantile tie threatens to become a danger. There is necessity in the way his childish phantasy

eagerly seizes upon the image of the church, for the church is in the fullest sense, and from every point of view, a mother. Not only do we speak of 'Mother Church', but even the 'womb of the church', and in the ceremony of the '*benedictio fontis*' of the Catholic Church the baptismal font is even called the '*immaculatus divini fontis uterus*'. We naturally think that these meanings must be consciously known if they are to become operative in a person's phantasy, and that it is inconceivable that they should take hold of a child who is manifestly unacquainted with their significance. Of course these analogies do not operate through consciousness, but in an entirely different manner.

The church here represents a higher spiritual substitute for the merely natural, and in a way, 'carnal' tie to the parents. It is an image therefore that can release an individual from his unconscious natural bonds, which strictly speaking are no bonds at all, but simply a condition of primordial unconscious identity. This state of identity, because of its unconsciousness, possesses tremendous inertia and offers the most determined resistance to all higher mental development. It would indeed be hard to say how such a condition differs from mere animal existence. It is by no means the special prerogative of the Christian church to aim at, and also make possible, the freeing of an individual from his initial animal-like state. The Christian church simply represents the modern, and specifically western European form of an instinctive striving which, presumably, is as old as man. We are dealing here with a precisely similar urge that is found in the most varied forms among all primitive peoples who are in any way developed, and have not again degenerated. It corresponds to the men's initiation ceremonies. At the age of puberty a youth is taken, either to the bachelor house, or to some other place of initiation, and systematically estranged from his family. At the same time he is initiated into the religious secrets of the tribe, and acquires in this way, not merely new kinds of relationships,

but finds himself placed in a new world, he himself having become '*quasi modo genitus*' a changed and renewed personality. Frequently the initiation is connected with all sorts of tortures, circumcision and similar rites being by no means unusual at this time. These customs are undoubtedly extremely old, and, like many other primitive experiences, have left their imprints upon our unconscious. They have almost become instinctive mechanisms, so that they even recur without any external need, as for example, the initiations into student societies of German universities, or the more exaggerated types of initiation found in the American university fraternities. They have become deeply engraved upon the unconscious in the form of a primordial image, an archetype, as St. Augustine calls it.

When the mother spoke to her small son about the Cologne Cathedral, this primordial image was activated and called into life. But no priestly educator was at hand to develop it further, and the child remained in his mother's care. The boy's longing for male direction, however, continued to develop, unfortunately in the form of homosexuality, a crippled development that might perhaps not have resulted, had some man taken a hand in the further elaboration of his childhood phantasy. The deviation toward homosexuality has, to be sure, numerous historical antecedents. In ancient Greece, as among certain primitive groups, homosexuality and education were in a sense identical. From this point of view the homosexuality manifested at adolescence, although disastrously misunderstood, is nevertheless a purposive reaching out toward the man. According to the dream context, the patient's submission to treatment signifies the fulfilment of the meaning of his homosexuality, in other words, his entrance into the world of mature men.

All that we have been forced to express by difficult and circuitous detail the dream has condensed into a few expressive metaphors; and therewith it creates a picture that influences the phantasy, feeling, and understanding of the

dreamer, infinitely better than a learned disquisition could do. By his dream, the patient came to his treatment far better and more ingeniously prepared than he would have been by the largest collection of medical and pedagogical dogmas. It is for this reason that I regard the dream not merely as a valuable source of information, but also as an unusually effective instrument for education and therapeutic treatment.

I shall now give you the second dream that the patient dreamt on the night following his first visit to me. His previous dream is here completed in a very interesting way. Let me add that during his first visit I paid no attention to the dream. He did not even mention it, nor was the slightest word said that could possibly be brought into any connexion with what we have discussed above.

The second dream was as follows: "I am in a large Gothic cathedral. At the altar stands a priest. My friend and I stand before him. I hold in my hand a small Japanese ivory figure and I have the feeling as though it had to be baptized. Suddenly an elderly lady appears, takes the ring off my friend's finger and puts it on her own. My friend is afraid that he might be regarded as being bound by it. At this moment, however, the most wonderful organ music is heard."

Unfortunately I cannot enter into all the details of this exceedingly ingenious dream in the short space allotted to me. I shall therefore only mention here those points that continue and complete the previous dream. This dream is clearly connected with the first one, for the dreamer finds himself again in a church, that is, in a condition suitable for initiation. Now, however, we encounter a new figure, the priest, whose absence in the earlier situations has already been commented upon. The dream thus corroborates the fact that the unconscious meaning of the homosexuality has been fulfilled, and that a new development can be started. The actual initiation ceremony, that is, the baptism, may now begin. In the symbolism of the dream my previous statement is thus corroborated, namely, that it is not the prerogative of

the Christian church alone to bring about such transitions and psychic transformations, but that behind them there looms a primordial image which, under the right conditions, can actually compel such transformations. The object that is to be baptized, according to the dream, is a small ivory figure. In this connexion the patient gave me the following: "The figure was that of a small grotesque looking manikin, that reminded me of the male organ. It is certainly strange that it is this organ that has to be baptized, and yet among the Jews circumcision is a kind of baptism. Doubtless this refers to my homosexuality, for the friend who is standing near me at the altar is the person with whom I have the homosexual connexion. He is in the same student society with me. The ring apparently symbolizes this connexion."

As you of course realize, the ring in ordinary usage is regarded as the symbol of a bond or tie, as for instance the wedding ring. We may therefore regard the ring in this case as a metaphor for the homosexual relation, just as the same meaning is to be given to the fact that the dreamer appears together with his friend.

The malady to be cured is, we know, homosexuality. The dreamer is to be brought out of this relatively infantile condition into a more mature stage of development by means of a kind of circumcision ceremony directed by the priest. These ideas correspond exactly to my comments upon the first dream. Up to this point the development has taken place logically and consistently, and in conformity with the archetypal images. But now a disturbing factor seems to enter. An elderly lady suddenly possesses herself of the ring. In other words, she transfers to herself what has hitherto been a homosexual relationship, and by her act causes the dreamer to fear that he has now fallen into a relationship implying new obligations. Since the ring is now on the finger of a woman, a type of marriage has been consummated, that is, the homosexual relationship has

been transformed into a heterosexual one. But it is a heterosexual relation of a very peculiar kind, for the lady in question is an elderly woman. "She is," my patient added, "the friend of my mother. I am very fond of her, she is in fact a motherly kind of friend." This statement allows us to understand what has happened in the dream. Through his initiation, his homosexual tie has been dissolved, and a heterosexual relation has been substituted for it, in this case a warm kind of friendship for a woman resembling his mother. In spite of her resemblance to his mother, this woman is in fact not his mother, and so his relation to her is a step forward. It leads him beyond the mother in the direction of masculinity, towards a freeing of himself from the mother and an overcoming of adolescent sexuality.

The fear of the new bond is easily understood as the fear that the woman's resemblance to his mother might naturally arouse. It might be argued, for instance, that through the dissolution of the homosexual tie there had been a complete regression to the mother, due to the fear of the new and unknown factors of the mature heterosexual condition with such possible obligations as marriage, etc. That we are dealing here not with a regression but with a progress seems to be corroborated by the sudden peal of the organ. Our patient is musical, and he is particularly susceptible to the awe-inspiring influence of organ music. Music therefore signifies for him a positive feeling, in this instance an intimate termination of the dream that is well adapted to leave a beautiful, almost holy feeling for the coming morning.

If now the fact be considered that up to that moment the patient had seen me only during one consultation in which very little had been said beyond the general medical anamnesis, it must surely be admitted that these dreams disclose very remarkable anticipations. On the one hand, they throw an exceedingly peculiar light upon the unconscious situation of the patient, and a stranger one still from the point of view of consciousness. On the other hand, an

aspect is given to a very banal medical situation that allows us, in a way that nothing else could, to understand the whole psychic peculiarity of the dreamer, and moreover this aspect is preeminently fitted to activate the patient's æsthetic, intellectual, and religious interests. Thus the best possible conditions for treatment are obtained.

The meaning of the dreams almost seems to suggest that the patient entered into the treatment with the greatest expectation and hopefulness, and that he was quite prepared to discard his adolescence and become a man. But this was absolutely not the case. Consciously, he was filled with trepidation and resistance, and in the subsequent course of the treatment he always showed himself antagonistic and difficult to handle, and always ready to fall back into his earlier infantilism. Accordingly his dreams are in definite contrast with his conscious behaviour. They move along a progressive line, and are on the side of his instructor. In my opinion, they permit the unique function of dreams to be clearly recognized. This function I have called compensation. The unconscious progressive tendency of dreams, when linked to the conscious regressive tendency, forms a contrasting pair of opposites which, so to speak, balance each other. The influence exerted by the instructor represents the balancing wheel. Hence, dreams can afford an effective support to our educational efforts, and, at the same time, they make a more profound insight possible into the intimate phantasy life. Thus the conscious attitude becomes gradually more understanding and receptive to new influences.

From what we have just said it might be inferred that, were all dreams to behave in this manner, they would offer an incomparable avenue to the most individual aspects of psychic life. In so far as dreams are capable of explanation, this is actually true, but the great difficulty remains of explaining the dream. Not only is wide experience and tact demanded, but also knowledge. To interpret dreams on the basis of a general theory, or on certain presuppositions,



is not merely ineffectual, but definitely a dangerous and harmful practice. By the means of gentle persuasion, and the use of a variety of assumptions, such as inversion, distortion, etc., as dream mechanisms, the dream can be construed to yield almost any meaning. The same arbitrary paraphernalia is to be found in the first attempts to decipher hieroglyphs. Before every attempt we make to understand a dream, we ought to say to ourselves: 'This dream can mean almost anything.' It may not even be opposed to, but may simply accompany consciousness, yet this would not necessarily be incompatible with the principle of compensation. Moreover, there are dreams that defy every effort at interpretation, and often the best we can do is to hazard a guess. At any rate, up to the present no open sesame for dreams has been discovered, as indeed no infallible method and no absolutely adequate theory yet exists.

The Freudian hypothesis, that all dreams are disguised wish-fulfillments either of a sexual nature, or of a kind equally inadmissible morally, I cannot corroborate. Therefore, I regard the use of this hypothesis and the technique based upon it as a subjective bias. Indeed, I am persuaded that, in view of the tremendous irrationality and individuality of dreams, it is perhaps quite impossible to construct an adequate theory. After all, why should we believe that everything can become a subject of scientific investigation? Scientific thought is merely one of the faculties of the human psyche for the understanding of the world. Perhaps it would be better to look upon dreams as in the nature of works of art, instead of regarding them as scientific data for investigation. The latter assumption seems to lead to better results, because it is nearer to the essence of dreams than the former. Then too, our main objective is to make effective, through a new conscious attitude, our unconscious compensation, so that we can overcome the former one-sidedness and inadequacy of consciousness. As long as other pedagogical methods are effective and useful we do not need the aid of the unconscious.

Indeed it would be a reprehensible error of judgment to try to substitute analysis for well-tried and recognized methods. The analytical method must be reserved only for cases where other methods have failed and then it should be used only by practised physicians, or by laymen under the control, and with the co-operation of such physicians.

The general results of the psychiatric studies and methods are not only of academic interest to the teacher ; they may also be of very real assistance, since in certain cases they can furnish him with an insight unattainable without such knowledge.

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