HEGEL'S EDUCATIONAL IDEAS

BRYANT

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PREFACE.

THE concept at the heart of the science current at the present day is expressed in the word "Evolution." So far as it refers directly to the inorganic world, this concept takes shape in the expressions: "Conservation of Energy" and "Correlation of Forces." As applied to the organic kingdom, the same concept assumes the aspect indicated by the phrase "Natural Selection."

Thus far the science of the day has to do chiefly with those processes—*i. e.*, concrete relations—which are unfolded in and through forms occupying space. These forms, acting directly upon the sense-organs, appeal immediately to the sensuous consciousness. In the main, therefore, scientific works within this sphere consist of vivid and presumably precise descriptions of phenomena. Not infrequently apology is offered for adding to the de-

scription serious discussion of the "abstract" principles involved in the phenomena.

Nevertheless, though the idea of evolution has so generally appeared in merely implicit rather than explicit or actually reasoned-out form, in treatises that have passed as "scientific," this very fact has not been without its compensation. There has indeed been positive advantage in the pictorial and dogmatic form in which this central feature in the thought of the time has been so generally presented. As pictorial it has appealed directly to the imagination. As dogmatically expressed, it has appealed to the element of faith inherent in the human mind. Thus it has rapidly made its way into general recognition and acceptance.

The pedagogical intimations contained in all this are of the greatest value; and we are now in full swing of the attempt to possess ourselves of that value. So eager have we been in this attempt, besides, that many of us are even now but just be-

ginning to suspect the gravity of the dangers it involves. The aspects of the world appealing to the sensuous consciousness have exercised such fascination upon us that for the time being the reflective consciousness has been held in abeyance—maintained in a state of comparative "inhibition." We have thus unawares actually been delivering ourselves over to the relatively rudimentary phase of consciousness as to an infallible guide, and neglecting the cultivation of the more adequate phase consisting of the reflective consciousness. This, too, on the assumption that somehow the latter must inevitably land us in the limbo of hopeless contradictions.

Yet the divine instinct of Reason in us is not wholly to be suppressed; and its protest against the attempt to impale thought upon the microscropist's needle, and by the magic of some new X-ray power compel the non-extended to assume sensuously visible form, has at length taken the special direction of serious psychological research. From our

exuberant contemplation of material forms we are turning with increasing evidence of anxiety to the consideration of mental modes.

But even this instinctive struggle illustrates in most impressive fashion the spell under which the mind of the time is still more or less completely bound. Ignoring the fact that mind can be known by mind alone, and be known alone to mind, we have been assured that a "new" psychology has taken the place of the "old;" that the true psychology consists in a mass of "truths" attained through a study of the nervous system; in short, we have been asked, with much show of seriousness, to accept a "psychology without the psyche."

By degrees, however, we are beginning to recognize that only the workings of an actual psyche could give rise even to such "psychology;" and so, grateful for the numerous, and often helpful, clews the "new psychology" affords us, we are beginning to brace ourselves to the really serious

task of studying mind *as Mind*—mind in its essential, universal, typical nature.

Most helpful of all the clews of which modern science has emphasized the value, indeed, is this: that spiritual as well as physical * *Reality* can be known only through its *appearance*—which in truth is not so far from saying with Spinoza, that "attributes are what constitute the essence of Substance." So that if we are really to know mind, we must observe mind itself.

But this throws us back upon the processes of mind as involved in the actual normal development of mind. In other words, it refers us to the whole process of education in its widest sense, as involving the essential facts to be co-ordinated and given accurate valuation in any really vital psychology. And the reciprocal of this is that if we would really comprehend the true significance of education, whether in respect of its aim or of its means or of its method, we must be guided

* And it may turn out that the latter is only an aspect of the former.

in our study by the principles of a sound psychology.

Clearly then the study of Natural Science forces us forward to the study of psychology; while the study of psychology necessarily leads us on to thoroughly re-examine education as constituting in its total range the positive process in which the phenomena of mind may be traced, not only in their essential, vital relation to each other, but also in their actual concrete evolution. In other words, we are driven to consider the total, universal nature of mind, both in its inner and in its outer phases. And this again necessarily involves the study of all the essential aspects of relation into which the individual mind can enter with other things.

Finally, when this survey has been completed, it is discovered that Education is the process of developing the individual mind through bringing it into ever increasingly complex actual — and that means conscious—relation with the total World or Universe, as the expression of the one

ultimate Reason or primal Cause of all, including the individual mind itself.

Throughout this whole research, as we may now observe, there is at every step increasingly imperative need of safe guidance. Such safe guidance, again, is to be found only in the organically unfolded thought of the world (universe), as expressed in the teachings of the great systematizers who have marked the great epochs in the evolution of human intelligence. Among these, Aristotle in ancient times, and Hegel in modern times, have presented the most comprehensive and consistent systematizations of human thought.

Like Aristotle, Hegel has been rejected by the impatient, and despised by the thoughtless. Nevertheless the truth remains, that whoever would set Aristotle or Hegel or any other great thinker aside as "antiquated," must first master such thinker's total thought, and show its imperfections. Otherwise he but exposes his own emptiness and conceit.

Thus the great and growing interest of the present day in mind, and in education as the process of the normal unfolding of mind, is inevitably referring us to the great thinkers for stimulus and guidance in our task of deepening and revising our knowledge of what mind essentially is, as well as of the true mode of its development. In this deeply significant and promising movement thoughtful minds are gravitating more and more definitely toward Hegel as the one who thus far has presented in clearest and most adequate form the true philosophic ground of all science and of all educational work, rightly so called. And if we are, as it were, predestined to go to school to him, it is because he obediently went to school to all the world, and learned from them the central clew to the actual evolution of the thought of the race as progressively reflecting the thought of the eternal Mind, which again constitutes the absolute law of the development of the individual human mind.

The following essay is an attempt to in-

terpret Hegel's theory with direct reference to the educational needs of our own time. It is believed that this theory will be found to justify whatever is really good in the "New Education," and also to furnish adequate ground for the rejection of whatever it presents of the spurious and merely novel.

We may add, finally, that Hegel is not properly to be looked upon as a competitor with Pestalozzi and Froebel and Herbart for the honors of educational leadership. Rather he presents in his system of philosophy as a whole a universal scheme of education in which each of these great reformers finds his proper place and due relation. If this scheme is not found in the present essay, the fault must be credited to the present writer.

I am indebted to my son, Max Müller Bryant, for valuable assistance in reading the proof.

HEGEL'S EDUCATIONAL IDEAS.

I.

PRELIMINARY VIEW.

It is a matter of frequent remark that Hegel was one of those fortunate individuals who come to be born "in the fullness of time." He lived at the culmination of a great epoch in the spiritual history of mankind.

In the sixteenth century Luther had given articulate expression to the universal sense of protest against the demand for unreasoning submission to mere authority in morals and religion. In the seventeenth century Descartes gave utterance to the same spirit of protest, though by him the protest was directed against unreasoning submission to mere authority

within the realm of speculative science. In the eighteenth century the rising spirit of Individualism gradually assumed political form, and at length burst forth in the French Revolution.

In the mind of Locke this principle had developed, not so much in the form of a universal principle applicable to all men alike, as in the form of a staid, respectable self-assertion appropriate to a member of a cultivated English household.* Rousseau, while borrowing from Locke, yet wrenched the idea of individualistic right and individual destiny completely free from the limitations of the mild form in which Locke had rendered it familiar to the English-speaking people, and with fierce energy proclaimed it as the central characteristic native in every man.

It was thus that Rousseau came at once to be recognized as the apostle of the revolutionary spirit, and that he proved to be the actual and specially appropriate

* Cf. Erdmann, *History of Philosophy* (Trans. Williston S. Hough), II., 110.

prophet of the Revolution. If, as he taught, individual man is already good when he comes from the hand of nature, and is only ruined by Society, then, as an individual, man has the right to turn upon and destroy Society.

Such reckless intellectualism has its offset in the devoutly ethical, but still essentially individualistic, spirit of Kant, who summed up the whole of philosophy in its practical import in the declaration that, in all the world there is nothing good "except a good will."* But also, it is important to remember that, by a "good will," he meant not the mere individual will, as it comes directly from the hand of nature (Rousseau's view), but rather the individual will, enlightened and disciplined through the practical unfolding of its normal social relations in the full range of all their normal aspects.

Let us note now that all these elements, revolutionary and restraining, were already

* Kant's *Theory of Ethics* (Trans. Abbott), 4th ed., p. 9.

in full swing of seething ferment when, in 1770, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was ushered into individual existence in this world of ours. Such storm-brewing atmosphere he breathed from his infancy. As a youth he witnessed the bursting of the storm, and felt through his whole being the awakening force of the shock. In his maturer years he saw the full measure of destructiveness involved in the unrestrained fury of the mere crude natural individualism of Rousseau. It was thus that he was led to penetrate to the deepest secret of that transfigured individualism which never emerges into fullness of definition save in the character of a second birth. And this spiritual regeneration in turn is possible in no other way than through conscious and deliberate self-restraint within the limits of a rational social organization.

Naturally enough, the youthful Hegel, like the youthful Goethe, was dazzled by the splendor of the Titan, Napoleon. Even as late as 1806 he refers to him as

"this World-Soul."* On the other hand the mature Hegel, like the mature Goethe, turned resolutely away from the Titan, and paid his deeper homage to the actual Divinity, which he more and more clearly saw to be struggling into ever richer degrees of self-realization in humanity as a whole, and also in each individual member of the race.

Such may serve as a hint in explanation of the fact that the writings of Hegel are everywhere so strikingly pervaded with the calmly reasoned assurance of the divine nature of man as genuine individual Person. Equally, too, does the inevitable inference, that because of this divine nature man as individual is immortal and weighted with an infinite destiny, appear as the fundamental tone in every line.

Thus Hegel may rightly be regarded as the representative of absolute Individualism, in which the individual human soul is seen as at once the vibrant focus of all divine influences, and as the infinitely pro-

* Thaulow, *Hegel's Ansichten*, III., 165.

phetic germ of all divine qualities, and hence, as the central object of interest in all the universe, so far as the universe is viewed as a process of evolution from lower to higher forms.

Hence, also, the whole of the Hegelian system is the absolute denial of exclusive right on the part of any "royal" personage to declare of himself, "I am the state," because the whole of that system is the absolute declaration of right on the part of *each and every member of the human race* to make and verify that declaration of and for himself.

And because Right and Duty are but obverse aspects of one and the same relation, it is equally the *duty* of each and every member of the race to practically assert the organic oneness of the State with himself. For true Royalty inheres in every human being; a Royalty bearing within it the inalienable, because divine, Right to all the conditions, negative and positive, needful for his own complete self-unfolding.

Such, in brief, may be taken as a preliminary intimation of the central practical characteristic of the Hegelian philosophy. And because this in turn is but the summarizing and fusing into organic unity of all the vital results of the entire ferment of the spirit of Individualism in its deepest import, Hegel may be called in respect of this, as long ago he was called in respect of the whole field of speculative thought: "the Harvester"—the one who had only to gather, and arrange in bundles, and store, the ripened fruit of other men's labors.

"Only!" His wisdom was nothing more than that of selection, and arrangement, and discovery of vital relations, and bringing to view of essential values, and showing, as had never been shown before, that the world is one infinite organic Whole, whose inner creative principle is absolute, eternal Mind, and whose outer form is but the manifestation of that Mind —such manifestation culminating in conscious units identical in nature with that Mind. That is all.

In fact, it is just this view that the world is the product of Mind and culminates in mind that constitutes the real clew to Hegel's educational principles; and equally it is this that explains how it happens that throughout Hegel's writings are found everywhere references to educational needs and conditions and appliances; so much so that one may very well conclude that every word Hegel deemed worth the trouble of recording was set down because to him it pointed the way to the education of man in the sense of the unfolding of the divine nature in each individual man.

It would even lead us to suspect that Hegel intended his whole system to find its practical culmination in the systematic exposition of the fundamental principles underlying the aims, the means and the methods of Education. And in fact, a letter from Hegel to Niethammer indicates his intention of writing out what he significantly calls a *Staatspädogogik;* that is, a science of Education in which education is viewed as on the one side, a function of

the social organism, and on the other, as the individual's own development through his reactions upon the whole round of the institutional life in which he is involved.*

Nor can we doubt that, as Thaulow confidently believes,† Hegel would have carried out this design but for the sudden termination of his life, while yet in the full vigor of his mental power.

In the following essay, I shall attempt to present, in as clear, connected and concise a form as possible, what I conceive to have been Hegel's educational ideas, as these appear by way of seemingly incidental remark and illustration scattered throughout his various works; and I shall also endeavor to show how, when brought together, these occasional notes of his on the subject of education simply expand into detailed form the central idea of the human mind in the normal process of its own development—the idea which, as already indicated, constitutes the practical,

* Cf. Rosenkranz: *Hegel's Leben*, p. 254.

† *Hegel's Ansichten*, III., 5.

living core of Hegel's whole system of philosophy. It need hardly be added that what I shall have to say must of course assume, in large measure, the character of interpretation. How far the interpretation is faithful to the original the critical reader will judge for himself.

Before entering upon this, however, it will be well to bring before our minds, though it be ever so briefly, Hegel's own personality.

II.

HEGEL'S PERSONALITY AND ENVIRONMENT.

ALREADY in the sixteenth century the Protestant ferment forced upon the ancestors of Hegel the choice between conviction and comfort—between inward peace coupled with outward struggle on the one hand, and outward calm, with inward unrest, on the other. The choice was in favor of the deeper conviction of Right; and this involved the breaking up of established associations and the entering into new relations, the emigration from Catholic Austria into Protestant Schwabia.

Lying in a valley, but commanding an extended view, is the capital city, Stuttgart. Here, on the 27th of August, 1770, was born the child who was to become the philosopher in whose educational ideas we are now centering our interest.

Everywhere man is more or less distinctly the child of Mother Earth; and

the Schwabian character has a peculiarity of texture due to the Schwabian land. So that Rosenkranz' reference to Hegel's "*tiefen ächt Schwäbischen, Innigkeit,*"* to his deep, genuine Schwabian Internality, or tendency to serious reflection, is by no means merely a figure of speech.

Similarly, on the other hand, there can be no doubt that the passing of his early life in the city which constituted, not only the focus of all the interests of Schwabia, but also one of the foci of the more general interests of Protestant Germany, served as an offset to the revery-inviting quiet of the beautiful mountain-bordered valley, and stimulated the mind of the gifted boy to inquire into the secrets of the currents of human interest that were ceaselessly mingling in the life of the town. And this the more as the employment of his father in the public service brought the family into direct and varied relation with many persons of high official rank—persons constituting the immediate

* *Hegel's Leben*, p. 5.

embodiment of actual current public interests.

Under these circumstances it was but natural that there should develop in such a mind as that of the youthful Hegel an "all-sided attentiveness," amounting to a special alertness as toward every sort of aim and activity. Nor was it less natural that through his native "Schwabian internality" this all-sided attentiveness should deepen into a lively desire for systematized knowledge along every line of inquiry open to the human mind.

Neither can we doubt that the clerical precision and formal finish of the official life with which he was surrounded during his early years impressed him deeply; and so much so as to account in part for the pains-taking, methodical way in which throughout his whole life he pursued his studies. Especially would this seem to be the case in respect of his voluminous note-books. Nor does it seem unreasonable to suppose also that this entered as a subordinate but appreciable factor into his high

estimate of formal finish and methodical completeness and consistency in the working out of the details of his System of Philosophy. However this may be, the fact is beyond dispute that Hegel is, above everything else, just the *systematizer* of human knowledge.

In this respect he is the man whose work, more than that of any other in the history of human thought, is rich in its suggestiveness for the teacher. For it is the teacher above all others, to whom, as such, Method is the very breath of life. And this because it is of the very essence of the daily life of the teacher to bring other minds to a consciousness of the true method of *Thinking* as the process of the inner definition of life, and of *Doing*, as the process of its outer definition.

Eager, yet methodical, enthusiastic, yet self-contained and logical, Hegel very early proved himself to be a representative at once of the spirit of the highly sophisticated eighteenth century "Enlightenment" and of the buoyant spirit of

classical antiquity. Awake in the Present he was also awake to the Past. So that from the outset his instinct of methodical completeness, stimulated as we have seen, forced him forward to read the Past in the light of the Present, and to interpret the Present as the normal fruit of the Past. The very conditions of his own mental evolution led him on by a logical necessity to the unfolding of his own famous "historical method," and hence to the speedy transcending of the over-confident spirit of the *Aufklärung*.

Thus his school-days were occupied, not with mere mechanical conning and reciting of prescribed lessons. Rather the most significant picture presented to us in those days is that of Hegel, alone in his private room, working with quiet, unremitting intensity over books *not* assigned as text. These were by no means books of "light literature." They were such books as the Psalms, the Iliad, Cicero's Letters, Euripides, Aristotle's Ethics, the Œdipus of Sophocles, Epictetus, Thucy-

dides; besides modern works in history, mathematics, science, art, criticism, philosophy and theology. From all of which he made careful and extended extracts.

Throughout all this, too, there was the gathering force of the prophetic instinct that was at length to unfold into such marvelously symmetrical and richly varied realization in the form of explicit and sustained thought.

For our present purpose, too, it is of especial moment to notice that even so early as his fourteenth year the central significance of education was already dawning upon him; so that from that time forward he collected in his note-books significant sayings of various authors upon this theme, and more and more recorded his own ever-deepening reflections.

Thus, though we have no separate work upon education from the hand of Hegel, yet reflections upon the subject as gathered out of his works by Thaulow and published in 1853–54 cover some thousand closely printed pages!

To all which we must add the further remark that the divided and helpless state of Germany, during the earlier part of Hegel's active life, could not but have the effect of throwing him back upon and intensifying his native reflectiveness or "Schwabian internality," and in this indirect way could not but prove a really strong factor in his wonderfully thorough-going analysis of the possibilities and ultimate significance of the individual life in its subtler spiritual aspects. Such analysis, besides, could not fail to deepen and clarify his conviction as to the supreme significance of education. And as a matter of fact we do find him expressing himself upon this subject in that troublous period in the following positive terms: "The importance of a good education was never more manifest than under the conditions of our time. The inner treasure which parents give their children through a good education and through the use of institutions of learning are indestructible and retain their worth under all conditions."*

* From an Address of Hegel's.

III.

GENERAL EDUCATIONAL VIEW IMPLIED IN THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM.

Of course no pretense can here be made to outline the system of philosophy developed by Hegel. At best we can do no more than indicate its central aim. The system itself is an organic whole, no part of which can really be comprehended save with reference to the whole.

The first draught of the system was struck out at a white heat in the "*Phenomenology of Mind*," a volume of about six hundred pages. After more fully elaborating the system, at a later period, Hegel undertook its condensation (while still preserving its now explicitly differentiated aspects) into a compass manageable by students. The result was the "*Encyclopædia*" in three volumes—(*a*) the Logic, (*b*) the Philosophy of Nature, (*c*) the Philosophy of Mind—amounting in all to fifteen hundred pages.

(*a*) The *Logic* presents the *system of thought* as such. That is, it presents in systematic arrangement the fundamental categories of Reason, beginning with the simplest, and showing by the famous "dialectical method" how, from its very nature, mind cannot rest in such simple, vacuous forms; but by its own inherent energy necessarily unfolds into ever richer phases of consciousness until it reaches the idea of an eternally self-contained, self-conscious, self-active Energy, which, by that fact, is an eternally self-realizing, and therefore infinitely creative, Mind.

(*b*) The *Philosophy of Nature* is the interpretation of the phenomena of *the outer world of nature*, on the one hand, as constituting nothing else than the infinitely manifold forms in which that creative Energy forever manifests itself; and on the other, as leading up to and culminating in that subtle complex of physical energy in which consists the human body — the medium in and through which the human soul emerges into conscious being.

(*c*) The *Philosophy of Mind* is the interpretation of the *phenomena of the inner world of mind.* It traces the evolution of the human mind through its merely natural qualities—that is, the qualities determined through external, natural influences—finds it emerging into individualized form as "feeling soul," and again unfolding into the "actual soul," which already begins to distinguish itself from its embodiment, and to command the latter, and thus already to give to it a significance properly described as *ideal.* Thus man stands erect, not because it is physiologically "natural" for him to do so, but only because he *wills* the upright attitude.

But this is only initial. The Philosophy of Mind traces further the fundamental forms of *consciousness*, emphasizing especially the contrast between the merely *sensuous* consciousness, on the one hand, and on the other, *self*-consciousness, which, in its highest term, is the thinking consciousness, or *Reason*.

Following this a summary of Psychology

closes the treatment of the "Subjective Mind;" *i. e.*, Mind as self-related *individual.*

But this necessarily implies an *objective* aspect of mind; that is, it implies the outward manifestation of mind whose inner or subjective characteristics have thus far been considered. It is the consideration of mind in this phase which gives rise to the estimation of the practical relations into which the individual mind enters, and to the very brief summarizing of what Hegel presents more fully in his *Philosophy of Right*—that is, ethics from the objective or "practical" point of view.

The last thirty pages indicate the various aspects of "Absolute Mind," or Spirit. By which Hegel means the universal, ideal forms or degrees in which the human mind realizes its highest characteristics and finds its purest satisfaction. These forms are (1) Art, to which Hegel elsewhere devotes three volumes; (2) Religion, to which he gives two volumes, and (3) Philosophy, to which he devoted his life, and to which

the whole of his works, in eighteen volumes, are his amazingly rich contribution.

Hegel's Logic is a search for the eternal forms of Reason. His Philosophy of Nature is an attempt to trace these abiding forms as in eternal process of manifestation in the eternally vanishing forms and phases of the outer world. His Philosophy of Mind indicates the way by which the human soul "struggles upward out of nature into spirituality." *

In the Hegelian system of Philosophy, then, there is presented a reasoned, articulated account of the total organic round of Evolution. † The Logic culminates in a glimpse of the Eternal Mind, whose absolute Internality is focused in God. In the Philosophy of Nature this same absolute, divine Internality is seen unfolding its creative energy into the form of that infinite Externality which we call Nature.

* *Werke*, X2., 120.

† It is Hegel, and not Darwin, nor yet Herbert Spencer who is the real author of the modern doctrine of evolution.

In the Philosophy of Mind we see the same infinite creative Energy again gathering itself into foci, constituting human souls—units characterized by the same absolute Internality as that which constitutes the central, vital element of the Eternal creative Energy or Mind itself.

Nature is the outer form of the divine Thought, and apart from that Thought it is nothing. The return of this Thought to its own native Internality in the form of a self-conscious unit is the process of the creation of a human soul. Man is made in the image and likeness of Divinity, for he *is* Divinity awaking out of the sleep of infinitely self-expanded being. And as the expansion is infinite, so the concentration of Return is infinite, assuring to the individual soul an infinite destiny, consisting of endless progress in self-realization, one essential phase of which must be an ever-deepening consciousness of its own God-likeness. If nature is God's omnipresence, in the sense of his infinitely diffused being, the human soul is God's omnipresence, in

the sense of his infinitely concentered being.

To aid the individual soul in fulfilling this destiny—to aid it in freeing itself from its own capricious tendencies, and in conforming to the divine Type or Ideal Nature common to all spiritual beings—such is the central aim of all true educational effort. Indeed, Hegel expressly says:* "With the school begins the life of universal regulation, according to a rule applicable to all alike. For the individual spirit or mind must be brought to the putting away of its own peculiarities, must be brought to the knowing and willing of what is universal, must be brought to the acceptance of that general culture which is immediately at hand"—at hand, that is, in the organized social life around him.

Evidently, then, in the Hegelian view, man is in truth the *microcosm*,† and it is in

* *Werke*, VII2., 82.

† It is to be wished, in this connection, that every thoughtful teacher might be induced to read Lotze's great work, the *Microcosmus*. It has been translated by Elizabeth Hamilton and E. E. Constance Jones.

this manner that we are henceforth to regard him. He is the *Cosmos* in miniature. As such he is in vital relation alike to Nature, to Society, and to God. And because of these phases of relationship involved in the life of each individual human being, it is evident that his education can rightly be developed only on condition that in the process of his education all these conditions determining his life shall be taken into consideration, and freely allowed full measure of efficiency, each in its own specific way.

But it is also important to keep clearly in view the fact that Nature is only the infinitely extended outer form of the infinitely concentered inner mind of the Creator. As such, Nature is not merely something opposed *to* Mind, it is also and especially only one aspect *of* Mind. It is Mind reduced to its lowest terms. And the condensation of Nebulæ into stars and suns, and their attendant spheres, and the further gathering of Energy into crystalline forms, and again into microscopic spheres, palpitating with the first pre-

monitions of individualized life—all this constitutes the way of return from infinitely expanded unconscious being to concentered conscious existence, the highest term of which is that self-directed activity which specially characterizes Man, and proves him to be the actual, endlessly ascending descendant of the primal, eternal Mind. It is on this ground that each individual human being has infinite and inalienable Rights. "Man is by nature rational; therein lies the possibility of equality of the rights of all men."*

But thus all men are *identical in nature* —are of the one self-same divine Type. And because the type is divine, and therefore infinite, and because the type can be completely fulfilled only in the individual, then each individual has an infinite destiny, and hence a destiny which ultimately is one and the same with that of every other. The Brotherhood of Man has its absolute assurance of unquestionable truth in the Fatherhood of God.

* *Werke*, VII2., 65.

Hence, each can aid every other, and be aided by every other. Humanity constitutes a divine Family, the ideal of which is that each shall work for the good of all, and precisely in so doing shall secure to himself the greatest good. And as the greatest good is continuous and normal inner growth, or growth of mind, and as it is just this growth which constitutes the essence of all true education, it is evident that the education of the individual includes in the full round of its indispensable appliances the whole range of those human relations which constitute the organic determining substance of the social or institutional world.

Association, then, is a primal law of the very nature of Man. As Aristotle insisted, "Man is *by nature* a social being." And to Hegel this truth is of still deeper import than appears in the form in which it presented itself to the great Greek.

But thus the social factor in the education of Man is of still more vital importance than is the factor consisting of his

relation to Nature. In fact, the realization of man's destiny—the actual development of his education—is impossible, save through mutual helpfulness. Hence, all the forms of social life, all human institutions, have each its specific educational value. And when we remind ourselves that education is but the process of unfolding the divine Type into realized form in the individual human being, and that that Type has for its central characteristic self-activity or Freedom, we can see how all-comprehending is the statement of Hegel, that "History is nothing else than progress in the consciousness of Freedom,"* and why Rosenkranz should say explicitly that "Hegel represents History as the education of Man through God."†

And further, since Freedom or Self-activity is the supreme quality in and through which we recognize the oneness in nature of Man with Divinity, it would appear

* *Werke*, IX., 24 (*Philosophy of History*, Bohn lib. Trans. Sibree, p. 19.)

† *Hegel's Leben*, p. 9.

that the consciousness of Freedom cannot be rightly unfolded save in so far as the educational processes intended to secure this result include explicit and systematic reference to the fundamental relation sustained by man to God.

Thus the education of the individual human being can be really complete in any given degree only by being at once physical, social and religious.

IV.

"FROM THE SIMPLE TO THE COMPLEX."

THE first word in the most thoroughly orthodox articles of modern educational faith is this of the necessary law of advance "from the simple to the complex." It will be worth our while to see what interpretation Hegel's philosophic theory suggests for this assumed law.

Even so meagre an intimation as that already given will serve to show how absolutely the three-fold idea of Unity in Substance, Completeness of Energy, and Consistency of Process dominates in Hegel's view of the world. And this again is only a deepening of Aristotle's conception of *Cause* as (*a*) Material Cause (Substance), (*b*) Formal Cause (Self-defining Energy) and (*c*) Efficient Cause (actual concrete Process). And further; Cause cannot be real, save as the completly fused unity of these three aspects. And being this it is

also *Final* Cause—that is, the perfect and perpetual fulfilment of the absolute demands of Reason.

Herein, too, is the one thoroughly adequate ground of the doctrine of Evolution. Self-active Energy or Mind appears as the primal, self-differentiating Substance. Such primal Mind cannot be conceived save (*a*) as Energy or Will; (*b*) as self-directing Energy or Intelligence; (*c*) as self-sufficing Intelligence or Substance; (*d*) as self-satisfying Energy, or absolute repose in absolute activity. To which we must add that absolute activity cannot have less than absolute result. A perfect Creator necessarily implies a perfect Creation—and *vice versa*.

The infinite exercise or forth-putting of this Energy is in the first place the creation of the extended or material world. But this infinite forth-putting or self-expansion of the primal Energy is at the same time its infinite self-concentration or coming together with itself. As infinite Energy its act is infinite. Looked at

from one side the result of this act must be infinite self-differentiation, or infinite self-analysis. But this is only one aspect of the process, the complementary aspect of which can be nothing less than infinite self-integration or self-synthesis.

In fact we cannot guard ourselves too carefully against supposing that differentiation and integration are ever found or findable in actual separation. In the heart-beat of the Universe systole and diastole are coincident. Both the outflow into the form of the extended world of Matter and the inflow into the non-extended world of Mind are incessant, and the "heart-period" is the eternal Now of divine Perfection.

But also either aspect of the process looked at separately—*i. e.*, abstractly—presents a definite order of succession; and thus gives rise to *time*, which is but the form of succession. As we come to comprehend the process and recognize it as working toward a definite end we call it "history" or "evolution," and proceed to

record our observations of and reflections upon the process.

The records thus far made constitute what is called "Science"—the cumulative results of the knowing process of humanity. Geometry, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry—these are the divisions of the one total "Universal History" within that elementary stage which has to do with the forms and processes of the outer material world as such. At the same time Chemistry involves "organic compounds," and thus introduces us to the secondary stage of our "Universal History" which leads through Biology to Human Physiology; and this in turn proves to be the transition form in which we are already introduced to the final or Human stage.

And all this is not merely important, it is altogether essential to the right understanding of the end, the means and the method of education. If man would comprehend his actual destiny, and the true mode of fulfilling that destiny, he must know what he is in his own essential na-

ture. And this he can rightly know only through discovering the way in which he has come to be what he is. Man studies Nature only because he sees himself reflected in Nature. He seeks to know the World only because from the dawn of his existence he has been prompted by the inextinguishable premonition that the world is only his own larger self. The "Know Thyself" of the Delphic Apollo is no outwardly given command. "It is nothing else than the inborn, absolute Law of Mind. All activity of Mind is, therefore, only a seizure of one's own self; and the end of all true science is only this: that the spirit of man shall recognize itself in all things, whether in the Heavens or upon the Earth."*

First of all, indeed, education consists in a theoretical process—*viz:* the process of discovery that the World is a world of Reason. But it is also, and equally, the practical process of progressive self-adjustment to that World. And this self-adjustment, let us

* Hegel's *Werke*, VII2., 4.

repeat, has a three-fold significance. It is the process of self-adaptation (*a*) to *Nature* as the necessary condition of man's *physical* life; (*b*) to human *Institutions* as the necessary condition of realizing man's *ethical* life; and (*c*) to the *Eternal Mind* as the primal condition of the whole life of man, and especially of his *religious* life.

Evidently, then, in Hegel's view, the process from the simple to the complex is meaningless, save as the complement of the process from the complex to the simple. Accepting which it is easy to see that in educational discussions the phrase, "from the simple to the complex" is only too often used in merely one-sided fashion, and thus, at best, with only superficial meaning.

Meanwhile the educator, as such, is under absolute obligation to know the ultimate, infinitely complex typical nature to the realization of which, by virtue of his office, he pledges himself to guide the child. It is, in fact, only in comparison with this ultimate, infinitely complex typi-

cal nature that he can hope to judge correctly of "simplicity" in all, or even in any, of its endlessly varying degrees, whether in ends, or in means, or in methods, in his work.

In this connection we may quote Hegel's express declaration that "The consideration of mind is only then, in truth, philosophical or rational, when it recognizes the idea or notion (*Begriff*) of the same in its living development and actualization; in other words, when it comprehends the [human] mind as an image of the eternal Idea [or divine Mind]."* And it is further worth our while to remind ourselves that Hegel elsewhere defines philosophy as "the thinking consideration of things,"† in which sense every teacher

* *Werke*, VII2., 3.

† *Werke*, VI., 4. Of course Hegel uses the word thinking (*denkende*) in its really serious sense of the most careful tracing out of relations, and this persisted in until a *reasoned whole* is reached. The mere idle reflection, so often called thinking, Hegel would rather regard as a sort of *traümerei*, or aimless, vapory dreaming.

ought assuredly to be an ever-growing "philosopher." And the more thoughtfully the interests of education are considered, the more unquestionable it appears that the formula, "from the simple to the complex," only suggests an infinite progressive series, each term of which, from one point of view, may and must be regarded as "simple," and from the opposite point of view, must equally be looked upon as "complex." And this *complexity of simplicity and simplicity of complexity* must be kept constantly in view by every teacher who would prove himself worthy of his high calling. For only on this condition can he judge rightly of the adaptation of means to ends, and of the relative values of ends in his work.

And now let us note the significance of this evolutional clew with reference to the development of each individual mind.

V.

"THE AGES OF MAN."

WITH Hegel the existence of the race is presupposed in the existence of the individual Man, just as the existence of Nature is presupposed in the existence of the race, as again the existence of God is presupposed in all, as the primal cause of all. Not only is it true that man inherits his *spiritual* nature from Divinity; he also derives his *physical* nature, his organism, not *from* the material world, but *through* the material world, from God; always remembering that the material world itself is nothing else than a mode of the divine Energy. In the fact that man possesses an outward form as the expression of his inward being, he is rightly said to be made in the *image* of God, whose outer being fills infinite space. And in the fact that, as man, his inner being is mind, he is made

in the *likeness* of God, whose inner being is also Mind. God is perfect Mind. Man is Mind struggling toward perfection.

Nature is thus the outward form of the Revelation of Divinity to Man, as Man himself is the inner form of that revelation. So that Nature proves to be of two-fold significance in education. On the one hand it is of significance for the reason that it constitutes the immediate determining condition of the outer physical life of Man. It is this that constitutes the so-called practical import of Nature. On the other hand, the manifold aspects of Reason involved in Nature, and constituting the simpler modes of the eternal Mind, have always appealed to the deeper reason of Man; and, accordingly, the interpretation of Nature in terms of Mind has from the beginning been one of the most significant of all the factors in the gradual education of the race. The beginnings of this interpretation were made through the phantasy in the form of myth; the revised and matured forms are un-

folded through reflection and speculative reason, and constitute what is called science.

In respect of this two-fold significance of Nature, few treatises can be found equal to Hegel's *Anthropology** in direct, and in the deeper sense, *practical* suggestiveness, for the teacher. Not only does he show there in terse form and with fairly unerring precision the great, fundamental determining influences due to distribution of land and water, and to the conformation of the land, and how these have predetermined the destinies of primitive races and nations; but with a marvelous keenness of vision which nothing seemed to escape, he indicates the progress made by men of different races in the power to read aright the Sybiline books of nature.†

Here, as elsewhere, it will be impossible to enter much into details. We can only note that the clew to the explanation and

* *Werke*, VII2., 46–249.

† This latter phase is developed more extendedly in the *Philosophie der Religion*.

correction of superstition in all its forms is indicated, following which clew one can trace the stages through which mankind have advanced from the various forms of superstitious interpretation of Nature to a right understanding and more or less adequate comprehension of its various aspects —*i. e.*, from the mythical to the scientific view.

So long and so far as the things of the outer world were impenetrable to his vision, man bowed in fear before them. As nature became transparent to his view, he beheld God the Spirit as its substance and soul; and his worship became a worship of joy and love. The breath of God's spirit is the creation of Worlds; the breath of the spirit of man is the creation of words; as man saw and understood the coming and going of worlds, his own breath came and went with quickened intensity and firmer coherence, and his soul breathed thoughts and his thoughts condensed into words and the words blended into song. It is such rythmic outbreathing

of the soul that constitutes Literature and Art of every form and every degree.

The lower animals have voices also; but the *symbolism* of the voice, as also that of color, all this belongs to *mind articulate*, and this exists for man alone. And the spontaneous symbolizing process involved in sensuous perception on the part of man, constitutes the intellectual root of that wonder, with which, as already noticed, all human knowing begins, and which, therefore, all real success in education necessarily implies.

Evidently, then, it is the business of the teacher, not to suppress curiosity or wonder—that is, interest—nor yet merely to indulge it, but rather to guide it and direct it upon worthy objects. And in order to do this, the teacher must know the limitations of the child. And to really *know* these limitations, he must know them first of all with reference to the universal Type of Mind, and also as being absolutely protean in character. So far from being fixed once for all, they are infinitely

variable, to-day vanishing and to-morrow reappearing in other and subtler forms. The task which yesterday taxed his strength to the utmost, so that the sense of contradiction between what was demanded and what could be accomplished amounted to nothing less than poignant suffering, is to-day performed with exuberance and even with scorn that any one should count it difficult. The problem with which he struggles desparingly to-day he will play with to-morrow, and smile a rainbow of triumph through the vapor of vanishing tears. The "impossible" means only the "deferred."

Endlessly elusive as all this must ever be for the teacher, there must nevertheless be no illusion in his mind concerning the nature of what, in any given instance, constitutes the actual difficulty in which the individual child-mind is involved. Rather it is for the teacher to know the whole process through which the child must pass—to know that process in its general character, and to know it also in its de-

tails and so be able to render real service to the child at every crisis in his progress.

Thus education, as Hegel explicitly describes it, is essentially a process of "mediation,"* of the reconciliation of what at first appear as opposing or even contradictory elements in the child's mind; and thus, at every step, it is the process of raising the consciousness of the child to a higher power, to a richer, more positive unity. Whence we may note the necessary inference that the office of the teacher is essentially mediatorial. If the priest is *ex officio* a teacher, so also the teacher is *ex officio* a priest. And it is high time that this fundamental character of the function of the teacher were better understood and appreciated.

But this brings us to notice, in the next place, that the first (and least concrete) specific formula of the evolutional process through which the child must pass—mainly under the guidance of the teacher—in its attainment of maturity, is that of the so-

* *Werke*, VI., 135.

called "ages of man;" that is, the several periods of childhood, youth, maturity and old age in the life of the individual. In which connection it is extremely interesting to see how Hegel traces the forms and relations of the inorganic world over into the realm of the organic; and how again he shows the relation between the individual and the species within the limits of the simple sphere of the organic—the individual organism completing serially the round of characteristics pertaining to the species only to die at length and thus to leave the species as a mere abstraction. But also, in its failure ever to express at one and the same moment within itself more than a single phase of the significance of the species of which it is the "realization," the individual is itself also fated never to escape wholly from the ghostly realm of abstraction. The individual never wholly includes the species, nor does the species ever wholly include the individual. Each excludes even while it includes the other.

Such the contradictory character of the

merely organic world. On the other hand it is in the realm of mind, properly speaking, that the species finds itself fully realized. For in this realm the individual, through self-consciousness, comes to include the species in itself; and thus death is subordinated to life in the individual and hence proves to be only the form of transition to a more adequate degree of individual existence.

But here, also, the *initial point of view* is simply "anthropological;" that is, it takes account of man chiefly as a "natural" being, or as a mere product of nature. Thus regarded, he is subject to natural changes, and therefore still falls within the limits of Time as the form of change. Hence arises a series of distinct states through which the individual as such passes—states which, so far from being fixed, prove their fluid nature by merging the one into the other; a fact which shows the life of the individual to have a wider and subtler significance than pertains to the life of a race or of a nation as such. It is this series of

clearly marked states or conditions that constitutes what has already been indicated as the course of the "ages of man."

Even from the merely anthropological point of view, this succession of periods is of deep practical interest to the teacher; for on the one hand the child is not merely a *soul*, but an *embodied* soul; and on the other hand the body of the child is not merely an animal, but also the *organ of a developing mind*. So that the study of man as animal can never be adequately pursued, save in so far as it is pursued with reference to the mental functions which the body, as organ, is fitted to serve.

In fact, the complete separation of the anthropological from the psychological and the ethical point of view is quite impossible, and the consideration of the characteristics of the later are inevitably more or less anticipated in the analysis of the earlier. For what, in the living or organic being as such, constitutes nothing more than the simple quality of the species, shows itself in the spiritual being as noth-

ing less than the characteristic of rationality.

It is this rationality that constitutes the central point of interest even in the initial anthropological stage. "The age of infancy is the period of natural harmony, of simple contentedness on the part of the 'subject' [or individual mind] with itself and with the world. It is thus the beginning in which contradiction has not yet arisen; as the period of old age is the end from which opposition has ceased." Whatever oppositions appear in infantile life are without interest, since they are superficial and fail to penetrate to the inner being of the individual. "The child lives in innocence, without lasting grief, in love for his parents and in the feeling of being loved by them." And yet the germ is here of all that is to follow.

For this reason "this immediate, and hence non-spiritual, merely natural unity of the individual with his species and with the world in general *must be broken up.*" The individual must progress to the point

of putting himself in direct opposition to the actually existing world about him. For thus alone can he take the first step in the attainment of his own independence. It is this that specially characterizes *youth.*

True, this opposition is altogether one-sided, and in turn must also be overcome. The individual must recognize that the actually existing order of the world is itself the immediate, practically unfolded form of Reason, to which he must conform, if he would realize his own individual existence.

Arrived at this point the youth has become a *man.*

Old age, finally, is the simple return to a state of indifference to affairs, and presents no point of positive interest in an educational sense.

(*a*) But upon this important aspect of the subject we must enter a little more into detail.

And here the first thing we have to notice is that the age of infancy is characterized especially as the period of *bodily*

growth; and above all, as we may add, of the growth of the brain as the more immediate organ of individualized life. Such individualized life *begins* with breathing—that special rhythmic practical relation, positive and negative, to the outer world, consisting in inspiration and expiration of the enveloping medium. Immediately connected with this is vocalization—a *cry*, which, regulated and articulated, at length becomes *speech*.

It is worth noting, too, that talking and walking begin simultaneously, which serves to remind us that the brain is the organ of mind as *will*, no less than of mind as *intelligence*. For, as already noticed, man stands erect, not because it is "natural" for him to do so, but because he *wills* to stand. To which we may add that though a cry may be "involuntary," the utterance of a word is no less a deliberate expression of will than is standing or taking a step; just as standing and walking are *definite* forms of activity, and hence are expressions of intelligence no less than expressions of will.

But with the beginning of definite, deliberate act and speech the definite *formal* education of the child has begun. The child *feels* his independence ; is ceaselessly surprised and delighted with the discovery and exercise of his own powers. Through language he learns to apprehend things in their universal character, and also attains to the consciousness of his own universality in the use of the pronoun " I."

At the same time the feeling of independence on the part of the child is shown in *handling* things in *play*. To which Hegel adds that the most rational use to which children can put playthings is to *break them to pieces*. And he would certainly have emphasized this judgment still further had he lived to see the greed of the manufacturer invading the sacred world of childhood, and, by anticipating all the wants of children in respect of the means of play, rob them of the inalienable right to growth in intelligence and in will and in healthful pleasure through the invention and practical creation of their own

toys. Happily Froebel and an army of Froebelians have come to the rescue, and children are being trained in the spirit of play joyfully to exercise their intelligence in invention and their will in creation. Happily, too, the normal child can never be altogether satisfied with the toy that has been given him ready made until he has *analyzed* it, that so at least he may see how its *synthesis* has taken place.

Thus even infancy reveals a seriousness of purpose, and the play of childhood is already the premonitional form of the creative activity of *work*—of the self-regulated exercise of power through which the individual attains maturity. The theoretical phase of this is *inquisitiveness*, which is the mainspring of intellectual *acquisitiveness*. The awaking, prophetic sense of what he ought to be—the stirring of the deepest instinct of his being consisting of the divine element of Reason in his heredity —this involves the disquieting recognition that what he is does not conform to what he ought to be. And of this the inevit-

able outcome is the lively desire to become as mature people are, and to this end to live in association with them.

Herein, too, is the secret of the deeply significant disposition towards *Imitation*, which is so like a frenzy in children. Hence, too, that eager questioning spirit which heeds no bounds, and which so often appears as impertinence in the child. "This characteristic striving of children after self-definition (*Erziehung*) is the inner moving element in all education (*Erziehung*)."

But the ideal of which the child is conscious and to which he would elevate himself does not appear to him in abstract general form. Rather it appears to him, as Hegel specifically notes, in the form of a given individual person who is to him an *authority*. Only in this concrete fashion as embodied in another and relatively mature human being does the child recognize that essential being which he still regards as his own and to realize which in his own person constitutes his chief aspiration.

This feeling of reverence for authority—for an example in the concrete of what the child himself desires to become—ought, Hegel insists, to be preserved and fostered with special care.

According to Hegel, then, it is evident that in the theoretical aspect of the child's education the teacher is an authority whom he must follow, and that in the ethical aspect of his education the teacher is a model whom the child must imitate. And, indeed, in the nature of the case this can scarcely be otherwise, let the capability and the character of the teacher be what they may—a point upon which boards of education may very well reflect with even more than ordinary seriousness.

We may note in the next place that with such penetrating view of the significance of child-life Hegel could hardly be expected to treat with any great degree of consideration the trifling pedagogics (*Spielende Pädagogik*) which would strip educational work of all earnestness of purpose and definiteness of means and con-

tinuity of method and reduce it to the mere aimless form of childish play—which would demand of the educator that he let himself down to the level of the pupil instead of elevating the latter to the seriousness of a purpose in itself essential. Such mere pass-time "education" may easily result, and in fact could not fail to result, in the child coming to regard everything in a merely superficial manner and to act from mere caprice.

In this connection we may easily gather that much of the so-called child-study of the present day could hardly have failed to awake the scorn of Hegel, who would indeed have the child thoroughly studied by the educator; but studied with explicit reference to its essential nature on the one hand and to its inevitable limitations on the other; *not* with reference to its caprices and mere trifling fancies and observations—these, too, set down at random and altogether indiscriminately by wholly untrained and even immature minds. No doubt the peculiarities of the individual

child ought to be noted by the teacher; but only in order that they may be corrected—not with a view to recording them as if they were of profound and universal significance! We ought still to go to school to Aristotle if we have not yet learned that, as he says, "there can be no science of the accidental."

On the other hand not less seriously detrimental results may easily follow from a different method sometimes followed by injudicious teachers. That method consists in never-ending commendatory inciting of children to "reasoning;" whence mere glibness and flippancy is likely to be the only result. No doubt the thought of the child must be awakened, but the teacher ought to remember the limitations of the child's mind in this respect, and not attempt to present the ultimate values of things to the unripe, empty understanding of children.

(*b*) We have next to observe that just as the most conspicuous transition occurring within the period of childhood is that

out of *infancy* into the *articulately speaking* stage; so the transition from childhood to youth occurs in and through puberty which, in Hegel's phrase, is the life of the species rising to consciousness in the individual and beginning to seek satisfaction. And of course by the "species" coming into explicit form in the individual consciousness Hegel here means, not so much the animal species as manifested in the form of mere physiological tension, as species in the sense of what he calls the "Substantial Universal;" that is, species in the sense of an internal vital principle constituting the essential ideal or type struggling, in the form of vague premonition, to be realized in and for and by the individual himself.

Thus instead of seeing his ideal already realized in the person of a given human being of relatively mature age and serving as an authority and a model, as happens with the child, the youth conceives his ideal as something too exalted to have yet attained realization, and in comparison

with which the things and persons and institutions of the actually existing world are insignificant and worthy only of commiseration or contempt. Hence, that the world of present reality should be regarded as itself the form in which the actual evolution of that Ideal has already taken place and is now taking place can only excite the scorn of the clear-sighted and impatient youth. On the contrary the present world of fact in its whole range is for him a mere perversion and caricature of the genuine Ideal. Hence the youth feels himself called to revolutionize the world and bring it into conformity with the Ideal—*i. e.*, *his* ideal.

It is thus, as Hegel puts it, that the peace in which the child lives with the world is broken by the youth. And precisely on account of this persistent appeal to the Ideal the youth bears the appearance of having a more exalted aim and a greater generosity of soul than has the man engrossed in mere transitory interests. On the other hand it is for the

youth to discover that it is precisely the man of affairs who in freeing himself from his own subjective or merely individual fancies and visions of far-off unattainable "Ideals," has merged himself in the concrete Reason of the actual world and has come to put forth his energies for that world.

To this self-same end, indeed, the youth himself must come at last. Meanwhile his immediate aim, in his own estimation, is precisely this—to formulate himself, to prepare himself for the carrying out of the ultimate aim of bringing his splendid Ideal into perfect realization. And it is precisely in the carrying out of this, his *immediate* aim, that the youth becomes a man, and discovers at last the futility of his projects for revolutionizing the world.

But also this discovery constitutes a serious crisis in the experience of youth, and is likely to assume a more or less tragic form. The descent from his ideal life into the monotonies of actual communal life is apt to appear to him as a hopeless descent

into the inferno of Philistinism. In which case the utter irreconcilability of the present Reality with the fondly cherished Ideal plunges the youth into a sort of hypochondriac state—a state from which one of weak nature may prove unable ever to recover.

At this critical period there devolves upon parent and teacher the difficult and delicate task of bringing the youth to recognize that the *necessity* in which he finds himself involved—the necessity of entering into a world that seems to him an altogether alien world—is, after all, by no means a necessity of violence, but rather that it is nothing else than the necessity of Reason; that, therefore, considered as external to the life of the individual, it is just the Rational and Divine which as such possesses the absolute Might to bring about its own perfect realization; and that, also, considered as pertaining to the individual, it is nothing else than the very law of his own inner being demanding that precisely for the purpose of his own

self-realization—which is but the realization of his *true* Ideal—he shall willingly and unreservedly take his part in the total round of activity of this seemingly foreign world; but which, nevertheless, is a world to which he is actually altogether native, and in which it is his destiny to be altogether at home.

In short, we may say that youth is the period of the home-sickness of the soul. And the gravity of the disease is in the delirium by which the youth fancies that his true home is in a far-off cloudland, and that he is at present an exile in a world which can neither understand him nor sympathize with him.

In this critical period, we repeat, parent and teacher are joint physicians. Happy the youth whose case his physicians rightly understand! The true remedy is nothing else than right education.

From the study of the child, and of the youth, as thus indicated, we may securely infer the general character of education, and the course it must take, to be wor-

thy the name of education.* And first we will attempt to show in what education essentially consists.

*I omit any reference to the age of maturity, though this, too, is of importance, as the period of prolonged self-culture, and of mutual helpfulness to this end in the form of culture-clubs, university extension, etc., etc.

VI.

GENERAL NOTION OF EDUCATION.

We have now to remind ourselves of what is in itself a self-evident proposition: that the very idea of education presupposes a state of imperfection from which the individual is to be raised to a state of relative perfection. At the same time this self-evident fact has only too generally been interpreted as if it were of significance solely or mainly in respect of the intellectual aspect of human life. Whereas, on the other hand, education can really—*i. e.* rationally—mean nothing else than the regulated process of maturing the whole being of the individual. And while Hegel steadily and rightly kept his eye upon the central idea of education as consisting essentially in the process of developing into realized form the spiritual and abiding nature of the individual; yet the careful consideration he gives, espe-

cially in his *Philosophy of History*, to the influence of climatic conditions, to the configuration of the land-masses, and to the proximity to the sea, as influencing the development of races, of nations, and of individuals, shows how well aware he was of the significance of the physiological life of man—not in itself, but as *organic to his spiritual life*—and also how consistent with his whole view of education is the central idea of the so-called "New Education" to the effect that the child's own activity is the all-important factor involved in determining his own development, whether considered as physical, as intellectual, as moral, or as religious.

How to direct that self-activity is the real problem of all education, and Hegel could not, without self-contradiction, have done otherwise than heartily approve, not only of the kindergarten, as putting in consistent and effective practical form for children his own educational ideas, but he must also have recognized in "manual training" means admirably adapted to

disciplining the will in the critical and puzzling period of youth.

Were there any doubt upon this point it must be dissipated by reference to his explicit statements as to the deep-reaching significance of *imitation* as leading to *habit*, and of habit as the established form of *character*. Indeed, Hegel leaves no ground for question that with him the true aim of all education is just *character rationally formulated and practically fulfilled*—the development of *rational* habit as a transfigured *second* nature. He does not hesitate to expressly declare* that "Pedagogics is the *art of making men moral*." And to this he adds that, theoretically, "it regards man as natural, and shows the way of bringing about his regeneration, the way of transforming his first nature into a second spiritual nature, so that the latter shall attain the form of *habit* within him."

In accordance with the view thus intimated, Hegel points out that at the begin-

* *Werke*, VIII., 212.

ning of his existence each individual is merely rudimentary, merely germinal; that is, wanting in the practical development of all the characteristics that go to constitute manhood, properly speaking. It is this that Hegel expresses when he says that man is at first a merely "natural" being; which amounts to saying that, initially, man simply appears as a product of Nature—as a being whose explicit characteristics are essentially *animal.*

But this contradicts the ultimate ideal or typical nature of man as man, which is that of a being characterized by spiritual life; that is, by a life of self-consciousness and self-activity. Whence it is evident that in each individual there inheres at the outset a radical contradiction, which contradiction is that between his elemental or animal nature on the one hand, and his ultimate or spiritual nature on the other. In infancy the consciousness of the individual is merged in the former. Nevertheless, he is predestined to awake out of this into consciousness of his spir-

itual nature. And this transition, developed into active, transforming degree, Hegel regards as just the "second birth" of the individual.

The conception, then, that man is "by nature evil," is true, but true only in respect of his *elemental* nature. And even this is true only in a restricted sense; only in so far as this lower "nature" is brought into conflict with, instead of being made instrumental to, the higher or *spiritual* "nature," which latter is the ground of all possible goodness in him, and to satisfy the demands of which the elemental nature must be subordinated, or even sacrificed.

But this, of course, the child does not know, and, as a child, cannot comprehend; though, by the divine instinct of his higher nature, he has premonitions of it, and more or less deep yearnings toward it. And further, he must awake to this through experience, and must be guided to a *right* awaking by his intellectual and moral elders. In other words, it is only through a slow process of training

and culture that man first becomes what as man he ought to be. Which forcibly reminds us of Kant's positive declaration in his *Pädagogik*,* that "Man can become man only through education;" that in fact "he is nothing else than what education makes him." To which he adds, by way of emphasis, that, "Whoever is not cultivated is crude (*roh*); whoever is not disciplined is lawless (*wild*)," *i. e.*, has not advanced beyond the stage of primitive or "savage" life. It is the unenlightened and undisciplined yearning toward a larger and higher life that, left in such crude and rude state, becomes dwarfed, and also perverted into greed of unworthy things, and thus prompts the individual to violence and evil of every kind.

It is just these dwarfed and perverted yearnings that constitute what Hegel calls "negative or subjective"—*i. e.*, capricious and selfish—aims. Hence follows the conclusion that the individual, as a spiritual being, "must bring the two sides of his

* *Werke*, Ed. Hartenstein, X., 386.

double nature into unison and correspondence;" which really means that he must wholly subordinate his merely animal or "natural" being to his spiritual or rational being; and this to such extent that the latter shall have full mastery over the former.

And to this let us add that Hegel never wearies of declaring that "education" is the descriptive term applicable to the total process by which this complete self-mastery on the part of the individual is to be accomplished. And this, to repeat, already implies that education is at once both theoretical and practical. On the one hand, there is the inner fundamental Type, the universal, all-comprehensive form or Ideal of Mind inherent in each individual mind as mind, to unfold which into ever-increasing reality in and for its own positive, individual, and personal existence is the true destiny of each and every mind. On the other hand, so regarded, the individual mind is a "subject" —*i. e.*, a self-conscious, self-active unit of

energy—which finds itself in the midst of endlessly manifold "objects" with which it is ceaselessly and vitally related by the very necessities of its own being. Mind, and, above all, a merely rudimental mind, cannot exist in mere isolation. But neither can things utterly unlike be related. And this already suggests that the ultimate basis or essential ground of these very "objects" to which the individual finds itself related, must be identical with the Substance whose Form is the universal, all-comprehending Ideal of Mind. Whence it would seem that the Type which is in process of unfolding in the individual mind is forever unfolded in and through the universal, self-active, self-realizing Energy, which is the Soul of the Universe, and which may thus be named the one perfectly realized and hence eternal Mind. It is in this sense that Hegel declares that "even external Nature, like mind, is rational, is divine, is a forth-putting of the Idea" * —the word "Idea" being here used by

* *Werke*, VII2., 15.

Hegel to indicate the eternal Mind in its absolutely concrete character.

Hence, what is germinal in the individual mind or "subject" is immanent in the things or "objects" to which such mind finds itself related. From which it is evident that the education of the individual mind must include the progressive development of insight into that universal, all-comprehensive Form or Ideal of Mind which is at once germinal in each mind and also immanent in things.

And this, which constitutes education in its theoretical aspect, manifestly implies careful, regulated, ceaseless, and comprehensive study of Mind, on the one hand, and of nature, on the other. Not without such study can the germinal mind become realized as mind.

But mere theoretical insight, so far from being the whole of education, is itself impossible in any adequate sense save as including the practical phase. For while in its immediate form it consists in positive inner conformity on the part of the indi-

vidual mind to the fundamental law or Type germinal in its own being as mind, it has its outer, complementary form in progressive self-adjustment on the part of the individual mind to the actual "objective" world.

At the same time we must also keep clearly in view that to Hegel the "objective world" includes ultimately not merely the world of Nature, but also the world of human institutions. Though here again it must be noted that while Nature as such constitutes the immediate "objective" form of the eternal Mind, institutions are rather the mediate "objective" form of the human mind; and this not in its merely individual, but also and above all in its social character.

And still again, for the individual mind the subtlest aspect of the "objective" world consists in the universal forms in which man progressively apprehends the rhythm of the self-unfolding of the eternal Mind. One of these forms is that of Beauty. Striving to give utterance to his deepest experiences within this sphere,

man creates the world of *Art.* A second form is that of Goodness; and man's effort to illustrate what that is to him in its highest character unfolds the ceremonial forms that breathe the spirit of *Religion.* A third form of this highest phase of the objective world is that of Truth; and of this man formulates in language his own interpretation, and to such interpretation he gives the name *Philosophy.*

We are now prepared to say that in its widest range education begins in the regulated adjustment of the individual's organism to the right sensuous apprehension of the world of Nature, and culminates in the regulated adjustment of his reason to the right apprehension of the eternal Mind as immanent in Nature and germinal in the individual mind.

But also the *whole* mind is germinal in each from the first, and hence, in strict truth, education can add nothing to the mind, but can only stimulate the individual mind to and guide it in its own self-

activity as the one possible mode of its own actual unfolding.

And now we have to add that so far as this process consists in *self-definition* on the part of the pupil, the outer and corresponding process is properly named *Instruction;* so far as it consists in development of regulated *self-activity* on the part of the pupil, the outer and corresponding process is that of *Discipline.* So far as it consists in *self-harmonization* on the part of the pupil, the outer and corresponding process is the unfolding of the universal forms of *Refinement.*

The remaining portion of the present essay will be given to indicating what the present writer conceives to be Hegel's point of view with respect to these several essential aspects of education.

VII.

INSTRUCTION—ITS CHARACTER.

And here we must again remind ourselves of what with Hegel is a fundamental point, namely, that the mind of the child as being mind in its merely initial state is not yet *true* as mind. That is, it is only the rudiment and abstract prophecy of mind. To become "true" as mind it must unfold this prophecy into fulfilment, must develop this rudiment into the full measure of its typical nature, so that its present reality shall coincide with its rational Ideal. But also because this Ideal is infinite it is but inevitable that the present reality of the individual mind can never at any given moment actually be brought to a degree of perfection such that, then and there, it will prove to be the adequate fulfilment of the ultimate rational Ideal of Mind. And the highest *phase*—not degree—of excellence attainable by the individual

mind is this: That it shall become fully conscious of its own ultimate or Typical Nature. To go on deepening and enriching this phase of consciousness to infinity —this is the true destiny of the individual mind as a genuinely rational and hence immortal soul. And education cannot be conceived as ultimately including less than the whole of this process; though, of course, we are here directly concerned only with so much of this total process as takes place during the formative period of childhood and youth.

In this sense, then, education is to be looked at objectively as the system of aids by which the individual mind is enabled to rise from the helplessness of infancy to the independence characterizing true self-conscious existence. On the other hand, from the subjective point of view, it is to be regarded as just the process itself through which the individual mind advances from infancy to maturity as mind.

Thus Hegel expressly declares that it is only when we consider mind in the actual

process of its rational development that we can be said to really know mind in its *truth*; adding that by "truth" he means precisely the coincidence between the present reality and the rational Ideal.

Keeping this in view, it is easy to understand the further highly characteristic and significant statement that "the whole development of mind is nothing else than its own self-elevation to its truth; and the so-called powers or faculties of the soul have no other meaning than this; that they are merely the stadia of this development. Through this self-differentiation, through this self-transformation, and through this reference of its specialized phases to the unity of its *Begriff*, *i.e.*, the unity of its ultimate typical nature—the mind is not merely a [theoretically] true but also a [practically unfolded and hence] living, organic, systematic unit."* But again, this universal typical nature (to a consciousness of which as his own nature the individual attains through education)

**Werke*, VII2., 11.

is also just that which constitutes the central characteristic of the *species.* Hence the propriety of Dr. Wm. T. Harris's definition of Education as "the process by which the individual man elevates himself to the species."*

Let us consider this process a little more closely. Just here, too, it must be remembered that we are now considering it in its intellectual aspect, and thus as taking place under those special conditions summed up under the name of *Instruction.*

We shall first indicate the inner *process* of Instruction. Following this, consideration will be given to the outward *means* of Instruction; to which, thirdly, will be added a brief consideration of *Methods* of Instruction. As to the central aim of education, it will scarcely be necessary to remind the reader that that has already been indicated in what precedes.

*Rosenkranz *Pedagogics*, p. 31. (Note.)

VIII.

INSTRUCTION—ITS PROCESS.

THE process of Instruction in its most general character, may be described as a subtle, progressive interaction between two minds, one of which, as relatively mature, initiates and guides the process, while the other as relatively immature, voluntarily submits itself to such stimulation and guidance. The general psychological process is the same in both minds. But in the mind of the teacher the given exercise has been repeated many times. And not only so, but what is presupposed in the given exercise, is clearly seen, as also is that to which it logically leads. It is thus that the assumed relative intellectual superiority has been attained and is now manifested.

On the other hand, in the mind of the pupil, the process *as a consciously pursued* process, is now for the first time taking

place. The pupil is by that fact unable to trace for himself with clearness and adequacy, the rational necessity—*i.e.*, the essential logical relations—of the matter immediately under consideration. For this reason he feels himself to be relatively powerless and dependent. Hence all his power assumes the form of *intent attention.* And this is as much as to say that for the time being he merges all his interest in the indications given him of what is going on in the mind of the teacher. Without being aware of it, he becomes an intent psychological observer. And the direct aim which actuates him in this is to develop in his own mind what he discovers as taking place in the mind of the teacher. That is, he concentrates his whole energy in a determined effort to bring into full development on his own part the same mode of intellectual activity as that which presents itself as already clearly defined and realized in the mind of the teacher.

But this, clearly, is nothing else than *Imitation*—a characteristic which Hegel

holds, and may very well hold, in high estimation. Especially for the young child, as we have already seen, the teacher is regarded by Hegel as both an authority to be implicitly obeyed and a model to be constantly imitated. It may be said, therefore, that from this point of view the part played by the child in the interaction between himself and his teacher consists essentially in this: that in his character of a self-active unit of energy, he exerts himself to the utmost, that so he may unfold from within himself, the aspects of intellectual maturity which he recognizes as already realized in his model.

And to this we may add that even the transition from this first unquestioning acceptance of the model to the critical questioning of its validity, is still in essence an imitation of the model. The pupil is raised to the level of a critic through the criticism he has himself undergone. From which it is but a natural corollary that the character and method of the criticism indulged in by the pupil will reflect those

qualities as exhibited in the criticism of the teacher. Here, as elsewhere, Kant's remark—trite perhaps in itself—holds good; that "one generation educates another."

But again, from the fact that the teacher has already many times traversed the course which the pupil must pursue, it is open to him to regard that course either from the point of view of the result in which it culminates, or from the point of view of the initial stage with which the course sets out. In the former case the attitude of mind, as need hardly be said, is predominantly *analytical*, while in the latter it is predominantly *synthetic*. And we may add by way of a glance forward, that we have here the clew to all true *method*.

The choice of method—whether analytical or synthetic—must depend upon a variety of conditions. But above all, the fundamental condition is that of the present degree of advancement on the part of those whose education is in progress.

Strictly speaking, indeed, there is no such thing as a method that is either exclusively analytic or exclusively synthetic. These are but complementary phases of every actual method.* Meanwhile, initially, the individual mind seizes or apprehends everything first of all in its *totality*. Not by any means that for such mind the given totality is anything more at the outset than a whole of qualities which as yet are undistinguished from one another. But just because of this inability to actively distinguish between the qualities or characteristics of a given whole, the undeveloped mind *must* at first seize objects as wholes. Whence it is evident that the better understanding of such objects is possible for such minds, only through a process that is primarily that of analysis.

Nevertheless, this very analysis of the "object" is the process of unfolding into richer form within the mind of the pupil, just the consciousness of this self-same ob-

* Compare with this what has already been said on the subject of simplicity and complexity.

ject. So that while in its objective aspect, the process appears as predominantly analytic, yet equally in its subjective phase it is no less unquestionably of a predominantly synthetic or constructive character.

And indeed it is precisely this synthetic or constructive aspect of the process which takes place in the mind of the pupil that constitutes the positive, vital factor in all education. It is here that, if not the most "interesting," at least the most fruitful field for child-study presents itself. And here too, let us repeat, it is not the mere particular limitations constituting the peculiarities of individual children, the study and recording of which is of real significance. On the contrary what is required is the study of the limitations of the child-mind as such.

No doubt such study can be actually carried on only through observation of the minds of individual children. But there is infinite difference between the observations made by the mere untrained curiosity-seeker and those made by the

disciplined psychologist, who will note abnormalities as such, and as something merely by the way; but whose attention will be unswervingly directed to the fundamental Ideal of Mind as this is found in actual process of development in children; so that with this fundamental Ideal as his guide he may note the positive forms under which that Ideal presents itself in childhood, and also discover the degree and quality of concrete development it may reasonably be expected to assume at any given stage.

Nor can the teacher too often remind himself that all modes of mind are of necessity present from the outset in each individual mind; that, as Hegel never wearies of repeating in one or another form, the whole purpose and plan of education is simply this: To unfold into ever-increasingly explicit degree what is already implicit in the individual mind from the first moment of its existence as an individual mind. This and no other is the genuine Ariadne-thread that will guide

the teacher securely through all the labyrinthine perplexities of course of study, of text-books and of methods.

And indeed the education of the race has not progressed so far without substantial investigation of the limitations of the child-mind being actually made. In truth, these limitations in their essential practical significance are not so subtle and hidden as to render their discovery specially difficult. They have been known substantially for many centuries and the choice of means and methods has been determined accordingly. Mistakes have been made; "scientific" fads as well as caste interests have from time to time drawn attention more or less widely from the central aim of education; but in the main the process of education has always been substantially one and self-consistent, because on the one hand the fundamental nature of mind is invariable, and because on the other hand the limitations of the child-mind are so far beyond the reach of individual control that wherever educa-

tion takes place at all it must be along the lines already fixed in the very nature of the case.

On the intellectual side these limitations are substantially as follows:

(*a*) Even in respect of Perception it is, or ought to be, a matter of daily observation on the part of every thoughtful teacher that the average child-mind is able to form only very inadequate and for the most part very inaccurate images of objects. Upon which point we must content ourselves with simply calling attention to the fact that children's descriptions of what they have seen prove that what they saw was far enough from corresponding to what was there to be seen. And this is still further complicated by another fact, as follows:

(*b*) The Imagination of children is still so plastic that the images formed in their minds yield to the pressure of feeling—whether of fear or of desire, whether of disappointment or of elation—so that the image often becomes completely trans-

formed. And not infrequently this occurs without the child being in the least aware of the fact that any such change has actually taken place in his mind. He will therefore tell, with perfect assurance and in wholly good faith, of things to which he has been eye-witness, though his elders know that what he says represents what is "simply impossible." The reader will doubtless recall Oliver Wendell Holmes' humorous-pathetic account of his own experience as a child in this respect. And the case becomes further complicated by the fact that the crude images already existing in the child's imagination tend to fuse with and thus more or less to confuse the image in process of formation in any given act of perception—this result being the more pronounced in proportion as excitement is involved.

From which, as we may remark by the way, it is evident that what are called "children's lies" are often no more than the crude phantasies of children, and that irreparable moral injury is done the child

by those who, ignorant of his psychological limitations and difficulties, assume all inaccuracies of statement on his part to be evidences of moral perversity and apply punishment where the true remedy is careful, kindly explanation leading to closer observation by the child.

(*c*) And besides these limitations there is the still subtler one in respect of thought and language. We are so much in the habit of saying that perception develops first, imagination later, and thought last, that one is liable to accept this formula as literally representing the fact, and thus to forget that all three modes of intelligence are present from the first and develop, not merely simultaneously, but also in complete interfusion; the appearance of serial order being due to the relative complexity of these modes; so that thought is—not last to *develop*—but last to attain *maturity* of development.

Meanwhile, as a moment's reflection proves, the assumption so commonly made that the senses are completely developed

by the time the child enters school is clearly in utter contradiction of the fact. The senses, especially those of sight and hearing as the *specifically intellectual* senses, ought therefore to receive careful education and training, including, of course, the testing of the sense-organs.

But the still more vital point in respect of education is this: That sensation and perception are to be definitely and deliberately brought into *subordination to thought*, and thus *elevated* to the rank of a fundamental factor in all true *observation*. It is here, indeed, that the significance of sense-perception finds its highest term. The end and aim of education is, let us repeat, to bring the mind to maturity—to maturity, we may now add, as one whole mind in each and all its modes. It is peculiarly important in the educational sense, however, to bring to as high a state of maturity—*i. e.*, of clearness and precision and adequacy—as possible, the power of perceiving color and form and relative size; as well as the power of perceiving tone in

its three phases of pitch, loudness and quality.

The justification of this last statement is in brief as follows :

(1) Judgment—in fact thought in general—is involved in the very process of perception ; (2) Visual perceptions are indispensable to all scientific work, especially in respect of measurement and classification ; (3) precise perceptions through the sense of hearing are indispensable to exactness both in the utterance and in the understanding of spoken language ; (4) to which we must add that exactness in perception of form through the sense of vision is indispensable to precision of expression and to precision of understanding in respect of written lànguage.

Similiarly the imagination must be trained into full subordination to thought. In which connection teachers would do well to read Tyndall's very suggestive essay on "The Scientific Uses of the Imagination." Though also every teacher ought always to distinguish with perfect

clearness, and as rapidly as possible to bring his pupils as they advance in grade, to distinguish (with greater clearness and exactness than was done by Tyndall) as between thinking and imagining. Each is involved in the other, but neither *is* the other. To imagine is to develop an image in the mind. To think is to recognize a relation. One may think space as infinite, though he could never imagine it. One may imagine a dragon of the sky, though he could never really think it.

On the other hand, as already indicated, Hegel would here remind us, and does betimes forcibly remind us, that such distinctions as that between imagining and thinking—to develop which distinction is itself an example of deliberate and somewhat complex thinking—ought not to be expected of pupils who are still "children." Rather this has its explicit beginning in the period of *youth* when the individual mind is already more or less definitely awakened to that stage of consciousness which, as we have previously

noticed, Hegel described as "including the life of the species"—the period namely, in which the individual begins positively to recognize abstract universal forms, *i.e.*, begins really to *think*, and also to unfold universal, ideal images, *i.e.*, to exercise the higher degrees of creative imagination.

In fact the particular instance just referred to is a good example of Instruction that pertains rather to secondary than to primary education.

To which we may add, that since the progress of the child is continuous as well as gradual, the *gradations* in the progress are practically beyond number. To note these gradations and to be able with ease to modify the "instruction" accordingly, this is the proof of genuine power of divination on the part of the teacher. It is a secret which no "normal" school can communicate. It can only be grown into—more rapidly by some, less rapidly by others. It is the subtlest element in the "personality" of the teacher. The indispensable conditions of its development

are: Sincerity of purpose, rich and ever-increasingly varied culture, sympathetic enthusiasm in school-room work.

Nor must we turn from this topic without specially noting the intellectual value of the energy of will as expressed in conscious effort to work out a definitely apprehended plan. Not only does knowledge lead to self-activity; knowledge is gained through self-activity. Ultimately, indeed, no knowledge whatever can be gained in any other way. For knowing is itself a form of self-activity. But what especially is intended here is that the very hands are of extremely subtle significance as organs of intelligence, which yet must be brought into use by the intelligent will or the willing intelligence exercised not merely directly through the hands themselves, but also indirectly upon the hands through the eye.

It is this, as need hardly be remarked, that constitutes the justification, on the intellectual side, of that aspect of the "new education" represented by the kin-

dergarten, and the manual training school, as well as by the growing demand for actual performance of experiments and the direct examination of specimens by the individual pupils.

But we must turn to the consideration of the second phase of Instruction.

IX.

INSTRUCTION—ITS MEANS—A. LANGUAGE.

As to the means of Instruction in general, these may be said to consist of subject-matter properly arranged (course of study) and of the appliances for rendering this effective (text-book and apparatus). It is the former alone, that we shall here especially consider.

Under this head the first thing to notice is that such subject matter really constitutes just the immediate objective aspect of Education. As such it presents three distinct phases. The *first* of these phases is *Language* as expressive of Thought-relations. The *second* phase is that of *Form* as expressing Space-relations. The third is *Process* as expressing relations of Energy. Of course these are by no means mutually exclusive subject-*matters* of Education, but only distinguishable phases of the one total subject-*matter* which is to be

made the object of study in the one whole educational process.

These phases we have next to consider a little more in detail.

(*a*). *Language Universal.* Language is the most universal and adequate form in which the thought-aspect of consciousness finds expression. We have already noticed in this connection that Hegel regards the beginning of articulate thinking, that is, thinking in words, as marking the first great epoch in the education of the individual.

Indeed, when it is remembered that in the nature of the case an image as such can represent only a particular and isolated fact or object; and that, on the other hand, relations, totalities, multiplicities, exist in truth only for the thought-aspect of consciousness, while thought, properly speaking, can unfold into concrete realization only in and through language—when this is remembered, it can scarcely be questioned that the actual relation between thought and language is one and

the same with the relation which may otherwise be described as that between inner substance and outer form, and again as that between vital function and its organic expression. And this to such degree that there is really no extravagance in Max Müller's formula: "No Reason without Language—no Language without Reason"—a truth which he regards as of sufficiently vital significance to justify his placing it as the motto on the title page of his *Science of Thought*—the work in which he sums up the results of the studies of his whole life in his chosen field of Linguistics.

Nor does this in any way conflict with Steinthal's positive statement that "the animal thinks without speaking."* Indeed, Steinthal makes this remark directly after quoting with approval the conviction expressed by Herbart to the effect that silent thinking is for the most part only a suppressed speaking; and this to the ex-

* *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, 2d Ed., p. 48.

tent of involving the whole nervous process controlling the organs of speech, though not with such force as to bring the muscles into actual movement.*

Steinthal, in fact, is only insisting that *articulate* thinking is not the *whole* of thinking—that thought pervades the whole field of consciousness, and that though in its rudimentary degree it is inarticulate, it is still the mode of mind through which the universal aspects of things—types, qualities as such, tendencies (including consciousness of before and after *i.e.*, *time*) etc.,—are apprehended.

Indeed it is only in so far as thought is conceived to be already necessarily involved in inarticulate, but germinal form, even in the rudimental mind, that the actual development of explicit, articulate thinking as unfolded in actual speech can be accounted for at all upon any really scientific basis. And this is but to say in particular form, that if we are to have a

* It has even been said, however, that mere silent reading can produce hoarseness.

science of mind, and of Education as the process of unfolding mind, it must be upon the express presupposition of the absolute unity and wholeness of mind in its primal nature. That is, mind *as Type* must be conceived as unfolding into realized form in *individual minds*, each of which, from and in the first moment of its existence as an individual Mind, is already in germ all that the type implies, and hence all that the individual mind itself ever can become. In which case it is evident that we can never too strongly emphasize in its literal significance, the proposition that education is just the evolution of mind—the process of unfolding into explicit form the characteristics which are implicit in each mind from its birth as mind. Man inarticulate, as Hegel insists, is not essentially distinguishable from other objects of nature. It is only as *articulately thinking* man that he proves himself to have emerged out of mere nature into a sphere distinctively above animalhood and to be realized *as man.**

* *Cf.* *Werke*, VII2., 24.

And now we have to remind ourselves that it is precisely in *language* that the universal characteristics of mind find their subtlest, most exact and most adequate formulation. It is precisely for this reason that language constitutes not only the earliest subject-matter, but also at every stage, the predominating medium of education. From the kindergarten on through every stage of education, language is not only the most direct, it is the one absolutely indispensable medium. All other appliances find their highest values in this: that the knowledge of them is raised to its highest term through description of them in words, through command of them rendered exact by explanation of the relation of part to part in words, through appreciation of their uses—such appreciation becoming really matured only through tracing out by means of words the actual purposes which such appliances are intended to fulfil.

But not only is this true from the point of view of the teacher, who must consider

the appliances appropriate to the work of education. It is no less true in the actual development of the mind of the individual pupil. And because rational education consists in the unfolding of the individual mind in accordance with the universal type of mind, it may well be presumed that in the teaching of language, the process is essentially one of leading the individual pupil to recognize with ever-increasing clearness the universal character of language, and of thought as embodied in language. And this is only so much the more evident when we remember that it is in and through language that the typical or universal characteristics of mind find their subtlest, most exact, most adequate formulation.

In this respect the special phases which are of direct practical interest to teachers are: (1) Voice, (2) Reading, (3) Writing, and (4) Grammar.

(1) Of *Voice* it may be said that the tone merely as tone expresses the least differentiated phase of consciousness. Through

tone as such, only feeling becomes explicit. Whatever thought is involved remains merely implicit. Properly speaking, the human voice gives utterance to what is innermost in the individual consciousness. According to Hegel's peculiar formula, What the individual is, he infuses into his voice (*was er ist das legt er in seine Stimme*).*

But also—and to this we feel sure Hegel would offer no objection—the complementary aspect of this view is, that whatever the tone of voice to which the individual habituates himself, to that complexion will his inmost being come at last. For this habituation is itself essentially nothing else than an inner spiritual process. Feeling and tone are but inner and outer aspects of the one concrete fact of the individual's own spontaneous existence. And there is truth even in the paradox of the extreme evolutionists, that we are pleased because we smile and sing, and angry because we frown and mutter.

* *Werke*, VII2., 131.

Laughter and cursing alike may pass beyond control and grow hysterical. And it is not to be forgotten that it is precisely through this outer form that the inner substance of mind is really to be approached and influenced.

Even here, then, there is a world of practical suggestion for the teacher, and that charmed word of the Greeks: *Moderation*, ought to be the motto in every schoolroom. Tone is the subtlest gesture of the soul. By example, as well as by precept, therefore, a normal tone of voice ought to be cultivated, all affectations avoided, and voice-culture so conducted as to insure increased refinement of mind through growth in purity and strength along with gentleness of tone.

But long before the child is sent to school he has passed beyond the limits of that inner existence which utters itself in mere inarticulate cries. His thought has become explicit to a degree that must astonish one who has come for the first time to think of it deliberately. Indeed, the

extent to which the ordinary child, even of three years, has already mastered the thought and language of everyday life must go far to confirm in every thoughtful mind the belief in the original creative activity of mind on the one hand, and in the subtlety and extent to which the individual mind is already endowed at birth through the evolutional process of the race.

And so much the more significant does this transition from the inarticulate to the articulate in vocalization appear when we reflect that as a spiritual process the transition is from the stage of mere general consciousness to that of definite *self*-consciousness — to what Kant called the "transcendental unity of self-consciousness," and to what Hegel calls the "independently existing (*für sich seyende*) unity of self-consciousness."

Language is, in fact, just the explicit form (*Daseyn*) of the self, pure and simple, and in which that matured form of self-related unity, known as self-consciousness, enters into positive existence; and

this in such wise that its existence is at the same time manifest to another self.* For example, in saying "I" I realize for myself my own existence—bring my consciousness to the focus of explicit *self*-consciousness. But in saying "I" I also address myself to another unit, which I recognize as self-conscious likewise, and capable in turn of recognizing me in the same capacity. So that the expression "I" is *intended* by me, indeed, to indicate my own individual self, while, in fact, it proves applicable to all other selves, is recognized by others as having that value, and hence proves to be, not a mere individual, but rather a universal sign ; that is, a sign applicable alike, and without exception, to all minds.

But also, it is a sign which derives its universal nature from the fact that it is used by a self-conscious being, as a sign of a self-conscious being, and is addressed to a self-conscious being, and is understood by each because every such self-

* Cf. *Werke*, II., 370.

conscious being possesses a nature universal and common to all alike. Language, in short, is universal, because it is the immediate expression of the inward universal nature of Mind.

In learning language, therefore, the child is learning the universal form in and through which Mind expresses its own universal nature. And it is because of this subtle significance of language, as expressing the self-conscious universality of Mind in the form of specific self-definition or thought, that Hegel calls it "the etherial element, the sensuously supersensuous, through which the expanding knowledge of the mind of the child is elevated in ever increasing degree above merely sensuous and particular forms to universal types, principles and relations, to thought properly speaking."*

We may note, now, that from this point of view language can really exist as language only in so far as it is the outer, organic form in which thought is actually

* *Werke*, VII2., 97.

expressed. Otherwise it is a mere *flatus vocis*, no more than "sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." Hence, we may well imagine what Hegel would have thought of designating language as a mere formal study in contrast with, say, physics or chemistry, as a study having a content! As if language could be "form" at all, save in so far as it is the form of thought! As if thought were not the very essence or "content" of every "study."

Above all, in respect of elementary instruction in language, form and substance, are one and inseparable. For there the child is as yet wholly unable to distinguish between a "form" and a "content." Rather, he can only grasp the two in their concrete unity. He can no more know language apart from thought than he can know thought apart from language. For him the description of things is at the same time the direct embodiment of thought.

Now, by the time he is sent to school, the child has not only taken his first step,

but has advanced far beyond his first step in this process of explicit, articulate thinking. So that the teacher, even of the most elementary grade, may and does assume, with perfectly good reason, that this work has already been brought far on the way. Of course there are wide differences; but the minimum is still an accomplished fact of relatively great extent, and of absolutely vital import. The child has already attained substantial self-consciousness. He already feels the universal significance of things. He already possesses a vocabulary serving the modes of self-comprehension, and of communication with others, in respect of all ordinary interests.

Nevertheless, he has developed this vocabulary spontaneously. True, his spontaneity in this process has developed in reponse to external stimuli, including the spoken language of those with whom he has been associated. Hence, from this side it may also be said that he has attained to the stage of articulate utterance through *imitation*. But even so, the imita-

tion has been unreflecting, and, in this vital sense, *spontaneous.*

On entering school, therefore, the child's vocabulary consists of words as wholes. Nay, to him each sentence is a whole, the construction of which is not even a mystery to him; for as yet he has raised no question about it, and is not aware that any question could be raised. As Steinthal and others have intimated, the child comes to speak, much as he comes to see and to hear—by the spontaneous exercise of a power native to him, through an organ already formed, and only needing the spontaneous inner activity of the mind in answer to appropriate outer stimuli to bring it into effective use. Or, as Steinthal elsewhere suggests, the child cannot, properly speaking, be said to have *learned* language, seeing that no one has actually *taught* him. Rather, "what the gardener does with the seed, from which he expects to obtain plants, just that we do with our children, in order to bring them to speak: we bring them into the necessary condi-

tions of mental growth, that is, into human association."*

Such in brief are the conditions of the actual development of the fact of language on the part of the individual child. From which it will be seen that the first great epoch in the development of individual self-consciousness, consisting in the spontaneous unfolding of a vocabulary to meet the ordinary needs of human association, still involves a subtle synthetic process and corresponding product, of the nature of which the child is still unconscious.

Of the *process*, indeed, he must remain unconscious until he has attained the degree of *reflective* self-consciousness, where he can enter upon the investigation of ultimate questions, including the nature of the mind itself.

Of the *product*, he begins the analysis as soon as he enters upon school-life, properly speaking. And in order to do this, he must be brought into direct relation with language in a new form.

* Op. cit., p. 83.

(2) *Reading* constitutes this new form, and involves the first stage in the analytical examination of language as the outer, organic form of thought. As we have seen, the vocabulary he already possesses is the product of the spontaneous synthetic activity of the child's own mind. The first stage of his reflective activity in school will consist normally of the formal analysis of the elements of this vocabulary under the guidance of the teacher. What took place before by instinct is now to find its complement in regulated—*i. e.*, more or less prescribed—reflection. The first step is to be taken in the systematic reduction of the sensuous consciousness to subordination to the reflective consciousness.

On the other hand, this conscious analysis is only the transition between the unconscious synthesis by which it was preceded, and the conscious synthesis by which it is immediately followed, and which constitutes its true complement.

In its primitive, unanalyzed form language may not only be compared with, it

may rather be regarded as, an art-work.* With the analysis of the forms thus spontaneously produced, defects are discovered and corrected, and the work not merely restored to its primal unity, but also raised to a higher term of perfection, both in use and in beauty, for the consciousness of the child.

It is the bringing into its full significance this restored form of language after its analysis that in its first degree constitutes *reading* in the proper sense of the term. And here, evidently, two aspects present themselves. The one is the inner aspect. This consists in the careful endeavor on the part of the pupil to reproduce in his own mind the exact thought symbolized in the written signs. The other is the outer aspect, consisting in the attempt to give proper vocal expression to the thought thus inwardly reproduced. Both are in truth

* Curtius (*History of Greece*, Trans. Ward, I. 32), declares that the first historic deed of the Greeks was the development of their language, "and this first deed an artistic one."

exceedingly subtle processes, requiring a high degree of mental cultivation and of vocal skill on the part of the teacher. And so much the more when the distorted forms of speech so often developed by children through defective or vicious intellectual associations are taken into the account. Should the teacher also prove defective in culture and refinement, the case must indeed be hopeless.

It should be added that the *teaching* of reading presents two aspects corresponding to those just indicated as involved in the process of reading. The first consists in showing the child how to study the lesson, so as to find out exactly the thought it conveys, and along with this, and as a means to it, to bring him clearly to recognize the precise form of the given words and sentences. The second consists in leading him to find and bring into exercise the vocalization through which alone the thought can be rendered precisely and fully comprehensible to the hearer.*

* The reader will find in Prof. Hiram Corson's

Of so great importance did the proper instruction of the pupil in reading appear to Hegel that he expressed the wish and the hope that it might be made one of the chief means of culture in the schools. And, of course, this could be only through the careful exercise of reading, in the sense of proper vocalization, in direct, ceaseless combination with reflection, both as to the form of the language and as to the thought which the language conveys.*

(3) But though reading involves so much of reflection aud analysis, it still is predominantly "receptive" in character. That is, it depends upon an immediate, actually given external object—the book to be read. And this, of course, necessarily implies the complementary constructive process through which the book was produced. In other words, reading involves writing.

little book on "The Aims of Literary Study," admirable suggestions as to right method and true values of voice-culture in reading.

* Thaulow, *Hegel's Ansichten*, I., 90.

Writing is production. Reading is interpretation and reproduction. For this reason, as we may remark by the way, reading and writing ought, at the outset, to be taught simultaneously and as complementary phases of the same exercise. Spoken word, written word, printed word —these are so many forms of one and the same concept in the mind. And such genuine examples of unity in variety and variety in unity ought to be made the most of.

Here, too, as elsewhere, neatness and precision of form are but the outward means through which are developed exactness and finish of inward power; and it is not so much the visible, passing, more or less marketable product as the invisible, permanent, priceless mental habit that is of chief moment in education.

Such brief intimation will suffice with respect to the elementary and so-called formal work of instruction in writing. From the first, as the pupil advances

in power to produce at will the written form of language, it cannot be doubted that he should be led to exercise that power in giving written as well as oral expression to his own thought. By so doing he not only gives to his own thought visible and more or less lasting objective form, but he also becomes accustomed to examining it at his leisure in that form, and hence, to carefully noting and correcting its defects. Properly conducted, such exercises cannot fail to react upon the thinking of the pupil, rendering it more exact, concise, and forcible.

(4) Nevertheless all language-work, as thus far indicated, is still relatively spontaneous. Analysis appears, indeed, but only as a matter of judgment in the form of *taste*. It is still literally the *art* of language with which the pupil is occupied; and that precisely this phase of language-training may be brought to its highest degree of perfection it is indispensable that it should be supplemented by the *science* of language.

Thus *Grammar*, as the science of language, constitutes the instrument of reasoned criticism, of judgment in the form of *reflection*. In this connection Hegel declares that "The value of grammatical study cannot be too much emphasized since it constitutes the beginning of logical culture"—an aspect which, in our day as well as in that of Hegel, "appears to have fallen almost wholly into oblivion. In fact, Grammar has for its content the categories [or universal terms of thought] which are the peculiar products and determinations or characteristic forms of the understanding. In it [*i. e.*, in Grammar], therefore, the understanding itself begins to be *learned* [or technically exact].

"These most spiritual essentialities [*viz.* the categories] with which Grammar first makes us acquainted are something specially comprehensible to youth, and, indeed, there is nothing of a spiritual [or mental] nature more easily comprehensible than just these. For the as yet imperfectly developed power of comprehension

peculiar to this age is still unable to grasp the realm [of thought] in its manifoldness; while, on the other hand, those very abstractions are something altogether simple [and hence, easy of comprehension]." *

Elsewhere,† in speaking of the logical determinations or characteristic forms of thought, Hegel expresses himself more directly to the effect that "such determinations are laid down [or presented in definite, concrete form] especially in language. Hence is it that the instruction in grammar which is imparted to children has this phase of utility: that they are brought to attend unawares to the distinctions of thought."

All which may be restated somewhat as follows: The mind, in its very nature as mind, is a self-centered unit of energy, which unfolds itself into consciously realized form through its relation to its environment. In its sensuous modes of activity it *apprehends* particular things. That

* Loc. cit. † *Werke*, VI., 50.

is, in its responses to external stimuli it develops within itself sensuous representations of things. But also in its reflective modes of activity it *comprehends* things. That is, in the very fact of developing sensuous representations of things, it necessarily, and with more or less definiteness, recognizes these representations as modes of its own being, and, in that fact, also necessarily seizes them together in vital relation as modes of its own individual and indivisible consciousness.*

But this process of the comprehension of things under the form of the interrelation of the mind's own modes is just what constitutes thinking; and thinking assumes actual outer form in and attains positive reality through language and nothing else than language.

Further, by as far as the mind attains to *self*-consciousness it recognizes the modes of its own activity—makes these

* We will see later on how the psychological principle here indicated becomes manifest in the development of number.

the object of its own reflection. And this process of the examination of thought by thought finds its first positive form in the direct apprehension of the simple natural categories under which all thought-forms are primarily to be classified, and through the application of which all thought-processes are to be clarified, corrected, and matured.

It is precisely this process which in its elementary form constitutes the essence of grammar, and the application of which constitutes grammatical analysis. Once clearly understood, it appears as self-evident that this is one of the most valid and valuable of all educational media, and that its neglect is one of the gravest educational errors of our time.

So much is especially applicable to elementary work. For more advanced pupils Hegel is in accord with thoughtful educators generally as to the superiority of ancient languages over modern, and especially over one's mother tongue, for purposes of intellectual discipline. In the clas-

sic languages, not only is it that the forms are unfamiliar, and hence attract special attention, but also every phase of thought has its peculiar and appropriate grammatical form. And because it is through such concrete forms that the immature mind most easily seizes the universal aspects of thought, it is evident that Hegel does not exaggerate when he declares that the thoroughgoing study of grammatical forms presents itself as one of the most universal and noblest of all the means of cultivating the mind.

To which we may add that this must be true, above all, of that language which served to embody the thought of the first people in the world who devoted their highest genius to art production, on the one hand, and to scientific research, on the other, and who in just this process developed their language to a degree of precision and subtlety of expression nowhere else equaled, precisely in and through this freely creative activity within the realm of the Ideal. From which it is but a natural

corollary that the Greek language is a means of mental discipline for which there is no adequate substitute ; and the claim that its place in the course of study ought to be given up to some modern language is based upon a total misconception of the educational values to be derived from the study of language.

(*b*) *Language of Quantity.** Our discussion of the educational aspects of language would be radically incomplete were we not to consider the language of abstract quantity. What has already been said refers entirely to language in its most uni-

* I cannot pretend that Hegel has anywhere explicitly included number under language. But, of course, practically, Hegel, along with everybody else, does so include it. Even if it be admitted that, as President Eliot of Harvard has declared (Regents' Bulletin, No. 32, 1895, University of the State of New York, p. 955), "the reasoning of mathematics is peculiar to itself," yet it is still to be classed as a special aspect, and must therefore be regarded as realized and to be realized only in some form of *language*. That number is nothing else than a special aspect of language in general, has not, as it seems to me, been sufficiently appreciated hitherto.

versal form. The forms of expression peculiar to the realm of abstract quantity may be said to be a dialect of this universal language. Hence, all that precedes and all that could be said concerning language in the wider sense must be applicable in a measure to the language of quantity. Some things remain to be said, however, concerning the peculiarities of this dialectic form.

And first we may note that *Arithmetic*, which is commonly defined as the science of number, might, for that reason, very well be described as the elementary grammar of the special dialect in which the numerical aspect of thought finds appropriate expression. And here we are compelled by the limits of the present essay to confine ourselves to the single central characteristic of numerical synthesis.

Students of Kant know that "7+5=12" is one of his examples of a "synthetic judgment *a priori*;" that is, of a judgment in which (1) the predicate contains something not directly given in the sub-

ject; and (2) the truth of which, as soon as discovered, is recognized as being universal in its application, and also "necessary" in the sense that from the very nature of thought the judgment cannot but be accepted as absolutely valid so soon as its real meaning is clearly apprehended.

In referring to this Hegel declares that in his doctrine of Synthetic Judgments *a priori* Kant has emphasized a concept (*Begriff*) which belongs to whatever is great and undying in his philosophy—"the concept, namely, of a distinct aspect or characteristic which at the same time is inseparable from the given whole; something identical which at the same time is undivided difference."*

But he adds, dirèctly after, that though this concept is present even in perception, yet the proposition "7+5=12," does not really serve as an illustration of that concept. "Much rather is number a mere identity, and numbering or reckoning is the producing an identity which is utterly

* *Werke*, III., 232.

and wholly an external, superficial synthesis; a unity of ones of such nature that, so far from being posited, or definitely represented as identical with one another, are really set forth as external and positively separated."

Kant himself, in fact, notifies the reader that the given example has a certain analytical look, and that primarily the discovery that 12 is the sum of 7 and 5 is really arrived at by bringing to our aid, say, the five fingers which are one by one added to the 7.

The real problem in Kant's example of a numerical synthesis, as we may remark by the way, is in truth the very old one of the possibility of performing any addition at all, and hence the problem of the possibility of number in general. In *The Sophist*, and especially in *The Parmenides*, Plato treats seriously and at length of the problem of "the one and the many." Elsewhere, in a lighter mood, he allows Socrates to express himself as always wondering why it is that an object here and another there should, when brought

together, become *two*, and whether it is the mere juxtaposition of things that is the cause of multiplicity!

Of course it is impossible within the present limits to enter into the more abstract speculative aspect of the subject. Besides, for the practical purposes of educational work, the more immediate psychological aspect of the question is of greater value. Of this I shall present a brief intimation of what seems to me the correct view, only premising that Kant's doctrine of the "transcendental *unity* of self-consciousness," and Hegel's doctrine of the original *unity* and self-activity of mind as such, constitute, when taken together, the necessary presupposition of all really fruitful psychological research.

To this presupposition no other psychological problem refers us more directly than that of number. The very idea of self-consciousness necessarily implies the *unity* of the mind. But also such *idea* is possible only through a *reference of self to self*. This very reference of self to self,

however, is at the same time equally a *distinguishing of self from self.* Self-knowing is possible only in so far as the self is made the *object* of knowing. But it is the self alone that is capable of knowing. As knowing, however, the self is *subject.* Further, in the very fact of applying to itself the name "subject" the knowing self has transformed itself into an *object* to which at the same time it gives the name *subject.*

Thus the subject is its own object, and the object is itself the subject by which it is known as object. They are one and indivisible; yet also this *one* has already distinguished itself as *two.* And as there is no limit to the possibility of such self-distinguishing, the mind has thus already entered upon that phase of consciousness constituting the thought of multiplicity with its infinite possibility of number. The *whole* mind, besides, is involved in each of its many phases. Conversely each phase involves the whole mind.

From this point of view it is evident that one and one do not *make* two or *become* two at all. Rather, in the very nature of

the case they are from the beginning necessarily in such relation to each other that they just *are* two—a two, however, which is only a more complex *one*. When we consider the one *as one* it appears to us as continuous, intensive quantity; when we consider it as *multiple* it appears to us as discrete, extensive quantity. Every "one" may be considered as an indefinitely complex *sum* of "fractional parts;" though again each of these parts may be properly regarded as a "one." Similarly, every sum as such is equally a "one," though composed of many "ones." And we are to remember also that "reciprocal quantities" are any *two* quantities whose product is *unity*.

But thus, evidently, number is just a necessary aspect of thought, and can be said to inhere in things only in so far as things are themselves regarded as externalized thought. It is not the juxtaposition of things in space, *but their organic interrelation in consciousness* that constitutes the basis of number. When I know things they are by that fact proven to be in my thought. And

I can know them only in so far as they are in my thought. Whence it is evident that even the outward formal synthesis of number is dependent absolutely upon the inner synthesis of mind. Or, to return to Hegel's explicit utterance: "Number is the pure thought of the externalization of thought."*

In short we can know anything of one and of many only because the mind itself is a one which in its very nature is a self-differentiating one—a one which is forever specializing itself into many. At the same time the "many" thus produced are nothing else than modes of the mind itself—differences unfolded by, from and within the mind; which differences, nevertheless, are absolutely inseparable from the mind. Nay, each mode, as we have already noticed, involves the whole mind—is just a mode of the one whole mind.

Numbering, to repeat, then, is just one phase of thinking; and *number*, as outward form, is nothing else than just the

* Op. cit., 237.

special aspect of language expressive of this peculiar phase of thinking.*

But also this phase of thinking, as we must add, is limited to the simple, abstract characteristic of *quantity*. It is a mere question of *more* or *less*, and wholly ignores all qualitative aspects. In itself, therefore, number is altogether one-sided and wholly inadequate as an expression of thought in general, and all attempts in that direction must inevitably fail. Indeed the very "exactness" of number is due precisely to this inadequacy. It admits no question as to its results only because it omits from its processes all "disturbing elements"—*i. e.*, all the elements which give reality to things.

We have next to note on the one hand that this very simplicity or abstractness of number along with its generality explains

* On referring to Sigwart (*Logic*, Trans. Helen Dendy, II., 33) I find this statement: "Thus number shows itself to be the simple consequence of the fundamental functions of thought itself," and "has its root in self-consciousness," (p. 34). The whole section (266) will well repay careful study.

why it is so easy of apprehension, and why it is so much a matter of course to begin the definite work of instruction in number at the very outset even of elementary education. It is precisely the phase of thinking that is most abstract and which yet finds its application in immediately given sensuous forms. Indeed, just as the child comes to school already considerably advanced in language in its more general character, so he brings with him a rudimentary numerical vocabulary together with actually germinating habits of calculation developed through the spontaneous processes of his own mind awakened to activity through his daily experience.

On the other hand it is important also to emphasize a point already indicated, and which Hegel* shows to have been familiar even to the thinkers of antiquity—the point, *viz.*, that the very limitations of numerical expression renders it hopelessly inadequate to the expression of the richer,

* Op. cit., 238.

more concrete phases of thought. The vocabulary of number, we repeat, is but one aspect of the whole vocabulary of thought, and it is no less absurd to assume that the former is superior to the latter on the ground of its greater "exactness" than it would be to insist that the less includes and is superior to the greater because it is more easily apprehended.* The very "exactness" of number is the unmistakable mark of its hopeless finitude. For every actual number is exact only in expressing a positive limit; and any actual number can of course be multiplied by any other number or by itself on *ad infinitum*. No number can by any possibility be infinite; and just this thought, for example,—a thought which transcends number—is not a whit less "exact" than any that can be expressed in actual number.

* I do not say "comprehended," because to really *comprehend* the less one must know it in its relations —*i. e.*, must know the greater also—to know the one you must know the many; to know the many you must know the one.

We have next to remark that because of the extreme simplicity of its processes, in which, as Hegel says, the "same thing is always repeated," in which, as Sigwart puts it, "all consists finally in reducing manifold combinations of numbers to simple counting"—because of this we are bound to admit that, while within its sphere the study of number is not only valid but also indispensable, yet in point of educational value its sphere is very limited and its value within this sphere is by no means to be confounded with its "practical" or commercial value.

It cannot be doubted, in fact, that Hegel is entirely justified in saying* that "Arithmetic considers numbers and their corresponding figures; or rather, does *not* consider them but only *operates with* them. For numbers constitute no more than a neutral characteristic, something altogether inert; they have to be made effective through outward means and thus brought into actual relation." In fact the

* Op. cit., 227.

whole of arithmetic consists of the various modes of reckoning; and these are nothing else than the simple, special ways of bringing numbers into relation one with another. And we may add that when the "examples" are set aside and the actual description and explanation of the processes are given by themselves, the smallness of the compass of this remainder practically demonstrates the extreme simplicity of the theme, while the number of the examples shows how literally true it is that in this study there is for the most part only prolonged repetition of one and the same thing.

We are bound to repeat, therefore, that it is the commercial rather than the educational value of arithmetic that gives it so prominent a place in the course of study. This once clearly recognized, it is evident that the movement toward restricting this study to narrower limits in the schools has full pedagogical justification.

And as for *Algebra*, we need only remark for our present purpose that it is, as

Newton named it, only a Universal Arithmetic, and hence, only a higher, subtler form of the grammar of the language of abstract numerical quantity.

(*c*) *Form and Substance in Language.* Before taking final leave of the subject of Language, we must notice that, as here considered, it includes the whole range of what has generally been regarded as the substance of elementary education. In other words, we have passed under review the familiar "three R's"—Reading, Writing, and Arithmetic, as the universal aspects of language considered as the organic form of thought.

We have, besides, noticed that these are to be considered from two complementary points of view—the one being that of inner *substance*, the other being that of outer *form*. And we have now further to emphasize the fact that precisely for the purposes of elementary education these two aspects are altogether inseparable. It ought never to be forgotten that until Grammar, as the science of Language, is

formally entered upon, the exercises in language are predominantly of a spontaneous, creative character, and the products, however crude they may be, are still essentially of the nature of art products.

All education, as we cannot too often repeat, consists in the self-definition, or self-formulation, of the mind; and the most direct, and subtle, and exact form which mind assumes in this process of self-formulation, is just Language. This is the real reason for the fact that among all peoples in all ages elementary education has ever consisted chiefly in language exercises—in speaking, in reading, in writing, in numbering.

True, these have always been exercises in *form*, and from this point of view they might very properly be described as "formal" studies. But, also, they are quite as much exercises in differentiating the *substance* of thought itself; and hence may just as properly be described as "substantial" studies. What, indeed, can be more substantial for the mind than just

the mind itself—the mind, manifesting itself in its own subtlest modes, which are just the modes of *thought* realized in and through *language?* Add to this, that the child-mind is wholly unable to separate, or even clearly to distinguish, between form and substance, and it will be evident that, in elementary education especially, these studies are far enough from being merely formal in their value.

But yet another point ought to be mentioned. It is that, in all the exercises tending toward the education or self-formulation of the individual mind, such mind is itself the substance formulated, the formulating principle, and the formative energy—the ultimate aim being the fulfillment in the individual mind itself of the universal type to which it belongs. In other words, to repeat once more, the mind is nothing else, or less, than a substantial, self-differentiating unit of energy, which bears within itself all the fundamental aspects of *cause*, as these were traced out by Aristotle. For the mind as

spontaneous energy is nothing else than efficient cause, giving form to its own substance; and this to the final end of realizing within and for itself, just its own true nature.

On the other hand, we have also to notice that, causal though it be in its very nature, the individual mind still needs to be awakened to its own native, self-defining activity, and depends for its awakening upon its relations to the world of its "environment." So that while in the process of education the chief place is rightly given to the various phases of language as constituting the most immediate aspects of the mind's own self-differentiation, yet that process must be altogether incomplete, and hopelessly one-sided, were it not to include the careful study of the various aspects of the environment through which the mind is awakened to its own native, self-formulating activity.

And here, too, the same principle of causation is manifest. For Matter (material cause), cannot really be conceived as

something apart from definition (formal cause), nor as something apart from energy (efficient cause). On the contrary, energy can really be conceived—*i. e.*, rationally thought—only as being in its ultimate nature self-active substance, which, precisely through its own self-activity, defines itself, or gives itself specific form. But such substantial, self-formative energy cannot but be self-conscious energy, or Mind.

Thus, in its ultimate nature, the world or the environment by which the individual mind is awakened to its own self-defining activity, is itself nothing else than the outer form in and through which the eternal Mind is forever expressing itself as Mind. And this is the reason why the individual mind finds itself so much at home in its contact with its environment. For in this contact it has always had at least some dim premonition of the truth that somehow Nature is nothing else than the outer form in which the eternal Mind is forever revealing itself to the human

mind, and that thus, in its interpretations of Nature, the human mind is only attempting to spell out that revelation, and in so doing is only going to school to the eternal Mind. And thus the whole range of what in current fashion are called "substantial" studies, proves to be nothing else than the wider range of Language Lessons through which the individual mind is led up to still more adequate knowledge of Mind in its eternal, substantial, causal character. Nor should we forget that in this its highest character Mind finds by far its subtlest, most adequate expression in and through the human mind itself, partly as unfolded in institutions on the one hand and in language and literature on the other, but most of all as realized progressively in individual human lives.

Hence, while Nature, and Institutions, and Literature are highly important as media of the child's development, the living teacher is of still greater importance —so much so that there is no exaggeration in Emerson's saying to the effect that

"it matters less what you learn than of whom you learn."

It is upon this presupposition on the part of the teacher, the presupposition, *viz.*, that the whole world of nature and of humanity constitutes one continuous, progressive, divinely constituted subject-matter or "course of study"—that all true educational work must proceed, and toward the development of this convicton in reasoned form, on the part of the pupil, that all true educational work must tend.

Thus far Hegel is fairly explicit as to the Matter, the Method, and the End of education considered on the intellectual side or the side of "Instruction." What he would have said of the further phases which we have called *Form* and *Process* in the same sphere, is still more a matter of inference, and can here be indicated only in the briefest way.

X.

INSTRUCTION—ITS MEANS—B. FORM.

FORM, in the sense of the general and more or less abstract space-relations, serving as means to education, appears in the received course of study under three aspects: (*a*) Geography—the study of given *concrete real* forms; (*b*) Geometry—the study of *abstract ideal* forms; (*c*) Drawing—the study of *concrete ideal* forms.

Geography is, first of all, the more or less detailed study of the actually existing concrete form of the earth *as the habitation of man.* It is thus of immediate *practical* significance.

Of this we have the direct antithesis in Geometry, which is the study of the universal abstract relations true of all space in as far as space is simply a form of consciousness—relations, *i. e.*, which are nowhere realized as such, save in consciousness; and this, primarily, in the eternal

consciousness; secondarily in the human consciousness. In its immediate character, therefore, Geometry possesses no more than a purely "theoretical" significance.

These two antithetical aspects of the study of form may be said to find their unity in Drawing, which takes into consideration, and accepts as valid, the universal laws of form revealed in Geometry, and applies these laws in the idealization and representation of the forms concretely presented in Nature. It is through such application of the (consciously or unconsciously recognized) laws of form in the deliberate idealization and representation of actually given forms that what are known as *Ideals of Beauty* become explicit in consciousness.

Geography gives us actual forms; Geometry reveals to us the laws of form; Drawing develops ideal forms.

Even in such brief summary—and partly because of its brevity—the educational value of each of these aspects of Form is already fairly apparent. To this, how-

ever, we must add a few further intimations:

(*a*) *Geography*, it is true, is of immediate practical significance. But that is *not* its educational significance. The latter, as we must never forget, is to be sought, in any study, in the value which that study has *as a means to the development of mind.* The so-called "practical" significance can at most but lend an extrinsic *interest*, which serves to intensify—though also it is only too likely to confuse—whatever mental exercise is involved in the given study and which tend to the development of the mind of the pupil.

What, then, is the actual *educational* significance of the study of Geography? Our answer is, that here, as in language, the immediate given concrete form is to be studied as the form of a definite substantial *thought*. Thus, evidently, this study necessarily involves in its actual development the recognition of certain universal aspects of space-relation (Mathematical Geography), implying and therefore lead-

ing over to Geometry, which may be called the Universal Grammar of Form; and also implying and leading over (through maps and pictorial representations of natural types, inorganic and organic), to Drawing, which is the elementary aspect of the Art Form.

Not only so, but the study of geography necessarily involves the recognition of certain universal aspects of Process, inorganic (Physics and Chemistry), organic (Botany and Zoölogy), and spiritual (Human History); though, as we ought carefully to note, while geography involves these references, it does not and cannot include these sciences, but only presupposes them.

But what is the central thought involved in the facts with which Geography deals, and hence to be evolved in the mind of the pupil through his study of Geography? This thought is nothing else than what is often indicated by means of the term "orientation," and by this, again, is meant nothing else than the process of conscious self-adjustment to the actual present outer

world as thus far the concrete expression of Reason.

In Geography, strictly speaking, indeed, this process of orientation does not extend beyond its external aspect. But even this is by no means insignificant. Within this limit the pupil is brought to note the relative position and extent of land and water, the outlines of land-masses, the position and elevation of mountain systems, the extent of plains, the conditions and extent of rain-fall on the one hand and of drainage on the other—the last two necessarily implying the relations severally of given areas of land and water to the sun, together with the atmospheric currents due in part to this relation.

All this observation of relation of part to part of the earth's surface, together with the relation of the whole with its parts to the sun, constitutes the outer form of an inner process, consisting of the development and orderly arrangement of a vast array of imagery in the mind of the pupil. And we may remark that while

the development of the imagery is the work of the mind as imagination, which is the highest aspect of the sensuous consciousness, the orderly arrangement of the imagery is the work of the mind as understanding, which is one of the more elementary phases of the reflective consciousness.

It is through the study of Geography, then, that the child definitely enters upon the process of his own intellectual self-adjustment to the thought of the world in as far as that thought is expressed in outer physical *form;* though even here, let us repeat, through every fact he is brought face to face with relations which can be explained only through a study of the world as *Process.*

But this is only the beginning. For, as already noticed, the study of Geography, strictly speaking, is only a preparatory step to the study of Man. Man, as we cannot too often remind ourselves, is, indeed, ultimately the child of Divinity; but he is so in such wise as to appear and be,

immediately, the child of Nature. Further, the child, as the growing man, can orient himself *spiritually* only through the regulated study of the human race; for only in the race can he come to the clear apprehension of his own larger Self. Only through knowing Humanity can he come to adequately know himself as a human being.

As the child of Nature, however, man can be comprehended only in relation to his natural environment; so that while the study of man in the more elementary sense of the term—*i. e.*, from the point of view of anthropology—may be said to emerge out of physical geography, it attains its more positive educational significance in political geography. And this so much the more as the actually existing races of the world present in rough logical outline the whole series of chronological stages through which the most advanced races must have passed in the attainment of their present superior degree of self-realization.

Thus, Geography, as the elementary

study of the concrete forms of Nature, is found to culminate in History, as the subtlest and most concrete Process of the world. Hence the impossibility of comprehending the history of any given people without careful and continuous reference to the geographical conditions in the midst of which such people developed and expended their energies.

But, as we have already noticed, while geography implies all the other sciences, and may even be said to be the premonition of them, it still does not and cannot include them. True, as descriptive of the concrete outer world in which the pupil lives, geography serves as the means to the immediate or primary synthesis which he forms in his own mind of the world as a whole. On the other hand, the mediated, matured synthesis of the world, he can arrive at only through the analytical processes involved in the study of the various sciences, held in sharp distinction one from another.

These various aspects of the outer and

the inner world must therefore be taken up separately, and considered each within its own specific limits, if we would avoid endless confusions in our educational work.

(*b*) *Geometry*, as the study of the universal abstract laws of space-relations, has the special pedagogical value of accustoming the mind to insistance upon absolute precision of results in each and every case, whether in one's own work or in the work of others. Such habit of mind is, of course, of inestimable value in all studies.

Meanwhile it is not to be overlooked that the exactness demanded is exclusively *quantitative*, and that to the qualitative aspects of concrete forms Geometry is wholly indifferent. This is the limitation which constitutes at once its defect and its perfection.—Its defect, because unless the complementary aspect of quality is otherwise emphasized in the education of the pupil, the habit of demanding absolute quantitative precision must grow into a rigid formalism, tending to the final arrest of all further development.—Its perfec-

tion, because only by abstracting from quality and attending to quantity alone is such absolute precision possible at all.

And yet, even here the germ of qualitative difference is not altogether wanting, the "properties" of the triangle being different from those of the circle, those of a circle being different from those of a square, etc., etc.

It may be added that the very aspect of precision presented in Geometry, together with the simplicity of its more elementary degrees, renders this special phase of the study of Form peculiarly well adapted to the requirements of elementary education. On the one hand, the simplicity of the figures of plane Geometry must tend to put a wholesome check upon the wild exuberance of childish imagination; while the precision of such forms and of the relations involved in them must tend to render judgment more exact.

At the same time, as has been noticed in what precedes, Geometry is already implied in that aspect of Geography known

as "mathemathical;" though for the child this appears only in germinal form, in the simple names and descriptions of the circle, sphere, diameter, etc., and involves no actual instruction upon the properties of any geometrical figure. And if "triangulation" appears in map-drawing, this again, as need hardly be mentioned, involves no actual instruction in Geometry, properly speaking.

(*c*) As noticed above, *Drawing* accepts as valid the universal laws of form as revealed in Geometry, or the Grammar of Form, and so applies these laws in the idealization and representation of the actual forms in Nature as to develop Ideals of Beauty. We have now to add that in the history of the race Drawing (including modeling) has developed a world of idealized forms, which for the purposes of education are forms already at hand to be imitated by the pupil—models upon which his taste may be developed into ever higher degrees of realization, with the assurance that it will thus be enriched with those elements that constitute whatever is

essential in the best products of the race. Thus, as Geography consists in the study of the concrete forms produced by nature, and serving as the immediate outward conditions of the life of man, so Drawing consists in the study of and the attempt to reproduce the ideal forms produced by man himself, and expressing thus one essential phase of the inner life of the human spirit. Such study, again, cannot but result in the development and orderly arrangement of a vast array of imagery belonging to the Ideal World, and preparing the pupil for productive work of higher or lower degree on his own part.

And here, too, as in Geography, the production of the imagery is the work of the imagination, while the orderly arrangement of the imagery is the work of the understanding. But there is this difference: that the imagery in the realm of Geography is limited to the sphere of Nature, the forms in which are more or less accidental, so far as the element of beauty is concerned; while in the field of art the

forms are the conscious products of the human spirit stirred to utmost eagerness of effort for the purpose of satisfying its own inherent, irrepressible demand for perfection in Beauty.

It is these latter products, therefore, which serve best of all as the models upon which to form the taste of the developing individual mind. But also it is important to remember that the really worthy ideals of Beauty have always had a religious core. In which case we may well accept as substantial truth the statement that "Out of the perfection of Beauty God hath ordained the world."* And because on the human side religion is essentially ethical, it may very well be said that really good taste is nothing else than *Morality become beautiful.*

Hence the teaching of Drawing, including, as it ought to include, the study of the vital historical elements in the great art-products of the world, involves pedagogi-

* Such thought is at least suggested by Psalms L., 2; "Out of Zion the perfection of Beauty, God hath shined forth."

cal values, not merely of a formal, intellectual character, but also of a character which is essentially ethical.

Rightly estimated and conducted, therefore, this study, which deals in the ideal elements having their roots in the ethical and the religious world, cannot but point forward to the study of these more concrete spheres of human development as an actual Process.

XI.

INSTRUCTION—ITS MEANS—C. THE STUDY OF PROCESS.

WE have next to notice the educational significance of the study of Process as expressive of the essential relations of the Energy unfolding itself in the actual world. This presents itself under the general forms: (*a*) Inorganic Processes; (*b*) Organic Processes, and (*c*) the Process of Human History. And here our limits render still more hopeless any attempt to do more than barely intimate the educational significance of the themes named.

(*a*) It must be frankly admitted that Hegel was less happy in dealing with the world of Nature than in dealing with the world of man. So that while it may be said without exaggeration that his Logic is the most compact aud rigidly consistent statement ever given of the essential principles of Evolution, yet his attempt to apply those principles in the realm of Nature proved a conspicuous failure.

At the same time his work in this field is not without valuable suggestions; and if in details his Philosophy of Nature must be rejected as arbitrary, yet the general conception of nature as the precondition of human history, and as an orderly development leading up to and culminating in human life, is the fundamental thread of the whole, and must, therefore, be taken as indicating his real view of the proper significance of the natural sciences in a course of study.

Of the soundness of such pedagogical clew no one to-day is likely to entertain a doubt. And, in fact, Hegel's general philosophical theory, rightly understood and applied, may be said to furnish the one clew to a thoroughly consistent and completely satisfactory interpretation of the results to which modern science has attained.* Nor can there be a reasonable

*The present writer has attempted an interpretation of these results from this point of view in a volume entitled: *The World-Energy and its Self-Conservation*, published by S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

question that such interpretation is indispensable, above all, to the teacher of science, of whatever department or grade. For upon this largely must depend whether the pupil shall be satisfied with a crude materialistic view of the world, or whether he shall be led to comprehend "matter" as nothing else than a mode of the universal Energy which in its highest term is the absolute creative Spirit or divine Mind.

The latter, as Hegel would unquestionably urge, is the one legitimate conclusion to which the study of inorganic processes should lead.

(*b*) Similarly, the teacher of science within the realm of the organic, ought to be able to bring the pupil to recognize in the whole process of Nature, the endlessly manifold evidences of one all-comprehensive Method leading up from the inorganic, through the organic, to Man. And further he ought to be able to bring the pupil to see in this Method the proof that Mind is the source and substance of the world, and that, as the primal Life, the

eternal Mind in its self-unfolding, ceaselessly gives birth to every form of life.

To which it must be added that the direct pedagogical value of the natural science studies consists in the first place in the development of what is commonly known as the power of observation. This power, more closely examined, is found to have for its immediate factors, *Perception* on the one hand and *Judgment* (as the critical aspect of the understanding) on the other. And it is to be carefully noted that observation for the purposes of Science is different from observation for the purposes of Art. In both it is demanded that the observation shall be as exact as possible—*i. e.*, that the percepts* formed shall be accurate in the highest attainable degree.

But in observation for scientific ends, the actual process of perception is brought into definite and strict subordination to the deliberate exercise of judgment con-

* In its outer or objective aspect a percept is a "mental image."

cerning the essential inner relations determining the given outer form; while in observations for the purposes of art, though the power of perception is also exercised under the direct control of judgment, it is nevertheless judgment in that spontaneous aspect known as *Taste*. And in this peculiar character its exercise has for direct end to create a form of the same type as that of the given observed form, but with the difference that it shall be raised to the degree of ideal perfection *as form*.

Nor should it be forgotten that in science the ultimate aim is to satisfy the demand of the mind for perfection in *utility*, while in art the aim is to satisfy the demand of the mind for perfection in *Beauty*.

Such psychological distinctions cannot be too vividly present in the mind of the teacher, since they must have a controlling influence in his pedagogical methods and must thus radically influence the development of the mind of the pupil.

But again in the second place, natural

science studies have this pedagogical value: that in dealing directly with modes of energy as manifested through inorganic forms, the pupil is brought to positively exercise and to definitely measure his own powers, and thus to further his own self-development as *Will.* And this is true in a still subtler way in dealing with organic forms, such as putting seeds in the earth and watching the growth of plants, and noting the effect of his own work upon their development.

Here, indeed, is a specially fruitful field for practical self-definition on the part of the individual pupil, through his own regulated and hence increasingly conscious self-adjustment to the actual modes of the creative Mind as manifest in Nature. It is in this stern school of Nature, as it is well worth while to notice, that the agriculturist develops that keen shrewdness and subtle "common sense" which so often has the appearance of prophetic instinct.

(*c*) But without further remark upon

this special theme, tempting as it is, we must turn to the third phase of Process, *viz.*, to that specially complex and subtle mode of energy manifest in human history. Here Hegel is at his best. Not only does he conceive Nature to be the simple divine process culminating in man; to him the history of the human world is itself also, as we have seen, nothing else than "progress in the *consciousness* of Freedom." That is, the central, vital element in the history of mankind is essentially and solely of an educational character.

At the same time, it is of the highest importance to notice, that in the definition of history just quoted, everything centres in the idea of *Freedom*. So that one might infer from this alone that for Hegel the educational value of the study of history is essentially ethical in its character, while in comparison with this its value as an intellectual discipline is only secondary.

But here again human history is by no means to be considered merely as a *rec-*

ord. On the contrary, it is to be considered, above all, as an actual *Process.* The study of history is not the study of a book; it is the study of a process by means of a book. The book is merely a compound lens through which the events of the world are brought into focus for the individual pupil so that he may view them in their true perspective.

In such wise, the indvidual, even unawares, develops an ideal or universal standard of judgment by which to estimate the events of his own time as well as his own conduct and that of others.

Deeper than this, however, is the educational significance of the various institutions in and through which the universal spirit of humanity has unfolded itself. It is only through these institutions, in fact, that genuine Freedom can be attained at all on the part of the individual. For Freedom is a universal quality inhering in man as man. That is, it pertains to the universal or divine nature of man as a spiritual or personal being. It is Freedom

in this universal, positive, concrete sense, which Hegel describes as Freedom of the one in the other, and which, as he says, unites men in a manner which is essentially internal or spiritual; whereas, mere distress, or momentary need, only brings men together in a fashion that is wholly external and accidental, the groups dissolving as soon as the danger is ended, or the need satisfied.*

It is just this ethical aspect of institutional life that above everything else needs to be brought vividly home to the consciousness and conscience of the youth of our time. And where else will one find such searching analysis of the various forms of associated human life, or such adequate application of their central, positive elements as in Hegel's *Philosophie des Rechts*† to say nothing of his *Philosophy of History?*

We can here give no more than the

* Cf *Werke*, VII2., 276.

† Abridged Trans. by J. McBride Sterrett, under the title: *The Ethics of Hegel.*

barest intimations, the central idea being that all institutions educate through the subtle means of *custom*, which is nothing else than the Reason of the race become organic, and thus far actual, without having yet emerged from its instinctive or unreflecting form.

(1) In the *Family* the child learns language and begins the formation of his habits upon the model of custom as represented in the manners and requirements of the given household. These are determined in detail by the class and essentially by the race to which the family group pertains.

(2) In the *State* these customs begin to assume a reflective form in *Laws;* which, however, are still given out by *authority* and without further reason than that of custom, of which they are the more explicit formulation. So that the individual who adjusts himself to custom is by that fact already a "law-abiding citizen."

At the same time, the state restrains the individual who assumes to disregard

its laws; and this secures to the docile (teachable) individual, the negative freedom which consists in absence of external hindrance in his self-adjustment to custom as the actual, present, and presumably rational, world-order; such order never ceasing to bring to bear upon him its pressure or stimulus, yielding to which he attains to consistent and at least approximately rational, self-definition.

(3) In addition to these institutions, the *Church* is also ceaselessly as well as more explicitly, and upon still higher grounds, urging upon the individual the necessity of willingly adjusting himself to the actual, explicit form, which the Reason of the race has assumed.

(4) But the *School* is the institution which has for its essential and specific function, to bring the individual to explicit consciousness of the Laws of the world, both physical and spiritual, so that he may conform to these no longer as a mere matter of habit, but also as a matter of reflection; being thus able to give not

merely *a* reason but a *good* reason for the faith that is in him.

On the other hand, the school receives the child at an age when custom and authority are the only standards he can appreciate; so that here the problem of the transition of the individual from the merely instinctive and habitual, to the reflective stage of his own adjustment to the rational order of the world as expressed in nature on the one hand and in human institutions on the other, attains its most explicit and complex degree.

But just for this reason, the school presents itself as the highest *means* to instruction; for it has deliberately reduced the whole process of education to a *system*. To this phase of the subject, therefore, we have next to turn.

XII.

INSTRUCTION—ITS METHOD.

UPON this theme we need add but little to what has already been said in connection with the Process of Instruction. And the first thing we have to say is that nowhere else is the wholeness of Personality of such vital moment as in the teacher. Substantial natural gift, exact and adequate culture, positive force of refined character—these are the concrete aspects severally of "material, formal and efficient cause" which are the indispensable prerequisites of the really good teacher.

And it is the exact and adequate culture, constituting, as we have intimated, the phase of "formal cause," in which consists the essence of genuine vital *Method* in teaching. Hence true and truly effective methods of teaching are not to be prescribed and applied from without, but

to be developed as vital, spontaneous modes from within.

To this it should be added on the other hand that true methods are by no means "original" in the sense of being merely expressive of the notions peculiar to the individual teacher. On the contrary to be *true*, a method, like anything else, must be *rational*. It is not the *individuality* of the teacher that is to be insisted upon, but his *personality*. His methods, if they are to be valid, must be based, not in his individual whims, but in universal Reason. Hence the supreme necessity of sound and well-rounded education on the part of the teacher.

Meanwhile supervision can accomplish well-nigh the impossible through suggestion in respect of method. And the most vital aspect of this consists in the discovery, on the part of the supervisor, of latent gifts on the part of the individual teacher and the bringing the teacher to a consciousness of such gifts. The power of the teacher is thus increased not merely by

explicit knowledge of the value of the method already unconsciously made use of, but also by the increased confidence, vigor and definiteness of work which such knowledge brings.

In short the highest function of the supervisor is, not to "originate" methods and prescribe them for others to follow unquestioningly. It is rather to discover the central element of true method already spontaneously unfolding in the mind of each individual teacher under his supervision and to encourage and guide the teacher in the maturing of such inherent gift into its richest values.

The complement of this is to be found in the use of the imitative instinct through the observation of the work of specially successful teachers by those less experienced and still in the plastic stage.

Next to an autocratic, despotic negative criticism, which generally is made use of to conceal a barren intellect, nothing could be more deadly to educational interests than ready-made and elaborately worked

out "methods" prescribed for the sake and to the extent of actual uniformity. For this could only result in arrest of personal development on the part of the teachers affected, and this again could mean nothing else than the suspension of all vitality and the reduction of the whole educational process to the dead level of mere monotonous mechanism—the utter cancellation of the consciousness of Freedom through the annulment of Freedom itself in and for the individual.

And now we must remind ourselves once more that Freedom is to be realized only through the *ethical* process of voluntary action, the direct consideration of which constitutes the next subdivision of our theme.

XIII.

DISCIPLINE.

RESPECTING Discipline much has inevitably been anticipated. We have already noticed Hegel's dictum that just as the will begins in obedience, so also does thought; that in fact obedience is the beginning of wisdom.

Of course by such obedience Hegel means conscious conformity to Reason as such; not mere blind submission, with which, indeed, he strongly contrasts obedience properly speaking. And yet the child must *at first* simply submit to external guidance—happy if the actual authority to which he submits prove rational in character!

It is not to be forgotten, either, that Hegel is in full accord with what in one or another form is the world-old doctrine that, as the child of nature, man is evil; that is, that his immediate inclinations

pertain to his animal nature, and that only through training and discipline can he be brought into the state of positive moral life. In this, indeed, he simply reproduces Kant's affirmation that "Discipline or training transforms animality into humanity*;" an aphorism which Kant emphasized by the further statement that "Discipline preserves man from falling away from his manhood through his animal tendencies."

From this point of view it is but a matter of course that Hegel should have little patience with the sentimental sympathy for mere childhood as such and which would at all cost please the child—eliminating law by substituting the child's caprice in place of law, and thus encouraging a mere self-seeking interest on the part of the child, which interest Hegel pronounces "the root of all evil." On the contrary the child "must learn to obey precisely because his will is not yet rational" or matured as will.

* *Werke*, X., 383.

The purpose of the teacher, then, should not be merely to find out what the child happens to be most easily interested in and be governed accordingly ; but to find out how the child can be brought to take interest in whatever pertains to his own normal advancement. Thus the child, instead of being humored and excused in respect of his irregularities, must be brought to prize order and punctuality. And this is to be done quietly and by a strict requirement which assumes the instinctive approval of the child's higher nature, and above all with not too much or too obtrusive commanding and moralizing. For "men who are early plunged into the dead sea of moral platitudes come out, indeed, like Achilles, invulnerable, but also with the addition that all manly vigor is drowned therein."*

Along with this Hegel emphasizes the importance of silence as a form of self-restraint and hence as an aspect of discipline. It is an antidote to the disease of

* Rosenkranz ; *Hegel's Leben*, p. 467. (Quoted from one of Hegel's addresses).

volubility and mere egotistic argumentation. At the same time this ought not to be applied too rigidly to very young children. For, as Richter says: "The heroic virtue of silence requires for its practice the power of ripening reason. Reason teaches us to be silent; the heart teaches us to speak."*

Closely connected with what has just been said is the fact that *attention* is quite as much a matter of will as of intellect. "I am really attentive only then when I *will* so to be." Though it by no means follows from this that attention is an easy thing. On the contrary it requires special effort to *fix* the attention upon some one, to the exclusion of all other, representations which otherwise are equally present in consciousness.

Perfect attention, in fact, is one of the phases of complete self-mastery; and it is, for example, because of the value of military exercises in developing ready and full command over one's own powers,

* *Levana* (Bohn Lib.), p. 336.

quite as much as from their significance in respect of patriotism, that Hegel would have all boys trained in such exercises. We are, he says, "too much prone to consider every art and every science as something specific;" *i. e.*, as something out of relation to other aspects of life. On the contrary all such exercises have their organic significance in the total round of media for the full development of the individual, and this with respect both to his physical and to his spiritual nature.

Thus obedience and attention are necessary subjective modes which express themselves outwardly through definite, vigorous, sustained and purposeful action; and the two aspects, outer and inner, are the complementary aspects of the development of actual Freedom, or self-determination, on the part of the individual.

Along with this, Hegel points out two aspects of discipline—outward training (*Zucht*), and culture (*Bildung*), or inward formative process. As an aspect of education, the former is to be taken in the

sense of subduing the will of the child in so far as this appears in the form of mere wilfulness. And this is to be accomplished through the steady pressure of a wise, consistent, albeit kindly, *authority*. To endeavor always to *persuade* the child that the thing required of him is something that will prove pleasing to him, is to pervert his mind and confirm him in the belief that he ought to do nothing except what will give him pleasure in the doing.*

On the contrary, as we have already noticed, Hegel explicitly calls attention to the fact that the parent, and next to the parent the teacher, constitutes for the child the present living embodiment of all that is universal and essential; and for this reason the child cannot emerge out of childhood save by the more or less forbidding path of obedience; that is, by being brought to subordinate his own will, as in itself crude and capricious, to the will of parent or teacher, as relatively matured and rational.

* Cf. *Werke*, VIII., 231.

We might even say, then, that childhood is the inferno of infinite lack and longing, out of which the individual can escape into the paradise of enriched and blessed existence only through the purgatorial pains and strains of *Discipline*, which for the child consist first of all in *training*.

But while this phase of simple, unquestioning obedience to authority is appropriate to the rudimentary consciousness of *childhood*, the complementary phase, consisting of *Bildung*, or inner formative process, through which the individual approximates maturity as a self-conscious, self-active being, is no less indispensable to the growing personality of the *youth*. In this connection Hegel has repeatedly called attention to the fact that the oriental mind never attains to the full sense of personality, and the dignity pertaining thereto, while the occidental mind is specially characterized by self-consciousness, to which the individual very early attains in explicit form, and in ever-increasingly positive degree.

Hence, while in Asia discipline may very well consist chiefly in mere training, it is evident that in Europe and America this must early and rapidly give way to the far subtler form of discipline, consisting in the process of culture through which the sense of personal worth may be—not so much stimulated indeed, for here this develops spontaneously—*but regulated and directed into rational channels.*

Besides, with the general progress of culture in these countries a great change has taken place in the general estimate of what precisely it is in which training, and especially school training, ought really to consist. "In proportion as education comes to be judged of from the right point of view—that is, in proportion as it comes to be understood, that in essence education is rather the confirmation than the repression of the awakened sense of selfhood; that it is rather the positive, regulated unfolding of the spirit of independence—in like degree, both in the family and in the school, the whole mode

of dealing with youth has undergone progressive change."*

This change consists essentially in emphasizing less and less the importance of keeping up the feeling of subjection and dependence, even in respect of things which are in themselves indifferent. So, also, it is no longer assumed that there is special virtue in such instruction as has no other aim than that of cultivating the habit of obedience, nor that results which may be attained through the feeling of love, and through direct attention to, and serious interest in, the end the child or youth is seeking, would be in the least enhanced in value by being reached through harsh measures and forbidding means.

Meanwhile, Hegel does not forget, nor allow his readers to forget, that the social aspect is quite as real, and quite as valid, as is the individual aspect in the growth of human character. It is, in fact, just this social aspect that first begins to be emphasized for the youth precisely in the

* Thaulow: *Hegel's Ansichten*, I., 100.

school. It is there that he begins to feel on the one hand the force of universal interests, and on the other the necessity of subordinating his own merely particular interests to the general welfare. By degrees, also, he learns that this seeming sacrifice on his part, for what at first appears to be merely the good of others, really proves to be nothing else than the putting away of whatever is unworthy of himself—his whims and childish fancies—and that, hence, it is but one aspect of the process of attaining that true freedom which is the central characteristic of matured and maturing Personality.

Nor is this all; for since the rule of sacrifice for the general good is universally applied, it turns out that each necessarily receives the benefit of the sacrifice of all. Each sacrifices what in truth is only harmful to himself. Each finds himself free to pursue his own highest purpose of self-development, because of like sacrifices on the part of all the others.

In such fine form does the school pre-

sent, each day, each hour, that lesson, immeasurable in its significance, that every reasonable sacrifice the individual can be called upon to make for others must unfailingly result in his own good, as well as in the good of others.

Clearly, then, punishment, either at home or in school, whether by depriving of what is desired, or inflicting what is dreaded, has no real ground of justification save that of bringing the child to a sense of the universal Right, in conflict with which his own deed is *wrong*, in the very fact that through such deed his own personality becomes distorted, or *wrung*, out of its due form of moral comeliness. Punishment in anger, as mere vengeance, is simply monstrous.

All this, again, suggest's Kant's summary of the fundamental aspects of education, to the following effect: "(1) Man must be *disciplined*. (2) He must be *cultivated*. (3) Care must be taken that in his development the individual shall attain to prudence, that he shall be led to take

his place in the social organism, that he shall come to be esteemed, and to have an influence [that is, to count for something in the world]. To this aspect there belongs a special sort of culture which has come to be called *civilizing*. (4) Regard must be had to the end and mode of rendering the individual *moral*."*

To this it is important to add, that the individual becomes truly moral, in the Kantian, in the Hegelian, in any really philosophic sense, only through clear comprehension of, and direct personal adjustment to fundamental principles. The actual development of virtue, as Hegel expressly insists,† is not to be secured through some particular ethicality, or set of formulas, retailed by this or that individual, and warranted to apply without further trouble to all and sundry situations. Such striving after the moral is spurious and profitless.

On the other hand, Hegel never ceases

* *Werke*, X., 390.

† Cf. *Werke*, I., 399 and fol.

to insist that in its fullest meaning the actual school of morality for the individual is nothing else than just the social world in its organic character of existing human institutions. On this point he quotes as a word of the wisest in antiquity, and as expressing the central truth of the matter: "'Be moral,' means to live in accordance with the customs of one's own country" —*i. e.*, of course, the publicly recognized customs of the *whole* country, *not* the more or less disguised customs of this or that perverted neighborhood, or class, within that country.

But we must turn abruptly from this aspect of our theme—so deserving of extended discussion—and hasten to the close.

XIV.

REFINEMENT.

UNDER this heading we have first to remind the reader of the fact already noticed, that in his *Encyclopædia of the Philosophic Sciences* Hegel presents an outline of his whole system, intended directly for educational purposes. The Logic, as we may note again, indicates the fundamental principles of the system in universal, abstract form. The Philosophy of Nature represents his view of the outer evolutional process, which gives reality to the forms and forces and types of the outer world of space, and which thus leads up to the inner world of Mind. In the Philosophy of Mind he offers a sketch of the actual stages in the evolution of Mind, as at once Individual and Social.

This latter again presents three fundamental aspects:

(*a*) *Subjective Spirit* (or Mind). This

again appears in three essential phases, (1) Anthropology, (2) Phenomenology, (3) Psychology. And we may here remark that it is to this simplest sphere of Mind that educational discussions are commonly confined; in which fact may be seen the real reason why such discussions bear so one-sidedly individualistic an appearance, as far as concerns the explicit form of the theories developed. Hence the practically exclusive attention given to mere *Instruction*, and this as given in the *School*.

(*b*) The second part of the Philosophy of Mind is devoted to what, in Hegel's phrase, is *Objective Spirit* (or Mind). Here Hegel deals with man in his social relations. (1) in Property. (2) Individual Morality. (3) Social Morality. It is here, in fact, that we find the one substantial basis for rightly estimating the nature, the means, and the methods of *Discipline* in its full significance as a phase of education essential in itself and coördinate with Instruction. Coördinate, for if char-

acter without intelligence is crude, intelligence without character is demonic.

(*c*) The third subdivision of the Philosophy of Mind has for its special theme: *Absolute Spirit* (or Mind). This final subdivision presents again in ascending series the three subtlest aspects of spiritual evolution, *viz.*, (1) Art, (2) Religion, and (3) Philosophy; the latter finding its highest concrete interest in Theology.

To which we have now to add that we have in this sphere the basis and demand for a third aspect of education, to which we have already given the name *Refinement*.

And here we must restrict ourselves to barely indicating the general character of the theme in its three essential aspects.

(1) *Art* is the highest sphere in the realm of the Beautiful. It is so because art-works are developed as the direct expression of the inherent demand of the human mind for perfection in Beauty as expressed in outer form. Nature is the search for rhythm. Man is discovered rhythm.

Nature is Divinity going forth from himself. Man is Divinity returning to himself. The Beauty of Nature is inarticulate. The Beauty of Art is articulate. The Beauty of Nature is limited to the workings of simple mechanical laws. The Beauty of Art is the rhythm of the divine Consciousness concretely unfolded in and through the human consciousness, as itself a divinely constituted nature, and hence the highest medium through which the eternal creative Mind gives expression to itself. Art is the finished product of the most perfectly matured taste; and we have already noticed that true Taste is nothing else than Morality become beautiful.

But thus Art, as the direct product of mind as mind, is but the expression of a universal demand of mind. It is but one aspect of the demand of the mind for *Perfection.* And Perfection is nothing else than this: *Conformity of the Real with the Ideal.* Not the individual's chance, capricious "ideal," or mere momentary fancy;

but the universal, rational Ideal as in itself the abiding *Type* in any given sphere.

Art thus constitutes one essential aspect in the education of the human mind. The developing individual mind has the absolute right to be brought face to face with each and every specific Type of the Beautiful which has charmed the growing divinity in man through all the ages. And this introduction can be accomplished only through the media of the finest products of human genius within this realm.

But also this aspect of the education of the individual requires that he should test his own powers in the direction of producing rhythmic forms. He must not be permitted to assume in any sphere the attitude of *mere spectator*. He must be accustomed also to regard himself as *participator* in the actual process of the world. Hence is he given endless *exercises* in every department of his school-life.

It is this deeper educational value as *exercises of the pupil's inner spiritual powers* that constitutes the ultimate justi-

fication for the time devoted to Drawing, to Music, and to the study of Literature in the schools. They are, first of all, media of *Refinement*, of the cultivation of Judgment in the subtle form of *Taste* which, in proportion as it becomes matured, will spontaneously and unerringly select and rejoice in whatever is truly and nobly beautiful, whether in tone, or word, or deed, in all the world—and this is but one form of loving the truth and scorning a lie.*

(2) But thus we are brought to notice that true art-products are but the immediate, formal and outward creations of an inward spiritual principle, of which again the vital essence is *Religion*. It is, in fact, one of the cardinal principles of Hegel that all art, properly speaking, has a religious content. And this amounts to saying

* For further information (in English) as to the Hegelian view of Art the reader is referred to *Hegel's Philosophy of Art*, translated by the present writer, who has also printed a volume on the *Philosophy of Landscape Painting*.

that every attempt to separate between art and religious sentiment is nothing else than an attempt to separate between the outer Form of Beauty and its inner Substance.

Clearly, then, the cry of "art for art's sake," with which we have become so familiar in our times, is merely a cry of "form for form's sake." It is this cry that led the divinely beautiful Helen to forget that the soul of Beauty is actual ethical and religious life—forgetting which, as one specially significant version of the story tells us, she became herself the merest phantom. And this, indeed, is the story of the whole Greek world. For in proportion as their religious consciousness became reduced in vitality, their art lost poise, and became phantasmal.

Religion is the essence of art because it is the essence of Life. But can religion be taught? Upon this point Hegel declares that those who deny the practicability of making religion the object of instruction, really fail to understand what it

is with which such instruction ought to begin. One has only to recognize that religion has a positive inner content or substantial significance, which not only can, but must be set forth, in actual outer or "objective" fashion—whether in art-forms or in the more definite forms of language to be convinced that thus far religion *can* be taught.

On the other hand, stirring the heart, excitation of religious feeling—this is quite another thing. So far from being a form of instruction, this pertains to the eloquence and pathos of preaching and can attain to nothing more than awaking the hearer to an interest in a given theme. All this is valid and of the highest value in itself, but it is not teaching. Besides, whatever the degree in which feeling may be excited, it is yet vague, and hence needs to pass through the differentiating process of definite cultivation and clarification through the media of teaching in the proper sense of the term. Sentiment must be raised to the higher power of

clearly defined positive doctrine. And so much the more, since, were religion to exist merely as feeling, it must die away into a vague, dreamy, inner state that must become more and more incapable of outward manifestation either in any specific form or in any actual deed.*

Meanwhile, here as elsewhere, Hegel shows his alertness and self-poise in avoiding the temptation of the professional thinker to belittle feeling as if that were a less worthy phase of the life of mind. And especially does he note the pedagogical limitations involved in the question of the possibility of including Religion in a practical scheme of elementary instruction. The child, he reminds us specifically,† attains only to *vorstellenden Denken;* that is, to thinking that is still wholly involved in imagery. In fact, so far as his consciousness can be said to be explicit, the world exists only for his *Vorstellung*, for his power of representing the world

* 1 Cf. *Werke*, XI., 130-160, and elsewhere.

† *Werke*, VII2., 97.

about him in forms derived from and appealing directly to, the Imagination.

It is evident, therefore, that while Hegel regards religion as a proper object of instruction, and this to the full extent of the whole system of theology, he would restrict such instruction for children rather to the ethical aspects that can be represented to the imagination through imagery and to such simple formulas as those in which the catechism consists. And we may add that because the noblest religious ideas and sentiments have found their worthiest and sublimest sensuous expression in the various books of the Hebrew and Christian Bible, it is an absolute, inalienable right of every child to be made familiar with these forms, which only grow richer in content for the individual consciousness with each added year of his experience in actual life.

It was the world in its penny-wisdom that knew not God; and so gave proof of its pound-foolishness. If Art is the outward form of Refinement, Religion is its

inner soul and vital substance. And education which fails to take this fact seriously into the account must itself become phantasmal.

(3) Respecting *Philosophy*, we can add but a single word. Whether we regard it as the "unification of knowledge" (Spencer), or as the "thinking consideration of things" (Hegel) we are still discovering it to be the supreme effort made by the human intelligence to grasp together all objects of the Real World as constituting at the same time the objects of the Rational World. And this means that Philosophy is the name we give to the effort of the human mind to behold and account for all things in their actual, true relations, one to another.

Evidently, then, all teaching presupposes Philosophy, as all learning should lead up to it. For teaching consists essentially in the pointing out of relations, as learning consists in the tracing out of relations. And this includes the tracing out of *relations between relations*—that is,

the progressive recognition of the relative significance of relations as involved in the whole scheme of the world, through which alone the relative (educational) values of things can be ascertained.

From which this corollary is inevitable —that a course in sound philosophy ought to constitute an essential factor in the training of every teacher, and especially of every teacher who has to do with the instruction of advanced pupils, or with the supervision of work in any grade.

Such course ought to begin in rational *Psychology* as giving an account of the whole mind, including, by way of prelude, a summary view of anthropology, together with an account of the central characteristics of the brain and nervous system as the immediate organ of mind, and especially of mind within the range of the sensuous consciousness.

The next stage in the course should consist of *Logic* in the sense of a careful study of the Laws, the Forms and the Method of Thought.

The third stage would present the practical aspect—*Ethics*, in its individual, in its social and in its historical aspects.

The fourth stage ought to render the student familiar with the general outlines of the *History* of *Philosophy;* that is, a critical history of the successive phases in the evolutional process through which the human mind has passed in the interpretation of the world as a whole.

The fifth and culminating stage ought to consist in a thorough-going analysis which should also be a careful sympathetic study of *one great work* constituting the central ganglion of one of the great constructive Systems of Philosophy, and which would put the student in definite possession of an adequate and consistent organon or method for all his future work.

And if this is true of all teachers in general, only so much the more must it be true of those teachers who have the infinitely responsible task of teaching actual or prospective teachers.

To which we may add that (to quote

another of Hegel's happy definitions) Philosophy seriously pursued is just "a perpetual service of God;" for first of all it raises to the highest degree attainable for the individual the self-defining process of the mind and thus assures the highest measure of precision in the self-realizing process of mind, the unfailing outcome of which must be the unfolding of that rich rhythm of Refinement that constitutes the central charm in a truly worthy Life.

Yet one thing is lacking in the enumeration of the requirements which Hegel would make of the Teacher. It is that he should not depend upon his own mere personal gifts as these chance to develop into more or less one-sided method; nor yet upon imitation of this or that favorite teacher; but that he should become familiar with the whole course of the History of Education as such. It is thus alone that he can hope to escape falling into errors of greater or less gravity. Nor can he otherwise avail himself of the dis-

coveries and achievements of the race in the process of guiding and stimulating individual human minds in that struggle towards maturity that ends only in God.