EDITED BY MALCOLM SCHOFIELD

Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC

New Directions for Philosophy

CAMBRIDGE

more information - www.cambridge.org/9781107020115

ARISTOTLE, PLATO AND PYTHAGOREANISM IN THE FIRST CENTURY BC

This book presents an up-to-date overview of the main new directions taken by ancient philosophy in the first century BC, a period in which the dominance exercised in the Hellenistic age by Stoicism, Epicureanism and Academic scepticism gave way to a more diverse and experimental philosophical scene. Its development has been much less well understood, but here a strong international team of leading scholars of the subject reconstruct key features of the changed environment. They examine afresh the evidence for some of the central Greek thinkers of the period, as well as illuminating Cicero's engagement with Plato both as translator and in his own philosophising. The intensity of renewed study of Aristotle's *Categories* and Plato's *Timaeus* is an especially striking outcome of their discussions. The volume will be indispensable for scholars and students interested in the history of Platonism and Aristotelianism.

MALCOLM SCHOFIELD is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Philosophy, University of Cambridge, and Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge. He is co-author (with G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven) of the second edition of *The Presocratic Philosophers* (1983) and co-editor (with Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, and Jaap Mansfeld) of *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (1999). His other publications include *An Essay on Anaxagoras* (1980), *The Stoic Idea of the City* (1991; 2nd edition, 1999), and *Plato: Political Philosophy* (2006).

ARISTOTLE, PLATO AND PYTHAGOREANISM IN THE FIRST CENTURY BC

New Directions for Philosophy

EDITED BY

MALCOLM SCHOFIELD

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town,
Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Mexico City

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107020115

© Cambridge University Press 2013

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2013

Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the first century BC : new directions for philosophy /
edited by Malcolm Schofield.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-107-02011-5
1. Philosophy, Ancient. 2. Aristotle. 3. Plato. I. Schofield, Malcolm, editor of compilation.
B171.A75 2013
180 – dc23 2012025993

ISBN 978-1-107-02011-5 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to
in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such
websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

In memoriam
Anna Eunyoung Ju and Bob Sharples

Contents

Notes on contributors — *page* ix
Preface — xii
Introduction — xiv

1 The texts of Plato and Aristotle in the first century BC — 1
Myrto Hatzimichali

2 Platonist approaches to Aristotle: from Antiochus of Ascalon to Eudorus of Alexandria (and beyond) — 28
Riccardo Chiaradonna

3 Boethus' Aristotelian ontology — 53
Marwan Rashed

4 Aristotelianism in the first century BC: Xenarchus of Seleucia — 78
Andrea Falcon

5 Posidonius as historian of philosophy: an interpretation of Plutarch, *de Animae Procreatione in Timaeo* 22, 1023b–c — 95
Anna Eunyoung Ju

6 Asclepiades of Bithynia and Heraclides Ponticus: medical Platonism? — 118
Roberto Polito

7 The eclectic Pythagoreanism of Alexander Polyhistor — 139
A. A. Long

8 Pythagoreanising Aristotle: Eudorus and the systematisation of Platonism — 160
Mauro Bonazzi

9 Cicero and the *Timaeus* 187
David Sedley

10 Plato's *Laws* and Cicero's *de Legibus* 206
Julia Annas

11 Of Cicero's Plato: fictions, Forms, foundations 225
Ingo Gildenhard

Bibliography 276
Index of passages 291
General index 301

Notes on contributors

JULIA ANNAS is Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona, and has also taught at Oxford University. She has published widely in ancient philosophy, especially ancient ethics, and also in contemporary virtue ethics.

MAURO BONAZZI teaches History of Ancient Philosophy at the Università degli Studi di Milano. He has written on the history of Platonism and Greek Political Thought. His most recent books include: *Academici e Platonici. Il dibattito antico sullo scetticismo di Platone* (2003); *The Origins of the Platonic System* (2009), a collected volume edited with J. Opsomer; and *Platone, Fedro* (2011).

RICCARDO CHIARADONNA is Associate Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Università di Roma Tre. Among his publications are: *Sostanza movimento analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele* (Naples 2002); *Plotino* (2009); and articles on Galen, Plotinus and the ancient Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. He has edited, with Franco Trabattoni, *Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism* (2009).

ANDREA FALCON is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Concordia University, Montreal. He works on Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition in antiquity and beyond. He is the author of: *Corpi e Movimenti. La fortuna del De caelo nel mondo antico* (2001); *Aristotle and the Science of Nature. Unity without Uniformity* (Cambridge, 2005); and *Aristotelianism in the First Century* BCE*: Xenarchus of Seleucia* (Cambridge, 2011).

INGO GILDENHARD is Lecturer in Classics at the University of Cambridge, after holding positions at King's College London and the University of Durham. His previous work on Cicero includes *Paideia Romana: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations* (Cambridge, 2007) and *Creative Eloquence: The Construction of Reality in Cicero's Speeches* (2011).

MYRTO HATZIMICHALI was a post-doctoral researcher on the University of Cambridge AHRC-funded project on philosophy in the first century BC, where she was a Fellow of Girton College. After subsequent positions at University College London and the University of Exeter, she is now University Lecturer in Classics at Cambridge, and a Fellow of Homerton College. Her research interests centre on intellectual and cultural history, especially on the ways in which literary and philosophical texts were transmitted, received and professionally studied in the Hellenistic and Early Imperial periods. She is the author of *Potamo of Alexandria and the Emergence of Eclecticism in Late Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge 2011), and has contributed chapters to volumes on the philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon, on Ancient Libraries and on Hellenistic poetry.

ANNA EUNYOUNG JU pursued her studies for the PhD in the Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge, where her dissertation was entitled *Posidonius on the Stoic scala naturae* (2008). She then took up a research fellowship at the Jungam Academy for Greco-Roman Studies. She died in March 2010.

A. A. LONG is Professor of Classics, Irving Stone Professor of Literature and Affiliated Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of various books on ancient philosophy, including most recently *Epictetus. A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life* (2002) and *From Epicurus to Epictetus. Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy* (2006). He is currently working on Greek notions of soul and self, and (together with Margaret Graver) translating Seneca's *Moral Letters* to Lucilius.

ROBERTO POLITO was a post-doctoral researcher on the University of Cambridge AHRC-funded project on philosophy in the first century BC, where he was a Fellow of Wolfson College. Subsequently he held a further post-doctoral position at the Humboldt University, Berlin, with its project on ancient medicine and philosophy. He is the author of *The Sceptical Road* (2004). His edition of the fragments of Aenesidemus is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press.

MARWAN RASHED is Professor at the École normale supérieure, Paris, where he teaches history of Greek and Arabic philosophy. Among his recent books are: *Aristote: De la génération et la corruption, édition, traduction et commentaire* (2005); *L'héritage aristotélicien: textes inédits de l'Antiquité*

(Paris 2007); *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu sur la Physique d'Aristote (Livres IV–VIII): Les scholies byzantines* (2011). He is currently writing a commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*.

MALCOLM SCHOFIELD retired in September 2011 after teaching in the Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge, for nearly forty years. He continues as a Fellow of St John's College. He was co-editor (with Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes and Jaap Mansfeld) of *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge 1999), and was co-director of the AHRC-funded project on philosophy in the first century BC. He is currently working mostly on Cicero.

DAVID SEDLEY was director of the AHRC-funded project on philosophy in the first century BC. He is Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, and a Fellow of Christ's College. He has been editor of *Classical Quarterly* (1986–1992) and *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* (1998–2007). His recent publications include: *Plato's Cratylus* (Cambridge 2003), *The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus* (2004), *Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity* (2007), and (as editor) *The Philosophy of Antiochus* (Cambridge 2012), sister volume to the present one.

Preface

This volume represents the proceedings of an international conference held in Cambridge on 13–16 July 2009. It was the second such event organised in the context of a project on philosophy in the first century BC, which ran for the period 2005–9 with funding by the UK's Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). It is the second such volume to be produced. An account of the project and its work can be found in the acknowledgements section prefacing its predecessor volume, *The Philosophy of Antiochus*, edited by David Sedley (Cambridge University Press, 2012). We are grateful to the AHRC for all the support that made the July 2009 gathering possible, and we thank also the Faculty of Classics in the University of Cambridge, which as well as accommodating the project team throughout made additional financial support available on that occasion. Myrto Hatzimichali and Roberto Polito, research associates with the project, and Georgia Tsouni, PhD student supported to work with the team, took responsibility for many of the nuts and bolts of the running of the conference; we thank them warmly. The development and implementation of its academic programming were undertaken principally by David Sedley, as project director. The vision that launched the project, the energy that sustained it, and the decision to devote the second of the project's two conferences to the subject explored in the pages that follow were largely his, and though the rest of us made our input, I know that the rest of the team would wish to join me in expressing our deep gratitude for his initiative and support – and for fostering the collegial spirit in which every aspect of the work of the project was approached and undertaken.

This preface must, however, end on a note of sadness. We have to record the deaths of two of the speakers at the conference: Anna Eunyoung Ju, who died at the start of her career in March 2010, and Bob Sharples, who died after many productive decades of distinguished work, particularly on the Aristotelian tradition, in August 2010. Anna had revised her conference

paper and had submitted her chapter for this volume by the end of 2009; happily, it is now published here. Bob's paper – on Peripatetic ethics – would have added an extra dimension to the coverage of Aristotelianism in our period, but he was never to convert it into a book chapter. Both were people of unforgettable integrity. All the contributors mourn their loss. We dedicate the book to their memory.

MS, January 2012

Introduction

Malcolm Schofield

The first century BC was a time of new directions in philosophy. The previous two centuries had been dominated by Stoicism, Epicureanism and Academic scepticism, and by the Athenian philosophical schools that fostered them. Now came a change. Particularly after the Roman dictator Sulla's depredations of 88 BC, Athens lost its pre-eminence, and leading philosophers worked in other centres: Rhodes (associated particularly with the Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius), Pergamum, Herculaneum (with its famous Epicurean community and still more famous library) are venues that come to mind, and above all Alexandria and Rome. There were still Stoics and Epicureans and Academics. But what being a Stoic or an Academic amounted to was becoming increasingly controversial. The surviving evidence often leaves room for doubt about how various figures whom later tradition took to be important would have wished to position themselves relative to school labels – here not forgetting the Peripatos, since Aristotle and Aristotelianism now start to loom larger in the historical record than they had done since the time of Theophrastus. Plato for his part had never fallen off philosophers' reading lists, but the pace of attempts to appropriate versions of Platonism or otherwise engage with Plato also quickened.

This volume brings together a collection of papers by scholars who have been trying to open up knowledge and understanding of the philosophy of this period. As indicated in the Preface, all were delivered in their original form at the final conference of the Cambridge Faculty of Classics' AHRC project on philosophy in the first century BC. The focus was on the reception of Plato and Aristotle – and Pythagoreanism, too, although as will become evident, the Pythagoreanism we shall mostly be encountering is intimately tied to readings of Plato that emphasise his Pythagorising and mathematicising inspiration. One striking development particularly apparent in the first century is a fresh philosophical interest in the actual texts of Plato and Aristotle alike, something whose impact is registered more

or less explicitly in most of the contributions to the volume. Whether in Aristotle's case this coincided with a new availability of copies of school treatises by him that had long disappeared from general view remains a matter for debate.

It is discussed in Myrto Hatzimichali's opening chapter, which re-examines the evidence for early editorial activity on the writings of both Plato and Aristotle. She distinguishes sharply the situation with Plato, whose texts had been studied throughout the Hellenistic period, from that obtaining for Aristotle, where she concludes that even if copies of the treatises were not altogether lost at that time, they were not much studied. She distinguishes also between text-critical and similar editorial initiatives on the one hand, for which there is evidence both before (in Plato's case) and during the first century (for Aristotle too), and attempts on the other to organize both the Platonic and Aristotelian corpora. She agrees with Jonathan Barnes that there is no basis for attributing the former kind of activity to Andronicus of Rhodes, often wrongly typecast as Aristotle's first 'editor'. But she is emphatic that Andronicus' pronouncements on the nature of Aristotle's writings, particularly as concerns authenticity, book-division, and grouping and ordering of school treatises, were decisive in bringing order out of something like chaos, and transforming subsequent approaches to Aristotle – not least in bringing about the eclipse of all the more popular works that he had made widely available in his own lifetime.

Stoicised presentations of Aristotelianism, which show little sign of close attention to Aristotle's own writings, had been characteristic of the Hellenistic period. These continued to appear, e.g. in the writings of the Academic Antiochus and later of Arius Didymus. Other first-century philosophers, however, began to read and debate Aristotle's actual texts, in what Riccardo Chiaradonna dubs 'post-Hellenistic' mode: physical treatises such as *de Caelo* and the *Physics* itself, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but above all the work we know as the *Categories*. Among them were Stoics and Academics, as well as Aristotelians – though in calling them that we should not imagine a Peripatetic orthodoxy: Aristotle seems to have been regarded by them as a great thinker, but Aristotelians did not always find him consistent, and they thought he sometimes got things wrong. This varied Aristotelian terrain is surveyed and examined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

In Chapter 2 Chiaradonna looks first at Antiochus, then Aristo and Cratippus, and finally Eudorus. His consideration of the evidence for Antiochus, first in the sphere of ethics and then of epistemology, leads to the conclusion that 'his way of reading Aristotle' – if we assume he did read some actual Aristotle – 'definitely did not focus on close textual

interpretation of the treatises'. Chiaradonna contrasts in particular the treatment of the Peripatetic 'double criterion' of knowledge (the school was taken to acknowledge both sense-perception and thought as windows on truth) in Sextus Empiricus, which must rely on a source other than Aristotle's text, conceivably Antiochus, and in Porphyry, where the 'Aristotelian exegetical background of [his] account is very evident'. With Antiochus' pupils Cratippus and Aristo he finds an interesting divergence. Whereas 'what we know of Cratippus . . . shows no similarity with the technical exegetical works of the early commentators', Aristo 'was certainly engaged in a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's school treatises', notably the *Categories*. Eudorus, too, seems to have focused in his engagement with Aristotle on the interpretation of particular passages in the treatises, including once again the *Categories*, where we are told that he proposed *aporiai* and objections to specific aspects of Aristotle's theories of quality and of relatives: probably not in the spirit of total rejection, but rather with the aim of revising 'some details of Aristotle's views in order to integrate them in his overall Platonic-Pythagorean project' (see further Bonazzi's discussion in Chapter 8). With Boethus also grappling in this period with the text of the *Categories*, it might look as though a decisive shift of focus had taken place. But Chiaradonna notes that the swell of interest in the school treatises evidenced for the first century BC appears to have abated in the decades that followed, not regaining impetus until the second century AD.

So far the volume has been engaged in history of philosophy. Those who relish philosophical argument for itself, as it may be prompted by problems in the text of Aristotle, will find intriguing material in Chapters 3 and 4 (by Marwan Rashed and Andrea Falcon), excavated from the evidence for Boethus and Xenarchus respectively, two especially interesting, independent and original Aristotelian philosophers of our period. In Chapter 3 Rashed explores Boethus' *Categories*-based doctrine, radical in its implications, of the primacy of individual material substance. He shows how Boethus then grapples with the relation of form to matter if (as he claimed) substance is the composite of the two, and with the related problem of what ontological status form can then be supposed to have. This takes him into the way Boethus tackled the 'in' relation, apparently in light of the chapter on 'in' in Book 4 of the *Physics* and of consequential reflection on how the category of 'having' (with complications about its relation to the category of the 'relative') is to be understood. He then looks at some passages in which Alexander two centuries or more later seeks with no less ingenuity to defend the substantiality of form against an alternative Aristotelian view of it (which, he argues, can only be Boethus'), and how

Alexander requires in the end 'a non-canonical . . . scheme of predication, according to which the form is the subject and the matter what the form needs to have in order for it to exist as a form'. Finally, Rashed considers further ramifications of Boethus' own position. He asks what principle of individuation Boethus could have opted for if he is to delimit this man, or this horse, non-arbitrarily as *a* subject. Rashed suggests that he avoided specifying what form actually was, speaking of its categorical status in a way that at any rate leaves it without any strong role to play in individuation; and – on the basis of Boethus' attack on the Stoic doctrine of relatives – that 'he worked with a very relaxed notion of what it is to be an object, which permitted him to bypass the difficulty of having his subjects not substantially constituted by their forms'. 'Boethus' whole enterprise', he concludes, 'amounted to curtailing the ontological realm as far as he could . . . using the tools of Aristotle's *Categories* alone.'

Xenarchus has often been seen as a dissenting voice within the Peripatetic tradition – *die innere Opposition*, in Paul Moraux's phrase – on the basis of his critique, reported by Simplicius, of Aristotle's thesis that the heavens are made of a special simple body, unique to them: the fifth body, the fifth element, *quinta essentia*, identified as aether. Exploiting evidence of Xenarchus' philosophical efforts in ethics as well as the physics and mathematics of motion, Falcon in Chapter 4 argues that that interpretation rests on an unproven and unlikely premise: the assumption that in the first century BC there already was an Aristotelian orthodoxy – and a consensus that the right way to be an Aristotelian was to expound a version of what one took Aristotle to be saying, rather than to try and improve on him while still accepting the broad outlines of his approach to philosophical understanding. In developing the case for seeing Xenarchus as undertaking a project in this alternative spirit, Falcon devotes most of the chapter to his critique of the theory of simple linear and circular motions worked out in *de Caelo*, and to the positive doctrine of natural motion he seems to have wanted to put in its place. More specifically, after reporting on the whole battery of objections levelled against Aristotle's claims about the natural motions of physical bodies, he exploits Xenarchus' distinction between *being* a simple body and *becoming* a simple body to suggest that for him fire accordingly only really is fire when it has reached its natural place – and does not then lose its mobility, but manifests it in a different and more perfect form, namely circular motion. From a passage in Julian, Falcon goes on to extract the further positive claim that the celestial body moving in a circle is the cause of the union of matter and form in hylomorphic compounds. The overall upshot is that there is no need for a fifth element to account for

the nature and movement of the heavenly bodies, nor for the consequential generative processes in the sublunary world: celestial fire will suffice. As for ethics, Falcon points to Xenarchus' and Boethus' rewriting of Aristotle's claims about self-love in terms of the Hellenistic notion of the *prôton oikeion*, 'the first object that is appropriate', i.e. to natural desire: once again, engaging closely with his text, and this time sticking fairly closely to Aristotelian doctrine – but improving upon it.

As our chapters on the reception of Aristotle attest the prominence of the *Categories* in the first century BC, so many of the chapters in the volume devoted to Plato and Pythagoreanism are also preoccupied to a greater or lesser extent with the interpretation of one particular text: in this case the *Timaeus*. The Stoic Posidonius' interest in Plato's tripartite psychology is well known. Anna Ju in Chapter 5 considers the less familiar comments, hard to construe, that Posidonius made about the *Timaeus*' account of the ontological status of the soul. She rejects the commonly held view that Plutarch, on whom we rely here, provides evidence for Posidonius' deviation from a standard Stoic conception of soul, and at the same time illustrates his evolution into a Platonist or at least an ally of Platonists in taking 'divisible being' as matter, and in turn as a corporeal constituent of the world soul. This would require the presumption that he took the soul as described by Plato to be in some degree corporeal: which 'seems just implausible'. One thing she thinks will have attracted him to the *Timaeus* passage is its talk of 'divisible being coming to be in relation to bodies' (*Tim.* 35a), where she suspects the connotations of the preposition used here (περὶ τὰ σώματα) might have suggested that Plato had in mind the surface *round* a body, and that so far from supposing that Plato construed this limit as corporeal, he will have seen the text as congruent with what was probably his own view, that limits are incorporeal – without surrendering general commitment to Stoic materialism.

Posidonius evidently went on to offer some form of mathematical or mathematicising explanation for the Platonic soul, as intermediate between the intelligible and the sensible. A key point here is that for him the dialogue was essentially a Pythagorean text. There is evidence that he was particularly interested in mathematical cognition: not only does preoccupation with the logic of mathematics bulk quite large in the evidence, but he speaks in a Pythagorising vein of limits, hebdomads, and the even and the odd, drawing on these in accounts of the formation of surfaces, arctic circles, the tides, and time marked by the lunar orbit (Fr. 291, seemingly part of a comment on the *Timaeus*). And Ju points to the disproportionate length of the Pythagorean section in Sextus Empiricus' treatment of the criterion of

truth (*M* 7. 92–109), where like other scholars (but not A. A. Long: cf. pp. 144–5 below) she sees Posidonius as the likely source. In stressing the importance of reason in Stoic epistemology, Ju argues, Posidonius probably claimed a pedigree in the Pythagorean mathematising interpretation of reason he took to be shaping the *Timaeus* account of the soul, without thereby committing himself to a doctrine of its incorporeality. Although he apparently accepted that such a heritage framed the questions which it was natural for his own thought to pursue, his history-rewriting was ultimately undertaken as part of a Stoic project in at least selective appropriation – not unlike earlier Stoic theorising: one thinks for example of Cleanthes' use of Heraclitus in his *Hymn to Zeus*.

Chapter 6 turns to the medical theorist Asclepiades, who originated in Bithynia, although his career also took him for a period to Rome. Roberto Polito examines his elusive doctrine of 'jointless masses', an idea he seems expressly to have appropriated from Heraclides Ponticus, a candidate for the succession to the headship of the Academy at the death of Speusippus in 339 BC, and a writer of Pythagorean tendency who hailed from the same part of the world as himself. Why a thinker like Asclepiades, who emerges from the evidence as a theorist committed to solely materialist explanations, should attempt to rework a concept invented by a philosopher of quite different cast of mind, for whom the immortality of the soul seems to have been an important tenet, has always been found rather mystifying. Polito reviews some of the answers to the puzzle so far offered in the scholarly literature, and points out the difficulties in I. M. Lonie's views on the matter in particular. He thinks Lonie right, however, in pointing to Plato's *Timaeus* as a source of inspiration for Heraclides. He argues that Heraclides' 'jointless masses', probably a doctrine placed in the mouth of Empedocles in one of his philosophical dialogues, were very likely conceived as indivisible geometrical magnitudes such as were posited by Platonists of that same era (the latter part of the fourth century BC), echoing what they took to be the geometrical atomism of the *Timaeus*. And his conclusion is that Asclepiades' appropriation of the idea of 'jointless masses' must be seen not as homage to Heraclides, but rather as a challenge to Platonist modes of explanation as represented in the thought of one of their most prominent early exponents. He will have been deliberately substituting material for geometrical particles, just as in the medical sphere he gave mechanistic causes for the sorts of 'miraculous' recoveries for which Heraclides had invoked supernatural explanations.

The *Timaeus* has been seen in some previous scholarship, notably by A. -J. Festugière, as an important model for the *Pythagorean Commentaries*

of the polymath antiquarian Alexander Polyhistor, a work no less puzzling in its way than Asclepiades' theory of 'jointless masses'. It is the subject of A. A. Long's study in Chapter 7, which offers the reader *inter alia* an exercise in literary detection. While not denying exploitation of the *Timaeus*, Long finds also an extraordinary range of Presocratic, medical and Stoic ingredients – as well as other Platonist ones – in what he takes to be a learned scholarly concoction of our period, comparable in some ways (but not, for example, in its use of Attic rather than Doric dialect, nor in the variety of sources on which it draws) with the pseudonymous treatises that were attributed to early Pythagoreans, bearing little relation to any living Pythagorean tradition, and making no discernible impact on contemporaneous philosophy at Rome, where Alexander spent his mature years (*c.*80–60 BC). Just because the *Pythagorean Commentaries* stands apart from the rest of surviving 'Pythagorean' literature, it is 'of exceptional interest', as Diogenes Laërtius evidently judged in making it the doctrinal core of his entire account of Pythagoreanism in Book 8 of his *Lives of the Philosophers*.

The opening of the doxography which the *Commentaries* constitute sets out first principles – a Monad, which then acts upon an Indefinite Dyad as its matter, from which in turn are generated numbers and other mathematical entities, and in the end the entire created universe (at this point echoes of the *Timaeus* are indeed detectable, but of Stoic doctrine too). Long suggests that this scheme, evidently based on those produced by Plato's immediate successors in the Academy if not indeed by Plato himself, must precede in date the sort of Pythagorising system developed e.g. by Eudorus, who like later Platonists distinguishes a transcendent One from the Monad that forms a pair with the Indefinite Dyad (see further Bonazzi's discussion in Chapter 8). But thereafter, as Alexander gets into a more detailed account, often compressed and poorly organised, of the cosmos and its constituents, he deploys a whole welter of ideas apparently drawn from many different sources, Presocratic, Platonic, and post-Platonic. The entire ingenious construction, even if there is little in it after the opening section that sounds distinctively Pythagorean or 'Pythagorising', in fact 'registers an exceptional range of reading, and some authentic information, on the part of its author', and as candidate for that role, who more likely than Alexander himself?

With Eudorus in Chapter 8 we return to the *Timaeus* on the world soul, again interpreted as Pythagorean doctrine, and on ultimate principles, where as Mauro Bonazzi argues Eudorus seems to have had recourse also to the *Metaphysics*. He begins, however, with a discussion of the sense

in which the label 'Academic', often applied to Eudorus in our sources, is to be understood in this context, and shows that it need not mean that he was a sceptic, but more probably indicates that he was seen as a Platonist – as is confirmed by the great body of the evidence about his teachings. There are much stronger affinities with Antiochus than with Academic scepticism, in fact, although Bonazzi highlights two key differences which set Eudorus apart from him too: in method, engagement with detailed analysis of texts, and in his historical and philosophical outlook, strong interest in Pythagoreanism. He approaches Eudorus' Pythagorising reading of Plato by considering his interpretation of the same passage of the *Timaeus* on the world soul as Ju was dealing with in Chapter 5, and brings out the parallels with the similarly Pythagorising treatment in pseudo-Timaeus' *On the Nature of the Universe and of the Soul* and pseudo-Archytas' *On Principles*. Affinities between Eudorus' endorsement of the early Academy's insistence that the *Timaeus* upholds the eternity of the perceptible universe and its ascription to the Pythagoreans in the Pythagorean forgeries and in doxographies are likewise emphasised. Bonazzi then takes up 'the most important and most intriguing' of the extant testimonies, the novel postulation (ascribed to the Pythagoreans) of two levels of principles, the highest level of the One, later called *arche* and God, and a secondary level of the Monad and the Dyad, later specified as *stoicheia*, elements. He goes on to demonstrate how this version of 'Pythagoreanism' must be drawing on both the *Timaeus* and on Book Λ of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the latter exploited (as in pseudo-Archytas) for its conceptual framework, not regarded as metaphysical truth. What is ultimately most striking and important is how it is 'by addressing Aristotelian problems and criticisms that Eudorus' Platonism is shaped', and is what 'makes of him a legitimate protagonist in the long history of Platonism'.

The last three chapters of the volume are devoted to examination of Plato's presence in Cicero's philosophical work and outlook – or, rather more precisely, of his engagement with the Platonist in Plato. Cicero stands somewhat apart from the cast of Greek writers and theorists considered in the preceding chapters, although we know that in his youth he encountered Posidonius and sat at the feet of Antiochus. He is a Roman and a politician, who for all his devotion to philosophy always fought shy in publicly circulated writings from identifying himself as a philosopher. Nor would he have called himself an Aristotelian or a Pythagorean, or even without much nuancing a Platonist: unlike any of the thinkers so far discussed, Academic scepticism is what he professed, as David Sedley reminds us in Chapter 9; Platonist moments in his writings are ultimately qualified by

sceptical caution. And whereas like many of the 'post-Hellenistic' philosophers so far surveyed, a preoccupation with text (here Plato's) is apparent with Cicero too, and indeed in his case with the way Plato the supreme philosophical stylist writes, this focus finds its expression not in editorial activity nor in the attempt to organise the Platonic corpus, but in translation. Cicero stands at the fount of the long tradition of translation from Greek philosophy that continues into our own day, now on a vast scale; and he rightly represented the work he did in translation and interpretation of the Greeks for a Roman readership as his own greatest contribution to philosophical understanding.

Chapter 9 is devoted to a discussion of Cicero's translation of the first section of the *Timaeus*' cosmological narrative, evidently placed in the mouth of Nigidius Figulus, a contemporary Roman polymath and self-confessed Pythagorean. Sedley argues *inter alia* for a specific proposal about this tantalising philosophical fragment, consciously abandoned (he thinks) by the time *de Natura Deorum* was being composed in the latter part of 45 BC. Noting the references in the first surviving section of the work to a simultaneous encounter with Nigidius and with the leading Peripatetic Cratippus, and to adoption of disputation in 'the Carneadean fashion', he develops the hypothesis that Cicero's plan was to construct an *argumentum in utramque partem* between two opposed cosmologies: Plato's creationist theory (as Cicero interprets the dialogue), which as we have already seen is taken in our period as a statement of Pythagorean doctrine, and Aristotle's doctrine of an eternal universe. Sedley goes on to defend the proposition that Cicero's translation is deliberately slanted so as to encourage a literalist understanding of the creation talk in the dialogue, against the reading championed in the early Academy and (as he takes him, unlike Bonazzi in Chapter 8, already to be aware) revived by Eudorus. But he also finds signs that the Latin Cicero uses is designed in Academic sceptic style to maximise the provisionality of Timaeus' conclusions. In short, Cicero's *Timaeus* functions as 'both doctrinal tract and sceptic manifesto'.

A more authentic politics and a better political order, to be informed by ethical principle, were the causes closest to Cicero's heart, and the subject of his first major ventures in philosophical dialogue in the 50s BC, when he composed in succession *de Oratore*, *de Re Publica*, and *de Legibus*. In Chapter 10 Julia Annas looks at Cicero's *de Legibus*, another fragmentary work (although what survives is much greater in extent than the *Timaeus* fragment), and like that apparently never released by its author for circulation during his lifetime. She argues that its vision of the ultimate purpose of law is heavily indebted to Plato's *Laws*, in theoretical content,

not just in literary form and ambition (as is often supposed), even if there are significant differences in the way the relationship of the ideal to the actual is conceived (not incoherently, she insists, once more against a commonly held diagnosis). Annas sets up the comparison with an exposition of the function of the innovative 'preludes' to laws, as it is articulated and effected in practice in Plato's dialogue: that of persuading citizens that the legislation being enacted is designed to promote the virtue on which their happiness rests. She balances this account of the *Laws* with a detailed sketch of the argument of the foundational first book of *de Legibus*.

Annas brings out the basis in Stoic philosophy of its thesis that law and justice are rooted in nature, but at the same time stresses that Cicero is 'making the same kind of claim that Plato does in the *Laws*, namely that the laws of the best state will encourage virtues and the living of a virtuous and so happy life'. The focus is not just on 'right reason telling us what to do and what not to do', but on its function in 'encouraging virtues and discouraging vices, and as forming a way of life and the characters of the people who live that life'. In fact Stoicism offers a fuller account than is available in Plato of why that should be so: natural law 'holds together the community of rational beings in a relation of natural justice'. Cicero, too, has his persuasive preambles (supplied before the relevant sections of the legislative code he proposes at the start of both Book 2 and Book 3), and he also uses the conventions of the dialogue form to emphasize the reasonableness of his proposals. Where he differs from Plato is in claiming both the universal applicability of the legislation and its closeness to an actual legal system: that of Rome itself. There is no confusion here – so if Cicero was dissatisfied with the work it should not have been because he thought there was. He is simply supposing that Roman law, unlike other systems, mostly gives expression to universal law, understood in Stoic terms as the right reason of the wise. For a final comparison Annas proposes the parallel of Philo of Alexandria, who takes Mosaic law to be a written copy of natural law, conceived once again in Stoic terms not as a set of rules but as fostering the virtues and a way of life lived out within its structure.

With our final chapter we move at last away from the fragments (with Cicero's *Timaeus* and *de Legibus*, it is true, substantial and continuous for long stretches) and the testimonies on which so much of our understanding of philosophy in the first century BC has perforce to rest, with all the uncertainties that come inevitably with that type of evidence. Ingo Gildenhard in Chapter 11 offers a broadly based study of Cicero's engagement in writings he did put into circulation with Plato's metaphysics as presented in the dialogues, contrasting the caution of the writings of the

50s BC with less qualified appeal to the theory of Ideas in the productions of 45–43 BC – and reminding us in the process at once of his literary artistry and of his political decline. Gildenhard looks first at the complexities of the 'fiction' of the ideal orator in *de Oratore*, in which Plato is both emulated and dismissed at different points; then at the similar treatment in *de Re Publica* of his ideal city, which, divorced from living historical reality though it is, nonetheless offers 'proto-scientific insight into the laws and the logic of politics', enabling Scipio (the main speaker in Cicero's dialogue) and the author to 'appropriate his analytic powers for their own practical purposes'; and finally at the best code of law in *de Legibus*, which without comparable equivocation 'strategically reforms ancestral Roman law'. In these dialogues of the 50s BC the Platonic Forms play no role. In the *Orator* of 46 BC, by contrast, Cicero 'immediately and programmatically connects the heuristic construct' of the ideal orator with the Idea of perfect eloquence, in a sustained and intricate passage reminiscent of the ascent to the Idea of Beauty in the *Symposium*. It marks a shift in his engagement with Platonism which is maintained in other late philosophical works, notably the introductory treatment of the virtues in Book 1 of *de Officiis*, his last contribution to philosophy and – fittingly – to philosophical thinking about the ethical basis of politics. The passage is given an extended analysis by Gildenhard, who points to reminiscence of that same *Symposium* passage, as well as drawing attention to an explicitly signposted echo of a comparable passage in the *Phaedrus*. Why the change of outlook? Gildenhard proposes a political explanation. 'With the commonwealth crushed under the heel of Caesar', and 'with *historical* benchmarks of perfection all but lost', an alternative reality is what offered itself as the best option for intellectual resistance. Platonism – and Plato in his most sublime mode – was where, suppressing reservations, Cicero now looked for resources. In one way or another, the same was to become true for a great many thinking people whose thoughts survive in writing for centuries to come.

CHAPTER 1

The texts of Plato and Aristotle in the first century BC

Myrto Hatzimichali

One of the main developments that characterise first-century BC philosophy is that the detailed study of texts became an autonomous and often central philosophical activity in its own right. For this reason, any investigation of philosophical developments during this period must address questions surrounding the circulation of written texts. In this chapter I will examine the respective fates of the texts of Plato and Aristotle, and the editorial interventions that shaped each tradition. The case of Plato, as well as further evidence on the activity of ancient scholars and editors, will then inform my proposed interpretation of developments in the textual tradition of Aristotle, where the first century BC holds particular prominence thanks to the well-known sensational stories about the rediscovery of long-lost works. The history of these texts indicates two different and separable types of activity, namely textual criticism and canon-organisation. However, the modern term 'edition' is sometimes used to describe either activity, thus making it more difficult to ascertain what it was that ancient 'editors' actually did. In fact, as Dorandi pointed out, Porphyry is probably the only 'real' ancient editor of a philosophical corpus, having dealt with both aspects of Plotinus' text.[1] Keeping the two activities distinct will help to clarify what happened to Aristotle's text in the first century BC and inform the eventual value judgement that this period was of paramount importance for the way in which Aristotle has been transmitted to us.

TEXT-BASED PHILOSOPHY

In the context of the three revivals of Plato, Aristotle and Pythagoras it is significant that, as Frede notes, they were connected with the beginnings of classicism as a broader cultural development calling for a return to the ancients. A principal means available for this return to authors/authorities

[1] Dorandi 2010: 172.

from many centuries earlier was none other than the systematic study of their texts.[2] Textual exegesis of Plato's and Aristotle's writings was central to the articulation of organised philosophical systems for the two authors, systems that for historical reasons did not develop during the Hellenistic period in the way that the Stoic system did.[3] Matters are more complicated in the case of the Pythagoreans, given the lack of a recognised corpus of writings going back to Pythagoras himself. I will not have much to say about them in the course of this chapter, apart from remarking that the importance of written texts is evident in this movement too, taking the form of a proliferation of pseudepigrapha, attributed to several early Pythagoreans and aimed at supplying the missing texts.[4] The first century BC was a pivotal period for this type of activity too: Pseudo-Archytas, who claims paternity of the Aristotelian categories for the fourth-century Pythagorean,[5] as well as 'Timaeus Locrus', *On the nature of the cosmos and of the soul*, a work claiming to be the model for Plato's *Timaeus*, have both been dated to this period.[6]

The increased focus on texts may also be connected to the decentralisation of philosophy from the Athenian schools during the first century BC, following the growing impact of Rome as a cultural centre and the disruptions of the Mithridatic war. The new peripheral philosophical groups were deprived of the traditional school environment and dialectical interaction, and thus focused on books, which eventually became the cohesive element and starting point in the construction of these groups' philosophical identities. Sedley has pointed out that these developments amount to an 'end for the history of philosophy' in the first century BC, in the sense that most (even the most innovative and creative) philosophical activity now takes the form of looking back, recovering and interpreting the wisdom of the ancients through their texts.[7]

The precise ways of 'looking back', the tactics and attitudes of individual first-century BC philosophers towards the texts of the ancients, are taken up by different chapters within this volume. In what follows, I will focus on the state in which the texts of Plato and Aristotle were made available to anyone who was keen on approaching the original words of the two fourth-century philosophers. Activities that document this keenness on the ancients' original words and are crucial for the circulation of

[2] Frede 1999: 783–4. [3] See Donini 1994, esp. 5027–35, 5089–94.

[4] The evidence can be found in Thesleff 1961. [5] See Szlezák 1972.

[6] For the possibility that the *Pythagorean Commentaries* ascribed to Alexander Polyhistor is his own compilation, in which case it will be a further text created in this period, see Long's discussion in Chapter 7 below.

[7] Sedley 2003a, esp. 35–9.

texts include: collecting and distributing copies of books; engaging in textual criticism; defining and maintaining canons (by dealing with questions of authenticity); and writing commentaries or producing other forms of exegesis such as translations or monographs on topics arising from particular texts.[8] All of these enterprises flourished in the first century BC with respect to philosophical texts, marking a philological as well as a philosophical revival. It is also pertinent to bring up at this point Strabo's tantalising tale about the loss and rediscovery of Aristotle's books (13.1.54): the most extravagant claim in that story is that the Peripatos declined because its members had almost no access to Aristotle's works, a report that is highly questionable with respect to the Hellenistic period. But the fact that this loss was deemed a satisfactory explanation for the Peripatetic decline does betray very eloquently the importance placed upon original foundational texts in Strabo's own intellectual milieu in the first century BC.

In order to understand better the ways in which users gained access to these foundational texts, some general remarks on the circulation of books in our period are required by way of introduction. The feature that stands out first of all is the overwhelming centripetal force exercised by Rome and Italy in terms of accumulation of books (alongside other objects of culture such as artefacts, cultic statues etc.).[9] The first Roman general to have obtained an entire collection of Greek books as war booty was Aemilius Paullus in 168 BC, when he permitted his sons to carry off the books of King Perseus – since they were lovers of learning (Plut. *Aem*. 28.11; Isid. *Etym*. 6.5). Then Sulla famously took from Athens the library of the bibliophile Apellicon of Teos, which contained valuable Aristotelian texts (Str. 13.1.54; Plut. *Sull*. 26). Similarly, Lucullus amassed a very significant collection as war booty from Pontus and Asia Minor (Isid. *Etym*. 6.5). From Cicero's *de Finibus* (3.7–10) we learn that this library contained many Stoic texts as well as Aristotelian *commentarii*.[10]

The Romans also employed gentler ways of acquiring Greek books. Cicero's letters to Atticus in 67 BC contain references to a library (that is, a substantial collection of books) that Atticus had promised to obtain in Greece for Cicero's benefit: *et velim cogites, id quod mihi pollicitus es, quem ad modum bibliothecam nobis conficere possis* ('and please give some thought to how you are to procure a library for us as you have promised', Cic. *Att*. 1.7). Thus it appears that Greek collections (including philosophical

[8] Snyder 2000: 5. [9] Strabo 12.5.3; 13.1.19; 14.2.19; 10.2.21 etc.
[10] On Lucullus' library see Dix 2000.

works, presumably among other types of literature) were available for purchase en bloc by Romans who could afford it, especially given economic difficulties in Greece in the aftermath of the Mithridatic war. Finally, with Philodemus we have evidence for the voluntary transportation of a substantial philosophical collection to Italy by a Greek intellectual himself (we know that the collection predates Philodemus' migration, because the Herculaneum papyri include several texts written considerably earlier than Philodemus' time).[11]

This concentration and increased availability of books in Italy certainly informs the background to Cicero's philosophical work, but it would doubtless have also benefited the increasing number of Greek philosophers as well as other scholars who pursued a teaching career in Rome (in fact, Plutarch is keen to stress that Lucullus' library was particularly welcoming for Greeks).[12] Meanwhile in the East, we have evidence for the continued flourishing of libraries in Pergamum and Alexandria, and perhaps also Smyrna (Plut. *Ant.* 58; Str. 14.1.37). Strabo (13.1.54) and Posidonius are in agreement about the book-acquisition tactics of Apellicon of Teos in the early decades of the first century; he did not always employ legitimate means, yet his activities offer some indication about the opportunities open to a private bibliophile with philosophical interests and deep pockets. Thus Posidonius wrote:

ἐκπέμψας οὖν εἰς τὴν νῆσον Ἀπελλικῶντα τὸν Τήιον, πολίτην δὲ Ἀθηναίων γενόμενον, ποικιλώτατόν τινα καὶ ἁψίκορον ζήσαντα βίον ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐφιλοσόφει τὰ περιπατητικά, καὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλιοθήκην καὶ ἄλλας συνηγόραζε συχνὰς (ἦν γὰρ πολυχρήματος) τά τ' ἐκ τοῦ Μητρῴου τῶν παλαιῶν αὐτόγραφα ψηφισμάτων ὑφαιρούμενος ἐκτᾶτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων εἴ τι παλαιὸν εἴη καὶ ἀπόθετον.

He [the tyrant Athenion] sent Apellicon to the island [Delos]; he was from Teos but had become an Athenian citizen, and had led an eventful and diverse life. When he developed an interest in Peripatetic philosophy, he purchased both Aristotle's library and many others (for he was very rich); and he acquired by stealth the original copies of the ancient decrees of the Metroon, as well as any other old and rare document that was to be found in other cities. (Ath. 5.214d–e = Posidon. Fr. 253 E–K)

[11] See Sedley 2003a: 35.

[12] 'He was more keen on the use than the acquisition [of books]; his library was open to everyone, and the promenades and study-rooms surrounding it were without restriction receiving the Greeks, who gathered there as to a nest of the Muses and spent their days in each other's company' (Plut. *Luc.* 42.1–2).

From this brief survey it emerges that two widespread ways of gaining possession of philosophical books in the first century BC were war plunder and bloc purchases, the fruits of which could be shared among groups of peers. It is worth noting that our evidence points to private initiatives and networks much more than public or even school collections. But what sorts of texts would these initiatives yield, and how did they develop through scholarly and editorial intervention? This is the main question I will be dealing with in the rest of this chapter, focusing first on the text of Plato and then on that of Aristotle.

PLATO'S TEXT

In order to approach the state of play for Plato's text in the first century BC, one must reconstruct the stage between the Hellenistic period and the organisation of the corpus by Thrasyllus, astrologer to the Emperor Tiberius in the first century AD (Tac. *Ann.* 6.20–1). Thrasyllus' arrangement ultimately became canonical, having been universally adopted by modern editions since Burnet.[13] In what follows, I will discuss the main evidence on the history of Plato's text in order to demonstrate the different types of editorial intervention it was subject to, and to show how they resulted in the situation encountered by Thrasyllus.

There is good reason to believe that Plato was read widely (and beyond Athens) during the Hellenistic period, not only as a philosopher but also as a literary author. Part of the evidence for this is a group of early Ptolemaic papyri, including those of the *Laches* (*P.Petr.* II 50), *Phaedo* (*P.Petr.* II 5–8) and *Sophist* (*P.Hib.* 228), all going back to the third century BC. This is precisely the type of evidence that is lacking in the case of Aristotle, making it more difficult to get clear about the circulation of his texts during the Hellenistic period. What makes the Plato papyri listed above particularly significant is that they contain a very large number of variants and deviations from the manuscript tradition, enough to earn the characterisation 'wild' from Turner.[14] The fact that the papyri from our period onwards (first century BC to first century AD) present a much more normalised text is a phenomenon paralleled in the papyri of Homer. It suggests that some

[13] The Thrasyllan order, however, was far from the norm in editions circulating between the Renaissance and the twentieth century: see Burnyeat 2001. For the order of the dialogues in mediaeval manuscripts and its variation from Thrasyllus see Alline 1915: 124, 176–8.

[14] Turner 1968: 108. The *Phaedo* papyrus contains around 70 variants in 4–5 pages of Oxford text, while the *Laches* papyrus offers 40 variants in 3 pages. Burnet adopted 8 and 7 of these variants respectively.

form of editorial activity intervened, probably originating from the scholars of the Alexandrian Museum and Library, where the second century BC was the most productive period.[15]

Nevertheless, many scholars have been reluctant to credit the Alexandrian librarian Aristophanes of Byzantium with any major influence on the text of Plato and deny any critical edition by him, despite this evidence for a normalisation of the text in the Alexandrian Library.[16] It may be that we have to look to Aristophanes' successor Aristarchus for a more detailed engagement with the minutiae of Plato's text, as indicated by Schironi on the basis of new fragments from what may be a commentary on the *Republic* focusing on linguistic/stylistic aspects.[17] The evidence on Aristophanes of Byzantium is of a different nature, and concerns his view on the arrangement of the dialogues, where he opted for five trilogies, with the rest of the dialogues in no particular order:

ἔνιοι δέ, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικός, εἰς τριλογίας ἕλκουσι τοὺς διαλόγους, καὶ πρώτην μὲν τιθέασιν ἧς ἡγεῖται Πολιτεία Τίμαιος Κριτίας· δευτέραν Σοφιστὴς Πολιτικὸς Κρατύλος τρίτην Νόμοι Μίνως Ἐπινομίς τετάρτην Θεαίτητος Εὐθύφρων Ἀπολογία πέμπτην Κρίτων Φαίδων Ἐπιστολαί. τὰ δ' ἄλλα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἀτάκτως.

Some people, one of whom is Aristophanes the grammarian, drag the dialogues into trilogies and place first the one headed by the *Republic* [followed by] *Timaeus* and *Critias*. As a second [trilogy they place] *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Cratylus*; third *Laws*, *Minos*, *Epinomis*; fourth *Theaetetus*, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*; fifth *Crito*, *Phaedo*, *Letters*. The rest follow individually in no particular order. (D.L. 3.61–2)

Diogenes or his source (which may be Thrasyllus himself) does not agree with this arrangement: a critical stance is implied by the verb 'drag', and there is an accusation of randomness in the expression 'in no particular order/in a disorderly fashion'.

It would appear, then, that the grouping and arrangement of the dialogues was a point of contention for the Platonic corpus in the period up to Thrasyllus. It was probably the dramatic form of the dialogues that

[15] This evidence of course pertains to texts circulating in Egypt and does not permit a parallel assessment of the text(s) used in the Academy. We only know that at the time of Zeno of Citium the works of Plato had recently been made available, and perusal was possible upon payment of a fee to the owners of copies (according to the *Life of Zeno* by Antigonus of Carystus, cited at D.L. 3.66). Barnes 1991: 127–8 is certainly right in pointing out that there was not one 'Hellenistic Plato', and that none of the 'editions' we have information on may be considered as authoritative.

[16] E.g. Pfeiffer 1968: 196–7; *contra* Dörrie 1990: 334; Aline 1915: 84–103. See Schironi 2005: 431–2 for further references.

[17] Schironi 2005. She brings to attention new fragments from Aristarchus' pronouncements on Platonic expressions occurring at *Rep*. 327b7, 327c6, 414e7, 568a8.

encouraged an arrangement following the pattern of the plays performed in the Athenian dramatic festivals. Thrasyllus is explicit about the use of Athenian drama as a prototype and ascribes it to Plato himself:

Θράσυλλος δέ φησι καὶ κατὰ τὴν τραγικὴν τετραλογίαν ἐκδοῦναι αὐτὸν τοὺς διαλόγους, οἷον ἐκεῖνοι τέτρασι δράμασιν ἠγωνίζοντο – Διονυσίοις, Ληναίοις, Παναθηναίοις, Χύτροις – ὧν τὸ τέταρτον ἦν Σατυρικόν· τὰ δὲ τέτταρα δράματα ἐκαλεῖτο τετραλογία.

Thrasyllus says that he [*sc*. Plato] published his dialogues following the example of the tragic tetralogy, in the way that they competed with four plays (at the festivals) – at the Dionysia, the Lenaea, the Panathenaea and the Chytroi – of which the fourth was a satyric drama. The four plays together were called a tetralogy. (D.L. 3.56)

It is possible that Aristophanes' trilogies were the result of thinking along the same lines, but opting for the tragic trilogy without the satyric play.[18] Aristophanes could point to dramatic interrelations between the dialogues he grouped together – for example, the connection between *Theaetetus* and *Euthyphro* must be based on direct dramatic sequence, since at the end of the *Theaetetus* Socrates leaves to face Meletus' indictment at the king's porch, where he meets Euthyphro.

The evidence on Aristophanes of Byzantium and the fact that all but fifteen dialogues were left by him in no particular arrangement shows that the tetralogical ordering was not the norm in the Hellenistic period, even if it did originate in the Academy (there is no explicit evidence for this, apart from Thrasyllus' conviction). Still, Thrasyllus must have found some sort of precedent to legitimise his ascription of the arrangement to Plato, and the only hint we have for such a tetralogical precedent comes from the first century BC. It consists of a problematic passage in Varro, where a reference to the *Phaedo* is prefaced by what seems to be 'Plato in the fourth', suggesting that for Varro the *Phaedo* came fourth, either in its own tetralogy or in the corpus as a whole: *Plato in IIII de fluminibus apud inferos quae sint in his unum Tartarum appellat* ('Plato in the fourth [?] concerning rivers that are in the underworld names Tartarus as one of them', *Ling*. 7.37). Doubts have been cast, particularly by Barnes and Tarrant, on the reliability of this reading and the peculiar use of the numeral when one would expect a title.[19] Varro's reference, however, remains our only pointer

[18] See also Schironi 2005: 432–3.
[19] Barnes 1991: 127 with n. 50; Tarrant 1993: 75–6. Tarrant proposes taking the numeral as a cardinal and reading '*in quattuor fluminibus*' rather than '*in quarto de fluminibus*'; he ascribes to Varro the mistake of treating Tartarus as one of the rivers.

towards the organisation of the Platonic corpus in the first century BC, prior to Thrasyllus' intervention.[20]

From the evidence discussed so far we may already detect two different ways of making an impact on an author's transmission and circulation: firstly, textual criticism and correction, as indicated by the progressive normalisation of Plato's text as we move towards the end of the Hellenistic period and by Aristarchus' possible commentary; and secondly, corpus-organisation, as evidenced by the different pronouncements on the grouping and order of the dialogues. Some additional information on the former type of activity is provided by Diogenes Laërtius, who preserves traces of professional philological engagement with the Platonic text. Alongside some comments on Plato's distinctive use of terminology designed to prevent the ignorant from understanding his meaning (D.L. 3.63–4), we learn about the presence of critical signs in copies of his texts (3.65–6).[21] These critical signs are almost the same as those used by the Alexandrian editors of Homer, with the addition of some more 'philosophically-oriented' signs that may have been developed especially for Plato's text.[22] Thus Plato's text claims a place not too far behind that of Homer as one of the more intensely studied, corrected and annotated in antiquity, enjoying a rich transmission and provoking interest and debate both within and outside philosophical circles.

A particularly valuable copy of the Platonic text is mentioned alongside equivalent Homeric ones in the recently recovered Galenic treatise *On freedom from grief* (Περὶ ἀλυπ(ησ)ίας).[23] Galen talks about his lack of grief after a destructive fire in Rome in AD 192, when many valuable items were lost, including old, 'special editions' going back to eponymous sources. The fire devastated both Galen's own books and those kept at the Palatine libraries:

[20] The pre-Thrasyllan tetralogical arrangement is sometimes associated with a certain Dercyllides (cf. Alb. *Intr.* 4), but we know nothing about his date, and he may well have been later than Thrasyllus. See Tarrant 1993: 73.

[21] A better structured version of this list of critical signs survives in an earlier, second-century AD papyrus from Florence, *PSI* 1488 = *CPF* I.1*** Plato 142T. See Schironi 2005: 429–31.

[22] As in the texts of Homer, the *obelos* signifies passages thought to be spurious; the dotted *diple* points to editorial interventions by various scholars, often in a polemical way; the *antisigma* marks transpositions; in addition, the *keraunion* is used to denote passages central to philosophical education (ἀγωγὴ τῆς φιλοσοφίας), and the *asteriskos* to highlight the harmony across Plato's doctrines.

[23] Boudon-Millot 2007 is the *editio princeps*; a new Budé has since appeared (Boudon-Millot, Jouanna and Pietrobelli 2010); see also Gourinat 2008.

οὔτε οὖν ὅσα σπάνια καὶ ἀλ<λ>αχόθι μηδαμόθεν κείμενα δυνατόν ἐστιν εὑρεῖν [ἐστιν], οὔτε τῶν μέσων, διὰ δὲ τὴν τῆς γραφῆς ἀκρίβειαν ἐσπουδασμένων, Καλλίνια καὶ Ἀττικιανὰ καὶ Πεδουκίνια καὶ μὴν Ἀριστάρχεια οἵτινές εἰσιν Ὅμηροι δύο καὶ Πλάτων ὁ Παναιτίου καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, διασωζωμένων ἐν ταύταις [ed.: ἐν τοῖς cod.] τῶν γραμμάτων ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ἃ καθ' ἕκαστον βιβλίον ἢ ἔγραψαν ἢ ἀνεγράψαντο οἱ ἄνδρες ὧν ἦν ἐπώνυμα τὰ βιβλία.

So it is not possible to find those texts that are rare and not available anywhere else, or those that are common, but particularly valued due to the accuracy of their readings, 'Callinia' and 'Atticiana' and 'Peducinia' and equally Aristarchean copies consisting of two Homers, and the Plato of Panaetius and many more such things, because there those very writings were preserved, which the men after whom the books are named either wrote or copied [annotated?] in the case of each individual book. (Galen, *On freedom from grief* 13)[24]

Galen had seen sought-after 'eponymous' copies of both Plato and Homer, as well as other quality copies of unspecified authors from highly esteemed sources. The context in which Panaetius' Plato is mentioned, which includes a reference to Aristarchus' Homer, suggests some degree of textual criticism by the Stoic, enough to ascribe responsibility for the text to him.[25] When an ancient scholar undertook to produce his own text of a particular work, this normally meant using an existing copy as a 'base text' and supplying it with corrections in the form of critical signs (marking atheteseis, transpositions etc.) and/or marginal annotations.[26] So in the case of 'the Plato of Panaetius', I take Galen to refer to a copy of Plato which he knew to be either written out or annotated in the way described above by Panaetius himself.[27] It is not unthinkable that a physical copy that belonged to or was handled by Panaetius could have survived to Galen's time.[28] Galen's

[24] The text cited here is that of the *editio princeps*, Boudon-Millot 2007.

[25] See Gourinat 2008, esp. 147–51. He points to further parallels for Panaetius' philological activity on Plato, including his discovery of alternative openings for the *Republic* (D.L. 3.37); a controversial athetesis of the *Phaedo* (*Anth. Pal.* 9.358; Elias *in Cat.* 133); and support for the Attic ending of active pluperfect verb forms in –η in the text of Plato (ἐνενοήκη, ἐπεποιήκη, Eust. *ad Od.* 23.220, 11.305.31–4 Stallbaum). Panaetius also had views on the books to be ascribed to Aristippus and Aristo, as well as on the authenticity of Socratic dialogues by several authors (D.L. 2.85, 7.163, 2.64). For a critique of Gourinat see now Dorandi 2010.

[26] See Montanari 1998: 6–10.

[27] The text is unclear and may even be corrupt. It is particularly difficult to ascertain the exact nature of or the relationship between the two activities signified by ἔγραψαν (from *graphō*, 'to write') and ἀνεγράψαντο (from *anagraphomai*, 'to inscribe, record') in this context, which is why editors have corrected the latter to ἀν<τ>εγράψαντο ('had copies made'); see Boudon-Millot *et al.* 2010: 53–4.

[28] See Jones 2009: 392; Jones speaks of 'owners or editors' of these texts, 391.

evidence is also significant in that it corroborates the beginning of a growing interest in the text of Plato in philosophical circles, already highlighted by Frede with respect to Panaetius.[29]

The same passage from Galen contains a further piece of information that is of relevance to the circulation and state of Plato's text in the first century BC. It concerns the provenance of the *Atticiana* texts (Ἀττικιανά) that were lost in the fire: many interpreters now agree that these are to be associated with Titus Pomponius Atticus, Cicero's close associate, who is known to have been involved in the publication process of Cicero's own works and to have employed skilled Greek copyists whose services were much in demand.[30] From Galen's fragmentarily surviving commentary on the *Timaeus* we learn that there was a version of this text from *Atticiana* copies, which at 77c4 (on plants' lack of self-motion) read ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ('by itself'), the transmitted reading of our mediaeval manuscripts, as opposed to the ἐξ αὑτοῦ ('from itself') of some other copies consulted by Galen.[31] It is clear that texts of this provenance were held in high esteem, and it would be appealing to associate their quality with the versions that people like Cicero and Varro were working from. Unfortunately we have no contemporary sources on these texts, as all our information about the *Atticiana* comes from authors of the Second Sophistic (apart from these two references in Galen there are a few more in the lexicographer Harpocration regarding *Atticiana* copies of Demosthenes).[32]

As we sum up with some preliminary results on the fate of Plato's text, it is evident that it had a rich transmission, gaining the attention of philosophers and non-philosophers alike as a mainstream part of Greek cultural heritage, with recognised literary value and high-quality Attic prose. At the same time, the two types of engagement with the text take shape more clearly; on the one side, there are the text-critical and editorial initiatives such as those of Panaetius and Atticus (the producer of the *Atticiana*), which resulted in specific copies and versions of the text becoming renowned for the quality of their readings and sought after by connoisseurs like Galen. Aristarchus' possible commentary on the *Republic* and the critical signs that

[29] Frede 1999: 777.

[30] Jones 2009: 392, and 391–3 for possible identifications of Callinus and Peducaeus; Tarrant 1993: 193–4; Gourinat 2008: 144–6. Winsbury 2009: 53–6 is more sceptical, and warns emphatically against assimilating Atticus' activities to those of a modern publisher. See also Dorandi 2010: 165–6.

[31] αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἐξήγησίς (*sc.* ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ) μοι γέγονε κατὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀττικιανῶν ἀντιγράφων ἔκδοσιν, ἐν ἑτέροις δὲ εὑρὼν γεγραμμένον "διὰ τὸ τῆς ἐξ αὑτοῦ κινήσεως", 'I came across this interpretation (sc. "by itself") based on the published version of the *Atticiana* copies, while in other copies I found "by the motion from itself"', Gal. *Plat. Tim.* Fr. 11.107–9 Schröder.

[32] For the references see Gourinat 2008: 145–6.

accompanied some versions of the Platonic text also belong with this text-critical type of activity. On the other side, we have the pronouncements on the arrangement of the corpus and on the titles and sequence of dialogues, exemplified in the activity of Aristophanes of Byzantium and Thrasyllus, the latter reaching increased levels of sophistication with his double titles and generic headings (D.L. 3.57–8). This is not to say that the two activities cannot be undertaken by the same person or even at the same time (and Porphyry is a case in point, as we shall see below), but they are certainly separable, because views on corpus-organisation can be disseminated in separate works and do not require the production of fresh copies of the full texts.[33] In this form they can prove more important and influential than some quality readings on select copies held in a library and menaced by fire.

THE FATE OF ARISTOTLE'S BOOKS

Unlike the case of Plato, where papyrological and other evidence points to an uninterrupted tradition through the Hellenistic period and beyond, in the case of Aristotle's works we have ancient sources speaking explicitly of decisive developments in the course of the first century BC following a dramatic loss. The story told by Strabo and Plutarch has been interpreted as signifying a momentous rediscovery of long-lost texts in the first century BC, combined with an epoch-making complete 'edition' of the Aristotelian corpus more or less as we know it by Andronicus of Rhodes. In what follows I will try to take account of the challenge laid down by Barnes in his 'Roman Aristotle' (Barnes 1997), which invites a radical rethinking of developments in the first century BC and their importance with respect to the state of the corpus before and after this period. Barnes's contribution is valuable in that it distinguishes sharply between the actual evidence relayed by ancient sources and what modern scholars have argued, postulated and speculated on the basis of this evidence. Taking therefore Barnes's distillation of the ancient evidence as a point of departure, I will show that it is possible to draw some less minimalist conclusions than Barnes's own. What is at stake is Andronicus' stature as a figure of great significance in the transmission of Aristotle's texts – could he perhaps be worthy of the libation that Barnes denied him?[34]

[33] We know of a work by Thrasyllus which could be of such a nature, Τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως τῶν Δημοκρίτου βιβλίων ('Preliminaries to the reading of Democritus' works', D.L. 9.4).

[34] Barnes 1997: I, 66.

Ultimately the controversy over developments in Aristotle's text in the first century BC is not so much about events (what took place) as about value judgements (how important it was). Even Barnes does not deny that Andronicus of Rhodes had some involvement with the Aristotelian corpus, but he does not regard his role as particularly influential: 'Nothing suggests that the "Roman edition", done by Andronicus of Rhodes, revolutionised Aristotelian studies. His text of Aristotle left little mark on posterity. His work as orderer and arranger of the treatises was not epoch-making'.[35] In fact most of our modern value judgements (positive or negative) concerning Andronicus' work have been based on misplaced expectations about what constituted influential or 'epoch-making' involvement with an author's corpus in ancient times. Andronicus will be found to have fallen short of the canonical, reliable and critical edition he has been credited with in assimilation to modern editors, and so his performance on the text-critical side of things will be disappointing if judged by modern standards. But his achievements in the areas of canon-formation and corpus-organisation can be shown to be of greater significance than Barnes allowed.

The history of Aristotle's corpus is made particularly controversial and complicated by the fact that several issues are debated at once, when a distinction might be more helpful. One thorny issue is the availability of Aristotle's esoteric works during the Hellenistic period, which is almost impossible to ascertain because familiarity with particular Aristotelian ideas in Hellenistic authors could come from either esoteric or exoteric works.[36] Moreover, different circumstances of transmission and circulation seem to apply to different treatises. Primavesi recently renewed the case for the unavailability of several Aristotelian texts during the Hellenistic period. His ground was that the texts in our manuscript tradition retain the pre-Hellenistic system of book numbering by means of twenty-four plain letters rather than twenty-seven letter-numerals.[37] He takes this to mean that these texts did not pass through the Hellenistic editorial and library-organisational processes and, combining that in turn with the absence of many titles known to us from the Hellenistic catalogue of Aristotle's works preserved by Diogenes Laërtius (D.L. 4.22–7), he concludes that the Aristotelian treatises not listed by Diogenes were inaccessible until the

[35] Barnes 1997: 66.

[36] See Barnes 1997: 12–16 for evidence of knowledge of Aristotelian works in the Hellenistic period. Sandbach 1985 argues against any substantial influence by Aristotelian esoteric works on the Stoics on the basis of a lack of any explicit evidence. See also Tarán 2001: 482–4.

[37] Thus, for example, the sixth book of the *Physics* is Ζ rather than ϛ (see the discussion at Simpl. *in Phys*. 923.3–7); the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics* (excluding *Alpha Elatton*) is Λ rather than ια.

first century BC.[38] In any case, Andronicus' role in canon formation and corpus organisation was only partially about bringing new works to light, and more about constructing an organic whole out of existing ones, as we will see below.

It is now time to turn to the familiar ancient sources for the fate of Aristotle's works and the activity of Andronicus. The tradition for which Strabo is the earliest extant witness is essentially a tale of loss and rediscovery of the texts of Aristotle and Theophrastus, and we are entitled to turn to it for an explanation of the unavailability of any works in the third and second centuries BC.[39] Strabo lays special emphasis on the effects of textual provision upon the quality of Peripatetic philosophising. Here we pick up the story in the early first century BC, when the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus are purchased by Apellicon of Teos, having been hidden at Scepsis for two centuries by the descendants of Neleus, who inherited them from Theophrastus:

ἦν δὲ ὁ Ἀπελλικῶν φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος διὸ καὶ ζητῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν διαβρωμάτων εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε τὴν γραφὴν ἀναπληρῶν οὐκ εὖ, καὶ ἐξέδωκεν ἁμαρτάδων πλήρη τὰ βιβλία. συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν· τοῖς δ' ὕστερον, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προῆλθεν, ἄμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστοτελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. πολὺ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη προσελάβετο· εὐθὺς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος τελευτὴν Σύλλας ἦρε τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος βιβλιοθήκην ὁ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἑλών, δεῦρο δὲ κομισθεῖσαν Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς διεχειρίσατο φιλαριστοτέλης ὤν, θεραπεύσας τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης, καὶ βιβλιοπῶλαί τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει τῶν εἰς πρᾶσιν γραφομένων βιβλίων καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ.

This Apellicon was a bibliophile rather than a philosopher; for this reason, in trying to restore the damaged passages he transcribed the text onto new copies filling the gaps incorrectly, and published the books full of errors. It happened to be the case that the old Peripatetics who came after Theophrastus, not having access to the books at all, apart from a few and mainly the exoteric ones, were not able to produce any real philosophy, but were 'declaiming commonplaces' [LSJ].

38 Primavesi 2007, esp. 65–70. He counters Burnyeat's argument (Burnyeat 2004: 178–9 n. 3) that the twenty-four letter system excludes any first-century organisation of the corpus (because the twenty-seven letter-numerals were in use at that time) by claiming that Andronicus conservatively followed the system he encountered in the hitherto unavailable texts (Primavesi 2007: 68). In normal conditions of transmission and circulation the original pre-Hellenistic system should have been replaced by the letter-numerals.

39 Primavesi 2007: 74.

The later Peripatetics, however, after these books came to light, philosophised better and were closer to Aristotle's thought, but were forced to speak mainly in conjectures because of the large number of errors. Rome, too, played an important part in this; immediately after the death of Apellicon, Sulla – who captured Athens – took Apellicon's library. When it came here Tyrannion the grammarian, who was an admirer of Aristotle, handled it after paying court to the librarian, as did some booksellers who used bad scribes and did not collate the texts – the sort of thing that happens also with other books that are copied for selling, both here and in Alexandria. (Str. 13.1.54)

Two states of affairs are lamented here by Strabo: firstly, Peripatetics after Theophrastus could do nothing more than engage in rhetorical exercises.[40] This first comment also demonstrates a clear privileging of esoteric over exoteric works (more on this issue below). Secondly, after the appearance of the old books acquired by Apellicon, there was some improvement but it was still felt that Aristotle's true meaning could not be confidently accessed due to faults in the circulated texts. The precarious state of Peripatetic philosophy was jeopardised further by the removal of the books to Rome ('Rome, too, played an important part in this'). The term ἀριστοτελίζειν ('to aristotelise', translated above as 'to be close to Aristotle's thought') is unique to Strabo, and signifies the type of philosophical investigation that he considered most characteristic of Aristotle, namely the investigation of causes.[41] Strabo's pessimistic attitude towards the later 'Roman' stage of engagement with Aristotle's text is puzzling, given that he claims membership of this group of 'aristotelising' intellectuals as a pupil or fellow student of Boethus.[42] It would seem that he had experienced an inferior and unsatisfactory text: does this mean that Strabo and his fellow Peripatetics read a worse text than we do now? It is possible that these complaints are due to the same genuine difficulties that we still experience with Aristotle's text, only we are happy to accept that this is how Aristotle composed his esoteric works, whereas ancient interpreters felt the need to justify them by appeal to calamities in transmission.[43] Moreover, Strabo was particularly

[40] If in fact the reference is not to rhetorical exercises but to genuine philosophical debate and discussion (Hahm 2007: 98–101), then Sharples (2010: 29) is right in saying that Strabo's remark 'verges on the outrageous'.

[41] We can gather as much from Strabo's only other use of the coinage, in reference to Posidonius: 'for his work is full of inquiry into causes [τὸ αἰτιολογικὸν] and Aristotle-style investigation [τὸ ἀριστοτελίζον], which are avoided by the men of our school due to the obscurity of causes' (2.3.8).

[42] See 16.2.24: 'in my time the famous philosophers from Sidon were Boethus, with whom I studied Aristotle (συνεφιλοσοφήσαμεν ἡμεῖς τὰ Ἀριστοτέλεια), and his brother Diodotus'.

[43] An interesting parallel for elaborately blaming unfortunate editorial interventions for the state of Aristotle's text can be found in Asclepius' commentary on the *Metaphysics*, written from Ammonius' lectures in the sixth century AD, Ascl. *in Metaph.* 4.4–15. In this passage we find the same key

fussy about the quality of his texts and can be suspected of exaggeration here.[44] Thus we may avoid inferring from Strabo's remarks that the books brought to light from Sulla's booty were particularly poor copies, which would diminish the contribution of those involved in bringing them to light.[45] It is, nevertheless, significant that Strabo presents the production of Aristotelian copies as a commercial and thus potentially lucrative activity, meriting the hasty mobilisation of 'some booksellers' – apparently there was a market for these books.

This commercial production took place alongside Tyrannio's work on the Aristotelian manuscripts.[46] Tyrannio came to Rome in the early 60s BC,[47] but it is not clear exactly when he dealt with the contents of Sulla's library. It is important to examine what exactly Tyrannio did in this library and under what circumstances. At this point, some more information may be sought in Plutarch's version of the sensational rediscovery, which also introduces Andronicus of Rhodes:

ἀναχθεὶς δὲ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἐφέσου τριταῖος ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθωρμίσθη· καὶ μυηθεὶς ἐξεῖλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶνος τοῦ Τηΐου βιβλιοθήκην, ἐν ᾗ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου βιβλίων ἦν, οὔπω τότε σαφῶς γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται δὲ κομισθείσης αὐτῆς εἰς Ῥώμην Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλά, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας. οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι Περιπατητικοὶ φαίνονται μὲν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς γενόμενοι χαρίεντες καὶ φιλολόγοι, τῶν δὲ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου γραμμάτων οὔτε πολλοῖς οὔτε ἀκριβῶς ἐντετυχηκότες διὰ τὸ τὸν Νηλέως τοῦ Σκηψίου κλῆρον, ᾧ τὰ βιβλία κατέλιπε Θεόφραστος, εἰς ἀφιλοτίμους καὶ ἰδιώτας ἀνθρώπους περιγενέσθαι.

Having left Ephesus with all the ships, he [*sc.* Sulla] arrived at Piraeus on the third day; and after his initiation he took for himself the Library of Apellicon of Teos, which included most of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' books: at the time they were not yet well known to most people. It is said that when this Library

ingredients of Strabo's story: a text is removed from Athens; it remains deliberately hidden, and is belatedly published with faults due to material damage and less-than-expert editing; the alleged consequences did not only affect book-arrangement, but also the continuity of expression (τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς λέξεως).

[44] When he copied a text (for personal or other use) he required two copies of the original for comparison (εἰς ἀντιβολήν), cf. 17.1.5. In the passage quoted above he laments commercial booksellers' general failure to do so (οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες).

[45] Cf. Barnes 1997: 31: 'Andronicus *merely* published copies of corrupt manuscripts' (emphasis added).

[46] There are question marks about the relationship between Tyrannio and the booksellers, see Barnes 1997: 19–20. I agree that the text might be corrupt and take the connection to be that they both gained access to Sulla's library by 'unofficial' means.

[47] He came to Rome as a captive after the capture of Amisus by Lucullus in 70 BC, and was subsequently freed by Murena (Plut. *Luc.* 19.7).

came to Rome Tyrannio the grammarian arranged most things, and Andronicus of Rhodes through him got access to the copies, made them public, and prepared the lists that are now in circulation. But the older Peripatetics were clearly elegant and learned in themselves, but did not have access to many or to good copies of Aristotle's and Theophrastus' writings, because the inheritance of Neleus (to whom Theophrastus left the books) fell into the hands of unambitious and simple people. (Plut. *Sull.* 26)

From Cicero's correspondence with Atticus we know that Tyrannio also took charge of rearranging Cicero's own library, very much to Cicero's satisfaction. The words Cicero uses to describe Tyrannio's activity in *Att.* 4.4a and 4.8 are *dissignatio* and *disposuit* ('arrangement' and 'ordering'). This process, as we learn from *Att.* 4.4a, included gluing loose pieces of papyrus together with the help of specialist clerks, and labelling the books. The term 'arranged/prepared' (ἐνσκευάσασθαι) in Plutarch suggests some similar activity for Sulla's library. Tyrannio, therefore, improved the physical state of (some of) the manuscripts that Sulla had brought from Athens.

This does not suggest in any way an 'edition' by Tyrannio; on the contrary, his activity is presented by our sources as distinctly non-public, the result of a private understanding with Sulla's librarian. Apart from his conservation role, Tyrannio also acted as an intermediary, making the texts available to Andronicus, who is credited by Plutarch with making the results of Tyrannio's work public. Andronicus' dependence on Tyrannio is also crucial for the date of his own work on the Aristotelian corpus, which cannot be dated before the early 60s BC. It is widely accepted that Cicero's failure to mention any of these men's Aristotelian activities, even though he was closely acquainted with Tyrannio, means that these activities took place after Cicero's death in 43 BC.[48]

This evidence invites further consideration of the relationship between the activity of Tyrannio and Andronicus on the one hand, and the flurry of interest in Aristotelian texts on the other. This surge of activity centred especially on the *Categories*, and can be traced back to the first half of the first century BC. The Alexandrians Aristo and Eudorus, cited by Simplicius among the 'old interpreters' of the *Categories* are known to have been active in the earlier part of the first century.[49] Eudorus also knew a text of the first

[48] Moraux was in favour of an earlier date, mainly on the grounds of the revival described below and the report that Andronicus was the eleventh scholarch of the Peripatos (Ammon. *in de Int.* 5.28–9). See Moraux 1973: 45–58, with Barnes's criticism in Barnes 1997: 24 n. 108.

[49] Simpl. *in Cat.* 159.31–2: 'the old interpreters/commentators of the *Categories* . . . Aristo and Andronicus and Eudorus . . . ' Aristo had been a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon since 86 BC at the latest (Cic. *Luc.* 11–12), and Eudorus was his contemporary (Strabo 17.1.5).

book of the *Metaphysics* (at least), which he treated as fluid or problematic and offered an emendation (μεταγραφείσης) at *Metaph*.1.6.988a10–11.[50] The conversion of Aristo and Cratippus from Antiochus' Old Academy to the Peripatos may also be associated with this early revival.[51] But there is no need to date Andronicus' activity before these events, which would require rejecting Plutarch's evidence for his dependence on Tyrannio. Following Frede, we may plausibly connect the early exegetical activity (in which Andronicus himself took part) with the initial publication (ἐξέδωκεν) of the Scepsis find by Apellicon.[52] This initiative consisted in making fresh copies (εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε τὴν γραφήν) with supplements for the damaged parts (an unsatisfactory effort according to Strabo), while the originals remained in Apellicon's library, soon to be carried off by Sulla. We can then treat Andronicus' involvement (i.e. his procuring the books from Tyrannio, making them public and writing the *Pinakes*) as an important consequence rather than the cause of the first-century surge of interest in Aristotle. Admittedly this takes away from Andronicus the honour of publishing lost works of Aristotle for the first time, but Strabo is quite clear on the fact that Apellicon first produced copies of his prized manuscripts and made them publicly available (ἐξέδωκεν).[53] The ancient process of releasing a book to the public is not entirely clear; it could mean placing texts somewhere where they would be available for copying (cf. D.L. 3.66) and/or a public reading (cf. D.L. 5.73, where Lyco's books are divided between 'unpublished' and 'read').

Thus far, then, our sources have attributed textual interventions or responsibility for the state of the text to Apellicon (transferring to fresh copies, restoring damage unsuccessfully), the anonymous booksellers (producing commercial copies without proper collation), and perhaps Tyrannio (making some repairs and doing some arrangement). Plutarch does not say that Andronicus engaged in any similar activity, but rather that he made public (εἰς μέσον θεῖναι) the refurbished texts that he got from Tyrannio and that he wrote up the *Pinakes* that were current in Plutarch's own time. This implies that Plutarch knew or thought that there had been other

[50] Alex. Aphr. *in Metaph*. 58.31–59.8; for a discussion see Bonazzi 2005: 145–9.

[51] The information for this conversion comes from Philodemus' *Syntaxis of the Philosophers*, *Index Ac*. xxxv 10–16.

[52] See Frede 1999: 773–5, which includes a favourable assessment of Apellicon's activity, avoiding undue influence from Strabo's strictures.

[53] Scholars have denied that Apellicon produced an 'edition', cf. Moraux 1973: 99–101; Tarán 2001:484; Düring 1957: 393. This is because they take 'edition' to mean production of a 'reliable', critically corrected text. However, the term *ekdosis* (perhaps better translated as 'publication') refers simply to the act of releasing a text to the public.

different *Pinakes*, so he credited Andronicus with some innovation in this respect, but not with building from scratch. If this is all Andronicus did, what of the celebrated Andronican edition?

A lot of the controversy surrounding Andronicus depends upon our understanding of what an edition is supposed to amount to. Scholars have spoken of a 'canonical edition' or an 'authoritative text' by Andronicus, leading one to imagine a newly written out copy of the entire corpus, fresh from Andronicus' hand, in which he opted for readings of the highest quality, destined to become the standard point of reference. As a result of Barnes's sobering remarks, Andronicus' prestige was diminished because his work was found not to have met these high expectations (Barnes himself based his assessment on Andronicus' failure to meet them).[54] But Andronicus should never have been put on such a pedestal to begin with. As we have seen, our sources do not speak of a specifically Andronican text at all; there are no reports of an 'Aristotle of Andronicus' comparable to the 'Plato of Panaetius'. Moreover, Andronicus' name is not mentioned in connection with words implying textual scholarship such as γραφή ('writing/MS reading'), διόρθωσις ('correction/edition') or ἀνάγνωσις ('reading'), or with critical signs such as the ones circulating in copies of Plato.[55] Porphyry, who was probably the closest antiquity has to offer to a modern scholarly edition of a philosophical corpus (see above p. 11), cites Andronicus as an example of his ordering (διάταξις), not of his correcting/editing (διόρθωσις) activity (*Plot.* 24.2).

More generally, it is always too much to expect one individual's version of a text to become canonical in an ancient context. In a period when it was practically impossible to produce identical copies because everything was copied by hand, there could be no such thing as a standard stereotypical edition like our OCTs and Teubners. The most successful textual critics of antiquity were the Alexandrian editors of Homer, who were dealing with a much shorter text than the Aristotelian corpus and were also in control of the Alexandrian library. Even in their case it took centuries to normalise the text by removing the 'wild' divergences (see above p. 5), and still very often they failed to have their readings adopted by the mainstream manuscript tradition.

[54] See Barnes 1997: 27–36.

[55] Andronicus is mentioned in connection with an alternative MS reading only at Simpl. *in Phys.* 440.14–17, which may be taken as Andronicus' attempt to justify his reading in the face of other variants, or as his exegesis of what he took as an uncontroversial text. See Barnes 1997: 30, firmly in favour of the latter option. *Pace* Barnes, Andronicus' text has left some traces in the mediaeval transmission, see Ross's apparatus (*Phys.* 3.3.202a14).

ANDRONICUS AND THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS

Does his lack of a distinctly Andronican text mean that Andronicus was inconsequential for Aristotelian studies? On the contrary: the work that he did produce had every chance of being far more influential than the release of a text. This work contained Aristotle's biography, his will, probably some of the spurious letters, and a catalogue of Aristotle's works, the *Pinakes* referred to by Plutarch.[56] The evidence for this content comes from an Arabic translation of a text ascribed to a 'Ptolemy the Unknown', where the author claims to be summarising Andronicus' work on the catalogue of Aristotle's writings.[57] From a reference to the 'fifth book' of this work in the same source[58] we get an indication about its minimum length, which suggests that the catalogue was not a mere list but was accompanied by extensive supporting material. This may have included an explanation and defence of the rationale underlying the catalogue, such as the ordering of the works, problems of authenticity etc.

For more information on what Andronicus did in this work we may turn to the evidence from Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus*:

πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βιβλία οὐ κατὰ χρόνους ἐᾶσαι φύρδην ἐκδεδομένα ἐδικαίωσα, μιμησάμενος δ' Ἀπολλόδωρον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν Περιπατητικόν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμον τὸν κωμῳδιογράφον εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρων συνήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών· οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ νδ' ὄντα ἔχων τὰ τοῦ Πλωτίνου βιβλία διεῖλον μὲν εἰς ἓξ ἐννεάδας τῇ τελειότητι τοῦ ἓξ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἐννεάσιν ἀσμένως ἐπιτυχών, ἑκάστῃ δὲ ἐννεάδι τὰ οἰκεῖα φέρων συνεφόρησα δοὺς καὶ τάξιν πρώτην τοῖς ἐλαφροτέροις προβλήμασιν.

First, I judged that I should not leave the books in the chronological order in which they had confusingly been published: rather, I should imitate Apollodorus of Athens and Andronicus the Peripatetic, the former of whom collected Epicharmus the comic poet into ten volumes, while the latter divided the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, collecting related material into the same place. And so I divided the fifty-four books of Plotinus I possessed into six enneads (I was delighted to hit upon the perfection of the number six and the enneads). And in each ennead I united the related texts, putting first in order the lighter subjects. (Porph. *Plot.* 24, trans. Barnes)

[56] It is possible that *Pinakes* was the title of the entire work, following Callimachus' pioneering work in this genre of 'biobliography', see Blum 1991: 150–60; 233–46. See also below n. 69.

[57] The name is probably due to a misreading of Πτολεμαῖος Χέννος ('Ptolemy Chennos', perhaps identifiable with a first-century AD mythographer from Alexandria) as Πτολεμαῖος Ξένος ('Ptolemy the stranger'), cf. Rashed 2005: CCVII. See Barnes 1997: 25–6; Düring 1957: 213.

[58] No. 97 in Düring 1957: 230.

In this passage Porphyry compares the arrangement activities of three individuals, Apollodorus of Athens, Andronicus and himself, and in all three cases he describes a process of division and collection. Apollodorus gathered all of Epicharmus into ten volumes, while Andronicus and Porphyry divided the works of Aristotle and Plotinus respectively by grouping together material on related subjects. The result of Porphyry's division was the *Enneads*, corresponding to Andronicus' *pragmateiai*. Is then Porphyry crediting Andronicus with the creation of the treatises as we have them out of what were previously separate, disorganised essays? Barnes concludes that 'Porphyry does not hint that Andronicus invented the treatises'. However, by arguing that the *Enneads* correspond to Apollodorus' volumes of Epicharmus and not to any Aristotelian unit, Barnes does not explain the exact sense of the term *pragmateiai* (translated as 'treatises').[59] Porphyry *does* treat this unit as parallel to his own enneads: Andronicus divided into treatises (εἰς πραγματείας διεῖλε) and Porphyry divided into six enneads (διεῖλον εἰς ἓξ ἐννεάδας). Elsewhere Porphyry uses the term to refer both to treatises as we understand them, such as the *Metaphysics* or the *Categories*, and more generally to the treatment of particular subjects.[60] The kinds of 'related material' that Porphyry goes on to mention with respect to his own groupings are ethics, physics and cosmology, soul, *nous* and forms, and finally metaphysics. Therefore, even if we cannot extract from Porphyry that the units into which Andronicus divided the Aristotelian corpus are the treatises now familiar to us, we can take away at the very least that Andronicus ordered individual works according to subject-matter (ὑπόθεσις – ethics, physics, soul etc.). In both cases Andronicus emerges as a corpus-organiser rather than as an editor, in a role comparable to that of Aristophanes of Byzantium and Thrasyllus in the case of Plato's works.

This corpus-organisation proved to be a central component of Andronicus' contribution to Aristotelian studies, because it stipulated a specific order for Aristotle's works. Andronicus advocated beginning with logic because this is where demonstration is analysed, and Aristotle uses demonstration in all his other works. This view was opposed by Boethus, who thought physics should come first because it is more 'familiar and knowable' (Phlp. *in Cat.* 5.15–24 – note that Philoponus reports expository rather than hierarchical criteria for the classifications of both Peripatetics). Andronicus'

[59] Barnes 1997: 39–40.

[60] Porph. *Plot.* 14.7: ἡ «Μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ» τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους πραγματεία ('Aristotle's treatise entitled *Metaphysics*'); cf. *in Cat.* 57.5; but *Intr.* 1.13: βαθυτάτης οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας ('because this topic is very profound'); cf. *VP* 48.1.

thematic groupings reveal a tendency to organise Aristotle's philosophy into a system with distinct but interlinked parts and sub-disciplines.[61] In his choice to start with logic Andronicus was in agreement with a number of leading Stoics, including Zeno and Chrysippus, while Boethus coincided with Panaetius and Posidonius (see D.L. 7.40–1). In this case Andronicus' view prevailed and the logical works are still placed at the head of the Aristotelian corpus, starting with the *Categories*. This particular choice had, as Sharples observes, long-term implications for the emphasis that was placed on the problem of universals and the debate on being, knowledge and language.[62]

Andronicus' work also covered questions of authenticity: we get a glimpse into his methods and his criteria when later commentators criticise him for athetising the *de Interpretatione* on the basis of what he perceived as an inaccurate reference to the *de Anima* (cf. Phlp. *in de An.* 27.21–8). Andronicus' position was also rejected by subsequent commentators in the case of the *Postpraedicamenta*, which he refused to link to the *Categories*. In fact Andronicus believed that he was dealing with an interpolation intended as a 'bridge' between the *Categories* and the *Topics* by those who gave the *Categories* the title *Preliminaries to the Topics* (Τὰ πρὸ τῶν τόπων, cf. Simpl. *in Cat.* 379.9–12).[63] Barnes discusses Andronicus' (sometimes misguided) choices and compares them to evidence from the catalogue of Aristotle's works found in Ptolemy (see above, p. 19), which claims to follow Andronicus: he points out some discrepancies, but still concludes that Andronicus' canon corresponds more or less to Ptolemy's canon and hence to the modern canon.[64]

Alongside the division into *pragmateiai* according to subject-matter, Andronicus can be credited with one more arrangement of the Aristotelian corpus, this time according to genre and type of composition. Broadly speaking, there are three sections in Ptolemy's catalogue, corresponding to (i) exoteric works, including the best-known dialogues and some miscellaneous writings, nos. 1–28 (ii) the treatises that still form our Aristotelian corpus, nos. 29–56 (iii) collections of problems, constitutions and other such research material, nos. 57–91. They are followed by a brief list of documents and memoranda, including two collections of letters.[65] The Neoplatonist Elias (or David) cites both Ptolemy and Andronicus on the subject of the division of Aristotle's works by genre. The divisions

[61] On Andronicus and logic as an *Organon* see Moraux 1973: 76–9. [62] See Sharples 2008: 274.

[63] Adrastus of Aphrodisias defended this apparently pre-Andronican placement of *Top.* immediately after *Cat.*, Simpl. *in Cat.* 15.35–16.16.

[64] Barnes 1997: 33–7. [65] See Düring 1957: 221–31.

he reports are more complex than the one described above from Ptolemy and they should be traced to the Neoplatonic schools, but it does seem that the Neoplatonists found in Andronicus some precedent for their own elaborate classifications.[66]

It is important to emphasise again that all these pronouncements on authenticity, book-division, grouping and ordering of books etc. must have been found in the treatise containing the *Pinakes* (which was at least five books long, as we saw above), and they do not imply the existence of an Andronican copy of the corpus Aristotelicum. Simplicius offers further support for this when he says that he found Andronicus' view about the division of the *Physics* 'in the third book [of his] *On Aristotle's books*' (Simp. *in Phys*. 923.10).[67] It would be impossible, in any case, for an ancient edition to convey information on the detailed structure of so large a corpus, because individual books would be contained in separate papyrus scrolls, and an independent catalogue would always be necessary to spell out their order. Andronicus' unfortunate atheteses would then take the form of comments in the context of this general work.[68] This five-volume work had the potential to achieve much wider circulation and thus have a much larger impact than a full-scale edition of the entire corpus. By referring to the incipit and stichometric information provided by Andronicus, users of this work could identify the relevant texts in their own copies, put them in the right order and weed out any spurious material.[69]

We may briefly summarise the results so far on the nature of Andronicus' activity: he made certain texts available to a wider public, which could have included hitherto inaccessible works (or simply neglected ones) and he produced a 'biobibliography' of Aristotle that included a catalogue of the

[66] Elias (David) *in Cat*. 107.11–13; 113.17–20. He mistakenly refers to Ptolemy as 'Ptolemy Philadelphus', 107.13; the exact same words are used with reference to Andronicus at 113.18, which suggests that Elias probably knew of Andronicus indirectly through Ptolemy.

[67] The text here is uncertain; I am reconstructing the title of Andronicus' work as Τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλία or <Περὶ τῶν> Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίων, identifiable with the book known to Plutarch and to Ptolemy.

[68] Barnes 1997: 34 says that 'Andronicus' version of the *Categories* did not contain the pages which conclude our modern editions'. Apart from the fact that this is not how Andronicus conveyed his rejection of the *Postpraedicamenta*, it is not an accurate representation of the practice of ancient editions either. One may compare the view of Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus that the ending of the *Odyssey* should be at *Od*. 23.296 (cf. Schol. *Od. ad loc*.). The fact that Aristarchus commented on 23.310–43 (Schol. *Od. ad loc*.) means that he kept the suspected one book and a bit in his text.

[69] Ptolemy no. 97 in Düring 1957: 230: καὶ ὑπομνήματα ὧν εὑρήσεις τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν στίχων καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Ἀνδρονίκου Περὶ πίνακος τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίων, 'also *hypomnemata*, whose numbers of lines and incipits you will find in the fifth book of Andronicus' *On the Pinax of Aristotle's Books*'. Adrastus' comparable work *On the Order of Aristotle's Writings* used exactly the same methods for identifying texts, cf. Simpl. *in Cat*. 18.16–21.

philosopher's works. Therein he divided and ordered the books according to genre, providing a systematic arrangement by subject matter for the esoteric or 'acroamatic' works that have come down to us, leaving the rest in alphabetical order (at least as far as we can judge from Ptolemy's catalogue).

THE IMPACT OF ANDRONICUS' CANON

In order to come to an assessment of Andronicus' impact, we need to combine the evidence discussed above with any available information on the state of the Aristotelian corpus before and after his time, to see if he made any difference. As Barnes demonstrates in detail, there are strong discrepancies between the catalogue of Aristotle's works in Ptolemy and the one appended to Diogenes Laërtius' life of Aristotle.[70] The former includes most of the items in the modern canon that emerged from the mediaeval transmission and was eventually formulated by Bekker, whereas in Diogenes' catalogue fewer than ten out of more than one hundred entries can be safely said to correspond to surviving works, with a further fifteen or so partial identifications. Thirty-nine titles point to otherwise unknown works, while seventy-three titles are cited elsewhere but do not form part of our surviving corpus. Barnes cast doubt on Andronicus' claims to the paternity of this radical transformation by arguing that Diogenes' list is not necessarily representative of the pre-Andronican state of affairs because traces of 'Andronican' works can be found earlier than Andronicus.[71]

First of all we need to establish that Diogenes' list is more than a library catalogue and reflects levels of familiarity with Aristotelian philosophy in the Hellenistic period more broadly. This is supported by its correspondence to the doxography that follows it (D.L. 5.28–34): both the list and the doxography's account of logic ignore the *Categories* and *On Interpretation*, while the doxography ascribes the content of *On Interpretation* to the *Prior Analytics* and in turn that of the *Prior Analytics* to the *Posterior* (D.L. 5.29).[72] The other indications we have for the pre-Andronican state of affairs are that: (i) there was some form of catalogue that was overtaken by Andronicus' (the latter was 'now current' at the time of Plutarch, see above p. 17); (ii) the works were not placed in any particular order or, at

[70] Barnes 1997: 31–2, 41–4. [71] Barnes 1997: 44–63.

[72] On the doxography see Sharples 2010: 31–4. It appears that the *Analytics* suffered especially from a proliferation of pseudepigrapha: Diogenes' list (no. 49) mentions nine books of *Prior Analytics* and later commentators say that forty books of *Analytics* were found in the library of Alexandria, of which only four were genuine (see Philop. *in Cat.* 7.26–9).

least, not in a thematic order (this was Andronicus' contribution according to Porphyry, see above p. 20). As it happens, we know of such a catalogue that lacks thematic order precisely from Diogenes Laërtius.

Barnes's main witness for the early availability of 'Andronican' treatises is Cicero. Cicero cites the *Rhetoric* (*Orat*. 114; *de Orat*. 2.160), but also reports material on prose rhythm now found in its third book, which is thought not to have been part of the treatise pre-Andronicus (see D.L. catalogue, nos. 78, '*Art of Rhetoric*, two books' and 87, '*On Lexis*, two books'). But as Barnes admits, Cicero does not refer to any Aristotelian work in these prose rhythm passages, which means that he could have known a two-volume *Rhetoric* alongside separate collections of material on technical and stylistic matters.[73] Furthermore, Cicero provides evidence that a *Topics* by Aristotle was known before Andronicus, because he professes to translate or report from it in his own *Topica*. The circulation of versions of 'Topics' before Andronicus is confirmed by Diogenes' catalogue (see nos. 55, 60), but the content of Cicero's work bears no resemblance to our *Topics*. The freedom with which Cicero credits his own material to an Aristotelian 'Topics' means that there was no established consensus on what books and what kind of content belonged in that treatise. Thus Andronicus can get credit for arranging the work in its present form. In this case, the changes he effected were more than simply 'enlarging' or 'embellishing'.[74]

Barnes goes on to discuss Andronicus' putative involvement in the construction of the ethical treatises and the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. Cicero clearly knew two ethical treatises in a form different from that of Diogenes' catalogue, and must have been aware of the title *Nicomachean Ethics* which is absent from that catalogue (*Fin*. 5.12).[75] We cannot, therefore, ascribe the title or the construction of our *Nicomachean Ethics* (or Cicero's, if they are different) to Andronicus.[76] Regarding the *Physics*, Barnes shows that scholars misinterpreted the evidence when claiming that Andronicus inserted Book 7, thus 'creating' the treatise. The crucial text here is Simpl. *in Phys*. 923.3–925.2; what Simplicius in fact says there is that some people, including Andronicus, felt that Aristotle's physical treatise should be divided

[73] Barnes 1997: 51–4. The passages on prose rhythm are *Orat*. 172, 192–3, 214, 228; *de Orat*. 3.182.

[74] Cf. Barnes 1997: 54–7, and especially 54 for the disparate works that Andronicus may have assembled into the new *Topics*. It is possible that he excluded some books of the Hellenistic 'Topics' from his version, because they are listed separately in Ptolemy's catalogue (nos. 70 and 71, Düring 1957: 227). For a brief survey and further references on the problems of Cicero's *Topica* see Sharples 2010: 39.

[75] The *EN* is absent from Ptolemy's catalogue too, but this has been taken as an error of transmission.

[76] This may prove to be to Andronicus' credit if we follow Barnes 1997: 58–9: 'our *EN* is an absurdity, surely put together by a desperate scribe or an unscrupulous bookseller'.

into two sections: five books of *Physics* and three books of *On Motion* respectively. Support for such a division could be found in cross-references within Aristotle's own works (Simpl. *in Phys.* 923.18–924.13, translated in Barnes 1997: 67). The grounds for the rather unproductive division after Book 5 (rather than Book 4) must have been that Theophrastus referred to a sentence from Book 5 under the title *Physics*.[77] We can see from this that some decision-making on divisions and book titles by Andronicus (and others?) depended heavily on cross-references and citations, seemingly at the expense of more substantial considerations of content; we may compare this to what happened with *On Interpretation* (see above, p. 21). Finally, on the *Metaphysics* Barnes is right to point out that we have no information linking Andronicus' name with its creation.[78]

As a result, we cannot get any clearer on the pre-Andronican state of affairs on the basis of Cicero or of the compilation of the *Physics* or *Metaphysics*. Our evidence, such as it is, rests on the comparison of Ptolemy's catalogue with the earlier one found in Diogenes Laërtius. There can be little doubt that the arrangement of the corpus that was adopted by Andronicus (as seen in Ptolemy) made a lasting impact and defined the way we still read Aristotle. It is likely that some form of Ptolemy's work was known well into the Late Antiquity (because it forms the background of some late antique *Lives of Aristotle*);[79] therefore editors and scribes could have consulted the catalogue when collecting groups of treatises into large codices. The real point of contention that drives our judgement about Andronicus' importance is whether this canonical arrangement is the result of an active intervention on his behalf or whether what he encountered was already in the shape that we find it in Ptolemy.

Diogenes' catalogue may not represent the exact books available to everyone across the Hellenistic world, but it is nevertheless indicative. It suggests that books from various treatises were circulating individually, many works had different titles, and there was no thematic division into groups of works. Therefore Andronicus' impact comes first and foremost from the presentation of a complete, systematic corpus following a rationalised order throughout. Porphyry was of the opinion that the pre-Andronican state of the Aristotelian corpus was one of disorder, comparable to the confused (φύρδην) initial chronological publication of Plotinus' works. Andronicus' grouping and ordering of Aristotle's books does not need to be undisputed to be considered influential. The fact that it serves as a starting point for

[77] See Barnes 1997: 36, 60, 67–9; the five-plus-three division was also mentioned by Adrastus, Simpl. *in Phys.* 4.8–16.

[78] Barnes 1997: 61–3.

[79] See Düring 1957: 105, 116–19.

further investigation is equally important, for example in the case of Adrastus' work *On the Order of Aristotle's Works* in the second century AD, which argued for placing the *Topics* immediately following the *Categories* (Simpl. *in Cat.* 16.2). All later debate on the correct order and the authenticity of the contents of the corpus depends on the awareness of a specific Aristotelian canon: Porphyry and Plutarch tell us that Andronicus organised and disseminated such a canon, and Ptolemy via the Arabic witness confirms that this canon resembled very closely the one that eventually prevailed.

The more evidence we find that this form and organisation of the corpus goes back to Aristotle himself,[80] the more we should value Andronicus for restoring it in the face of the Hellenistic 'disorder' witnessed by the catalogue preserved in Diogenes Laërtius. Barnes can be misleading when he says that 'Andronicus cannot have claimed to have invented the treatise (*sc*. the *Metaphysics*) himself',[81] because this implies that we should expect Andronicus to make such a claim. On the contrary, I suggest that we should expect him to claim the exact opposite, namely that he was restoring Aristotle's original corpus and the true Aristotelian canon by revealing the philosophical system that was always there, but had become obscured in the course of transmission. We have some indication of the evidence he could have used to support this claim, which pertains to his classification of Aristotelian works by genre. Andronicus quoted some spurious correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander, attributing the publication of the 'acroamatic' writings to Aristotle himself.[82] The distinction between 'acroamatic' and 'exoteric' works must indeed be very old – there are references to 'exoteric' works in the surviving Aristotelian treatises[83] – but the letters published by Andronicus reinforced the perception that it was the 'acroamatic' writings that contained privileged teaching reserved for devoted disciples. In this way Andronicus could justify as genuinely Aristotelian his separate listing of only esoteric works in thematic/systematic order, and support the claim that this privileged section of his *pinax* was the 'essential Aristotle'.[84] With Andronicus' catalogue to hand, readers and editors could distinguish easily between 'essential' and 'non-essential' texts,

[80] See Burnyeat 2004, and esp. 178–9 n. 3. [81] Barnes 1997: 63.

[82] Simpl. *in Phys.* 8.16–39; Plut. *Alex.* 7.6–8. The explicit connection of Andronicus to these letters comes from Gellius, *NA* 20.5.11–12.

[83] *EE* 1218b34; *EN* 1102a26. Cf. Cic. *Att.* 4.16.2, *Fin.* 5.12.

[84] This sharp distinction escalated, to the extent that Alexander is reported to have treated the content of the dialogues as 'falsehoods' compared to the 'truth' of the acroamatic works, Elias (David), *in Cat.* 115.3–13.

and slowly but surely this particular value judgement resulted in the eclipse of all the works that Aristotle had made widely available in his own lifetime.

CONCLUSION

If we recall at this point the information gathered on the state of Plato's text in the first century BC, we can see that by comparison the study of Aristotle's text was indeed revolutionised. In the case of the Aristotelian corpus our sources tell a story of true *peripeteia*, with the appearance of new texts or at least new copies with special claims of antiquity and pedigree, and with the standardisation and ordering of the canon in Andronicus' *Pinakes*. A scrutiny of our sources has shown that it was the processes of cataloguing, canon-formation and corpus-organisation that had the greatest impact on the texts we now read, and not the appearance of new 'editions' and text-critical initiatives. If this appears counterintuitive, we should remember that judgements about the importance or otherwise of ancient editorial activity can be misleading if they are too dependent on modern experiences and expectations.

CHAPTER 2

Platonist approaches to Aristotle: from Antiochus of Ascalon to Eudorus of Alexandria (and beyond)

Riccardo Chiaradonna

ANTIOCHUS

Few facts about first-century BC philosophy are uncontroversial; among these, we can certainly count the renaissance of dogmatic Platonism and an awakened interest in Aristotle's philosophy. These transformations are mutually related; significantly, the two leading dogmatic Platonists of the time, Antiochus of Ascalon and Eudorus of Alexandria, were both interested in Aristotle.[1] All this is uncontroversial and well-known. It seems to me, however, that some further scrutiny is needed in order to shed light on the reception of Aristotle among first-century BC Platonists, on the distinctive features of this reception and its limits.

It has been suggested that Philo of Larissa took an interest in Peripatetic rhetoric and that this influenced Cicero's discussion of the subject.[2] The hypothesis is intriguing, but there is no reason to infer any familiarity on the part of Philo with Aristotle's works. The situation is completely different with Antiochus. Let us first recall some well-known facts. We know from Cicero that Antiochus aimed at reviving the philosophy of the 'ancients', i.e. that of the Old Academy of Plato and his immediate successors (Cic. *Luc.* 70; *Ac.* 1.13). Furthermore, according to Antiochus, the early Peripatetics (Aristotle and, more problematically, Theophrastus) also belonged to the Old Academy, and Stoicism itself should be considered an emendation of the Old Academy rather than a new school of thought (see *Luc.* 15; *Ac.* 1.33, 43; *Fin.* 5.7, 14; *ND* 1.16). The discussion on Antiochus' revival of the *veteres*

[1] People usually associate Platonism with doctrines like the theory of Ideas and the immortality of the soul, or with 'Neoplatonism': the application of all this to Antiochus is controversial. However, I should note from the outset that my use of 'Platonist' is somewhat loose: it merely refers to the fact that these authors had some kind of allegiance to Plato; I refrain from any discussion about the meaning of the terms 'Platonist' (Πλατωνικός) and 'Academic' (Ἀκαδημαικός) in post-Hellenistic philosophy. For further details and a discussion of the relevant scholarship, see Bonazzi 2003: 52–9, and Ch. 8, pp. 160–4 below. On Antiochus and Platonism see now Bonazzi 2012.

[2] See Reinhardt 2000.

and on its significance for the history of ancient Platonism is still open. Indeed, virtually every aspect of Antiochus' project has been investigated during the last century; his attitude to Aristotle is no exception, and an appraisal of Antiochus' philosophical project largely exceeds the scope of this paper.[3] Here I would like to address a different question, namely: what degree of familiarity with Aristotle can we attribute to Antiochus.

Antiochus' literary activity presumably spanned some three decades, from his years of apprenticeship at the school of Philo to his death around 68 BC.[4] The period in question, then, is roughly the first quarter of the first century BC; if we suppose that the *testimonia* concerning Aristotle ultimately stem from Antiochus' works *after* his rupture with Philo, we should think of some time between 88 and 68 BC. Even according to such a late dating, Antiochus' discussion of Aristotle would still be situated early in the century, when Andronicus' work on the school treatises was either forthcoming (if, following Moraux and Gottschalk, we accept an early dating of Andronicus' *floruit* in the first half of the century) or still long to be produced (if, with Düring, Donini and Barnes, we accept a later dating to around 30 BC).[5] This has not prevented some scholars from suggesting that Antiochus' interest in Aristotle was founded on 'first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's work'.[6]

This hypothesis is not implausible *a priori*; generally speaking, it reflects the conclusions reached by research on ancient Aristotelianism in the last four decades. It is a well-known fact that the importance of Andronicus' work for the renaissance of interest in Aristotle during the first century BC has been considerably minimised; conversely, the renaissance of interest in Aristotle's philosophy has come to be regarded as a 'long duration' phenomenon, which began toward the end of the second century BC, at the

[3] For further details, see the classical contributions by Görler 1990 and Barnes 1989. For more recent discussions, see Karamanolis 2006: 51–9; Bonazzi 2012, Sedley 2012.

[4] Antiochus' chronology is a debated issue and I will not go into it. The literature is abundant: further details in Tarrant 2007.

[5] See Moraux 1973: 45–58 (with a full *status quaestionis*); Gottschalk 1987: 1095; Düring 1957: 421; Donini 1977: 241–2 (critical discussion of Moraux 1973); Barnes 1997: 21–3. The issue is controversial, to say the least, and the problem of Andronicus' chronology remains open. Cicero's silence about Andronicus certainly suggests a late chronology, but (at least in my view) does not suffice to settle the issue. Interestingly, Cicero is also completely silent about Aristo's work on Aristotle, although he was certainly aware of Aristo's existence: see below, pp. 37–41.

[6] According to Karamanolis 2006: 59 *et passim*, Antiochus was the first of a long series of Platonists, culminating with Porphyry and the late commentators, who championed Aristotle in order to illuminate Plato's real beliefs. Since I incline to disagree with Karamanolis' account of the reception of Aristotle among first-century BC Platonists, I should note from the outset that I regard his research as an outstanding contribution, which illuminates many crucial aspects of the interpretation of Aristotle in Imperial Platonism (up to Porphyry); my disagreement in no way affects this overall assessment.

time of Panaetius, and can hardly be associated with the existence of one single library (such as that of Sulla) or with the work of a single author (such as Andronicus).[7] Rather than signalling the start of a new interest in Aristotle, Andronicus' work (whatever its character) probably originated as a reaction to such newly awakened interest. Given these premises, nothing rules out the possibility that Antiochus had some knowledge of Aristotle's school treatises; furthermore, he could certainly have been acquainted with Aristotle's exoteric works and was possibly familiar with the writings of Theophrastus, whose importance for the shaping of the Hellenistic philosophical traditions is a well-established fact.[8] Yet it seems to me that the current scholarly trend runs the risk of replacing an implausible common opinion (the abrupt renaissance of knowledge of Aristotle thanks to Andronicus' 'edition' of his school treatises) with another common opinion which is problematic to say the least: that the work of the early Aristotelian commentators did not trigger any substantial change in the reception of Aristotle. As I see it, the situation is more complex. Behind such facts as the 'interest' in Aristotle's philosophy, or the very availability of Aristotle's school treatises, important aspects of first-century BC philosophy may be concealed. Even though the early commentators were not the *cause* of the increasing interest in Aristotle, and even though the circulation of Aristotle's school treatises did not depend on Andronicus' 'edition', the early commentators certainly inaugurated a new way of reading Aristotle, and this fact should in no way be underestimated.

A rapid survey of the evidence will help illustrate this point. Two famous passages are usually taken into account when dealing with Antiochus' attitude to Aristotle. The first comes from Cicero's *Ac.* 1.33. Varro, Antiochus' spokesman, shows awareness of Aristotle's abandonment of Plato's theory of Ideas (or at least Aristotle's weakening of Plato's ideas: much depends on the meaning accorded to the verb *labefactavit*):[9]

Aristoteles primus species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit: quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in iis quiddam divinum esse diceret.

Aristotle undermined the Forms I mentioned a bit earlier – though Plato had been so astonishingly keen on them that he claimed that there was an element of the divine in them. (Trans. Brittain)[10]

[7] See Barnes 1997; Frede 1999: 774–5. [8] See Sedley 1998a: 166–85.

[9] See now the in-depth discussion in Boys-Stones 2012, who renders *labefactavit* with 'Aristotle made the Forms unstable'. A cursory survey of the scholarly debate can be found in Karamanolis 2006: 60–1.

[10] This passage finds an important (and famous) later parallel in Plutarch's *adversus Colotem*: Plutarch argues that Aristotle 'everywhere assails them (i.e. Plato's Forms) and brings up against them every

Antiochus could well have been relying for his information on Aristotle's school treatises or (perhaps more plausibly) on exoteric works, such as the *On Philosophy*. And yet I would resist the conclusion that the above passage from Cicero points to Antiochus' textual work on Aristotle;[11] at most, it confirms that Antiochus was not utterly uninformed about some basic views of Aristotle. No direct knowledge of Aristotle's writings (either his exoteric works or school treatises) was required to prove that Aristotle did not accept Plato's theory of Forms.[12]

The second testimony comes from the fifth book of Cicero's *de Finibus*. Piso, Antiochus' spokesman, acknowledges his debt to Aristotle's ethical works and mentions the *Nicomachean Ethics*. I will limit myself to quoting the famous lines where Piso (probably echoing Antiochus) alludes to Aristotle's ethical writings:

Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum; cuius adcurate scripti de moribus dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video, cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius. (*Fin.* 5.12)

So I shall confine myself to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus. Now the elaborate treatise on ethics is attributed to his father, but I do not see why the son should not have matched the father. (Trans. Woolf)

Barnes aptly comments upon these lines: 'Cicero knew a *Nicomachean Ethics* – even if he had never read of, or even come across it, himself'.[13] If one admits that Antiochus is behind Piso's remarks, it can at most safely be inferred that Antiochus was aware of the existence of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which – however – he may have been inclined to attribute to Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle. Diogenes Laërtius (8.88) indicates that one tradition interpreted the title of the *Ethics* as meaning 'written by' (rather than 'dedicated to' or 'edited by') Nicomachus; and, indeed, the adjective Νικομάχεια may support this interpretation.[14] However, it can reasonably be assumed that an extensive knowledge of the *Ethics*, or a

sort of objection in his treatises on ethics and on natural philosophy and in his exoteric dialogues' (1115 B, trans. Einarson–De Lacy).

[11] Interestingly, Sedley 2012 claims that the late Antiochus was influenced by the exegetical scholarship of Alexandria. As Sedley argues, however, while this affected Antiochus' reading of Plato, there is no evidence that the city's scholarly climate had any impact on Antiochus' reading of Aristotle.

[12] Although the issue would require a longer discussion, I am inclined to think that the same holds for Plutarch's *adversus Colotem* (see above, n. 10): indeed, Plutarch knew of the existence of arguments addressed against Plato's Ideas in Aristotle's writings. Plutarch's discussion, however, does not suggest any detailed reading of the corpus on his part: there is no allusion made to any specific argument formulated by Aristotle, no reference to this or that passage from his treatises; see Chiaradonna 2008a.

[13] Barnes 1997: 58. [14] See Barnes 1997: 58 n. 249.

thorough familiarity with Aristotle's works and biography, is enough to prevent anyone from accepting this interpretation, which has aptly been qualified as 'amateur'.[15]

The assessment of Antiochus' ethical theory as reported by Piso (as well as in the parallel passage from *Luc.* 131) is a difficult issue. In her influential discussion, Julia Annas has effectively qualified Antiochus' position as 'hybrid', in that it combines Peripatetic and Stoic features. Such conclusions are not uncontroversial, and others are more inclined to see that of Antiochus as a genuine attempt to do justice to Aristotle's ethical doctrine.[16] Be that as it may, it is very difficult to detect clear traces of any first-hand reading of Aristotle in Cicero's report. True, some aspects of Piso's account strike the reader as genuinely Aristotelian: for example, his emphasis on the supreme value of knowledge, or his conception of man as a political animal. In addition to this, Antiochus' celebrated distinction between a *beata* and a *beatissima vita* has plausibly been traced back to the *Nicomachean Ethics* (see Aristotle's distinction between the *eudaimôn* and the *makarios* at *EN* 1100b22–1101a8).[17] And yet, these Aristotelian *doxai* are fully incorporated within an overall account, where unmistakably Stoic elements (most notably, the doctrine of *oikeiôsis*: see *Fin.* 5.24) have a crucial position, and which points to a prominent Hellenistic background.[18]

Antiochus' ethical discussion as reported in *Fin.* 5 famously shares several common features with Arius Didymus' summary of Aristotelian ethics as preserved by Stobaeus.[19] Paul Moraux, who devoted a masterly discussion to Arius' summary, reached the conclusion that Arius was unaware of the exegetical methods of the early commentators.[20] Admittedly, it is easy to find parallels in Aristotle's corpus; however, according to Moraux, those reported by Arius are mere school doctrines, the mention of which only reveals that this author belonged to a certain tradition, and is not indicative

[15] See Görler 1989: 259 n. 7: 'dilettantische Erwähnung der *Nikomachischen Ethik*'.

[16] See Annas 1993: 180–7 and the criticism of her interpretation by Karamanolis 2006: 72–80. On Antiochus' attitude towards Stoic ethics see now Bonazzi 2009.

[17] Further details in Karamanolis 2006: 75.

[18] See the excellent overall assessment in Barnes 1989: 86–7.

[19] I.e. 'Doxography C' = *Ecl.* 2.7.13–26 = 116.19–152.25, according to the label introduced by Hahm 1990: 2945.

[20] The identity and chronology of Arius are disputed (see Göransson 1995: 212–18 with the review by Inwood 1996 and the additional remarks by Mansfeld and Runia 1997: 238–49). I refrain from endorsing any hypothesis about the identity of Arius; as far as the chronology is concerned, what I try to show is compatible with both an early (first-century BC) and a late dating (down into the second century AD). As a matter of fact (and even if we grant for some limited exceptions such as their interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories*), the exegetical methods developed by the Peripatetic commentators had no widespread impact until the age of Plotinus.

of any first-hand use of Aristotle's works.[21] As I see it, Moraux's conclusions can hold *a fortiori* for Antiochus too (since one can see familiar material from the Aristotelian corpus recycled in Arius, whereas there is virtually none in *Fin*. 5), but some further qualifications are needed.[22] In fact, in no way do I wish to deny *a priori* that Antiochus *could* have been familiar with some of Aristotle's school treatises (or at least with parts of them).[23] However, no real exegetical work is detectable behind Antiochus' cursory references to Aristotle; accordingly, his attitude is wholly different from that of Peripatetic commentators such as Andronicus or Boethus. Furthermore (and more interestingly), Antiochus' attitude is different from that of those (slightly) later Platonist authors whose direct albeit limited acquaintance with Aristotle is an unmistakable fact (as we shall see below, this was for instance the case with Eudorus and the anonymous commentator of *Theaetetus*, both of whom discuss or make clear references to Aristotelian texts). To sum up, Antiochus simply incorporated references and allusions to Aristotle's tenets. His approach to Aristotle – *whatever he may have read* – definitely did not focus on close textual interpretation of the treatises.

The closest parallel to Antiochus' attitude is perhaps the famous summary of Aristotle's philosophy in Diogenes Laërtius (5.27–34), where Aristotle's philosophy is presented in a Stoicising fashion and (despite the presence of a number of parallels)[24] no first-hand use of Aristotle's works is detectable with any certainty. In fact, it seems to me very important that, while Antiochus' overall position marks the end of the Hellenistic Academy and his revival of the *veteres* points to later developments in Imperial Platonism, his philosophical background plainly reflects his own time and may aptly be qualified as *late* Hellenistic rather than *post*-Hellenistic.[25]

[21] Moraux 1973: 273, 350.

[22] On parallels between Arius' summary and the *Magna Moralia* see Sharples 1983 and Furley 1983. As David Sedley has suggested to me, Arius may not reflect Aristotelian commentary, but he certainly reflects a context of far greater familiarity with the school treatises than Antiochus; this may be extremely important for understanding developments between the early and the late first century BC.

[23] Boys-Stones 2012 speculates that Antiochus could have been familiar with Aristotle's *Categories* or with his biological works.

[24] For example, Diogenes' account at VII.31 includes a reference to Aristotle's definition of soul in *de An*. 2.1.412 a 27–8. See Dorandi 2007: 445, with references to the scholarly debate.

[25] Interestingly, Antiochus' discussion of Aristotle seems to reflect the methods of the late Hellenistic Peripatos *before* the exegetical work of the early commentators. In a recent paper on Critolaus, David Hahm has given an illuminating characterisation of these methods, outlining their difference from the later approach. Hahm argues that Critolaus' philosophy can best be understood as part of the late Hellenistic interschool debate, which focused on those philosophical propositions that came to fill the Hellenistic doxographies. Probably Critolaus produced arguments in defence of Peripatetic principles, without specifically discussing Aristotle's writings. According to Cicero, it

Antiochus might have accorded the status of authorities to Aristotle and the older Academics, but he does not show any real familiarity with the conceptual framework of Aristotle (or the Old Academy). Rather, Antiochus' doctrines – whatever their overall significance – are, so to speak, built with late Hellenistic bricks. I should add that this is anything but an isolated example in the history of philosophy: those who break 'ideologically' with a certain tradition are more often than not conceptually completely embedded in that same tradition (the relation between Renaissance philosophers and the Scholastic tradition is a good example of this).

The conclusions I have just pointed to derive further confirmation from Sextus Empiricus' well-known doxography on the Peripatetic criterion in *M* 7.217–26, which is part of a larger doxography on the criterion and has sometimes (albeit not uncontroversially) been regarded as originating from Antiochus' *Canonica*.[26] It is difficult to find any conclusive evidence that Antiochus is the source of Sextus, but it is a widely accepted view that Sextus' account comes from a Hellenistic source, which antedates (or is unaffected by) the early commentators.[27] According to Sextus, Aristotle, Theophrastus and the Peripatetics have a twofold criterion: 'Perception [*aisthêsin*] for perceptible things and thinking [*noêsin*] for thinkable things, and common to both, as Theophrastus used to say, is the evident [*to*

was a characteristic of the Peripatetics to argue both sides of a question, and this practice went back to Aristotle. According to Hahm, this view, rather than being a mere invention on Cicero's part, is likely to reflect the late Hellenistic practice of defending and debating philosophical theses or propositions, which characterised the Peripatos before the textual work of the early commentators. As Hahm points out, despite Antiochus' critical opinion of Critolaus (and, in general, of Peripatetics after Aristotle: see *Fin.* 5.14) his method seems to be close to those of the late school of Aristotle before the time of Andronicus (see Hahm 2007: 94–101). Kupreeva 2009: 136–50 draws attention to a number of very interesting parallels between Critolaus and the Antiochean summary of physics in Cic. *Ac.* 1.24–9.

[26] See now Sedley 2012.

[27] When I say that this phase in the reception of Aristotle 'antedates' the work of the early commentators, I do not mean it necessarily does so chronologically; rather, what I suggest is that those late Hellenistic accounts of Aristotle ultimately reflect a philosophical climate which antedates the work of the commentators. Our evidence suggests that different approaches to Aristotle coexisted during the first century BC and even later, down to the end of the post-Hellenistic age. As noted by Sharples 2007, these approaches can be traced back to the different kinds of Aristotelian works which circulated at that time: exoteric works, school treatises and broadly doxographical literature, which approached Aristotle on the basis of doctrines rather than texts. In my view, Piso's speech, Arius, the summary of Aristotle's philosophy by Diogenes Laërtius and Sextus' account of the criterion all belong to the latter kind of literature, which had a less technical character than that typical of a commentary and reflected a markedly late Hellenistic philosophical background. If (as it is generally assumed) Sextus was a contemporary of Alexander of Aphrodisias, then his account conceptually points to a much earlier time. Diogenes' doxography of Aristotle shares the same character as the work of Sextus and it clearly took a very long time for the work of the commentators to have a widespread impact. The late Hellenistic approach remained well alive down to the end of the second century.

enarges]' (*M* 7.217–18, trans. Annas). The 'Peripatetic' view on the double criterion reported by Sextus can also be found (with some modifications) in Diogenes Laërtius and Arius Didymus (see D.L. 5.29; Ar. Did. *apud* Stob. *Ecl.* 1.58 = fr. 16 Diels). Furthermore, this 'Peripatetic' doctrine became a commonplace in post-Hellenistic philosophy: it was adopted by Ptolemy and Galen, and there are allusions to it in several authors.[28] In his commentary on Ptolemy's *Harmonics*, Porphyry presents a detailed account of the double criterion theory, which he ascribes to the 'Ancients' (*in Harm.* 11.4–6).[29] It is extremely interesting to compare Sextus' account with that of Porphyry, since the two philosophers developed the same doctrine from different points of view, reflecting two distinct phases in the reception of Aristotle.

Sextus' account, which can broadly be regarded as 'Aristotelian', echoes Aristotle's celebrated discussion of the genesis of knowledge in *Metaphysics* A.1 and *Posterior Analytics* 2.19. Sextus' reference to Theophrastus is also significant: according to Sextus' source, it is Theophrastus who situates the criterion in the 'evidence' common to perception and thinking and it has interestingly been supposed that the whole account largely derives from Theophrastus.[30] A further parallel should be noted, namely that with Antiochus' epistemological account in Cicero, *Luc.* 39. The shared use of the notion of 'similarity' (*similitudo*: *Luc.* 39, ὁμοιότης: S. E. *M* 7.220) in the two works is noteworthy, and Antiochus' view on the genesis of *sapientia* can be compared to Sextus' account of the genesis of *epistêmê* in *M* 7.224. This may well be an indication of the Antiochean origin of Sextus' account, although I would refrain from drawing any definite conclusions on the matter.

To summarise, Sextus enumerates and succinctly describes those capacities (starting from perception) which are causally responsible for the genesis of the concept (ἔννοια) of science (ἐπιστήμη) and of skill (τέχνη). The whole process is explained on the basis of the activity of certain movements (κινήματα) of the soul, which are divided into three categories (evident perception, memory and *phantasia*, and understanding and intellect – the last two associated with 'rational (λογική) *phantasia*', *M* 7.221). Significantly, Sextus' account accords a prominent position to *phantasia*, whose role goes far beyond what Aristotle suggests in *de Anima* 3.3.[31] Theophrastus

[28] See Barnes 2007a. [29] On Porphyry's references to the 'Ancients', see Barnes 2003: 317–19.

[30] See Huby 1989 and 1999: 93–9.

[31] See the discussion by Annas 1992: 207–10 with the remark at 210 n. 19: 'Sextus is writing for an audience whose philosophical interests are determined not by Peripatetic specialists, but by philosophical debates shaped by the earlier Hellenistic handbooks.'

may well be behind what we find in Sextus and – generally speaking – it is more than likely that any late Hellenistic account of Peripatetic theories will owe much to Theophrastus. This, however, should not prevent us from recognising the markedly Hellenistic 'colour' of Sextus' presentation. Hellenistic epistemological concerns are here read into the Peripatetic theory of knowledge, whose presentation also includes Stoicising notions such as that of 'rational *phantasia*', or the view that opinion results from the 'assent' of the soul to the content of *phantasia* (*M* 7.226: συγκατάθηται). There is a structural similarity between Sextus' report on the Peripatetic criterion and Piso's speech on Peripatetic ethics. In both cases, the 'Peripatetic' doctrine is presented in unmistakably Hellenistic terms. In Piso's speech, the theory of *oikeiôsis* has a pivotal position in the presentation of Aristotle's ethics; in Sextus' account, it is the notion of *phantasia* that holds a similar position. Both in Sextus' account and in Piso's speech there are clear echoes of Aristotelian doctrines, terms or distinctions, but it is extremely difficult to detect precise allusions or references to any passage in Aristotle's works. Even if such reports ultimately stem from a first-hand reading of Aristotle, their origin almost disappears.

The character of Sextus' debt to Peripatetic sources emerges clearly when Sextus' account of the 'double criterion' is compared with the much later account of Porphyry. The overall theory is the same and there are some very interesting parallels between the two passages. Porphyry also accords an important position to *phantasia*, and his account of the genesis of *epistêmê* can interestingly be compared to that of Sextus (see Porph. *in Harm.* 13.29–14.4 *vs* S. E. *M* 7.222–4).[32] However, unlike what happens in Sextus, Porphyry's entire discussion is full of clearly recognisable allusions or references to Aristotle's works (and to the commentary tradition). Just to mention a couple of examples, Porphyry (*in Harm.* 11.13) alludes to Aristotle's view, according to which perception resides in the reception of the perceptible form; Porphyry's remarks on definition at *in Harm.* 11.22 contain a clear reference to *Metaphysics* H.2.1043a21. Furthermore, Porphyry presents the formation of universal concepts (*in Harm.* 11.31–2; 14.2–3; 10–11) in terms close to those used by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his account of Form abstraction (see *de An.* 85.14–20).[33] Porphyry even employs the very Alexandrian expression ὑλικὸς νοῦς (see *in Harm.* 13.17).[34] The Aristotelian exegetical background of Porphyry's account is very evident; instead, it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that Sextus' report

[32] On the role played by *phantasia* in Porphyry's account, see Sorabji 2006: 117–20.
[33] See Chiaradonna 2007: 231. [34] See Lautner 2004: 84 n. 23.

rewrites Aristotle's (and Theophrastus') views from a different conceptual perspective. As already noted, this operation points to the late Hellenistic phase in the reception of Aristotle (the same phase to which both Antiochus and the source of Diogenes Laërtius belong), prior to the exegetical work of the early commentators. Porphyry's account, by contrast, reflects a much later phase in the reception of Aristotle, when the textual work of the commentators had fully been assimilated.

AFTER ANTIOCHUS: ARISTO AND CRATIPPUS

While in the case of Antiochus no conclusive evidence can be found for first-hand familiarity with Aristotle's corpus, the situation is different when it comes to Antiochus' immediate disciples. I do not wish to focus here on Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle, which is an issue too large and difficult to be dealt with in brief.[35] I would simply like to recall the overall conclusions reached in recent studies on the matter and most notably in Tobias Reinhardt's work on Cicero's *Topics*.[36] Reinhardt makes a careful distinction between: (1) the availability of Aristotle's school treatises for Cicero; and (2) Cicero's reading of Aristotle. While it is very plausible that some of Aristotle's school treatises were available to Cicero (even aside from Andronicus' edition, which he never mentions) – and according to Reinhardt's insightful reading of Cicero, *Top*. 1–3 this also holds true for the *Topics* – the fact that Cicero actually read any of these treatises is difficult to prove (a partial exception here being Aristotle's *Rhetoric*). Rather, Cicero's opinion of Aristotle appears to be based on the exoteric writings and practices of the Hellenistic Peripatos.[37] Cicero regards Aristotle as a great stylist and the champion of discussion *in utramque partem* (see *Orat*. 46; *de Orat*. 3.71, 80, *Fin*. 5.10);[38] his picture of Aristotle, then, is far removed from that of the early commentators. For the sake of this discussion, it is important to note Cicero's interest in Aristotle's *Topics*. This interest of Cicero is easy to understand, given his late Hellenistic and Academic philosophical background: whatever Cicero's actual reading of the *Topics*, this was obviously an attractive work for those versed in the Academic practice of dialectical debate. It is not surprising, therefore, that Aristotle's *Topics* are among the few school treatises for which we have reason to believe that Platonists between the first century BC and the first century AD may have known them first-hand: the anonymous commentator

[35] See e.g. Long 1995a and Barnes 1997: 44–54. [36] See Reinhardt 2003: 177–81.
[37] See Hahm 2007: 91–2. [38] See Long 1995a: 52–8.

on the *Theaetetus* possessed direct knowledge of (parts of) this work (col. xxiv.30–xxv.29) and Plutarch too may have written a treatise on it (no. 56 in Lamprias' catalogue).[39] Indeed, the reception of Aristotle's *Topics* among the early post-Hellenistic Platonists can well be seen as a consequence of their Hellenistic 'Academic' interests.

All this would suggest a smooth internal development, whereby Platonists were gradually led by their late Hellenistic philosophical concerns to appropriate certain portions of Aristotle's school treatises for themselves. Such a conclusion, however, would only be a partial one: the situation was in fact rather different and, apparently, the relations between Platonists and their contemporary Aristotelian colleagues were suddenly intensified after Antiochus. Some well-known lines of Philodemus' *Index Academicorum* (xxxv.11–16) report that Aristo and Cratippus, two students of Antiochus and of his brother Aristus, 'became Peripatetics' (ἐγένοντο Περιπατη[τι-/κοὶ . . . : xxxv.14–15).[40] It is generally assumed that they 'converted' after Antiochus' death, although Philodemus is not quite explicit on this point. These lines have been the focus of much excellent scholarship and I will not dwell on them. It has been supposed that the conversion of Aristo and Cratippus from Antiochus' 'Academy' (whatever it may have been) to the Peripatos was connected to the work of the early commentators (for example, it has been recently proposed that they made the move after having heard Xenarchus; formerly, scholars posited an influence on Andronicus' part).[41] None of these hypotheses is really supported by the extant evidence, but it can safely be supposed that the 'conversion' of Aristo and Cratippus reflected an overall increasing interest in Aristotle. Unfortunately, we simply do not know why Aristo and Cratippus became Peripatetics and (more importantly) we do not even know what precisely that implied, since the very existence of the Peripatetic school in Athens is doubtful at the time of their philosophical activity.[42] It seems a reasonable hypothesis that Aristo and Cratippus simply changed their 'allegiance' from Plato to Aristotle, thus identifying themselves as 'Peripatetics' (indeed, Plutarch and Cicero inform us about Cratippus' teaching, which was apparently in no way connected with the survival of Aristotle's school in Athens).[43] Such details,

[39] On the anonymous commentator's familiarity with the *Topics*, see Sedley 1995: 515; on Plutarch, see Karamanolis 2006: 89–90.

[40] Text after Blank 2007: 89.

[41] Xenarchus: Puglia 1998; Andronicus: Moraux 1973: 225 and Gottschalk 1987: 1095. The relevant literature includes Glucker 1978: 9–20; Dorandi 1994; Karamanolis 2006: 81–2 and Blank 2007. See now the updated discussion in Hatzimichali 2011: 40–52.

[42] *Status quaestionis* in Donini 1977: 242–3.

[43] See Moraux 1973: 227 and the in-depth discussion by Glucker 1978: 114–16.

however important, are not the focus of the present investigation. Here I would rather emphasise something different. The conversion of Aristo and Cratippus to the Peripatos has long been regarded as an 'apostasy' from the Academy and this view (which suggests a somewhat traumatic separation from Antiochus' group) found support in Bücheler's conjecture at xxxv.13: ἀ[ποστα]τήσα[ντες τῆς Ἀ]καδημείας. However, as David Blank has shown in a recent paper, Bücheler's conjecture is unwarranted and there is no hint that Philodemus regarded Aristo and Cratippus as apostates.[44] Indeed, it was already suggested by Moraux and Donini – and their suggestion seems a very plausible one – that the move of Aristo and Cratippus from Antiochus' Academy to the Peripatos was not perceived as a traumatic event and that it may even have been inspired by Antiochus' favourable attitude to Aristotle.[45] Such a conclusion lends further support to the idea that the philosophical panorama of the first century BC was extremely fluid. Rather than regarding this phase of ancient philosophy as the preparation for what came later, it is important to grasp its distinctive character. Several and diverse philosophical currents existed (the late Hellenistic traditions, new dogmatic Platonism, the early Aristotelian commentators etc.) which interacted in different philosophical centres scattered around the Mediterranean world; apparently, there was no clear philosophical hegemony of one current over the others.

Aristo and Cratippus offer an interesting confirmation of these remarks. Their conversion to the Peripatos has sometimes been presented as a common reaction to increased interest in Aristotle. This is extremely plausible, but should not overshadow the profound differences between their works on Aristotle. Cratippus was highly praised by Cicero, who refers to him as the leading Peripatetic of his day[46] – a telling fact in itself. Indeed, what we know of Cratippus (most notably, his views on mantic as reported in Cicero's *de Divinatione*) shows no similarity with the technical exegetical works of the early commentators; instead it appears as a continuation of the methods of the Hellenistic Peripatos.[47] While Cratippus' knowledge of Aristotle's exoteric writings (and particularly *On Philosophy*) is a well-established fact, his familiarity with the school treatises cannot be proven with any degree of certainty, even if – and this should not come as a surprise, given what has emerged so far – parallels can certainly be found between what we know of Cratippus and the view presented in the school treatises (for example, Cratippus' view of our souls as partly deriving 'from outside',

[44] See Blank 2007: 92. [45] See Moraux 1973: 225–6; Donini 1977: 247–8.

[46] See e.g. *Tim* 2. and the list of references in Moraux 1973: 227 n. 17.

[47] See the discussion in Moraux 1973: 229–56. See also Tarrant 2000.

extrinsecus, may be reminiscent of Aristotle's theory of *nous thurathen* and, as Moraux has convincingly argued, possibly ultimately derives from the combination of *de An.* 3.5.430 a 22 and *GA* 2.3.736 b 27).[48]

The situation is completely different when it comes to Aristo. Cicero is aware of his existence (Aristo is said to have been with Antiochus, Aristus and Lucullus during the 'Sosus affair': see *Luc.* 12), but Aristo's work on Aristotle did not attract Cicero, who is completely silent about it. Indeed, Aristo had few means of attracting Cicero. We have an interesting set of fragments from Aristo deriving from commentaries by Simplicius (*On Categories*) and [Apuleius] (*de Interpretatione*).[49] There is no evidence that Aristo wrote any commentaries (and similar evidence is wanting for most of the early exegetes), but he was certainly engaged in a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's school treatises. In his chapter on the relative, Simplicius (*in Cat.* 159.32) provides a list of 'ancient interpreters' (τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξηγητὰς) of Aristotle's *Categories*, which includes Boethus, Aristo and Andronicus (Peripatetics), Eudorus (an Academic) and Athenodorus (a Stoic). Aristo's conversion to the Peripatos, then, made him one of the earliest commentators (at least in a loose sense).

Interestingly, all of Simplicius' *testimonia* on Aristo focus on the category of the relative (more on this later); his interpretations are not always clear (in particular, his views on the conversion of relatives have puzzled modern interpreters),[50] but Aristo was manifestly not an amateur and was at ease with technicalities. This emerges even more clearly from [Apuleius]' passage (*de Int.* 193.16–20), where Aristo is reported to have introduced five additional moods to Aristotle's syllogistic, i.e. those resulting from the conclusions of the moods recognised by Aristotle via the rules of conversion and subalternation.[51] To sum up, Aristo's approach to Aristotle differs toto

48 See Moraux 1973: 231.

49 The extant evidence on Aristo of Alexandria is collected in Mariotti 1966. Certainty cannot be attained, but it seems to me a likely and economical hypothesis that the student of Antiochus mentioned by Cicero and Philodemus, the exegete mentioned by Simplicius, the Peripatetic philosopher mentioned by Apuleius, and Eudorus' Peripatetic rival mentioned by Strabo, are one and the same person: this was argued by Mariotti 1966: 22–41, but doubts have been raised by Moraux 1973: 182. For further discussion, see Sharples 2010: 20 and Hatzimichali 2011: 44–7.

50 See Moraux 1973: 182–5.

51 See Moraux 1973: 186–91; on Aristo's views on syllogisms see Barnes 2007b: 534–6 and Sharples 2010: 96–7. I should add (but see Hatzimichali 2011: 46 n. 54) that Aristo's name at p. 193.16 ('Aristo . . . Alexandrinus') is not a correction from *Aristo[teles]*, even though MSS GC have actually *Aristoteles* instead of *Aristo* (see Mariotti 1966: 66). The correction *Aristo[teles]* refers to the immediately following passage (193.21–194.22) and was proposed by Prantl, who was inclined to ascribe one further fragment to Aristo regarding the problem of the possible combinations of premises in each syllogistical figure. Moraux's doubts (see Moraux 1984: 190–1) are about this second ascription, whereas the ascription of the five additional moods is not questioned.

caelo from that of Cratippus. Both identified themselves as Peripatetics, but (as far as we can judge) they were Peripatetics of two very different kinds, which correspond to different aspects of the reception of Aristotle in their day. As noted by Donini, the first century BC appears as the 'intersection of different forms of Aristotelianism'.[52] Increased interest in Aristotle did not necessarily coincide with a newly awakened interest in his school treatises; the methods of the commentators and their focus of interest only gradually emerged and coexisted with different approaches. Aristo and Cratippus represent, perhaps, the most telling example of this fluid and, so to speak, 'transitional' situation.

EUDORUS

We know virtually nothing about Eudorus' life and chronology. The only evidence comes from Strabo, who reports that 'in his (i.e. Strabo's) time' (καθ' ἡμᾶς) Eudorus and Aristo 'the Peripatetic philosopher' each wrote a book about the Nile, and that Eudorus accused Aristo of plagiarism (Str. 17.1.5 = T. 13 Mazzarelli).[53] It is not completely certain that the Aristo mentioned in Strabo can be identified with Antiochus' disciple, but this is a plausible hypothesis.[54] Strabo's testimony is important in that it establishes some kind of connection between Antiochus' circle and Eudorus. There has been much speculation about the possible relations between the two main Platonist philosophers of the first century BC; unfortunately none of the hypotheses formulated can be verified and, in particular, there is no reason to believe that Eudorus was a disciple of Antiochus.[55]

Interesting similarities exist between Antiochus' and Eudorus' overall projects. Both are the champions of a renewed dogmatic approach to Plato and the Academy, and both support their views with a complex approach to the earlier tradition. Eudorus is regarded as an 'Academic' by the ancient sources (e.g. Simpl. *in Cat.* 187.10) and this *may* point to some connection with Antiochus' school. However, the differences are so important that they

[52] See Donini 1977: 248.

[53] On the meaning of the phrase καθ' ἡμᾶς, see Fraser 1972: 2.708 n. 96. For the chronology of Aristo and Eudorus, see Fraser 1972: 1.489 (text), 2.708 nn. 95 and 96; Glucker 1978: 96. According to Fraser, both men must have been older than Strabo.

[54] See Moraux 1973: 182 and above, n. 49.

[55] See Glucker 1978: 96–7. David Sedley has suggested to me *per litt.* that Eudorus is rather to be connected with the Philonian Academy, thus anticipating Plutarch as a mildly fallibilist Platonist 'Academic'. The reason is the otherwise very odd juxtaposition in Stobaeus (II.7.2 = 39.20ff.) of the outlines of ethics by (a) Philo the Academic and (b) Eudorus the Academic. I would rather leave the question open, since it is not relevant to the present discussion; for further details see the paper by Mauro Bonazzi in the present collection.

prevent us from drawing any precise conclusion about the relations between Eudorus and his older colleague. The late Hellenistic background which so prominently emerges in the work of Antiochus is less visible in that of Eudorus, who chooses a different 'patronage' for his dogmatic approach, i.e. that of Pythagoras.[56] Although Eudorus remains a somewhat shadowy figure, his historical position is crucial, since he can be regarded as the archegete (or at least one of the very first representatives) of that Pythagorising approach to Plato, which replaced Antiochus' Stoicising reading and profoundly shaped Imperial and late antique philosophical traditions.[57] The Pythagorean turn in Eudorus had a significant impact on the cultural *milieu* around him, if one accepts the hypothesis that at least some of the extant pseudo-Pythagoric forgeries (for examples, pseudo-Archytas' *On Categories* and *On Principles* or pseudo-Timaeus' *On the Nature of the World and the Soul*) were composed in Eudorus' circle at Alexandria.[58]

Here, I want to try to shed some light on the relation between Antiochus' approach to Aristotle and that of Eudorus. In his commentary on *Categories*, Simplicius reports a number of critical arguments of Eudorus, who is mentioned in the list of ancient exegetes I have previously referred to. There has been much speculation about Eudorus' criticism of Aristotle's categories, which has often been regarded as a sort of anticipation of the much later criticism by Nicostratus and Plotinus.[59] Strangely enough, the issue of the relation between Eudorus' approach to Aristotle and that of Antiochus has rarely been tackled by scholars; furthermore, the interpretations formulated so far are (to the best of my knowledge) for the most part unsatisfying. Eudorus' approach has been presented as a reaction against Antiochus' favourable attitude to Aristotle.[60] While Antiochus is happy to use Aristotle in order to elucidate Plato's beliefs, and while he overtly includes Aristotle in the Old Academic tradition, Eudorus' attitude is apparently critical as he maintains that Plato's philosophy is essentially Pythagorean and at odds with Aristotle.[61] It is worth noting from the outset that there are some problems with this interpretation. As already

[56] A (predictable) exception is constituted by Eudorus' ethical views as reported in Stobaeus, which can be characterised as a 'Platonic appropriation' of distinctively Stoic doctrines: see Bonazzi 2007a.

[57] See Mansfeld 1988 and 1992: 274–8, Donini 1994: 5075–80, Bonazzi 2005 and 2007b, Staab 2009: 66–70.

[58] See Szlezák 1972: 15–19; Baltes 1972: 22–3. See the *status quaestionis* in Centrone 1990: 14–5. On Eudorus and ps.-Archytas' *peri archôn*, see Bonazzi 2005: 152–7 and Bonazzi's paper in the present collection.

[59] *Status quaestionis* in Chiaradonna 2009.

[60] Karamanolis 2006: 82.

[61] This traditional view on Eudorus' polemical attitude towards Aristotle's *Categories* has recently been questioned by Tarrant 2008, Chiaradonna 2009 and Griffin 2009.

mentioned, Eudorus has been regarded as the 'inspirer' of some pseudo-Pythagorean forgeries such as pseudo-Archytas' treatise on categories. In his edition, Szlezák (just like Theiler before him) has pointed to a number of parallels between Archytas' distinctive interpretations and those of Eudorus, something which makes this hypothesis attractive (although of course impossible to verify conclusively).[62] If this is the case, however, the anti-Aristotelian interpretation of Eudorus has to face an evident difficulty, since the author of the pseudo-Pythagorean treatise deems Aristotle's doctrine of categories valuable enough to claim it has Pythagorean origins. This difficulty has not escaped the attention of specialists, who nevertheless have not abandoned their usual reading of Eudorus. In my view, the anti-Aristotelian interpretation of Eudorus rests on shaky grounds.

Before focusing on Antiochus' and Eudorus' attitudes to Aristotle, it is worth noting the radical 'qualitative' differences between their arguments. As noted above, Antiochus (or at least Antiochus as reported by Cicero) never quotes or discusses specific Aristotelian texts; rather, he incorporates Aristotle's views in his discussions. The situation is completely different with Eudorus, since most of the extant *testimonia* concerning his reception of Aristotle focus on specific Aristotelian passages. I leave out the interpretation of Simpl. *in Phys.* 181.7–30 = T. 3 Mazzarelli: as shown by Mauro Bonazzi, Eudorus' theory of principles as reported by Simplicius may be based on *Metaphysics* Λ, even though Aristotle is not explicitly referred to in the text.[63] Bonazzi's discussion is in my view convincing, but I will not make use of his conclusions. Instead, I would like to recall some well-known *testimonia* which clearly associate Eudorus with a reading and interpretation of Aristotle's school treatises. The first passage comes from Alexander of Aphrodisias (*in Metaph.* 58.25–59.8 = T. 2 Mazzarelli), who explains that Eudorus proposed a textual amendment to Aristotle's report on Plato's theory of principles at *Metaph.* A.6.988a10–11. Alexander's report is cursory and obscure, but it suffices to establish some important features of Eudorus' approach.[64] There is obviously no reason to suppose that Eudorus wrote a commentary on the *Metaphysics*; instead, it is extremely tempting to connect Eudorus' amendment of Aristotle's text with his Platonic-Pythagorean philosophical project. Aristotle's reports on Plato and the Academy were a crucial source for any account of the Old Academic theory of principles and Eudorus was predictably engaged in a close interpretation of these texts.[65] This, however, implies not a merely

[62] See Szlezák 1972: 17, 132. [63] See Bonazzi 2005 and his paper in the present collection.
[64] There is a vast literature on this passage; further details in Bonazzi 2005: 146–52.
[65] See the studies mentioned above, n. 58.

generic, amateur 'interest' in Aristotle, but a thorough familiarity with parts of the corpus. A gulf, then, divides Antiochus' approach to Aristotle from that of Eudorus and this on account of the different attitudes to Aristotle's writings the two philosophers display. The difference in approach between Antiochus and Eudorus, on the other hand, has nothing to do with the later debate on the 'harmony' between Plato and Aristotle.

During the second half of the century (which is when Eudorus was probably active), the approach to Aristotle had changed substantially even among philosophers like Eudorus, who definitely did not identify themselves as Peripatetic. Whatever the chronological details (and whatever the nature of Andronicus' edition), this fact suggests that the cultural climate was changing and textual work on Aristotle was gaining popularity in increasingly wide circles.[66] Interestingly, this conclusion may be reinforced if one accepts an hypothesis recently put forth by Primavesi, who (against recent mainstream research) accords some credibility to Strabo's report on the 'tunnel in Skepsis' and argues that the renewed circulation of Aristotle's treatises in the first century BC included works that hadn't at all been available in the Hellenistic age: among these, Primavesi includes Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.[67] If this were true, Eudorus' familiarity with Aristotle would not only involve a generic 'interest' in the school treatises, but also a firm connection with the most innovative work carried out on Aristotle in his day.

Eudorus' involvement in the debates of the early commentators is most clearly confirmed by his work *On Categories*. For reasons that still await an adequate explanation, Aristotle's *Categories* had been assigned a dominant position in the early commentary work on Aristotle: almost all of the early commentators had written about this treatise, and their overall interpretations of Aristotle were so strongly based on *Categories* that Marwan Rashed has aptly characterised the reading of Aristotle developed by Andronicus and Boethus, in which the theory of essential form plays no significant role, as '*Catégories*-centrique'.[68] One may suggest that this interest in *Categories* can simply be explained by the material position of this treatise at

[66] Unfortunately, the chronology is far from certain: see the discussion of the evidence in Fraser 1972: 1.489; 2.708 n. 97. Eudorus and Andronicus were approximately contemporaries. However, accepting a late date for Andronicus' work may entail that Aristo and Eudorus wrote their works on Aristotle *before Andronicus*, an hypothesis which Gottschalk 1987: 1096 n. 85 regards as 'very unlikely'. Griffin 2009 is inclined to regard Andronicus' logical reading of *Categories* as a reaction to Eudorus' Neo-Pythagorean approach. The question remains open and the least one can say is that both Eudorus and the early Peripatetic commentators reflect a new textual approach to Aristotle.

[67] See Primavesi 2007: 69–70.

[68] See Rashed 2007a: 42.

the start of Aristotle's corpus[69] but a similar argument runs the risk of being a circular one, since it was probably in the course of the first century BC that *Categories* acquired its strategic introductory position, which may then be the result, rather than the cause, of the interest in the treatise. In a well-known text, Simplicius reports that Andronicus favoured the title *Categories* against those interpreters who entitled the treatise *Preliminaries to the Topics* (*in Cat.* 379.8–10; this title was still accepted by Adrastus in the second century AD: see Simpl. *in Cat.* 15.36ff.). There are difficulties with this report, but a basic conclusion to be drawn is that some interpreters (correctly, according to some recent research)[70] regarded *Categories* as a work on dialectic rather than a general introduction to logic, and Andronicus reacted against them. Even Boethus, who was by far the sharpest early commentator on *Categories*, apparently did not accept the introductory position of this work without reservation, since according to some sources he believed that physics should be assigned the first position in the study of philosophy (see Phlp. *in Cat.* 5.15–10; Elias *in Cat.* 117.15–25; 118.9–13). The introductory position of *Categories*, then, is not an adequate explanation in itself for the popularity it enjoyed among the early commentators.

The evidence concerning this problem has usefully been discussed by Robert Sharples and I refer to his study for further details. Sharples has reached the conclusion that interest in *Categories* should be seen in the context of interpreters (both Peripatetic and non-Peripatetic) trying to make sense of Aristotle's work 'against the background of philosophy known to them'.[71] I completely agree with this conclusion, but not with the subsequent points made by Sharples, who suggests that *Categories*, unlike other works by Aristotle such as *Physics* or *Ethics*, did not obviously fit existing (Hellenistic) agendas and that this is what made the treatise 'both interesting and perplexing';[72] hence its fortune. I am rather inclined to believe that the fortune of Aristotle's *Categories* was connected to the fact that this (short and relatively easy to handle) work fitted the Hellenistic philosophical background of the early commentators very well. Indeed, there is no precise Hellenistic counterpart to the Peripatetic notion of 'category', and what we now call the four Stoic categories were apparently never called such in antiquity.[73] However, Aristotle's *Categories* provides a synthetic, elementary and distinctively non-Stoic account of notions which were certainly current in Hellenistic and late Hellenistic philosophical debates: commenting on this short treatise was then a very straightforward way of

[69] See, however, Sedley's remarks quoted in Sharples 2008: 277 n. 20.
[70] See, for example, Bodéüs 2001. [71] Sharples 2008: 286.
[72] Sharples 2008: 287. [73] See Sharples 2008: 282.

developing a non-Stoic perspective on the problems that shaped the late Hellenistic, distinctively Stoic or 'Stoicising', philosophical background of the late first century BC. This may explain the interest of the early interpreters, both Peripatetic and Platonists; and this may also explain why the Stoic Athenodorus wrote *against* the *Categories* (see Simpl. *in Cat.* 62.25–6).

What has just been noted holds for the treatment of logical notions such as those of genus, species, contrary etc., for the remarks on semantics and predication of *Cat.* 1–4, for the treatment of quality and, most notably, for the notion of the relative (*Cat.* 7), which was (at least from what we know from Simplicius) the main focus of the early commentators (significantly, Simplicius' list of 'ancient' exegetes pertains to their interpretation of the relative) – unsurprisingly enough, given their Hellenistic philosophical background: see Boethus' extensive discussion on the Stoic relative *apud* Simpl. *in Cat.* 167.20 ff.[74] By contrast, some issues that characterise late antique interpretations of *Categories* (for example, the extensive discussion of substance and the attempt to make Aristotle's views on substance in *Categories* compatible with what he says elsewhere on matter and essential form) were apparently not important for the agenda of the early commentators. Even when these commentators tackled such issues, their solutions were significantly different from those of their later colleagues (this is best shown by Boethus' famous thesis that Aristotle's substantial form falls outside substance: see Simpl. *in Cat.* 78.10–20).[75]

Eudorus' extant *testimonia* on *Categories* correspond to this overall *panorama*. They all come from Simplicius' chapters on quality and relative. This cannot suggest any precise conclusion about the character of Eudorus' work *Categories*. (A commentary? A monograph on specific exegetical problems? A treatise on the doctrine of *Categories*? All hypotheses should be left open, although the first one seems by far the least plausible.) Eudorus' interest in the categories of quality and relativity nevertheless suffices to place him in the mainstream of first-century BC *Categories* exegesis.

Most of the fragments of Eudorus preserved by Simplicius propose *aporiai* and objections to particular aspects of Aristotle's theory; Eudorus' views are interestingly preceded by verbs such as αἰτιᾶται and ἐγκαλεῖ (see Simpl. *in Cat.* 174.14 = T. 15 Mazzarelli; 187.10 = T. 16 Mazzarelli; 236.28 = T. 18 Mazzarelli; 246.22 = T. 19 Mazzarelli). As noted above, Eudorus has sometimes been regarded as a Platonist opponent of Aristotle and his approach has been compared to that of later 'Platonist' opponents of his, such as Nicostratus or Plotinus. This view is based for the most part

[74] See Marwan Rashed's discussion in the present volume.

[75] See Reinhardt 2007: 524–7.

on a short passage, where Simplicius reports Eudorus' view on the order of categories (*in Cat.* 206.10–15 = T. 17 Mazzarelli); indeed Simplicius suggests here that Eudorus regarded Aristotle's discussions as pertaining to 'sensible' substance. However, there is simply no reason to suppose that Eudorus anticipated the objection formulated by Nicostratus and Plotinus that Aristotle's treatment is incomplete, since it leaves out the intelligible *ousia* (see Simpl. *in Cat.* 73.15–28 = Lucius, T. 5 Gioè; 76.13–17 = Nicostratus, T. 13 Gioè; Plot. 6.1 [42], 1.28–30). As I see it, the 'Eudorus–Nicostratus–Plotinus' genealogy is a mere scholarly construction, no trace of which can be found in the extant evidence. The evidence is too meagre to draw any certain conclusion, but nothing prevents us from supposing that Eudorus embraced the same Platonising interpretation of the *Categories* given by ps.-Archytas (*Cat.* 30.23–31.1 Thesleff), according to whom all of Aristotle's categories pertain to the physical world with the exception of substance, which includes *both* all sensible and transcendent beings. Since I have already developed this point elsewhere, I will not go into it.[76] Here, I would rather focus on another short passage, which can be taken as evidence for Eudorus' hostile stance. At *in Cat.* 174.14–16 (*ad* Arist. *Cat.* 7.6a36–6b14; Eudorus T. 15 Mazzarelli) Simplicius reports that 'Eudorus is critical, asking why, although the relative is contrasted with the *per se*, Aristotle has discussed the relatives and not the *per se*' (trans. Fleet). The ultimate origin of the bi-categorial division proposed by Eudorus is Plato's *Sophist* (255c–d); the division was endorsed by Xenocrates (Simpl. *in Cat.* 63.22–4 = fr. 95 Isnardi Parente) and a similar division of 'beings' between *kath' hauta* and *pros hetera* is ascribed to Hermodorus (Simpl. *in Phys.* 248.2–5 = fr. 7 Isnardi Parente). It would be tempting to come to the conclusion that Eudorus aimed to replace the tenfold Aristotelian division of categories with the Platonic and Academic bi-partition.

The above conclusion, however, lacks any firm ground to support it. Nothing suggests that Eudorus aimed to replace Aristotle's categories with a different classification. The opposite is rather the case, and Eudorus' multiple objections to particular aspects should not conceal the crucial fact that he did not reject Aristotle's *Categories* at all. In fact, his *aporiai* on quality and his discussion of the order of categories rather show that Eudorus proposed a different, emended *arrangement* of Aristotle's categories, without in any way suppressing them.[77] Simplicius' report may at most show

[76] See Chiaradonna 2009.

[77] See the balanced account of Tarrant 2008: 593, who regards Eudorus as a 'Platonically-inclined philosopher who struggled with the details of some Aristotelian texts'. Griffin 2009 stresses Eudorus' effort to assimilate *Categories* into a Pythagorean framework.

that Eudorus connected Aristotle's division with the 'Platonic-Academic' bipartition and criticised Aristotle for not having sufficiently developed the notion of *per se*. Significantly, ps.-Archytas describes substance as existing *per se* (see *Cat*. 26.21 and Syrianus' testimony *apud* Simpl. *in Cat*. 199.17 = T. 5 Szlezák); it may perhaps be supposed that Eudorus held the same view, but possibly extended the *per se* to quality and quantity too, since according to Simpl. *in Cat*. 206.10–15 Eudorus grouped substance, quality and quantity *together* as opposed to the subsequent temporal and spatial categories (such an extensive interpretation of the *per se* would find an interesting parallel in Lucius' remarks *apud* Simpl. *in Cat*. 156.14–23 = T. 8 Gioè).[78]

Be that as it may, maintaining the Platonic-Academic twofold division of categories *along* with Aristotle's list cannot in any way be seen as a sign of anti-Aristotelian allegiance. In fact, it seems that the early interpreters of *Categories* were happy to use the two categorial schemes together and discussed the problem of their mutual relation. The closest parallel to Eudorus' remarks is given in Simplicius' well-known passage reporting that Andronicus and Xenocrates endorsed bipartition and had reservations (αἰτιῶνται) about the redundancy of Aristotle's division (*in Cat*. 63.22–4). Further parallels come from Lucius *apud* Simplicius and from the anonymous commentary on the *Theaetetus*.[79] The parallel with Andronicus is extremely interesting for several reasons: not only is he reported to endorse the twofold division, but he is also associated with Xenocrates:[80] interestingly, Andronicus' position is overtly presented as a criticism of Aristotle's division. And yet Andronicus was certainly not an Academic opponent of Aristotle; furthermore, everything suggests that he did not give up Aristotle's categories at all. As in the case of Eudorus, it can reasonably be maintained that Andronicus accepted the bi-partition as a *general* division, which might well include Aristotle's tenfold division.[81]

These and other passages show that the early commentators displayed a rather 'free' attitude towards Aristotle: these interpreters could disagree

78 On Lucius' identity and his relation to Eudorus, see now the intriguing (though somewhat speculative) discussion in Griffin 2009. According to Griffin, 'Lucius' might have been originally the fictional interlocutor in a commentary by Boethus of Sidon. Lucius might have represented the Neo-Pythagorean approach to Aristotle's treatises originated by Eudorus, against which Boethus addressed his criticism.

79 See Lucius *apud* Simpl. *in Cat*. 156.14–23 = T. 8 Gioè; An. *in Theaet*. col. LXVIII.7–15. See Sedley 1997: 117.

80 This is not an isolated case: see the testimony about Xenocrates' and Andronicus' views on the soul in Themistius, *in de An*. 32.19–31, with the discussion by Rashed 2004: 45–8. See also the recent discussion by Griffin 2009.

81 See Reinhardt 2007: 518–21.

with Aristotle, even though Aristotle was treated as an authority. Boethus' view on substance and essential form, Xenarchus' discussion of the fifth element and Andronicus' discussion of the categories are all examples of the same attitude, which is extremely different from that of later commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias.[82] In addition, Andronicus' views on the twofold division show that Academic theories were discussed (and endorsed), along with those of Aristotle, even outside Academic circles.[83] Again, Boethus of Sidon provides a further confirmation of this fact: Simplicius (*in Cat*. 36.28–31) reports that Boethus criticised Aristotle for neglecting what 'the moderns' (i.e. the Stoics) call synonyms and Speusippus called 'polyonyms'; furthermore, Boethus claimed that Aristotle followed Plato in his first definition of the relative in *Categories*, Chapter 7 (see Simpl. *in Cat*. 159.12 ff.). All this points to the distinctively fluid situation of the first century BC, which was previously noted with regard to Aristo's and Cratippus' vicissitudes. Eudorus' objections to particular aspects of the categories in no way make him an adversary of Aristotle. It seems more likely that Eudorus aimed to revise some details of Aristotle's views in order to *integrate* them in his overall Platonic-Pythagorean project. If this were the case, Eudorus' approach is remarkably similar to that of ps.-Archytas. Indeed, his overall project was different from that of early commentators such as Andronicus and Boethus, but this difference is not captured at all by the antithesis between a 'favourable' and a 'hostile' attitude to Aristotle.

To sum up, Eudorus cannot be connected to any reaction against Antiochus' favourable attitude to Aristotle; instead, their overall philosophical projects are remarkably similar: both aimed to integrate an emended version of Aristotle's philosophy within their renewed dogmatic Platonism and this was certainly linked to the increased interest in Aristotle that characterised the philosophical milieu in which they operated. There is simply no trace of the later debate on the 'harmony or difference' between Plato and Aristotle in first-century BC Platonism. However, a gulf separates the way in which Antiochus and Eudorus implemented their overall projects. Antiochus' dogmatic Platonism points to a markedly late Hellenistic cultural atmosphere, in which Stoicism had a dominant position and the textual work on Aristotle's school treatises was either absent or modest; Eudorus' dogmatic Platonism instead has a Pythagorean patronage and points to a phase of the Aristotle reception in which the textual work on the treatises

[82] This was already noted by Moraux 1973: 147–8; see also Frede 1999: 793. On Xenarchus' attitude, see the article by Andrea Falcon in this volume (with a criticism of Moraux's overall account of the early commentators).

[83] See Frede 1999: 787.

was being assimilated by an increasing number of philosophers. To sum up: Antiochus' reception of Aristotle can be seen as a late Hellenistic phenomenon and is close to the methods of such Peripatetic philosophers as Critolaus;[84] instead, that of Eudorus is definitely post-Hellenistic and is closely connected with the work of the early commentators.

CONCLUSION

Towards the end of the first century BC, the work of Eudorus marked a turn in the Platonist reception of Aristotle. One might have expected that this shift would have had immediate consequences for philosophy in the following period. Yet the situation is different. It is rather the case that the explosion of interest in Aristotle's school treatises in the second half of the first century BC abated in the decades that followed. The pseudo-Pythagorean forgeries show familiarity with parts of Aristotle's school treatises, and this also holds true for other works, which have been – not uncontroversially – dated to somewhere around the first century BC (for example, the author of the anonymous commentary on *Theaetetus* is familiar with Aristotle's *Topics*).[85] Yet (as far as we can tell from the extant sources) this familiarity did not extend beyond limited parts of the corpus: i.e. those which had been the focus of interest during the first century BC. Furthermore, the popular 'doxographical' literature was in no way replaced by the exegetical work of the commentators: Plutarch's references to Aristotle, for instance, often do not originate from a textual work on the school treatises[86] (in fact, Plutarch possibly wrote on the *Topics* and *Categories*, but this does not mark any real improvement with respect to the situation in the first century BC). After flourishing in the first century BC, the Peripatetic tradition apparently underwent a period of stagnation in the first century AD: evidence concerning commentators in this century is meagre to say the least, the only real exception being Alexander of Aigai, the Peripatetic teacher of the Emperor Nero.[87] It seems, then, that it took much time to assimilate the crucial transformations of the philosophical landscape that took place in the first century BC. Seneca's

[84] See above, n. 25.

[85] Sedley 1995: 254–6 and 1997 suggests an early date for the anonymous commentator (first century BC). His arguments are critically discussed in Brittain 2001: 249–54 and Bonazzi 2003.

[86] See above, n. 10.

[87] See Moraux 1984: 222–5. Sotion and Achaicus are other (shadowy) figures, who may have been active during the first century AD: see Moraux 1984: 211–21. Aristocles of Messene was probably active at the same time, but he was anything but a commentator: survey in Karamanolis 2006: 37–41.

famous plea against the 'philological' character of philosophy in his day (*ep*. 108.23) points to an increasing practice of textual and exegetical work, but apparently no substantial progress was made in the interpretation of Aristotle's school treatises for many decades after Andronicus and Boethus. This long lull may perhaps be seen as the mark of a slow yet gradually increasing assimilation of Aristotle's school treatises before the explosion of the great Peripatetic commentators in the second century AD, which culminated with the monumental work of Alexander of Aphrodisias.

The flourishing of the Aristotelian commentary tradition in the second century AD certainly had an impact on the Platonist tradition of the time. Indeed, what we know about second-century Platonists shows that the discussion of Aristotle was a major issue for them, so much so that Nicostratus wrote a very critical work on Aristotle's *Categories* and Atticus vehemently reacted against the increasing contamination of Plato's doctrines with those of Aristotle. Unfortunately, the evidence concerning second-century Platonists is meagre and we are not well informed about figures such as Taurus, who certainly had an important position in these debates (he wrote a treatise *On the Difference between the Doctrines of Plato and Aristotle*: see 3 T. (ed. Gioè)). Second-century Platonists were certainly well familiar with Aristotle's philosophy and there was a lively debate at the time about the 'harmony' and 'difference' between Plato and Aristotle (as previously mentioned, nothing of the sort can be found in the first-century BC tradition). However, whether this debate entailed any extensive work on Aristotle's treatises and a thorough familiarity with the exegetical work of the Peripatetic commentators remains an open question. Our extant sources do not suggest any such conclusion and this even holds true for Atticus, whose numerous polemical discussions of Aristotle show no traces of extensive work on Aristotle's treatises and the Peripatetic commentators.[88] As noted earlier on, Sextus and Diogenes show that the late Hellenistic tradition on Aristotle was well alive even around 200 AD, when Alexander of Aphrodisias was developing his exegetical work. As a matter of fact, it is only with third-century Platonists that the work of the Peripatetic commentators was fully assimilated in the Platonist tradition. Again, the reasons for this are impossible to determine with any certainty, but it is safe to assume that the exegetical work of Alexander of Aphrodisias had a crucial position in the later reception of Aristotle. Plotinus' impressive knowledge of Aristotle's treatises and Porphyry's commentaries

[88] See Moraux 1984: 580.

are based on Alexander and mark a real turn, which deeply affected the course of philosophy in later centuries.[89]

[89] The distinction between 'Middle' and 'Neo' Platonism has often been questioned after the influential discussion by Frede 1987. Indeed, such modern historical categories may convey a misleading or oversimplified picture of ancient Platonism (but see the very convincing defence of the notion of 'Middle Platonism' in Donini 1990). At least as far as the reception of Aristotle is concerned, however, it can plausibly be assumed that Plotinus and Porphyry actually represnted a crucial turn in ancient Platonism, since (as we can judge from the extant evidence) they were the first Platonists who were extensively familiar with Aristotle's school treatises and with the Peripatetic commentary tradition: see Chiaradonna 2008b and Chiaradonna and Rashed 2010: 267–70. From this perspective, the third century AD certainly marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of ancient Platonism.

CHAPTER 3

Boethus' Aristotelian ontology

Marwan Rashed

Boethus is surely one of the most important thinkers of the first century BC. Though only few testimonies, and no clear fragment, remain, their number and content are sufficient to show how insightful he was in commenting upon Aristotle.[1] It is not just that he was typical of this first generation of commentators who have struck modern historians by the free spirit with which they approached Aristotle's text.[2] Boethus' fragments on substance testify to more than a free attitude towards the Philosopher: it is also possible to recognise, through the many layers of the tradition – Alexander, Porphyry, Iamblichus and Simplicius – a coherent and unitary doctrine. His doctrine, of course, is not un-Aristotelian; it does not even stand somewhere halfway between Aristotle and other thinkers of antiquity, the Stoics in particular (even if it is obviously inspired by a general Stoic atmosphere). Boethus has consciously built, out of a few indications in the text of Aristotle, a certain kind of Aristotelianism among other possible ones.[3] This doctrinal approach is probably both the cause and the effect of a cultural fact: the Peripatos' nearly exclusive focus, in the first century BC, on the *Categories*.[4] For sure, the treatise of the *Categories*, by itself, does not necessarily produce a definite account of the world. But by contrast with what is the case with other parts of the Aristotelian corpus, its basic ontological features seem naturally at home in the framework of a doctrine upholding the primacy of the individual material substance.

I would like to thank the participants in the Cambridge Conference for their helpful suggestions and remarks. I am particularly grateful to David Sedley and Malcolm Schofield, who read a first draft of this paper and provided me with a number of comments.

[1] Curiously enough, there has been until now no collection of Boethus' fragments. I am currently working, together with Riccardo Chiaradonna and Philippe Hoffmann, on just such a project. Our book, to be published with de Gruyter, will include all the fragments (Greek and Arabic), a French translation, and a commentary.

[2] See Moraux 1973: 98–9 and 105–13.

[3] See Rashed 2007a: 22–6.

[4] See R. Chiaradonna's chapter in the present volume.

BOETHUS' CRITERION OF SUBSTANTIALITY

1. Boethus' theory of substance and predication

It is not just blind following of the tradition – dictated by ignorance of any of the treatises of the Aristotelian corpus other than the *Categories* – if Boethus decided to put matter and the primary substance of the *Categories* at the centre of his ontology. A fragment preserved by Simplicius testifies to the fact that (i) he was aware of the tripartition of *Metaphysics* Z; (ii) he consciously interpreted this tripartition as a *choice* between three possible candidates to the title of substance; and (iii) he opted, against the obvious invitation of *Metaphysics* Z, for what could resemble the first substances of the *Categories*, if one is to follow Aristotle's famous fourfold distinction:[5]

	in a subject	not in a subject
said of a subject	general properties	genera, species and differentiae of primary substances
not said of a subject	particular properties	primary substances

Only matter and the composite of matter and form, so Boethus, will match the criteria for being a (first) substance.[6] Let us translate Simplicius' important testimony:

It would have been more convenient, [Boethus] says, to mention an extra difficulty, namely that whereas in other writings, after having divided substance in three, he said that substance is said to be in different senses the matter, the form and the composite, he claims here that substance is a unitary category. But what is this category, and how will he subordinate to it these three substances, which are not said according to the same account? Addressing this question, Boethus says that the account of the primary substance is suitable to the matter and the composite. For to both of them belongs the fact of neither being said of a subject nor being in a subject (since none of them is in something else). This being said, the composite, even if it is not in something else, has the form which is in it as something being in something else, namely the matter, whereas the matter does not even have something which would be in something else. They have therefore something common and something different, inasmuch as matter is matter of

[5] *Cat.* 2.1a20–b 9.

[6] As remarked by R. Chiaradonna in his forthcoming commentary (see above, n. 1), 'Dans tout cet argument, Boèthos passe directement de la 'catégorie de substance' à la 'substance première': c'est comme si les substances secondes n'existaient pas dans les *Catégories*.' Chiaradonna devotes a fine analysis to Boethus' critical stance with regard to the universals.

something *qua* matter, as well as subject, whereas the composite substance is not *of* something. Thus, says Boethus, the matter and the composite will belong to the category of substance, while the form will be outside substance and fall into some other category, either quality or quantity or some other one.[7]

First or *genuine* substances must be *genuine* subjects, i.e. things existing *per se*, things of which everything else is predicated without being themselves possibly predicated of anything. And in an Aristotelian framework, quantities and qualities do not exist *per se*: they need a material subject to inhere in. Hence Boethus' ontological claim: since to be a substance is to be a real subject of predication, it follows that to be a substance is to be a material subject. To be what we might call a worldly substance – i.e. to be anything except (perhaps) the Prime Mover – is, for Boethus, to be a concrete and unitary lump of matter. His system, up to this point, seems coherent. Its basic principle is the following:

X is a substance iff X is a subject and X is not in a subject.

As Simplicius' testimony makes clear, Boethus is conscious of the radical implications of his claim. He knows that if the individual substances of the *Categories* are Aristotle's last ontological word, the claim of the form to substantiality, such as we find it expressed in the central books of the *Metaphysics*, becomes very problematic, to say the least.[8] But Boethus is not the kind of commentator to conceal every difficulty in a verbose mess. He is a philosopher, who accepts the consequences of his ontological decisions, even if they appear to contradict Aristotle's authority. That is obviously the reason why he explicitly rejects the substantiality of the form. The form is in a subject, and the form is very unlikely to be a subject.

2. *Boethus on inherence*

Which kind of texts might Boethus have in mind when claiming that the form was, after all, a predicate or, what for him amounted to the same, something inhering in some material subject, and not itself a subject? A first answer may be that he was simply taking literally the passages of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle himself spoke of the form as a predicate of the matter.[9] I would of course not reject a possible influence of these texts of

[7] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 78.5–20.

[8] I shall come back to this question below, pp. 58–9, 67–72.

[9] For a complete list, see Brunschwig 1979: 131–66. Brunschwig argues, and I am convinced, that the 'predication' at stake in these passages in not the kind we find in the *Categories*. It is rather a *determination* of the matter by the form, i.e. a kind of relation which does not preclude, as such, the substantiality of the form.

the *Metaphysics*. But another piece of evidence suggests another possibility which, in view of the later evolution of the problem, appears to me more promising: the list of the various kinds of *being in something* (ἔν τινι εἶναι) at *Physics* 4.3.210a 14–24:

The next step we must take is to see in how many ways one thing is said to be *in* another. In one way, as a finger is in a hand, and generally a part in a whole. In another way, as a whole is in its parts; for there is no whole over and above the parts. Again, as man is in animal, and in general a species in a genus. Again, as the genus is in the species, and in general a part of the species in its definition. Again, as health is in the hot and the cold, and in general the form in the matter. Again, as the affairs of Greece are in the King [i.e. in the hands of the Great King], and generally events are in their primary motive agent. Again, as a thing is in its good, and generally in its end, i.e. in that for the sake of which. And most properly of all, as something is in a vessel, and generally in a place.[10]

The first thing to be recalled is that these lines come from Aristotle's treatment of place. We are sure, for at least three reasons, that Boethus read them with some attention. First, we are told by later commentators that Boethus considered physics to be an appropriate starting point for philosophy.[11] The reason was probably that according to him, Aristotle's *Physics* contained a description of the natural world around us, which is necessary before embarking on the study of logic. The second reason is that we find attested, in Themistius' and Simplicius' commentaries on the *Physics*, that Boethus objected to Aristotle's conception of the relation between time and the counting soul.[12] That betrays a fairly good knowledge of *Physics* 4, where our text on the various types of inherence appears. Third, this text *may* have been quoted extensively, and rephrased, in at least one place in Boethus' commentary on the *Categories*. The Byzantine manuscript *Laur*. 71.32 has notoriously preserved interesting fragments from a lost commentary on that work, which has been attributed to Boethus by Pamela Huby.[13] And one of these fragments is an account of the various significations of 'in something' obviously inspired by *Physics* 4.3. Here is the text in question:

(1) 'In something' has eleven uses: as the attribute is *in* the substance [ὡς τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ], as the parts are *in* the whole, as the whole is *in* the parts, as the form is *in* the matter [ὡς τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ], and further as the genus is *in* the species and the species *in* the genus, and in addition to these the affairs

[10] I quote from *ROTA*, vol. 1, p. 357. [11] Philoponus, *in Cat.* 5.16–18; Elias, *in Cat.* 117.21–2.
[12] Simplicius, *in Phys.* 759.18–20, Themistius, *in Phys.* 160.26–8.
[13] Huby 1981: 398–409. I will come back to this ascription below, p. 71, n. 43.

of the subjects are '*in*' [= dependent upon] the ruler and those of the ruler '*in*' the subjects, and as being *in* a vessel or *in* place and time. (2) Well, since there are so many uses of 'in something', it is worth asking why it is only in respect of those two relations that categories have been established. We say: some of the other meanings of 'in something' complement each other, like the parts and the whole and the genera and the species and the ruler and the subjects. (3) Others cannot subsist separately, like the form [*eidos*] in the matter and the attribute in the subject, which is also the shape [form, *morphē*] of the subject; for this reason the subject is given a name with reference to it, such as 'white' and 'having increased', and [so] with the other categories that exist in substance. How then in these cases could the one thing be *in* the other in the strict sense, when they do not even exist substantially in the strict sense separated from each other, but only in the thought in which we separate the genera? (4) For this reason each of the [cases] like this was not judged worthy of a category of its own; but the things that are in time and in place were [judged worthy]. In these alone, since one [thing] contains and the other is contained, each preserving its own nature and neither becoming a part of the other or complementing the other. (5) For in these alone 'in something' becomes a definite nature subsisting in the relation; and for this reason each of them has been judged worthy of a category of its own. For the things that are in time and in place are most clearly different from time and place; that is why things which are numerically identical are at different times in a different place and time.[14]

In this list in the *Physics*, the crucial sentence for us is ' . . . as health is in the hot and the cold, and in general the form in the matter' (lines 20–1). Health and, more generally (ὅλως), form, are entities inhering in a subject. The health, even if it is somehow essential to the living body or its part, inheres in them, so that we rightly say: 'Peter is healthy' or 'Peter's heart is healthy'; similarly, the form is inherent in the subject in the sense that it would be impossible for it to exist, were not some matter ready to receive it. The author of the fragment preserved in *Laur*. 71.32, however, does *not* assimilate the inherence of the form in the matter to that of the attribute in the substance. His immediate aim is to explain why, among the many uses of 'in something', there are only two categories concerned, namely place and time. His answer is that these two categories are the only ones where a *real* (i.e. not merely *in thought*) relation takes place between what contains and what is contained. The other cases are explained away on two main grounds. Some items 'complement each other'. That probably means that there is a sort of circle taking place between them. The author implicitly holds that as soon as the genus is 'in' the species and the species

[14] The fragment is edited in Waitz 1844–6: i.22.28–23.8. I borrow the English translation from Sharples 2010: 67.

'in' the genus, neither the genus nor the species is an independent being, characterised by a category *per se*. Other items, on the other hand, 'cannot subsist separately'. Here, we have no circle. The substance is not 'in' its attribute. Only the attribute is in the substance. But the attribute cannot be given a category, since it cannot exist without the substance, nor the substance without it. The reason for this is probably that every *particular* attribute needs a subject to inhere in, and that every subject cannot exist deprived of *any* attribute. The inherence of the form in the matter belongs to this type. But if it does really differ from the inherence of the attribute in the substance, we should probably conclude that the form does not belong to any secondary category. Before discussing this issue below, we cannot but stress, for the time being, that the present fragment remains ambiguous. As such, its formulation might be accepted by someone holding that the form falls in a category other than substance, as well as by someone claiming that the form *is* substance.

Despite this negative result, I think that this text of the *Physics* is crucial for our understanding of why Boethus did not accept the form to be a substance. An interesting clue appears later in Simplicius' commentary, when the discussion focuses on the tenth category, that of *having* (ἔχειν). The Stoics, Boethus tells us, are wrong to rank ἔχειν under πῶς ἔχειν. They do not grasp that σχέσις is a homonymous term. For a σχέσις is either 'of the thing to itself', or 'of the thing to something else', or 'of something else to the subject'.[15] Among these three significations, the first one expresses a πῶς ἔχειν, the second a relation (πρός τι) and the third, so we understand, a 'possession' in the restricted and proper meaning of the term.[16] Then follows a difficult passage, which I translate in its entirety:

Unless we have, says Boethus, as significations [σημαινόμενα)] of *having*, on the one hand what amounts to having anything, either part or field, which is perhaps also what signifies [σημαίνεται] the expression taken in itself and, on the other hand, all these other things, in syntactical composition. For if 'the field', or 'the father', or 'the part' is put ahead, it produces the differentia'. To this sense [σημασίαν] of *having*, he says, is subordinated some other one, which is assigned, in particular, to the case of *possessing*. 'If then someone sets up the category according to its first signification [κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον σημαινόμενον], he will include into this category *being-wise* [τὸ φρονεῖν], *being-prudent* [τὸ σωφρονεῖν] and *being-healthy* [τὸ ὑγιαίνειν] – for *being-wise* amounts to having wisdom – while we will take apart from it the category of action and passion and it will be separated from the relative (for the man who has acquired will belong to the relative, the fact of having acquired to the *having*, the father to the relative, the fact of being a

[15] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 373.7–18. [16] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 373.7–18.

father inhering itself in that of *having* a son). But if it is according to its second signification [κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον <*sc.* σημαινόμενον>], the other significations of having [τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοῦ ἔχειν σημαινόμενα] will be included into the other categories, while only the cases of possession of some possessed item will belong to this one. Such is our account of the considerations of the noble Boethus.[17]

We must be cautious, when interpreting this text, not to be misled by the careless use made by its author of the word σημαινόμενον. When he employs it in the plural (σημαινόμενα), the author refers to the different significations of the various formulae in which the verb ἔχειν appears. He is not there speaking of the different significations of the category of *having*. When he alludes to that point, he uses the same word in the singular (σημαινόμενον). Thus, 'the first σημαινόμενον' and 'the second σημαινόμενον' (singular) are not, respectively, the first and the second sense of the *word* ἔχειν, but the ways in which the *category* itself is to be understood. Once we have grasped that point, the text is rather plain. Boethus suggested two possible extensions for the category of ἔχειν. According to the first, it includes the second kind of significations (σημαινόμενα), i.e. those where ἔχειν may signify either a possession or more than a simple possession. According to the second, it includes only the first kind, i.e. those significations according to which ἔχειν refers to 'the possession of some possessed item'.

The most remarkable feature of this text, for us, is its readiness to consider *being-healthy* (ὑγιαίνειν) as translatable into *having-health*. The case at stake, in Aristotle's text, was 'having as a state and condition or some other quality (we are said to have knowledge and virtue)'.[18] Boethus added a new example, which had no textual basis in the *Categories*. By so doing, he reminds us of our passage of the *Physics*. Thus, if the form *is in* the matter as one of the cases of ἔν τινι, it is because the matter *has* the form. The matter, then, is clearly the *subject* of the form.

*3. A confirmation: 'substance', 'relative' (*sic*) and 'having' according to Boethus*

We must here face a difficulty. In the text just translated, the father is said to be a correlate (πρός τι), the *being-a-father* a possession (namely, the possession of a son). Similarly, the *possessor* was a correlate, his *possessing*

[17] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 373.18–32.

[18] *Cat.* 15.15b18–19: . . . ὡς ἕξιν καὶ διάθεσιν ἢ ἄλλην τινὰ ποιότητα· λεγόμεθα γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν καὶ ἀρετήν.

a case of having. But we know from those who read Alexander's lost commentary on the *Physics* that Boethus drew a distinction between the word 'matter' (ὕλη), which refers to a physical state deprived of form, and the word 'subject' (ὑποκείμενον), which designates matter inasmuch as it is envisaged in its connection with a form.[19] If our argument is valid, accordingly, we should say that what Aristotle calls 'matter' in the passage of the *Physics* is matter as connected with form, i.e. ὕλη as a ὑποκείμενον. Secondly, and more importantly, we should conclude that the subject, by definition (to be a subject is to be a subject *of something*), is a correlate. But in this case, and if we hold that no relative is a substance, the subject will not be a substance, which contradicts the main principle of Boethus' ontology.

The answer is that Boethus seems very keen on distinguishing, for every item, its concrete nature when it is taken in itself, from its functional being, which belongs to it insofar as it interacts with other items. The crucial sentence, from this point of view, appears at the end of the text just translated: 'the man who has acquired will belong to the relative, the fact of having acquired to the having, the father to the relative, the fact of being a father inhering itself in that of having a son'. Taken in itself, *father* belongs to the category of relation, because it denotes nothing but the fact of being a relative, i.e. one element in a set of at least two correlated elements. But the relation itself, which links together this relative to its correlative (the son), belongs to the category of having.

Prima facie, we might try to transpose this distinction to the case of the subject and its form. Boethus would have said that the subject taken in itself (i.e. as matter) will belong to the category of substance, the fact of being a subject to the category relation, and the very fact of being the subject of this form to that of having. All the more so, since it is actually more or less what he says, in an apparently similar case, when he addresses the question of the category to which the parts of the body will belong:

Boethus was right to concede that the hand and the head belong to the relatives inasmuch as they are parts, but not inasmuch as they are hand, i.e. not by the very fact of being a hand or a head – for in such a way, according to him, they are substances. Let us then now consider their being relatives as dictated by their being parts with respect to wholes, and nothing absurd will follow.[20]

[19] See Themistius, *in Phys.* 26.20 sqq. and Simplicius, *in Phys.* 211.15–18.
[20] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 188.3–7.

Similarly, the subject *qua* subject, i.e. as a correlate of the form, will belong to the category of πρός τι; its being informed will fall in the category of having: it is because the material subject *has* a form that it is informed; and the subject *qua* matter will be substance, as well as the father *qua* man is substance.

But that would be to forget that according to the fragment in *Laur.* 71.32, which again may have Boethus as its author, the inherence of the form or the accident *as such* is insufficient to produce a category of its own, for the reason that the form and the accident are nothing but 'dependences' of the subject they inhere in. Boethus' answer would therefore have been more radical: we cannot view subject and form as two relatives because a relation, in order to hold true, must link together at least two *subjects*.[21] That is precisely why Boethus addressed this aporia in the case of the parts and the whole, but not of matter and form.

This discussion sheds some light, by contrast, on an issue which will be important when we come to address Alexander's position, i.e. that of knowing whether we can consider matter and form as two parts of the composite. For Boethus, the answer is clearly negative. The passage in the *Physics*, by distinguishing the form in the matter from the part in the whole, is enough to exclude, implicitly, the possibility of considering the form as a part of the composite – since the form is dependent upon the matter for its existence. Alexander does not agree. On the contrary, he will not refrain from justifying that the form is a substance by relying on the fact that it is a part of the composite substance.

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS AGAINST BOETHUS ON SUBSTANCE

Alexander's opposition to Boethus allows us to see more clearly in what sense Boethus' ontology is neither a piece of 'Aristotelian orthodoxy' nor un-Aristotelian, but nothing but a possible way of reading Aristotle. The main interest of the commentators is precisely to construct, out of different possible doctrines latent in the Master's corpus, a coherent interpretation. The tensions, and even the contradictions, in Aristotle's writings are what have given rise to Boethus' interpretation, which identified the substance with the subject of the predication, and to Alexander's alternative reading, which, as we shall immediately see, tried to substitute Boethus' matter by form at the centre of Aristotle's ontology.

[21] More on this below, pp. 75–6.

1. *The parts of the substance are substances*

In a plurality of texts,[22] Alexander maintains the substantiality of the form by relying on the principle that

the parts of the substance are substances.

The substance in question is obviously the σύνολον, the parts of which are the matter and the form. In the majority of the texts where he mentions this principle, Alexander formulates it as if it were an analytical rule. The mere fact of being a substance and of having parts would analytically lead to the conclusion that these parts also are substances.

Let us first try to figure out a case where such a rule may hold true. A simple example would be that of two-dimensional figures. Since neither the line nor the point is a part of a figure, we are entitled to say that the parts of any two-dimensional figure are two-dimensional figures. This proposition is true (i.e. the state of affairs it describes holds true) because it is plain, in this case, that being two-dimensional is an analytical condition of being a part of a two-dimensional figure. The case is non-problematic because: (i) a two-dimensional figure is equivalent to the sum of its two-dimensional parts, and, more importantly perhaps, because (ii) any conceivable part of a two-dimensional figure is an *extended* part of this figure.

The case of the biological substance is more difficult, chiefly because we do not know how to define the 'part' of a living body. First, it is not plain that any three-dimensional part of our constitutive matter is a *part* of our living body. If, for instance, I am cutting an arbitrary slice of a human body, I will extract from it a three-dimensional cylinder but not a real *part* of this living body. To be a part of a living body is to have some functional unity, as in the case of its external members or internal organs. It is a crucial aspect of Aristotle's biological ontology to claim that the living substance's organs are substances. His reason for this doctrine has probably something to do with the impossibility of giving a satisfactory definition, in terms of form and matter, of the living body as a whole. The pseudo-definition of man as 'rational mortal animal', apart from not being truly Aristotelian, conceals the fact that we would be wholly unable to give a similar definition for any other creature.

Alexander, however, never accepted the 'biological turn' represented in Aristotle's *de Partibus Animalium*. This text is in fact the only surviving major treatise by Aristotle that he *never* quotes. Not only does he make

[22] I have discussed these texts in Rashed 2007a: 35–81.

no mention of the physiology of Books 2–4, but, more interestingly, even the methodology of the first book is totally absent from his commentaries and his own monographs. Alexander tries, again and again, to make the 'real' substance – which corresponds to the biological species – and the definition coincide. That explains why when he asserts PSS, he is not primarily thinking of the bodily parts of the living being, but of its parts as a σύνολον, namely matter and form.

This strategy, however, gives rise to still greater difficulties. First, even if they are not solely *extended* parts, the bodily organs are *also* extended. Each one clearly exists, with its own identity and causal distinctiveness – i.e., each one is a relatively independent body which exists as such for the sake of something. Nothing similar in the case of matter and form, which are distinguishable only on the basis of an analogy between living beings and artefacts. But even this dubious operation is not sufficient to produce a clear idea of each of them. What actually *is* the form of man, as opposed to his matter? The most we can say is that each human being occupies a three-dimensional space characterised by a precise kind of informing of matter. Sublunar matter is organised in this space in such a way that *there* is a man and not, for example, a bronze charioteer or a corpse.

As a consequence, it is hardly possible to interpret PSS as analytical. As soon as we take it this way, it has simply no meaning, because, except in the case of the bodily organs which is precisely *not* at stake here, we have no clear idea of what a part of a substance is – i.e. we have no clear idea of how matter and form can be viewed as *parts* rather than mere *elements* of the σύνολον.

Another interesting difficulty is that Alexander never in fact uses this principle in order to assess the substantiality of the matter. This circumstance in itself provides a good indication of the polemical context he is engaged in. PSS, which appears for the first time under Alexander's pen (and which I guess he was the first to articulate in this sense),[23] was motivated by the necessity of answering Boethus' theory of substance and predication. In other words, Alexander agrees that matter has some substantiality of its own. What he wants to show is that form is at least as substantial as Boethus' matter.

But if not analytical, and if in practice not even symmetrical, how then to interpret PSS? It seems to me that Alexander does not use it as a scientific rule, but only as a sort of tag, expressing the epistemic fact that we can know, *on some other grounds*, that the form – and, as we shall see, the form

[23] Cf. Wurm 1973: 184–5 and n. 28.

more than the matter – is substance and that it is the substantiality of the form which in turn explains the substantiality of the composite – the latter being the only clear substance *we* are acquainted with in the phenomenal world. The sole passage where Alexander gives some explanation along these lines is in his monograph *On the Soul*. Probably because he addressed it to a broader audience, he there took pains to explain away some possible misconception:

Each of them [*sc*. form and matter] is, however, substance. For as well as matter being substance, so is form. For the parts of substance are substances, or rather, because each of them is substance, the composite of both is also a substance and a certain unique nature, not like the things stemming from art, which are substances according to the subject and the matter but qualities according to their forms.[24]

This text leaves no doubt as to Alexander's intentions when he relies on PSS. He is here trying to articulate, in terms acceptable to Boethus and those who can be regarded as having followed his basic approach (i.e. people placing the composite at the centre of their ontology), a truth about the substantiality of the form which they explicitly reject. It remains for us to show how Alexander thinks it possible to interpret the form as a substance.

2. *A new theory of inherence*

I shall start with a *Quaestio* preserved only in Arabic, where Alexander aims at showing that the differentia of substance falls in the category of substance and not in some other category. Roughly speaking, his strategy consists in identifying the differentia (διαφορά) with the form (εἶδος), to claim the substantiality of the latter by relying on PSS and to conclude that the differentia belongs to the category of substance. Let us quote the relevant passage, towards the end of the *Quaestio*:

. . . The differentiae of the living being, which are not animals, are, however, substance. For the substance, since it is the genus of the living being, retains its nature as it is, in the composite beings as well as in each one of both things out of which the composite has its existence, namely: the form and the matter, the incorporeal and the corporeal substance.[25]

We find here PSS very crudely expressed. The author makes mention of it in the most analytical formulation possible, so that we may even be tempted to claim that he has deliberately cancelled the real principle at

[24] Alexander, *de Anima*, 6.2–6. [25] See Rashed 2007a: 63–4.

work under the usual tag, in order to make his argument run smoother. But this need not detain us here. What appears to deserve more attention, in the context of PSS, are the lines immediately following:

For the discourse saying that the differentiae of substance are not substances because they do not receive the contraries belongs to someone deprived of understanding. For it is the individuals which are in the substance who receive the contraries, not the genera, the species and the differentiae, since they are all general.[26]

We see that immediately after having dwelt on PSS, Alexander mounts an attack against the *Peripatetic* identification of substantiality with the capacity of receiving the contraries, i.e. obviously, with the fact of being a subject. There is no place I am aware of in the corpus of the Greek commentators where the two criteria are so clearly opposed. Alexander's target here is not the Stoics or some other rival school, but an internal rival interpretation of Aristotle's ontology, put forward, in particular, by Boethus.

In a series of passages, Alexander expressed in nearly the same terms, in the form of a *nota bene* (σημειωτέον), how we are to understand the relation of matter and form.[27] The most complete version appears in his commentary on the passage of the *Physics* we have already discussed in connection with Boethus.[28] It is transmitted under two forms, first in Simplicius' quotation in his own commentary on the *Physics*, and secondly in a more or less direct quotation from Alexander's commentary, preserved in the marginalia of the manuscript *Paris. Suppl. gr*. 643:

It is to be noted that after having given as an example of 'in a subject' the health in the humours (for health is in them as in a subject), he added 'and in general the form in the matter', owing to the fact that the form is in a subject. But also in the second book of his treatise *On the Soul*, after having shown at the beginning that the soul is not a body, he assumed that the soul is 'in a subject' in the body: for what he says there to be 'in a subject' is what is, properly and adequately speaking, a being. He may say then in the *Categories* that no substance is 'in a substrate' *among the things* that are said in the *Categories* to be substances, in the same way as he would say that to *that* substance, nothing is contrary. Unless however all things which are subjects are those in which the things which must be in relation to them are 'in a subject', even if they are not in them in the same way as the things of the *Categories* are said to be 'in a subject'.[29]

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Mantissa* 5, 120.33–121.7 and Simplicius' quotations: *in Phys*. 270.26–34 and 552.18–24, *in de Caelo* 279.5–9.

[28] See above, pp. 54–5.

[29] See Rashed 2011: 191–2.

We do not know whether Boethus himself concluded, from the inherence of the soul in the body, to its non-substantial status. We do know, however, that there was a deeply rooted tendency, in the early Peripatos, to consider the soul as a mere quality. It would not be very surprising, in this historical context, if he took the beginning of *de Anima* 2 as implying the qualitative status of the soul taken as the form of the living body.

Be that as it may, Alexander uses the Aristotelian evidence in an opposite direction. That the soul is more a being (ὄν) than the body seems obvious for him. So is the fact, stressed in the opening chapter of *de Anima* 2, that the soul is in the body.[30] The conclusion is inescapable, and we have already met it in the Arabic *Quaestio:* the fact of being a subject is not a good criterion for substantiality; the *Categories* cannot be Aristotle's last word in ontological matters.

In the Paris fragment, Alexander suggests two possible ways of getting rid of the narrow normativity of the *Categories*. The first is to assume that the criteria of substantiality put forward in this work are relevant only for a peculiar kind of substances, namely the first substances of the *Categories*. Exactly as in the realm of the elements (στοιχεῖα), some substantial forms are contrary to others;[31] we can affirm that some substance may be in a subject, provided that 'subject' is taken in the sense of the *Categories*, but 'substance' is not.

An alternative solution is to introduce another sense not only of the word 'subject', but also of the word 'substance'. The subject, according to this proposal, is always dictated by the needs of what it is the subject of. This solution is constantly put forward by Alexander in a similar context. Let us compare the different expressions of the sentence:

- *In Phys*. 2.1.192b 34 sqq. *ap*. Simpl. 270.32–3: τὸ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς πρὸς τὸ εἶναι χρῇζον ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ νῦν λέγει.
- *In Phys*. 4.3.210a 20–1: πάντα [τὰ] ὑποκείμενα πρὸς ἃ τὰ εἶναι δεόμενα ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστί.
- *In de Caelo* 278b.1–3 *ap*. Simpl. 279.7–8: τὸ εἶδος ἐν ὑποκειμένῃ τῇ ὕλῃ λέγει κοινότερον ὡς ὑποκειμένου τινὸς δεόμενον.
- *Mantissa* 5, 121.6: ὃ δεῖται πρὸς τὸ εἶναι ὑποκειμένου τινός.

In each of these passages, Alexander argues that in the case of the form, to be in a subject does not amount to being 'received' in some underlying matter already there, but to being in need of some matter to exist *qua* form. It is not just a question of terminology. Alexander obviously wants to stress

[30] Alexander is actually simplifying the issue: Aristotle only says that the body as opposed to the soul is subject and matter.

[31] Allusion to *Gen. Corr*. 2.8.335a 3–6.

that we must not envisage the form as passive, i.e. as a pure object or state possessed by the (really existing) subject. He claims, on the contrary, that the form is the real active principle, and that the matter is nothing but a condition of exercise of the form. In other terms, the matter is nothing but the concrete, three-dimensional realisation of the sensible form as it is. It is the form that *has* some matter and not, as postulated by Boethus, the matter that *has* some form. That explains the indefinite adjective τι with ὑποκείμενον. A sensible form can be realised by one material disposition only. The word τι, here, means a *certain* subject and not *whatever* subject. The human form, for example, can be realised in one and only one material configuration.

We can now understand Alexander's answer to Boethus. For the principle of the substantiality of the subject, we must substitute the principle of the substantiality of the parts of the substance. And to achieve this exegetical turn, we must substitute, in place of a canonical doctrine of predication (where the matter has the form and the form is predicated of the matter), a non-canonical, or 'deontic', scheme of predication, according to which the form is the subject and the matter what the form needs to have in order for it to exist as a form.

	Fundamental principle of ontology	The couple matter/form and predication
BOETHUS	X is a substance iff X is a subject and X is not in a subject.	The form is canonically predicated of the matter. The matter *has* the form.
ALEXANDER	X is a real substance iff X is the part of a phenomenal (= individual) substance, be X a subject or not.	The matter is deontically predicated of the form. The form *has* the matter.

BOETHUS AGAIN ON THE NON-SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE FORM

We have seen that Boethus rejected the claim of form to be a substance, and placed it in a category outside substance. But it is easier to deny that it is in the category of substance than to identify *where* else it might be. It should be obvious to anybody that the form is more than a simple quality among others. Even if it is predicated of the matter, the form is much more important to it, so to say, than any other predicated item. The fact that I share in human form is more closely connected to my

very nature than the fact that I share in baldness and darkness-of-the-eyes. Alexander's theory had at least the advantage of accounting for this gap between different types of predication. And Boethus himself could not deny that the secondary substances of the categories were not interpreted by Aristotle as *mere* qualities, quantities or the like.

Moreover, Alexander has a real point in interpreting the form as the dynamic activity explaining how we are entitled to speak of *a* subject. After all, if, as a good Aristotelian, Boethus denied the existence of vacuum in the world, he must have admitted that there is matter *everywhere* in the sublunary realm (at least). But in that case, how is it possible to speak of this man, or this horse, as *a* subject, without reference to their form? What is it that makes their delimitation *real*, and not purely conventional, as soon as the form is nothing but some kind of inhering accident as, say, wetness or colour?

Even if we must face here the prejudicial lack of textual evidence, I would suggest, in the last part of this chapter, that Boethus' answer was twofold: first, he never clearly specified what exactly the form was; and second, he worked with a very relaxed notion of what it is to be an object, which permitted him to bypass the difficulty of having his subjects not substantially constituted by their forms.

1. Boethus on the category of the form

Let us first recall the end of Simplicius' testimony on Boethus account of substance:[32]

> But thus, says Boethus, the matter and the composite will belong to the category of substance, while the form will be outside substance and fall into some other category, either quality or quantity or some other one.

This sentence is very puzzling. For what is exactly the signification of the 'either . . . or . . . or . . . '? T. Reinhardt writes:

> . . . Boethus' position is either that the form will fall in one and only one non-substance category or that the form will be an aggregate of features classifiable in one or more of the non-substance categories such that normally a plurality of items from the non-substance categories would account for form.[33]

[32] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 78.17–20: ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως μέν, φησὶν ὁ Βόηθος, ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ὑπαχθήσονται τῇ τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορίᾳ, τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἐκτὸς ἔσται, ὑπ᾽ ἄλλην δὲ πεσεῖται κατηγορίαν, ἤτοι τὴν ποιότητα ἢ ποσότητα ἢ ἄλλην τινά.

[33] See Reinhardt 2007: 525.

Reinhardt has four reasons persuading him to opt for the second solution (which he calls the 'aggregate view').[34] First, because 'some of the non-substance categories make very unlikely candidates for "form" (*sc*. on their own)'. Reinhardt probably means that since quality and quantity are already quoted, it would be absurd to suppose that the 'other one' mentioned in the text could be the single exclusive category to which form belongs. But since at least the relative and the disposition may be alluded to, the argument is perhaps not entirely conclusive.[35] The second argument is more intricate, and deserves to be quoted at length:

> Second, it seems fairly uncontroversial that quality more than any other non-substance category ought to play a role in the constitution of forms, and to view an aggregate of features would allow Boethus to give a role to the non-substance categories other than quality as he wishes according to [our passage] and yet to accommodate the pre-eminence of quality by allowing that qualities will normally play a role, a possibility which would not be available on the alternative interpretation, according to which form can fall in one and only one of any of the non-substance categories.[36]

In other words, if I understand rightly, the interpretation in terms of aggregate is preferable because it accounts for the pre-eminence of quality as well as for Boethus' present *formulation* of the problem, which indeed *does* mention non-substance categories other than quality. But why in this case, did Boethus write '*either* . . . *or* . . . *or* . . . '? If I want to say that form is mainly a quality, but that other categories must also be taken into account in its definition, is it not unlikely that I would write that form 'will fall under *a* category different than substance, *either* quality, *or* quantity, *or* another one'? Someone could reply that all Boethus wants to say is that even if the form taken in itself *is* an aggregate, *we* can *view* it as a quality, or a quantity, or (perhaps) something else. But first, Boethus does not say that, i.e. he does not introduce 'our' view on the form; and second, it would be odd in this case to write '*either*' (ἤτοι) before 'quality'.[37] Even if we were speaking of *our* apprehension of the form, there would be no point in introducing such a sharp disjunction. A sequence 'and . . . and . . . ' (καὶ . . . καὶ . . .) would have been more appropriate or, at most, as in Reinhardt's translation, a

[34] Reinhardt 2007: *ibid*.

[35] We should mention, in this context, that in a *Quaestio* preserved only in Arabic, Alexander tells us that the differentia – which, according to him, belongs to substance – had been put by others under the genus of quality *or of relation*. See Rashed 2007a: 57.

[36] Reinhardt 2007: *ibid*.

[37] It is by the way significant that Reinhardt 2007: 524–5, translates: ' . . . and will fall under a different category, quality *or* quantity *or* another one'. Led by his interpretation in terms of aggregate, he unsurprisingly skipped the disjunctive particle ἤτοι (*either*).

sequence '. . . or . . . or . . . ' without 'either'.[38] I leave aside Reinhardt's two last arguments – Porphyry's interpretation of the passage and the overall likelihood of the aggregate interpretation – which seem more confirmative than properly demonstrative. All in all, it is not easy to feel comfortable with either of Reinhardt's two solutions. I agree that the exclusive interpretation is as such hardly conceivable, but there are serious difficulties also with the aggregate conception.

The least we can say is that the formulation we are dwelling on betrays some sense of difficulty on Boethus' part. If, envisaging the problem from the start, we try to capture what Boethus' sentence could mean, it seems that we can imagine ten basic elucidations, which I shall set out moving from the strongest to the weakest possible claim:

- (i) Boethus knows to which non substantial category the form belongs, but here leaves the question open because his arguments would be too long and intricate for the present context.
- (ii) Boethus thinks that all possible forms must belong to one single category, but has not made up his mind as to which of them they belong.
- (iii) Boethus thinks that a single form may belong, by its variety of aspects, to different categories he could cite, and in particular to quality, but never to substance.
- (iv) Boethus thinks that a single form is a bundle of categories, i.e. is necessarily composed by a plurality of items belonging to different categories he could cite, all other than substances, and likely to include quality (Reinhardt's 'aggregate view').
- (v) Boethus thinks it not the case that all possible forms belong to the same category/ies; different types of forms belong to different categories he could cite, but never to substance.
- (vi) Boethus has no idea at all as to the category/ies of the forms; he just claims that arguably, it *is* a category, or some categories, but not the category of substance.
- (vii) Boethus thinks that the form, like the point or the instant, somehow exists without belonging to any category.
- (viii) Boethus thinks that one and only one of the seven previous theses is correct, but that for the philosophical business he is engaged upon he can do without investigating which one.
- (ix) Boethus thinks that at least one of the seven first theses is correct, but that for the philosophical business he is engaged upon he can do without investigating which one/s.
- (x) Boethus thinks that the form is nothing but a *façon de parler*.

[38] See previous note.

I fear that the evidence at hand is not sufficient for allowing us to select any particular one of these options. If I am allowed to resort, in such a severe context, to the tools of rhetorical analysis, I would argue that the very way in which Boethus evokes the secondary categories tends to show that he did not know what the form exactly was. I am conscious that such a conclusion is rather frustrating. But I cannot succeed in believing that if Boethus had clear ideas about which non-substance category the form falls in, he would have written in the way he did.

Let us however try to better understand his position. Boethus was of course aware of the distinction between species and form. First of all, this is clear because one would have to be blind not to see the difference between both usages in Aristotle. Second, because as already stated, he must have been aware of the different meanings of 'in something' listed in *Physics* 4.3.[39] Thus, he knew that the species (εἶδος) is in the genus, while the form (εἶδος) is in the matter. It would be too hasty, then, to attribute to him the view that the form is a quality because Aristotle, in the *Categories*, describes the species, together with the genus, as a ποιόν.[40] For the species is a ποιόν because it is a kind of universal.[41] But then, it includes under its scope also the individual's *matter*, as well as its form.[42] The species cannot therefore be equated with the individual's hylomorphic form.

That being said, Boethus was on the other hand surely convinced that there must have been some deeper connection between the εἶδος as species and the εἶδος as form. For if we accept P. Huby's identification of the fragments preserved in *Laur*. 71.32, we will conclude that he drew a clear distinction between the inherence of the accident in the subject and the inherence of the form in the matter.[43] Let us try to imagine what kind of reasons he might have. In both cases, something inheres in something. And in both cases, there is an existential dependence taking place. For what inheres does not exist independently of its subject. Therefore,

[39] See above, pp. 56–9. [40] *Cat*. 5.3b13–16.

[41] See *Metaph*. Z.13.1038b34–1039a2. [42] Cf. *Metaph*. Z.11.1037a5–7.

[43] One must remain cautious on this identification, however. First, because Boethus' commentary was surely no more extant in the Palaeologan era (when the scholia have been copied in the margins of *Laur*. 71.32) and, second, because some pages of an anonymous commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* written at the end of the ninth century and preserved in the 'Archimedes palimpsest' have recently revealed that portions of Porphyry's *Ad Gedalium* were still extant in Byzantium in the thirteenth century – when some of its leaves have been recycled for the copy of a theological text (more on the attribution to Porphyry in a forthcoming article, to be published in *OSAP*, by R. Chiaradonna, D. Sedley and myself). It is a fair conjecture, then, to suppose that the anonymous fragments preserved in *Laur*. 71.32 come from Porphyry's *Ad Gedalium* (for a parallel case, see Ebbesen 1987: 309–10). Thus, the thesis expounded in these fragments may stem from an author quoted by Porphyry, like Boethus, or belong to Porphyry himself – this second eventuality having not been taken into account by P. Huby.

the only difference between the two situations must be that in the first case, the accident inheres in a composite of matter and form, while in the second, the form inheres in the matter, which is simple. Boethus surely held, then, that the hylomorphic form contained essential features of the substance, those precisely that are intended when we say that this individual is a man or a horse.

Now, to be a man or a horse, which, as we have just shown, must have amounted for Boethus to having the hylomorphic form of a man or a horse, is to have, inherent in some matter, a bundle of items belonging to different non-substance categories. In the famous passage of the *Categories* where he characterises species and genus as ποιόν, Aristotle was very cautious in distinguishing the proper meaning of the term (a *quality*, like 'white') from its extended meaning (a substantial *qualification*).[44] I would suggest, then, that Boethus' vague formulation mirrors the simple fact that he worked, implicitly or explicitly, with a *third* sense of ποιόν in order to describe the hylomorphic form as a whole. In other words, Boethus probably held that this ποιόν denoted the bundle of items belonging to different non-substance categories – ποιά, ποσά etc. – and constituting, all together, the form inhering in the matter. To be a man's form presupposes a nest of interwoven determinations, which are constitutive of the humanity belonging to this particular chunk of matter. The form of a substance is a quality in the weak sense of the term – i.e. in the sense according to which it qualifies some matter – and includes in its nature *qua* form a wider range of determinations belonging to other categories, among which qualities, in the strong sense of the term this time: to be a man is to have certain qualities, configurations, size etc. In conclusion, I suppose that if Boethus was so allusive in the passage quoted by Simplicius, it is because he had something of the kind of this double level of secondary characterisations in mind.[45]

2. *Boethus on what it is to be a subject*

In the case of Alexander, we know, thanks to some evidence in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* and to the Arabic *Quaestio* already alluded to, that the real 'categorial question' was not that of the three types of substances – since they are all substances – but that of the status of the

[44] See *Cat.* 5.3b18–23.

[45] It is worth noting that we find here something very similar to the double level/signification of the relative admitted by Andronicus, according to Reinhardt's interpretation. See Reinhardt 2007: 521–2.

differentia.[46] It is the essentialist connection of form and differentia that in turn explains, according to him, why the *differentia* belongs to substance. It is not fortuitous, from this point of view, that we do not find the faintest hint of an account of the relationship between form and *differentia specifica* in Boethus' fragments. For the essentialist differentia, as a feature characterising the very nature of an individual substance, cannot be simply material – since matter is indefinite and any such account would have to be definite. A differentia, in Boethus' ontology, could only be the verbal formulation of some given aspect of the material substance. It cannot apply to this substance as a whole, unless we consider that the mention of a proper attribute can do the job. But even in this case, we are very far away from Alexander's ontology.

We should mention, in this context, a passage where Boethus mounts an attack against the Stoic notion of relation. It appears again in Simplicius' commentary on the *Categories*, in the page immediately following the famous text containing the sole serious account we have of the Stoic doctrine of the relatives.[47] Let us first remark that the whole development comes probably from Boethus' commentary, through Porphyry and Iamblichus. The fact that we owe our only reliable information on the Stoic doctrine to Boethus is already interesting in itself. He is likely to have been one of the rare thinkers in antiquity to have had a clear grasp of this difficult issue. I shall of course not try to propose a systematic account of what has been said by modern scholars on the Stoic doctrine. Rather, I shall focus on the relevance of this discussion for our understanding of Boethus' doctrine of what it is to be a subject. The context of Boethus' remarks is that of the Stoic distinction between two kinds of relatives, one where the fact of being relative is connected to some 'difference' (διαφορά) or 'character' (χαρακτήρ) inside the substance – the πρός τι – and the other – the πρός τί πως ἔχον – where no internal state of the substance has any bearing on the relation. As stressed by M. Mignucci, the criterion for the second class is furnished by the fact that its bearers are subject to 'Cambridge change'.[48] Let us take a stock example of the first class, the sweet taste of a given substance. Its sweetness is a πρός τι, since to be sweet has no meaning apart from the fact of being possibly appreciated as sweet by some animal having the organ of taste. Thus, sweetness requires both an internal disposition and an external relation. By contrast, fatherhood is not an internal state (since nothing internal distinguishes a father from

[46] See *in Metaph.* 206.12–207.6 and Rashed 2007a: 56–65. The similarities between these texts had been first noted by Moraux 2001: 473 and Haas, 1997: 218 n. 173.
[47] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 165.32–166.29. [48] Mignucci 1988: 149–54.

a man without child) but a pure relation, beginning and ceasing with the existence of the child.

Significantly enough, the Stoics, according to this account, drew some kind of subtle distinction between διαφορά and χαρακτήρ. As far as we can judge from this text – where the Aristotelian tradition (Porphyry, Iamblichus and Simplicius), may have left its mark – I would guess that initially, the χαρακτήρ was a body and the διαφορά the incorporeal predicate, i.e. the very fact of having the χαρακτήρ. In other words, the χαρακτήρ must have been the corporeal feature inhering in the corporeal subjects, be they καθ' αὑτά or πρός τι, the διαφορά the incorporeal predicate and somebody having this διαφορά the corresponding *sayable*.[49]

Let us now read Boethus' reply:

> That it is necessary also in the case of the πρός τί πως ἔχοντα that a character exist in the subjects, has been shown sufficiently by Boethus and is immediately clear. For the relation to something else is not of such a nature that it exists itself by itself, but it is necessary that it exist in the character which is function of a difference (ἐν τῷ κατὰ διαφορὰν χαρακτῆρι). This character is sometimes a quality, as the whiter is such (taken along with the surface), sometimes a quantity, as in the more and longer, sometimes a motion, as in the faster, sometimes a time, as in the older, sometimes a place, as in the higher. But the left and the right exist with more than one difference. For they manifest themselves together with place and with a part of such a kind (namely, it is because we have parts of such a kind that right and left are said, since a stone will not be 'at the right' relatively to a stone if there is nobody to apply it to our right and left parts). Also in the case of the identical, the relative exists, albeit in a startling way: it is not said relatively to something else, but to itself. For what is *fully* similar and not in respect of something nor in some qualified way, that is the identical.[50] In this way, the relation exists always together with the characters of the differentia, and these things are not two, contrary to what these people say, but the composite is one.[51]

The Stoic context is not sufficient to explain the massive presence of the term χαρακτήρ in Boethus' answer. All the less so, since Boethus does *not* use the couple διαφορά–χαρακτήρ in the same way as the Stoics

[49] On this in general, see Frede 1994: 109–28; see in particular *ibid.*: 114–15, on Seneca's *Epistle* 117.11–12.

[50] See following note.

[51] Simplicius, *in Cat.* 167.2–18. At 167.15–16, τὸ γοῦν καθάπαξ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατά τι μηδέπως is the manuscripts' unanimous reading according to the C.A.G. editor. The sense is not clear to me. I suggest τὸ γοῦν καθάπαξ <ὅμοιον> ὄν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατά τι μηδέ πως. It is worth noting that the opposition καθάπαξ/κατά τι is attested in Hellenistic philosophy, see Philodemus, *Po.* 5.16. The doctor Archigenes, in the second century AD, may have been influenced by Boethus' treatment of the distinction: the quotation in Galen, *Diff. Puls.*, 8.626 K. seems to be reminiscent of the fragment cited by Simplicius.

did. For contrary to them, Boethus seems to envisage the διαφορά as the non-substance *category*, and the χαρακτήρ as the item belonging to it and inhering in the substance. White's διαφορά, for example, is *quality*, while any realisation of the white in the substance is a χαρακτήρ.[52] There is no place for the *fact of somebody having* such or such quality – a *lekton* – which, as we have noted, is probably lurking in the background of the Stoic διαφορά. The distinction, for the Stoics, was rather straightforward: the qualitative χαρακτήρ was a body, the διαφορά an incorporeal. For Boethus, the problem was obviously more intricate. Aristotelian qualities being of course incorporeal, it was more difficult, *prima facie*, to draw a sharp distinction between the quality and its διαφορά. After all, an individual quality *is* a difference of its bearer. However, in suggesting that the διαφορά was the category to which the quality described as a χαρακτήρ belongs, Boethus was probably *not* alluding to the mere distinction between a higher-order genus and one of its particular instantiations. This would have been rather out of place in the framework of his ontology, where universals are drastically downgraded. More probably, Boethus was drawing a distinction between the existential and the predicative aspects of items belonging to the non-substance categories. Our sensory experience is sufficient to assess their existence as χαρακτῆρες, even if they are not bodies; their inherence, i.e. the fact that a body *has* them, is sufficient to consider them as διαφοραί.

A consequence is that every existential feature must be translatable into physical terms. That means that the *Categories* are supposed to supply us with a definitive list capable of accommodating every well-founded physical being or event. The world is four-dimensional (three spatial dimensions plus time) and material. Every bit of matter has sensible qualities and every object has a configuration and a quantity. Motion and rest are functions of place and time. Relation is just a way of putting together everything there is. That means that relation has *always* some physical basis. Let us dwell an instant on the example given by Boethus. I have two stones, S and T, in front of me. I say that S is at the right of T. What does this really mean? According to Boethus, it means that if, while I am standing, I draw a segment between my right eye and S and another segment between my left eye and T, the two segments will not intersect in the

[52] These considerations are diametrically opposed to Alexander's ontology. For the latter, the only διαφορά worth mentioning belongs to the category of substance. For Boethus, substance *as such* seems to be undifferentiated; the διαφορά is always linked to an accidental χαρακτήρ of the subject.

space between the vertical plane of the stones and the vertical plane of my eyes.[53]

One could object that this example does not contradict Cambridge change, i.e. the possibility that a relation might change without one of its terms changing at all. That is true, but according to Boethus, does not matter at all. The important thing is rather that there is no Cambridge change which cannot be reduced to a change affecting items belonging to some category or other.

In an article devoted to the Aristotelian notion of relation, D. Sedley has shown that Aristotle drew a distinction between 'hard-relatives' and 'soft-relatives'.[54] The hard-relatives, which have their very being in a relation, are singled out by the test of cognitive symmetry: if A and B are hard-relatives, we cannot know A without knowing B. Dwelling on the report of the Stoics occurring a page before our passage in Simplicius, Sedley suggested that the Stoics had the same distinction between two kind of relatives, but that they changed the identification criterion of the hard-relatives: '. . . hard relativity is now helpfully explicated by a test simpler and more effective than Aristotle's "cognitive symmetry" criterion. A relative property is hard-relative if it is subject to what is nowadays called Cambridge change, that is, if its bearer can acquire and lose it without undergoing any intrinsic alteration, simply because something external has altered.'[55] Superficially, Boethus would agree with this description. But there is an important shift of emphasis, precisely due to the fact that Boethus does his best to alleviate the contrast between the two kinds of relatives. In other terms, while Aristotelian users of Cambridge change will underline the fact that one of the relatives will not undergo any internal change, Boethus will stress the fact that the global system constituted by both relatives and their medium cannot remain intrinsically unchanged. We cannot then avoid concluding that in order to save his materialistic account of relation, Boethus is ready to relax his views on the subject of predication. For in the case at stake, the subject of the changing characteristics is not a single substance, but a nest of at least two substances.

This example is very telling, because it illustrates how, in the absence of defining forms, the topological delimitation of the subject of predication tends to become purely qualitative, instead of definitional. In the case of hard-relatives, for instance, the pertinent subject to be taken into account

[53] Boethus refers implicitly here to the first sense of the right and the left of inanimate beings expounded at *de Caelo* 2.2.285a 3–4: a clear sign that Xenarchus was not the only reader of Aristotle's *de Caelo* in the first century BC.

[54] Sedley 2002: 324–52.

[55] Sedley 2002: 339–40.

is a spatial zone including more than a single (in principle definable) individual. The individual substance becomes a sort of limit-case, where the quality of the subject reaches a peak of coherence and distinctiveness with regard to its environment. In other terms, we may infer that the substance itself, according to Boethus, is nothing but a three-dimensional portion of matter bearing, over a certain period of time, definite features. In turn, this bundle of matter and properties becomes the subject of other, more transient characteristics, which are in it as in a (composite) subject.

CONCLUSION: BOETHUS' *HAVING* VS. STOIC *SAYABLE*

At two places in the present chapter, we have seen that Boethus was doing a bit of rewriting of Aristotelian doctrine in a way that allowed him to bypass Stoic λεκτά. First, in his discussion of the category of *having*, Boethus adduced the example of health, and rewrote the fact of being healthy in terms of the inherence of the accident of health in a subject.[56] And, addressing Aristotle's category of relation, Boethus suppressed from it what could appear as an anticipation of the Stoic λεκτόν, in order to explain it as a material affection of a complex subject.[57] *Prima facie*, one could try to account for his strategy by suggesting that in his system, the category of *having*, taking place between a subject and its predicate, assumed the function of the propositional *sayable* in Stoic ontology. The category of *having* would be nothing but a Stoic λεκτόν in Aristotelian disguise. I think, however, that such an interpretation is misleading. For Boethus' *having* has no genuine consistency nor, if I dare say, any genuine reality comparable to a Stoic *sayable*. Boethus' category of *having* has one single function: it *says* the inherence of the accident in the substance, or, to put it differently, the fact that we can predicate the attribute of the subject. In conclusion, Boethus' whole enterprise amounted to curtailing the ontological realm as far as he could, by constructing, using the tools of Aristotle's *Categories* alone, a system that does without any kind of shadowy beings – Platonic Ideas, obviously, in the first place, but also, and more subtly, Stoic sayables.

[56] See above, pp. 58–9. [57] See above, p. 74.

CHAPTER 4

Aristotelianism in the first century BC*: Xenarchus of Seleucia*

Andrea Falcon

The starting point for any study of the Peripatetic tradition in the post-Hellenistic period is *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*. In the *Vorwort* to the first volume, Paul Moraux describes this segment of the Peripatetic tradition as striving for orthodoxy.[1] By his lights, the intense exegetical labour on Aristotle's writings that began in the first century BC eventually culminated in an orthodox interpretation of Aristotle. Although Moraux does not stop to define what he means by an orthodox interpretation of Aristotle, it is clear that he has in mind the interpretation defended by Alexander of Aphrodisias in the late second and early third century AD. One problem with this narrative is its teleological character. What may be perceived by us as an orthodox interpretation of Aristotle is in place only at the end of a process that unfolded over a period of three centuries. But it is far from clear that the engagement with Aristotle in the first century BC is best understood in light of what Alexander achieved in the late second and early third centuries AD. Moreover, it is not obvious that the return to Aristotle that took place in the first century BC was motivated by a concern for orthodoxy. For one thing, it is not obvious what might have constituted orthodoxy in the first century BC. We know very little about the Hellenistic Peripatos, but the little we know strongly suggests that the Peripatetic tradition in the Hellenistic period was rich, complex and open to a variety of philosophical positions.

I will try to show that openness to a variety of philosophical positions remained a conspicuous feature of the post-Hellenistic return to Aristotle by looking at the remaining evidence for Xenarchus of Seleucia, a Peripatetic philosopher whose activity is to be dated to the second half of the first

[1] Moraux 1973: xii–xx, especially xvi–xvii. This interpretation was anticipated in the Charles De Koninck lectures that Moraux delivered at Laval University in the Spring of 1969. His lectures are published in Moraux 1970. The first lecture, *Trois siècles d'aristotélisme grec*, is a crisply clear introduction to the narrative of *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*. There, Moraux describes post-Hellenistic Aristotelianism as a period of orthodoxy. Cf. Moraux 1970: 17.

century BC.[2] In the first volume of *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, Xenarchus is cast as a dissenting voice within the Peripatetic tradition. It is very telling that the title chosen by Moraux for the chapter on Xenarchus is *Die innere Opposition*. This title suggests that Xenarchus is a voice that stands out from the chorus, or even an anomaly within the Peripatetic tradition.[3] In the pages to come, I will argue that there is nothing anomalous about his philosophical position. Xenarchus becomes an anomaly within the Peripatetic tradition only if we approach the extant evidence with the expectation that the early engagement with Aristotle was bound to result in acceptance of Aristotle's doctrines. In fact, a study of the evidence for Xenarchus is a forceful reminder that this was by no means the case.[4]

XENARCHUS' CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE FIFTH SUBSTANCE

Although Xenarchus is described by our sources as a Peripatetic philosopher,[5] he is best known for his criticism of Aristotle's thesis that the heavens are made of a special simple body, unique to them: the fifth substance, also known as the fifth body, the fifth element, *quinta essentia*, or aether. Our source of information is Simplicius. From his commentary on the *de Caelo* we learn that Xenarchus wrote a book against the fifth substance.[6] It is not clear whether Simplicius is providing the title of the book, giving information about its content, or doing both. Moreover, it is simply impossible to evaluate how many liberties Simplicius took in reporting Xenarchus' words, since we are not able to reconstruct a text of Xenarchus' book that is independent of his citations. Things are complicated by the fact that Simplicius may not have had direct access to this

[2] From Strabo, we learn that Xenarchus was originally from Seleucia on the Calycadnus in Cilicia Tracheia, but that he spent most of his life away from home, teaching philosophy first in Alexandria, then in Athens, and finally in Rome. Strabo adds that he himself attended Xenarchus' lectures. See Strabo, *Geography* 14.5.4 (670c12–30).

[3] By casting Xenarchus in the role of the opposition from within the Peripatos, Moraux sets Xenarchus apart not only from the 'new Peripatos' (Andronicus of Rhodes, Boethus of Sidon, and Ariston of Alexandria, who are presented as the first generation of Aristotelian commentators) but also from the 'old Peripatos' (Staseas of Naples and Cratippus of Pergamus, who are treated as mere epigones of the Hellenistic Peripatos). Suggestive as it may be, this narrative is a direct consequence of the application of the category of orthodoxy to the history of the Peripatetic tradition.

[4] What follows is a condensation of the main results reached in the study of the historical and philosophical significance of the remaining evidence for Xenarchus of Seleucia. See Falcon 2011.

[5] Strabo, *Geography* 14.5.4 (670c12–30), Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.320.5–8 Wachsmuth (= Aëtius *Placita* 4.3.10), and Julian *Speeches* 8 (5) 3.107.7–108.1 Rochefort.

[6] Simplicius *in de Cael.* 13.23; 20.12–13; 21.33–4.

book. When he is reporting Xenarchus' objections to Aristotle, Simplicius seems to depend on Alexander of Aphrodisias and his now lost commentary on the *de Caelo*.[7] At any rate, the polemical nature of Xenarchus' book cannot be disputed. The target is the thesis that the heavens are made of a special simple body distinct from (and not reducible to) earth, water, air, and fire. Xenarchus advanced objections (*enstaseis*) and raised problems (*aporiai*) with the intent to refute this thesis. It would help if we could say something more specific about the scope of the book or its literary nature. Unfortunately we cannot, but it is very unlikely that this book was written in the form of a commentary.

A full study of Xenarchus' criticism of the doctrine of the fifth substance goes emphatically beyond the scope of this paper.[8] Here I am content to recall his most significant objections:

1. In the *de Caelo*, Aristotle argues that there are two simple motions because there are two simple lines: the straight line and the circle (*de Caelo* 268b19–20). But it is never clear, in the *de Caelo* or elsewhere, what set of considerations might lead us to accept the claim that there are but two simple lines. Xenarchus addressed what he perceived as a lack of explicitness on the part of Aristotle by objecting that there is also a third line that can be regarded as simple, namely the helix drawn on the surface of a cylinder (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 13.22–8 combined with 14.13–21). His objection is best understood, I think, as an invitation to spell out what counts as a criterion for simplicity and why.
2. The importance of the thesis that all simple motion is either in a straight line or in a circle can hardly be overstated. Aristotle's theory of natural motion depends on it, as well as his strong division of the physical world into a celestial and a sublunary region. This thesis can be regarded as a fundamental truth in Aristotle's physical theory. Xenarchus expressed dissatisfaction with how it is established in the *de Caelo*. His dissatisfaction may be summarised as follows: the *physical* truth that there are but two forms of simple motion – motion in a circle and motion in a straight line – is established by applying the *mathematical* principle that there are but two forms of simple line, the circular and the straight. But by applying a mathematical principle to physics, Aristotle

[7] Moraux was convinced that the book written by Xenarchus was still circulating in the sixth century AD, and that Simplicius had direct access to it. According to Moraux, Simplicius used Alexander as his main source of information but was still able to check the interpretation offered by Alexander against the text of Xenarchus. Cf. Moraux 1973: 199–200 combined with 214. This view is challenged by Andrea Rescigno. The latter argues that Alexander was Simplicius' only source of information. Cf. Rescigno 2004: 205–6.

[8] For such a study, I refer the reader to Falcon 2011.

is crossing the boundary between mathematics and physics (or, at least, he is oblivious to this boundary) (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 25.11–21).

3. According to Aristotle, there is one and only one natural motion for each simple body (*de Caelo* 269a8–9). Elsewhere I have suggested referring to this assumption as the principle of the uniqueness of natural motion.[9] Xenarchus rejected this principle (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 23.31–24.7). This rejection creates the theoretical space for the claim that a simple body can naturally perform two simple motions. This claim may be invoked by someone who wishes to preserve the material unity of the natural world by endorsing the view that the heavens are made of fire. More directly, it is possible to argue that fire possesses two natural motions. It naturally moves toward the extremity of the universe because of its mobility. But once it has reached that place, fire does not lose its mobility. On the contrary, fire keeps moving, but since it can no longer move in a straight line, it now moves in a circle. Philoponus seems to have endorsed this doctrine in his *contra Aristotelem*.[10]
4. Xenarchus argued that circular motion cannot be the natural motion of any simple body. His argument depends on the consideration that, in the case of the simple bodies, each part must display the same nature as the whole. This nature, because it is simple, cannot account for the difference in speed displayed by different parts of the whole (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 24.20–7).[11]
5. In the *de Caelo*, Aristotle invokes the principle that any one thing has one contrary at most to argue that fire (or any other sublunary simple body) cannot perform circular motion, either naturally or non-naturally (*de Caelo* 269a12–18). Xenarchus objected to Aristotle by pointing to a conspicuous exception to this principle. According to Aristotle, virtue is a mean; however, if virtue is a mean, there are two ways to go wrong, one in the direction of excess and one in the direction of deficiency (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 55.25–31 combined with 52.12–17).
6. Fire is described by Aristotle as the lightest body. If unimpeded, fire rises over all that is moving upward or downward. The verb chosen by Aristotle to describe the natural behaviour of fire is ‘to rise to the surface’ (*epipolazein*). His choice is quite deliberate. It points to the

[9] Falcon 2005: 57–9. [10] Wildberg 1987: Book I, Fragments 9–17.

[11] It is not easy to see how this objection is supposed to work. If the point is that different heavenly bodies move at different speed and Aristotle has no way of explaining that difference, we should note that this objection works only on the assumption that the motion of the heavens is equated to the circular motion of the celestial simple body. But it is far from clear that Aristotle would have endorsed this equation.

> *limited* tendency of fire to surface above all the *sublunary* bodies. In other words, fire never gets in the way of the celestial simple body because the latter has a tendency to move in a circle *above* fire.[12] Xenarchus took issue with Aristotle's definition of lightness as that which rises to the surface of everything (*de Caelo* 311a17–18). He argued that this definition does not apply to fire that we encounter here on earth, but only to fire that has reached its natural place (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 70.20–9).

There is a gap separating these objections from another testimony preserved by Simplicius (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 285.27–286.6). The latter is evidence of a post-Hellenistic debate between Stoics and Peripatetics on the existence of extra-cosmic void. Xenarchus entered this debate by suggesting to change the Stoic definition of void from 'capable of receiving a body' into 'receptive'. This testimony is often read as implying an endorsement of the Stoic view that the world is surrounded by void (and, consequently, a rejection of the Aristotelian thesis that there is no void inside or outside the world).[13] Here, suffice it to say that it is unclear how this testimony is related (if at all) to Xenarchus' criticism of the doctrine of the fifth substance.

Xenarchus was not content to raise a series of objections against the doctrine of the fifth substance. The information preserved by Simplicius strongly suggests that his criticism of Aristotle implied a positive doctrine of natural motion. It is possible, to some extent, to reconstruct this doctrine on the basis of the information preserved by Simplicius (Simplicius, *in de Caelo* 21.33–22.17 combined with 20.10–25). It is a substantial claim of Aristotle's that every simple body naturally performs a simple rectilinear motion (*de Caelo* 310a33–4). If unimpeded, a simple body naturally moves upward or downward until it has reached its natural place. In addition, at least for Aristotle, the nature of the simple body is such that it stops moving when it has reached its natural place. Put differently, the nature of the simple body is such that it is at rest when it is in its natural place. Xenarchus departed from this Aristotelian tenet by claiming that a simple body in its natural place either is at rest or moves in a circle. This claim involves a creative interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of natural motion. Aristotle describes the natural motion of a simple body as a motion 'toward

[12] For more on the cosmological significance of this doctrine, I refer the reader to Bodnár 1997: 97–8.

[13] Moraux 1973: 203, 209–10. But we have absolutely no information about the context in which Xenarchus made his suggestion. In particular, it is not clear whether Xenarchus intended to support the Stoic view that the world is surrounded by void. For a recent, helpful discussion of this testimony as evidence of a putative influence of Stoicism on Xenarchus, I refer the reader to Kupreeva 2009: 153–6.

its *entelecheia*' (*Physics* 255a29–30) or 'toward its form' (*de Caelo* 310a33–b 1). For Aristotle, in other words, the natural motion of a simple body is never an unbounded process. On the contrary, this process always has a starting as well as an ending point. Moreover, the choice of the technical term *entelecheia* suggests that the ending point is regarded as the culmination of the process, as Aristotle employs this word to refer to a particular state of being, the state of being in a full or complete reality. Xenarchus exploited this idea in an ingenious way. He introduced the distinction between *being* a simple body and *becoming* a simple body. What is becoming a simple body is a body that is moving in a straight line toward its natural place. This motion does not count as a case of natural motion because a simple body that is away from its natural place has not fully realised its nature. It is only when the body has finally reached its natural place that it has fully realised its nature. Hence, it is only the motion that the body eventually performs when it has reached its natural place that counts as its natural motion. There is, however, only one motion that the perfected simple body can perform in its natural place, namely circular motion. This is the only motion that a body can perform without leaving its natural place. This means that a simple body that has fully realised its nature is *either* at rest *or* moves in a circle.

At first sight, Xenarchus made an innocent point: statements about the nature of a simple body should be made with reference to the simple body in its natural place. However, this point can lead to a crucial revision of Aristotle's physics. If one of the bodies that we encounter on earth can move in a circle once it has reached its natural place, then there is no need to introduce a special simple body that naturally performs circular motion in order to account for celestial motion. No one in antiquity disputed that mobility is a conspicuous feature of fire. If unimpeded, fire regularly moves upwards. But what happens to fire when it has reached its natural place? According to Aristotle, fire loses its mobility. Xenarchus disagreed with Aristotle on this point. He revised Aristotle's theory of natural motion in order to be able to say that fire does not lose its mobility once it has reached its natural place. On the basis of this revision, Xenarchus could say that this mobility manifests itself in a different and more perfect form, namely circular motion.

By adapting Aristotle's doctrine of natural motion, Xenarchus was able to argue that fire that is fully realised and non-stationary could account for the mobility of the heavens. There is no immediately obvious objection that can be raised on behalf of Aristotle against Xenarchus. This only makes the task of finding out what motivated Aristotle to posit the existence of

a special simple body that naturally moves in a circle more pressing. In other words, what is the introduction of such a body needed for, if it is not needed to explain the mobility of the heavens? A plausible answer to this question is that a body entirely different from (and hence not reducible to) earth, water, air and fire is needed to secure the incorruptibility of the heavens. One should keep in mind that, at least for Aristotle, earth, water, air and fire are perishable in that they can change into one another. There is no reason to think that a fully realised, non-stationary fire of the sort envisioned by Xenarchus as the matter of the heavens has lost its capacity to change into the other elements. In other words, even if it is removed from the cycle of generation and corruption, this fully-realised, non-stationary fire retains a capacity for change into the other elements. But it is clear that Aristotle would have considered this capacity for change (even if it is never fulfilled) a potential threat to the eternity of the heavens. At least for Aristotle, the only way to secure a sufficiently robust version of the thesis that the heavens are eternal involves positing the existence of a celestial simple body lacking the capacity to change into the sublunary simple body. That (at least as Aristotle would have seen it) Xenarchus has not successfully removed his fully realised, non-stationary fire from the cycle of generation and destruction can be argued starting from the distinction, central to Xenarchus' argument, between *becoming* a simple body and *being* a simple body. According to Xenarchus, it is only when it has reached its natural place that what we call fire has become fire. It is possible to object to Xenarchus that what has become fire retains the capacity to be in its previous state. Consider how Aristotle objects to those who argue that the world has come to be, and also is eternal (*de Caelo* 279b24–31). Whatever has come to be, Aristotle says, retains the potential to be in a different state (whether or not that potential is fulfilled). If we apply the same idea to the fire envisioned by Xenarchus as the matter of the heavens, we can object that this fire retains the capacity to be away from its natural place. But if this body can be away from its natural place, it is not really removed from the cycle of generation and corruption.

BEYOND XENARCHUS' CRITICISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE FIFTH SUBSTANCE

Both his objections to the doctrine of the fifth substance and his alternative theory of natural motion indicate that Xenarchus engaged in a close textual study of Aristotle's writings. In particular, his theory of natural motion is a brilliant appropriation of the conceptual apparatus found in the

de Caelo and the *Physics*. Elsewhere, I have argued that there is conceptual discontinuity between the theory developed by Xenarchus and what we know about the Hellenistic theories of motion.[14] This discontinuity is best explained by assuming that Xenarchus bypassed the Hellenistic theories of motion and developed a theory which is a direct response to what can be read in the *de Caelo* and the *Physics*. What Xenarchus developed is a revision of (and a departure from) Aristotle's theory of natural motion. Xenarchus reworked this theory so as to make Aristotle's celestial simple body unnecessary.

We generally tend to underestimate how controversial Aristotle's physics was in antiquity. Part of the problem is that Aristotle's physics was so dominant, and dominant for so long, that it is easy for us to assume that this physics was never controversial. In reality, several aspects of Aristotelian physics were widely resisted, and even openly criticised, in antiquity. The doctrine that the heavens are made of a special simple body, unique to them, is an especially vivid example of this phenomenon. Xenarchus was not alone in rejecting the doctrine of the fifth substance. What makes his case special is that he found in Aristotle's writings the conceptual resources to do away with this doctrine. Marwan Rashed has recently suggested that this revision is best understood as a simplification of Aristotle's physics.[15] On Rashed's interpretation, Xenarchus did not intend to reject Aristotle's physics; rather, he intended to improve on it by disposing of the doctrine of the fifth substance. Thinking about his criticism of the doctrine of the fifth body as an attempt to ameliorate Aristotle's physics has the great merit of making it easier for us to see how it was possible for Xenarchus to be considered (and to consider himself) a *Peripatetic* philosopher.[16]

There is evidence, however, that Xenarchus was not content with disposing of the fifth substance. Our source of information is Julian, the last pagan Roman emperor (also known as Julian the Apostate):[17]

Perhaps it is necessary to specify more clearly what I am saying. We claim that matter is something, but so too is enmattered form. But if some cause is not ranked above them, we would introduce inadvertently the Epicurean doctrine: for if there was nothing more important for explanation than these two principles, then some spontaneous movement and chance event would have arbitrarily combined them.

[14] Falcon 2008: 7–18. Cf. Falcon 2011: 36–40.

[15] Rashed 2009: 18–42, in particular 18–19.

[16] By contrast, when we approach the remaining evidence concerning Xenarchus' philosophical activity in terms of the narrative offered by Moraux in *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, it is very difficult, if not even impossible, to make sense of the insistence that we find in the ancient sources on his affiliation to the Peripatos.

[17] Julian reigned from 361 to 363 AD.

'But we see', says a certain clever Peripatetic like Xenarchus, 'the body that is fifth and has circular motion as the cause of these [matter and enmattered form]. And Aristotle made a fool of himself in inquiring and fussing about these [matter and enmattered form], and so too Theophrastus, who certainly did not understand how he himself sounds! Take the way that when he reached the incorporeal and intelligible substance, he stopped without fussing over the cause, but said that this is how these things naturally are – but, of course, in the case of the fifth body, too, he should have assumed that this was how it naturally was, and not gone on to inquire into the causes, but should have stopped with them [i.e. the fifth body, form and matter] and not gone off course onto the intelligible, since the intelligible is by nature nothing *per se* but pointlessly involves guesswork devoid of meaning.' These are the sort of things Xenarchus says, as I remember having read. (*Speeches* 8 (5) 3.107.7–108.1 Rochefort, my translation)

This testimony is difficult, and a few details are far from crystal clear. Here, I am content to say that we need not suppose that the language used in this passage goes back to Xenarchus. By his own admission, Julian is not reporting the actual words of Xenarchus. For one thing, Xenarchus could not have called the body that moves in a circle a fifth body, which is to say a body *in addition to* earth, water, air and fire. This idea does not sit well with the distinction that plays a central role in his revision of Aristotle's theory of natural motion, namely the distinction between *becoming* a simple body and *being* a simple body. As we have seen, the thought behind this distinction is the following: the fire encountered in the sublunary world is not fire but something that is still becoming fire; when it has reached its natural place and occupies that place by moving in a circle, then that body is not merely a species of fire (the purest form of fire) but is, strictly speaking, the only thing that should be called fire.

The feature of the celestial body relevant to the present discussion is that this body moves with circular motion.[18] Julian credits Xenarchus with the view that the celestial body moving in a circle is the cause of the union of matter and form in the hylomorphic compounds. If we bear in mind that this body is a natural body, on the basis of this passage we can read Xenarchus as urging us to consider the body that moves in a circle as the *natural cause* of the combination of matter and form. Of course, we do not 'see' that the cause of the union of matter and form is the celestial simple body. But we can supply an account of how the continuous and everlasting rotation of the heavens accounts for the regular union of matter and form in the sublunary world. A highly selective emphasis on certain

[18] It is telling that Julian uses the expressions 'fifth body' and 'body moving in a circle' interchangeably. For *pempton sôma*, see 116.7 and 111.7 Rochefort; for *kuklikon sôma*, see 108.7–8 Rochefort.

passages in Aristotle's writings may have encouraged Xenarchus to adopt a position that is best described as *strict naturalism*.[19] What is distinctive about this position is a commitment to the explanation of the natural world by appealing solely to natural causes (matter, form and the rotation of the heavens). This commitment is emphatically not shared by Aristotle. The latter famously argues that a separate cause is needed to explain the eternity (and maybe uniformity) of celestial motion. It is because this cause is wholly outside the chain of motion that it has moved and will always move the heavens in the same invariable way. But because it is wholly outside the chain of motion, such a cause is not part of the physical world and is not the object of a physical investigation. It is telling, I think, that Aristotle says little, almost nothing, about its nature in his writings on natural philosophy. The reason for this silence is that there is another science beyond and above physics (Aristotle calls it first philosophy) that deals with it. We need not discuss how exactly Aristotle envisions the relationship between first philosophy and physics (also known as second philosophy). Suffice it to say that by rejecting the view that the natural world is dependent on the existence of this separate cause, Xenarchus did not only mean to break the causal link between the physical and the intelligible world; in all probability, he also meant to make this cause expendable.

We have seen that for Xenarchus the heavens are made of a fully realised, non-stationary fire that naturally moves in a circle. In all probability, he maintained that the rotation of the heavens is eternal because there is nothing that can prevent the fire that has reached its natural place from moving in a circle according to its nature. Moreover, the information preserved by Julian suggests that Xenarchus considered the eternal rotation of the heavens sufficient to secure the continuity of generation and corruption of hylomorphic compounds in the sublunary world. Taken together, these claims imply the conclusion that the cosmic arrangement envisioned by Xenarchus – the earth at the centre and the heavens rotating around it – has the capacity to sustain itself. This often overlooked but important

[19] In the second book of the *Generation and Corruption*, for example, Aristotle argues that the sun, by its continuous circular motion, enters as an efficient cause into the explanation of the continuity of the process of generation and corruption (336a14–18). This idea is succinctly conveyed by the Aristotelian slogan that it takes a man *and the sun* to generate a man (*Physics* 194b13. Cf. *Metaphysics* 1071a11–17). Passages like the one from the second book of the *Generation and Corruption* can be taken as evidence that for Aristotle the celestial simple body enters as a natural efficient cause in the explanation of the combination of matter and form in the sublunary world. More precisely, this body, without contributing to the causal explanation of any particular hylomorphic compound, secures (through its continuous motion) that there is always union of matter and form.

implication of his theory of natural motion suggests that Xenarchus may not have disagreed with Aristotle on the topic of the eternity of the world. On the contrary, he may have tried to defend the thesis of the eternity of the world without assuming the existence of a special simple body in addition to earth, water, air and fire. Does this mean that his departures from Aristotle's physics are best explained as entailing a simplification of this physics?[20] I prefer to think of these departures neither as a simplification nor as an outright rejection but rather as an adaptation of Aristotle's physics. More directly, I see these departures as part of an attempt to update Aristotle's physics. Admittedly, in the case of Xenarchus, this update takes the form of a revision that may result in a violent rupture with this physics as, for example, in the case of his rejection of the doctrine of the fifth substance. But even when it occurs, such a rupture is always the consequence of a serious engagement with Aristotle's writings.

The best evidence for the attitude that I would like to ascribe to Xenarchus, which is neither opposition to Aristotle nor simple acceptance of his ideas, comes from his treatment of Aristotle's ethics.

XENARCHUS AND ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

Xenarchus' critical engagement with Aristotle's ethics did not result in a rejection of Aristotle's thought. It resulted in the attempt to make it hospitable to the doctrine of the first appropriate thing (*prôton oikeion*). Although it seems to have been introduced by the Stoics, the idea that we are born with a pre-rational tendency toward something that belongs to us, motivates us and explains our behaviour is one that enjoyed enormous success not only in late Hellenistic philosophy but also in post-Hellenistic philosophy. Xenarchus responded to theoretical pressures that were essentially post-Aristotelian by returning to Aristotle and developing an Aristotelian doctrine of the *prôton oikeion*.

Our source of information is Alexander of Aphrodisias. In a short essay entitled '[Selections] from Aristotle concerning the first appropriate thing',[21] Alexander deals with three Peripatetic attempts to establish the nature not of the *ultimate* object of desire, which is happiness, but of

[20] The thesis defended by Marwan Rashed (Rashed 2009).

[21] The title '[Selections] from Aristotle concerning the first appropriate thing' announces a discussion of Peripatetic views on the first appropriate thing. The phrase *para Aristotelous* may indicate that the views discussed by Alexander do not just derive *from* Aristotle; they are also found *in* Aristotle. Put differently, the title does more than conveying the sense of a tradition: it makes an explicit appeal to the authority of Aristotle.

the *first* object of desire, also known as the first appropriate thing (*prôton oikeion*). The emphasis on the existence of a first appropriate thing gave rise to a style of ethical thinking which typically began with a treatment of what is by nature the first object of desire, and continued with an account of how, in the course of human natural development, this first object of desire is supplemented with, or replaced by, the ultimate object of desire, namely happiness. Several candidates for the role of *prôton oikeion* were advanced. Alexander gives us a glimpse into this debate. While the Stoics argued that the animal itself – or rather its constitution and its preservation – is the first appropriate thing, the Epicureans maintained that we are initially motivated by pleasure. Freedom from stress (*aochlesia*) and non-precipitancy (*aproptôsia*) were the candidates advanced by the Megarians and the Academics. But Alexander's immediate concern is a particular segment of this debate. Each of the three Peripatetic theories he criticises is a remarkable exegetical exercise whose ultimate goal is to incorporate the idea that there is a first appropriate thing into Aristotle's ethics. In particular, Xenarchus of Seleucia and Boethus of Sidon elaborated an Aristotelian doctrine of the *prôton oikeion* out of Aristotle's discussion of love (*philia*):[22]

Some say that for Aristotle we are the first appropriate thing to ourselves. For if the object of love is an object of desire, but we do not love anyone in preference to ourselves, nor are we in a relationship to something else as appropriate in this way (for it is by reference to ourselves that we also lay claim to other people and love someone), then each [of us] will be the first appropriate thing to himself according to this argument. Xenarchus and Boethus are of this opinion. Both take their lead from what is said on friendship in the eighth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where the text begins '*Perhaps clarity will be achieved once the object of love is known*' and up to: '*This will make no difference: for it will be what appears to be the object of love*.'[23] And in the ninth book, Aristotle similarly says: '*The facts are*

[22] Alexander, *Mantissa* 151.3–13. What we read in Alexander can be usefully compared with the first part of the outline of Peripatetic ethics preserved by Stobaeus under the title 'Aristotle and other Peripatetic philosophers on ethics' (Stobaeus *Selections* II 118.5–119.19 Wachsmuth. An English translation plus commentary of this text can be found in Görgemanns 1983: 165–89). There are obvious points of contact between this outline and the attempt to read the doctrine of the *prôton oikeion* in Aristotle ascribed to Xenarchus (and Boethus).

[23] *EN* 8.1155b17–27: 'Perhaps clarity about these things could be achieved when the object of love is known. For it seems that not everything is loved, but [only] the object of love, and this is either good, or pleasant, or useful. But it would seem that that through which something good or pleasure come about is useful; hence the good and the pleasant would be objects of love as ends. It is, then, the good that people love or the good for them? For sometimes these things are in conflict (the same is true for the pleasant). It seems that each loves what is good for him, and that, although it is the good that is object of love without qualification, for each [the object of love] is what is [good] for each. Each loves not what is really good for him but what appears [to be good]. But this will make no difference: for it will be what appears to be the object of love.'

not in agreement with these arguments' and up to: '*So it is oneself that one ought to love most of all*.'[24] (Alexander, *Mantissa* 151.3–13, my translation)

At least a couple of things are clear from this passage. First, what Aristotle says on self-love was used by Xenarchus and Boethus to claim that we are the first appropriate thing to ourselves, in the sense that we have a pre-rational impulse to strive for what preserves and promotes our physical existence. Second, they based their claim on what can be read in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Their reading of Aristotle may look anachronistic to us. Note, however, that Alexander is seemingly untroubled by this anachronism. He does not object to the attempt to find the doctrine of the first appropriate thing in Aristotle's ethical thought. On the contrary, Alexander believes that he can positively contribute to this attempt. Evidently, the theoretical pressures that in the first century BC prompted Xenarchus and Boethus to elaborate a doctrine of the first appropriate thing in Aristotelian terms were still felt by Alexander at the end of the second and beginning of the third centuries AD.

To the extent that Xenarchus contributed to an ethical debate framed in Stoic terms, he was certainly not immune to the influence of Stoicism. But there is absolutely no evidence that Xenarchus intended to mediate between Aristotle and the Stoics. In fact, Xenarchus contributed to an essentially Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic debate from a distinctively Aristotelian point of view. His contribution consisted in returning to Aristotle and finding in his ethics an answer to a question that belongs to a style of ethical thinking that is decidedly post-Aristotelian. At least in this case, his intention was not to move away from Aristotle. Quite the contrary: Xenarchus invoked Aristotle's authority and claimed that a doctrine of the *prôton oikeion* can be found in Aristotle's ethics. Hans Gottschalk has described this phenomenon, quite aptly, as 'conservatism in a context of development', or 'resistance to change in a context of change'.[25]

This last remark leads to the broader question of how the testimony of Alexander contributes to our understanding of Xenarchus' philosophical activity. First, it confirms that his activity was rooted in close textual

[24] *EN* 9.1168a35–b10: 'The facts are not in agreement with these arguments, and that is not unreasonable. They say that one ought to love most of all the person who is most of all dear, and most of all dear is the person to whom one wishes good things for his own sake, even if no one will know; this belongs most of all to a person in relation to himself, and so too are all the remaining things by which a dear person is defined: for it has been said that all the features of love extends from oneself and toward others. In addition, all proverbs agree: for instance "a single soul", "the things of friends are in common", and "love is equality", and "the knee is closer than the shin". For all these things belong most of all [to a person] in relation to himself: for a person is most of all dear to himself, and so he ought to love himself most of all.'

[25] Gottschalk 1997: 109.

reading of Aristotle's writings. Second, it suggests that his close textual reading did not have to result in either acceptance or outright criticism of Aristotle's ideas. It could result in adaptation of these ideas. Finally, the evidence preserved by Alexander may be taken as evidence that Xenarchus' attitude towards Aristotle was different in the case of ethics and physics. Whereas his attitude toward Aristotle's physics could result in opposition, his engagement with Aristotle's ethics was better suited to acceptance. But we cannot rule out that mere accidents of transmission may have left us with a somewhat distorted picture of Xenarchus' activity. In other words, it is in principle possible that the little we know about his physics depends on a selection stressing disagreement and dissent, or that the little we know about his ethics is the result of an emphasis on agreement to the expense of disagreement and dissent. Still, it is significant, I think, that Xenarchus seems to be closer to Aristotle's ethics than to Aristotle's physics.

XENARCHUS AND THE RETURN TO ARISTOTLE IN THE FIRST CENTURY

By now it should be clear that we are almost completely dependent on Alexander of Aphrodisias for information about Xenarchus of Seleucia. Seen through the lenses provided by Alexander, Xenarchus achieved at best mixed results as, for instance, in his attempt to find a doctrine of the *prôton oikeion* in Aristotle's ethical thought. However, it is the commentary that Alexander wrote on the *de Caelo* that is crucial for the history of the reception of Xenarchus in antiquity. This commentary is now lost, but the evidence preserved by Simplicius strongly suggests that Xenarchus was cast into the role of Aristotle's adversary. This picture of Xenarchus was taken over by Simplicius, who is our immediate source of information for his criticism of the doctrine of the fifth substance. Simplicius never describes Xenarchus as a Peripatetic philosopher. His silence is symptomatic of the role that Xenarchus ended up playing in the commentary tradition. Embedded in the pro-Aristotelian exegesis that goes back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Xenarchus turned out to be anti-Aristotelian. But there is emphatically no evidence that Xenarchus, even when he is objecting to the doctrine of the fifth substance, regarded his disagreement with Aristotle as a break from the Peripatetic tradition.[26]

[26] I note, in passing, that Simplicius goes beyond Alexander by presenting (somewhat anachronistically) Xenarchus and Philoponus as part of the same anti-Aristotelian front. But it is far from clear that there is anything that unites Xenarchus and Philoponus besides their common polemical target.

Thanks to Simplicius, the picture of Xenarchus as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher was transmitted beyond antiquity. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration that Xenarchus remained boxed into the role of Aristotle's adversary is given in the *Apologia de quinta substantia caeli adversus Xenarcum*, *Ioannem Grammaticum, et alios* that Cesare Cremonini wrote in 1616. Today Cremonini is remembered as a stubborn defender of the text of Aristotle, unwilling (or maybe unable) to go beyond that text in explicating reality.[27] As the title of his *Apologia* announces, Cremonini offered a defence of the doctrine of the fifth substance in the form of a response to what has been objected to in Aristotle. This defence is a condensation and a reworking of what can be read in Simplicius' commentary on the *de Caelo*. Following Simplicius, Cremonini has Xenarchus and Philoponus play the negative role of *adversarii* (or *contradictores*) whose objections are to be refuted in order to reaffirm the validity of the Aristotelian conclusion about the material constitution of the heavens. But the reader who looks closely at how Cremonini deals with Xenarchus' critique of the doctrine of the fifth substance does not find an interest, let alone an effort, to reconstruct the motivations that may have led Xenarchus to criticise Aristotle. Trapped in the narrative inherited from Alexander and Simplicius, Cremonini is not really interested in Xenarchus' criticism of the fifth substance, or in his alternative theory of natural motion. In short, Cremonini gives us at most a caricature of Xenarchus.

In light of the tenacity of the picture of Xenarchus as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher, it is important to try to go beyond the distortion created by the selective use that Alexander made of Xenarchus' criticism of Aristotle. We have two testimonies that antedate Alexander: that of Strabo, *Geography* 14.5.4 (670c12–30), and a doxographical report that ultimately goes back to the compendium of physical doctrines in Aëtius (Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.320.5–8 Wachsmuth).[28] Both Strabo and Aëtius recall Xenarchus as a *Peripatetic* philosopher. Neither links him to the doctrine of the fifth substance. In particular, Aëtius registers Xenarchus as a philosopher noted

While both criticised the Aristotelian thesis that the heavens are made of a special simple body, their criticism was motivated by different philosophical agendas. In the case of Philoponus, the explicit goal of his *contra Aristotelem* was to demonstrate the corruptibility of the world. There is no evidence that Xenarchus shared this goal. On the contrary, I have argued that his objections to the doctrine of the fifth substance are fully compatible with an endorsement of a weak version of the thesis that the world is eternal.

[27] In the opening pages of *Aristotelianism in the Renaissance*, Charles Schmitt introduces Cremonini as a memorable illustration of an Aristotelian philosopher who was true to *the letter* (as opposed to *the spirit*) of Aristotle. For an attempt to offer a more sympathetic presentation of the man and his activity, see Kuhn 1996.

[28] Aëtius, *Placita* 4.3.10.

for his views on the soul. In all probability, his views are recorded because Xenarchus *disagreed* with Aristotle (although it is not entirely clear how exactly he did):

> Xenarchus the Peripatetic and some others of the same school [declare that the soul is] completion and actuality with respect to the form, being *per se* and also being conjoined with the body. (Stobaeus, *Selections* 1.320.5–8 Wachsmuth = Aëtius, *Placita* 4.3.10, my translation)

The information concerning the affiliation of Xenarchus to the Peripatos is best understood in light of the diaphonic structure of the compendium. This information contributes directly to its dialectical structure, which registers not only the disagreement but also stark oppositions between schools. In all probability, Xenarchus is mentioned because he serves to introduce a deviant opinion whose function is to add a new dimension to the ancient debate on the nature of the soul. Moreover, by ascribing this opinion to 'Xenarchus the *Peripatetic* and others of *the same school*' Aëtius is inviting his reader to connect (and contrast) it with Aristotle's definition of the soul as first actuality of the natural body having potentially life, which is also mentioned by Aëtius.[29]

This doxographical information suggests that early on Xenarchus' reputation did not rest on his criticism of the doctrine of the fifth substance. Interestingly enough, that line of criticism is not even recorded in the compendium (or, for that matter, in the broader doxographical tradition). Given that that tradition was especially interested in emphasising conflict of opinion, it would hardly have passed by the opportunity to mention Xenarchus' criticism of the fifth substance. The absence of this criticism from the doxographical tradition suggests that it was not widely known. It also confirms that Alexander of Aphrodisias played a central role in its transmission in antiquity and beyond.

CONCLUSION

That Xenarchus departed from Aristotle's philosophy cannot be disputed. But his departures, no matter how significant they are, do not necessarily make him a rebel challenging Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. I have urged that a more nuanced approach to the surviving evidence about

[29] Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 1.319.6–8: 'Aristotle [declares that it is] first actuality of the natural body, having potentially life.' 'Actuality' is to be taken as equivalent to 'form' and 'activity'. On the various uses of the affiliation-label in Aëtius, including also the use of this label as a way to signal disagreement within a school, see Mansfeld and Runia 2009: 174–6.

his philosophical activity is possible. To begin with, I have recommended taking the idea that Xenarchus was a Peripatetic philosopher very seriously. I have also argued that we should not assume that the return to Aristotle was bound to end up in acceptance of his thought. Quite the contrary: what we know about Xenarchus suggests that disagreement with Aristotle was a possible outcome of the early engagement with his works in the post-Hellenistic phase of reception. Moreover, at least in the case of Xenarchus, this disagreement was most likely to occur in the field of physics. Last but not least, there is more to Xenarchus and to his philosophical activity than an opposition to Aristotle. Xenarchus was a creative philosopher, and his views are best understood as an attempt to revise and update Aristotle's philosophy. These revisions and updates are made from within the Peripatetic tradition and as a positive contribution to it.

What makes it difficult for us to see Xenarchus as positively contributing to the Peripatetic tradition is a certain tendency to think of the post-Hellenistic return to Aristotle as a straightforward reinstatement of Aristotle's philosophy culminating in Alexander of Aphrodisias. This tendency is often coupled with an improper emphasis on the role that orthodoxy played in the study of Aristotle's philosophy. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the return to Aristotle that took place in the first century BC paved the way for the distinctive interpretation of Aristotle elaborated by Alexander. On the other hand, it is not clear that this return is best explained in light of his exegetical achievements, or that it is best understood as a concern with defending what was perceived as the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle. I have argued that to the extent that Xenarchus was vigorously engaged with Aristotle and his engagement resulted in acceptance, resistance, or even rejection of Aristotle's doctrines, there is nothing anomalous about his philosophical position.[30]

[30] There is a caveat, however: the post-Hellenistic return to Aristotle was first and foremost a return to the *Categories*. This is especially true in the case of the two champions of the Peripatetic tradition in the first century BC, namely Boethus of Sidon and Andronicus of Rhodes. There is absolutely no evidence linking Xenarchus to the *Categories* or suggesting that the *Categories* had an impact on his views. What sets Xenarchus apart from the early engagement with Aristotle is that he was remarkably disengaged with the *Categories* – or so I suggest, on the basis of the complete lack of evidence associating Xenarchus with the *Categories*.

CHAPTER 5

Posidonius as historian of philosophy: an interpretation of Plutarch, de Animae Procreatione in Timaeo *22, 1023b–c*

Anna Eunyoung Ju

INTRODUCTION

It has been suggested that the Stoicism of the late Hellenistic era was understood in terms only partially overlapping with those applying to classical Stoicism. It is typical of the early Stoics, for instance, that they did not see themselves as commentators on Platonic texts and ideas, rather adopting some Platonic ideas and ignoring others without necessarily feeling the need to render this process explicit, whereas the Stoics of that period, notably Panaetius and Posidonius, 'lived at a period of culture in which the transmission of, and commentary on, texts from an earlier period, including those of Plato and Aristotle, was becoming a more important part of philosophical activity'.[1] This is not to argue that those Stoics substantially deviated from their inherited Stoicism. However, to a large extent, the processes prompted for them a revised recognition of a Platonic, and also an Aristotelian, heritage, with the result that these formed a new trend in Stoicism's orientation, which was to determine the school's future character in the Imperial age.

In the last two decades, scholars have been active in debating and determining the implications of this reorientated Stoicism, attending particularly to the two most prominent Stoic precedents for it, Antipater of Tarsus and Panaetius, who, purportedly, initiated within the school the exploration of common ground with Plato. Leaving aside some degree of disagreement among scholars in appreciating the Stoics' exploration of the philosophical past, however, the question exactly how Posidonius responded to his school's syncretistic move and to what purposes he participated in it demands fuller examination. In attempting to answer this question, however, I restrict myself to offering a few more specific comments on the topic of Posidonius' use of his reading of Plato.

[1] Gill 2006: 213.

It is well recognised that the study of Plato had a significant impact on Posidonius' style of thinking, as we see him frequently referring to Plato's *Timaeus*;[2] far from being incidental, this pattern of reference supports Posidonius' development of his own distinctive philosophical positions. It is not necessarily the case that the historical context of Posidonius' citations was one of polemic (as for example when Antipater of Tarsus engaged the sceptical Academy, seeing that Posidonius' particular antagonists in his own day were, according to the evidence, Epicureans such as Zeno of Sidon.[3] Posidonius' use of his reading of Plato instead reflects on the continuing dialectic and controversies between the schools, determining his own syncretistic agenda. Unfortunately, insufficient textual evidence remains for us to reconstruct his discussion fully. These writings draw attention to the difficult question of why Posidonius was motivated to draw on Plato in the *Timaeus* in particular. There is more debate, however, over how far this meant that Posidonius adopted non-standard positions within Stoicism or whether he used his reading of Plato to support, or at most refine, an essentially Stoic view. It has been suggested that Posidonius' underlying motivation in his repeated recourse to Plato was in some sense to break from his immediate Stoic context in order to effect a certain reconciliation with Platonism.[4] The extant remains of Posidonius' works, however, cannot satisfactorily ground this assumption, for three reasons expanded on below.

First, among the references to Plato, the majority are not just restricted to Platonic topoi but refer further back to Plato's predecessors, as well as to his contemporaries and successors.[5] This allows us to conjecture that although the topics as discussed by Posidonius bore on the corresponding concepts developed by Plato in his dialogues, he did not seek to set up Plato as the ultimate authority figure on each topic, rather tracing ideas back to other authorities. Further, the contexts of the evidence for

[2] Kidd 1988: 1.339, provides eight references by Posidonius mainly to the *Timaeus*: Frs. 28, 31, 49, 85, 141, 149, 205 and 291. In Ju 2008: 89–91, I add a few others to show a fuller list of Posidonius' reference to Plato and Aristotle more generally. The references' topics are diverse. Not all attest direct reference to Plato, but most seem to bear out Posidonius' discussion or at least his knowledge of Plato's theory on selected topics. Among these references, at least nineteen are, however implicitly, linked to Plato's dialogues, and especially to his *Timaeus*.

[3] For Posidonius' critical reference to Epicurus and Epicureans, see Frs. 22, 46, 47, 149, 160, 187, 288 EK.

[4] Edelstein 1936: 303; Merlan 1953: 34–40; Rist 1969: 204–6; Dillon 1977: 111–12.

[5] For Epicurus, see n. 3; Parmenides, Fr. 49 EK; Pythagoras, T91, 95, Frs. 16, 49, 98 and 141; Aristotle, T85, 96, 100, Frs. 18, 49, 84, 93, 149, 220; Euclid, Frs. 196, 199; Eudoxus of Cnidus, Frs. 49, 205; Aratus, Frs. 48ab; Theophrastus, T100, Fr. 93; Xenophon, Fr. 203; Xenocrates and Speusippus, Frs. 140, 141a (I omit Posidonius' reference to Homer and others).

Posidonius' references give good reason to believe that his citations presuppose his own philosophical stance even when drawing material of an illustrative or other kind from the Platonic passages, and that, like earlier Stoics, Posidonius accepted some of Plato's ideas and rejected others. This pattern of engagement, however, need not have followed that of his master Panaetius, nor that of other Stoics, who are thought typically to have maintained their distance from Plato's thought, regarding Socrates as their ultimate authority figure.

It is, rather, typically the case that, like Panaetius, Posidonius was enthusiastic in his conscription for his own views of 'old authorities' more generally, as shown by Galen's report that Posidonius 'praises and accepts the account of the old authorities'.[6] In addition to Strabo's claim that attests Posidonius as 'Aristotelising' in his inquiry into causes,[7] Galen's testimony, despite the characteristic obscurity regarding context, gives good reason to believe that Posidonius admired Plato and Pythagoras also.[8] Besides, Posidonius in some instances consulted the theory even of the early Academy while responding to contemporary Platonists on selected topics.[9] This inclination may be read as a mark of Posidonius' strong historical sense: he seems to have believed that the development of his own ideas and theories may have had the potential to resolve outstanding problems in the context of a Platonic – and an Aristotelian – heritage; also, he apparently accepted that such a heritage framed the questions which it was natural for his own thought to pursue.

The second reason why Posidonius' references to Plato cannot be read straightforwardly as Platonising is that they also allow us to conjecture the extensive recovery on his part of a Pythagorean heritage as part of Stoicism's ancestry. This is supported by the fact that the majority of Posidonius' citations are plausibly traced back to Pythagoras, as well as to Plato. Most notably, references dealing with the topics of a tripartite soul and the soul's two irrational parts are undoubtedly linked to Pythagoras via the Pythagoreans, as a few passages of Galen's treatise suggest.[10] This Galenic attestation has given rise to lively debate among scholars, in which

[6] Gal. *PHP* 4.420, p. 284.18–24 De Lacy (T101 EK): ἐπαινεῖ καὶ ἀποδέχεται τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰρημένα.

[7] Str. 2.3.8 (T85, EK).

[8] Gal. *PHP*, 4.425, p. 290.1–5 De Lacy (T95 EK): 'Not only Aristotle and Plato held such views, but still earlier there were others, and in particular Pythagoras; Posidonius too says that he, Pythagoras, was the first to hold the view, while it was Plato who worked it out and made it more complete' (tr. by Kidd).

[9] Cf. Frs. 140, 141a EK.

[10] Gal. *PHP* 5.430, p. 292.25 De Lacy (T62 EK) and 4.377, p. 248.6 De Lacy (T102 EK).

the principal question on Posidonius' psychology is whether, and if so in what senses, he himself acknowledged there to be parts to the soul.[11] I attempt no direct treatment of it here. But it is sufficient to note that, contrary to Galen's assertions, Posidonius' loyalty to Plato would now seem generally to stand in doubt.

The significance for Posidonius of the tripartite psychology seems to fall not on any supposed allegiance to Plato but rather on the fact that this theory (as he himself inaugurated it in the school) clearly went beyond what the earlier Stoics recognised as Socratic. In so doing, the tripartition invoked a Platonic and an earlier, allegedly Pythagorean tradition, purportedly attributed by Diogenes Laërtius to Pythagoras.[12] Even when Posidonius borrowed from the *Phaedrus* the comparison of the two lower soul parts to a pair of horses driven by a human charioteer, in appropriating Plato's tripartite psychology Posidonius' ultimate authority was most probably Pythagoras.[13] Posidonius made this claim, as Galen himself reports, by tracing the theory back to Pythagoras by way of the works written by his pupils.[14] This pattern of engagement presumably contributed to the processes whereby Posidonius reoriented his inherited Stoicism and shaped his school's syncretism in a manner different to that of Antipater and Panaetius. That is, by way of interpreting Plato's *Timaeus* Posidonius sought predominantly to translate Platonic and Pythagorean ideas into a Stoic form.[15]

A last point about the nature of Platonic references in Posidonius is that they can be shown to reflect an extensive range of reconstruction of history of philosophy in his work, as will become clear. Judging from the context of evidence for Posidonius' references, this rewriting or rather cross-referencing and reinterpretation of a variety of previous opinions represents a pervasive characteristic of his method of study. To a large extent, reference to Plato, that is, formed one part of Posidonius' practice in reconstructing history on selected topics, as informed by contemporary syncretistic tendencies. It is likely that, as for Antiochus, for Posidonius too, understanding the history of the schools' tradition was integral to the task of achieving a correct philosophical alignment.[16]

[11] For scholars' debate on this topic, see Kidd 1971: 200–15; Cooper 1999: 449–84; Tieleman 2003: 198–287; Sedley 2003b: 20–4; Gill 2006: 213–15, 266–90.
[12] D.L. 8.30 (DK 58B1a). [13] Sedley 1992: 33; 2003: 22.
[14] Gal. *PHP* 5.478, p. 334.23–33 De Lacy (T91, Fr. 151 EK).
[15] For scholars' debate on this topic, see Sedley 1992: 32; 2003: 21–4; Frede 1999: 782–5; Boys-Stones 2001: Ch. 6; Gill 2006: 212–15; Ju 2008: 145–50.
[16] For Antiochus, see Sedley 2012.

My exposition of the evidence below therefore considers Posidonius' suppositions and methodology in his history-rewriting, with particular regard to Plutarch's *de An. Procr.* 1023b–c. Attention to Posidonius' likely motives for drawing on Plato in the *Timaeus* suggests that in this Plutarch testimony Posidonius re-examines a highly complex body of evidence for the psychological and metaphysical hierarchy of soul for Plato in order to illuminate the relationship between Platonic and Pythagorean thinking, and that in doing so Posidonius gives attention to a conception of 'reason' expounded by Plato in the *Timaeus*, and envisages mathematicising it, possibly encouraged by a Pythagorean heritage widely believed to be present in the dialogue.

'THE BEING OF THE LIMITS'

We can now delve into the details of Posidonius' interpretation included in Plutarch, *de An. Procr.* 1023b–c. Posidonius, according to Plutarch, referred to *Timaeus* 35a (as indicated in my accompanying footnote),[17] where Plato discusses the creation of the world soul in respect of its constituents in adopting a dualistic distinction between indivisible and divisible, and between intelligible and perceptible. Following his criticism of the Platonists who supposedly regarded matter as a corporeal constituent of the soul, Plutarch continues with the statement:

> Similar objections to this can be made also to Posidonius and his followers; for they did not withdraw far from matter; but having taken it to be the being of the limits around bodies that was being called 'divisible' . . .[18] (Plut. *de An. Procr.* 1023b; Fr.141a EK)

This is a very important piece of evidence for Stoic and especially Posidonian thinking. But it is also very difficult to interpret and has given rise to extensive debate, in which there is still no consensus as to its meaning.[19]

[17] Pl. *Tim.* 35a1–7: 'In between the being that is indivisible and always changeless and the one that is divisible and comes into being in the case of bodies [τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς], he mixed a third, intermediate form of being, derived from the other two. Similarly, he made a mixture of the same and then one of the different, in between their indivisible parts and their divisible parts in the case of bodies.'

[18] Plut. *de An. Procr.* 1023b (Fr.141a, EK): ὅμοια δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ἀντειπεῖν καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ποσειδώνιον· οὐ γὰρ μακρὰν τῆς ὕλης ἀπέστησαν· ἀλλὰ δεξάμενοι τὴν τῶν περάτων οὐσίαν περὶ τὰ σώματα λέγεσθαι μεριστήν . . .

[19] For scholars' debate on the testimony, see Edelstein 1936: 303; Thévenaz 1938: 63–7; Merlan 1953: 34–58; Laffranque 1964: 373–4, 379–80, 431–2; Rist 1969: 204–6; Hoven 1971: 95–102; Cherniss 1976: 2.217–25; Theiler 1982: 1.200–1; Kidd 1988: 1.530–8; Reydams-Schils 1997: 455–76; 1999: 96–100; Ferrari 2002: 277–86; Tieleman 2003: 210–13; Opsomer 2004: 137–62; Gill 2006: 283–5; Ju 2009: 386–9.

This debate usually centres on the question of the existence of a Posidonian commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*, about which scholars are sceptical with some justification.[20] The debate focuses specifically on the question whether, and if so in what aspects, the evidence implies an acquaintance on Posidonius' part with Platonism. A central difficulty in resolving this question is, however, the entire lack of context. The Plutarch passage, in my view, consists of a patchwork of paraphrases, made up of indirect quotations, which do not refer in detail to a specific text of Posidonius. The Stoic source used by Plutarch cannot be identified, despite the assumption that he may have used some intermediary material for Posidonius' interpretation.[21] Apart from the meagre report by Macrobius,[22] the extant Stoic evidence is silent on the topics dealt with in the Plutarch passage. In this situation, there would seem no secure way to distinguish from the passage an exact verbatim fragment of Posidonius, although it need not follow that the basic information given by Plutarch is entirely incorrect.

A further difficulty in probing Posidonius' interpretation is that the context of the testimony is extremely polemical, given that Plutarch's ideas and arguments at this point essentially aim to justify his own objections to Posidonius; in effect, Plutarch is presenting his version of what Plato

[20] Plutarch's report has given rise to the question whether Posidonius wrote a commentary on Plato's *Timaeus*. In attempting to answer this question, scholars give attention to S.E. *M* 7.93 (Fr. 85 EK): φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος. The old view of Taylor that the whole section of Sextus 7.89–140 or at least its Pythagorean section 7.92–109 came from a separate commentary by Posidonius on the *Timaeus* is now generally rejected by scholars. See Taylor 1928: 35 n. 1; Edelstein 1936: 304 n. 72; Kidd 1988: 1.337–40; Sedley 1992: 33; Frede 1999: 777–8.

[21] To resolve the question of Plutarch's Stoic source, scholars give attention to the expression in the opening line of Plut. *de An. Procr*. 1023b: τοῖς περὶ Ποσειδώνιον, suggesting that Plutarch used some intermediary material. This expression may mean only 'Posidonius', or only his pupils or 'circle'. Cherniss 1976: 2.216 suggests that, as by οἱ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα (1012f) after writing οἱ δὲ Κράντορι τῷ Σολεῖ προσέθεντο (1012d) Plutarch must have meant 'Crantor and his followers', so here too by that expression Plutarch meant to refer to both 'Posidonius and his followers'. *Contra*, see Tieleman 2003: 210 n. 37. On the similar expression οἱ περὶ τὸν Ποσειδώνιον see D.L. 7.144 and 7.146. Cherniss' suggestion seems plausible, since, if Plutarch's source were a work by Posidonius himself, it is unlikely that he would include this reference to 'his followers'. If there was thus an intermediary, one outstanding candidate for it is Eudorus, Posidonius' younger contemporary, who wrote a commentary on the *Timaeus*. This reading is supported by the assumption that Eudorus' interpretation of the same *Timaeus* passage is discussed by Plutarch immediately before he provides Posidonius' interpretation. Even in that case, Eudorus may not have had direct access to Posidonius' interpretation, on account of his career in Alexandria; he may rather have read or listened to work by one of Posidonius' pupils, whose book quoted or referred to Posidonius' interpretation directly. As D.L. 7.41 (T43 EK) shows, Phanias, 'an acquaintance of Posidonius', wrote *Lectures of Posidonius*, in more than one volume. This evidence suggests that, apart from Posidonius' own books, there was other material from his oral lectures published by his pupils. The inference would then be that the intermediary was Eudorus, whose source was also another intermediary, such as some published post-Posidonian material.

[22] Macr. *in Somn. Scip*. 1.14.19 (Fr. 140 EK).

really meant, against rival interpreters.[23] It is worth noting in this regard that in the previous passages of the same treatise Plutarch argued against those Platonists who maintained the world soul to be a mixture of, on the one hand, 'indivisible being' in the sense of 'shape' or 'form' and, on the other, 'divisible being' interpreted as 'matter'. Plutarch's particular antagonists here are those who supposedly regarded matter as a corporeal constituent of the soul, whom Plutarch faults on the basis that 'only after the creation of the soul' does Plato in the *Timaeus* introduce any 'presumption of matter'.[24] Plutarch proceeds to criticise 'Posidonius and his followers', suggesting that they, too, 'did not withdraw far from matter'. However, the question of what Plutarch intended in his objections to Posidonius remains unclear and controversial. Therefore, I will address this question first, in questioning the views offered by scholars, before proceeding to treat Posidonius' interpretation of Plato's theory of the soul.

The discussion of the testimony by scholars of the twentieth century, however varied, generally presumes that Plutarch provides evidence for Posidonius' deviation from a standard Stoic conception of soul, and at the same time illustrates his evolution into a Platonist or at least an ally of Platonists in taking 'divisible being' as matter and in turn as a corporeal constituent of the world soul.[25] Leaving aside Posidonius' own view on limit, Tieleman meanwhile thinks that 'Posidonius, unlike Plutarch, assumed that matter was involved in the creation of soul', and that when Plutarch faults him for not withdrawing far from matter, 'this can only mean that Posidonius took the soul as described by Plato to be corporeal'.[26] Tieleman at this point seems to presume that Plutarch's evidence, for all its polemicism, provides material for a Stoicising comment by Posidonius on Plato's theory of soul in the *Timaeus*. But I do not agree with this line of argument, for the reason that the extant evidence makes it unambiguously clear that while for Posidonius the soul is entirely corporeal, for Plato it is not.[27] Unless we take it for granted that Posidonius neglected Plato's obvious meaning, the presumption that he took the soul as described by Plato as corporeal seems just implausible. We can then legitimately suppose that in interpreting Plato's passage Posidonius himself had, at least, no motive for adopting Plato's dualistic distinction between indivisible and divisible,

[23] Xenocrates, Fr. 68, Heinze, 187.6–8; Plut. *de An. Procr.* 1012d; Crantor, Fr. 3, Mullach, *Frag. Philos. Graec.* iii. p. 140; Timaeus Locrus, 205.13–206.4, 208.13–15, 215.13–14, Thesleff; Speusippus, Stob. *Ecl.* 1.364.4 W = Fr. 40 Lang; Cherniss 1944: 396 n. 321; 1976: 136–8, 162–5, 172–3, 212–17; Merlan 1953: 17, 34–5, 45–8; Kidd 1988: 1.533.

[24] Plut. *de An. Procr.* 1022e.

[25] Cf. n. 4; see also Kidd 1988: 1.530–8; Reydams-Schils 1997: 466–7.

[26] Tieleman 2003: 210–11. For my discussion of Tieleman's view, see Ju 2009: 387.

[27] D.L. 7.156.

or between intelligible and perceptible, in analysing the constituents of the soul. Since this dualism is alien to Stoicism, it would have been extremely difficult for him to translate it into a Stoic form, insofar as he adhered to the core Stoic doctrine of a corporeal soul.

Kidd, on the other hand, on the assumption that shape is for Posidonius a 'corporeal containing limit', takes the view that a reference in Plutarch to 'the being of the limits' implies Posidonius' treatment of limits as corporeal beings, and hence that Plutarch was accurate in judging 'the limits' as 'material' for Posidonius.[28] Yet the weight of Plutarch's objections to Posidonius somehow fails to coincide with Kidd's emphasis. It seems, rather, probable that where Posidonius in Plutarch's eyes envisaged some sort of 'matter' was in interpreting Plato's words at *Timaeus* 35a: 'the one that is divisible and comes into being in the case of bodies'. That is, as Plutarch might better have argued, Posidonius took Plato's words περὶ τὰ σώματα or 'in the case of bodies' to mean 'around bodies' in a literal spatial sense, and linked this term, so understood, to 'limits'. Posidonius therefore understood 'divisible being' as plane surfaces, that is, as Plutarch also cites, 'the limits of bodies'. It is crucial to understand that Plutarch's objections to Posidonius were grounded on his super-dualist view of the soul as expounded by Plato in the *Timaeus*.[29] That is, for Plutarch at least, not only should the soul have no corporeal components whatsoever, but 'divisible being' too should be taken as something completely conceptual. Inasmuch as Posidonius, by contrast, included 'the limits of bodies' as an instance of Platonic 'divisible being', alongside other mathematical limits, Plutarch interpreted Posidonius as being not very far from matter.

Weighing these considerations, any residual uncertainty as to the testimony's context notwithstanding, one thing remains clear: that in interpreting Plato's passage Posidonius' concern lay at least with a Platonic theory of the divisible and, more generally, of all mathematical limits. While Plato in the *Timaeus* expounds the theory of limits in his discussion of divisible parts of the soul, this would hardly prevent Posidonius from using his reading of Plato to support or at least refine his views on limits, even without accepting a Platonic theory of the soul. If this conjecture is correct, in addition to the question of Posidonius' own views on limits, the

[28] Kidd 1988: 1.531–2: 'So Posidonius' version of the Platonic "divisible being" . . . is "the being of (the) limits", which was regarded by Plutarch as material (and so open to objection). This makes excellent sense for Posidonius', 'since although orthodox Stoicism held that limits exist in thought only (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν, Proclus, *in Euc. Def.* I, p. 89F [= *SVF* II. 488]), Posidonius believed that they existed in reality also (καθ' ὑπόστασιν, see F16 [D.L. 135])'. See also n. 40. For my discussion of Kidd's view, see Ju 2009: 388.

[29] Gill 2006: 284 n. 361.

question how and why he used his reading of Plato on this topic demands further investigation. This question is controversial and I attempt no direct treatment of it here, except to offer a few more specific comments below.

It has been conjectured that for Posidonius limit is not a body but a subsistent incorporeal.[30] This conjecture is grounded on the inference that in Diogenes Laërtius' evidence Posidonius would not have used with respect to surface the description καὶ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν or 'both in thought and as subsistent',[31] had he taken it to be corporeal, for two reasons. First, Posidonius would have preferred the words 'as existent', for example, to the words 'as subsistent', since the former term specifically indicates in Stoicism corporeality, whereas the latter in itself does not. Further, though he might thereby have better argued for a limit's corporeality, the reason why, then, he conceived existents as two-dimensional remains unclear, since in Stoic terms a 'body' corresponds to a three-dimensional existent. Second, and more importantly, Posidonius would have had little reason to adopt the words '(being) in thought' as an ontological qualification with regard to surface; in Stoic terms a 'body' receives no such qualification, since this expression for Stoic ontology conveys a reality without bodily existence; nor would limit require the same qualification, were it a body. That is, what Posidonius may have intended in this combined terminology was to claim that limits not only are in thought but also subsist objectively, holding to a view that limits are incorporeal (not corporeal, as more commonly supposed).

Supposing that Posidonius had an idea of incorporeal limit as argued above, the expression τὴν τῶν περάτων οὐσίαν in Plutarch's evidence represents Posidonius' way of presenting a Platonic idea that Posidonius would himself describe, more precisely, as τὴν τῶν ἀσωμάτων περάτων ὑπόστασιν, namely 'the subsistence of incorporeal limits'. In this case, the imputation to Posidonius of an alleged Crantorian approach in construing 'divisible being' as matter (and in turn as a corporeal constituent of the soul) seems unwarranted. Consideration of Posidonius' likely motives for drawing on the passage in Plato suggests that he may have abandoned the earlier Stoic opinion about shape as a mere thought-construct. This opinion

[30] For discussion on Posidonius' conception of incorporeal limit, see Ju 2009: 380–9; 2006: 329–58; White 2007: 52. *Contra*, see Reydams-Schils 1997: 467; Kidd 1988: 1.531–2; Mansfeld 1978: 160–2, 166.

[31] D.L. 7.135 (Fr. 16 EK): 'A surface is the limit of a body, or that which has only length and breadth without depth. This Posidonius in his *On Celestial Phenomena* Book 5 retains both in thought and as subsistent [καὶ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν καὶ καθ' ὑπόστασιν]. A line is the limit of a surface, or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the limit of a line – the smallest marker' (tr. by LS 50E).

would have led him to highly counter-intuitive conclusions – for instance, that even the spherical shape of the world corresponds to a fictitious construct and is therefore non-subsistent. If Posidonius abandoned this earlier Stoic account, he would have been liberated from that old dilemma, finding himself free to revert to the Platonic, and the Pythagorean, conception of limit,[32] without thereby depriving it of subsistence. In that case, for Posidonius the spherical shape of the world, like other sorts of limit, without being a body, still corresponds to a real and objective something, namely a subsistent incorporeal. However, this Posidonian conception of shape marks a partial innovation within Stoic theory, and one which had some subsequent influence on Stoic thinking, namely in Cleomedes' astronomy.

THE PLATONIC 'SOUL' AS REASON

We can now profitably turn our attention to the remaining part of Plutarch's testimony, where he continues to criticise Posidonius' interpretation of the soul expounded by Plato in *Timaeus* 35a.

> . . . and having mixed these [limits] with the intelligibles, they declared the soul to be the form of what is everywhere extended, constructed according to number which embraces concord. For the mathematicals have been ranked between the primary intelligibles and the sensibles, and it is an appropriate thing for the soul, possessing as it does the permanence of the intelligibles and the passivity of the sensibles, to have its being in the middle.[33] (Plut. *de An. Procr.* 1023b–c; Fr.141a EK)

The immediate context is Plutarch's attribution to Posidonius of an interpretation of the Platonic soul in mathematical terms. Plutarch continues to assign to Posidonius an explanation of the soul's intermediate status between intelligibles and sensibles by means of an analogy with the mathematicals. This part of the passage is obviously difficult to interpret and draws attention to the difficult problem of what Posidonius meant in the explanation. More specifically, on what grounds might Posidonius have

[32] S.E. *M* 7.119 is a possibly Posidonian interpretation of Platonic numbers and limits as incorporeals. See Burkert 1972: 56 and n. 19.

[33] Plut. *de An. Procr.* 1023b–c (Fr.141a, EK): . . . καὶ ταῦτα τῷ νοητῷ μίξαντες ἀπεφήναντο τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ, κατ' ἀριθμὸν συνεστῶσαν ἁρμονίαν περιέχοντα τά τε γὰρ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πρώτων νοητῶν μεταξὺ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τετάχθαι τῆς τε ψυχῆς, τῶν νοητῶν τὸ ἀίδιον καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ παθητικὸν, ἐχούσης, προσῆκον ἐν μέσῳ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάρχειν.

offered the explanation of the soul's status as equivalent to that of the mathematicals for Plato?[34]

Apart from the absence of direct sources on the conception Plutarch assigns to Posidonius, the testimony's argumentation would appear in itself insufficient to claim Posidonius as its instigator. The fact that Plutarch mistakenly takes the word 'form' to mean a Platonic 'Idea' would also seem to make it difficult to make any use of his testimony as such.[35] On the other hand, there are grounds for believing that an equivalent explanation, though highly abbreviated, genuinely derived from Posidonius, given the testimony's employment of 'passivity'.[36] The possibility therefore remains that he may have advanced some form of mathematical or mathematicising explanation for the Platonic soul, as suggested in the testimony, possibly on the back of his knowledge of Plato's unwritten doctrines.[37] It is at least not typical of Posidonius, however, that he should have wished to integrate into his own concepts Plato's dualism of the intelligible and sensible, or of the indivisible and divisible, constituents of the soul, as argued above. It is rather the case that, while the testimony is sufficient to confirm Posidonius' interest in Plato's passage, the explanation included in the testimony neither presents nor constitutes in itself a theory of soul such as we might attribute to Posidonius himself, beyond some terms and ideas through which he interpreted the passage.

In considering Posidonius' likely motives for drawing on the Plato passage, two possibilities deserve to be considered, which are compatible with each other. First, the explanation plausibly represents Posidonius' comments on Platonic and later Platonist ideas of soul in mathematical terms, as parts of his history-rewriting. That is, what Posidonius may have

[34] There is more debate whether the explanation genuinely derived from Posidonius or Plutarch conflated an account offered by Posidonius or even Plutarch's own explanation foisted on Posidonius. In favour of the third consideration above Kidd 1988: 1.536–7 continues: 'Plutarch was not overscrupulous in such matters. It is certainly the case that reinterpretations and straight interpretation (or explanation) of Plato became confused with each other in the tradition', a suggestion I do not follow, for reasons argued above.

[35] Cherniss 1976: 2.219–20, followed by Kidd 1988: 1.532 and Gill 2006: 215, pinpoints that Plutarch was mistaken in taking the word ἰδέα to mean 'Idea' or a Platonic Form; and that the same word ἰδέα at *Timaeus* 35a7 in the sense of 'entity' or unity was 'the source of its use in the Posidonian definition'.

[36] Posidonius' term 'passivity', as presented in the Plutarch passage we are studying, occurs also at Gal. *PHP* 5.467 (Fr 148 EK); but this does not necessarily convey the same sense as in the Galenic passage. *Contra*, see Tieleman 2003: 211–12.

[37] Arist. *Metaph*. A.6.987a14–18; Aristotle had already treated Platonic ontology in terms of a tripartition of sensibles, intelligibles and mathematicals, the tripartition found in Plutarch's testimony. But from the testimony there seems little room to confirm that Posidonius used Peripatetic sources on the issue; he may merely have used his knowledge of Plato's unwritten doctrines.

intended in the explanation is to refer to Plato integrally by reference to later, comparable views offered by Platonists, in the context of a relatively comprehensive discussion of the topic of soul.[38] This conjecture is grounded on the inference that the definition of the soul included in the testimony conveys Speusippus' wording 'the form of what is everywhere extended', as well as 'number', which early Academics such as Xenocrates may have imported from the Pythagoreans.[39] Weighing these considerations, then, it is possible that in reverting to the Platonists' debate on the topic of soul Posidonius should have constructively rewritten material, perhaps in the contexts in which he cited, for instance, an emerging tendency in the early Academy to identify the soul for Plato with the mathematicals by using Pythagorean terms and ideas. Besides, Posidonius' treatment in mathematical terms of the Platonic idea of soul can be read as an expression of his enthusiasm for finding a Pythagorean pedigree for Platonists' thinking in Plato's theory, given the terms and ideas of the explanation that may be traced back to Pythagoras via the Pythagoreans.[40]

A second possibility: it is at least true that the whole definition of the soul attributed by Plutarch to Posidonius does not only rework the accounts of earlier Platonists, but at the same time also anticipates the versions proposed by later Platonists such as Severus and Moderatus, as shown by the passages of Iamblichus and others, in all its three aspects: soul is the form of what is everywhere extended, self-moving number and mathematical concord.[41] This anticipation by Posidonius does not necessarily mean that he was a precursor of later Platonism as to this selected topic. How and to what extent later Platonists affiliated their positions to his example constitutes another question. But Posidonius'

[38] This reading is also consonant with many attested references by Posidonius to previous ideas of soul, such as soul defined in terms of numerical concord (as developed by Plato and allegedly the Pythagoreans), self-moving soul (as attributed to Plato as well as to Philolaus, Xenocrates and Aristotle) (see Macr. *in Somn. Scip*. 1.14.19, Fr. 140 EK) and the souls of the stars (as attributed to Plato and Aristotle as well as to Chrysippus) (see Ach. Tat. *Intr. in Arat*. 13, Aratea, 41.1–5, Fr. 149 EK and S.E. *M* 9.71–2).

[39] Cf. n. 23.

[40] Cf. S.E. *M* 4.5–6; Nem. *de Nat. Hom*. 2 (BT p. 17.1–10 Morani [= Fr 21A Mirhady]). In light of the evidence from Sextus and Nemesius, whoever its source, it suggests a tendency in and after Posidonius' day to aver some form of mathematical or mathematicising explanation for the soul as genuinely Pythagorean, indicating that Posidonius himself may have done so through interpreting Platonic and Platonist material.

[41] Iamblichus, Stob. *Ecl*. 1.364.4 W (Fr. 40 Lang), and *Comm. Math. Scientia* 9.40 Festa, the former of which preserves Speusippus' geometrical definition of soul as 'the form of what is everywhere extended', seem significant for clarifying the account of the soul as suggested in Plutarch's testimony. But, since Iamblichus does not mention Posidonius, his passages cannot be regarded as references to Posidonius.

anticipation does suggest his originality in combining in the definition of the Platonic soul the geometrical, arithmetical and harmonic categories of mathematics. It further suggests that Posidonius transmitted the desire for a unified scientific account of the soul to later Platonists and Pythagoreans.[42]

My exposition of the evidence below therefore considers the hypothesis that, in offering the explanation of the soul's status as equivalent to that of the mathematicals for Plato, Posidonius gave attention to a conception of 'reason' or the soul's cognitive faculty expounded by Plato in the *Timaeus*, and envisaged mathematicising it, possibly encouraged by a Pythagorean heritage widely believed to be present in the dialogue.

We can begin by considering certain features of Posidonius' references to Plato, as presented in a few passages of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus, *M* 7.93 reads:

> And, says Posidonius by way of interpreting Plato's *Timaeus*, 'just as light is cognised by vision, which is light-like, and voice by hearing, which is air-like, so too the nature of the wholes should be cognised by reason, which is akin to it'.[43] (S.E. *M* 7.93; Fr. 85 EK)

This testimony preserves a verbatim fragment of Posidonius in which he maintains 'reason' as the criterion of truth, in the statement: (a) 'the nature of the wholes should be cognised by reason, which is akin to it'.

We will return to this testimony, but Posidonius' interpretation reported here recalls another Platonic passage: *Timaeus* 27d–28a, where Plato's spokesman Timaeus begins by distinguishing 'that which always is' from 'that which comes to be'. This sees Timaeus further observing a distinction between 'intellection along with reason', through which the former is 'comprehensible' (περιληπτόν), and 'opinion along with reasonless sense-perception', through which the latter is merely 'opinable' (δοξαστόν). It is worth mentioning here in passing an interpretation of the same passage offered by certain 'Platonists'. They took the view that Plato in the passage distinguished things into intelligibles and sensibles, defining intelligibles as 'comprehensible' by reason, and sensibles as 'opinable'.[44] I return below to this Platonist interpretation, but for the moment will restrict myself to a comparison from Plutarch's evidence and from the Plato passage of the two statements explicitly attributed to Posidonius and Plato: (b) The soul is

[42] Kidd 1988: 1.534.

[43] S.E. *M* 7.93 (Fr. 85 EK): καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου.

[44] S.E. *M* 7.141–4; see n. 57.

intermediate between intelligibles and sensibles, possessing characteristics both of the permanence of intelligibles and of the passivity of sensibles. (c) That which always exists is comprehensible by intellection along with reason, but that which comes to be is opinable by opinion along with reasonless sense-perception.

By implication, Posidonius' ascription to the soul of an intermediate status becomes understandable as confirming or continuing a Platonic idea that the soul involves both intelligibles and sensibles, on the strength of its two parts or faculties: a cognitive and reasoning faculty, on the one hand, and an affective and opining faculty, on the other. It is easy to see Posidonius taking the soul's possessing the permanence of intelligibles (and hence grasping Ideas) to equate to a Platonic conception of the cognitive faculty. In assigning the soul an intermediate status, the weight of Posidonius' emphasis therefore seems to fall on his restatement of (as he saw them) the grounds of Platonic epistemology – that Ideas or intelligibles are comprehended by the soul as reason. Further, the significance for Posidonius of specifying the soul's involvement with intelligibles is surely tied to his identification of reason as the criterion for the knowledge of things, as expounded by Plato at the beginning of Timaeus' speech. There seems little room to doubt, then, that Posidonius largely stood by a Platonic conception of reason in his interpretation of the dialogue, given that this need not have committed Posidonius himself to any doctrine of an incorporeal soul.

If this assumption is correct, the question immediately arises whether, in using his own term 'reason', Posidonius proposed to correct the early Stoic criterion of the 'cognitive impression' (φαντασία καταληπτική), which the founding fathers of the Stoa construed as offering a basis for truth through sensory self-evidence. To answer this question we need briefly to consider Diogenes Laërtius 7.54, where after speaking of the Stoic criterion of cognitive impressions as developed by Chrysippus, Antipater of Tarsus and Apollodorus, Diogenes continues: 'Boethus admits a number of criteria – intellect, sense-perception, desire and scientific knowledge. And Chrysippus, at variance with himself, says in book I of *On Reason* that sense-perception and preconception are the criteria; preconception is a natural conception of universals'. Then he says:

And some others of the older Stoics admit right reason as a criterion, as Posidonius says in *On the Criterion*.[45] (D.L. 7.54; Fr. 42 EK part)

[45] D.L. 7.54 (Fr. 42 EK part): ἄλλοι δέ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίου φησί.

The assignation in this testimony of 'right reason' as representing a criterion for some other, older Stoics has generated extensive debate among scholars in considering both historical and philosophical aspects of Stoic epistemology.[46] My contributions to this debate will be necessarily limited. The testimony's context makes it reasonably certain that the unusually vague assignation to 'some others of the older Stoics' was Posidonius' own. But there are grounds for doubting the assignation, given that the remaining extant Stoic evidence is sufficiently strong to suggest that it is historically incorrect; no earlier Stoics, in fact, entertained 'right reason' as the criterion of truth. In this connection, scholars suggest that one way to resolve the difficulty raised by the assignation is to claim that in assigning independent criterial status to some kind of reason, Posidonius may have used such references in the context of polemic against Chrysippus, which appears to be the background here.[47]

It seems at least believable that the assignation noted above is offered not as straight doxography but as a speculative interpretation on Posidonius' part of previous Stoics' methodology on the topic.[48] Be that as it may, the extant evidence gives little room for us to confirm Posidonius' objections to Chrysippus or other Stoics, for two main reasons. First, Chrysippus proposed a plethora of criteria of truth, including cognitive impressions, sense-perceptions, preconceptions and common conceptions.[49] It remains possible that the contentious term included in the testimony 'at variance with himself' did not come from Posidonius. 'In their generality and complexity', as Posidonius may have thought, 'preconceptions and common conceptions cover truths which cognitive impressions, or at least sensory ones, do not transmit directly'; and Chrysippus can be 'assumed to have regarded these criteria as complementary to sense-perception'.[50] Second, in offering the criteria above, Chrysippus did not deny the accessibility of preconceptions (or common conceptions) to the operations of reason, as in the Stoics' claim that we are susceptible to non-sensory impressions (such as those of incorporeals), and also have cognition of conclusions reached through demonstration (such as the gods' existence and providence).[51]

The school context in which Posidonius may have found himself in debate with Chrysippus, then, need not have been characterised by polemic. We should remember that the Stoics presented a range of different criteria of truth on the view that such criteria applied to different contexts. Taking

[46] Sandbach 1971: 9–21; Rist 1978: 138–47; Kerferd 1978: 251–72; Long and Sedley 1987: 2.243; Kidd 1988: 1.189–95; 1989: 137–150; Sedley 1992: 33–4 nn. 35–7.
[47] Kidd 1988: 1.193–194. *Contra*, see Sedley 1992: 34 n. 37.
[48] Long and Sedley 1987: 2.243.
[49] D.L. 7.49–51.
[50] Long and Sedley 1987: 1.252–3.
[51] D.L. 7.51–2.

these points into account, despite the silence of direct sources it is likely, then, that Posidonius did not grant his criterion of reason any status independent of the Stoics' cognitive impression, and that 'right reason', used simply to allude to 'human' reason, by contrast with 'divine' reason,[52] conveys no more than the sense of 'reason' as provided by previous Stoics and also Posidonius himself. It was certainly possible for Posidonius to find the term complementary to other criteria, though more philosophically interesting, considering that his concern lay with 'knowledge of the nature of what is'[53] in relation to the rational faculty, as well as with non-sensory rational impressions conceived by intellection.

Possibly the actual historical context in which Posidonius stressed reason as a criterion bore on the continuing dialectic and controversies between the schools of the second and first centuries BC.[54] Stoics of this period, such as Antipater of Tarsus, began to review the implications of the school's conventional criteria as noted above, especially in seeking to counter the sceptical Academics' objections to Stoic epistemology,[55] and they began to consider other subordinate criteria, as shown by Boethus' list.[56] It is difficult to see how, exactly, the post-Antipatrian Stoics conducted epistemological debate. However meagre, though, the extant Stoic evidence is clear that no late Stoics departed significantly from their inherited criteria, suggesting further that the weight of Posidonius' emphasis on 'reason' did not fall on a denial of Stoic, or even Chrysippean, criteria, but rather concerned Posidonius' specification of the active role of reason in cognising the nature of things.

In this connection, it is worth noting in passing how the contemporary Academic Antiochus envisaged merging the self-evidence of impressions, a typical Stoic term in epistemology, with reason, as specified by Plato in the *Timaeus*, as in the statement that

> . . . Clearly he [Plato] specified reason as the criterion for knowledge of things, but comprehended in it sensory self-evidence as well.[57] (S.E. *M* 7.141)

[52] S.E. *M* 7.115–25. [53] Gal. *PHP*, 5.466–8, pp. 322.28–326.8 De Lacy (Frs. 31, 148 EK).

[54] Kidd 1988: 1.194; Long and Sedley 1987: 1.249–53.

[55] The main Stoic sources for the schools' epistemological debate are from two texts, Cic. *Luc*. and S.E. *M* 7 and 8.

[56] Long and Sedley 1987: 2.243 find Boethus' list to 'resemble the faculties cited as criteria of many philosophers by Sextus Empiricus (e.g. *M* 7.141–9), probably deriving from classifications made by Antiochus'.

[57] S.E. *M* 7.141: . . . προδήλως κρτήριον ὥρισε τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσεως τὸν λόγον, συμπεριλαβὼν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐνάργειαν. See also S.E. *M* 7.141–4; Cic. *Luc*. 11–62. On the assumption of the source for *M* 7.141–260 as Antiochus see Hirzel 1883: 3.493–524; Sedley 1982: 263–72; Sedley 1992: 44–9 and n. 72; for the entire section 7.89–260, Tarrant 1981: 80. *Contra*, see Barnes 1989: 64–5.

As the evidence shows, Antiochus adopted a method, quite inappropriately, even with regard to Plato, of taking from *Timaeus* 27d the term 'comprehensible' (περιληπτόν) and making it co-extensive with his own term 'comprehensive' (περιληπτικόν) and further, with little plausibility, with the Stoic term 'cognitive' (καταληπτικόν).[58] This series of postulated equivalences allowed Antiochus further to claim 'comprehensive reason' as the Platonic criterion of truth, grounded on infallibility. The significance of this Antiochean claim lay in his purported attempt to revive Platonic epistemology in the face of the Academic sceptics, through an integration of Stoic 'cognition' with Platonic 'reason'.

In this connection, Posidonius' focus on reason is likely to have stood in some sense as his response to Antiochus' attempt noted above, as well as to earlier sceptical assaults on the Stoic 'cognitive impression' as potentially fallible. However, Posidonius probably recognised that, given Plato's anti-empiricism, the gap between the two criteria offered by Stoicism and Platonism could never close entirely. Whatever the context of debate, we can be sure, though, that Posidonius was highly mindful of the Platonic criterion, reason, as shown by his interpretation of the *Timaeus* – 'the nature of the wholes should be cognised by reason'.

MATHEMATICISING PLATONIC 'REASON'

We should say something further here on Posidonius' criterion of reason, and may begin by reviewing the explanation of the soul implicitly laid out in Plutarch's original testimony. This explanation, however vague, centres on the three following points: (b) The soul is intermediate between intelligibles and sensibles. (d) The mathematicals are intermediate between intelligibles and sensibles. (e) This (b and d) gives the soul the same status as the mathematicals.

Why Posidonius advanced this form of explanation remains controversial, on account of our ignorance of the original context. The discussion above supports the reading that Posidonius concerned himself at least with the active role of reason in cognition as specified by Plato in the dialogue. But this reading barely explains why Posidonius assigned the soul the same status as the mathematicals. It is possible that the assignment stretched no further than the making of an analogy. But the testimony's explanation gives the impression that Posidonius further wished to take the soul to be something mathematical for Plato, though the testimony does not fill us in

[58] Sedley 1992: 45.

on his argumentation or rationale in doing so. The construal of the soul for Plato as something mathematical remains plausible, as in the lines preceding the explanation Posidonius takes the soul to be an entity 'constructed according to number which embraces concord'.

In this connection, it is worth noting Sextus' evidence at *M* 7.119:

> Plato in the *Timaeus* uses the same kind of proof to establish the fact that the soul is incorporeal. For if, he says, the sense of sight as perceiving light is thereby light-like, and hearing as discerning smitten air, which is voice, is thereby seen to be air-like and smell as recognizing vapours is definitely vapour-like, and taste as recognizing flavours flavour-like, so the soul too must be incorporeal in grasping incorporeal Ideas, just as [it grasps] those in numbers and those in the limits of bodies.[59] (S.E. *M* 7.119 trans. R. G. Bury)

We will return to this testimony, but may note for the moment that, since the testimony includes the account of sense-perception developed by Plato at *Timaeus* 45b–d, scholars have posed the question whether it implies a close acquaintance on Posidonius' part with the theory of sense-perception attributed to Plato by him according to Sextus at *M* 7.93 in the same treatise. I will not join this debate here, beyond venturing a few comments.

In comparison, apart from the resemblance in the analogies between the two Sextus passages *M*. 7.93 and 7.119 above, there seems little other basis on which we could reconstruct a Posidonian theory of sense-perception, comparable to Plato's; the rather slender grounds could be no more than the idea that vision and voice are light-like and air-like respectively. The acceptance by Posidonius of the analogies' premises may rather imply simply that he would concur with what had come to be recognised as the Platonic theory of sense-perception.[60] That is, as the analogies' contexts show, all that concerned Posidonius was the general principle of cognition that *like is cognised by like*. The analogy at *M*. 7.119 aims to prove that the soul grasps 'Ideas' on the strength of their very incorporeality, in the statement: (f) 'the soul . . . grasps incorporeal Ideas . . . those in numbers and those in the limits of bodies'.

This reading is supported by the fact that the two passages above interpret the analogies differently, to the extent of taking them in each case to a different conclusion; one Sextus section draws from the analogies a criterion, reason, which is akin to the nature of all things, while the other infers a relation of kinship between Ideas and an incorporeal soul. Nevertheless, the two sections have something in common, in that both possibly embody Posidonius' interpretations of Platonic passages, even if written

[59] See also S.E. *M* 7.116; Pl. *Tim*. 67b–e. [60] Kidd 1988: 1.343.

for different purposes; further, the significance for Posidonius of reviewing the Platonic passages, among other things, would seem to lie in their endorsement of a broad principle of cognition as constituting the criterion of truth both for him and for Plato.

It is in this regard worth noting that in interpreting the soul's cognitive faculty in Platonism, Posidonius himself added the description 'just as [it grasps] those in numbers and those in the limits of bodies', as noted above. It remains possible, then, that Posidonius took the soul's grasping intelligibles to equate for Plato to the cognitive faculty of sharing also the nature or characteristics of, and thus intelligibly seizing, in Posidonius' wording, 'those in numbers and those in the limits of bodies'. Posidonius perhaps had a reason to add these mathematical entities, which are for him typical incorporeal items, as among the class of objects grasped through intellection by reason, like the other Stoic incorporeals such as time. It seems conceivable, then, that in discussing the soul's status in Platonism Posidonius further intended to convey that, consonant with the broad thinking of the early Academy or even Plato, the human cognitive faculty involves the realm of mathematical beings. Although we can only speculate on how Posidonius may have elaborated this explanation, what concerned him most was possibly mathematical reason as the criterion of truth.

To pursue these points further, it may be helpful to take stock of the whole section of Sextus, *M* 7.92–3:

> But the Pythagoreans declare that it [the criterion of truth] is not reason in general, but the reason attained from mathematical sciences, as Philolaus too said that 'being acquainted with the nature of the wholes, it has some sort of kinship with it, since it is natural that like is cognised by like'. . . . says Posidonius by way of interpreting Plato's *Timaeus* . . . 'so too the nature of the wholes should be cognised by reason, which is akin to it'. And the principle of the subsistence of the wholes is number. Hence a judge of all things, reason, which does not lack the faculty of it, can also be called 'number'. (S.E. *M* 7.92–3)

We will return to the above testimony in discussing the source of this historical doxography, but may begin by adducing a comparison between the statements offered by Posidonius and Philolaus, as presented in the testimony: (a) The nature of the wholes should be cognised by reason, which is akin to it. (f) The soul . . . grasps incorporeal Ideas . . . those in numbers and those in the limits of bodies. (g) The reason attained from mathematical sciences has some sort of kinship and is acquainted with the nature of the wholes, that is, number. (h) Hence this reason is also called number.

The testimony's context gives the impression in effect that the Posidonian term 'reason' here at (a) (and 'the soul' as reason for Plato at (f)) refers not just to reason in general, but more specifically to mathematical or scientific reason, taken as equivalent to the Pythagorean 'reason attained from mathematical sciences'. This reading seems tempting on three accounts. First, the description at (f) recalls Posidonius' preoccupation with mathematics; to a large extent, in aligning reason with mathematical cognition he may have been inspired by Pythagoreanism, both in the Pythagorean literature and in certain Platonic passages. Posidonius often indulged in Pythagorean theories of limits, hebdomads, and the even and the odd, drawing on these in accounts of the formation of surfaces, arctic circles, the tides, and time marked by the lunar orbit. Second, it is very likely that Posidonius offered a narrowly understood mathematical criterion in expounding the Platonic passages such as *Timaeus* 35a–b. Lastly, the two statements above, (a) and (g), which occur in the middle of the discussion of the Pythagorean criterion 'reason', both equally adopt the term 'kinship' and its cognates, and also the expression 'the nature of the wholes', representing 'number' for the Pythagorean Philolaus.

If this conjecture is correct, Posidonius most likely intended by the expression 'the nature of the wholes' the realm of mathematical beings, which are not just for him but also for Pythagoras and Plato a real and objective part of the world's make-up. Taking into account the last statement above (g), Posidonius' assignation to the soul of the same status as the mathematicals becomes understandable as applying to mathematical cognition the principle that *like is cognised by like* – that is, as Posidonius might better have argued, just as for the Pythagoreans, reason, which has kinship and is acquainted with number, is called number, so too for Plato, reason, which is akin to and cognises mathematical entities, can appropriately be called mathematical. It seems possible, then, that Posidonius' epistemological claim here turns on his treatment of reason as the criterion for knowledge specifically of the mathematical realm for Plato and Pythagoras.

I shall conclude with one remark on Posidonius' practice in history-rewriting. Since little evidence survives for Posidonius' interpretation of Pythagoreanism, the exact implications of Posidonius' treatment of this issue are difficult to recover fully. One relevant attestation is Sextus Empiricus, *M* 7.92–109. This long Pythagorean section from Sextus in effect represents a historical doxography dealing with Pythagorean mathematical reason as the criterion of truth. The source of the doxography remains a

theme of lively discussion for scholars. Nevertheless, it seems the majority view that Posidonius represents the source for the Pythagorean section, even perhaps for the entire section *M* 7.89–140.[61] It is at least certain that the Pythagorean section occasionally features Stoic ideas and terms.[62] On the argument running from 7.92 to 7.109 in particular, Posidonius' fingerprints are apparent. Without treating this section in close detail, I will characterise this passage's treatment of Pythagoreanism in a few respects expanded on below.

First, in expounding Pythagorean mathematical reason, the testimony invokes the broad principle of cognition noted above in particular at 7.92–3, which includes a verbatim fragment of Posidonius. The testimony's argument begins with the Pythagorean criterion 'reason', claiming it to be identified with 'number'. The argument continues with the statement that everything, whether 'body or incorporeal', is 'cognised from the conception of numbers', leading to the conclusion that 'all things resemble number, which is the reason that judges and is akin to the numbers which compose all things'.[63] Second, the testimony further expounds, within the framework of a dichotomy of body and incorporeals, Pythagorean 'numbers', which it calls 'incorporeals', here taken as equivalent to the principles of 'intelligibles' preceding sensibles, though this dichotomy need not necessarily be seen as Stoic. Further, in expounding those Pythagorean principles in the case of body, the argument, as previously considered, deploys a distinctively Posidonian tripartition of body.[64] In dealing with Pythagorean numbers under the heading of 'incorporeals', the argument advances a form of numerical reductionism characteristic of the Pythagorean theory of number. The testimony's source further provides 'time' and limits such as 'point, line and surface' as being fundamentally numerical, matching two types of 'incorporeals' listed by Posidonius; these types are

[61] On the assumption of the source for S.E. *M* 7.89–140 as Posidonius, see Ju 2006: 99 n. 8; Sedley 1992: 31–3; Kidd 1988: 1.342; Burkert 1972: 54–6; Taylor 1928: 35–6; for *M* 7.92–109, Mansfeld 1971: 156. *Contra*, see Tarrant 1981: 80.

[62] Sedley 1992): 31–2 n. 27.

[63] The argument at S.E. *M* 7.92–109 runs as follows: 7.92, Pythagorean 'reason attained from mathematical sciences', and is akin to 'the nature of the wholes'; 7.93, Posidonian 'reason', which is akin to the nature of the wholes; 7.93–8, 'number is the principle of the subsistence of all things', the tetractys, the ratios of numbers; 7.99–100, limits; 7.101, 'everything is cognised from the conception of numbers'; 7.102–3, numbers in the case of bodies; 7.104, numbers in the case of incorporeals (for instance, time and point, line, surface); 7.105–7, calculation and proportion in ordinary practice (for instance, art and craft); 7.107–8, a story about the Colossus of Rhodes; 7.109, conclusion 'all things resemble number'.

[64] S.E. *M* 7.102 is parallel to 9.78–9, where the Posidonian tripartition of body occurs in his argument for cosmic interaction.

understood in the argument as being conceived by number, whose conceptions are reducible to numbers.[65] Third, in expounding Pythagorean numbers, the argument, as shown by the statement that 'the principle of the subsistence (ὑπόστασις) of all things is number', appropriates a specification 'subsistence', used as we have seen by Posidonius of mathematical planes. Fourth, in almost every section, the argument regularly uses 'be cognised' (καταλαμβάνεται), a typical Stoic term in epistemology. Lastly, the argument introduces a story, as Sedley writes, 'otherwise not recorded, about the Colossus of Rhodes, the island where Posidonius lived and taught'.[66] There seem no persuasive grounds for doubting that, in comparison with the Pythagorean material transmitted by Aristotle and others, this particular rewriting of Pythagoreanism is due specifically to Posidonius.

The discussion above contains three major suggestions. First, Posidonius envisaged taking reason in Platonism to involve the mathematicals, insofar as they form part of the realm of Ideas. Second, Posidonius himself claimed reason as the critical criterion for knowledge of things, including mathematical entities. Insofar as things formed 'wholes' (a term which Posidonius seems mindfully to have chosen for his explanation), as Posidonius may have supposed, they are amenable to reasoned comprehension in terms of number and limits. Lastly, the long Pythagorean section from Sextus reproduces a single argument of Posidonius, where he aimed to show mathematical reason as the ultimate principle of cognition in Pythagoreanism. Possibly Posidonius' *On the Criterion* contained a historical doxography of reason as the criterion substantially expounding his reading of Platonic 'reason', as well as Heraclitean 'reason' and others. Given the disproportionate length of the Pythagorean section from Sextus, Posidonius in his book probably discussed Pythagorean 'reason' at especial length, reflecting his particular interest in Pythagorean mathematics. The full significance of this concentration on Posidonius' part is, for lack of evidence, difficult to recover. Bearing in mind, however, Posidonius' reference to Pythagoras and

[65] The doctrine of incorporeal time appears elsewhere in the middle of the Pythagorean section at S.E. *M* 10.218, 248; when we bear in mind both the absence of any Pythagorean theory of time and the author's rendition of Stoic incorporeal time, the occurrence in the Pythagorean section of the equivalent conception may suggest that it was a Stoic insertion.

[66] Sedley 1992:31–3 already pinpoints the several significant features which I mention above. If the source for the section is Posidonius, Sedley's attribution of its material to Posidonius' *On the Criterion* seems highly probable; although there is admittedly no direct evidence for the contents of his book, beyond the meagre report from D.L. 7.54, this seems to be 'the most apposite possible title'.

Plato, as regularly rehearsed in his philosophy, for now it remains plausible to consider the basic purposes of his citations to be as follows: to highlight mathematical reason as a working principle of Pythagorean and Platonic epistemology. This emphasis allowed Posidonius to reinterpret inherited Platonism by mathematicising it; in doing so he seems to have endorsed Pythagoreanism as an august precedent for his mathematicisation.

CHAPTER 6

Asclepiades of Bithynia and Heraclides Ponticus: medical Platonism?

Roberto Polito

To state that Heraclides of Pontus is a shadowy figure is somewhat of an understatement. We know next to nothing of him.[1] Of the very few things we do know, one is that he played an important role in establishing the legend of Pythagoras and Empedocles having supernatural, 'shamanic' powers. Another thing is that he made some claims concerning certain corpuscles being the elements of things. These corpuscles are known as ἀνάρμοι ὄγκοι. The term ὄγκοι indicates 'masses'. The adjective ἀνάρμοι, lit. 'unjointed', is ambiguous: it could mean 'frail' in the sense that these masses tend to split, or 'seamless' in the sense that they tend to hold tight.[2] Further, it is a matter of debate whether these masses are divisible into smaller parts, and, if so, whether these smaller parts are further divisible to infinity, or atom-like. This doctrine was then resumed by the first-century BC physician Asclepiades of Bithynia, a full-blooded upholder of mechanism, whom Galen presents as an Epicurean in disguise.[3]

Now Heraclides' fondness for the supernatural suggests that he believed in spirits and invisible forces pervading the world. While we can perhaps discount the most fanciful details of the stories he told as a matter of literary embellishment, we can at least say that he was a full-blooded supporter of a vitalistic account of universe, with his theory of matter presumably being a part of this account. By contrast, nothing could be more alien to Asclepiades than the idea of spirits pervading the world. Yet he borrowed

[1] Comprehensive studies on Heraclides are Wehrli 1967–9 and Gottschalk 1980. To these Fortenbaugh–Pender 2009, a collection of papers by different scholars on individual aspects of Heraclides' thought, is now to be added. A recent outline account of Heraclides is at Dillon 2006: 204–16.

[2] The first view has been advocated by Heidel 1909, Lonie 1964, and, more recently, Vallance 1990: 7–43, discussing Asclepiades. The second view is that of Gottschalk 1980: 37–57. A third view is that of Stückelberger 1984 and Dillon 2006: 209–11, who understand the adjective as indicating absence of external fastenings. I myself in Polito 2007 show that at least one ancient authority, Calcidius, understood ἀνάρμοι as indicating solidity. Sharples 2009 offers a recent *status quaestionis*.

[3] I discuss Galen's attitude to Asclepiades in connection with Epicurus in Polito 2006.

from Heraclides such a basic tenet of his system as his theory of matter.[4] There is a problem here.

Can we can make short work of the problem? Could it be that Asclepiades borrowed from Heraclides his theory of matter in isolation, while getting rid of the rest? I do not believe that we can make our work so short as all that. One's theory of matter is not a marginal aspect of one's philosophy, but the basis from which the rest follows. We cannot say how Heraclides' own theory of matter was to take him where he wanted to go: souls passing from one body to another, visions of the afterlife, trips from the moon. However, it is not plausible to think that this theory could provide a suitable and ready-to-use basis for Asclepiades' thoroughly mechanistic account of nature. If Asclepiades wanted to use Heraclides for his purpose, he presumably had to do a deep and thorough reworking job. But (1) what kind of reworking job and (2) why take the trouble?

In view of the difficulty of answering these questions, some scholars prefer to pass over the entire problem. Their reasoning is the following: there are many uncertainties concerning the nature and functioning of Asclepiades' corpuscles, but there are still more uncertainties concerning the way these corpuscles were to work in Heraclides' original formulation. Therefore, their supposedly Heraclidean origin, even if proven, would be of no help for understanding Asclepiades. Thus we should make a virtue of necessity, and concentrate on Asclepiades in his own right and against the background of the medical debate of his day.[5]

However, this approach won't do. No doubt, Asclepiades' agenda was different from Heraclides'. Yet, precisely because of this, Asclepiades' appropriating Heraclides' primary bodies is a remarkable choice, all the more remarkable because, by giving to his primary bodies the same name Heraclides did, Asclepiades was not just reflecting upon and developing, for his own purposes, ideas of Heraclides, but declaring that Heraclides was his source of inspiration and associating himself with him. To make a declaration of this kind, be it with respect to one's entire set of doctrines or to certain items alone, is to warn one's readers that this set of doctrines or these certain items alone should not be interpreted in their own right and as an independent thought, but against the background of someone's else discussion of them. In view of the substantial difference between Heraclides' and Asclepiades' philosophical stances, it is a puzzle why the latter should

[4] Evidence to the effect that Asclepiades shared the same theory of matter as Heraclides comes from the doxographical tradition, which is not always reliable. However, see below, n. 16.

[5] Vallance 1990: 11–13, and, again, 21.

want to do so, and it does not seem quite right to dismiss the problem as irrelevant to our understanding of him.

In this paper I propose to answer the two questions I raised above, viz. what kind of reworking job of Heraclides' doctrine Asclepiades did, and why he took the trouble. I shall suggest that the reworking job Asclepiades did was actually a substantial one, up to the point of doing away with a key aspect attributable to Heraclides' primary bodies. This suggestion will rely on a reconsideration of the evidence on their nature.

In connection with this answer to my first question, I shall explore the possibility that, by appropriating the label of Heraclides' theory of matter, but not the ideas behind it, Asclepiades was not intending to claim allegiance to him, but actually to challenge him. We naturally tend to think that to associate oneself with a predecessor is necessarily a matter of claiming allegiance to him. But it does not need to be that way. The purpose may well be to measure oneself against someone else.

Before arguing for my own conclusions, however, I will consider in more detail the argument to the effect that selected items were already ready in Heraclides for Asclepiades' own use, and that, therefore, no such reworking job was necessary. This argument has been put forward by Lonie 1965. Reviewing Lonie's argument will not only give me the opportunity to take a closer look at the material, but also, above all, show the necessity of pursuing a different interpretation.

The argument runs as follows: Asclepiades' account of nature is thoroughly mechanistic; if he were to seek a suitable theory of matter for this account, Epicurus' atomism would seem to be his best option. But Asclepiades made a different choice and resumed Heraclides' theory of matter instead. Why? Lonie's answer is the following: Epicurean atomism had never been used in the explanation of diseases; if Asclepiades wanted to use it for this purpose, he would have to start from scratch. There is some evidence of Hellenistic physicians having a theory of corpuscles other than atoms. But the evidence is controversial, and, moreover, most of these people are only names to us. By contrast, Heraclides not only put forward a particulate theory of matter, comparable with atomism, that was suited to Asclepiades' purpose, but also had already put this theory to work in the explanation of diseases.

Thus Heraclides' engagement in medical explanations based on the working of corpuscles was Asclepiades' ground for resuming his theory of matter, and since the agreement between the two was so deep and substantial we should not be surprised that Asclepiades wanted to acknowledge his debt to Heraclides and to signal it to his audience.

Lonie starts by observing that Diogenes Laërtius mentions a treatise *On diseases* for Heraclides, something which of course sounds very promising. Things become more complicated when we consider the actual content of this work. Extant evidence enables us to make some conjectures. This treatise was actually a dialogue,[6] best known by its other title *On the woman whose breathing had stopped*, and it featured Empedocles the day before his legendary apotheosis. He tells Pausanias and other followers the story of a woman who had no pulse and was not breathing, with only some faint warmth in the chest area to show that she was not dead. The physicians who had been called to treat her were at a loss. Empedocles alone was capable of diagnosing her condition, that her soul was temporarily separated from her body. During this time the woman apparently had a vision of the afterworld and her soul actually visited it. We are not told how Empedocles restored her to life, but, given the kind of account he gave of her state, this presumably involved forcing her soul to make its way back to the body with the aid of some magical technique. The story of the several transmigrations of Pythagoras' soul was also probably told in this dialogue, perhaps in the form of a report by Empedocles.[7]

Thus the theme of the dialogue is the immortality of the soul in connection with its separability from the body. As for the practice of medicine, Heraclides' thesis appears to be that knowledge of the functioning of the body alone is an unsufficient basis for it, indeed that there cannot be genuine knowledge of the body without knowledge of the soul, which, although a separate entity, nonetheless has a direct impact on bodily functions. By advocating this view, Heraclides was thereby challenging the scientific and non-religious approach to medicine which goes as far back as the Hippocratic tradition, and which Asclepiades himself was to reinforce and to radicalise – this is the most paradoxical side of the story – precisely by applying to medicine the particulate theory of matter he had supposedly borrowed from Heraclides.

The situation appears to be discouraging, but Lonie is not discouraged. He does not challenge a reconstruction of the content of the work along the lines I have sketched above, but he contends that it would be wrong to assume that Heraclides' fondness for the supernatural would prevent him from considering the physiological side of the disease. On the contrary, there is evidence to the effect that Heraclides' work also contained a serious

[6] But see now Mejer 2009: 32–3. Nothing in my argument turns on the format of the work.

[7] A recent discussion of the dialogue is in Eijk 2009, who tends to play down the mystical or magical side of the work, in favour of the scientific one, which he wants to trace back to the Peripatos. Wehrli 1967–9 offers a different reading. Gottschalk (1980: 13–36) is balanced.

and scientifically respectable discussion of this disease, as well as diseases in general, based on corpuscles. Thus, Lonie concludes, the only thing Asclepiades had to do was to isolate Heraclides' medical aetiologies from the supernatural elements which also featured in Heraclides' work.

Gottschalk casts doubt that the texts Lonie mentions even prove that Heraclides gave a physiological account of diseases at all, but, if anything, only a description of the symptoms of the disease by which the woman whose breathing had stopped was affected.[8] I myself am not so sceptical concerning the possibility that Heraclides gave a physiological account of this and other diseases. There is, in fact, enough good evidence that he did.[9] My own concern is, rather, with Lonie's additional hypothesis that Heraclides held the same style of medical aetiology as Asclepiades, and therefore was a source of inspiration for him. The main piece of evidence is Galen *Trem.* 6 (7.615 K = F 82 W), one of the many passages in which Galen undertakes to refute Asclepiades' account of the functioning of the human body in terms of the working of ὄγκοι. The topic is Asclepiades' explanation of *rigor*. In this context, Galen reproaches the first-century BC physician Athenaeus, himself an opponent of Asclepiades, for mentioning only Asclepiades', Heraclides' and Strato's aetiologies of *rigor*.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἀθήναιον ἐπαινῶ περὶ μὲν Ἀσκληπιάδου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Ποντικοῦ καὶ Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λέγοντά τι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδενὸς μνημονεύοντα, καί τοί γε οὐ τὰς τούτων δόξας μόνον περὶ ῥίγους, ἀλλ' ἑτέρας πολὺ πλείους οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐνδόξους τε καὶ πιθανὰς εἶχεν εἰπεῖν.

Nor do I praise Athenaeus, who says something about Asclepiades and Heraclides of Pontus and Strato the physicist, while failing to mention any of the other authors, in spite of the fact that it would have been possible to mention not only the views on *rigor* of these people, but also many others that are no less reputable and plausible.

Lonie takes the passage to show that Asclepiades and Heraclides gave the same account of *rigor*. Yet the plural δόξας discourages the hypothesis that the reference is to one and the same account. It could be argued, and Lonie is clearly committed to this reading, that the two accounts, although not exactly the same, were cognate. However, Galen mentions three authors, not two. Strato, the third mentioned, did not have any theory of ὄγκοι. He did apparently advocate a particulate theory of matter.[10] Thus it is quite

[8] Gottschalk 1980: 19–21. Eijk 2009 is clearly committed to the opposite view, that Heraclides did offer an extensive dicussion of the medical issues involved.

[9] E.g. Gal., *Loc. aff.* 8.414 K, and Plin. *NH* 7.52, in addition to Gal., *Trem.* 7.615 K, discussed below.

[10] Evidence is controversial, but the attribution of a particulate theory of matter to Strato follows from his positing interstitial void. It is a plausible inference that for him physical processes should

possible that Strato's own account of *rigor* would be along similar lines as Asclepiades' and, supposedly, Heraclides' own. But this consideration, far from helping Lonie's case, actually poses a threat to it. The premise of Lonie's interpretation was, we may recall, that no other model of a particulate theory of matter applied to medical aetiology was available on the market. We now learn from Galen that this is not quite true. Strato too offered a model of this kind. Not only this, but Strato was committed to a mechanistic account of nature, just like Asclepiades, thus actually offering a *better* model than Heraclides.

This issue of mechanism is crucial. According to Galen, to account for diseases in terms of the working of ὄγκοι is thereby to reduce life to mechanical processes of non-organic matter, and this is an understanding of Asclepiades to which Asclepiades himself does not object. He declared: 'all things happen by necessity; there is nothing without a cause, and nature is nothing but body and its motion' (Cael. Aurel. *Morb. acut.* 1.115). In the passage of Galen that Lonie invokes as evidence that Asclepiades and Heraclides held the same style of medical aetiology, Galen reports that Asclepiades did away with inborn heat by reducing it to friction of corpuscles. Inborn heat is, according to Galen, a special kind of heat found in living beings alone, an idea that goes as far back as Plato and Aristotle. Doing away with inborn heat and inborn powers in general is not a move attributable to someone like Heraclides. It is more plausible to think that, if Heraclides ever gave a physiological account of diseases, this would be along the lines of providing a scientific justification for magical or semi-magical practice, and hence essentially different from Asclepiades' own.

Lonie answers this difficulty by positing that Heraclides offered two accounts, a physiological one which, if taken in isolation, was mechanistic and hence suitable for Asclepiades' own use, and a second account centred on the action of the soul and of spirits over and above physical laws (e.g. hysteric suffocation being a matter of the soul separating temporarily from the body). But why would Heraclides embark on giving a physiological account of diseases, which was either in conflict with the point he wanted to make, or at any rate which did not contribute to it? Lonie makes a historical point. It is a feature of the tradition to which Heraclides belonged, from Pythagoras through Empedocles down to Plato's *Timaeus*, to combine mysticism and science. Thus, in Lonie's view, the historical plausibility of the picture he draws of Heraclides compensates for the absence of evidence.

involve 'bits' of matter interacting with 'bits' of void. This inference, however, is now challenged by Sharples in his forthcoming edition of Strato. Unfortunately I did not have the opportunity to read this work of Sharples.

I think that Lonie is right in thinking that historical considerations offer an invaluable aid when evidence is absent or controversial. Yet I disagree with the conclusions Lonie draws on this basis, and indeed I believe that historical considerations, combined with a closer examination of the texts, invite a reassessment of our understanding of Heraclides' theory of matter, and, related to this, of the puzzle of Asclepiades' appropriation of it. For this purpose I shall first place Heraclides' doctrine against its background. Lonie points to Plato's *Timaeus* as a source of inspiration. So it is worth starting from Plato and taking a closer look at his project.

Plato in the *Phaedo* expresses his dissatisfaction with natural science as pursued by the Presocratics. Just as human actions have a purpose, it is his view that natural processes too have a purpose, and must be accounted for in this light. His point is not exactly that a material account ought not to be pursued. Rather, that it ought to be subordinate to teleology, and suited to it. By contrast, the Presocratics in Plato's view were merely concerned with material causation, thereby conveying the idea that there is no purpose in nature. And indeed by Plato's day a comprehensive and systematic account of nature openly doing away with purpose was indeed on offer, in the shape of Democritus' atomism. What was missing, and, in Plato's view, badly needed, was an equally comprehensive and systematic account developing the opposite thesis, that of intelligent design. In the *Phaedo* he hints at the project of providing an account of this kind, but we have to wait until the *Timaeus* to get it.

In this dialogue Plato undertakes the task of offering a full-scale account of nature centred on the idea that the universe is ensouled and the product of god's ordering action on matter. As part of this account he advocates the thesis that objects of our ordinary experience are made up of corpuscles of Empedocles' four elements combined in different ways. However, Empedocles' elements are not primary, but themselves reducible to more basic principles, elementary triangles. This theory is essentially different from Democritean atomism because the constituents of things in Plato's world are not microscopic bodies of a random shape, but geometrical figures.

Plato's geometrical atomism, as it is called,[11] is perhaps not his most influential legacy. However, the limited success that it was to enjoy in the long term should not mislead us into thinking that it was not an essential part of his account of nature. Geometrical figures possess measure and proportion, and to make them the constituents of things best conveys the

[11] This description, which goes as far back as Furley 1967 and Vlastos 1975, has been recently adopted and thematised by Gregory 2000: 187–240.

idea that teleological laws are not superimposed on mechanical ones, nor run in parallel with them, but are instrinsic to the very way in which physical objects, starting from the four elements, came into existence. In view of the place that Plato's geometrical atomism occupies within his account of nature, it is not a cause for surprise that developing and refining it was at the top of the agenda for his pupils, Xenocrates above all.[12]

As we understand from Aristotle, this area of Academic philosophical investigation was centred on the notion of *minima*, that is, the primary irreducible units of measure of things, of which things themselves are made. For Xenocrates these units were minimal lines, the smallest thinkable lines, of which all others are multiples, and which provide the basic elements from which we conceptually arrive at planes, solids and finally bodies. While only lines were primary, Xenocrates nevertheless appears to have posited second-order *minima* for each class of things: planes, solids and even bodies.[13]

Thus *minima* are kinds of atoms, and indeed Aristotle couples the Academic doctrine of *minima* with Democritus' atomism. The difference between the two can be best appreciated in the light of Epicurus' revision of Democritus' atomism. Atoms are physically indivisible bodies, of different shapes and sizes, which provide the material constituents of things. Yet according to Epicurus they can be conceptually divided into smaller parts, *minima* (*ad Hdt*. 58–9). No distinction by shape and size can be made among these smaller parts, given that they are the natural primary irreducible units for measuring things. While for Epicurus *minima* were only thought-constructs, they were real entities for the Academics, on account of the different ontological status that conceptual entities have within Epicureanism and Platonism respectively.

Thus the geometrical atomism of the *Timaeus* as well as its subsequent Academic developments provide the context in which to place Heraclides' own theory of matter. Evidence concerning the nature and working of his basic elements is controversial, and it is difficult to say exactly how his theory was a reworking of Plato's own, but surely it was a reworking of some sort, and there would be no cause for surprise if geometrical figures were a part of the picture. Yet, to the best of my knowledge, the case for Heraclides' holding a form of geometrical atomism has never

[12] Plato himself (*Tim*. 53d) states that the principles prior to triangles 'are known to Heaven and to such men as Heaven favours', thus setting his pupils' agenda.

[13] This is at least the theory attacked by the author of *de Lineis insecabilibus*, widely agreed to belong to Xenocrates. Xenocrates again is Aristotle's primary target when discussing *minima* according to Gemelli Marciano 2007.

been explored by any modern commentator.[14] This is because evidence concerning ἀνάρμοι ὄγκοι, albeit controversial in several respects, is clear at least in this, that there is no sign of geometry. If this is the case, we should conclude that Heraclides, although advocating a particulate theory of matter just as Plato and his contemporary fellow Academics did, stood against them by taking the side of Democritus that the elements of things have a random shape. Thus my initial puzzle why Asclepiades claimed allegiance to him would disappear: Heraclides advocated a thoroughly mechanistic account of nature, and it would be his own problem and a token of his inconsistency that he also talked about invisible forces and spirits.

Yet this picture is hardly believable, and this consideration invites us to reassess our evidence on Heraclides' theory of matter. Although several commentators have made the point that we should not take it for granted that Heraclides' basic elements were exactly the same as Asclepiades', and therefore we should not use just any report on Asclepiades in our reconstruction of Heraclides, none of them has taken the additional step of considering the possibility that the absence of geometry in Asclepiades' theory of matter was Asclepiades' own innovation. Yet I believe that there are fairly good grounds for thinking that this was actually the case.

Now, evidence on Heraclides' theory of matter can be divided into three sets of reports. One is the set in which Heraclides alone is mentioned. A second set ties Heraclides to Asclepiades. A third set names Asclepiades alone.

Werhli in his edition of Heraclides correctly includes only the first two sets of evidence (121 and 118–120 respectively). Gottschalk used all three sets. Yet if we have reason to think that Heraclides held a different theory of matter, or a different understanding of the same theory of matter, from Asclepiades, it seems that we should rely on the first set of evidence alone, while using the other two only to the extent they confirm or expand what the first says. This option, obvious as it is, has not been taken by any

[14] Lonie (1964: 163) considers the hypothesis only in order to dismiss it as 'unnecessary': 'It is not necessary to suppose that Heraclides' theory was *strictly* [my emphasis] mathematical, as Plato's was.' Could it have been, then, 'loosely' mathematical? Dillon 2006 insists on the Platonic origin of Heraclides' theory perhaps more than any other commentator, but fails to consider the hypothesis. Isnardi-Parente 1982: 375, contrasts Heraclides' doctrine, which she interprets in the light of Asclepiades' corpuscularism, with the geometrical atomism of Plato and Xenocrates. Gottschalk (1980: 54) observes that the role Heraclides' fragments play is analogous to that of Plato's triangles. However, Gottschalk's use of the evidence on Asclepiades for reconstructing Heraclides' own theory prevents him from identifying Heraclides' fragments with geometrical figures.

commentator,[15] and on a very understandable ground: this set of evidence actually amounts to just one short and hardly usable report (Stob. 1.14.1 = F. 121 W): 'Heraclides [defined the smallest things] as fragments (Ἡρακλείδης θραύσματα [τὰ ἐλάχιστα ὡρίζετο])'.

Yet I believe that this report tells us more than usually thought. Scholars have tended to consider merely one half of it, that which concerns Heraclides' talk of θραύσματα. It has been noted that this term is the Greek for *fragmenta*, by which Cael. Aurel. at *Morb. acut.* 1.105 calls the elements into which corpuscles split according to Asclepiades, thus confirming that the latter used the same terminology as Heraclides.[16]

Further, θραύσματα derives from the same verb that Plato, with a different prefix, uses twice in order to indicate the splitting of the four elements' corpuscles, themselves 'masses' (ὄγκοι), into more basic elements,[17] thus pointing to Plato's *Timaeus* as a source of inspiration for Heraclides, and suggesting that his fragments have an analogous role to Plato's triangles, although not necessarily an analogous nature.[18] All these are important pieces of information, and yet they fall short of giving us a clue as to what Heraclides' fragments were like.

However, the report does not just say that Heraclides used the term θραύσματα. It also says that he had a theory concerning 'the smallest things'. I shall argue that this other piece of information, read against the context in which it is given, lends support to the suspicion that geometry was in the picture.

The context, which is worth quoting in full in the version of Stobaeus (1.14.1), is the doxographical chapter *On the smallest things* (Περὶ ἐλαχίστων) at Aët. 1.13:

[15] Sharples 2009 is actually quite accurate in distinguishing between the two bodies of evidence. My disagreement with him concerns his taking the notion of *minima* in a non-technical sense as referring to some unspecified 'smallest things' (cf. note 17: '"minimum" [ἐλάχιστον] might be interpreted just as "very small"'). He is compelled to do so by his concern about reconciling the doxographical report that Empedocles advocated a theory of minima with Empedocles' actual doctrine. But there is no need to attempt any such reconciliation. The report on Empedocles should be considered in its own right as a later interpretation in the light of Plato's geometrical atomism in the *Timaeus*.

[16] The separate attribution of a theory of fragments to both Heraclides and Asclepiades by two independent sources (Aëtius and Caelius Aurelianus) discourages the hypothesis, advanced to me in private conversations by Rebecca Flemming and David Leith, that Asclepiades was credited with Heraclides' theory of matter due to a doxographical error or simplification. Nor is it likely that Asclepiades arrived at ἀνάρμοι ὄγκοι independently, in view of the idiosyncratic nature of this description.

[17] *Tim.* 56e (καταθραυσθῇ) and 57b (διαθραυόμενα). The masses of the four elements are called ὄγκοι at *Tim.* 56c and 60e.

[18] Gottschalk 1980: 54; Dillon 2006: 211 n. 92.

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔφη πρὸ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων θραύσματα ἐλάχιστα, οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα πρὸ τῶν στοιχείων ὁμοιομερῆ. Ἡράκλειτος πρὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς δοκεῖ τισι ψήγματα καταλείπειν. Ξενοκράτης καὶ Διόδωρος ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ὡρίζοντο. Ἡρακλείδης θραύσματα.

Empedocles said that there are fragments prior to the four elements: the smallest things, like elements of the elements, homogeneous. Heraclitus seems to some to have posited dust-particles prior to the One. Xenocrates and Diodorus defined the smallest things as partless. Heraclides [defined them] as fragments.[19]

I shall discuss the attribution to Empedocles of the same talk of 'fragments' as Heraclides shortly. My first concern is to understand exactly what the chapter is about.[20]

The term ἐλάχιστα is to be understood in the technical sense of *minima*, as expounded above, in the case of Xenocrates and Diodorus, but what about the other entries? Neither Empedocles nor Heraclitus held a theory of *minima*. It has therefore been suggested that we do better to take ἐλάχιστα in a loose sense and as referring to 'very small' particles of matter. Accordingly, as the argument goes, we need not put too much weight on talk of ἐλάχιστα for Heraclides either, in the absence of supporting evidence to the effect that he held a theory of *minima* (see n. 15 above). However, to take ἐλάχιστα in a loose sense is of little help if our concern is historical plausibility, given that at least Heraclitus did not hold any particulate theory of matter whatsoever, whether in the form of *minima* or just very small particles.[21] Further, a chapter entitled Περὶ ἐλαχίστων will hardly refer to anything else than the Academic *minima*, and while the attribution of such a theory to Empedocles and Heraclitus is historically implausible, this consideration alone falls short from proving that just such an attribution was not in view by the doxographer.

As a matter of fact, it is not impossible to make a guess as concerns the origin of this interpretation of Empedocles. Plato in the *Timaeus* argued that fire, air, water and earth are not the real elements of things, but themselves reducible to more basic ones. Plato's point was that Empedocles' four-element theory is not so much wrong as incomplete and in need of supplement (*Tim.* 48b). The report found in Aëtius appears to correct

[19] Plutarch's parallel report at *Plac.* 1.13.14 fails to include either the entry for Xenocrates and Diodorus or that for Heraclides.

[20] In what follows I further elaborate the interpretation of the report offered by Gemelli Marciano 2007: 188–93.

[21] Empedocles' account of sensation in terms of effluxes of matter being commensurate to the sensory pores commits him to some kind of particulate theory of matter, or at least Aristotle is keen on emphasising this commitment, perhaps relying on an Academic interpretation of Empedocles (Gemelli Marciano 1991).

Empedocles precisely on this point, by retrojecting to him Plato's view that there are more basic elements of which the fire, air, water and earth are composed. The name the doxographer gives to these elements, 'fragments', provides no indication concerning their nature, whether geometrical or otherwise. (But see below my comment on the adjective 'homogeneous'.) However, as we have seen, the term recalls the verb used by Plato to indicate the splitting of the four elements, thus lending support to the hypothesis that the *Timaeus* lies beyond this attribution of 'fragments' to Empedocles. The Academic origin of this interpretation is confirmed by another doxographical report which, once again, attributes to Empedocles a doctrine of *minima*, and associates him with Xenocrates in this respect.[22]

The same genetic account can arguably be given for the entry on Heraclitus. The doxographer reports that, according to some people, Heraclitus claimed that the 'One', that is, fire (note the remarkable, Pythagoreanising terminology in use) was not the primary element, but secondary to certain more basic elements, which these people called ψήγματα ('dust-particles'),[23] and which the doxographer understands as being *minima* of some kind. We can infer from *Tim.* 54d (cf. 56d) that fire was the first element to be generated, its pyramidical structure occupying an intermediate position, as it were, between the triangles and the principle posited by Empedocles. It is not clear how far Plato is willing to go in attributing to fire a privileged status. Moreover, he isolates earth from the other three elements, in such a way that earth could be seen as standing aside from fire in the coming to be of the phenomenal world.

Whatever the point Plato intended to make as concerns fire, Aristotle at *de Caelo* 304a9–18 reports an argument to the effect that 'fire and pyramid are the same thing' on account of their shared subtle and cutting nature, which grants them primacy in their respective classes of beings, with fire

[22] Stob. 1.17.1 (Xenocr. Fr. 151 IP): Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων. Here Empedocles' *minima* are remarkably called ὄγκοι. (See below, n. 26, for additional comments.)

[23] The term comes from the verb *psecho*, 'rub down', 'scratch', and is typically used with reference to the dust of metals. In philosophical literature it occurs in Philoponus five times as a gloss for *xysmata*, the term by which Aristotle at *de An.* 404a1–21 indicates the dust-particles that float in the air and which reflect the sun's light when it beams through the windows. It is Aristotle's view that the particles of fire that compose the soul according to both Democritus and the Pythagoreans are comparable. Thus, in both the philosophical and non-philosophical use the term seems to convey some idea of shining. This is perhaps the reason why the authors of the interpretation of Heraclitus that the doxographer reports chose this term for indicating the elements of which they thought Heraclitus' fire was made.

being 'the primary body', and pyramid 'the primary solid'.[24] The Academic origin of this argument is beyond any reasonable doubt. Thus at least some followers of Plato can be credited with a form of Heraclitean monism centred on fire, and yet revised in the light of his geometrical atomism. The doxographical report on Heraclitus appears to presuppose just this kind of revision of Heraclitus' doctrine, retrojected to Heraclitus himself, in the same way as the report on Empedocles presupposes Plato's revision of Empedocles' four-element theory, retrojected to Empedocles.

The *de Caelo* passage has also the merit of giving us a clue as to the meaning of the adjective 'homogeneous (ὁμοιομερῆ)', used by the doxographer in order to describe the nature of Empedocles' fragments. By analogy with the case of fire and pyramid being 'the same thing', we can suppose that, according to the authors of the interpretation of Empedocles reported by the doxographer, fragments and elements were 'homogeneous' not in the sense that they shared the same phenomenal characteristics, but rather that these characteristics of the four elements reflected the different shapes of the fragments of which each of them was made.

Although the doxographer does not give any explicit indication concerning the nature of Empedocles' fragments, the hypothesis that they were not bodies, but either solids or other geometrical figures, follows from the Academic pedigree of the interpretation of Empedocles that lies at the origin of the report, and finds no evidence to the contrary in what he himself tells us about them. Nor does he say anything suggesting or implying that Heraclitus' *minima* are just small particles of matter. For all we know, they may well have been pyramids. And, at any rate, the idea that fire, while being the primary body, is reducible to more basic elements, is attested, as we have seen, for the early Academy and nowhere else.

Thus there is no reason for not taking the term ἐλάχιστα, which gives the chapter in Aëtius its title, in the light of the theory of *minima*, whose prominent upholder was Xenocrates, and which Diodorus subsequently appropriated and developed for his own purposes. It is the doxographer's claim that Empedocles and Heraclitus had already anticipated a theory of this kind, and that Heraclides too adopted it.

Once it has been established that the chapter concerns the Academic *minima*, its putative antecedents and its later developments, we come to

[24] Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν σχῆμα περιάπτουσι τῷ πυρί, καθάπερ οἱ τὴν πυραμίδα ποιοῦντες, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἁπλουστέρως λέγοντες ὅτι τῶν μὲν σχημάτων τμητικώτατον ἡ πυραμίς, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων τὸ πῦρ, οἱ δὲ κομψοτέρως τῷ λόγῳ προσάγοντες ὅτι τὰ μὲν σώματα πάντα σύγκειται ἐκ τοῦ λεπτομερεστάτου, τὰ δὲ σχήματα τὰ στερεὰ ἐκ πυραμίδων, ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ τῶν μὲν σωμάτων τὸ πῦρ λεπτότατον, τῶν δὲ σχημάτων ἡ πυραμὶς μικρομερέστατον καὶ πρῶτον, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον σχῆμα τοῦ πρώτου σώματος, πυραμὶς ἂν εἴη τὸ πῦρ.

the question of whether Heraclides actually held a theory of *minima*, and, if so, whether the difference with Asclepiades could lie here.

The doxographer tells us that we should understand Heraclides' theory of matter as a theory of *minima*. However, he makes the same claim concerning both Empedocles and Heraclitus, and at least in their case he is certainly unreliable: he reports an anachronistic interpretation of them in the light of the correction of their doctrines that Plato had made in the *Timaeus*. Why should we trust the doxographer in the case of Heraclides?

To start with, Heraclides was a contemporary and school-fellow of Xenocrates, and certainly acquainted with the Academic debate on *minima*. So there cannot be any suspicion of anachronism. True, the report could be unreliable in other respects. But there is good reason for thinking that it is not. As every commentator has noticed, 'Empedocles' and Heraclides are credited with the same *minima*, that is, θραύσματα. It could be that 'Empedocles' and Heraclides arrived at positing fragments independently, and hence that the two theories have nothing in common except the name. However, since Empedocles never actually held a theory of fragments, and since the attribution of such a theory to him stems from the circle of Plato's pupils – Heraclides was one of them – it is far more plausible to think that the two theories do have something in common, in terms of Heraclides' influencing this interpretation of Empedocles or indeed being its author.

This hypothesis is all the more plausible in view of the fact that 'Empedocles' is credited elsewhere in the same book of the *Placita* with a theory of ὄγκοι in connection with Heraclides' school-fellow Xenocrates.[25] The two reports on Empedocles are similar – both speak of *minima*, either 'fragments' or 'masses' (ὄγκοι),[26] prior to phenomenal elements – and voice one and the same understanding of Empedocles. Whether or not 'Xenocrates' is to be amended to 'Heraclides',[27] the description ὄγκοι on its own, as referring to the elements of things, recalls Heraclides so closely as to establish yet another tie between the two.[28] We can imagine the character of

[25] Stob. 1.17.1 (Xenocr. Fr. 151 IP), quoted above in n. 22.

[26] Empedocles' *minima* are called 'fragments' at Stob. 1.14.1, but 'masses' at 1.17.1. Are we to understand that, according to the author of the interpretation of Empedocles from which these two reports originate, 'fragments' and 'masses' were the same thing? This is unlikely. According to Plato (see note 17 above), masses of the four elements undergo a process of fragmentation, but are not themselves fragments. The same goes for Asclepiades' *corpuscula* and his *fragmenta* as reported at Cael. Aurel. *Morb. acut.* 1.105. It is more plausible to suppose that the reference is to two different orders of *minima*: minimal bodies (masses) and minimal parts of the bodies (fragments).

[27] Isnardi Parente 1982: 372.

[28] If we retain the reading 'Xenocrates', we may think that Xenocrates too had a theory of 'masses', just as Heraclides apparently did, or, at any rate, that he was later understood as if he had one.

'Empedocles' expounding the doctrine that fire, air, water and earth are reducible to more basic, minimal elements (fragments), in the dialogue of Heraclides in which he featured as a speaker.[29]

While the agreement between Heraclides and Empedocles has been widely recognised, scholars have refrained from making the additional move of inferring information concerning Heraclides' theory of matter from that of 'Empedocles'. True, there is no evidence that the four elements for Heraclides had the same privileged status as for 'Empedocles'. However, quite apart from the fact that evidence on Heraclides is very scanty and, therefore, any argument *e silentio* inconclusive,[30] the distinctive feature of the interpretation of Empedocles found in the *Placita* is not to be sought in the four-element doctrine, but rather in positing fragments prior to the four elements themselves. If these fragments are to be understood in the light of Plato's correction of Empedocles' four-element doctrine in the *Timaeus*, they are not just 'very small things', but *minima* in a strict sense and geometrical figures.

Could it be that Heraclides' fragments too were *minima* of this kind? If I am right in thinking that his sharing the same basic elements with 'Empedocles' is not a coincidence, the conclusion that they should be roughly the same thing naturally follows. There are two additional elements that encourage us to trust the doxographer that Heraclides' fragments were *minima*.

Empedocles and Heraclides are listed separately in different entries in spite of being both credited with the same theory. This rules out the hypothesis of a doxographical simplification, with the same *placitum* being attributed to different people either on account of a loose similarity or just by mistake. Nor is the order of the entries in the chapter perhaps without significance. Empedocles is listed first, in spite of him being posterior to Heraclitus, while Heraclides is mentioned last, in spite of him being earlier than Diodorus. As a result, fragments provide both the starting point and the point of arrival of the ancient debate on *minima*, as the doxographer saw it. Given the prominence he ascribes to them, it is unlikely that he

[29] Dillon (2006: 209) may be right in suggesting that Heraclides expounded *in propria persona* his theory of matter in the treatise *Against Democritus*. The suggestion does not of course conflict with the hypothesis that Heraclides went on putting this theory into the mouth of Empedocles in the dialogue in which Empedocles was the main speaker, a hypothesis that makes best sense of Aëtius' straightforward attribution of fragments to Empedocles. (Note, by contrast, Aëtius' addition 'according to some' when reporting Heraclitus' own supposed theory of *minima*.)

[30] Heraclides seems to have accepted the Aristotelian doctrine of aether as a fifth element, which he identified as the element of the soul (Philop. *in de An*. Proem. 9 = F. 99 W.). This does not rule out the possibility that he adopted Empedocles' four-element theory in his account of the phenomenal (sublunar) world.

would be loose or inaccurate on just this crucial point, that the fragments posited by 'Empedocles' and Heraclides were *minima*.

Once it has been established that it is not implausible that Heraclides held a theory of *minima* as did other Academics of his day, it is now time to investigate whether the difference with Asclepiades might lie here. Asclepiades is mentioned elsewhere in the *Placita*, but not in the chapter on *minima*, in spite of holding a theory of fragments, just as Heraclides did, and supposedly derived from it. His fragments were certainly 'very small', but were they also *minima* in the sense of being partless and irreducible units of measure of things? Galen *de Elem*. 1.416 K seems to understand them in this way, as he refers to some people who posited 'elements that are minimal and unjointed and partless [ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἄναρμα καὶ ἀμερῆ ... στοιχεῖα]'. The reference to Asclepiades is implicit but uncontroversial. It is controversial, by contrast, whether we should put any weight on Galen's associating these three descriptions as part of one and the same theory attributable to Asclepiades.[31] For Caelius provides compelling evidence that Asclepiades' fragments failed to qualify as *minima* at least in one respect: they differed in size and shape (*fragmenta ... magnitudine atque schemate differentia*).[32] Although, as I said, a theory of *minima* may well recognise different sorts of *minima* (e.g. the *minimum* plane as distinct from the *minimum* solid), Caelius implies that Asclepiades was thinking of an infinite range of shapes and sizes, that is, that his fragments were neither themselves *minima* nor having a *minimum*.[33]

Now the question of whether the elements of things have a random shape was not a marginal point, but the key point of disagreement between Plato's geometrical atomism and Democritus' physical one. If Asclepiades modified Heraclides' original theory on this point, this is not a minor change, and the question of why he nevertheless borrowed his basic elements, or at least his name for them, from Heraclides demands an answer.

One possible answer is that, while being unsatisfied by Heraclides' theory of matter in that particular respect, Asclepiades found it suitable in others.

[31] Gottschalk (1980: 41–3) mentions the passage as evidence that fragments were atom-like. Vallance (1990: 40), challenges the reliability of the passage as a report on Asclepiades.

[32] Cael. Aurel., *Morb. acut.* 1.105.

[33] Leith (2009: 312–14) offers a close analysis of the Caelius text, and proposes to emend the MS reading *infinita partium fragmenta* to *infinitarum partium fragmenta*, so as to have the fragments themselves made up of an infinite number of parts. Whether or not Leith is right, the conclusion that Asclepiades' fragments are of an unspecified number of shapes and sizes, and hence not *minima*, is secured by Caelius even if we retain the MS reading. Further, Leith hypothesises a criticism of the Epicurean theory of *minima*, but if a criticism of *minima* is implied, this is more likely to target Heraclides, who spoke of *minima* in connection with 'fragments'. The term θραύσματα never occurs in Epicurean material.

Since many details of Asclepiades' theory of matter are obscure and/or controversial, it is impossible either to verify or to refute this hypothesis. My grounds for pursuing an alternative answer are the following.

Several particulate theories of matter, other than plain atomism, were available in the market, including the medical one, and ready for Asclepiades' use if his goal was to find an alternative to plain atomism.[34] Concede that Asclepiades was not happy with any of these theories, he could still adopt generic talk of 'bodies visible to the mind alone (σώματα λόγωι θεωρητὰ)', as do other authors discussing particles of matter, e.g. Anonymus Londinensis and Hero. Concede that Asclepiades was not only not happy with any of these theories, but also fond of aspects of Heraclides' theory of matter other than his doctrine of minimal fragments. He did not need to acknowledge his debt to Heraclides explicitly. For how many authors borrow ideas from their predecessors without explicitly associating themselves with them? If one does acknowledge such an association, it is hardly a matter of being fair. Rather, one is signalling to his audience that one is to be understood in the light of one's predecessors. Now, there would be no puzzle if Asclepiades wanted to signal to his audience that he is to be understood in the light of Heraclides' philosophy, if he had been in agreement with it. But he was not.

Once we can plausibly rule out that Asclepiades intended to claim allegiance to Heraclides, there remains the possibility that Asclepiades, by borrowing from Heraclides the name for his elements, was actually measuring himself against him, and challenging him. Gottschalk writes that 'ancient critics judged Heraclides' writings more as works of literature than philosophy', and, later, 'Heraclides is not praised as a philosopher or a scientist by any ancient authority.'[35] But we should not forget that Heraclides competed with Xenocrates for the succession in the Academy and lost the election only by a very few votes (F 9 W). Moreover, he was chosen as acting head of the Academy by Plato during his journey in Sicily. Gottschalk is not right in denying him any philosophical authority whatsoever.

Quite apart from Heraclides' authority as a philosopher in his own right, we should bear in mind that in most of his works he would speak for other people who are more eminent than himself. Pythagoras and his

[34] Lonie (1965: 129–30) is far too quick in dismissing them as a possible source of inspiration for Asclepiades.

[35] Gottschalk 1980: 8. It is, then, somewhat surprising to find Gottschalk accounting for Asclepiades' appropriation of Heraclides' theory of matter in the light of the latter's popularity as a writer in first-century BC Rome.

alleged follower Empedocles are among them. It is in the mouth of these characters that he put the ideas we ascribe to him, and indeed, for all a reader of first-century BC philosophical handbooks knew, Heraclides' theory of fragments was actually Empedocles'. Two hundred years later we find Galen understanding Empedocles, pretty much in the same way, as committed to a theory that the four elements 'fragment themselves' into small parts (κατὰ σμικρὰ μόρια καταθραυομένων).[36]

Plato does not feature in Heraclides' dialogues because it was Heraclides' policy to choose characters from the distant past. But, as I have argued, the attribution to Empedocles of a theory of fragments is an echo of the *Timaeus*, and, of course, the tradition to which Heraclides claimed allegiance was the same as Plato's. It is this tradition, I suggest, that Asclepiades proposed to measure himself against and to target via Heraclides.

Is there any evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Asclepiades did not just disagree with this tradition, but appropriated some of their ideas for the sake of criticising or ridiculing them? If there is, my suggestion that he did so also with Heraclides' theory of matter will gain additional support. There are at least three texts inviting treament in this light. The first is Sext. Emp. *M* 8.7.

> Of those who have inquired concerning truth, some say that there is not, others that there is something true; and of the latter some have said that only thought-objects are true, others that only sense-objects are, and others that both sense- and thought-objects alike are true [. . .]. Plato and Democritus supposed that only thought-objects are true [. . .]. Plato [supposed so] on the grounds that sense-objects always become and never are, their substance being in flux like a river, so that nothing remains the same even for two instants of time, nor, as also Asclepiades said, can the same thing be pointed at twice on account of the speed of the flux.[37]

It is strange to find Sextus mentioning Asclepiades in this context, not only because of the role Asclepiades is given, almost that of a source on Plato, but also because Plato and Asclepiades had very different and conflicting agendas, notably as concerns flux. Plato's point, as Sextus himself states, was that 'only thought-objects are true', with implicit but obvious reference

[36] Gal. *de Prop. plac.* 4.762 K.

[37] τῶν γὰρ σκεψαμένων περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναί φασιν ἀληθὲς οἱ δὲ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν εἶναι φαμένων οἱ μὲν μόνα ἔλεξαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ νοητά, οἱ δὲ μόνα τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δὲ κοινῶς τὰ αἰσθητά [. . .] τε καὶ νοητά. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Δημόκριτον μόνα τὰ νοητὰ ὑπενόησαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι [. . .] ὁ δὲ Πλάτων διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἀεὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, μηδέποτε δὲ εἶναι, ποταμοῦ δίκην ῥεούσης τῆς οὐσίας, ὥστε ταὐτὸ μὴ δύο τοὺς ἐλαχίστους χρόνους ὑπομένειν, μηδὲ ἐπιδέχεσθαι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης, δύο δείξεις διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς ῥοῆς.

to the forms. Asclepiades, by contrast, believed that nothing exists except matter and its motion (Cael. Aurel. *Morb. acut.* 1.115), and Sextus elsewhere associates him with Epicurus, both of them made to claim that the senses, not intellect, give us access to truth (*M.* 7.202).

It is possible that Sextus decided to couple Asclepiades with Plato all the same for the sake of completeness, although knowing that their agreement was very limited in scope. This move, however, would find no parallel in the rest of the doxographical section *M* 8.4–10, in which he considers philosophers, or schools of philosophers, one by one, and carefully distinguishes between their positions, emphasising *diaphônia*.

It is more likely that Asclepiades himself referred to Plato in his discussion of flux, and that Sextus is merely recording it. But what did this discussion comprise, and how does Plato fit into it? According to Asclepiades, flux involves not only the sensible world, but also our soul, described by him as a by-product of the functioning of the sense-organs. As a result, he believed that there is no such thing as an identifiable and stable self over and above the pneuma that we breathe in and out during respiration, and which accomplishes sensation.[38] This idea of the self is deeply and intrinsically anti-Platonic, and one which Plato himself had challenged in the *Theaetetus*. If Asclepiades referred to Plato in this context, we can at least suspect that he would go on distancing himself from him.

We will never know for sure whether and for what purpose Asclepiades associated himself with Plato as concerns flux. But a polemic against the tradition to which Heraclides claimed allegiance can also be detected in the following passage from Anonymus Londinensis:

> On this matter Asclepiades says that, according to the story, Democritus having fasted for four days was near to death. Certain women besought him to remain in life a few days longer, so as to prevent their suffering the ill-luck to have the Thesmophoria cancelled, which occurred at that season. They say he bade them remove him, and set him in the bakery, where the loaves shed over him the steam that arose. Democritus having inhaled the steam from the oven strengthened his powers and lived out his life.[39]

The idea that odours are some sort of food goes as far back as the Pythagoreans. Aristotle, *Sens.* 445a 16–17, reports that, according to them, certain living creatures ('animals' is perhaps not the right translation here) are

[38] Galen *de Util. resp.* 4.484 W; see also Calcidius, *in Plat. Tim.* Ch. 216, p. 231. Vallance (1990: 102–8) discusses flux in general. I myself discuss the flux of the soul in Polito 2006: 297–307.

[39] Anon. Lond. 37.34–46; see also Cael. Aurel. at *Morb. acut.* 2.37.

nourished by odours alone. This idea can be traced further back to the religious belief that the gods are fed by the smells of sacrifices.

What was deemed to be special about smells was that they are quasi-immaterial, and hence the purest nourishment suitable for the soul as well as for those beings superior to humans, and in a way themselves made of soul.

We would have expected Asclepiades to pay no attention to the idea that odours have semi-magical powers. Yet he appropriated precisely this idea, incorporated it into the anecdote on Democritus, and used it for arguing in favour of the existence of effluxes of invisible particles: odours are matter just as is any visible food, only at a different state of organisation, and they nourish the soul not because of any special power they supposedly have, but because smells, by being inhaled through the nose, reach the brain directly and hence have a direct effect on the soul.

Asclepiades' attributing this idea of soul nourishment to Democritus does not conflict with the hypothesis of a deliberate echo of the Pythagoreans, but rather contributes to the argument for thinking that he wants to identify an alternative source of authority for his own rationalisation of their idea.

The third text is perhaps the most telling. This is the anecdote of Asclepiades resurrecting a dead man, told by three ancient sources (Apul. *Flor*. 19; Plin. *NH* 26.14–15; and 7.124; Celsus *Med*. 2.6 13–15). I quote it in the English rendering by Robinson (1931: 91):

> One day a long funeral procession, with torches raised over the anointed and spice-sprinkled corpse, was winding its dolorous way through the streets of Rome. A physician, who was returning from the suburbs to the city, happened to be passing, and professional instinct caused him to approach the body. Unseen by the mourners, he managed to touch the dead man, and certainly no one saw the dead man move. With lagging feet, and in silence broken only by weeping, they came nearer the pyre. Suddenly the loud commanding voice of the physician startled all: 'I am Asclepiades, and I say take this funeral feast from the pyre to the table.' Some turned in anger and mockery upon him [. . .] but others insisted that the physician be heeded. While the discussion continued, Asclepiades brought the body to his house, applied restoratives which re-established respiration, and the supposed corpse participated in his own funeral festivities.

The story is likely to originate from within the circle of Asclepiades' own pupils, promoting the image of their teacher that he himself wanted to promote. To the best of my knowledge, there are no comparable stories told of other ancient doctors. And this should not be a cause of surprise: it

was their concern to distinguish themselves from charlatans and religious healers.

However, we do have a comparable story, that of the breathless woman, told by Heraclides about Empedocles, the 'half-physician and half-prophet' as described by Heraclides (D.L. 8.60 = F. 77 W). Both stories concern cases of apparent resurrection, but there is a difference: Empedocles' breathless woman is the subject of a supernatural event, with her soul being temporarily away from the body; Empedocles is praised for 'diagnosing' this event and reversing it, presumably with the aid of some shamanic power of his.

By contrast, there is no hint of Asclepiades' thinking or suggesting any supernatural event underlying the man's breathlessness, and Asclepiades himself is praised simply for his expert eye, capable of detecting life in what others thought to be a mere corpse. The miracle-like presentation of this act of diagnosis is nonetheless remarkable and, I suggest, was intended to hint at a comparison between Asclepiades and magic healers endowed with prophetic and supernatural powers of the kind Heraclides' 'Empedocles' was. If whoever invented this story was acquainted with the works of Heraclides, it is hard not to see it as mocking Heraclides' fondness for the supernatural.

The hypothesis that Asclepiades appropriated themes from the tradition to which Heraclides belonged for the sake of criticising or ridiculing them remains, of course, a mere conjecture. It is a fact that his appropriation of Heraclides' basic elements stands in sharp conflict with his different idea of what these elements were like, as well as conception of nature at large.

I suggest the following parallel: Plato in the *Timaeus* appropriated aspects of Democritus' atomism. And yet, by replacing the atoms with triangles, he turned Democritus' world into the ensouled world of which Heraclides was fond. Asclepiades, by appropriating Heraclides' fragments and yet altering their nature in an essential respect, did the same thing the other way round, and vindicated Democritus' world – on his own terms – against Plato.[40]

[40] I should like to thank Maria Kilby for linguistic help at an early stage, as well as the editor Malcolm Schofield for both linguistic and argumentative advice.

CHAPTER 7

The eclectic Pythagoreanism of Alexander Polyhistor

A. A. Long

INTRODUCTION

Ask anyone to list some Greek philosophers, and chances are that Pythagoras will be mentioned. His name was, of course, one of the most illustrious throughout the eleven hundred years of Greek philosophy's creative history, and it became more hallowed the further one gets from the great man's actual lifetime. The closer we are to that date, however, the less we can say with any security about what Pythagoras thought and taught. Starting in the third century BC, many works purporting to fill that gap were fabricated. They drew some of their content from material attributed to the late fifth/early fourth-century Pythagoreans Philolaus and Archytas, but most of it from a mishmash of Academic or Peripatetic ideas.[1]

This Hellenistic corpus of work on Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism includes one text that is significantly different. I refer to the so-called *Pythagorean Commentaries* (*hypomnemata*) recorded by a certain Alexander of Miletus, nicknamed Polyhistor, in the first decades of the first century BC, and thence transmitted by Diogenes Laërtius in his *Life of Pythagoras* (8.25–33), probably composed around AD 200.[2] Alexander was one of Diogenes'

I am grateful to Carl Huffman and David Sedley for encouraging me to work on Alexander Polyhistor, and to Phil Horky and Jaap Mansfeld for helpful comments on the draft I delivered to the Cambridge Conference, where I benefited particularly from observations made by the late Anna Ju. I thank Carl Huffman again for further suggestions that have enabled me to improve this final version. By the time this study was already in press I learned that Alexander Polyhistor is the subject of a chapter that André Laks will contribute to the forthcoming Cambridge University Press volume *A History of Pythagoreanism*, edited by Carl Huffman.

[1] See Thesleff 1965.

[2] Commentaries or notes is a better translation of *hypomnemata* than Hicks' 'memoirs' (in the Loeb edition of Diogenes Laërtius). According to Iamblichus, *VP* 262, Timaeus of Tauromenium drew on a work entitled *People of Croton's Hypomnemata* for reconstructing his own history of the Pythagoreans, on which see von Fritz 1940: 65–6, and Burkert 1972: 104–5. *Hypomnemata* is the standard term for Pythagoras' supposed writings, and is already found in the fabricated Letter of Lysis to Hipparchus (Burkert 1961: 25), where Pythagoras is said to have bequeathed his *hypomnemata* to his daughter Damo. For recent discussion of this letter, see Kahn 2001: 74–6, and Riedweg 2005: 120–1.

principal sources for biographical details such as the birthplace of his philosophers, but this passage concerning the Pythagoreans, taken from Alexander's *Successions of Philosophers*, is the only extended citation of his work that Diogenes has included. We are in no position to determine how much scissors and paste Alexander applied to what he allegedly 'found' (D.L. 8.24) in this Pythagorean manual, or the extent of Diogenes' editing of what he in turn found in Alexander's material. Unlike the typical pseudo-Pythagorean works, which were composed in a form of Doric, the text Diogenes excerpted is written in regular Attic dialect. In other ways, too, it is unrepresentative of those other works, because of the sheer number of doctrines it records and the variety of philosophical and medical theories it represents, with sources that seemingly range from as early as the fifth century up to and including the late second or early first century BC. For all these reasons Alexander's text (as I shall call Diogenes' excerpt) is of exceptional interest.

During the first half of the twentieth century Alexander's text attracted a fair measure of scholarly work (as this study will subsequently note), but some sixty years ago that activity waned. It is time to take a fresh look at this intriguing material, which is mentioned in the most recent studies of Pythagoreanism but only cursorily.[3]

Most of Diogenes' *Life of Pythagoras* is a typical compilation of biographical details, anecdotes and summaries of doctrine. Early on Diogenes (8.6) ridicules reports that Pythagoras left no writings, and gives the titles of several works attributed to him. The content of these works, according to Diogenes, was entirely ethical and prescriptive with the exception of metempsychosis, a teaching that he says Pythagoras originated (8.14). Diogenes then asserts that no Pythagorean doctrines were accessible before the time of Philolaus. After recording a long list of so-called Pythagorean precepts (*symbola*) such as 'Don't stir the fire with a knife' or 'Don't sit down on your bushel', and a further list of prescriptions and exemplary actions, Diogenes gives his report from Alexander's *Successions* concerning the *Pythagorean Commentaries*.

Diogenes (8.25–33) purports to cite several pages of Alexander's 'findings' from this work, and appends to them a further set of precepts and some doctrinal statements (8.34–5) taken (so he says) from Aristotle's work *On the Pythagoreans* (fr. 195 Rose). He then rounds off this sequence of excerpts with the words: 'This is what Alexander says he found in the

[3] See Burkert 1972: 53; Dillon 1977: 342–4; Huffman 1993: 218–19; Kahn 2001: 79–83 (the fullest discussion, which I discuss at the end of this paper); and Riedweg 2005: 23.

Pythagorean Commentaries, and what comes after them is stated by Aristotle' (8.36). Diogenes' *Life of Pythagoras* continues for a further fifteen sections of largely anecdotal material. Its doctrinal core is the excerpt from Alexander.

This man was the author of an astonishing number and range of works, most of them on places and peoples: hence his nickname Polyhistor.[4] Cited especially by the grammarian Stephanus of Byzantium, Clement of Alexandria and anonymous scholia, Alexander was in essence an antiquarian compiler, whose works consisted largely of excerpts from his voluminous reading. Apart from his *Successions of Philosophers*, he also wrote a work *On Pythagorean Precepts* (Clem. Alex. *Strom*. 1.358). It is a fair guess that Diogenes Laërtius garnered his list of *symbola* from this work. There is nothing else to suggest that Alexander had any special interest in the ideas of philosophers as distinct from details about their lives. He was a Greek by birth, but spent his mature years (*c*. 80–60 BC) in Rome, where the mythographer Hyginus was one of his students.

Alexander's lifetime gives us a terminus *ante quem* for the date of the *Pythagorean Commentaries*, but suggestions about when this work was composed before then have ranged from the late second/early first century BC (Zeller 1903: 108) to as early as the first half of the fourth century (Wellmann 1919, Delatte 1922, and Wiersma 1942). Since the publication of Burkert's *Weisheit und Wissenschaft* in 1962, the favoured date for the work has been the end of the third century.[5] Controversy over the compositional date of the *Pythagorean Commentaries* is inextricably implicated in questions concerning the work's sources and originating doctrines. Zeller found in it strong traces of Stoicism, but most later scholars, with the exception of Mansfeld, have not followed his lead.[6] Wellmann, Delatte and Wiersma opted for an early date because they found numerous connections with Presocratic thinkers, especially Heraclitus, Empedocles, Alcmaeon and Diogenes of Apollonia, and also with Hippocratic texts. Wellmann (1919: 226) actually proposed that the text, apart from a few Stoic accretions, derives from the circle of such Pythagoreans as Philolaus and Eurytus. His study

[4] I take this and the following information from the very informative article of Schwartz 1894.

[5] A later date for Alexander's source text is supported by parallels between Aëtius 4.5 (Diels 1879: 391) and D.L. 8.30, where the context of both passages is the location of the soul's cognitive faculty. Aëtius refers to 'certain of the more recent thinkers', a formula he uses at 2.29.4 (Diels 1879: 360) to signify Pythagoreans subsequent to 'the research of Aristotle and the assertion of Philip of Opus'. I owe this point to Jaap Mansfeld.

[6] See Wiersma 1942: 97, 112, and Festugière 1945: 1. In my opinion, they do not undermine the cumulative effect of the Stoic parallels that Zeller 1903: 103–5, adduced. Zeller's findings have been confirmed and supplemented by Mansfeld 1971: 98–102; see below.

was sufficiently influential for Kranz to include the entire Alexander passage in subsequent editions of DK.[7] But in an extended study from 1945, Festugière sought to prove that the main body of the text, together with its anatomical observations (D.L. 8.30–1), cannot precede the late fourth/early third century, and that such Stoic words and formulations as it does contain are due to a still later compiler. Subsequently, with the exception of a short article by Boyancé (1967), proposing an earlier date for part of Alexander's original text, the findings of Festugière have been seemingly accepted without any question.

In view of this complex history of interpretation we had better make no presuppositions concerning the compositional date of the *Pythagorean Commentaries*, as supposedly quoted by Alexander, and whether a single author was primarily or wholly responsible for the work's composition. For all we know, Diogenes has modified Alexander's text, and Alexander has done the same to the version of the work that he claims to have transmitted. It is virtually certain that Alexander worked from material that already contained the different chronological and doctrinal strata that we find in Diogenes. In the latter's excerpt Alexander's text opens with statements about principles and mathematics that unquestionably reflect the systematic Platonism propagated by Speusippus and Xenocrates. Yet, much of what follows this beginning has no obvious Academic background and could be inspired by pre-Platonic or post-Platonic ideas, or by both. In which case, the truth about the work's composition as a whole would be partly but only partly grasped by any one of the scholars I have cited.

These uncertainties raise many questions about how we should situate this text in the history of Pythagoreanism. Should we think of it as an early instance of the Neo-Pythagoreanism later associated with such names as Moderatus, Numenius, and Nicomachus, or as largely a product of early Academic Platonism, projected onto the name of Pythagoras, or as a text that contains traces of an early and authentic Pythagoreanism, or, finally, as a text that has been strongly marked by Stoicism? I will argue that all four of these interpretative options are in order, making Alexander's text too heterogeneous to be associated with a single philosophical movement. That heterogeneity, of course, may still allow the text to be the work of a single historian or doxographer, as I will actually propose in the conclusion of this study.

[7] It is presented in DK vol. I 58 'Pythagorean School' as B1a under the heading of 'Anonymous Pythagoreans' alongside texts of Aristotle.

TEXT AND CONTEXT

Before taking up these issues, I will comment briefly on the relevance (or irrelevance) of Alexander's text to philosophy in the first century BC, which is this volume's general theme. The passage in Diogenes Laërtius takes the form of a doxography, organised topically as follows:

1 Principles (Monad and Indefinite Dyad), numbers, four elements, universe (8.25)
2 The Earth: including equality of the opposites up down, light dark, hot cold, dry moist; terrestrial and celestial air (8.26)
3 Heat as the source of divinity, heavenly bodies, human beings and all other living things (8.27)
4 Immortality of soul in general, embryology and sensory functions (8.28–9)
5 Tripartition of human soul in particular and its relation to the body (8.30)
6 Eschatology: destiny of pure and impure souls and demonology (8.31–2)
7 Ethical principles and rituals (8.33)

Festugière (1945: 5–8) maintained that this order of topics 'must' depend on Theophrastus' doxographical categories, as found in Aëtius (in the order principles, universe, earth, soul and seed), but that its primary source is the *Timaeus*.[8] Alexander's topics do correspond to a large extent with Aëtius' headings, but the proposed connection with the *Timaeus*, though sometimes close, is not as consistently obvious as Festugière maintained. Here, as elsewhere in his important study, Festugière was overeager to establish a post-Platonic date for all the material in the Alexander doxography.

Was this text available to Roman authors of the first century BC? If so, little possible trace of it is evident in Cicero. He drops the name of Pythagoras in no fewer than seven of his philosophical works, but discursively for the most part, and at greatest length in the preface to *Tusculans* 4, where he endorses the tradition that Pythagoreans had a great influence on the early culture of Italy but coyly declines to expatiate on its numerous traces (*vestigia*). Cicero's Pythagoras is primarily the exalted founder of an esoteric fellowship, renowned for piety, defence of divination, and an 'absurd' ban on eating beans.[9] As far as doctrines are concerned, Cicero cites the soul's immortality, its consisting of number, and

[8] For Aëtius, see Diels 1879: 181–4; Mansfeld and Runia 2009. For the *Timaeus* see 27d–31b, 48a–52d and 53c–57c.

[9] *ND* 1.74: *Laws* 2.26; *Div*. 1.5, 2.119. Cicero firmly rejects the legend that King Numa was a follower of Pythagoras, *Rep*. 2.28.

as having two parts, which, in this context, he also attributes to Plato.[10] He gives no comprehensive doctrinal summary of Pythagoreanism as in Alexander's report. There is just one passage where Cicero chimes to some extent with Alexander's text. In a doxographical survey of basic principles, probably derived from Antiochus, Cicero reports that 'the Pythagoreans take the universe to originate from numbers and mathematical principles' (*Luc*. 118). Strikingly, however, Cicero does not follow Alexander and the later Pythagorean tradition in positing the Monad and Indefinite Dyad as the foundation of the system.

In the introduction to his translation of the *Timaeus*, Cicero gives Nigidius Figulus the credit for reviving the long dormant philosophy of Pythagoras.[11] Figulus was celebrated for his learning, but there is no scrap of evidence concerning anything he wrote about Pythagorean doctrines. The closest Latin text I have found that has any clear connection with the Alexander material is Varro (*Ling. Lat*. 5.11), who says that, according to Pythagoras, 'all the principles of things are binary, such as limited and unlimited, good and bad, life and death' (*omnia rerum initia bina esse, ut finitum et infinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem*).[12] Pythagorean doxography vacillates between monism and dualism. In its oldest form, as attested by Aristotle (*Metaph*. 1, 987a13), the Pythagoreans posit two *archai*, the limited and the unlimited, a doctrine which in essence goes right back to Philolaus (DK 44 B1). Varro evidently had access to a text that set out a Pythagorean table of opposites, starting with limit and unlimited. Those terms, however, are completely absent from Alexander's doxography, while in Varro's statement there is no mention of numbers. I infer that Varro had access to a text, perhaps a summary of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, which gave a quite different account of Pythagorean principles from the one we find in Alexander Polyhistor.

Before returning to that document, it is worth noting that Posidonius, according to his own words, as reported by Galen (T91 Edelstein/Kidd), said that no writing by Pythagoras has been preserved 'to us'. Posidonius, however, 'from what some of Pythagoras' pupils have written' infers that Pythagoras agreed with Plato and Hippocrates in assigning a composite nature to the soul.[13] Did Posidonius study the work of such pupils? Many scholars have supposed that the Pythagorean doxography reported by Sextus at *M* 7. 94ff. reached him via Posidonius because the context includes

[10] *Tusc*. 1.10, 39; 4.10. [11] See Dillon 1977: 117. [12] See Mansfeld 1990: 182.

[13] Cicero, *Tusc*. 4.10, credits Pythagoras with anticipating 'Plato's bipartite' distinction between rational and non-rational parts of the soul. Plutarch more cautiously (*Virt. mor*. 441A) suggests that Pythagoras was probably aware of this distinction.

Sextus' allusion to Posidonius' supposed commentary on the *Timaeus*.[14] But I. G. Kidd (in his commentary on Posidonius) has convincingly shown that there is no reason to extend Posidonius' presence in Sextus' text beyond that single statement. If that is so, we have no secure evidence that Posidonius made any reference to the mathematical cosmology credited to Pythagoreanism in the Academy and Lyceum, and reported in Alexander's text.[15]

In light of these points about Cicero, Varro and Posidonius, it seems quite doubtful whether Alexander's text made any significant impact in Rome during the first century BC. Dillon (1977: 117) suggests that Figulus 'may have learned his Pythagoreanism from' Alexander, who, he says, 'taught in Rome in the 70s' BC. Maybe so, but did Alexander actually do any teaching? Even if we suppose that he did, it is likely to have involved grammar and antiquarianism rather than any formal instruction in philosophy. As to Cicero, Dillon speculates that, though he never mentions Alexander, 'he should have known of him', and 'may not have got on with him and perhaps ignored him for that reason'. This amusing comment begs all kinds of questions. At this point, we should leave speculation aside, and take a close look at what Alexander tells us about his findings in the *Pythagorean Commentaries*.

PHILOSOPHICAL CONTENT AND CHARACTER

The first section (D.L. 8.25) merits particularly close attention.

Principles

The starting point [*arche*] of everything is the Monad. From the Monad the Indefinite Dyad subsists [*hypostenai*] as matter for the Monad, which is cause.

If anything is certain about Alexander's material, it is the Academic origin of these allegedly Pythagorean principles and elements. The concepts of Monad (or One) and Dyad originated in the early Academy. They were

[14] See Burkert 1972: 54–6.

[15] If, however, Posidonius took the *Timaeus* to be a broadly Pythagorean work, as he may well have done, he could have helped to propagate Roman interest in the specifically Pythagorean tradition. There are a number of intriguing correspondences between Diogenes Laërtius' report of Alexander and well-attested Posidonian material. Thus Posidonius wrote a book entitled *On heroes and daemons* (fr. 24 EK), beings to whom Alexander's Pythagoreans attribute divinatory powers (D.L. 8.32). Much of Alexander's terminology (D.L. 8.25–7) is also found in Posidonius (cf. Posidonius *ap*. D.L. 7.138–9, 142–3). I am grateful to the late Anna Ju for drawing my attention to these correspondences.

seemingly first stated by Plato himself in his famous Lecture on the Good.[16] Under the influence of Speusippus and Xenocrates, these concepts (in place of Philolaus' limit and unlimited) came to be assigned as principles to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans as early as Theophrastus, and thereafter they become ubiquitous in Pythagorean doxographies.[17] Thus Aëtius (1.3, Lemma on Pythagoras' *archai* (Diels, *DG* p. 281)) states that the Monad is called 'the active and everlasting [or 'specific'] cause, i.e. *nous* God', while the Indefinite Dyad is termed 'passive and material, i.e. the visible world'. However, Aëtius' implicit contrast between visible and intelligible worlds reflects Neo-Platonic influence, of which there is of course no trace in Alexander's text. Its account of the Pythagorean *archai* is quite spare, as compared with parallel accounts given by such later figures as Eudorus and Sextus Empiricus (*M* 10.261–2).[18]

Eudorus posits a transcendent One, over and above the other two *archai* (called Monad and Indefinite Dyad), with good and bad things assigned to these latter two principles respectively. In Sextus, the derivation of the Dyad from the Monad is explained in terms of the contrast between *self-identity* (*autotes*, the Monad) and *otherness* (the Dyad). Whatever that distinction means, it purports to provide an explicit account of the relation of the principles to one another. In Alexander, by contrast, all we get is the vague verb 'subsists' (*hypostenai*) to state how the Dyad stands with respect to the Monad.

Neither here nor anywhere else does Alexander's account use the terms 'limit' and 'unlimited'. In contrast with the comparable treatments by later writers he employs no theology or ethics in characterising the principles. As we have seen, Aëtius identifies the Monad with divine *nous*, and in another Aëtian lemma (ps.-Galen 35 (*DG* p. 618)) Pythagoras is said to have made the Monad God and the good, and assigned bad to the Indefinite Dyad alone with its domain extending over the visible world. Cosmic goodness and badness are completely absent from Alexander's account.

This material shows that Alexander's source for his opening section precedes the development of Neo-Pythagoreanism in the sense of a movement whose first principle is an absolutely transcendent One. This chronology is confirmed, I think, by the staccato way Alexander continues (8.25).

[16] See Burkert 1972: 17–22, and Dillon 2003: 17–21.

[17] Thphr., *Metaph.* 11a27–b7; see Burkert 1972: 58–9. For Speusippus and Xenocrates, in detail, see Dillon 2003: 40–63 and 98–111.

[18] On Eudorus, cited by Simplicius, *in Phys.* 181, 10ff. Diels, see Dillon 1977: 126ff. and Bonazzi 2007b.

From numbers to the formed universe

From the Monad and the Indefinite Dyad issue numbers. From numbers, points; from points, lines; from lines, plane figures; from plane figures, solid figures; from solid figures, perceptible bodies whose elements are four: fire, water, earth, and air. These elements interchange and turn about through and through (*di' holon*), and from them is generated a world that is ensouled, intelligent and spherical, with the earth, which is itself spherical and inhabited all around, at its centre. There are also antipodes, and our 'down' is their 'up'.

The generation of numbers from the Monad and Indefinite Dyad is repeatedly ascribed to the Platonists by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* M (e.g.1081a14, 1098b7). Alexander's five-stage mathematical sequence – points, lines, plane figures, solid figures and perceptible bodies – does not seem to be exactly attested in any extant Academic or Peripatetic material, but Aristotle, in his criticism of Platonist number theory, has the triad line, plane and body (*Metaph.* M 1085a9). In the same context he criticises those who generate magnitudes from the point, probably in reference to Speusippus (1085a32).[19] Theophrastus refers to the derivation of numbers, planes and bodies in a context where he is criticising those who posit the One and the Indefinite Dyad (*Metaph.* 6a25f.). Alexander's full sequence recurs with much more detail in Sextus (*M* 10.276–83), which reads like a greatly expanded version of this section of Alexander's text, and is attributed to Plato himself by Plutarch (*Quaest. Plat.* 1002a).[20] We can conclude that Alexander's text depends on Academic doctrine, the rationale of which was to fill out the traditional Pythagorean theory that number is the world's metaphysical and epistemological foundation.

I turn now to the last two items in the mathematical sequence – solid figures and perceptible bodies. In the parallel passage in Sextus (*M* 10.283) the perceptible bodies are identified *in the first instance* with earth, water, air, and fire, which in turn are taken to be derived from 'solids' (*sterea schemata*). We are presumably to understand solids in mathematical terms, such as the cube, pyramid, dodecahedron and icosahedron of Plato's *Timaeus*. Alexander's text is similar, but confusingly expressed. Instead of saying 'perceptible bodies whose elements are four', it would have been better to write: 'the perceptible bodies, earth, air, fire and water, which are the elements of the world'. However, the general point is clear enough.

[19] See Annas 1976: 185.

[20] Cf. Burkert 1972: 247, Cherniss 1976: 49, and the references cited by Festugière 1945: 13.

It seems certain, as Festugière has fully argued, that this portion of the cosmology has been ultimately inspired by the *Timaeus*.[21] It shares with that account the world's sphericity and intelligent soul. Plato also envisions constant inter-transformations between three of the elements, though he exempts earth from that process (*Tim.* 55d–58c). Early Pythagoreanism, by contrast, adopted neither the four-element theory nor the notion of a world soul. Its distinctive cosmological notions such as the central fire, the earth's revolutions around that fire and the counter earth are strikingly absent from Alexander's *Pythagorean Commentaries*.[22]

I have not found any exact parallel for Alexander's statement that the earth is 'inhabited all around', which he implies to be a consequence of its spherical shape. Festugière (1948: 20f.) appropriately refers to *Phaedo* 109a9–b4, where Plato writes about people living in many hollows of the spherical earth. Reminiscence of Plato is probably confirmed by Alexander's ensuing reference to 'antipodes, where our "down" is their "up"', an idea that recalls *Timaeus* 63a. However, the geography of Alexander's text may also reflect authentically old Pythagorean doctrine, because Aristotle alludes to Pythagoreans in connection with his own account of right and left, and of up and down.[23] There, in a discussion of the stars' risings and settings, Aristotle contests the view of the Pythagoreans, who 'situate us above [in the upper hemisphere] and to the right, and situate those [who live in the opposite region] below and to the left'.[24]

Is Academic doctrine sufficient to account for the rest of this first section of Alexander's text? Not quite. The statement concerning the four elements' 'through and through inter-transformations' specifically recalls the early Stoic doctrine of the elements' origination from one another in cosmogony, and the phraseology (*metaballein kai trepesthai di' holon*), calling attention to the elements' mutual co-extension, is distinctively Stoic[25] Zeno was sufficiently interested in Pythagoreanism to write a work so entitled (D.L. 7.4). Nothing is known about its contents, but, with the

[21] Festugière 1945: 17–18 with references; cf. Zeller 1903: 104 n. 2.

[22] The attempt by Wellmann 1919 to assign Alexander's evidence to a Pythagorean contemporary of Plato, drawing on fifth-century Pythagoreanism, is trenchantly refuted by Festugière 1945. Delatte (1922: 198–201) provides numerous Pythagorean texts to illuminate Alexander's material, but they are largely drawn from Neo-Pythagorean sources. Wiersma (1942: 98–9) recognises that Alexander's first section is Academic in origin but defends Wellmann's general thesis concerning the early date of the main body of the text.

[23] *De Caelo* 2.2.285b22, cited by Delatte 1922: 205.

[24] Cf. Cicero, *Rep.* 6.21 in Scipio's discourse on two opposite habitable zones, which Cicero may intend to sound Pythagorean.

[25] See *SVF* 1.102 and 2.413. The Stoic affinity is noted by Zeller 1903: 104 n. 2, Festugière 1945: 17, and Mansfeld 1971: 99.

exception of its explicit mathematics, Alexander's account of principles and cosmology is quite consistent with Stoicism. As in his 'Pythagoreanism', so too in early Stoicism we have: a pair of antithetical and coordinate principles, one active the other passive, with the passive principle standing to the active one in a relation of matter to form; four interchanging elements, earth, air, fire, water; and an intelligent and ensouled spherical universe.[26]

These Stoic affinities do not cast doubt on the primarily Academic and Peripatetic provenance of Alexander's Pythagorean principles and cosmology. Plato's *Timaeus* both directly and through its Academic and Peripatetic interpreters exercised a major influence on the development of Stoic physics.[27] According to Theophrastus, Plato could even be credited with two principles, god (or the good) and matter, which strikingly anticipate and correspond to Stoic doctrine.[28] Alexander's text, however, seems to signify an author who wanted to mark doctrinal convergences between so-called Pythagoreanism and Stoicism, probably because the latter was the dominant philosophy at the time of composing this account. Stoic influence on Alexander's original will emerge still more clearly when we turn to the dominant role his text assigns to heat.

Alexander's opening section moves clearly and coherently from the two basic principles to the formed universe with the earth at its centre. The next two sections (8.26–7) treat features of the universe and the earth, but without comparable coherence. There are three dominant notions: first, equality of opposite powers; second, a theory about air and *aether*; and third, the role of heat as the essence of divinity and the cause of life. I will take these notions in order.

Equality of opposite powers: light dark, hot cold, dry moist (D.L. 8.26)

Light and dark have equal shares in the universe, and so too, hot and cold, and dry and moist. In the case of the latter, when hot predominates, summer comes; when cold, winter; when dry, spring; and when moist, autumn. If they are all of equal strength, the year is at its finest; it is healthy during the freshness of spring, but unhealthy in the decay of autumn. During the day too the morning is fresh but the evening is in decay, and therefore more unhealthy.

[26] The sphericity of the universe attested by Philolaus B7 is the only early Pythagorean doctrine here; see also Burkert 1972: 303–5.

[27] See Reydams-Schils 1999.

[28] Theophrastus Fr. 230 in Fortenbaugh *et al.* 1992. At D.L. 3.69 Plato's principles are god and matter. See Sharples 1995: 69, and Sedley 1998b: 349–50.

The equality of opposites has an archaic ring.[29] It recurs in different guises in Parmenides, Empedocles and, most relevantly perhaps, in Alcmaeon, who (DK 24 B4) explained health in terms of the *isonomia* of such opposites as moist dry, cold hot and sweet bitter, as does Plato in the physiology of *Timaeus* 82a.[30] Comparable passages occur in the early Hippocratic corpus, where, as in Alexander, seasonal changes are explained by the temporary dominance of one such opposite over another.[31] Aristotle and the Stoics seem to have viewed the terrestrial elements as equal in as much as they are incessantly subject to interchange, as with Alexander's Pythagoreans, but his application of opposites to explain the seasons, and the healthiest and most noxious times, could well go back to late fifth-century sources.

The next section is highly compressed and poorly organised, but it does have a primary controlling idea, the vital power of heat.

Air and aether*, heat, divinity and the source of life (D.L. 8.26–8)*

The air around the earth is stagnant and noxious and everything within it is mortal; but the uppermost air is in perpetual motion, pure and healthy, and everything therein is immortal and therefore divine. Sun, moon and the other stars are gods; for in them heat predominates, and heat is the cause of life. {The moon gets its light from the sun.} Gods and human beings are akin, because the human being shares in heat. Therefore God cares for us. {Fate is the cause of the world order both in general and in particular.} The sun's ray penetrates the *aether*, both that which is cold and that which is dense – they call [here Alexander switches to direct speech] the [terrestrial] air cold *aether*, but sea and moisture they call dense *aether* – and this ray sinks into the depths and therefore bestows life on everything.

Setting aside the intrusive references to the moon's light and to fate, I paraphrase as follows: the universe is divided into a terrestrial region, the living contents of which are impure and mortal, and a celestial domain, which contains immortal gods, including the heavenly bodies. This conception of the universe is marked by differences between the quality of the air within its upper and lower divisions. Heat (whose source is the sun) is

[29] See Kahn 2001: 81.

[30] Festugière (1945: 32–9) surveys this material in great detail. Rather than allowing it to be directly influenced by fifth-century ideas, he proposes that Alexander's 'Pythagorean' has derived it from Plato.

[31] See Hippocrates *Nat.* 4 and *Airs* 10–11, with commentary by Delatte 1922: 205–7, and Longrigg 1993: 91–2. Stoics explain the seasons by variations in the sun's temperature, owing to its distance from the earth, with spring due to *eukrasia* of the air; cf. D.L. 7.151–2. If Philo of Alexandria (*SVF* 2.616) reflects the Stoics, we can attribute to them *isonomia* of the four elements and their reciprocity to one another.

responsible for all life, both the celestial life of the immortal gods and our human selves, and, at the lowest extreme, the life of plants. Differences of air are in fact differences of a single substance – *aether*, such that fire is hot *aether*, air cold *aether*, and water dense *aether*.

The passage raises numerous questions. Here, I shall pursue just three: the division of the universe into lower and higher; the notion of vital heat; and the *aether* terminology.

In a late doxography (Aëtius, *Plac.* 2, Diels, *DG* 336 (= DK 44A16)) Philolaus is reputed to have made a tripartite division of the world into a top region containing purity of elements, a middle domain, where the planets, sun and moon are located; and a sublunar region of biological change.[32] Diels took this passage to be probably derived from Theophrastus, but Burkert rightly found traces of the *Timaeus* in it.[33] In Philolaus, on the other hand, the primary and most honourable part of the world is the central fire.[34] By deifying the upper region of the universe Alexander's Pythagoreans are in line with Plato, Aristotle and Stoicism.

The emphasis his text lays on vital heat is striking, together with the analysis of three of the traditional four elements as species of air, here redescribed as types of *aether*.[35] Festugière rightly notes that Plato in the *Timaeus* distinguishes three different types of air (58d), but unlike our text, Plato confines the word *aether* to the brightest kind of air. There is no suggestion in Alexander's text that the hot *aether* has anything more than a name in common with Aristotle's fifth element.[36]

In Presocratic contexts *aether* is typically distinguished from air, so Alexander's 'Pythagorean' use of the term for all species of air appears anomalous. With its emphasis on heat and sunlight as the cause of life, we may be warranted in finding a monistic tendency in this part of the text, as in Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia and a time-honoured interpretation of Heraclitus' dominant element fire.[37] There are further hints that Alexander's text has incorporated pre-Platonic material. According to D.L. 9.22 Parmenides invoked the sun to explain the origin of human beings, while the sea, as the location for the origins of life in general, harks back to several early Greek thinkers.[38] As to specific reminiscences of old Pythagorean doctrine, the most promising text to adduce is probably

[32] For the doxographical context, see Mansfeld and Runia 2009: 394–408.

[33] Burkert 1972: 244–5, followed by Huffman 1993: 398.

[34] See Huffman 1993: 242–6.

[35] See Solmsen 1957 and Mansfeld 1971: 83–103.

[36] See Boyancé 1967, who convincingly contests the proposal of Festugière 1945: 23–6 that Alexander's *aether* shows the influence of Plato and Aristotle.

[37] As suggested by Wellmann 1919: 228–31, and Wiersma 1942: 101–6.

[38] See Delatte 1922: 210–11.

DK 44 A27, where the Anonymus Londiniensis claims that, according to Philolaus, our bodies are constructed out of heat, on the evidence that sperm and the womb are hot.[39]

In the middle of this section, as we have seen, Alexander's text makes big claims about gods and human beings, but with lightning brevity. What connects the two races is heat, which, in its celestial form as hot *aether* confers not only life but also immortality. Immortality pertains in the first instance to the gods and heavenly bodies, but by implication, owing to our kinship (*syngeneia*) with the gods, are we too immortal? Divinity cares for us (*pronoeisthai*) because in our heat we resemble the divine! And in the next section, our immortality will be made explicit on the grounds that soul as such is immortal.

This entire passage closely recalls Alcmaeon, who, according to Aristotle (*de An.* 1.2.405a29 (= DK 24 A12)), declared the soul to be immortal because of its resemblance to immortal beings, and by virtue of this property stated that the soul is in everlasting motion, just like the heavenly bodies. Similarly Alexander's text situates the heavenly bodies within ever-moving air or hot *aether*. Immortality of soul is a thesis that a Pythagorean of any vintage must defend. Strikingly, though, Alexander's Pythagoreans are physicalists, through and through. Our text eschews any hint of incorporeal or transcendent reality, and the psychology, to which we shall come shortly, is represented in entirely physical terms.

This section has introduced us to equal elements, seasonal changes, sub-lunar and super-lunar domains, purity and impurity, mortality and immortality, vital heat and sunlight, divinity and types of air or *aether*. This is a lot to take in. As with the opening section on principles, resonance from the Academy is still strong, but here it is evident in general rather than specific points, many of which are shared by the Stoics. When it comes to the passage's most distinctive details – vital heat, divine providence's concern for human beings, and strong physicalism – we are very close, exempting immortality, to early Stoicism. The seemingly intrusive statement (between the theology and the doctrine on the sun) concerning fate (*heimarmene*) is further proof that this passage has passed through the hands of someone whose intellectual background includes Stoicism.[40] Mathematics and numbers have dropped out completely, and there is nothing that points specifically to Aristotle or Theophrastus. Some theories may

[39] See Huffman 1993: 290ff. [40] So too Festugière 1945: 59.

have a pre-Platonic lineage, and the air/*aether* doctrine appears to be quite unique.

From cosmology and theology, Alexander's text now turns to the soul, reproduction and embryology.

Soul, reproduction, embryology (D.L. 8.28–9)

Everything that shares in heat is alive – hence plants too are living beings – although not all living beings have soul, which is a detachment (*apospasma*) of *aether*, both the hot and the cold, since the soul shares in cold *aether*. Soul is different from life: it is immortal since that from which it is detached is immortal. Living beings are generated from one another by seeds, and their generation out of earth is impossible. The seed [sc. of animals] is a droplet (*stagon*) of brain containing hot vapour within itself. When this droplet is applied to the womb, it emits from the brain ichor, moisture and blood. From these [brain fluids] flesh, sinews, bones, hairs and the whole body are formed, while soul and sentience (*aisthesis*) emerge from the vapour. First congealing in forty days, it [the embryo] acquires form, then according to the ratios (*logoi*) of harmony in seven or nine or at most ten months the completed foetus is brought forth. Within itself it contains all the ratios of life and, with these ratios systematically strung together, the newborn infant is made coherent with each of its parts accruing at determinate times.

By comparison with the stark brevity of the preceding section, this account of biology and embryology is quite full. It also hints for the first time at taking a stand on controversial issues. Plants are *zoia*, living beings, but, unlike Platonic and Aristotelian plants, they lack soul, or so I interpret the implication of the statement ψυχὴν μέντοι μὴ ἔχειν πάντα, where the negative *me* instead of *ou* suggests the statement's concessive dependence on the assertion that plants are *zoia*: 'although not all living beings (i.e. plants) have soul'. The obvious source for the denial of soul to plants is Stoicism.[41] Resonance of Stoicism continues in Alexander's calling soul 'a detachment of hot and cold *aether*' (an expression a Stoic could have used in reference to psychic *pneuma*) and in the emphasis here and in the next section on blood as the soul's nutriment.[42] However, Alexander's Pythagoreans, as we would expect, posit immortality of soul, which the Stoics do not.

The second hint at adopting a controversial position is the insistence that all reproduction requires seeds, with the attendant denial of spontaneous generation from the earth. Stoics probably rejected that popular theory.

[41] *SVF* 2.708–11, 714. See Long 1996: 237–9. [42] See *SVF* 1.128, 140, 2.633.

As to the bizarre embryology that follows, the three items emitted from the brain under the seed's influence – ichor, water (*to hygron*), and blood – form a series of fluids that seem to range from the most to the least refined.[43] These fluids and attendant processes indicate a physiology that is quite distinct from Stoic theory, in which the heart is the primary organ for embryological development.[44] The description of the seed as a drop of brain might go back to Alcmaeon (Aëtius. *Plac.* 5.3.3) or even to Philolaus, though it most probably echoes Plato, *Timaeus* 73cd on seed, marrow and brain.[45]

The most intriguing feature of this section is the repeated mention of the *logoi* of harmony in the context of the embryo's development.[46] Here, we have a notion that looks authentically Pythagorean, connected as it is with precise numbers signifying months for gestation. In late Pythagorean material, starting with Varro, the number of days for a seven-month or nine-month pregnancy are computed on the basis of precise multiplications.[47] We can probably infer from this material that Alexander's 'ratios of harmony' are intended to invoke numbers pertaining to musical harmonics, as in Hippocratic texts, where numerical ratios are adduced in computing the number of days for different periods of gestation.[48] Unfortunately, the chronology of the relevant Hippocratic works is too uncertain to warrant any inferences from them concerning which way the influence goes, so far as Alexander's text is concerned.

The extract continues (8.29) with a few lines concerning sense-perception in general and vision in particular, with all sensory functions attributed to 'very hot vapour' (*atmos*).[49] I pass over this passage except for one particularly intriguing point it contains. Alexander reports that Pythagoras called the eyes 'gates of the sun'. That is a Homeric expression, taken from the beginning of *Odyssey* 24, where Hermes summons the souls of the dead suitors. Lines 9–12 of that book read as follows:

[43] Ichor is sometimes used for a vital fluid distinct from blood (as in Homer), or as the watery part of blood (e.g. Plato, *Tim.* 83c, Arist., *PA* 651a18) or as a generic term for bodily discharges.

[44] See Long 1996: 243–4.

[45] There may be a genuine reminiscence of Philolaus B13, which Burkert 1972 and Huffman 1993 take to be authentic (see Huffman 1993: 307–32). This fragment, cited by Nicomachus, purports to give Philolaus' theory of 'the four principles of the rational animal', viz. head for intellect, heart for life and perception, navel for initial growth, and genitals for sowing seed. The brain is said to be the human being's origin.

[46] Zeller (1903: 105 n. 6) relates the expression 'all the *logoi* of life' to the Stoic notion of *spermatikoi logoi*.

[47] See Delatte 1922: 216–19.

[48] See Burkert 1972: 262–4.

[49] These lines on *aisthesis* seem out of place. The suitable context for them is the next section on psychology, where *aistheseis* are mentioned all over again.

Hermes the kindly healer led them down broad paths. They went along past Ocean's streams and the White Rock, and past the gates of the sun and the land of dreams.

A page or so later Alexander's text (D.L. 8.31) refers to Hermes and his escorting of souls. Pythagoreans, even Pythagoras himself, may have called the eyes 'gates of the sun' without any interest in the original eschatological context of this striking phrase.[50] In Alexander, however, the contextual coincidence, if that is what we have here, clamours to be noticed.

The human soul (D.L. 8.29)

The human soul is divided three ways – into *nous*, *phrenes* and *thumos*. *Nous* and *thumos* are also present in the other animals, but *phrenes* are only present in the human being. The soul's domain (*arche*) extends from the heart up to the brain. The part that is in the heart is *thumos*, while the parts in the brain are *phrenes* and *nous*. Sensations (*aistheseis*) are secretions (*stagones*) from these [latter]. The rational part (*to phronimon*) is immortal, but the rest is mortal. The soul gets its nourishment from the blood, but the soul's *logoi* are winds. The soul itself and the *logoi* are invisible, because the *aether* is invisible. The veins, arteries and sinews (*neura*) are the soul's linkages (*desma*). When it is strong and has become self-contained and at rest, *logoi* and actions become its linkages.

This passage, remarkable for its obscurity, terminology and eclecticism, merits a whole paper to itself.[51] The tripartition of the soul sounds Platonic, and features of the text, including the anatomy and the immortality of the rational part, call the *Timaeus* specifically to mind.[52] But Alexander's text maintains the physicalism I have emphasised before, and there are too many other differences of detail to posit Plato as more than one likely influence. Immediate questions that the passage raises are the use of the old Homeric word *phrenes* to refer to the soul's rational part and the consequential downgrading of *nous*; the interpretation of *stagones* in reference to *aistheseis*; the statement that the soul's *logoi* are winds; and, lastly, the repeated application of *desma*, which I translate 'links', to the soul.

50 Pythagoreans liked to align mythological expressions with empirical phenomena: 'sunlike' and 'fiery' are words they are said to have applied to the eyes. See Delatte 1922: 221.

51 Festugière (1945: 43ff.) discusses the passage at great length, mainly by citing medical texts, especially ones deriving from Diocles of Carystus. I find the passages he cites more tangential than genuinely illuminating. His neglect of Stoic *pneuma* is a major shortcoming, and also his lack of comment on the curiously literary terminology.

52 The doxographical tradition often assigns Platonic tripartition to Pythagoras and Pythagoreans; see Burkert 1972: 74.

As regards Alexander's use of *phrenes*, I first quote Kahn (2001: 82): 'This archaic use of *phrenes* seems . . . to have been preserved in medical usage, as the term *phreneitis* for brain-fever shows.'[53] That is true enough, but medical usage does not explain why an account of supposedly Pythagorean material should have used this largely anachronistic term. In the doxographical tradition, the Pythagoreans are credited with the doctrine that the heart is the seat of the vital principle (*zotikon*), and the head that of the rational (*logikon*) and intelligent principle *(noeron)*.[54] These three terms call for no comment, but no one, to the best of my knowledge, has come up with a convincingly philosophical or medical parallel for Alexander's use of *phrenes*. I tentatively suggest that it may be explained as a result of the Pythagorean extension of rational capacity (*logikon*) to all animals.[55] That notion, probably a consequence of metempsychosis, leaves Alexander's Pythagoreans needing a different word for specifically human rationality. Whatever the merits of this suggestion may be, we should note that the combination of cardiovascular and brain-centred theories for the soul's bodily vehicles is typical of this text's eclecticism and syncretism.

My next question is what to make of the claim that *aistheseis* are *stagones* from 'these', where 'these' refers to the cerebral *phrenes* and *nous*. *Stagon* is literally a drop of liquid. I had initially found such a reference quite out of place in this account, both because Alexander has previously told us that *aesthesis* in general and vision in particular are 'exceedingly hot vapour' (8.29), and also because of his account's overall affinity with Stoic *pneuma*, which he seems to underline with his reference to the soul's *logoi* (rational principles?) being 'winds'.[56] On further consideration, I am inclined to think that the liquidity he alludes to with the word *stagones* is blood (to which *stagon* commonly alludes) and that *aistheseis* here are particular

[53] Festugière (1945: 44f.) refers to Anon. Lond. IV.14–17, where *phrenes* actually alludes to the brain. However, the Hippocratic author of *On the sacred disease*, 20, takes *phrenes* to signify diaphragm, and dismisses its having any connection with intelligence.

[54] Aëtius 4.5.10 (Diels 1879: 391–2).

[55] See Aëtius 5.20.4 (Diels 1879: 432), who says: 'Pythagoras and Plato say that even the souls of so-called non-rational animals are rational, but they do not act rationally because of their bodies' poor composition, and their not having the capacity to speak, as in the case of apes and dogs; for they are intelligent (*noousi*) but do not speak' (*phrazousi*). Burkert (1972: 75) says that this last sentence explains the distinction between *nous* and *phrenes* in Alexander's text. How so? Burkert seems to be aligning *phrenes* with *phrazousi*, but he gives no support for this linkage.

[56] Alexander's earlier mention of *logoi*, in the context of embryology, had seemingly mathematical connotations, but they are out of place here. If *anemoi* is a literary equivalent to *pneumata*, as seems likely, I propose Stoicism again as the ancestor of Alexander's eccentric terminology. Cf. Cleanthes (*SVF* 1.467), who, with allusion to Heraclitus, compares the unification and separation of cosmological constituents to the way 'certain rational principles (*logoi*) pertaining to parts unite and combine in the seed, and then separate out, as the parts develop'.

sensations, not the sense faculties.[57] Blood, as Alexander immediately observes, is what nourishes the soul, and he has already indicated that the soul's activity involves transmission from the heart to the brain. Support for the notion that *stagones* are secretions of blood may be drawn from Alexander's next observation concerning the soul's 'linkages' *(desma)*.

Desma is not a word one expects to find in a doxographical text on psychology and anatomy, especially with this largely archaic plural instead of the more familiar form *desmoi*.[58] The triad of *desma* – 'veins, arteries, and *neura*' – may suggest that Alexander's original source has hedged its bets between cardiovascular and neurophysiological theories of the soul's channels of communication in the body, but the imprecision of the entire passage favours the translation 'sinews' for *neura* rather than nerves.[59] Alexander's point is, presumably, that the blood vessels and the sinews are the linkages by means of which the soul communicates with the rest of the body in executing its basic nutritive and sensory functions. I have wondered whether the use of *desma* could be due to a Pythagorean thought to the effect that the veins and so forth keep the soul *chained* to the body.[60] Against this, however, is the fact that Alexander describes a strong and self-contained (mature?) soul as having *logoi* (thoughts or reasons) and actions (*erga*) as its 'linkages'. The language is bafflingly obscure. The best I can suggest is that the soul is here being characterised in what we moderns would call its function as mind or centre of consciousness. If that is right, we can understand why the mature soul's relevant links to the whole person are expressed in mental rather than anatomical terms.

Eschatology and rituals

Alexander's text moves on from psychology to eschatology and the soul's postmortem destiny (8.31–2). The treatment of this latter topic draws on familiar mythology, in specifying Hermes as the escort of souls and a celestial domain for the pure, but it also incorporates the following peculiar

[57] I follow a tentative suggestion from the anonymous referee for Cambridge University Press that Alexander means to say that the senses are drops of blood, since this is what nourishes the soul (D.L.8.30 fin.), in which case it might be implied that there is a difference between *aesthesis* and *aestheseis*, such that the latter are the actualisations of the former. I also note the role that Aristotle attributes to the blood and to blood vessels in transmitting sensory movements: *de Insomniis* 2.461a8ff.

[58] Plato, *Tim*. 73b, calls marrow life's chains (*desmoi*).

[59] Festugière (1945: 47) insists that *neura* should be translated 'nerves', but I prefer sinews since I find no other evidence that Alexander's text was influencd by the latest Hellenistic medical discoveries.

[60] Thus Epictetus (1.9.11), echoing Plato's *Phaedo* warns his students against suicide, even though he grants the rectitude of treating their attachment to the body and to possessions as *desma*.

ideas – 'unbreakable bonds' (*desma* again) imposed by the Furies for the fate of the impure, and transmission, by souls 'called daimons and heroes', of dreams and prophetic signs not only to human beings but even to sheep and other grazing animals.[61] Could this remarkable interest in supernatural messages to livestock hint at or make up for the most striking omission from Alexander's explicit text – Pythagoras' theory of metempsychosis?

It is the final section (8.33) that has the most obvious affinity with Pythagoreanism as a cult marked out by specific rituals and prescriptions. Here we are told that virtue, health, all goodness and divinity are harmony. Alexander's text gives instructions on how we should worship gods and heroes. Finally, we are offered rules, many of them culinary, about how to stay pure.

CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, I start by quoting the following statement by Kahn (2001: 83):

> This curious text thus claims to reflect a living cult that maintains a number of ritual observances characteristic of the Pythagorean tradition from the earliest times. On the face of it, this text represents the updated doctrines or doxography of a Pythagorean community from the third or second century BC, which has preserved features from both the theoretical tradition of the *mathematikoi* and the ritual tradition of the *akousmatikoi*, all of this blended in a strange medley of Presocratic, Platonic, and Stoic elements. If this impression is correct, this text is the only unmistakable trace of a Pythagorean (or Neopythagorean) ritual community from the Hellenistic centuries before 100 BC.

In a footnote to these comments, Kahn suggests, as a much less probable alternative, that Alexander's original text 'might represent a purely literary phenomenon, the creation of a learned Hellenistic scholar who is more interested in older traditions and more successful in avoiding glaring anachronisms than the usual authors of pseudo-Pythagorica'.

Kahn's expression 'strange medley' is entirely apt. But, in deciding between his options – traces of a Pythagorean ritual community from the Hellenistic epoch, or the work of a learned Hellenistic scholar – I incline to the latter for the following reasons, though without giving the author Kahn's compliment of composing an account that has some chronological plausibility.

[61] These 'daimons' are presumably departed souls: see Schibli 1993: 147–9, 154–7.

First, the eclecticism is so extreme that it is difficult to credit the text to the ultimate authorship of anyone actually calling himself a Pythagorean. Whoever wrote the work in its final form was familiar with much of what became standard Pythagorean (but in origin early Academic) doxography. That is clear from the opening section on Monad and Dyad. Thereafter, apart from some possible echoes of Philolaus and Alcmaeon, the text veers away from anything distinctively Pythagorean before getting to the final material on eschatology and ritual. The central sections principally reflect a physiology that reads chiefly like a mishmash of Stoicism and medical theory, together with some apparent reminiscence of Presocratic ideas.

My second reason for preferring Kahn's second option is the literary character of this text. As we have seen, it includes unusual words for a doxography – e.g. *ichor*, *stagon*, *phrenes*, *desma* – and the style in general seems to me more literary or mannered than one expects to find in this kind of handbook writing.

Third and finally, I like Kahn's suggestion of a 'learned Hellenistic scholar' because I doubt whether there already existed a Pythagorean doxography corresponding to all the sections of Alexander's text – basic principles, cosmology, psychology and so forth. In that case, what we have here must be counted as a piece of pseudo-Pythagoreanism after all, but a piece that registers an exceptional range of reading, and some authentic information, on the part of its author.[62] Who better to be that author than Alexander Polyhistor himself?[63] Could his reporting what he 'found' (D.L. 8.24) in the *Pythagorean Commentaries* be itself an elaborate literary forgery, making his *Commentaries* into an ancient likeness of a Borges essay, such as only an immensely learned antiquarian could write?

[62] In its range, Alexander's *Pythagorean Commentaries* is probably closest to the tracts attributed to the Peripatetically influenced Occelus and also to Timaeus Locrus (see Thesleff 1965) but it differs from these texts in its radical eclecticism. Much of Occelus is devoted to establishing the eternity of the world, but Alexander's text leaves that question untouched.

[63] As originally proposed (though later retracted) by Diels 1890. Burkert 1961, supported by Riedweg 2005: 121, argues persuasively that the pseudo-Pythagorean Letter of Lysis (see n. 2 above), with its mention of Pythagoras' *hypomnemata*, was written in order to authenticate this fabricated work, which, in its turn, must be identical to the *Pythagorean Commentaries* that Alexander purports to record. Modern suggestions concerning the compositional date of the Lysis Letter (which is transmitted both by Iamblichus and anonymous sources of Greek epistolography) range from about 250 BC (Burkert 1961: 23–5) to the early Roman Empire (Städele 1980). I owe to Carl Huffman the intriguing suggestion that if, as I conjecture, Alexander composed the *hypomnemata* (as distinct from excerpting an independently existing text), he probably wrote the Lysis Letter too.

CHAPTER 8

Pythagoreanising Aristotle: Eudorus and the systematisation of Platonism

Mauro Bonazzi

Time has been both harsh and generous with Eudorus: harsh because it has allowed the disappearance of his works and has condemned him to an almost definitive oblivion; and yet generous, for the disappearance of the texts has encouraged the attribution to him of so many works and doctrines, that he might be virtually regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of post-Hellenistic philosophy, not to say all antiquity. From time to time, Eudorus has been credited as the author of such different texts as the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises and a commentary on the *Theaetetus*, of Stobaeus' *Anthologium* Book Two, and even of Plato's letters. That he has been regarded as 'the' father of Middle Platonism, a controversial category which raises as many problems as solutions, is only the natural consequence of this 'paneudorism'.[1] True, in some cases these attributions are grounded on important arguments and further help to illuminate the history of Platonism. But it is clear that to argue for Eudorus' importance on the basis of texts whose attribution is disputed runs the risk of begging the question. In fact, Eudorus' importance can be proved without crediting him with so many texts and doctrines. As I will try to show in this chapter, the available testimonies and fragments, when put in their own appropriate context, suffice to demonstrate that Eudorus is an interesting philosopher, who substantially contributed to the renewal of Platonism, from both an historical and a philosophical perspective.[2]

EUDORUS THE 'ACADEMIC'

Eudorus is a shadowy figure. Apart from his Alexandrian origin, almost all the details of his life are lost, and from the scanty evidence at our disposal it is difficult to achieve a precise and uncontroversial reconstruction of his

[1] Rist 1986: 468. For Eudorus' testimonies and fragments, I follow the edition of Mazzarelli 1985.

[2] In the present chapter 'Platonist' is taken in a loose sense as indicating some kind of allegiance to Plato; in this sense it can equally apply to systematising philosophers, such as Middle- and Neo-Platonists, as to the Hellenistic Academics; for more in general on this problematic notion, cf. Bonazzi 2012: 307–8.

thought. But we can at least be confident of his philosophical affiliation. In all, Eudorus is mentioned by six authors, and three of them, the geographer Strabo (64/60 BC to AD 23), the Neoplatonist Simplicius (sixth century AD) and an anonymous commentator on Aratus' *Phainomena* (second to third century AD),[3] call him an Academic (*Akademaikos*). The convergence of such different authors makes basically certain the link to the Academy. On chronological grounds, this probably does not imply that he was an actual member of the Academy of Athens, that is the school founded by Plato.[4] But that Eudorus was not an actual member of the Athenian Academy does not constitute a real obstacle for his Academic association. At the time Strabo was writing and later, it was common for philosophers to be identified by their allegiance to one of the rival schools that went back to the earlier period of the Greek philosophical tradition, even when these institutions did not exist any more or had been succeeded by other schools. Philosophers claiming an Academic stance are recorded until the second century AD, and this probably applies also in Eudorus' case. Eudorus' Academic association has to be taken primarily as an affiliation to a school of thought.

Yet a major problem remains – to make clear what his Academic affiliation means. For it is well known that in its long history the Academy passed through different phases, endorsing philosophical views which are hardly compatible. And this is not without consequences also for the meaning of 'Academic'.[5] Since in the last phase of its life the school was dominated by the teaching of Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Philo, a virtual identification between 'Academic' and sceptic has become common, in antiquity not less than today. In fact, this is basically correct from the second century AD onwards. In parallel and in opposition to the emergence of *Platonikos* as a technical term denoting a group of philosophers committed to a systematising and doctrinal version of Platonism, *Akademaikos* was progressively restricted to the Hellenistic Academy, and hence regarded as close to our term 'sceptic'. But earlier than the second century AD the situation is more complicated. We do find uses of the latter term that resemble the later usage, in the case of Academic philosophers committed to scepticism: for

[3] On the date of this commentator, see Mansfeld-Runia 1997: 299–300.

[4] Strabo (64/60 BC to AD 23) refers to Eudorus as living in his own time (καθ' ἡμᾶς, 17.1.5 = T13; on the meaning of this expression in Strabo, cf. Dueck 2000: 1–5). Even though this does not exclude that the latter was somehow older than the former, it does seem highly implausible that Eudorus was so much older as to be able to attend classes in Athens, before the Academy was closed in 86 BC. For what it is worth, Cicero's silence, otherwise so generous of information on the philosophical life of the Athenian Academy, also seems to provide a further confirmation.

[5] Glucker 1978: 206–25; Bonazzi 2003: 52–9.

Philo, just to mention the last 'diadoch' in the succession of heads of the school, 'Academic' necessarily involves both endorsing a sceptical stance and belonging to the school founded by Plato, for scepticism is regarded as distinctive of the school. But the long history of the school allowed also for different readings of the term, as the example of two other heirs of Plato will show, one before and one after Eudorus, Antiochus of Ascalon and Plutarch of Chaeronea.

Antiochus and Plutarch diverge on many issues, and most notably on Academic scepticism, which Plutarch claimed as a legitimate part of the Platonic tradition in opposition to Antiochus.[6] But, in spite of this disagreement, they both maintain that what characterised the Platonic tradition is a positive doctrine, and they both speak of this positive tradition as 'Academic'. The main target of Antiochus' polemics against the Hellenistic Academy was a defence of 'the dignity of the name' (*nomen dignitatis*, cf. also *Academicorum umbra*, *Luc.* 70), which consisted in the revival of the authentic Academy of Plato and his successors down to Polemo (*vetus Academia revocata*, *Luc.* 70).[7] Likewise, Plutarch, when advocating the doctrinal unity of the entire philosophical tradition stemming from Plato (including both Speusippus and Carneades, both Xenocrates and Arcesilaus), repeatedly used the word *Akademaikos*, while – remarkably – avoiding *Platonikos*.[8] Like Philo, for both Antiochus and Plutarch 'Academic' refers to the school founded by Plato and to the doctrine which one takes as distinctive of the school; but contrary to Philo, what characterises the Academic tradition is a positive doctrine, and this is what is implied when claiming an Academic allegiance. 'Academic' is not equivalent to 'sceptic', but rather labels the allegiance to Plato, and its meaning depends on what one takes Plato and Platonism to be.

If we now turn to Eudorus, what is implied by his Academic allegiance? A recurring temptation in modern scholarship, from Victor Brochard to Hans Joachim Krämer and Harold Tarrant,[9] is a sceptically oriented interpretation of Eudorus. Yet, apart from the (unwarranted) identification

[6] Cf. Cic. *Luc.* 15; Plut. *vit. Cic.* 4.1–3; *Adv. Col.* 1121f–1122a; Lamprias Catalogue, no. 63.

[7] Antiochus' Academic affiliation is further confirmed by two of his major critics, Sextus and Numenius, who, in spite of charging him with being a Stoic, both include him in a discussion of the *Akademaike philosophia* (S.E. *PH* 1.235: Ἀντίοχος τὴν Στοὰν μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν; Numen. fr. 28 DP: . . . Ἀντίοχος, ἑτέρας ἄρξας Ἀκαδημίας. Also the title of Cicero's book, *Academica*, and Plut. *Vit. Luc.* 42.3 point into the same direction.

[8] Cf. *de E* 387f, *de Sera* 549e, *de Defectu* 430f–431a, *de Facie* 922a, with Donini 2003: 248–52, Opsomer 2005: 167–75.

[9] Brochard 2002: 232–3, Krämer 1971: 89–92, Tarrant 1985: 130–32.

between Academic and sceptic, nothing seems to support this claim – not even the often-quoted passage from Plutarch's *On the Generation of the Soul in the 'Timaeus'*. At the beginning of the treatise, Plutarch reports Xenocrates' and Crantor's views of the generation of the soul in the *Timaeus* and concludes by remarking that 'Eudorus thinks that neither of the two lacks likelihood; but to me they both seem to miss utterly Plato's opinion if one must use plausibility as a standard, not in promotion of one's own doctrine but with the desire to say something that agrees with Plato (ὁ μὲν Εὔδωρος οὐδετέρους ἀμοιρεῖν οἴεται τοῦ εἰκότος· ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκοῦσι τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀμφότεροι διαμαρτάνειν δόξης, εἰ κανόνι τῷ πιθανῷ χρηστέον, οὐκ ἴδια δόγματα περαίνοντας ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ τι βουλομένους λέγειν ὁμολογούμενον; 1013b = T6)'. Contrary to what has been claimed, the occurrence of *eikos* is less indicative of a leaning towards the sceptical Academy than at first sight it may appear. For the exegetical context makes clear that Eudorus was adopting the term from Plato directly, without the need of any intermediary. The importance of *eikos* in the *Timaeus* is evident, and in Plutarch's testimony it is clearly matter of interpreting the *Timaeus*, so that it is a much more economical assumption that Eudorus was using a 'Timaic' concept for the interpretation of the *Timaeus*. But the term as employed in the dialogue itself does not necessarily imply any sceptical commitment, and in consequence there is no reason to impose any sceptical inclination on Eudorus either.

If Plutarch's evidence does not provide us with any positive evidence in defence of a sceptically oriented reading of Eudorus, other clues seem to call for a different, and opposite, reconstruction. Indeed, an overview of the testimonies at our disposal rather suggests that Eudorus was closer to Antiochus than to the Hellenistic Academy. For Antiochus, the authentic doctrine of the Academy was Plato's philosophy as developed by the Old Academy along with Aristotle, and later (with some qualifications) by the Stoics. Now, Plutarch witnesses to Eudorus claiming the support of Old Academics like Xenocrates and Crantor for his way of interpreting the *Timaeus* (T6), while other sources inform us that he was concerned with and partially influenced by both Aristotle and the Stoics. Almost half (10 out of 22) of Eudorus' extant testimonies are devoted to reading and commenting on Aristotelian texts (*Categories* and *Metaphysics*, T14–22 and 2); Stobaeus reports one ethical classification which strikingly resembles Stoic classifications (T1), and in the anonymous commentary to Aratus' *Phainomena* Eudorus is often associated with leading Stoic philosophers

such as Panaetius and Posidonius (T9–11). The parallels with Antiochus are striking.[10]

More remarkably, it is not only the resemblances with Antiochus that argue in favour of a positive reading of Eudorus' Academic affiliation. So far, the analysis of the available evidence may inspire the view that Eudorus was nothing more than a follower of Antiochus,[11] undoubtedly at that time one of the dominant figures of Platonism whether in Athens or in Alexandria. But Eudorus also reveals original features. In particular, it is the interest in ancient Pythagoreanism that deserves the most serious attention. Unlike Antiochus, who does not seem to have been concerned with this philosophy,[12] the link with Pythagoreanism is a cardinal point, which affects Eudorus' concern with other thinkers as well, not only Plato and the early Academy but also, and perhaps less predictably, Aristotle (in this chapter it will not be possible to dwell on the Stoic testimonies and their possible relationship with Pythagoreanism). Attending to that link will also enable us the better to assess his stance with regard to the Hellenistic Academy. An overall scrutiny is therefore needed, which focuses on all these authors and movements. Once the reasons for the confrontation with the early Academy, Pythagoreanism and Aristotle become clear, it will be possible to get an altogether better sense of the value of Eudorus' contribution to the history of Platonism.

EUDORUS AND THE PYTHAGOREAN 'TIMAEUS' ON THE WORLD SOUL AND THE GENERATION OF THE UNIVERSE

Along with the references to his Academic affiliation, the most explicit evidence for Eudorus' commitment to Plato comes from Plutarch, in the already mentioned treatise *On the Generation of the Soul in the 'Timaeus'*.[13] In fact, Plutarch, our source for Eudorus, introduces Eudorus as a source for Xenocrates and Crantor, so that the passage is more useful as a testimony for the two Academics than for Eudorus. And yet the passage is not devoid of interest either for the latter, insofar as it offers a proper context for his thought. First, the importance of the reference to the *Timaeus* must not be

[10] See however the concluding remarks below for a more balanced comparison between Eudorus and Antiochus; cf. also Chiaradonna, this volume, Chapter 2. In fact, as it will emerge, Eudorus shares the most remarkable affinities not so much with Antiochus as with some pseudo-Pythagorean treatises.

[11] Susemihl 1892: II, 295.

[12] Antiochus' possible interest for Pythagoreanism has usually been inferred by the interest showed by Varro, one of his most loyal pupils; but cf. now the reappraisal of Blank 2012.

[13] Plut. *de An. Procr.* 1012d–1013b, 1019e–f, 1020c (= T 6–8).

undervalued. Eudorus emerges as a reader and interpreter of the dialogue which for subsequent Platonists will be accorded an authority resembling that attached to the Bible by Christians. And second, it is important to remark that Plutarch not only mentions Eudorus as a source, but explicitly asserts his accord with Xenocrates and Crantor as on the right lines as interpreters of Plato. Clearly, Eudorus' implication that he is in substantial accord with early Academics about Plato confirms that he was committed to a doctrinally positive version of Platonism. As we have already observed, that reminds us of Antiochus. But the differences are equally important. As far as we know, Antiochus was not interested in detailed analysis of Plato's text, which however is something evidently central for Eudorus. Antiochus read and used the *Timaeus*, but we do not have any evidence that he commented on the text as Eudorus appears to be doing in the Plutarch passage.[14] Antiochus and Eudorus are agreed on the particular importance of a specific Platonic dialogue and on the correctness of the approach to it taken by the early Academy. But the close attention to the text is distinctive of Eudorus.

A third and most notable element, which again appears to distinguish Eudorus from Antiochus, is as already indicated the reference to Pythagoreanism, which occurs at the beginning of the testimony, when Xenocrates' interpretation is under discussion.[15] Following Eudorus, Plutarch reports that Xenocrates had interpreted the indivisible and the divisible being of *Tim*. 35a in terms of One/Monad and Dyad; the importance of this coupling is well attested in several testimonies on Xenocrates' thought

[14] See also Chiaradonna, this volume, pp. 30–3. Unfortunately, contrary to what is usually assumed, it is impossible to maintain that he was commenting on all the *Timaeus* and not rather only parts of it, cf. Ferrari 2002: 14–15.

[15] Plut. *de An. Procr*. 1012e (= fr. 188 IP): Xenocrates 'believes that nothing but the generation of number is signified by the mixture of the indivisible and divisible being (τῇ μίξει της ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας): the One (τὸ ἕν) being indivisible and Multiplicity (τὸ πλῆθος) divisible, number is the product of these when the One bounds multiplicity and imposes a limit upon unlimitedness, which they also term indefinite Dyad (δυάδα . . . ἀόριστον) too (Zaratas too, the teacher of Pythagoras, called this Dyad mother of number; and the One he called father, which is also why those numbers that resemble the Monad are better); but they believe that this number is not yet soul, for it lacks motivity and mobility. But after the commingling of sameness and difference, the latter of which is the principle of motion and change while the former is that of rest, then the product is soul, soul being a faculty of bringing to a stop and being at rest no less than of being in motion and setting in motion.' Since later, at 1026b (or elsewhere, *de Iside* 369d–e), Plutarch will also speak of Zoroaster, he must have been unaware that 'Zaratas' was just another form of 'Zoroaster'. This makes clear that Plutarch was recovering the information from his source, that is from Eudorus, from whom he is avowedly depending for the account on Xenocrates and Crantor, cf. Cherniss 1976: 164–5 fn. c. *En passant*, given the importance of their contribution and the deep knowledge Eudorus shows of their thought, it is more than probable that Eudorus had access to some early Academic treatises at least – a fact too often neglected.

from Aristotle onwards, and here is referred back to Pythagoreanism.[16] Pythagoreanism does not seem to play a major role in Antiochus, nor does it appear to affect the way he understands the early Academy. By contrast, a Pythagorising view of the early Academy is precisely what is implied in this Plutarch text: the reference to Pythagoreanism, far from being a mere exhibition of erudition, is more probably aiming at underlining the connection between the Academic Xenocrates and Pythagoreanism in the attempt to present Xenocrates' philosophy and his interpretation of the *Timaeus* as Pythagorean doctrine. The result is then a Pythagorean Plato, read through the lens of the Old Academy: this is what Eudorus is claiming allegiance to.

If we consider the philosophical literature of the period, it is easy to see that Eudorus was not an isolated case. For several of the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises also basically share the same view:[17] these allegedly Pythagorean texts were produced in order to promote the view that Plato was following Pythagoras' teachings. But the content of the forgeries, far from mirroring the ancient Pythagorean teachings, was heavily influenced by Plato's doctrines, as they had been interpreted and systematised in the Old Academy. Predictably, it is pseudo-Timaeus' *On the Nature of the Universe and of the Soul* that most closely resembles Plutarch's testimony,[18] but not less interesting is the parallel of pseudo-Archytas' *On Principles*. Together, they show that it is the whole Academic doctrine of the world soul, as endorsed by Eudorus in the footsteps of the early Academy, that was presented as basically Pythagorean.

The extent of the agreement becomes clear when compared to modern readings of the composition of the world soul. Modern scholars, on the basis of the most important manuscripts, interpret the passage as introducing four compounds: (1) from the indivisible *ousia* and the divisible *ousia* there arises an intermediate *ousia*; (2) from the indivisible Sameness and the

[16] On Xenocrates' Monad and Dyad, cf. Fr. 213 IP. The relevance of the pair of One/Monad and Dyad will be clear later, when we will consider Simplicius' testimony on the Pythagorean doctrine of principles according to Eudorus, see pp. 171–9.

[17] The date and the origin of the pseudo-Pythagorean literature is too complicated a problem to be dealt with here. For the sake of the present paper, suffice it to say that we can assemble a group of treatises, written in artificial Doric and all displaying a similar doctrinal content. Since these doctrines basically combine Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines as they were developed by early Imperial Platonists, they can be reasonably dated back to the period between the first century BC and the first century AD (and probably to an Alexandrian milieu), cf. Moraux 1984: 605–7, Centrone 1996: 153–9. Among them, several treatises attributed to Archytas are listed, together with the pseudo-Timaeus. Most of these texts, it has been argued and we will soon see, reveal striking similarities with Eudorus.

[18] On Eudorus and pseudo-Timaeus, cf. Baltes 1972: 22–3.

divisible Sameness there arises the intermediate Sameness; (3) from the indivisible Difference and the divisible Difference comes the intermediate Difference; (4) the blending of these three intermediary beings produces the soul.[19]

Plutarch's testimony presupposes a different text, which leads to a different account of the generation of the world soul, in three steps:[20] (1) from the blending of the indivisible being and the divisible being there arises an intermediary being; then, the commingling of (2) Sameness and (3) Difference gives to this intermediary being, which is a number according to Xenocrates, the faculty of being at rest and giving motion, and finally produces the soul. This is how Xenocrates and Crantor account for the generation of the soul, with the approval of Eudorus. And this is what we find in the corresponding part of pseudo-Timaeus, which presupposes the Academic reading and serves to support it.[21] The resemblance between the early Academy and the pseudo-Pythagorean literature becomes even more notable when we take into account pseudo-Archytas' *On principles*, which enables the comparison between pseudo-Timaeus' *ameristos morphe* and the *meriste ousia* (cf. *Tim.* 35a1–2) to the Monad and the Dyad, thereby confirming the reference to Pythagoras found in the above-mentioned quotation of Plutarch.[22] Together, pseudo-Timaeus and pseudo-Archytas endorse an interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* which corresponds to the one attributed by Eudorus to Xenocrates and Crantor.[23] The parallel is undoubtedly eloquent, and it is not by chance that in the doxographical tradition (Aëtius, Philoponus, Theodoretus, Nemesius) the doctrine of the soul as number moving itself is attributed, before Xenocrates, to Pythagoras himself.[24]

Another subject on which Eudorus appears to be in agreement with both Xenocrates and Crantor is the issue of the eternity of the soul and of the world – a question which was a matter of controversy in the early days

[19] Cf. for instance Cornford 1937: 61.

[20] A useful comparison between the text as read by Plutarch and by modern editors is in Ferrari 1999.

[21] Pseudo-Tim. *de Nat. Univ. et An.* 18, 208.13–17: τὰν δὲ τῶ κόσμω ψυχὰν μεσόθεν ἐξάψας ἐπάγαγεν, ἔξω περικαλύψας αὐτὸν ὅλον αὐτᾷ, κρᾶμα αὐτὰν κερασάμενος ἔκ τε τᾶς ἀμερίστω μορφᾶς καὶ τᾶς μεριστᾶς οὐσίας, ὡς ἓν κρᾶμα ἐκ δύο τουτέων εἶμεν. ᾧ ποτέμιξε δύο δυναμίας ἀρχὰς κινασίων; τᾶς τε ταὐτῶ καὶ τᾶς τῶ ἑτέρω.

[22] Cf. e.g. ps.-Arch. *de Princ.* 19.18. Baltes 1972: 71 argues that *morphe* and *ousia* indicate respectively Idea and matter, which, given the convergent stance of these pseudo-Pythagorica, does not contrast with the above suggested identification. One may wonder why pseudo-Timaeus does not explicitly state the same view, if he shared it. The reason probably is that, composing a paraphrase of Plato's *Timaeus*, he also adopted its reticent style, cf. also *infra*, note 55.

[23] On Crantor's agreement with Xenocrates cf. Dillon 2003: 222–3.

[24] Aët. *Plac.* 4.2.1, Theod. *Graec. aff. cur.* 5.17, Philop. *in de An.* 81.25, Nemes. *de Nat.Hom.* 44, cf. also Cic. *Tusc.* 1.20 (= Xenocr. Frs. 168–9, 184, 190, 199 IP).

of the Academy no less than in Imperial Platonism. The problem was how to account for Plato's assertion that the world 'came into being' (γέγονε, 28b) – whether it meant that it was created in time, or whether Timaeus' discourse is rather to be regarded as a metaphorical account. Eudorus followed Xenocrates and Crantor in maintaining that Plato's account depended on 'purposes of instruction' (θεωρίας ἕνεκα . . . λόγῳ), and hence was not to be taken literally: in fact, the soul 'did not come to be in time and is not subject to generation [τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ γεγονέναι μηδ᾽ εἶναι γενητήν]', and the universe is 'everlasting and ungenerated [ἀίδιον ὄντα καὶ ἀγένητον; 1013a–b]'. Regrettably, the brevity of this report prevents us from a detailed reconstruction of the arguments Eudorus might have adopted in defence of the thesis.[25] But again it emerges that this view is paralleled and endorsed by the pseudo-Timaeus, who *de facto* supports for his part the Old Academic interpretation endorsed by Eudorus: if this is predictable, it is nonetheless remarkable that he uses the same expression as occurs also in Plutarch, that is λόγῳ (verbally).[26] Likewise, the 'didactical device' also is attributed to Pythagoreanism in the doxographies,[27] and more generally, and contrary to the ancient Pythagorean view attested above all by Aristotle, in the pseudo-Pythagorean tradition there are repeated arguments for the eternity of the universe. In addition to the doxographical tradition, 'Ocellus', 'Philolaus', 'Aristiaeus' (a possible corruption of Archytas) all share this thesis.[28] Once again, the Pythagorean forgeries are endorsing the

[25] From Plutarch's statements it may be inferred that Eudorus was aware of Xenocrates' and Crantor's arguments. That the soul was presented as generated for the sake of analysing its multiple faculties clearly mirrors Xenocrates' explanation that generation has to be regarded as a didactical device, like the one exploited by geometricians, who when constructing their figures do not imply that they really had a beginning (Arist. *de Caelo*, 279b33ff. = Fr. 153 IP). Plutarch's phrase refers to the world soul, but it suits also the universe, as it is confirmed by a remarkable parallel in Taurus (T 23 Gioè). In the following sentence, where the reference is to the universe, a second argument crops up, for the use of the verbs *syntasso* and *dioikeo* probably points to Crantor's explanation that Plato's allusions to the process of generation have to be interpreted not in the sense that the universe had a beginning, but that it depends on an extrinsic cause. This second explanation, which is not incompatible with the first and more methodological explanation, relies on a metaphysical and cosmological interpretation of the *Timaeus*. With regard to Eudorus, it has a further element of interest, for it may account for his theological inclinations: if the extrinsic cause is identified with God, as was common ground for Platonists (cf. again Taurus T 23 Gioè), the view would be that the universe, even though eternal, is nonetheless dependent on God, taken as a transcendent cause (cf. also Albin. *Epit.* 14.3, p. 81: *archikoteron*). Plutarch's silence makes such a hypothesis highly speculative; but, as we shall soon see, from Simplicius' testimony there emerges a similar account of the universe.

[26] Pseudo-Tim. *de Nat. Univ. et An.*, § 7, 206.11–12: πρὶν ὦν ὠρανὸν λόγῳ γενέσθαι ἤστην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα καὶ ὁ θεὸς δαμιουργὸς τῶ βελτίονος (cf. Plat. *Tim.* 37e1, 52d4). As Baltes 1972: 48 remarks, the expression is not very common.

[27] cf. Aët. 2.4.1; cf. also 'Timaeus' *ap.* Clem. Alex. *Str.* 5.116, Harder 1926: 54, Baltes 1976: 94–6.

[28] Ocell. *de Univ. Nat.* 128.9–24; Phil. *in de Anima* 150.5–151.6 (= B21 DK); Aristox. *Harm.* 52.21–53.2.

position which is attributed to Plato and the Academy. The comparison between Plutarch and the pseudo-Pythagorean literature therefore shows that rehabilitating the early Academy as giving the correct interpretation of Platonism goes in parallel with and is supported by the renewed importance of Pythagoreanism. It looks as though Pythagoreanism is somehow being exploited to provide the historical ground for the Early Academic interpretation of Plato. And it is in connection with the combination of Pythagoreanism and the early Academy that Eudorus' contribution becomes relevant. Eudorus is not, or at least cannot be proven to be, the author of these Pythagorean forgeries. But he shares their same goal, that is to support a doctrinal Platonism by linking it to a supposedly ancient Pythagoreanism.

The importance of these parallels is not only substantial in itself; they also serve to introduce a fourth player, whose importance will soon become clear. As is well known, the controversy on the generation of the cosmos (and of the soul) was mainly prompted by Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy. More specifically, the non-literal interpretation developed in opposition to Aristotle's reading of Plato's *Timaeus*. But it also implied that Aristotle's view on the issue had been widely adopted as the correct one. Unfortunately, from Plutarch alone it is impossible to state whether Eudorus addressed Aristotle's arguments. It is important to notice, however, that a polemical attitude towards Aristotle can be detected in the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises and testimonies, which probably does not go without consequences for Eudorus. Aristotle famously claimed that he had been the first to endorse this view.[29] Moreover, in passages such as *Metaph.* N.3.1091a18, the same claim is advanced in open opposition to the Pythagoreans, or better, to Speusippus' and Xenocrates' pretence of presenting their reading of the *Timaeus* as a Pythagorean doctrine.[30]

The main thesis of the Pythagorean forgeries was on the contrary to claim that ancient Pythagoreans already argued in favour of the eternity thesis: they were the first. Needless to say, the pretence these Pythagorean texts make of being authentic and original documents inhibited any open reference to Aristotle. But since most of their arguments were based on the Aristotelian arguments,[31] it is clear that Aristotle not only was known to them but was also their main polemical target. This polemical context

[29] *De Caelo* 1.11.279b14: 'that the world was generated all are agreed'. [30] Burkert 1972: 70–1.

[31] On the pseudo-Pythagorean dependence on Aristotle apropos of the eternity thesis, cf. Moraux 1984: 635–7 (who also shows that the Aristiaeus fragment contains an implicit polemic against the literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*); on pseudo-Philolaus' dependence on Aristotle, Plato and Platonism, see further Huffman 1993: 343–4.

was clear in the Early Empire, as Philo of Alexandria shows: 'some say that the author of this doctrine was not Aristotle but certain Pythagoreans, and I have read a work of Ocellus, a Lucanian, entitled *On the Nature of the Universe*, in which he not only stated, but sought to establish by demonstrations that it was uncreated (*ageneton*) and indestructible'.[32] But what was perhaps less clear, and is surely more striking, is that from this polemical confrontation with Aristotle there also followed a remarkable consequence. For by appropriating the Aristotelian doctrine a substantial modification of ancient Pythagoreanism is produced, to the effect that Pythagoreanism is now credited with the thesis of the eternity of the world. As a matter of fact, as with the Old Academy, so also for the 'Pythagoreans' the encounter with Aristotle did not fail to produce effects.

In the case of Eudorus, regrettably, Plutarch's evidence does not allow us to conclude that he was addressing Aristotle. In fact, we cannot even say whether he was aware of the Aristotelian arguments on this specific issue. But given his relationship with the pseudo-Pythagorean literature, the evidence provided by these forgeries cannot easily be dismissed. Moreover, as we have already remarked and we will soon be seeing in detail, Eudorus was well aware of some of Aristotle's texts, at least, and of his arguments. Furthermore, we must take into account that he was, as far as we know, the first to defend the non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus* (and hence the eternity thesis) after centuries.[33] All this does not perhaps constitute a real proof, but makes the hypothesis an attractive possibility. It is in sum tempting to enlist Eudorus among the anonymous thinkers mentioned by Philo.[34]

[32] *De Aet.* 12, trans. Colson. Clearly, the Pythagorean priority could further be exploited also in defence of Plato, which is what was really at stake.

[33] Baltes 1976: 85. It is interesting to observe further that in this period Aristotle's *de Caelo* was again read and commented on, as the example of Xenarchus clearly shows.

[34] Philo was surely aware of Eudorus, cf. Bonazzi 2008. That he was alluded to in the *de Aet.* is suggested by Runia 1986: 97. More generally, it is worth noticing that this reconstruction enables us to make some further remarks with regard to Eudorus' relationship with the Hellenistic Academy. In Chapter 9 below, David Sedley argues that (1) Cicero and the Hellenistic Academy (or at least Philo's Academy) supported a literalist interpretation of the *Timaeus*, and that (2) this reading was directed against those, 'from Speusippus to Eudorus, who sought to interpret the *Timaeus* as excluding a temporal act of creation' (p. 196). Now, if the first point is surely correct, one may object to the second that Cicero's silence rather suggests that the opposite was the case. Indeed, it may be argued that it was rather Eudorus who was for the first time reacting against the reading which dominated the Hellenistic Academy. And this will have been a consequence of the new version of Platonism he was claiming allegiance to – a Platonism combining Plato with the Old Academy, Pythagoreanism and Aristotle. In any case, the comparison with Cicero confirms once again Eudorus' distance from the Sceptical Academy of Cicero and Philo.

Be that as it may, so far the following points can be taken as secured. First, Eudorus' overt dependence upon the early Academy, which plays an important role in his version of Platonism. A second remarkable trait is the connection with Pythagoreanism. And third, a possible confrontation with Aristotle. On the basis of Plutarch alone it is hard to see whether and how these three points were interrelated. But a comparison with the other testimonies not only will help us to see that they were interrelated, but will also show the importance of Aristotle to this effect. In fact it will emerge, or so I will argue, that Eudorus' relation with Aristotle is complex, and it implies the same oscillation between criticism and appropriation we have already detected both in the Old Academy and in the pseudo-Pythagorean literature. Like the Old Academy and the 'Pythagoreans', Eudorus' Platonism also will be heavily affected by this encounter.

PLATONISING PYTHAGORAS, PYTHAGOREANISING ARISTOTLE

Among the extant testimonies, a quotation in Simplicius is probably the most important and most intriguing (*in Phys*. 181.7–30 = T 3–5). While commenting on a passage of Aristotle's *Physics* which deals with the Presocratic dualistic doctrines of principles, Simplicius introduces Eudorus as a source for Pythagoreanism. The term used by Eudorus, *pythagorikos* (as opposed to Simplicius' more common *pythagoreios*), seems to confirm that he was pretending to revive the authentic Pythagoreanism of the origins.[35] And this is what Simplicius and the other Neoplatonists were ready to believe.[36]

However, in spite of this claim to antiquity and genuineness, Eudorus' account is no evidence for what the ancient Pythagoreans actually believed. The Pythagorean doctrine of principles, as presented by Eudorus, postulates two levels of principles, the highest level of the One, later called *arche* and God, and a secondary level of the Monad and the Dyad, later specified as *stoicheia*, elements, of the *systoichiai*. The introduction of the

[35] An anonymous *Life of Pythagoras*, dated to the first century BC and revealing several remarkable affinities with Eudorus, distinguishes between *pythagorikoi* and *pythagoreioi*, the first designating the very first generation of Pythagoras' pupils, the latter the pupils of the pupils, in other words the following generations (anon. *Vit. Pythag. ap*. Phot. *Bibl*., cod. 249.438b23–6; a third class, which does not deserve to be discussed in this paper, was composed by people called *pythagoristai*, who imitated the Pythagorean way of life, though living outside the Pythagorean communities). If the link is justified, the parallel confirms that Eudorus' choice was deliberate, and that he was claiming to promote a return to the authentic Pythagoreanism of the origins. On the date and affinities with Eudorus, see Theiler 1965: 209–10; Burkert 1972: 53 n. 2.

[36] Cf. e.g. Syrian. *in Metaph*. 165.33–166.8, 183.1–3 on Archaenetus (= Archytas?), Philolaus and Brotinus.

pair Monad–Dyad, the characterisation of the second principle as 'Indefinite Dyad', the systematic development of the series of paired principles (*systoichiai*), all clearly show Eudorus' account to be an eloquent example of 'Academic' Pythagoreanism, that is, Pythagoreanism as it had been reshaped and adapted by Old Academics such as Speusippus and Xenocrates, in order to integrate it into their philosophical system. In sum, Eudorus claims as the original Pythagoreanism a doctrine which is deeply indebted to the early Academy. Given his already mentioned interest in Xenocrates and Crantor at least, it is striking but not surprising to be able to detect such a massive Academic influence in his Pythagorean report.

And yet there still is good reason for surprise. For, however important, Academic influence does not suffice to explain the most important and distinctive details of the doctrine. More precisely, the dualism which is distinctive of Pythagoreanism in both its ancient and Academic versions appears only partly compatible with the basic structure of Eudorus' system. As far as our sources allow us to see, neither variant of Pythagoreanism nor the early Academics understood matters in precisely the way Eudorus here alleges. They all, it seems, spoke in terms of a duality, a binary opposition between two supreme, antithetical principles.[37] Eudorus, on the other hand, subsumes this duality under a higher unity, with a single principle, called 'One' (*Hen*) and 'God above' (*hyperano theos*), above the pair of the Monad and the Dyad. To be sure, the famous testimony of Alexander Polyhistor shows that Eudorus was not the only supporter of a monistic Pythagoreanism. But neither Alexander nor the other Pythagorean testimonies anterior to Eudorus help to properly account for the peculiarities of the Eudoran two-levels account.[38]

Elsewhere, I have argued that a possible solution points us towards Plato, more precisely to the *Timaeus*.[39] Indeed, as John Dillon has suggested, the triangular schema, with a supreme unifying element standing over a subordinated antithetical pair, significantly recalls the *Philebus*, where the Pythagorean Limit and Limitedness are presided over by a cause identified with Mind and Zeus.[40] Michael Trapp has further suggested that Eudorus' account 'can be seen as the result of reflection on the problem of bringing together diverging tendencies in Plato's work: the sense of a single supreme principle that informs the heart of the *Republic* with the dyadic system of

[37] This is the case also of Hermodorus Fr. 8 IP, who remained a dualist even though he denied matter the title of *arche*, cf. Dillon 2003: 203.

[38] Cf. Mansfeld 1992: 98–100; on Alexander Polyhistor see further Long, in Chapter 7.

[39] Bonazzi 2005: 121–7 and 2007.

[40] Dillon 1977: 127.

the unwritten doctrine'.[41] These references certainly provide useful parallels. Yet, by themselves, they fail to explain what appears philosophically most important in the passage, that is the distinction between *arche* and *stoicheion*: according to Eudorus, only the 'God above' or the first 'One' can properly be considered as principle, *arche*, while Monad and Dyad are called *archai* only in a secondary way. In fact, Monad and Dyad are rather *stoicheia*, elements, or more precisely, ultimate elements (*anotato stoicheia*), given their prominent role in the *systoichiai*.

Strange as it may appear, among Plato's dialogues it is the *Timaeus* which helps to grasp the meaning of the distinction between *arche* and *stoicheia*. Admittedly, neither in the *Timaeus* we do find a clear account of the distinction between *arche* and *stoicheion*. But it is a well-known fact that Timaeus' elusive statement on the value of his discourse (an *eikos muthos*) could and did encourage Platonists to recover what they took to be the real meaning of Plato's doctrine. Eudorus' account of *arche* and *stoicheia* can be properly regarded as one of these 'creative' interpretations, as the analysis of the expression *anotato stoicheia* can show. More precisely, Eudorus' 'Pythagorean' doctrine appears to emerge from a cross-reading of *Tim.* 48b5–c2 and 53c4–d7. In the first passage, the traditional first elements are at once denied the status not merely of principles, but also of first *stoicheia*,[42] whereas in the second the reduction of the four elements is taken explicitly as far as the geometrical figures, but implicitly even further: 'this we assume as the principle of fire and of the other bodies . . . the principles yet further above (*anothen*) these are known to God and to such men as God favours'.[43] Contrary to modern readings, for ancient Platonists it was only too natural to proceed with the 'reduction' process until one reaches

[41] Trapp 2007: 352.

[42] Plat. *Tim.* 48b5–c2: τὴν δὴ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς φύσιν θεατέον αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτου πάθη· νῦν γὰρ οὐδείς πω γένεσιν αὐτῶν μεμήνυκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς εἰδόσιν πῦρ ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀρχὰς αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός, προσῆκον αὐτοῖς οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὡς ἐν συλλαβῆς εἴδεσιν μόνον εἰκότως ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ βραχὺ φρονοῦντος ἀπεικασθῆναι. νῦν δὲ οὖν τό γε παρ᾽ ἡμῶν ὧδε ἐχέτω· τὴν μὲν περὶ ἁπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχὰς εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ τούτων πέρι τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον, δι᾽ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, διὰ δὲ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι κατὰ τὸν παρόντα τρόπον τῆς διεξόδου δηλῶσαι τὰ δοκοῦντα, μήτ᾽ οὖν ὑμεῖς οἴεσθε δεῖν ἐμὲ λέγειν.

[43] Plat. *Tim.* 54c4–d7: Πρῶτον μὲν δὴ πῦρ καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀὴρ ὅτι σώματά ἐστι, δῆλόν που καὶ παντί· τὸ δὲ τοῦ σώματος εἶδος πᾶν καὶ βάθος ἔχει. τὸ δὲ βάθος αὖ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τὴν ἐπίπεδον περιειληφέναι φύσιν· ἡ δὲ ὀρθὴ τῆς ἐπιπέδου βάσεως ἐκ τριγώνων συνέστηκεν. τὰ δὲ τρίγωνα πάντα ἐκ δυοῖν ἄρχεται τριγώνοιν, μίαν μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχοντος ἑκατέρου γωνίαν, τὰς δὲ ὀξείας· ὧν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἑκατέρωθεν ἔχει μέρος γωνίας ὀρθῆς πλευραῖς ἴσαις διῃρημένης, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον ἀνίσοις ἄνισα μέρη νενεμημένης. ταύτην δὴ πυρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σωμάτων ὑποτιθέμεθα κατὰ τὸν μετ᾽ ἀνάγκης εἰκότα λόγον πορευόμενοι· τὰς δ᾽ ἔτι τούτων ἀρχὰς ἄνωθεν θεὸς οἶδεν καὶ ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἂν ἐκείνῳ φίλος ᾖ.

the *ultimate* elements/principles, the constituents of which bodies are built up. And these ultimate elements were traditionally taken to consist in the Monad and the Dyad. Such was a popular account at Eudorus' time, as the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha[44] or Plutarch of Chaeronea, a philosopher supposed to have been influenced by Eudorus, readily show.[45] If one further adds that Plutarch's testimony in the *On the Generation of the Soul in the 'Timaeus'* reports that Eudorus was ready to find in the *Timaeus* a link to the Monad and the Dyad, it is more than reasonable to conclude that he too was prepared (and perhaps was the first) to extract from the *Timaeus* the pair of One/Monad and Dyad as the first *anothen* constituents (termed both *archai* and *stoicheia*), from which bodies derive and of which they are built up.[46]

But this is only half of the story. What is even more important is that the treatment of Monad and Dyad as (ultimate) elements paves the way to the identification of the real *arche*. For a theologically-minded reader, the reference to God's knowledge at 53d6–7 would hardly have been disregarded. On the contrary, this reference to God could easily be taken as referring to Plato's divine Demiurge (30a, c, d, 34a), and in consequence interpreted as introducing another causal level, an external one. And if Monad and Dyad, taken individually, are partial causes, Plato's demiurgic God is the common cause of generation: things being in a chaotic condition, 'God began by giving them a distinct configuration by means of shape and numbers' (53b). In spite of the terminological lack of precision (but Timaeus' account is said by Plato to be only probable), we can distinguish between two different levels, one transcendent and the other immanent, in other words, between the real principle and the more ultimate of the elements, between God, who is external, and the pair of Monad–Dyad, which is internal. It is true that the Demiurge is not explicitly called a principle, but it is nevertheless clear that insofar as he is the artificer, he is a principle.

If this interpretation is correct, therefore, it is in the light of the *Timaeus* that Eudorus' account becomes meaningful. And this suggests a comparison with Plutarch's testimony. For, even though the evidence is scanty, the two testimonies fit together and reveal a similar strategy. In Plutarch,

[44] See the already mentioned anonymous *Life of Pythagoras* preserved by Photius (*Bibl.* 439a19–24), and Alexander Polyhistor's *Pythagorean Memoirs* (*ap.* Diogenes Laërtius 8.24–5).

[45] The most remarkable parallels are the third of the *Platonic Questions* (1002a), where Plutarch develops the system of derivation in both ways, and even more the *The Obsolescence of Oracles* (428e–f), where the One and the Dyad are characterised both as more ultimate principles (*anothen archai*) and as *stoicheia*.

[46] Burkert 1972: 24.

Eudorus' reading of the *Timaeus* is dependent on its Pythagorean context; here it emerged that the supposedly historical account of the Pythagorean doctrine depends on an original and creative interpretation of the dialogue, and clearly anticipates doctrines which will be prominent in Imperial Platonism. In particular, it is worth noticing that we have here a first testimony to the superiority of God as a higher principle. Certainly, to present God as the real principle is not particularly original. But to argue for his uniqueness and separateness – for transcendence – is something distinctive of Imperial Platonism, as opposed for instance to Stoicism. Eudorus' Pythagorean account anticipates and supports a theological reading of Plato, with the demiurge/God at the higher position, such as will be prominent in Imperial Platonism. Moreover, from the importance of the God there also follows a first version of the 'doctrine of the three principles' which is another distinctive tenet of Middle Platonism (God, Monad and Dyad corresponding to God, Forms or Numbers, and matter).[47] When inserted into its proper historical and philosophical context, and accordingly when compared with the Pythagoreanising trend of Platonism, it is difficult to deny the originality and importance of Eudorus' metaphysical position. But his case appears even more intriguing if we further consider that the *Timaeus* alone does not solve all the difficulties.

In fact, on a deeper reconsideration, it quickly appears that the *Timaeus* alone does not suffice to explain Eudorus' 'Pythagorean' account of first principles. For, even though it is possible to read into the dialogue an analysis of the notions of principle and elements with the consequent introduction of an external and divine cause, it can hardly be argued that the *Timaeus* alone promoted it. The *Timaeus* is not so much the starting point as the fundamental authoritative text for confirming a doctrine which borrowed from other material as well.[48] The problem is now to find out the source of inspiration.

But if not Plato, where is it possible to search for such a distinction between *arche* and *stoicheia*? This distinction is attested for different authors and in different periods: it was notoriously important in Stoicism, and was

[47] More precisely, it does seem that Eudorus supports a mathematicised version of the three-principles doctrine, with mathematical entities as mediating principles. This again recalls the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises (cf. e.g. Archytas mentioning *arithmon dynamias*, the power of numbers for ordering the universe). The relevance of mathematics is clear: mathematics, or better the mathematicalisation of principles, enables the transition from a theological and metaphysical perspective to a cosmological one, thus resolving the problem of mediating between two degrees of different realities, cf. Bonazzi 2008: 241–5.

[48] Baltes 1975: 258.

adopted by Antiochus; later, also pseudo-Galen's *Historia philosophos* will refer to it.[49] But although the same words and notions recur, Eudorus used them differently. In particular, neither the Stoics nor Antiochus appear to reserve any place for one single *arche* as a transcendent cause above the elements. The most we could allow is that Eudorus exploited terms and concepts which were used by Stoics, but adapted them into a different philosophical context. But the Stoics are not Eudorus' major influence. In fact, it is rather to Aristotle that we have to look as a possible source. For Aristotle not only provides a clear analysis of the notions of principle and element (and of their differences), but also exploits the distinction in favour of a divine and transcendent cause. An important text is surely *Metaphysics* Λ.4–5, but other texts can be added, from *On Generation and Corruption* 2.9[50] to the *peri philosophias*.[51] In *Metaph.* Λ.2 Aristotle argues that a theory of principles reduced to a theory of first elements can hardly explain the causes of reality; for at the most one can say that elements are the immanent constituent of things (i.e. they can be regarded as a sort of immanent cause), but still an account of their interaction would be lacking, to the effect that it cannot be properly regarded as a proper causal theory of the generation of beings. If this is the problem, Aristotle also provides his own solution: 'since not only what is present in something is cause, but also something external, i.e., the moving cause, clearly principle and element are different [ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐνυπάρχοντα αἴτια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς οἷον τὸ κινοῦν, δῆλον ὅτι ἕτερον ἀρχὴ καὶ στοῖχειον; 1070b22–4]'. Here 'element' is equivalent to the notion of immanent cause, as opposed to an external one, the real principle.[52] Since the actuality of things (both in the sense of their coming to be and of their essential unity) is produced not so much by their internal constituents as by the action of one external moving cause (which conveys form), this cause is definitely not an element, but the proper *arche*. This external cause, which will be later specified as God, is first and common to all things, insofar as it is the ultimate cause of all movement (1072b35), because the existence of everything in the world depends on its action.

[49] See D.L. 7.134 (= Posid. F5 E.-K.), ps-Galen. *Hist. Phil.* 21. A similar distinction is also adumbrated in Alex. Polyhistor *ap.* D.L. 8.24.

[50] Pépin 1964: 65–7.

[51] Remarkably, the *peri philosophias* was quoted by Cicero and later by Plutarch and Philo of Alexandria, which confirms its popularity in Eudorus' age. It probably included both a scrutiny of the Academic doctrine of principles and a defence of the divine cause; if that is the case, the resemblances are noteworthy; a further point in common is the thesis of the eternity of the world, which was shared by Eudorus as well, as we have already seen.

[52] Crubellier 2000: 144.

Before going on, it is worth noticing that Aristotle's theory of principles has also a polemical target, Plato and the Old Academy. In *Metaph.* Λ.4–5 the reference is not explicit, but many parallels confirm Aristotle's criticisms on this issue. For instance, along with *Metaph.* M and N, we may adduce *Metaph.* A.6, where Plato's principles (One/Monad and Dyad) are regarded as the elemental constituent of things and hence treated as equivalent to form and matter, with the consequent criticism that they do not properly account for the most important cause, the divine and efficient principle. Of such a polemical attitude we must be aware for a correct interpretation of Simplicius' testimony, as it will soon emerge.

If we come back to Eudorus, it does seems to me that it is this doctrine which better explains the peculiarities of his Pythagorean account. Do we have any reason to confirm this interpretation? Of course, since it is matter of an ancient Pythagorean doctrine, no mention of Aristotle occurs in the text. Nevertheless, the evidence at our disposal, both concerning Eudorus directly and his philosophical milieu, makes plausible the view that his 'Pythagorean' presentation was heavily affected by Aristotle's theology. As to Eudorus himself, we know from Alexander of Aphrodisias that he was an attentive reader of *Metaphysics* A.[53] Regrettably, the text of Alexander's testimony is desperately corrupted and does not allow for any clear reading. But in any case, regardless of whether Eudorus was an attentive philologist or not, it is a fact that he was carefully reading *Metaphysics* A.6, i.e. another Aristotelian text dealing with Plato's and the Academy's doctrine of principles and causes (and it is a fair assumption that he was aware also of the preceding chapter, concerning the Pythagoreans). In spite of the brevity of the relevant testimony, his interest in *Metaph.* A, along with his careful reading of the *Categories* (see later), constitutes a possible confirmation of an Aristotelian influence on Eudorus on this issue.

Moreover, it is worth noticing that Eudorus was not alone. The same distinction is also attested in the Syriac version of Nicolaus of Damascus' *On the Philosophy of Aristotle*: 'if somebody wishes to make a division of principles, he will divide into †[. . .]† immanent and external'.[54] But above all else, it is once again the comparison with the pseudo-Pythagorean texts that can be adduced in favour of the hypothesis. Eudorus speaks in the first person, the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises pretend to be the original documents, but both basically endorse the same doctrine. And in the pseudo-Pythagorean texts we find what in the scanty Eudoran fragments we

[53] Alex. Aphr. *in Metaph.* 58.25–59.8 (= T2), cf. Bonazzi 2005: 145–9.
[54] *On the Philosophy of Aristotle*, Fr. 7 Drossaart Lulofs.

found only implicitly, that is the explicit union of Aristotelian and Platonic doctrine as the concrete basis for Pythagoreanism. Among others it is pseudo-Archytas' *On Principles* which provides the most striking parallels.[55] Indeed Archytas endorses exactly the same metaphysical two-level doctrine we already found in Eudorus' Pythagorean account. And whereas the pair of lower principles/elements is explicitly equated with form and matter (19.18–20, 26), the first principle which could bring them together (19.23–4), first in power and superior to the others, is named not only God (19.24–5), but also demiurge and mover (19.27). True, pseudo-Archytas does not have recourse in this short passage to the terms *arche* and *stoicheion* (again, it is only a small fragment!). But he clearly argues for the same system of Eudorus, and the dependence not only on Plato but also on Aristotle is undeniable.

An intriguing situation hence emerges. Both Eudorus and pseudo-Archytas appropriate Aristotle and exploit him for their purposes. The result is an instrumental use: it is not a matter of interpreting Aristotle, but rather of adapting him to a different system. Thus, in the case of pseudo-Archytas, many notions and terms are clearly of Aristotelian derivation, yet the system does not fit into an Aristotelian ontology: form and matter are posited as metaphysical principles, and the mover does not act on the heavens but on the two metaphysical principles. All these concepts fit rather into the Platonist theory of principles.[56] And like pseudo-Archytas is Eudorus, whose distinction between external and immanent principles is the base for developing a metaphysical and theological version of Pythagoreanism and of the *Timaeus*. Clearly, Aristotle's philosophy becomes a tool for discussing philosophical issues, but with reference not to Aristotle's but to Plato's philosophy.

But it is not only a matter of using Aristotelian doctrines in a non-Aristotelian context. The relation with Aristotle is much more complex. For, as we have seen, Aristotle developed his theories on metaphysical first

[55] Pseudo-Archytas' *On Principles*, 19.5–7. On this treatise and Eudorus, cf. Centrone 1992, Bonazzi 2005: 152–7. The similarities between 'Archytas' and Eudorus become even more striking if Huffman's suggestion is accepted that part of the treatise is also the brief testimony of Syrianus *in Metaph*. 151.19–20; on Archytas distinguishing between *hen* and *monas* (remarkably, the context of Syrianus' discussion is Aristotle's critical account of the Academic doctrine of principles): cf. Huffman 2005: 597. Another text which may have provided important clues is pseudo-Timaeus. But the parallels are less exciting than expected. That treatise does indeed introduce God as the principle of the best, thus anticipating a theological interpretation which is hardly compatible with Plato's dialogue; later it derives the *stoicheia* of body from the interaction of form and matter, making use of Aristotelian terms, which, as we have already remarked, ultimately refers to principles/elements corresponding to the Monad and the Dyad. But these are only hints, for, like the Platonic character, the 'Pythagorean' Timaeus also is reticent on the ultimate principles of reality. In fact, the main goal of this treatise is a paraphrase of the *Timaeus* alone, cf. *supra* note 22.

[56] Moraux 1984: 633–4.

principles in opposition to Plato, the Academy, and also against Pythagoreanism. This is clear, and more or less explicitly stated, in all the abovementioned passages, from *Metaphysics* Λ to *GC* 2.9, where the polemic is directed against Plato's *Phaedo*, and even more in *Metaphysics* A.(5–)6, which Eudorus read and commented on. Basically, Aristotle directs against Plato and the Academics, but also the Pythagoreans, the reproach that they were not capable of understanding that an efficient (and divine) cause was needed along with the formal and material causes; they made a confusion between *stoicheia* and *archai*.[57] And it is against this polemical context that it becomes clear why it was so important to argue for the historical priority of the Pythagorean doctrine. The claim that the distinction between *arche* and *stoicheion* had already been developed by ancient Pythagoreans serves to defend not only the Pythagorean tradition but also Plato (who is part of that tradition) from Aristotle's attacks. For if that is the doctrine of ancient Pythagoreanism, Aristotle's criticism can be dismissed as groundless. But the consequences of such a strategy are more than remarkable, for the rejection of Aristotle's criticism at the same time goes along with the adoption or at any rate exploitation of some of his doctrines, and this produces a substantial modification of Platonism (and of Pythagoreanism). Paradoxical as it may appear, the theological reshaping of Platonism, which is the most distinctive aspect of Early Imperial Platonism, results from the confrontation with Aristotle not less than from an exegesis of Plato's dialogues.[58] The three elements that we detected separately in Plutarch (the early Academy, Pythagoreanism and Aristotle) are here strictly interconnected: an Aristotelian doctrine is exploited for a Platonist theory on the basis of a Pythagorean precedent. And the consequences are difficult to underestimate.

EUDORUS AND ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES

The analysis of Simplicius' report revealed the importance not only of Pythagoreanism but also of Aristotle for the 'Academic' Eudorus. Given the way that Platonism and Pythagoreanism were traditionally regarded

[57] Remarkably, this is the problem at stake also in the passage of Alexander of Aphrodisias where Eudorus is mentioned. After explaining the meaning of Aristotle's text Alexander raises some doubts about the reliability of his criticism: 'one might (*tines*) ask how is it that, although Plato speaks of the efficient cause in the passage where he says, "It is then our task to discover and to make known the maker and father of the universe" (*Tim.* 23c)' (*in Metaph.* 59.28–31). However, due to lack of evidence, it is impossible to prove that this passage also refers to Eudorus, and the alternative view is equally probable that the reference to the *tines* was more a didactical device than the reference to particular concrete thinkers such as Eudorus.

[58] Cf. Pépin 1964: 24–5.

as closely connected, the interest for Pythagorean philosophy is clearly important, but not unexpected. As a matter of fact, the presence of Aristotle should also not surprise, if one considers that Eudorus read and commented on parts of the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics* at least. And yet a difficulty remains, which needs to be resolved in order for us to get a coherent view of Eudorus' thought. For it is usually assumed that Eudorus was very critical of the Aristotelian categories, and this seems to contrast with the more positive attitude I have so far reconstructed apropos of the doctrine of principles. Eudorus' engagement with the Aristotelian doctrine of principles combines a rejection of Aristotle's anti-Platonic criticisms but also an appropriation of some of his ideas. In the case of the categories, on the contrary, the standard view is that there is a complete refusal to have anything to do with Aristotle's scheme. But is it true that Eudorus was such a bitter adversary of the categories, aiming at a complete rejection of the Aristotelian theory? This standard view has been endorsed by many authoritative scholars, but runs the risk of overinterpreting the evidence. In fact, from a close scrutiny of these fragments a coherent view of Eudorus emerges which does not conflict with the other testimonies.[59]

In order to evaluate Eudorus' stance towards the categories, two testimonies have to be taken into account, both coming from Simplicius: one dealing with the bicategorial scheme *kath' hauto*/*pros ti*, the other with the order of the categories and the scope of their application. With regard to the first, for the moment I will just limit myself to repeating that the simple comparison of the two testimonies suffices to invalidate an assumption which is often attributed to Eudorus apropos of the two categorial schemes. Since Simplicius reports Eudorus as 'criticising' (*aitiatai*) Aristotle for discussing the relative but not the per se,[60] it has been claimed that Eudorus argued for reducing the ten Aristotelian categories to these ultimate two – in other words, he would have advocated the adoption of the Academic bicategorial scheme against the Aristotelian one. But the second testimony clearly shows that this is not the case: since Eudorus discusses the correct order of the Aristotelian categories, it is clear that he accepted also the Aristotelian scheme. More probably he was concerned in combining the two schemes, like many other philosophers of the first Imperial age, Platonists like the anonymous

[59] In what follows I am heavily dependent on Chiaradonna 2009; see further Chapter 2, pp. 41–50 for valuable remarks on affinities and divergences with Antiochus, and Tarrant 2008: 593–4 for a comparison with Plutarch.

[60] Simpl. *in Cat.* 174.14–16 (= T 15): 'Eudorus is critical, asking why, although the relative is contrasted with the *per se*, Aristotle discusses the relative, but makes no further mention of the *per se*'.

commentator on the *Theaetetus* and Lucius, or Peripatetics like Andronicus of Rhodes.[61]

The second testimony deals with the order of the categories: Simplicius first reports that Eudorus opts for the sequence: substance, quality, quantity (as opposed to the sequence: substance, quantity, quality); and then adds the categories of time and space: 'Eudorus declares that the account of Quality is to be subjoined to that of Substance, and after that should come the discussion of Quantity. For Substance exists in conjunction with Quality and Quantity, and after these should be taken the categories of Time and Space. For every substance, namely the sensible substance, is somewhere and at some time.'[62]

This passage has been often regarded as the first evidence of the Platonist reaction against the Aristotelian categories. The hint at the 'sensible substance' (which is probably a gloss by Simplicius) would seem to suggest that Eudorus interpreted the Aristotelian substance as referring to the material substance only, thus indicating that the categories were concerned exclusively with the sensible world. And this would make of Eudorus the first supporter of the criticism that the Aristotelian categories are seriously defective, since they fail to apply to the intelligible world, which is the world of real beings – an argument later developed by Lucius, Nicostratus and most notably by Plotinus.[63]

But this interpretation attributes to Eudorus more than the passage allows.[64] In the context of the discussion of quality (and not of substance), Simplicius' paraphrase refers to the categories, and to the category of substance, as applying to the sensible world. But nothing, in this passage or elsewhere, supports the assumption that since it deals with the sensible world, the Aristotelian category of substance only applies to the sensible world, and hence neglects the intelligible world. This is the core of Plotinus' argument against the *Categories*.[65] In order to be valid, the argument requires that the Aristotelian category of substance be reduced to sensible substance only: intelligible substance and sensible substance are so different that they cannot be included in the same category; Aristotle's category of substance clearly refers to sensible substance; therefore Aristotle neglected the intelligible and most important substance. In fact, nothing

[61] Anon. *in Tht.* 68.1–15; Lucius *ap.* Simpl. *in Cat.* 156.14–23; Andronicus *ap.* Simpl. *in Cat.* 63.22–4; cf. Sedley 1997: 117, Rashed 2004: 64–8, Chiaradonna 2009: 105.

[62] Simpl. *in Cat.* 206.10–15 (= T 17).

[63] Simpl. *in Cat.* 73.15–28. Cf. now Karamanolis 2006: 83.

[64] Chiaradonna 2009: 100–1.

[65] Cf. Chiaradonna 2005: 238–59, who also points out the differences between Plotinus' dialectical arguments and Lucius' and Nicostratus' criticisms.

justifies the inference that this was also Eudorus' view, and the comparison with the above-mentioned testimonies shows that another reading is possible.

For the time being. we have seen that Eudorus referred the category of substance to the sensible world. The previously mentioned testimony on the per se/relative distinction enables us to take a step further, and to argue for what was anyhow obvious in the case of a Platonist such as Eudorus – that he took into account also intelligible substance. In Plato and the Academy the category of the per se was also referred to intelligible substance;[66] if Eudorus adopted the Academic bicategorial scheme, it follows as a more than reasonable consequence that he spoke also of intelligible substance. So far so good. But what was then the relation between intelligible and sensible substance? We have considered the 'Plotinian' solution, which sharply distinguishes between the Platonic intelligible substance and the Aristotelian sensible substance as mutually incompatible. But another solution was available. For it was also possible to superimpose the Academic and the Aristotelian categorial schemes, as two versions of the same scheme. Now, if this is the case, it may be argued that the Academic category of the per se somehow corresponds with the Aristotelian category of substance, with the further consequence that the intelligible and the sensible substance are kept together.

Admittedly, this interpretation of Eudorus is tentative, and the possibility of placing intelligible substance in the Aristotelian category of substance is debatable. But there is evidence that this possibility had also been envisaged. Strange as it may appear, the evidence of Andronicus and of the anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus* confirms (controversially the first, uncontroversially the latter) that at the beginning of the Imperial Age the virtual equivalence between the Academic and Aristotelian schemes had been argued for.[67] Likewise, we have evidence also that arguments were made for the inclusion of the intelligible substance in the Aristotelian category of substance. In particular, this was the view attributed to the Platonised Aristotle of Hippolytus' *Refutatio*[68] and, above all, this is the view of the pseudo-Pythagorean treatise, Archytas' *On the Structure of the Discourse*, which purports to be the original from which Aristotle borrowed

[66] Plat. *Soph*. 255c–d, *Phlb*. 53d, Xenocr. F 95 IP.

[67] Cf. *supra*, note 61. As Mansfeld (1992: 61) correctly pointed out, 'Andronicus may have wanted to reduce the gap between the Aristotelian and Early Academic accounts of the categories; in its turn, this facilitated the reception of the ten categories in Middle Platonist thought' (cf. also Donini 1982: 89, Sharples 2008: 282 n. 46): the anonymous commentator is a good example of this tendency.

[68] *Ref*. 1.20 and 6.24.1–2 with Mansfeld 1992: 64–6.

his *Categories*. Pseudo-Archytas explicitly associates *kath' hauto* and substance (πᾶσα γὰρ οὐσία καθ' αὑτὰν ἐντι, 26.22–3),[69] and maintains that *ousia* indicated both intelligible and sensible substance.[70] Of all the authors mentioned so far in this section, pseudo-Archytas is surely the closest to Eudorus: as the exhaustive comments of Thomas Alexander Szlezák have proved beyond doubt, where a comparison is possible Eudorus and Archytas share the same views.[71] Given this resemblance, it is therefore tempting to assume that this is also Eudorus' view.

Be that as it may, whether Eudorus followed Archytas or not on intelligible substance, or whether he superimposed the Academic and the Aristotelian categories, it remains that he did not aim at completely rejecting the Aristotelian categories. It is a more probable hypothesis that he exploited them for his own purposes – which are difficult for us to uncover. And in that case, the resemblance with Archytas is interesting and deserves to be taken into account. For it provides a justification for the appropriation of the Aristotelian categories. Earlier, when investigating Eudorus' Pythagorean doctrine of principles, we detected a possible and important Aristotelian influence; now, when investigating Eudorus' testimonies on the Aristotelian categories, we have found a Pythagorean parallel coming to light. In both cases, the conclusion is the same, that Eudorus' Platonism is deeply dependent on this Aristotelisation of Pythagoreanism or Pythagorisation of Aristotle.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

If this interpretation is correct, we can finally evaluate the importance of Eudorus' contribution to the Platonism of his time. At the beginning of the chapter I observed that Eudorus shares resemblances with Antiochus. Yet our scrutiny of the testimonies has also revealed that the divergences are equally, and probably more, important. Antiochus and Eudorus emerge

[69] Cf. also Simpl. *in Cat.* 199.17–20; more controversial is Elias, *in Cat.* 201.23–5.

[70] Arch. *Cat.* 30.24–31.5: αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὃς τὰν πράταν ἐπιδέχεται σημασίαν, λέγω δὲ τὸ τί ἐστιν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, οὔτε δὲ ποιός τι ἐστιν οὔτε πηλίκος οὔτε πρός ἕτερον τί πως ἔχων, οὐδέ γε ποιῶν τι ἢ πάσχων; οὐδὲ ἔχων τι οὐδὲ ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ποτὲ ὑπάρχων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα φυσικῆς οὐσίας καὶ σωματικῆς συμβεβηκότα ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐ νοητῆς καὶ ἀκινήτου καὶ προσέτι ἀμεροῦς. More precisely, Archytas maintains that the category of substance encompasses both intelligible and sensible substance, the difference being that the latter is always associated also with the other categories, whereas in the intelligible world there is only the first, cf. Chiaradonna 2009: 101–3.

[71] Szlezák 1972: 15–19. For instance, pseudo-Archytas agrees with Eudorus that quality, and not quantity, comes directly after substance, 22.14, 23.21. Cf. also Simpl. *in Cat.* 206.8 with Mansfeld 1992: 68 n. 28.

as the first promoters of a doctrinal interpretation of Plato and Platonism after the sceptical phase of Hellenistic philosophy. But the common interest in Plato, the Academy and Aristotle relies on different assumptions and leads to different conclusions. And it is from such differences that the importance of Eudorus can be better appreciated. Eudorus and Antiochus basically differ from a methodological, an historical, and a philosophical viewpoint. From the methodological point of view, Eudorus emerges as one of the first Platonists to regard philosophy as an exegetical practice. Like Antiochus, Eudorus also does philosophy by doing history of philosophy, by reconstructing an ancient doctrine which is credited as the only authoritative truth. But of Antiochus we are not told that he was concerned with the detailed analysis of the ancient authoritative texts, as is the case for Eudorus.[72] For Eudorus, exegesis does not depend on erudite or evaluatively neutral interests, but is a way of practising philosophy. Given the importance of this method in the Imperial Age, the value of Eudorus' contribution must not be undervalued.

From the historical perspective, Eudorus' greatest innovation is the introduction of Pythagoreanism as an essential part of the Platonist tradition. Like Antiochus, Eudorus too is principally concerned with Plato, the early Academy and Aristotle. But the adoption of a Pythagorean perspective radically modifies the reception of those philosophers, and prompts new problems and questions. As far as we can see from the available evidence, Antiochus was still deeply immersed in the Hellenistic context, and his aim was to account for Platonism as the best system of thought to tackle the problems of the Hellenistic philosophical agenda. Eudorus' Pythagorean interests, on the other side, take up themes and issues, such as the doctrine of principles, the transcendence of God, the categories, which hardly fit the Hellenistic debates, and which trigger a new form of Platonism. In this sense, he can be regarded as a post-Hellenistic thinker.[73]

Eudorus' interest in Pythagoreanism also enables us to make a better assessment of his position with regard to scepticism and the Hellenistic Academy. As I have already remarked, the evidence at our disposal does not allow space for any sceptical reading of Eudorus. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that he may have adopted some sceptical arguments. But it is clear that in that case he would have exploited the sceptical arguments in a non-sceptical way. For, as I hope to have demonstrated, the adoption of a Pythagorean perspective commits one to a form of

[72] On Antiochus, see further Chiaradonna, this volume, pp. 28–37.
[73] See Chiaradonna, this volume, on this historiographical category.

Platonism which is totally divergent from the Platonism of the Hellenistic Academy. It is worth noticing that the genealogies of the Hellenistic Academy never list Pythagoras or his pupils among the ancestors of Plato (*Varro*, *Lucullus*, *adversus Colotem*). As a matter of fact, the incompatibility was clear also to the ancients, if we can trust to another forgery, a letter attributed to Xenophon, but which according to his editor Hercher derives from the first century BC. Writing to 'Aeschines', 'Xenophon' complains of some people who betrayed the teaching of Socrates because they were enchanted by Pythagoras' 'miraculous wisdom': Αἰγύπτου ἠράσθησαν καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου τερατώδους σοφίας (ps-Xen. *Ep.* 1, p. 788 Hercher). All in all, it would not be surprising if Eudorus were enlisted among these devotees of Pythagoras and of Egypt as one of the polemical targets of the letter.

From the philosophical point of view, however, what is really important is not so much the Pythagorean surface as the Platonic and Aristotelian body. The project of making a thoroughgoing unity of Pythagoreanism and Platonism was common already in the early Academy of Speusippus and Xenocrates. But Eudorus' Platonism is not completely reducible to the early Academy, for it is also influenced by Aristotle, not only his doctrines but also his criticisms. The appropriation is made historically possible on the assumption that Aristotle is somehow a follower of Pythagoras – or even a *diadochos* of his school, as it is claimed in the already mentioned *Life of Pythagoras* (Aristotle is reported to be the tenth *diadochos* (head) of the Pythagorean school, the ninth being Plato). And the consequences are philosophically remarkable. For, as the case of the categories and of the doctrine of principles (and perhaps also of the eternity of the world) showed, the appropriation of Aristotle introduces important novelties into Platonism. It is by addressing Aristotelian problems and criticisms that Eudorus' Platonism is shaped, with the result that in many cases it appears more as what results from the adoption of Aristotelian problems and doctrines than what emerges from an independent reading of Plato's dialogues. To define Platonism as the Platonic response to Aristotelian problems may at first sight strike one as bizarre, but it well depicts Eudorus' philosophy. Other readers will perhaps share pseudo-Xenophon's view that such a metaphysical reshaping of Plato's philosophy cannot be labelled anything but 'miraculous' or 'monstrous' (τερατῶδες). But if one considers what posterity made of some of Eudorus' views, for instance the theological reading of the *Timaeus*, the relevance of such an appropriation strategy is impossible to dismiss. Its influence over the centuries, and not only in antiquity, is undeniable. And it is against this history that Eudorus' contribution

is significant. Clearly, Eudorus cannot be regarded as the philosopher who definitely combined Aristotle and Plato, and it is probably debatable whether a combination between Plato and Aristotle is possible. But the very fact of raising the problem, of feeling the need for a confrontation with Aristotle, makes of him a legitimate protagonist in the long history of Platonism.

CHAPTER 9

Cicero and the Timaeus

David Sedley

The *Timaeus* is one of just two Platonic dialogues from which Cicero translated wholesale. The other translation, that of the *Protagoras*, is lost, but we are fortunate to possess, apart from one or two lacunae, his translation of *Timaeus* 27c–47b. Why did he choose the *Timaeus*, and what relation if any did he see this text as having to his own New Academic philosophical stance?

It is unlikely that Cicero's motivation had anything to do with a positive evaluation of the dialogue's literary style. In his writings he never reveals a literary fondness for the *Timaeus* such as he does for the frequently cited *Phaedrus*. That the *Timaeus* was written with exceptional obscurity he does not deny. In Book 2 of the *de Finibus*, speaking as a protagonist in the dialogue of which he is also author, Cicero criticises Epicurus' obscurity, and in doing so, he contrasts it with two forgivable kinds of literary obscurity:

> There are two kinds of obscurity which are not vulnerable to criticism: either (a) if you do it deliberately, like Heraclitus, nicknamed *skoteinos* because of the extreme obscurity with which he spoke about nature, or (b) when it is the obscurity of the world, not that of words, that prevents the discourse from being understood, as in the case of Plato's *Timaeus*.[1]

Whether he is speaking here as author, as New Academic spokesman, or simultaneously as both, this passage is unique in conveying Cicero's own judgement on the *Timaeus*. Elsewhere the comments on it are voiced by spokesmen for other schools, in particular the Epicurean school, thus leaving Cicero's own perspective inscrutable.

My thanks to all who commented at the July 2009 Cambridge conference 'Plato, Aristotle and Pythagoras in the first century BC', and at the January 2010 'Quid novi' conference in Paris; also to Mauro Bonazzi, Ingo Gildenhard and two anonymous readers, for further written comments.

[1] *Fin.* 2.15, 'quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, cognomento qui σκοτεινός perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit, aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis.'

The observation about the obscurity of its writing – venial according to Cicero because of the exceptionally difficult subject-matter – might easily have been made by anybody who had encountered the *Timaeus*, and does not necessarily reflect the particular viewpoint of someone who has struggled to translate the dialogue. Indeed, the prologue to this same work, the *de Finibus*, contains a strong indication that Cicero had not yet written either his *Timaeus* or his *Protagoras* translation. But at the same time it conveys a clear hint that by now he had those projects in mind.

First of all, in describing his project for the Latinisation of philosophy, he justifies his current practice of critically reporting, rather than merely translating, the major Greek authorities (1.5–6):

> [W]ill people not want to have Plato's arguments about the good and happy life expounded in Latin? So what if we do not perform the function of translators, but preserve what our authorities have said and add to it our own judgement and our own order of exposition?

A few lines later, however, he adds an unexpected side-remark about wholesale translation (1.7):

> Though if I were directly translating Plato and Aristotle, in the way our poets have translated plays, I suppose that by acquainting them with those divine geniuses I would be letting my countrymen down! But actually this is something which I neither have done up till now nor, on the other hand, consider myself debarred from doing. I shall at least translate some passages if I see fit, and especially passages by those I have named, whenever it turns out that it may be appropriate to do so, just as Ennius does from Homer and Afranius from Menander.[2]

Up to now, Cicero indicates, he has represented Greek philosophers not verbatim but in an expository order chosen by himself, and with critical responses added. Nevertheless, he goes on, he reserves the right to add to his portfolio wholesale translations of the great masters, Plato and Aristotle, analogous to Roman playwrights' Latinisations of complete Greek plays. But he does not guarantee that he will ever turn out translations on that scale, and his more confident prediction is that he will on occasion translate entire passages verbatim from the authors he has mentioned, apparently

[2] mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. an 'utinám ne in nemore' nihilominus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? quid, si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, eisque nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus?

. . . . [7] quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poëtae fabulas, male, credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto.

referring once again to Plato and Aristotle. He had by this date translated only three relatively short excerpts from Plato,[3] and as far as we know nothing at all from Aristotle. It is likely that the prediction here refers to future translation plans on a considerably more ambitious scale than that.

The *Timaeus* translation, it thus seems, did not yet exist in late May of 45 BC, when the first two books *de Finibus* were written (*ad Att.* 13.32). That inference is, moreover, to a considerable extent confirmed by Cicero's mention, in the prologue to his *Timaeus* translation itself, of the *Academic Books* as already written, because this latter work was completed (albeit from earlier material) in June 45, more or less contemporaneously with the completion of the *de Finibus*. But although the translation from the *Timaeus* did not yet exist, the words quoted from *de Finibus* 1 make it likely that it was among the projects Cicero was actively considering at the time. We can therefore date the *Timaeus* translation between late June 45 and Cicero's death on 7 December 43. More specifically, however, there seems good reason to assume that he turned to the task very soon after completing the *de Finibus* and *Academic Books*, and before embarking on his next surviving dialogue, the *de Natura Deorum*, which was completed in the following six months or so.

45 BC	
May	*Lucullus*
	(end of month) *de Finibus* 1–2
June	*de Finibus* completed
	Academici libri (incorporating redrafted *Lucullus*)
July–Dec.	*Tusculan disputations*
	<*Timaeus*>
	de Natura Deorum

The reason for this suspicion is as follows. The work of which the *Timaeus* translation was to constitute a part is incomplete as it has come down to us. Is this due to an accident of transmission, or because Cicero did not complete it? There is evidence favouring the latter explanation. For, remarkably, the *Timaeus* translation contains one stretch which is repeated verbatim in *de Natura Deorum*.[4] Here first is the Greek text of *Timaeus* 33a–b:

[3] See Long 1995a: 44 n. 14, and Powell 1995b: 279–80, for a full list of Cicero's translations from Plato. Of these, probably only *Phdr.* 245c–246a (*Rep.* 6.27) and 278e–279b (*Orat.* 41) and *Laws* 12.955e–956b (*Leg.* 2.45) predate *Fin.*

[4] I have not found out who first spotted this textual coincidence, but Fries 1899: 567 already records several earlier notices of it. It is also considered by Ax and Giomini in their app. critici.

σχῆμα δὲ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ συγγενές. τῷ δὲ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὑτῷ ζῷα περιέχειν μέλλοντι ζῴῳ πρέπον ἂν εἴη σχῆμα τὸ περιειληφὸς ἐν αὑτῷ πάντα ὁπόσα σχήματα· διὸ καὶ σφαιροειδές, ἐκ μέσου πάντῃ πρὸς τὰς τελευτὰς ἴσον ἀπέχον, κυκλοτερὲς αὐτὸ ἐτορνεύσατο, πάντων τελεώτατον ὁμοιότατόν τε αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ σχημάτων, νομίσας μυρίῳ κάλλιον ὅμοιον ἀνομοίου.

He [the Demiurge] gave it [the world] the shape which was appropriate and akin. The shape which would be appropriate to the animal destined to encompass in itself the entire range of animals is the shape that encompasses in itself all the shapes there are. Which is why he turned it out it spherical (σφαιροειδές), its boundaries equidistant from the centre on all sides, round being the most perfect of all shapes and the one most like itself, because he considered like vastly more beautiful than unlike.

Cicero's translation is for the most part reasonably accurate, with the exception of the words italicised below:

formam autem et maxime cognatam et decoram dedit. a quo enim animanti omnis reliquos contineri vellet animantes, hunc ea forma figuravit qua una omnes formae reliquae concluduntur, et globosum est fabricatus, quod σφαιροειδές Graeci vocant, cuius omnis extremitas paribus a medio radiis attingitur, idque ita tornavit ut nihil efficere posset rotundius, *nihil asperitatis ut haberet, nihil offensionis, nihil incisum angulis, nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens, nihil lacunosum*, omnesque partes simillimas omnium, quod eius iudicio praestabat dissimilitudini similitudo.

The words I have picked out can be translated '. . . so that it should have no roughness, no resistance, no sharp corners, nothing crooked, nothing protruding, no gaps'. The whole description is introduced as Cicero's rendition merely of Plato's πάντων τελεώτατον, 'the most perfect of all shapes'. Why so? Not untypically,[5] it seems likely that Cicero feels the need to gloss or amplify his rendition of σφαιροειδές by *globosum*. The Latin *globus* and its cognate adjective *globosus* were not geometrical terms for 'sphere' or 'spherical',[6] but indicated more broadly a round mass or

[5] For other expansions of what Cicero found in the Greek text of the *Timaeus*, cf. 38, where 'itaque eorum vocabula nobis prodiderunt' has nothing corresponding to it at *Tim.* 40d8. Cf. also 16, 'earum autem quattuor rerum quas supra dixi sic in omni mundo partes omnes conlocatae sunt ut nulla pars huiusce generis excederet extra, atque ut in hoc universo inessent genera illa universa', a paraphrastic expansion of *Ti.* 32c5–8, τῶν δὲ δὴ τεττάρων ἓν ὅλον ἕκαστον εἴληφεν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου σύστασις. ἐκ γὰρ πυρὸς παντὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς συνέστησεν αὐτὸν ὁ συνιστάς, μέρος οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ δύναμιν ἔξωθεν ὑπολιπών. Cf. also Lambardi 1982: 54–67.

[6] These same renditions had earlier been used for the heavenly spheres in the *Somnium Scipionis* = *Rep.* 6.15–17, which however predates Cicero's systematic attempt in 45–44 to develop the Latin philosophical vocabulary. At *Tusc.* 1.68, applied to the earth, *globus* may still mean no more than an approximately round body, since protrusions are specifically mentioned. On early uses of *globus* and *globosus*, cf. also Puelma 1980: 171–2.

lump – in fact 'glob', rather than 'globe'. The usual geometrical term for 'sphere' was in fact *sphaera*, and Cicero was understandably reluctant to use this Greek loan word when forging a Latin vocabulary. Hence his speaker's expansion of the Platonic text, to emphasise that he is recruiting *globus* to mean a perfect geometrical sphere.

As this case exemplifies, Cicero's project of cumulatively enriching the native Latin philosophical vocabulary, by explicitly introducing new renditions of Greek terms one by one as they cropped up, was maintained in his *Timaeus* translation, in seamless continuity with his other philosophical writings of the period. The present example is one of six Greek terms whose renditions are announced during the course of the translation.[7] Four of the six are terms imported into physics from mathematics, namely ἀναλογία, σφαιροειδές, μεσότης and ἁρμονία. A fifth has a specifically astronomical sense, namely what he (questionably) interprets as a special use of κόσμος to indicate the heaven, which he decides to translate 'lucens mundus', 'the illuminated world' (35.10 = *Ti.* 40a6). Only one of the six, δαίμων, falls altogether outside mathematics. Here we can see Cicero seeking in his *Timaeus* translation to rectify the poverty of the Latin mathematical vocabulary, which he had made Varro lament at the beginning of the *Academic Books* (1.6). Varro had made it clear there that his ensuing account of early Academic physics – an account itself derived ultimately from the *Timaeus* – would be compelled to omit the more mathematical aspects of Platonic cosmology. It is above all this lack that his *Timaeus* translation seeks to rectify.

In the light of the *Timaeus* translation's glossing of σφαιροειδές, consider now a passage from *de Natura Deorum* (2.47) where the Stoic Balbus replies to the Epicurean Velleius' aesthetic mockery of the heaven's spherical shape:

> conum tibi ais et cylindrum et pyramidem pulchriorem quam sphaeram videri, novum etiam oculorum iudicium habetis. sed sint ista pulchriora dumtaxat aspectu – quod mihi tamen ipsum non videtur; quid enim pulchrius ea figura quae sola omnis alias figuras complexa continet, quaeque nihil asperitatis habere, nihil offensionis potest, nihil incisum angulis nihil anfractibus, nihil eminens nihil lacunosum; cumque duae formae praestantissimae sint, ex solidis globus (sic enim σφαῖραν interpretari placet), ex planis autem circulus aut orbis, qui κύκλος Graece dicitur, his duabus formis contingit solis ut omnes earum partes sint inter se simillumae a medioque tantum absit extremum, quo nihil fieri potest aptius.

You say that the cone, cylinder and pyramid seem to you more beautiful than the sphere (*sphaira*). Your school even has a new criterion for visual judgements!

[7] Cf. Lambardi 1982: 69–90.

But let's grant that those shapes you mention are more beautiful, at least to look at – though even that I don't agree about: for what is more beautiful than that shape which is unique in encompassing and containing all other shapes, and *which can have no roughness, no resistance, no sharp corners, nothing crooked, nothing protruding, no gaps*? And since there are two supreme figures – among solids the sphere [*globus*] (that being how I want to translate σφαῖρα), among planes the circle, which is called κύκλος in Greek – it falls to these two figures alone to have all their parts entirely alike, with every boundary equidistant from the centre. And nothing can be more appropriate than that.

The whole description of the sphere closely echoes the *Timaeus* passage. In some details Cicero's rendition differs from that in the *Timaeus* translation, but it has long been recognised that in the sequence I have italicised the wording is as good as identical. And since these are precisely the words which Cicero himself added to the *Timaeus* translation to gloss the geometrical notion of a sphere, it seems a near certainty that in the *ND* passage he is drawing, not on the *Timaeus* itself, but on his translation of it.

The reason is not hard to guess. Cicero typically introduces each Latinisation of a Greek term just once, at its first occurrence in his dialogues. In *de Natura Deorum* 2, finding himself introducing 'globus' as a rendition of σφαῖρα, he remembers that he has already done the same, with regard to the cognate adjective σφαιροειδής, in his *Timaeus*. He therefore turns to the actual passage of his *Timaeus* translation, and copies or paraphrases material to boost Balbus' anti-Epicurean argument, including in this his glossed technical use of 'globus'.

Both the virtual repetition of the gloss on σφαῖρα = *globus*, and the wholesale copying of wording from an earlier work, are uncharacteristic of Cicero.[8] A very natural inference[9] is that by the time of writing *ND* 2 he had decided to abandon the unfinished work in which the *Timaeus* translation had been due to appear, and therefore felt fully justified in rescuing material from it by transferring it across into his new dialogue.

[8] When Cicero, exceptionally, glosses one and the same Greek word again in a different work, the reason is that he is introducing a variant or revised translation of it: see *Luc.* 95, *Tusc.* 1.14, and *Fat.* 1 and 20 for ἀξίωμα, translated three different ways in the three dialogues, with the only repetition of a gloss occurring within the economy of a single dialogue, *Fat.*, and understandably so, given his need to establish the now favoured translation after his previous vacillations. (For useful discussion of the motivation behind the *Tusc.* rendition, see Gildenhard 2007: 227–9, although I myself attribute Cicero's vacillation to a less subtle cause, namely his usual dilemma between words which sounded sufficiently technical but inelegant and words which sounded natural in Latin but insufficiently technical; cf. Sedley 1998a: 43.)

[9] Thus Ax 1938: vi–vii.

An alternative option, which some have favoured,[10] is to suppose that it is the other way round: that the paraphrastic explanation of the sphere was first written for the *de Natura Deorum*, then subsequently copied into the *Timaeus* translation. But that would be surprising. *De Natura Deorum* is a completed work, and if Cicero had copied from it he would have done so with the intention that the very same sequence of phrases, and virtually the same introduction of the same translation for σφαῖρα, should appear twice in two different published dialogues. That would be to the best of my knowledge a unique[11] departure from his regular practice in his philosophical corpus of 45–44 BC. If, on the other hand, it was the way round that I have postulated, with the paraphrases and translator's gloss originally composed for the *Timaeus* translation, he would be rescuing phraseology from an abandoned work in order to give it a good home in a work he confidently expected to complete and publish.

We have here then evidence that when he wrote the *de Natura Deorum* Cicero had consciously abandoned the project of which the *Timaeus* translation formed a part. This hypothesis of abandonment finds some further support in Cicero's informal catalogue of his philosophical works, presented in the prologue to *de Divinatione* 2, a catalogue from which the work containing the *Timaeus* translation is absent.

Why did he ever embark on that work? An important clue is contained once again in *de Finibus* 1.7. There we saw Cicero reserving for himself the right to translate wholesale not only Plato but also Aristotle. Unlike Plato's dialogues, many of which were very well known to Cicero, and which are often cited in more or less verbatim translations in the *philosophica*, Aristotle's works seem in general not to be known to Cicero at first hand. The only explicit reference to any of the school treatises is a mention of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in *de Finibus* 5.12, and nothing in the remainder of the book confirms that Cicero had in fact read this work.[12] His acquaintance with Aristotle's published dialogues is undoubtedly stronger, as his otherwise surprising praise of Aristotle's style (*Luc.* 119, 'flumen orationis aureum fundens Aristoteles'; *Top.* 3, 'incredibili . . . dicendi . . . suavitate') tends to confirm. We will need to bear this in mind as we proceed.

A reason why it is unlikely to be a coincidence that Cicero mentions translating Plato and translating Aristotle in the same breath is supplied by

[10] E.g. Fries 1899: 567–9.

[11] Exact repetition of his translation from the *Phaedrus*, first published at *Rep.* 6.27, occurs at *Tusc.* 1.53–4. But that is an explicit self-citation ('quae a Socrate est in Phaedro explicata, a me autem posita est in sexto libro de re publica'), which if anything tends to confirm the relative improbability of an unannounced self-plagiarism.

[12] Cf. Gigon 1959: 145.

the surviving but incomplete prologue to the work containing the *Timaeus* translation. Describing a meeting in 51 BC, he writes (*Tim.* 1–2):[13]

There are many things which I have both written up against the physicists in my *Academic Books* and frequently argued about with Publius Nigidius [Figulus] in the manner and style of Carneades. For Nigidius was not only equipped with all the arts worthy of a free man, but also a keen and meticulous investigator of those things that nature seems to have concealed. Moreover, in the wake of those noble Pythagoreans whose creed somehow faded away after thriving for centuries in Italy and Sicily, I think that he has appeared on the scene to revive it.

I was on my way to Cilicia, Nigidius himself, returning to Rome after his legateship, had awaited me at Ephesus, and Cratippus, easily the leading figure among all the Peripatetics I had heard, had come to that same place from Mytilene to greet me and pay me a visit. I was delighted both to see Nigidius, and to recognise Cratippus. The initial period of greeting we spent on asking questions.

Since the dialogue was never completed, there is no more reason to think that this draft prologue was finished either. But even in its incomplete state it is revealing about the context in which the *Timaeus* translation was meant eventually to appear.

The protagonists, in addition to Cicero himself, were to be a Pythagorean and a Peripatetic. The pairing already calls to mind Cicero's provisional plan, formed around this time, to translate both Plato and Aristotle. For the *Timaeus* was by this date widely regarded as a Pythagorean testimony, in which Plato voiced the doctrines of the Pythagorean Timaeus of Locri. If Nigidius' Pythagoreanism was to be showcased in a translation from the *Timaeus*, it is only too likely that Cratippus' Aristotelianism was due to be, in matching fashion, showcased in a translation from Aristotle.

There is admittedly an oddity that deserves comment here. Cratippus was a Greek, who worked in Mytilene and later in Athens but not so far as we know at Rome – a fact acknowledged by Cicero's depiction of a meeting held in the eastern Aegean region thanks to a chance convergence of circumstances. It therefore hardly seems plausible that Cratippus could, like Nigidius, even fictionally have been assigned the role of translating a

[13] 'multa sunt a nobis et in Academicis conscripta contra physicos et saepe <cum> P. Nigidio Carneadeo more et modo disputata. fuit enim vir ille cum ceteris artibus, quae quidem dignae libero essent, ornatus omnibus, tum acer investigator et diligens earum rerum quae a natura involutae videntur; denique sic iudico, post illos nobiles Pythagoreos, quorum disciplina extincta est quodam modo, cum aliquot saecla in Italia Siciliaque viguisset, hunc extitisse qui illam renovaret. qui cum me in Ciliciam proficiscentem Ephesi expectavisset Romam ex legatione ipse decedens, venissetque eodem Mytilenis mei salutandi et visendi causa Cratippus, Peripateticorum omnium, quos quidem ego audierim, meo iudicio facile princeps, perlibenter et Nigidium vidi et cognovi Cratippum. ac primum quidem tempus salutationis in percontatione consumpsimus.'

Greek text into Latin. The presence of a Greek philosopher in a Ciceronian dialogue is anyway unique, and needs explaining.

Cicero had exceptional admiration for Cratippus, expressing it not only in writing, as we have seen, but also by sending his son Marcus to be taught by him in Athens (*Off.* 1.1–2), and by obtaining Roman citizenship for him.[14] Moreover, distinguished native Romans with a formal Peripatetic allegiance would not have been easy to find.[15] My guess is therefore that the role of delivering a Latinised Aristotelian passage was to be assigned either to a minor Roman speaker, or possibly to Cicero himself, but that Cratippus was present both to give the enterprise his blessing and to provide a suitably august counterweight to Nigidius, himself proclaimed by Cicero as the leader of a philosophical movement.

If, as the opening sentence implies, the debate was to be conducted 'in the Carneadean fashion' – Cicero's way of referring generically to his own regular method[16] – we may imagine roughly the following structure. Speeches were to be given on two competing sides of a single issue, each of them in turn followed by further debate between the parties. Cicero and Cratippus, even if not the principal speakers, might well have become participants in this closing debate. At the end some of the parties, or at least Cicero himself, might say which position they found most likely.

What then can the subject of debate have been? Insofar as Peripatetic philosophy is elsewhere showcased in Cicero, above all in *de Finibus* 5, it is as a component of Antiochus' 'Old Academic' philosophy. But the *de Finibus* is an ethical text, whereas the dialogue we are presently considering was clearly about physics, and even Antiochus stopped short of denying all differences between Plato and Aristotle on physics.[17] One notable exception to the harmony of Plato and Aristotle, and one which moreover had impressed itself on Cicero around the time he embarked on his *Timaeus* translation since he makes it explicit in the temporally adjacent *Tusculans*,[18]

[14] Plutarch, *Cic.* 24

[15] Assuming that the context was a debate between Platonism and Aristotelianism, the need was not for a harmoniser of Plato and Aristotle in the tradition of Antiochus, such as Piso, the Antiochean spokesman in *Fin.* 5, is likely to have been, but for an anti-Platonist in the tradition of Aristo and Cratippus, who actually left Antiochus' Old Academy to become Peripatetics (Philodemus, *Ind. Ac.* 35.13–18). One Roman who might have fitted the bill is M. Claudius Marcellus, who was Cratippus' pupil (Cic. *Brut.* 250); but since only months before Cicero's composition of the *Timaeus* he had been buried in the Academy (Cic. *ad fam.* 4.12.3), it is hard to be confident that he was formally a Peripatetic.

[16] *Tusc.* 5.11, 'quem morem [i.e. Socratic method] cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus et alias saepe et nuper in Tusculano ut ad eam consuetudinem disputaremus.'

[17] E.g. Cic. *Ac.* 1.26. Cf. Karamanolis 2006: 60–4.

[18] *Tusc.* 1.70 (cf. also Lévy 2003: 105, and text in n. 21 below). The *Tusculans*, which belong to the same six-month period (July–Dec. 45) as *Tim.* and *ND*, probably refer to Cicero's *Tim.* at 5.10, 'cuius

concerned the question whether the world had a beginning in time: Plato, Cicero informs us, believed in a created world, Aristotle in one which is uncreated because it has existed from infinite time past. In all probability this was the debate around which Cicero planned to construct his dialogue.

Although the *Tusculans* passage is Cicero's first and only fully explicit mention of the debate, Aristotle's position is likely to have been well known, having been supported with new arguments by the Peripatetic Critolaus in the mid-second century.[19] As for Plato, in Cicero's day it was common to read the *Timaeus* as describing a world which, although thanks to divine protection it will never end, did have a literally temporal beginning. Such is the literalist interpretation of creation in the *Timaeus* regularly assumed in Cicero's dialogues, where it is echoed by spokesmen for the Epicureans,[20] for Philo of Larissa,[21] and for Antiochus,[22] as well as by Cicero himself as a New Academic speaker in the *Tusculans*.

There already existed a rival tradition, going back to Speusippus, Xenocrates and Crantor and represented in Cicero's own day by Eudorus,[23] according to which Plato too, even before Aristotle, had in reality considered the world to have no temporal beginning. I have found no mention of this anti-literalist option in Cicero's writings. But when we turn to his *Timaeus* translation itself one pressing question must be whether he knows it and is tacitly responding to it.

I raise this question because the world's createdness is a point on which Cicero is visibly most eager to disambiguate Plato's text. Is this simply a matter of maximising the contrast with the opposing Aristotelian position? Or is it in addition meant as a blocking move against those, from Speusippus to Eudorus, who sought to reinterpret the *Timaeus* as excluding an actual temporal act of creation? A close look at the text will tend to vindicate the latter option.

The second-century AD Platonist Calvenus Taurus, in a passage quoted *in extenso* by Philoponus (*Aet. Mundi* 145.13–147.25), criticises the Aristotelian

[sc. Pythagorae] de disciplina aliud tempus fuerit fortasse dicendi', but whether this is a forward reference to a work not yet started, or a backward reference to a work started but not yet either completed or abandoned, is uncertain.

19 Philo, *Aet.* 55–75.

20 *ND* 1.20.

21 *Luc.* 118–19, 'Melissus hoc quod esset infinitum et immutabile et fuisse semper et fore. Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo sempiternum . . . Aristoteles . . . neque enim ortum esse umquam mundum . . . '

22 *Ac.* 1.28, on the physics of the early Academy: ' . . . unum effectum esse mundum . . . ', with a world soul which is 'sempiterna (nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat)'.

23 Plut. *An. Procr.* 1013b.

interpretation of the *Timaeus* as describing a temporal origin of the world. When Plato refers to the world's 'beginning' (ἀρχή) and calls the world 'generated' (γενητός), Taurus remarks, there are a number of possible meanings of the term 'generated', and once we have considered them all 'we will be aware that Plato does not call the world "generated" in the sense in which we call "generated" those things that were constructed starting from some temporal beginning [τὰ ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς χρόνου συστάντα]' (146.3–6). Although Taurus is properly credited with the fullest list of alleged non-temporal senses of γενητός (namely five),[24] it was undoubtedly no more than the culmination of an anti-literalist campaign that had been being conducted since the mid-fourth century BC.

That this is so is illuminatingly confirmed by a close look at Cicero's translation of the relevant sentences. Plato writes (*Ti*. 28b4–5):

σκεπτέον δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρῶτον, ὅπερ ὑπόκειται περὶ παντὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ δεῖν σκοπεῖν, πότερον ἦν ἀεί, γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος. γέγονεν.

The first question we must ask about it [the universe] is the question which it is laid down as proper to ask at the beginning regarding every matter: whether it was always, having no beginning of generation [γενέσεως ἀρχήν], or has come to be (γέγονεν), having begun *from some beginning* [ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος]. It has come to be.

Here now is Cicero's Latin translation (*Tim*. 5):

de quo id primum consideremus, quod principio est in omni quaestione considerandum, semperne fuerit nullo generatus ortu, an ortus sit *ab aliquo temporis principatu*. ortus est.

Here, as often, he translates Greek γίγνεσθαι by *oriri*, 'arise' or 'come into existence'. Elsewhere he similarly uses the cognate noun *ortus*, with *origo*, 'origin', as a variant. Two further favoured variants for the verb are *gigni* and *generari*, 'to be generated', which capture Greek γίγνεσθαι in sound as well as meaning, but with a more overtly passive and also more strongly existential sense, conveying once again the idea that the world has been brought into existence. The more neutral *fieri*, which like γίγνεσθαι can cover qualitative as well as existential becoming, he nowhere uses of the world's coming to be. All this tends to encourage a literalist understanding of the *Timaeus*: the topic is, in Cicero's rendition, unambiguously the world's having been brought into existence.

[24] For the most recent discussion, with citation of earlier literature, see Karamanolis 2006: 180–4.

But more revealing still is his translation in the above passage of ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος as 'ab aliquo *temporis* principatu', 'from some beginning *in time*'. With this insertion into the text of an explicit reference to time, he precisely captures the Greek ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς χρόνου, Taurus' expression for the common misreading (as he sees it) of the *Timaeus* that it is his mission to resist.[25] Such a wording, when added to the choices of vocabulary already noted, seems to me strong evidence that the debate later attested by Taurus was already known to Cicero. He is not unreflectively assuming a literal reading of the cosmogony, in the way that anyone unfamiliar with the debate might do, but is quite consciously choosing the appropriate language to favour the literalist reading over its rival.

In the ancient and modern debate alike, a key item of evidence for the anti-literalists has been the passage at *Timaeus* 37c6–38c3 on the generation of time. If, according to Plato, time itself came into being only with the world, it has frequently been argued, then neither the pre-cosmic chaos nor the actual process of the world's generation can themselves have been temporal, dated events. That this argument was already being pressed in Cicero's day is attested by the Epicurean argument against the *Timaeus* at *ND* 1.21. Cicero's Epicurean spokesman Velleius puts the point by asking 'why the world-builders suddenly appeared on the scene after infinitely many centuries'. He continues as follows:

> For if there was no world, it does not follow that there were no centuries. By 'centuries' here I don't mean the ones made up by the number of days and nights as a result of the annual orbits. Those, I concede, could not have been produced without the world's rotation. But there has been a certain eternity from infinite time past, which was not measured by any bounding of times, but whose extent can be understood, because it is unthinkable that there should have been some time at which there was no time.[26]

[25] Taurus himself seems to favour the fifth option (curiously overlooked in modern discussions of Philoponus' report), namely that the world is 'generated' in the sense of having a bodily nature whose being consists in constant becoming. His argument for this (147.21–5) is that at 28b7–8 Plato writes γέγονεν· ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τέ ἐστιν καὶ σῶμα ἔχων, where 'having body', rather than simply 'being body' is allegedly an allusion to the world's possession of that bodily nature. This is such a strained proposal that I am hesitant to interpret Cicero as already responding to it, but the supposition that he is doing so might nevertheless help explain the puzzle (cf. Lévy 2003: 103) as to why he translates the emphasised phrase as 'undique corporatus'. On the other hand, this last word is a near-hapax and its precise connotation remains obscure.

[26] 'non enim, si mundus nullus erat, saecla non erant. saecla nunc dico non ea quae dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur; nam fateor ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse; sed fuit quaedam ab infinito tempore aeternitas, quam nulla circumscriptio temporum metiebatur, spatio tamen qualis ea fuerit intellegi potest, quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit ut fuerit tempus aliquod nullum cum tempus esset.'

In these remarks Velleius implicitly distinguishes two kinds of 'time':[27] measured time, which can exist only in a cosmos, and the infinite stretch of time whose existence does not depend on measurability. It would be hard to understand Velleius' point without assuming that he is responding to Platonists of the non-literalist wing. They will have argued that the ordered world cannot, according to Plato, have come into being after a preceding phase of material chaos, since Plato himself points out that time itself does not predate the cosmos. There was therefore no time at which the chaos can have existed. It is to this move that Velleius is responding when he insists that all that chaos requires is the unmeasured type of time, and that at least in this sense of the word 'it is unthinkable that there should have been some time at which there was no time'.

The exchange witnessed in the *De natura deorum* provides evidence that, when in translating *Timaeus* 28b Cicero makes it explicit that the world's beginning was a temporal one, he is likely to have been aware of the alleged conflict between that interpretation and the later passage according to which the generation of time coincided with that of the world (37c6–38c3). What was his response to this notorious problem? He may of course have anticipated Vlastos[28] by siding with the Epicureans and distinguishing two kinds of time. If so, that manoeuvre could not have been put into effect in the course of the translation itself, but would have had to be reserved for the subsequent debate between Nigidius, Cratippus and Cicero. As for the *Timaeus* passage on the generation of time, most of Cicero's translation of it is unfortunately lost in a lacuna, leaving us unable to extract from it any clues as to his intended strategy.

In the light of what we have learnt, it is time to say something more about the entire work. Its title clearly was not *Timaeus*, even if that name, as a natural designation of the transmitted portion, is carried in some of the manuscripts. Some other manuscripts more credibly bear the title *de Universalitate*, probably representing Περὶ τοῦ παντός, although the word is otherwise unattested and a likelier original title is the shorter *de Universitate*, which is in fact found in one manuscript. *Universitas* is at least a word for τὸ πᾶν actually used once by Cicero in the *Timaeus* translation (43.3), even if he prefers the simpler *universum*. The most likely guess of all is that, being unfinished, the work had no official title.

[27] Cf. the later, similarly motivated distinctions between two kinds of time made by Atticus (fr. 19 Des Places) and possibly Plutarch (*Platonic Questions* 1007c), both of them literalist interpreters of the Timaean creation.

[28] Vlastos 1939.

It is often said that Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus* is unfinished. I have tried to avoid putting it that way, because it is in reality the entire Ciceronian dialogue that is unfinished, whereas I see good reason to think that, whether or not he ever revised it, Cicero did consider the *Timaeus* translation itself already complete.

First, there is no reason to assume that Cicero ever had it in mind to translate the whole Platonic dialogue. In the *de Finibus* passage (1.7) in which he alludes to possible future translations of Plato and Aristotle, we saw that as regards translations of whole works he went no further than not to rule these out, whereas he seemed confident in predicting that he would be translating at least substantial passages from these two authors. That prediction would be fully satisfied by a dialogue in which he translated a single complete passage from the *Timaeus* and another from Aristotle.

(What work by Aristotle? If, as I have suggested, the theme was specifically the world's uncreatedness, it was probably either the *de Caelo* – with or without support from *Physics* 8 – or the *de Philosophia*.[29] And in view of what I noted earlier about Cicero's greater familiarity with Aristotle's exoteric works, the latter seems the stronger candidate, especially as at *Luc*. 119 he imagines Aristotle coming along to defend the world's uncreatedness by 'pouring out a golden river of speech', an expression which hardly calls to mind the Aristotelian school treatises. But I shall not pursue that question here.)

The second argument for the *Timaeus* translation's completeness is based on its content. Cicero has clearly decided to omit certain features of the *Timaeus*. The entire conversation preceding Timaeus' speech has been omitted, and so has Timaeus' opening prayer, along with the dialogical features manifested soon after the speech's beginning when Timaeus enjoys a brief exchange with Socrates (27c1–d4, 29c4–d6). These omissions are entirely natural and proper, because the speech was being adapted to furnish a monologue which would itself be a characteristic part of a regular Ciceronian dialogue. Undoubtedly, the dialectical exchanges were destined to follow later. Cicero's speaker, presumably Nigidius, opens directly with the argument for the world's creation by a supremely good divine craftsman. He continues uninterrupted (other than by lacunae in the manuscripts) until he is approaching the end of the speech's first major section, devoted to the works of *nous*. And the translation closes on the highest possible note, at 47a7–b2: the gift of eyesight has enabled us to study the nature

[29] The assumption that the world's eternity was a theme of the *de Philosophia* has in general been too uncritically accepted, but Furley 1989: 209 offers a judicious survey of the evidence, concluding that there is a reasonable basis for the attribution.

of the universe;[30] and from this in turn 'we have acquired the discipline of philosophy, than which no greater good has come, or ever will come, to the mortal kind as a gift from the gods'.

This rousing climax was a natural place to stop, for several reasons: (a) It presents what is probably the most anthropocentric expression of creationism in the entire *Timaeus*, likely to be especially appealing to Cicero's taste given his tentative approval of Stoic theology at the end of *de Natura Deorum*. These words had meant enough to Cicero for him to remember and paraphrase them years earlier in the *de Legibus* (1.58), and twice in works almost exactly contemporaneous with the *Timaeus* translation (*Acad*. 1.7, *Tusc*. 1.64).[31] (b) After the quoted words, it is hard to find another equally natural ending in the page or so before Timaeus' transition to the works of necessity, and it is easy to believe that Cicero wanted to halt the account of creation before the deeply puzzling nature of matter was broached. (c) It is in any case in this first section of Timaeus' cosmogony that the major part of his speech's mathematical cosmology is to be found, and Cicero has by this point translated it in full. If the *Timaeus* cosmogony is being treated as Pythagorean, as its assignment to Nigidius suggests it is, we should expect just such a concentration on mathematics. In the remainder of the dialogue the only serious return to mathematics will be when it comes to the composition of the elemental particles out of primary triangles. Cicero no doubt could have grafted that passage in for good measure, but who will blame him for not doing so?

Down to this point I have argued that Cicero's excerpted translation from Timaeus' speech served a coherent function in his speaker Nigidius' exposition of Pythagorean cosmogony. Presumably it was to be presented as a quotation from Plato – Cicero and his speakers regularly name Plato when quoting him, and it would be very odd not to do so here – and with no pretence of being Nigidius' own exposition. It is not unlikely that Plato was himself described as here voicing the cosmogony of the Pythagorean Timaeus. That the *Timaeus* should be cited as Pythagorean in content need not surprise us, since contemporaries of Cicero's like Posidonius[32] and Eudorus undoubtedly used the *Timaeus* for that same purpose. But if

[30] 'quaestionem totius naturae' translates περί τε τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως ζήτησιν, so I assume *totius* to be the genitive of *totum* used as a noun, as at 43.1.

[31] *Acad*. 1.7, 'nec ullum arbitror, ut apud Platonem est, maius aut melius a diis datum munus homini.' Compare his eventual translation of the sentence in question (*Tim*. 52), 'quibus ex rebus philosophiam adepti sumus, quo bono nullum optabilius, nullum praestantius neque datum est mortalium generi deorum concessu atque munere neque dabitur.'

[32] Cf. Anna Ju's chapter, this volume.

Timaeus was here cited as a Pythagorean, does it mean that the text was not also being treated as a Platonist one?

That would be a hard conclusion to have to accept. I started this chapter with a passage in which Cicero explained the obscurity of the *Timaeus*' diction as justified by the matching obscurity of Plato's subject-matter there. Although that idea may have some Pythagorean overtones, because Nigidius' skills in 'investigating the things that nature seems to have concealed' were praised in the prologue to the *Timaeus* translation, it undoubtedly has an Academic ring to it as well. For according to Cicero elsewhere it was the obscurity of things that drove Arcesilaus, the founder of the sceptical Academy, to suspend judgement on all matters, and, he adds, in so doing Arcesilaus was following in spirit his greatest predecessors, including Socrates and Plato (*Ac*. 1.44–6). A *Timaeus* in which the obscurity of the world is pointedly reflected in the obscure diction adopted, and in which probability rather than cognition is offered as the best available outcome, sounds like a thoroughly New Academic text.

A second and closely related Academic-sounding feature is the εἰκὼς λόγος of the *Timaeus*. Cicero's Platonism was to the end of his life that of the probabilist Philonian Academy. There is evidence from the late *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* that one of the arguments for considering Plato a sceptic had been his probabilist-sounding language of likelihood (εἰκός), characteristic of the *Timaeus*.[33] The only plausible source of this sceptical interpretation is the New Academy in its probabilist phase under Philo. Once the school conceded the admissibility of fallible belief, it was entirely natural that the *Timaeus*, with its proclaimed εἰκὼς λόγος, should become a canonical text.

And when we turn to Cicero's *Timaeus* translation we find that he does indeed, as has often been noticed, equate Platonic εἰκός with Academic πιθανόν, a term represented in his writings by both *probabile* and *veri simile* (*Luc*. 32). *Timaeus* 29b–d contains Plato's best-known formulation of the 'likelihood' (εἰκὼς λόγος, εἰκὼς μῦθος) that underlies his methodology for physics. Cicero's translation renders the εἰκών/εἰκώς pairing there with *simulacrum* and *similitudo veri*, and goes on to translate εἰκώς twice by *probabilis*.

When the εἰκός theme returns at *Timaeus* 30b–c, Cicero deepens his Academic interpretation of the term by linking it to rhetorical methodology. Timaeus' conclusion that the world was created as an intelligent being is expressed in the following words:

[33] Anon. *Proleg*. 10.1.10.

οὕτως οὖν δὴ κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα δεῖ λέγειν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν τε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γενέσθαι πρόνοιαν.

In this way, then, according to the likely account, we should say that this world came to be in all truth an ensouled and intelligent animal, because of the god's providence.

This reads as a strong claim to have hit on a truth, thanks to the likely account that has been developed in the preceding lines. Cicero's translation omits the reference to truth, and instead emphasises the conjectural nature of the conclusion:

quam ob causam non est cunctandum profiteri, *si modo investigari aliquid coniectura potest*, hunc mundum animal esse, idque intellegens et divina providentia constitutum.

Therefore we should not hesitate to declare, if at any rate it is possible for something to be *investigated by conjecture*, that this world is an animal, and moreover an intelligent one and created by divine providence.

Finding, if not the truth, at least the 'more truth-like' (*ND* 3.95) account is perfectly at home in Cicero's Academic methodology. By nevertheless omitting Plato's reference to the conclusion's truth, and at the same time converting εἰκός into 'conjecture', he has maximised the provisionality of Timaeus' conclusion. Compare *de Divinatione* 2.55:

iam vero coniectura omnis, in qua nititur divinatio, ingeniis hominum in multas aut diversas aut etiam contrarias partis saepe diducitur. ut enim in causis iudicialibus alia coniectura est accusatoris, alia defensoris et tamen utriusque credibilis, sic in omnibus iis rebus quae coniectura investigari videntur anceps reperitur oratio.

Actually all conjecture – the thing on which divination depends – is steered by people's minds in many, or different, or often even opposite directions. For just as in judicial cases the plaintiff makes one conjecture, the defendant another, yet both of them are credible, so too in all those matters which appear to be investigated by conjecture discourse on both sides is found.

Thus it seems that, thanks to the forensic model adopted, in this part of the *Timaeus* translation Plato's εἰκὼς λόγος has been assimilated by Cicero to the purely conjectural kind of verdict that can emerge from the quasi-forensic adversarial context of Academic debate. This is, in effect, the kind of debate illustrated by his own dialogues – the present one included – in which matching stochastic arguments are propounded for but also against each philosophical thesis. From this perspective, the world's divine creation represents not an overwhelming probability which nevertheless falls short of absolute certainty, but just one side in a closely contested case, from

which no better than a provisional verdict can be expected. Nigidius, as presumed speaker, is being made to adapt the methodology of Timaeus' speech to fit the pro-and-contra debate into which it has been inserted.

Nevertheless, Cicero regularly cites the *Timaeus* for its doctrinal content. And there can be no doubt that he hears in it the voice of Plato, much more than that of Pythagoras. He subscribes to the tradition that Plato was deeply influenced by Pythagoreanism, which indeed he learnt from, among others, Timaeus of Locri (*Rep*. 1.16, *Fin*. 5.87). But that Pythagorean heritage does not in any way annul the fact that the doctrines of the *Timaeus*, including that of the world's temporal beginning, are Plato's. It is a heritage that Plato has made his own. Moreover, it is important to Cicero that Plato presents his cosmogony without the unargued certainty which Cicero elsewhere deplores, citing the Pythagoreans' own excessive reliance on their founder's authority (*ND* 1.10–11, *ipse dixit*). Significantly, at the one point where Timaeus himself gives the impression of leaning on the authority of wise men (29e4–30a2), Cicero simply drops the phrase from his translation (9).[34] It is his special blend of doctrine and methodological prudence that Cicero regards as Plato's most enduring legacy, and that is what his translation of the *Timaeus* sets out to capture.

If what I have said is right, the *Timaeus* played two parallel roles in Cicero's unfinished dialogue. On the one hand it provided half of a *diaphōnia*, a conflict of views between doctrinal schools. On the other hand, it also provided the modest principle of likelihood which enabled Cicero to deal appropriately with the irresolvability of that conflict. For Cicero's Philonian methodology did not oblige him to suspend judgement altogether at the end of the debate, but permitted him to indicate which he found on balance the more probable position. Quite possibly he would have concluded the dialogue by declaring the Timaean cosmogony more probable in his eyes than the Aristotelian alternative, albeit without discounting the latter. And in doing so he would have been conforming to the principles of the *Timaeus* itself, as these have been interpreted in the course of his translation.

In case this double role of the *Timaeus*, as both doctrinal tract and sceptic manifesto – should seem implausible, let me end by pointing out that Cicero's teacher Philo of Larissa himself had already given the dialogue the same double role. In the Philonian *diaphōnia* towards the end of the *Lucullus*, the *Timaeus* cosmogony is cited among the conflicting views held

[34] Lévy 2003: 99 remarks that this omission 'obviously dogmatizes Plato's thought. Where Plato refers to a human authority, Cicero expresses the absolute truth of a proposition.' Cicero's familiar methodological distrust of appeals to authority seems to me a likelier explanation.

by the physicists (118). Yet as we know from the *Academic Books* (1.46), Philo also declared Plato an ancestor of his own sceptical stance, and for reasons I gave earlier it is pretty well certain that the *Timaeus* was part of the basis for this attribution too. If so, we have here confirmation that Cicero's treatment of the *Timaeus* was, in essence, that of the Philonian Academy.

CHAPTER 10

Plato's Laws *and Cicero's* de Legibus

Julia Annas

CICERO'S PLATO

As Cicero tells us,[1] Plato's *Laws* is the literary model for his own work *de Legibus*, as is his *Republic* for Cicero's *de Re Publica*. In the case of the *de Legibus*, how much is the influence merely a literary one? At *de Legibus* 2.16–17 Cicero remarks that he has made what Plato calls a prooemium or prelude to the laws, and Quintus responds:

> I am very pleased that you are concerned with different issues and different ideas from Plato's. What you said earlier was quite unlike his approach, and the same is true of this introduction about the gods. As far as I can see, the only thing you imitate is his literary style.

Cicero's reply appears to concede this point:

> Wish to imitate, perhaps. For no one is, or ever will be, able to imitate that. It is very easy to render the ideas; I would do that if I were not determined to be myself.[2]

Does Cicero the writer go along with Quintus here? In what we have of the dialogue Quintus often takes the position that Cicero the character argues against,[3] and here Cicero the character concedes only that he is taking his own line and not merely translating Plato. Indeed Cicero the character opens Book 3 by saying,

I am grateful to my audience at Cambridge, and to the audience at the University of Oslo where I presented a paper with some of the material here. I am very grateful to Fritz-Heiner Mutschler for very helpful discussion and written comments.

[1] *De Legibus* 2,14.

[2] I use the translation of Niall Rudd (Rudd 1998). I have also consulted the translation by Zetzel (Zetzel 1999). I have throughout used the Oxford Classical Text edited by Powell (Powell 2006).

[3] Notably, on the tribunate and the secret ballot; these differences with his brother remain unresolved. Dyck 2004: 28–9 summarises the presentation of Quintus in the dialogue as impatient and philosophically limited. He 'is a man of opinions and is sometimes contradicted by his elder brother'.

Well, then, I'll follow, *as I have from the start*, the lead of that inspired man whom I praise more often, perhaps, than is necessary, because I regard him with something like veneration. (My italics.)

Quintus is mistaken here, in fact, as I hope to show.

Major differences between *Laws* and *de Legibus* are obvious enough. To mention just three: Plato's lawgivers envisage themselves as setting up a new city which will need new legislation, while Cicero sees himself as returning to a purified version of an older legal system; Cicero is more concerned than Plato about proper forms of religious cult, sharing none of his punitive anxiety about 'heretical' theological beliefs;[4] and while both see law as objective and as the form accessible to humans of divine reason in the cosmos, Cicero's account of this is Stoic rather than Platonic. Cicero is certainly trying to 'be himself' rather than to reproduce Plato.

But the relationship of Plato's *Laws* to Cicero's *de Legibus* is deeper, and more complex, than that of being the obvious literary model for a conversation about laws, in an attractively described landscape, among three people (one clearly more intellectual, and with more positive ideas, than the other two). This idea is not new, and has been discussed from other points of view.[5] In this paper I try to locate and explore some points where Cicero follows Plato's philosophical lead in his own distinctive way.

Plato is mentioned fairly frequently in the *de Legibus*. Some of these references simply reflect Cicero's generally high esteem for Plato. At 1.15 Atticus calls Plato 'your idol and favourite, whom you revere above all others', and at 2.39 Cicero calls Plato 'Greece's greatest thinker and by far her most learned scholar'. Of course it is natural for Cicero to be respectful in a work avowedly referring to a dialogue by Plato.[6] But it is obvious in the *de Legibus* that he knows the *Laws* well.[7] At several points he refers to passages of Plato's work for points of detail. At 2.45, discussing votive offerings to the gods, he takes over, in close translation ('*his fere verbis utitur*') *Laws* 955e–956b, perhaps because he is following Plato in innovating here.[8] At 2.67–8 he explicitly refers to Plato for the points that funeral rites

[4] As is stressed by Brunt 1989: 198.

[5] In this paper I shall not be concerned with issues of Platonist influence on Cicero's Stoic sources. Horsley 1978 argues for Platonist influence on the account of natural law in Book 1; this is effectively criticised by Ferrary 1995: 67–8.

[6] See Long 1995a for Cicero's attitude to Plato in general, and DeGraff 1940 for references to Plato in Cicero's works. In *de Legibus* Plato is mentioned at 1.15; 2.6 (for the *Phaedrus*), 14, 16, 38, 39, 41, 67, 68; 3.1, 5, 32. 1.15 is the fullest reference to the Platonic work as a formal model.

[7] Rawson 1973: 343 is mistaken in holding that 'there is some doubt if he had read it with care', and also in holding the *Laws* itself to be 'chaotic' (n. 28).

[8] Dyck comments that of Plato's 'specific limitations on dedications, some [are] without any known historical precedent' (Dyck 2004: 371–2).

are to be referred to experts, and funeral and monument expenses limited. The passage referred to is *Laws* 958d–e, again rendered fairly closely.[9] At 3.5 he refers to *Laws* 701b–c, though in this case less accurately; he gets across the general idea that people who are rebellious against authorities are like the Titans.[10] At 2.41 there is a reference to *Laws* 716d–717a, for the thought that no god wishes gifts from a wicked person, since even good people reject this. And there are also more general references, such as the allusion to the behaviour of theatre-goers, where *Laws* is in mind but not exclusively.[11] Plato's work is in the background, but it is visible from time to time, and Cicero is clearly very familiar with it.

PLATO'S PREAMBLES: LAW, VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS

In the *Laws*, Plato insists on the originality of having preludes or preambles to the laws, since he wants to insist on the importance of what he takes to have been neglected, namely 'mixing' persuasion with the sanctions of the law, so that citizens will obey it without recourse to sanctions. The preambles themselves are diverse. Sometimes they offer rational backing for a law, as with the long philosophical arguments about God in the Book 10 preamble to the law against impiety; people disturbed by argument need to be countered with argument for the appeal to be successful. Sometimes the preambles use rhetoric and appeal to non-rational factors, as with the laws against sexual misconduct and the laws against murder, where appeal is made to beliefs about the walking spirits of the murdered. Presumably argument is thought inappropriate when dealing with powerful and potentially disruptive non-rational forces. But despite their dissimilarity the preludes try to persuade in a specific and distinctive way, as I have argued at greater length elsewhere.[12]

It is explicitly important to Plato that his citizens of Magnesia live a life which is virtuous, and so happy. The *Laws* not being a work of technical philosophy, this idea is not discussed at an abstract level, but it is frequently stated that the purpose of the city is to enable the citizens to live happy

[9] Dyck points out that here the distinction Cicero draws between Athenian custom, just mentioned, and Plato's rules is not as clear-cut as Cicero suggests (Dyck 2004: 420).

[10] Dyck: 'Cicero paraphrases loosely . . . [he] misremembers Plato's text or adjusts it to the current context' (Dyck 2004: 436–7).

[11] *De Legibus* 2.38–9 and 3.32, where reference seems to be made to both *Republic* and *Laws* for Plato's view of the corrupting effect of music and drama on the audience.

[12] In Annas 2010.

lives, and that the only way for them to achieve this is to live virtuously.[13] In the *Laws*, unlike the *Republic*, the citizens' lives are organised and directed at every point, from (and before) the cradle to the grave, and it is frequently stressed that citizens' obedience to the city's laws should be both ready and thoroughgoing.[14] How, though, can habits of prompt and deep obedience to the laws produce citizens who are virtuous, rather than citizens who are merely law-abiding, ready to follow orders? Again, the *Laws* not being a work of technical philosophy, we do not find an account of the moral psychology of virtue and happiness, such as the *Republic* offers us. Rather, the gap is filled in a different way, by the preambles.

The preambles display the ethical point of the practice or way of life that the laws structure. The first preamble, to the law of marriage, gives us a good example.[15] The law is that men are to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; otherwise they are to be penalised by fines and loss of status. The preamble develops the idea that it is natural for a human being to look further than the span of his[16] own biological life, and to aim at a kind of immortality, as is shown by desire for posthumous fame. It is thus not pious (*hosion*) to break the link of the generations which keep humans going on without end; this would fail to show understanding of a crucial fact about humans, namely, the way in which individual humans look beyond their own lives and see themselves as part of the continuous links of a family.

The preamble aims to persuade by bringing home to people a correct understanding of what it is to be human. Without it, marriage might be a disagreeable, and possibly inconvenient, obligation. A man persuaded by the preamble is more likely to think of getting married as something he just does without prompting at a certain stage of life, in an unforced way, because it is part of living well. He will, judging as a good citizen does, find the idea of family life attractive, and solitary life selfish. He will develop the appropriate family virtues, as well as related dispositions which will be exercised in contexts other than family life (bravery in defence of his family, for example). So in what he does he is following the law, but not merely to avoid the penalties for breaking it; rather, he appreciates the objectives of laws that structure family life and the virtues these encourage.

[13] The city's aim is making the citizens happy by making them virtuous: 631b3–632d7, 718a3–b5, 828d5–829b2. Happiness and virtue are both frequently mentioned as the city's aims.

[14] So much so that Plato stresses that the citizens should be, and think of themselves, as 'slaves to the laws', a theme I discuss in Annas 2010.

[15] *Laws* 721b6–d6.

[16] This prelude is definitely aimed at men only, despite the (unclear) commitment to women's being citizens of Magnesia.

The preambles serve this kind of function, whether large or small. A citizen who follows the laws about hunting[17] will know that he is not allowed to hunt animals with traps or nets, but only with spears, horse and hounds. He will not resent this, however, on the grounds that he could hunt more game otherwise, but will realise that the only kind of hunting worth doing is that which involves some risk and personal danger, and so develops the right kind of courage. Citizens who sell goods in the market will know that they are not allowed to bargain, but must state a fixed price and sell only at that price, and not praise the articles or swear by the gods about their worth.[18] The point of this – one in which Plato is very much an innovator in a culture used to bargaining – is that bargaining is a kind of lying, made even worse when backed up by oaths by the gods; citizens must not get used to the custom of saying untrue things in order to make a profit, and taking this lightly.[19]

The preamble to the law-code as a whole[20] makes the claim that a human should first honour the gods, then his soul before his body and possessions, and that this attitude should direct all his behaviour to family, friends, fellow citizens and strangers. Honouring the soul is explicated in terms of making virtue one's aim overall, and thus avoiding selfishness and self-assertion. Someone taking this idea to heart would have come to understand that in obeying the laws of Magnesia he was not just avoiding penalties, but coming to have a good life, one educating him to have good priorities. Thus he would come to have a positive attitude to obeying the law: he would see that all citizens should obey the laws not just as a way of not getting into conflict, but as a way of developing virtues and thus living together in a good and valuable way. Living virtuously is thus living according to the laws because you have come to understand the ethical aims of the laws.

Plato thinks that the virtuous and happy way of life of the Magnesians can become self-maintaining, passed on from one generation to another without the need for constant lawgiving. Moreover, for good people it will not involve constantly thinking about the laws and their penalities, though they will be obedient to the laws. The more the laws do their work, the less they are needed as ongoing motivating forces for the citizens'

[17] *Laws* 822d–824c. This law is explicitly an example of the lawgiver's desire to produce obedience to 'unwritten' rules rather than the sanctions of explicit laws.
[18] *Laws* 916d–917e.
[19] Plato's insistence on fixed prices is astonishing in his culture; it foreshadows the Quakers' much later introduction of fixed prices on the same ground, namely that bargaining involves lying.
[20] *Laws* 726e–734e.

behaviour. All of this comes for him from the point that the citizens are not just to be forced to obey the laws; they are also to be persuaded, and they are persuaded by being shown that the laws have an ethical aim, that they structure practices and ways of life within which the citizens develop virtues (family affection, courage, honesty, the right attitude to material possessions).

Plato's lawgivers aim to produce laws which express the wisdom that can also be seen on a larger scale in the direction of the cosmos by reason. They do this not just by setting up a list of rules, but by bringing out the relation of these laws to the virtue and happiness of the citizens. It is because living according to the laws of the best state encourages virtue, and so happiness, in the citizens, that they can be persuaded to obey the laws in a more positive spirit than that of just avoiding the sanctions for lawbreaking.

CICERO ON LAW AND VIRTUE

Cicero also holds that the statesman's aim is the virtue and happiness of the citizens, as we find at *de Legibus* 2.11: 'laws were devised to ensure the peaceful happy life of human beings . . . those who first passed such enactments showed their communities that they meant to frame and enact measures which, when accepted and adopted, would allow them to live happy and honourable lives.'[21] In fragments of the *de Re Publica*, Scipio asserts similar claims: '[T]he aim of our ideal statesman is the citizens' happy life (*beata vita*) – that is, a life secure in wealth, rich in resources, abundant in renown and honourable in its moral character (*virtute honesta*).'[22] All these passages leave open the question of what the relation is of virtue to happiness. As is appropriate for a work on political theory, Cicero does not go into the theoretical issues that arise for virtue and its relation to happiness; from the work as a whole, it appears that he assumes a general educated consensus that virtue is necessary for happiness, ignoring theoretical complications which might move us to the idea that it is necessary and sufficient.

How does this view of the statesman's aim relate to what Cicero does in the *de Legibus*? He does not take over Plato's practice of having a general

[21] *Vitamque hominum quietam et beatam . . . quibus illi ascitis susceptisque honeste beateque viverent.* The context is that of giving reasons for considering laws which are unjust and harmful not to be laws at all, properly speaking.

[22] Fragment VI, Book 5 of *de Re Publica*, from *ad Att.* 8.11.1. Cf. Fragment III of Book 4; *Considerate nunc cetera quam sint provisa sapienter ad illam civium beate et honeste vivendi societatem; ea est enim prima causa coeundi, et id hominibus effici ex re publica debet, partim institutis, alia legibus.*

preamble to the law-code and then a preamble for each law, though he does have a short introduction to each of the two groups of laws we have (2.15–16, 3.2–5). However, he is, I think, proceeding in a way that can reasonably be seen as comparable to Plato's attempt to persuade citizens to obey the laws by showing how they structure practices which are part of a good life. I will try to show this first by looking at what he does in Book 1, then by looking at other persuasive ways in which the system of law is presented. My interpretation of Book 1, like any other, is qualified by the fact that our text has gaps at crucial points. I am assuming that nonetheless we can see a coherent development of thought in what we have.

Cicero begins his account of law in a Stoic way:[23] *lex est summa ratio insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria*. 'Law is the highest reason, inherent in nature, which enjoins what ought to be done and forbids the opposite.' This and similar formulations are repeated throughout the work. One notable feature is that this accounts for law as right reason commanding which *actions* should be done or not done, an emphasis retained in Cicero's discussion of the etymologies of the Greek and Latin words for law.

Law, we also find, is right reason, the wisdom of the wise person, which has normative authority because it is *right* reason, a *correct* grasp of what should be done. It is a 'force in nature', since the wise person's right reason is aligned with the directive force of cosmic reason in the universe; although the wise person does not need to be *required* to do what they should, the rest of us do appreciate the directives of right reason as *commanding*. And law distinguishes for us what is right and wrong. *Ea est enim naturae vis, ea mens ratioque prudentis, ea iuris atque iniuriae regula*. 'For law is a force of nature, the intelligence and reason of a wise man and the criterion of justice and injustice' (1.19). We also find later, at 3.3, a claim that for both cosmic and human law authority, *imperium*, is crucial, a very Roman way of putting the point that the commands of law must be obeyed. Cicero stresses this less than does Plato, possibly because the idea of unquestioned deference to law was more familiar to Romans.[24]

Cicero then says that the laws are to be framed to fit the kind of state described in the *de Re Publica*, which is why it is important to begin from the highest source of law. It is also important, he says, to plant customary practices, and not everything should have the sanction of written law. At

[23] I am concerned with the use Cicero makes of his material, rather than his sources. It seems clear that this account of law in nature derives from works by Chrysippus.

[24] He also avoids Plato's provocative metaphor of slavery to the laws.

this point, this objective is just part of his general aim, not related closely to the law-code.[25]

We find further explication of the idea of law in nature, rather than in mere convention. Humans are the only creatures that have reason, and thus can not only exhibit the universal reason that structures the cosmos, but come to understand it. To understand reason properly is to grasp its nature as directive, and so to come to share with the gods a system of directive reason or law, thus participating in a cosmic community of gods and humans. Hence virtue is the same in humans and gods, since in both it is the completion or perfection of their nature. After commenting on how excellently humans have been equipped by nature to make use of their rational faculties, Cicero follows out the thought that, as rational beings, humans are all alike; it is in the ways we go wrong that we differ (and even some of these are generally predictable). He then goes on to the thought, interrupted by a lacuna in the text but fairly clear in outline, that we are by nature apt to share in the community of reason in a co-operative and benevolent way, since rational beings care rationally no more for themselves than for others.

Cicero then turns to defending what he has said about law, and hence justice, in nature, not just to Stoics but also to a broader range of people, namely all who consider virtue to have intrinsic value. He excludes only the Epicureans, who, he claims, think virtue valuable only for pleasurable results, and the Academic Sceptics, on the grounds that, while he respects them, they can make no positive contribution to this debate. Who are the philosophers who *do* think virtue valuable in its own right? Here the 'Old Academy' and the Peripatetics are grouped together as holding the same position, and the Stoics are said to hold this too, though in different terms. Even Ariston of Chios is included, although his position is said to be long rejected (an indication that the grouping is meant to be as inclusive as Cicero can make it). It is clear from this grouping that Carneades' classification of ethical theories, mediated by Antiochus, is in the background.

In what follows, Cicero, rather than producing a technical philosophical argument, presents his case to a broader audience by establishing a conceptual connection between law, and so justice, in nature, and the position that the virtues are valuable in their own right, not merely instrumentally. He appeals to our intuitions about virtue to establish that we do in fact

[25] *De Legibus* 1.20: *serendi etiam mores nec scriptis omnia sancienda*. Dyck 2004 notes that Cicero innovates in using the metaphor in *serendi* positively.

agree in recognising good and bad – 'no villain has ever been so brazen as to deny that he has perpetrated a crime' (40) – and that to regard virtue as instrumental to some further aim, such as pleasure or self-interest, is to mistake what virtue is, and that not only do we recognise that what is just by nature is different from what actual laws call just, the same is true of goodness and the virtues: 'Not only justice and injustice are differentiated by nature, but all things without exception that are honourable and dishonourable' (44).

How is all this connected to natural law? We find out at 42–3 (where unfortunately the text is damaged). Cicero repeats the point that there will be no justice at all if justice is not by nature, and goes on, 'And that is why every virtue is abolished if nature is not going to support justice. What room will there be for liberality, patriotism and devotion, or for the wish to serve others or to show gratitude? These virtues are rooted in the fact that we are inclined by nature to have a regard for others, and that is the basis of justice.' Natural law, that is, establishes natural justice, and this, involving the right attitude to yourself and to others, is the source of all the virtues.

We recognise natural law, then, by reflecting on human reason recognising its role in the cosmos. We come to realise that law has an objective basis in nature, not just in the force of existing human laws. Having a share in natural law unites all rational beings in a community in which they are related to one another by natural justice. So justice, a proper attitude to ourselves and to others in relation to ourselves, has a natural basis. And when we articulate what is involved in having this proper attitude to ourselves and to others, we can see that this is the basis of all the virtues.

And this latter claim about the virtues turns out to have independent support. For nature, we are told, has given us all shared conceptions (*intelligentiae communes*) which are latent and unarticulated, but which everyone can develop until we achieve clear and distinct knowledge – assuming, of course, that we are not corrupted by pleasure, or misled by specious divergences of opinion.[26] Cicero is optimistic here about the way our initially vague and unspecific conceptions of virtue can be developed. At 30 he claims that anybody from any nation can achieve virtue if they follow nature as their guide. At 44–5 he says that it is 'insane' to come to think that there is merely a conventional distinction between the honourable and

[26] Paragraphs 26, 27, 30 and 59 discuss the *communes intelligentiae*. In 26 (Powell's text) we find that nature gives us *rerum plurimarum obscuras nec satis <enodatas> intelligentias {enodavit} quasi fundamenta scientiae*. In 30 we find *quaeque in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixi, inchoatae intelligentiae, similiter in omnibus imprimuntur*.

the dishonourable. Someone thinking *that* has clearly failed to articulate their conceptions properly. So ideas about natural law expressed in terms of Stoic theory turn out to have implications about the virtues, and these implications, it emerges, have independent support, for when we properly examine and articulate our shared conceptions of virtue, we realise that they provide support for the claim that law is grounded in nature. Anyone can recognise the virtues, and so can appreciate this connection, though only the wise person will understand it fully.

Examining the idea that law is founded in nature thus leads on to examining virtue and vice, good and bad human character. Logically, according to Cicero, we are now led (52) to discussing not just what is good for us humans, but what is the right answer to the question, what is our highest good? Is it the Stoic answer, that it consists just in virtue, virtue alone being good? Or is Antiochus right, that the Stoics are really agreeing with the 'Old Academy' consensus that you can live virtuously and still lack something crucial to the highest good? Cicero agrees with Antiochus here[27] – but at this point Quintus, the impatient non-philosopher, is allowed to drag the conversation back to law. Formally, the aborted discussion of the *telos* is a digression (cf. 57). But if it is a digression from the main theme, this can hardly be because of the material's not being relevant to the discussion. If we accept the argument so far, and also accept, as the interlocutors do as a matter of course, that legislation aims at the citizens living a happy life,[28] it is of the first importance to know whether virtue suffices for happiness, or not, and to have proper grounds for holding either position. It seems that Quintus is introduced to break off the discussion because Cicero finds himself having to explain the Stoic indifferents in order to claim that the Stoics disagree only verbally with the 'Old Academy', and this is going too far into technical ethical theory for a dialogue on politics and law.

There is now a lacuna; when the text resumes, Quintus tells Cicero that he is not asking for actual laws, *sed te existimo cum populis tum etiam singulis hodierno sermone leges vivendi et disciplinam daturum*. 'I expect you, in what you say today, to provide a code of living and a system of training for nations and individuals alike.' Laws are now presented as *leges*

[27] He uses the Carneadean dilemma which will get such a workout in *de Finibus* 3 and 4: either the Stoics agree with Ariston's discredited view, or they are saying the same thing as the 'Old Academy' in different terms. But here, like Antiochus in *de Finibus* 5, he takes the result not to detach us from all the alternatives but to leave us with the Antiochean one. In *de Finibus* 5 Cicero, after explicating Antiochus' position with fulsome oratory, demolishes it decisively (77–86). Cf Annas 2007a.

[28] Cf. 2.11: *constat profecto ad salutem civium civitatumque incolumitatem vitamque hominum quietam et beatam inventas esse leges, eosque qui primum eiusmodi scita sanxerint, populis ostendisse ea se scripturos atque laturos, quibus illi ascitis susceptisque honeste beateque viverent.*

vivendi, a code to live by, together with *disciplina*, a 'system of training' (or 'discipline of life', Zetzel). Cicero's reply underlines this new point: *sed profecto ita se res habet, ut quoniam vitiorum emendatricem legem esse oportet commendatricemque virtutum, ab ea vivendi doctrina ducatur*. 'There is no doubt that, as the law should correct wickedness and promote goodness, a code of conduct may be derived from it.' (Or: 'since law ought to correct vices and encourage virtues, then the knowledge of how to live should be drawn from it', Zetzel.)

Even recognising the gappiness of our text, and the qualifications this brings to conclusions drawn from it, I think that it is significant that now, after the discussion of virtue, we find law described not just as right reason telling us what to do and what not to do, but as encouraging virtues and discouraging vices, and as forming a way of life and the characters of the people who live that life. It is at this point that we find that a code of law produces practices and a way of life which forms people's characters by encouraging some traits and discouraging others. We find, that is, that a code of law is not just a body of rules directing our *actions*, but also what structures a way of life and so forms *character*. Having made this connection, Cicero now concludes the book with an exposition of the importance of philosophy – not just in the broad sense of 'knowing yourself' but in the stricter sense of training yourself in ethics, physics and logic in order to acquire true wisdom. This is what is required to become a good person, and so a happy one (59).[29]

The first part of the discussion of natural law, then, does not stop merely with actions that we are to do and not to do, important though these are. It concludes with virtuous character and happiness, and with the importance of developing your understanding to become a virtuous, and so happy, person.

It is clearly important to Cicero to make this connection between law on the one hand and virtue, and so happiness, on the other; he spends a good part of Book I doing it. He is, I suggest, making the same kind of claim that Plato does in the *Laws*, namely that the laws of the best state will encourage virtues and the living of a virtuous and so happy life. For both philosophers, this is why people can be persuaded to obey laws rather than merely be made to do what the law commands in order to avoid punishment. The laws of the best state will not just be a bunch of rules and regulations to get people to behave, but will structure a way of life which encourages virtuous character in the citizens and so their happy life.

[29] See Annas 2007b.

Cicero, because he can appeal to the more developed Stoic idea of natural law, can do more than Plato does to fill out what it is that the rational person grasps in the cosmos and in law. This is the substance of the discussion in Book 1. Because natural law is what holds together the community of rational beings in a relation of natural justice, it can be seen as the basis of all the virtues, and so law is connected conceptually more closely to virtue than it is by Plato.

Plato's preambles introduce the element of persuasion as well as that of force into the system of law. Does Cicero have anything that corresponds? It may seem at first as though he does not, given Quintus' sharp rejection of the idea which we saw at the beginning of the chapter. Quintus is mistaken, however. The speech he refers to is one of Cicero's brief introductions to the groups of laws, an introduction which he prefaces by saying that he will speak in praise of his laws before reciting them.[30] The speech (2.15–16) tells the citizens to hold that the gods are all-powerful and providential, and are involved with all we do. This is a belief which leads to true and useful convictions, chiefly the appreciation of the regular workings of reason in the cosmos as well as in humans. It briefly recalls the theme of reason operating in the overall regularities of the cosmos as well as in the laws governing human interaction, a theme Cicero certainly shares with Plato.

Cicero follows Plato in thinking it important that law should make use of persuasion as well as compulsion by force and threats. He does not follow Plato's use of preambles exactly. Rather, for Cicero it is the main argument of Book 1 which serves the function of a general preamble, since it makes the point that natural law is the basis of the virtues, and that this is something which anyone, from any culture, can appreciate. At the beginning of Book 2 there is a recapitulation of the main points about law, leading into the brief introduction to the laws on religion. This is what Cicero calls a Platonic preamble, and the brief introduction to the laws on magistrates in Book 3.2–5 has the same role. However, the function of Plato's great preamble, which the Athenian delivers to the citizens of Magnesia in Book 5 of the *Laws*, is taken over in Cicero by the discussion of natural law in Book 1.

The laws that Cicero lays out, in Books 2 and 3, are also afterwards gone over and discussed in some detail with his interlocutors, in ways that

[30] 2.14. Cicero here compares Plato to actual lawgivers like Zaleucus and Charondas (though he admits that the existence of the former is disputed), and ranges himself with them as an actual legislator in practice, as opposed to the mere theoretician Plato, whose system of laws was merely for 'study and amusement'. Cicero here sees himself, as often, as uniting philosophical and political abilities. Compare *de Oratore* 1.224–5 (on the practical uselessness of Plato's ideas – though he is thinking of the *Republic*) and 3.56–81 (on the regrettable division between philosophy and political oratory).

clarify them and enable Cicero to justify them. There is even the dramatic fiction that the interlocutors are voting on them. After the first set of laws, at 2.24, Atticus politely requests to be persuaded to vote for them, and we even find the vocabulary of voting tablets and the official formulae for voting Yes or No.[31] However, Cicero is not giving voting any authority; when both Atticus and Quintus vote against him on the tribunate and the ballot law, he carries on regardless.[32] The literary conceit of voting is introduced not to give the interlocutors any authority over the legislation but to emphasise, as Plato does in different ways, the point that citizens should abide by laws because these have a reasonable basis that they can in principle become convinced of, not merely because laws are backed up by force.

Cicero in the *de Legibus* is thus, I suggest, following Plato's *Laws* in more than the literary setting. He is presenting a system of law in a way which has taken full account of Plato's point in the *Laws* that laws should be obeyed by citizens who have been persuaded to obey them, rather than just avoiding the sanction of force. Plato makes use of persuasive preambles which are to indicate to the citizens the ways in which practices structured by the laws encourage a virtuous, and so happy, way of life. Cicero uses the Stoic account of natural law to draw conceptual links between an objectively good system of law, resting on nature rather than mere convention, with objectively just relations among people, and hence with the basis of the virtues. This is something which he claims that absolutely anyone can see the rudiments of, though it takes a wise person to articulate fully. Hence the project of presenting law in a persuasive manner appears as a sensible one, indeed one that should be important to a statesman concerned about the virtue and happiness of the citizens.

There are two major points of divergence between Cicero's conclusions and Plato's, both of which are open to explanation both philosophically and also in terms of his Roman background. First, whereas Plato has in mind laws for a particular Greek *polis*, making no assumptions that other cities will be governed in similar ways, Cicero claims that his system of law is 'not just for Romans, but for all good and stable communities' (2.34);

[31] The Yes formula, which Atticus mentions, is 'Uti rogas', representing the tablet with VR (the No vote was a tablet with A (=Antiquo)). See Dyck 2004 for the historical details. It is interesting that in the *Republic* Glaucon once represents himself as voting on a law proposed by Socrates (380b3–c10), although in general Socrates and his interlocutors lay down laws for the ideally virtuous city without appeal to anything but philosophical argument about what is best. In the *Laws* there is no pretence that the interlocutors are doing anything like voting on the Athenian's proposals.

[32] *De Legibus* 3.26, 38–9.

his claims are explicitly universal. This does not mean, of course, that he is thinking of a United Nations kind of global community; he is thinking of a universal system of values which is, for him, represented by Rome and its impact on a variety of different societies.

Second, he claims that this system of law with universal ethical validity exists already in pretty much complete form, namely in Roman law, which requires only small adjustments to express what natural law requires. This claim is made explicitly: Atticus is pleased that the naturally best laws on religion turn out to be pretty much the laws of Numa,[33] and Cicero comments that there is little or nothing that needs changing in the Roman laws about magistracies, since the Roman state does in fact exhibit the best constitution. He means the constitution of the *de Re Publica*,[34] reached at an earlier stage of the Roman Republic, not the actual constitution and laws of his own day.

LAWS FOR THE BEST STATE

But it is just this combination of claims to universal legislation and acceptance of the laws of Rome which has been the basis for persistent claims that Cicero is confused (and even that it may be dawning awareness of this confusion which led him to abandon the work). We can find statements of this in two recent scholars of the *de Legibus*. Andrew Dyck, author of a commentary on the *de Legibus*, objects, 'How can the law of a particular state claim universal validity?'[35] Jonathan Powell, who has produced the recent Oxford Classical Text of the work, finds Cicero wavering between two objectives: 'It is difficult here not to see a vacillation from one part of the *de Legibus* to another between this universality [of a 'universal, specimen law-code'] and the specifically Roman character of many of the enactments . . . One gets the impression that Cicero is thinking as he writes, and that he had not fully thought through the issue of how universal he wanted his law-code to be.'[36]

[33] *De Legibus* 2.62. [34] *De Legibus* 3.12.

[35] Dyck 2004: 410–11. Cf. *ibid.* 114–15: 'This is perhaps the most problematical aspect of *Leg.*: in practice the legislation of Books 2 and 3, oriented on Roman institutions, tends to stultify the *universum ius* set up as the ideal in Book 1 with its potential for providing a thoroughgoing critique of existing law.'

[36] Powell 2001: 34. Cf. *ibid.* 35: '[T]he law-code of the *de Legibus* is partly a universal code for all well-run states insofar as they conform to the type of the mixed constitution; and partly a set of suggestions as to how things might be improved at Rome. Cicero's apparent failure to make up his mind between these two purposes is, doubtless, confusing.'

But has Cicero really failed to notice this extremely obvious problem?[37] He notes that the general ban on night-time religious meetings would meet reasonable objection if applied to the Eleusinian Mysteries,[38] and also notes that some provisions even of the Roman law-code make concessions to realist political compromises.[39] So he is far from thinking that a universal law-code can be straightforwardly applied everywhere; proper judgement is needed to take account of different circumstances.

But is this not just itself an example of confusion between the best and the actual? At 1.17 Cicero distinguishes firstly the nature of law, then laws by which states should be governed, and only then the laws and commands people have written down, including Roman civil law. Many take this to be a distinction of levels, and the problem to be that we have two kinds of law-code, the universal best or ideal one and the actual specific Roman one, with Cicero distinguishing the levels clearly in theory but wobbling back and forth between them in practice.

The assumption here is that an ideal law-code will be, or be something like, a set of rules in universal terms, while actual law-codes are sets of rules in specific terms, the problem being how we get from the universal set of rules to the specific one. But we have no good reason to think of natural law in this way, as a set of rules like actual laws, only on a different, very very general level. Cicero is clear that law is *summa ratio* in nature and also in the minds of humans (1.18). He more than once makes the move from *ratio* to *recta ratio* to *lex*. Law in nature is right reason in the mind of the wise person, and, as recent debates have underlined, it is simply not obvious that this is supposed to take the form of universal or even general rules or laws.[40] We should therefore be cautious and not import the model of universal rules or laws from which actual laws are to be mysteriously derived.[41]

Cicero is discussing not two systems of laws but one, namely Roman law. He is arguing that this system of law has ethical authority which other

[37] Girardet 1983 should have alerted scholars to this point, and to interpretative problems with the 'universal specimen law-code' view of natural law. I am grateful to Fritz-Heiner Mutschler for the reference.

[38] 2.35–6. The upshot is not completely clear, but it appears that Athens has an exception to the law in force at Rome (and presumably elsewhere).

[39] 3.26: Pompeius, in restoring the tribunate correctly, took account not only of the best but also the unavoidable (*necessarium*).

[40] See Mitsis 1992 and 2003, Inwood 2003, and Vogt 2008. Vogt argues that natural law should be understood in terms of the wise person's reasoning, and not in terms of rules at all. For some criticisms, see Annas 2009.

[41] Cicero is searching for the *caput* (1.18), *fons* and *stirps* (1.20) of law. Why should we expect these themselves to have a law-like structure?

systems of law lack. But this is not because he is confusing Roman law with some other, universal, system, nor because he thinks it can somehow be derived from some other, universal system. Rather, it is because he thinks that it, unlike other systems of law, expresses (mostly) the correct reasoning, *recta ratio*, of the wise person; this is what shows it to be correct, as against other systems of law which the wise person would not similarly endorse. In Book 1, Cicero has stressed[42] that insofar as humans share in right reason, and hence in law, they form a community with one another and with the gods: they have a right understanding, that is, of the nature and role of reason in the universe and in humans. The excellence (in the main) of Roman law is thus endorsed by the reasoning of all wise people, who, insofar as they are wise, form a community of the wise with one another in a way transcending their actual communities. It is in this sense that Roman law (in the main) can be considered to have universal application: it has ethical authority, even where it lacks actual authority, and thus is recognised and endorsed by wise people whether they are Roman or not. This does not, of course, imply that Roman laws as they stand are exactly as they should be, or that even a reformed version should be imposed on everyone. Cicero may be prepared to make an exception to one of his laws for the Eleusinian Mysteries; this is the kind of local adjustment that is quite consistent with his general claims about the universal ethical authority of Roman law.

It is a mistake, then, to think that Cicero is going back and forth between two systems of law, the best and the actual. Rather, he is putting forward an actual law-code as one which expresses the right reason of the community of the wise, mildly revised in what he takes to be ways also endorsed by the right reason of the wise. The result is the nearest anyone can get to the best law-code, and as such it has ethical authority not just at Rome but everywhere, though this does not exclude adjustments to local circumstances. The endorsement of Roman laws by the community of the wise takes into account something which even ordinary people can appreciate: laws endorsed by right reason favour virtue and discourage vice, and so help to produce a state where the citizens are virtuous, and so live happy lives.

On this interpretation of *de Legibus*, its procedure fits well with that of *de Re Publica*. The laws of *de Legibus* are to be the laws of the best state, that is, the state of *de Re Publica*; in conforming to natural law, and encouraging virtue and so happiness in the state, they express the right reason of the wise

[42] See Book 1.23–4 especially.

person, and this fits with the theme of the *de Re Publica* that what is needed is a *rector rei publicae*, a wise statesman. I follow Ferrary[43] in holding that all of Cicero's range of terms, including *optimus civis* and *rector*, indicate that his concern is with a statesman, *politikos*. The statesman's job is not to produce a new system of laws, but to endorse, and to recall citizens to, the laws of the best constitution, which they already have, but are, because of corruption of character, no longer satisfied with.[44] The laws of the *de Legibus* are to do exactly that.

This raises the issue of what Cicero takes his own standing to be in the *de Legibus*, where, as a character, he takes the lead in proposing the laws and the other two interlocutors merely discuss what he has put forward. Given his knowledge of Stoicism, Cicero can scarcely be taking himself to be a *sapiens*, though he probably casts himself as someone uniting the philosophical and political talents that would be required for the project (and which he takes to be fatally divorced among the theoreticians of Greek culture). He appeals to *doctissimi* (1.18), but he also puts forward a lot of Roman *mos maiorum* without any argument. Here Plato gives him a model. It is not the *Republic*, where Socrates tells us what knowledge of the ideal society would be like, but it is clear from the form and style of the *Republic* that the work itself does not express such knowledge. Rather, the *de Legibus* is much more like the *Laws*. There, the Athenian puts forward laws in a conversation with two people who are explicitly unphilosophical, and much of the discussion is not theoretical. In both cases, the interlocutors accept that the laws in question do show the wisdom of the divine reason that gods and men share. However, they are not themselves philosophers; the prospective audience is taken to be practical people, and full explication of the reasoning of the wise is implicitly put off for a more strictly philosophical occasion.

CONCLUSION

It is, as we have seen, his knowledge of the Stoic idea of natural law that underlies both of Cicero's notable divergences from Plato: the universality of his claim, and at the same time the fact that he is talking about a particular existing legal system, namely Roman law. We have seen that these two claims are not in conflict; they are perfectly compatible, given the Stoic understanding of the kind of claim to universal acceptance that natural law has. It is perhaps the fact that he focuses on Roman law which explains why Cicero, though following Plato on the need for law

[43] Ferrary 1995: 51–3. [44] Cf. Powell 2001.

to persuade and not just compel, does not follow his precise practice with preambles. Cicero is giving us laws which are already established, based on tradition which is already familiar. Plato, in contrast, is putting forward proposals which, though often based on Athenian law, are put forward as improvements for the future, for an envisaged rather than an existing community. Citizens might well be thought to need a general exhortation to obey a new legal code rather than a familiar one.

We do not, at any rate, have to take the abandonment of the *de Legibus* to show that Cicero belatedly realised that the project was confused, since it is not at all confused. Whether it succeeds is another matter altogether, and Cicero is somewhat naïve in many of his claims, though I will not pursue that now.[45] To Cicero, Roman Republican law embodies natural law because it is a system of law which (with a few improvements) fosters virtues and discourages vices, and so leads to a happy life for the citizens. Roman laws are already mostly fine; what Romans need to do is to live by them.[46] And so do other peoples, if they wish to live virtuous and so happy lives.

There is a later parallel to Cicero in Philo of Alexandria, who also understands natural law in Stoic terms. Philo takes Mosaic law to be a written copy of natural law, and thus to have ethical authority against the laws of the pagans; living by Mosaic law, he claims, fosters virtues superior to theirs.[47] Philo also sees the issue not in terms of universal rules which are somehow to be applied to particular situations, but in terms of the superiority of the way of life structured and fostered by Mosaic law. Close study would, I think, support the parallel with Cicero, who sees the way of life structured by Roman Republican law as ethically superior to others. (He is one with Philo in seeing his own laws as greatly superior to those of the Greeks!). Philo's laws are, of course, not the product of humans, even of such paragons of virtue as Cicero takes past Romans to have been; for Philo, the laws have a divine origin and thus do not require any improvement. There is not likely to have been any influence of Cicero on Philo, but it is interesting that both of them see a particular existing system of law as one

[45] At *De Legibus* 3.39, for example, he says, of his compromise proposal to let the people vote in secret but have the votes available to the optimates, *populo satis licere est* and *lege nostra libertatis species datur, auctoritas bonorum retinetur, contentionis causa tollitur*. These claims, especially the last, are, to say the least, highly contentious.

[46] Which would require their recovering traditional Roman virtues, which Cicero clearly thinks have been lost or compromised in his own day.

[47] See *Life of Moses* 2.14: 'the laws of Moses alone are firm, unshakeable, immovable, stamped, as it were, with the seals of nature itself'. Cf. Najman 2003.

that can be defended in Stoic terms as having ethical authority lacking in other systems of law, and thus as actually expressing natural law.

Plato, with his less developed ideas about law in nature, can reasonably be seen as a philosophical as well as literary model for Cicero's ideas. Cicero succeeds in 'being himself' by rethinking the Platonic connection of law and virtue in a different context, one where he takes advantage of Stoic developments of the idea of law and nature, and where, as a Roman, he looks to the better past rather than, as Plato does, to the better future.

CHAPTER 11

Of Cicero's Plato: fictions, Forms, foundations

Ingo Gildenhard

For Western literature and thought, Cicero's engagement with Plato is of foundational importance, as influential and significant an interlocking of Greece and Rome as Virgil's dialogue with Homer. Both Roman authors, in emulating their enablers, produced a body of texts and ideas that came to assume a key place within the canon of classical authors and has, in varying degrees, shaped literary and intellectual discourse ever since, not least during 'the Christian millennium' (*c.* 500–1500) when Homer and Plato, and Greek authors more generally, by and large ceased to be available in the original in the Latin West. But whereas Virgil's Homeric turn was predictable as soon as he set his mind to epic, in part because it was prefigured by Ennius, who, in the preface to his *Annals*, fashioned himself as Homer incarnate, Cicero's 'special relationship' with Plato was not (though, as we shall see, it too involved a Roman 'incarnation' of Greek ideas). Indeed, it constitutes something of a scandal within the history of (Greek) philosophy, anticipating, as a one-off, 'genuine' neo-Platonism.[1]

Given both the undeniable importance and the apparent oddity of Cicero's choice of Plato as his principal interlocutor in matters philosophical, it comes as no surprise that the phenomenon has spawned abundant commentary. Studies range from indispensable attempts to establish facts

I wrote this paper during my time as fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg at the University of Konstanz (part of Exzellenzcluster 16 'Cultural Foundations of Integration' of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and am most grateful to the Steering Committee, in particular Professors Gotter and Schlögl, for the invitation to spend the summer semester 2009 in this uniquely stimulating environment. The argument has also benefited much from comments and feedback during the Cambridge conference and subsequent discussions. For input, my particular thanks go to Thomas Bénatouïl, Mauro Bonazzi, George Boys-Stones, Marcel Humar, Tobias Reinhardt, Malcolm Schofield and David Sedley. Mauro Bonazzi, George Boys-Stones, and Tobias Reinhardt also kindly shared forthcoming work, from which this paper has benefited considerably. In December 2011, I had the opportunity to present this material in a seminar at the Freie Universität Berlin, which generated further valuable feedback; I am much obliged to Therese Fuhrer and Tobias Uhle for the invitation and discussion.

[1] I owe this point to George Boys-Stones. Attempts to situate Cicero within a wider, contemporary Platonic movement, such as Gigon 1955, do not compel.

and figures (what parts of Plato did Cicero read? Which bits and pieces did he translate? Where and how does he allude and rewrite?[2]) to general appreciations of Cicero's 'Platonism'[3] – and discussions of the thorny issue to what extent his reading of Plato was conditioned by post-Platonic developments in the history of philosophy, both within and outside the Academy.[4] His emulation of Plato as a literary artist (including the cross-cultural tussles involved in his transferral of (Platonic) philosophy from Athens to Rome) has been well studied[5] – just as his professed allegiance to New-Academic scepticism.[6] In addition, ancient historians have commented on how Cicero's engagement with Plato informed his political practice – and the problematic implications thereof.[7]

Cicero's use of both Plato himself and his philosophical *oeuvre* is thus complex, comprising diverse modes of appropriation and engagement. To name only some of the more prominent: the emulation of Plato, by means of domestication and improvement, constituted a key aspect of Cicero's self-fashioning as a literary artist and self-validation as author of philosophical works.[8] Likewise, he saw it fit to cast his own situation under Caesar and, after the assassination of the dictator, his relationship with Caesar Octavianus, as a re-enactment of Plato's political activities in Syracuse.[9] He relied on figures of thought and conceptual distinctions articulated by Plato to establish normative benchmarks for political practice, which were frequently at variance with the cultural knowledge that defined interaction in the Roman field of power.[10] Platonic philosophy further enabled him to uphold a counterfactual or eschatological belief in the ultimate justice

[2] DeGraff 1940; Poncelet 1957; Puelma 1980; Powell 1995b.

[3] Boyancé 1953, Burkert 1965, Gigon 1973, Büchner 1978, Dörrie 1987: 212–55, 483–543, Powell 1995a, Long 1995a.

[4] See e.g. the judicious account of Gersh 1986: 53–154, who draws attention to the conflicting influences of two of Cicero's Academic teachers, Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon (55), and the powerful presence of Stoicism in his philosophical *oeuvre* – as well as Cicero's ability (and practice) to mediate the Greek philosophical heritage in distinctive, indeed original ways.

[5] See e.g. Zoll 1962; Görler 1988; Zetzel 2003. Schofield 2008 achieves a welcome broadening of the analytic lens by focusing on Cicero's use of the dialogue form. Quintilian's famous tag of Cicero as *Platonis aemulus* (*Inst.* 10.1.123) underlines the pervasive presence of Plato in Cicero's literary *oeuvre*, and autoexegetical passages in Cicero's letters (such as *Att.* 4.16.3 = 89 SB) afford glimpses of the degree of sophistication and detail that informs the *literary* dialogue he entertained with his illustrious predecessor.

[6] Glucker 1988 and 1995; Steinmetz 1989; Lévy 1992; Görler 1992 and 1995; Long 1995a; Peetz 2005; Fox 2007.

[7] Gelzer 1939: 864–5; Gotter 1996; see also Wiseman 2009.

[8] For a representative instance of the spirit in which Cicero presented himself as outdoing his model see *Tusc.* 1.24 with Gildenhard 2007: 244–5.

[9] Gildenhard 2006: 203–5 and in press.

[10] Gildenhard 2011: 7 and *passim*.

of the universe and the immortality of the soul, or at least the souls of outstanding statesmen such as himself.[11]

More generally speaking, Cicero's brand of Platonism (including its inflections over time) is pragmatic, political and personal – a Platonism, in other words, that: combines hefty criticism of Plato with the utilitarian exploitation of his thought; turns Plato, above all, into a fundamentalist political thinker devoted to civic ethics; and shows the imprint of unique biographical circumstances, as part of Cicero's positioning (and re-positioning) within the shifting configurations in the Roman field of power. The present paper, which considers the (changing) ways in which Cicero engaged perhaps the most distinctive aspect of Plato's thought, that is, his theory of Forms, confirms the general picture just delineated and tries to bring further facets of the overall phenomenon into focus, in particular: (i) Cicero's strategic exploitation of the formal possibilities inherent in Plato's philosophy to think perfection and thereby to promote the grandeur of Rome and himself (as historical realisations of Platonic ideals); (ii) his reading of Plato as a political scientist, who offers rational, analytic access to the logic of politics, in order to make sense of Rome's historical experience, past, present and future; and (iii) his reliance on Plato's ontology as an ultimate foundation that enables incisive critiques of Roman political realities.

The presence of Plato's Forms in Cicero's *oeuvre* has been the subject of much discussion and (ongoing) controversy; the heuristic interests brought to bear on the relevant passages, however, are by and large doctrinal in orientation: scholars tend to ask to what extent Cicero replicates or deviates from Plato's own theory (or theories) and to what extent (if at all) such replications (or deviations) reflect the influence of other thinkers and schools, notably Antiochus and Stoicism.[12] Throughout the present paper I presuppose and gladly build on this body of mostly excellent work, even though my emphasis will be somewhat different: apart from paying attention to doctrinal nuances, the following pages explore how Cicero has built thinking with (and against) Forms into the fabric of his arguments, with the aim of illustrating the strategic value that engaging this aspect of Plato's philosophy (and its reception) had for Cicero's own politico-philosophical project. This includes particular attention to the seemingly paradoxical fact (frequently overlooked) that Plato's Forms only register *negatively* in the dialogues Cicero wrote in the 50s BC (*de Oratore*, *de Re Publica*, *de*

[11] Gildenhard 2011: 373–84.

[12] Past and forthcoming studies include Luck 1953: 28–44; Boyancé 1953: 241–5; Theiler 1964: 16–19, 38–43; Gersh 1986: 145–54; Long 1995a: 47–50; Bonazzi 2012; Boys-Stones 2012; Reinhardt in press.

Legibus) – dialogues, in other words, that in other respects (such as literary imitation and emulation) belong among his most Platonic – yet appear with considerable prominence in the *philosophica* he composed in the 40s.

THINKING PERFECTION: IDEAL TYPES AND FORMS IN PLATO

A central technique of Platonic philosophy is the 'thought experiment', which involves the construction, in discourse, of ideal entities or types that serve, not least, as heuristic as well as normative guides to establish a counter-intuitive position vis-à-vis empirical reality. The most famous application of this technique occurs in the *Republic* where Socrates construes an ideal city, by way of getting at the question of justice and its rewards. Crucially, this city is not, or at least not initially, set up as an attempt to capture some ultimate reality to do with the Forms; rather, throughout the conversation, the interlocutors underscore its 'fictional' status: via repeated use of the verb πλάττειν, Plato highlights that his characters are engaged in an activity of imaginative invention for 'heuristic' purposes: they are in search of justice.[13] At the same time, over the course of the argument, Socrates' construct acquires ever more substantive ethical and ontological import. And eventually, it even turns into a blueprint or paradigm of sorts, situated somewhere and somehow in heaven, which can proffer orientation and guidance to those who behold it. Indeed, the climactic finish of *Republic* 9 inverts the relation between real and imagined by endowing the world of notional perfection with quasi-divine substance and elevating it over and above empirical realities. The following moment of dialogue from the close of the book comes after Socrates' assertion that the wise man will not endanger in any way 'the established constitution' (τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν) that has come into being in the course of the discussion, in either his private or his public actions.[14] The discussion continues as follows (*Rep*. 9.592a–b):

[13] See e.g. *Rep*. 2.374a: Οὔκ, εἰ σύ γε, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἅπαντες ὡμολογήσαμεν καλῶς, ἡνίκα ἐπλάττομεν τὴν πόλιν ('No, I said, at least not if you and we all correctly agreed back when we were devising our imaginary city'); 4.420c: νῦν μὲν οὖν, ὡς οἰόμεθα, τὴν εὐδαίμονα πλάττομεν, οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες ὀλίγους ἐν αὐτῇ τοιούτους τινὰς τιθέντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλην ('But now, I think, we are devising the happy city, not by setting apart and putting in it a few of such a disposition, but the city in its entirety'); 5.466a: . . . ἡμεῖς δέ που εἴπομεν ὅτι . . . τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς οἷοί τ᾽ εἶμεν εὐδαιμονεστάτην [ποιοῦμεν], ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰς ἓν ἔθνος ἀποβλέποντες ἐν αὐτῇ τοῦτο εὔδαιμον πλάττοιμεν ('But we said that . . . we would make the city as happy as we could, but would want to devise this happiness within it without focusing on one segment only.')

[14] *Rep*. 9.592a: Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀποβλέπων, τῶν μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἑκών, ἃς ἂν ἡγῆται ἀμείνω αὑτὸν ποιήσειν, ἃς δ᾽ ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν, φεύξεται ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. With the phrase τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξιν in particular, Socrates promotes the programmatic analogy and ultimate conflation of (ideal) city and (ideal) self and obliquely stakes out a claim to

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τά γε πολιτικὰ ἐθελήσει πράττειν, ἐάνπερ τούτου κήδηται.

Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι, ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις συμβῇ τύχη.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι.

Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται· τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς.

Then he will not want to get involved in politics, he said, if he cares for this?

On the contrary, I said, very much so at least in his own city, if perhaps not in his fatherland unless some divine chance comes to his aid.

I see, he said, you mean in the city that we just now founded and rehearsed and which is located in our discourse since I do not believe that it exists anywhere on earth.

But, I replied, it is perhaps situated in heaven as a blueprint for anyone wishing to see and to set himself up according to what he sees. It makes no difference if such a one exists or will exist anywhere; he would wish to administer the affairs of this one alone, yet decidedly not those of any other.

The overarching concern that guides the conversation at this point is the question as to whether (or on what terms) the wise man will become involved in politics. In reply to his interlocutor's assumption that regard for his inner constitution will keep the wise man out of public affairs, Socrates disagrees and clarifies his point by drawing a distinction between involvement 'in his own city' (ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει) and involvement 'in his fatherland' (ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι): the wise man will be political through and through in the former, yet not in the latter, or only in exceptional cases (ἐὰν μὴ θεία τις συμβῇ τύχη).[15] By promoting the city he has just construed in philosophical discourse over and above the historical affiliations that arise at birth, Socrates utters a categorical goodbye to common sense or, more specifically, the attitude towards public engagement that prevailed in Athens at the time. Implicitly dismissing the political affairs of his native city as second-rate and beholden to a world of imperfection and falsehood, he advances an alternative concept of what being a politician truly entails: 'In founding the city *within himself* after the likeness of the heavenly city

the ontological primacy of the imagined entity: ἕξις signifies both constitution of the city and the condition of the individual, in particular his soul, whereas the attribute ὑπάρχουσα underscores the originary qualities of the 'state of being' under discussion, intimating Socrates' argument that his city exists in an 'ideal reality', quite independent of any historical community.

[15] Adam 1963: 369 refers to *Rep*. 6. 499b.

the philosopher is in reality a true πολιτικός, because he is thereby faithful to the principles of the true and perfect state.'[16]

The way in which Plato introduces his 'true and perfect state' into the discussion is deft indeed. Socrates' interlocutor, perhaps with a slight sneer, glosses Socrates' phrase ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει, which leaves the ontological status of the city unspecified, by explicitly linking it to the discursive construct that has emerged in the course of the conversation (διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες; τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένῃ), instantly reinforcing ἐν λόγοις with the explication that the city, after all, exists 'nowhere on earth' (γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ). 'On earth' (γῆς) seems, prima facie, a needless qualification; but it provides Socrates with just the opening he needs to turn the contemplation of utopia into a contemplation of metaphysical realities. In his reply, he implicitly concedes that the city does indeed not exist anywhere *on earth*, but then goes on to suggest that it may still exist *somewhere* – namely in heaven (ἐν οὐρανῷ). His choice of imagery (ἐν οὐρανῷ) and his lexicon (παράδειγμα) assimilate his city to the Forms.[17] The verbal construct that, as far as Socrates' interlocutor is concerned, exists only in discourse, serves Socrates as a means to invoke an ultimate reality that is accessible to (some sort of) sight (ὁρᾶν, ὁρῶντι) and, for those who behold it, turns into the foundation of lived experience: the wise man, so he claims, organises his own life *as if* he lived in the ideal city, which includes the refusal – counter-intuitive from the point of view of Greek common sense – to engage in politics unless the ideal city has become an empirical reality.

Socrates' pivot from earth to heaven goes along with a suitable hedge (ἴσως), but also a subtle and suggestive use of religious terminology: his shift from the simplex κειμένῃ to the compositum ἀνάκειται, which, in its basic sense, does not mean so much 'to be located' as 'to be laid up as a votive offering', introduces an apposite hint of the supernatural into the conversation. While the agent who performed the founding (or dedication) of the paradigmatic city remains obscure, Socrates specifies a beneficiary in the syntactical position usually reserved for the divinity to whom the dedication is made:[18] in his case, however, the dative object is no deity but the individual who is able to see the city in heaven and, on the basis of this visionary experience, to align his self with what he has seen. The intimation

[16] Adam 1963: 370–1; for 'a true' read 'the only true' πολιτικός.

[17] Cf. e.g. Pl. *Smp*. 212a4–5, where Diotima calls the Form *paradeigma* whereas empirical phenomena are mere *eidola*.

[18] See e.g. Pl. *Smp*. 197e (Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὁ παρ' ἐμοῦ λόγος, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῷ θεῷ ἀνακείσθω).

is more than understated, but Socrates' lexical and syntactical choices still suggest an assimilation of the philosopher to quasi-divine status on account of his insight into ultimate reality. For our purposes, the thing to note is that in the course of the *Republic* Plato leads his readers from a heuristic fiction to transcendental Forms or divine entities.

All of this is well known. But the brief reminder of the argumentative movement in the *Republic*, which begins with a figment of the imagination and ends in the invocation of ultimate reality, will serve as useful background to identify a watershed in how Cicero thinks with (and against) Plato's theory of Forms. In a nutshell, the Plato of the three dialogues he wrote in the 50s, that is, the *de Oratore*, the *de Re Publica*, and the *de Legibus*, is predominantly the Plato of heuristic fiction,[19] whereas the Plato of the treatises he wrote in the 40s, in particular the *Orator* and the *de Officiis*, is the Plato of the Forms *as well* – with all that validating this particular aspect of Platonic metaphysics entails. The reasons for this shift in emphasis are, as always with Cicero, political and have to do with changes in the Roman field of power and his own position within it.

HISTORICAL PERFECTION IN THE 50S BC

One of the more grandiose figures of thought that animate the three magnificent works of Platonising philosophy which Cicero composed in the 50s consists in his breathtaking premise that Plato's (speculative) notions of perfection in matters of politics have become reality in Rome's (historical) *res publica* and her representatives.[20] Within this overall conception, Plato's Forms register only infrequently and obliquely; when they do, they serve as negative foils for both Roman realities and Cicero's own philosophical project. Yet, in different ways, all three dialogues are set up as Platonising exercises in the invention or discovery of perfection.

In the *de Oratore*, Plato plays a prominent role as both model and counter-model.[21] Thus Cicero frames his dialogue with an explicit reference

[19] The stress on 'predominantly' is important: already in the early dialogues, Plato figures as a political scientist, ethicist and eschatologist (notably in *de Re Publica* 6); the point is that Cicero in the 50s does not link these aspects of Plato's philosophy to the Forms in any way (unlike his practice in the 40s).

[20] Discussions include Pöschl 1936 and Lévy 1992; Zetzel 2001: 84 calls the *de Re Publica* a synthesis of Plato and Cato.

[21] This is not to say that Plato is Cicero's one and only interlocutor in the *de Oratore*: see Wisse 2002, esp. 391, for a corrective to the tendency to ignore or downplay Cicero's engagement with post-Platonic thinkers and contemporary debates in rhetoric and philosophy.

to the opening, and an allusive gesture to the end, of Plato's *Phaedrus*;[22] and the overall appraisal and appreciation of eloquence and oratory in the work, in particular vis-à-vis the rival discourse of philosophy, sets up the *de Oratore* as an anti-*Phaedrus* or anti-*Gorgias*, the two dialogues, that is, in which Plato tries to establish the superiority of philosophy over rhetoric.[23] What tends to get overlooked, however, is that the entire intellectual agenda of the *de Oratore*, namely the search for the ideal orator, replicates the dynamic that informs the search for the perfect state in Plato's *Republic*, with a movement from perfection as, initially, a fictional or heuristic construct to its ultimate incarnation.[24]

In terms of theme, of course, the *Republic*, unlike the *Phaedrus* and the *Gorgias*, does not constitute a particularly resonant point of reference for the *de Oratore*, and its explicit intertextual presence is fairly limited. But Cicero, in Bloomian fashion, signals its powerful formal significance for his intellectual project by way of a seemingly gratuitous attack. In a programmatic passage designed to illustrate the contrast between the practical wisdom of the orator and the bookish learning of philosophers, his character Antonius concedes that exposure to philosophical literature has a place (however marginal) within an education in eloquence insofar as it ensures that the aspiring orator, when the need arises to speak on such topics as justice or loyalty, is not compelled to fall back on Plato (*de Orat.* 1.224):[25]

[22] See, respectively, *de Orat.* 1.28 ('*Cur non imitamur Crasse Socratem illum qui est in Phaedro Platonis?*') and 3.228–30 (discussed below); secondary literature includes Leeman and Pinkster 1981: 65–7, Görler 1988, Zetzel 2003: 119–20.

[23] Cicero refers repeatedly to the *Gorgias*, and always in programmatic fashion: at *de Orat.* 1.47, Crassus states that he read the dialogue in Athens with the Academic Charmadas and records his pleasure at Plato's performative contradiction (in ridiculing orators, he showed himself to be a *summus orator*); at *de Orat.* 3.122, the *Gorgias* is castigated as literary archetype for people who have too much leisure at their hand and use it to ridicule the orator (*nostra est, inquam, omnis ista prudentiae doctrinaeque possessio, in quam homines quasi caducam atque vacuam abundantes otio nobis occupatis involaverunt, atque etiam aut irridentes oratorem ut ille in Gorgia Socrates cavillantur aut* . . .); and at *de Orat.* 3.129, Crassus, with reference to the historical Gorgias, uses a dilemma to assess his performance in Plato's dialogue: either Gorgias was never defeated (and the proceedings depicted are untrue) or, in defeating Gorgias, Socrates proved himself the superior orator: *qui aut non est victum umquam a Socrate neque sermo ille Platonis verus est, aut, si est victus, eloquentior videlicet fuit et disertior Socrates, et, ut tu appellas, copiosior et melior orator*. Put differently, Plato emerges as the author of either a self-serving fiction or a self-contradiction.

[24] The orator that the participants seek to define is clearly marked as an ideal. May and Wisse 2001 accordingly translate *de Oratore* with 'On the Ideal Orator'.

[25] The wider context of this passage is Antonius' elaboration of the point that oratory and philosophy are two profoundly diverse modes of discourse and that the former has little to gain from the latter. In certain quarters at Rome, this position would have been unobjectionable, if hardly novel.

philosophorum autem libros reservet sibi ad huiusce modi Tusculani requiem atque otium, ne, si quando ei dicendum erit de iustitia et fide, mutuetur a Platone, qui cum haec exprimenda verbis arbitraretur, novam quandam finxit in libris civitatem; usque eo illa, quae dicenda de iustitia putabat, a vitae consuetudine et a civitatum moribus abhorrebant.

But may he set aside for himself books of philosophers for a time of rest and leisure of the type we have here in Tusculum so that, if he ever has to speak about justice and trustworthiness, he need not borrow from Plato, who, when he thought these matters had to be put into words, invented in written form a completely new civic community – to such an extent the matters that he believed ought to be said about justice differed from the common practices of life and the customs of civic communities.

The passage is peculiar, to say the least: Antonius seems (a) to suppose that the philosophy of Plato will serve as default option for any aspiring Roman orator unless he is exposed to other philosophical writings; and (b) to think that such a reliance on Plato needs to be avoided at all costs (cf. Antonius' own use of the idiom of financial liability in *mutuetur*) – that is, even at the cost of reading other Greek philosophers. But this position is bizarre, and for various reasons:[26] to begin with, Antonius' advice to read philosophy *in order to avoid having to read Plato* sounds more than a bit paradoxical; secondly and relatedly, he appears to take it for granted that unless a Roman orator spends time on reading other philosophers he will be *compelled* to rely on (his knowledge of) Plato's *Republic* when trustworthiness and justice are at issue as if in Roman education this dialogue was the primary or even exclusive textbook for thinking about *fides* and *iustitia* – clearly a preposterous notion; finally, Antonius imagines that these themes can *only* be discussed meaningfully by a Roman orator with reference to Greek philosophy, Platonic or otherwise – again a strange assumption to make, especially for someone who elsewhere in the work downplays the importance of familiarity with Greek ideas.

All of these apparent absurdities ensue from Antonius' curious desire to denounce Plato's *Republic*, for the heuristic procedures adopted therein as well as their material outcomes. The formulation *novam quandam finxit in libris civitatem* is an absolute gem of polished spite, with the key verb *finxit* at the centre of the hyperbaton *novam . . . civitatem* that underscores

[26] Readers or commentators tend to pass over them in silence or even gloss them out of existence. Thus Zetzel 2003: 122 simply notes the obvious, i.e. that the passage conveys 'distrust . . . of Plato's unworldliness and impracticality' and Leeman, Pinkster and Nelson 1985: 141 summarises *de Orat.* 1.224 thus: 'Philosophische Bücher abstrakten Inhalts – in der Art von Platons fingiertem Staat – bewahre er für sein Otium auf.'

the unheard-of novelty of Plato's imagined city. It is flanked on either side by a further qualification, that is, the dismissively unspecific *quandam* and *in libris*, which picks up the earlier *libros* and climactically reinforces *verbis*, resonating with implicit contempt for the Greek intellectual who not only cooks up and articulates the weirdest ideas, but also feels compelled to codify them in writing.[27] Given that Antonius' attack on this Platonic dialogue is dramatically unmotivated, the suspicion emerges that it has rather less to do with the status and function of the *Republic* in the educational discourse of first-century BC Rome than with Cicero's own project in the *de Oratore*, which is, on formal grounds, virtually identical to Plato's agenda in the *Republic*. For his other protagonist Crassus obliquely applies the Platonic technique of using a heuristic fiction in the search for perfection – without, however, explicitly acknowledging his intellectual debts (cf., again, *mutuetur*). Crassus himself makes this clear early on in the dialogue. In his reply to Scaevola's demurral that his demands of excellence in oratory are unrealistically high, he insists that the orator he is trying to delineate is a notional character – and certainly not himself (*de Orat*. 1.71):

Nam quod illud, Scaevola, negasti te fuisse laturum, nisi in meo regno esses, quod in omni genere sermonis, in omni parte humanitatis dixerim oratorem perfectum esse debere: numquam me hercule hoc dicerem, si eum, quem fingo, me ipsum esse arbitrarer.

As for your remark, Scaevola, that you would not have tolerated my claim that the orator must be perfect in every type of speech and in every aspect of humane learning if you had not happened to be within my kingdom: I would indeed never have said such a thing if I believed myself to be the one whom I am construing.

Just as Plato's ideal city comes first into being in and through dialogue, so too Cicero's ideal orator is, initially, entirely a figure of the imagination (*quem fingo*); and just like Plato's Socrates, Cicero's Crassus highlights the invented nature of his specimen. Indeed, in the course of the *de Oratore* it becomes apparent that *fingere* in Cicero constitutes a functional equivalent of (and allusively gestures to) Plato's πλάττειν. Likewise, the attribute *perfectus* establishes some absolute standard of excellence, while raising doubts about the possibility of its empirical (historical) realisation: it invokes an ideal, rather than real, benchmark that Crassus at least assigns to the realm

[27] The way Antonius formulates this point also draws an implicit if disingenuous contrast between Plato and Cicero: both authors present their works as records of historical conversations, but Antonius suppresses this aspect of Plato's verbal art, situating both the impulse to write and the outcome entirely in his imagination.

of the imagination. Some paragraphs later, he again underlines the imaginary qualities of the sought-after perfection: *Sed quia de oratore quaerimus, fingendus est nobis oratione nostra detractis omnibus vitiis orator atque omni laude cumulatus.*[28] These and other passages underscore the significance of *fingere* as a Platonic *terminus technicus* of sorts – and, together with Antonius' dismissive reference to Plato's fiction at 1.224, illustrate the double strategic function it has in staking out Cicero's position vis-à-vis his predecessor: he employs *fingere* to signal the *formally* Platonic nature of the discussion in the *de Oratore*, while at the same time distancing its *material* outcome from Platonic hokum.

Crassus and Antonius thus complement each other. While Crassus surreptitiously promotes a Platonic technique of inquiry, Antonius offers a crushing critique of the Platonic dialogue that offers the most famous illustration of this technique. As we have seen, at *de Orat.* 1.224 he presents Plato's community as the outcome of a wilful and solitary act of writing that, he implies, need not have happened, not least since it produced unsavoury results. His repeated reference to Plato's mental processes (*arbitraretur*, *putabat*) in combination with a gerundive (*exprimenda*, *dicenda*) brims with irony and introduces a cordon sanitaire between Plato, who emerges as having been under the strange compulsion to articulate some made-up nonsense in writing, and the sound common sense of Antonius, Crassus, and Cicero.[29] At the same time, his attack serves as an oblique reminder of the fact (salient in terms of literary and philosophical debts and genealogies, counterproductive in terms of cultural prestige) that Plato in the *Republic* prefigured Cicero's agenda in the *de Oratore*: the imaginary construction of notional ideals (cf. *finxit*). Crassus and Antonius thus represent and enact two vital aspects of Cicero's domestication of Plato. Crassus

[28] *de Orat.* 1.118 ('But since we are searching for the orator "as such", we ought to imagine him in our discourse as free of all flaws and abounding in every praiseworthy quality'). Crassus here resorts to the same idiom that Cicero uses *in propria persona* at *de Orat.* 1.20: *ac mea quidem sententia nemo poterit esse omni laude cumulatus orator, nisi erit omnium rerum magnarum atque artium scientiam consecutus: etenim ex rerum cognitione efflorescat et redundet oportet oratio* ('In my opinion, at any rate, no one will be an orator abounding in every praiseworthy quality unless he has attained knowledge of all important matters and skills: for speech needs to blossom and flow from an understanding of the material').

[29] Several paragraphs later he ups the ante by refering to the state of the *Republic* as *illa commenticia Platonis civitas*, where rhetoric and psychagogia are conspicuous by their absence (*de Orat.* 1.230). In his critique of Plato's constitution as 'unreal' Cicero was anticipated – and arguably influenced – by Polybius 6.47. A millennium and a half later Machiavelli chimed in: 'Ma, sendo l'intento mio scrivere cosa utile a chi la intende, mi è parso più conveniente andare drieto alla verità effettuale della cosa, che alla immaginazione di essa. E molti si sono immaginati repubbliche e principati che non si sono mai visti né conosciuti essere in vero' (*Il Principe*, Chap. 15).

appears as a Roman Socrates who adopts the same approach to intellectual inquiry as Plato's character in the *Republic*, whereas Antonius helps to underscore the vital differences between Plato's and Cicero's projects, leaving no doubt that the fictional commonwealth that Socrates and Plato construe suffers from the same deficiency that Cicero and his characters diagnose as a routine shortcoming of Greek philosophical thought, that is, its divorce from common sense and everyday practice.[30]

The same dialectic pattern – formal parallels, differences in material outcome – also marks the end of the *de Oratore*, which features a shift from discourse to reality similar to the one that occurs at the end of *Republic* 9:[31] Cicero, like Plato, after spending the entire dialogue in search of notional perfection, concludes by having his characters trying to locate this perfection somewhere outside speech; yet Cicero, unlike Plato, does not turn to metaphysics, but history. The telos of the *de Oratore* turns out to be specific and concrete. Cicero's Roman interlocutors had anyway exhibited a much stronger desire than Plato's characters to endow the object of inquiry with empirical substance. Despite Crassus' own repeated protestations that the perfect orator he is trying to define is certainly not himself (apart from 1.71 cited above, see also 3.74: *petam a vobis, ut ea, quae dicam, non de memet ipso, sed de oratore dicere putetis*) and, if at all, a figure of the future (3.80: *sin aliquis extiterit aliquando . . .*), other figures in the dialogue are quick to identify him as the *summus orator* under investigation. Thus, after Crassus has argued for comprehensive knowledge of philosophy as a hallmark of the perfect orator, Catulus exclaims that he had previously regarded Crassus as the perfect orator (*summus orator*) and the wisest of human beings (*sapientissimus homo*) on account of his natural gifts (*natura*), whereas now he realises that a main source of his eloquence consists in the pursuit of *sapientia* via the study of philosophy (3.82). While Crassus of course demurs (again) and repeats (twice) that the orator he undertook

[30] Objecting to 'departures from common sense' is a key theme of Antonius' intellectual outlook in the *de Oratore*: thus at 1.83 he dismisses the Stoic Mnesarchus' discourse with the remark: *sed haec erat spinosa quaedam et exilis oratio longaque a nostris sensibus abhorrebat*, and shortly before raising the same objection against Plato he takes a conciliatory attitude towards philosophy, while emphasising its irrelevance for the practical requirements of public oratory as follows (1.219): *quorum ego copiam magnitudinemque cognitionis atque artis non modo non contemno, sed etiam vehementer admiror; nobis tamen, qui in hoc populo foroque versamur, satis est ea de motibus animorum et scire et dicere quae non adhorrent ab hominum moribus*. He thereby turns into the spokesperson of the first law of oratory that Cicero formulates in the preface: *in dicendo autem vitium vel maximum sit a vulgari genere orationis atque a consuetudine communis sensus abhorrere* (1.12). The main targets of this criticism are the Stoics: apart from *de Orat.* 1.83, see 3.66 and the preface to the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* and, more generally, Atherton 1988.

[31] Cicero here also reworks the end of the *Phaedrus*, which concludes with (ironic) praise of the young Isocrates.

to outline is a notional ideal, in line with a basic principle of intellectual inquiry, Catulus likes his realism;[32] and at the very end of the dialogue he returns to the vague gesture to the future that Crassus made in 3.80: he submits that up and coming Hortensius will in due course excel in all the qualities that Crassus identified as being constitutive of supreme eloquence. Crassus instantly endorses the appraisal and even wonders why Catulus uses the future: as far as he is concerned, Hortensius has no apparent shortcomings in either *natura* or *doctrina*. Still, he concludes his celebration of Hortensius by reasserting the importance of seniority, exhorting Cotta and Sulpicius, who are slightly older than Hortensius, to apply themselves: it would not do if a young firebrand outshone his elders in eloquence. His closing words of course failed to stymie Hortensius' rise to the top – just as considerations of seniority failed to prevent Cicero's own upstaging of Hortensius at the height of Hortensius' career (being more gifted in nature and better versed in *doctrina*). Cicero thus turns his own characters into prophets of the perfect orator to come in the near future, in what amounts to a pre-figuration of himself.[33] As with other instances of his self-promotion, he deftly combines megalomania with modesty: he is the chosen one, the Roman individual who will incarnate a Platonic notion of perfection; yet he refrains from making this identification (too) explicit.[34]

The *de Re Publica* exhibits a similar pattern of abuse and appropriation, confiscation and correction, and in this dialogue, which takes Plato's *Republic* as its principal model, Cicero's engagement of Plato's ploy to proceed by means of a heuristic fiction is transparent, sustained and programmatic throughout. In addition, the *de Re Publica* also features some early, if oblique and largely arch, references to Plato's theory of Forms and domain of Being. Laelius sets the agenda early on when he asks Scipio to explicate what he believes to be the best condition of a citizenry, in an implicit endorsement of the methodological principle that intellectual

[32] *de Orat*. 3.84: *similiter nunc de oratore vestro impulsu loquor, summo scilicet; semper enim, quacumque de arte aut facultate quaeritur, de absoluta et perfecta quaeri solet*; 85: *ac tamen, quoniam de oratore nobis disputandum est, de summo oratore dicam necesse est; vis enim et natura rei, nisi perfecta ante oculos ponitur, qualis et quanta sit intellegi non potest*. See also 3.90. For the wider background (Platonic and otherwise) of the principle that intellectual inquiry ought to proceed with reference to an ideal see Leeman, Pinkster and Wisse 1996: 285.

[33] See Leeman, Pinkster and Wisse 1996: 276 (*ad de Orat*. 3.80: *sin aliquis exstiterit aliquando*): 'stimmt zu Cr.' Ablehnung des Gedankens, daß er selbst vollkommen ist, und suggeriert natürlich zugleich Cic. selbst', with a list of parallel passages.

[34] Other instances of this technique include *Cat*. 3.2 (Gildenhard 2011: 378–80), the end of the *Brutus* (esp. 143: Cicero praises Crassus as *summus orator*; Atticus demurs: Cicero is so much better; see further Steel 2002–3), and *Tusc*. 1.5 (Gildenhard 2007: 143–4).

enquiry should proceed with reference to benchmarks of perfection.[35] In complying, Scipio announces that he will deviate from Platonic practice by developing his thoughts with reference to a real, rather than an imaginary commonwealth:

> ... facilius autem quod est propositum consequar, si nostram rem publicam vobis et nascentem et crescentem et adultam et iam firmam atque robustam ostendero, quam si mihi aliquam, ut apud Platonem Socrates, ipse finxero.
>
> But I shall more easily attain my objective if I show you our commonwealth at birth, growing, and firmly established, and strong and durable besides, than if I imagine for myself some commonwealth or other as Socrates does in Plato. (*Rep*. 2.3)

Packed into this announcement is a nuanced polemic against Plato, who is here both acknowledged as a precursor and put in his place, invoked as a thinker of notional perfection and dismissed for the insubstantial contents of his philosophy. Cicero again uses *fingere* to refer to Plato's approach to philosophy and more specifically the imaginary city of the *Republic*, and again the Platonic precedent is employed as a negative foil for his own modus operandi. Instead of inventing some commonwealth as Socrates does in Plato's dialogue, Scipio takes pride in exploring the best possible constitution by offering a history of the Roman *res publica*. Cicero's decision to offer a historical *exemplum* as the Roman counterpart to Plato's pursuit of notional (and metaphysical) perfection is not unlike Marx's rewriting of Hegel, whom he claimed to have turned from its head onto its feet. Scipio's sequence of biological attributes modifying *nostram rem publicam* (*nascentem et crescentem et adultam*) firmly situates the Roman commonwealth within the ontological realm that Plato famously denigrates as the world of seeming and becoming; yet the final two qualifiers (*et iam firmam atque robustam*) seem designed to endow it with the sort of quality and substance that Plato reserves for the realm of the Forms. Later, Scipio claims – in the teeth of both Polybius' theory of inevitable *anacyclosis* and Platonic metaphysics – that a commonwealth, despite having a beginning, need not necessarily have an end, indeed that its demise is a perversion of its nature (*Rep*. 3.34); at *Rep*. 2.3, after validating the strength and durability of an entity from an ontological sphere (historical reality) that Plato attacked as inferior and secondary, he proceeds to vitiate the contents of Plato's own philosophy as insubstantial fiction (cf. *finxero*), a point deftly underscored

[35] *Rep*. 1.33: *Scipionem rogemus, ut explicet quem existimet esse optimum statum civitatis*. At *Q. fr*. 3.5.1, Cicero describes the *de Re Publica* as a work *de optimo statu civitatis et de optimo cive*.

by the dismissive *aliquam* that imputes a gratuity to Socrates' imagined city that is entirely absent in Plato. The finishing touch in this policy of co-option and inversion, however, is the antithesis between *vobis . . . ostendero* and *mihi . . . ipse finxero*. If Scipio had followed the practice of Plato, he, *too*, would have produced an exercise in solipsism along the lines of his Greek predecessor, engaging in political philosophy for his own private pleasure, perhaps (or so *mihi* and *ipse* imply), but without wider socio-political relevance;[36] yet of course he does not, and so his effort to illustrate the ideal state, which is identical to 'our commonwealth' (*nostram rem publicam*), is a community affair, designed, in the first instance, to benefit others and playing itself out in a civic context.

Soon after this polemic opening salvo, Scipio's choice of method receives a resounding endorsement from Laelius:

'Nos vero videmus, et te quidem ingressum ratione ad disputandum nova, quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris. Nam princeps ille, quo nemo in scribendo praestantior fuit, aream sibi sumpsit in qua civitatem extrueret arbitratu suo: praeclaram ille quidem fortasse, sed a vita hominum abhorrentem et moribus. (22) Reliqui disseruerunt sine ullo certo exemplari formaque rei publicae de generibus et de rationibus civitatum. Tu mihi videris utrumque facturus; es enim ita ingressus, ut quae ipse reperias tribuere aliis malis quam, ut facit apud Platonem Socrates, ipse fingere; et illa de urbis situ revoces ad rationem, quae a Romulo casu aut necessitate facta sunt, et disputes non vaganti oratione sed defixa in una re publica. Quare perge ut instituisti; prospicere enim iam videor te reliquos reges persequente quasi perfectam rem publicam.'

'We see it indeed, and also that you have embarked upon your disputation in a novel way, which is nowhere to be found in the books of the Greeks. For that prince, whom no one excelled in writing, took for himself a location in which he construed a community according to his whim and will, magnificent perhaps but divorced from human life and customs. The others discoursed without any fixed blueprint or Form of a commonwealth about types and guiding principles of communities. You seem to me about to do both: for you have set about thus that what you find yourself, you prefer to ascribe to others rather than to think it up yourself, as Socrates does in Plato, and the matters pertaining to the site of the city, which were done by Romulus by chance or by necessity, you relate to reason, and you do not develop your thoughts in errant speech but in one focused sharply on one specific commonwealth. Hence continue as you started; for already I seem to foresee, as you treat the remaining kings, the (as it were) perfect commonwealth.' (*Rep*. 2.21–2)

Laelius here works a three-way comparison that contrasts Scipio's discourse with the political philosophies of both Plato and the Peripatetics,

[36] Cf. *Rep*. 4.19, where Cicero reiterates the phrasing: . . . *ex ea urbe quam sibi ipse fingit [sc. Plato]*.

to underscore both his originality (*ratio nova*) and superiority over Greek precedents. The differences can be tabulated as follows:[37]

	Plato	Peripatetics	Scipio
Ontological status	Imaginary (−)	Real (+)	Real (+)
Quantity	One (+)	Many (−)	One (+)
Attitude	Arrogant (*arbitratu suo*; *ipse fingere*) (−)		Modest (*quae ipse reperias tribuere aliis malis*) (+)
Realism	Violates common sense (*a vita hominum abhorrentem et a moribus*) (−)		Historical and realistic, in line with *vita hominum et mores* (+)
Focus		Errant investigation, owing to lack of a normative benchmark (*sine ullo certo exemplari formaque rei publicae* ∼ *vagans oratio*) (−)	Focused on a specific state, which coincides with a normative ideal (*certum exemplar* ∼ *oratio defixa in una re publica* = *res publica perfecta*) (+)
Key: (+) = positive; (−) = negative			

The table illustrates that Scipio shares with Plato and the Peripatetics whatever may count as features in their respective approaches to political theory, while eschewing their respective faults. In combining the Platonic focus on a single state, envisaged as an absolute benchmark and transcendental norm (*exemplari formaque rei publicae* constitutes a tautological Latin gloss on Plato's ἰδέα) with the Peripatetic interest in real constitutions, he avoids the (ultimately arrogant and gratuitous) departures from common sense that one finds in Plato (again, the verb *fingere* is used dismissively to underscore the merely 'imaginary' status of his commonwealth) as well as the (ultimately pointless) cataloguing of actual instances that Plato's

[37] For his engagement of two distinct traditions of political philosophy see *Div.* 2.3: *Atque his libris adnumerandi sunt sex de re publica, quos tum scripsimus, cum gubernacula rei publicae tenebamus: magnus locus philosophiaeque proprius a Platone, Aristotele, Theophrasto totaque Peripateticorum familia tractatus uberrime*. Note Cicero's claim that he wrote the *de Republica* while holding the helm of the commonwealth, which chimes with his self-assessment in his letters from the late 50s. The common view that Cicero penned the treatises of the 50s in 'political retirement' (e.g. Kroll 1939: 1095; Habicht 1990: 10–11; Zetzel 1995: 97) is mistaken: Leeman and Pinkster 1981: 17–21; Gildenhard 2007: 45–51.

Peripatetic successors practised.[38] His judicious eclecticism results in an exposition that easily outclasses any Greek model, or, indeed, comes close to perfection: the programmatic final phrase *perfecta res publica* subsumes both the Roman commonwealth and its explication by Scipio/Cicero and has (again) Platonic connotations, in the sense that the Romans achieved what Plato could only dream of in his philosophy.

Scipio himself reinforces the contrast between (Plato's) philosophical imagination and (Rome's) historical reality later on in the book, when he considers the origin of the tyrant:

Quare prima sit haec forma et species et origo tyranni, inventa nobis in ea re publica quam auspicato Romulus condiderit, non in illa quam ut perscripsit Plato sibi ipse Socrates illo in sermone depinxerit . . .

Hence this may stand as the first Form, archetype, and origin of the tyrant, which we found in the commonwealth that Romulus founded with the help of augury, not in that which Socrates, as Plato recorded in detail, painted for himself in that conversation . . . (*Rep*. 2.51)

The passage betokens the same dialectic intertextuality that we observed elsewhere: the idiom Scipio uses to describe Roman realities is distinctly Platonic (the formulation *forma et species* constitutes another Latin gloss on Plato's ἰδέα), though he then goes on to invoke Plato's *Republic* as a negative foil, on the grounds that it is a mere verbal artefact. Apart from expressing pride in chronological precedence (*prima*), Scipio endows the Roman political phenomena (such as tyranny) with ontological qualities that situate it in an intermediary realm between Platonic Forms and Platonic fiction: whereas the first two items of the tricolon *forma et species et origo* grant the first Roman tyrant the archetypal import that Plato ascribes to his Forms, the final item resolutely situates the figure under discussion within historical reality, rather than the realm of Platonic metaphysics; yet just as Cicero implicitly distances Rome's reality from Plato's ideality, so he uses Plato's preference for heuristic fictions to stake an explicit claim to Roman superiority. Deftly using Socrates' rhetorical ploy of rendering his verbal city more graphic by comparing it to a painting as a negative foil,[39] Scipio stresses that at Rome the figure and the concept of the tyrant are

[38] The description of the political philosophy of Aristotle and the Peripatetics with the phrase *vagans oratio* contains a triple pun: (i) it alludes to their habit of travelling around the political communities of the Greek world to catalogue different constitutions; (ii) it indicates the lack of absolute, normative benchmark of the kind offered by Plato's Forms (hence it is 'errant'); and (iii) it hints at the name of the school, i.e. 'Peripatetics', 'those who walk around'.

[39] *Rep*. 5. 472d–e; 6. 500c–501c; see further below pp. 244–5.

being empirically discovered (*inventa*) within an actual, rather than imaginary commonwealth.[40] Cicero again uses an otherwise superfluous reflexive pronoun (*sibi*) to underscore once more the apparent self-involvement (and involution) of Platonic philosophy. In their affirmation of historical realities, Scipio's discourse (and Cicero's political philosophy) eschew both, the – from a Roman point of view – implausibilities of Platonic metaphysics and the apparent ontological feebleness of Platonic fiction. The polemics continue in a similar vein in the subsequent paragraph:

. . . civitatemque optandam magis quam sperandam, quam minimam potuit, non quae posset esse, sed in qua ratio rerum civilium perspici posset effecit. Ego autem, si modo consequi potuero, rationibus eisdem quas ille vidit, non in umbra et imagine civitatis, sed in amplissima re publica, enitar ut cuiusque et boni publici et mali causam tamquam virgula videar attingere.

He (sc. Plato) constructed a civic community, more to be wished than hoped for, as small as he could, not one that could exist, but in which the logic of politics could be discerned. But I, if only I am able to attain this, shall strive by means of the same rational principles he saw, not in the shadowy image of a civic community but the most magnificent commonwealth, that I seem to touch, as with a magic wand, upon the cause of each public good and evil. (*Rep.* 2.52)

If in the previous paragraph, he used a critical allusion to Plato's Forms to endow Roman historical figures and events with paradigmatic significance, Scipio here reinforces the point by employing Platonic imagery to downgrade the substance of Plato's philosophy:[41] in contrast to the Roman commonwealth that Scipio explicates, which is both of sublime grandeur (*amplissima*) and real, Plato's imagined community is minuscule in comparison, a mere shadow or figment of the mind. Indeed, it is tempting to read the unusual formulation *in umbra et imagine* as a sly allusion to Plato's allegory of the cave in *Republic* 7. Put differently, Scipio here turns Plato's ideal state into an inferior mirror image of the Roman real state and thus reduces Plato himself and his intellectual achievement to the status of his cave dwellers, who live and think in a realm that lacks ontological substance. Cicero is thus part of a tradition that polemically ascribes qualities that Plato associated with his world of becoming to his world of being.[42]

[40] *auspicato*, i.e. after soliciting the will of the gods, contrasts with the *arbitratu suo* in 2.21: the founder of the Roman commonwealth consulted and carried out the will of the gods; Socrates/Plato act on their (deeply arrogant) caprice. Cf. *Div.* 2.1 where Cicero identifies as one of the reasons that attracted him to the New Academy the fact that its approach to philosophy is 'least arrogant' (*genus philosophandi minime adrogans*).

[41] Asmis 2005: 399: 'Plato's shadowy, unrealizable state is clearly the ideal state of his *Republic*.'

[42] This tradition continues today: witness Bertrand Russell, who speaks critically of 'some shadowy Platonic world of being' (*My Philosophical Development*, London 1959, 64).

Yet at the same time, Scipio acknowledges, almost as an aside, that Plato's philosophy articulates genuine insights into the workings of politics *tout court* (*ratio rerum civilium*). The formulation implies that contained within his writings is an analytic explication of the principles of statesmanship that underwrite civic life everywhere – and thus also inform Scipio's account of the Roman commonwealth. Differently put, Cicero here, surprisingly, recognises that politics has a *ratio* and Plato found it. Within the thematic economy of the *de Re Publica*, this claim harks back to the preface. At *Rep*. 1.13 Cicero ascribes to himself, apart from active service for the commonwealth, the same quality that Scipio here attributes to Plato (and practises himself), namely *quaedam facultas in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium*. This assertion in turn points back to *Rep*. 1.2, where Cicero stresses, in the teeth of Greek philosophers of whatever persuasion, that anything worthwhile to be found in political philosophy is simply a retrospective verbalisation of what outstanding statesmen (especially of Roman provenance) had long since put into practice.[43]

Roman practice and Greek discourse thus complement each other; and if in the preface Cicero put the emphasis on the former, at *Rep*. 2.52 he gives due recognition to the latter. For on the premise that political affairs manifest a trans-cultural logic accessible to rational analysis and that this logic has been explicated by Plato, Plato's political philosophy turns into an independent source of knowledge about socio-political matters at Rome as well – and thus also into a potential guide for action. While Cicero conceives of philosophy as a secondary discourse that has the purpose to reflect in theory what the best statesmen have already enacted in practice, one outcome of such reflection is the (permanent) recognition in the form of texts of what sustains a perfect commonwealth. Especially in periods of political decline (and both Scipio and Cicero unequivocally mark theirs as such), when the standards of the ancestral lawgivers have somehow been lost, discourse can come to the aid of practice, as a storehouse of insight and information of how politics works or, rather, *ought to* work. In a Roman context no less than in most Greek ones, the notion that a promising means of addressing political crisis is the consultation of Plato's philosophy will not have been a self-evident one. Scipio concedes as much by portraying his use of Plato as a source of insight into political good and evil in terms of magic (cf. *tamquam virgula*); at the same time, the (quasi-magical) ability to identify the underlying forces that shape public virtue and vice and thus

[43] *nihil enim dicitur a philosophis, quod quidem recte honesteque dicatur, quod <non> ab eis partum confirmatum sit, a quibus civitatibus iura descripta sunt.*

the overall constitution of a commonwealth is of course rather useful in understanding, recuperating and restoring past perfection – and explain why Scipio and Cicero *bother* with Plato at all: they understand him to offer proto-scientific insight into the laws and the logic of politics and appropriate his analytic powers for their own practical purposes.[44]

Cicero continues to offer a critique of Plato as a writer of philosophical fiction while using insights and imagery from Plato's philosophy to offer a critique of Roman realities in the second half of the work. The fragments that have survived from Books 4 and 5 are extremely meagre, but suffice to indicate that Plato remained an important interlocutor.[45] At the beginning of *Rep*. 5, Cicero implicitly revises Plato with the claim that the greatness of the Roman commonwealth rests on excellent customs or institutions (*mores*) as well as excellent men (*viri*) (Plato, in contrast, in his survey of constitutions in *Republic* 8, makes the state of the polity entirely dependent on the character of its rulers), but also diagnoses a case of 'ontological fading' at Rome that has Platonic connotations, even though Plato himself is not explicitly mentioned:

Nostra vero aetas, cum rem publicam sicut picturam accepisset egregiam sed iam evanescentem vetustate, non modo eam coloribus eisdem quibus fuerat renovare neglexit, sed ne id quidem curavit ut formam saltem eius et extrema tamquam lineamenta servaret . . . nostris enim vitiis, non casu aliquo, rem publicam verbo retinemus, re ipsa vero iam pridem amisimus.

But when our age had received the commonwealth in the same way as an outstanding painting that was, however, already fading with age, it not only failed to renew it with the same colours in which it had been, but did not even see to it that it at least retained its form and, as it were, the outer lines . . . For through our own sins, not through some kind of chance, do we nominally retain the commonwealth, but have in fact lost it long ago. (*Rep*. 5.2)

Cicero here implies that the Roman *res publica* is in the process of becoming as insubstantial as a discursive construct in Plato – a point subtly reinforced by his choice of analogy from the world of art.[46] Plato himself of course

[44] Control of Greek and Roman political resources is of course also a central aspect of Scipio's (and Cicero's) self-fashioning. See e.g. Zetzel 1995: 16: 'Scipio like Crassus in *De orat*. (and C. himself), represents a synthesis of the two extremes: an experienced statesman, who is knowledgeable about both Greek political theory and Roman history, and is therefore capable both of theoretical analysis of the Roman constitution and of taking action on the basis of his knowledge and experience.'

[45] See *Rep*. 4.2a, 18 and 19 Powell.

[46] The analogy has Platonic precedents (*Rep*. 5.472d–e; 6.500c–501c; *Tim*. 19b–c): see Asmis 2005: 387; *rem publicam sicut picturam* may recall Scipio's use of *depingere* with reference to the state that Socrates 'painted' in Plato's *Republic*, though the figurative force of *depingere* in *Rep*. 2.52 is (admittedly) weak.

would have greeted Cicero's dismay with a knowing chuckle: of course, empirical phenomena are ephemeral and the *res publica* that Scipio sketched as coming into being and growing (*nascentem et crescentem*) and called 'firm and strong in its maturity' (*adultam et firmam atque robustam*) in *Rep*. 2.3 would eventually go into decline (cf. *evanescentem vetustate*). But while Cicero would presumably have no problem with conceding the truth of this principle with reference to objects such as artworks, his characters explicitly except states from the inevitability of a life cycle: a commonwealth, Scipio asserts in *de Re Publica* 3, is designed for eternity and the death of a state is an abomination, a violation of its nature. This is especially the case at Rome, which on all accounts (or at least in Scipio's account) reached a state of perfection. If the decline of a commonwealth ceases to be an inevitable law of nature, other factors must account for its demise. Cicero named them in the previous paragraph: the failure of men (*viri*) and customs or institutions (*mores*). He thereby preserves a genuine political sphere, in which a historical commonwealth could in principle exist forever if the statesmen ensure its survival within an evolved institutional setting. At the same time, the passage also helps to illustrate what Cicero needs Plato *for*: despite the deficiencies of his imaginary city, his philosophy provides Cicero with the analytical means of identifying perfection, diagnosing a gap between past perfection and the present condition (the Roman commonwealth being reduced to a fading image of what it once was), and putting forward suggestions for reform or, more precisely, restoration.[47]

With the *Somnium Scipionis*, Book 6 of *de Re Publica* brings Cicero's rewriting of Plato's *Republic* to a Platonising end, though even here parallels and inversions are noticeable in equal measure, not least in how Cicero shifts the focus from Plato's emphasis on punishment for individual transgression in Hell in the myth of Er to reward for civic excellence in Heaven in the dream of Scipio. Picking up a theme first introduced but then quickly discarded in the opening book, Cicero develops a vision of politics as cosmo-politics and the *res publica* as cosmopolis. In the *de Re Publica*, as Klingner puts it, after sketching the Platonic and Stoic pedigree of this

[47] To what extent he believed in the practicality or likelihood of achieving this objective is a different matter that has much exercised scholars and need not detain us for present purposes, though it is worth noting that the terms of the debate, which tends to get polarised into the extremes of 'practical intervention' and 'philosophical reflection', have not always been helpful. While readings of the *de Re Publica* as a 'pamphlet' or a 'blueprint' are too reductive, not least in ascribing to Cicero an unrealistic assessment of what literary works could achieve in a Roman setting, to claim that 'the subject of *Rep*., like that of its Platonic model, is broadly ethical, not narrowly political' (Zetzel 1995: 29) is to construe a false dichotomy – indeed, to miss precisely what is distinctive in Cicero's approach to politics.

figure of thought as background and precondition for the entirely original approach of Cicero, 'wird der römische Staat nicht mehr als ein Mechanismus mit künstlich berechnetem Zug und Gegenzug erklärt, sondern als Kosmos verherrlicht, in dem ein jeder Teil wie im Weltall seinen ihm wesensmäßigen Raum sucht, damit die Harmonie des Ganzen erhalten bleibt'.[48] A perfect, political order, once imagined minuscule in scope by Plato, now realised on a cosmic scale at Rome, thus receives metaphysical approval, not least because it meets ethical norms. Enacting divine principles of excellence, in particular as regards justice, the Roman *res publica* manifests meaningful analogies between individual, community and the world: the perfect statesman and the supreme commonwealth are embedded within, and interact with, wider cosmic parameters, including the spheres and their music. Within this grand vision of the world, however, an absence registers as well. The proof for the immortality of the soul that Cicero propagates towards the end of the *Somnium* has as its centrepiece an (unacknowledged) translation of a passage from the *Phaedrus*, in which Socrates argues the principle that anything self-moving (which includes the soul) is eternal;[49] in contrast, he does not mention the anamnesis-argument in favour of the soul's immortality, which is connected with the theory of Forms in the *Meno* or the *Phaedo* – even though the *Phaedo* in particular would have been an apt intertext for Scipio's dreamscape.[50]

Finally, the *de Legibus*, too, features a peculiar mixture of the universal and the particular, notional perfection and its historical realisation, though in this case the interlocking of philosophy and history that the dialogue enacts has troubled commentators: 'The move from the embrace of Stoic theory in Book 1 to the drafting of legislation for human communities in Books 2 ff., though held the [*sic*] prospect as early as 1.17, is thus deeply problematic in ways Cicero either did not see or chose not to grapple with.'[51] From a logical point of view, Cicero's design may indeed generate the impression of a *concordia discors*, the infelicitous marriage of two projects at variance with one another. But from a rhetorical point of view, the conflation of Greek philosophical theory and Roman legislative practice makes 'perfect' sense: it continues and concludes the approach Cicero had pioneered in the *de Oratore* and developed further in the *de Re*

[48] Klingner 1961: 635. [49] *Rep.* 6.31 ~ *Phdr.* 245c.

[50] Contrast *Tusculans* 1, where Cicero recycles his translation of the *Phaedrus*-passage (1.53–4, now with acknowledgement), but also recapitulates Socrates' claim in the *Meno* and the *Phaedo* that pieces of knowledge we must have acquired through an encounter with the Forms in a disembodied state prior to birth prove the immortality of the soul (1.57–8).

[51] Dyck 2004: 238. Contrast Girardet 1983, to whom this paragraph is much indebted; and see Annas' discussion in Chapter 10, at pp. 219–23.

Publica. Upon inspection, the *de Legibus* pursues exactly the same agenda as the earlier dialogues, insofar as it situates (the possibility of) perfection in Roman reality, within a larger temporal dynamic: a past perfection lost, to be regained with the help of Greek, more specifically Stoic and Platonic philosophy. In the *de Legibus*, as elsewhere in Cicero's *oeuvre*, philosophy is thus brought into play to bridge the gap between the past and the present, helping to restore vanished greatness. For at present, much is rotten in the Roman commonwealth, and Cicero's own experience with the law proffers ample evidence that matters are not as they ought to be: in particular, his tragic downfall after the heroics of his consulship evinces that currently both legal institutions and pieces of legislation have the potential to make a mockery of justice. Much of Roman positive law is sound; but it needs reform along philosophical principles, which means, not least, the introduction of ethical considerations into the law-code. No one is better suited to achieve this reform than Cicero himself, and so he volunteers to act within the remits of his literary world as cosmic *nomothetes* who imposes a code of law *urbi et orbi*. His own tenet that the city of Rome has become co-extensive with the universe helps to eliminate the apparent tension between history and philosophy, positive and natural law: in Cicero's vision the two ultimately (ought to) coincide, just as Rome is both polis and cosmopolis. However problematic the move from Stoic theory to actual legislation may be for the conceptual coherence of the work, it is at the very heart of Cicero's undertaking, namely to imbricate the search for perfection with Roman realities, by means of historical revival and philosophical innovation.[52] In the *de Legibus*, it is, not least, pieces of legislation inspired by, or directly taken from, Plato that are designed to realise this task.[53]

To sum up the findings from our survey of the three dialogues Cicero wrote in the 50s, which are, respectively, concerned with the ideal orator, the perfect commonwealth, and the best code of law: in each of the three works, the search for perfection is flagged up as a Platonic undertaking, even if Plato himself comes in for heavy criticism and Platonic doctrine is not accorded any special status – indeed, it often takes a back seat to Stoicism or New-Academic thought and figures (such as Carneades). Still,

[52] For the triangulation of the search for the perfect code of law, the revival of lost excellence, and innovation see e.g. *Leg*. 3.37: *quamobrem, quoniam non recognoscimus nunc leges populi Romani sed aut repetimus ereptas aut novas scribimus, non quid hoc populo obtineri possit sed quid optimum sit tibi dicendum puto*.

[53] For Platonic influence on Cicero's legislation see the survey by Dyck 2004: 290, with detailed discussion in the commentary.

it would be mistaken to downplay the Platonic outlook and inspiration of these intellectual enterprises as a whole, which are at any rate obvious in the case of *de Re Publica* and *de Legibus* but also inform the *de Oratore*, especially in how each work is set up as an inquiry in search of perfection. Unlike Plato, however, who goes beyond imagined perfection to endow it with metaphysical reality, Cicero correlates imagined perfection with its empirical realisation, in what amounts to a brand of thought that one could label 'Platonic realism' or 'the incarnation of the Forms': it consists of a peculiar merging of Greek metaphysics and Roman reality. In the *de Oratore*, the instantiation of the ideal is prospective, insofar as the ideal orator is a figure of the future for Cicero's characters (though the discussion makes it clear that his coming is nigh); in the *de Re Publica*, it is decidedly retrospective: both Cicero and his characters situate the ideal commonwealth in the distant past; and in the *de Legibus*, it is both retrospective and prospective at once: the dialogue develops a code of law that comes close to being identical with, but also strategically reforms, ancestral Roman law.

In these dialogues, Cicero clearly sees no reason to follow Plato in endorsing the existence of the Forms or even to mention them. Rather, his ultimate points of reference remain empirical facts, or at least possibilities. Indeed, he deliberately and programmatically contrasts the empirical substance of his (perfect) entities with the theoretical fancy of Plato's *Republic* by taking Socrates at his word that his city is an imaginative invention, the outcome of πλάττειν. In the *de Oratore* and the *de Re Publica*, its Latin equivalent *fingere* emerges as the lexical linchpin that allows Cicero to appropriate the Platonic strategy of seeking perfection in discourse, while at the same time distancing his own efforts from the fictions that he takes to be the outcome of this strategy in Plato. All three of the dialogues are Platonic in spirit and outlook, insofar as a Platonic commitment to ideals guides and governs their overall argument; at the same time, there is never a hint that Cicero takes Plato's theory of Forms seriously – on the contrary, he subjects the ontology of his predecessor to subtle ridicule.

ASCENT TO THE FORMS: CICERO'S *EPANABATHMOS*

If, in the 50s, Cicero kept Plato's Forms at arm's length, in the 40s he started to validate Platonic metaphysics, in a way that went beyond the eschatological dreamscape of *de Re Publica* 6. The first evidence of this 'turn to the Forms' comes from the *Orator*, penned in 46, a treatise in which Cicero revisited the search for perfection in eloquence; as in the *de Oratore*, this involved him in the delineation of the perfect orator (*summus*

orator) or, rather the Form of Eloquence, through an act of imaginative invention (*fingere*). Yet in contrast to the *de Oratore*, in the *Orator* Cicero immediately and programmatically connects the heuristic construct with Plato's Forms, thus acknowledging the full intellectual agenda of Plato's *Republic* and other Platonic dialogues that feature an 'ascent' to the Forms, notably the *Symposium* (*Orat.* 7–10):

Atque ego in summo oratore fingendo talem informabo qualis fortasse nemo fuit. non enim quaero quis fuerit, sed quid sit illud quo nihil esse possit praestantius, quod in perpetuitate dicendi non saepe atque haud scio an numquam, in aliqua autem parte eluceat aliquando, idem apud alios densius, apud alios fortasse rarius. (**8**) sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit unde illud ut ex ore aliquo quasi imago exprimatur; quod neque oculis neque auribus neque ullo sensu percipi potest; cogitatione tantum et mente complectimur. itaque et Phidiae simulacris, quibus nihil in illo genere perfectius videmus, et iis picturis, quas nominavi, cogitare tamen possumus pulchriora. (**9**) nec vero ille artifex, cum faceret Iovis formam aut Minervae, contemplabatur aliquem e quo similitudinem duceret, sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam, quam intuens in eaque defixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat. ut igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens, cuius ad cogitatam speciem imitando referuntur ea quae sub oculos ipsa [non] cadunt,[54] sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus, effigiem auribus quaerimus. (**10**) has rerum formas appellat ἰδέας ille non intelligendi solum sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister Plato, easque gigni negat et ait semper esse ac ratione et intelligentia contineri, cetera nasci occidere, fluere labi nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu. quicquid est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum.

As for my part, in fashioning the ideal orator I shall construe him as such a one as perhaps no one ever was. I am not inquiring who he was but what that ideal is that cannot be surpassed, which, in the universal history of public speech, shines forth not frequently and, for all I know, perhaps never, but in some part at some point, in some in more concentrated, in others, perhaps, in less concentrated fashion. But I am of the opinion that nothing of any type is so beautiful that that is not more

[54] Editors and interpreters are divided as to whether or not to retain the *non* of the codices. Wimmel 1974: 186–8 has recently argued forcefully for its retention. He translates as follows: 'So, wie es also im Bereich der Formen und der plastischen Kunst etwas Vollendetes und Herausragendes gibt, nach dessen (geistig) vorgestelltem Idealbild (*ad cogitatam speciem*) im Nachahmungsverfahren (des produzierenden Künstlers) diejenigen (Elemente des Kunstwerkes) bemessen und umrissen werden (*referuntur ea*), die im Bereich der unseren Augen zugänglichen Wirklichkeit nicht vorkommen (*quae sub oculos ipsa non cadunt*) . . . ' This is an ingenious attempt to make sense of the transmitted text, but I think the case for deletion is stronger. As already Sandys 1885: 10–11 had pointed out, 'Cicero is using the notion of the ideal in art to illustrate the contrast between ideal eloquence and its actual realization', with *cogitata species eius, quod in formis et figuris perfectum est et excellens* prefiguring the *perfectae eloquentiae species* that we see with our mind (*animo videmus*) and the phrase *ea quae sub oculos ipsa cadunt* prefiguring the 'concrete copy' (*effigies*) of the ideal eloquence that we perceive with our ears.

beautiful from which it has been copied as if it were a mask taken from someone's face. This cannot be perceived with the eyes, ears, or any other sense; we only grasp it in thought and our mind. Therefore we are nevertheless able to *think* of things more beautiful than even the statues of Phidias, the most beautiful in this category to look at, or the paintings I mentioned. And when that artist created the statues of Zeus and Athena, he did not envision anyone in particular whom he reproduced, but inside his mind there resided a certain outstanding form of beauty; gazing upon it with focused concentration, he oriented his craft and his hand towards its imitation. And just as there is something perfect and outstanding in forms and figures, towards whose contemplated Form those aspects are related in the act of imitation that fall within empirical sight, so we see in our mind the Form of perfect eloquence and seek its image with our ears.[55] These Forms of things Plato, the most authoritative author and teacher not only of philosophical insight but also of eloquence, calls 'Ideas' and he denies that they come into being and says that they are eternal and grounded in reason and rational insight; other entities are born, perish, flow, and collapse and do not remain any longer in one and the same condition. Hence everything that is the subject of rational and methodical inquiry must be related back to the ultimate Form and essence of its type.

In the course of the paragraph Cicero gradually works his way up, via argumentative steps and lexical slippage, from a figment of the imagination to (transcendental) Forms; and after his ascent from the familiar to the Platonic, he turns the Forms into the requisite point of reference for all systematic inquiry, in a ring-composition of sorts.[56] In the move from an imaginary construct to ultimate entities, different modes of reality and the nature of their relation (or imbrication) come gradually into view. In outline, the argument proceeds via the following steps:

§ 7: Point of departure

Key contrast: 'perfection' (*in summo oratore*), introduced as an imaginary construct (*fingendo*, *informabo*) vis-à-vis its empirical/historical realisation (arguably never; if ever, then by degrees).

Unresolved problem: the precise ontological status of (the quality of) perfection, especially in the light of the slippage from *fingendo* and *informabo* to *quaero* and, especially, *eluceat*.[57]

[55] Cf. Kroll 1913: 25: 'wir suchen das reale Abbild der Idealberedsamkeit mit dem Ohre aufzufassen.'

[56] The highly technical *quicquid est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur* of **§ 10** picks up and systematically develops the unfocused and banal *quaero* of **§ 7**.

[57] The first two verbs put the emphasis on discursive construction, whereas *quaero* and, in particular, *eluceat* suggest at least the possibility of empirical manifestation. An analogous adjustment concerns Cicero's switch from the person of the *summus orator* (*non enim quaero quis fuerit*) to the quality of perfection in eloquence (*sed quid sit illud quo . . .*), which can be realised in different degrees. See also § 104: *nec enim nunc de nobis, sed de re dicimus*.

§ 8: Addressing, at least provisionally, the unresolved problems of **§ 7**: 'perfection' exists somewhere/somehow outside the human imagination (it is not a 'mere' construct) since empirical qualities necessarily point beyond themselves to something better ('more perfect'), in which they are implicated and from which they derive in inferior acts of mimesis.

Key new contrast: perfect entities vis-à-vis their (inferior) mimetic replication.

Unresolved problem: what are these perfect entities and where do they reside?

§ 9: Oblique solution of the unresolved problem of **§ 8**, by (a) an analogy with artistic creation and (b) the distinction between sense-perception and mental perception: (a) the notion of perfection upon which the artist looks (*intuens*) resides in his mind (*in mente insidebat*);[58] (b) just as the perfection instantiated in empirical forms and figures (*ea quae sub oculos ipsa* [*non*] *cadunt*) is accessible to thought (cf. *ad cogitatam speciem*), so the Form of perfect Eloquence is open to mental perception (*animo videmus*), and its (mimetic) instantiation in practice is to be perceived by the ears (*effigiem auribus quaerimus*).

Unresolved problem: what is (the nature of) this Form that Cicero has here introduced?

§ 10: Addressing the unresolved problem of **§ 9** with reference to Plato's ἰδέαι.

Before considering issues of philosophical doctrine, it is worth lingering a bit on matters of diction, argument and rhetoric, not least the linguistic subterfuges by which Cicero tries to endow the actual existence of Plato's Forms with at least a semblance of plausibility. To begin with, in the course of the passage, the Forms undergo a gradual increase in ontological import, which Cicero helps along by means of strategic lexical choices. Thus we start out with a 'mental sketch' (*in-<u>form</u>-abo*) that only exists in the imagination (cf. *fingendo*).[59] This is very much in the spirit of Crassus in the *de Oratore*, but already the subsequent sentence features a determined departure into novel territory: Cicero, without flagging up what he is doing, simply drops fictional perfection in favour of notional perfection that exists in and of itself and may manifest itself to varying degrees in empirical entities (cf. *eluceat*). In what follows, we get a similar movement at a higher level as Cicero proceeds from the material form of the statue of a god (*Iovis <u>formam</u> aut Minervae*), to pointing out that this presupposes, both temporally and conceptually, the existence of an immaterial form of

[58] Kroll 1913: 25 refers to Pl. *Crat.* 389a and *Tim.* 28a.

[59] The *TLL* glosses *informare* with '*animo concipere*' (7.1, 1478.76–8). A suggestive parallel for the *Orator* passage is *ad Att.* 7.3.2 = 126 SB: *illum virum, qui in sexto libro informatus est*. In both places, Cicero assesses Roman realities against his notional ideals, and the practice of constructing notional ideals derives from Plato. (See also *Orat.* 33.)

beauty in the mind of the artist (*species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam*), to using the artist analogy to posit the existence of (Platonic) Forms (*perfectae eloquentiae species*; *has rerum formas appellat ἰδέας*), the existence of which encourages the heuristic use of perfection in intellectual inquiry. The last sentence, with its exhortation to relate each object under investigation *ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque*, brings the argument full circle – perfection has progressed from speculative fiction to metaphysical fact.

The repeated use of *forma* (as well as etymologically related words or synonyms, such as *species*) prepares for the use of the term to render the Platonic ἰδέα. In support of his gradual ascent to Plato's Forms Cicero makes deft use of analogy (one Roman, one Greek) derived from mimetic crafts: the creation of a wax mask from a face;[60] and sculpture. Likewise, he uses the artistic vision of invisible entities (such as gods) and their material representation to illustrate the correlation of the perfect and the real. In Plato's *Republic*, of course, artistic mimesis is one level further removed from the world of ideas than our everyday reality and hence a potential distraction from the pursuit of truth and insight. Cicero reverses the dynamic: in the *Orator*, artistic creation is marshalled in support of a movement towards, rather than away from, the Forms, even though Sandys rightly draws attention to the fact that our passage recalls, however dimly, Plato's own use of the artist analogy at *Rep*. 6.484c and 501b: 'In both of these passages, the attitude of the philosopher engaged in developing a perfect republic is described in language borrowed from the art of painting.'[61] And even if the references to artistic endeavours were to introduce a slightly incongruous note, their persuasive benefits are considerable. By combining the phenomenon of resemblance of form across different media (*imago*, *exprimere*, *similitudo* (twice), *imitari*, *effigies*) with the strategic use of the comparative (*praestantius*, *pulchrius*, *perfectius*) Cicero produces the

[60] The formulation *ut ex ore aliquo quasi imago exprimatur* alludes to the practice of Rome's senatorial elite to generate wax masks of deceased former office-holders (whether from their face, a bust or a statue remains somewhat unclear), which were preserved in little shrines in the *atria* of noble houses: see in general Flower 1996.

[61] Sandys 1885: 9–10; Cicero already engaged these passages in the *de Re Publica*. See above pp. 244–5. We may also ponder the possibility that Cicero's portrayal of the artist obliquely plays off the demiurge of Plato's *Timaeus*: as commentators have pointed out, the formulation *species . . . quaedam quam intuens in eaque defixus . . . artem et manum dirigebat* recalls *Tim*. 28a: ὅτου μὲν οὖν ἂν ὁ δημιουργὸς πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχον βλέπων ἀεί, τοιούτῳ τινὶ προσχρώμενος παραδείγματι, τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ δύναμιν αὐτοῦ ἀπεργάζηται, καλὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὕτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι πᾶν, which Cicero translated as follows: *quocirca si is qui aliquod munus efficere molitur eam speciem, quae semper eadem, intuebitur atque id sibi proponet exemplar, praeclarum opus efficiat necesse est* (*Tim*. 4).

requisite scaling across levels of reality that finds quasi-natural closure with the Platonic Forms.[62]

The rhetorical dimension of the passage gains further in profile when set against a comparable passage in Plato. While it is impossible to identify any one place in Plato that served Cicero as model, *Symposium* 211a–b (that is, the end of Diotima's speech) offers an illuminating parallel, on account of both similarities in theme and differences in style.[63] It is indeed suggestive that Cicero turns to the special case of (perfect) beauty and the Platonic idea of the beautiful (**§ 8**: *pulchrum*, *pulchrius*, *pulchriora*; **9**: *species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam*) to explore what the search for perfection entails:[64]

πρῶτον μὲν **ἀεὶ ὂν** καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλό, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ' ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν· οὐδ' αὖ φαντασθήσεται αὐτῷ τὸ καλὸν οἷον πρόσωπόν τι οὐδὲ χεῖρες οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν σῶμα μετέχει, οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ που ὂν ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινι, οἷον ἐν ζώῳ ἢ ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἢ ἔν τῳ ἄλλῳ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς **ἀεὶ ὂν**, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον

[62] In *Orat.* 19 Cicero characterises his own discourse with reference to the idiom he introduces here to define the relationship between ontological levels: if he is unable to represent or reproduce the perfect orator (*quem si imitari atque exprimere non possumus*), a task that presupposes quasi-divine powers, he can at least attempt to describe him.

[63] See Kroll 1913: 25–6, who refers to *Smp.* 211a, though not before noting: 'Cic. Äußerungen über Platons Lehre beruhen nicht auf einer Platonstelle, sondern sind aus mehreren kombiniert, also vielleicht aus einer ὑποτύπωσις der platonischen Lehre entnommen.' The following comparison does not require us to assume that Cicero had the *Symposium* in mind when composing *Orator* 7–10.

[64] Another passage that may have stood as a model is *Tim.* 27d–28a (Ἔστιν οὖν δὴ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν. ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.), not least since Cicero's translation of it (*Tim.* 3: *quid est quod semper sit neque ullum habeat ortum, et quod gignatur nec umquam sit? quorum alterum intellegentia et ratione conprehenditur, quod unum atque idem semper est; alterum quod adfert <ad> opinionem sensus rationis expers, quod totum opinabile est, id gignitur et interit nec umquam esse vere potest*) features some striking lexical parallels with *Orat.* 10. Moreover, while Cicero omits to translate Plato's insistence on a fundamental distinction (. . . πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε), the spirit of the distinction, and the dire need *to be able to* distinguish, between a domain of being and truth and a domain of fluidity and falsehood animates the *Orator* (see below on *Orat.* 16) and Cicero's oratory and philosophy more generally: Gildenhard 2011: 141–67. One further Platonic dialogue of relevance here is the *Phaedrus*, where Socrates/Plato also single out beauty. It is a constant presence in the *de Oratore* and Cicero alludes to it at *Orat.* 15, 39, 41. Long 1995a: 52 has the following observation, within a general discussion in which he proposes to see the *Orator* as Cicero's *Phaedrus*: 'But the Form Plato expounded most fully in the *Phaedrus* was that of beauty, not eloquence. In Cicero's treatment of the latter, I suggest we are intended to see a critique of Plato's depreciation of rhetoric as well as a constructive use of his philosophy.'

γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἀπολλυμένων μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν.

To begin with, it is always and neither comes into being nor passes away, neither increases nor diminishes; then it is not in part beautiful and in part ugly, nor sometimes beautiful and sometimes not, nor in comparison to this beautiful and in comparison to that ugly, nor in this location beautiful and in that one ugly, as if it is beautiful for some, but ugly for others. And the beautiful will not appear to him as some face or hands or anything else that the body partakes of, or as a speech or some piece of knowledge, or as being somehow within something else, such as a living being or the earth or the sky or anything else; rather it is entirely by and within itself and forever unchanging. But any other beautiful thing partakes in the beautiful in such a way that even though the other things come into being and pass away it becomes neither anything more or anything less and remains entirely unaffected.

Diotima here fleshes out the idea of the beautiful in two rhetorical movements: after positing for it the status of an eternal, unchanging essence (ἀεὶ ὂν), she switches into definition by negation, detailing at length what properties the idea of the beautiful does *not* possess. Her focus is on two modalities: coming in and out of existence, an aspect she dispatches quickly via a pair of antonyms (οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον); and undergoing change (of perception) while in existence, an aspect that she extensively elaborates via a catalogue of negatives that culminates in the reiteration of the positive assertion that the idea of the beautiful has an eternal, unchanging essence entirely resting in itself (αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μεθ’ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὂν). The stark contrast between the idea of the beautiful and empirical manifestations of beauty sets up the second part (τὰ δὲ ἄλλα . . .), in which Diotima explains the nature of the relationship between the former and the latter – empirical instances of beauty *partake* in the idea of the beautiful, but are themselves subject to permanent change, including loss of the quality altogether – which she concludes with a renewed emphasis on the fact, via a series of negative specifications, that the idea of the beautiful is itself immune to change. With supreme economy, *Orator* 7–10 re-enacts the contrastive delineation of two distinct ontological spheres, as well as the attendant specification of how these two spheres interrelate.[65] Another close resemblance concerns Cicero's description of the Forms, which he sets out with the help of one of his favourite tropes, i.e. the chiasm:

[65] The notion of perfection somehow partaking, sharing and manifesting themselves in empirical reality is introduced by *eluceat* in **§ 7** and finds elaboration in the Phidias-simile in **§ 9** (see esp. the formulation *in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens*).

I The Forms

A1: negative specification: *eas gigni negat*

B1: positive specifications: *ait semper esse (ac ratione et intelligentia contineri)*[66]

II Empirical phenomena

B2: positive specifications: *cetera nasci occidere, fluere labi*

A2: negative specification: *nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu*

Like Diotima, Cicero focuses on the two modalities of coming into, and going out of, existence and undergoing change: he uses two pairs of antonyms to cover the former (*eas gigni negat*/*ait semper esse*; *nasci*/*occidere*) and a climactic tricolon (*fluere*, *labi*, *nec diutius esse uno et eodem statu*) to articulate the latter. Implied in the last item is the claim that the form is always *uno et eodem statu*, which captures rather deftly the concept that in Diotima's discourse reads αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ μεθ' αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν.[67] Irrespective of whether the *Orator* passage constitutes a deliberate rewriting of *Symposium* 211a–b, the differences in style and design between Plato's Greek and Cicero's Latin are symptomatic. The principles at work in Diotima's discourse are ring-composition, catalogue-style enumerations, and carefully balanced antinomies; Cicero prefers a chiastic arrangement that is, by definition, rhetorically disciplined and produces a set of clearly articulated symmetries and contrasts.

Diotima's speech also provides a good comparandum for how Plato and Cicero imagine the acquisition of knowledge of the Forms. She outlines a gradual progression from seeing (only) empirical particulars to grasping their underlying enabling conditions, i.e. the Forms, that requires practical exercises in pederasty as well as less hands-on philosophical instruction and culminates in a grasping of the Form of the beautiful, which she parallels to initiation in the mysteries and a moment of revelation (210e):

ὃς γὰρ ἂν μέχρι ἐνταῦθα πρὸς τὰ ἐρωτικὰ παιδαγωγηθῇ, θεώμενος ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς τὰ καλά, πρὸς τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν.

[66] One advantage of this 'architectural' approach to verbal composition is that it highlights those pieces that do not fit into the basic structure. In this case, it is the phrase *ac ratione et intelligentia contineri*, discussed below.

[67] Plato uses μονοειδές as attribute of the Forms only here and in the *Phaedo* (78d5, 80b2, 83c2), in the sense of 'eingestaltig, bloß eine einzige Gestalt habend': Schmitz 1985: 17.

For someone who has been taught thus far about the matters of love, viewing beautiful things in an orderly sequence and moving by this time towards the final consummation of the process, will suddenly see something wonderful, beautiful in its nature.

Diotima's discourse is replete with signifiers pertaining to sight, although it is important to note that the presence of mystic language is rather restrained, being limited to the point that ultimate insight happens 'suddenly' (ἐξαίφνης) and that the Form of the beautiful 'becomes visible' (211e: φαντασθήσεται) mentally, rather than empirically: 'this suggests the final stage in the mysteries, when out of darkness there blazed forth suddenly the mystical φθέγγος'.[68] But at least on the lexical level Diotima tries hard to downplay the difference between empirical and 'theoretical' sight: both gazing upon particular instances of beauty and upon the idea of the beautiful are activities she describes by means of *theasthai* and *(kath)oran*. In her account we first get the seeker of beauty gazing at beautiful things (210e: θεώμενος . . . τὰ καλά); at the end, he gazes at the beautiful (211d–e: θεωμένῳ αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν; αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν; αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν . . . μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν). Cicero, while differing in nuances, offers essentially the same dichotomy and ascent from empirical sight to theoretical/speculative insight, even though on the lexical level he differentiates much more sharply between these two modes of seeing: *oculis/auribus/sensu percipi* stands in contrast to *cogitatione/mente complecti* and *videre* to *cogitare* (**§ 8**).[69] Besides opposing sense-perception to thought, he emphasises that the object of contemplation is inaccessible to the eyes (cf. the contrast in **§ 9** between *cogitata species* and *ea quae sub oculos ipsa [non] cadunt*). Only towards the end does he blur the distinction by introducing the concept of 'mental vision': *perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus, effigiem auribus quaerimus*. Likewise, he does not adopt the mystic language of Diotima – and, of course, says nothing about fondling beautiful adolescents as an intermediary step towards rational insight into

[68] Bury 1932: 128.

[69] The idiom of (mental) perception recurs in *Orat.* 18, where Cicero, upon reporting that his teacher Antonius claimed to have known many verbally skilled speakers (*diserti*) but no one who was eloquent (*eloquens*) continues: *insidebat videlicet in eius mente species eloquentiae, quam cernebat animo, re ipsa non videbat*. (See also *Orat.* 19: . . . *habuit profecto comprehensam animo quandam formam eloquentiae*; the *quandam* is Cicero's only, though, from a Platonic view, rather considerable qualification to the claim that Antonius beheld the Form of Eloquence.)

the true nature of things.[70] His emphasis on method and principled procedure at the end (*quicquid est igitur de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ultimam sui generis formam speciemque redigendum*) rather resembles Plato's own endorsement of strenuous dialectics as a way of inducing the ultimate flash of rational insight in *Epistle* 7 – especially in conjunction with his earlier insistance that perfection may shine forth empirically (cf. *eluceat*).[71] His choice of idiom to describe how to get from one vision to the other (*ratio*, *intellegentia*, *redigere*) is much closer to the rational inquiry of the *Timaeus* than the mysticism of the *Symposium*.

Cicero, then, put much careful thought into diction and argument. From a rhetorical point of view, the passage is masterful. It is therefore all the more striking that, from a philosophical point of view, it leaves much to be desired. The material, of course, is dense and difficult: Cicero delineates four different modes of being (fictional, empirical, notional, transcendental), explores their correlation (or imbrication), addresses the epistemological challenge of how we can grasp an invisible, ulterior reality, and asserts its foundational importance for how to assess and position ourselves within everyday reality, at least for the purpose of intellectual inquiry. But the way he does all this manifests a striking lack of conceptual precision – it is as if he offered us a view of the Forms through a Latin looking-glass, darkly.

Various features of the passage contribute to this overall sense of philosophical imprecision. To begin with, as we have already noted, despite his explicit reference to Plato, Cicero studiously avoids the exact invocation of a specific model text; rather, we have more or less vague similarities with a range of passages, mainly from the *Symposium*, the *Timaeus* and the *Seventh Letter*. What makes matters even murkier is the fact that he uses

[70] Cf. *Orat.* 101: *non enim eloquentem quaero, neque quidquam mortale et caducum, sed illud ipsum cuius qui sit compos sit eloquens; quod nihil est aliud nisi eloquentia ipsa, quam nullis nisi mentis oculis videre possumus*.

[71] *Ep.* 7. 344b: μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, ὀνόματα καὶ λόγοι ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἐν εὐμενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόμενα καὶ ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσεσιν χρωμένων, ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις περὶ ἕκαστον καὶ νοῦς, συντείνων ὅτι μάλιστ' εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην. The passage adumbrates three elements (recognition of limits to human efforts in knowing, the vital importance of dialectics, and the postulation of the existence of an (inaccessible) realm of (metaphysical) truth or wisdom that may became apparent in glimpses) that are also constitutive of the conjectural metaphysics that characterises Cicero's brand of New Academic scepticism: Peetz 2005, with particular reference to *Off.* 2.8 (*Contra autem omnia disputantur a nostris, quod hoc ipsum probabile elucere non possit, nisi ex utraque parte causarum esset facta contentio*). As Burkert 1965: 187 points out with reference to *ad Att.* 10.8.6 = 199 SB, *ad fam.* 1.9.18 = 20 SB, *Tusc.* 5.100, Cicero was intimately familiar with the *Epistle*. See also Gildenhard 2006: 203–5 for the special political relevance of this letter for Cicero's self-fashioning as a *Plato redivivus* in the civil war period.

Plato to pursue an unPlatonic, indeed anti-Platonic, agenda: 'Eloquence' is not a Form that Plato would have easily recognised.[72] Moreover, whereas only Plato receives named acknowledgement, Cicero's choice of idiom, imagery and argumentative technique features parallels with Stoic thought and New Academic procedure, including how these schools may have interpreted Plato's Forms in an effort to bring this difficult and obscure doctrine in line with their own philosophies.[73] The gradual scaling of quality towards perfection, for instance, resembles Balbus' argument for the existence of a (Stoic) divinity in the *de Natura Deorum*.[74] In addition to strategic syncretism Cicero practises tactical reticence, only broaching, without satisfactorily addressing, various key issues to do with the philosophy of Forms.[75] Thus, he is clearly conscious of the problem of how empirical phenomena 'participate' in the Forms – but only loosely adumbrates the precise modality of participation.[76] Several formulations raise the question of where the Forms are located; Cicero, however, never addresses this issue head-on – indeed, he skirts around it so deftly that scholars have taken him to endorse the full spectrum of possibilities, from transcendental entities in the spirit of Plato and Platonism to the Stoic assimilation of Plato's Forms to universal and perhaps even mind-dependent concepts.[77]

[72] Long 1995a: 50 offers the following brilliant observation on 'Cicero's use of Plato in order to set up the clearly unPlatonic Form of Eloquence': 'Cicero does this because he wants to represent his own ideal – the proper combination of philosophy and rhetoric – as true to the spirit, though not to the letter, of Plato's discourses.'

[73] Burkert 1965: 190–1 n. 45 briefly summarises the meaning and function of ἰδέαι and εἴδη in Peripatetic, New Academic and Stoic philosophy.

[74] As pointed out to me by Malcolm Schofield: see *ND* 2.45; Balbus' view is attacked by Cotta at 3.20–1. See also Gersh 1986: 152: 'the use of this latter phrase [sc. "that than which nothing can be more excellent"] seems to reflect the Stoic definition of God, so that it looks as though Cicero or his source is combining Stoic theology and Platonic epistemology'.

[75] As *Ac.* 1.30–2 shows, Cicero was quite aware of the fact that Plato's Forms constituted a highly controversial piece of thought that triggered a range of criticisms and re-interpretations.

[76] Dörrie 1987: 520: 'Wenn auch der hier zu erwartende Ausdruck "Teilhabe" nicht fällt, so kann doch die Wendung *quod . . . eluceat* nur von hier aus verstanden werden.'

[77] On Stoic concepts see Dyson 2009: 88–102. (I owe this reference to Reinhardt in press, which offers further thought on the topic.) The question of existence and location emerges obliquely in Cicero's choice of *insidebat* and his assertion that the Forms *ratione et intellegentia contineri*. Translation and interpretation of this phrase are controversial. Kroll 1913: 26 argues that Cicero translates *Tim.* 28a (cited above, note 64); Dörrie 1987: 247 suggests that Cicero translates λογισμῷ καὶ διανοίᾳ and translates as follows: 'Er sagt, daß sie . . . durch Vernunft und Denkvermögen umschlossen werden'; Gersh 1986: 150 takes the phrase to mean that the Forms '"are sustained by" (*contineri*) the mind' and, in part following Burkert 1965, explains this apparent deviation from Plato with reference to 'the intervention of the Stoics' (153). This reading is strongly rejected by Long 1995a: 49: 'We should resist the common supposition . . . that Cicero or his source approached the Platonic theory of Forms via Aristotelian and/or Stoic doctrine about the conceptualization of universals. What Cicero says is much too close to Plato's text for our need to intrude those heresies as mediating

Rather than reading an unequivocal commitment to any one school conception out of (or into) the text, however, it is perhaps more prudent to acknowledge that Cicero's account does not endorse a clear line on the problem – arguably deliberately so: 'Bezeichnenderweise geht Cicero dieser Frage nicht nach . . . Er versagt es sich durchaus . . . die schulüblichen Folgerungen, welche in die ontologische Problematik führen müssen, zu ziehen.'[78] Epistemological issues – where and how are the Forms present for humans? – receive just as opaque and allusive a treatment as ontological matters: Cicero uses the formulations *cogitatione et mente* and *ratione et intellegentia*, without further elaboration.[79]

There is a rationale to Cicero's doxographical syncretism and doctrinal reserve that has arguably little to do with any putative reliance on any putative Greek source and a lot with his own agenda in the *Orator* (and his late *philosophica* more generally). Right after establishing Plato's Forms as a necessary point of reference of any systematic investigation into the nature of things, Cicero acknowledges that this approach may well raise eyebrows (*Orat.* 11):

Ac video hanc primam ingressionem meam non ex oratoriis disputationibus ductam sed e media philosophia repetitam, et eam quidem cum antiquam tum subobscuram aut reprehensionis aliquid aut certe admirationis habituram. Nam aut mirabuntur quid haec pertineant ad ea quae quaerimus – quibus satis faciet res ipsa cognita, ut non sine causa alte repetita videatur – aut reprehendent, quod inusitatas vias indagemus, tritas relinquamus.

I realise that this initial part of my introduction has not been derived from discussions on oratory, but has been taken from the centre of philosophy, and an ancient and rather obscure philosophy at that, bound to incite some rebuke or at least astonishment. For readers will either wonder in what sense these matters are pertinent to the subject of our investigation – these will be satisfied once the thing itself has been understood so that it does not seem to have been taken from afar without reason – or reprove that we embark upon novel paths and leave behind well-travelled ones.

In his reply to the objections he imagines here he argues that what appears to be new is in fact of archetypal age, if unknown to most, and fully in line with his commitment to Plato as the founder of the Academy, to which he professed allegiance, not least since it enabled his mastery of

factors, nor are they compatible with the everlasting and changeless existence that he ascribes to Plato's Forms.'

[78] Dörrie 1987: 521.

[79] Dörrie 1987: 522: 'Daß einzelne Menschen nur darum zu erkennen vermögen, weil sie an einem und demselben *Noûs* teilhaben, wird von Cicero nicht erwähnt.'

rhetoric.[80] Cicero clearly felt that his endorsement of Plato's Forms called for some sort of apology and explanation – as well he might. But however he tries to justify himself, the fact remains that his turn to the Forms marks a new departure – especially when compared to his practice in the 50s BC – that, he anticipates, will be met with surprise and suspicion or indeed outright hostility. Given such (imagined) resistance, keeping technicalities to a minimum makes sense: there was no need for Cicero to delve into intricate and obscure issues of Greek ontology and epistemology for his own purposes; on the contrary, adding them on would most likely have even further decreased the already precarious appeal and plausibility of his chosen approach to intellectual inquiry. Evocative diction, suggestive images, graphic analogies, appeals to common experience, and a sound and intuitive progression of the argument, with just a few requisite hints and gestures to metaphysical doctrine, served his purpose much better than doxographical precision, thoroughness and polemics. We can therefore sum up our findings so far as follows:

(i) For some reason, Cicero wanted the Forms for his own rhetorical-philosophical (and hence also political) project, despite the fact that their invocation violated some basic principles of public speech, such as commitment to common sense and demotic reach. In fact, he is fully cognisant that his use of Plato's Forms may register negatively with his readers and does his best to downplay the novelty of his move by situating his endorsement of the Forms within a wider biographical context (a lifelong commitment to Plato and the Academy).

(ii) In his actual account of perfection and the Forms, however, which includes a reconfiguration of the relation between philosophy and oratory vis-à-vis his earlier writings in particular the *de Oratore* (and a renewed appreciation of Plato as the fountainhead of both), philosophical considerations take a backseat to rhetorical concerns.[81] Facing a steep threshold of plausibility – not least in light of his own earlier practice – he proceeds to outline an ascent to Plato's Forms by means of a carefully crafted text that draws on the entire repertory of available

[80] *Orat.* 12: *Ego autem et me saepe nova videri dicere intellego, cum pervetera dicam sed inaudita plerisque, et fateor me oratorem, si modo sim aut etiam quicumque sim, non ex rhetorum officinis sed ex Academiae spatiis exstitisse; illa enim sunt curricula multiplicium variorumque sermonum, in quibus Platonis primum sunt impressa vestigia*. With the formulation *ex Academiae spatiis* Cicero recalls his training by New Academic philosophers, in particular Philo (see Reinhardt 2000), but also picks up the praise of Plato as a master and authority in both philosophical insight (*intellegere*) and eloquence (*dicere*).

[81] For shifts in the respective value of oratory and philosophy in Cicero's *oeuvre*, as well as their ultimate sublimation in a 'perfect philosophy', see Gildenhard 2007: 152–6 with further bibliography.

reflections on the Forms (of whatever provenance – Platonic, Stoic, New Academic) in an effort to render the existence and import of these entities of perfection as plausible as possible to a most likely rather sceptical audience. This rhetorical approach entails a deliberate skirting or indeed obfuscation of doctrinal problems and doxographical nuances.

(iii) Still, Cicero's account of the Forms fits nicely with his own brand of New Academic scepticism, which combines a heavy investment in dialectical efforts as a means of approximating the truth (or perfection) with a conjectural (in contrast to a dogmatic) metaphysics that enables him to posit that something like Plato's domain of being, truth and perfection is somehow, somewhere out there and can – indeed, ought to – serve as orientation and guide in discourse (and, as we shall see, in practice).[82] While it can never be fully grasped, it may manifest itself in glimpses in empirical reality. But precisely because human cognition has its limits, there is no need to engage in needlessly complicated speculations about the precise nature of the Forms or the exact modalities of their comprehension by humans beyond the premise of their existence and their normative force.

Given the truncated and cagey approach to Cicero's appropriation of an obscure and controversial aspect of Plato's philosophy, the question arises why he felt the need to do so in the first place. As his trilogy of the 50s BC betokens, to insist on notional perfection as a benchmark in intellectual pursuits does not require any reference to Plato's Forms at all. And given his earlier practice of deliberate avoidance or even ridicule, why does he suddenly decide to give such prominence to a problematic aspect of Plato's philosophy that he could have done without? The question has larger implications: the *Orator* passage is by no means a one-off, but representative of a more general shift in Cicero's outlook on philosophy and the world. Plato's Forms remain an implicit and explicit point of reference in various other works he authored in the 40s. In his late *philosophica*, he abandoned the brand of history ('Platonic realism') that he pioneered so forcefully in the 50s, in which he played off the empirical and historical perfection realised at Rome against the insubstantial fictions of Greek philosophical discourse. From the *Orator* onwards, in contrast, we can detect a re-orientation or rather expansion of his thinking. The historical achievements of Rome remain a powerful presence and point of reference throughout; but in addition, Cicero now also validates more forcefully a

[82] Peetz 2005, building on Burkert 1965: 187.

conjectural metaphysics that includes an explicit endorsement of Plato's Forms as standards of perfection. As if to mark this new departure, Cicero begins in *Orator* 7 as if he wanted to revisit the procedure of using a heuristic fiction in the search for perfection; but after mooting the possibility of its historical realisation (if in degrees), which is still very much in the spirit of the dialogues he wrote in the 50s, he takes his argument into an entirely different direction – towards a divine reality, metaphysical foundations, and an absolute point of reference that has some supernatural quality or substance but is ultimately grounded in philosophical speculation. To get at the rationale of Cicero's Platonic turn it will be useful to consider some further passages from the late *philosophica* in which the Forms feature, especially from the *de Officiis*.

FORMS AND THEIR FUNCTION: PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

Gersh helpfully distinguishes passages in which the Forms occur 'as a doctrine of Plato or of the Old Academy from which Cicero withholds his personal commitment' and those in which they are referred to 'as a doctrine of Plato which is central to the development of Cicero's own argument'.[83] We may group among the former such passages as *Ac.* 1.31, where Plato's Forms are mentioned as part of a doxographical survey on epistemology that Cicero puts into the mouth of his character Varro; or *Tusc.* 1.57–8, where Cicero, in trying to persuade his student of the immortality of the soul, recapitulates the Platonic link between the immortal soul, the existence of the Forms, and knowledge as recollection with explicit reference to the *Meno* and the *Phaedo*.[84] Cicero here primarily reports Platonic doctrine, either as a chapter in the history of philosophy or as an apposite move within a lecture that argues for the immortality of the soul. In each case, reference to the Forms – as entities of Platonic pedigree – has a clear, yet also clearly circumscribed, purpose and function. What we can take away from such passages is nevertheless the sense that Cicero does not shy away from appealing to the Forms as an important piece of Platonic doctrine that can be marshalled to corroborate a specific point or outlook on reality.

More interesting for our concerns are passages in which Cicero builds explicit appeals to Plato's Forms into his argument or makes implicit use of the conception of reality they presuppose. In the preface to *Tusc.* 3, for instance, he integrates allusion to Platonic ontology within an account of

[83] Gersh 1986: 150; equally helpfully, he points out that the distinction 'may be of purely literary significance'.
[84] The two passages receive a detailed new discussion in Reinhardt in press.

Stoic *diastrophe*, contrasting *vera honestas*, *eminens effigies virtutis*, and a *gloria* that is *solida et expressa* with a *gloria popularis* that is not real glory (*vera gloria*) but its shadowy image (*adumbrata imago gloriae*). The imagery presupposes a Platonic distinction between a realm of truth (which, however, Cicero goes on to define in socio-ethical terms, stating that genuine glory consists in the *consentiens laus bonorum*) and a realm of falsehood, which stand to each other in the same relation as Plato's spheres of being and becoming: the latter is a shadowy mirage of the former.[85] Yet the best examples of how Cicero has worked the Forms into the fabric of his political philosophy occur in the *de Officiis*.

In *Off.* 1.11–15 Cicero proceeds from what in large stretches reads like an orthodox account of Stoic anthropology, with an emphasis on the identity of *natura* and *ratio*, and an exposition of the *oikeiosis*-doctrine, to a transition from sense perception to mental perception (*ab oculis ad animum*), to a definition of the *honestum* – which initially appears to be the result of rational understanding of empirical experience, but which Cicero then assimilates to a Platonic Form (1.15).[86] In fact, the Platonic climax does not come out of nowhere; Cicero carefully sets it up from 1.13 onwards, in a train of thought not unlike the one we traced in *Orator* 7–10, though here tailored to the main preoccupations of the *de Officiis*, that is, the formulation of a new civic ethics after the experience, and the continuing prospect, of tyranny. The best way to extrapolate the Platonic subtext is via a detailed, running commentary:

In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. Itaque cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui, tum avemus aliquid videre audire addiscere, cognitionemque rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium ad beate vivendum necessariam ducimus. Ex quo intellegitur, quod verum simplex sincerumque sit, id esse naturae hominis aptissimum.

The most distinctive hallmark of the human being is the scrutiny and search of the truth. Hence whenever we are free from our unavoidable occupations and worries, then we desire to see, hear, and learn something, and we consider insight into hidden and wonderful matters essential for a happy life. From this it follows that what is true, absolute, and pure, is most in keeping with human nature. (*Off.* 1.13a)

[85] For a detailed analysis see Gildenhard 2007: 167–87. Cf. *Fin.* 5.69.

[86] After noting what all living beings share, i.e. the drive for self-protection and the drive for procreation, Cicero goes on to detail what sets the human being apart on account of his rational capacity: (i) brute beasts have only a dim awareness of time and understanding of causes and consequences and essentially live in the present; (ii) reason underwrites community and cultural and economic life; (iii) the search for truth; (iv) the desire for dominance; (v) an appreciation of proportion and beauty.

Cicero here brings into some sort of correlation various aspects from the spheres of anthropology, ethics and epistemology: (i) he identifies inquiry into the truth as the essential characteristic of what it is to be human; (ii) he situates the pursuit of truth in the sphere of *otium* (*cum sumus necessariis negotiis curisque vacui*); (iii) he avers that some kind of understanding of the truth is necessary for a happy life; (iv) he outlines, obliquely, what the truth looks like (by means of the attributes *simplex* and *sincerum*); and (v) he claims an innate correspondence of some sort or another between human nature and the truth (and its qualities).

The passage contains at least two striking peculiarities. First, the notion of truth, which, at the beginning of the passage, is abstract and undefined, becomes first associated with matters that are *aut occultae aut admirabiles*, and is then brought into correlation with the qualities of simplicity and purity. How can Cicero be so sure about the properties of truth if truth is a matter that tends to elude human understanding? Second, the claim that the understanding of matters that are hidden or wonderful is necessary for a happy life is an odd thing to say in a Roman context, given that the senatorial elite gave the sphere of *negotium* unconditional priority over the sphere of *otium*.[87] True, Cicero's restriction of the pursuit of truth to whatever time is left over after public business has been taken care of 'accords with the accepted place of intellectual activity in Roman life', which elsewhere in the *de Officiis* Cicero fully and explicitly endorses.[88] Yet he here also validates theoretical insight to a surprising degree by means of an oblique antithesis, underscored on the lexical level, between the *necessaria negotia curaeque*, which inevitably dominate the lives of everyone but philosophers, and the premise that insight into obscure and wonderful matters (or, in a word, the truth) is a prerequisite for a happy life (*ad beate vivendum necessariam*).[89] This is an essentially philosophical (that is, Greek) point of view and produces a conflict with Cicero's insistence that *negotia* take precedence over *otium* – that, indeed, the pursuit of truth at the cost of meeting one's socio-political obligations (*officia*) constitutes

[87] The first sentence (*In primisque . . .*) picks up and elaborates on 1.11, where the human being is set apart from animals on account of his participation in reason (*homo autem, quod rationis est particeps . . .*). Still, the identification of the search for truth as the most distinctive characteristic of the human being introduces a new aspect into the argument, not least since it follows immediately upon a discussion of how *ratio* underwrites our social behaviour in 1.12.

[88] Dyck 1996: 92.

[89] I am grateful to Malcolm Schofield for bringing this aspect of Cicero's text to my attention.

a form of injustice.[90] Within the overall argument of the *de Officiis*, the passage hints at a latent tension between happiness grounded in knowledge of truth and the fulfilment of civic responsibilities.

Despite the tight logical sequence suggested by *itaque* and *ex quo intellegitur*, the passage thus turns out to be rather open-ended, not least in how truth can both belong to matters that are *occultae* or *admirabiles* and be *simplex* and *sincerum* and how the anthropology Cicero endorses here fits into the work as a whole, with its emphasis on civic commitment and the preservation of justice as the *non plus ultra* of human nature.[91] In all, the stress on theoretical investigation as the main hallmark of humanity (over and above the sphere of public affairs) and the nexus between insight into truth and a happy life are *prima facie* at variance with key coordinates of the identity-discourse of Rome's senatorial elite as well as the thematic economy of the *de Officiis*, in which theoretical pursuits are subordinated to socio-political endeavours.

A third peculiarity may help us to make some headway in unearthing the intent of Cicero's prose: the somewhat curious assertion that once we are free from our public duties 'we desire to see, hear and learn *something*' (*avemus aliquid videre audire addiscere*). The theme of desire that Cicero here introduces (*avemus*) continues forcefully in the second half of the paragraph (see 1.13b: *huic veri videndi cupiditate*... discussed below), but the multiple options enumerated in the asyndetic tricolon *videre audire addiscere*, as well as the needlessly random *aliquid*, seem pointlessly diffuse – unless we read this entire sentence in intertextual dialogue with the opening scenario of Plato's *Phaedrus* (an explicit allusion to which at 1.15 also forms the climax to the section of the *de Officiis* under consideration here). Cicero's emphasis on intellectual activity as coming after the completion of public business (in spite of our natural calling as human beings) inverts Socrates' gambit at the outset of the *Phaedrus* that hearing a report of the conversation between Lysias and Phaedrus takes precedence over any other business[92] – a point reinforced shortly afterwards when

[90] See *Off.* 1.28, which contains a critique of Plato's philosopher-kings (Cicero deems their disinterest in participating in public life a potential dereliction of civic duty and hence an injustice) and, explicitly, 1.155; further Gildenhard in press.

[91] Dyck 1996: 93 indexes the passage s.v. 'Connection of thought, careless, loose, or lacking'.

[92] *Phdr.* 227b: – Πεύσῃ, εἴ σοι σχολὴ προϊόντι ἀκούειν. – Τί δέ; οὐκ ἂν οἴει με κατὰ Πίνδαρον "καὶ ἀσχολίας ὑπέρτερον" πρᾶγμα ποιήσασθαι τὸ τεήν τε καὶ Λυσίου διατριβὴν ἀκοῦσαι; ('You shall learn if you have leisure to walk along and listen.' 'What? Don't you think that I consider hearing your exchange with Lysias "a more important matter even than business", as Pindar says?').

Socrates, having heard from Phaedrus that the topic of the conversation was love, states that he will not part from Phaedrus' side even if he were to launch upon a Marathon march, so desirous is he to hear the report: ἔγωγ' οὖν οὕτως ἐπιτεθύμηκα ἀκοῦσαι, ὥστ' . . . (*Phdr.* 227d). Cicero's *avemus aliquid videre audire addiscere* reads like an ironic gloss on Socrates' utterance.[93]

Encouraged by the possibility that Cicero may have furnished his argument with a Platonic inflection, we may also note that the sequence from *veri inquisitio atque investigatio* to *cognitio rerum occultarum aut admirabilium* to the description of the object of investigation and understanding as *verum*, *simplex* and *sincerum* maps surprisingly well (if sketchily) onto how Plato conceives of the ascent to the Forms and the Forms themselves.[94] Put differently, positing a Platonic foil would endow the passage with a coherence it would otherwise lack and give it a compelling proleptic force insofar as it sets up the *cognitio* of a matter that is both *occulta* and *admirabilis*, yet also *vera*, *simplex* and *sincera*, namely the Form of the *honestum*, which forms the telos of this section (1.15).[95] Cicero continues:

> Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quaedam principatus, ut nemini parere animus bene informatus a natura velit nisi praecipienti aut docenti aut utilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperanti; ex quo magnitudo animi exsistit humanarumque rerum contemptio.
>
> Linked to this desire to see the truth is a certain desire for supremacy so that a soul that is naturally well shaped does not wish to obey anyone except him who gives instructions or teaches or gives just and justified orders on account of utility. From this derives greatness of mind and disregard for human matters. (*Off.* 1.13b)

The relationship between the *cupiditas veri videndi* (which recapitulates the previous section) and the *appetitio principatus* has again flummoxed commentators: 'How are the two joined? Merely in being two of the drives basic to the human being, or is some subtler relationship implied? Probably

[93] The phrase *avemus aliquid videre audire addiscere* is less arbitrary than it looks. Apart from the symmetrically patterned alliteration (a – a – v – a – a) that gives it stylistic cohesion, each verb in the asyndetic tricolon of complementary infinitives arguably signals a vital aspect of the argument: *videre* points to the *veri videndi cupiditas* that forms the centre-piece of this stretch of text, *addiscere* gestures to the pedagogic mission of the *de Officiis* (in generic terms, the work is a didactic epistle addressed to his son and the Roman youth more generally on the topic of civic ethics), and *audire* signals the Platonic intertext that Cicero here engages.

[94] That *res aut occultae aut admirabiles* is a formulation designed to allude to the Forms finds support in *Orat.* 11, discussed above.

[95] This match, if it is one, does not depend on registering a deliberate allusion to the *Phaedrus*. At *Smp.* 211e, for instance, Plato describes the Form of the beautiful in a similar idiom, giving αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν the attributes εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον, and μονοειδές – i.e. absolute, pure, unmixed, and unchanging.

we have to do with a fairly pat transitional formula.'[96] Be that as it may, the passage features some felicitous strokes of the pen: the phrase *veri videndi cupiditas*, for instance, unifies three key themes into a single notion that in 1.13a were still more or less discrete: truth, vision and desire.[97] In other words, Cicero neatly sums up one human drive, i.e. the desire to behold the truth, before pairing it with another: *appetitio quaedam principatus*. Within the context of the *de Officiis*, we are not simply dealing with 'two of the drives basic to the human being' – rather, we are dealing with the two basic human drives: the drive for (true) knowledge; and the drive for self-assertion, power, autonomy or supremacy (*principatus* covers all of these notions). In the *de Officiis*, Cicero tries to undo the pernicious consequences that a misguided will to power has had on the Roman commonwealth by revalidating the import of knowledge of the truth, which for him is tantamount to the endorsement and enactment of a civic ethics.[98] The topical nature of his juxtaposition of the two drives emerges with the necessary clarity in 1.26, where he stigmatises Caesar for subverting all human and divine laws *propter eum quem sibi ipse opinionis errore finxerat principatum*. And the exhaustive resolution of whatever baffles in 1.13 comes in 1.62–5, where Cicero tackles the problematics of *magnitudo animi*, by differentiating, with Plato, a mindset of courage that is committed to civic ethics (in particular through its devotion to justice and the common good) and the pursuit of truth, from a mindset of temerity that is self-interested and manifests itself in the desire for power and domination (*cupiditas principatus*).[99] The key word in the phrase *appetitio quaedam principatus* in 1.13 is therefore *quaedam*: it turns the drive for supremacy into something initially undefined that, as the example of Caesar and the discussion at 1.62–5 demonstrates, can go awfully wrong – unless, that is, the *appetitio principatus* is subsumed under and acquires guidance from the *veri videndi*

[96] Dyck 1996: 94.

[97] Coincidentally, the desire to see the true objects of love is the motivating force behind the souls' ascent to heaven in Socrates' simile of the chariot of the soul in the *Phaedrus*. See e.g. *Phdr*. 248b: ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον. And the nexus of desire and cognition is of course also a key theme of Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*.

[98] Just like *addiscere* in the previous paragraph, the tricolon *praecipienti*, *docenti*, *imperanti* is a not-so-subtle reminder of the work's pedagogic mission.

[99] For the nexus of ethics, truths and straightforward simplicity as bulwark against dysfunctional daring, see e.g. *Off*. 1.63: *itaque viros fortes et maganimos eosdem bonos et simplices, veritatis amicos minimeque fallaces esse volumus*. The sentence comes immediately after Cicero's translation of a passage from either the *Menexenus* (246e) or the *Laches* (197b) to distinguish the virtue of *fortitudo* from the vice of *audacia*. See further Gildenhard 2011: 141–3.

cupiditas.[100] The investment in epistemology and the encounter with the truth as a solution to issues in practical ethics is of course a Platonic move, and later on Cicero revisits the matter in terms strongly reminiscent of Plato's allegory of the cave (see *Off.* 3.69, discussed below). Here, at the beginning of the work, he only alludes to the tension without resolving it; but the unmediated juxtaposition of desire for truth and desire for power feeds into Cicero's key agenda in the *de Officiis* of rooting political practice in philosophical truth, while at the same time ensuring that the pursuit of philosophical truth does not acquire precedence over political practice.

After thus integrating material to do with the political project of the *de Officiis*, Cicero returns to epistemological issues, which he now links to ethics, in what is a Platonic move par excellence:

Nec vero illa parva vis naturae est rationisque, quod unum hoc animal sentit quid sit ordo, quid sit quod deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus. Itaque eorum ipsorum quae aspectu sentiuntur nullum aliud animal pulchritudinem, venustatem, convenientiam partium sentit; quam similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens multo etiam magis pulchritudinem constantiam ordinem in consiliis factisque conservandam putat, caveatque ne quid indecore effeminateve faciat, tum in omnibus et opinionibus et factis ne quid libidinose aut faciat aut cogitet.

That force of nature and reason is by no means puny since only this living being discerns what order is, what is seeming, and which measure applies in deeds and words. Hence no other animal discerns the beauty, charm, and harmony of parts of even those items that are discerned through empirical sight; nature and reason, by transferring this analogy from the eyes to the mind, believe that beauty, consistency, and order must be preserved all the more in counsels and deeds and guards against doing anything indecorous or effeminate, and also against doing or thinking anything licentious in any sentiment and practice. (*Off.* 1.14a)

Cicero here returns explicitly to the basic theme of 1.11–15, that is, the differences between human beings and animals, and adds, as his final point of contrast, the ability to appreciate beauty and proportion, both in an aesthetic and in an ethical sense. After simply *juxtaposing* aesthetics (*sentit quid sit ordo*) and ethics (*quid sit quod deceat* and *in factis dictisque qui modus* could be understood in both aesthetic and ethic terms) in the first sentence,

[100] At *Off.* 1.65 Cicero concedes that this point is difficult to render plausible in Rome, where the *cupiditas principatus vel gloriae* dominates the field of power: *facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam* ('But the loftier someone is in spirit, the more easily is he driven towards unjust deeds by a desire for glory. This is slippery ground indeed since hardly anyone is found who, after undertaking efforts and confronting dangers, does not desire glory as reward (as it were) for his deeds').

he proceeds to *correlate* them in what follows, according to the gospel of Platonic epistemology. The perception of beauty in empirical particulars (*quae aspectu sentiuntur*) is, via analogy (*quam similitudinem*), subsumed under, or serves as a stepping-stone towards, the mental perception of the 'ethically beautiful' in human conduct. This perception has normative consequences: the acquired grasp of what is right and proper serves as guide to thought and action.[101] The transition from empirical to mental vision, and from an appreciation of physical to one of ethical beauty has a precise parallel (and model) in Diotima's discourse in the *Symposium*.[102] And likewise, the final step beyond even ethical beauty towards a grasp of the beautiful in and of itself (the *honestum*) that follows in the *de Officiis* reads like a gloss or paraphrase of Diotima's climactic finish. Compare *Off.* 1.14b with *Smp.* 211c:

Quibus ex rebus conflatur et efficitur id quod quaerimus honestum, quod etiamsi nobilitatum non sit, tamen honestum sit, quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, natura esse laudabile.

Out of these things the honourable that we seek is formed and brought into being, which, even if it is not celebrated, nevertheless remains honourable and which is, as we say truly, even if it is not praised by anyone, praiseworthy by nature. (*Off.* 1.14b)

. . . καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν.

. . . and to finally proceed from various pieces of knowledge to that knowledge which is nothing else but knowledge of that beautiful itself, and one finally knows that which is beautiful. (*Smp.* 211c)

Cicero here achieves a further level of abstraction by situating the *honestum as such* in a sphere beyond human experience – a sphere that is, ontologically speaking, all but identical to Plato's Forms. The nature (*natura*) of the *honestum* is such that it leads an existence entirely independent of socio-political practices (and Cicero's lexical choice to establish this point, i.e. *nobilitatum*, not coincidentally evokes the prime political ambition of Rome's ruling elite) – and can hence serve as an absolute, unchanging benchmark, over and against the cultural 'certainties' that have ruined the

[101] As Dyck 1996: 97 remarks, 'that control is to be exercised even over thoughts . . . is unusual in pagan, as opposed to Christian . . . ethics'. But see *ad Att.* 7.11.1 = 134 SB.

[102] Dyck 1996: 96: 'This description of the transference of the notion of the beautiful from the physical to the moral realm was surely inspired by Pl. *Smp.* 211b7ff.' See esp. *Smp.* 211c: . . . ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα . . .

Roman commonwealth. As Long puts it, Cicero here attempts 'to detach "the honourable" from the traditional honour code and to conceptualize it in terms of what is intrinsically or naturally good'.[103] Given Plato's subliminal presence throughout this stretch, it makes perfect sense that Cicero should conclude this line of thought by citing him and alluding to his Forms:[104]

Formam quidem ipsam, Marce fili, et tamquam faciem honesti vides, 'quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores, ut ait Plato, excitaret sapientiae.'

You see the Form itself, my son Marcus, and, as it were, the countenance of the honourable, which, if you perceived it with the eyes, would arouse wonderful desires for wisdom. (*Off.* 1.15)

ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ ὁρᾶται – δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν – καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά.

For sight is the sharpest of our physical sense-perceptions, through which, however, wisdom is not perceived – it would arouse exceedingly powerful desires, if some such bright image of it were furnished by coming into our sight – nor any of the other lovable things. (*Phaedrus* 250d)

Cicero's *quae si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores . . . excitaret sapientiae* reproduces quite literally Plato's present counterfactual condition δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν, if with a 'corrected' sequence of protasis and apodosis. And he uses Plato's reflection on sense-perception, sight and insight to underscore obliquely the gradual ascent from empirical to notional realities (the switch, as he put it in *Off.* 1.14, *ab oculis ad animum*): the instrumental ablative *oculis*, which is strategically placed before *cerneretur*, sets up a contrast between two types of vision: a vision performed with the eyes, and the kind of vision his son will have when he sees the Form of the Honourable (*Formam . . . ipsam . . . honesti <u>vides</u>*). But in terms of contents, Cicero introduces significant adjustments to connect the Platonic source text to his concern with the Form of the Honourable. Indeed, in thematic terms, the fit of the translation is less than fully compelling. In Plato, the counterfactual condition has a much more forceful point and purpose (Socrates here draws a vital distinction between the perception of beauty (κάλλος), which is possible, and the perception of wisdom (φρόνησις), which is not) than in Cicero – where it is, in fact, rather pointless. After all,

[103] Long 1995b: 218, cited by Dyck 1996: 98.
[104] Cicero had already translated the passage at *Fin.* 2.52.

his son Marcus *sees* the Form of the Honourable (if by some sort of mental vision) and this sight should (one assumes) suffice to stimulate the requisite degree of passion for wisdom – why, then, add that if he were also to see the Form *with his eyes* those passions for wisdom would become *mirabiles*?[105] The awkward fit suggests that other considerations motivated Cicero's decision to include a bit of Plato here. First, by *referencing* the translation (*ut ait Plato*), which is not something Cicero always does, he manages to identify, in an unobtrusive way, *formam . . . honesti* with a (transcendental) Form of Plato, thereby embedding his by and large Stoic account of the honourable within a Platonic frame of reference. And second, in citing Plato here, he recalls the starting point of his Platonic movement in 1.13, where he arguably alluded to the beginning of the *Phaedrus* in the context of introducing the *cognitio rerum aut occultarum aut admirabilium*. In 1.15 he harks back, in a gesture of ring-composition, to both attributes: to *occultus* by means of the counterfactual *cerneretur – excitaret*; and to *admirabilis* via the phrase *mirabiles amores*. As in the *Orator*, then, he is keen to validate his discussion with a reference to a Platonic Form – as for eloquence, so too for ethics he wants an ultimate foundation.

Plato remains a recurrent partner in intertextual dialogue throughout the work, and Cicero also has further occasion to gesture to his theory of Forms:[106]

sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis.

But we do not have a solid and articulated image of true law and genuine justice; we rely on shadows and images. If we only were to follow those! For they derive from the best archetypes of nature and truth. (*Off.* 3.69)

Some scholars have maintained that Cicero did not engage with what is arguably the centre of Plato's philosophy: 'Unter allen Platonzitaten und Platonanklängen bei Cicero ist nie von dem die Rede, was wir fürs Zentrum der platonischen Philosophie zu halten geneigt sind: vom Höhlengleichnis.'[107] As we have already had occasion to note, Cicero may well have alluded to the allegory of the cave in his earlier writings. And this passage from the *de Officiis* all but demands to be read against the allegory of the cave in *Republic* 7, inasmuch as it reproduces the three states

[105] Cicero turns the object of (unattainable) sight in Plato, i.e. *phronesis*, into the outcome of seeing the Form and the Face of the Honourable, i.e. formidable passions for wisdom (*sapientia*).
[106] Peetz 2005. [107] Burkert 1965: 198; cf. Long 1995a: 45.

of seeing and existing that Socrates outlines, when he describes the soul exposed to sunlight after its exit from the cave:[108]

Συνηθείας δὴ οἶμαι δέοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾷστα καθορῷ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τά τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἴδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά

I think he would require habituation in order to perceive the things above; to begin with, he would most easily behold the shadows, afterwards the reflections of humans and other things in water, and only then the things themselves. (*Rep*. 7. 516a)

Both Plato and Cicero thus operate with three different levels:[109]

	Plato	Cicero
Level 1	The things themselves (αὐτά)	*Solida et expressa effigies*
Level 2a/2b	σκιὰς > εἴδωλα	*umbra et imagines*
Level 3	The cave	Complete disorientation (*eas ipsas utinam sequeremur!*)

As in 1.15, Cicero contents himself with a middling degree of insight into true justice: it would suffice if we were to orient ourselves along its shadow and mirror image; in fact, as the *utinam*-sentence makes clear, not even that tends to be the case. Political life at Rome betrays no concern for justice whatsoever, the leading politicians do not even have a glimpse of what it is and ought to entail. In other words, they lead the existence of Platonic cavemen.[110] Irrespective of whether Cicero here alludes specifically to the allegory of the cave, he certainly invokes the Forms. As in his late *philosophica* more generally, this aspect of Plato's metaphysics is part of his thematic repertory – in contradistinction to his deliberate abstinence in his earlier writings.

[108] Tanner 1972, cited by Dyck 1996: 583, who remains noncommittal about the precise passage in Plato that Cicero here reworks, but notes that he 'has recourse to language proper to the Platonic ideas'. Marcel Humar suggests to me that Plato's analogy of the divided line (*Rep*. 6. 511d–e) with its four degrees of insight – ranging from 'pure knowledge' (νόησις) via διάνοια and πίστις to εἰκασία ('mere conjecture') provides another possible parallel for Cicero's construction.

[109] Tanner 1972: 583 sees in *umbra* a reference to the partially lit ambience of the cave, takes *imagines* to refer to the shadows of the figurines that the prisoners can see, and maintains that only *effigies* denotes the forms in the upper world. This strikes me as misguided, not least since it does violence to the Latin phrase *umbra et imaginibus utimur*: in exact analogy to Plato's σκιὰς and εἴδωλα, *umbra*, just as *imagines*, clearly denotes a type of reflection, not an ambience.

[110] This despairing complaint resonates throughout all of Cicero's *oeuvre* the day that Caesar crossed the Rubicon and destroyed the commonwealth that gave Cicero's existence meaning and purpose. See *ad Att*. 7.11.1 = 134 SB with Gildenhard 2006: 198–9.

CONCLUSION: WHY THE SHIFT?

Our findings so far necessitate a modification of Long's point that Plato's theory of Forms 'evidently appealed to' Cicero.[111] Rather, the theory evidently *started* to appeal to him in the 40s. In the three otherwise strongly Platonising dialogues he penned in the 50s, Cicero was uninterested in validating the metaphysics of the Forms, even though he gladly endorsed other aspects of Platonic theology, such as the immortality of the soul. Indeed, in some passages he even seems to be poking fun at the doctrine by mocking the speculative and insubstantial qualities of Plato's heuristic fictions, deliberately ignoring Plato's strategy of using such fictions as steps in a ladder towards insight into an immutable realm of truth and beauty that is ontologically distinct from our empirical reality. In the 40s, however, starting with the *Orator*, Cicero appeals repeatedly to this Platonic realm of the Forms and, however obliquely, integrates their existence into his arguments. Prima facie, this shift in outlook puzzles. Moving from empirical phenomena to Forms, in a counter-intuitive process designed to turn something invisible to the eyes into the ultimate foundation of the manifest, is a philosophical operation to boot, an investment in speculative metaphysics that requires skilful psychagogia to overcome steep thresholds of plausibility, especially in Rome. The question arises: if, in the 50s, Roman realities assumed the place of the Platonic Forms in Cicero's writings, as instances of past, present or future perfection, why, in the *philosophica* of the 40s, does he valorise, in various ways, Plato's peculiar ontology?[112]

Some of the answer may have to do with a change in his approach to philosophical writing; the *philosophica* in the 40s are, by Cicero's own account, a systematic attempt to capture all of Greek philosophical discourse in Latin, and are therefore almost by definition more doxographical in orientation than the three dialogues in the 50s (which is not to say that there doxographical material is absent). But, as we have seen, doxography can only account for few references to the Forms and is unable to explain their presence in other places, notably the *Orator* and the *de Officiis*. The answer, I submit, has to be looked for in the wider political circumstances. If the Roman *res publica* experienced ontological fading in the 50s, in the

[111] Long 1995a: 46.

[112] Scholars have by and large passed this question over in silence. See, however, Leeman and Pinkster 1981: 65 on Platonic influence in the *de Oratore*: 'Cicero ist noch nicht, wie später im *Orat.* (9–10; 101), auf den Gedanken gekommen, das Ideal vom orator perfectus mit der platonischen Idee in Verbindung zu bringen.' As I have tried to show, think of it he did – and obliquely advertised himself as the embodiment of Platonic perfection.

40s it was gone. With the commonwealth crushed under the heel of Caesar, Cicero no longer faced the challenge of reforming the political culture of the Roman Republic; rather, the task now was to revive it. With *historical* benchmarks of perfection all but lost (the obvious exception being himself), Cicero turned to Plato's Forms as an ultimate foundation on which to reconstruct the Roman commonwealth.

Put differently, in the 50s there was no particular need for Cicero to validate Plato's speculative ontology; in the 40s, there arguably was. The alleged existence of ultimate, invisible and unchanging truth within an alternative reality that operates in contradistinction to the unacceptable brutality of tyrannical facts offers an excellent basis from which to stage intellectual resistance. *Orator* 16 points the way: after an elaboration of the importance of Plato and philosophy more generally (especially Plato's school), both for himself and for Greek orators, Cicero specifically mentions the epistemological benefits to be derived from philosophical thought: it facilitates, indeed enables, insight into the nature of things, their classification and definition, the clarification of the distinction between truth and falsehood (*iudicare, quae vera quae falsa sint*), including procedures of disambiguation; he stresses that the remit of philosophy subsumes both physics and ethics and concludes that without a sound training in it nothing on the latter can be either understood or said.[113] In the *Orator*, and his late *philosophica* more generally, these basic operations of philosophical discourse are frequently grounded in Plato's metaphysics of the Forms. It offers a new foundation at a time when the mainstay of Cicero's identity, the *libera res publica* and its associated cultural certainties, have disappeared; Plato's dogmatic ontology, or a sceptical version thereof, is a welcome substitute and goes hand-in-hand with a conjectural metaphysics that finds orientation and guidance in Plato's Forms as notional yet perfect entities of reference that ground reality even though they elude full perception and comprehension.

The fact that Cicero adjusts his engagement with Plato on such a key component of Platonic doctrine as the Forms in response to changing political circumstances has far-reaching consequences for our appreciation of his attitude towards Plato more generally. Quite clearly – and this point

[113] *Orat.* 16: *quid de vita de officiis de virtute de moribus de quibus sine multa earum ipsarum rerum disciplina nihil aut dici aut intellegi potest*? The phrase *dici aut intellegi* harks back to Cicero's hailing of Plato at *Orat.* 10 as *non intellegendi solum, sed etiam dicendi gravissimus auctor et magister*. The systematic combination of eloquence and philosophical insight is a hallmark of Cicero's *oeuvre* from the *de Inventione* to the *de Officiis*, though the respective import of oratory and philosophy, not least vis-à-vis one another, undergoes subtle shifts in the course of his career, according to political circumstances: see Gildenhard 2007: 148–56, with further bibliography.

stands irrespective of how we account for the embrace of the Forms in the 40s – Cicero's way of reading his predecessor is strikingly strategic: he takes from Plato whatever he happens to like and require at any given moment, hardly ever without criticising Plato in the process, in what amounts to an imperial enactment of cultural and intellectual superiority; and his choices have, arguably, little to do with dogmatic consistency and school-allegiances and a lot with his changing argumentative needs, which are closely related to the condition of the Roman commonwealth.

Bibliography

Adam, J. (1963) *The Republic of Plato, Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices*, 2nd edition, with an introduction by D. A. Rees. Cambridge.

Alline, H. (1915) *Histoire du Texte de Platon*. Paris.

Annas, J. (1976) *Aristotle's* Metaphysics *Books M and N*. Oxford.

—— (1992) 'Sextus Empiricus and the Peripatetics', *Elenchos* 13: 201–31.

—— (1993) *The Morality of Happiness*. Oxford.

—— (2007a) 'Carneades' classification of ethical theories', in *Pyrrhonists, Patricians, Platonizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155–86 BC*, ed. A.-M. Ioppolo and D. Sedley. Naples: 189–223.

—— (2007b) 'Ethics in Stoic philosophy', *Phronesis* 52: 58–87.

—— (2009) 'Law and value in the Stoics: a discussion review of K. Vogt, *Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City*', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 37: 275–86.

—— (2010) 'Virtue and law in Plato', in *Plato's Laws: A Critical Guide*, ed. C. Bobonich. Cambridge: 71–91.

Asmis, E. (2005) 'A new kind of model: Cicero's Roman constitution in *de Republica*', *AJP* 126: 377–416.

Atherton, C. (1988) 'Hand over fist: the failure of Stoic rhetoric', *CQ* 38: 392–427.

Ax, W. (ed.) (1938) *Cicero, De divinatione; De fato; Timaeus*. Leipzig.

Baltes, M. (ed.) (1972) *Timaios Lokros. Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele*. Leiden.

—— (1975) 'Numenius von Apamea und der Platonische Timaios', *Vigiliae Christianae* 29: 241–70.

—— (1976) *Die Weltenstehung des Platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten*, vol. 1. Leiden.

Barnes, J. (1989) 'Antiochus of Ascalon', in *Philosophia Togata. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, ed. M. Griffin and J. Barnes. Oxford: 51–96.

—— (1991) 'The Hellenistic Platos', *Apeiron* 24: 115–28.

—— (1997) 'Roman Aristotle', in *Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome*, ed. J. Barnes and M. Griffin. Oxford: 1–69.

—— (2003) *Porphyry. Introduction*, *Translated with an Introduction and Commentary*. Oxford.

—— (2007a) 'Peripatetic epistemology: 100 BC–200 AD', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100 BC–200 AD* vol. II (*BICS* Suppl. 94 vol. II), ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 547–62.

—— (2007b) 'Peripatetic logic', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100 BC–200 AD* vol. II (*BICS* Suppl. 94 vol. II), ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 531–46.

Blank, D. (2007) 'The life of Antiochus of Ascalon in Philodemus: history of the Academy and a tale of two letters', *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 162: 87–93.

—— (2012) 'Varro and Antiochus', in *The Philosophy of Antiochus*, ed. D. Sedley. Cambridge: 250–89.

Blum, R. (1991) *Kallimachos. The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography* (trans. H. H. Wellisch). Wisconsin.

Blumenberg, H. (1957/2001) 'Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit. Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung', in *Ästhetische und metaphorologische Schriften* (Auswahl und Nachwort von A. Haverkamp), Frankfurt a. M.: 139–72.

Bodéüs, R. (2001) *Aristote. Catégories*, *Texte établi et traduit*. Paris.

Bodnár, I. (1997) 'Movers and elemental motions in Aristotle', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 15: 81–117.

Bonazzi, M. (2003) 'Un dibattito tra academici e platonici sull'eredità di Platone: la testimonianza del commentario anonimo al *Teeteto*, in *Papiri filosofici. Miscellanea di studi IV*. Florence: 41–74.

—— (2005) 'Eudoro di Alessandria alle origini del platonismo imperiale', in *L'eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo*, ed. M. Bonazzi and V. Celluprica. Naples: 115–60.

—— (2007a) 'Eudorus' psychology and Stoic ethics', in *Platonic Stoicism – Stoic Platonism: The Dialogue Between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity*, ed. M. Bonazzi and Ch. Helmig. Leuven: 109–32.

—— (2007b) 'Eudorus of Alexandria and early imperial Platonism', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100 BC–200 AD* vol. II (*BICS* Suppl. 94 vol. II), ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 365–78.

—— (2008) 'Towards transcendence: Philo and the renewal of Platonism in the early imperial Age', in *Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy*, ed. F. Alesse. Leiden: 233–51.

—— (2009) 'Antiochus' ethics and the subordination of Stoicism', in *The Origins of the Platonic System: Platonisms of the Early Empire and their Philosophical Contexts*, ed. M. Bonazzi and J. Opsomer. Leuven: 33–54.

—— (2012) 'Antiochus and Platonism', in *The Philosophy of Antiochus*, ed. D. Sedley. Cambridge: 307–33.

Boudon-Millot, V. (2007) 'Un traité perdu de Galien miraculeusement retrouvé, le *Sur l'inutilité de se chagriner*', in *La science médicale antique. Nouveaux regards*, ed. V. Boudon-Millot *et al.* Paris: 73–123.

Boudon-Millot, V., Jouanna, J., and Pietrobelli, A. (2010) *Galien, Ne pas se chagriner*. Paris.

Boyancé, P. (1953) 'Le platonisme à Rome. Platon et Cicéron', *Association Guillaume Budé, Congrès de Tours et Poitiers, Actes du congrès*. Paris: 195–221. Reprinted in his *Études sur l'humanisme cicéronien* (1970), Brussels: 222–47.

—— (1967) 'Note sur l'éther chez les Pythagoriciens, Platon et Aristote', *REG* 80: 202–9.

Boys-Stones, G. R. (2001) *Post-Hellenistic Philosophy: A Study of its Development from the Stoics to Origen*. Oxford.

—— (2012) 'Antiochus' metaphysics', in *The Philosophy of Antiochus*, ed. D. Sedley. Cambridge: 220–36.

Brittain, Ch. (2001) *Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics*. Oxford.

Brochard, V. (2002) *Les sceptiques grecs*, 4th edition. Paris.

Brunschwig, J. (1979) 'La forme, prédicat de la matière?', in *Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, ed. P. Aubenque. Paris: 131–66.

Brunt, P. A. (1989) 'Philosophy and religion in the late Republic', in *Philosophia Togata*, ed. M. Griffin and J. Barnes. Oxford: 174–98.

Büchner, K. (1978) 'Zum Platonismus Ciceros', in *Studien zur römischen Literatur IX*, Wiesbaden: 76–99.

Burkert, W. (1961) 'Hellenistische Pseudopythagorica', *Philologus* 105: 16–43.

—— (1965) 'Cicero als Platoniker und Skeptiker', *Gymnasium* 72: 175–200.

—— (1972) *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*. Cambridge, MA.

Burnyeat, M. F. (2001) 'What was the "common arrangement"? An inquiry into John Stuart Mill's boyhood reading of Plato', *Apeiron* 34: 51–90.

—— (2004) 'Aristotelian revisions: the case of the *De Sensu*', *Apeiron* 37: 177–80.

Bury, R. G. (1932) *The Symposium of Plato*. Cambridge.

Centrone, B. (1990) *Pseudopythagorica Ethica. I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo*. Naples.

—— (1992) 'The theory of principles in the "Pseudopythagorica"', in *Pythagorean Philosophy*, ed. K. Boudouris. Athens: 90–7.

—— (1996), *Introduzione ai Pitagorici*. Rome.

Cherniss, H. (1944) *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*. Baltimore.

—— (1976) (ed., trans.) *Plutarch's Moralia XIII*, 2 vols. Cambridge, MA.

Chiaradonna, R. (2005) 'Plotino e la corrente antiaristotelica del platonismo imperiale. Analogie e differenze', in *L'eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo*, ed. M. Bonazzi and V. Celluprica. Naples: 235–74.

—— (2007) 'Platonismo e teoria della conoscenza stoica tra ii e iii secolo d. C.', in *Platonic Stoicism – Stoic Platonism: The Dialogue Between Platonism and Stoicism in Antiquity*, ed. M. Bonazzi and Ch. Helmig. Leuven: 209–42.

—— (2008a) Review of Karamanolis 2006, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 90: 229–34.

—— (2008b) 'What is Porphyry's *Isagoge*?', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 19: 1–30.

—— (2009) 'Autour d'Eudore. Les débuts de l'exégèse des *Catégories* dans le Moyen Platonisme', in *The Origins of the Platonic System: Platonisms of the Early Empire and their Philosophical Contexts*, ed. M. Bonazzi and J. Opsomer. Leuven: 89–111.

Chiaradonna, R., and Rashed, M. (2010) 'Before and after the commentators: an exercise in periodization. A discussion of Richard Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200–600 AD*', *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 38: 251–97.

Cooper, J. M. (1999) 'Posidonius on emotions', in his *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical theory*. Princeton: 449–84.

Cornford, F. M. (1937) *Plato's Cosmology*. London.

Crubellier, M. (2000) 'Metaphysics Λ 4', in *Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda*, ed. M. Frede and D. Charles. Oxford: 137–60.

DeGraff, T. B (1940) 'Plato in Cicero', *Classical Philology* 35: 143–53.

Delatte, A. (1922) *La vie de Pythagore de Diogène Laerce*. Brussels.

Diels, H. (1879) *Doxographi Graeci*. Berlin.

—— (1890), 'Ein gefälschtes Pythagorasbuch', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 3: 451–70.

Dillon, J. (1977) *The Middle Platonists*. Ithaca, NY. (Revised edition 1996.)

—— (2003) *The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC)*. Oxford.

Dix, T. K. (2000) 'The library of Lucullus', *Athenaeum* 88: 441–64.

Donini, P. (1977) 'L'Aristotelismo nel primo secolo', *Rivista di Filologia* 105: 237–51.

—— (1982) *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino*. Turin.

—— (1990) 'Medioplatonismo e filosofi medioplatonici. Una raccolta di studi', *Elenchos* 11: 79–93, reprinted in Donini 2011: 283–96.

—— (1994) 'Testi e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i metodi della filosofia in età postellenistica', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* vol. II.36.7. Berlin–New York: 5027–5100, reprinted in Donini 2011: 211–81.

—— (2003) 'L'eredità academica e i fondamenti del platonismo in Plutarco', in *ΕΝΩΣΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΙΑ. Unione e amicizia. Omaggio a Francesco Romano*, ed. M. Barbanti, G. Giardina and P. Manganaro. Catania: 247–73.

—— (2011) *Commentary and Tradition: Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Post-Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. M. Bonazzi. Berlin and New York.

Dorandi, T. (1994) 'Cratippos de Pergame', in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, vol. II, ed. R. Goulet. Paris: 503–5.

—— (2007) 'Diogène Laërce "lecteur" d'Aristote', *Elenchos* 28: 435–46.

—— (2010) ' "Editori" antichi di Platone', *Antiquorum Philosophia* 4: 161–74.

Dörrie, H. (1987) *Der Platonismus in der Antike I: Die geschichtlichen Wurzeln des Platonismus: Bausteine 1–35: Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.

—— (1990) *Der Platonismus in der Antike II: Der hellenistische Rahmen des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus*. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.

Dueck, D. (2000) *Strabo of Amasia: A Greek Man of Letters in Augustan Rome*. London–New York.

Düring, I. (1957) *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*. Göteborg.

Dyck, A. R. (1996) *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis*. Ann Arbor, MI.

—— (2004) *A Commentary on Cicero, De Legibus*. Ann Arbor, MI.

Dyson, H. (2009) *Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa*. Berlin and New York.

Ebbesen, S. (1987) 'Boethius as Aristotelian scholar', in *Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung, P. Moraux gewidmet*, 2 vols., ed. J. Wiesner. Berlin and New York: 2.286–311.

Edelstein, L. (1936) 'The philosophical system of Posidonius', *AJPh* 57: 286–325.

Eijk, P. van der (2009) 'Heraclides on diseases and the woman who did not breathe', in Fortenbaugh–Pender 2009: 237–51.

Falcon, A. (2005) *Aristotle and the Science of Nature: Unity without Uniformity*. Cambridge.

—— (2008) 'The pre-history of the commentary tradition: Xenarchus as a case study', *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 64: 7–18.

—— (2011) *Aristotelianism in the First Century* BCE*: Xenarchus of Seleucia*. Cambridge.

Ferrari, F. (1999) 'Platone, Tim. 35a1–6 in Plutarco, An. Procr. 1012b–c: citazione ed esegesi', *Rheinisches Museum* 142: 326–39.

—— (2002) *Plutarco. La generazione dell'anima nel Timeo*. Naples.

Ferrary, J.-L. (1995) 'The statesman and the law in the political philosophy of Cicero', in *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy*, ed. A. Laks and M. Schofield. Cambridge: 48–73.

Festugière, A.-J. (1945) 'Les "Mémoires Pythagoriques" cités par Alexandre Polyhistor', *REG* 58: 1–65.

Flower, H. I. (1996) *Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture*. Oxford.

Fortenbaugh, W. W., and Pender, E. E. (eds.) (2009) *Heraclides of Pontus: Discussion*. New Brunswick, NJ.

Fortenbaugh, W. W., Huby, P. M., Sharples, R. W., and Gutas, D. (1992) *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, 2 vols. Leiden.

Fox, M. (2007) *Cicero's Philosophy of History*. Oxford.

Fraser, P. M. (1972) *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (3 vols.). Oxford.

Frede, M. (1987) 'Numenios', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* vol. II.36.2. Berlin–New York: 1034–75.

—— (1994) 'The Stoic notion of a lekton', in *Companions to Ancient Thought*, vol. III: *Language*, ed. S. Everson. Cambridge: 109–28.

—— (1999) 'Epilogue', in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. K. A. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld and M. Schofield. Cambridge: 771–97.

Fries, C. (1899) 'Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Timäus', *Rh.M.* 54: 555–92.

Fritz, K. von (1940) *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy: An Analysis of the Sources*. New York.

Furley, D. (1967) *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists*. Princeton, NJ.

—— (1983) 'Comments on Dr. Sharples' Paper: a note on Arius and *Magna Moralia* 1.1–2', in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh. New Brunswick: 160–4.

—— (1989) 'Aristotelian material in Cicero's *De natura deorum*', in *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos* (RUSCH 4), ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz. New Brunswick, NJ: 201–19.

Gelzer, M. (1939) 'M. Tullius Cicero (als Politiker)', *RE* 7A: 827–1091.
Gemelli Marciano, L. (1991) 'L'atomismo e il corpuscolarismo Empedocleo: Frammenti di interpretazioni nel mondo antico', *Elenchos* 12: 5–37.
—— (2007) *Democrito e l'Accademia : studi sulla trasmissione dell'atomismo antico da Aristotele a Simplicio*. Berlin.
Gersh, S. (1986) *Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition*. Notre Dame.
Gigon, O. (1955) 'Die Erneuerung der Philosophie zur Zeit Ciceros', *Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique* 3. Geneva: 25–61.
—— (1959) 'Cicero und Aristoteles', *Hermes* 87: 143–62.
—— (1973) 'Cicero und die griechische Philosophie', in *ANRW* 1.4: 226–61.
Gildenhard, I. (2006) 'Reckoning with tyranny: Greek thoughts on Caesar in Cicero's Letters to Atticus in early 49', in *Ancient Tyranny*, ed. S. Lewis. Edinburgh: 197–209.
—— (2007) *Paideia Romana: Cicero's Tusculan Disputations*. Cambridge.
—— (2011) *Creative Eloquence: The Construction of Reality in Cicero's Speeches*. Oxford.
—— (in press) 'Tyranny and civic ethics: Cicero's *de Officiis*', in *Antimonarchic Discourse in Antiquity*, ed. H. Börm. Stuttgart.
Gill, C. (2006) *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*. Oxford.
Giomini, R. (ed.) (1975) *Cicero, De divinatione; De fato; Timaeus*. Leipzig.
Girardet, K. (1983) *Die Ordnung der Welt. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und politischen Interpretation von Ciceros Schrift De Legibus*. Wiesbaden.
Glucker, J. (1978) *Antiochus and the Late Academy*. Göttingen.
—— (1988) 'Cicero's philosophical affiliations', in *The Question of 'Eclecticism': Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, eds. J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long. Berkeley: 34–69.
—— (1995) '*Probabile, veri simile*, and related terms', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J. Powell. Oxford: 115–43.
Göransson, T. (1995) *Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus*. Göteborg.
Görgemanns, H. (1983) '*Oikeiosis* in Arius Didymus', in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh. New Brunswick: 165–89.
Görler, W. (1988) 'From Athens to Tusculum: gleaning the background of Cicero's *De Oratore*', *Rhetorica* 6: 215–35.
—— (1989) 'Cicero und die "Schule des Aristoteles"', in *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, eds. W. W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz. New Brunswick and London: 246–63.
—— (1990) 'Antiochos von Askalon über die "Alten" und über die Stoa. Beobachtungen zu Cicero, Academici posteriores 1: 24–43' in *Beiträge zur hellenistischen Literatur und ihrer Rezeption in Rom*, ed. P. Steinmetz. Stuttgart: 122–39.
—— (1992) 'Ein sprachlicher Zufall und seine Folgen. "Wahrscheinliches" bei Karneades und bei Cicero', in *Zum Umgang mit fremden Sprachen in der griechisch–römischen Antike*, eds. C. W. Müller, K. Sier and J. Werner. Stuttgart: 159–71.

—— (1995) 'Silencing the troublemaker: *De Legibus* 1.39 and the continuity of Cicero's scepticism', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J. Powell. Oxford: 85–113.

Gotter, U. (1996) 'Der Platonismus Ciceros und die Krise der römischen Republik', in *Hellenismus: Beiträge zur Erforschung von Akkulturation und politischer Ordnung in den Staaten des hellenistischen Zeitalters* (= Akten des Internationalen Hellenismus-Kolloquiums 9–14. März 1994 in Berlin), ed. B. Funck. Tübingen: 543–59.

Gottschalk, H. (1980) *Heraclides of Pontus*. Oxford.

—— (1987) 'Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* vol. II.36.2, ed. H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin and New York: 1079–174.

—— (1990) 'Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD', reprinted version with additions and revisions, in *Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence*, ed. R. Sorabji. London: 55–81.

—— (1997) 'Continuity and change in Aristotelianism', in *Aristotle and After* (*BICS* Supplementary volume 68), ed. R. Sorabji. London: 109–15.

Gourinat, J.-B. (2008) 'Le Platon de Panétius: à propos d'un témoignage inédit de Galien', *Philosophie Antique* 8: 139–51.

Gregory, A. (2000) *Plato's Philosophy of Science*. London.

Griffin, M. (2009) *The Reception of Aristotle's Categories, c. 80 BC to AD 220.* Unpublished Oxford DPhil dissertation.

Haas, F. A. J. de (1997) *John Philoponus' New Definition of Prime Matter. Aspects of its Background in Neoplatonism and the Ancient Commentary Tradition.* Leiden.

Habicht, C. (1990) *Cicero der Politiker*. Munich.

Hahm, D. (1990) 'The ethical doxography of Arius Didymus', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* vol. II. 36.4. Berlin and New York: 2935–3055 and 3234–43 (Indices).

—— (2007) 'Critolaus and late Hellenistic Peripatetic philosophy', in *Pyrrhonists, Patricians, Platonizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155–86 BC*', ed. A. M. Ioppolo and D. Sedley. Naples: 47–101.

Harder, R. (ed.) (1926) *Ocellus Lucanus. Text und Commentar*. Zurich.

Hatzimichali, M. (2011) *Potamo of Alexandria and the Emergence of Eclecticism.* Cambridge.

Heidel, W. A. (1909) 'The *anarmoi onkoi* of Heraclides and Asclepiades', *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 40: 5–21.

Hirzel, R. (1883) *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*. Leipzig.

Horsley, R. A. (1978) 'The law of nature in Philo and Cicero', *Harvard Theological Review* 71: 35–59.

Hoven, R. (1971) *Stoïcisme et stoïciens face au problème l'au-delà*. Paris.

Huby, P. M. (1981) 'An excerpt from Boethus of Sidon's commentary on the *Categories*?', *CQ* 31: 398–409.

—— (1989) 'Theophrastus and the criterion', in *The Criterion of Truth: Essays Written in Honour of George Kerferd*, ed. P. M. Huby and G. Neal. Liverpool: 107–22.

—— (1999) *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence. Commentary* vol. IV*: Psychology*. Leiden.

Huffman, C. A. (ed.) (1993) *Philolaus of Croton*. Cambridge.

—— (2005) (ed.) *Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King*. Cambridge.

Inwood, B. (1996) Review of Göransson 1995, *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* **7**: 25–30 (http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1995/95.12.08.html).

—— (1999) 'Rules and reasoning in Stoic ethics', in *Topics in Stoic Philosophy*, ed. K. Ierodiakonou. Oxford: 95–127.

—— (2003) 'Natural law in Seneca', *Studia Philonica Annual* 15: 81–99.

Isnardi Parente, M. (1982) (ed.) *Frammenti / Senocrate, Ermodoro; edizione, traduzione e commento*. Naples.

Jones, C. (2009) 'Books and libraries in a newly-discovered treatise of Galen', *JRA* 22: 390–7.

Ju, A. E. (2006) 'Posidonius on incorporeal limits', *The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies* 25: 329–58.

—— (2008) *Posidonius on the Stoic scala naturae*. Unpublished Cambridge PhD dissertation.

—— (2009) 'Stoic ontology of geometrical limits', *Phronesis* 54: 371–89.

Kahn, C. (2001) *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans*. Indianapolis.

Karamanolis, G. (2006) *Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry*. Oxford.

Kenter, L. P. (1972) Cicero, *De Legibus, A Commentary on Book I*. Amsterdam.

Kerferd, G. B. (1978) 'The problem of synkatathesis and katalepsis in Stoic doctrine', in *Les Stoïciens et leur logique*, ed. J. Brunschwig. Paris: 251–72.

Keyes, C. W. (ed.) (1928) *Cicero, De Re Publica, De Legibus*. Cambridge, MA.

Kidd, I. G. (1971) 'Posidonius on emotions', in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. A. A. Long. London: 200–15.

—— (1988) *Posidonius: The Commentary*, 2 vols. Cambridge.

—— (1989) 'Orthos logos as a criterion in the Stoa', in *The Criterion of Truth*, ed. P. M. Huby and G. C. Neal. Liverpool: 137–50.

Klingner, F. (1961) 'Rom als Idee', in *Römischer Geisteswelt*, 4th edn. Munich: 631–52.

Krämer, H. J. (1971) *Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie*. Berlin.

Kroll, W. (1913) *M. Tullii Ciceronis Orator, als Ersatz der Ausgabe von Otto Jahn erklärt von Wilhelm Kroll*. Berlin.

—— (1939) 'M. Tullius (Rhetorische Schriften)', *RE* 7.1: 1091–103.

Kuhn, H. C. (1996) *Venetischer Aristotelismus im Ende der aristotelischen Welt: Aspekte der Welt und des Denkens des Cesare Cremonini*. Frankfurt.

Kupreeva, I. (2009) 'Stoic themes in Peripatetic sources?', in *God and Cosmos in Stoicism*, ed. R. Salles 2009. Oxford: 135–69.

Laffranque, M. (1964) *Poseidonios d'Apamée*. Paris.

Lambardi, N. (1982) *Il 'Timaeus' ciceroniano: arte e tecnica del 'vertere'.* Florence.

Lautner, P. (2004) 'Perception and self-knowledge: interpreting Fr. 264 Smith', in *Studies on Porphyry* (*BICS* Suppl. 98), ed. G. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard. London: 77–90.

Leeman, A. D., and Pinkster, H., (1981) *M. Tullius Cicero de Oratore Libri III, Kommentar 1. Band: Buch I, 1–165*. Heidelberg.

Leeman, A. D., Pinkster, H. and Nelson, H. L. W. (1985) *M. Tullius Cicero de Oratore Libri III, Kommentar 2. Band: Buch I, 166–265; Buch II, 1–98.* Heidelberg.

Leeman, A. D., Pinkster, H., and Wisse, J. (1996) *M. Tullius Cicero de Oratore Libri III, Kommentar 4. Band: Buch II, 291–367; Buch III, 1–95*. Heidelberg.

Leith, D. (2009) 'The qualitative status of the *onkoi* in Asclepiades' theory of matter', *OSAP* 36: 283–320.

Lévy, C. (1992) *Cicero Academicus: recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne*. Rome.

—— (2003) 'Cicero and the Timaeus', in *Plato's Timaeus as Cultural Icon*, ed. G. Reydams-Schils. Notre Dame: 95–110.

Long, A. A. (1995a) 'Cicero's Plato and Aristotle', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J. G. F. Powell. Oxford: 37–62.

—— (1995b) 'Cicero's politics in *De officiis*', in *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy*, ed. A. Laks and M. Schofield. Cambridge: 213–40.

—— (1996) *Stoic Studies*. Cambridge.

Long, A. A., and Sedley, D. N. (1987) *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, 2 vols. Cambridge.

Longrigg, J. (1993) *Greek Rational Medicine*. London and New York.

Lonie, I. M. (1964) 'The *anarmoi onkoi* of Heraclides of Pontus', *Phronesis* 9: 156–64.

—— (1965) 'Medical theory in Heraclides of Pontus', *Mnemosyne* 18: 126–43.

Luck, G. (1953) *Der Akademiker Antiochos*. Stuttgart.

Mansfeld, J. (1971) *The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract Peri hebdomadôn, Ch. 1–11 and Greek Philosophy*. Assen.

—— (1978) 'Zeno of Citium: critical observations on a recent study', *Mnemosyne* 31: 134–78.

—— (1988) 'Compatible alternatives: Middle Platonist theology and the Xenophanes reception', in *Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman World*, ed. R. van der Broek, T. Baarda and J. Mansfeld. Leiden: 92–117.

—— (1990) *Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy*. Assen and Maastricht.

—— (1992) *Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus' Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy*. Leiden.

Mansfeld, J., and Runia, D. T. (1997) *Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer*, vol. I: *The Sources*. Leiden/Boston/New York.

—— (2009) *Aëtiana: The Method and Intellectual Context of a Doxographer*, vol. II: *The Compendium*. Leiden/Boston/New York.

Mariotti, I. (1966) *Aristone di Alessandria, Edizione e interpretazione*. Bologna.

May, J. M., and Wisse, J. (2001) *Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Ideal Orator*. New York.

Mazzarelli, C. (1985) 'Raccolta e interpretazione delle testimonianze e dei frammenti del medioplatonico Eudoro di Alessandria', *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 77: 535–55.

Mejer, J. (2009) 'Heraclides' intellectual context', in *Heraclides of Pontus: Discussion*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Pender. New Brunswick, NJ: 27–40.

Merlan, P. (1953) *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*. The Hague.

Mignucci, M. (1988) 'The Stoic notion of relatives', in *Matter and Metaphysics*, ed. J. Barnes and M. Mignucci. Naples: 129–221.

Mitsis, P. (1992) 'Natural law and natural rights in post-Aristotelian philosophy', in *ANRW* II 36.76. Berlin: 4812–50.

—— (2003), 'The Stoics and Aquinas on virtue and natural law,' *Studia Philonica Annual*: 35–53.

Montanari, F. (1998) 'Zenodotus, Aristarchus and the *ekdosis* of Homer', in *Editing Texts – Texte Edieren*, ed. G. Most. Göttingen: 1–21.

Moraux, P. (1970) *D'Aristote à Bessarion. Trois exposés sur l'histoire et la transmission de l'aristotélisme grec*. Quebec City.

—— (1973) *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias.* Vol. I: *Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im I. Jh.v.Chr*. Berlin and New York.

—— (1984) *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias.* Vol. II: *Der Aristotelismus im i. und ii. Jh.n. Chr*. Berlin and New York.

—— (2001) *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen*, vol. III: *Alexander von Aphrodisias*. Berlin and New York.

Najman, H. (2003) 'A written copy of the law of nature: an unthinkable paradox?', *Studia Philonica Annual* 15: 51–6.

Opsomer, J. (2004) 'Plutarch's *De Animae procreatione in Timaeo*: manipulation or search for consistency?', in *Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries*, 2 vols. *BICS*, Supplement 83.1, ed. P. Adamson, H. Baltussen and M. W. F. Stone. London: 137–62.

—— (2005) 'Plutarch's Platonism Revisited', in *L'eredità platonica. Studi sul platonismo da Arcesilao a Proclo*, ed. M. Bonazzi and V. Celluprica. Naples: 161–200.

—— (2007) 'Plutarch on the one and the dyad', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100BC– 200AD vol. II* (*BICS* Suppl. 94 vol. II), ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 379–96.

Peetz, S. (2005) 'Ciceros Konzept des *probabile*', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 112: 97–133.

Pépin, J. (1964) *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne*. Paris.

Pfeiffer, R. (1968) *History of Classical Scholarship*. Oxford.

Plinval, G. de (ed.) (1968) *Cicéron, Traité des Lois*. Paris.

Polito, R. (2006) 'Matter, medicine, and the mind: Asclepiades vs. Epicurus', *OSAP* 30: 285–335.

—— (2007) 'Frail or monolithic? A note on Asclepiades' corpuscles', *Classical Quarterly* 57: 314–17.
Poncelet, R. (1957) *Cicéron traducteur de Platon*. Paris.
Pöschl, V. (1936) *Römischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero*. Berlin.
Powell, J. G. F. (1995a) 'Introduction: Cicero's philosophical works and their background', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J. G. F. Powell. Oxford: 1–35.
—— (1995b) 'Cicero's translations from the Greek', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J. G. F. Powell. Oxford: 273–300.
—— (2001) 'Were Cicero's *Laws* the laws of Cicero's *Republic*?', in *Cicero's Republic*, ed. J. G. F. Powell and J. North, *BICS* Supplement 76. London: 17–39.
—— (2006) (ed.) *M. Tulli Ciceronis De Re Publica, De Legibus, Cato Maior De Senectute, Laelius De Amiticia*. Oxford.
Primavesi, O. (2007) 'Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: Vier Kapitel zur frühen Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum', *Philologus* 151: 51–77.
Puelma, M. (1980) 'Ciceron als Platon-Übersetzer', *Mus. Helv*. 37: 137–78.
Puglia, E. (1998) 'Senarco di Seleucia nella storia dell'Academia di Filodemo (PHerc 1021 XXXV 2–18)', *Papyrologica Lupiensia* 7: 143–51.
Radt, S. (2005) *Strabons Geographika*. Volume IV: Buch XIV–XVII. Text und Übersetzung. Göttingen.
Rashed, M. (2004) 'Priorité de l'εἶδος ou du γένος entre Andronicos et Alexandre. Vestiges arabes et grecs inédits', *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 14: 9–63. Reprinted as Rashed 2007b: 29–83.
—— (2005) (ed.) *Aristote. De la génération et la corruption*. Paris.
—— (2007a) *Essentialisme. Alexandre d'Aphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie*. Berlin and New York.
—— (2007b) *L'héritage aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l'Antiquité*. Paris.
—— (2009) 'Contre le mouvement rectiligne naturel: trois adversaires (Xénarque, Ptolémée, Plotin) pour une thèse', in *Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism*, ed. R. Chiaradonna and F. Trabattoni. Boston/Leiden 2009: 18–42.
—— (2011) *Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Commentaire perdu à la Physique d'Aristote (Livres IV–VIII)*. Berlin and New York.
Rawson, E. (1973) 'The interpretation of Cicero's "*De legibus*"', in *ANRW* 1.4: 334–45.
Reinhardt, T. (2000) 'Rhetoric in the fourth Academy', *CQ* 50: 531–47.
—— (2003) *Marcus Tullius Cicero. Topica*, edited with translation introduction, and commentary. Oxford.
—— (2007) 'Andronicus of Rhodes and Boethus of Sidon on Aristotle's *Categories*', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100 BC–200 AD* vol. II (*BICS* Suppl. 94 vol. II), ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 513–29.
—— (in press) 'Common notions and Platonic Ideas in Cicero', in *Proceedings of the Diatribai di Gargnano 2011*.

Rescigno, A. (2004) *Alessandro di Afrodisia: Commentario al De caelo di Aristotele. Frammenti del primo libro*. Amsterdam.

Reydams-Schils, G. (1997) 'Posidonius and the *Timaeus*: off to Rhodes and back to Plato?', *CQ* 47: 455–76.

—— (1999) *Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Platonist Reading of Plato's Timaeus*. Turnhout.

Riedweg, C. (2005) *Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching, and Influence*. Ithaca and London.

Rist, J. M. (1969) *Stoic Philosophy*. Cambridge.

—— (1978) 'Zeno and the origins of Stoic logic', in *Les Stoïciens et leur logique*, ed. J. Brunschwig. Paris: 138–47.

—— (1986) Review of Tarrant 1985, *Phoenix* 40: 467–9.

Robinson, V. (1931) *The Story of Medicine*. New York.

Rochefort, G. (1963) *L' Empereur Julien. Oeuvres complètes*. Volume II.1. Paris.

Rowe, C. J. (1986) *Plato: Phaedrus*. Warminster.

Rudd, N. (trans.) (1998) *Cicero, The Republic and The Laws*. Oxford.

Runia, D. (1986) *Philo of Alexandria and the* Timaeus *of Plato*. Leiden.

Sandbach, F. H. (1971) 'Phantasia kataleptike', in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. A. A. Long. London: 9–21.

—— (1985) *Aristotle and the Stoics*. Cambridge.

Sandys, J. E. (1885) *M. Tulli Ciceronis ad M. Brutum Orator: A Revised Text with Introductory Essays and Critical and Explanatory Notes*. Cambridge.

Schibli, H. S. (1993) 'Xenocrates' daemons and the irrational soul', *Classical Quarterly* 43: 143–67.

Schironi, F. (2005) 'Plato at Alexandria: Aristophanes, Aristarchus and the "philological tradition" of a philosopher', *CQ* 55: 423–34.

Schmitt, Ch. (1983) *Aristotelianism in the Renaissance*. Cambridge, MA and London.

Schmitz, H. (1985) *Die Ideenlehre des Aristoteles*. Vol. II: *Platon and Aristoteles*. Bonn.

Schofield, M. (1995) 'Cicero's definition of *res publica*', in *Cicero the Philosopher*, ed. J. G. F. Powell. Oxford: 63–83.

—— (2008) 'Ciceronian dialogue', in *The End of Dialogue in Antiquity*, ed. S. Goldhill. Cambridge: 63–84.

Schwartz, E. (1894) 'Alexandros von Milet', *RE* 1.2, cols. 1449–52.

Sedley, D. N. (1982) 'On signs', in *Science and Speculation*, ed. J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat and M. Schofield. Cambridge: 239–72.

—— (1992) 'Sextus Empiricus and the atomist criteria of truth', *Elenchos* 13: 19–56.

—— (1995) *Commentarium in Platonis Theaetetum (P.Berol. inv. 9782)*, ed. G. Bastianini and D. Sedley, in *Corpus dei papiri filosofici* vol. III: *Commentari*. Florence: 227–562.

—— (1997) 'Plato's *auctoritas* and the rebirth of the commentary tradition', in *Philosophia Togata II. Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society*, ed. J. Barnes and M. Griffin. Oxford: 110–29.

—— (1998a) *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom*. Cambridge.
—— (1998b) 'Theophrastus and Epicurean physics', in *Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources. Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*, Vol. 8., ed. J. M. van Ophuijsen and M. van Raalte. New Brunswick, NJ: 331–54.
—— (2002) 'Aristotelian relativities', in *Le style de la pensée. Recueil de textes en hommages à Jacques Brunschwig*, ed. M. Canto-Sperber and P. Pellegrin. Paris: 324–52.
—— (2003a) 'Philodemus and the decentralisation of philosophy', *CErc* 33: 31–41.
—— (2003b) 'The school: from Zeno to Arius Didymus', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. B. Inwood. Cambridge: 7–32.
—— (2012) 'Antiochus as historian of philosophy', in *The Philosophy of Antiochus*, ed. D. Sedley. Cambridge: 80–103.
Sharples, R. W. (1983) 'The Peripatetic classification of goods', in *On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh. New Brunswick, NJ: 139–59.
—— (1995) 'Counting Plato's principles', in *The Passionate Intellect: Essays on the Transformation of Classical Traditions. Presented to Professor I. G. Kidd*. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: 67–82.
—— (2007) 'Aristotle's exoteric and esoteric works: summaries and commentaries', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100 BC–200 AD* vol. II (*BICS* Suppl. 94 vol. II), ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 505–12.
—— (2008) '*Habent Sua Fata Libelli*: Aristotle's *Categories* in the first century BC', *Acta Antiqua Hungarica*, 48: 273–87.
—— (2009) '"Unjointed masses": a note on Heraclides' physical theory', in *Heraclides of Pontus: Discussion*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Pender. New Brunswick, NJ: 139–54.
—— (2010) *Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to AD 200: An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation*. Cambridge.
Snyder, H. G. (2000) *Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World*. London.
Solmsen, F. (1957) 'The vital heat, the inborn pneuma, and the aether', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (Part 1): 119–23.
Sorabji, R. (2006) 'Universals transformed: the first thousand years after Plato', in *Universals, Concepts and Qualities*, ed. P. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti. Aldershot: 105–26.
Staab, G. (2009) 'Das Kennzeichen des neuen Pythagoreismus innerhalb der kaiserzeitlichen Platoninterpretation: «Pythagoreischer» Dualismus und Einprinzipienlehre im Einklang', in *The Origins of the Platonic System. Platonisms of the Early Empire and their Philosophical Contexts*, ed. M. Bonazzi and J. Opsomer. Leuven: 55–88.
Städele, A. (1980) *Die Briefe des Pythagoras und die Pythagoreer*. Meisenheim am Glan.
Steel, C. (2002–3) 'Cicero's *Brutus*: the end of oratory and the beginning of history', *BICS* 46: 195–211.

Steinmetz, P. (1989) 'Beobachtungen zu Ciceros philosophischem Standpunkt', in *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz. New Brunswick and London: 1–22.

Stückelberger, A. (1984), *Vestigia Democritea*. Basel.

Susemihl, F. (1892) *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit*, vol. II. Leipzig.

Szlezák T. (ed.) (1972) *Pseudo-Archytas über Die Kategorien. Texte zur Griechischen Aristoteles-Exegese*. Berlin and New York.

Tanner, R. G. (1972) 'Cicero on conscience and morality', in *Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt*, ed. J. R. C. Martyn. Amsterdam: 87–112.

Tarán, L. (2001) 'Aristotelianism in the first century BC', in *Collected Papers (1962–1999)*. Leiden: 479–524. Reprinted from *Gnomon* 53 (1981): 721–50.

Tarrant, H. (1981) 'Agreement and the self-evident in Philo of Larissa', *Dionysius* 5: 66–97.

—— (1985) *Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy*. Cambridge.

—— (1993) *Thrasyllan Platonism*. Ithaca.

—— (2000) 'Recollection and prophesy in the *de Divinatione*', *Phronesis* 45: 64–76.

—— (2007) 'Antiochus: a new beginning?' in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100 BC–200 AD* vol. II (BICS Suppl. 94 vol. II), ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 317–32.

—— (2008) 'Eudorus and the early Platonist interpretation of the *Categories*', *Laval théologique et philosophique* 64: 583–95.

Taylor, A. E. (1928) *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*. Oxford.

Theiler, W. (1964) *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus* (2nd edn). Berlin and Zurich.

—— (1965) 'Philo von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus', in *Parusia. Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus. Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger*, ed. K. Flasch. Frankfurt am Main: 199–218.

—— (1982) (ed.) *Poseidonios, Die Fragmente*, 2 vols. Berlin.

Thesleff, H. (1961) *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period*. Abo.

—— (1965) *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period*. Abo.

Thévenaz, P. (1938) *L'Âme du Monde, le devenir, et la matière chez Plutarque*. Paris.

Tieleman, T. L. (2003) *Chrysippus' On Affections: Reconstruction and Interpretation*. Leiden.

Trapp, M. (2007) 'Neopythagoreans', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy. 100 BC–200 AD*, ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 467–82.

Turner, E. G. (1968) *Greek Papyri: An Introduction*. Oxford.

Vallance, J. T. (1990) *The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia*. Oxford.

Vlastos, G. (1939) 'The disorderly motion in the *Timaeus*', *CQ* 33: 71–83. Revised version in his *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, Princeton (1995) II: 247–79.

—— (1975) *Plato's Universe*. Oxford.

Vogt, K. M. (2008) *Law, Reason, and the Cosmic City: Political Philosophy in the Early Stoa*. Oxford.
Wachsmuth, K. (1884) *Ioannis Stobaei anthologii libri duo priores qui inscribi solent eclogae physicae et ethicae*. Berlin.
Waitz, T. (1844–6) *Aristotelis Organon graece* (2 vols.). Leipzig.
Watson, G. (1971) 'The natural law and Stoicism', in *Problems in Stoicism*, ed. A. A. Long. London: 216–38.
Wehrli, F. (1967–9) *Die Schule des Aristoteles: Texte und Commentar*, 2nd edn. Basel.
Wellmann, M. (1919) 'Eine Pythagoreische Urkunde des iv Jahrhunderts v. Chr.', *Hermes* 54: 225–48.
White, M. J. (2003) 'Stoic natural philosophy', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. B. Inwood. Cambridge: 124–52.
White, S. (2007) 'Posidonius and Stoic physics', in *Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC to 200 AD*, ed. R. Sorabji and R. W. Sharples. London: 35–76.
Wiersma, W. (1942) 'Das Referat des Alexandros Polyhistor über die Pythagoreische Philosophie', *Mnemosyne* 10: 97–112.
Wildberg, Ch. (1987) *John Philoponus: On Aristotle on the Eternity of the World*. London.
Wimmel, W. (1974) 'Cicero auf platonischem Feld. Zu 9 des *Orator*', in *Studia Platonica. Festschrift für Hermann Gundert zu seinem 65. Geburtstag am 30.4.1974*, ed. K. Döring and W. Kullmann. Amsterdam: 185–94.
Winsbury, R. (2009) *The Roman Book*. London.
Wiseman, T. P. (2009) *Remembering the Roman People: Essays on Late-Republican Politics and Literature*. Oxford.
Wisse, J. (2002) '*De oratore*: rhetoric, philosophy, and the making of the ideal orator', in *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, ed. J. M. May. Leiden: 375–400.
Wisse, J., Winterbottom, M., and Fantham, E. (2008) *M. Tullius Cicero de Oratore Libri III: A Commentary on Book III, 96–230*. Heidelberg.
Wurm, K. (1973) *Substanz und Qualität. Ein Beitrag zur Interpretation der plotinischen Traktate VI 1, 2, 3*. Berlin.
Zeller, E. (1903) *Die Philosophie der Griechen III.2*, 4th edn. Leipzig.
Zetzel, J. E. G. (ed.) (1995) *Cicero, De Re Publica: Selections*. Cambridge.
—— (1999) (trans.) *Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws*. Cambridge.
—— (2001) 'Citizen and commonwealth in *De Re Publica* Book 4', in *Cicero's Republic*, ed. J. Powell and J. A. North. London: 83–97.
—— (2003) 'Plato with pillows: Cicero on the uses of Greek culture', in *Myth, History and Culture in Republican Rome: Studies in Honour of T. P. Wiseman*, ed. D. Braund and C. Gill. Exeter: 119–38.
Zoll, G. (1962) *Cicero Platonis aemulus: Untersuchungen über die Form von Ciceros Dialogen, besonders von De oratore*. Zurich.

Index of passages

Bold type signifies a passage for which a translation is given.

AËTIUS
1.3, 146
1.13, **127**
2.4.1, 168
2.7.7, 151
2.29.4, 141
4.2.1, 167
4.3.10, 79, 92, **93**
4.5, 141
4.5.10, 156
5.3.3, 154
5.20.4, 156

ACHILLES TATIUS
Introductio in Aratum
13, 106

ALBINUS
Epitome
14.3, 168

Introductio
4, 8

ALCMAEON
Fr. 4, 150

ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS
de Anima
6.2–6, **64**
85.14–20, 36

Mantissa
120.33–121.7, 65
121.6, **66**
151.3–13, 89, **90**

in Metaphysica
58.25–59.8, 43
58.31–59.8, 17, 179
206.12–207.6, 73

apud Paris. Suppl. Gr.
643, 65–6

AMMONIUS
in de Interpretatione
5.28–9, 16

ANONYMUS
Laur. 71.32, **56–7**

ANONYMUS
Prolegomena
10.1.10, 202

ANONYMUS
in Theaetetum
XXIV.30–XXV.29, 38
LXVIII.1–15, 48, 181

ANONYMUS LONDINENSIS
4.14–17, 156
18.8–19.1, 152
37.34–46, **136**

ANTHOLOGIA PALATINA
9.358, 9

APULEIUS
Florida
19, 137

[APULEIUS]
de Interpretatione
193.16–20, 40
193.21–194.22, 40

[ARCHYTAS]
de Principiis
19.5–7 Thesleff, 178
19.18–27, 178
19.18, 167

Categoriae
22.14, 23.21 Thesleff, **183**
26.21, 48
30.23–31.1, 47
30.24–31.5, 183

ARISTOTLE
Categoriae
1a20–b9, 54
3b13–16, 71
3b18–23, 72
6a36–b14, 47
15b18–19, 59
Analytica Posteriora
2.19, 35
Physica
194b13, 87
202a14, 18
210a14–24, **56**
255a29–30, 83
de Caelo
279b14, 169
268b19–20, 80
269a8–9, 81
269a12–18, 81
279b24–31, 84
279b33f., 168
285a3–4, 76
285b22, 148
304a9–18, 129
310a33–b1, 83
310a33–4, 82
311a17–18, 82
de Generatione et Corruptione
335a3–6, 66
336a14–18, 87
de Anima
404a1–21, 129
405a29, 152
412a27–8, 33
3.3, 35
430a22, 40
de Sensu et Sensibilibus
445a16–17, 136
de Insomniis
461a8ff., 157
de Partibus Animalium
651a18, 154
de Generatione Animalium
736b27, 40
Metaphysica
A1, 35
987a13, 144
987a14–18, 105
988a10–11, 17, 43
1037a5–7, 71
1038b34–1039a2, 71
1043a21, 36
1070b22–4, **176**
1071a11–17, 87
1072b35, 176
1081a14, b7, 147
1085a9, 147
1085a32, 147
1091a18, 169
Ethica Nicomachea
1100b22–1101a8, 32
1102a26, 26
1155b17–27, **89**
1168a35–b10, **90**
Ethica Eudemia
1218b34, 26
Ptolemy catalogue
Nos. 70, 71, 24
No. 97, 22

ARISTOXENUS
Harmonica
52.21–53.2, 168

ARIUS DIDYMUS
Fr. 16 Diels, 35

ASCLEPIUS
in Metaphysica
4.4–15, 14

ATHENAEUS
Deipnosophistae
214d–e, **4**

ATTICUS
Fr. 17 Des Places, 199

CAELIUS AURELIANUS
de Morbis Acutis
1.105, 127, 131, 133
1.115, 123, 136
2.37, 136

CALCIDIUS
in Platonis Timaeum
216, p. 231 Waszink/Jensen, 136

CELSUS
de Medicina
2.6.13–15, 137

CICERO
Academica
1.6, 191
1.7, 201
1.12, 191
1.13, 28
1.24–9, 34
1.26, 195
1.28, 196
1.30–2, 258
1.31, 262
1.33, 43, 28
1.33, **30**
1.44–6, 202
1.46, 205
ad Atticum
1.7, 3
4.4a, 16
4.8, 16
4.16.2, 26
4.16.3, 226
7.3.2, 251
7.11.1, 269, 272
8.11.1, 211
10.8.6, 257
13.32, 189
Brutus
143, 237
250, 195
in Catlinam
3.2, 237
de Divinatione
1.5, 2.119, 143
2.3, 240
2.21, 242
2.55, **203**
ad familiares
1.9.18, 257
4.12.3, 195
de Fato
1, 20, 192
de Finibus
1.5–6, **188**
1.7, **188**, 193, 200
2.15, **187**
3.7–10, 3
5.7, 14, 28
5.10, 37
5.12, 24, 26, **31**, 193
5.14, 34
5.24, 32
5.69, 263
5.77–86, 215
5.87, 204
de Legibus
1.15; 2.6, 14, 16, 38, 39, 41, 67, 68; 3.1, 5, 32, 207
1.15, 207
1.17, 220, 246
1.18, 20, 220
1.18, 220, 222
1.19, 212
1.20, 213
1.23–4, 221
1, 26, 27, 30, 59, 214
1.30, 214
1.40, 214
1.42–3, **214**
1.44–5, 214
1.44, **214**
1.52, 215
1.57, 215
1.58, 201, 216
1.59, 216
2.11, **211**, 214
2.14, 206
2.15–16, 212, 217–18
2.16–17, **206**
2.24, 218
2.26, 143
2.35–6, 220
2.38–9, 3.32, 208
2.39, 207
2.41, 208
2.45, 189, 207
2.62, 219, 220
2.67–8, 207
3.1, **206**
3.2–5, 212, 217
3.3, 212
3.5, 208
3.12, 219
3.26, 38–9, 218
3.26, 220
3.37, 247
3.39, 223
Lucullus
11–62, 110
11–12, 16
12, 40
15, 28, 162
32, 202

Lucullus (*cont.*)
39, 35
70, 28, 162
95, 192
118–19, 196
118, 144, 205
119, 193, 200
131, 32
de Natura Deorum
1.10–11, **204**
1.16, 28
1.20, 196
1.21, **198**
1.74, 143
2.45, 258
2.47, **191**
3.20–1, 258
3.95, 203
de Officiis
1.1–2, 195
1.11–15, 263–71
1.11, 264
1.13, 267
1.13a, **263**
1.13b, **266**
1.14a, **268**
1.14b, **269**
1.15, 266, **270**
1.26, 267
1.28, 155, 265
1.62–5, 267
1.63, 267
1.65, 268
2.8, 257
3.69, 268, **271**
Orator
7–10, **249–250**, 253, 254, 263
9–10, 101, 273
10, 16, 274
10, 253
11, **259**, 266
12, 260
15, 39, 41, 253
16, 253, 274
18, 256
19, 253, 256
33, 251
41, 189
46, 37
101, 257
114, 24
172, 192–3, 214, 228, 24
de Oratore
1.12, 236
1.20, **235**
1.28, 232
1.47, 232
1.71, **234**, 236
1.83, 236
1.118, 235
1.128, 232
1.219, 236
1.224–5, 217
1.224, **232**, 233, 235
1.230, 235
2.160, 24
3.56–81, 217
3.66, 236
3.71, 80, 37
3.74, 236
3.80, 236, 237
3.84, 85, 90, 237
3.122, 232
3.129, 232
3.182, 24
3.228–30, 232
ad Quintum Fratrem
3.5.1, 238
de Re Publica
1.2, 243
1.13, 243
1.16, 204
1.33, 238
2.3, **238**, 245
2.21–2, **239**
2.28, 143
2.51, **241**, 243
2.52, **242**, 244
3.34, 238
4.19, 239
4.2a, 18, 19, 244
4, Fr. III, 211
5.2, **244**
5, Fr.VI, **211**
6.15–17, 190
6.21, 148
6.27, 189, 193
6.31, 246
Timaeus
1–2, **194**
2, 39
4, 252
5, **197**
9, 204
10, **203**
16, 190
35, 191
38, 190
43, 199

43.1, 201
52, 201
Topica
1–3, 37
3, 193
Tusculanae Disputationes
1.5, 237
1.10, 39, 144
1.14, 192
1.20, 167
1.24, 226
1.53–4, 193
1.57–8, 246, 262
1.64, 201
1.68, 190
1.70, 195
3.2–4, 262
4.10, 144
5.10, 195
5.11, 195
5.100, 257

CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS
Stromateis
1.358, 141
5.116, 168

CRANTOR
Fr. 3 Mullach, 101

DIOGENES LAËRTIUS
2.64, 9
2.85, 9
3.37, 9
3.56, **7**
3.57–8, 11
3.61–2, **6**
3.63–4, 8
3.65–6, 8
3.66, 6, 17
3.69, 149
4.22–7, 12
5.23–4, 24
5.27–34, 33
5.28–34, 23
5.29, 23, 35
5.73, 17
7.4, 148
7.31, 33
7.40–1, 21
7.41, 100
7.49–51, 109
7.51–2, 109
7.54, 108, **108**, 116
7.134, 176
7.135, 102, **103**
7.138–9, 142–3, 145
7.144, 146, 100
7.151–2, 150
7.156, 101
7.163, 9
8.6, 140
8.14, 140
8.24–5, 174
8.24, 140, 176
8.25–33, 139–59
8.30, 98, 141
8.34–5, 140
8.36, 141
8.60, 138
8.88, 31
9.4, 11
9.22, 151

ELIAS
in Categorias
107.11–13, 22
113.17–20, 22
115.3–13, 26
117.15–25, 45
117.21–2, 56
118.9–13, 45
133, 9
201.23–5, 183

EPICTETUS
Dissertationes
1.9.11, 157

EPICURUS
Epistula ad Herodotum
58–9, 125

EUSTATHIUS
ad Odysseam
ad 23.220, 9

GALEN
de Elementis
1.416K, 133
de Utilitatione Respirationis
4.484K, 136
de Propriis Placitis
4.762K, 135
de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis
5.377K, 97
5.420K, 97
5.425K, **97**

de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (*cont.*)
5.430K, 97
5.466–8K, 110
5.467K, 105
5.478K, 98
de Tremore
7.615K, **122**
de Locis Affectis
8.414K, 122
de Differentia Pulsuum
8.626K, 74
de Indolentia
13, **9**
in Platonis Timaeum
Fr. 11.107–9 Schröder, 10

[GALEN]
Historia Philosophiae
21, 176
35, 146

GELLIUS
Noctes Atticae
20.5.11–12, 26

HERACLIDES
Fr. 9 Wehrli, 134
Fr. 77, 138
Fr. 99, 132
Fr. 118–20, 126
Fr. 121, **127**

HERMODORUS
Fr. 8 Isnarde Parente, 172

HIPPOCRATES
De Aeribus, Aquis, Locis
10–11, 150
de Morbo Sacro
20, 156
de Natura Hominis
4, 150

HIPPOLYTUS
Refutationes
1.20, 6.24.1–2, 182

HOMER
Odyssey,
24.9–12, **154**

IAMBLICHUS
de Communi Mathematica Scientia
9.40 Festa, 106

ISIDORE
Etymologiae
6.5, 3

JULIAN
Orationes
8 (5) 3.107.7–108.1, 79, **86–87**
8 (5) 3.108.7–8. 111.7, 116.7, 86

MACROBIUS
in Somnium Scipionis
1.14.19, 100, 106

NEMESIUS
de Natura Hominis
2, 106
44, 167

NICOLAUS DAMASCENUS
On the Philosophy of Aristotle
Fr. 7 Drossart Lulofs, **177**

OCELLUS
De Universali Natura
128.9–24, 168

PAPYRI
PHib.
228, 5
PPetr.
II 5–8, 5
II 50, 5
PSI
1488, 8

PHILO ALEXANDRINUS
de Aeternitate Mundi
12, **170**
55–75, 196
Vita Moysis
214, 223

PHILODEMUS
Index Academicorum
XXXV 10–16, 17
XXXV 11–16, 38
XXXV 13, 39
XXXV 13–18, 195
de Poetica
V 16, 74

PHILOLAUS
Fr. 1, 144
Fr. 7, 149

Fr. 13, 154
Fr. 21, 168

PHILOPONUS
de Aeternitate Mundi
145.13–147.25, 196
146.3–6, 197
147.21–5, 198
in Categorias
5.15–24, 20, 45
5.16–18, 56
7.26–9, 23
in de Anima
Proem. 9, 132
27.21–8, 21
81.25, 167
150.5–151.6, 168

PHOTIUS
Bibliotheca
438a23–6, 171
439a19–24, 174

PLATO
Cratylus
389a, 251
Epistula 7
344b, 257
Laches
197b, 267
Laws
631b–632d, 718a, 828d–829b, 209
701b–c, 208
716d–717a, 208
721b–d, 209
726e–734e, 210
822d–824c, 210
916d–917e, 210
955e–956b, 189, 207
958d–e, 208
Menexenus
246e, 267
Phaedo
77c, 10
78d, 80b, 83c, 255
109a–b, 148
Phaedrus
227b, 265
227d, 266
245c–246a, 189
245c, 246
248b, 267
250d, **270**
278e–279b, 189
Philebus
53d, 182
Republic
327b, 6
327c, 6
374a, 420c, 466a, 228
380b–c, 218
414e, 6
472d–e, 500c–501c, 241, 244
484c, 252
499b, 229
501b, 252
511d–e, 272
516a, **272**
568a, 6
592a–b, **228**
592a, 228
Sophist
255c–d, 47, 182
Symposium
197e, 230
211a–b, **253**, 255
211a, 253
211b–c, 269
211c, **269**
211e, 266
212a, 230
Timaeus
19b–c, 244
23c, 179
27c–47b, 179, 187
27c–d, 29c–d, 200
27d–31b, 48a–52d, 53c–57c, 173
27d–28a, 107, 253
27d, 111
28a, 251, 252, 258
28b, 168, 197, 198, 199
29b–d, 202
29e–30a, 204
30a, c, d, 34a, 174
30b–c, **202**
32c, 190
33a–b, **189**
35a, xviii, **99**, **102**, 105, 165, 167
37c–38c, 198, 199
37e, 52d, 168
40a, 191
40d, 190
45b–d, 112
47a–b, 200
48b–c, 53c–d, 173
48b–c, 173
48b, 128
53b, 174
53c–57c, 143

Timaeus (*cont.*)
53d, 174
54c–d, **173**
54d, 56d, 129
55d–58c, 148
56e, 57b, 127
56e, 60e, 127
58d, 151
63a, 148
67b–e, 112
73b, 157
73c–d, 154
77c4, 10
82a, 150
83c, 154

PLINY
Natural History
7.52, 122
7.124, 26.14–15, 137

PLOTINUS
Enneads
6.1.1, 47

PLUTARCH
Aemilius Paulus
28.11, 3
Alexander
7.6–8, 26
Antonius
58, 4
Cicero
4.1–3, 162
24, 195
Lucullus
19.7, 15
42.1–2, 4
42.3, 162
Sulla
26, 3, **16**
de Animae Procreatione
1012d–1013b, 1019e–f, 1020c, 164
1012d, f, 100
1012d, 101
1012e, 165
1013a–b, 168
1013b, **163**, 196
1020c, 164
1022e, 101
1023b–c, **99**, **104**, 99–106
1023b, 99, 100
1026b, 165
adversus Colotem
1115b, 31
1121f–1122a, 162
de Defectu
428e–f, 174
430f–431a, 162
de E
387f, 162
de Facie
922a, 162
de Iside
369d–e, 165
Quaestiones Platonicae
1002a, 147, 174
1007c, 199
de Sera Numinis Vindicta
549e, 162
de Virtute Morali
441a, 144
Lamprias catalogue
No. 56, 38
No. 63, 162

[PLUTARCH]
Epitome
1.13.14, 128

POLYBIUS
6.47, 235

PORPHYRY
in Categorias
57.5, 20
in Harmonica
11.4–6, 35
11.13, 36
11.22, 36
11.31–2, 14.2–3, 10–11, 36
13.17, 36
13.29–14.4, 36
Introductio
1.13, 20
Vita Plotini
14.7, 20
24, **19**
24.2, 18
Vita Pythagorae
48.1, 20

POSIDONIUS
Fr. 5 EK, 176
Fr. 16, 49, 98, 141, 96
Fr. 16, 102, **103**
Fr. 18, 49, 84, 93, 149, 220, 96
Fr. 22, 46, 47, 149, 160, 187, 288, 96

Fr. 24, 145
Fr. 28, 31, 49, 85, 141, 149, 205, 291, 96
Fr.31, 148, 110
Fr. 42, 108, **108**
Fr. 48a, 48b, 96
Fr. 49, 205, 96
Fr. 49, 96
Fr. 85, 100, 107, **107**
Fr. 93, 96
Fr. 140, 141a, 96, 97
Fr. 140, 100, 106
Fr. 141a, **99**, **104**
Fr. 148, 105
Fr. 149, 106
Fr. 151, 98
Fr. 196, 199, 96
Fr. 203, 96
Fr. 253, 4
T43, 100
T62, 97
T85, 96, 100, 96
T85, 97
T91, 95, 96
T91, 98, 144
T95, **97**
T100, 96
T101, 97
T102, 97

PROCLUS
in Euclidis Definitiones
1.89, 102

QUINTILIAN
Institutiones
10.1123, 226

SCHOLIA
ad Odysseam
23.296, 22
23.310–43, 22

SENECA
Epistulae
108.2–3, 51
117.11–12, 74

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS
adversus Mathematicos
4.5–6, 106
7.89–260, 110
7.89–140, 100, 115
7.92–109, 100, 115
7.92–3, **113**, 115
7.93, 107, **107**, 112
7.102, 115
7.115–25, 110
7.116, 112
7.119, 104, **112**
7.141–260, 110
7.141–9, 110
7.141–4, 107, 110
7.141, 110, **110**
7.202, 136
7.217–26, 34–6
8.4–10, 136
8.7, **135**
9.71–2, 106
9.78–9, 115
10.218, 248, 116
10.261–2, 146
10.276–83, 147
Outlines of Pyrrhonism
1.235, 162

SIMPLICIUS
in de Caelo
13.22–8, 14.13–21, 80
13.23, 20.12–13, 21.33–22.17, 79
20.10–25, 21.33–22.17, 82
23.31–24.7, 81
24.20–7, 81
25.11–21, 81
52.12–17, 55.25–31, 81
70.20–9, 82
279.5–9, 65
279.7–8, **66**
285.27–286.6, 82
in Categorias
15.35–16.16, 21
15.36ff., 45
16.2, 26
18.16–21, 22
36.28–31, 49
62.25–6, 46
63.22–4, 47, 48, 181
73.15–28, 47, 181
76.13–17, 47
78.5–20, **55**
78.10–20, 46
78.17–20, **68**
156.14–23, 48, 181
159.12ff., 49
159.31–2, 16
159.32, 40
165.32–166.29, 73
167.2–18, **74**
167.20ff., 46
174.14–16, 47, **180**
174.14, 187.10, 236.28, 246.22, 46

in Categorias (*cont.*)
187.10, 41
188.3–7, **60**
199.17–20, 48, 183
206.8, 183
206.10–15, 47, 48, **181**
373.7–18, 58
373.18–32, **59**
379.8–10, 45
379.9–12, 21
in Physica
4.8–16, 25
8.16–39, 26
181.7–30, 43, 171
181.10ff., 146
211.15–18, 60
248.2–5, 47
270.26–34, 552.18–24, 65
270.32–3, **66**
440.14–17, 18
759.18–20, 56
923.3–925.2, 24
923.3–7, 12
923.18–924.13, 25
923.10, 22

SPEUSIPPUS
Fr. 4 Lang, 101, 106

STOBAEUS
Eclogae
1.14.1, **127**, 131
1.17.1, 129, 131
1.58, 35
1.319.6–8, **93**
1.320.5–8, 79, **93**
1.364.4, 101, 106
2.39.20ff., 41
2.116.19–152.25, 32
2.188.5–119.19, 89

STOICORUM VETERUM FRAGMENTA
1.102, 2.413, 148
1.128, 140, 2.633, 153
1.467, 156
2.616, 150
2.708–11, 714, 153

STRABO
2.3.8, **14**
10.2.21, 3
12.5.3, 3
13.1.19, 3
13.1.54, 3, 4, **14**
14.1.37, 4
14.2.19, 3
14.5.4, 79, 92
16.2.4, **14**
17.1.5, 15, 41, 161

SYRIANUS
in Metaphysica
151.19–20, 178
165.33–166.8, 183.1–5, 171

TACITUS
Annales
6.20–1, 5

TAURUS
T23 Gioè, 168

THEMISTIUS
in de Anima
32.19–31, 48
in Physica
26.20ff., 60
160.26–8, 56

THEODORET
Graecarum Affectionum Curatio
5.17, 167

THEOPHRASTUS
Metaphysica
6a25f., 147
11a27–67, 146
Fr. 230 FHS&G, 149

[TIMAEUS LOCRUS]
205.13–206.4, 101
206.11–12, 168
208.13–17, 167

VARRO
de Lingua Latina
5.11, 144
7.37, 7

XENOCRATES
Fr. 95 Isnarde Parente, 182
Fr. 153, 168
Fr. 168, 169, 184, 190, 199, 167
Fr. 188 [=Fr.68 Heinze], 101, 165
Fr. 213, 166

General index

Academics xv, 37, 161
  sceptical xiv, xxi–xxii, 89, 96, 110, 111, 202–5, 213 (*see further* scepticism)
  term xxi, 41, 161–2
Academy xix, xx–xxi, 7, 41, 49, 134, 161, 226, 259, 260
  early xxii, 97, 113, 125–6, 128–31, 139, 142, 145, 149, 152, 159, 164, 165–71, 172, 177–9, 182–5, 191, 262
  Hellenistic 33, 161, 164, 184
  New 187–8, 196, 202, 226, 247, 258, 261
  Old 17, 28, 34, 38–9, 163, 195, 213, 215
Adrastus 26, 45
Aemilius Paulus 3
aesthetics 268
Aëtius 92–3, 128–33, 143, 146
Afranius 188
Alcmaeon 141, 150, 152, 154, 159
Alexander of Aigai 50
Alexander of Aphrodisias xvi, 36, 49, 51, 60, 61–8, 72, 78, 80, 88–93, 94, 177
Alexander Polyhistor xx, 139–59, 163, 172
Alexandria xiv, 4, 6, 8, 14, 16, 42, 160, 164
anatomy 155–7
Anaximenes 151
'Ancients' 2, 28, 33, 35
Andronicus xv, 11–13, 15–27, 29–30, 40, 44, 48–9, 51, 181, 182
Anonymous Prolegomena 202
Anonymus *in Aratum* 139–59, 163, 172
Anonymus Londinensis 134, 136
Anonymus *in Theaetetum* 33, 37, 50, 160, 180, 182
anthropology 264
Antiochus xv–xvi, xxi, 17, 28–37, 41–4, 49–50, 98, 110, 162–4, 165–6, 176, 183–4, 195–6, 213, 215, 227
Antipater of Tarsus 95, 98, 108, 110
antiquarianism 145, 158–9
Apellicon of Teos 3–4, 13–14
Apollodorus of Athens 19–20, 108
Arcesilaus 161–2, 202
Archytas 139 (*see also* pseudo-Archytas)
Aristarchus 6, 8, 9, 10
Aristo xv, 16, 38, 49
Ariston of Chios 213
Aristophanes of Byzantium 6–7, 11, 20
Aristotelianism xiv–xviii, 53–77, 97
  'orthodoxy' xv, xvii, 61, 78–9, 94
Aristotle xiv–xviii, xxii, 11–27, 28–51, 53–77, 78–94, 95, 123, 125, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 163–4, 169–71, 176–86, 189, 193–6, 200, 204 (*see also* treatises)
  Categories xv–xvii, 16, 21, 26, 40, 42, 44–9, 50, 51, 53–77, 94, 163, 169–71, 177, 180–5
  de Anima 66
  de Caelo xv, xvii, 79–83, 85, 200
  de Gen. and Corr. 176, 179
  de Interpretatione 21
  de Partibus Animalium 62
  de Philosophia 39, 176, 200
  Metaphysics xx–xxi, 17, 25, 43–4, 54–6, 144, 176–7, 179, 180
  Nicomachean Ethics xv, 24, 31–2, 45, 193
  Physics xv, xvi, 22, 24–5, 45, 56, 60, 61, 71, 85, 200
  Rhetoric 24, 37
  Topics 21, 24, 26, 37–8, 50
Aristus 38
Arius Didymus xv, 32, 35
Asclepiades xix, 118–38
Athenodorus 40, 46
Athens xiv, 3, 14, 38, 161, 164, 223, 226
atomism xix, 118, 120, 124–5, 134, 138
Atticus 10, 51

bad 146
Barnes, J. xv, 11–12, 18, 20, 21, 23–6
beauty 252, 253–6, 268–9, 270, 273
biology 153–4
Bithynia xix

body xvii, 62–3, 74, 75, 79–88, 102–4, 115, 123, 130, 134, 147
  human 121–2, 123, 138, 143, 210
  primary 119–20 (*see also* elements,; fifth)
Boethus xvi–xvii, xviii, 14, 20, 33, 40, 44, 49, 51, 53–77, 89–90
Boethus Stoicus 108, 110
booksellers 14–15, 17
Borges, J.-L. 159
brain 154, 156–7

Caelius Aurelianus 133
Caesar xxiv, 226, 267, 274
Calvenus Taurus 51, 196–8
canon 3, 12–13, 21, 27
Carneades xxii, 161–2, 194, 195
catalogue 12
category xvi, 45, 47–9, 57, 180–3
causation 123–4, 145, 174, 175–9
character 73–5
  moral 216, 222
Chrysippus 21, 108–10
Cicero xxi–xxiv, 3–4, 10, 16, 24–5, 37, 39–40, 143–5, 187–205, 206–8, 211–24, 225–75
  Academica 185, 189, 191, 194
  ad Atticum 3
  de Divinatione 39, 193
  de Finibus 187–8, 189, 193, 195
  de Legibus xxii–xxiv, 206–8, 211–23, 227, 231, 246–8
  de Natura Deorum xxii, 189, 192–3, 199, 201, 258
  de Officiis xxiv, 231, 262, 263–72, 273
  de Oratore xxii, xxiv, 227, 231–7, 246–9, 251, 260
  de Re Publica xxii, xxiv, 206, 211, 219, 221, 227, 231, 237–48
  Lucullus 185, 189
  Orator xxiv, 231, 248–62, 273–4
  Timaeus xviii–xxii, 188–205
  Topica 24, 37
  Tusc. Disp. 143, 189, 195–6
citizens 208–12, 217–18, 222, 223
Cleanthes xix
cognition xviii, 107–14
commentaries 3, 6, 8, 10, 40, 43, 44, 46, 80, 95, 100
commentators xvi, 30, 32, 34, 38, 39, 45–6, 48–51, 61, 91
commonwealth 236, 238–48, 267, 270, 274–5
composite xvi, 54, 62–4
constitution 219, 222
corporeal xviii, 101–3
corpus arrangement xv, 6–7, 8, 11, 12–13, 18, 27
corpuscles 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127
cosmology xx, xxii, 145, 148–9, 153, 159, 169, 191, 201, 204
Crantor 163, 164–5, 167–8, 172, 196
Cratippus xv, xxii, 17, 38–41, 49, 194–5, 199
creationism xxii, 168, 196–9, 203
Cremonini, C. 92
criterion xvi, 34–6, 107, 108–16
Critolaus 50, 196

decentralisation 2, 39
Demiurge 174, 178
Democritus 124–6, 136–7, 138
desire 265–8
dialect xx, 140
dialogue xxii–xxiv, 121, 193, 200, 203, 206, 235, 248
  intertextual 265, 271
differentia 64–5
Diodorus 128, 130, 132
Diogenes Laërtius xx, 23–6, 33, 35, 37, 139–59
Diogenes of Apollonia 151
disease 120, 136–7, 138
divisible 101–3, 165, 166
doxography xx, xxi, 34, 50, 92–3, 114, 116, **127**, 136, 143–4, 146, 151, 156, 167, 168, 262, 273
dualism 99–102, 105, 144, 171–2
Dyad xx–xxi, 143–7, 159, 165, 167, 171–5, 177

earth, the 143, 148, 187
'edition' xv, 1, 22
Egypt 185
elements 118, 124–35, 138, 143, 147–9, 171, 173–4, 177, 178, 201 (*see also minima*)
eloquence 248–51, 258
embryology 143, 153–4
Empedocles xix, 118, 121, 128–33, 135, 138, 141, 150
empirical 256–7, 258, 261, 263, 269, 270, 273
Ennius 188, 225
Epicureanism xiv, 85, 89, 96, 118, 120, 125, 187, 191, 192, 196, 198–9, 213
Epicurus 125, 136, 187
epistemology xv, xix, 107–17, 257, **259**, 260, 264, 268, 269
eschatology 143, 155, 157, 159, 226, 248
eternity xxi, xxii, 84, 87–8, 167–70, 185, 246
ethics xv, xxii–xxiv, 36, 88–91, 143, 146, 195, 213, 215, 216, 227, 228, 263, 268, 274
Eudorus xv, xx–xxi, xxii, 16, 28, 33, 40, 41–50, 146, 160–86, 196, 201
Eurytus 141

family 210
Festugière, A.-J. xix, 142, 148
fiction 228, 231–2, 234–6, 237–52, 262, 273

fifth, body/element xvii, 49, 79–82, 84–8, 91–3
fire xvii–xviii, 81–2, 83–4, **86–87**, 129, 151
flux 135–6
form xvi–xvii, 49, 54, 57–72, 73, 86, 101, 106, 149, 177, 178–9 (for Form *see* Idea)
'fragments' 127–8, 129, 130–5, 138

Galen 8–10, 35, 97–8, 118, 122–3, 133, 135
  pseudo-Galen 176
geometry xix, 124–6, 127–33, 138, 147, 192, 201
God, god, gods xxi, 124, 146, 149, 150–2, 171–5, 176, 178, 184, 210, 213, 217, 221–2, 223, 262
good 146, 149, 215, 267, 270

happiness xxiii, 32, 89, 208–11, 215–16, 221, 223, 264–5
Harpocration 10
'having' xvi, 58–9, 60–1, 67, 77
heat 143, 149–53
Hegel, G. W. F. 238
Hellenistic xv, xviii, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 23, 26, 30, 34, 37–8, 45–6, 78, 85, 90, 139, 158, 184
  late 33–7, 42, 49, 51, 95
  post- xv, xxii, 33, 35, 38, 50, 78, 82, 88, 90, 94, 160, 184
Heraclides Ponticus xix, 118–38
Heraclitus xix, 116, 128–32, 141, 151, 187
Herculaneum 4
Hermes 154–5, 157
Hermodorus 47
Hero 134
Hippocratics 121, 141, 150, 154
Hippolytus 182
history 227, 236, 238, 241–2, 245, 246–7, 261, 274
Homer 8, 9, 154, 155, 188, 225
honourable 270–1
human 209, 211, 213, 220–2, 223, 264–9
Hyginus 141

Iamblichus 74
Idea xxiv, 31, 77, 105, 108, 112, 116, 136, 227–8, 230–1, 239–41, 246, 248–75
ideal xxiii–xxiv, 227, 228, 232, 234–5, 247
'in' 56, 57, 59, 71, 77
incorporeal 74, 75, 103–4, 108, 112–15
individual xvi, 53–77
individuation xvii
indivisible xix, 101, 102, 166
inherence 58, 61, 64, 66–8, 71, 77
intellect 136
intelligible xviii, 99, 102, 107–8, 111, 115, 181–3
Italy 143, 194

Julian xvii, 85–7
justice xxiii, 213–14, 226, 228, 246, 247, 267, 272

Kahn, C. H. 158–9
knowledge xvi, 32, 108, 174, 267

Latin xxii, 188, 212, 255, 257, 273
Laur. 71.32, 56, 61, 71
law, legislation xxii–xxiii, 207–24, 243, 246–7
  universal 219–21, 222, 246, 267
library 3–4, 6, 8, 14, 15–16, 30
life
  biological 138, 150–2, 209
  way of xxiii, 32, 209–12, 223, 264–5
limit xviii, 102–4, 113–16
Lonie, I. M. xix, 120–4
logic 20, 45, 56, 216
Lucius 48, 181
Lucullus 3–4
Lyco 17

magic 121, 123, 243
magistracies 217, 219
Marx, K. 238
masses xix, 118, 127
mathematics xiv, xvii, xviii, 80, 102, 104–7, 113–17, 144, 147, 149, 152, 191, 201
  mathematicals 104–7, 111, 113–14
matter xvi–xvii, xviii, xix, xx, 53–77, 86, 101–3, 118, 123–8, 133, 136, 145, 149, 177, 178–9, 181
  particulate theory 121, 122, 128, 130, 134, 137
mechanistic xix, 118, 120, 123, 126
medicine xix, xx, 119, 120–3, 137–8, 140, 159
Megarians 89
Menander 188
metaphysics xxiii, 175, 178, 185, 230, 236, 238, 241, 248, 252, 261, 262, 273–4
metempsychosis 156–8
minima 125, 127–33
Moderatus 106, 142
Monad xx–xxi, 143–7, 159, 165, 167, 171–5, 177
monism 144, 172
Moraux, P. xvii, 78–9
Moses xxiii, 223
motion xvii–xviii, 80–8, 123, 136, 152, 176, 246
mysticism 256–7
Mytilene 194

nature xvii–xviii, xxiii, 80–8, 89, 119, 124–5, 201–2, 212–20, 222–4, 245, 247, 264–5
Neleus 13, 16
Neoplatonists 22, 146, 171
Neopythagoreanism 142, 146 (*see also* pseudo-Pythagorica)

Nicolaus of Damascus 177
Nicomachus 142
Nicostratus 42, 46, 51, 181
Nigidius Figulus xxii, 144–5, 194–5, 199, 201–2, 204
number 106, 112, 113–16, 143–7, 152, 154, 167
Numenius 142

Octavian 226
oikeion 89–90, 91
oikeiôsis 36, 263
One xx–xxi, 129, 145–7, 165, 171–3
ontology xvi, xviii, 53–77, 125, 178, 227, 228, 230, 242, 244, 248, 254, 257, 259, 260, 273–4
opposites 149–50

Panaetius xiv, 9–10, 21, 30, 95, 97, 98, 164
papyri 5, 16
Parmenides 150
parts 60, 62–4, 67, 81, 92, 98, 102, 118
perfection 227, 228–30, 231–2, 234–8, 243–4, 245–62, 273
Pergamum xiv, 4
Peripatetics, Peripatos xiv, xv, 3, 13–14, 16, 28, 32, 34–6, 37, 38–41, 51, 78–9, 82, 85, 88, 91–4, 139, 149, 194–6, 213, 239–41
persuasion 208–12, 217–18, 223
phantasia 35–6
Philodemus 4
Philolaus 113–14, 139, 141, 144, 146, 151–2, 159
Philo of Alexandria xxiii, 170, 223
Philo of Larissa 28–9, 161, 196, 202, 204–5
Philoponus 20
philosopher 230, 231
philosophy 232, 233, 238, 243, 246–7, 260, 274
physicalism 152, 155
physics xvii, 20, 45, 56, 80, 83, 85–8, 91, 94, 123, 133, 149, 191, 195, 216, 274
place 56, 57
Plato xiv–xv, xviii–xxiv, 1–11, 20, 31, 41, 42–4, 95–117, 144, 146, 149, 151, 153, 155, 161–9, 172–9, 182, 184–6, 187–205, 216–18, 222–4, 225–75
  Gorgias 232
  Laches 5
  Laws xxii, 206–11, 216–18, 222
  Letters 160, 257
  Meno 246, 262
  Phaedo 5, 7, 124, 179, 246, 262
  Phaedrus xxiv, 98, 187, 232, 246, 265
  Philebus 172
  Protagoras 187
  Republic 6, 10, 172, 206, 209, 222, 228–31, 233–45, 252
  Sophist 5, 47
  Symposium 1, 253
  Theaetetus 136
  Timaeus xviii–xxii, 2, 10, 96–114, 123–32, 135, 138, 143–5, 147–9, 151, 155, 163, 164–70, 172–5, 178, 185, 187–205, 257
Platonikos 161–2
Platonism, Platonists xvi, 28, 33, 37, 49, 96–107, 125, 142, 147, 160–86, 199, 202, 258 (*see also* Neoplatonists)
  Middle Platonism 160, 175
Plotinus 1, 20, 42, 46, 181–2
Plutarch xviii, 11, 15, 38, 50, 99–106, 162–3, 164–71, 174, 185
Polemo 162
political philosophy 211, 239, 242–3, 263
politics xxi–xxiv, 32, 215, 227, 231, 243–5, 264, 272, 274
Polybius 238
Porphyry xvi, 1, 11, 18, 25, 35, 36–7, 74
Posidonius xiv, xviii–xix, xxi, 21, 95–117, 144, 164, 201
power 267
preambles 206, 208–12, 217–18, 223
predicate (Stoic) 74
predication xvii, 55, 67–8, 77
Presocratics xx, 124, 141, 151, 159, 171
principles xx–xxi, 43, 142–3, 149, 159, 171–80, 184, 185
probabilism 202–4
pseudo-Archytas xxi, 2, 42–3, 47, 49, 166–7, 178, 182
pseudo-Pythagorica xx, 2, 42–3, 50, 140, 158–9, 160, 166–71, 174, 177
pseudo-Timaeus xxi, 2, 42, 166–7, 168
Ptolemy 35
Ptolemy the Unknown 19, 21, 23
Pythagoras 1, 42, 97–8, 106, 113–16, 118, 121, 123, 134, 139–40, 142, 143–4, 146, 154, 157, 166, 167, 185, 204
Pythagoreanism xiv, xvi, 2, 42–3, 49, 97–9, 106–7, 114–17, 129, 136–7, 139–59, 164, 165–6, 168–80, 184–5, 194, 201–2, 204

quality xvi, 46, 55, 66, 68–70, 71–2, 75, 77, 181
quantity 55, 68–9, 181

reason xix, xxiii, 107–17, 155–6, 207, 212–14, 217, 220–2, 256
  cosmic 212–14, 217
Reinhardt, T. 37, 68–70
relative xvi, 40, 46, 49, 60–1, 73–7
  vs. *per se* 47, 180, 182–3
religion 207, 217, 219
rhetoric 208, 232, 255, 257
Rhodes xiv

Rome xiv, xix, xx, 2, 3–4, 14, 15–16, 141, 145, 194–5, 212, 218–24, 225–7, 231, 236, 237, 238, 241–8, 264–5, 267, 269, 272, 273–5

sayable 74, 77
Scepsis 13, 17, 44
scepticism xxi–xxii, 161–3, 184, 202–5, 226, 274
science (*epistêmê*) 35–6
self-love xviii, 90
Seneca 50
sense-perception xvi, 34–5, 112, 136, 143, 154, 155, 156, 256, 263, 270
sensible xviii, 47, 99, 102, 115, 136
Severus 106
Sextus xviii, 34–6, 107, 135–6, 146
Sharples, R. W. 45
Sicily 134, 194
signification 58–9
Simplicius xvii, 16, 74, 79, 91–2, 161, 171, 177, 179, 180–1
Smyrna 4
Socrates 202
soul xviii–xix, 39, 56, 93, 97–113, 121, 123, 136–8, 143–4, 152, 157, 163, 210
  immortality 152, 153, 155, 227, 246, 262, 273
  world xx–xxi, 124, 138, 148–9, 166–8
Speusippus xix, 49, 106, 142, 146, 147, 162, 169, 172, 185, 196
spirits 118, 123, 126
statesman 211, 218, 227, 243, 246
Stobaeus 160, 163
Stoicism 33, 46, 49, 53, 222–4, 227, 261
  doctrines xvii, xviii–xix, xx, xxiii, 32, 73–7, 82, 148–9, 150, 151, 152, 153, 159, 175, 191, 201, 207, 212, 215, 218, 246–7, 258, 263
  system xiv, 2, 95–117
Stoics xv, 21, 49, 88–90, 95–7, 163–4, 213
Strabo 3, 11, 13–15, 92, 161
Strato 122–3
subject xvii, 55
substance xvi–xvii, 46, 47, 48, 53–77, 181–3
Sulla xiv, 3, 30

supernatural 118, 121, 138, 158
syllogistic 40
Syracuse 226
Syrianus 48

teleology 124–5, 153
texts xiv–xvi, xviii, xxi, xxii, 1–27, 49–51, 84, 90, 95, 165, 177, 184
  criticism 3, 8, 9, 10, 17–18, 43
theology 146, 175, 177, 178–9, 185, 201, 273
Theophrastus xiv, 13–14, 15, 19, 25, 30, 34–7, 86, 143, 146, 147, 149, 151, 152
thought xvi, 34–5, 256
Thrasyllus 5–8, 11, 20
Timaeus of Locri 194, 204 (*see also* pseudo-Timaeus)
time 56, 57, 196–9
translation xxii, 187–204
treatises, Aristotelian xv–xvi, 20, 30
truth 203, 252, 257, 261, 264–8, 273, 274
Tyrannion 14–17
tyranny 241, 263, 274

universe 143–4, 149, 150–1, 246 (*see also* cosmology)
unjointed, masses 118, 133

Varro 7, 144, 154
Virgil 225
virtue xxiii–xxiv, 208–11, 213–18, 221, 223–4, 243
vitalism 118

wisdom 212, 270
wise 220–2, 228–9

Xenarchus xvi, xvii–xviii, 38, 78–94
Xenocrates 47, 48, 106, 125, 134, 142, 146, 162–9, 172, 185, 196
'Xenophon' 185

Zeno of Citium 21, 148
Zeno of Sidon 96