

Jonathan H. Turner

**Theoretical
Principles of
Sociology** Vol.2

Microdynamics

 Springer

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To the memory of my early mentors at the University of California at Santa Barbara from 1961–1965: Tamotsu Shibutani, Donald R. Cressey, and Walter Buckley, all of whom exposed me to symbolic interactionist theory, which became the starting point of my interest in micro theory. An especial thanks to Tamotsu Shibutani, my advisor for 3 years, for cultivating my interest in psychoanalytic theory, a key ingredient in my approach to the study of emotions.

Preface

This is the second volume of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* on microdynamic processes. Like the other volumes in this trilogy of books, I seek to define the fundamental properties of a realm of social reality and then develop principles on the operate dynamics of these properties. The ultimate goal is to articulate a series of highly abstract principles that apply to all times and places that humans have interacted and organized. The twenty-nine nice principles in this volume explain, I believe, many if not most of what transpires when humans interact in focused (face-to-face) and unfocused (avoidance of face engagement) encounters. I obviously take the distinction between focused and unfocused encounters from Irving Goffman because I see encounters as the fundamental structure of the micro social realm. A theory of microdynamics should explain the forces driving the behaviors of individuals in encounters, and as is evident, these behaviors are constrained not just by the properties and dynamics of encounters but also by the dynamics of meso- and macro-level phenomena. An encounter is almost always embedded with in meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations. This embedding loads the values of the variables in the theory, while providing conduits by which the meso and macro realms influence individuals interactions in encounters. Thus, in developing principles on the dynamics of encounters, considerable progress is made on linking, theoretically, the micro, meso, and macro realms together. The often-noted macro-micro gap is closed; and the three volumes of *Principles of Sociology*, when taken together as one general theory, resolve to a very great extent the conceptual gap across levels of social reality.

The principles offered here build on two earlier efforts to develop a general theory of microdynamics, *A Theory of Social Interaction* (2000) and *Face-to-Face: Toward a Theory of Interpersonal Processes* (2002), and *Human Emotions: A Sociological Theory* (2007). The major difference in this volume and these other books is that the principles developed in these

pages to be part of a more inclusive set of principles on mesodynamics and macrodynamics that address the other two fundamental realms of the social universe. Of course, my effort here is not the last answer, but only a beginning to formulate the laws of interpersonal processes and to see how these laws articulate with those about meso- and macro-level dynamics. Although the theory is certainly in the grand theory genera, it is nonetheless a theory that can be tested and revised; moreover, the theory can be assessed in more purely analytical terms with regard to whether or not the principles capture all of the properties and processes of the micro realm. When arguments are stated in a formal way, even when couched at a very high level of abstraction, the ideas do not get buried in textual discourse but, instead, are highlighted so that their plausibility can be assessed. If there is to be discourse, it should focus on what are seen as generic properties and on theoretical principles explaining their dynamics. When discourse is on these issues, it promises to advance theoretical sociology as a science.

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The research for this volume, as will all my other works in theoretical works in sociology, has been supported by the Academic Senate, University of California at Riverside. I remain ever-thankful that these funds are made available each year because they allow me to complete even very large projects like this one.

I also remain thankful that Clara Dean, my typist for over 40 years, continues to type for me, while proof reading for serious errors. Her conscientious efforts save me a great deal of time, and on many occasions, potential embarrassment.

I should also acknowledge two other people who have exerted the most influence on my theorizing about micro social processes. I cannot consider him as an undergraduate mentor because he came to Santa Barbara in my last year and one-half on campus; yet, as the years have gone by, it is clear that I owe continuing debt to *Thomas Scheff*, whose work continues influence of my analysis of emotional dynamics. And as is most evident by the frequent citations, this volume owes a debt to *Randall Collins*, my former colleague, who pulled me back into micro-level theorizing after a 20-year excursion into more macro-level theorizing and whose theory set me thinking about how I might conceptualize microdynamic processes, especially as they relate to meso- and macro-level dimensions of the social universe.

Contents

1 The Micro-level Realm of Social Reality	1
Encounters and the Microdynamic Realm	1
Dynamic Forces of the Micro Realm	9
Ecological and Demographic Forces of the Microdynamic Realm	11
Status Forces in the Microdynamic Realm	15
Role Forces in the Microdynamic Realm	16
Cultural Forces of the Microdynamic Realm.....	18
Motivational Forces in the Microdynamic Realm	21
Elementary Principles on Micro-level Forces in Encounters	25
Conclusion.....	27
2 The Embedding of Encounters	29
The Unfolding of Social Reality.....	29
The Emergence and Power of the Macro Realm	29
The Meso Realm of Reality	31
The Structure of Embedding	39
The Structure and Culture of Macro-level Social Reality.....	39
The Structure and Culture of Meso-level Reality	46
The Structure and Culture of Micro-level Reality	48
Elementary Principles of Embedding of Encounters.....	51
Conclusion.....	54
3 Ecological and Demographic Dynamics in Encounters	57
The Dynamics of Ecology and Demography in Focused Encounters.....	59
The Juxtaposition and Movements of Bodies in Focused Encounters	60
Density Among Participants and Onlookers to Encounters.....	61
The Organization of Space in Focused Encounters	63

Props and their Use in Focused Encounters.....	66
Technological Mediation of Interaction in Focused Encounters	71
Ecological and Demographic Dynamics in Unfocused Encounters.....	73
Why Unfocused Encounters are Important in Micro- and Macro-level Theorizing.....	73
Juxtaposition of Bodies and Movement in Unfocused Encounters	76
Density Among Participants and Onlookers to Unfocused Encounters	80
The Organization of Space in Unfocused Encounters	82
Props and their Use in Unfocused Encounters.....	86
Technologically Mediation of Unfocused Encounters.....	88
Elementary Principles on the Ecology and Demography of Encounters.....	89
Conclusion.....	91
4 Status Dynamics in Encounters.....	93
Status-Organizing Processes.....	93
Status Dynamics in Focused Encounters.....	99
The Clarity of Status	100
Network Dynamics and Status.....	111
Power and Authority as Status.....	114
Prestige and Honor as Status	117
Embedding of Status.....	118
Status Dynamics in Unfocused Encounters.....	119
Determining Status in Corporate Units.....	120
Status and Categorical Units.....	122
Elementary Principles on Status Dynamics in Encounters.....	126
Conclusion.....	130
5 Role Dynamics in Encounters.....	133
The Dynamics of Roles in Focused Encounters.....	134
Role-Taking and Role-Making	134
The Phenomenology and Psychology of Role-Making and Role-Taking	136
Inventories of Roles and Role-Making/Role-Taking	138
Verification and Re-verification of Roles	142
Complimentary Roles	147
Normatizing of Roles.....	148

The Embedding of Roles	150
The Dynamism of Roles	154
Roles in Unfocused Encounters.....	156
Elementary Principles on Role Dynamics in Encounters.....	158
Conclusion.....	161
6 Cultural Dynamics in Encounters.....	163
Normatization in Focused Encounters.....	167
Categorizing Persons and the Situation	167
Keying and Re-keying Frames.....	171
Forms of Talk and Non-verbal Communication	174
Rituals in Encounters	176
Emotions and Feelings in Encounters.....	183
Normatizing in Unfocused Encounters	185
Elementary Principles on Cultural Dynamics in Encounters	188
Conclusion.....	191
7 Motivational Dynamics in Encounters	193
Transactional Needs in Focused Encounters	195
Needs to Verify Identities	195
Dynamic Relations Among Identities.....	202
Needs to Realize Profits in Exchange Payoffs.....	204
Needs for Group Inclusion.....	210
Needs for Trust	212
Needs for Facticity.....	213
Embedding and Meeting Transactional Needs in Focused Encounters	216
Transactional Needs in Unfocused Encounters	222
Trust in Unfocused Encounters.....	222
Facticity in Unfocused Encounters	225
Group Inclusion in Unfocused Encounters.....	226
Exchange Payoffs in Unfocused Encounters	228
Verification of Identities in Unfocused Encounters.....	229
Elementary Principles on the Dynamics of Transactional Needs in Encounters	231
Conclusion.....	234
8 Emotional Dynamics in Encounters.....	237
The Nature of Human Emotions.....	238
Expanding the Emotional Palate.....	238
The Defense of Self	245

The Folk Notion of Personality.....	249
The Language of Emotions.....	250
Emotional Dynamics in Focused Encounters.....	252
Basic Conditions of Emotional Arousal.....	252
The Effects of Attributions on Emotional Arousal.....	254
Embedding and Emotional Arousal.....	258
Emotional Arousal in Focused Encounters.....	262
Emotional Dynamics in Unfocused Encounters.....	263
Elementary Principles on Emotional Dynamics in Encounters.....	265
Conclusion.....	268
9 The Micro Basis of the Meso and Macro Social Realms.....	271
The Evolution of the Meso and Macro Realms of Reality.....	274
Commitments to Meso- and Macro-level Social Units.....	277
Reproduction and Change in Meso- and Macro-level Social Units.....	281
Reproduction Dynamics in Encounters.....	281
Transformational Dynamics in Encounters.....	289
Principles Microdynamic Reproduction and Transformation.....	295
Conclusion.....	298
10 Principles of Microdynamics.....	303
The Principles of the Microdynamic Realm.....	304
Basic Properties and Dynamics in Encounters.....	304
The Embedding of Encounters.....	306
The Ecology and Demography of Encounters.....	308
Status Dynamics in Encounters.....	310
Role Dynamics in Encounters.....	314
Normatizing Dynamics in Encounters.....	316
Transactional-Need Dynamics in Encounters.....	319
Emotional Dynamics in Encounters.....	321
Microdynamics and the Reproduction or Transformation of Meso- and Macro-level Sociocultural Formations.....	324
Conclusion.....	328
References.....	329
Author Index.....	341
Subject Index.....	345

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1	A simple conceptual scheme	6
Fig. 2.1	The structure of embedding and encounters.....	42
Fig. 2.2	The culture of embedding for all encounters.....	49
Fig. 6.1	Culture and normatizing	165
Fig. 6.2	Axes of framing	173
Fig. 6.3	Types of rituals	177
Fig. 7.1	Types and levels of identity formation	197

List of Tables

Table 1.1	Definitions of basic properties of the micro realm	7
Table 1.2	Broad definitions of microdynamic forces driving encounters	10
Table 2.1	Properties of corporate units. Increasing clarity of expectation in encounters	32
Table 2.2	Properties of categoric units. Increasing clarity of expectations in encounters	37
Table 2.3	Generalized symbolic media within institutional domains.....	44
Table 6.1	Dimensions or axes of normatization	164
Table 6.2	Categorizing situations and intimacy	169
Table 7.1	Transactional needs	194
Table 7.2	Brief definitions of types of identities	196
Table 8.1	Representative examples of statements on primary emotions.....	239
Table 8.2	Variants of primary emotions	241
Table 8.3	First-order elaborations of primary emotions.....	242
Table 8.4	The structure of shame and guilt	243
Table 8.5	Repression, defense, transmutation, and targeting of emotions	246

Chapter 1

The Micro-level Realm of Social Reality

Encounters and the Microdynamic Realm

If we knew nothing about the social world of humans, and then began observing this world, what would we see? Without knowledge of society, the social world would look like an ant or bee colony. There would be busy movements through physical space, rapid movements in vehicles, movements in and out of physical structures punctuated by periodic gatherings animated talk or even louder talk into strange devices held to an ear. We might be impressed by the fact that people avoided each other in crowded places; and we would be equally impressed by the animated talk among individuals when standing or sitting face-to-face; and we would become increasingly curious as to why people talked into devices pushed to their ears, only to pull them down and begin massaging them with opposed thumbs. Literally, these and similar events would be all that we could see, unless we know something about the nature of social structure and culture. While we could clearly understand how physical structures constrained the movements and assemblages of individuals in space, we would become ever-more interested in how people miraculously avoided each other in their movements and in gatherings of face-to-face engagements with others. We might hypothesize that there were hidden structures, not easily observable, that were very much like the constraints of physical barriers imposing themselves on movements and assemblages. Much like a wall, there must be unobservable forces in play pushing on individuals, or perhaps there was some form of genetic programming in each individual that drove them to behave in such a patterned manner. If our curiosity about all of this would not subside, we would have to invent a new field of inquiry that would increase our capacity to see these hidden structures and to learn about how they seemingly push people about, restricting their movements and organizing their assembly in physical space. We would, in essence, need to invent

a sociology of the micro realm that would expose the forces in play and increase our understanding about their dynamics.

At the beginnings of our inquiries, we might be like the pre-literature people's gazing to the sky, observing the movement and patterns of small lights as well as the movements of a strange disk that would change its shape, only to reconstitute itself back to a full circle in a clear cycle. Without a theory to explain these phenomena and other phenomena, we could not understand or explain them. The social universe is really not different than the physical or biological universe; there are patterns to events, and scientific theories are what explain these patterns. Yet, many in sociology appear to desire – even hope – that we remain like early pre-literate peoples, impressed by the wonder of the social universe but unwilling to ask how and why observable regularities occur.

The above is obviously not possible for the simple reason that if we did not have familiarity with social structure and culture, we probably would not have the mental categories that allow us to even label human movements and assemblages in space and in buildings. Still, the scenario makes a simple point: understanding our human world requires that we have theories to explain the forces that shape the social universe. What are these forces? How do they work? What changes their valences? Answers to these kinds of questions require science not theology. Curiously, many sociologists eschew science in the name of more secular theologies that demand a kind of blind faith that the world cannot be understood with the tools of science. The tools of science are of little use, it is often argued, because the chaos, complexity, and ever-changing nature of the social universe make formulating universal laws of human behavior, interaction, and social organization impossible. Indeed, those seeking to use the tools of science are pronounced naïve if not pretentious, and often castigated for their hopelessly outdated epistemology (of the natural sciences).

Much of this criticism of efforts in scientific sociology, and especially in micro sociology, stems from a fundamental misunderstanding between the seeming chaos and unpredictability of the empirical world and the underlying forces that drive all of this variability. Theory cannot explain the unique and contextual variations of social events; rather, scientific theory attempts to understand forces inherent in the social universe. If the events are micro and revolve around people taking cognizance of, and talking to, each other, the goal of sciences is to look behind the empirical variability of these events to discover the forces that are always in play when such events unfold.

Science cannot predict the exact causal sequences in unfolding empirical events without details of previous conditions, any more than a weather forecaster or geologist can predict exactly when it will rain or when an earthquake will occur without detailed knowledge of preceding conditions. Still, science can

explain the forces driving these events and, in this way, achieve understanding of why and how these events occur. Micro theorizing in the social realm is like macro-level theorizing because it is not about the particulars of empirical cases, but rather, it is about seeing specific empirical occurrences as manifestations of *more generic processes and formations* that transcend time and place and that can be explained with a relatively small set of highly abstract theoretical principles and models. And, if we know the valences of the forces specified in a theory as well as their interaction effects, we can even begin to make predictions, although intervening processes can always throw predictions off when theorizing about processes in natural systems.

Yet, the problems for sociologists on how to theorize in natural systems are not any greater than those of other scientists – from geologists to ecologists and on to biologists and physicists – when they must deal with complex naturally occurring systems. Even physicists who would combine their knowledge (of gravity) with the knowledge of botanists cannot tell us *precisely* when that leaf on a tree will move to the ground in the fall. And if we adopted the sociological critics of scientific sociology's efforts, physicists and biologists would simply have to abandon all hope of explaining anything. Again, there is confusion of empirical events which are always contextual and contingent with what is generic and universal. It is possible, however, to understand why leaves fall, but the time, place, trajectory and other properties of leaves falling to the ground are contingent on other forces – temperature, wind, aerodynamics, water, and the like. Thus, precise predictions are a difficult business when scientists, even in the most rigorous sciences, must work in natural systems where the values and interaction effects of the forces in play are not easily measured. Sociology is much like biology and physics working in natural systems outside of the controls of the laboratory; we can make rough predictions that an event or set of events is likely to occur, but we cannot make an exact prediction. But we can explain *why* and *how* an encounter unfolds in a particular pattern; and this should be the criterion by which we judge the maturity of a science.

For sociology to be a mature science, then, it must ignore the skepticism and solipsism critics. Sociologists need to turn their inquiry determining the generic and universal properties of the social universe, to the forces driving the formation and operation of these properties, and finally, to the formulation of principles that explain the dynamics of these forces. How, then, do we get a handle on what is generic at any level of social reality and explore the forces driving this reality? My answer to this question when applied to the micro-level social universe of social interaction is threefold. We first need to see interactions among persons at the micro level as varying along continuum. Erving Goffman (1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1983) labeled

the poles of this continuum (1) *focused* and (2) *unfocused* encounters. An encounter is an episode in time and place of interaction between two or more persons, even if this interaction is virtual and/or technologically mediated. At the unfocused end of the continuum, individuals are aware of each other's presence in physical space but avoid eye contact. People are able to navigate public places through a kind of interpersonal sonar, but in the case of humans, it is a visual process more than auditory. People see and perhaps also hear others in their zone of movement and navigate around each other, while at the same time avoiding face-to-face eye contact, thus keeping the interaction unfocused. There is still interaction because individuals are mutually aware of each other, reading the gestures provided by their respective movements and adjusting their individual lines of conduct so as to avoid eye contact. If by intent or chance eye engagement is made, the encounter begins to move toward more focus and requires more gestural communication – from a smile, nod of the head, or short auditory acknowledgement to a full stop in space followed by face-to-face talk. A focused encounter, then, exists when individuals are face-to-face, reading and mutually responding to each other's verbal and non-verbal gestures.

Encounters mediated by only audio technologies or by visual/audio devices (such as text messaging) are less focused, but if you watch something engaged in interaction through these devices, it is clear that they are imaging how others look and, if texting, what they are saying in more elaborate locutions; and you can see emotions on face and inflections of voice, or animation of thumbs moving over a small keyboard. And if interactants activate the camera functions on their cell phones, face engagement increases the level of focus in the encounter. Thus, these mediated encounters, even though the participants may not be in physical proximity and do not see each other directly are driven by the same dynamics as all other forms of encounters.

Whether focused or unfocused, then, the notion of *encounters* gives us a property of the micro realm that is common to all interactions among individuals. Knowing what the phenomenon to be explained is – in this case, encounters – allows us to move to the second element of theorizing: discovering the basic forces or, if one prefers, processes that drive the operation of encounters. The empirical differences among specific encounters vary enormously, and yet encounters are driven by a small set of micro-level forces. Hence, it should be possible to theorize about their operative dynamics and, hence, to explain all encounters. Whom I talk with today is somewhat predictable but not completely so because just how a day unfolds, like history at the macro level of reality, is contingent and often unpredictable. Still, when walking across campus and navigating around others, when I stop and say a few words to a friend or acquaintance whom I encountered by chance,

or when I walk into a room at a scheduled time to talk with others, all of these events are encounters – varying along an unfocused–focused continuum. They are the *same basic phenomenon*, and theoretical principles about the dynamic forces driving their formation can be developed. I cannot explain why I encountered this person in a public place without details of our respective schedules and other pieces of information, but I can explain what occurs *once the encounter is activated*. There are just a few well-known and well-understood forces operating in all encounters; and principles on these forces allow for an explanation of all encounters.

The third element that facilitates theorizing about encounters and the forces driving their operation is embedding. Encounters are almost always lodged within meso-level structures and culture – that is, what I term corporate and categoric units (see Fig. 1.1). A *corporate unit* is a social structure revealing a division of labor organized to achieve goals, whereas a *categoric unit* is a social distinction that people make about the characteristics of persons that place individuals into distinct categories such as age, gender, ethnicity, race, religious affiliation, income and wealth. Every encounter is embedded, at a minimum, in a categoric unit – even if it is all male, which means that the interaction will be constrained by expectations in a society about “being a male.” But most encounters, especially more focused ones, are also embedded in a corporate unit of some kind. For example, if I walk across campus, I am in a public place within a corporate unit – my university – and as I walk, I am very aware of the cultural expectations on me in my position as a professor in the division of labor of the university, and I am very aware of my categoric unit membership in this context as an older male (especially when young skate borders wiz by). What transpires in any encounter as I walk is partially explained by the culture and structure of the meso-level structure – that is, the university and the categories of gender, age, and perhaps ethnicity of individuals in this mesostructure.

Embedding does not end at the meso level, however. Corporate units are typically embedded into what I term *institutional domains* (e.g., economy, kinship, religion, polity, law, medicine, sport, education, and the like) and *stratification systems* (formed by inequalities of resources and the formation of social classes based upon shares of resources). Thus, even though I may not be consciously thinking about education as an institutional domain, my behaviors will certainly reflect the expectations of me as a professor in a university within the domain of education; my actions will also be constrained, perhaps to a lesser degree in this situation, by my social class position within the stratification system of American society, including its gendered and ethnic dimensions. Table 1.1 reviews the key definitions that I have introduced thus far.

In Fig. 1.1, I duplicate with appropriate modifications the figure that appears in Vol. 1 of this trilogy of books on *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*.




Fig. 1.1 A simple conceptual scheme

The encounter is the explicandum or the domain of social reality to be explained. The explanation will come from the forces on the left that, as the arrow is intended to suggest, drive the formation and operation of the encounter, but this explanation will also need to include the effects of embedding of any encounter in corporate and categoric units and, by extension, institutional domains and stratification systems and, by further extension, societal and inter-societal systems. The degree of embedding along with the structure and culture of the units in which embedding occurs will have, as we will come to see, large effects on the valences and interactions among the micro-level forces that explain encounters. The theoretical principles that I will offer as an explanation – or the *explanas* in nomothetic “philosophica; talk” – will be about the dynamics of the forces driving encounters, per se, and the effects of embedding on the valences of these forces.

Table 1.1 Definitions of basic properties of the micro realm

<i>Encounters</i> : Episodes of mutual awareness of others where individuals adjust their behaviors in reactions to the behaviors of others
<i>Focused encounters</i> : Episodes of mutual awareness revolving around face-to-face engagement, in which the verbal and non-verbal gestures of others and the context of the situation influence the behaviors of individuals toward one another
<i>Unfocused encounters</i> : Episodes of mutual awareness without face engagement, where the gestures of others are used to adjust movements in space that allow the lack of face engagement to continue
<i>Embedding of encounters</i> : The situation where an encounter – whether focused or unfocused – occurs within a larger social unit, most typically corporate and categoric units which, in turn, are embedded in institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and inter-societal systems and their respective cultures. Embedding constrains what occurs in the encounter by imposing the structure and culture of more inclusive social units, which individuals then draw upon to construct lines of conduct in encounters
<i>Corporate units</i> : Any ongoing structure that reveals a division of labor oriented to achieving goals, no matter how vague or ill-defined these goals may be. Virtually, all encounters occur within corporate units
<i>Categoric units</i> : Any distinction of difference among persons that places them in a social category that carries an evaluation and set of expectations for how people in this category should respond

The forces listed at the bottom left of Fig. 1.1 are hardly startling; they are very familiar topics in the analysis of micro social processes. In a very real sense, the “heavy lifting” has already been done by the sociological canon; my task is to assemble this knowledge into a series of elementary principles on each of these forces. Granted, visualizing well-known micro processes *as forces* requires a modest a mind shift, but it is not necessary to buy into my emphasis on forces. One can also employ a label like *processes*, if this is more familiar and easier. Still, from my perspective, these are forces because they drive the formation, operation, and transformation of the *explicandum* – encounters. Just like gravity in physics or natural selection in biology, the structure and operation of encounters is shaped by these forces. Gravity is part of the explanation of why galaxies and solar systems form; natural selection is one part of the explanation of speciation. And similarly, the forces listed in Fig. 1.1 and defined in Table 1.2 below explain why encounters – for all of their empirical variation – reveal certain basic properties that can be explained by a few elementary principles about the micro-level social universe. Again, it is not necessary to buy into my vocabulary here; perhaps I have “physics envy”, but I believe that sociology can be a natural science like physics, although my fallback position is to be more like biology which also talks about the “forces” of evolution (i.e., mutation, natural selection,

genetic drift, and gene flow) as explaining the process of speciation. I think that we can do the same thing in sociology, and in fact, the familiarity of the forces listed in the figure and the cumulative body of knowledge on these forces would suggest that we have already done so. We can, then, explain the micro universe of encounters by highly abstract and elementary principles on a small set of microdynamic forces.

Embedding emphasizes that what transpires in encounters is constrained by meso and macro structures and their cultures. Most of the time, meso and macro sociocultural formations have larger effects on any given encounter than the latter has on the structure and culture of meso and macro structures. Social reality reveals, then, this top down bias; this conclusion is not a theoretical bias that I have but, rather, a recognition of the reality of the micro social order. However, it is also clear from the arrows pointing upward toward meso and macro structures that encounters have effects on the very structures in which they are embedded. Indeed, from a sociological perspective, encounters are the basic building blocks of all sociocultural formations. Encounters that are iterated and strung together in space and across time are, ultimately, the “materials” from which the meso and macro realms of social reality constructed (Collins 1981). Thus, particular valences and combinations of forces – say, high valences for negative emotions – in encounters can, over time, have effects on the structure and culture of meso structures and, even further, on macro structures and culture. For example, if workers in particular types of corporate units remain unhappy, they may organize into another type corporate unit, such as a union or a social movement organization, to change the terms of their embeddedness. To take another example, members of a particular categoric unit, such as one built upon race and ethnicity, may become sufficiently angry at their level of day-to-day treatment by others in encounters that they organize to change the stratification system and the institutional domains that have discriminated against them. Without shifting valences in the forces driving the micro realm, societies would not change as much as they do. Moreover, because encounters are embedded, changes in iterated encounters can often have cascading effects as they alter the divisions of labor in corporate units or the beliefs legitimating the definitions placing individuals into categoric units; and if these changes of the meso realm are large, then the dynamics of encounters can explain changes in institutional domains and stratification systems and, potentially, in societal structures and culture (and, perhaps, even in inter-societal systems as well).

It is critical, then, that the theoretical principles address the dynamics of embeddedness and the conditions under which the dynamics of encounters can alter meso and macro structures and cultures – as will be explored in Chap. 9. It may be that meso structures are “cages” and delimit behaviors

and interactions, but agency is nonetheless inherent in the operation of microdynamic forces. Too often agency is equated, at least implicitly, with free will and unpredictability of human behavior; for me, agency is endemic to being human and to the modes by which humans forge social relations in encounters. Meso and macro structures can hinder or facilitate the agency of individuals in iterated encounters, and thus we need to understand what properties and dynamics of encounters increase the potential for change-generating agency.

While it is not necessary to read Vol. 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology on Macrodynamics* to make sense of the theory to be developed here (Turner 2010a), it is easier to see why I wrote the macrodynamics part of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* first. The fact of embedding of encounters in mesostructures that, in turn, are embedded in macrostructures requires that we have some idea of the dynamics of the sociocultural formations in which encounters are nested. I will outline the basic properties of these mesostructures and cultures in the next chapter, but my goal across the three volumes of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* is to develop principles that offer a unified vision for the dynamics of the social universe at the micro, meso, and macro realms.

Why, then, have I not written the volume on mesodynamics before this volume on micro-level social reality? The answer is, as Fig. 1.1 suggests, that meso level of reality does not have its own unique forces as do the micro and macro realms. The meso realm of social reality stands between the macro and micro realms, and the two sets of forces from these realms push on individual and collective actors as they forge corporate and categoric units. True, an organization reveals some dynamics of its own, as do categoric units, but these are derivative of pressures emanating from macro and micro forces, as I will attempt to show in Vol. 3 on *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* (Turner 2011). Corporate units are created as actors respond to the forces of the macro and micro realms, and traits marking differences and placing people into categoric units are also the outcome of forces from the macro and micro realms. Thus, as we will come to appreciate, the principles of the meso-level realm are about the *outcomes* of particular valences and configurations of micro and macro forces as they lead to the formation and drive the operation of corporate and categoric units.

Dynamic Forces of the Micro Realm

To posit “forces of the micro realm” of social reality does not represent a radical shift in thinking. A force is any property of the social universe – or any other domain of the biophysical universe – that drives the formation of

reality. Whether gravity or the forces examined in physics, mutation and selection in biology, or roles and status in the sociology, these properties of various realms of the universe drive the formation and operation of various types and levels of reality. As noted earlier, these forces can be considered to be processes that push on individuals and channel their responses in ways that give all encounters their structure and form. While the empirical variability can be quite wide, the underlying form, structure, and operation of encounters are much the same across all types of empirical situations. Theories are not about empirical variations but, rather, about variations in the valences of the forces and their interaction effects that drive all social encounters – both focused and unfocused. The first task, then, is to outline the forces that are in play when encounters are activated by the behaviors of individuals.

Table 1.2 presents brief and preliminary definitions of these forces (Turner 2002, 2007a), and as is immediately evident, these are not obscure or revolutionary. On the contrary, they are processes that micro sociology has studied for a long time. Thus, since sociologists have known about these forces for many decades, a theory on their dynamics involves selecting key ideas from large literatures and established theoretical-research traditions and then integrating these into a series of elementary principles.

Table 1.2 Broad definitions of microdynamic forces driving encounters

<i>Ecological forces:</i> Boundaries, configurations of the physical space, and the props in space as these constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters
<i>Demographic forces:</i> Numbers of individuals co-present, their density, their movements, and their characteristics as these constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters
<i>Status forces:</i> Positional locations and their organization within corporate units revealing divisions of labor and memberships in categoric units defined by parameters as they constrain behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters
<i>Roles forces:</i> Moment-by-moment configurations of gestures mutually emitted and interpreted by persons to communicate their respective dispositions and likely courses of action as these constrain behaviors in focused and unfocused encounters
<i>Cultural forces:</i> Systems of symbols organized into texts, values, beliefs and ideologies, and norms as they generate expectations and thereby constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters
<i>Motivational forces:</i> Universal need-states as these constrain behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters
<i>Emotional forces:</i> Types and valences of affect aroused, experienced, and expressed that constrain the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters

For the present, I will only define and outline in broad strokes the forces that will be topics of the core chapters to follow.

Ecological and Demographic Forces of the Microdynamic Realm

Ecological Forces. All encounters, even those that are mediated by communication technologies, occur in physical space. This space is typically configured in some way so that the movements of persons are constrained. Moreover, there are almost always props – e.g., benches, tables, podiums, power-point projectors, computers, microphones, and chairs – that can be used by individuals. Erving Goffman (1963, 1971) was the first sociologist to recognize fully the significance of the configuration of space and the props in space for structuring the flow of interaction in focused and unfocused encounters.

At a brute physical level, the ecology of a situation simply imposes itself on individuals by its sheer physicality. Walls, hallways, pathways, chairs, tables, benches, and other dimensions of ecology simply constrain individuals' options for movement and assembly, forcing people to adapt to the constraints of spatial configurations and props. At another level, each element of situational ecology "means" something to individuals; space and props are also symbols that can be used to communicate meanings about self and others in an encounter. For example, when a lecturer abandons the podium to walk among students in the audience, this movement is constrained and channeled by the walls and rows of chairs in the room; and equally important, this very movement coupled with the abandonment of the podium as a prop communicate meanings about the nature and style of instruction offered by the lecturer to students who, reciprocally, use these meanings to adjust their behaviors toward the lecturer. As Goffman (1959, 1967) emphasized, persons always orchestrate "fronts" and "lines" in encounters as they present self to others, and vice versa. Indeed, I have always found that when I wander around the room, students pay much more attention (or "put on" the front of doing so) because their note taking becomes much more frenetic and their computers quickly lose the video game that they were playing as the window for note-taking pops up. Thus, both sets of actors – I as the professor and they as students – are using props and spatial configurations to "say something" above and beyond the literal meaning of walls, chairs, desks, podiums, computers, pencils, and paper – thereby structuring the flow of interaction in the encounter.

These physical and symbolic properties of situational ecology can be theorized. Most of these properties are imposed by embedding in meso-level corporate units, while the manner in which this ecology is used to communicate meanings is constrained by other microdynamic forces – that is, demography, status, roles, culture, transactional motives, and emotions. As a general rule, the more these other microdynamic forces are in play and the higher are their valences, the more likely is the ecology of the encounter to be actively manipulated. Again, these relationships between ecology and other forces can be theorized, as we will come to see.

Demographic Forces. There are at least four dimensions of demography that always drive the formation of encounters. One is the number of individuals co-present. Another is the density of individuals who are co-present. The third is the distribution of individuals across categoric units. And, the fourth is the movement or migration of individuals in and out of encounters. These dimensions all interact with ecological forces in encounters, since the number of people co-present, their density, and their movements are, to a great extent, constrained by the size of the space and its organization which, in turn, are determined by the corporate units within which encounters are embedded. Similarly, the distribution of individuals in categoric units is also determined by ecology, particularly as it is constrained by embedding in corporate units. The division of labor of corporate units will determine, first of all, the number of individuals in different categoric units – men, women, young, old, rich, poor, educated, uneducated, religious affiliations, ethnicity/race, and other *parameters* that define memberships in categoric units. Secondly, the division of labor will also determine the location in space of members of categoric units and their opportunities to form encounters. Let me examine these dimensions in more detail below.

(1) The number of individuals in an encounter has direct effects on what can occur because, as the number increases, the ability of individuals to interact directly declines; and when individuals are not in mutual face-to-face engagement, sustaining a focused encounter decreases unless the ecology and structure of the situation force individuals to sustain a common focus of attention, as would be the case when individuals are in rows of chairs facing speakers who can command attention by enhancing their presence through communications media. But even here, the focus is only on one person or a small set of individuals who are speaking, and even as questions are entertained from the audience, the focus merely shifts to another person. The assembled individuals as a whole cannot interact with each other directly, thus changing the dynamics of the encounter from what would be the case with smaller numbers of person who can face each other.

Often larger encounters divide into smaller sub-encounters where people can interact face-to-face, as long as the ecology of the situation allows or even facilitates this differentiation into separate encounters. For example, a dinner party at a long table will differentiate into a series separate encounters of people in proximity to each other, or a reception in a large room will reveal gatherings will break down into more focused encounters scattered about the room. Moreover, the nature of the corporate and categoric units in which the encounter is embedded will constrain the operation of all other microdynamic forces, which in turn will determine how individuals behave. For instance, as a larger dinner party breaks into sub-encounters, the relative status of guests and hosts, the roles to be played by each, the cultural norms pertinent to such engagements, the motives of individuals, and the emotions aroused will all channel behaviors in the encounter; and if differentially evaluated members of categoric units must interact or if the converse is true and individuals are all of the same categoric unit, the expectations and evaluations of people in these categoric units will drive the actions of individuals.

(2) The density of individuals will also have direct effects on individuals in an encounter. When density is high, individuals are more aware of others around them. If the encounter is to remain unfocused, individuals will work especially hard to sustain a lack of direct face engagement. For instance, people standing in line may avert their eyes to avoid focus, although in American culture at least some focusing of the encounter will often occur by those in proximate space. If people are densely packed as they move, they will also seek to avoid focus as they pass one another, but they will also be ready to use prepackaged rituals to manage situations where density leads to contact, such as bumping into someone. Density is also determined by the structure and culture of the corporate units that, to a degree, will delimit how individuals cope with density. For example, high density among workers in a company within a large meeting-space in a building will respond to density differently than if they were in a much larger corporate unit such as a community where they must cope with density in public gathering places. Density, under certain conditions, can also increase monitoring of others' behaviors, partly to avoid contact with others in unfocused encounters but also to search for violations of norms and other kinds of expectations for members of different categoric units or for individuals at different status positions in a corporate unit. Moreover, density does not necessarily mean that there is a large number of individuals who are co-present; smaller numbers of persons assembled within restrictive ecological boundaries will reveal high density. As density increases under ecological constraints, people are able to observe each other, face-to-face, and this mutual engagement

focuses the encounter and activates social control process revolving around mutual monitoring and sanctioning (Hechter 1987; Collins 1975). For example, a board meeting in a room immediately leads to monitoring of others to be sure that they behave appropriately in terms of appropriate cultural expectations, appropriate motive states, status considerations, and roles that can be made. Social control thus increases with density, with the result that the flow of an encounter will be much more predictable. Even unfocused encounters involve considerable social control as individuals try to avoid face contact, move in normatively acceptable ways, present self in a non-threatening manner, and remain at-the-ready to ritually apologize for breaches brought upon them by density or mistakes in navigation.

(3) Membership in categoric units immediately sets up expectations for not only those in each unit but also for those responding to these members of categoric units. When encounters involve interaction among members of different categoric units, the expectations on members in each type of unit will be somewhat different, as will their evaluations of each other. For instance, an encounter of all males will flow very differently than one of mixed genders, although embedding can increase or decrease the salience of expectations for these two categoric units. If, for example, men and women are equally distributed in positions of authority in the corporate unit and if norms about gender neutrality prevail, the salience of expectations and differential evaluations of males and females outside the corporate unit will be less than would be the case when the structure and culture of the unit distribute men and women to different positions of authority and when the culture of the organization differentially evaluates men and women. Unfocused encounters can also be very much influenced by the distribution of memberships in categoric units. When, for instance, members of valued and de-valued categoric units must move in dense public spaces, these movements will often exhibit more pronounced, if not somewhat exaggerated, demeanors to keep the encounter unfocused. Ritual responses are at-the-ready if needed for repairing breaches in focusing. These rituals would become even more pronounced if the encounter suddenly shifts to a focused mode, as would occur if individuals could not navigate space successfully.

(4) Movements in encounters affect their dynamics. If a focused encounter allows for individuals to move in and/or out of the ecological huddle that occurs with most focused encounters, the behaviors of individuals will be much different than when they huddle in ways that prevent outsiders from coming in (Goffman 1967). If the encounter is set off in physical space, as is the case when people are in a closed room or a corner of public space, movement in and out becomes more difficult, or if it must occur, it is highly ritualized

with appropriate demeanor such as apologies that explain the movement. Even in public places, movement of individuals around props is constrained by how they are to be used to communicate meanings to others, and if movement of others into the ego-centric space of another or several others, it must be highly ritualized. For example, a person comes to a bench where another is sitting must typically ask if it is acceptable to sit in what had been the ecological preserve of another. Movements can thus force focus, which in turn changes the encounter. Other movements then determine how long this focus will remain. Thus, if the person on the bench moves to one end, turns face and body away, becomes absorbed in an activity (e.g., reading), and otherwise indicates that the focus is to be terminated, the other must – to be polite and non-threatening – honor this message.

Status Forces in the Microdynamic Realm

Individuals occupy positions in corporate and categoric units. Corporate units reveal divisions of labor among positions, and incumbency in positions, per se, will influence the behaviors of individuals. Moreover, the structure among positions along several dimensions, such as the network properties of positions and the degree of hierarchical ordering of positions in terms of authority or the range of horizontally organized positions, will also determine how individuals behave in encounters. As I briefly mentioned earlier, categoric units are defined by what Peter Blau (1977, 1994) has termed *parameters* which can be either nominal or graduated. A *nominal parameter* is one where a person is either in or out of a discrete category denoted by the parameter, such as sex and gender, ethnicity and race, and religious affiliation. Even differences that clearly vary by degree, such as darkness of skin color, are often converted into a nominal parameter of “race” despite the fact that this concept has no significant biological basis (at least, no more biological basis than eye color which does not serve as a parameter to put people into a “racial” category). *Graduated parameters* rank individuals along a scale revealing differences such as years of education, income, wealth, power and authority, and age. In actual practice, however, individuals tend to convert graduated parameters into nominal parameters such as: (a) old, young, middle age, and even finer distinctions; (b) rich, poor, and middle class; or (c) college or high school degree, post graduate education. For all categoric units there is typically an evaluation of individuals codified into *status beliefs* about their worth and other characteristics and expectation states for how members of these differentially

evaluated categories should behave (Berger 1988; Berger et al. 1977, 1980; Berger and Zelditch 1985, 1998).

Status is typically bestowed by membership in corporate and categoric units. Indeed, as is often argued, status is the link between meso-level structures and microdynamic processes because behaviors in encounters are very much determined by people's place in corporate and categoric units. This fact constrains how status forces operate and delimits the range of possible behaviors in encounters which, in turn, makes theorizing about the dynamics of status that much easier. Indeed, sociology has a large set of findings about the dynamics of status, and so we do not lack for materials on how to explore and explain the dynamics of status in the micro universe. Moreover, other microdynamic forces, such as roles, motive-states, culture and emotional arousal, are very much constrained by status forces, although there are often mutual effects between status and these other forces.

Even though status as a force is tied to meso-level structures and their cultures, status differences will almost always emerge when individuals interact (Berger 1958, 1988; Berger and Conner 1969; Berger and Zelditch 1985, 1998; Berger et al. 1977, 1992). Some will be seen as more competent than others in whatever individuals are doing and, as a result, will be given more deference and power to influence what occurs in an encounter; and if there are differences among individuals, they may be consigned to categoric units. Alternatively, categoric units from the meso realm may be invoked to explain differences in abilities to carry out activities in encounters. Status differences and the forces that they set into motion are not simply a byproduct of the meso realm; they operate independently as a force in the micro realm when encounters are not embedded. Furthermore, even when an encounter is embedded, what transpires in the encounter can change the relative status of individuals and, potentially, the status structure and culture of the meso units in which the encounter is embedded.

Role Forces in the Microdynamic Realm

Roles are configurations of gestures that signal to others the intentions, motives, and likely lines of behavior by a person. There is a phenomenological and cultural element to all roles. At the phenomenological level (Turner 1962, 1988, 2002), individuals carry in their "stocks of knowledge" (Schutz [1932] 1967) syndromes of behaviors that mark different types of roles and variants of any given type of role; and these syndromes are used by persons to present self and, in the words of Ralph Turner

(1962), to *role-make* or orchestrate a role *vis-à-vis* others, whereas these others employ these same stocks to interpret or, in George Herbert Mead's (1934) terms, to *role-take* with others by reading their verbal and non-verbal gestures, searching their stocks of knowledge, and selecting that role corresponding to the observed behaviors. At the cultural level, there are almost always sets of expectations about how individuals should play roles in a situation. Some of these expectations are attached to status, as is the case with the expectations for behavior of individuals incumbent in particular positions within corporate units and as is also the requirement for members of categoric units. There can be higher-order expectations contained in the beliefs and ideologies of what is proper behavior within an institutional domain or a particular class within the stratification system. There are even more highly generalized expectations in value-premises and the meta-ideologies (or combinations of ideologies from different institutional domains) in a society. But, these expectations are rarely straight-jackets; individuals typically have some latitude in *how* they execute a role, as long as the configuration and syndrome of gestures allow others to role-take effectively and as long as role behaviors meet the expectations inherent in cultural and status forces.

As we will see in Chap. 5, roles are particularly critical to focused encounters because individuals need to know how others are likely to behave; and by discovering the underlying role being orchestrated by others and, at the same time, presenting to others a syndrome of gestures marking a role, interaction can proceed smoothly. It is when this process breaks down – whether from the failure to make a role or discover the role of others through role-taking – that the importance of role as a microdynamic force becomes evident. While roles are constrained by meso-level structures, which provide the sets of expectations that guide behaviors in encounters, they can also operate independently of embedding. People are programmed neurologically to discover each other's roles because, once known, interaction becomes more predictable and less stressful. Indeed, until individuals discover each other's roles, they must work hard at the interaction. Embedding will increase the likelihood that individuals will role-make and role-take successfully because the structure and culture of meso-level units delimits the range of options for playing roles and thus enables individuals to know *which* roles to present and *which* gestures to use to mark this role. Roles are also a critical force in unfocused encounters because just how a person navigates space and avoids face engagement is also guided by syndromes of gestures marking roles for appropriate behaviors in public places.

Other forces have large effects on behaviors marking an underlying role. Expectations for what ecological space and props mean will influence which roles persons can select and how these roles can be played. The

number, density, movements, and categories of individuals in an encounter will also determine what roles are available and how they can be played out in an encounter. As mentioned above, status and cultural forces always constrain expectations for who can play what role in what manner. Motive states, or what I term *transactional needs* (Turner 2002), determine which roles individuals will seek to play, and how they play them. And emotional forces, or states of affective arousal, will constantly intersect individuals' efforts to select roles and the manner in which they are played (Turner 2007).

Cultural Forces of the Microdynamic Realm

Culture is organized at different levels of generality and along different dimensions, but in all encounters it constrains how individuals in encounters behave. The symbol systems that constrain encounters can filter down from the macro-level of social reality through the meso level and, then at the micro level, push individuals to behave in certain ways. There are, however, clear patterns of control exerted by culture on interactions. At the level of the encounter, culture establishes expectations for individuals to engage in particular lines of conduct. I have taken to calling these dynamics the process of *normalizing* the encounter (Turner 1998, 2002, 2007a). Often "norms" are seen as a noun but, in my view, they are more like a verb because expectations are assembled and then re-assembled during the course of interaction around several axes: (a) categorizing, (b) framing, (c) communicating, (d) ritualizing, and (e) feeling. As individuals enter encounters, they often "know" implicitly or explicitly the expectations associated with each of these axes, but as the encounter ensues, there are typically adjustments and readjustments of expectations. The dynamics of encounters are thus driven by expectations that are imposed by meso-level structures and their cultures, or assembled on the ground as individuals respond to each other in encounters. Let me briefly outline what each of these axes entails.

Categorizing involves the process of, first of all, placing individuals into categoric units and, then, becoming cognizant of the evaluations and expectations for members in such units. At times, categoric unit membership is highly salient, while at other times, membership in such units is less important; and so, individuals must also determine *if* expectations for categoric members are relevant and to be invoked, or not. A second dimension of categorization is establishing expectations for the relative amounts of

work-practical, *ceremonial*, and *social* content, and then assembling the appropriate expectations (Goffman 1967; Collins 1975). And the final dimension of categorizing is determining the *level of intimacy* appropriate for the situation (Turner 2002) and whether others and self are to be treated as *personages* (representatives of roles to whom little intimacy is owed), *person* (with some consideration of individuals' characteristics), or *intimates* (with considerable knowledge of biography and knowledge of others' feelings). Before an encounter can proceed, these axes of categorization must be established, because if expectations are not clear along these lines, then breaches to the flow of interaction become likely.

Framing is the process of developing expectations for what is to be included and excluded for the purposes of the interaction. Frames are cognitive schemes that array those elements of the social world to be assembled during the course of interaction (Goffman 1974). Categorizing helps in this *keying* of frames, but individuals will still need to engage in interpersonal work to establish expectations for which generalized symbolic media of discourse are appropriate, which values and ideologies are relevant, which persons are to be included, which portions of bodies and biographies are relevant, which stages and props in ecological space that can be used, and which categoric or corporate units and their respective cultures are to be invoked as a point of reference. I obviously borrow the notion of framing from Erving Goffman (1974), but I do not make distinctions between primary and natural frames, nor do I pursue his rather extensive inquiry into the phenomenology of experience. Rather, frames are, as the name implies, like picture frames that impose boundaries on expectations for what is to be inside and what must remain outside the frame. Yet, as Goffman notes some *keying* and *re-keying* of the frame – that is, altering the boundaries and scope of the frame – typically occurs during the flow of interactions; such keying dynamics are typically done through highly ritualized communication (see below).

Communicating is the process of developing expectations for the forms of talk to be used, the types of generalized symbolic media that can be employed in communications, and the nature of appropriate non-verbal cues that can be used in communication during the course of the interaction. Categorizing and framing greatly facilitate this process, but as categories and frames change, so will expectations for how to communicate. For example, when a professor and a student talk in an encounter, the form of talk will be more formal, the symbolic medium will revolve around issues of learning, the use of body language will reflect the work-practical nature of the conversation, and the categorization of student and professors as personages (i.e., as representatives of role and status positions in a corporate

unit). If this exchange between professor and a student is iterated over time, however, it may be slightly re-keyed to somewhat less formal talk, to conversations about other matters than school and learning, to more social talk, and to more informal non-verbal cues.

Ritualizing is the process of understanding which stereotypical sequences of gestures are to be employed in opening, closing, forming (the flow of communication), symbolizing the encounter (as an object or totem worthy of attention), and repairing breaches to the encounter. As Goffman (1967) was the first to fully recognize and conceptualize, all interactions involve the activation of rituals that open and set the tone for the ensuing encounter, that structure the flow of talk and body language, that repair breaches to the smooth flow of interaction, that mark the participants and their interaction with symbols, and that close the encounter and establish expectations for the next iteration of the encounter. Without rituals, it is difficult to know when the encounter begins and ends, or how to shift from one topic to another. For example, if a person simply comes up and starts talking to another, the normal greeting rituals have not been observed and the individuals subject to this “intrusion” will likely feel uncomfortable, and if a person simply walks away from another in an encounter without the appropriate closing rituals, those left behind will often feel angry at such rudeness and uncertain about what will transpire at the next encounter among the same individuals; indeed, at the next iteration of the encounter, the greeting rituals, if used, will be strained as individuals try to figure out if the new encounter is on a firm footing.

Feelings are always regulated by norms; and thus, any encounter develops expectations for what feelings individuals should experience and what feelings they can appropriately express during the course of interaction. Moreover, the intensity of the emotions is also regulated by the normatizing efforts of individuals in an encounter. As Arlie Hochschild (1979, 1983) first conceptualized, encounters are directed by *feeling ideologies* (or generalized moral beliefs about what should be felt and expressed in a general context); and these ideologies, in turn, constrain the kinds of *feeling rules* and *display rules* that can be invoked in the situation. These rules establish what people should experience and what specific feelings they can safely display in a situation. Categorizing and framing greatly facilitate this process of establishing proper expectations for the experience and expression of emotions, as does embedding in corporate and/or categoric units. Yet, as the encounter ensues, adjustments to feeling and display rules often occur, as categories and frames are readjusted. For instance, if categorization shifts to persons being seen as intimates and to new frames allowing more personal topics of

conversations, individuals will be given latitude to experience and display to others more personal feelings.

All of these elements of the normatizing process – categorization, framing, communicating, ritualizing, and feeling – establish expectations for individuals. They are, to a high degree, constructed during the course of interaction, but to an equally high degree, normatizing also pulls relevant symbols from meso- and macro-level cultures into the interaction, indicating which expectations from these cultures are to be relevant and how they are to be assembled during the course of interaction. Embedding obviously facilitates this process by plugging individuals into the culture of the relevant corporate and categoric units. Similarly, other microdynamic forces also push on normatizing efforts as individuals seek to establish expectations that allow status, role, motivational, ecological, demographic and emotional forces to direct individuals to behave in normatively correct or at least acceptable ways.

Motivational Forces in the Microdynamic Realm

The concept of motives remain vaguely conceptualized in the social sciences. My definition does not resolve these problems, but it is at least simple: motivations in encounters revolve around universal need-states of individuals that drive them to behave in particular ways. As I noted earlier, I term these need-states as *transactional forces* because they are always present when individuals engage in interpersonal transactions; and the more focused the encounter, the more likely will all five of these needs be activated.

The first and most important need-state is desire *to verify self* in the eyes of others. As I will argue, self dynamics operate at least four levels. One level is *role-identity* (Burke 1991; Stryker 1980) or emotionally charged cognitions about role performances in specific institutional domains – economy, polity, kinship, religion, etc. – and corporate units in these domains. Another level is *social-identity* (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Hogg 2006; Hogg and Mullin 1989; Hogg et al. 1999, 1995), which roughly corresponds to the categoric units that are most salient to an individual in a situation and across situations. Individuals always have emotionally valenced cognitions about themselves as members of categoric units, and they use these to orchestrate their behaviors in encounters. Social-identities are most likely to revolve around gender, age, and ethnicity but they can be extended to religious affiliation, social class, education, and other parameters defining the boundaries

of categoric units. Unlike role-identities, social-identities are not tied to a particular role or situation but, instead, are more likely to be invoked across different roles. In fact, the way in which a person plays all roles is influenced by the salience of a particular, or a small set, of social identities; and when individuals are role-making and role-taking, they look for cues about both role-identities and social-identities being presented. The third level of identity can be termed *group-identity*, but I extend this idea to other types of corporate units. Individuals often see and evaluate themselves and others in terms of the structure and culture of a corporate unit – a team, gang, community, business organization, club, or virtually any type of corporate unit. A person's sense of self is tied to their belonging to, or at least identifying with, this corporate unit; and their behaviors and demeanors will reflect this sense of attachment. Indeed, individuals can be highly emotional about their corporate-unit attachments and demand that others accept, and evaluate favorably, these attachments. The fourth level of self is the relatively stable core-identity of a person, which revolves around emotionally charged cognitions about self. Core-identities are salient in virtually all encounters because they represent an individual's sense of personhood (Smith n.d.) and self worth; and as such, core-identities have large effects on how individuals play all roles and how they go about trying to verify their other levels of self – that is, role-identities, social-identities, and group-identities. When individuals cannot verify any level of self, they experience negative emotions and a sense of deprivation; and their emotional reactions increase the more failure to verify self moves from role-identities and group-identities through social-identities to core-identities. Conversely, individuals feel positive emotions when any level of self is verified.

The second need-state that is universal to humans during the course of interaction in encounters is the desire to *receive a "profit" in the exchanges of resources*. All interactions involve the exchange of resources – sometimes extrinsic but most of the time intrinsic. Individuals always assess the resources that they receive in relation to their costs (alternative sources of resources forgone) and investments (accumulated costs over time) incurred to receive resources. They experience positive emotions and a sense of fulfillment when they make a profit, and negative emotions and a sense of deprivation when they do not. Calculations of profits are, however, mediated by other forces. One is cultural in that there are always norms and ideologies about what is "a fair share" of resources in an exchange (Homans 1961; Jasso 2006); and so, if a person makes a profit but does not realize what is defined as a fair share, then this person will experience negative emotions and feel deprived even as he or she makes a profit (relative to actual costs and investments). Another complication comes from

the fact that individuals are always comparing their shares of resources received with the shares that others receive (Homans 1961; Jasso 1993, 2001). If others are perceived to make a greater profit with the same costs and investments as another person, the latter will feel deprived even if he or she has made a profit, and doubly so if a profit has not been forthcoming. Status can affect these calculations because even if a person and others receive the same profit, a higher-status person in a corporate unit or in a more valued categoric unit will feel deprived because lower-status persons should not receive the same payoffs as higher-status persons. People's efforts to make a profit intersect with the other microdynamic forces. Self is often verified or unverified by the shares of resources that a person thinks should be forthcoming (because of "who they are" in terms of role-, group-, social-, and core-identities). Cultural and status forces also intervene in calculations of profits because they establish comparison points for what is a just share of resources. And, emotions are always aroused when a person makes a profit, or fails to do so, in exchanges; and once emotions are aroused toward a positive or negative pole, they alter the rate of exchange and, thereby, the course of interaction in encounters.

The third universal need-state is *group inclusion*. Individuals are motivated in all encounters, but especially in focused encounters, to feel that they are part of the ongoing flow of interaction. They do not always need to feel high solidarity with others in encounters, only that they are "part of the action." Persons' emotional reactions to what occurs in an encounter are very much a response to feeling included or excluded. Their sense of self verification at any level is also influenced by this sense of inclusion, and the emotional reactions to either inclusion or exclusion will be that much higher when several levels of self are salient. Other motivational forces – needs for *trust* and *facticity*, to be discussed below – will also be very much shaped by a sense of group inclusion. Even with embedding, where individuals' positions in the corporate and categoric units determine their relative claims to be included, a sense of inclusion is not guaranteed. Group inclusion comes from the give-and-take of interaction on-the-ground; and while the culture and structure of larger social units can impose constraints on what occurs in encounters, it is from the actual flow of gestures between self and others that a sense of group inclusion is achieved, or lost. When achieved, people feel mild positive emotions, whereas when not achieved, negative emotions will be experienced and will motivate persons to work harder to feel included or to withdraw from the ongoing flow of interaction.

The fourth universal need-state is experiencing a *sense of trust*. This sense is achieved when the behaviors of others are predictable and in

rhythmic synchronization (Collins 1988, 2004), when others are respectful of self, and when others are perceived as being sincere. When any one of these conditions does not prevail, the sense of distrust increases, and a person experiences negative emotions; and if all these elements of trust are not perceived to be in place, then the negative emotions are that much greater. Moreover, it will be more difficult to meet all other transactional needs for self-verification, profitable exchange payoffs, sense of group inclusion, and facticity (discussed below) without an underlying sense of trust. Even when interactions are embedded in clear structures and their cultures, there is no guarantee that all individuals will feel trust. Much like group inclusion, moment-by-moment interaction in the encounter determines the degree of trust experienced by participants in an encounter.

The last transactional need is for a *sense of facticity*. Individuals need to sense that they share a common world – both intersubjectively and externally – during the course of interaction, that the reality of the situation is as it appears, and that external reality “out there” beyond self has an obdurate character. When persons cannot achieve this implicit sense of facticity, they experience anxiety and anger (Garfinkel 1967; Giddens 1984), whereas when they do, they feel a mild sense of satisfaction. Embedding will generally increase this sense of facticity because structure and culture determine much of the reality that people experience in encounters, but again, embedding does not guarantee that this sense of facticity will emerge among all persons in the encounter. This need is quiet, and individuals are not aware of its power, unless they fail to achieve facticity. In fact, when facticity is failing, the emotional reaction – typically anger or at least visible annoyance – can seem disproportionate to others, and even to the person emitting these emotions. Facticity is a kind of background motive state that, most of the time, is realized as other needs are met, but it can exert an independent power. Without a sense of facticity, other need states cannot easily be realized, and in fact, the encounter will stall as individuals seek to restore this needed sense. In the famous breaching experiments of early ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967), it was rather surprising how annoyed individuals became with the experimenter persistently disturbing others by acting in ways that violated their sense of facticity. For example, a student who plays the role of “guest” when visiting his parents at home will disrupt the sense of a shared world for the parents, sending them into a repair mode and, perhaps, leading them to inquire if they “had done something wrong.” Or to ask “what is a flat tire?” when someone offers an apology for being late because “he had a flat tire,” causes the latter to feel and express anger that the reality created by the apology is not

honored (Garfinkel 1967). In fact, as the term “ethnomethodology” indicates, there are “folk methods” by which individuals work to construct a sense of a shared, common world; and without this background feeling, other need states are difficult to realize.

Elementary Principles on Micro-level Forces in Encounters

We are now in a position to articulate the first set of principles on focused and unfocused encounters. In many ways, these principles are more definitional than explanatory but they set the stage for principles in other chapters that emphasize, first of all, the constraints of embedding of encounters in meso and macro structures and cultures and, then, the dynamics of the forces that drive the operation of all encounters. With this caveat in mind, I can summarize the discussion in this chapter with three simple principles.

1. The viability of a focused encounter is a positive and multiplicative function of its participants’ capacity to:
 - A. Sustain a common visual, cognitive, and emotional focus of attention
 - B. Form an ecological huddle allowing for
 1. Heightened mutual relevance of acts
 2. Eye-to-eye contact, maximizing perception and monitoring
 3. Use of talk and body language
 4. Rhythmic synchronization of talk and bodies
 5. Emotional entrainment
 - C. Use ritual and ceremonial punctuations for opening, closing, entering, exiting, and structuring the interpersonal flow
 - D. Use rituals to repair breaches to the interpersonal flow
 - E. Experience an emergent “we” feeling of solidarity
 - F. Symbolize this solidarity with words, phrases, and objects that operate as totems or markers of the solidarity
 - G. Exhibit righteous anger for violations of the symbols marking group solidarity and, for those violating these symbols, demands for ritual apologies
2. The ability of individuals to form and sustain a focused encounters is a function of the conditions listed under 1-A through 1-G above and a positive and additive function of the capacity of participants’ capacity to:
 - A. Develop common meanings for the ecology of the place, particularly organization of space and the props available for use in space

- B. Develop common meanings for the demography of the bodies co-present, particularly their numbers, movements, density, and memberships in categoric units.
 - C. Understand each other's relative status and the respective prerogatives of status
 - D. Make viable roles for self and, through role-taking, and determine the roles being presented by others
 - E. Establish normative expectations for:
 1. The relevant categoric unit memberships of self and others, the nature of the situation, and the appropriate level of intimacy
 2. The relevant frames and procedures for keying and re-keying frames
 3. The appropriate forms of talk and non-verbal communication
 4. The appropriate rituals to be employed
 5. The appropriate emotions to be felt and displayed
 - F. Meet transactional needs for:
 1. Verifying types and levels of identity salient in the situation
 2. Making profits in exchanges of resources
 3. Sensing group inclusion for self in the interpersonal flow
 4. Experiencing trust in others
 5. Perceiving facticity
 - G. Experience a high ratio of positive to negative emotions
3. The viability and ability to execute unfocused encounters is a positive and additive function of individuals' capacities to:
- A. Avoid face-to-face engagement with others
 - B. Develop common meanings for how the ecology of place, particularly organization of space and the props available for use in space, is to be used to avoid focus
 - C. Develop common meanings for how the situational demography, particularly the number, movements, and density of various categories of bodies in space, can be used to avoid focus
 - D. Understand how relative status, if relevant in the situation, can be used to avoid focus or, if focus is inevitable, how relative status is to be used to navigate in and out of focus
 - E. Use role-making and role-taking to avoid focus or, if focus is inevitable, how role-making and role-taking can be used to navigate in and out of focus
 - F. Determine normative expectations appropriate for members of categoric units, treating others as personages in a situation of unfocus,

without face-engagement, keying proper frames, engaging in ritual acts sustaining unfocus and managing episodes of focus in unfocused situations, and displaying through demeanor cues neutral and/or low-key positive emotions keeping others from having to focus on behavioral outputs

- G. Understand how transactional needs for verifying identities, receiving profits in exchanges, experiencing group inclusion, developing a sense of trust, and having a sense of facticity must be subordinated to sustaining a lack of focus with others
- H. Understand that emission of high levels of any emotion, whether positive or negative, will often breach unfocused encounters and cause focus

Conclusion

My goal in this chapter has been to outline in very broad strokes the forces of the microdynamic realm. When individuals find themselves in encounters, these forces are what push them to act in particular ways to sustain the encounter. The more focused is the encounter, the higher are the valences of these forces, although they also operate in unfocused encounters as well, but not with the same intensity. In unfocused encounters, ecological and demographic forces are more pronounced, whereas in focused encounters, status, role, symbolic, motivational, and emotional forces become more intense. Thus, a theory of microdynamics is about the conditions that increase or decrease the valences of forces and that cause intersections among the seven forces, particularly status, role, symbolic, motivational, and emotional forces, as focused encounters are formed.

As I have emphasized, the nature of embedding has large effects on the valences of forces and how they interact with each other to propel encounters along a particular trajectory. Encounters are almost always nested inside corporate and categoric units which, in turn, are lodged, respectively, inside institutional domains and stratification systems. Thus, in order to fully understand the dynamics of micro encounters and the forces that drive their formation and operation, it is first necessary to examine the nature of embedding in more detail than I have in this chapter. For as will become evident, the type and degree of embedding of encounters in meso and macro levels of reality have large effects on the valences of the forces driving encounters. And so, before I move into developing elementary principles on the microdynamic forces, it is useful to outline the nature of embedding.

In doing so, we will also have taken a first step for answering a question that has plagued sociological theory for decades: the link between micro and macro levels of social reality. As will become clear across these volumes of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*, the theory that I develop tries to answer this fundamental question – not so much by ontological fiat as by theoretical principles that explain the effects of embedding of the micro into the meso and, then, the embedding of meso in the macro, while at the same time, offering principles on how the meso level of reality is built up from micro-dynamics and how the macro is constructed from the units of the meso level of reality. Again, it is not essential to read the volume on macrodynamics, if this is not of interest, but in examining embedding, we can gather key insights into how micro social processes are influenced by macro and meso levels of reality, and vice versa.

Chapter 2

The Embedding of Encounters

The Unfolding of Social Reality

The Emergence and Power of the Macro Realm

The first human societies were built around small bands of hunter-gatherers organized into nucleated kinship units (composed of mother, father, children). These first societies were obviously not macro in the contemporary sense, but the history of human societies has involved episodic movements toward ever-larger societal and inter-societal formations. This evolution has not been linear, of course; periods of growth and increased complexity have been followed by societal disintegration, only to be reintegrated as new sociocultural formations have been built up. Beginning around 10,000 years ago, however, these episodic cycles became shorter and the scale of societies and inter-societal began to increase across an ever greater proportion of the human population; and today, the evolution of a complex macro level of social reality clearly constrains what individual and corporate actors in a society can do.

This macro reality is constructed from institutional domains, which are sets of groups and organizations located in communities that deal with problems of sustaining a population in an environment. I have termed these problems *selection pressures* because they push on individual and collective actors to find new ways to (a) produce goods and commodities, (b) distribute sufficient resources to support the larger population, (c) regulate, coordinate, and control activities by actors in this population, and (d) reproduce members and the structures coordinating their activities (Turner 1995, 2003, 2010a; Turner and Maryanski 2008a, b). These selection pressures first arose from population growth that made older, simpler forms of social organization unviable. One way to look at these early selection pressures from population growth is as *first-order logistical loads* that individual and

corporate actors must manage, or face the disintegrative consequences. As the complexity of the sociocultural formations evolved in response to these first-order logistical loads from population growth, *second-order logistical loads* arose from this very complexity and generated a new round of selection pressures to produce and distribute resources to the larger and more differentiated population, to regulate and control its activities, and to reproduce individuals for diverse positions in the more complex division of labors in corporate units. These first- and second-order logistical loads and the selection pressures that they generate constantly have put pressure on individual and corporate units to find solutions to reducing these loads over the last ten millennia, and if solutions are not forthcoming, a societies have disintegrated or been conquered by more powerful and efficiently organized societies. The history of humans on earth, then, has revolved around a constant battle to meet rising logistical loads that come with population growth and increasing societal complexity.

Second-order logistical loads increase not only from differentiation of diverse institutional domain – e.g., kinships, economy, polity, law, religion, education, arts, sport, science, medicine – but also from the inequalities that institutional domains generate. Each institutional domain distributes valued resources, and as societies become more complex, each does so unequally. Out of this unequal distribution of money, power, prestige, piety, learning, influence, knowledge, health, competitiveness, and aesthetics emerges a stratification system composed of classes that are rank ordered by their respective shares and configurations of resources (Turner 1984, 2010a, b, c). Inequality always generates tensions, and thus, one of the most powerful second-order logistical loads comes from inequality and stratification which, if not managed, will tear a society apart.

It may seem strange to begin a book on the micro-level of human social organization with such a grand narrative. Yet, as will become clear, what occurs in encounters of face-to-face interaction is almost always embedded in larger-scale structures and processes. We do not need to examine in detail the dynamics driving the operation of these larger-scale structures and their cultures (see Vol. 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*), but it is necessary to remain attuned to the fact that interaction is constrained by these structures. This constraint is mediated by two basic types of meso-level structures and their cultures: (1) *corporate units* that ultimately are the building blocks of institutional domains and the units (within domains) distributing resources unequally and (2) *categoric units* that often serve as the building blocks of stratification systems. Encounters are almost always embedded in both corporate and categoric units; and it is typically through these meso-level

structures and their cultures that the macro-level of reality exerts its influence on what transpires in the micro realm of social reality.

The Meso Realm of Reality

Corporate Units. The outcome of the battle to stave off the disintegrative pressures from logistical loads has been the evolution of institutional domains, and as noted above, these domains are built from corporate units, such as *organizations*, revealing a division of labor to achieve specific goals. These organizational corporate units are located in geographical corporate units, or *communities*. In turn, corporate units are built up from *group structures* composed of individuals engaged in iterated interactions within organizational corporate units. In the history of human societies, then, there have been only three basic types of corporate units at the meso level of social organization: *groups*, *organizations*, and *communities*. Groups are periodic gatherings of individuals to achieve some end, which can be as vague as achieving sociality and companionship or as instrumental as accomplishing some specific task; organizations are larger and more enduring, structures organizing groups in divisions of labor to achieve what are typically more clear-cut goals that are defined by the nature of the institutional domain in which they are lodged (e.g., education, economy, polity, law, science); and communities are spatial units that regulate sections of territory in order to coordinate the activities of individuals in corporate units.

Encounters are embedded in one and, quite often, all three basic types of corporate units. For example, an encounter among members of a group of individuals in an academic department occurs within the larger organizational systems – the university or college – that in turn is embedded within a community. Moreover, the university is also embedded within an institutional domains – i.e., education – that is nested inside a societal system and, in the case of many universities, in an inter-societal system. Just which of these structures has the most influence on what transpires in an encounter can vary, depending upon the individuals and their place in the corporate units of the institutional domain of education. Thus, while some encounters may not be embedded in meso and macro structures, most are. They are part of a complex web of embeddedness in meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations. On the one hand, this embedding makes encounters more complicated, but on the other hand, the number of formations in which encounters can potentially be embedded is limited to groups, organizations,

communities, institutional domains, societies, and inter-societal systems, and as I will discuss shortly, categoric units that are lodged in stratification systems which, in turn, are nested in societal and, potentially, inter-societal systems. The structure and culture of these meso- and macro-level units constrain what can transpire in encounters, and reciprocally, the interactions in encounters sustain, reproduce, and at times, change the structure and culture of these meso and macro units.

Certain properties of corporate units increase the clarity of expectations guiding all microdynamic processes. These are listed in Table 2.1. One key property is the degree to which the boundaries of a corporate unit are explicit, such that persons know when they have crossed this boundary and entered the corporate unit. For example, walking through the doors of a building housing a corporate unit is a very clear boundary, separating the division of labor of the unit from its environment. At other times, the boundaries of corporate units are vague, as is the case when entering a community where the boundaries are so extensive, it is difficult to know for sure what elements of such a large corporate unit are relevant. Even entering a shopping mall does not make it clear which boundaries apply – the mall as a corporate unit or its stores? The greater the clarity of the boundaries, the more likely will individuals be aware of the meanings of the ecology and demography of a setting, the relative status of persons, the roles that can be played, the normative expectations, the motive states that can be realized, and the emotions

Table 2.1 Properties of corporate units. Increasing clarity of expectation in encounters

1. Visibility of the boundaries of a corporate unit, separating the division of labor within the unit from its surrounding environment
 2. Clarity of the entrance and exit rules that inform individuals when and where the culture and structure of the corporate unit is relevant
 3. The explicitness of the goals and the degree of focus of the division of labor of a corporate unit on these goals
 4. The explicitness of the positions in the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in corporate units specifying tasks and relative authority
 5. The formality of the structure and culture of a corporate unit and its division of labor
 6. The degree of consolidation or correlation of positions in the division of labor, particularly the vertical division of labor, with memberships in discrete categoric units
 7. The degree of relative autonomy of the institutional domain in which a corporate unit is embedded from other institutional domains
 8. The level of consistency among generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and norms governing the operation of the corporate unit as a whole and its internal divisions of labor
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that are to be felt and displayed. A related, second property of corporate units is their entrance and exit rules that can facilitate recognition of boundaries. The more entrances and exits are marked off, and the more they involve ritual acts when crossing a corporate-unit boundary, the more likely will individuals understand the expectations guiding encounters. The simple act, for example, of punching a time card, showing an ID card, or having a hand stamped accentuates that the rules applying to the division of labor of the corporate unit are now in effect, or having to open the door to a classroom after it begins signals that classroom demeanor rules are now in effect; without such explicit entrance-exit markers, individuals will often need to work at establishing what rules with respect to what elements of the division of labor are relevant. A third property of corporate units is the clarity of the unit's goals, which increases the likelihood that individuals will understand expectations for all microdynamic processes. When the division of labor within a corporate-unit and its culture are organized to meet specific goals, individuals are much more likely to understand relevant expectations for encounters that occur within this division of labor. For instance, entering a university laboratory devoted to a particular line of research generates clear expectations for what individuals are supposed to do, as does entering a workplace, church, or school. The goals provide the frame establishing what is relevant and irrelevant for individuals. A fourth property is the explicitness of the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor in corporate units which also increase clarity of expectations tied to tasks and lines of authority; and when these are spelled out, individuals are able to form and navigate encounters among those in the same and different positions and roles. A fifth property is the formality of the structure and culture of a corporate unit, which specifies the rituals, forms of talk, deference of demeanor, status and roles, relevant norms, appropriate motivational states, and emotions that can be expressed. Formality makes encounters less fluid and spontaneous, but it always increases clarity of, and consensus over, expectations. A sixth property is the degree of consolidation or correlation of positions in the divisions of labor with discrete categoric units. If, for example, all decision makers are male and all secretaries are female – a situation that at one time was quite common in business corporate units – expectations for members of diverse categoric units and for positions in the hierarchical division of labor reinforce each other and, thereby, make expectations for behaviors in encounters clear (at the price, however, of higher inequality).

Other properties of corporate units are related to their embeddedness in the structure and culture of institutional domains. Thus, a seventh property of corporate units is the degree of autonomy of the institutional domains in which they are embedded. When a domain is relatively autonomous with its

own distinctive generalized symbolic medium, ideology, and institutional norms, corporate units within this domain are more likely to be organized by these cultural elements, allowing individuals to understand expectations for encounters within the division of labor of the units in a domain. For instance, churches, schools, businesses, teams, medical clinics and other corporate units are embedded in relatively autonomous domains, making it much easier for individuals to determine the culture of the situation and the expectations on diverse actors in encounters. An eighth and related property is the degree of consistency among generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and norms; the more consistent these are at the institutional level, the more likely are the corporate unit's division of labor and goals toward which this labor is directed to be clear, thereby making it easier for individuals to frame the relevant expectations in encounters.

These varying properties of corporate units and their embedding within institutional domains and, at times, the stratification system (when there is a high correlation of categoric unit memberships with positions in the divisions of labor in corporate units) highlight the importance of embedding as a constraint on microdynamic forces. If we ignore embedding, we will miss some of the key dynamics of encounters (Grannovetter 1985). Moreover, we will also fail to analyze how encounters can, at times, be the seedbeds for social change in meso and macro sociocultural formations. Social change comes when actors in iterated encounters within corporate units push for change or create new kinds of corporate units as a means for responding to selection pressures arising from first- and second-order logistical loads. For most encounters, however, the actions of individuals are constrained by the pattern of embedding – that is, groups lodged in organizations within communities and institutional domains that, in turn, are nested in societies which are part of inter-societal systems. The structure and culture of these embedded corporate units will have very large effects on the loadings of the forces that drive encounters, and while these can be diverse and complex, they are nonetheless delimited and can be theorized, as I hope to demonstrate in the pages to follow.

Categoric Units. The other basic type of meso-level unit in which encounters are always embedded is the categoric unit, which are defined by a *parameter* marking individuals as distinctive (Blau 1977, 1994a). As I noted in the last chapter, parameters can be *nominal* or *graduated*, with nominal parameters placing individuals inside (or outside) a discrete categoric unit and with graduated parameters marking individuals' location along a scale. In actual practice, however, graduated parameters are often converted into rough nominal parameters during the course of interaction. For example, years of education is translated into categories such as high

school dropout, high school diploma, college education, and graduate education; or age is broken down into such categories as infant, young, middle aged, old, and very old; or income is divided into rough categories like poor, rich, average income, and affluent.

At first glance, it seems odd to visualize encounters as lodged in categoric units, but there is a rather large literature on status characteristics, and especially on *diffuse status characteristics*, to document the effects that embedding in categoric units has on behaviors of individuals in encounters (see, for example, Berger et al. 1977; Berger and Zelditch 1985; Berger 1998). Indeed, a moment of reflection will document this effect. An encounter composed of all males will suddenly change when females begin to participate; an encounter of two old people will be very different when younger persons enter; an encounter among members of one ethnic categoric unit will be very different from one where multiple ethnic categories are co-present.

For each categoric unit, there are *status beliefs* that are translated into *expectation states* for how individuals should act as members of a social category (Ridgeway 1982, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2006). To some degree, these expectations arise from the differential evaluation of categoric units. Expectations for members of highly valued social categories will be different from those who are incumbent in devalued categories. The differential evaluation of categoric units is generally tied to the resources that members of a categoric unit can command, and the resources of members are an outcome of the unequal distribution of resources in corporate units within institutional domains. For example, if high and low education represent a categoric unit in a society, the valued resource – i.e., learning – has been unequally distributed, with those possessing learning being more valued than those with little learning. As a result, entirely different sets expectations on high- and low-learners will be imposed on individuals in encounters. When members of categoric units are defined by their respective resources, discrimination at the level of corporate units within institutional domains has typically been operative. Those without education, jobs, and health care have often been subject to discrimination, often on the basis of their membership in other categoric units, such as their ethnicity or religious affiliation. Categoric units are thus part of the larger stratification system in which the unequal distribution of resources has led to the formation of distinctive social classes (another type of categoric unit) that may have a gender or an ethnic component when members of these categoric units are over-represented in some classes and under-represented in others.

This embedding of individuals in categoric units that, in turn, are embedded in a stratification system (within a society and, potentially, inter-societal

system) has very large effects on how individuals interact in both focused and unfocused encounters. If, for example, members of devalued categories must walk through space where members of more valued categories dominate, the salience of individuals' respective categoric units will be high, with the consequence their movement in space and the demeanor will be orchestrated so as to mark their categoric-unit membership. The same would be true in more focused interactions; all of the microdynamic forces in play will be influenced by how categoric-unit memberships load the valences of these forces. Thus, the degree of embedding of individuals in categoric units, the salience of categoric units in any given encounter, the degree of differential evaluation of salient categoric units, and the expectations on members of these differentially evaluated units will all have significant effects on what transpires in focused and unfocused encounters.

Embedding in categoric units and, by extension, the larger macro-level stratification system will be as critical as positions in corporate units (within institutional domains) in explaining the dynamics of all encounters. Since all individuals are members of categoric units – if only by gender/sex and age – categoric units exert an influence on all encounters, but as the complexity of societies increases, so does the diversity of categoric units in which encounters can be embedded. To some degree, incumbency in many different categoric units can reduce the power of the evaluation and expectations for any one unit, but this outcome is related to the degree of correlation among memberships in high- and low-evaluation units. The key point is that the nature of the embedding in diverse categoric units and the effects of this embedding can be theorized (Table 2.2).

As is the case with embedding in corporate units, particular properties of categoric units increase the clarity of expectations in encounters. One is the discreteness of the parameters defining the boundaries of membership in a categoric unit. In Peter Blau's terms, the more nominal is a parameter, the more is the boundary between being in or out of a categoric unit likely to be clear. Thus, gender and markers of ethnicity such as skin color (even with large variations in actual skin color) signal clear boundaries for membership in a categoric unit; and under these conditions, the expectation states for how members of categoric units are to behave will guide the flow of interaction. A second property is consensus over the evaluation of members in a categoric unit in terms of their moral worth and the ideologies and meta-ideologies that are employed to form this evaluation. When the moral worth of individuals in categoric units is clear, so are expectation states for their behaviors; and while inequalities in moral worth may be unfair and generate a certain amount of tension, these inequalities still make expectations for

Table 2.2 Properties of categoric units. Increasing clarity of expectations in encounters

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1. The discreteness of the boundaries defining membership in a categoric unit
 2. The level of consensus over the relative evaluation of categoric units (and hence, the “moral worth” of their members) and the ideologies and meta-ideologies used to form this evaluation
 3. The degree of embeddedness of categoric units in the macro-level stratification system and the (a) level of inequality of resource distribution, (b) the degree of homogeneity of classes, and (c) the linearity in rank-ordering of classes in terms of shares of resources and moral worth
 4. The homogeneity among individuals who are members of a categoric unit
 5. The degree of correlation of membership on one categoric unit with membership in other categoric units revealing similar levels of evaluation
 6. The degree of correlation of membership in categoric units with diverse positions in the divisions of labor or corporate units, particularly the vertical division of labor
 7. The degree of embedding of corporate units in which categoric unit membership is consolidated with positions in the division of labor within relatively autonomous institutional domains, and especially those domains distributing highly valued resources
-

behaviors very clear. A third property is the degree of embedding of a categoric unit in the macro-level stratification system; for, the more correlated is membership with locations in the class system, the more clear-cut are evaluations of, and expectation states for, individuals in categoric units. The correlation of membership in categoric units is most likely when there are (a) high levels of inequality in resource distribution by corporate units within diverse institutional domains, (b) high degrees of homogeneity of class memberships, and (c) high levels of linearity in the rank-ordering of classes in terms of their relative resource shares and moral worth. A related, fourth property is the homogeneity among individuals in a categoric unit; the more their appearances and demeanors converge, and the more similar their shares of resources, the more explicit are evaluations of their moral worth and expectation states for their behaviors. A fifth property is the degree to which memberships in categoric units are correlated with each other. For instance, if ethnicity is correlated with class location, or if ethnicity is correlated with a nominal category created from a graduated parameter, such as years of education (e.g., poorly educated), the dual sets of expectations from different memberships reinforce each other and thus establish clear expectations, thereby making these expectations even more compelling. However, if memberships in categoric units are not correlated with each other or with locations on graduated parameters, then the effects of categoric unit membership will decline and, as a result, expectation states

will often be ambiguous because just *which* membership is salient during an encounter may be unclear.

The last two properties once again stem from embedding. One is the situation where there is a high correlation between memberships in categoric units with specific positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units, especially the vertical dimensions to the division of labor. This property only works to clarify expectations, however, when the moral evaluation correlates with high and low rank along the vertical dimensions of the division of labor. If low-esteem categoric unit members are spread across the entire division of labor, then the salience of categoric unit membership declines, and status in the division of labor will be more salient than expectation states attached to members of categoric units. In essence, status will trump diffuse status characteristics associated with categoric unit membership. Yet, if there is a high correlation between categoric unit membership and status positions in the division of labor, this association increases the salience of categoric unit membership and hence makes expectation states more explicit and powerful. If the corporate units revealing a correlation between (a) diffuse status characteristics and (b) status in the division of labor are embedded within autonomous institutional domains, then the effects of this correlation will be that much greater on the expectations for individuals in encounters. For example, if all executives in a business corporation are male and white, while all secretaries are women and line workers are disproportionately members of devalued ethnic categories, these correlations mean that money and power are unequally distributed and that those with less of these resources will be negatively evaluated by the ideology of, say, a capitalist economy where money and power are highly evaluated and denote moral worth. Encounters among these categoric units – male, female, and ethnicity marked by skin color – may have some tension associated with inequality but they will also reveal relatively clear expectation states for all parties.

In sum, then, embedding in corporate and categoric units that, in turn, are embedded in autonomous institutional domains and stratification systems revealing high inequalities constrains the options of individuals in encounters because of the moral evaluations and expectations states attached to positions in divisions of labor and to memberships in categoric units. The culture and structure of meso-level units (i.e., corporate and categoric units) and the structure and culture of macro-level structures and their cultures in which these meso units are embedded thus have large effects on how micro-dynamic processes play out. Hence, it is worth reviewing, once again, the structure of embedding that builds on the brief discussion in the last chapter and the beginning of this chapter.

The Structure of Embedding

All structural units have a culture or system of symbols regulating actions and behaviors, and it is for this reason that I label units at all levels of social reality *sociocultural* formations as a way to communicating this obvious fact of social life. Embedding at any level of social organization thus involves location at a point in the social structure of the more inclusive unit, which in turn determines the relevance of particular aspects of culture. The relative effects of structure and culture can be highly variable, but there are patterns to these effects and, hence, they are amenable to theoretical generalizations. To fully understand how embedding determines behaviors in encounters, I need to step back and provide a broader conception of sociocultural formations at the macro, meso, and micro levels of social reality. The focus of this discussion will be on how the structure and culture of the macro and meso realms influence actions and behaviors in the micro realm, but to appreciate the power of embedding, it is important to outline some of the key properties and dynamics of the macro and meso levels of social reality.

The Structure and Culture of Macro-level Social Reality

To briefly summarize the discussion above and in Chap. 1, the macro level of social reality is composed of institutional domains, stratification systems, societies, and inter-societal systems (see Fig. 1.1). Institutional domains are congeries of variously related corporate units for resolving logistical loads and selection pressures. Stratification systems revolve around the unequal distribution of the resources by corporate units within institutional domains, the formation of classes, the rank-ordering of classes on a scale of worth, and mobility of individuals and families among social classes. Societies are geopolitical units controlling and defending territories, and inter-societal systems are relations among societies, most often through corporate units in key institutional domains, especially economy, polity, and religion. At the meso level, as emphasized above, are corporate and categoric units that, respectively, are the building blocks of institutional domains and stratification systems.

Corporate units are not only the building blocks of an institutional domain, they are also embedded in this domain. Groups are nested inside of organizations which are part of an institutional domain, and hence the structure and culture of both groups and organizations will reflect this nesting. Organizational systems are located within communities, and since organizations are embedded in institutional domains, communities are also embedded in a configurations

of institutional domains – almost always, economy, polity, law, religion, education, and kinship but also sport, arts, medicine and, at times, science. The culture and structure of these configurations of institutional domains thus have large effects on the dynamics of communities. For our purposes, however, it is group and organizational corporate units that have the greatest effects on encounters because most encounters are embedded in one or both; and since groups are a part of organizations, and organizations are lodged in institutional domains, the structure and culture of institutional domains will at least indirectly influence what occurs in encounters. Institutional domains determine, to a high degree, the properties of corporate units. For example, the basic kinship system in western societies is nucleated – that is, composed of mother, father, and their children in smaller and relatively autonomous corporate units – with the consequence that kinship is composed of mostly group structures and does not reveal the embedding of nuclear units in larger organizational systems, such as lineages, clans, moieties, built up from nuclear units. Thus, encounters embedded in the kinship domain of a post-industrial society where nuclear kinship units dominate will be very different than those in a horticultural society where kinship is elaborated into organizations constructed from descent and residence rules. To take another example, economic activities and encounters among hunter-gatherers are lodged inside of kinship and band, whereas in contemporary industrial and post industrial societies, kinship and economy are differentiated from each other, with the result that the structure of economy will determine how organizational systems and groups are organized and, thereby, how encounters will proceed.

Institutional domains are embedded in societies, with the structure of a society determined by the level of differentiation among institutional domains and the mechanisms by which they are integrated (Turner 2010a). Similarly, an inter-societal system is built from relations among particular institutional domains, most typically economy and polity but, potentially, religion and kinship as well. Even though societal and inter-societal systems may seem remote from encounters, these large-scale structures determine who is present in encounters and how they are supposed to act. For instance, encounters in schools in many parts of the world are directed by not only the indigenous institutional domains of education, but the educational system may be partially embedded in a “western model” of education that has been imposed by supranational agencies, such as The World Bank or The International Monetary Fund, which have historically required (as a condition of making loans) that the system of education and the corporate-unit building blocks of this institutional domain reveal a western post-industrial profile, guided by its culture. Or an encounter among diplomats is a gathering that is clearly embedded in the respective polities of two or more societies; the same is true of trade negotiations which are embedded in the respective economies of the

potential trading partners. True, these encounters are also embedded in groups and organizations of polity and economy, but to understand the dynamics of the encounter, it is also necessary to see how the structure (and culture) of the more macro units constrains what these parties can do as they negotiate in encounters. Moreover, the mode of integration among these domains and the corporate units in them can be critical to what transpires in encounters. For instance, if power and domination by the polity of one society is the mode of integration of an inter-societal system – as has been the case through much of human history – then encounters in political and trade negotiations will be very different than if integration was achieved by market exchanges or by common cultures of the parties in encounters. These modes of integration are the subject matter of macro-level analysis and have their greatest direct impact on the structure of corporate units as these constrain encounters. Yet, at times this effect can be more direct, but even if it is mediated by the structure (and culture) of corporate units, the latter is very much constrained by the institutional domains involved in societal and inter-societal formations as well as the mechanisms by which integration among institutional domains within and between societies is achieved (see Turner 2010a: for a detailed analysis).

Encounters are also embedded in stratification systems. The types and levels of varying resources held by individuals is always critical to what transpires in an encounter. At times these resources are part of an organizational system and groups, but the nature of the resources and the pattern of resource distribution is determined by the structure and culture of broader institutional domains and the stratification system that emerges from the unequal distribution of resources to individuals in each domain. At other times, individuals meet as members of different categoric units outside of institutional domains and organizations; and what occurs in encounters will be influenced by the shares of resources and evaluations of respective worth of members in different categoric units. The more a categoric unit is embedded in the stratification system, the more salient will be categoric membership during the course of an encounter, and particularly so when members of differentially valued categoric units interact but also when members of only one type of categoric unit interact (e.g., encounters among members of one ethnic subpopulation, or members of one social class). It would not be possible to understand the interaction among individuals in these categoric units without some appreciation for the structure of the stratification system along such dimensions as the level of inequality in the distribution of various resources, the degree to which homogeneous classes exist, the degree of linear rank-ordering of classes, and the rates of mobility across class boundaries. These properties of stratification will have direct effects on encounters as well as mediated effects through the formation of categoric units.

Figure 2.1 offers a rough vision of how embedding of encounters in successive layers of macrostructures constrains the dynamics of encounters. Encounters are strips of interaction but they almost always are lodged within a social structure that imposes itself on encounters from remote macrostructural levels of social organization.

Attached to these structural units are symbol systems or culture that order cognitions, arouse emotions, and regulate the behaviors of individuals and collective actors. Later, in Fig. 2.2, I outline graphically what I see as the




Fig. 2.1 The structure of embedding and encounters

most relevant dimensions of these cultural systems for understanding the microdynamics of focused and unfocused encounters. At the societal level of social organization (and by extension the inter-societal as well) are (a) languages that are used by actors to build all other elements of culture, (b) technologies or knowledge about how to manipulate the environment and, thereby, build up institutional domains, (c) texts (both oral and written) on the history traditions, characteristics, and life-ways of a population, (d) values or the highly general moral premises about what is right and wrong, good and bad, and (e) meta-ideologies or composites of the ideologies from each institutional domain in a society. Obviously, culture is much more robust than this simple list of categories, but for my purposes in developing a set of abstract principles on microdynamics, this attenuated conceptualization is sufficient. These societal-level elements of culture arise from institutional domains and stratification systems, but once in place, they constrain the options and actions of actors at all levels of social reality.

At the institutional level, each domain has a distinctive *generalize symbolic medium of exchange* which is employed in discourse among actors in a domain, in the articulation of themes and orientations among actors, in exchanges of resources, in the unequal distribution of resources that initiates the formation of stratification systems, and in the formation of ideologies for each domain that specify what should and ought to occur a domain. In Table 2.3, I denote what I see as the generalized symbolic medium of the most prominent institutional domains in a society. The notion of generalized symbolic media is rather under-theorized in sociology by all but a few theorists (Parsons 1963a, b; Parsons and Smelser 1956; Luhmann 1982; Turner 2010a, b, b, c), and although I have tried to extend the conceptualization of these media for macro-level social processes, I have not fully developed the idea very much beyond the efforts of others. Yet, symbolic media are critical to understanding social processes at all levels of social organization because, as noted above, they are the terms of discourse, the valued resources distributed unequally, the resources exchanged among actors within and between domains, and the basis for ideological formation as well as the construction of meta-ideologies. To illustrate, *money* is the medium of exchange within the economy (of complex societies) and between the economy and other institutional domains. For instance, family members provide loyalty (to come to work) in exchange for wages. Moreover, money is the valued resource unequally distributed by corporate units in the economy proper and corporate units in other domains where money (along with the symbolic medium unique to a domain) is distributed unequally. As money is used by actors within and between domains, it becomes the medium by which discourse about the economy (and other domains where

Table 2.3 Generalized symbolic media within institutional domains

Kinship	<i>Love/loyalty</i> , or the use of intense positive affective states to forge and mark commitments to others and groups of others
Economy	<i>Money</i> , or the denotation of exchange value for objects, actions, and services by the metrics inhering in money
Polity	<i>Power</i> , or the capacity to control the actions of other actors
Law	<i>Influence</i> , or the capacity to adjudicate social relations and render judgments about justice, fairness, and appropriateness of actions
Religion	<i>Sacredness/Piety</i> , or the commitment to beliefs about forces and entities inhabiting a non-observable supernatural realm and the propensity to explain events and conditions by references to these sacred forces and beings
Education	<i>Learning</i> , or the commitment to acquiring and passing on knowledge
Science	<i>Knowledge</i> , or the invocation of standards for gaining verified knowledge about all dimensions of the social, biotic, and physico-chemical universes
Medicine	<i>Health</i> , or the concern about and commitment to sustaining the normal functioning of the human body
Sport	<i>Competitiveness</i> , or the definition of games that produce winners and losers by virtue of the respective efforts of players
Arts	<i>Aesthetics</i> , or the commitment to make and evaluate objects and performances by standards of beauty and pleasure that they give observers

it also circulates); and out of this discourse emerge themes about the nature of the economy and what occurs in an economy (Luhmann 1982) which, in turn, are codified into an economic ideology that specifies what are right and wrong, proper and improper, and good and bad behaviors of actors within the economy. To take another example, *sacredness/piety* is the symbolic medium of the religious domain, with exchanges and discourse occurring using the premises of this symbolic medium; and from these exchanges and discourse come religious themes which are then codified into religious beliefs and ideologies about what is morally correct or incorrect behavior

by actors in the religious domain. And, to continue the example, when sacredness/piety is part of an exchange with other domains, it is exchanged for love/loyalty and money from families, money from economy, and delimited rights for authority to interpret the supernatural from polity.

In any societal system, some institutions are more dominant than others; as a result, when the ideologies of all domains are combined into a meta-ideology, the premises of these dominant institutional domains will be more prominent in the meta-ideology. This meta-ideology feeds into highly abstract value premises of a society, often changing values and, yet, at the same time being constrained by these values. Furthermore, the meta-ideology of a society is typically employed to legitimate its stratification system and to create standards of moral worth that are employed to evaluate not only class as a categoric unit but all other categoric units possessing shares of valued resources.

Values, ideologies, and meta-ideologies not only provide the moral premises for actions by individual and collective actors, they also constrain the formation of norms in corporate and categoric units. Within an institutional domain, there are broad *institutional norms* about how individuals and corporate actors are to behave; and these are constrained by the moral premises of values and meta-ideologies as well as the specific ideology of a given domain. In turn, the norms within the divisions of labor in corporate units are delimited not only by the structural properties of a corporate units but also by the ideologies of a domain and the values as well as meta-ideologies of the more inclusive society and, at times, inter-societal system. Within the stratification system, there are moral premises provided by values, meta-ideologies, and specific institutional ideologies that legitimate the stratification system as a whole while, at the same time, constraining the formation of normative expectations for individuals and corporate units like families at each differentiated point in the stratification system. And, if categoric units, such as ethnicity and religious affiliation, are also correlated with locations in the stratification system, the expectations for behaviors of individuals in these categoric units will also be heavily infused with the moral premises of the stratification system. For example, if particular categories of persons, such as members of an ethnic subpopulation, are over-represented in the lower social classes of the stratification system, expectations for their behaviors will not only follow from their ethnic heritage but be heavily weighted toward devaluation of their moral worth because of their position in the class structure of a society. Thus, in a capitalist, market-driven society, members of ethnic populations over-represented in the lower classes of the society will be perceived to have “not worked hard enough” to secure learning resources (from education) that could be used to gain access to corporate units distributing such valued

resources as money and authority. The normative expectations on members of categoric units (or expectation states for diffuse status characteristics) are, then, almost always constrained by the moral codes that have been used to justify inequality and stratification.

The Structure and Culture of Meso-level Reality

Encounters are generally embedded in corporate units, typically groups and organizations but also communities. Corporate units determine the organization of physical space – offices, buildings, walkways, streets, parks, and other dimensions of ecology – that constrain what can occur in both focused and unfocused encounters. This ecological constraint, coupled with divisions of labor, also determines interpersonal demography: the number of individuals co-present, their density of arrangement, the positions they hold in relevant corporate units, and the distribution of members in various categoric units. Along with the ecology and division of labor of corporate units, categoric units determine how many persons in which categories are co-present and, most importantly, the salience or relevance of categoric unit membership for focused and unfocused encounters. The differentiation of distinctive categoric units is related to universal categories, such as gender, age and “race” (or people’s perceptions of race), to differences created by cultural backgrounds such as religious affiliation and ethnicity, and to locations in the stratification system. As noted above, the more any categoric distinction is correlated with membership in a specific class location (another type of categoric unit), the more salient will categoric unit membership become in focused and unfocused encounters. Moreover, when categoric-unit membership is correlated with positions in divisions of labor in corporate units, and particularly with positions in the hierarchical division of labor of organizations and with neighborhoods in communities, the salience of membership increases for all encounters, and especially for encounters among members of differentially evaluated social categories. Thus, embedding in corporate and categoric units constrains the dynamics of both focused and unfocused encounters; and in so doing, embedding makes it much easier to develop theoretical principles on these dynamics.

As cultural codes move from the societal and even inter-societal system levels to the institutional and stratification system level, and then, down to meso-level corporate and categoric units, they become ever-more restrictive on actors as they impose expectations for behaviors in encounters. The layering of culture across different levels of social structure, and the successive

embedding of situational expectations gives culture more power. Thus, as situational norms in encounters are embedded in the norms of corporate units, as these norms are nested in beliefs about status in divisions of labor and about categoric-unit memberships, as these status beliefs are lodged inside of ideologies of institutional domains, as these ideologies are consolidated into meta-ideologies across diverse institutional domains and the stratification system, and as all of these cultural layers reflect generalized value premises, the power of culture increases and imposes constraints on how individuals normalize the encounter. It is this movement from abstract moral premises to ever more specific prescriptions and proscriptions that puts teeth into culture and forces individuals to pay attention to its demands in all encounters. Let me briefly elaborate on these properties and dynamics of cultural embedding.

Corporate units are built up within institutional domains to resolve selection pressures from the logistical loads created by macrodynamic forces. As they evolve, distinctive generalized symbolic media emerge for discourse leading to what Niklas Luhmann (1982) termed *thematicization* or general orientations within an institutional domain and, eventually, to ideological formation about what should and should not occur within an institutional domain. As ideologies form, they constrain the range of general institutional norms that can emerge in a domain; and in turn, these institutional norms carry the power of ideologies and the use of symbolic media down to the corporate unit level, thereby constraining the normative culture attached to the divisions of labor in corporate units.

Categoric units are the outcome of differences in the biology, culture, and organization of individuals within a society, but as I have emphasized, they are also formed through the unequal distribution of resources in corporate units within domains. This inequality can create categoric units, such as a ranked series of social classes, and it can also add further points of distinctiveness to categoric units formed by other parameters (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation) to the extent that categoric unit and social class membership are correlated or consolidated (that is, members of categoric units are over-represented in class categories in the stratification system). The meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system as a whole generate moral evaluations of categoric units on a scale of “worth” which takes on greater clarity and linearity when the correlation of categoric units with class position within the stratification system is high. This evaluation is also directly influenced by the evaluative tenets contained in all generalized symbolic media of institutional domains and the ideologies that these media generate within domains. Similarly, institutional norms will also have effects on the expectation states for members of categoric units and, reciprocally,

these expectation states can influence the substance of institutional norms when members of categoric units are habitually confined (by discrimination) to only certain domains (or, conversely, excluded from some domains) and to a delimited set of positions in the corporate units in those domains where access is possible.

The expectations on members of categoric units arise from a complex of cultural systems operating at diverse levels of social reality. At the core of these expectations is a general evaluation of worth that can become codified into society-wide (and even inter-societal) beliefs about the characteristics, qualities, and capacities of members of categoric units (Ridgeway 1998, 2001, 2008). Thus, general evaluations of worth cause the formation of what expectation-states theorizing terms *status beliefs* about individuals who evidence *diffuse status characteristics* (e.g., gender, ethnicity, age or in my terms parameters marking categoric-unit memberships). What makes these diffuse status characteristics (or categoric unit memberships) unique is that individuals carry them from situation to situation; they are often not confined to a particular corporate unit, but to positions in all corporate units, to all unfocused encounters in public places, and to all focused encounters at any location in the social universe. These beliefs and expectation states contained in these beliefs are translated into norms for individuals at the meso level of social reality. These norms for categoric unit members often influence the norms in the division of labor of corporate units, especially when that categoric unit membership is highly salient. Categoric unit membership increases in salience when locations in the division of labor of corporate, particularly the hierarchical divisions of labor, are correlated with categoric unit membership, whereas the salience of categoric unit membership declines when the correlation of membership with positions in the divisions of labor of organizational corporate units or locations in community corporate units is low. Under conditions of high salience, then, expectation states for categoric units become codified in the norms of corporate units; conversely, when categoric unit salience is low, the norms specifying specific tasks in the division of labor of corporate units trump those that arise from status beliefs about members of categoric units.

The Structure and Culture of Micro-level Reality

As promised earlier, Fig. 2.2 offers a rough picture of layers of culture from the macro through meso realms of social reality that impinge upon the




Fig. 2.2 The culture of embedding for all encounters

normatization of encounters. The details of Fig. 2.2 are less important than the imagery of how macro- and meso-level culture forms, as is indicated by the one- and two-way arrows. The one-way arrows are only intended to denote an important causal effect of a cultural element on another. A two-way arrow simply emphasizes a reverse causal effect, as is the case when ideologies evolve within institutional domains and become part of a larger meta-ideology which then constrains subsequent ideological formation with institutional domain, or as is evident with meta-ideologies that are constrained by value premises that, reciprocally, are altered as new ideologies are added to the mix of a meta-ideology.

Technologies constrain the formation of institutional domains and the corporate units from which they are constructed, and in so doing, they also influence the culture of a domain. As a unique generalized symbolic medium emerges within a domain, this medium is used to form ideologies that, in turn, constrain the formation of institution-specific institutional norms, with the latter constraining the norms of meso-level corporate units operating within this domain. Symbolic media and the ideologies that they generate determine the evaluations of, and the status beliefs about, members of categoric units within the stratification system which, along with institutional norms, set up expectation states for members of categoric units (or, *status beliefs* about those exhibiting *diffuse status characteristics*). These become codified into normative expectations for individuals in categoric units. And, together, the norms of corporate units within domains and the norms of categoric units structure the formation of micro-level culture, particularly the process of normatization briefly reviewed in Chap. 1 and examined in more detail in Chap. 3. And normatization imposes high levels of constraint on the behaviors of individuals in focused and unfocused encounters.

Let me emphasize that Figs. 2.1 and 2.2 only outline general properties of the social universe that are important for theorizing. The outlines in the figures do not constitute theory, but only a sense for the terrain to be covered by theorizing. Some of this terrain needs distinctive theories of the macro and meso realms of social reality and, thus, are not our concern here where emphasis is on the micro realm. Yet, embedding is critical to understanding the dynamics of this micro realm because meso and macro socio-cultural formations constrain the dynamics of encounters directly and indirectly by loading the values and valences for the forces driving the micro realm of focused and unfocused encounters. It is for this reason that I begin analysis of encounters with a conceptual scheme that maps some of the key causal connections among the micro, meso, and macro levels of reality. These will all need to be refined and stated as elementary principles in the chapters to follow.

Elementary Principles of Embedding of Encounters

I will introduce the dynamics of embedding at many points in the next chapters, but we are now in a position to offer an elementary, though complex, principle on embedding, *per se*. This principle will allow us to anticipate other principle on microdynamics because embedding must be the center of any theory of encounters. Virtually every focused or unfocused encounter is lodged in corporate or categoric units, and generally both. As a result, macro-structures and cultures are instantiated in micro-level through embedding. The *interaction order*, as Erving Goffman (1983) emphasized in the posthumous publication of his never-delivered presidential address to the American Sociological Association, is part of a larger a *social occasion* that brings more macro-level phenomena to micro-level encounter. Goffman was on the right track but he never developed a very adequate conception of the properties and dynamics of the meso and macro social orders; indeed, sociologists have struggled with this issue since sociology's inception, and my emphasis on embedding here and in subsequent chapters represents my best effort to connect the encounter to larger-scale social orders (see also Lawler et al. 2009) for a recent and important effect to address the dynamics of embedding). Thus, the fourth principle of microdynamics can be stated as follows

4. The more an encounter is embedded in corporate and categoric units, and the more these units are, respectively, embedded in relatively autonomous institutional domains and in class locations in the stratification system of a society or inter-societal system, the more readily will participants in the encounter be able to interpret the meaning of the ecology and demography of the situation, to determine each other's relative status, to role-make and role-take successfully, to normatize the situation from their stocks of knowledge about the culture of corporate and categoric units, to determine how to meet universal motive- or need-states, and to display and feel the appropriate emotions; and conversely, the less embedded is an encounter in corporate and categoric units and, by extension, macro-level sociocultural formations, the more ambiguous are expectations likely to be and, hence, the more effort individuals will expend in determining the meaning of situational ecology and demography, the respective status and roles of participants, the relevant norms of the situation, the means for meeting motive-states, and the appropriate emotions to be felt and displayed.
 - A. The more an encounter is embedded in a corporate unit, the greater will be the effects of embedding, with these effects increasing with
 1. Visible boundaries marking a corporate unit off from its environment
 2. Clear entrance and exit rules for entering and leaving the corporate unit

3. Explicitness of goals organizing the division of labor
 4. Explicitness of both the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor
 5. Formality of the culture and structure of the corporate unit and its division of labor
 6. Degree of correlation of positions in the division of labor with memberships in nominal categoric units, especially correlations with the vertical division of labor
 7. Level of autonomy of the institutional domain in which a corporate unit is embedded
 8. Level of consistency among generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and norms governing an institutional domain and the corporate units in this domain
- B. The more an encounter is embedded in categoric units defined by nominal parameters or by graduated parameters that are converted into quasi-nominal categories, the greater are the effects of embedding on microdynamic processes, with these effects increasing with
1. Discreteness of the parameters defining the boundaries of categoric unit membership
 2. Consensus over the relative evaluation of members of categoric units and the ideologies and meta-ideologies used to form this evaluation
 3. Correlation of memberships in categoric units with class locations within the stratification system, with this correlation increasing with
 - a. The degree of inequality of resource distribution by corporate units
 - b. The degree of intra-class homogeneity
 - c. The degree of linearity in the ranking of classes on a scale of moral worth
 - d. The degree to which inter-class mobility is restricted
 4. Correlation of memberships in categoric units with positions in the divisions of labor, especially the vertical division of labor, in diverse corporate units across a wide range of institutional domains
 5. Degree of homogeneity among members in diverse categoric units
 6. Degree of salience of categoric unit memberships in general, with this general salience being an additive function of the conditions listed above
- C. The less an encounter is embedded in categoric units and/or categoric units are of low salience, the greater will be the effects of
1. Status in the divisions of labor of corporate units on all microdynamic processes in focused encounters
 2. Ecology and demography in unfocused encounters

D. The less are encounters embedded in the divisions of labor of corporate units, the greater will be the effects of memberships in differentially evaluated categoric units on all microdynamic processes in both focused and unfocused encounters

This long but still relatively simple principle summarizes the thrust of my argument in this chapter. Let me recapitulate by commenting on the elements of this principle, especially since these effects of embedding are critical to understanding microdynamic processes. The initial portion of Principle 4 simply emphasizes that with embedding of an encounter in meso structures and their cultures, the range of options for individuals in encounters is reduced. Corporate units reveal divisions of labor around status positions, roles, and norms that influence how individuals will interpret the ecology and demography of the situation, how they will respond to status differences or similarities, how they will role-make and role-take, how they will normalize the situation, how they will go about meeting transactional needs, and how they will display emotions. Categoric units are almost always differentially valued, thereby setting up expectations for the relative worth of individuals and, hence, for their behaviors. When encounters are *not* embedded in these meso structures and the cultures that they bring to bear on an encounter, both focused and unfocused encounters will require considerably more work to remain viable as individuals try to figure out what ecology and demography mean, what the respective statuses of individuals are, what roles are being made by others and what roles can be made by person, what norms are relevant, what transactional needs can be realized to what degree, and what emotions can be expressed.

This kind of ambiguity is reduced with embedding in meso structures and cultures, and the ambiguity is reduced even more when meso structures are, in turn, embedded in macro-level structures, particularly (1) an institutional domain revealing a coherent culture built up from the use of the generalized symbolic medium to forge discourse and talk, to develop themes and orientations, to exchange valued resources, to formulate ideologies, and to articulate broad institutional norms and (2) a stratification system that establishes the resource shares distributed by corporate units in domains to individuals and the relative worth of individuals on the basis of these shares (as specified in the ideologies of all resource-giving domains and the composites, meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system as a whole). Categoric unit memberships can exert even more power on encounters when there is a high correlation of membership not only with locations in the class system but also the divisions of labor of diverse corporate units across a wide variety of institutional domains. In essence, there is a compounding of the effects of class and divisions of labor with parameters marking a categoric unit

when members of diverse categoric units are over-represented in some class locations and in low or high positions in the divisions of labor of diverse types of corporate units in a wide range of different institutional domains. For example, African-origin individuals are over-represented in the lower classes and in low-level positions in corporate units in all domains (economic, political, religious, educational, medical, legal, scientific, etc.) or are denied access to corporate units in some domains (e.g., economy, polity, education, and medicine), this consolidation of membership of categoric units with locations in the stratification system and with access to, or locations in, corporate units in resource-giving institutional domains reinforces expectation states for members of categoric units. This consolidation also increases the salience of membership in categoric units, thereby, individuals' perceptions of each other, but as I emphasize in 4-B (6), salience can be high in general among members of a society, somewhat independently of the correlation of membership with class locations and/or positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units within institutional domains.

Finally, encounters may not be embedded in categoric units, or if they are, they are embedded in categoric units that carry low salience (as would be the case when there was a low correlation of memberships in a categoric unit with class location or positions in divisions of labor). That is, categoric-unit memberships are, in Peter Blau's (1977, 1993) words, *unconsolidated* with corporate units or inequalities; instead, there is an *intersection* and penetration of categoric unit members in all classes and across all types of corporate units in all institutional domains. Under such conditions, the effects of categoric unit membership decline, while the effects of status, per se, in the division of labor of corporate units increase, especially when status is structured hierarchically. If, however, an encounter is *not* embedded in the divisions of labor of a corporate unit, then the diffuse status characteristics or categoric unit memberships of individuals (say, by gender, age, ethnicity) will increase in salience and structure more of the flow of interaction in both focused and unfocused encounters.

Conclusion

Thus, embedding is central to a theory of microdynamics, so much so that I have sequenced the next chapters on microdynamic forces in rough order of the effects of embedding. I begin with demographic and ecological forces in Chap. 3 because these are determined by the embedding of encounters in corporate and categoric units. Next is Chap. 4 on status forces, which can

only be understood by their embedding in corporate and categoric units. Chapter 5 on role forces recognizes that roles are often attached to status and, thus, indirectly constrained by the embedding of status, but as we will see, roles are more than adjuncts to status. They reveal dynamics of their own that are often follow from embedding in meso and macro level culture. Chapter 6 addresses symbolic or cultural forces which are very much delimited by embedding in social structures at the meso and macro levels of social reality, especially as this embedding influences status and role forces. Chapter 7 on motivational need-states or what I term *transactional forces* are circumscribed by embedding in meso and macro sociocultural formations, but they are also determined by the nature of humans as beings and will always be operative when humans interact, even in encounters that are not embedded in meso or macro structures and their cultures. Chapter 8 completes the review of microdynamic forces and addresses human emotions, which as I argue are as unique to humans as is their capacity for language and culture. Humans are always emotional wherever they are; and while embedding in social structures and culture often determines the emotions experienced by persons and the intensity of these emotions, emotions are aroused by the other microdynamic forces and, as we will see, are critical to sustaining commitments to the larger social order and to changing this order. In Chap. 9, I will address how embedding also provides conduits for change emanating from microdynamics. While these dynamics are constrained by embedding, and the more macrodynamics forces that creates macro-and meso-level social reality, social change often is a “bottom up” process. What people experience and feel at the micro level of the encounter can, over time, generate pressures for change of meso-level structures and, eventually macro social reality. Thus, we will need to correct for the clear impression given in this chapter that micro social life is so highly constrained by embedding that the dynamics operating at this micro level have no power to change the social universe. As we will see, such is not the case. Finally in Chap. 10, I will summarize the (numbered) abstract principles of macrodynamics that now has reached four in this chapter and will reach – as each chapter on microdynamic forces is developed. These principles constitute what I see as an elementary theory of the micro realm of social reality, and together with similar sets of elementary principles on the dynamics of the meso and macro realms of social reality, constitute a theory of *all* social reality – imperfect and perhaps wrong in many places but, nonetheless, a general or grand theory for sociological analysis of the social universe.

As formal principles, it is clear what is being asserted; it is possible to test them with a wide variety of research methods; and most importantly, it is possible to explain an entire domain of the social universe. And, if the

principles are found to be inadequate, then the burden of proof shifts to the critic to develop better principles that can only make sociology a more mature science. As I noted in Chap. 1, I reject as irrelevant the very idea that scientific theory cannot be developed in sociology – an idea so common these days in sociology that it is almost depressing to be a scientist in such a discipline. This rejection of science takes sociology nowhere; our goal is to explain how the social world operates. This book represents my best effort to do so for the micro realm (see Turner 1995, 2003, 2010c, for efforts for similar efforts for the macro realm), and I welcome constructive criticism that seeks to articulate better theoretical principles.

Chapter 3

Ecological and Demographic Dynamics in Encounters

Within sociology, ecology is the study of the relationship among social units and their bio-social-cultural-physical environments, whereas demography is the study of population size, density, migrations, and characteristics. Generally, ecological and demographic analyses are conducted at a more macro level, although meso-level analyses within specific fields, such as urban ecology and organizational ecology, remain highly prominent (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984, 1989; McPherson 1981; Carroll 1988; Berry and Kasarda 1977). The basic thrust of ecological and demographic analysis can also be brought down to the micro level; and since Erving Goffman's pioneering work (1963, 1971), the theoretical insights to be gained from a concern with the ecology and demography of encounters has been all too evident.

Indeed, all encounters are driven by ecological and demographic forces. An encounter must occur in physical space, even when mediated by communication and transportation technologies, with the structure and organization of space pushing on individuals in both focused and unfocused encounters. An encounter always reveals demographic dimensions revolving around the movements or migrations of individuals across space and the characteristics of individuals in encounters, especially their categoric unit memberships; and these demographic properties cause individuals to behave in particular ways.

Perhaps ecology and demography seem less "dynamic" than other forces operating in the micro realm of social reality, but they are critical nonetheless. These forces put constraints on how other forces driving encounters can be mobilized. Equally important, the structure of space, the movements of people in space, and the characteristics of individuals forming and reforming chains of focused and unfocused encounters almost always constrained, to some degree, by the meso-level structures – i.e., corporate and categoric units – in which almost all encounters are embedded.

Corporate units and the institutional domains in which they are embedded organize spatial dimension of encounters, while often determining what categories of persons are co-present in focused and unfocused encounters. In so doing, corporate units bring the structure and culture of particular institutional domains down to the level of the encounter. Similarly, categoric units and the stratification system in which they are frequently embedded affect the resources and respective evaluations of persons in encounters, thereby determining the relevance of larger patterns of societal inequality to individuals in focused and unfocused encounters. Moreover, the relative valences of other microdynamic forces – that is, culture, status, roles, motives and emotions – are delimited by how corporate and categoric units structure space and by the distributions of various types or categories of persons in encounters. Thus, in examining the forces of the microdynamic realm of the social universe, the ecology and demography of encounters are useful places to begin developing a general theory.

Ecological and demographic forces exert pressures on individuals along several fronts (Goffman 1963, 1967, 1971; Collins 1975). One is the *juxtaposition and movements* of bodies in space; a related force is the *density* of various *types or categories individuals* in space; yet another is the *organization of space* into places, pathways, and structures where focused and unfocused interactions can occur; still another is the *props* that individuals can bring to, or claim in, structured space; and a final ecological and demographic front is *technological mediation* of communication among various categories of persons who sustain a lack of focus as they move in space and who, periodically, form focused encounters.

When navigating ecological space and taking cognizance of others, individuals use the implicit information contained in their stocks of knowledgeability (Schutz 1932 [1967]) about the *meanings* communicated by the juxtaposition and movement of bodies, by the densities of persons, by the presence of various categories of others, by the organization of space, and by the use of communication technologies. On the basis of this implicit knowledgeability, individuals determine the relevance of various dimensions of not only ecology and demography, but also the available status positions, the range of roles that can be played, the norms determining (a) the categorization of others, situation, and relations, (b) the rituals to be employed, (c) the forms of talk and communication, (d) the frames to be imposed, and (e) the emotions to be felt and displayed.

Knowledgeability about these matters is greatly influenced by embedding of encounters in corporate and categoric units. Indeed, without embedding it is often difficult to know what the properties of the ecology and demography of a situation “mean”; and, hence, it becomes difficult and often stressful to

“know” when and how to focus or to avoid focusing interactions. Thus, ecology and demography are at the center of all encounters because they directly constrain what stocks of knowledge can be invoked and what dimensions of corporate and categoric unit structure and culture are relevant in a situation. In a very real sense, then, ecology and demography are the conduits by which meso structures and their cultures impose themselves on individuals. The meanings associated with the ecology and demography of encounters come from the culture of meso structures and, by extension, the macro-level sociocultural formations in which corporate and categoric units are embedded.

The Dynamics of Ecology and Demography in Focused Encounters

Erving Goffman (1961), who originally developed a theory on the dynamics of encounters, offered an ecological-demographic definition of the *focused encounter*. For Goffman, a focused encounter evidences an “eye-to-eye ecological huddle” that maximizes mutual perception and monitoring among individuals. This face-to-face huddle is essential for the other elements of all focused encounters to emerge. These other elements include: a single visual and cognitive focus of attention, a mutual and preferential openness to verbal communication, a heightened mutual relevance of acts, an emergent “we feeling” of solidarity, a ritual punctuation of openings, closings, entrances, and exits, and procedures for managing deviant acts. These properties of focused encounters vary by degrees, beginning with the degree of openness or closure in the ecological huddle and, then, proceeding through the degree or level of the other defining features of a focused encounter. Thus, encounters varying by their *degree or level of* huddling and among participants, movement of persons in and out of the ecological huddle, single visual focus of attention, openness of participants to verbal communication, attention to mutual acts, “we feelings,” and ritual activity. Later theorists such as Randall Collins (2004) have added elements to the dynamics of focused encounters that are more implicit in Goffman’s portrayal – elements such as the degree of (1) rhythmic synchronization of talk and body language, (2) the arousal of positive and negative emotional energy, (3) the entrainment of individuals in the interpersonal flow, and (4) the development of common symbols and unique culture. Like Goffman, Collins views these elements as increasing social solidarity in focused encounters; and in all these dimensions or

elements of encounters, when operative, increase the degree of focus among individuals in the encounter.

Implicit in this definition of focused encounters are more explicit demographic variables. The nature and number of individuals in the ecological huddle is critical to understanding what transpires during the course of a focused encounter. Similarly the movements of individuals around the focused encounter as well as in or out of the ecological huddle have large effects of the flow of interaction in focused encounters. Thus, while Goffman's definition had an ecological bias, the categoric unit memberships of persons in the face-to-face huddle, their juxtaposition, and their movements are the demographic forces crucial to analyzing the dynamics of focused and unfocused encounters.

The Juxtaposition and Movements of Bodies in Focused Encounters

When humans are co-present, they are likely to become mutually aware of each other and to initiate some form of face-to-face interaction, unless norms specify otherwise (as they do for unfocused encounters where direct face-engagement is to be avoided). Even when bodies are in juxtaposition for a focused encounter, the "meanings" that individuals give to the situation are critical in determining whether or not interaction will become focused, and to what degree. For co-presence to cause an encounter to form, individuals must, first of all, perceive that it is normatively appropriate to make face engagements and, secondly, perceive that others are attentive and open to mutual role-taking and communication. Movement of bodies is often critical to meeting these conditions, with those ready for communication moving into normatively prescribed distances for face-to-face communication in a situation. When there are more than two people in an encounter, the juxtaposition of bodies becomes an important property of the encounter. If there is a fully closed circle of individuals who can all face each other and, thereby, block access by others to the encounter, then the encounter will have more focus and will generally reveal high levels for all of the variable properties that define a focused encounter – that is, a single visual and cognitive focus of attention, mutually and preferential openness to verbal communication, heightened mutual relevance of acts, emergent "we feeling" of solidarity, extensive use of rituals, and awareness of proper ritual procedures for correcting deviant acts. And high levels of these variables will increase the values of those dynamic properties emphasized by Collins – rhythmic

synchronization, arousal of positive emotional energy, emotional entrainment, and common symbols.

If, however, the circle of bodies is not closed and reveals greater spacing among individuals or conspicuous gaps, then the loadings of these elements of focused encounters will decline. Individuals' attention may wander to the action outside the encounter or drift into mental woolgathering. Moreover, individuals will be able to leave without elaborate exist rituals; and others can join the encounter with minimal entrance rituals. Larger encounters have much the same effect because after a certain number of persons, the huddle will be broken – thereby lowering the loadings for all elements of the encounter. Individuals will be less likely to sustain focus of attention, preferential openness to communication, heightened sense of relevance of mutual acts, and feelings of solidarity. In fact, the larger the number of bodies juxtaposed and the greater their movements, the less will be the focus. Yet, larger encounters often break down into smaller encounters, which then increases the values for the defining variables of all focused encounters. At other times, the juxtaposition of bodies among large numbers of individuals can sustain a focus if the focus be on a single individual or small group of persons who stand in front of others whose bodies are turned toward them, as is the case with a person giving a sermon or lecture, a board of directors addressing stockholders, and a political activist exhorting the troops. Yet, as is certainly the case with lectures, those facing the lecturer often engage in sub-encounters with their neighbors sitting around them, or text and email others – thereby obviously breaking the focus of attention and lowering the loadings for the variable properties of focused encounters. The number of individuals co-present, then, increases the likelihood that the encounter will lose its focus or evolve into a series of smaller encounters.

Density Among Participants and Onlookers to Encounters

When individuals are concentrated in space, this density alone makes them mutually more aware and ready to be responsive to others, unless the norms of unfocused encounters are salient. Density increases the likelihood that individuals will form encounters with those in proximate space, but only if movements of individuals across space are not rapid; when individuals are moving through space, unfocused encounters will form and then recede as individuals move past one another. And, if a focus develops, it generally will be brief, unless those engaged can move in unison and sustain their focus or can shuffle “off the beaten track” from those moving more rapidly through space.

Density of focused encounters increases the monitoring of one's own and others' behaviors so as to avoid *faux pas* or other acts that would require others to sanction negatively a person, who would then need to offer a repair ritual. Density also raises awareness of the broader situation outside any given encounter, leading individuals to monitor what transpires around them and, if possible, to sanction (through, for example, "dirty looks," "stares," and "head shakes") what are seen as inappropriate behaviors for all persons in densely populated spaces. Density thus increases the likelihood that individuals will become aware of, and conform to, the normative expectations of a situation and that they will actively monitor each other's behaviors and be ready to sanction what are perceived to be inappropriate behaviors. Such will be the case for both focused and unfocused encounters. Yet, if there are power differences among individuals and/or those violating norms are members of threatening social categories, monitoring and disapproval may not be communicated for fear of retribution.

Because dense situations increase awareness of self and others, individuals will generally be cognizant of the relevant norms and will play roles and seek status positions that are normatively appropriate. They will also engage in considerably more expressive control and will employ highly ritualized, if not somewhat exaggerated, forms of communication to signal their intentions to act appropriately and to behave in a non-threatening manner. If unfocused encounters are called for, then individuals will work to avoid face engagement with others, but if such engagements become unavoidable, they will be highly ritualized so as to verify their good intentions; and these rituals will be used to quickly break face engagement and bring the encounter back to an unfocused form, unless there are other normatively appropriate reasons for sustaining the focus, as would be the case with acquaintances or friends whom we happen to meet in public. These kinds of encounters are often difficult to navigate because the situation may call for unfocused encounters, but the proximity of "friends" requires some face-to-face talk, but just how much face engagement, and for how long, are always difficult to judge; and indeed, these encounters often activate iterations of closing rituals before successfully shutting the encounter down.

The demography of dense situations, particularly the number of persons co-present, their movements, and their categoric-unit memberships, will affect the degree and nature of focusing among persons. If individuals are of the same categoric unit – e.g., all white or black, male or female, young or old, rich or poor – there will generally be more openness to focusing encounters under conditions of density and mobility of persons through space. If, however, memberships in categoric units are diverse, and especially if some memberships are devalued or correlated with class position in the larger

stratification system, individuals will be less open to focusing interactions in dense spaces, unless they are co-present for a particular activity requiring a common focus of attention, such as a sermon, lecture, or sporting event. Under this condition, the embedding of the dense population of persons in corporate units lodged within institutional domains will, as I will explore in more detail shortly, decrease the tension between members of diverse categorical units. They now have something in common—their focus on a particular person or activity—and this takes them a long way to increasing the loadings for the other variables defining focused encounters—i.e., mutual openness for talk and an emergent sense of solidarity, however temporary. Still, when those with different levels of resources and diverging levels of moral evaluation by virtue of their respective resource shares interact, there is always a potential for a *faux pas*; as a result, the interactions will be tentative and highly ritualized during their initial stages, and once the common focus is lost, the encounter will generally be terminated, often with elaborate verbal rituals in order to avoid giving offense to others. If there is no common focus in the larger environment, the focusing of interaction will be less likely, and if it occurs, it will be highly ritualized and typically short term. Indeed, the focusing will be just sufficiently prolonged to avoid offending social “inferiors” or “superiors.” If the focusing is somehow breached by a *faux pas*, then negative emotional arousal will increase the level of focus but set the stage for conflict, unless appropriate appeasement rituals are offered.

The Organization of Space in Focused Encounters

Physical space is almost always configured in some manner. In more public places, there are typically boundaries, paths for movements, stalls where people can retreat alone or with others, and use-spaces that can be claimed for some instrumental purpose, including a focused encounter. And as noted above, if an encounter occurs within a public place where unfocused encounters dominate among people moving through space, individuals who want to sustain a focused encounter must get out of the way and retreat to a fixed geographical space to keep a focused encounter going.

In addition to partitions in public places, the ecology of an encounter is often composed of physical structures that have been explicitly built to house encounters within corporate units. Thus, most focused encounters are doubly constrained by the physical properties of the structures in which they occur and by the social structure and culture of the corporate unit(s) housed within a physical structure. For example, a suburban house is both an

ecological constraint and a locus of family groups and, by extension, the institution of kinship; an office building is composed of rooms, hallways, elevators, and other spaces where encounters occur but it is also the place where corporate units within institutional domains like economy and government are housed; a school is sets of classrooms, gymnasiums, administrative offices, cafeterias, and other spaces where focused encounters occur but it is also the place where the corporate units forming the institutional domains of education reside, with the culture of specific corporate units and the broader institutional domain constraining what occurs in most spaces within a school structure.

The same can be said for all other physical structures in which corporate units of various institutional domains – e.g., religious, medical, scientific, sport, arts, law – are located. The “meanings” of space are thus very much defined by the culture of an institutional domain – i.e., generalized symbolic medium and the modes of discourse, themes, ideologies, institutional norms, and corporate-unit norms that converge in the space where a focused encounter transpires. As encounters occur in this symbolically charged space, persons evaluate their own actions as well as the actions of others by the culture that, almost literally, impregnates the walls and hallways of the physical spaces occupied by a corporate unit. Indeed, role-identities – e.g., identities as a mother, father, student, worshiper, or worker – within institutional domains are very much on the line as individuals interact within buildings and other physical structures where the corporate units of institutional domains are housed.

The more enclosed is the physical space, the more it is partitioned into fixed territories, the more access to space is limited by status and roles of particular persons in corporate units, the more formal and hierarchical is the division of labor in these units, then the more will the structure and culture of corporate units define what spaces “mean.” Furthermore, all other microdynamic forces – motive-states, normatizing, and emotions – will be constrained by the culture and structure of meso-level sociocultural formations and the macro-level formations in which the encounter is embedded. Ecological space takes most of its meanings, then, from the corporate units that are instantiated in this space. Even public spaces are part of a larger corporate unit, such as a city, with the structure and culture of the city exerting large effects on what these public spaces mean; and the more spaces are identified with institutional domains – e.g., sport, arts, medicine, education, work, politics, religions, etc. – the more constraining is the structure and culture of corporate units in these domains.

Physical space can also take on meanings from categoric units, and the broader stratification system. For example, a “ghetto” is a geographical place

or neighborhood within a corporate unit (i.e., community) where members of a particular ethnic category are over-represented and, if ethnicity is correlated with class position, where members of particular classes predominate. Together, class and ethnicity will constrain the culture and the resulting behaviors of those who enter and structure the flow of interaction in focused encounters in this space. At times one can observe this powerful effect of place as the conduit of class and ethnic cultures when, for example, a person leaves one encounter using rituals, forms of talk, frames, categories, and emotional expressions of an ethnic culture and walks across the street to a place defined as outside the “ghetto,” shifting gears to the culture of a different categoric unit (e.g., student) in a new corporate (e.g., the university). I have observed this phenomenon among students living at home; their encounters with “homies” are conducted in one way, but as they enter the bus that will take them to the university outside their neighborhood, their forms of talk, ritual, emotional expressions, frames, and general demeanor begin to shift to a new culture imposed by the university as a corporate unit and the broader institutional domains of education, or more specifically, higher education. It is changes of place or situational ecology that activates this shift to the tenets of a different culture and corporate structure. Ecological arrangements thus serve as markers that define *which* structural and cultural formations are salient and relevant to the flow of interaction in focused encounters.

The degree of correlation between incumbency in positions of corporate units and memberships in categoric units has significant effects on what transpires in focused encounters. The relative numbers and the degree of differential evaluation of individuals in diverse categoric units will influence the flow of interaction in all focused encounters, but this effect is greatest when there is *consolidation* or high correlation of categoric unit memberships with status and roles played out in the division of labor. When devalued members of categoric units are also over-represented in lower-status positions in the division of labor of corporate units, the effects of status and categoric unit membership are compounded, increasing the inequalities between those members with higher and lower “moral worth” associated with their categoric unit membership and with their higher and lower status in the hierarchy of a corporate unit. Interactions between persons of different status and diffuse status characteristics will, as a result, be stressful and reveal clear patterns of highly ritualized deference and demeanor (Collins 1975; Goffman 1967). If, however, diffuse status characteristics or membership in differentially evaluated categoric units *intersects* with the status order, this lack of correlation will, over iterated encounters, reduce the effects of categoric membership and increase the relative impact of status in the division of labor on what transpires in a focused encounter.

Thus, it is when status and categoric unit membership reinforce differences and inequalities that the demographic characteristics of persons exert the greatest effect on the flow of interaction.

Still, even though the effects of categoric unit membership decline with intersection (as opposed to consolidation) of diffuse status characteristics and status, these effects rarely go away, as the status characteristics literature in social psychology documents. In fact, as the older Gestalt psychological tradition emphasized and as recent research has documented, differences, or what the Gestalt tradition termed *contrast-conception*, appears to be hard-wired into the human neuro-anatomy, with individuals searching for differences and mutually categorizing each other in ways that can persist over iterated interactions in focused encounters (Ridgeway et al. 2009). Even as intersection of status positions with diffuse status characteristics (i.e., memberships in categoric units) works to reduce the influence of the latter on interaction, the effect often persists, depending upon the nature of the encounter. When there is high intersection of incumbency in the division of labor and membership in categoric units, the salience of categoric unit membership will be the least evident in “work-practical” encounters where the focus is on task and the status of individuals in the division of labor, while being most manifest in “social” encounters where task and division of labor are likely to be less salient.

Yet, if encounters are iterated in long chains over time, members of diverse categoric units “get to know one another” and their cultural backgrounds, with the result that membership in categoric units has less and less impact on the flow of interaction in encounters within the divisions of labor of corporate units. The salience of categoric unit memberships declines even more to the extent that intersection occurs across many different types of corporate units in diverse institutional domains (Turner 2002, 2007a, 2010a, 2011). Conversely, as emphasized above, the more consolidation occurs in all corporate units in all institutional domains, the greater is the influence of categoric unit membership on face-to-face interaction. Thus, the degree of intersection or consolidation of categoric unit memberships with the divisions of labor in corporate units lodged in physical structures has very large effects on the interpersonal flow in focused encounters.

Props and their Use in Focused Encounters

Not only is space organized into structures, there are always props distributed within these structures or, as is often the case, props that individuals

are allowed to bring into these structures. The props can be any physical object that individuals use to communicate a line of activity and to present self to others in encounters. Tables, chairs, podiums, benches in public places, microphones, computers, cell phones, ipods, clothing, jewelry, and many other objects are either a part of the space where encounters occur or are the objects that can be carried or worn by individuals entering space. There are always meanings attached to these props. One kind of meaning attached to props is determined by who has the right to use them. For example, students in a classroom are not permitted to use the podium, unless instructed to do so, whereas a professor using the chairs in the classroom would seem strange, unless there is an instrumental reason for doing so. Benches in public places can be used by anyone, but if another is on the bench, elaborately orchestrated ritual requests are required by those seeking permission to sit on this bench. And, if several people are on a bench engaged in a focused encounter, it would generally be considered an affront for someone to ask if they can also sit there. Sometimes props can be used to reserve rights to another prop, as is the case when students put their backpacks and books on a table (thereby reserving it for themselves) before they go to get their coffee or food.

Because props are often attached to physical places and social structures organizing space, they often carry the culture of the corporate units. The podium has a generalized meaning in the broader culture (the right of designated persons in particular status to play out a role using this prop to an audience that is required to be attentive, or at least pretend to be so), but a podium in a university classroom and a pulpit in a church will invoke different cultural symbols. Indeed, like physical structures in general, the podium and the pulpit are much like a cultural lightning rod that pulls meanings from the broader systems of generalized symbolic media, texts, ideologies, and norms for both the person using the prop and those observing this usage. Thus, props and their use are more than mere instrumental tools; they are often markers of the respective status of persons, the roles that they should play, the norms that they can invoke, the motive-states they can mobilize, and the emotions that they can emit in a focused encounter.

This dimension of social reality becomes immediately evident when the wrong person usurps a prop and begins to use it in the wrong way; righteous anger from others often ensues because the moral order has been violated. Indeed, the more a prop defines relative status and roles for diverse individuals in encounters, the greater is its power to influence what occurs, and the more morally infused will this prop become, inviting negative sanctions when used inappropriately. And props that become totems or symbols

of a corporate unit – whether this totem be the cross of a church or the podium of a lecture hall – carry even more morality and, thereby, constrain who can use them in what manner.

Many props are brought to encounters and each will carry meanings about the line that each person is pursuing in a focused encounter. For example, when individuals bring their personal computers to a meeting, this prop signals that the encounter will be more work-practical than social and that the persons booting up are “serious” about getting some work done. The flow of interaction in the encounter will, therefore, be directed by the normative systems invoked by carrying a computer into a meeting. Similarly, backpacks on students, who like snails with a large shell on their back must trudge from class to class with this heavy payload, are signaling something about how “serious” they are as students. Indeed, when I was an undergraduate, I cannot ever remember anyone using a backpack; perhaps a briefcase would communicate a certain seriousness that, in turn, would constrain to some degree the flow of interaction among “serious students” although, in my day, a briefcase-using undergraduate would also have been seen, fairly or unfairly, as a “nerd.” The key point is that for many generations students could function without a backpack; its use is perhaps part of the stylistic equipment denoting the status and role of “student” but at some cost to a young person’s back. Fortunately, backpacks and suitcases on rollers are replacing the backpack (actually on the back) as the new prop, but the question remains: why does so much stuff have to be hauled around? Sometimes inappropriate props are brought into space and must be explained. For instance, I can remember a class in social psychology with Tamotsu Shibutani at the University of California at Santa Barbara in the early 1960s where I would bring a stack of tennis rackets to class because the lecture was right before practice for the tennis team (I preferred my own rackets to those given to the team by sponsors). I felt a bit awkward doing this, and apparently so did professor Shibutani who felt it necessary to offer an explanation for why I brought this load of wood (rackets in those days were wood). Maybe he felt my sense of awkwardness or, more likely, he felt the need to explain why sporting props had been brought to an academic setting. I can only wonder what would have happened had I brought my baseball bats to class, as these are obviously more threatening than a wooden tennis racket. Today, this need to explain would seem strange but classrooms were more formal 50 years ago, and the only acceptable props were notebooks, pencils, pens, and clearly instrumental objects for taking notes. I am tempted to say that students now bring just about everything else to class—scooters, skateboards, ipods, cell phones, computers loaded with games – *except* pencil and paper for taking notes.

In general, the more formal the setting in which a focused encounter occurs and the more it is embedded within a corporate unit, and the more hierarchical is the division of labor within this unit, the more likely are props to have meanings that invoke well-understood norms, texts, generalized symbolic media, and ideologies; and furthermore, the more likely are props to denote the relative status and roles of those participating in an encounter. Props become markers defining rights and how those with varying rights are supposed to behave. Furthermore, the more hierarchical is the division of labor (in terms of authority), the more props in space and props that are brought to the encounter – props like clothing and objects attached to clothing such as badges or any object denoting place in the hierarchy of authority – will serve as markers of status and role prerogatives. Thus, while props are often instrumental and allow for tasks to be accomplished, they are almost always symbolic markers that signal the salience of the relevant culture (generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and norms) and the place of individuals not only in space but as incumbents in positions of corporate units and, at times, as members of categoric units.

As just noted, props also mark memberships in categoric units, thereby making diffuse status characteristics more salient to the flow of interaction in focused encounters. For example, the “gang banger” mode of dress, which in recent years has diffused to a larger mass of young teenage males, was once a marker of membership not only in a “gang” but also of membership in an ethnic categoric unit. When in full display, forms of talk, ritual, emotional expression, and cultural symbols all conformed to the expectations associated with the gang-banging lifestyle. Even today, after widespread diffusion of dress styles and rap/hip hop music to the general population, these markers still have the power to influence how individuals comport themselves. Even college students in my classes, who spend a great deal of time holding up their pants between classes, while admiring their looping chains, act (semi) “tough” and “cool” when in this dress mode. I can only imagine the psychological shock of dressing in chinos and button down shirts to not only their self-conception but also to their demeanor in focused encounters. The recent craze for tattoos among just about everyone is also a rather low-key way of communicating membership in a categoric unit, vaguely defined as being “cool” with overtones of being “semi-bad.” Props such as “boom boxes” once communicated, rather loudly, membership in categoric units, at least until Sony “walkman” and eventually ipods eroded the symbolism of this prop. Thus, the props that adorn a person and that can be viewed as markers of self as well as membership in categoric units can have large effects on the flow of interaction, primarily because they make membership in categoric units highly salient, if not “in your face.”

Yet, these markers in a media driven society—markers like styles of clothing, sun glasses, cars like the Cadillac Escalade, boom boxes, baggy pants, all varieties of chains, and other symbols informing others of categoric unit memberships – can be marketed to non-members of both categoric and corporate units. For instance, the adoption of gang banger dress and the assault on the auditory cortex through loud rap music have been marketed to just about every young person not only in the United States but the world; the result, as the postmodernists often argue, is the loss of coherent meaning to these markers. They no longer denote a discrete category of persons but a behavioral and attitudinal style of those who employ these props. Similarly, the “biker jacket” of groups like the Hell’s Angels has been adopted by many upper middle class “weekend bikers”; indeed, simulations of the “real thing” can be bought at your local Harley–Davidson dealer, if not Macy’s. To some degree, these clothing styles dilute the power of the symbols marking a member of the Hell’s Angels, but they are sufficiently different to communicate that the person wearing the jacket with the emblem on the back is a “biker” (but not a member of Hell’s Angels). Indeed, since I live relatively close to where this biker culture was founded, I still see the real thing, and they look distinctly different than the orthodontist out for a weekend cruise, despite surface similarity in their dress. Still, when corporate units mark themselves symbolically –forming an in-group – they often employ props that can adorn the body. Long before this, of course, corporate units like the military had used uniforms and other body adornments to mark the unit as well as the rank of those within this unit.

Whether marking membership in a categoric unit or incumbency in a corporate unit, the use of these markers affects the flow of interaction. The more props set off individuals from others; and the greater the cultural differences between members of categoric or corporate units and others, the more will focused encounters *within* the categoric-unit or corporate-unit boundaries marked by props requiring distinctive demeanors, forms of talk and address, and rituals to sustain solidarity and boundaries of the group against encroachment from the “outside” world. The more focused encounters are *between* and among members of diverse categoric or corporate units that mark their boundaries with props, the more strained, formal, and ritualized will the flow of interaction be, even after a number of iterations. Props set boundaries and mark differences that are not easily bridged by a few episodes of focused interaction. And if there are large differences in not only the culture but in the resource shares and in definitions of the moral worth of members in different categories and corporate units, the interaction will be doubly strained, with participants aware of the potential for breaches and conflict.

Technological Mediation of Interaction in Focused Encounters

It was not too long ago that *no* focused encounter, except a large public address to an audience, could be mediated by audio and visual technologies. Even 50 years ago, a “conference call” on the telephone was not possible, but obviously technologies allow for individuals to have both visual and audio communication at long distances. In some ways, these “encounters” are like a simulation of a real face-to-face interaction where bodies are co-present because, even with the best technologies, much of the needed visual information is lost by the limitations of the technology itself but also by lack of physical co-presence where one can simultaneously read “body language” of all individuals and where body synchronization (along with emotional entrainment) can more readily occur. The result is that the encounters lack the rhythmic synchronization of talk and body of a true face-to-face interaction (Collins 2004). Indeed, they are often typified by individuals talking over each other and by awkward pauses in turn-taking, punctuated by ritual apologies for minor breaches of interpersonal etiquette. In fact, most participants are stiff and awkward. When encounters of two persons or more are conducted only on the audio sense modality alone, problems in sustaining the interpersonal flow are even greater. Without the visual modality, it is difficult to read emotions of multiple others and to see precisely when someone is clearing the verbal track for another speaker. If it were possible to trade the sound on the audio track for the visual track, it would be much easier to get a sense for at least the emotional content of the interaction and, hence, to understand the rhythmic flow of talk among participants. What keeps a focused encounter on track and in rhythm, then, is visual cues; and humans have very fine-grained visual senses that can pick up nuanced emotional states that cannot be communicated by vocal cues alone.

When mediated encounters are not clearly embedded in a corporate unit, which provides the relevant culture and structure, they become particularly difficult. With embedding, individuals have at least a relatively clear idea of the positions of participants, the roles they are supposed to be playing, the relevant ideologies and symbolic media for talk and discourse, and the norms regulating the form of talk, frames, rituals, and emotions. Without embedding, the footing for an encounter will have to be constructed on-the-ground, and without co-presence of participants, it becomes difficult to sustain the encounter on a firm footing. If we look at individuals today as they gab on their cell phones, most now with cameras, we can see that a great deal of communication occurs through technological mediation. Add to direct cell

phone contact among persons various web-based forums, and it would appear that mediated encounters are relatively easy. But, if we examine how these encounters actually proceed, there are texting conventions that allow sequential talk, sometimes accompanied by a visual posting. Still, even the most vigorous efforts at technologically mediated communication do not typically allow for *simultaneous reading* of the verbal and non-verbal gestures of all participants; communication is more sequential than simultaneous, which dramatically limits how focused the interaction can become. In fact, these mediated encounters are very weak focused encounters. For instance, I once asked one of my texting granddaughters why she just didn't phone the person to whom she was texting; and she replied: "That would be too much work." And, this from someone intensely moving thumbs across a tiny keyboard. Or, my older, college-age granddaughter who visited during Christmas and spent most the night writing her "friends" from her college on the computer, when asked why she did not use the Skype function so that she and her friends could all talk at once, replied that this would be too much work at night. What she was telling me is that a truly focused encounter involves a full mobilization of the senses – vision and hearing, and perhaps touch – and that such mobilization required a great deal of energy expended through rituals, expressive control of voice and body, and many other dynamics of focused encounters. In Goffman's (1959, 1967) terms, focused encounters are on the front stage, while mediated encounters are often conducted on back stages where self-presentation visually and even verbally do not have to be so carefully orchestrated or choreographed. These are, then, simulations of real focused encounters (at least by Goffman's definition); and while they do not have the same power to engage individuals, they are easier and, in many ways, more relaxing. They simply do not require the level of effort of truly focused encounters among co-present individuals, but at the same time, they allow for individuals to sustain social relations that are important to them.

There is, then, a liminal region between focused and unfocused encounters that has emerged with communication technologies. Mediated encounters are toward the focused end of the spectrum, but they do not have the power of full face and body engagements. Like all focused encounters, they work best when embedded in corporate units – from friendship groups through family groupings to workplaces – where the structure and culture of the corporate unit provide the needed footing that is difficult to create or sustain when bodies are not physically co-present. At a minimum, knowing the status, appropriate roles, and normative expectations for others facilitates the flow of interaction. Yet, even with this footing provided by nesting in corporate units, the flow and rhythm of the encounter can be difficult to

sustain, particularly when more than two people are talking. There will be stops and starts, talk-overs', interruptions, ritual apologies, and other problems in conversational turn-taking; and the emergent "we feeling" will be difficult to generate without the capacity to establish a synchronized flow of talk and the ability to read emotional states through fine-grained role-taking that relies upon seeing face and body.

These problems are compounded by technologically mediated conversations among members of different categoric units, whether the parameter for inclusion be age, ethnicity, gender, or any other parameter that differentiates individuals. And, if there are high levels of inequality in resources and in definitions of moral worth attached to members of categoric units, mediated encounters can be even more difficult to keep on track, unless the encounter is focused on work-practical issues. Encounters with high social content are particularly difficult because of the vast differences in cultures, forms of talk, and resources of diverse participants. The result is that members of differentially evaluated categoric units spend a great deal of time trying to gain a common footing in the encounter, and this problem is aggravated by the lack of actual face-to-face body engagement where emotional cues can be read visually and where rhythmic synchronization is easier to accomplish. Over a phone, interaction will be stilted, ritualized, and instrumental, but it will generally not evolve into greater levels of focus because it is difficult to activate the other defining elements of focused encounters through technologically mediated interaction among individuals at some distance from each other, and especially so when the individuals are from differentiated categoric units.

Ecological and Demographic Dynamics in Unfocused Encounters

Why Unfocused Encounters are Important in Micro- and Macro-level Theorizing

Erving Goffman's (1963, 1971) analysis of behavior in public drew attention to unfocused encounters, in which individuals are aware of each other's presence, mutually reading each other's gestures as they occupy or move through space, and adjusting behaviors so as *to avoid* face engagement or contact. This analysis of unfocused encounters has taken a back seat to his theorizing on focused encounters, but a moment's reflection reveals how important unfocused encounters are in large-scale societies. People understand

rules of non-engagement in physical space as much as they know how to behave toward others in focused encounters; and the scale of societies would be highly constrained if individuals could not avoid focusing the interaction when in each other's presence. Interaction is still occurring in unfocused encounters because individuals are adjusting their behaviors in response to the each other's movements and in reference to relevant norms. The fact that people can do so, and even in crowded situations move about without bumping into each other is, indeed, a remarkable achievement for animals that evolved in very small-scale groupings.

As Richard Machalek (1992) has documented, macro societies are rather rare in the animal world; and humans with their relatively large bodies are the only species of mammals that can create and sustain themselves in macro societies of many millions of individuals. There are reasons why macro societies are difficult to sustain, including the body size of their potential inhabitants, the availability of resources to support large populations (especially with large body plans), and the costs relative to the fitness-enhancing benefits of organizing in large populations. There are also sociological constraints on species that would organize into large populations. Individuals must be divided into distinct categories; they must be able play roles in divisions of labor and then integrate their labor; and they must be able to engage in impersonal contact and cooperation. Given these various constraints and limitations, it is perhaps not so surprising that macro societies are rather rare.

The social insects are, of course, the best example of a macro society. Like insects, humans can create macro societies because they are able to divide their labor, categorize each other, and engage in impersonal contacts. Part of this capacity involves the ability to occupy crowded spaces with many bodies engaged in unfocused encounters, where people monitor each other but avoid face engagements that would tend to pull them into a focused encounter. Insects accomplish this needed impersonality through genetically based bioprogrammers that push different categories of insects to play predetermined roles within the large colony (although, when needed, some insects can morph new roles and even body types, whereas humans do so through cultural symbols and social structures). Without the ability to assemble in larger spaces and move about without making personal contact, the scale of human societies would have remained small.

As I have argued, humans are not as naturally social as many presume because we are, in essence, evolved apes who have a preponderance of weak to strong ties (Turner 2000a; Turner and Maryanski 2008; Maryanski and Turner 1992). In fact, as will become clear, it is much more difficult for humans to forge strong bonds in focused encounters than it is to go out in public and move freely about without making personal contact with others.

Even when there is some personal contact, as is the case when an individual pays a cashier in a store, the amount of real face engagement is very low, with customer and clerk playing assigned roles and mutually categorizing each other and the situation as one where impersonality dominates, although clerks and cashiers are trained to “act friendly.” The reason that a whole book on the microdynamics is even necessary is that focused encounters among humans are not only complicated but also difficult to create and sustain for long periods. As evolved apes, we are not programmed to create cohesive social structures, but our evolutionary history is one where our hominin ancestors were forced to do so, or die. But below the patina of “sociality” is a species that is generally comfortable in impersonal interactions in crowded places; and moreover, our ape ancestry for weak ties enables us to easily move through chains of unfocused encounter, whereas we must work rather hard to sustain a focused encounters.

I do not want to go too far in developing this theme (see Turner 2000, 2002, 2007), but it is important to understand how easily humans can do something that most other animals cannot: engage in coordinated *impersonal* interactions with *categories of others* in complex *divisions of labor*. Without this ability, for better or worse, large scale human societies could not be forged. Humans did not evolve in such societies, but when population growth forced this adaptation, our ape ancestry represented a pre-adaptation. Indeed, apes became weak-tie animals because they had to adapt to marginal niches in the arboreal habitat where groups could not be sustained (Maryanski 1988; Maryanski and Turner 1992); the result was for natural selection to reprogram apes to be weak-tie animals who forged no permanent groupings. Community or home range of many square miles is the natural social structure for an evolved ape; groups and encounters are rarely enduring. Thus, the very traits that humans carry in their genome for weak ties and fluid groups represented a necessary adaptation away *from even* micro societies and the focused encounters in them, and ironically, these very traits allow us to forge macro societies. We can do so because humans have little difficulty moving about space filled with strangers, entering and leaving bureaucratized corporate units of all kinds, seeing each other as representatives of categories, most importantly for my purposes in these pages, engaging both focused and unfocused interactions.

Thus, unfocused encounters are not a tangential line of inquiry; they are the key to creating and sustaining macro societies. Much of our daily life consists of unfocused encounters, revolving around walking down streets, driving the freeways, moving across plazas, strolling in parks and shopping malls, standing in elevators, sitting in lobbies and waiting rooms, standing in lines, and many other situations where unfocused encounters occur.

We can approach the ecology of unfocused encounters with the same topical headings as focused encounters – that is, juxtaposition and movement of bodies, density of bodies, props, organization of space, and mediated technologies. All of these properties of ecology have large effects on behaviors of individuals. However, as will become evident in the chapters to follow, the valences of microdynamic forces in unfocused encounters are very different from those in focused encounters; and even when unfocused encounters are embedded in corporate and categoric units, these differences remain. Indeed, ecology and demography as social forces are generally more significant in unfocused than focused encounters, because in the latter the forces of status, roles, motivational need-states, and emotions generally dominate the flow of interaction. Among the microdynamic forces, normatization, coupled with ecology and demography, register relatively high valences in unfocused encounters compared to the other microdynamic forces.

Juxtaposition of Bodies and Movement in Unfocused Encounters

In unfocused encounters bodies are to be aligned in ways that allow subtle monitoring of the actions of others without face-to-face engagement. When individuals move through space, there are general rules that sustain this kind of alignment: Keep as much distance as the organization of space allows, pass to the right (at least in most cultures), and be ready to offer highly ritualized apologies involving little face work for movements that “cut off” others, lead to body collisions, or force others to deviate from their intended path. When individuals must stand together in space – as is the case when waiting in line or collectively observing some activity – there are additional rules that vary by culture. In general, except for those closest to one’s body, efforts should be made to avoid focus, unless others are so close as to require some form of ritualized comment that informs others that one is not a threat. In some cultures, close proximity of bodies leads to more focused but highly stylized and ritualized talk, whereas in other cultures, such talk is not considered appropriate. For example, Americans are among the most talkative people on earth, it appears, picking up conversations with those who are proximate in space, whereas in other societies, such as the Netherlands (a densely populated society), such talk is discouraged, even ritual greetings when passing another on a walking or bike path. Indeed, at the beginning of my year at the Netherland’s Institute for Advanced Study in 1984, I was initially insulted when American-style ritual greetings to others on walking

paths were met with frowns and clear negative sanctions; later, I came to appreciate the ease of movement without having to exhibit even the slightest face engagement. In fact, on returning home, I recall being overwhelmed at the airport terminal by the constant and, to me, rather loud chatter of Americans sitting in the crowded waiting room. I had come to prefer the lack of focus because it involved so much less effort, and moreover, it made life more peaceful. This was, of course, all before the invention and distribution of cell phones (more on this below), whose users often force others to listen to one-half of a semi-focused conversation.

Erving Goffman (1963a) emphasized the importance of “demeanor cues” to others when moving or standing in space also occupied by others. One class of cues is what Goffman termed *orientation cues* in which individuals signal to others that they are engaged in appropriate activities at the present time and place; another class of cues revolved around *circumspection* or the willingness to avoid encroachment on, or to pose a threat to, others; a third set involved *overplays* or exaggerated gestures to signal to others that one is in control of their actions and is not *under duress* (e.g., the elaborate looking back at whatever object a person may have tripped over to signal to others that the stumble was not a lack of self control but the result of an external object).

Goffman also emphasized that when bodies are juxtaposed, there are normatively appropriate *territories of self* which, depending upon the distribution of bodies, space, and props, are what individuals can claim as the proper spacing of self from others. There are many potential territories of self, including: (1) *egocentric preserves* or areas of non-encroachment that can be claimed by persons as they move in space; (2) *personal spaces* that can be claimed and that others are not to violate under any circumstances; (3) *possessional territory* or objects identified with self and arrayed around a person’s body; (4) *informational preserves* or the facts about a person that is to be controlled and regulated by self in public places; (5) *conversational preserves* or the right to control who can summon and talk to an individual; (6) *fixed geographical spaces* that are attached to a person and that must be honored by others; (7) *stalls* or bounded places that an individual can temporarily claim; (8) *turns* or claims on receiving something in a given sequence relative to others in a situation; and (9) *use-spaces* that can be claimed as an individual engages in some appropriate instrumental activity.

These territories of self are normatively regulated and allow individual bodies to sustain claims to space and to warn others about breaches to these claims. The rights of individuals to territories of self and to the underlying norms that regulate these claims are typically made visible by what Goffman (1963, 1971) termed *markers*. These markers denote the type of territory

claimed (1–9 above), the extent of its boundary, and the duration of the claim. Violation of markers and the underlying rights to positioning of one's body relative to others represents an encroachment upon self; and the stronger is the right being asserted, the more intense will the emotional reaction be when these rights are violated, often to the point of creating a public breach which immediately focuses the encounter and floods it with negative emotions. Thus, because these territorial claims are extensions of self, and because individuals are motivated to verify and sustain self in all situations, they invite more intense emotions than might be expected when someone inadvertently cuts another off, butts in line, or enters someone's "personal space." As ego extensions, the territories of self are packed with emotions, and when markers are clear to all, their violation is a breach to the moral order governing the unfocused encounter.

Once the encounter becomes focused around the breach, the potential for conflict increases dramatically, unless the person or persons violating territorial claims offer a highly ritualized apology (revolving around some combination of expressions of chagrin, clarification that proper conduct is understood, and disavowal and rejection of the behaviors that have led to a violation of norms about territories of self). Often it is also necessary to offer *an account* for the breach, which will involve an explanation for why the breach occurred (ignorance of rules, unusual circumstances, unmindfulness, temporary incompetence). When a violation of territories of self is inevitable or, for some reason, must occur, individuals will often make highly ritualized *requests* that ask for the license to do something that might otherwise be considered a violation of a norm or the territory of another. Requests to sit on a bench that has been claimed by another, to ask for the time, to ask if a table can be shared, and many other movements inside the territories claimed by others are also accompanied by highly ritualized phrases and non-threatening vocal and body demeanor.

Membership in categoric units always affects the dynamics revolving around territories of self. To take obvious examples, young children are allowed to violate these territories whereas older children are not; the territories of self are very different for men and women; members of devalued (however unfairly) ethnic subpopulations will evidence wider territories of self *vis-à-vis* more valued ethnics; or higher-class persons have in some societies more latitude in invading the territories of self of lower-class persons, if they choose to do so. As a general proposition, the more valued and worthy are members of a categoric unit, the more they can sustain their territories of self and command others to offer accounts and apologies for violation and to use highly ritualized and deferential requests for any necessary movement inside the membrane defining a valued person's territory of self.

Conversely, members of devalued categoric units have less claim to their territories of self, although devaluation, *per se*, will generally keep others at bay. Moreover, when devalued categories are also low in resource shares distributed by the stratification system, they will often present “threatening” demeanors that allow them to maintain their territories of self. Still, the very fact that they must exhibit diffuse hostility to others suggests that they feel vulnerable to violations of self by the actions of higher-status persons in more valued categoric units. Thus, as individuals move in space and adjust the position of their bodies, members of different categoric units can normatively claim somewhat different territories of self, while those in devalued categories will need to work harder than members of more valued categories in maintaining their territories of self. And, when territories of self are violated, members of devalued categories are expected to offer more elaborate apologies, accounts, and requests than those in valued categories, while moving the interaction more rapidly back to an unfocused state.

To avoid the focusing of an encounter, as inevitably occurs when accounts, apologies, or requests are used, there are typically *pre-packaged rituals* available for offering any of these without extensive face engagement or emotional involvement; and if the transgression is minor, accounts and apologies can be offered and accepted with virtually no real focusing of the encounter. Moreover, there are also norms – and rituals reinforcing these norms – that allow for the positioning of bodies in ways that restrict face engagement and, hence, that allow individuals to avoid breaches in the first place, thereby also avoiding the need to offer accounts, apologies, or requests. Again, the power of these norms will vary by the moral worth and evaluation of diverse categoric units; the more inequality in the resources and evaluations of diverse categoric units, the more those with few resources and devalued diffuse status characteristics must abide by the norms and employ the rituals that enable them to avoid accounts, apologies, and requests. Indeed, low-resource and devalued categories of persons will be motivated to do so in order to avoid the high emotional costs of offering elaborated and ritualized accounts, apologies, and request to higher-ranking categories of persons.

However, the very etiquette inhering in norms and rituals maintaining the public order are often deliberately violated, without offering accounts, apologies, or requests. Such violations are most likely to occur when members of devalued categoric units evidence diffuse aggression over their plight, which is then displaced in the public sphere where the fragile public order is sustained by the norms and rituals of etiquette. For a time, unless formal agents of social control intervene, individuals can violate territories of self for many others by being noisy and threatening; and if others “fight

back,” the situation can quickly degenerate into highly focused conflict (Collins 2000). Thus, the norms governing body positioning and movements in unfocused encounters can become targets for others to gain situational power, however temporarily, by disrupting the ecology of public places; and they can often “get away” with such behavior because most people, most of the time are working to maintain a lack of focus by following the implicit but still well understood rules of etiquette in public places.

When unfocused encounters become embedded in meso-level categoric units and the more inclusive system of stratification in a society, they are highly vulnerable to deliberate disruption. It is for this reason that embeddedness in differentially valued categoric units makes individuals highly aware of differences and the potential threats inhering in these differences, especially with differences tied to inequalities. Unfocused encounters are always fragile because they depend upon monitoring without focus and on implicit norms and ritual procedures to sustain the lack of focus. Any breach of space and violations of territories of self and body juxtaposition will focus the encounters around negative emotional energy.

Density Among Participants and Onlookers to Unfocused Encounters

High levels of density among bodies always increase monitoring among not only those engaged in unfocused encounters but also among those observing encounters. As emphasized earlier, density always escalates self-awareness *vis-à-vis* others; indeed, one of the most important pieces of information that individuals seek in densely populated situations is how well both focused and unfocused encounters are going. Are focused encounters removed from the routes of movement by others? Are individuals able to sustain the lack of focus as they move about? To what degree are individuals forced to focus what would normally be an unfocused encounter? What are the implicit norms governing situations of density, and what ritual practices would be necessary for breaches of these norms? What territories of self and ritual practices for sustaining these are relevant for different categories of others?

Experiences with a wide variety of public places generally allows individuals to answer such questions; and if encounters are embedded in corporate and categoric units, the normative expectations from both these units and the larger macro structures (institutional domains and stratification systems) and their cultures (generalized symbolic media, ideologies, meta-ideologies, norms) can be used to understand expectations at the micro level and the

appropriate procedures for meeting these expectations and for repairing breaches. For example, crowds at a football or baseball game will often break the lack of focus because they share totemic “worship” of their respective teams. I have found that just wearing a piece of clothing denoting my team loyalties is sufficient for people to initiate a more focused encounter. We are seen as worshipping the same totem, and so norms make it acceptable to initiate encounters, with the duration of the focus depending upon the responsiveness of those who have been drawn in to a focused situation. Moreover, both focused and unfocused encounters revolving around totems will generally reduce the salience of categoric unit membership in how individuals comport themselves since focus is on the totem and the social reality that it makes “sacred” rather than on the level of moral worth of members in categoric units. In contrast, people rarely come up to each other as strangers in shopping malls because these encounters are embedded in the economic as opposed to sport institutional domain, and hence, the ideologies of the economy and the role “shoppers” in corporate units – ranging from the entire mall to each individual store – are very different from the ideology of the institutional domain of sport and from the role of “fan” requiring collective effervescence (toward team totems and heroes) in the Durkheimian mode (Durkheim 1912 [1965]). Thus, depending upon *where* density occurs, the normative expectations can shift dramatically. Compare, for instance, density in a mall, sport arena, religious or political rally, university campus, public park, and other basic situations where density can increase; the expectations for sustaining a lack of focus, for when focus can be activated, and repairing breaches will be very different. In all of these cases, however, there will be a high level of monitoring of self and others to determine the expectations and procedures for increasing or decreasing the degree of focus and unfocus. Individuals will monitor those in the immediate vicinity as well as those in more remote places to see what rules apply along the focused-unfocused continuum.

In highly dense situations where territories of self are difficult to sustain, individuals will focus just enough to communicate ritually that they are unable to honor territories of self. These ritualized accounts coupled with the implied apology, will be ritually acknowledged, with the encounter moving back to a higher level of unfocus, unless the party or parties receiving the initial account prolong the focus. Thus, whether or not focusing of an unfocused encounter persists depends upon the responses of those receiving accounts, apologies, or requests; the burden, in essence, shifts to the person receiving the account to decide to open the door to more focus or to close this door and seek a return to unfocus. At any moment in highly dense situations, individuals are at the ready to offer accounts, apologies, or

pre-emptive requests to sustain the public order, and unless the breach of normative expectations has been deliberate, others are also ready to acknowledge these with ritualized responses.

The more diverse are the categoric units to which people belong in unfocused encounters, the more ready are individuals able to deal with any breach with an account, apology, or request. Differences always pose threats, and especially differences revolving around inequalities in the distribution of resources among members of diverse categoric units; class and especially ethnic markers of categoric unit membership will typically arouse heightened monitoring and rituals-at-the-ready because of the implicit recognition of threats and tensions that always inhere in inequalities. In fact, individuals from very different categoric units will, if forced into focus, go out of their way to sustain the focus ritually in order to assure and be assured that self and others are non-threatening. During these episodes of focus under conditions of density, the very crowding of the situation will be almost like a totem that all parties can acknowledge and use as a footing for informal talk; and the longer such talk proceeds, the less threatening parties are to each other. The problem with these types of footings, of course, is when to break focus without being rude or insulting others, especially when the parties involved are members of differentially evaluated categoric units.

The Organization of Space in Unfocused Encounters

There are clear normative expectations for how focus is to be maintained within the structures that organize space. In large public places, the rules of density outlined above generally apply, but in more confined spaces, there are general norms for sustaining *a lack of* focus within the elements of physical structures like hallways, lobbies, waiting rooms, and elevators. When alone, individuals are to avoid eye contact and to sit, stand, or move in particular ways. For example, the norm in American society for elevators is that, with each new person entering, those in the elevator should move to the “farthest neutral corner” in order to make room for newcomers and to avoid face engagement; and there is an implicit rule that the more densely populated the elevator, the less individuals should talk (since obviously others are pulled into their focus) – a rule that is often violated but still irritating to those trying to sustain a lack of focus. A similar rule applies to cell-phone talk, but this rule is often violated as well, but still, most individuals consider such behavior rude (although this reaction may be generational with the younger generation, who has grown up talking on cell phones, being far less

distracted by hearing one side of somewhat focused encounter). In lobbies and waiting rooms, individuals are to sit and/or stand apart, until the room is filled; and then, with ritual requests, individuals will sit and stand closer to each other. In hallways, individuals follow, literally, “the rules of the road” in their country, staying to one side, waiting to make turns across traffic, and avoiding eye contact. If eye contact is expected in a building where people know each other, the greetings will be perfunctory; and indeed, if individuals must pass each other many times during the course of the day, the greetings may cease because they are unnecessary and because focus consumes time and energy.

There are also rules about how individuals must comport themselves with specific types of organized spaces. In general, the more recreational and social are the organized spaces where individuals must congregate, the more relaxed are norms about face engagement. And, if individuals must crowd together in a line or in a room that is simply too small, more face engagements and highly ritualized focused encounters can emerge, but these will be abandoned once individuals can begin to move away from others or leave this space. The more instrumental is the organization of space – particularly spaces designed for what Goffman and later Randall Collins termed *work-practical activity* – the more individuals will remain unfocused, unless the nature of the work-practical activity requires individuals to focus their encounters. The more the organization of space is designed for ceremonial activities (e.g., a church), the more the focus is on the key actors in the ceremony and the more unfocused are all other encounters among individuals in proximate space.

When space is organized for the activities by individuals who are frequently co-present and who, periodically, must engage in focused encounters, the expectations for how to comport self over the course of a day can be ambiguous. Initial encounters typically involve a greeting ritual; and depending upon the legacy of the focused encounters among the individuals involved and, of course, their level of mutual liking, the rituals will be short or elaborated. The greeting rituals will, as noted above, decline in focus and effervescence over time, unless there is the need to refocus the encounter for some instrumental or ceremonial reason. Also, when there are differences of power and authority among individuals, the subordinate will need to follow the superordinates person’s lead in greeting rituals to determine if focus is to be sustained. For a subordinate to push for focus, beyond a ritual greeting, with a superordinate will often be viewed as violating expectation states for individuals with different levels of authority.

Thus, the more unfocused encounters occur within a corporate unit revealing a division of labor and hierarchy of authority, the more will the

relative status of individuals determine *how* unfocused encounters will be. Any corporate unit is also lodged within an institutional domain, and so, the generalized symbolic medium of discourse and exchange as well as the ideology and institutional norms built from this medium will also generate expectations for unfocused encounters, just as embedding does for focused encounters. Thus, the nature and degree of unfocus encounters in the workplace (the economic domain), school (education), museum (art), laboratory (science), church (religion), courtroom (law), government offices (polity), gym/arena/stadium (sport), hospital (medicine), and other domains will vary somewhat depending on the culture of the domain in which any given encounter is embedded. Yet, there are expectations for generic patterns of organized space – hallways, elevators, lobbies, and the like – that can be utilized in all situations, but each corporate unit with an institutional domain organizes some elements of space in unique ways.

In a media society, individuals can learn the implicit rules for sustaining a lack of focus in a wide variety of institutional domains and, then when needed, act in accordance with the appropriate expectations. Most individuals, for example, have never been to court, but it would be hard not to know the general rules for both focused and unfocused court-house encounters in a society where the media are filled with “law and order” entertainment. More difficult are arenas where individuals may not fully know the rules, such as walking through an art gallery, where the guards monitoring each room must at times remind individuals of rule, such as not standing too close to, or touching, the art. The focus is to be on the art, but a certain distance is to be maintained, and individuals are to avoid face engagements. Even when individuals remark on the art, the focus is not intense nor does it last long, as each person sustains attention on the art rather than on each other (I would thus hypothesize that an art gallery is not the best place to “pick up” a date). Typically, even though some generalized public behaviors are appropriate for most socially and physically structured spaces, the unique elements of spaces may lead individuals to act tentatively and to monitor movements, body positionings, forms of talk, and other elements of encounters carefully so as to pick up on the appropriate behaviors for sustaining unfocus and, if necessary or if by chance, for navigating through periodic focusing of encounters.

In many physical structures, there are partitions of space, such as meeting rooms or assembly halls, that are explicitly intended to be used for focused encounters. At times, however, individuals are included in the liminal space around these focused encounters but they are not supposed to become explicitly a part of the focus of attention; instead, they are to “observe” and “listen.” Sometimes they are introduced in a highly ritualized manner and then

expected to recede “into the woodwork,” not actively participating in the encounter. Nor are these marginalized individuals to form focused encounters with their counterparts who are also sitting on the sidelines. At times, these individuals can be drawn by a participant into the encounter by, for instance, a request for information, but once this information is provided, the focus is to be abandoned. Often, there are periodic breaks in the focused encounter, with individuals migrating out to hallways or moving about a meeting room or adjourning for a time to another room where less instrumental activity occurs (or seems to occur); here the rules are often ambiguous as to how much the sideline observers are to engage the main participants in focused encounters. They may feel most comfortable huddling amongst themselves in semi-focused encounters, and yet a few will often seek to engage the main participants in a focused encounter, often employing rather elaborate deference rituals to cover for any potential breach of etiquette. These kinds of situations are quite common in large corporate units with complex and hierarchical divisions of labor in which it is necessary to assemble diverse incumbents from different positions in this division of labor; and they can be highly stressful for both super- and subordinates because of the ambiguity of what assembling them in rooms “means” for how they are to comport themselves. What level of focus for what duration of time and in what room or place can be established? When must unfocus be maintained, and when can it be eased? What behaviors would lead to a breach of etiquette? Over time these questions will be answered as encounter is iterated, generating clear expectations that reduce the stress on individuals. But, in these types of ambiguous situations, achieving the right balance between focused and unfocused encounters in corporate units revealing inequalities in divisions of labor can be difficult, despite the fact that embeddedness generally makes most expectations clear.

When physical space is organized so that memberships in differentially valued categoric units are correlated with distinct places in space, the dynamics of both focused and unfocused encounters become more complex and often difficult for individuals to navigate. For example, if all reception desks are occupied by women, focus will follow expectation states associated with gender and with the relative status of incumbents in positions with corporate units, but what of meetings in less focused situations, such as riding elevators, forming lines at the cafeteria, passing in the hallway, gathering in the coffee room, and other situations outside the reception area? What is the appropriate level of focus or unfocus in these situations? Because of this ambiguity, greeting rituals in such situations will be highly stylized and perfunctory in order to communicate respect and to move rapidly to an unfocused encounter, unless the *superordinate* in this encounter seeks to

sustain focus. The more that space is organized in a manner that correlates with memberships in differentially valued categoric units, then, the more ambiguous are the expectations for how to maintain focus and what to do when focus is inevitable. If, however, membership in categoric units is correlated with the positions in the division of labor in a corporate unit, some of the ambiguity about categoric unit memberships is mitigated by the respective locations of individuals in the status order of the corporate unit.

Thus, the more physical structures correlate with locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units, the more the expectation states attached to status will determine the expectations for demeanor in both focused and unfocused encounters, thus taking some of the ambiguity that often accompanies efforts to achieve the right balance between focus and unfocus. If memberships in diverse categoric units are associated with place in physical structures, and if interactions are among members of the same categoric unit, then expectations for members of categoric units or diffuse status characteristics can facilitate establishing the conditions for unfocus and focus, but if members of diverse categoric units must “mix” in space, there will be some ambiguity over whether the expectations about space or about membership in categoric units should dominate how individuals sustain unfocused encounters. Much of this ambiguity is eliminated when positions in the divisions of labor establish expectation states that, in essence, trump all other considerations. In fact, the more expectations from the status locations in the division of labor in corporate units dominate, the more likely is focus, when it occurs, to revolve around attention on the goals of the corporate unit.

Still, even when such is the case, there will always be some uncertainty until encounters have been iterated with sufficient frequency that a set of amalgamated expectations (among categoric unit membership and positions in the divisions of labor) for how unfocus should be created or abandoned within the structure of physical space. Embeddedness is, therefore, crucial to resolving the uncertainties that often confront individuals navigating physical structures.

Props and their Use in Unfocused Encounters

Physical props in space operate somewhat differently in unfocused compared to focus encounters. They are less likely to operate as markers and totems reinforcing individuals’ status and rights in focused encounters; rather props communicate individuals’ rights to use physical objects to sustain *a lack of* focus. The territories of self are marked by persons’

possessing, often temporarily, objects that entitle them to be, in essence, “left alone.” For instance, a person working with a computer in a crowded place like an airport is also claiming the right to work uninterrupted; another person sitting in the middle of a bench in public (rather than at one of its ends) communicates a request to privacy and unfocus; a person who places books and papers on a chair or table in a the library or cafeteria is closing off access to others; a person wearing dark glasses indoors communicates much the same (or, alternatively, that they are “cool,” perhaps too cool to be approached for a focused encounter); and a person texting is not to be interrupted; and a person talking (often too loudly) communicates that he or she is occupied while, ironically, allowing everyone to listen to one side of a mediated focused encounter). There are, then, certain props in public places signaling that encounters are to remain unfocused, unless others offer highly elaborate and stylized rituals (requests) to penetrate the invisible but still powerful membrane that separates individuals in unfocused encounters. To ask for the time, for instance, can involve such an elaborate ritual as “sorry to bother you, but would you have the time?,” accompanied by non-threatening voice inflections and body demeanor.

Props marking demographic features of unfocused encounters, particularly differences in categoric unit memberships, become particularly important in unfocused encounters when the status order in the division of labor of a corporate unit is not available as a default marker. And, when categoric unit memberships do not correlate with locations in the division of labor and when those present in a situation come from highly diverse categoric units, individuals will monitor the movements and positioning of those in these differentially evaluated categoric units. Props such as dress, body adornments, mutilations (such as tattoos), hair styling, and other markers of categoric unit membership will become critical to anticipating the responses of others and to the ritual practices employed if breaches to the unfocused encounter occur. The more inequality in the definitions of moral worth and resource shares of categoric-unit members, the more intense will be the monitoring of the activities of “others.” And, the more will individuals be ready to offer ritualized apologies, accounts, and requests if focus is likely to occur, unless those in devalued categories exploit the norms of unfocused etiquette as a means to release diffuse hostility (Collins 2000).

Thus, there are basic classes of objects that serve as markers of unfocus: (1) those that adorn self (e.g., dark glasses, cell phones, computers, notebooks, books), (2) those that define a use-space that can be claimed temporarily (e.g., benches or tables), (3) those that define a stall or place that can be occupied without interruption (e.g., alcoves, empty rooms, phone booths, if available anymore), (4) those that define status in relevant corporate units

(dress, uniforms, badges), and (5) those that denote membership in categoric units (dress, hair styling, mutilations of body, adornments to body). Requests to violate the membrane signaled by these props must be, as noted above, highly ritualized; apologies for having breached the membrane must also be elaborate and reek of sincerity, and accounts for having violated the space of another must seem plausible. Props as markers generally remove ambiguity about *when* a situation is in an unfocused mode so that requests, apologies, and accounts are not necessary, but in order to repair the moral order, it is also critical that there be normatively regulated ritual procedures when a marker of unfocus must be violated by intent or accident.

Technologically Mediation of Unfocused Encounters

In contrast to focused encounters, technology typically serves as a prop signaling to others a lack of focus. Public transportation, for instance, generally signals that those sitting in seats or standing have rights to privacy; indeed, ever since they stopped serving meals on airplanes – which generate opportunities for normatively acceptable interaction with seat mates who are crushed together – most flights that I have taken recently have not generated a word of conversation with those sitting next to me – except the ritual request to have me vacate my aisle seat so that those in my row can go to the bathroom. Similarly, use of technology – e.g., computers, cell phones – communicates a lack of focus to observers (because of the focused state with others on the other end of the line), and in this sense act like the membranes of focused encounters. Thus, technology does not so much serve as a means for mediating an encounter across a greater expanse of space but, instead, typically operates as yet one more class of markers signaling to others that unfocus is to be maintained. And, some classes of technology serve as markers of categoric unit memberships, as is the case when young children play with their gameboys, teenagers text their friends, adults boot up their computers and yak into their cell phones (again too loudly). The lack of communication technologies can also serve as a reverse prop, as is the case with someone who is poor not having the technology with which to adorn themselves. Indeed, one of the reasons that technologies sweep through stratified populations is because, in a market society, even those in categories typified as poor can purchase markers of affluence – e.g., ipods, cell phones, and video game players. These are not only valued in their own right for their functions, but they are doubly valued because they can be used as markers of claims to more moral worth and status.

Elementary Principles on the Ecology and Demography of Encounters

5. The more individuals in a focused encounter understand the meaning of situational ecology and demography, the greater will be the potential effects of ecology and demography on a focused encounter, and the more likely will individuals be able to create and sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with understanding of situational ecology and demography increasing with:
 - A. Embedding of the encounter in a corporate unit and, in turn, the degree of embedding of the corporate unit in an institutional domain, with the effects of embedding increasing with:
 1. Clarity of status and roles of individuals, with clarity increasing with the formality of the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in the corporate unit
 2. Consensus over the meanings of use-spaces and props, especially when these serve as markers of the relative status and roles of participants, while plugging participants into the culture of the corporate unit and more inclusive institutional domain
 3. Availability use-spaces and partitions (a) restricting movements of participants in and out of the encounter, (b) limiting the number of individuals co-present, and (c) determining density of those co-present
 - B. Embedding of an encounter in categoric units linked to locations in the larger system of stratification, with this effect increasing with:
 1. Homogeneity among members in categoric units participating in a focused encounter
 2. Correlation of categoric units with locations in space and distribution of use-spaces and props in this space, and especially when space, use-spaces, and props can serve as markers of memberships in categoric units
 3. Consolidation of members of categoric units with both the horizontal and vertical differentiation of status and roles of corporate units embedded within institutional domains
6. The more individuals understand the meaning of the ecology and demography of a situation, the more they can avoid face-engagement in unfocused encounters and the more likely will they be able to manage episodes of face-engagement when they occur, with avoidance of face-engagement and/or management of episodes of face- engagements increasing with:

- A. Size of the space and the degree of spacing among individuals
- B. Speed of movements by individuals through space
- C. Capacity of individuals to claim territories of self, with this capacity increasing with the clarity of norms over the:
 - 1. Fixed geographical use-spaces that can be claimed
 - 2. Egocentric preserves of non-encroachment that can be claimed when moving in space
 - 3. Personal spaces that can be claimed
 - 4. Stalls and territories that can be temporarily claimed
 - 5. Use-spaces that can be occupied for instrumental purposes
 - 6. Turns in spaces that can be sequentially claimed
 - 7. Possessional territory and objects identified with, and arrayed around self, to claim distance from others
 - 8. Informational preserves that can be used to regulate disclosure of facts about self
 - 9. Conversational preserves that can be invoked to control talk
- D. Availability of props to mark spaces and activate the salience of norms regulating the claims listed in C above
- E. Capacity of individuals to provide demeanor cues about:
 - 1. Appropriateness of their activities at the present time and place so that the need for focus is reduced
 - 2. Willingness to avoid encroachment on, and hence threat to, others in space so that the need to focus is reduced
 - 3. Ability to regulate conduct without duress and constraints so that the need to focus is reduced
- F. Knowledge and availability of normatively appropriate repair rituals, revolving around the capacity to:
 - 1. Give accounts and explanations for transgressions of unfocus
 - 2. Offer apologies or expressions of embarrassment and regret for actions that break unfocus
 - 3. Make requests or pre-emptive and redemptive inquiries for possible transgressions of unfocus
- G. Embedding of space, movements in space, props, use-spaces, and territories of self within corporate units within an institutional domain, especially with respect to rules about when and how unfocus is to be sustained, with this effect of embedding increasing with:
 - 1. Clarity of the division of labor
 - 2. Hierarchy in the division of labor
 - 3. Correlation of space and props with positions in the division of labor

- H. Embedding in diverse and differentially evaluated categoric units and the clarity of status beliefs about the characteristics of members in these categoric units and expectation states for these members' behaviors, with the clarity of expectation states increasing with:
1. Clarity in the parameters marking categoric unit membership, with nominal parameters generally providing more clarity than graduated parameters
 2. Homogeneity of membership in categoric units, with homogeneity of individuals in a categoric units increasing clarity of expectation states (and conversely, with heterogeneity increasing ambiguity of expectation states among members of diverse categoric units)
 3. Differential evaluation of members in diverse categoric units in space, which will:
 - a. Increase the rate of unfocus and, if focus is inevitable, will increase the potential tension in episodes of focused interaction
 - b. Increase the use of highly ritualized forms of talk and body demeanor to move into focus, and then back to unfocus
 4. Clarity of props denoting memberships in distinctive categoric units and the normative meanings of these props for signaling unfocus
 5. Nature of the activity, with those activities focused on common symbols and totems allowing more latitude to move in and out of unfocus among those observing or participating in these activities
- I. Mediation of movements in space by individuals using communication technologies, serving as markers that invoke norms of unfocused encounters (to not interrupt those engaged in a mediated, and semi-focused encounter)

Conclusion

The ecology and demography of encounters constrain what individuals can do in a situation. In many ways, they are the conduit of embedding by meso structures and cultures because they, literally, ground the encounter in space and place, while determining the demography of individuals involved in both focused and unfocused encounters. Ecology and demography are thus dynamics in this sense: they push individuals to behave in certain ways, and to some degree, it is possible to theorize on how these dynamics operate – as

I have tried to do with the two principles above. We are now ready to begin examining other forces of the micro realm, and these are a bit more familiar to micro sociology and, for that matter, sociology in general. I begin with status because this is what connects persons to meso structures, whether as a position in the division of labor of a corporate unit or as diffuse status characteristic marking someone as a member of a categoric unit. The roles that individuals play, the culture that they invoke and use to normalize an encounter, the motive states that they mobilize, and the emotions that they feel and express are, to a very great extent, constrained by status forces as they push on individuals in both focused and unfocused encounters.

Chapter 4

Status Dynamics in Encounters

Status is the most direct link of individuals to social structures, connecting persons to divisions of labor in corporate units and to memberships in categorical units. When individuals know their status and the status of others in an encounter, it becomes much easier for them to understand the meanings of situational ecology and demography, to role-make and role-take, to plug into relevant cultural elements and normatize, to channel motive states in appropriate ways, and to manage emotions. Embedding of an encounter in corporate and categorical units increases the viability of an encounter through establishing the relative status of participants. Conversely, when status is unknown or ambiguous, individuals will need to work much harder to sustain the encounter because, without the capacity to find each other's locations within corporate and categorical units, they must work to discover the meanings of situational ecology and demography, actively orchestrate gestures to make a role and read the gestures of others to role-take, search for cues about what elements of culture are relevant and appropriate, figure out what motive states are to be mobilized, and discover the feeling and display rules so as to emit the right mix of emotions.

Status-Organizing Processes

Over the last half century, a large research literature has accumulated in a theory-research tradition variously known as expectations states, status generalization, and status-organizing theory. This literature has tended to have an experimental bias, examining the dynamics of status processes in task groups assembled in research laboratories. Originally developed by Joseph Berger (1958), this long scholarly tradition has branched out in many directions (see, Berger et al. 1977; Webster and Foschi 1998; Berger and Zelditch 1985, 1998; Wagner and Turner 1998); and as will become evident in the

next chapters, the core ideas are relevant to all microdynamic forces. At the same time, these ideas need to be modified by the fact that many, if not most, encounters do not occur in task-oriented groups.

The core idea of this theoretical-research program is that in task groups, individuals' performances establish expectations for how they should perform in the future, and on the basis of their performances and expectation states, persons are also given higher or lower degrees of status, whether this status is prestige or authority. Those who contribute the most to task outcomes establish expectations for their future performance, while those who contribute less to task outcomes similarly generate lowered expectations for their performances. Once in place, these expectation states can become self-fulfilling prophecies because individuals act and react to expectation states, giving those who carry higher expectation states more opportunities to initiate interaction and to direct group activities, while sanctioning those who overstep what is expected of them. Moreover, those individuals who have contributed the most to group tasks and who, as a result, have higher expectation states for their performance gain prestige and perhaps even authority to direct the actions of others. Once in place, this emergent status order is difficult to change because expectation states for performances are self-reinforcing. At times, of course, expectation states are pre-packaged as existing authority in a corporate unit or as moral evaluations of individuals in differentiated categoric units. Those higher in authority or carrying higher prestige associated with divisions of labor or those incumbent in more highly evaluated categoric units will be *expected to perform better* than those who are not ranked as highly in the division of labor or who are members of devalued categoric units.

When lower-ranking individuals challenge the authority of higher-ranking or higher-evaluated persons, other lower ranking individuals are likely to sanction their fellow lower-ranked member because he or she is violating expectation states and because this challenge will invite negative emotional reactions, such as annoyance and anger, from higher-ranked persons. Since negative emotional arousal is costly, it is easier to sustain the status order because higher-status persons will generally offer positive emotional responses and positive sanctions to those who accept inequalities in the status order (Ridgeway 1982; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). Of course, these dynamics make it difficult to change status orders, even when superordinates reveal incompetence or, alternatively, when subordinates or members of devalued categories evidence high levels of competence. The rigidity of status orders is, I believe, related to the focus of expectation research on task groups, but before qualifying the research findings in this tradition, let me review some of its key generalizations.

One early question in the research literature concerned a situation where multiple status characteristics are in play. For expectation states researchers, individuals are seen as combining several status characteristics when they are perceived relevant to an encounter (in this case, encounters of individuals focusing on a task). Individuals are seen as combining negative and positive evaluations into two sets and, then, summing the two sets (i.e., subtracting the negative set from the positive set of evaluations) to produce an overall evaluation that generates a composite expectation state for each person (Berger et al. 1980; Norman et al. 1988). Once this has occurred, however, each new piece of positive or negative status evaluation has less effect on the overall evaluation of a person indicating that, once expectation states have been established, they are difficult to change.

Another research tradition focuses on justice evaluations associated with expectation states. Broader cultural evaluations of various status positions establish a *referential structure*, which creates expectations for the relative shares of resources that those in differentially evaluated positions should receive (Ridgeway and Berger 1986, 1988). When individuals do not receive what they believe is their due according to this referential structure, they will experience injustice, as will others in the encounter. Furthermore, when referential structures are invoked, they are added to other expectation status associated with status, thereby generating a meta-expectation for payoffs and receipt of resources by those in different status positions. When the elements of this meta-expectation are consistent and payoffs correlate with relative status and evaluations of status, inequalities will be sustained, if not increased. When, however, there is inconsistency in the elements of this meta-expectation – that is, payoffs and expectation states do not correlate – inequalities may be reduced as positive and negative sets of expectations are subtracted from each other.

Yet another key idea in the expectation states literature is that when broader cultural ideologies (as *referential structures*) are invoked as an element of expectation states and meta-expectations about "just" and "fair" payoffs, differences in authority and prestige are more likely to be seen as legitimate. Once individuals invoke meso- and macro-level culture, expectation states are reinforced and become more resistant to change because they are defined as legitimate by more general evaluative cultural codes. Once legitimated, then, expectations in the present become expectation states in the future because they now carry moral gravitas about what should and ought to be.

The introduction of referential structures to expectation states theorizing implicitly invoked the notion of embedding of encounters in meso- and macro-level structures and their cultures. When an encounter is embedded

in corporate and categoric units, referential structures – or *status beliefs* associated with positions in divisions of labor and memberships in categoric units – are more likely to be salient and unambiguous. And, to the degree that corporate and categoric units are, respectively, embedded in autonomous institutional domains or in the stratification system, the ideologies and meta-ideologies of macrostructural formations will be invoked when defining and evaluating status at the micro-level of the encounter. For example, the position of professor in a university carries status beliefs arising from the ideology of the relatively autonomous institutional domain of education; and the evaluation of professors and their relative prestige in relation to other positions within education and their evaluation in the broader society are established by reference to the ideology of education as well as the meta-ideology and general values of the society as a whole. And, the more the evaluation of a status invokes societal level ideologies and value premises, the more difficult is change in the evaluation of status and the expectations states that flow from this evaluation. Similarly, a low-income, uneducated person in the unskilled labor force will be a member of a lower-class categoric unit and will be judged by the moral premises in the ideologies of education and economy as institutional domains, as well as the moral premises in the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system. Embedding thus increases the power of moral codes from macro structures and cultures on positions in corporate units and on members of categoric units; and in so doing, expectation states take on greater consistency and clarity as well as power, as I will explore shortly.

Moreover, by virtue of increasing the power and clarity of the moral evaluation behind expectation states, embedding will also invoke standards of justice defining who has rights to what shares of resources in encounters. As Chap. 6 on transactional needs will emphasize, one of the most important human needs in all encounters is to receive a profit in the exchange of resources; individuals always seek shares of resources that exceed their costs and investments. And, to a very large extent, this sense of profit is conditioned by whether or not the resources received in relation to the costs/investments of self compared to the costs/investments of others are defined as “just” and “fair.” When the moral standards of ideologies are clear and consistent, then standards of justice are usually unambiguous, thereby increasing the likelihood that persons will be employing the same standards of justice as part of the expectation states associated with status.

The invocation of ideologies and meta-ideologies of institutional domains and stratification thus “moralize” status, and in so doing, they increase the salience of justice standards. When ideologies and meta-ideologies are consistent, there will be more consensus over the justice standards that are used

to determine expectation states. Conversely, when conflicting ideologies are invoked – say, “equality of opportunity” vs. an ideology devaluing members of lower social classes for “their lack of work ethic” – this conflict will generally produce different standards of justice among individuals, thus assuring that some will be angry about violations of their standards of justice. Thus, while embedding will generally increase consistency and clarity, the existence of multiple ideologies in diverse institutional domains that are often conflict within meta-ideologies legitimating stratification can generate inconsistent and even conflicting expectation states; in turn, these inconsistencies increase the likelihood of negative emotional arousal and, potentially, motivations to change status beliefs built from ideologies.

From these considerations, several obvious but still important generalizations emerge that will guide my analysis below. One is that the greater the differences in the authority, prestige, and moral evaluation of status, the more these will generate expectation states for performances that will, in turn, become self-fulfilling prophecies that sustain the status order. Another is that the more consistent are the evaluations of a status, the greater is the effects of evaluations on establishing expectation states. Still another generalization is that once expectation states are established, new evaluative information will have less effect than is the case during the initial formation of expectations. And finally, embedding will increase the likelihood that ideologies and meta-ideologies of meso- and macro-level reality will become a part of expectation states and increase the level of moral evaluation of expectations for performance and for rewarding to those holding different status locations in corporate and categoric units.

Yet, there are countervailing forces at work in these expectation state dynamics – forces that have been underemphasized by expectation states research which, as I have emphasized, has focused on temporary task groups in experimental settings. One countervailing force is iterations of encounters over time. As encounters are repeated in naturally forming groups (compared to short-term and arbitrary experimental groups), status differences become less visible and often less salient, particularly in non-instrumental groups. As individuals learn more about each other, diffuse status characteristics or memberships in categoric units become less critical, while differences in power, authority, and prestige become less pronounced, again especially in non-task groups (less so in task groups since authority and prestige are allocated on the basis of task performance).

Another countervailing force is that, with enough time, individuals can adopt strategies that allow some to rise in the status order. While individuals may soon learn that direct confrontations or challenges to the status order bring negative sanctions, they may also discover that more indirect strategies

of quietly demonstrating competence in non-threatening ways may slowly raise their status, while those who initially had high status may discover that failure to perform over time erodes status.

Yet another countervailing force is inconsistency in expectations for status, even in embedded encounters. High-status individuals in a division of labor may prove incompetent, while members of devalued categoric units may demonstrate great skill; new arrivals to encounters can shift relative evaluations of competence; new social movement organizations may emerge to challenge and ultimately change status beliefs about members of categoric units. Thus, expectation states, despite their self-reinforcing character, are rarely static, particularly in highly differentiated, dynamic societies. The outcome is inconsistencies among evaluations of, and expectations for, members of the status order in corporate and categoric units.

Still another countervailing force is embedding of individuals in contradictory status locations, as would be the case for a person in a devalued categoric unit having high authority in the division of labor of corporate units. And, the more this kind of intersection of status occurs, the less will be the power of expectation states, especially those attached to diffuse status characteristics.

A related countervailing force is ambiguity in the membership of persons in categoric units (say, a light-skinned “black” or a wealthy but uneducated person) and/or positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units (such as unclear lines of authority). Rarely does embedding leave no room for uncertainty about status and expectations. And, the more ambiguity, the more will the status order emerge from encounters rather than be imposed by the structure and culture of corporate or categoric units.

Finally, emotions operate as a force in sustaining or changing the status order. Individuals do not generally like being at the bottom of the division of labor, nor do they enjoy membership in devalued categoric units. Thus, they will always be some resentment of having to give deference to those with more power/authority or those considered more morally worthy. These resentments always place pressure on encounters revealing high levels of inequality to become more equal; and at times, the negative emotions aroused can cause breaches in encounters as individuals refuse to accept expectation states that sustain inequalities. Moreover, the arousal of negative emotions as other microdynamic forces are played out can also influence the stability of the status order. When persons cannot play roles that they consider critical, when they cannot meet transactional needs, and when they cannot normatize the encounter in ways that they think appropriate, they will inevitably experience negative emotions. In turn, these emotions cause individuals to challenge and attempt to change expectation states.

When we look at a wider variety of encounters lodged in different types of corporate units and categoric units that, in turn, are embedded in diverse institutional domains and at locations in the stratification systems, we can see that there is lots of room for ambiguity, if not outright inconsistency, in expectation states associated with status. Embedding increases consistency and clarity, to be sure (see below), but in complex, differentiated societies, and especially in ones where class distinctions are often difficult to determine except at the very top or bottom of the system (thereby leaving a vague set of “middle classes”), embedding cannot fully eliminate ambiguity. In fact, embedding can increase ambiguity when, for example, the correlation of categoric unit membership with class locations is low or when the nature of the division of labor is changing away from a highly bureaucratized vertical hierarchy of authority to a flatter, more horizontal and collaborative division of labor. Under these conditions embedding does not increase clarity but, instead, forces individuals to forge expectations “on the ground” as the encounter unfolds.

Status Dynamics in Focused Encounters

There are at least five properties of status that are critical to micro-level interactions. One is the *clarity* and discreteness of status. Is the status of a person clear, or is there ambiguity over which status a person occupies? For example, being a “mother” is clear; if you have children, you inevitably occupy this position. But, what of a status such as “friend,” “acquaintance,” or member of a categoric unit defined by graduated parameters (e.g., rich or poor)? In these latter cases, there is a certain lack of clarity about when and whether or not a person holds one of these status locations. A second property of status is its *relation to other status locations*, or its *network properties*. What is the configuration of relations among status along such network dimensions as density (degree of connectedness of all positions), centrality (connectedness of status to a few key positions), equivalence (similar locations of status *vis-à-vis* other positions in a network), brokerage and bridges (location of status between other positions in a network)? All of these properties of status are important, but as will become evident, I believe that density, equivalence, and centrality are the most important network properties of status in encounters. A third property of status is the amount of *power and authority* it carries. Does a status location give persons the right to tell others what to do? And to what extent? A fourth property of status is the amount of *social worth, honor, prestige* that it carries. Does a status allow a person to claim deference and honor from others? And if so, how much?

Or does a status stigmatize an individual, forcing them to offer deference to others? A final property, as emphasized above and in earlier chapters, is the *degree of embeddedness* of status in corporate and/or categoric units. Does a status mark a location within the division of labor of a corporate unit or membership (as a diffuse status characteristic) in a categoric unit? Does embeddedness in corporate units take precedence over embeddedness in categoric units, or vice versa, and to what degree? These and other questions will guide the analysis of status in both focused and unfocused encounters.

The Clarity of Status

Status-taking, Status-making, and Games of Micropolitics. Just as individuals role-take and role-make, signaling the roles that they intend to play and reading the gestures of others to determine their roles, they also *status-take* and *status-make*. Persons will orchestrate gestures and use the ecology of a situation to assert their status, and they will be attuned to what the gestures of others reveal about their status. Often there is a game of *micropolitics* involved in asserting status, with individuals seeking to hold higher status than others and, as a result, trying to claim more honor and/or power in relationships with others. Games of micropolitics are most likely to occur when there is room to maneuver in an encounter and where embeddedness does not wholly circumscribe claims to status at particular locations in corporate and categoric units. Under these conditions, status competition ensues, with individuals acting in ways to enhance their status relative to others; and eventually, some may be able to claim more authority or moral worth than others through their ability to demonstrate their competence at tasks or their superiority in general. These competitions are, however, loaded with tension and conflict; and hence, an equally likely outcome is breaches to, and termination of, the encounter.

As Candice Clark (1987, 1990) has emphasized, games of micropolitics can occur within a status order, with individuals understanding each other's status but, still, maneuvering to gain "place" *vis-à-vis* others. The goal is to either increase or decrease the distance (in authority, prestige, or both) between status positions. Those in lower positions may try to enhance their status by increasing their place relative to higher-status persons, and conversely, those in higher status may seek to maintain the status differences and hence distance. When a subordinate praises his superordinate, the goal is to decrease distance, even as the "sucking up" acknowledges status differences. Alternatively, a superordinate may seek to sustain distance by remaining formal and resisting efforts by subordinates to be more informal.

Status competition and games of micropolitics are thus intended to reduce the clarity of status, or at least to mitigate its effects on the flow of interaction in focused encounters. If successful, the salience of status is reduced, but often at the costs of increasing tensions arising from the competition and from the new ambiguity over status and, hence, how individuals are to interact in the new (less clear) status order. These costs can be high, and as a result, individuals are disposed to take account of embedding of status in order to re-set their interpersonal compass and, thereby, reduce the costs of uncertainty over how to behave.

Embedding and Clarity of Status. Clarity of status thus reduces the effects of these games of micropolitics because, when locations in the division of labor of a corporate unit and/or memberships in categoric units are visible to all, status becomes more salient. As Principle 4 first presented in Chap. 2 underscores, certain properties of corporate and categoric units increase clarity of expectations, and as is evident from the proposition, most of these conditions denote the clarity of expectations, which include the expectation states associated with status. These expectation states are often derived from broader sets of status beliefs about the characteristics of individuals in categoric units (and their diffuse status characteristics) and in locations of the divisions of labor of corporate units. For instance, gender is a diffuse status characteristic around which status beliefs develop, distinguishing females from males (often unfairly) that become translated into unique expectation states for female and male behaviors. The same would be true for members of ethnic categories, or individuals of varying ages. Similarly, general types of positions in corporate units – e.g., foreman, supervisor, CEO, secretary, line worker, department head, and the like – all carry generalized status beliefs that constrain expectation states for individuals occupying positions that fall under these generalized status labels. And, the more embedded a categoric unit is within the stratification systems or a corporate unit within a relatively autonomous institutional domain, the more likely are the meta-ideologies justifying inequalities in the stratification system and the ideologies of an institutional domain to further circumscribe the moral evaluation and expectation states accompanying both locational status (in corporate units) and diffuse status characteristics (in categoric units). And, to the degree that behaviors in encounters affirm status beliefs, they become evermore a part of the broader culture (Ridgeway 1998, 2001, 2006; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). In particular, status beliefs associated with inequalities of power/authority and prestige or “moral worth” associated with resource shares are most likely to become institutionalized into cultural beliefs, backed up by ideologies and meta-ideologies.

When an encounter is embedded in categoric units, the diffuse status characteristics are generally known to all; and the more nominal are the parameters defining categoric unit membership, the more likely are diffuse status characteristics to influence the flow of interaction in focused encounters. This influence will increase when status beliefs have codified large differences in the respective evaluations of members of different categoric units in an encounter. Similarly, if categoric units generated by graduated parameters that have been converted into more nominal parameters (e.g., rich, poor, educated, uneducated), these now quasi-nominal parameters will have more effect than if they remained purely graduated. If diffuse status characteristics are correlated with each other (e.g., black-poor-uneducated-male), the effects of diffuse status characteristics on the behaviors of individuals in encounters will be that much greater.

As the proposition 4 in Chapter 2 outlines, status in divisions of labor within corporate units has greater effects along its vertical than the horizontal axis. When individuals have more power/authority and prestige than others, expectation states will require different behaviors from high- and low-status individuals – as I will explore in more detail shortly. In the horizontal division of labor, status differences along a hierarchy are more difficult to discern, with the result that status, per se, will have less effect than is the case when a status hierarchy is in play.

Expectation states may exist for individuals in different status positions, but these will often be supplement by performances in encounters during which some individuals display qualities that allow them to establish a higher place in games of micropolitics and thereby claim more status than others. Moreover, when status in corporate units is not highly salient, as is often the case with horizontal divisions of labor, membership in categoric units may become more salient and have more effects on establishing the relative status of individuals in focused encounters. For example, when a man and a woman hold different status positions that, however, are not differentiated in terms of their relative power/authority/prestige, the diffuse status characteristics revolving around gender differences may have more influence on the interaction than their respective positions in the division of labor. But, if there is greater clarity of their relative status in the division of labor (with clearly defined expectations) and if there are differences in power/authority/prestige of their respective status positions, then the effects of diffuse status characteristics will decline, while the expectation states associated with location in the division of labor will increase. Still, diffuse status characteristics rarely recede completely, as a moment's reflection on an interaction between two men at different locations on the status hierarchy and an between a man and a woman at these locations will attest; in the

latter case, different diffuse status characteristics will have effects that differentiate the flow of interaction from what would transpire during the interaction between two men.

As proposition 4 also emphasizes, the degree of consolidation of categoric unit memberships with locations in the divisions of labor in corporate units can have large effects on behaviors in focused encounters. When diffuse status characteristics are correlated with positions in the division of labor, the combined effect of status and diffuse status characteristics is amplified. And such is especially the case if the moral evaluation of diffuse status characteristics (as high, medium, or low) is also correlated with positions on the vertical division of labor (as high, medium, or low power/authority/prestige). When these correlations are high, the effects of diffuse status characteristics increase and amplify status differences in the division of labor. Individuals do more than “average” or “sum” the values for diffuse and positional status; when diffuse status characteristics (from categoric unit memberships) and positional locations (in corporate-unit divisions of labor) correlate on a scale of evaluation, the effects are more multiplicative, amplifying both the evaluations associated with diffuse status characteristics and status arising from variations in the power/authority/prestige of positions in the division of labor. And when there is a consistent correlation that persists over time, these effects of diffuse status characteristics become part of the system of status belief (Ridgeway 1998, 2001; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000).

The converse of these dynamics are also important. When a focused encounter is embedded in categoric and corporate units where diffuse status characteristics and positional status in divisions of labor intersect and, hence, do not correlate with each other, the effects of diffuse status characteristics decline relative to the effects of positional status in divisions of labor, particularly status associated with differences in power/authority/prestige. Yet, it often takes time for intersection to reduce the effects of diffuse status characteristics if there has been a previous history where a high correlation existed. For example, as women have moved from being secretaries in corporations to more executive positions over the last 40 years, the correlation of gender as a diffuse status characteristic with a narrow range of locations in the vertical divisions of labor in corporate units has declined; and yet, status beliefs about women (vs. men) still linger, often forcing women in positions of power and authority to act differently than their male counterparts. Hence, diffuse status characteristics still have effects on behaviors in focused encounters even as the correlation between diffuse status characteristics and positional status in divisions of labor decline. Still, over time, the effects of diffuse status characteristics will decrease as remaining patterns of

discrimination against women and members of other categoric units, such as minorities, are eliminated and as women and minorities begin to occupy a full range of positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units so that the correlation between diffuse and positional status drops to virtually zero (still a ways off into the future of most societies). Patterns of discrimination often persist, backed up by status beliefs, evaluations, and expectation states about those who have been members of formerly devalued categoric units.

Experimental data indicate that perceptions of difference and associated expectation states almost immediately emerge in interaction among individuals of different categories and, moreover, that the effects of these differences on status beliefs are difficult to eliminate (Ridgeway 2001; Ridgeway and Erickson 2000). Humans may be hard-wired to notice differences and to codify these differences into status beliefs that will persist as long as there are some arenas where they can be used to legitimate discriminatory treatment. Thus, while intersection of parameters marking categoric-unit memberships with divisions of labor may reduce the power of these status beliefs, it generally takes time for these beliefs to recede and not effect behavior in focused encounters. But over time, the effects of status in the division of labor within corporate units will increasingly have more effect on behavior in focused encounters than diffuse status characteristics associated with categoric unit memberships.

Yet, humans are motivated to determine status – through *status-taking* and *status-making*. One of the first questions that people ask of each other when meeting for the first time is: What do you do (for a living)? By noting categoric unit membership of the respondent and then by learning their place in the divisions of labor of corporate units (e.g., work, family, church, etc.), individuals acquire information about others' status-sets. For example, at my fortieth high school reunion, I asked a woman (someone whom I had known well in high school but had not seen in four decades) “what she did and had been doing.” Her answer (with sadness and implicit apology) was that “I have just been a housewife and mother,” which spoke volumes in that she had apparently devalued her own work and accepted implicit status beliefs about “women in the home.” My reaction (in my mind) was “how sad” that such important work was so devalued; my initial reaction would have been much different, I suspect, had she said that she was the CEO of a company (which was more in line with my expectation state for her, given her student status as a “star”). Thus, seemingly innocent questions or observance of demeanor are always used to determine the degree of intersection or consolidation of diffuse status with status in different corporate units; and on the basis of the degree of intersection or consolidation, different status beliefs will be invoked and different expectation states for behavior will be generated.

At the same reunion, my best friend in high school, whose wife had recently died, came out as “gay,” which was a real surprise to me since he had been such a prominent executive at a university, father of two children, and husband to a very interesting woman who had been mayor of a well-known coastal city in California. While it was indeed a surprise that my friend was gay, status beliefs about homosexuality had changed so dramatically since the 1950s that this revelation was far easier for me to accommodate than the sadness (in the voice and demeanor) of my friend who had “just been a housewife.” Thus, societies where status beliefs about members of categoric units are in flux present interesting case studies for how diffuse status characteristics interact with locations in divisions of labor; and these changes often make establishing a clear status for a person difficult, especially as there is always a lag between changes in the structural positions of individuals and the status beliefs about their diffuse status characteristics.

At times, embedding in corporate units leads to the formation of what I might call *quasi categoric units*, accompanied by status beliefs, for those at particular locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units. For example, the position of mother and wife (as my friend indicated) becomes a kind of categoric unit (“homemaker” or some such label) with accompanying status beliefs and expectation states. Or, high-ranking personnel on a military base become “the brass” to enlisted men. Or, as I have at times derisively denoted the high administrators of my university (“the fourth floor suits”), they too can become a local categoric unit with accompanying status beliefs. Being a student, blue collar worker, government bureaucrat, CEO, and other locations in divisions of labor can become quasi categoric units, with status beliefs and expectation states attached to these locations. This conversion of locations in divisions of labor into quasi categoric units or diffuse status characteristics represents a mechanism for simplifying encounters, at least initially, by discovering a “master status” for a person and then responding to them in terms of the status beliefs and expectation states for persons in this quasi categoric unit.

Time, Iteration, and Decreasing Clarity of Status. When focused encounters among more or less the same persons are iterated over longer stretches of time, the initial effects of diffuse status characteristics of members of categoric units and of status in vertical divisions of labor will generally decline. This decline is greater for diffuse status characteristics than for status in vertical divisions of labor in corporate units.

George Homans (1951) emphasized a long ago that high rates of interaction generally increase “sentiments of liking,” although he qualified this argument by noting that interactions among those with different levels of authority worked against such sentiments emerging in encounters.

Homans was probably too quick in making this qualification because there is ample evidence that positive sentiments emerge, even among those with different degrees of authority, when interactions are iterated over time. As Cecelia Ridgeway (1994) has documented, expectation states for individuals of higher and lower ranks in task groups vary, with those in higher ranks presumed (until proven otherwise) to have greater competence and rights to initiate and control interactions than those in lower ranks of authority. If a lower-ranking person challenges the actions of a higher-ranking individual, the latter will display negative emotions such as annoyance and anger because expectation states for lower-ranking persons have been violated by this challenge. Fellow lower-ranking group members may sanction this person negatively to bring him or her back into line because, as noted earlier, negative emotions from superiors are costly; and moreover, when higher-ranking individuals have their authority verified, they are more likely to emit positive sentiments to all members of the group. Hence, members of groups will tend to support differential expectation states because this support increases the flow of positive emotions and reduces the circulation of negative emotions. It is emotionally costly to challenge expectation states and, instead, more rewarding to go along with these expectations. The outcome of these forces is bias toward mutual liking over iterated encounters.

These effects are probably even greater in non-task groups, where individuals are more motivated to experience positive emotions. Initial differences in authority and prestige will be more relaxed, allowing individuals to experience positive affect, even in situations where some degree of formal authority exists. As long as expectation states are met, individuals will be able to relax and experience positive emotions, with the ironical consequence that the salience of hierarchy will decline (but not disappear). Another irony is that the clarity of expectations in the situation will decline, and as this clarity declines, individuals will need to work much harder at determining the meaning of situational ecology and demography, the salience of status differences, the manner in which to play roles, the way to normalize the situation (with respect to frames, categorization of others and situation, forms of talk, rituals, and emotional displays), the motive-states to be mobilized (with respect to verifying self, receiving profits in exchanges of resources, being part of the group, experiencing trust, and having a sense of facticity), and the emotions that should and can be felt and displayed. Thus, as informality and positive emotions of liking emerge, interactions in such situations will, ironically, require a great deal more work because the expectation states attached to differences in authority and prestige now provide much less guidance, with new expectation states having to be negotiated

and, perhaps, re-negotiated. Under these conditions *faux pas* become more likely, thereby generating tension and needs to employ repair rituals. Thus, as contradictory as it might seem, the flow of positive emotions can reduce the clarity of expectations tied to status differences, but at the cost of forcing individuals to become more diligent about how to reconcile authority with the new informality.

At other times, authority and prestige differences in corporate units may not recede because those in higher-ranking positions work to sustain status differences, thus reducing the flow of positive sentiments. Moreover, superordinates can act in ways that increase tension and the potential for conflict in corporate units, when they (a) deny subordinates the ability to realize transactional needs for verifying self, receiving profits in interpersonal exchanges, experience group inclusion, feeling trust, and sensing facticity, (b) impose negative sanctions on subordinates as a means for maintaining status differences, (c) make it difficult for subordinates to understand expectation states that are in play, (d) force subordinates to constantly re-normalize the iterated encounters, (e) act in ways demeaning subordinates and thereby lowering their status, and (f) force subordinates actively role-take (the constantly changing dispositions of superordinates) and to remake roles during the course of one encounter or across a chain of iterated encounters. Under these conditions, negative sentiments will emerge, thereby increasing the salience of hierarchy. Additionally, if the negative sentiments are sufficiently strong, they may have to be repressed by subordinates, thereby imposing additional amounts of emotion work and, hence, costs on subordinates.

Sometimes subordinates will, under the above conditions, mobilize for conflict to challenge authority, and in so doing, they can mitigate against the abuse of authority. Yet, even when challenges occur, the salience of hierarchy is highlighted (as abusive), and equally often, there is a hardening of lines of authority that will, in turn, sustain the flow of negative sentiments. Still, even as negative sentiments circulate, expectation states are often clarified, with individuals understanding better what they must do in focused encounters (even if they are unhappy about what is required of them).

I should also emphasize that when hierarchy seems less salient and positive sentiments flow, much of the apparent reduction in hierarchy is just that: only apparent. It is in the interests of subordinates to present themselves in a positive light to those in positions of authority, and it is often in the interest of those in authority to appear relaxed about their prerogatives and to appear “nice” so as to reduce potential negative emotional arousal among subordinates. Good actors can bring these appearances off and increase the surface flow of positive emotions, but lurking under this patina

of positive affect are the realities of differences in status. These differences still exist and put limits on how far the surface reduction in status differences can go.

Even with these qualifications about reductions in the salience of status over iterated encounters, there is something that is very real about the emergence of positive sentiments and the decline in relevance of inequalities of authority and prestige. When subordinates “like” their superordinates, and vice versa, individuals at very different locations in the division of labor can all receive a most valuable reward: positive emotional energy (Collins 1975, 2004). There may be a certain fragility to the flow of these emotions because of authority differences lurking in the background, but there is nonetheless a reduction in status differences over iterated encounters.

These dynamics also apply to encounters embedded in categoric units, where individuals may be members of diverse and differentially valued categoric units. In fact, the effect of iterations in encounters is probably much greater for categoric than corporate units in reducing status differences stemming from diffuse status characteristics. As individuals interact, they establish more personal bonds that begin to erode differences in the moral evaluation contained in status beliefs about members of categoric units. As a result, they re-normalize the situations by re-categorizing each other in terms of personal qualities rather than by membership in a categoric unit. The relevance of status beliefs declines, and if sufficient numbers of encounters across a wide variety of situations erode categoric distinctions, status beliefs begin to change – just as they have, for example, for women, African Americans, and gays over the last 30 years. The key to breaking the effects of status beliefs is for widespread intersection of parameters defining categoric unit membership so that individuals from diverse social categories are in a position to interact frequently, thereby setting into motion the positive sentiments of liking that come from high rates of interaction and, in the process, the decline in the salience of status beliefs.

Once again, the intersection of diffuse status characteristics of categoric units and locational status in the divisions of labor of corporate units generate interesting dynamics. If, as I have been emphasizing, there is a high correlation between membership in differentially evaluated categoric units with status locations in the division of labor, especially if the degree of moral worth of members in categoric units is correlated with the degree of authority and prestige in the vertical division of labor in corporate units across a wide variety of institutional domains, the salience of both memberships in categoric units and status differences in authority and prestige in corporate units increases, even with iterations of the focused encounter. For example, if all managers are white males and all subordinates are females, iterations

of encounters will have less effect in reducing either the salience of diffuse status characteristics and positional status. There may be some diminution in salience, but not nearly as much as would be the case for status in categorical units and status in the division of labor alone. It is this consolidation and compounding of diffuse with positional status that works against reduction of status as a social force in focused encounters. Informalities and positive sentiments may emerge but they do not have the same power to reduce the salience of status and status beliefs. In contrast, if there is a high degree of intersection between diffuse status characteristics and status in the vertical division of labor – that is, the correlation between positions in corporate units and membership in categorical units is low or even zero – the salience of diffuse status characteristics will decline rapidly since there is too much contradiction between the expectation states associated with status beliefs and those inhering in differences in authority. Unless those in authority act in ways that increase status differences, as listed earlier, iteration will decrease the salience of categorical unit membership and status in the corporate unit, although the effect will be much greater, I would hypothesize, for the salience of diffuse status characteristics.

As I noted earlier, sometimes positions in corporate units are converted into quasi categorical units and generate additional expectation states from the emergent status beliefs that are piggybacked onto the expectation states for status in the division of labor. My hypothesis is that this emergent, quasi status belief will initially have more influence in encounters but, later as focused encounters are iterated, this influence will decline—just the influence of diffuse status characteristics declines with iterated interactions. Much like categorical units proper, then, status beliefs will recede as individuals spend time with each other. I have noticed this phenomenon in universities where the “president” is more than a position in the division of labor but a category (composed of a mix among being a CEO and a highly educated person), but over time, as members of the community (and faculty) interact consistently with the president, the salience of this quasi categorical unit declines, as does the status as president. Interestingly, I have noticed that when the president is a member of a previously devaluated categorical unit – say, African American or women – the salience of these categorical units is slow to erode from iterated interactions because the status beliefs and expectation states are much more firmly rooted into the culture of a society. Moreover, these incumbents must also be subjected to a constant and hypothetical comparison process of what “white, older males” did or would do in this position. Few would, of course, admit to being part of these dynamics, but the patterns in the interaction that I have observed over the last 40 years are all too obvious.

The nature of the interaction situation as work-practical, social, or ceremonial can have large effects on how salient status is, even after iterated encounters. I would hypothesize that iterated ceremonial encounters would be the least amenable to reduction in the power of status arising from categoric-unit memberships and positions in the divisions of labor within corporate unit. In contrast, iterated social encounters would reduce the effects of status. Work-practical would be somewhere in between ceremonial and social encounters, unless of course, the person in authority actively seeks to maintain status differences by the processes listed earlier.

In sum, there is a clear tendency for iterated encounters to reduce the salience of diffuse status characteristics of categoric units and the positional authority in corporate units, unless certain conditions prevail: One is a high degree of consolidation of authority with diffuse status characteristics. Another is abusive practices by those in authority that arouse negative emotions among, and even conflict with, subordinates. Still another is persistent conflict with subordinates. And a final condition is that the encounter remains ceremonial or highly work-practical with little social interaction. Absent these conditions, the increased informality and flow of positive emotional energy among individuals that comes with high rates of interaction and with reduced sense of authority and decreased relevance of diffuse status characteristics are highly rewarding, but at a cost: reduced clarity of expectations.

Why, then, would individuals seek less clarity in expectations, which in turn requires that they work harder at sustaining the positive flow of emotions because they now have to re-negotiate the relevance of dimensions of status, roles to be played, motive-states to be activated, norms to be invoked (over categories, frames, forms of talk, rituals, and emotions), and emotions to be displayed and felt. Part of the answer resides in human biology. Humans are evolved apes, and the great apes reveal high levels of interpersonal autonomy and individualism (Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2008a); and humans clearly resist the imposition of authority – as would most great apes. If, however, monkeys were our more approximate ancestors, then humans would have gravitated toward hierarchies of power, as do most species of monkeys. But, humans are evolved apes where dominance hierarchies are truncated; and, if our hunting and gathering ancestors are a clue to human nature, we resist domination (Boehm 1993). Only when the consolidation of power and authority are essential to organizing larger numbers of individuals do humans acquiesce to the necessity for inequalities of power and prestige. The second reason, noted above, is that positive emotions are highly rewarding, and individuals are generally willing to lose clarity of expectations in exchange for positive emotional energy, even at a cost of having to work a bit harder to sustain the emotional flow.

Furthermore, as positive emotions flow, they become yet one more expectation state whose violation would arouse negative emotions and lead to sanctions, which in turn would set off another round of negative emotional arousal. When expectation states – in this case emotional expectation states (Berger 1988) – are violated, the negative emotional arousal is that much more intense; and if these emotional expectation states become more important to persons, then they are difficult for both subordinates and superordinates to violate.

The irony of this situation is that, as clarity of expectations with respect to authority or to diffuse status characteristics declines, the likelihood of breaches to encounters increases, thus violating emotional expectation states and forcing individuals to use repair rituals to bring the encounter back into line. Moreover, they will have to re-double their efforts in re-normatizing by re-assessing their categorizations of the situation and each other, their use of frames, their forms of talk, their rituals acts, and their displays of emotions; they will have to re-assess status; they will have to adjust role-making and role-taking; and they will have to re-examine which motive states to arouse. Still, even though the salience of status reduces uncertainty, it is filled with potential for negative emotional arousal; and thus individuals are motivated to reduce the power of status, even at the cost of decreased clarity of expectations, unless those in superordinate positions abuse their position by constantly shifting expectation and arousing negative emotions among subordinates. Yet, the more prevalent situation is to reduce the relevance of status without completely obliterating expectations states while, at the same time, working to sustain the flow of positive emotions, which in most cases is more rewarding than the additional costs of overcoming ambiguity or lack of clarity in expectation states.

Network Dynamics and Status

Status locations are often connected to each other in varying patterns and configurations. Network properties of these configurations can have large effects on status dynamics because resources generally flow across nodes or positions in the network. The analysis of networks is highly refined, but for my purposes, I need only examine a few basic properties of networks: (1) density, (2) equivalence, and (3) centrality.

Density. The concept of density denotes the degree to which the number of ties or connections among positions in a network reaches the theoretical maximum of all nodes being directly connected to each other. Density increases awareness of status, at least initially; and thus, the greater

is the degree of density in a network, the more individuals will be attuned to status forces, especially power/authority/prestige in divisions of labor within corporate units and diffuse status characteristics in categoric units. To interact with a person at a given place in the division of labor in corporate units will, in a dense network, be subject to view by larger numbers of others in this network. To avoid a *faux pas*, it becomes critical to status-make and status-take to be sure that the correct role is played, the relevant norms are invoked, the meeting of transactional needs is proper, and the emotions displayed are appropriate; if not, then the breach in one relation in a dense network will reverberate across the network and expose an individual to potential sanctioning by others. Thus, in dense networks, individuals are particularly sensitive to their own and others' status and place in this network as they channel other microdynamic forces. For example, when individuals are part of a "team" engaged in an activity, each person is implicitly aware that their responses are being evaluated by all others, with the result that each person will make sure that they get their relative status in the division of labor right and that they have responded to members of categoric units in the appropriate ways.

Iteration of interaction in encounters within a dense network will typically reduce the salience of status – both locations in the division of labor of a corporate unit and membership in various categoric units – but density assures that individuals will monitor their own and other's behaviors. Yet, since density increases the likelihood that individuals will interact over time and get to know each other, these effects will kick in and erode some of the initial concern with positional authority/prestige and with membership in categoric units. Expectations for others in the network will be less directed by status forces, *per se*; rather, as individuals come to know each other, expectations states will become increasingly particularistic, revolving around the characteristics of persons as individuals rather than as incumbents in the status order. Indeed, gossip becomes prominent in dense networks as a mechanism for "learning about" others, irrespective of their place in the status order. What is learned from gossip will affect the expectations that individuals have for others as much as their relative locations in the status order.

The converse is also true: low-density networks will allow individuals to simply respond to one status position without having to worry about all nodes in the network. For example, when a customer pays a clerk in a store for a good or service, the only relevant positions are clerk and customer, and all other positions to which clerk and customer are connected are irrelevant. The customer does not know others in the store who are part of the clerk's network, nor does the clerk know about the family and other networks in which

the customer is embedded. The result is that the transaction can proceed rapidly in a highly ritualized manner, without having to consider other status positions. In contrast, members of a family are part of a dense network, and what one person does will have consequences for all other family members; hence, individuals will be particularly attuned to the status being claimed, the roles played, the norms that apply, the way needs can be met, and the emotions that can be expressed and felt for self and others in the network.

Size of the corporate units in which encounters are embedded has large effects on density. Small corporate units are more likely to reveal high-density networks, whereas density in larger corporate units will decrease. As density declines, status has more effects than particularistic information about individuals as persons, with individuals more attuned to positional authority/prestige and/or categoric unit membership than the personal qualities of individuals. Of course, dense cliques can emerge within divisions of labor among corporate units, reducing the effects of positional status and diffuse status characteristics within the clique, while often increasing the salience of status when interacting with those outside the clique.

Equivalence. Status positions in corporate units and memberships in categoric units often reveal equivalence by virtue of standing in the same kind of relation to other status positions. Thus, students in universities, stay-at-home mothers in families, line workers in industry, secretaries in firms, and members of devalued categoric units all find themselves in similar status locations *vis-à-vis* other status positions. Students stand in the same position relative to professors, as do moms with children and spouses, workers to their foreman, secretaries to their bosses, and members of devalued categoric units to members of more highly evaluated categoric units. Because of these equivalences, individuals share common experiences (in relation to other status positions), develop common orientations, and hence, become more likely to behave in similar ways. To phrase the matter in terms of microdynamic forces, individuals in equivalent locations in networks will typically have played roles, normatized the situation, met transactional needs, and managed their emotions in similar ways.

When individuals who are structurally equivalent interact, this similarity in their status relative to sets of other status positions will allow them to interact in a manner of persons in the same positions in dense networks. Even though they may have had no previous experience with each other, they can more readily form and sustain encounters. They will generally pay less attention to status of self and others in corporate units and devote more attention on (a) diffuse status characteristics (at least initially), (b) role-playing styles, (c) transactional needs, and (d) emotional states of others as they fine-tune their responses to each other. For example, students from different

college campuses often meet for some activity, and from my observations, they immediately launch into more relaxed interactions, paying far less attention to situational ecology, status, and culture, since these are structurally equivalent, and more attention to the categoric membership, role-playing style, transactional needs, and emotional dispositions of others. And, if such equivalence is accompanied by density of ties and high rates of iteration of encounters, then the salience of diffuse status characteristics will decline, while attention to role-playing, transactional needs, and emotions will increase. The same can be said for parents in parks, fans at games rooting for the same team, and other situations where there is structural and cultural equivalence that reduces the salience of status, diffuse status characteristics, and normatizing; by default, individuals turn to more fine-grained interaction around role playing, meeting needs, and managing emotions as forces driving encounters among the structurally equivalent.

Centrality. In many networks, some locations are more central than others in that communication and flows of resources must pass through particular positions to reach other positions. In an extreme case, all communication and resources flow would have to move through only one central position to reach any other position, although in most networks of any size, there are typically several central nodes. Networks revealing centrality will, I believe, make individuals more attuned to status because those in central positions have power to regulate the flow of information and resources to and from others in the network. Centrality thus increases the concentration of power and authority, and because this power is used to regulate the flow of resources, all others in the network remain aware of their status relative to the status of central nodes in the network. As a result, role-playing, meeting transactional needs, normatizing, and displaying emotions are coordinated to accommodate the demands of central figures in the networks. Of course, as Richard Emerson (1962) emphasized, if centrality is used to increase power and authority over others, then the latter may initiate a number of balancing operations to reduce the monopolistic hold of central nodes on those less central, but even as individuals work to reduce the authority of central players, status remains salient since it is inequalities in status that drive the search for alternative sources for resources.

Power and Authority as Status

When individuals display competence in task activities, they are often able to claim the right to direct the actions of others. In so doing, they acquire

power and authority. Once they do so, expectation states are likely to crystallize among members of groups about the competence of those with higher and lower degrees of authority. When encounters are embedded within corporate units, the vertical division of labor establishes lines of authority, with individuals in authority presumed (by expectation states) to have more competence and to have the right to tell others what to do. And, the more the corporate unit is embedded in an institutional domain revealing an explicit ideology, the more moral are these expectation states.

As long as incumbents in positions of authority demonstrate competence in their behaviors, expectation states will not be questioned by subordinates; and if authority is defined as moral by the ideologies of institutional domains, those in authority will have rights to use power that is legitimated by general cultural symbols that superordinates and subordinates alike accept as appropriate. More interesting, perhaps, are situations where these dynamics sustaining expectation states and the moral right to authority break down along a number of potential fronts: those in authority do not act competently; those in authority alienate and antagonize subordinates; those in authority are challenged by some with less status; those in authority cannot legitimize their rights with institutional ideologies; and those in authority or subordinates act in ways that reduce status differences. Let me briefly examine these basic types of situations.

When those in authority do not meet expectation states, they inevitably arouse negative emotions among others – emotions such as anger, frustration, disappointment – and if the failure to meet expectations persists, emotions such as alienation will spread among subordinates. Under these conditions, the moral premises of institutional ideologies will work against incumbents in positions of authority because they will be seen as not measuring up to their moral obligations; and as a consequence, the legitimacy of the status held by a person will decline rapidly and will be very hard to restore. The responses of those holding status have large effects on what transpires in the encounter (Lovaglia 1997; Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Houser and Lovaglia 2002). If this holder of authority attributes the responses of others to the action of subordinates rather than to self, then annoyance and anger will be expressed, thus increasing the distance between high- and low-ranking individuals as negative emotions among subordinates are aroused. If, however, the holder of authority makes self-attributions for failures to meet expectations, this person will experience shame, embarrassment, and potentially guilt. If these emotions cause a person to react defensively and assert authority, then status differences will increase between low- and high-ranking persons, but the former will withdraw legitimacy and engaged in alienated conformity. If the holder of authority

acknowledges his or her failings, status distance will decrease and the ability of leaders to use their authority in all situations will decline.

Whether as an outcome of the dynamics summarized above or as a general style of exercising authority, those who use their authority arbitrarily to disrupt the routines of subordinates and to degrade subordinates will arouse fear, anger, embarrassment, and even shame in subordinates. These emotions can become the impetus to conflict with superordinates, thereby reducing status differences and group solidarity at the same time, or to alienation of subordinates from those with authority. In either case, the status of those with authority is diminished, and in extreme cases, authority is only sustained by slavish conformity by subordinates and constant monitoring by those with authority over subordinates' actions.

If authority is challenged by subordinates, fellow subordinates will sanction negatively those who make the challenge, if they perceive holders of authority to be legitimate and/or if they believe that challenges will disrupt the flow of positive emotions in the group (Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). If, however, authority is not fully legitimated and/or if authority is used abusively, challenges can be a first foray into more explicit conflict between superordinates and subordinates. If conflict cannot remove persons in authority and, in fact, increases their use of abusive authority, then subordinates will become even more alienated, whereas if conflict leads to changes in authority and new holders of authority meet expectation states, then legitimization of status becomes more likely.

When those in authority downplay their rights to tell others what to do and, instead, seek input from subordinates and give off positive emotions to group members, status distance declines (Lovaglia and Houser 1996). Those in authority are more liked by subordinates, with the latter giving off positive emotions and perceiving authority to be legitimate. However, as status distances decline, the clarity of status also decreases, with the result that there will be more ambiguity about when authority can and should be used, how informal relations between super- and subordinates can be, when suggestions to authority can be made, and other questions about how those in higher and lower ranks are to interact. Informality and the flow of positive emotions increase solidarity, to be sure, but they also decrease clarity of status which, in turn, makes it difficult to know when status differences are salient, how roles should be played, how needs are to be met, how situations are to be normalized, and what emotions can be felt and displayed. Without sufficient clarity of relative status locations, a *faux pas* becomes more likely which, in turn, will reverse the polarity of emotional arousal to the negative pole and force those in authority to re-assert their rights, which will produce negative emotions among subordinates that can activate some of the outcomes discussed above.

Prestige and Honor as Status

Those with power and authority are typically given both prestige and honor; and more generally, those who hold shares of all valued resources are also given prestige. As emphasized in Chaps. 1 and 2, generalized symbolic media of institutional domains are not only the basis for ideological formation that legitimate status, these media – e.g., money, power, health, learning, knowledge, sacredness/piety, love/loyalty, aesthetics, and the like – are also valued resources in their own right; and like other resources, they are unequally distributed by corporate units. As a general rule, the more of these resources that persons possess, the more likely are they to be given deference, honor, and prestige. While money and power (as authority) are highly valued in most societies, they are not the only prestige-giving resources. Knowledge, learning, sacredness, and other symbolic media as resources can also, under varying conditions, be the basis for prestige. Indeed, studies of prestige in advanced post-industrial societies all document the extent to which resources like knowledge and learning can bestow prestige, per se. Moreover, this prestige will increase when knowledge and learning allow individuals to claim authority or earn high incomes. Thus, the more encounters are embedded in relatively autonomous institutional domains, those who can lay claim to the generalized symbolic media of a domain will be given prestige; and the more persons can garner resources across a variety of differentiated institutional domains, the greater will be their capacity to lay claims to prestige in all encounters. Indeed, high shares of many resources become very much like a diffuse status characteristic that are carried into a wide variety of encounters and allows individuals to claim prestige.

Prestige and honor are always attached to members of categoric units that are highly valued, whereas members of categoric units that are devalued or stigmatized cannot claim honor or prestige. These differences in evaluation stem from locations in the stratification system, where holders of valued and varied resources receive prestige and holders of few valued resources are stigmatized and devalued. Thus, class is an important categoric unit, either increasing or decreasing the capacity to claim deference, honor, and prestige. When memberships in other categoric units are correlated with the rank-ordering of classes, membership in these other units – e.g., age, ethnic, religious, gender, educational – will bestow prestige when correlated with higher-class positions or stigma when correlated with lower-class positions in the stratification system (Turner 2010a, 2011). When a categoric unit or set of such units (e.g., white, male) is correlated with class (say, upper class),

then being a white male will allow persons to claim honor in many situations, whereas when a set of categoric units – e.g., ethnicity, coupled with dark skin – is correlated with lower class positions, then dark ethnics will have difficulty garnering prestige and, in fact, will find themselves devalued by others. Thus, consolidation of parameters marking categoric unit memberships increases the stratification of prestige, with the consequence that prestige is likely to cause positive emotional arousal, whereas low prestige will lead to negative emotional arousal. As a further consequence, the stratification of positive and negative emotions is tied to the distribution of prestige in encounters. Prestige and positive emotions thus become highly generalized and valued resources that, like all resources, are unequally distributed.

Yet, categoric units carry different evaluations, above and beyond, their correlations with class and resource distributions in the stratification system. Memberships in categoric units often carry evaluations, per se, that allow their members to claim or not claim prestige. For example, in American society, to be old is somewhat stigmatizing, whereas in many pre-literate societies age was honored; ethnic minorities are often devalued simply by virtue of their ethnicity that, in turn, leads to discrimination which prevents them from securing prestige-giving resources; members of religious denominations may be devalued simply for their religion, even if they hold resources and even more so if they do not; gender, per se, has been unequally valued since hunting and gathering societies, with women given less honor than men (even with dramatic changes over the last decades). Thus, categoric unit memberships become a prominent basis for the differential evaluation of individuals' worth and hence their claim to honor and prestige. When categoric unit memberships are correlated or consolidated with resource shares, the evaluation of the worth of memberships becomes more polarized and extreme. In contrast, when memberships in categoric units are not correlated with but, instead, intersect with diverse locations in corporate units and with class positions in the stratification system, the differential evaluation of categoric units is less severe and polarizing, thereby decreasing the effects of categoric unit membership on the rights to claim prestige in encounters.

Embedding of Status

I have already addressed this issue in some detail, but let me briefly summarize the main effects of embedding on status. The more an encounter is embedded in corporate and categoric units and the more, respectively, these

units are embedded in autonomous institutional domains with coherent ideologies and in the stratification system legitimated by meta-ideologies from dominant institutional domains, the more salient, clear, and moral will status and the expectation states for status become. The greater the clarity of status and the expectation states for status, the more will individuals understand their status *vis-à-vis* others, while successfully role-making and role-taking, normatizing the situation, meeting transactional needs, and managing emotions. Conversely, the less embedded is status, the more ambiguous will status become, and hence, the more individuals will need to work at status-taking and status-making, role-taking and role-making, normatizing, meeting transactional needs, and managing emotions. To the degree that status is embedded in the vertical divisions of labor in corporate units, the more likely will status carry authority and prestige. The more diffuse status characteristics are correlated with the ranking of classes in the stratification system, the more moral will evaluations of categoric units become, with those ranking high in the stratification system being seen as more “worthy” than those low in the system. As an outcome, the more unequal will be the distribution of the resources by institutional domains; and as resources are distributed unequally, so will more generalized resources such as prestige and the positive emotions that come from holding high shares of resources.

When categoric unit memberships are correlated (or consolidated) with the vertical divisions of labor in corporate units, the greater will be the salience of (a) authority in the division of labor in all encounters (b) the moral evaluation of categoric unit membership. Conversely, the more categoric unit memberships intersect with (i.e., do not correlate with) locations in the hierarchical divisions of labor in corporate units and the greater is the number of institutional domains in which categoric unit memberships intersects with the divisions of labor, the more salient will be status as authority in corporate-unit locations relative to diffuse status characteristics as markers of memberships in categoric units.

Status Dynamics in Unfocused Encounters

The capacity to status-take and role-take is limited in unfocused encounters by the necessity to stay unfocused. Individuals must monitor each other’s behavioral trajectories without face engagement, with the result that it is difficult to determine status, roles, motivational dispositions, awareness of norms, and emotional states. Yet, if possible within the confines of staying

unfocused, information on status is useful, and so, people covertly look for status cues. Moreover, if they can, individuals will send out status cues to others, thereby facilitating their movements in space while sustaining a lack of focus.

The conditions outlined in principle 6 emphasize some of the key conditions increasing the viability of unfocused encounters. The larger the space and the greater the spacing of individuals, the easier it is for them to monitor each other without face engagement and to search for status cues. For example, the manner in which individuals claim territories of self can signal much about status as can the use of available props can offer clues about a person's status. Most important, however, is the embedding of an unfocused encounter in corporate and categoric units, coupled with knowledgeability about the institutional domains in which corporate units are embedded and the degree to which categoric unit membership is embedded in the societal stratification system. This embedding can significantly increase the chances that the status of self and others can be determined, at least to the point that it facilitates movement through the ecology and demography of space.

Determining Status in Corporate Units

The key to discovering status in corporate units embedded in institutional domains is visibility of markers denoting a person's location in the division of labor of a corporate unit. At times, it is relatively easy to determine when the unfocused encounter is embedded in a corporate unit by the very fact that the corporate unit has a physical boundary that marks entrances and exits from the unit. Moreover, if entrance and exit rules require rituals during movement in and out of the corporate unit, it is that much easier to assess if an encounter is embedded in a corporate unit. Thus, simply walking into a building and engaging in ritualized interaction with a receptionist activates the norms for public behavior in a corporate unit and the institutional domain in which this unit is embedded. To enter a doctor's office, for instance, involves crossing a boundary (by opening the door), and then the process of signing-in and presenting insurance information can be viewed as a set of ritualized practices that reinforces the norms appropriate for corporate units embedded in the institutional domain of medicine. Moreover, for critical status positions, individuals will generally be adorned with clothing and objects signaling their status. For example, a non-medical person will often not wear a uniform or any distinguishing objects; instead,

normal clothing for office work will adorn the body. Nurses and doctors, in contrast, typically wear clothing such as a lab coat, often with the persons' name and rank as a doctor or nurse. Indeed, when the higher-ranking medical staff do not wear objects denoting their status, patients can feel uneasy. For example, for some years in the 1970s, my doctor never wore a lab coat; and in fact, he had long hair tied into a ponytail and favored loud Hawaiian-style shirts. I thought that this was rather amusing, but when I asked some friends who also used this clinic why they did not see this physician (Harvard educated and quite good in my estimation), they replied that they did not like his "bedside manner" – which is one of the reasons that I liked him. The first time that I walked back to the examination room in this doctor's office, I navigated past the doctor without focus since he seemed to be another patient and thus not available for talk, even a perfunctory ritual greeting. I can only imagine how others responded to him in the elevator, cafeteria, and other public places in this large clinic; his status would be unknown, unless he had been (as he probably was) the subject of gossip in which case he would probably be defined as eccentric. Moreover, when seeing him in a hospital, he was probably more difficult to spot because he did not wear markers indicating that he was indeed a doctor. In fact, he looked like someone's "biker-dude" relative who was visiting his brother in the hospital. In hospitals, individuals wear clothing marking their rank; and sometimes clothing differences can be rather subtle, but individuals in a culture typically can recognize the differences. A number of years ago, I had surgery in a Swiss hospital where I stayed for over three weeks, first in my hospital bed for eleven days and later in their guest house where I would sit all day writing on my computer in the cafeteria serving the hospital staff, who took their main noon meal and breaks in the cafeteria. It took me almost three weeks of my stay to figure out the rather diverse set of uniforms worn by personnel – cleaning personnel, aids to nurses, ambulance staff (who administered the pain killers in my room), nurses of various ranks, doctors, food carriers, and other positions in the division of labor (which, because this was a German-speaking hospital, would be arranged hierarchically). My doctor and his team of trainees walked around in matched white pants, belts, and polo shirts with the hospital logo, whereas as other doctors put on the lab coat typically with a stethoscope conspicuously hanging out of the pocket; nurses wore uniforms that were not much different than the cleaning personnel, and so it took a while to determine who was a nurse and who was a cleaning person, unless of course, one was walking around with a bucket and mop. In public places, nurses could be addressed with a greeting ritual in movement around the public areas (indeed, they were very friendly), if one came in close contact (such as an elevator or narrow hallway) but

doctors were off limits. My team of doctors was not off limits, but the greeting rituals were rapid and quickly moved to reduced face-engagement, unless I had a question that required an explanation. I committed a number of *faux pas* before I learned the rules of public spaces in this hospital.

When locations in the divisions of labor in a corporate unit are correlated or consolidated with membership in distinctive categoric units, it becomes easier to determine the status of individuals. For example, 50 years ago, the vast majority of nurses were women, while the reverse was true for doctors, and hence gender was often a proxy clue to status in medical settings. The same was true in the corporate world where the most executives were male, with most secretaries being female. Similarly, when the specific types of positions in the division of labor, especially its vertical dimension, are correlated with membership in ethnic categoric units, ethnic markers can supplement uniforms to add information about the status of individuals. For example, if service personnel in any corporate unit are ethnic minorities of color, skin color helps establish their status. Under these conditions, the members of this ethnic category who happen to perform higher-ranking work (than fellow ethnics performing janitorial tasks) will generally wear uniforms and other adornments to distinguish themselves in public places. In hotels, for example, clothing, adorned with ties, leather shoes, and name tags stating status become essential to avoid a potential *faux pas* of addressing a higher-ranked person as if he or she was a lower-ranking ethnic, especially when higher-ranking staff are of the same ethnicity as the majority of lower-ranking staff. In American society, we tend to establish momentary face engagement with all categories of persons in tight public places, such as the hallway of a hotel, but in many parts of the world, this is a violation of the norms of public places. Only the maids who clean rooms are to be addressed, with all other inquiries made to persons in a specific place, standing in uniform behind a reception counter. Personnel appear to understand American's tendency to say hello to anything that moves, and so we are granted a certain license for our ignorance of the rules of public places (although one can observe a subtle effort to mask annoyance).

Status and Categoric Units

As the above suggests, categoric-unit membership is also critical in determining status outside the divisions of labor in corporate units. In larger public places, as well as in more confined spaces such as sidewalks, elevators, lobbies, and other public arenas, knowing a persons' categoric unit membership can

be critical to navigating space. For example, if younger children are in space, such as a public park, the rules of unfocus are very different than if older persons occupied a park. Children are allowed to break unfocus and to invade the territories of self of others, whereas adults are not; and if a parent sees his or her child invading the space of another, it is often incumbent on the parent to issue a sanction to the child and an apology to the adult whose territory of self has been breached. When the parameters marking categoric unit membership are nominal – that is, one is either a member or not – it is easier to determine membership. Thus, males and females in public places can, for the most part, be readily determined by biological markers plus large differences in clothing and objects attached to body and clothing; and as a result, it is easy to sustain unfocus while navigating space. Indeed, even in the United States, males and females who are strangers rarely acknowledging each other's presence in public places, unless they are in confined proximity in which case it can be appropriate for males to signal that they are not threatening (with simple greetings and with unthreatening body demeanor). In contrast, males are most likely to nod their heads to other males when in close proximity.

In determining categoric unit membership and its relation to status, graduated parameters can pose problems because it is often difficult to know where on the graduated parameter a person is. When, for instance, does a man go from middle-age to old? When is a dark skinned person sufficiently “dark” to become “black”? When is a child no longer a child but a teenager, for whom very different expectations apply? Is a person rich or just affluent? When relevant to their own movement in unfocused encounters (and in focused ones as well), persons will typically convert graduated parameters into quasi-nominal parameters. For purposes of sustaining unfocus, this categorization is a convenient way to develop expectations about the likely behavior of others. For instance, expectations for a teenager on a skateboard are very different than those for a middle-aged male on a skateboard (in my part of the world, this is common); and so, with the teenager, I always give them plenty of room to “do their thing” (mostly obnoxious) than I do an “adult” on a board in public places. I also respond to teenage girls and boys on skateboards very differently, treating girls more like mature men because they tend to be less hyper and significantly more polite in public places.

When categoric unit memberships mark class position, expectations for behaviors in public places vary. When individuals perceive each other as in the same social class position – roughly converted into nominal parameters like poor, working class, middle class, affluent, and rich – navigating public arenas is relatively easy, whether the arena be a park in an affluent area, a

corporate unit filled with professional white workers, a school in a poor or rich part of town, a street corner in an ethnic ghetto, a shopping mall that draws shoppers from either affluent or poor social classes. When public areas involve unfocused encounters among individuals of *different* social classes, however, persons tend to be highly attuned to dress, clothing and body adornments, and demeanor cues about the social class positions of others. Since the dress, adornments, and demeanor of individuals from very different social classes vary, it is often rather easy to note social class of those around you and, on the basis of this information, to navigate public places. In general, the greater the class differences among individuals, the more the higher-class persons will navigate away from lower-class positions, if they can. Reciprocally, public places can become arenas for lower-class persons to vent some of their diffuse anger at their situation in life and, hence, to act more aggressively, often violating rules of public demeanor and, thereby, intimidating more affluent persons. This reality, especially in American society, is not lost of higher-class persons who generally give those of a different class backgrounds a wide berth.

When memberships in other categoric units, such as ethnicity, are correlated with class position, members of ethnic categories can supplement demeanor cues, dress, and adornments of clothing and body as clues to their class background. Because categoric units almost always carry moral evaluations of worth, and especially when correlated with class location in the stratification system, individuals will carry themselves differently in public places. Those in lower classes and devalued ethnic categories will generally display deference demeanors, unless they are deliberately or even subliminally venting diffuse aggression against those who are more affluent. Historically, members of lower social classes, especially when consolidated with devalued non-class categoric units like ethnicity, carried subservient demeanor in public places when members of higher social classes and more valued categoric units were present (Annet and Collins 1975). But, in some societies like the United States where great reservoirs of anger exist among those who feel that they have not received their fair shares of resources, these older deference and demeanor patterns are typically absent. As a result, the more affluent will generally distance themselves from those in lower classes and devalued categoric units, ready with ritualized responses if a breach to unfocus should occur. And much of the time, the more affluent will avoid public places altogether where members of valued and devalued categoric units congregate. For example, I have always viewed the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) in California as a great democratizing influence in California in that all persons – rich and poor, valued or devalued – have traditionally had to stand in line; thus, the DMV forces

members of different social categories to sit, stand, move, and somehow avoid face engagement in a rather crowded setting. Even when the DMV office is crowded, which is most of the time, avoiding face engagements is still the general rule, unless someone else is immediately co-present in line or, these days, sitting close by in the bleacher seats waiting for their number to be called. And, if face engagements occur, the responses are highly ritualized complaints about the DMV since individuals often have little else in common. In fact, the DMV historically is one of the few places where the diversity in the population in California are co-present under conditions where unfocus is the norm. Under these conditions, the exaggerated body language to signal the avoidance of face engagement and the stylized and ritualized interactions when unfocus is broken indicate how awkward everyone feels. Computerization of much DMV activity, however, now makes it possible to schedule appointments or do the necessary paper work online, but the assembling of individuals from diverse classes and categoric unit memberships is a reminder that individuals who can claim honor and prestige tend to avoid being co-present with those who cannot.

When categoric unit membership is correlated with class position in the stratification system, the effect of status on even unfocused encounters is more evident; it becomes easier to determine the social “worth” of persons by their categoric unit memberships, however unfair such judgments may be. Individuals will know how much social and ecological distance to maintain to avoid face engagements, and they will have the necessary repair rituals at the ready if the rules of unfocus are violated. If the breach of unfocus is aggressively initiated by the “less worthy” person, there is always uncertainty about how to respond to intrusive acts since rituals can rarely manage the intense and diffuse aggression; and again, for this reason, more “valued” persons often avoid places where they must navigate around those in devalued categories because the latter pose threats to their well being in some societies, like the United States. It is for this reason that pan-handling poses a problem to the public order in many cities; individuals do not like to be verbally accosted in public places and forced to interact, however briefly, with members of devalued categoric units.

Still, despite these problems stemming from high levels of inequality in the stratification system, knowing the status of self and others in the divisions of labor within various types of corporate units or in differentially valued categoric units facilitates the flow of unfocused encounters. They become more viable when individuals know each other’s relative status in meso-level structures and their respective cultures and, by extension, institutional domains and the stratification system in which meso structures are embedded. Knowledge of status will inform individuals

about how much space to give others, how to adjust demeanors, how to use props, how to claim use-spaces, how to emit rituals necessary to manage breaches to unfocus.

Elementary Principles on Status Dynamics in Encounters

We are now in a position to add to the small body of principles on microdynamics that have been developed so far. We need to emphasize the importance of expectation states in general, because they always surround status. Indeed, status only takes on real meaning in interaction when the expectations on persons in categoric units and in positions of the divisions of labor in corporate units are examined. While status is most relevant to the dynamics of more focused encounters, because it sets constraints for how all other microdynamic forces will play out, status cues can greatly facilitate sustaining the viability of unfocused encounters. Thus, below, I add two more long but still relatively straightforward principles to the propositional inventory.

7. The more status is salient and relevant in a focused encounter, the more likely will the participants in this encounter be able to create and sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with effects of status being:
 - A. A positive function of the stability in the expectation states attached to status, with this stability of expectation states increasing with:
 1. Individuals' abilities to meet expectation states associated with status
 2. Consistency among status beliefs generating expectation states
 3. Differentiation of status and the expectation states associated with status
 4. Embeddedness of encounters in the structure and culture of meso-level units, with the effects of embedding increasing with:
 - a. The existence of referential structures, or beliefs about "just" and "fair" payoffs of resources that correspond to inequalities in expectation states on those with different degrees of status
 - b. The existence of status beliefs that both establish and legitimate status differences, with the effects of status beliefs increasing with:
 - (1) Salience of institutional ideologies, as these reflect value premises in a society, to establish expectation states and evaluations associated with status in corporate units

- (2) Salience of meta-ideologies, composed of the ideologies of those institutional domains distributing resources, to establish expectation states and evaluations of members of categoric units
 - (3) Consistency among ideologies, meta-ideologies, status beliefs, and referential structures used to establish expectation states and evaluations of status
- B. A negative function of instability in the expectation states attached to status, with instability increasing with:
1. Iterations of encounters over time that lower the salience of status, particularly diffuse status characteristics generated by membership in categoric units
 2. Strategizing by individuals to raise their status, which is most effective when:
 - a. Avoiding direct challenges to the rights and prerogatives of higher status persons
 - b. Using indirect strategies of displaying competence and other characteristics needed to raise status
 3. Intersections of differentially evaluated status characteristics, especially the intersection of diffuse status characteristics among memberships in differentially valued categoric units with positions in divisions of labor in corporate units
 4. Ambiguity in persons' status, particularly their diffuse status characteristics associated with categoric unit membership
 5. High levels of negative emotional arousal among those in subordinate status positions in corporate units or in devalued categoric units
- C. A positive function of the clarity of status which, in turn, is a positive function of the degree of embedding of the encounter in corporate and categoric units (with embedding increasing clarity under the conditions listed in 4-A and 4-B above), while being a negative function of:
1. The prevalence of status competition and games of micropolitics among individuals with the same or different status
 2. The degree of intersection of diffuse status characteristics for individuals in categoric units with their locations in the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor in corporate units
 3. The rate of iteration of encounters over time, especially with respect to decreasing clarity of diffuse status characteristics from categoric unit memberships and horizontal divisions of labor in corporate units

4. The pervasiveness of intersections between diffuse status characteristics for individuals in categoric units and locations in the divisions of labor in corporate units across a wide variety of corporate units embedded in diverse institutional domains
- D. A positive function of the degree to which higher status incumbents use their authority and prestige to mark their rank *vis-à-vis* subordinates
 - E. A positive function of the degree of density of network ties among individuals in encounters which, in turn, is a negative function of the size of the encounter and the size of the corporate unit in which the encounter occurs, while potentially being mitigated by the formation of cliques within the lower-density network structures
 - F. A positive function of the degree of structural equivalence among individuals within the divisions of labor of corporate units and in categoric units *vis-à-vis* other locations in the divisions of labor and other categoric units, with structural equivalence increasing when:
 1. Corporate units evidence differentiated status positions, especially along a vertical axis of authority and prestige
 2. Categoric units are formed by nominal and quasi-nominal parameters that define status characteristics which are differentially evaluated by status beliefs derived from meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system
 3. Differentially evaluated categoric unit memberships are correlated with locations, especially vertical locations, in the divisions of labor of corporate units across diverse institutional domains
 - G. A positive function of the degree to which networks exhibit centrality whereby communication and resources must flow through particular status locations in the network, thereby increasing the power and authority of those occupying these central nodes in the network
 - H. A positive function of the degree to which status is defined by the relative power and authority of incumbents and the degree to which these differences in power are legitimated by subordinates, with legitimated status differences increasing with (1) the ability of those in authority to meet expectation states derived from institutional ideologies, while decreasing when (2) those with authority (a) fail to meet expectations or live up to institutional ideologies, (b) blame subordinates for their failure to meet expectations, and thereby, (c) arouse negative emotions among subordinates
 - I. A positive function of the degree to which status is defined and differentiated by the relative prestige of incumbents, with the ability to garner prestige and deference from others increasing with:

1. Inequalities in the resource shares held by members of categoric units and by incumbents in locations in the division of labor of corporate units
 2. Correlation (or consolidation) of moral worth in categoric units with rank in divisions of labor within corporate units
 3. Intersection of parameters marking categoric unit membership with positions, especially ranked positions, in the divisions of labor within corporate units embedded in diverse institutional domains
8. The more status can be determined using ecological and demographic markers, the greater will be its effects on unfocused encounters, and hence, the more likely will participants be able to sustain unfocus, with the ability to determine status increasing with:
- A. The visibility of markers of status in the divisions of labor of corporate units, with visibility increasing with :
 1. Discreteness of boundaries marking corporate units and use-spaces in these units, which increases with:
 - a. The visibility of entrances to, and exits from, corporate units
 - b. The explicitness of rules governing entrances and exits
 - c. The emission of ritual acts during entrances and exits
 2. The degree to which positions in the divisions of labor within corporate units can be marked by objects and behavioral demeanor
 3. The degree of correlation (consolidation) of positions in the division of labor with differentially valued memberships in diverse categoric units
 - B. The visibility of parameters marking categoric unit membership, with visibility of members in categoric units increasing with:
 1. Discrete or nominal parameters marking categoric unit membership
 2. Categoric memberships that are marked by visible objects, props, and role demeanor
 3. Graduated parameters that are converted into visible quasi-nominal parameters
 4. Differential evaluation of categoric units, which is a joint function of:
 - a. The degree of correlation of categoric unit memberships with class locations in the stratification system
 - b. The differential evaluation of members of categoric units by status beliefs derived from the meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system

Conclusion

The ecology, demography, and status order are generally the most embedded of all microdynamics. The ecology of most encounters and the locations of individuals in the status order are highly constrained by embedding in corporate and categoric units. Ecology plugs individuals into physical space, often structured by corporate units; and the status order places individuals in positions within the divisions of labor of corporate units. Ecology and status thus become two key conduits by which macro level structure and culture work their way down to the encounter, via meso-level structures and culture. The ecology of an encounter, coupled with the divisions of labor of corporate units, determines how many persons are co-present in encounters, how they use props and use spaces, and how they move about and assemble in physical space. The other key demographic feature of an encounter – the nature and characteristics of those co-present – is also determined by the ecology and the status order, but the key to understanding the demography of encounters is the distribution of members across categoric units. Just as divisions of labor in corporate units operate as the conduit for the structure and culture of institutional domains to reach the encounter, so the embedding of categoric units in the societal stratification system brings to the encounter differential evaluations of individuals at different locations in the class order. And when other parameters marking categoric units are correlated with the class locations of persons, the power of the stratification system to influence what transpires in encounters in all encounters is that much greater.

The two dimensions of the status order – that is, positions in the division of labor and membership in categoric units – are primarily vehicles by which individuals are attached to meso- and macro-level reality. These realities constrain what occurs in encounters, to a much higher degree than sociologists are often willing to admit, in their haste to see humans as having the capacity for agency. But, in fact, most encounters, most of the time are far more constrained by the status order than by creative or even rebellious acts of agency. As I have emphasized, however, the status order always contains inequalities and ideologies legitimating these inequalities, and therefore, this order will systematically generate tensions at the level of the encounter; and under conditions that can be theorized, these tensions can lead to acts (especially in iterated encounters) that change the culture and structure of meso reality and, at key moments, macrostructures and cultures as well.

In the next chapters on roles, motivational needs, culture and normatizing, and emotions, it will become evident that these other microdynamic

forces are somewhat less constrained by embedding. To be sure, the valences of these forces and their operation are certainly influenced by the culture and structure of meso-level as well as macro-level social reality. Still, there are more possibilities for acts at the level of the encounter to change social structures and their cultures because they are less directly tied to meso structures, especially when compared to ecology, demography, and status. In the end, as I will examine in later chapters, what transpires at the level of encounters can, under certain conditions, cause social change when all of the microdynamic forces are in play and evidence particular valences. If only ecology, demography, and status were operating, social reality would resemble an ant colony, or at least a bee hive where some flight is allowed. Of course, unless meso and macro reality constrained the behaviors of individuals encounters, the social world would be too chaotic, and indeed not even possible. Other microdynamics forces must also contribute to the stability and predictability of human behavior and interaction, but they also contain great potential for acts that change social relations.

In the next chapter on role dynamics, we can see this potential in the very nature of roles. On the one hand, roles are attached to status, and hence circumscribed by the structure and culture of meso and macrostructures, but on the other hand, individuals have latitude to role-make and orchestrate their presentations of self to others, and in so doing, they can push on the constraints of social structure and culture. Still, most of the time for most people in most situations, roles are made in ways that allow interactants to fit in, to get along, and to verify themselves; and yet, there is more room to maneuver in roles than in status. And, since it is through role behaviors that individuals meet their needs, normatize a situation in culture, and emit emotions, the change potential in roles can be greatly magnified by other microdynamic forces.

And yet, we should not go overboard on this point because social change is, to a very large extent, generated by macrodynamic forces (see Vol. I on *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*). These forces may put persons into motion to find solutions to selection pressures and, thereby, be innovative and create new kinds of sociocultural formations. Moreover, in so doing, microdynamics are always in play as individuals in encounters develop new ways to organize activity, but the change was more macro-level in its ultimate origins. Thus, in contrast to much micro chauvinism, I am more cautious about seeing the micro order as the primary engine of change. It can be so, to be sure, but equally if not more often, change comes from selection pressures on whole populations or form dynamics built into existing sociocultural formations. For example, once markets and money are the major distributive mechanisms in a society, they have dynamics of their own that

literally push both individual and collective actors to behave in certain ways. Or, if religious elites control power and other resources, inherent in this control is also control of individuals in corporate units. Or, if stratification generates high levels of inequality, inherent in this fact is conflict and change, at least in the long run. People in encounters are, of course, responding to these pressures from the macro realm, and so they are agents of change, but this conclusion is not the same as much micro chauvinism, which often assumes that change *only* originates at the micro realm. Perhaps such is the case sometimes, but certainly not most of the time.

Chapter 5

Role Dynamics in Encounters

Despite its importance to sociological analysis, the concept of roles remains rather vaguely conceptualized. Part of the reason for this vagueness is that roles organize the behaviors through which other microdynamic processes operate; and as a consequence, role dynamics become complex. Just listing the many dimensions of roles can best bring home this point. For instance, roles are cultural in that there is usually a script or set of expectations for how individuals should behave in a particular situation or in a status position (Linton 1936; Goffman 1959, 1967); roles are cognitive in that persons carry in their stocks of knowledge inventories of roles and elements of roles that they use to interpret the actions of others and to orchestrate their behaviors in order to make a role for themselves (Turner 1962, 1988, 2002); roles are the mechanism by which persons come to understand the dispositions and to anticipate the likely actions of others during the course of interaction (Mead 1934); roles are the anchor that gives individuals a sense that they are experiencing the same reality (Schutz 1932 [1967]); roles are played on a stage or in an ecological location and often involve the use of props to bring off a line of conduct (Goffman 1959); roles are what give meaning to ecological settings, props, and use-spaces (Goffman 1963, 1967, 1971); roles are used strategically to bring off a performance and to secure resources, and conversely, roles can be the means by which resources are mobilized for exchanges with others and, at times become a resource in and of themselves (Callero 1994); roles are the vehicle by which individuals verify their various levels of self (Burke 1980; Burke and Stets 2009; Stryker 1980); roles are also the vehicle by which other transactional needs are realized, allowing persons to secure resources in exchange, to feel included in ongoing activity, to achieve a sense of trust, and to experience a sense of facticity (Turner 2002, 2008); roles are the means for signaling which elements of culture to what degree are relevant in normatizing encounters (Turner 1962, 1968, 2002); roles are both behavioral adjuncts to status (Park 1926) and the means and resources for asserting status (Clark 1990);

and roles are the vehicle by which emotions are often displayed to others (Moreno 1934 [1953]; Turner 2008).

This partial listing of the complexity of role dynamics helps account for variations in the ways that roles have been conceptualized by sociologists. My goal in this chapter is to retain a robust conception of roles and, yet, to isolate what I see as the key properties of roles as a microdynamic force in focused and unfocused encounters. Let me begin with focused encounters, where the complexity of role dynamics is greatest.

The Dynamics of Roles in Focused Encounters

Role-Taking and Role-Making

Role-taking. George Herbert Mead (1934) emphasized that the key mechanism of interaction is the ability of persons to read each other's gestures and, thereby, to determine their dispositions to act in particular ways. He termed this process *taking the role of the other*, or *role-taking*. Role-taking depends upon other behavioral capacities. One is the ability to use *conventional* or *significant gestures* that mean the same thing to the person sending and to the person receiving the information communicated by words, vocal inflections, and body language. Another is the behavioral capacity for *mind* or the ability to imagine the consequences of various courses of action for self and others, to inhibit inappropriate responses, and to select that course of action that would lead to adjustment and adaptation to a social situation. Adaptation was seen by Mead as the ability to cooperate with others (by taking their roles) in ongoing concerted and coordinated actions (his labels for what Goffman termed *the encounter*). And a final behavioral capacity is the ability to see and respond to *self as an object in the environment* during coordinated actions and to evaluate self from the perspective of others who are present in the encounter, others not present, and even generalized others (built up from the norms, beliefs, and perspectives of communities of others). Reciprocally, role-taking involves the capacity to read the gestures of others and understand the identity or identities that others are presenting in a situation. By understanding the identities of others, it becomes easier to understand their dispositions and likely courses of action.

It is not necessary to add very much to Mead's conceptualization of role-taking. Let me translate and extend his ideas to the vocabulary that I am employing. Role-taking is, first of all, a process of reading all behavioral outputs of others to determine (a) the identities being asserted by others,

(b) the motivational states of others (for securing resources in exchanges, for group inclusion, for trust, and for facticity), (c) the underlying role that others are seeking to play in the situation, (d) the emotional states of others as these will influence interaction, (e) the status being presented and the expectations associated with this status, and (f) the culture being invoked to normalize the situation.

Secondly, role-taking is also the mechanism by which individuals see themselves as objects reflected in the mirror or “looking glass” created by the gestures of others (Cooley 1902). In viewing self from the perspective of others and more generalized others (or culture), individuals will experience positive or negative emotional arousal as they evaluate themselves. On the basis of this arousal, persons will adjust their lines of conduct so as to meet (a) their own transactional needs for identity-verification, profits in exchange payoffs, group inclusion, trust, and facticity, (b) the transactional needs of others, if they can, and (c) the expectation states associated with status and elements of culture invoked in the situation.

Role-making. Ralph H. Turner (1962) coined the term *role-making* to emphasize the converse of *role-taking*. In all encounters, individuals orchestrate, both consciously and unconsciously, their behavioral outputs and gestures to assert a role for themselves in the situation. To some degree, role-making is constrained by status (i.e., positions in the division of labor of a corporate unit and memberships in a categoric unit), situational ecology, and culture of corporate and categoric units, but individuals always have some latitude in how they make a role for themselves, even under relatively high degrees of constraint. For example, the role of student is only loosely constrained but there is a wide variety of ways that this role can be played, even in highly restrictive settings like a classroom. Moreover, the context of the encounter can vary in terms of the demography (number of people co-present and their diffuse status characteristics or membership in categoric units) of those co-present and the locations of individuals in the divisions of labor of corporate units; and these variations can change, thereby forcing adjustments to how individuals role-make. For instance, an encounter composed of students from one gender or ethnic categoric unit will be very different than one of mixed gender or ethnicity, and should other features of the encounter change, such as adding a professor to the mix, everyone in the encounter will need to re-role-make. Thus, inherent in the very nature of the forces impinging on encounters is potential and often the necessity for re-role making.

How a role is made is also very much influenced by the transactional needs that motivate individuals. Individuals carry multiple identities, and depending upon *which combination of identities* is salient (see Chap. 7), the

variant of any given role and the style with which it is played will reflect efforts to verify various dimensions of self. Similarly, depending upon the resources that individuals have to offer and the preferences that they have for the resources held by others, their efforts to realize a *profit in exchanges* will greatly circumscribe the role that they seek to make for themselves in an encounter. People also vary in their needs for *group inclusion*, and depending upon the nature of the encounter, they will play their roles in ways that allow them to feel that they are part of the ongoing flow of interaction. The same is true for people's sense of *trust* (that others are sincere, respectful of self, predictable, and capable of being in sync) and *facticity* (that the situation is "as it appears" and that reality has an obdurate character). Thus, there is always variability in how intensely transactional needs are felt, and moreover, the flow of an ongoing encounter can change the valences of these needs, thereby altering and re-directing their role-making efforts.

The Phenomenology and Psychology of Role-Making and Role-Taking

Ralph Turner's (1962, 1968, 2002) conceptualization of role-making as the reciprocal of role-taking introduces a more phenomenological argument into role theorizing: individuals operate under the "folk norm of consistency" in role-taking. They implicitly assume that the gestures of others constitute a syndrome marking an identifiable role; and they are often quite patient with another's behavior, waiting to discover the identifiable role that is being played out by another. There is also a Gestalt argument in Turner's view of the folk norm of consistency; humans are wired neurologically to see patterns of relationships (Kohler 1947; Koffka [1935] 1955), an early Gestalt Psychology idea that eventually evolved into notions of cognitive consistency, congruence, and balance (e.g., Heider 1946, 1958; Newcomb 1942, 1953; Harary 1969; Cartwright and Harary 1956). Humans are cognitively biased toward the visual sense modality, since this is our dominant sense, and thus individuals visually focus on patterns to gestures, especially non-verbal gestures, that reveal consistency. As I have argued and will explore further in Chap. 8 on emotions, humans are particularly attuned to gestures marking emotions, and they seek to discover (a) consistency among the emotional states revealed by the gestures of others, and (b) consistency between emotional phonemes and syntax, on the one side, and verbal utterances, on the other.

Thus, role-taking is directed not so much by a "folk *norm*" in the cultural sense as by deep neurological wiring to see patterns, even if these are not

immediately evident. This need for consistency is powerful, and so, individuals are often given time and latitude to communicate with others about the role that they are seeking to make for themselves. One consequence of this tendency is that breaches to an encounter become less likely as individuals exhibit patience in letting others make coherent roles for themselves. In fact, when individuals role-make, they are also role-taking and observe reactions of others to their role-making efforts. If there is seeming confusion in the responses of others, if only by minor facial gestures, the person can recalibrate gestures to clarify the role, or if necessary, to make a new role. This kind of recasting of role-making is only possible when individuals are given “the benefit of doubt” about what their gestures mean and, equally important, are given time and leeway to clarify role-making.

This “lag time” underscores the extent to which others implicitly recognize that discovering the underlying role being made is critical to avoiding not only breaches to the encounter but also to meeting their transactional needs for trust and facticity. Individuals have needs to feel that another in an encounter is being sincere, respectful of self, and predicable, and capable of being in rhythmic synchronization with self and others (trust) in the encounter; they also need to sense that persons and the situation are as they appear, that they are experiencing, for the purposes of the interaction, a common inter-subjective world with others, and that the encounter has an obdurate character (facticity). Much of this trust and facticity is only achieved when individuals recognize each other’s roles; and thus, to wait and give others’ time to reveal their roles – indeed, to assume that roles will be revealed – is critical to meeting these two transactional needs.

Other needs also depend upon successful role-taking and making. The most important transactional need is, as I will argue in Chap. 7, is verifying self. Tied up in role-making is the process of presenting, at a minimum, a (role) identity and, at maximum, all levels of self to others (i.e., group-, social-, and core-identities); and if a person cannot make a coherent role, his or her efforts at self-presentation and identity-verification will fail, thereby arousing highly negative emotions causing a breach to the encounter. Reciprocally, when others cannot determine the (role) identity and perhaps additional layers of self being presented by another, they become unsure of how to respond to this person and, hence, are likely to experience negative emotional arousal themselves, thus increasing the likelihood that needs for trust and facticity will go unmet. Moreover, when role-taking by a person leads to uncertainty about either the role or self being presented by another, it becomes difficult for this person to verify his or her identity(ies) since the gestures from others are ambiguous; again, the result is negative emotional arousal that disrupts and potentially breaches the encounter.

The same is true for the second most important transactional need: receiving a profit in exchanges of resources with others. Without coherent role-making from others, it becomes not only difficult to role-take but also to exchange resources with these others. Indeed, the mutual verification of self and understanding of each other's role is one of the most gratifying sets of resources that can be exchanged; and if an encounter cannot go this far in resource exchanges, the exchange of all other resources becomes that much more problematic – again, increasing the likelihood of negative emotional arousal and disruption of the encounter.

Inventories of Roles and Role-Making/Role-Taking

As is evident, there is a lot at stake in individuals making a role in an encounter and in determining the roles of others. When role-taking and role-making are unsuccessful, fundamental need states are not realized, thereby arousing negative emotions. Moreover, the smooth functioning of all other microdynamic processes become problematic and, as a consequence, a breach in the encounter becomes more likely. Without clear roles for individuals, status is difficult to establish, the meanings of ecology and demography of the encounter become ambiguous, normalizing the encounter by bringing culture to bear is no longer automatic, and as I have emphasized, experiencing and displaying appropriate emotions becomes problematic, especially if failures at role-taking and role-making generate negative emotions such as fear, anger, frustration, shame, embarrassment, irritation, and annoyance.

The search for patterns of consistency in gestures marking identifiable roles is thus crucial to the viability of an encounter. This process of discovering the patterns of gestures and the underlying role that they denote is facilitated by the fact that “loose cultural frameworks” are generally understood by participants in an encounter (Turner 1962); and these frameworks can be used to determine what the gestures of others mean for discovering roles. As I will emphasize shortly, embedding increases individuals capacity to know *which* “cultural frameworks” are relevant in a situation, but I would go beyond R. Turner and argue that individuals carry in their stocks of knowledge at hand (Schutz 1932 [1967]) *fine-tuned frameworks* about the roles denoted by particular syndromes of gestures (Turner 2002, 2007a). I would further speculate that these more fine-tuned frameworks are readily accessed because they are stored in the prefrontal cortex of the human brain. There are four basic types of roles stored in the human prefrontal cortex, and these modes of storage make retrieval of roles relatively easy, once initial clues about the role being made by another take on some degree of coherence and consistency.

These four modes can be termed (Turner 2002: 173–174): (1) preassembled roles, (2) combinational roles, (3) generalized roles, and (4) trans-situational roles.

Preassembled Roles. The more prevalent a role is, the more likely is it to be preassembled in humans' memory. Prevalence is tied to embedding in the minimal sense that basic roles in institutional domains are well known and, hence, pre-packaged. For example, the roles of mother, father, child, worker, worshiper, student, doctor, nurse, and many more roles and their variants are well known in a post-industrial society revealing high levels of institutional differentiation. The basic contours of these roles and the gestures signaling their operation are learned early in life, and refined as individuals grow and mature. The result is that it takes a relatively short time to figure out when such roles are being played because each of us already knows the basic elements in these roles and the gestures that mark them. These roles can become quite fine-tuned because they are so prevalent and because persons have a great deal of experience with them as both role-players for themselves and as role-takers of others' behaviors. For instance, we can readily make fine-grained determinations of roles such as lazy or hard worker, indifferent or serious student, strict or permissive parent, and many other calculations about the way a general role within an institutional domain is played by a person. The result is that role-taking and role-making are facilitated by this cognitive preassembling of well-known roles and their variants.

Combinational Roles. Some roles, often preassembled, can be combined readily with little effort. For example, a daughter hosting a family party is combining the role of host with various roles within her family (in this case daughter *vis-à-vis* her mother and father, and a variety of kin relations). Individuals understand this combination because it is so common, but combinational roles are not without their problems. Should the role of host or daughter/family member dominate? How are guests to orient to their host, as a daughter, niece, cousin, or host? The world is rife with stories about how family gatherings “go bad” when the relative weights to the roles that are combined are not understood. Indeed, it is up to the role-maker to signal which role is dominant, but often the host does not do so, or tries to play both roles, often with unpleasant outcomes. Thus, even though people know this combinational role quite well, and even though they know of the potential problems that inhere in this combination, the lack of explicit role-making hampers guests' ability to role-take, as does the fact that they often make the role of relative more important than guest at another's house.

When combinational roles can be played at somewhat different times and places, it often becomes easier to know which one is being asserted. For instance, students in a fraternity and sorority play both student roles

(studying) and social roles (partying), and while houses often blend these into one another, especially the “animal” houses that often obliterate the student study role in favor of the party role, most do not. There are times and places, even during the course of day and night for each role; and this temporal and often ecological partitioning of the roles make it easier to know which role is in effect. The same is true for roles such as worker in the division of labor of a corporate unit and the friend role in the coffee room where individuals can talk more informally and personally. Thus, the ecology of encounters often determines which role is switched on or off; or if the roles must be played simultaneously, movement through this ecology to specific use-spaces activates efforts to establish the right mix of the two roles in role-making. For example, parties are not all partying, at least in most cases, because individuals often activate work-practical roles, or gatherings in coffee rooms involve mixes of social and work-practical activity, but determining the relative amounts of each is greatly facilitated by the ecology of, and props in, the space where an encounter occurs.

Generalized Roles. Part of all persons’ stocks of knowledge are generalized roles that can be added to most other roles, producing another kind of combinational role. For instance, the syndromes of gestures marking being upbeat, assertive, shy, reserved, gracious, sad, serious, provocative, energetic, quiet, and other basic types of behaviors that typically carry specific emotional dispositions are all known and rather readily recognized when added to other roles. For instance, a quiet student, energetic worker, gracious host, sad player, and other roles that are combined with generalized roles can be easily understood, allowing persons to role-take accurately and to adjust their lines of conduct so as to cooperate with persons exhibiting specific roles blended with generalized content.

Trans-situational roles. Generalized roles can be trans-situational in that they are attached to roles in virtually all encounters. What I have in mind about trans-situational roles, however, are syndromes of gestures tied to membership in categoric units. When categoric units are differentiated, there are always behavioral syndromes “typical” of people in these units; and these syndromes stay with the person in a variety of situations and, in fact, become expectation states for both the person exhibiting these syndromes and for others in the encounter. Gender, age, levels of income and education, ethnicity, and other potential parameters defining categoric units all carry expectations for how persons should act. For example, there are somewhat different behaviors that typify male and female performances of the same role, as there are for young and old, members of different ethnic categories, different levels of income and education, and other parameters marking membership in categoric units playing the same role.

Trans-situational roles are, to be overly metaphorical, like the shell that a snail carries on its back; they are part of being a member of a categoric unit, which, if parameters are strong, will be exhibited in all situations. These kinds of roles greatly facilitate role-taking because markers of categoric unit membership allow others to anticipate how roles will be played, depending upon the membership in a categoric unit of each person playing a role. Yet, at the same time, this anticipation of how members of categoric units should play roles can become a basis for prejudice and discrimination, or minimally, for *a faux pas* if a person does not meet expectations for how they should play or is offended by such expectations. Moreover, in creating expectations for how trans-situational roles should be played, the most visible marker of categoric unit membership, such as gender or skin color, will often be used, thereby obscuring memberships in other categoric units, such as class, levels of education, or income. This tendency to rely on what is known and visible came home to me in my first year as a professor at U.C. Riverside. I was teaching the very difficult undergraduate course in theory. In my class was an All-American athlete (who was also African American). When he got the highest grade on the first exam in a class of about one-hundred students, I was surprised because I had lumped categoric unit membership (male, black) with a combinational student-athlete role (with more emphasis on the athlete part than the student part of this role). Then, when I talked with him, his demeanor and voice were clearly upper-middle class (as it turned out, he was the son of the superintendent of schools in a large southern California school district and his mother was a teacher). He was also a concert-level violinist with a great passion for classical music. His twin brother was much the same, although he was not a star athlete in college. Obviously, I had prepackaged the roles associated with student, athlete, male, and black in a manner that could have been highly prejudicial; and after acquiring additional knowledge about him, the most relevant categoric unit was his class background and additional role as classical musician as these other roles influenced his student role. Being black and an athlete were *the least relevant* influences on the role he played as a student. I came to know the brothers, and they would often bring long-play records (before the days of disks and flash drives) to my house for an evening of listening and talking about music. When they graduated, the athletic brother went on to Harvard for graduate school and his twin went onto UCLA to attend business school.

Yet, even though mistakes can occur and discriminatory expectation states can emerge in using trans-situational roles associated with categoric units, it is a natural thing for humans to do. We seek syndromes of gestures and markers of how people will behave; and seeing highly visible markers of categoric unit membership can lead persons to jump the gun in determining another's role. Yet, without using this kind of information, role-taking

would become more complex and difficult. The key is to re-role-take when the information received does not fit the syndrome; prejudiced persons may not change their evaluation and response to what they perceive to be members of devalued categories, whereas unprejudiced persons will change their evaluation and seek out new syndromes of gestures to inform them about the role another is really playing.

These Gestalt mechanisms for ordering inventories of roles facilitate role-taking and role-making, but they do not lock persons into roles. Individuals will often seek to play unique variants of even pre-assembled roles, forcing others to re-assess the accuracy of their initial role-taking. For instance, there are many ways to play the role of professor, although there are just a few basic variants. Yet, there are many more variants when generalized and trans-situational roles are combined with the role of professor, thereby forcing others to work a bit harder at role-taking. Thus, Gestalt mechanisms, revolving around contrast-conceptions and consistency, are useful because they order potential complexity, but there is always a generative dimension to role-making. People add elements that are not expected and that are very unique and innovative, requiring others to make adjustments to their role-taking in a focused encounter. Still, without some cognitive ordering mechanisms that sort and catalogue that vast arrays of gestural phonemes into syntactical patterns connecting elements of roles, role-taking would be a much slower and difficult undertaking, and interaction would be much more work than it already is. Most of the time, relying upon visible markers of categoric unit membership and syntactical bundles of gestures marking a role will be successful, but sometimes this reliance leads us to get ahead of the role-making efforts of another. And so, after a relatively short period of not being able to assign a role to another, individuals will re-assess and re-role take. Ambiguity and uncertainty over not finding a role for a person generate the negative emotions – anxiety, embarrassment, frustration, irritation – that push individuals to work harder at finding the role or roles being made by another. Indeed, because roles are implicated in just about all other microdynamic processes, failure for these processes to operate properly significantly raises the emotional stakes; and it is the implicit recognition of this potential for cascading emotions that drives individuals to work harder at role-making and role-taking.

Verification and Re-verification of Roles

Transactional needs for facticity, trust, and perhaps even group inclusion may jump start the role-taking and role-making process. Individuals have

needs to feel that the world is as it seems and that others are trustworthy, but once the process unfolds, individuals also need to be assured that their interpretation of a role made by another is accurate; reciprocally, individuals also need to feel that the role that they have made for themselves is accepted by another or others in the encounter. The needs for facticity and trust drive the effort to verify the roles made by others, but the need to verify one's own role in the eyes of others comes increasingly from two other transactional needs: the need to verify the identity(ies) or self attached to a role and the need to receive profits in exchanges of resources that are part of role dynamics.

Most of the time, the need to verify self is more important in the role verification process than the need for profits in exchanges of resources because if individual cannot feel that they have verified self, interaction will stall and cycle around re-role making until others indicate that they have accepted a role. There are several layers of self, and depending upon which combination of these layers of identities is salient in role-making, the dynamics of encounters will vary. As I briefly explored in Chap. 1 and as I will examine in detail the next chapter, I visualize four distinct levels self: *role-identities* in which a person has a particular view of self when playing a particular role (e.g., student, worker, parent, child, worshiper, etc); *group-identities* involving identification and commitment to particular corporate units (e.g., workplace, team, community, etc.); *social-identities* revolving around membership in categoric units (e.g., gender, age, ethnicity, class); and a *core-identity* or general self-conception which is the view that a person has of self in all situations. All identities are emotionally valenced, with individuals carrying complexes of positive and negative emotions for the various identities that they hold. Role-identities are the most numerous because we typically have an identity for each important role that we play, especially for our roles in institutional domains. Group-identities arise from membership in, or identification with, corporate units that are important to individuals. Social identities revolve around memberships in variously evaluated categoric units, with role-playing style influenced by which categoric unit membership is salient in a role. And, core-identity or self-conception is the cognitions and emotions that a person holds about self and will exhibit (for verification) in all roles, although the salience of the core-self varies from role to role.

People are always aware of this connection between the salience of various levels of self to the roles that people play and hope to have verified; and as I have noted, this simple fact pushes others to verify roles, if they can. One of the first elements of role-taking, then, is to determine *how* salient *which* identity is to a person who is role-making. People search for signs of how committed persons are to identities in roles by looking for certain cues.

First, the more animated and emotionally charged are the role-making efforts of a person, the more likely are multiple, especially core-identity, tied up in a role. Second, a person's costs and investments (accumulated costs) in playing a role are another signal that there is also a heavy investment of self. Third, the more a role is highly valued by the ideologies and meta-ideologies at the macro level of social organization is yet another sign that identities are invested in this role. Fourth, roles that carry power and authority are likely to involve high investments of all identities. Fifth, roles that are heavily imbued with memberships in corporate and/or categoric units will inevitably involve not just group- and-social identities but core-identities as well. Sixth, roles that can be used as resources to gain access to other roles will generally pull in all levels of identity. Seventh, roles that are discretionary and chosen by a person will be seen as roles in which self is heavily invested. Eighth, roles that are played with a high degree of competence are also roles in which people have invested their identities.

These and other markers of people's commitments to a role are important for those who are role-taking because the more the above eight conditions prevail, the more self is implicated in a role and the more emotionally valenced will this role become. To fail to verify such a role invites intense emotional reactions, and the more core-self feelings are on the line in the role-playing of a person, the more others will try, if possible, to verify this role. Otherwise, the emotional reaction of a person will breach the interaction, causing it to fall apart or, short of this outcome, forcing people to work with repair rituals to bring the encounter back to where roles and the underlying identities lodged in them can be verified.

Thus, as role-making and role-taking proceed, needs for self-verification come to dominate the role verification process. Persons will generally try to verify another's role, if they can, because they implicitly recognize that self is implicated in most roles. And if role and self go unverified, others will become emotional, stalling the interaction until their roles and the identities embodied in their enactment can be verified. Individuals are also driven to verify roles of others because they implicitly recognize their own self is on the line in their role performances and will, therefore, need to be verified by others in the encounter. If these others fail to have their roles and identity(ies) verified, they will be less likely to verify the roles of those individuals who have failed to verify their role-making efforts. We are, in essence, trapped into this role-taking and role-making dance, and it is the main reason that we always try, if at all possible, to verify each other's role (and the underlying identities played out in a role). For, to have a role and the underlying self go unverified will generate a variety of negative emotions, such as shame, embarrassment, hurt, fear, guilt, anger, and frustration. As negative

emotions rise, persons who have failed to verify their roles become more likely to breach or leave the encounter. And, they may blame others for their lack of “responsiveness,” thereby assuring a breach of the encounter. As we will see in Chap. 8, when self is on the line in any microdynamic process, the emotional stakes are raised; and because negative emotions to self are painful, they are often repressed, which only raises the emotional stakes that much higher. When negative emotions stemming from the inability to have a role verified are repressed, they not only intensify, but they also are transmuted into new kinds of “more acceptable” emotions, such as anger, that also lead to breaches to the interaction.

When emotions are repressed, an attribution process kicks in – another idea originally conceptualized by Gestalt psychology and still used by cognitive psychologists (e.g., Weiner 1986, 2006) as well as sociologists (Kemper and Collins 1990; Lawler 2001; Ridgeway 1994; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990). There is a limited number of objects to blame for negative feelings (Turner 2007): individuals can make an internal attribution and blame themselves; they can blame others; they can blame the situation and encounter; they can blame the corporate unit in which the shame-generating encounter is embedded; they can blame members of categoric units; and they can blame macrostructures. We will explore these dynamics in much detail in Chap. 8, but the critical point is that verification is potentially a volatile process because self is on the line; and persons almost always seek to sustain their identity and self in encounters, while making attributions that can disrupt encounters as well as more meso and macro structures.

Since individuals all recognize this potential in role-making, role-taking, and role-verification, they try to interpret and, if necessary, reinterpret the roles being made in a situation; and if they possibly can, they will signal that they have understood and that they are now going to verify the underlying role of others. As Alfred Schutz (1932 [1967]) implied in his phenomenology and as ethnomethodologists (e.g., Garfinkel 1967) later emphasized, it is necessary to let much inconsistent information pass for a time in role-taking with others. As I stressed earlier, people give others considerable latitude in offering inconsistent gestures because it is in their interests to find an underlying role being presented and to verify this role so that the potential for negative emotionality can be avoided. This potential for negative emotional arousal is more costly than letting some inconsistencies in gesturing and role-making slide, but there are limits to how far persons ignore inconsistencies. People’s needs for facticity and trust are very real, and if they cannot be met by allowing for inconsistencies, the roles of others will not be verified. And, when roles and the underlying identities contained in them go unverified, the encounter will be breached.

When these disruptions to encounters occur, the person who feels that his or her role has not been accepted by others will become self-conscious and motivated to assemble a role that is understood by, and acceptable to, these others. One irony of becoming self-conscious and emotionally mobilized to re-make roles is that a person's role-making will often become more stilted. Most of the time, role-making, role-taking, and role-verification occur below the level of full consciousness. These processes simply kick in without much thinking, with the result that encounters unfold in a relaxed manner. But, when role-making becomes conscious and deliberate, the encounter becomes strained because those re-making their role are trying to convince others of the validity of their role, while wondering what "others are thinking", which only makes their role-making more self-conscious and awkward. Reciprocally, because the emotional stakes can be very high, those observing efforts of others at re-role making are also trying hard to figure out the role and to accept role-making efforts of others; and as a consequence, they too become self-conscious and may indeed "over-think" the role-taking process, with the result that the person re-role making picks up the more stilted responses of others, which only makes the role-maker more self-conscious.

Most encounters, however, do not get pulled into these crises of role-making, role-taking, and role-verification. The human brain is wired to search for underlying patterns and to do so without undo conscious reflection. The result is for the process of role-making, role-taking, and role/self-verification to proceed smoothly. But this same acuity and fluidity of the human brain will immediately pick up elements of a role performance that are inconsistent or insincere, increasing the valences of needs for facticity and trust, and setting off the processes summarized above. For instance, a person who is highly depressed but who tries to put on a "happy face" will generally not succeed. Others will pick up on the fact that the generalized role – in this case, the generalized role of being "upbeat" – that is added to whatever other role the person is playing will not be genuine or sincere, thereby raising the valences of others' needs for facticity and trust. The dilemma then becomes whether or not to let the inconsistency slide or to broach the matter to a person and, in the process, breach the encounter. If the encounter is instrumental and does not involve treating others as intimates, persons will typically let inconsistencies slide because to raise the issue and, thereby, disrupt the encounter works against the work-practical goals. If, on the other hand, the encounter is among intimates in a more social than work/practical situation, then there is a good chance that the inconsistency will be noted, forcing a person to remake the role so that gestures are consistent by, for example, shedding the generalized role of being "upbeat" for the real emotion being experienced and, instead, the

displaying the sadness contained the generalized role of being “downbeat.” Such a shift may bring consistency among role-making gestures, but it imposes costs on others who must now re-role make a complementary role to another who is in emotional pain and depressed. It should not be surprising that individuals are often reluctant to re-role make so drastically, and so, they will let even a rather large inconsistency slide, perhaps talking about it later in gossip networks (e.g., did you see how unhappy X was?) when there is no danger of breaching or redirecting the encounter.

Complimentary Roles

When individuals role-take on the role-making efforts of others, they seek to make a role for themselves that complements the roles being made by these others. For example, if a person is sad but putting on a happy face, the dilemma for others in the encounter is what complementary role should be presented to this person? Does one broach the inconsistency, force a confession about the real mood of another (that is, sadness), and then take on a complementary role that involves generalized role elements revolving around sympathy (Clark 1987, 1990)? Or, does one let the inconsistency pass and verify the role as intended by another (as basically happy)?

Finding complementary roles is critical to the role-verification process because roles that work at cross purposes will generally breach encounters. Moreover, if a person cannot find a complementary role to the role-making efforts of others, this person’s own role-making efforts will fail, forcing this individual to deal with this and to cope the corresponding failure to meet key transactional needs (e.g., for verifying identities, sensing trust, and achieving facticity). For instance, if a person “let’s slide” another’s unhappiness beneath a patina of surface happiness presented by another, this person’s own role making will seem disingenuous and often stilted because the complementary role to sadness (e.g., being sympathetic) is not being played, thus creating dissonance in the self presented and the role being made by a person. In fact, if the pain of another is so obvious and the effort to cover up this emotion so clear, a person may feel that they are presenting a disingenuous self, playing a role that is a facade, and contributing to the breakdown of trust and facticity. As a result, this person will become overly self-conscious and awkward in role-making, thereby disrupting the rhythmic flow of the interaction even more.

The need to find and play an acceptable complementary role represents one more constraint on people’s role-making efforts. Once a complementary role has been made and verified by others, it is often difficult to “get out of

this role” in the present or in future iterations of an encounter (Turner 1968). To change the complementary role would force others to remake their roles again; and since this can be a lot of work, these others will not let another escape a role. Expectation states become an important force in these dynamics because once complementary roles have been made and verified, expectation states attached to role emerge; and the same dynamics involved in status-based expectations come into play. To violate expectation states will breach the encounter, arouse negative emotions, and often lead others to sanction those who are not living up to the expectations in the roles that have made for themselves. For instance, a person who is known as “the life of all parties” is not likely to be allowed to be sad and morose because such role-making would violate expectations states and force all others to adopt new complementary roles – all of which is a great deal of interpersonal work.

Normalizing of Roles

Roles thus carry expectations for how individuals should behave in a given role. Many of these expectations are constrained by the culture that is relevant and invoked in a situation. As I will outline in the next chapter, normalizing involves developing expectations for (1) categorizing the situation by the relative amounts of social, work-practical, or ceremonial content as well as level of intimacy among persons in an encounter (as personages, persons, or intimates), (2) establishing frames for what is to be included and excluded from the encounter, (3) using the appropriate forms of talk and non-verbal forms of communication, (4) understanding the appropriate rituals to open, close, and structure the flow of interaction, and (5) establishing the emotional tone to the encounter in terms of what emotions should be felt to what level of intensity and then displayed to others in the encounter.

Normalizing constrains the roles that can be made and played in an encounter, and in so doing, normalizing makes role-making and role-taking easier. By knowing the nature of the situation, the appropriate level of intimacy to be achieved with others, the frames that delimit the content of an encounter, the relevant forms of talk and communication, the rituals that are to be used, and the emotions that are to be felt and displayed, the range of options in role-making and in role-taking is reduced. One does not have to sort through all inventories in stocks of knowledge to find a role for self and a complimentary role to the role-making efforts of others; only certain subsets of role elements can be invoked and used to role-make, while role-taking does not have to consider an unlimited range of gestures but only those that fit within the parameters imposed by normalization.

If, however, an encounter is *not* embedded in corporate and categoric units which, in turn, are embedded respectively in an institutional domain and locations in the stratification system, normatizing can become difficult. In fact, the relationship between roles and normatizing is reversed: individuals will have to normatize the situation through their role-making, role-taking, and role-verifying efforts. And, to the degree that status is not a constraint, an even greater burden will fall upon role activities to, first of all, establish status (if possible) and, secondly, to normatize the situation.

At times the ecology and demography of a situation can provide glimpses of status and some indication of the corporate and categoric units in which the encounter is embedded, thus allowing some normatization that can guide role-making, role-taking, and role-verifying efforts, but still if the ecology, demography, and status-order are vague or even contradictory, the burden will fall upon role activities to normatize the encounter. It is for this reason that encounters that occur in public places (where unfocused encounters tend to dominate) are often so awkward because they have to be built up through role activities since there is typically not clear guidance from ecology, demography, status, and culture. Individuals are on their own, at least for a while, as they role-make, role-take, and role-verify. From such efforts they will begin to find sources of embedding and begin to normatize the encounter, but it will be stressful. You can see this awkwardness when encounters among people who “know each other” from entirely different contexts occur in public places. The encounter is focused in a world of unfocused encounters, but the embedding of the encounter in corporate and categoric units is unclear, and hence so are status constraints and relevant elements of culture. As a result, it is unclear how they should play roles. What one sees is rather animated greetings (generalized social greetings), statements to the effect of “fancy meeting you here” (but what is “here”?), and rather self-conscious efforts to make roles. Moreover, the termination of the interaction is often rather awkward because the participants do not know which closing rituals are appropriate, or how to use them. As Goffman would have noted, these kinds of encounters lack a clear “footing”, which I take to mean that it is not clearly embedded in the status order, culture, or roles; it must evolve anew, thus requiring its participants to engage in a great deal of interpersonal work, which they try to terminate as soon as they can (without being rude). I still recall my first large lecture class at the University of Hawaii and what happened when I went into a store to buy underwear. The clerk in the men’s underwear section was a student in the class; and I knew this because she and her flaming red hair always sat in the front row directly in front of the podium. When I approached her to ask about underwear, I could see the panic rising because this was not the footing for our

usual rather distant interaction (in a large lecture hall), and by the time that I was in front of her, she simply ran away, not able to make a role for herself because the role that I was playing was customer rather than professor. In this case, the encounter was breached and terminated before I said ten words because this encounter was embedded in a different corporate unit (store instead of university); and what was most interesting, from that day on she never sat in the front row again. Indeed, out of curiosity I looked to find her, and she did her best to hide in the middle of the crowded lecture hall. Her reaction was simply an extreme form of all people's reactions when they are forced to focus encounters with familiar individuals in unfamiliar settings; a great deal of extra role-making and role-taking must occur. In the case of my student, she was not up to this, and so, she simply ran and hid – for how long I do not know but long enough for me to find, gather up, and pay another clerk for my new underwear.

The Embedding of Roles

There is a tendency to see roles as the behavioral-side of status, which is certainly one facet of roles. Yet, as I have indicated, roles are much more; indeed, status is sometimes the outcome of how well, or poorly, individuals play roles. Thus, embedding of roles involves much more than attaching a role to a status position or membership in a categoric unit. The existence of combinational, generalized, and trans-situational roles signals that roles are also a part of the broader culture of society as it is stored in persons' cognitive inventories of roles and role elements. Roles, then, are rarely just adjuncts to the status order. As a result, the embedding of roles in both the broader culture and social structures of the meso and macro levels of social reality is critical to understanding how they operate in micro-level encounters.

The culture of corporate and categoric units, as it filters down to individuals in focused encounters from the ideologies of institutional domains and meta-ideologies of the stratification system, is one very important focal point of embedding. As individuals seek to normatize an encounter, they invoke relevant elements of ideologies from macrostructures, expectation states for status in corporate and categoric units, and inventories of roles that have been stored as part of their stocks of knowledge at hand. As normatizing proceeds, they make roles for themselves and carefully role-take to determine if the roles of others are normatively acceptable. As categorizing, framing, talking, ritualizing, and emoting ensue, a focused encounter will gain cultural focus and coherence; the encounter will develop a set

of implicit normative expectations drawn from culture and from inventories of roles in participants' stocks of knowledge. The more explicit is the culture and the more consensus among individuals over its key elements, the more likely will normatizing be rapid, and once in place, the embedding of roles in this culture will constrain the range of roles that can be played in the present, and later if the encounter is iterated. For instance, college students on campus know the range of roles that are possible in a variety of situations – from studying in the library through asking a question in class to talking with professors in their offices. The ideology of the institutional domain of education, especially higher education, already has been built up from the generalized symbolic medium of *learning*; once in place, this ideology imposes constraints on categorizing self, others, and situations, on framing options, on discursive practices proper forms of talk, on rituals that are to be employed, and on the emotions to be felt and displayed. These are all in the stocks of knowledge by the end of a person's first year in college, if not before; and because basic types of focused encounters – say, students with each other, administrative staff, TAs, and professors – are so culturally embedded, members of encounters can be immediately drawn down the relevant elements of the ideology of higher education and the narrow range of appropriate roles in stocks of knowledge to normatize the situation. Individuals know the relevant roles to be played, and as the complementary roles to be made, taken, and verified; and playing these roles reinforces cultural constraints. And, if the encounter proceeds smoothly, it is likely that these cultural constraints will be invoked in the next iteration of an encounter.

Of course, occupying the status of student also embeds a person in a corporate unit and an institutional domain, and so, embedding in structure will dramatically increase the likelihood that the encounter will invoke the appropriate elements of culture. Embedding in a positional status in a university or college points a person to the specific elements of culture that are most relevant. Still, there are many ways to play the student role – e.g., serious student, politically active student, student athlete, party-animal student, and other variants of the student role – and just being a student does not inform an individual of *which* variant of the role he or she can or should play; it makes a great deal of difference as to *which* aspects of the culture are salient to the student and *which* set of student roles are in stocks of knowledge. I remember, for example, my first few days as a freshman student at the University of California, Riverside in 1960. At that time, my campus was a small liberal arts experiment of the University of California system, with the result that it was intensely intellectual and, as I soon learned, academically rigorous [with half the freshman class on academic probation and with the

Dean's list requiring only a 3.0 GPA (since so few students had a simple B average)]. Since I had spent many years of my youth on the Stanford University campus, one might think that I had a robust inventory of student roles at my disposal. But, I had been a "jock" in junior and senior high school, becoming serious about education only in the last 3 years of high school; thus, I did not know much about the culture that pervaded UCR in 1960. Moreover, I was to play football and tennis, and so, I was initially inclined to act out a variant of my "student-athlete-who will-grub-for-grades" role that had served me so well in high school. I soon realized that when I tried to normalize encounters with this role variant, I was out of step; for even the athletes at UCR considered themselves intellectuals! To say the least, a whole new world had presented itself to me. My status only put me in a place to realize that I was out of step; the culture that I brought was not quite right (if I had gone to the University of Southern California, as I originally planned, the culture that I brought to UCR would have worked just fine); and so, I had to "culture-take" or role-take with Mead's *generalized other* and figure out how one goes about acting more intellectual because being merely hard-working and "studious" was not enough; grade grubbing was a necessary but not sufficient condition to enter the intellectual realm. Thus, occupying a status does not always give a person access to the relevant culture; in my case, the culture in which I had previously been embedded was not quite appropriate, and so, I had to learn the new culture by trying out roles and then role-taking to see if I had the role right. By the end of my freshman year, I had found the proper role: "the jock intellectual," with my interest in sports rapidly declining. Still, the year had been so stressful that I transferred to the University of California at Santa Barbara; now my "jock intellectual" role was no longer proper outside the classroom (inside the classroom, professors were relieved to find a serious student), but fortunately, I still had my high school student role in my cognitive inventory and could fall back on this, eventually fine-tuning my roles outside of class; and later, as I quit sports altogether, adjusting this role closer to the one that I had learned at Riverside because I was wanted, to the surprise of everyone including me, to go to graduate school and become a professor.

Thus, having to learn roles, regardless of the help that incumbency in the status order provides, still involves role-taking with the relevant culture, just as Mead had suggested with his view that role-taking with the "generalized other" (i.e., culture) was essential for concerted action among individuals. People need to find the appropriate cultural ideologies and norms as they search stocks of knowledge. Without the embedding of encounters in the local culture, roles cannot be played well, even when one knows his or her status *vis-à-vis* others in the encounter. The role-verification process, especially as it holds self and identity out to verification, is the critical dynamic

in discovering the relevant and appropriate elements of culture. Role-making that is not verified by others is a powerful sanction on a person, not just because of the failure to play the role properly but also because dimensions of self and identity also go unverified and, hence, constitute an even more powerful negative sanction. There is nothing more emotionally traumatic than failure to meet this critical transactional need for identity-verification, and so, individuals become highly motivated to invoke culture, re-search role inventories, and re-make a role that others will verify. As much as status, then, the need to verify self motivates individuals to see their roles as embedded in local cultures that in turn are generally embedded in meso- and macro-level cultures.

Of course, embedding in corporate units and categoric units which, in turn, are lodged respectively in an institutional domain and a stratification system, points individuals in the right direction as they culture-take and seek to normalize the situation and thereby play roles that can be verified. Still, there are always problems in finding the “right roles.” Such is particularly the case when embedding in a position in a corporate unit invokes a culture that is alien to the culture of a categoric unit. On my campus these days, a large portion of the student population is the first member of their extended family to go to college, and moreover, the UCR campus is one of the most diverse by social class and ethnic background in the United States. I encounter the daily struggles of students who simply do not understand the culture of higher education because the cultures of the categoric units to which they belong provide few guidelines or lifelines to students having to adapt to the culture of a research university. Indeed, the academic culture often clashes with class and ethnic cultures, putting students in a very difficult position. It takes several years for many students to learn the academic culture and to integrate this new culture with the ones that they brought to UCR. Only by constantly role-making and re-role making does the right mix of cultures generally allow for eventual role-verification, and yet at times, even as graduation approaches, some students have never fully been acculturated which means that the roles in academia that they seek to make for themselves often leave them experiencing mild, and sometimes, intense shame because role-verification of such a central role is also necessary for identity-verification.

The ecology and demography of encounters are often critical to plugging individuals into the appropriate culture. Social structures and their cultures are located in space, with the ecology of situations operating as markers for invoking particular cultures. Coupled with the division of labor within corporate units and the spatial distribution of members in various categoric units, the ecology of space also affects who is co-present. If the ecology

allows for inter-categoric unit interaction, then it becomes easier for the unique cultural elements and expectation states associated with categoric unit memberships to become intertwined and integrated with the cultural backgrounds of students. Beginning about 20 years ago as UCR became more ethnically and class diverse, the ecology and demography seemed to be working against intersection of members of categoric units with student roles in corporate units (the various organizational units of any university). One could see clusters of fellow ethnics sitting around tables that were in a space “reserved for them.” Very little inter-ethnic interaction seemed to occur in places devoted to social interaction, and so these encounters were mostly normatized by the culture of categoric units rather than the culture of the corporate unit – UCR as a university. This isolation was all too evident in the classroom, which would often reveal ethnic segregation by regions of the classroom seating arrangements. I used to comment on this to my students, and they often replied that they needed “their own role models” (of people who were *not* like I am). I replied that increasing the diversity of faculty was important (as a matter of equal opportunity and justice) but that this would not solve the problems that they were experiencing; they had to learn about academia as much as academia had to learn how to integrate its culture with the new, and highly diverse, cultural backgrounds of students. My concerns back then turned out to be overblown because, as it turns out, the students figured out that integration of cultures was the best path to successful role-making and role-verification; and over a very brief period, the tables and spaces available for student interaction became integrated, and this too was reflected in my classes with the decline of “seating ghettos.” The ecology now works to integrate the demography of the campus; the result has been an adaptation of ethnic cultures to academic culture and, equally important, *vice versa*. Thus, intersection of nominal parameters like ethnicity with points in a division of labor of a corporate unit like a university campus can have large effects in promoting cultural integration which, in turn, allows individuals to role-make in ways that represents an amalgamation among cultures – thereby expanding the range of ways in which playing the student role can be made and verified. Moreover, because role-verification is the path to self-verification, students seem far more relaxed and adjusted than they were 20 years ago.

The Dynamism of Roles

At one time, “role theory” was highly prominent in sociology, but over the last four decades, there has been a marked decline in theorizing about roles.

It appears that status as a dynamic force has occupied theorists' and researchers' attention, with the dynamism of roles pushed to the back burner. Indeed, it is difficult to find new work on roles, and yet, as I have tried to demonstrate, roles are critical to the operation of focused encounters. Encounters cannot even get started without initial role-taking and role-making efforts of individuals, even in highly embedded social situations. While embedding dramatically increases the clarity of the guidelines for what roles can be made and what structural (status) or cultural (normatizing) forces are in play, there is nonetheless a considerable amount of latitude given individuals in their roles.

Individuals carry, I believe, large inventories of roles in their stocks of knowledge, and as societies have become increasingly differentiated, this inventory has grown. Much of this knowledgeability is implicit and difficult to articulate, but individuals still "know" roles when they see them during role-taking, and they both consciously and unconsciously use these stocks of knowledge about roles to role-make. Some of the roles in these stocks are pre-assembled; some are common combinations of roles; others are generalized roles; and still others are trans-situational and typically tied to people's memberships in categoric units. Yet, most roles in people's stocks of knowledge are variants of basic roles that individuals play within corporate units of institutional domains.

Individuals seek to discover the roles that others are making for themselves by suspending immediate judgment and then looking for consistency in the gestures emitted to determine what role others are seeking to play. As I have emphasized this search for consistency is probably hard-wired in human neurology, but it is also driven by transactional needs for trust and facticity. On the flip side of role-taking is role-making, with individuals consciously and unconsciously emitting syndromes of gestures to mark their roles to others, who then search their stocks of knowledge to discover the role being made by a person. Role-making is driven by the most powerful of motivational forces: the transactional need to present self to others and to have identities verified. If roles cannot be successfully made, then identities cannot be verified; and the result will be the arousal of negative emotions among those who cannot verify, at a minimum, their role-identity and, at a maximum, their group-, social-, and core-identities.

Role-making is likely to be successful when individuals can play roles that are complementary to the roles of others. Playing a complementary role is, in a sense, a form of role-verification because one person has adapted his or her role to that of another, and in so doing, has implicitly verified the role of another and the underlying identities implicated in this role. Once roles are complementary and successfully made, it becomes increasingly difficult

to change one's role in subsequent encounters because each person in the encounter will have to start role-taking and role-making all over again; and individuals are generally reluctant to incur the costs of doing so, unless absolutely necessary.

These role dynamics are constrained by social structure and culture, but equally important, role processes are often the mechanism or vehicle by which status in social structure and normatizing guidelines in culture are asserted and discovered. There has been a tendency in recent decades to see roles as revealed by status and culture, but the opposite is often true: status and relevant culture are revealed by role-making and role-taking. The more individuals must use roles to establish status and to invoke relevant culture, the more animated and dynamic will an encounter become. Individuals will work especially hard to discover the structural and cultural embedding of each other's behaviors, and they will assume that these behaviors will reveal a pattern that will not only mark a role but also point to the structural and normative constraints to be imposed upon the encounter. Thus, as noted earlier, status and normatizing dynamics can often be dependent upon role dynamics – a point that seems to have been underemphasized over the last decades in sociological theorizing.

Roles in Unfocused Encounters

The fact that status is often revealed only by roles in focused encounters is also true in unfocused encounters. Among the cues that individuals use in determining how to behave in unfocused encounters are behavioral outputs marking status, particularly membership in categoric units in public places and authority in more confined spaces within corporate units. The (a) configuration of spatial ecology, along with the use-spaces and props, (b) the biological markers of difference and categoric-unit membership, and (c) the objects that adorn individuals (clothing, badges, etc.) and their territories of self can all provide needed information about who others are; still, behavioral cues are also critical in determining how to adjust conduct in unfocused encounters. For example, a member of a devalued categoric unit can potentially behave with deference, indifference, or aggression; and until persons in unfocused encounters know *which* generalized role is being played by this individual, adjustment of the behaviors by persons is problematic. If deference is the role being made, then others can pass more closely and engage in less indirect monitoring, whereas if the generalized role of aggressiveness is coupled with other roles and status, individuals must be sure to sustain a lack of focus and give individuals playing these aggressive roles a wide berth.

Just as roles can offer clues to status and culture in focused encounters, so roles can provide needed information for locating the embedding of unfocused encounters. Again, other markers can be employed, but still, behavioral demeanor is often important in determining how one is to maintain unfocus. For example, uniforms, badges, and equipment attached to a person, as well as other markers in territories of self, can inform others the role being made in a public place. Still, individuals will seek behavioral verification that these markers are indeed consistent with actual role behaviors. The visible markers of a status and role, such as a uniform or equipment attached to body, must be confirmed or verified by monitoring of behavioral outputs or role activities. If there is inconsistency between the physical markers adorning the body and the behavioral outputs of persons, individuals will respond much differently than when there is consistency. Indeed, if there is consistency and, hence, less threat, unfocus can even be briefly broken for short periods of time, as would be the case if a person needed directions from a janitor who was clearly playing the role of janitor. In fact, criminals often seek to use markers of roles to enter places to commit crimes because uniforms and badges place them in appropriate roles and thus cause people to lower their guard, but as soon as behaviors seem inconsistent with physical markers, individuals immediately begin to monitor the situation and to distance themselves from those whose behavioral cues are suspect.

Unfocused encounters revolve around an implicit sense of trust and facticity that expressive gestures and cues marking converge with the actual behaviors of individual. Role-taking in unfocused encounters is, therefore, as important to sustaining the social order as it is in focused encounters. The extra burden in an unfocused encounter is that role-taking has to be done “on the sly” without making eye-contact or establishing face-engagement, but even with this extra burden, it is critical that behavioral cues (role-making) of others are consistent with each other and with any additional markers of a status or role. Shoppers in a mall, for example, must demonstrate that indeed they are playing this role and groups of persons who do not appear to be playing the role of shoppers are avoided; likewise persons walking down the street as pedestrians on their way to a destination must consistently give off cues that such is indeed the case. Similarly, people in hallway of a corporate unit must evidence markers of their status that are confirmed by their behavioral demeanor. For instance, students with backpacks and “student” dress must also confirm this role by how they behave on a college campus (indeed, it is rather easy to spot a “non-student,” which can be very important for universities in difficult neighborhoods). Thus, the viability of unfocused encounters often depends upon successful role-making and role-taking in order to secure additional information that makes it comfortable to sustain unfocus.

Elementary Principles on Role Dynamics in Encounters

9. The more individuals are able to role-make and role-take in focused encounters, the greater will be the effects of roles vis-à-vis other micro-dynamic processes, and the more likely will participants in the encounter be able to create and sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with the likelihood of active role-making and role-taking increasing with:
 - A. Initial lack of clarity in the status of self and others, with these efforts to use role-making and role-taking to determine status an inverse function of:
 1. Embeddedness in corporate units
 2. Embeddedness in categoric units
 - B. Ambiguity over the relevant elements of culture necessary for normatization
 - C. Success in initial mutual role-taking, with this success in role-taking increasing with:
 1. Consensus over and consistency among conventional gestures and the syntax ordering these gestures
 2. Intensity of transactional needs, especially needs for trust, facticity, and self-verification
 3. Coherence in stocks of knowledge of roles and variants of roles
 4. Embedding of the encounter in corporate and categoric units, with this embedding having larger effects on roles under the conditions listed in 4-A and 4-B in Chapter 2
 5. Success in normatization of the encounter, with normatizing having larger effects on roles under the conditions listed in 14-A-F in Chapter 6
 - D. Success in initial role-making of complementary roles among individuals, with this success in role-making increasing with:
 1. Success in mutual role-taking among individuals, with this success increasing with the conditions listed under 7-A in Chapter 4
 2. Success in status-taking and status-making, with success in status-making and status-taking increasing under the conditions listed under 7-A, 7-C through 7-G and decreasing with the conditions listed under 7-B in Chapter 4
 3. Strong transactional needs to have identities attached to the roles verified
 4. Reliance on preassembled, generalized, trans-situational roles in role-making

- E. Success in and mutual role-verification of roles, with role-verification increasing with the:
1. Conditions listed under 7-A and 7-C listed above in Chapter 4
 2. Mutual ability of persons to determine the salience of identities that are lodged in roles and that direct role-making, with the salience of one or more identities in a role increasing with:
 - a. The level of animation and emotionality with which individuals play
 - b. The level of costs and investments incurred by individuals to play a role
 - c. The extent to which the role is highly evaluated by macro-level ideologies and meta-ideologies
 - d. The degree of power and authority inhering in a role
 - e. The degree to which a role is tied to performances by members of categoric units
 - f. The extent to which a role can be used as a resource to gain access to additional resources
 - g. The degree to which a role is discretionary and chosen by persons
 - h. The extent to which a role is played with a high level of competence
10. The arousal of positive emotions in encounters increases when role-taking, role-making, and role-verification enable status-taking, status-making, and normatizing to be successful, whereas the arousal of negative emotions increases when role-taking, role-making, and role-verification fail to establish the relative status of self and others as well as relevant elements of culture, thereby increasing the likelihood of breaches to the encounter and/or its termination
 11. The more an encounter in which negative emotions have been aroused and where breaches have occurred cannot be terminated, the greater will be efforts of individuals to re-role-take, re-role make, and re-verify roles, thereby increasing the salience of roles and making the effect of roles on the behaviors of individuals that much greater
 12. The more individuals can monitor, without direct face engagement, the behavioral demeanors of others to determine the roles that these others are playing, the more they can sustain unfocus and avoid potential breaches that can occur when focus occurs, with the capacity to monitor without face engagement increasing with:
 - A. Consensus over the meaning of the properties of situational ecology (configuration of space, use spaces, and props) and the legitimate role behaviors that these properties allow

- B. Consensus over the meaning of objects adorning others' territories of self and the roles that these objects denote
 - C. Markers of status within the divisions of labor of corporate units and the expectations for roles that are attached to status
 - D. Markers of membership in categoric units and the expectations for roles that are contained in status beliefs about members of differentiated categoric units
13. The more behavioral demeanors of others are consistent with the expectations attached to properties of situational ecology, objects adorning territories of self, markers of status in corporate units and categoric units, and the more these expectations are consistent with what is normatively appropriate in unfocused situations, the more likely is unfocus to be sustained and, if breached momentarily, the more likely will individuals know and use the appropriate repair rituals to return to unfocus

As is evident in comparing proposition 9-A and 9-B with, 9-C, 9-D, and 9-E, there appears a contradiction. 9-A and 8-B argue that when roles are used to establish status and to find the relevant culture for normatization, they become highly salient and have large effects on behavior. Propositions 9-C, 9-D, and 9-E imply the opposite: successful role-making, role-taking, and role-taking under conditions where status and culture are known, primarily because of embedding, also increases the salience of roles on behaviors in encounters. Both are true, I hypothesize, because under the conditions of 9-A and 9-B, roles are the primary means for activating other microdynamic forces, while under the other conditions in, 9-C, 9-D, and 9-E, roles that are successfully made and taken by virtue of the constraints of culture and social structure also have high salience and large effects on behaviors. In the latter case, success in role-making, role-taking, and role-verification makes roles salient and increases their effects because of the importance of roles to meeting transactional needs and, moreover, in sustaining status in corporate and categoric units and in bringing culture to bear on normatization dynamics which, in the end, are often sustained by roles that are the behavioral means by which expectations for the appropriate categories, frames, forms of talk, rituals, and emotional states are generated. Other forces such as ecology, demography, and status are also involved, but because roles are behaviors, they have an equally large effect in normatization. Thus, whether initially using role-taking, role-making, or role-verification as the means to probe and search for status (whether inside or outside corporate and categoric units) or for relevant elements of culture to normatize, roles become the critical force in activating these other forces. Once activated, roles are still very much involved in executing and reinforcing expectations

for status or for norms. Thus, in either case, roles are highly salient to individuals and have very large effects on behaviors in focused encounters.

Conclusion

As I emphasized at the outset, roles have been relegated to the conceptual background in sociological theory, with a clear preference to emphasize status. In my view, roles are much more than adjuncts to status, and as I have tried to demonstrate, roles are just as important as status in creating and sustaining viable encounters. Conversely, when encounters are breached and disrupted, it is usually a mistake in role-playing as it affects meeting expectations associated with ecology, demography, status, and culture.

The disproportionate concern with status dynamics over role processes in sociological theory is evident in the number of well-established and cumulative theoretical research programs, often using experimental research designs, compared to virtual no current theoretical research traditions on role dynamics. The decline in emphasis on roles is not so easily explained because, at one time, “role theory” was a highly prominent theoretical research tradition, but over the last 40 years, concern with role dynamics has declined. This decline has, I feel, led to a biasing of micro-level theorizing away from a central dynamic in encounters: people’s efforts to make roles for themselves and, using their stocks of knowledge about roles, to role-take in order to determine the likely behaviors of others. Theorizing has strayed away from George Herbert Mead’s recognition that status and culture are often unclear or ambiguous, with the result that role-taking becomes a critical mechanism for discovering status and culture. Moreover, understanding the topic of the next chapters – motivational need-states, culture, and emotions – also depends heavily on role-taking and role-making. Irving Goffman (1967) did not follow Mead’s emphasis on self as a key motive force, preferring instead to emphasize self as a mere dramatic presentation (without any coherence or stability), but he was correct in recognizing that roles are at the center of dynamics in encounters. And so, it is not surprising that I am trying to resurrect roles to a central place in microdynamic processes. If ecology/demography, status, culture, motives, and emotions were the only microdynamic processes, encounters would not operate as we know them. Indeed, people *behave* in encounters, and this behavior is not just an outcome of ecological constraints, demographics, status in social structures, cultural norms, universal motive-states, or emotions. If these were the only behavioral forces in play, encounters would be highly stilted and robotic, and hence, not

human. Indeed, how people deal with the ecology and demography of the situation, how they interpret status and cultural expectations, how they reveal and meet need-states, and certainly how they emote are very much determined by the roles that they seek to play and whether or not others are willing to verify these roles. Roles are not the sum total of the effects of other microdynamic forces; rather, they are an independent and powerful force in how these other forces play themselves out in encounters. Thus, theorizing about roles needs to be reinvigorated in sociology, as I have tried to do in this chapter, which appears at the middle or central point of this book because roles are central to understanding other microdynamic processes.

Chapter 6

Cultural Dynamics in Encounters

Encounters are always embedded in cultural systems that generate expectations for how individuals should behave. At the level of encounters, I use the term *normalization* to denote the process of determining *which* cultural elements are made relevant in an encounter. Granted, this is an awkward term but it communicates the *assembling* of expectations in encounters. Culture exists at all levels of human social organization, from the technologies, texts, values, and meta-ideologies of societal and even inter-societal systems, through the generalized symbolic media, ideologies and norms of institutional domains and the meta-ideologies and subcultures of the stratification system, to the ideologies and norms of corporate units and the status beliefs about categoric units and, finally, to the process whereby these levels of culture *are assembled and made relevant to encounters*.

In their stocks of knowledge (Schutz 1932 [1967]), people store rather large stores of information about all these levels of culture that they then assemble, on the ground, to create expectations for how individuals should behave. The human brain is wired to bring culture to bear because, without expectations or normative understandings, encounters will not be viable. People generally do not have fully assembled cultural packages in their stocks of knowledge, but these stores of cultural elements and sub-assemblages among these elements can be assembled and readjusted depending upon the circumstances in an encounter. The more an encounter is embedded in corporate and categoric units lodged within, respectively, institutional domains and stratification systems, the more stocks of knowledge will be already assembled, at least to a degree. Yet, there is always “some assembly required” (and often re-assembly) as individuals normalize an encounter.

Although the human brain is wired to put together relevant elements of culture (Turner 2000a), all cultures have implicit grammars for organizing cultural elements into systems of meaning; and the less embedded is an encounter in meso structures and their cultures, the more individuals will have to work at putting together cultural elements into a coherent set of

Table 6.1 Dimensions or axes of normatization

Normatization is the process of culture-taking and culture-making in which individuals establish expectations for how individuals should interact during the course of an encounter. These expectations revolve around the following axes:

1. *Categorizing the encounter*: The process of culture-taking and culture-making in which individuals typify (a) the categoric-unit memberships of participants in the encounter, (b) the relative amounts of work-practical, social, and ceremonial activity to be conducted in the encounter, (c) the degree of intimacy to be achieved with others along a continuum of treating others as personages (people as only representatives of categoric units or as incumbent in positions of corporate units), persons (with some knowledge of others as individuals), and intimates (with more in-depth knowledge of others), and (d) the relative authority/power of self and others; and on the basis of these nodes of categorization, expectations for behaviors of self and others are developed
2. *Framing the encounter*: The process of culture-taking and culture-making that imposes expectations for what can be included and, conversely, what is to be excluded as subjects of talk and non-verbal behaviors
3. *Forming communication in the encounter*: The process of culture-taking and culture-making by which expectations for the proper modes of (a) talk and conversation as well as (b) expressions of body language and demeanor
4. *Ritualizing the encounter*: The process of culture-taking and culture-making in which expectations are developed for the appropriate rituals to (a) open and close interaction, (b) form and structure the flow of interaction, (c) symbolize the significance of the interaction, and (d) repair breaches to the interaction
5. *Emotionally energizing the encounter*: The process of culture-taking and culture-making whereby expectations for the nature and valence of (a) emotions to be felt by a person and (b) emotions to be displayed to others are established

expectations. With embedding, this process is easier; without it, interaction will cycle around *culture-taking* or, in George Herbert Mead's terms, role-taking with the *generalized other*, and *culture-making* or the process of asserting to others one's own view of relevant cultural elements. Yet, even without clear embedding, persons are helped in culture-making and culture-taking by certain fundamental dimensions along which the process of normatizing occurs: (1) *categorization* of the situation and others, (2) imposition of *frames* on what is to be included and excluded, (3) *forms of* talk and nonverbal *communication* to be used, (4) *rituals* to be employed, and (5) *emotions* to be felt and displayed to others. These dimensions or axes of normatizing are listed and defined in Table 6.1. Encounters will always involve efforts to assemble expectations along these dimensions, and the more individuals can achieve consensus over the expectations along these dimensions, the more viable will the encounter be.

One way to visualize the layers of culture as they constrain the process of normatizing the encounter is outlined in Fig. 6.1 (as well as earlier in Fig. 2.2).




Fig. 6.1 Culture and normatizing

Societal culture penetrates institutional domains and constrains how generalized symbolic media are used to develop institutional ideologies and norms. As institutional domains distribute their generalized symbolic media as resources, inequalities in this distribution become the basis for the formation of a stratification system. The same symbolic media are also used to formulate institutional ideologies and norms that, in turn, become part of a

meta-ideology legitimating the inequalities of the stratification system. Institutional ideologies and norms constrain the culture of corporate units that generate their own cultural beliefs and norms, while the meta-ideology of the stratification system provides the symbolic underpinnings of status beliefs about members of categoric units, beginning with an evaluation of class but also incorporating beliefs about the *diffuse status characteristics* of persons – e.g., their gender, sexual preferences, ethnicity, religious affiliation, and other social categories which are differentially evaluated.

The beliefs and norms of corporate units and the status beliefs attached to categoric units operate as the most immediate cultural constraint on the process of normatizing and, thus, bias how cultural elements are assembled into expectations in encounters. Still, these immediate cultural constraints are, in turn, constrained by the culture of macrostructures. Even with some ambiguity about the degree of relevance of corporate and categoric units, very few cultural assemblages in humans' stocks of knowledge are not influenced by the culture of macro structures; and so, as individuals assemble culture, they indirectly bring the culture of both macro and meso structures to bear on the encounter.

In fact, the process of normatizing often involves searching stocks of knowledge for relevant cultural assemblages; and, as these are brought to bear, the structural units in which these elements are embedded, and the status locations and roles of individuals in these units, are also discovered. Normatizing can thus operate to remove ambiguity about *which* macro and meso structures are relevant to an encounter. Indeed, embedding can often occur in the search for expectations about categories, frames, forms of communication, rituals, and emotions; in trying to develop expectations for the encounter, these efforts point to the embedding of the encounter in meso and macro structures. Yet, most of the time, individuals are aware – even if only dimly – of the structural units and the culture of these units that are needed to normalize the encounter. As a result, the normalization process can be rapid and not even wholly conscious. For as individuals try to normalize, they also search for the status and roles of individuals; and as this search proceeds, embedding may become clear. Naturally, if individuals are well aware of embedding, this search is often very brief and, again, maybe not even completely conscious. And, as status and roles are specified through normatizing, expectations for categories, frames, talk and body language, rituals, and emotions are made that much easier to discern. These processes are highly recursive and have reverse causal effects and exert constraints on further normatization of the encounter.

I have perhaps dwelled on the preamble to the specifics of normatizing too long, but I want to communicate a simple reality: norms are not fully

formed cultural scripts; they are, instead, a continuous and recursive process of discovering expectations in the moment-by-moment process of face-to-face interaction. Once in place, however, these expectations do exert a powerful constraint on the behaviors of individuals, at least for a time. Still, each person in an encounter is a potential writer of a new script; indeed, to pursue the dramaturgical analogy, human stage productions in encounters are constantly being rewritten, redirected, and reenacted.

Normatization in Focused Encounters

Categorizing Persons and the Situation

The notion of *typification* gained currency with Alfred Schutz (1932 [1967]) and has been carried forward but often at some loss of Schutz's original meaning. He invoked the notion of *ideal types* as a reaction against Weber's use of this concept and emphasized that individuals constantly place each other into a social category, or in my terms, into categoric units – e.g., female, male, old, young, ethnic minority, rich, poor, educated, and so on. When the parameters marking categoric unit membership are highly visible, this categorization is often the very first step in normatizing an encounter. For membership within a categoric unit contains conceptions about the *diffuse status characteristics* along with a moral evaluation by ideologies and, equally important, by expectation states for how those in a categoric unit should and will behave. These elements of culture become codified into sets of *status beliefs* about the character, nature, and expected behaviors of members of different categoric units; and on the basis of these status beliefs, other individuals will begin to adjust their behaviors toward members of categoric units in encounters.

During this initial categorization, and at times even before membership in categoric units is determined, individuals also typify situations into a delimited number of types (Goffman 1967; Collins 1975; Turner 1988): (1) *work-practical* situations where participants to an encounter are instrumental and trying to complete a task or realize a particular goal; (2) *social* situations where persons are engaged in interactions for their own sake as moments of positive emotional flow from the simple pleasure of interacting with others; and (3) *ceremonial* situations where people observe or are actively engaged in stylized behaviors and rituals that honor or dishonor particular individuals or groups of individuals and that often mark the significance of a particular occasion. It is very rare for a situation to be only one of these three types; rather, situations are “typified” by *the relative amounts* of work-practical, social, and ceremonial content.

For example, when I sit on the stage during graduation to hood a new Ph.D., the basic situation is dominated by ceremonial content, and yet, sitting there also allows me to interact socially with my professorial colleagues and, often, to accomplish some instrumental tasks revolving around Academic Senate business. Or, to illustrate further, I cannot remember a time at a party of academics in which the sociality was not also filled with work-practical activity (perhaps this is a good reason to avoid academic social events). Thus, individuals will need to determine the expectations for the relative amounts of these three basic types of activity in an encounter, and to miscalculate can bring negative sanctions, often to the point of breaching the encounter.

At the same time that the categoric unit memberships of self and others are determined and the situation is typified as a mix of work-practical, social, and ceremonial content, individuals in encounters are also determining the expectations for the relative level of intimacy that is appropriate to the situation, an idea given particular emphasis by Alfred Schutz (1932 [1967]). In the spirit but not quite the details of Schutz's argument about levels of "intersubjectivity," I have seen three basic types of categorization (Turner 2002): (1) *personages* where other(s) are seen as representatives of a categoric unit and/or status in a corporate unit, and are treated as such, with relatively little effort to "get to know the person" beyond their status; (2) *persons* where some knowledge about others beyond their incumbency in a categoric unit and/or in a status position and corresponding role is acquired; and (3) *intimates* where much greater knowledge of others (e.g., their biography, experiences, and feelings) is evident. Depending upon which category is most appropriate, the expectations on self and others will vary. When I interact with a clerk in a store, this person is treated as a *personage*, or as an incumbent in a status location who is playing a role, but if I frequently interact with this clerk, as I do at my local grocery store, she becomes a *person* but not an *intimate*. If I think back on my relations with graduate students, they begin as *personages* (just another graduate student), but over time as I get to know and work with them, they become *persons*; and for the most part, this is far as it goes (especially with the ever-increasing age gap between me and students), but over the years some of my students have become close friends and, indeed, *intimates* where we share highly personal information.

There is a triangulation dynamic in categorization. We must decide, first of all, if membership in categoric units makes a difference in terms of the nature of the situation or the level of appropriate intimacy (from none to a great deal). Then, we implicitly cross-tabulate variations in levels of intimacy with expectations for different types of situations in order to see which of the potential combinations is in play. In Table 6.2, I have outlined these shifts in expectations along just two dimensions: (1) nature of the

Table 6.2 Categorizing situations and intimacy

Levels of intimacy in dealing with others	Types of situations		
	Work/Practical	Social	Ceremonial
Personages	Others as functionaries whose behaviors are relevant to achieving a specific task or goal and who, for the purposes at hand, can be treated as strangers	Others as representatives of a larger collective enterprise toward whom highly stylized responses owed as a means of expressing their joint activity	Others as strangers toward whom superficially informal, polite, and responsive gestures are owed
Persons	Others as functionaries whose behaviors are relevant to achieving a specific task or goal but who, at the same time, must be treated as unique individuals in their own right	Others as fellow participants of a larger collective enterprise toward whom stylized responses are owed as a means of expressing their joint activity and recognition of each other as individuals in their own right	Others as familiar individuals toward whom informal, polite, and responsive gestures are owed
Intimates	Others as close friends whose behaviors are relevant to achieving a specific task or goal and toward whom emotional responsiveness is owed	Others as close friends who are fellow participants in a collective enterprise and toward whom a combination of stylized and personalized responses are owed as a means of expressing their joint activity and sense of mutual understanding	Others as close friends toward whom informal and emotionally responsive gestures are owed

situation and (2) the level of appropriate intimacy in the situation. Most of the time this cross-tabulation does not need to be thought out, and hence, it is not cognitive in the sense of being subject to conscious reflection; rather, we intuitively and subliminally “know” which of the nine options are to be invoked in a situation. In fact, if we consciously “think about” how to place a person or situation along these dimensions, we will generally come off as stilted and insincere.

There are well-known expectations for this set of cross-tabulations, and over time, this set becomes part of individuals’ implicit stocks of knowledge. In fact the cross-tabulation is much more complex because there is a third dimension cutting across the tabulation delineated in Table 6.2: membership in categoric units. For example, we would have very different expectations for self and others when the others are children and you are an adult in a work-practical situation, or a social or ceremonial situation. In actual practice, added complexity comes when individuals occupy several different categoric units. For instance, a younger woman in a work-practical situation who is also a member of an ethnic minority will generate somewhat different expectations for how the work-practical and level of intimacy dimensions work out, and the gender and age of self will also intersect with these two dimensions to generate varying expectations, as would be the case for an older male in a work-practical situation with a younger, minority female. This interaction would be very different than one with a younger female interacting with a young minority female in a work-practical situation.

What is rather amazing is how easily persons can normatize or generate expectations for behaviors based upon implicit knowledge about these intersecting tabulations without having to consciously think about what to do. We implicitly know the expectations for different patterns of intersection among categoric unit membership(s), type(s) of situation, and levels of intimacy or non-intimacy. There are other points of potential intersection as well. For example, incumbency in categoric units and the length of time that interaction occurs within one encounter or in an iterated encounter can make for a large difference in expectations, with the salience of categoric unit membership likely to decline over time, especially over iterations of an encounter (see Chap. 4 on status dynamics). Relative power and authority in corporate units also intersect with categoric-unit memberships, types of situations, and levels of intimacy. If there are power differences among individuals, participants in an encounter will have to consider varying expectation states for individuals at diverse positions in the division of labor of the corporate unit, and then, these expectations will have to be reconciled with expectations for the varying diffuse status characteristics associated with categoric unit memberships, the type of situation (as work-practical, social, or ceremonial), and

the level of appropriate intimacy. Again, most of the time, people can perform this reconciliation with relatively little or no conscious thought, especially when power is consolidated with the level of evaluation of members of categoric units; but when these intersect so that members of low-evaluation categoric units have power and those without power are members of more valued categoric units, categorizing the situation and individuals in this situation suddenly becomes much more complex and difficult.

Another dimension of encounters, as I noted above, is the length of time that the same individuals interact in iterated encounters. As a general rule, long-term encounters that are linked together in chains of iterated encounters will increase the amount of social content and the level of intimacy, at least from personages to persons and often to intimates, while decreasing the effects of status in corporate units (power/authority) and membership in categoric units. Yet, the effects of status are rarely completely obviated but their influence on the flow of interaction can be reduced over time, unless those with higher status deliberately work to maintain status differences. To do so, however, is costly because lording status over others typically generates resentments by subordinates and works against the flow of positive emotional arousal in encounters.

Categorization is a critical first step in most encounters because, until persons determine the nature of the situation, the appropriate level of intimacy, the status beliefs about categoric unit memberships of participants, and the expectation states for various location of persons in status hierarchies of the more inclusive corporate unit, it is difficult to establish expectations for all of the other dimensions of normatization. It is hard to know the forms of talk and body language that are appropriate, the frames that can be imposed, the rituals to be used, or the emotions to be felt and displayed. Thus, without clear categorization, encounters will often stall at this first stage, with interaction being very tentative and stilted until participants to the encounter can categorize each other and the situation.

Keying and Re-keying Frames

The notion of *frame* denotes a metaphor to a picture frame, which at its edges excludes materials outside the encounter, while highlighting what can occur inside the frame. Erving Goffman (1974), who first used this idea in sociology, tended to get bogged down in what can only be described as a phenomenological orgy, postulating different types, layers, and laminations of frames. I think that the process is much simpler than Goffman's portrayal.

When individuals interact, they signal to others the subjects, topics, and issues that can be part of the interaction and, equally significant, what is to remain outside of the frame. In Goffman's words, they *key* the frame and, then if necessary, they can *re-key* this frame by expanding and contracting it, by imposing an entirely new frame, or perhaps by laying one frame partially over another. As frames are keyed and re-keyed, the process is often highly ritualized so that people are aware that a frame shift has occurred. For example, when someone in a normal conversation suddenly asks "would you mind if I asked you a personal question?," this is a ritualized way to shift frame or impose a new frame on the conversation. The person who has been asked this question can signal yes or no, and perhaps demure and suspend the new frame by saying something like: "it depends upon the question?" All of this conversational banter is highly stylized and ritualized, with stock phrasing; and until the person receiving the request for more personal information answers the question, the effort at re-keying the frame is held in abeyance.

Categorizing an encounter helps to key frames because some basic framing issues are resolved. Categorizing establishes expectation states for members of categoric and corporate units, expectations for type of situation, and expectations for intimacy. This categorization sets parameters within which framing can occur. For example, if the grocery store clerk scanning your groceries asks a question seeking personal information, the categorization of the situation as work-practical and involving personages will work against successful re-keying of the frame toward more personal content. There is virtually no limit to what people can talk about in encounters, and so, it becomes essential to establish some "guidelines" or a frame. Categorization helps this process along, and then within the constraints of expectations associated with categorization, individuals can begin to key and re-key a more delimited range of topics and subjects within the encounter.

As with categorizing the encounter, framing is also facilitated by the fact that there is a limited number of dimensions along which framing generally occurs. In Fig. 6.2, I outline what I see as the general axes of framing. For any encounter to be viable, individuals must implicitly agree on the frames with respect to body, demography, physical features, structural units, cultural elements, and personal materials that are to be included and excluded from interaction. Again, categorization helps establish appropriate frames. For example, if a situation is defined as interaction among intimates, then touching, and other types of physical contact are acceptable; similarly, frames allowing for more biography and self-involvement can be imposed, adding a new layer of expectations for intimacy.




Fig. 6.2 Axes of framing

Like most elements in interaction, persons carry large inventories of frames in their stocks of knowledge, and they generally “know” which frames are appropriate, and which are inappropriate, in variously categorized encounters. This knowledge is implicit because it is difficult to articulate the nature of the frames; yet, we know when it “feels right,” and when it does not. In fact, if people have to address the issue of framing explicitly with a question like “what shall we talk about,” the interaction is already lost because it has no

clear footing to orient its participants. People will feel awkward in making a reply because the question of framing is simply too “out front.” Framing works best when it is done rather subtly, where proposals for keying or re-keying the frame are embedded in the ritual flow of the interaction, and where individuals can quietly accept or resist the frame. In fact, much of the proposing and acceptance/rejection of framing is done with body language – facial expressions and body movements – rather than spoken words. For example, a person who moves too close to you is trying to shift the body frame, and your body response, such as backing up or even holding up a hand to signal stop, work to reject the effort to re-key the frame without saying a word but still “speaking volumes.” For framing to work effectively to structure an encounter, then, it must be part of the larger rhythmic flow of the interaction.

Forms of Talk and Non-verbal Communication

Forms of communication are constrained by the categories and frames that have been imposed on the encounter and that, as a result, generate expectations for how individuals should behave. There is a tendency to view verbalizations as the primary form of communication, backed up by a secondary forms of communication through body language – that is, expressions in face, body countenance, spacing of bodies, hand gestures, and other bodily movements. In fact, as I have already noted, I think that it is the other way around: the first language among humans’ hominid ancestors was “the language of emotion” that was communicated primarily through facial gestures and body countenance, and to a lesser extent through non-speech verbal expressions. This language of emotions has phonemes (revolving mostly around face and body) and a syntax that strings these non-verbal phonemes together to communicate meanings, primarily emotional meanings about the state of arousal of an individual (Turner 2000a, 2002, 2007a) This language of emotions evolved, I believe, millions of years before humans emerged some 200,000 years ago; and in fact, recent data on several genes responsible for humans’ capacity for articulated speech appear to have been under selection for around 200,000 years, suggesting that speech in the full human measure is unique to us as a species (Enard et al. 2002a, b). Rather than body language being piggy-backed onto speech, then, it is speech that is attached to an existing non-verbal language built around emotions. The significance of this conclusion is that humans rely more upon body language than speech in determining the emotional undertones and likely dispositions of others,

and so, the forms of non-verbal communication are just as important, if not more important, than forms of talk.

With categorization and framing, forms of communication are constrained. How one talks will be determined by the categoric units, the location of individuals in corporate units, the nature of the situation as work-practical, social, and ceremonial, and the appropriate level of intimacy. For example, a student will shift to a different form of speech when talking with a professor compared to when he or she is talking with fellow students, or persons at a funeral will talk very differently than when they are at a party. These examples represent extremes, perhaps, but they give a sense of what persons can do; they can make both large-scale or subtle shifts in speech (Gregory 1994, 1999) – its grammar, its pace, its frequency, pitch, amplitude, formality, and many other features of speech – as they categorize and re-categorize or key or re-key frames. Many years ago, I was struck by my 5-year old son's behavior at my grandmother's (his great grandmother's) funeral; he immediately shifted into "funeral talk," even though he had never been to a funeral and, in this case, had not known the person being eulogized. His voice (perhaps for the first time) was modulated and quiet, his body language was gentle and reserved, and even cried quietly during the eulogy – all of which was a great surprise to me. By the age of 5, then, he had learned about this type of ceremonial situation and the frames that this categorization imposes on talk and body language; and as a result, with no direction from me (but perhaps cueing by the demeanor of others), he easily shifted into proper form of communication.

Use of a particular form of speech and shifts in forms of speech occur without great reflection, as was clear from the ease of a 5 year old who had never been to a funeral attests, and we immediately know when someone is not using the right form, causing us to flinch, to feel embarrassed or awkward, or even to sanction the "outsoken" individual. The same is true of non-verbal communication: depending upon the categorization and frames, expressions of face, movement of arms, countenance and spacing of bodies, and other aspects of body language will be adjusted. For example, I have often noticed that when students are talking with each other and, then, when one breaks away to talk with me as I walk by, not only does the breakaway individual speak to me in a more formal tone and adjust body toward a more serious and formal mode of self presentation, the other persons in the previous (or suspended) encounter adjust their body language to reflect a work-practical mode of interaction between persons of different status. As long as the person talking to me stays within about ten feet of the others, they tend to look over in a more serious display than before the breakaway occurred. Once the distance passes twenty

feet, however, the others go back to their normal student mode of chatter and informal body language typical of social encounters.

As forms of communication are adjusted to fit categorization and frames, the latter are reinforced; and in fact, talk and non-verbal communication become a way to sustain categories and frames. Of course, talk and non-verbal communication may have initially set categorizing and framing into motion, as would be the case if someone comes up to you with a serious face, shrunken body language, soft and sad speech; such communication goes a long way to establish the way the encounter can be categorized (non-social, somewhat intimate) and framed (body and personal frames geared to talk about “what is wrong”). As talk proceeds, categories and frames are reinforced if the other accepts the role of sympathetic friend, but if this other refuses to do so and simply brush off the sad and serious person with “problems,” the talk and body language will reframe the situations, perhaps around the anger at being so rejected. Thus, categorizing, framing, and forms of communicating are all interrelated and often almost simultaneous in establishing the footing for the encounter; and if they reinforce one another, then the footing is more firmly established and generates expectations for all other dimensions of normatization.

Rituals in Encounters

Erving Goffman (1967) was the first sociologist to theorize about how rituals are critical to day-to-day interactions. Rituals are stereotypical sequences of gestures designed to communicate a mood and to mark moments in an encounter. Rituals involve talk and body language, and they are employed to open and close (bracket) an encounter, to form or structure the flow of interaction, to symbolize (or totemize) the interaction, and to repair breaches in the encounter. I have listed these in Fig. 6.3, and like almost all other facets of interaction, people carry in their stocks of knowledge inventories of verbal and body language used in various types of rituals. Without rituals, an interaction is difficult to open or close, to sequence over time, to denote or symbolize, or to effect repairs when breaches occur. For example, if you simply walk up to someone whom you do not know without an opening ritual, the encounter will not go well, or will even appear threatening. Or, if you walk away from an encounter of friends without a closing ritual – e.g., “got to go, see you later” or some such stereotypical sequences – the next time you enter an interaction with the same people, it may be strained. Indeed, the opening and closing rituals will be critical in establishing the footing for the next encounter. Rituals can be used during




Fig. 6.3 Types of rituals

initial categorization and framing, but equally often, they reflect expectations from categorization and framing. Without rituals that reinforce other dimensions of normatization, the encounter will become confusing and easily breached because it is the rituals that keep the flow of interaction on the right track and that offer a means for repairing any breaches to this flow. Let me review the basic types of rituals delineated in Fig. 6.3

Bracketing Rituals. These rituals open and close interaction in a focused encounter; and in so doing, they help categorize the type of situation and the level of intimacy, while facilitating the keying of the initial frames for the interaction. Greeting rituals generally open an encounter; and depending

upon their enthusiasm, formality, body contact (e.g., shaking hands, hugs), and other demonstrative sequences of the ritual, the interaction will proceed on the footing communicated by the ritual. For example, a formal hello greeting accompanied by a hand shake and a “shall we get to work” utterance sets the encounter off on a very different footing than a hug, enthusiastic hello, and personal question about the other and her family; even if this is to be a work-practical interaction, the introduction of heavy social content plus more intimacy will establish a very different footing for the encounter. This opening ritual must, however, seem genuine and sincere in order to meeting transactional needs for trust (i.e., people are sincere, respective of self, and predictable) and facticity (i.e., the situation is as it appears and has an obdurate character). Anyone who has, at least in the old days of car-buying, been the victim of clumsy efforts of the sales person to open the interaction with handshakes, *faux* enthusiasm, and feigned treatment of you as a person (with preemptive first-name usage and often questions about matters other than buying a car) knows when an opening ritual is not genuine and on the wrong footing. There is simply no trust or facticity evident; indeed, the sales person appears to be insincere and concerned only with selling you a car. It is no wonder that many people find these encounters unpleasant, thereby giving a real boost to internet sales where such insincerity is less likely (indeed, before the internet, I had begun to send my son--an individual who loves “the game” of negotiation--to bargain the deal for me; I found the interaction too unpleasant, whereas my son, the ultimate negotiator, finds the bargaining contest to be great sport).

There are, of course, large cultural variations in how greeting rituals are supposed to go. Americans, for example, are among the most enthusiastic (compared to people in many other countries) and also the most irritating of greeters, immediately trying to put the interaction on a more personal and social footing. Japanese, in contrast, are much more formal in initial greetings, although in their efforts to be polite, they are quite tolerant of American enthusiasm. Other cultures fall somewhere between these extremes, but they all have clear rules about how greeting rituals in varying types of situations are to transpire.

The body language in opening rituals is probably more important in most circumstances than the verbal track; and indeed, this is why, for instance, that varying types of bows and head movements are so much more important among the Japanese in establishing the footing than the actual words spoken (which are secondary to body and face movements). Such is also the case even when the verbal channel is effusive; we will tend to ignore this channel until we get a handle on the facial and body movements of the person emitting the ritual. Similarly, we will use body language to communicate to

others just whether or not we have accepted the categorization and framing implied by another's opening ritual. For example, when I used to shop in person for cars, I would be "stone cold" to a young salesman in his "get personal" mode, only giving him my last name and responding with muted utterances to what I considered and still consider to be personal questions that are none of the salesman's business. Thus, the counter-ritual in response to an opening ritual is critical in determining what will transpire. Most of the time, individuals try to be polite and let pass what they see as overbearing greeting rituals, but it is still in their power to dampen the footing of the interaction through a counter-ritual.

The other end of the encounter, where the closing rituals are played out, are also very important in not only bringing to a close the encounter in a polite way but also in setting up what will transpire the next time the encounter is iterated. For example, I use to ask students in my large introductory sociology class to conduct breaching experiments in their interactions on campus – at least until they became too disruptive (since there were almost 600 students, or 4% of the student population at UCR, from introductory sociology "out there" disrupting encounters). The one breach that the students had the most trouble executing was a closing ritual where, in essence, there was no ritual. I asked them to simply walk away from a small and ongoing encounter without saying a word; and then, I asked them to monitor the next time the encounter was to be formed. They reported a tentative opening ritual from those who had been "rebuffed," at least until they emitted an appropriate greeting ritual. Also, many times the students were not allowed to just walk away, with those being the rebuffed challenging the lack of a closing ritual with, "where are you going," "aren't you going to say 'goodbye,'" or "why be so rude" and other sanctions for breaching the close of an encounter. Since social structures and cultures are ultimately sustained by chains of focused encounters, the closing ritual is as important as the opening ritual in creating the trust and facticity essential to sustain chains of focused encounters.

Another breaching experiment, and the kind that began to cause problems for me, was for a student to walk up to a table of students that he or she did not know and sit down and join their talk. This proved very difficult for students to do, and the reaction of others varied from shy awkwardness at the interruption to outright hostility. These more potentially volatile encounters eventually led the administration to request that I stopped sending hordes out there to disrupt the micro social order.

Bracketing rituals thus work in concert with other dimensions of normatizing to sustain expectations for what will transpire in this and the next encounter; and if necessary, they can be used to change the footing of encounters, to shift categories, frames, forms of talk, and emotional displays. Without use of

the appropriate rituals, encounters will be stressful and often breached because it is the opening and closing rituals that “set the mood” of all encounters (Collins 2004).

Forming Rituals. These rituals structure the flow of interaction between the opening and closing rituals. One of the most difficult problems in most encounters is sustaining a flow or, as Randall Collins (2004) has termed it, a *rhythmic synchronization* of talk and bodies. When an interaction is proceeding smoothly, talk will flow back and forth in a rhythmic pattern of “I talk” and then “you talk.” Bodies will also be in rhythm, and indeed, even if you cannot hear a word of an encounter, you can see the rhythmic synchronization of bodies and facial expressions and “know” that the encounter is “in sync” and hence is probably meeting basic transactional needs for trust and facticity, along with even more powerful needs for identity-verification, profits in exchange, and sense of group inclusion.

Rituals are important in creating and sustaining rhythmic synchronization. Subtle facial gestures and short utterances are used to keep the interaction on track. For example, turn-taking in conversation is structured by subtle patterns of vocalization and body gesturing (Sachs et al. 1974; Sachs 1992). When a person is near the end, sometimes they say something like “I am almost done” (typically when they have held the floor for too long, with this ritual being an implicit acknowledgment of their *faux pas* and ritualized apology for having done so). More subtly, a person’s voice may trail off and facial gestures will shift from an expository mode to listening mode, signaling to others that it is “their turn” to talk; and as another begins to talk, this person draws in body and face “up”, signaling to others that he or she indeed about to “take the floor.” We can see how important these kinds of forming rituals are because when people “talk over” each other, they both may suddenly stop, then signal to the other to “go ahead” often accompanied by ritualized apologies to repair the breach in conversational flow. If such breaches occur often, it is difficult to get the encounter on a firm footing or in rhythmic synchronization (Collins 2004).

The absence of forming rituals can also cause problems. We all know persons who are not very demonstrative; they simply do not employ those subtle rituals – nod of head, movement of face, and other gestures that signal that they are there with you. Rather, they simply stand there without saying a word, and I find that I talk and talk with such people because they never ritually signal that it is “their turn.” Even when I use standard rituals – trailing off of voice, expectant look – to signal that it is their turn to talk, they do not give me a counter-ritual signaling that they are ready to step up to the plate. Sometimes I have had to be really obvious with a ritual “what do you think” as a means to get them to talk – surprisingly without a response in

many cases. Such encounters are always difficult because trust and facticity have not been established; we just do not know “where a person is coming from” and, so, the lack of synchronization assures that other transactional needs will not be met.

There are rituals to shift frames and/or re-categorize the interaction; indeed, if efforts to make a shift are not initiated by a ritual, they will not be accepted or they will seem inappropriate. For instance, if too much social content is overwhelming the work-practical mission of an encounter, a ritualized “o.k., can we get back to work” or something along these lines will often be needed to redirect the encounter – at times with little success when people are having a good time avoiding work. If a person has authority, then this ritual will generally be more successful but without authority it can be a futile exercise. In particular, rituals are critical to re-categorizing some element of the encounter or to re-keying the frame. As noted earlier, a ritualized phrase such as “can I ask you a personal question?” not only shifts the frame but also puts the encounter on a more intimate footing. Without this ritualized question and counter ritual indicating that, provisionally at least, it is o.k. to ask, the question would be as intrusive as if a stranger walked up and asked you “how’s your sex life.” The body language accompanying verbal rituals to shift the flow of interaction is also important. A person who wants to ask a personal question will generally lean forward (closing distance of bodies), lower voice, and ask in a very quiet and tentative way if they can “ask you a personal question; without this almost obsequious pattern of gesturing, the verbal ritual will come across as too intrusive and, hence, will disrupt as much as sustain the flow of interaction.

Totemizing Rituals. As Émile Durkheim (1912 [1947]) emphasized, encounters are often symbolized in some manner when they have aroused positive emotions. The symbols are often part of a process of embedding, as is the case when individuals in the military interact. Their uniforms and badges not only symbolize the larger corporate unit – e.g., the army and units in the army – these symbols often establish categories and frames at the beginning of an encounter. But, even with these pre-existing symbols, encounters, typically develop additional symbols when iterated over time – often stock phrases that are unique to a group of persons, or even physical symbols of various kinds, such as the jackets of motorcycle clubs and gangs. Even normal clothing apparel with logos and names represent efforts to totemize membership in a corporate unit in which encounters have charged up positive emotions and promote solidarity among those “worshipping” the totems of the group.

Totemizing rituals can also apply to specific relationships. For instance, if your wife says “I love you,” the appropriate response (unless you are

crazy) is “I love you too” or something along these lines. This ritual and counter-ritual do more than sustain the intimacy of the encounter and its personal frames; they symbolize the relationship (as a kind of “verbal totem”) as standing out from all other relationships and, hence, as worthy of being totemized. Thus, totems do not need to be physical objects; they can be verbal or even body gestures that denote a relationship as “special” and as “standing out from all other relationships.” In general, the greater the positive emotional energy generated in encounters, particularly in chains of iterated encounters, the more likely are totemizing rituals to be used. For example, specific forms of greeting rituals, or forms of talk, or hand signals, or virtually any set of verbal or non-verbal signs can serve as a totemizing ritual. Such rituals immediately charge up the sense of group solidarity, thereby assuring that needs for group inclusion will be met, and in all likelihood, that needs for trust and facticity as well as for identity-verification and profits in exchange payoffs will also be realized.

Repair Rituals. A *faux pas* or a breach to an encounter will immediately arouse negative emotions in others. If a person is unaware of the breach, others will generally apply negative sanctions, but in a highly ritualized manner so as to elicit a ritualized apology and, if necessary, ritualized compensation to others for the *faux pas*. For instance, if a person says an inappropriate thing, another may say “I don’t see how you can say that” – a ritualized sanction demanding, in essence, a counter-ritual apology or explanation. The counter-ritual must seem genuine and sincere; and it must be emitted in the proper manner if it is to be successful in repairing the breach. In response to the ritualized sanction directed at a person who has misspoken, he or she may offer a ritualized apology such as “Oh, I am so sorry; I don’t know what I was thinking” which can be followed by a counter-ritual such as “Oh, that’s o.k.” which closes the repair ritual sequence.

The rituals involved in this sequence do not need to be verbal. They can be almost purely non-verbal and even when verbalized, talk will be heavily infused with stereotypical body language. Any parent with a teenager has had to endure the rolling of eyes by the all-knowing teenager perceives you as “hopeless” and “clueless”, a ritualized sanction by body language that, in my case at least, I considered a badge of honor that I was probably doing something right. And, if the eye roll were too extreme, I would typically reverse the tables and in a ritualized manner give my “stare of death” (which meant withdrawal of car privileges and more restrictive curfew) that usually brought a muted but still detectable repair ritual, which I could acknowledge quietly with such ritualized phrases as “good move.”

Such repair sequences diminish the arousal of negative emotions and provide the emotional space for the interaction to get back onto a footing that

can generate more positive emotions. There are some rather stock rituals that all persons in a culture understand and can use in a wide variety of situations. This knowledgeability greatly facilitates repairs because a person does not have to think of a unique ritual response but can adopt one of the “old standards” and adjust it to the particulars of a situation. For instance, “how could you say that!” has a number of stock ritualized replies such as: “Oh, I am so sorry, I don’t think you understood me” (as a more aggressive and defensive repair apology), “Oh, I misspoke,” “Sorry, I am not being myself today” and other stock phrases that can be brought out and offered to keep the ritual repair going. Of course, if body language signals that the verbal utterance is insincere, then a new and more serious breach has occurred in the encounter, one that is often more difficult to repair. Indeed, a full repair may not occur in the current encounter; apologies may be the opening ritual of a new encounter at a later date when everyone has “cooled down.” The important point is that culture and social structure cannot be sustained without the capacity to use rituals to repair tears in the interpersonal fabric. Since humans are highly emotional, even seeming minor breaches need to be repaired because, if not, they will often fester and arouse more intense emotions.

Emotions and Feelings in Encounters

In Chap. 8, I will analyze emotions as a central microdynamic force; and because it is such a potentially powerful if not volatile force, it must be regulated by normative expectations. Nothing can disrupt a focused encounter like emotional outbursts, especially negative emotional outbursts but even a positive one that is simply too effusive and effervescent. Emotions are thus controlled by *feeling* and *display* rules (Hochschild 1979, 1983) as well as more general *blueprint rules* (Ridgeway 1982, 1994), which I see as much like what I term institutional norms. Moreover, there are *emotion ideologies* that are part of an institutional domain and meta-ideologies of a society; these ideologies are highly general but they do place limits on the range of emotions that should be expressed and felt for encounters within corporate units embedded in an institutional domain or for encounters composed of members of categoric units.

Other dimensions of normatization help to fine-tune feeling and display rules. Categorization of the situation as work-practical, social, or ceremonial and as revealing an appropriate level of intimacy (see Table 6.2) delimit what emotions can be displayed, even if the actual emotions felt must be repressed or covered up in some way, although individuals will also engage

in *emotion work* to bring their emotional feelings in line with what emotions they can display in a situation (Hochschild 1979, 1985). Moreover, since emotion rules also apply to members of categoric units, the process of categorization will thereby delimit the emotions that are appropriate to those categoric unit memberships that are salient in an encounter. For example, the expectations for emotions to be felt and displayed between males and females are different, often forcing more emotion work burdens on females than males in American culture (one of many points of injustice and inequality). For example, it is far more acceptable for men to display anger in encounters, whereas as for women this is often considered an inappropriate emotion. The same would be true for other categoric distinctions. For instance, members of diverse ethnic categoric units, or categories marking different levels of income, or varying levels of education will have somewhat different expectations placed upon them as to how they display emotions and what emotions they should feel.

Framing further constrains the emotions that can be felt and displayed; and if a new frame adding more emotional intensity is sought by some in an encounter, they will have to re-key the frame using appropriate rituals. To simply jump to a new emotional state will generally breach the encounter, and so ritualized transition, such as “I’m really getting upset about this,” can pave the way, although others may sanction a person who utters this ritualized phrase because they do not want to change the frame or have to “deal with” another’s emotions. Thus, rituals also act as a brake on emotional outburst, requiring an individual to “warn others” through a ritualized effort at re-keying the frame; and to continue to push for a new, more emotional frame when others are resistant is likely to breach the encounter.

Forms of talk and body language, as they follow from categorization and frames, also constrain what emotions can be displayed. To give off anger in either talk or body language (face and body countenance) in a situation where such communication is not tolerated is to breach the interaction. For example, a person who is smiling and talking in a voice that is modulated through clenched teeth revealing anger is giving off contradictory cues that will breach the interaction, unless this person is allowed to re-frame the encounter to more aggressive behavior and forms of communication. And so, if individuals want to shift forms of communication, they must do so by re-categorization and by re-keying of frames. If they do not seek to do so, they will be sanctioned, if only by the collective silence and disapproving looks of others; and yet, as we all know, sometimes people “lose it” or “go postal” and seriously breach the encounter because they simply cannot control their emotions.

If emotions exceed the limits imposed by categorization, framing, forms of communication, and rituals, they not only breach the encounter but also

force others to make rapid and often unpleasant adjustments to overly emotional persons. These others will have to shift categorization toward more intimacy in having to deal with a person's "true feelings"; they will have to re-key frames toward more personal and perhaps biographical content; they will have to alter modes of communication to incorporate more emotional content; and they will have to employ of whole new set of rituals to tolerate and control emotional outbursts. In general, such re-categorizing, re-framing, re-ritualizing, and re-constructing forms of talk represents a lot of work, and hence, individuals are resistant to efforts to do so, unless it becomes absolutely necessary. When internal emotional states break out among some individuals in the encounter, others thus face a dilemma: they can let it happen and thus engage in all the necessary work to put the encounter on a new footing; they can resist change in the footing through sanctioning or other efforts to get someone to calm down; or they can simply remove themselves from the encounter, if not physically at least emotionally (by tuning out the disruption).

Not only does excessive emotionality break frames and require everyone else to perform ritualized emotion-management, it also sets up tensions and uncertainty for the next time the same participants must interact. Opening rituals will be strained, just how to categorize the situation will be unclear, what frames to employ will be ambiguous, what forming rituals will be needed, and what will be the forms of talk and body language. Even if there has been an intervening apology and repair ritual work, emotions have such power that individuals will still be uncertain as to how they should or can behave. This kind of uncertainty assures that meeting transactional needs for trust and facticity will be problematic, to say nothing of even more powerful motive states such as self-verification, profitable exchange payoffs, and sense of group inclusion. Thus, the effort to regulate emotions stems from many potential sources in all encounters; and so, it is not surprising that feeling and display rules are perhaps the most important expectations that come with normatization.

Normatizing in Unfocused Encounters

Without face-to-face engagement, normatization is a much more difficult process; and as a consequence, embedding in corporate and categoric units becomes the major basis for developing expectations. Many of these expectations come from the ecology of the space that people occupy and move through, especially the configuration of space, the use-spaces (e.g., benches,

stalls, tables, alcoves) that can be claimed, the props that can be brought into or expropriated a space, and the normative expectations of the larger corporate unit that arrays space. Moreover, the demography of the situation becomes critical, with expectations developing for how people should behave in terms of their number, density, movements, and categoric-unit memberships.

Thus, the culture and structure of the more inclusive corporate unit that organizes space (e.g., a government building, park, street scene, a shopping mall, a sports arena, an office building) are one source of normalizing without face-engagement. Another, as emphasized above, is the demography – number, density, movement, and categoric unit memberships – of those occupying the space where unfocused encounters occur. And a third is the ecology of space where unfocus is to be maintained. People carry in their stocks of knowledge understandings of the expectations that apply when certain markers appear in unfocused situations – markers such as types of corporate units, configurations and nature of space and props, and demography of the situation; and from these markers individuals assemble expectations for how they should behave in order to sustain a lack of focus.

These markers allow individuals to categorize the situation as work-practical, social, and ceremonial (and perhaps other social subcategories such as recreational); and they signal that others are to be treated as person-ages rather than intimates (unless traveling with known others in a moving focused encounter), as representatives of roles and/or as members of categoric units if these can be discerned and seem relevant. This categorization facilitates framing; and categorization and framing together establish the appropriate forms of talk, if this becomes necessary, and perhaps more importantly, the modes of body demeanor to signal to others that one is not threatening and thereby behaving in ways that uphold the public order.

The rituals of how to focus an unfocused encounter in public places are well known, and so, these are always at the ready as individuals are working to sustain unfocus – just in case it becomes necessary to focus the encounter, however briefly. There are clear greeting or acknowledging rituals if focus cannot be avoided, forming rituals to structure brief face-engagements or even longer engagements if these cannot be avoided, and repairs to breaches of unfocus.

There are also expectations for how demonstrative and emotional individuals can be in situations where expectations emphasize sustaining unfocus. For instance, the difference among emotional displays in an office building, public park, sport venue, or crowded street vary; and most individuals understand the feeling rules for these and other basic types of public places where unfocus is to be sustained. High emotionality will break unfocus, just as it will disrupt or breach a focused encounter, and so there are

well-understood feeling and display rules for situations where unfocus is to be maintained. Again, the nature of the more inclusive corporate unit where unfocused encounters are occurring (say a sport venue vs. a theatrical performance), the configuration and props in space, and the demography of those occupying and moving in this space all carry with them feeling rules that most people know and follow. Yet, at times individuals may want to breach public places; and one of the most effective ways to do so is to violate display rules about emotions.

Many of these “understandings” that are assembled into expectations are automatically invoked as we move in space and use markers to activate normatization. Our expectations are, in essence, pre-packaged from past experiences, and we do not have to think or worry about how to sustain unfocus. Yet, at times it becomes essential to re-normatize situations because of crowding that forces individuals to bump into each other (whether literally or figuratively), and so focus must occur. Just how long this focus is sustained depends upon the external situation, but also on the (a) greeting/acknowledging that is often mixed with a repair ritual for breaking focus and (b) the counter-rituals and responses of others to these ritual openings. The focus can be brief, or it can be sustained for a longer period of time, as might be the case for people standing in line for a prolonged period where avoiding eye contact would become increasingly difficult. Under these conditions, encounters can cycle back and forth between unfocus and focus, but the talk and body language will be tentative and always highly ritualized (almost cliché-like, as individuals comment on their common predicament, on the weather, or on the common activity they are about to engage in). But, a certain amount of re-categorization (from, say, personages to persons) and re-framing has occurred (toward slightly more personal, even biographical). Moreover, as re-categorization and re-framing occur, forms of talk will shift to a more social mode, body language will appear more relaxed and open, and more emotions can be displayed (as long as they are positive). These shifts in normatization will be guided by rituals, but as they occur, the ratio of stylized ritual to normal conversational forms of communication will decline.

Yet, even as people are able to re-normatize with relative ease, there is still a certain tension and hesitancy evident because people need to hit the “right level” of focus in situations where more general expectations call for unfocus. The result is that the focusing of normally unfocused encounters feels awkward and stilted. And yet, all parties need to work hard at sustaining the right focus in order to preserve the public order and meet, at a minimum, transactional needs for trust and facticity, perhaps group inclusion, and even a role-identity if it is relevant to the situation.

Elementary Principles on Cultural Dynamics in Encounters

We are now ready for two elementary principles on normalizing dynamics. These principles follow from those enumerated in Chap. 2 on embedding, since as I have emphasized, one of the key conditions for the smooth operation of all microdynamics is the degree to which an encounter is embedded in meso and macro structures and their respective cultures. As has become evident, I am emphasizing in principles of focused encounters the degree to which the encounter can sustain its focus and rhythmic synchronization, and in so doing avoid breaches or, if breaches occur, have the capacity to ritually repair disruption to focus and rhythmic synchronization. Thus, the degree of success in normalizing an encounter partially determines the extent to which focus and rhythmic synchronization can be achieved in the first place and then sustained over the duration of the encounter. In contrast, an unfocused encounter depends upon the ability of individuals to avoid face-engagement and, if focus is unavoidable, to manage with rituals, forms of communication, and emotional demeanor during the movement into and out of focus.

14. The more a focused encounter can be normalized, the more it can sustain its focus and rhythmic synchronization of talk and body language, with normalization increasing when individuals can culture-make and culture-take and, thereby, successfully:
 - A. Categorize the encounter, with categorization being a multiplicative function of the capacity of individuals to assemble and reconcile expectations for:
 1. The relative amounts of work-practical, social, and ceremonial content to be played out
 2. The relative amounts of intimacy to be exhibited by individuals
 3. The relevance of diffuse status characteristics arising from categorical unit memberships and status beliefs associated with these memberships
 4. The relevance of status location of individuals in corporate units
 5. The duration and rate of iteration of the encounter which, to varying degrees, will:
 - a. Decrease the salience of diffuse status characteristics
 - b. Decrease the salience of status in corporate units
 - c. Increase the level of intimacy
 - d. Add social content
 - e. Increase the amount of particularistic culture

- B. Frame the encounter, with framing increasing when individuals can use rituals to assemble and reconcile expectations for:
 - 1. Elements of categorization, which is a multiplicative function of the conditions listed under 14-A above
 - 2. Elements of body, especially distances among, allowable access to, and relevant portions of bodies
 - 3. Elements of demography, especially membership in categoric units, number of persons co-present, and migrations of persons in and out of the encounter
 - 4. Elements of ecology, especially the configuration of space, props, use-spaces, and physical boundaries
 - 5. Cultural elements, especially relevant value premises, ideologies, and norms
 - 6. Structural elements, especially relevant corporate and categoric units, institutional domains, and dimensions of stratification
 - 7. Personal elements, especially biography, self-involvement, emotionality, and intimacy
- C. Establish forms of communication in the encounter revolving around talk and body language, with expectations on forms of communication increasing when individuals can use rituals to:
 - 1. Categorize the encounter
 - 2. Frame the encounter
 - 3. Shift forms of communication
- D. Invoke and use rituals to open and close the interaction, form and reform the rhythmic flow of interaction, totemize or symbolically represent the interaction and corporate units in which it is embedded, and repair breaches to the interaction
- E. Regulate the valence and intensity of emotions by developing expectations for the feelings to be experienced and displayed, with the constraints of these feelings rules increasing with:
 - 1. Categorization of self, other(s), and situation in the encounter
 - 2. Framing of the encounter
 - 3. Establishing forms of talk and body language to be used in the encounter
 - 4. Rituals to structure the flow of interaction in the encounter
- F. Embedding of the encounter in corporate and categoric units that are, respectively, embedded in a relatively autonomous institutional domain or a clear class location in the system of stratification

15. The more an unfocused encounter can be normatized, the more likely will individuals be able to sustain unfocus and thereby avoid or repair breaches that come with focusing unfocused encounters, with normatization of unfocused encounters increasing with:
 - A. Embedding of situational ecology within corporate units and their cultures which, in turn, increases the likelihood that individuals will understand:
 1. The meanings of the spatial configuration in which unfocused encounters occur
 2. The meaning of props and use-spaces within this configuration
 3. The meanings of density and movement individuals within this configuration
 4. The status and roles that might be relevant to the actions of persons within this configuration
 - B. Embedding of demography within corporate and categoric units, which increases the likelihood that individuals will understand:
 1. The status beliefs and expectation states for individuals in categoric units
 2. The expectation states for individuals occupying status positions within the divisions of labor of corporate units and playing roles within these units
 3. The meaning of varying levels of density among individuals within locations in space, especially the density among members of varying categoric units, incumbents in status positions within divisions of labor of corporate units, and individuals playing roles in these units
 4. The meaning of movements of individuals through space, especially the movement of members of categoric units, incumbents in status positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units, and individuals playing roles in these units
 - C. Capacity of individuals to use appropriate rituals and forms of communication to manage episodes of focus in unfocused situations, which increases with the extent to which the conditions under 15-A and 15-B above are realized

Conclusion

Normatizing occurs as other microdynamic processes are played out in encounters. All microdynamic forces interact with each other in making encounters either viable or unviable. When individuals understand the relevant cultural symbols, they can assemble expectations for what should occur in an encounter. Normatizing occurs along six dimensions that are particularly important in creating and sustaining focus and synchronization of talk and body language: categorization of self, others, and situation; framing to establish what can and cannot be part of the encounter; establishing forms of talk and body language that are appropriate; recognizing the rituals that can be used to open, close, form, totemize, and repair the flow of interaction; and establishing feeling rules about what emotions can be felt and expressed. The more an encounter can develop expectations over these six dimensions, the more viable is the encounter in present and future iterations.

At the same time that individuals are determining the cultural symbols that are relevant to the encounter as they culture-take and culture-make, they are also assessing the demography and ecology of the situation and seeking to understand the structures in which an encounter is embedded. Situational demography and ecology is often given meaning only by the nature of the corporate and categoric units in which an encounter is embedded. And, as individuals seek to determine the structural location of the encounter, they try to understand the status of self and others in the situation as well as the relevant roles that individuals can play; and as they determine status and roles, they not only determine the structural units in which an encounter is embedded, but they also learn what elements of meso and macro level culture to use in normatizing the encounter.

Chapter 7

Motivational Dynamics in Encounters

Motivation is a complex and, surprisingly, not a well-understood dynamic in the social sciences. I see motivation as the energy that drives individuals to behave in certain ways; and while a great deal of motivation among humans is idiosyncratic and tied to each person's biography, there are certain universal motives that drive the formation and operation of encounters. I see these motivations as *need-states* in the sense that individuals have a relatively small set of persistent needs that they seek to meet in virtually all encounters, especially focused encounters. These universal need-states may be supplemented by a host of additional needs that are unique to individuals or particular situations, but of most importance to theorizing about the dynamics of encounters is the recognition that there certain need-states are *always* present. If individuals can meet these needs, they will experience a range of positive emotions, whereas if these needs cannot be realized, they feel negative emotions that will lead them to leave the encounter or sanction those who are perceived to have thwarted efforts to meet these universal needs.

The emotional dynamics that are aroused and set into motion will be examined in more detail in the next chapter. As we will see, emotions run through all microdynamics; when these dynamics do not operate smoothly, they breach encounters and cause the arousal of negative emotional energy. Emotions – whether positive or negative – are likely to be particularly intense for meeting or failing to meet need-states because, without their consummation, individuals will not be able to mobilize and channel the energy required to form and sustain the flow of interaction in focused encounters.

In recent years, I have come to label these universal motive states as *transactional needs* because they are what energize individuals when they interact face-to-face in focused encounters (Turner 2002, 2007a). In contrast, unfocused encounters are driven by a kind of meta-need to avoid activating those need-states that are most salient in focused encounters, although as I will argue, they still operate to some degree in unfocused encounters. Still, the point of an unfocused encounter is to avoid face-engagement and hence,

Table 7.1 Transactional needs

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1. *Verification of identities*: Needs to verify one or more of the four basic identities that individuals present in all encounters
 - (a) *Core-identity*: the conceptions and emotions that individuals have about themselves as persons that they carry to most encounters
 - (b) *Social-identity*: the conception that individuals have of themselves by virtue of their membership in categoric units which, depending upon the situation, will vary in salience to self and others; when salient, individuals seek to have others verify this identity
 - (c) *Group-identity*: the conception that individuals have about their incumbency in corporate units (groups, organizations, and communities) and/or their identification with the members, structure, and culture of a corporate unit; when individuals have a strong sense of identification with a corporate unit, they seek to have others verify this identity
 - (d) *Role-identity*: the conception that individuals have about themselves as role players, particularly roles embedded in corporate units nested in institutional domains; the more a role-identity is lodged in a domain, the more likely will individuals seek to have others verify this identity
 2. *Making a profit the exchange of resources*: Needs to feel that the receipt of resources by persons in encounters exceeds their costs and investments in securing these resources and that their shares of resources are “just” and “fair” compared to (a) the shares that others receive in the situation and (b) reference points that are used to establish what is a just share
 3. *Group inclusion*: Needs to feel that one is a part of the ongoing flow of interaction in an encounter; and the more focused is the encounter, the more powerful is this need
 4. *Trust*: Needs to feel that others’ are predictable, sincere, respective of self, and capable of sustaining rhythmic synchronization through talk and body language
 5. *Facticity*: Needs to feel that, for the purposes of the present interaction, individuals share a common inter-subjectivity, that the situation is indeed as it seems, and that the situation has an obdurate character
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focus; and so, individuals seek to reduce the salience and valences of these transactional needs. Yet, if an unfocused encounter loses its unfocus and turns into a focused encounter, even a very brief one, these transactional needs increase in intensity.

As I outlined in Chap. 2, there are five transactional needs. In order of their relative intensity and valence in most encounters, especially focused encounters, each is summarized in Table 7.1 Understanding motivational forces is, I believe, important in explaining human behavior and interaction, despite the fact that sociologists have not generally been interested in this force. Still, almost all theories of interpersonal behavior contain an implicit motivational dynamic; my goal here is to make these motives more explicit and outline how they function in encounters. For, in my view, encounters are not driven solely by culture, structure, roles, or ecology/demography;

indeed, how individuals culture-take and culture-make, role-take and role-make, and status-take and status-make is very much driven by the relative valences for the transactional needs reviewed in Table 7.1.

Transactional Needs in Focused Encounters

Needs to Verify Identities

William James (1890), Charles Horton Cooley (1902), and George Herbert Mead (1934) all developed the first social-science formulations of the dynamics revolving around humans' capacity to see themselves as objects in their environment. For Cooley, humans see themselves reflected in the "looking glass" or mirror created by the gestures of others; and on the basis of an individual's assessment of others' evaluations, this person will experience either positive or negative emotions. And, for Cooley, the key polarity of positive and negative emotions revolves around pride and shame (see Scheff 1988, 1997 for more recent theorizing in Cooley's tradition). Thus, when persons see that others evaluate them in a positive light, they experience low levels of pride, whereas when the evaluation is less positive and indeed even negative, they will experience varying degrees of shame. These emotional reactions motivate individuals to present themselves to others in ways that will cause them to experience pride and avoid shame. Individuals are thus motivated to verify the self that they present to others since shame, even at relatively low valences, is a highly painful emotion; and indeed, it may be the most painful emotion that humans can experience because it makes people feel incompetent and, hence, "small" in the eyes of others.

Mead did not emphasize these emotional dynamics but he added another critical insight: humans see themselves not only as objects in the immediate situation, they also role-take with others who are not present and with *generalized others* who personify the culture of the situation. On the basis of this role-taking, they see and evaluate themselves in terms of how well they measure up to the expectations of these remote and generalized others. James added still another important insight: humans have different kinds of selves – in his case, *social*, *material*, and *spiritual* selves. We need not borrow directly from James, however, to carry for the basic insight that self operates on a number of different levels.

As I have emphasized, humans seek to verify identities operating at four levels: at the level of roles, or *role-identities*; at the level of corporate units or *group-identities*; at the level of categoric unit membership or *social-identities*;

and at a more the level of general self-conception or *core-identities*. All of these identities are often presented to others in encounters, although some may be more prominent than others (McCall and Simmons 1978; Stryker 1980; Burke and Stets 2009). Table 7.2 offers a more formal definition for each level of self, from the least to most inclusive, while Fig. 7.1 outlines what I see as the critical properties of the entire system of identities that persons have and seek to verify in encounters, particularly focused encounters.

Table 7.2 Brief definitions of types of identities

<i>Core-identity</i>	This level of identity represents the accumulated cognitions and subliminal cognitions that persons hold about who and what they are, coupled with the emotions associated with these cognitions. This level of identity is always salient, and the more focused the encounter, the more individuals seek to verify that the basic elements of this core identity are acceptable to others
<i>Social-identity</i>	This level of identity is associated with the memberships of individuals in categoric units that are salient in situations. Social identities are built from the valuations of, and expectations for, individuals in various categoric units. Even when not highly salient, membership in categoric units influences the behavioral demeanor of individuals across most encounters, and individuals are highly motivated to perceive that others accept this social identity
<i>Group-identity</i>	This level of identity sometimes emerges when individuals identify with corporate units, seeing themselves as representing and personifying the culture of the corporate unit. While occupying a status position and playing a role within a corporate unit is typical of a group identity, individuals often carry identities derived from corporate units in which they are not members
<i>Role-identity</i>	This level of identity revolves around the way a person plays a particular role. As individuals role make, they always seek to have others verify this role and the sense of self that a person has by virtue of playing this role




Fig. 7.1 Types and levels of identity formation

Core-Identity. Historically, this level of identity has been denoted by the terms *self-conception* or *core-self* in order to emphasize its centrality to how a person sees him or herself, and equally important, how this person feels about self. Core-identity is the complex mix of cognitions and emotions that have accumulated during an individual’s biography of encounters, typically with the images and feelings about self from early encounters with significant others having the most impact on the formation of a core-identity. By late adolescence, core-identity is formed and difficult to change for several reasons. First, core-identity is a cumulative sense of self that directs behaviors in all situations; it is a kind of gyroscope that gives behaviors and demeanors a certain constancy across a wide variety of situations, with no one situation or experience having much impact in dislodging these core feelings that make up a core-identity. Second, core-identity is always rather ambiguous to persons; and they typically have great difficulty in articulating the elements and even feelings in this level of identity. Yet, when this identity is not verified, individuals will have intense emotional reactions; and these reactions cause them to leave situations where this identity is not verified or to force others to shift their responses or endure the arousal of negative emotions in an encounter. Indeed, when individuals perceive that the core-identity of another is on the line in a focused encounter, they will try – if they possibly can – to verify this identity because (a) the failure to verify the

identity of another will arouse intense negative emotions, thereby breaching the encounter and (b) the failure to verify another's identity places in jeopardy verification of one's own identity since those who have had their sense of self rejected are less likely to be sympathetic to self-presentations by others in the encounter. Third, core-identities are the most likely to be "protected" by defensive strategies, such as selective perception or selective interpretation of others' responses, disavowing the audience, riding out and ignoring short-term failures to verify core feelings about self, and leaving and avoiding situations where core-identities cannot be verified. Fourth, if defensive strategies fail, core-identities are often shielded from disconfirmation by repression of the negative emotions, such as shame, anger, fear, and sadness, that are aroused when elements of this identity are not verified; and once repressed, core-identities become more immune to change. Fifth, core identities determine to a high degree the content of other levels of identity, and thus, to have core-identity called into question forces alternation of other identities – something that individuals are rarely interested in doing because of the cognitive and emotional work involved.

While core-identities are the most difficult for a person to articulate, they are nonetheless the most emotionally valenced of all identities. As noted above, failure to have this level of identity verified will arouse intense emotions, such as shame and humiliation, which will often be repressed and, then, transmuted into other emotions such as diffuse anger, anxiety, or sadness (see next chapter for the specific dynamics involved). And, since core-identities are carried into virtually all encounters, and certainly those encounters that are important to an individual, there is always the potential for intense emotions when others fail to recognize that role-making efforts signal the elements of a core-identity that are on the line. Because the core-identity is amorphous and rather vague to persons, they are often unable to account for why they became so emotional or, if they have repressed particularly painful emotions, why they feel so uncomfortable and anxious about certain encounters. Given these complex dynamics, it is often very difficult to measure core-identities with the crude instruments of social science research; they are not amenable to full consciousness, and they are subject to mixes of defensive strategies and full-blown repression and other defense mechanisms, with the result that people cannot easily articulate or write down how they think of, and feel about, themselves. This measurement problem should not, however, define away the reality that the most important transactional need in most encounters is verification of the core-identity – *if* it is salient.

Social-Identities. In previous works, I have termed this level of identity "sub-identities" (Turner 1998, 2002) but in order to be consistent with the large and growing empirical and conceptual work on social identities,

mostly within psychology (e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979; Hogg 2006), I have changed my terminology. People belong to categoric units – e.g., sex, gender, age, ethnicity, class, religious affiliation – and each of these categoric units marks a set of *diffuse status characteristic* that carries evaluation and expectation states for how individuals in this categoric unit should behave, as described in the chapters on normatization, status, and roles. Over time and to varying degrees, individuals internalize these expectations/evaluations and develop a sense of self revolving around their membership in categoric units. Behavior and demeanor are always affected by social-identities, and the more salient is a social identity in a situation, the more demeanors will reflect this identity. Thus, women and men behave differently in most situations, as do older and younger people, incumbents in upper and lower classes, members of different ethnic subpopulations, and so on for all categoric-unit memberships that may become salient in a focused encounter.

Some social-identities, such as those for age, gender, class, and ethnicity, are carried around to different encounters and generally influence the behaviors and demeanors of persons, even as they respond to other microdynamic forces like normatization, status, and roles. Part of the reason for this influence is that membership in categoric units generates *status beliefs* that both members and non-members of a categoric unit carry in their stocks of knowledge. Thus, expectation states for those presenting a social-identity and those responding the self-presentations of another inevitably form. Moreover, social-identities are generally learned early in life and, much like core-identities, cumulate in deeply seeded cognitions, feelings, and behavioral patterns that are not so easily abandoned. Further, to the degree that a social-identity has involved immersion in, and socialization within, a distinct subculture – whether by ethnicity, class, religion, or gender – this culture is internalized and, thereafter, guides elements of all behaviors, such as accented speech, body demeanors, cognitive world views, or emotional propensities.

Yet, unlike core-identities, social-identities do not need to be so actively verified. Indeed, it is often the case that individuals only need to determine that this identity is not being rejected, with the verification process shifting to assuring that a mix of core-, group-, and role-identities is being verified. Yet, if a social-identity is salient in a situation or, more generally, if this identity is simply important to an individual, role-making and self-presentations will clearly signal to others that more than mere neutrality is required; others must offer signals indicating that actively and demonstratively affirm the social-identity being presented.

Group-Identities. Group identities are not always salient or relevant, and thus, this level of identity is less likely to be carried about from situation to

situation; rather, it is an identity tied to incumbency in, or identification with, a corporate unit. Generally, individuals with high status in corporate units within institutional domains identify with these units. For example, executives, ministers, high-ranking faculty, officers in the military, and many other incumbents in corporate units will evidence some degree of group-identity, which in turn has large effects on how they behave. Thus, high-ranking faculty and military officers will present self in very different ways in most situations because of differences in the corporate units that form the basis for a group-identity. It is not necessary for individuals to have high status to develop group identities: members of fraternities and sororities, students in general, workers in particular industries, members of communities, and many other incumbents in different types of corporate units can also reveal group-identities. The more valued to a person is this incumbency, the more likely are persons to develop group-identities. Indeed, even after incumbency in a particular type of corporate unit has ended, individuals may still carry a group identity, as is the case when a former military incumbent still wears a hat or other totem signaling affiliation with a particular branch of the military or when a former student wears apparel or jewelry signaling that they are an *alumnus* or *alumna* of a particular college. When confronting these individuals in an encounter, this clear marking of a group-identity will have some affect on how we talk with them in a focused encounter.

It is also the case that individuals have group-identities with corporate units in which they have never been incumbent. Being a fan of a sports team is perhaps the most noticeable group-identity because persons array their territories of self with totems denoting their apparent worship and loyalty to “their team.” Indeed, I have all manner of San Francisco Forty-Niner shirts, jackets, and hats that I occasionally wear – especially when the team has been winning, and hence my group-identity has some claim, however minor, to status. But I have known persons where the attachment to team is rather fanatical, with territories of self, talk, and emotions all devoted to team issues. Walk into a sports bar, and this kind of identity is all too evident. Thus, group-identities can be rather intense, even when a person has not ever been an incumbent in the relevant corporate unit. Of course, marketers play on this tendency for group identification because there is a great deal of money to be made in totemic apparel and rather expensive tickets to observe the group in action. Again, a “team fanatic” will have to be dealt with very differently in an encounter than someone who has no evident team worship; and it is for this reason that team fanatics hang out together because then they can be assured that their group-identity will be verified,

even by those worshipping the arch rival of a particular team that has been totemized by persons.

Role-Identities. Individuals also tend to have identities associated with all of the important roles that they play, especially roles in corporate units lodged within relatively autonomous institutional domains. Role-identities that are important to a person will generally become more diffuse, spreading out to situations beyond those inside the corporate unit or even the institutional domains. For example, the role of mother (a role within a family unit within the kinship domain) is played in many other situations; and indeed, it is easily recognized in a wide variety of encounters in different corporate units and institutional domains. Similarly, the role of student is carried to other encounters outside of a college or university. The role of professor, I find, is difficult to escape because I am often introduced in social occasions as a professor at UCR; hence, my role-identity is invoked for me and affects how others respond (often trying to escape in a polite manner). There are, of course, the public personalities – actors, news reporters, athletes, and others – who have great difficulty shedding their highly visible role-identity. Indeed, when a role is highly visible and prestigious, there is an implicit assumption that it is important to a person and, hence, to be honored no matter what the occasion (R. Turner 1962; Stryker 1980). I remember many years ago that a prominent actress became a friend of my family, primarily because she no longer had to be an actress but could be a person who had a strong sense of identity in other roles. Indeed, she and I had many interesting times sailing boats, where her role-identity as an actress was irrelevant; and in fact, even though she was quite famous, many people did not recognize her in yachting circles because of dark glasses, dress, and matted hair beneath a hat and brim; and she explicitly asked me to introduce use her to others using only her middle name (and no last name). Thus, visible roles and the presumed non-stop identity attached to them are often difficult to escape, which ironically, is often why actors, athletes, and other visible people hang out together because their obvious role-identity can be minimized, and other identities can become more salient.

Role-identities, when salient, are the most visible identity because most focused encounters are embedded in corporate units revealing a division of labor where roles are played out or in categoric units revealing expectation states and status beliefs for how people in a category should play a role. It is simply assumed, unless demonstrated otherwise, that incumbency or membership in corporate or categoric units will involve efforts to present a role-identity and have this identity verified. If the identity is verified, individuals will experience satisfaction and, if they had some doubts about this identity

being verified, the positive emotions will be more intense. If the role-identity is not verified or, at least, not to the level expected, negative emotions will be aroused but these emotions will not be as intense as would be the case if a core-identity was not verified, or if a social-identity was demeaned.

Yet, identities rarely stand in isolation. Core-identities are built up by the experiences of people playing roles in corporate units and by the reactions of others to their categoric-unit memberships. And so, many social- and role-identities are the vehicle by which other identities are made evident to others. We can all sense, for example, when a core- or social-identity is tied up in a role-identity. A professor playing the role of professor is also presenting at least many elements of his or her core-identity and perhaps also a social-identity, and even elements of a group-identity (as an incumbent in a university). When I look back on my 40+ years as a professor, I realize that at the beginning my core-identity was far less tied up in my academic roles than it is today; other roles where I invested much of my core-identity are no longer played – e.g., athlete, father of young kids, son to parents, and the like – while more of my sense of self is tied up – for better or worse – in the academic roles that I play. Without being highly explicit, we all subliminally signal that core-identity is tied to certain roles, with the result that others will generally recognize such to be the case and work hard to verify the role-identity because, at one and the same time, they are able to verify other identities tied to the role and thus do not have to work so hard to verify each identity separately. Indeed, while somewhat unusual, all identities could be tied to a particular role, thereby making it easier to verify all identities at once. Of course, the opposite can be the case; failure to verify this role-identity disconfirms all of the other identities – the dangers that await those who put too many identities in one basket. They are almost guaranteeing that some identities some of the time will not be fully verified, thereby arousing intense negative emotions.

Dynamic Relations Among Identities

These considerations bring me back to Fig. 7.1, where the levels of the four basic types of identities are arrayed with arrows signaling their potential relations to each other and their varying properties. Core-identities typically become part of all other identities, as is indicated by the arrows flowing down the figure. Each level of identity will generally have an effect on the adjacent identity in the figure. For example, group-identities will be most influenced by role-identities and, potentially, by a social-identity if it is attached to particular categoric units. Conversely, a role-identity is most

directly influenced by membership in corporate and categoric units, and hence, playing a role will be the vehicle by which group- and social-identities are also presented for verification. Core-identity will influence how a role-identity is played, while a particular role may have some impacts on verification of core-identity, but unless a person has invested everything about themselves in a particular role – as sometimes happens, for example, with obsessive students, parents, workers – failure to verify a core-identity at the level of roles will not have large effects on this more general and inclusive identity. The same would be the case for social-identity, but if a sufficient number of roles in which this identity is played lead to a failure to verify a social-identity and, in fact, demean this identity, then the emotions aroused will breach the encounter. Similarly, if group-identity is not verified in roles or if it is demeaned by others, then emotions will once again run high and, potentially, begin to have effects on core-identity.

The arrows on either side of the levels of identity are critical to understanding identity as a transactional need. The emotional valences attached to identities will generally increase from role- through group- and social-identities to core-identity, while the level of conscious awareness of the elements of the identity will decline. Coupled with the fact that movement up the levels of identity-formation increases the inclusiveness and generality of an identity, the potential for emotional arousal also increases because core-identities are part of other identities lower in the hierarchy. Since these core-identities are valenced with intense emotions but, at the same time, less visible to a person consciously, they can generate explosive and confusing emotions to both the person emitting these emotions and others having to deal with another's emotionality.

It is for these reasons that persons in encounters are always cautious about identities. Without fully understanding these dynamic interrelations, we all tread lightly in rejecting role-making efforts of persons because we implicitly know that much more than a role-identity is typically at stake. Similarly, for those with a strong group-identity, we are usually aware that more than identification with a corporate unit is involved, and so again, we tread politely and quietly around persons for whom group-identity appears to be so strong. The same is even more true with persons who clearly invoke a social-identity; we not only seek to communicate that this identity is accepted and, if a person appears highly emotional about a social-identity, we try to be even more affirmative – if we can. While core-identity is not always easy to spot for both the person and others responding to this person, we have all learned to be on the look out for this identity; when it appears to be salient, people generally work very hard to verify this identity because it is the most emotionally volatile.

I have spent a considerable amount of time on identity verification as a transactional need because this transactional need is the most important of all universal need-states. It is the need that *must* be verified in an encounter for individuals to feel comfortable, even when it is at relatively low valences. And, as I will try to document in the next chapter on emotional dynamics, the flow of affect in encounters is very much influenced by whether or not this most prime transactional need is met. When self is verified, people feel a range of positive emotions that increase the focus and rhythmic synchronization of the interaction, whereas when self is not verified, negative emotions and the complexity introduced by defense mechanisms not only transmute and intensify emotions, they also increase the potential for breaches to focused encounters. But, for the present, let me simply emphasize again that verification of identities is the most important transactional need, followed in second place by the need to realize profits in the exchange of resources with others.

Needs to Realize Profits in Exchange Payoffs

All human interactions involve the exchange of resources, where one individual gives up resources to receive resources from others (Homans 1961/1971; Blau 1964; Coleman 1990; Hechter 1987; Molm 1997). The nature of the resources exchanged can vary considerably, and in most encounters they are not extrinsic but intrinsic. In either case, individuals seek to make a “profit” in this exchange, receiving resources in excess of their costs and investments incurred to secure these resources. When individuals feel that they have made a profit, they experience positive emotions, whereas when they do not, they will feel negative emotions, primarily variants and combinations of anger. To understand how this need-state operates, we need to consider the nature of the resources in play during an exchange and the elements involved in calculating profits.

Resources. The resources involved in interpersonal exchanges are mostly intrinsic, but some are extrinsic in that individuals can all agree on their value and the metrics used to establish value. Money is the most obvious extrinsic resource, but so are power and authority as well as prestige and honor. Experiencing positive emotions is an intrinsic resource; and yet, emotions are often the measuring stick for the value of other intrinsic and extrinsic resources. For example, meeting transactional needs, such as verifying identities and feeling a sense of group inclusion, trust, and facticity are valued resources because they meet basic needs of all humans and, in so doing, give

individuals a sense of emotional well-being – with these emotions being yet one more highly rewarding intrinsic resource in the exchange. Even the value of more extrinsic resources is determined by the amount of positive emotions that they bring to individuals (Collins 1993). For instance, spending money on a product often occurs because it gives persons an emotional lift. Thus, emotions are a kind of common measure of the reward value of resources; the more receipt of resources arouses positive emotions, and the more intense these positive emotions, the more valuable are they as intrinsic resources. Conversely, the more intense the arousal negative emotions when a resource is not received, the more valuable was this resource to an individual.

As I have emphasized, almost anything can be a resource. The generalized symbolic media of institutional domains, for example, are all potential resources because individuals value them and experience positive emotions when they are received, and negative emotions when they are not. Other generalized resources in interpersonal behavior include sociality, attentiveness from others, various interpersonal types of cognitive-emotional arousal such as friendliness, caring, love, sympathy, openness, commitment, understanding, and other states of being that are rewarding to individuals. Sometimes even negative emotional states are rewarding, as is the case of a person seeking vengeance where anger and happiness are combined to make this person feel positive emotions when they can vent their anger on others. Thus, since so many of the resources being exchanged in interpersonal relations are intrinsic, they are best measured by the positive emotions that they arouse and how individuals determine the level of “profit” in resource exchanges.

Calculating Profits. Rarely do individuals explicitly “calculate” their profits in interpersonal exchanges; instead, they experience positive sentiments when they sense that they have received resources that exceed their *costs* and *investments* in securing them and when profits seem to meet implicit standards of *fairness* and *justice*. Costs are a mixture of (a) the resources that must be given to others and (b) the resources that are forgone by virtue of exchanging with one set of others over another. Investments are the accumulated costs over time to secure resources of a given kind from others in iterated encounters. Fairness and justice are more complicated because they involve a comparison process revolving around: (a) the costs and investments relative to resources received, (b) the costs and investments of others receiving the same resources, and (c) the degree to which they meet standards of justice. Humans appear to be hard-wired to engage in (a), (b), and (c) because other higher primates can do so as well; indeed, achieving a sense of justice appears to be hard-wired into the higher primate line (Bronson and De-Waal 2003; Fiske 1991; Cosmides 1989). Standards of justice among humans are cultural, and individuals carry in their stocks

of knowledge understandings of what the standards of fair and just exchange should be in different types of situations. Yet, the propensity to assess fairness and justice is hard-wired in all higher primates.

There is another complexity in justice calculations, however. A person's sense of justice is very much influenced by the reference points invoked (Turner 2007b, 2010b). One reference point is stated in (b) above, where persons use as a reference point their costs and investments relative to those of others receiving a given resource; if profits correspond to the relative costs and investments of self and others, then justice will be perceived to exist, and a person will experience positive emotions over their "profit." But if another receives the same resources for less costs and investments, then a person will experience injustice, even if this person's costs and investments are less than the value of the resources received. It is the comparison of the cost benefits of others that is critical here because humans always compare their shares of resources relative to their costs/investments against those of others. As long as the shares of resources received by persons in an encounter correspond to each of their *relative* costs and investments, then justice will be seen to exist and, hence, profits will seem "fair" and "just."

In fact, humans have stores of knowledgeability about what a "just share" can be in a situation; and these become expectation states for determining justice. When actual shares of resources received in exchange correspond to expectations for just shares, then a person will experience justice and positive emotions, whereas if the resources received do not meet expectations for just shares, then negative emotions will be experienced. Even when resources obtained exceed expectations for just shares, individuals can experience negative emotions such as guilt, although it apparently takes a great deal more over-reward to activate guilt than it does under-reward (relative to "just shares") to activate negative emotions like anger (Jasso 1993, 2001, 2006; Markovsky 1985, 1988).

How do humans determine what a "just share" is. Again, the notion of reference point becomes critical (Turner 2007b, 2010b). What reference points and moral codes are invoked by actors to make a determination of a just share? One reference point is categoric unit memberships of individuals in encounters. For all categoric units there are assessments of moral worth derived from status beliefs about the characteristics of individuals who are members of categoric units. This assessment can become a reference point, with those who are in more valued categoric units "entitled" to a larger "just share" than those who are in de-valued categoric units. As long as persons in more valued categoric units receive resources that meet or exceed their just share *and* that also exceed the level of resources of those less valued categoric units, justice will be seen to prevail, at least for the person in the

more valued categoric units. When those in de-valued units feel anger at not receiving their just share, they typically are invoking another reference point, such as actual costs and investments rather than their low evaluation as members of a devalued categoric unit.

The same dynamics also hold for incumbency in positions within the divisions of labor of corporate units. Those with higher-ranking status (power/authority/prestige) in the division of labor of the corporate unit are entitled to larger just shares than those in lower positions; and thus, injustice can be perceived to exist if a lower-ranking person receives a similar share to the higher-ranking person, to say nothing of the more intense sense of injustice if a lower-ranked person actually receive more than a higher-ranked individual. Lower-ranking persons are likely to agree in the right of those in higher-ranks to receive a larger share of valued resources, as long as they are using their respective locations in the hierarchical division of labor as a reference point. If they employ actual costs and investments as their comparison point, however, some may experience injustice because their share of resources does not correspond to their reference point of perceived costs and investments (rather than location in the division of labor).

While these are the principle reference points invoked in encounters, there are other potential points of comparison for determining just shares (Turner 2007a, 2007b). One is what Thibaut and Kelley (1959) termed *comparison level of alternatives*. Individuals will often use their alternative sources of resources and what they might expect from these alternative sources as a reference point for assessing whether or not sources of resources are providing a just share. People often inflate what they might receive from alternative sources, with the result that they perceive their present receipt of resource shares as not just. For example, a person may perceive that they could earn more money at another company and thus feel that their current pay is not just, but they may conveniently ignore the fact that have not been offered a job at this other company in reaching this conclusion.

Another potential reference point is what I have termed an “abstracted distribution” or sense for how resources of a given kind are distributed across not just participants to an encounter but among larger sets of individuals, including the whole population of a society. In the extreme case, a person may implicitly invoke a Gini-coefficient (stating deviations from a straight line of perfect equality in a distribution) to compare where they stand. They can do so for more than just money, although money is easier because it is a clear metric. Still, people can calculate the percentages of those with power, prestige, happiness, and other resources such as non-monetary generalized symbolic media. For example, a person could implicitly assess the abstract distribution of learning (via education) or knowledge and become upset that

his or her share is lower than the shares of others in the distribution. To take another example, students are often upset that I never “curve” an exam (but, instead, calculate a straight percentage with 90% or above being an A, 80–89% being a B, and so on); they feel they have not received their just share of a valued resource like a grade because they have in mind a different distribution of grades based upon a class curve. Needless to say, I always have a large percentage of students who are in a chronic state of anger over their unjust treatment at my hands, a problem that is exacerbated by grade inflation at colleges and universities that creates another abstracted distribution that is used as a reference point.

The emotions experienced by persons using somewhat different reference points will vary, but the general point is that if the actual distribution of resources falls below this reference point, individuals will experience injustice and will experience negative emotions like anger, frustration, alienation, sadness, and perhaps fear. Conversely, if resources meet expectations for a just share, individuals will experience positive emotions, and moreover, it will take a much larger over-reward for a person to experience a negative emotion like guilt compared to the very small amount of under-reward (below expectations for just share) that will, almost immediately, arouse intense negative emotions (Jasso 2001).

The Resource-seeking Process. When individuals are not sure of what resources are available in an encounter, they will experience negative emotions such as anxiety or even anger. The potential for negative emotional arousal from uncertainty about how to gain a profit in exchanges, then, motivates persons to scan the situation for available resources. If a person already has expectations for what resources are available, then the scanning will revolve around determining if these expected resources are indeed available. This process of scanning takes into consideration all other micro-dynamic properties and forces in encounters. The relevant categoric units and distribution of status (power and prestige) in corporate units will be considered for how they constrain or increase the availability of resources of various kinds. An assessment of the cultural constraints on normatization will also be undertaken. And so will the constraints imposed by the ecology and demography of the situation be assessed for how they will affect the availability of resources. These initial scans will also give a person some idea of the resources that must be given up – that is, the costs – to secure the resources that are available.

A second step in scanning is a search for resources that can allow a person to verify various levels of identity. The more the available are resources that can also be used to verify salient identities, the more likely will an individual incur costs and investments in an encounter to secure those resources

verifying self. Since identity verification is the most powerful of transactional needs, it always directs individuals to determine if relevant resources for self-verification exist, especially their quantities and their costs.

A third step involves a scan for resources relevant to meeting other transactional needs, above and beyond the need to verify self. Individuals will seek resources that will allow them to achieve a sense of group inclusion, trust, and facticity; and they will assess the costs for securing these resources. At the same time, they will determine what additional resources are available, beyond those necessary to meet transactional needs. Is there money to be gained? prestige? power? friendship? sociality? Indeed, the need for profits in exchanges is almost always a kind of reconciliation between resources that are valued for their extrinsic qualities to those that are intrinsic and necessary to meet transactional needs, especially for self-verification but also for all other transactional needs as well. Indeed, part of the attraction of some encounters is that they offer resources beyond those necessary for meeting transactional needs.

Most of the time, as I noted earlier, individuals do not need to consciously record the available resources, nor do they need to calculate how they will make a profit. In fact, if persons find themselves consciously thinking about these matters, they are typically uncertain about the resources available and how they can secure them. Yet, ironically, the more they consciously plot strategies to gain access to resources, the more they will generally come across as untrustworthy, thereby violating the needs of others and, in the process, thwarting their own efforts to make a profit in resource exchanges, especially for intrinsic resources that can meet transactional needs. Indeed, encounters are often breached when some participants seem too “calculating” and, hence, insincere and untrustworthy.

Embedding dramatically increases the ease with which individuals seek profits in exchanges. Embedding makes explicit the cultural and structural constraints on an encounter by (a) locating persons in status locations in divisions of labor of corporate units and memberships in categoric units, (b) highlighting the relevant elements of culture for making justice calculations, and (c) indicating what kinds of resources are available at what costs for individuals at different locations in corporate and categoric units. When encounters occur outside mesostructures and their cultures, or when the relevant mesostructures and culture are ambiguous, then the process of scanning for resources and calculating payoffs relative to costs and investments measured against various reference points becomes strained and, indeed, begins to impose costs before potential rewards are ever determined. Moreover, uncertainty is a negative emotion in its own right and, hence, costly to individuals. And so, the costs of any exchange where ambiguity

exists will be much higher, and costs incurred scanning for resources can be doubly costly in lost time, failure to verify self, failure to meet other transactional needs, non-receipt of other extrinsic or intrinsic rewards, and negative emotional arousal.

Needs for Group Inclusion

Humans have universal needs to feel part of the ongoing interpersonal flow, but unlike much social philosophy, I do not think that people have strong needs for high-levels of solidarity in most situations. As Alexandra Maryanski and I have argued (Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2005, 2008a; Turner 2000a), humans are evolved apes, and apes do not reveal high levels of group solidarity. Indeed, for the great apes – humans’ closest primate relatives – the most important unit is the community, which can be many square miles; individuals know who belongs and does not belong within the community and, in fact, male apes will defend their home range or community with extreme violence. Yet, within a community, there are no permanent groups for chimpanzees and orangutans, although gorillas reveal somewhat more stable local groups. Still, the composition of groups, even among gorillas, is constantly changing in a fusion-fission pattern. Since humans are evolved apes, they are likely to have the same propensity for weak-tie and temporary group formations; and when people feel too “engulfed,” they tend to back away in order “to get some space.” When people are alone, however, they often feel lonely and not “involved.” We are of two minds, it seems, with needs for a sense of being involved, but we are resistant to too much solidarity that can engulf us.

It is not that humans do not enjoy solidarity with others, only that they are selective in *how much* solidarity they seek. All social relations cannot be high-solidarity relations because this goes against what I see as the ape heritage from our hominid ancestors for individualism and some autonomy from others. Thus, individuals only seek to feel part of the ongoing interpersonal flow, and indeed, they have a strong need to do so. At the same time, they will limit the number of relations in which they are engulfed in diffuse, high-solidarity obligations. The spread of facebook, twittering, texting and other often rather compulsive messaging activities would seem to fly in the face of this conclusion, but in my view, these activities affirm what I am arguing. All of these messaging technologies allow individuals to “stay in touch” (often in rather time-consuming ways), but they do not produce high face-to-face

social solidarity. Instead, they allow people to feel involved in lots of rather weak-tie relations (with so-called “friends”) without being engulfed, except when they have too many “friends” out there in cyberspace.

I see group inclusion as the third most powerful transactional need, after needs to verify identities and realize profits in exchange relations. When individuals do not feel included, they experience negative emotions of various potential kinds. One is hurt which is a variant of sadness; another is anger; and still another is fear about the consequences of being not included. When persons experience sadness, they generally blame themselves, or make a self-attribution, for the failure to feel included. When they blame others, however, they experience anger and anxiety (a variant of fear). If a person’s core-identity is on the line or, alternatively, an important social-, group-, and role-identity is salient, they will experience shame; and if they evaluate their failure to achieve group inclusion in terms of morality contained in cultural values and ideologies, they also may experience guilt. Still, if individuals make external attributions to others, members of categoric units, or the structure of the corporate unit in which a sense of group inclusion could not be achieved, the most likely response is anger at others, anger and prejudice toward members of categoric units, and anger at and alienation from the structure and culture of corporate units. And, the more social is the encounter (as opposed to ceremonial and work-practical), the more the failure to achieve group inclusion will arouse negative emotions, although a sense of being excluded from the ongoing flow in any encounter will arouse negative emotions. If exclusion occurs in work-practical encounters, a person’s level of fear may increase because of what this means (for job, career, income) to be not part of, or be marginal to, a work-related encounter; similarly, if a ceremonial occasion is important, fear may be the dominant response because to be excluded from important ritual occasions may have other negative consequences.

As we will see in the next chapter, all of these emotional reactions can become somewhat convoluted by the activation of defensive strategies and defense mechanisms. If the defensive regime is relatively light, then defensive strategies will be employed, including: using short-term credits from past iterations of encounters where inclusion has been experienced to “ride out” the sense of non-inclusion in the current encounter; selective perception of the situation as actually involving inclusion; or selective interpretation of gestures signaling non-inclusion into gestures marking inclusion. These kinds of defensive strategies only work well for episodic failures to experience group inclusion; if these failures are chronic and if a person cannot leave the encounters where they occur, then full-blown repression and other defensive mechanisms may be activated. As we will see in Chap. 8,

the emotional dynamics change with repression because, once repressed, emotions intensify and also transmute into different kinds of emotions. For example, shame arising from group exclusion often turns into anger, fear, or sadness (the three component emotions of shame) or into alienation in which sadness, anger, and fear are, like shame, its component emotions but the anger component is more active in alienation than is the case with shame (see Table 8.4 on second-order elaborations of emotions).

When individuals cannot feel a sense of group inclusion, much of their emotionality stems from the fact that, without this sense of being involved, other transactional needs cannot be realized. Verifying self in the eyes of others and generalized others is less viable when a person does not feel involved with others in an encounter; realizing a profit in exchange payoffs, especially for intrinsic rewards like positive emotions, sociality, friendships, and other kinds of social reinforcement, becomes more difficult; achieving a sense of trust that others are being respectful of self, sincere, predictable, and in rhythmic synchronization is virtually impossible to feel when experiencing a sense of being excluded from the ongoing flow of interaction; and generating a sense of facticity that the situation is as it appears is more difficult, although a person may conclude that the situation is, indeed, as it appears in denying a sense of being included. Thus, as other transactional needs are not realized, the emotional stakes are raised and compounded into what are often rather complex emotional collages, many of which will breach encounters. Again, I will have more to say about these dynamics in the next chapter.

Needs for Trust

Humans have needs to sense that the talk and behaviors of others fall into rhythmic synchronization (Collins 2004) during the course of an encounter and, in so doing, signal that the actions of others are predictable, sincere, and respectful of another's dignity and self (Habermas 1970). I am grouping these elements under the rubric of trust. Predictability and rhythmic synchronization are the most important elements of trust because, without these elements, sincerity and respect for the dignity of others are difficult to effect. Even in rather minor encounters, such as an exchange with a clerk in a store, require all of these elements; and when encounters are more important to a person, the need for trust is that much greater. When trust is not achieved, individuals typically become angry and annoyed; and if the encounter is important to a person, fear and anxiety may also emerge.

The failure to achieve a sense of trust also makes other transactional needs difficult to meet, and as a consequence, arouses even more intense emotions. A lack of trust makes verifying identities, realizing profits in exchanges, especially intrinsic rewards, group inclusion, and even facticity highly problematic. And, when individuals cannot meet multiple need-states, the emotional stakes are raised. Conversely, when all transactional need-states are met because trust is achieved, individuals experience positive emotions, and if the encounter was important to a person, they will experience more intense variants of happiness as a basic emotion.

Much like group inclusion, individuals make attributions for both the success and failure to meet needs for trust. If they make self-attributions and see themselves as at fault, then they will experience shame and perhaps fear if others are important or powerful. And, if the failure to realize a sense of trust is viewed in moral terms, a person may also feel guilt as well. If they blame others, they will be angry at these others; if they blame the structure of the situation, they will also be angry and become alienated; and if they blame categories of others, such as an ethnic or a gender category, they will be angry and invoke prejudicial beliefs (e.g., “you can’t trust Jews” or “Arabs”) against members of this category. In general, individuals make either self attributions or attributions to specific others in the situation because achieving a sense of trust is so dependent upon the moment-by-moment flow of face-to-face interaction although, if others are members of highly visible categoric units, attributions may be directed toward the category rather than the person, *per se*, and lead to prejudicial beliefs.

When attributions are made to others, individuals will typically impute faulty personality characteristics to the individual who is not trustworthy. We have all had encounters where the interaction was out of sync and trust was difficult to achieve; and we usually imputed personality traits, ranging from “shyness” through “awkwardness” and “weirdness,” to such individuals. Or at times, we make attributions that a person is “arrogant,” “out of touch,” some other characteristic that makes them untrustworthy. Part of this effort to “explain” why individuals seem untrustworthy is that a lack of trust disrupts the capacity to realize the final transactional need: facticity.

Needs for Facticity

Anthony Giddens (1984) has postulated that individuals seek a sense of “ontological security” allowing them to feel that “things are as they appear.” Earlier, Alfred Schutz (1932 [1967]) emphasized that people seek to achieve

a sense of inter-subjectivity, one important component of which is that people need to feel that they share common subjective worlds for the purposes of a particular interaction. Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) as a field of inquiry in sociology emerged to explain the “folk methods” by which individuals construct a sense – usually a somewhat illusory sense – that intersubjectivity exists and that an obdurate world exists “out there.” The famous “breaching experiments” of early ethnomethodology were designed to disrupt this sense of the common inter-subjective sense that people were experiencing. Questioning the “obvious,” acting like you are “a guest in your parents house,” getting out of rhythm in turn-taking, and many other deliberate efforts to breach the encounter would, ethnomethodologists believed, allow researchers to discover the methods by which people create a common sense of an external and obdurate world “out there” that individuals thought they were experiencing. The early hype of early ethnomethodology did not quite pan out, since relatively few “folk methods” were discovered, but they were still onto an important need among individuals in encounters: the need for what I am terming *facticity*.

To state the elements of facticity more explicitly, this need revolves around (1) the sense that self and others share a common world for the purposes of the interaction, (2) the perception that the reality of the situation is as it appears, and (3) the belief that reality has an obdurate character for the duration of the interaction. As the ethnomethodologists soon discovered in their breaching experiments, this sense of facticity is critical to the smooth flow of interaction. When individuals attribute the failure to achieve this sense to the actions of others, they typically become annoyed with them, and if the lack of facticity persists, more intense forms of anger may be expressed; and, if they can, individuals will seek to terminate the encounter. It appears that it is rather rare for persons to make self-attributions for the failure to achieve facticity; rather, the blame is almost always heaped on others. Moreover, it is difficult to blame categories of others or corporate units because facticity is achieved through talk and body language in the give-and-take between specific persons in the immediate situation. When individuals role-take, they expect to find cues confirming facticity; and when these cues are not forthcoming, the sense of facticity is lost. And, as a result, those not emitting appropriate cues will be the target of attributions revolving mostly around variants of anger.

Sometimes it is difficult to pin the blame on specific others; and as a consequence, individuals may begin to experience a quiet anxiety because they sense that something is not right with the interaction. Under these conditions, individuals will redouble their efforts to signal others and to elicit gestures from them that subtly affirm a given sense of reality. Normalizing and

successful status-taking/status-making as well as role-making/role-taking in an encounter can help in this process of establishing a sense of facticity. For, if categories, frames, forms of talk, rituals, and emotions are all understood, if both status in corporate and categoric units is clear, and if the underlying roles being played by self and other are established, then much of the work to achieve facticity has been done. Similarly, if other transactional needs are realized, then facticity is likely to emerge because, if identities are verified, profits in exchanges of resources are forthcoming, group inclusion is achieved, and trust emerges, then the need for facticity will be easily realized. However, if we look at the matter the other way around, a failure to achieve facticity will make normatization, status-making/status-taking, and role-making/role-taking very difficult; and the failure to establish facticity will dramatically increase the likelihood that other transactional needs – verifying identities, making a profit in exchanges of resources, experiencing a sense of group inclusion, and achieving trust – will not be realized.

Individuals implicitly recognize what is at stake in achieving a sense of facticity because they know from past experiences that if a situation does not allow them to feel that they share a common world with others, that reality is at it appears, and that reality has an obdurate character, the interaction will simply stall around meeting this need. Thus, as other microdynamic processes unfold, they must immediately begin to establish facticity; otherwise, these other microdynamic forces will play out. Similarly, as transactional needs are being realized, facticity must emerge early on, or these transactional needs will not be fully consummated, with the result that the interaction will shift focus to establishing a sense of facticity before other needs are fully addressed.

It should not be surprising, then, that individuals get angry and anxious when interaction stalls around the problem of facticity; all other macrodynamic forces will be affected. Since facticity usually leads to external attributions directed at others, the need for facticity biases attribution processes in general. Most of the time, persons will blame others when microdynamic forces do not operate effectively because they have already begun to blame others when facticity is lost or not achieved in the first place. External attributions are not inevitable, but as Lawler and associates (Lawler 2001; Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998; Lawler et al. 2009) have discovered, negative emotions have a distal bias. To make self-attributions assures that identities will not be verified – a most painful outcome for all individuals. And so, individuals will seek to protect self by making external attributions, at least most of the time (see next chapter for a discussion of the conditions increasing or decreasing the likelihood of various types of internal and external attributions).

Moreover, in making external attributions for “who is at fault” in the first round of efforts to achieve facticity, a kind of facticity is achieved. The reality is that “person x did not act properly,” and so the obdurate reality becomes “the flaws” in this person’s or persons’ actions. It is a kind of facticity that will usually breach the interaction but ironically it still meets the need for facticity. Thus, facticity as a motive state may also contribute to the distal bias of attribution processes because, once the external attributions are made, the reality of the situation becomes clearer – even if it makes the interaction much more awkward. Moreover, attributions can also begin to target categories of others or even the more inclusive social structure as somehow “responsible” for not achieving facticity or, for that matter, any other transactional need; and as these external attributions are made, the need for facticity is more likely to be realized which, in turn, increases the chances that other needs can be met, albeit in a limited way (given the perceived “problems” with others, categories of others, or structure of corporate units).

The arousal of negative emotions directed outward and the resulting external attribution can thus become a mechanism for eventually realizing some degree of facticity after initial efforts to do so have failed. Yet, if facticity is achieved at the price of negative emotional reactions toward others, categories of others, and social structure of the situation, it is likely that other transactional needs will not be fully realized; hence, the only need that is often met is facticity, with the failure to realize other needs arousing negative emotions that often reinforce external attributions and, hence, facticity but that do little to help individuals realize other transactional needs.

Embedding and Meeting Transactional Needs in Focused Encounters

Embedding increases the likelihood that individuals will meet transactional needs by increasing the clarity of (1) relevant cultural symbols used in normatization, (2) status locations in corporate units, (3) memberships or diffuse status characteristics associated with categoric unit memberships, (4) roles that can be made and taken, and (5) emotions that can be experienced and expressed. At times, of course, the culture and structure of meso-level units can work against meeting needs, as would be the case if leaders of a group deliberately sought to exclude persons, if high-ranking incumbents in divisions of labor imposed their will on others, if members of categoric units were victims of prejudicial beliefs and subject to discrimination,

and many other potential scenarios. Still, once self and others know their respective places in divisions of labor and relevant norms and ideologies, recognize salient memberships in variously valued categoric units along with status beliefs associated with these memberships, and understand what roles can be played and that are to be taken, they are more likely to develop realistic expectations for what identities to what degree can be verified, what resources and level of profit in exchanges are possible, what symbols and signs of group inclusion are in play, what dimensions of trust are to be achieved, and what is necessary to achieve a sense of facticity. For, much of the sense for having met transactional needs is related to expectation states for each need. If needs are inflated, then they will not be met, whereas when they are constrained by sociocultural formations, they will be more realistic and, hence, more likely to be realized.

Embedding in Corporate Units. When the relative status and expectation states for status in divisions of labor are known and viewed as salient, so will the appropriate range of roles as well as elements of culture to be used in normatization. For the need to verify identities, individuals will present a role-identity that is appropriate for their place in the status order; they will invoke a group-identity, if it has formed around the corporate unit; they will present a social-identity, if salient, and adjust their role-making activities to reconcile this social-identity with the expectations of status; and they will know to what degree they can put their core-identity on the line and what elements of this identity can be realistically verified.

For needs to realize a profit in exchange payoffs, the existing status order, the roles that can be played in this order, and the cultural ideologies and institutional norms that will guide normatization will all constrain the resources that are available, while specifying how individuals at various places in the status order and playing diverse roles can go about securing a level of resources that will yield a profit. By knowing cultural, status, and role expectations for themselves and others, individuals will be in a better position to calculate their costs and investments to secure resources and, moreover, will be able to make comparisons of their costs, investments, and resource shares (relative to various reference points) to those of others; and if corporate-unit embedding makes cultural ideologies clear, these ideologies generate expectations for what would constitute a just share for self and others.

For needs to achieve a sense of group inclusion, clarity about status, roles, and culture that comes from embedding will allow individuals to “know” what would constitute markers of adequate levels of being included in the ongoing flow of interaction. If a person is low-status, for example, expectations for what would mark group inclusions for this person would be very different than for those who are high-status; and as long as individuals

understand their relative status and the roles that this status allows, coupled with the culture that is attached to status and roles, they will be able to develop realistic expectations for what level and kind of group inclusion is possible.

The same considerations apply to trust and facticity. For needs to achieve trust, the status order, role options in this order, and cultural ideologies and norms (as these constrain normatization) will specify what would be considered appropriate and possible degrees of rhythmic synchronization, predictability, sincerity, and respect for self. For example, I have very different expectations for trust in encounters with members of my family than I do for interactions with personnel and students at my university. For the family, rhythmic synchronization will be more relaxed and easily achieved; predictability will increase because I know my family members better; sincerity will be obvious and less problematic; and respect for self is more easily achieved. For the need to achieve facticity, embedding will facilitate status-making/taking, role-making/taking, and culture-taking/making; and in so doing, it will be easier to develop a sense of inter-subjectivity, to see that the situation is as it appears, and to believe that the situation has an obdurate character. Moreover, to the degree that the encounter is constrained by corporate-unit ecology, the obdurate character of the encounter will be even more evident.

Embedding in Categorical Units. If an encounter is embedded in clear categorical units, if there is differential evaluation of diffuse status characteristics of members of categorical units (by status beliefs as they are embedded in meta-ideologies), and if membership in these units is correlated with incumbency in status positions in the division of labor of corporate units, then the effects of both location in corporate units and membership in categorical units on expectations for meeting need-states will be compounded and, hence, that much more explicit and clear. Conversely, if there is a high level of intersection between membership in categorical units and locations in divisions of labor, and if discreteness or differential evaluation of categorical units is low, then the salience of categorical unit membership will decline, and individuals will have to rely more on status in corporate units and on cultural elements made relevant by status. Intersection in general, then, lowers the relevance and salience of diffuse status characteristics associated with categorical unit membership while, if only by default, raises the salience of status in divisions of labor in corporate units, although at times intersection creates ambiguities that individuals will need to work out in the here-and-now of interaction.

When categorical units are defined by a nominal parameter (Blau 1977, 1994), differentially evaluated, and correlated with status in corporate units, status beliefs that pull elements of meta-ideologies and differentially

evaluate members of diverse categoric units will set expectation states for all transactional needs. Social-identities will be verified, even for those with devalued social identities, as will role-identities tied to expectation states for diffuse status characteristics of categoric unit members and for status in divisions of labor. For valued categoric unit and for higher-ranking incumbents in the status order of corporate units, core-identities and group-identities are more likely to be verified, whereas devalued members of categoric units and lower-ranking incumbents in corporate units are less likely to put their core-identity on the line, especially if role-, social-, and group-identities imposed on lower-ranking persons and devalued members of categoric units are inconsistent with their core-identities.

With respect to exchange payoffs, needs to make a profit will have to be tempered by the level of evaluation of either diffuse status characteristics of members in categoric units or status locations in the divisions of labor within corporate units. More valued members of categoric units and higher-ranking members of the status order in corporate units will be in a better position to make a profit in exchanges than lower-ranking and devalued individuals. The former will be able to affirm extrinsic reinforcers such as authority and prestige and able to secure more intrinsic rewards, while devalued and lower-ranking persons will have fewer personal resources with which to bargain for either extrinsic or intrinsic resources. The result is that individuals in lower ranks and devalued categories will attempt to minimize costs and investments as a means for generating some profit from fewer resource shares; in contrast, higher-ranking persons and members of more valued categoric units will be able to increase their costs and investments because they are more assured in gaining larger resource shares in encounters.

Needs for group inclusion will also be tempered by expectations for positional ranks and positive or negative evaluation of membership in categoric units. Because those of higher rank and evaluation will be able to initiate more interaction and to use their resources to have their actions affirmed, they can feel that they are part of the ongoing flow – indeed, that they are in control of this flow. Conversely, lower-ranking individuals in devalued categories will have to be content with simply being participants in an interpersonal flow orchestrated by others; and as a result, they will generally be more content with less of a sense of group inclusion than higher-ranking and more valued others.

Trust becomes more complex when there are inequalities in rank within divisions of labor and in differential evaluations of members of categoric units. Even higher-ranking individuals in more valued categoric units cannot always determine whether the situation is real or just apparently real because deference and compliance by lower-ranking and devalued persons

may be highly disingenuous; conversely, lower-ranking individuals often suffer indignities at the hands of their superiors and perceive that these superiors are insincere, even with some degree of rhythmic synchronization of talk and body language in encounters. Thus, the higher are levels of inequalities in status, the more tenuous will trust be, and the more trust must be garnered through efforts of higher-ranking persons and members of more valued categoric units to convince others of their sincerity, their predictability, and their efforts to verify self presentations by subordinates and to accord them some dignity. Rhythmic synchronization in iterated encounters can, to a degree, achieve these goals, but typically superordinates will need to be far more active in presenting self in a manner that communicates predictability of responses, sincerity, and concern for the dignity of others. Good leaders know how to do so; poor leaders do not and, in fact, act in ways that engender distrust.

Facticity can be achieved even with high levels of inequality in the evaluation of categoric unit memberships and ranks in the status order of corporate units. Inequality becomes an element of facticity – things are indeed as they seem (i.e., unequal). In fact, when individuals in higher ranks and more valued categoric units seek to establish trust, they can often lower the sense of facticity – things are not as they seem – if they cannot successfully present self in a way that communicates predictability, sincerity, and concern for the dignity of subordinates. Indeed, superordinates can seem as if they are simply “play acting,” thereby not only eroding trust but making reality seem less obdurate. Ironically, then, inequalities if understood can generate facticity – even if lower-ranking and devalued persons do not like the way things are.

Embedding and Normalization. Structural embedding in corporate and categoric units, especially when these units are, in turn, embedded in relatively autonomous institutional domains and in clear class locations of the stratification system, generate clarity about what elements of culture are relevant to encounters. Meta-ideologies as they are translated into status beliefs about members of categoric units and ideologies of institutional domains as they constrain norm formation in corporate units delimit the range of culture elements that need to be normalized. Categorization is facilitated because the norms of the division of labor in corporate units will define the nature of the situation as work-practical, social, or ceremonial and the appropriate level of intimacy, while membership in categoric units will add additional clarity about the expectation states inhering in status beliefs about the diffuse status characteristics of persons. The same is true of frames and forms of communication; the more categorization is clear, the greater will be the clarity of frames and communication; and with this clarity, the more likely are appropriate rituals to be employed to open, close,

form, and repair breaches in encounters. Similarly, feeling and display rules will become explicit as other elements of normatization fall into place.

The result is that expectations for categorization, framing, communicating, ritualizing, feeling, status, and roles will be consistent and clear, allowing individuals to better understand *which* transactional needs can be met *to what degree*, thereby generating yet another layer of expectations states that allow individuals to avoid raising expectations for meeting transactional needs beyond what is actually possible. In particular, they will understand *which* identities should be salient and verifiable to what degree, *which* resources can be attained with what degree of profit, *which* markers of group inclusion can be expected to be available and to what degree, *which* elements of trust can reasonably be achieved and to what degree, and *which* aspects of the situation can be seen as real and to what degree.

Embedding, Transactional Needs, and Emotions. Transactional needs have the capacity to generate more emotions than other microdynamic forces. In particular, as I have emphasized, needs for identity verification and profitable exchange payoffs are the two most powerful motivations in all encounters. And thus, the failure to meet these needs can generate more intense emotions than problems of normatization, understanding situational ecology and demography, status-making/taking, and role-taking/making – although I do not want to underemphasize the emotional potential in these other microdynamic processes when they do not operate smoothly to sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization of encounters. Embedding increases clarity of expectations and, in so doing, increases the chances that individuals will meet the powerful transactional needs for self-verification and profitable exchanges. The result is that persons will experience at least satisfaction at verifying some identities and gaining some resource shares, with the result that they avoid the shame and perhaps even guilt at having failed to do so and the transmuted effects of shame and guilt when some degree of repression of these painful emotions occurs (see next chapter for more details).

When the embedding of an encounter in corporate and categoric units, and their respective cultures, is ambiguous, individuals will have to work at normatizing, understanding situational ecology and demography, status-making/taking, role-taking/making; and as they put special effort into managing these microdynamic forces, they are driven by transactional needs to do so. If individuals are successful at normatizing, understanding ecology and demography, making and taking status as well as roles, then transactional needs are more likely to be realized, with the consequence that the potential for negative emotional arousal is diminished, while the likelihood of at least mild positive emotional arousal increases. Yet, without the constraints and direction imposed by embedding, encounters can go badly;

people can have trouble figuring out what elements of culture are relevant, what ecology and demography mean, what the distribution of status is, and what roles are appropriate; and when these microdynamic processes become problematic, powerful transactional needs are likely to go unmet, or at least incompletely realized – a situation that generates a variety of negative emotions and, thereby, increases the likelihood of breaches to the encounter. And if the encounter is not adequately normatized, the relevant repair rituals may not be known, thereby further breaching the encounter. And as negative emotions are aroused, all other microdynamic forces increase in valence but without clear guidelines for how to channel behaviors in appropriate ways so that these more intense valences do not continue to disrupt the focus and flow of the encounter.

Transactional Needs in Unfocused Encounters

Transactional needs are typically more powerful in focused encounters, where the responses of others become critical to verifying various levels of self, receiving resources in response to active exchange, sensing that one is part of the ongoing flow, trusting others, and sustaining the illusion of facticity. When face-to-face engagement is limited by the culture and ecology of locations where unfocused encounters occur, trust and facticity become more important, while the inability to engage others in face-to-face contact limits the degree to which needs for identity verification, exchange profits, and group inclusions can become salient.

Trust in Unfocused Encounters

Achieving a sense of trust is important in unfocused encounters. Individuals must feel that others will respect their territories of self and dignity, that the actions of others are indeed sincere and directed at a legitimate purpose, and that others will not, if possible, disrupt the flow, movement, and synchronization of bodies in space. Other forces intersect with needs for trust by providing additional information.

Normatization provides expectations for treating others as personages, for forms of talk among one set of individuals will not force face-engagement from other sets, that frames excluding personal and biographical information are in place, that rituals are “at-the-ready” for repairs to unfocus and, if necessary, to open, close, and form episodes of focus, and that emotional

expressions will not draw attention and force focus. Individuals within a culture typically carry stocks of knowledgeability about the relevant norms for different types of situations where unfocus encounters dominate; without these stocks of knowledgeability, it would be difficult to normalize situations where face-engagements are to be kept to a minimum. All persons must know the pre-packaged sets of expectations for types of unfocused situations. Much of this knowledgeability is invoked by markers provided by the demography and ecology of the situation. And, if there are also clear markers of status and roles, these forces provide additional information on which set of expectations for unfocused encounters is relevant. As I note below, membership in categoric units provides one marker of status and expectation states for role behaviors; and if there are also markers of corporate unit incumbency and rank within a corporate unit (e.g., uniforms, badges), these provide additional help in determining how to culture-take and normalize unfocused encounters.

Demography is also critical because normalization will change by virtue of the number, density, and categoric unit memberships of those co-present in unfocused situations. Density will force extra efforts to avoid face engagements and, hence, require that individuals have appropriate ritual responses ready to deploy if unfocus is broken. Diversity in categoric unit memberships, especially units of varying levels of moral evaluation, will force extra care to avoid focus and to ritualize focus when it occurs. Since members of devalued categoric units often pose threats, especially when they are engaged in intra-unit focus in a situation of unfocus, others will sustain unfocus by moving as far as possible from any members of categoric units who display diffuse negative emotions to others. Markers of categoric unit membership – e.g., physical features, forms of intra-categoric unit talk that can be picked up, role behaviors and demeanors, emotional moods of categoric unit members individually and collectively, dress, body mutilations (e.g., types and locations of tattoos, or piercing of body) – greatly facilitate categorization that allow for invoking status beliefs and expectation states for individuals in particular categories. If there is any deviation between actual role behaviors and expectation states, extra monitoring of others will occur, and individuals will seek to increase spacing from others who are not living up to expectations, especially expectations for members of devalued categoric units. Indeed, individuals implicitly understand that those who are devalued may carry diffuse anger and, hence, pose threats that are even greater when they are not playing roles in accordance with expectation states.

Situational ecology is perhaps the most visible and important marker for establishing trust. Spatial configurations, embedding in types of corporate units, use-spaces, and props all signal to individuals the nature of the

situation and the normative expectations on individuals. Ecology constrains the movement of persons, and as long as individuals move as dictated by situational ecology, unfocus can be sustained. Ecology also determines the distribution in space of individuals in varying categoric units; and if the distribution is appropriate for a particular type of situation, monitoring can be relaxed somewhat and unfocus can be sustained. If, however, individuals move incorrectly through space, usurp use-spaces that are generally forbidden, and use props incorrectly or even bring props not appropriate to the situation, these become immediate signals for distrust and, hence, for avoiding individuals who are not “acting right” in space.

Similarly, if status in corporate units can be marked, then individuals have yet one more clue about how to determine trust. If incumbents from appropriate corporate units are present, if they move through space correctly, if they carry or use appropriate props, and if they deploy themselves properly in use-spaces, then unfocus will be easier to sustain. But, if the wrong incumbents from corporate units (such as members of a gang, or extra numbers of police) are present, individuals will have to monitor more closely and perhaps break unfocus to assure themselves that there is no clear danger.

Status in categoric and corporate units, if marked in some way, provides important information about how to determine if individuals are moving synchronically in space, if they are sincere in their goals, if they are prepared to respect the dignity of others, and if their actions are predictable. Coupled with other demographic (e.g., movements and density) and ecological markers, it becomes that much easier to normatize the situation; and if individuals do not display the proper demeanors – talk, body language, rituals, and emotional states – as defined by the relevant culture for a given type of unfocused encounter, individuals will have to step up monitoring and, if necessary, re-route themselves in space.

Role behaviors are also essential markers of trust. Individuals carry vast inventories of roles in their stocks of knowledge, and when others are perceived to play a role that is appropriate to the situation – as defined by ecology and demography, expectations, status, and emotion rules – persons will feel that these others are being sincere, that they are engaged in proper and predictable actions, that they are behaving in synchrony with movements of others in space, and that they are likely to respect the dignity of others. Again, if a role cannot be imputed to others or if the role is not appropriate to the situation, then monitoring increases; and with added monitoring, face-engagements become more likely to break unfocus. To avoid this possibility, people will typically move further away from those playing deviant roles, thereby allowing them to monitor discretely from a distance and, thereby, avoid face-engagement.

Emotions are a very critical marker of trust. Display rules dictate the kinds and intensity of emotions that are to be exhibited in unfocused situations. Individuals are always on the look out for emotions that deviate from display rules, especially negative emotional displays. But even happy emotions, such as drunks singing their way through a crowd, pose a sense of danger because their emotional displays are simply too intense for a given type of unfocused situation. In fact, *any* deviation from what is normative – whether on the positive or negative side of the emotional spectrum – forces individuals to increase monitoring, and if monitoring is too obvious, it will break unfocus and force stressful face-engagement and interaction, which may not be easily repaired through rituals.

Needs for trust, then, will dominate unfocused encounters. Without this sense of trust, individuals will monitor more intensely and potentially break unfocus. With trust, however, they can go on a kind of interpersonal “automatic pilot” as long as the behaviors of others do not violate expectations associated with situational demography and ecology, culture and normatization, status in corporate and categoric units, and role behaviors. Thus, the forces driving focused encounters still operate in unfocused encounters, as I have tried to document in previous chapters, but they do so in a somewhat different way. These forces, as they push on individuals, produce markers of whether or not behaviors in unfocused situations are appropriate to the type of situation; and these markers become critical to sustaining what is generally the dominant need-state in public places: the need for trust. The same dynamics operate to allow individuals to meet what is the least important need-state in focused encounters – facticity – but which becomes more powerful in unfocused encounters.

Facticity in Unfocused Encounters

Like trust, facticity increases in salience in unfocused encounters, at least relative to the dominant needs in focused encounters: verifying identities, realizing profits in exchanges, and feeling a sense of group inclusion. Situational ecology is critical to meeting needs for facticity because individuals are motivated to believe that the configuration of space along with its use-spaces and props mean the same thing subjectively to self and others; moreover, these ecological features of a situation are what gives an unfocused encounter an obdurate character. However, in order to confirm this sense of inter-subjectivity and belief that the external world has an obdurate character, other forces must come into play to validate the meaning of situational ecology.

This confirmation can only occur if situational demography, normatization, status in corporate and categoric units, role enactments, and emotional displays all are relatively consistent with the meaning of spatial configurations, props, and use-spaces where unfocused encounters occur. If too many or the wrong people are in space, if they appear to be following different normative expectations, if their status in corporate or categoric units does not fit with situational ecology, if roles are not appropriate, or if emotional displays violate feeling rules, then not only is trust eroded but the sense of facticity also declines. The configuration of space, the use of props, and the utilization of use-spaces are seen as not meaning the same thing to self and at least some others, thereby eroding people's presumption of inter-subjectivity; and moreover, even the apparent obdurate character of space and props is undermined when people are perceived to use them in inappropriate ways.

Group Inclusion in Unfocused Encounters

In unfocused encounters, individuals need to feel that they are part of an ongoing flow of movement through space; and they must develop this sense without overt face-engagement. Thus, group inclusion is a weak force in unfocused encounters but it is nonetheless critical. For example, if individuals are strolling through a mall, simply walking along a sidewalk, or entering or leaving a store, they need to sense that all of those co-present are similarly engaged; and if some are not, their activities can be understood. Thus, a shopper who enters the store must see that most people co-present are fellow shoppers, and that others who are not shoppers, such as salespeople, are engaged in appropriate behaviors. This sense of appropriateness comes from being able to determine that if others are occupying an identifiable status and are playing an understandable role in accordance with normative expectations.

I once asked students to go to a store and stand around looking at people within a section of the store where their presence would not be expected. For instance, male students might go stand around the cosmetic's counter, the purse display, or women's underwear department. They were told to avoid actual shopping activities but, instead, to "just hang or "look around" (at everything except the products being sold). They reported that the first checking up on them came from the sales clerk who would ask "can I help you" (with "what are you doing here" undertones), and when the student replied that he was just "looking," this ritualized response was appropriate but not satisfying to the clerk who would back off but continue to monitor.

The males also reported that other customers began to monitor their presence because they were members of the “wrong” categoric unit, were playing the “wrong” role (not the role of “male shopper for wife or girlfriend”), and were violating norms by their mere presence. They thus violated the weak sense of being part of a common activity – shopping – and the longer they stood around, the more dangerous they seemed. Indeed, in several of these quasi-breaching experiments, the male manager was called in to “handle” the situation, thereby breaking unfocus and assuring that the sense of inclusion in a common activity would be broken.

There is a stronger sense of group inclusion in situations of unfocus. Often, more focused encounters among sets of individuals sitting or moving through space occur in situations where most others remain unfocused. These focused engagements among a few in an otherwise unfocused situation can often become problematic. For example, groups of teenagers wandering through a mall in animated conversation is a focused encounter where the sense of group inclusion is high, but to others in the mall who are moving alone without any face engagement and normatively required to abide by the rules of unfocus, these focused encounters within a situation of unfocus can be unsettling, unless their participants abide by the rules of focusing within unfocused situations. If the focused persons seem to be too loud or emotional and play inappropriate roles, they violate even the rules of focus within unfocused encounters. They will be monitored and avoided, if they seem threatening; and often, external authority, like a mall cop, can be called in. Thus, too much group inclusion by one set of individuals can break and breach the unfocus required by another set of persons; and in most situations, there are clear rules of how roles, movements, emotions, talk, and other features of focused encounters are to be played out when a focus encounter must occupy a use-space or move through an otherwise unfocused situation. The general rule, at least in US culture, seems to be that those in focus are to sustain the focus and avoid all others in space, moving as a group in ways that are not threatening and that do not force others to “get out of the way” or to become face-engaged with any member of the moving focused encounter. If this rule is not followed, then both the focused and unfocused encounters will be breached, thereby activating repair rituals or, perhaps, conflict.

At times, members of focused encounters deliberately break this rule, forcing others to get out of the way and to otherwise avoid what can be a hostile group “on the move.” For example, “riots” after soccer matches in many European cities are typically orchestrated to disrupt the unfocus of public places (Collins 2008). Or hostile youth outfitted in full gang-banger dress and displaying a hostile demeanor can aggressively walk through public places and force others to retreat. Thus, members of devalued

categoric units or hostile corporate units are the most likely to disrupt the sense of inclusion in a common activity as a means to vent their diffuse anger. As in so doing, they also destroy any sense of trust or facticity in the situation, thus generating anger and anxiety among those who would typically operate under the rules of unfocus. Even when persons are not deliberately trying to break unfocus, as is too often the case with loud “cell yell” on a cell phone, they disrupt the public order by intruding upon the unfocus of others. But over the last few years, older persons appear to have learned to expropriate use-spaces or to put distance between themselves and others when on the cell phone. In response, more places such as restaurants and movies are requiring that cell phones be turned off or put on vibration mode. Thus, new norms of focus within unfocus are slowly emerging to regulate cell-phone use – although these rules are frequently violated, especially by younger users of these devices.

Thus, needs for group inclusion of focused encounters can come into conflict with those for unfocused encounters, and especially if the focused and unfocused participants are members of different categoric and corporate units. Still, most of the time, the public order is maintained because individuals understand the rules of unfocus and the rules of how to focus in unfocused situations without breaching the surrounding unfocused encounters.

Exchange Payoffs in Unfocused Encounters

The exchange of resources is generally not highly relevant in unfocused situations, although the level of success in sustaining unfocus and avoiding breaches can be considered a type of intrinsic resource. Also, at times, people are in unfocused situations in order to secure a valued resources – from watching a movie or sporting event to buying merchandise – but these resources are secured by brief periods of focus, such as buying a ticket to a movie or paying a cashier in a store. When unfocused is breached, there are potential costs in becoming focused in unfocused situations, but if repair rituals are properly executed, these costs will not exceed the rewards of the positive emotions that ensue with ritualized encounters. And, at times, a conversation with people at the next table or standing in line can be highly rewarding compared to standing alone or in a small encounter; thus, there is always some potential for a profit in intrinsic rewards. But, even with these sources of potential profits, the lack of focus reduces potential exchange partners and, hence, the likelihood that needs for profits will be highly salient in unfocused situations.

Verification of Identities in Unfocused Encounters

The most salient identity in unfocused situations is often a person's social-identity, especially a highly visible one such as gender, age, or ethnicity (if marked by skin color or facial features, or some obvious mode of dress). Core-identities are typically not salient, except to the degree that they are embedded in a social-identity. The same is true for both group- and role-identities, although group-identities and role-identities can be visible in their own right if there are clear markers of such identities (e.g., uniforms, stylized modes of dress, badges, unique demeanors). The reason that social-identities are so important is that they are visible markers that establish which norms are relevant, what roles are appropriate, what expectation states apply, and what emotions can be displayed within a given ecology and demography. There will be very different expectations for young and old, males and females, rich and poor, and members of diverse and differentially valued ethnic categories in unfocused situations; and so, depending upon the expectations, what constitutes conformity or deviance changes. Because social-identities are the most visible, they are subject to verification and potential non-verification, although not to the degree evident in a focused encounter. The lack of focus assures that role-taking will be "on the sly" through low key monitoring that avoids face engagement. The result is that verification is weak and often indirect, with individuals implicitly verifying a social-identity by accepting the roles being played by members of categoric units or by special accommodations of categoric unit members. I have noticed, for instance, that with age, others are more likely to move (even jump) out of my way, hold doors open for me, and otherwise make "allowances" or show deference for my age – a situation that I find somewhat distressing because, on the inside, I feel young (despite what the x-rays say). Similarly, traditional patterns of gendered behaviors allow women much the same deference or attention, although to a much lesser degree than 40 years ago; still, there is acknowledgement of gender differences. Thus, verification of self comes when individuals implicitly acknowledge a person's membership in a categoric unit.

In other cases, simply ignoring membership in a categoric unit, especially a devalued one, represents a kind of positive reinforcement for a person. If a people of dark-colored skin have historically been devalued and discriminated against in a society, and if others in unfocused (or focused) encounters do not act in any demonstrable manner with reference to expectation states attached to this ethnic category, the social identity has not been actively verified but the experience will nonetheless be positive; and the

member of the devalued ethnic category may take away positive intrinsic resources – respect, for example – from the unfocused situation. To simply be allowed to move freely about public places can be highly rewarding in highly stratified societies where involvement in public has historically been highly restrictive.

At still other times, social-identities need to be acknowledged, if only by very brief face-engagements, such as a nod, opening a door for another, shuffling out of an elevator, sharing a use-space like a park bench, and other situations where unfocus is required but at the same time very brief moments of focus can occur. Here, a social-identity may have to be acknowledged, and focusing rituals will have to be tailored to the categoric-unit membership(s) of the other(s), as would be the case for the ritual opening of a brief focus by male to another male or to a female. The two rituals would be somewhat different in light of perceived gender differences. Or, a ritual to a young or older person would be very different. The key is to achieve and leave focus rapidly, and in the moment of focus, to acknowledge the other and, if salient or obvious, to acknowledge membership in a categoric unit.

When unfocused situations exist within corporate units, such as an office, stadium of a sports team, park in a community, group- and role-identities may also need to be acknowledged, especially if there are clear markers for these identities. Fans to a football game will generally wear totemic markers of their team loyalty, and inevitably these will draw people into brief encounters, from a thumbs-up sign to a slightly more prolonged face engagement (about the teams). Within a corporate unit, role-identities must often be acknowledged, if only by a nod or hello, when the individuals are clearly playing a relevant role within the division of labor of a corporate unit. Such acknowledgements are typically the outcome of spatial configurations and density of individuals in space, as is the case in a hallway, small waiting room, elevator, busy doorway, xerox room, crowded parking lot, and the like. For example, students inevitably say hello to me if they have had me in class when passing me in a hallway, with the interaction briefly focused during the ritual passing of each other. Since they know me more than I am likely to know them (because of the size of my classes), it is a ritual that they initiate and to which I respond, but at the same time, we both keep moving and lose focus within seconds. But my role is acknowledged and the student's role is also acknowledged, and perhaps even a bit of group-identity (as incumbents in university) is also thrown in. These role- and group-identities would generally be highly salient in a more prolonged focus, but the fact that individuals still try to acknowledge them in unfocused situations indicates that people generally recognize that even when the focus is brief, identities are important.

As with focused encounters, embedding generally raises the salience of identities in unfocused encounters. If an encounter is embedded in a corporate unit, individuals seek information as they monitor each other for markers of role- and group-identities. If members of diverse categoric units are co-present, especially when members come from differentially valued units, the unfocused encounter is inevitably embedded in categoric units and, hence, social-identities are actively relevant. Monitoring will pick up markers of membership in different units, and individuals will adjust their positioning in space and movement depending upon the relative moral worth of different categoric units and the degree to which expectation states for members are being followed in unfocused situations. Thus, the more an unfocused encounter is embedded in either corporate and categoric units, the more salient are identities, particularly social-identities (attached to categoric units) and role- and group-identities (attached to corporate units). Core-identities are less salient, unless a social-, group-, or role-identity represents an important way in which a core-identity is expressed and verified. Generally, the more the territories of self include adornments (clothing, body mutilations, and props arrayed around a person's body), the more salient is an identity; and as individuals observe these adornments, they become prepared, if necessary, to ritually acknowledge the identity marked by adornments in a person's territory of self. There will be a brief focus, but it will typically be immediately broken in unfocused situations, unless some physical property of space forces more focus, which, if sustained for a period, will typically involve a highly ritualized forms of talk geared toward activating an exit ritual back to an unfocused state.

Elementary Principles on the Dynamics of Transactional Needs in Encounters

16. The more individuals in a focused encounter can meet transactional needs, in order of their relative magnitude, for verifying identities, for receiving profitable exchange payoffs, for achieving a sense of group inclusion, for establishing a sense of trust, and for achieving a sense of facticity, the more they will be able to create and sustain focus, rhythmic synchronization, and emotional entrainment, and the more will these encounters develop solidarity and symbols marking this solidarity; and conversely, the more transactional needs fail to be met in an encounter, the more likely are the negative emotions aroused to cause breaches and/or efforts to terminate the encounter

- A. The more salient are identities of individuals in a focused encounter, and the more emotions attached to these identities, the more interaction will revolve around identity verification as the primary focus of attention and as a condition for rhythmic synchronization, with the salience of identities, the emotional valencing of these identities, and efforts at their verification increasing when:
1. Core-identities are highly salient and when verification of this core level of identity must be channeled through verification of a social-identity and role-identity
 2. Group-identities, social-identities, and role-identities alone or in combination are highly salient and require active role-making by each person, while requiring active affirmation from others in the encounter
- B. The more individuals can receive profits in exchanges of resources in a focused encounter and experience positive emotions as a result of these profits, the greater will be the focus, rhythmic synchronization, and emotional entrainment among individuals, with profitable exchange payoffs increasing when:
1. Resources available in an encounter can be readily determined.
 2. Resources received by each individual are perceived as proportionate to each relative costs and investments.
 3. Resources received meet expectations and cultural definitions of fairness and just shares.
 4. Resources received are assessed by common reference point(s) for evaluating relative costs, investments, and just shares.
- C. The more individuals in a focused encounter can perceive that they are part of the ongoing flow of interaction in an encounter, the more likely will they reveal mild positive emotions, sustain focus, fall into rhythmic synchronization, and potentially become emotionally entrained, with this sense of group inclusion increasing when expectations for what would constitute group inclusion are clear and when other transactional needs can be realized.
- D. The more individuals in a focused encounter sense that others are in synchronization, that their actions are predictable, that they are sincere, and that they are respectful of others, the more likely will they experience trust and mild positive emotions and the more likely are they to be able to sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with this sense of trust increasing when other transactional needs are realized.

- E. The more individuals in a focused encounter can sense that the situation is as it appears, that self and others have common inter-subjective experiences, and that the situation has an obdurate character, the more likely will they experience a sense of facticity and mild positive emotions and the more likely are they to be able to sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with this sense of facticity increasing when needs for trust are realized.
17. The capacity of individuals to meet any or all transactional needs in a focused encounter is a positive and additive function of:
- A. The degree of embedding of an encounter in corporate units within relatively autonomous institutional domains, with the effects of this embedding being an additive function of:
1. Ideologies and institutional norms that can guide the process of normatization
 2. Vertical and horizontal divisions of labor making expectation states over status unambiguous
 3. Roles that are attached to the status order and are regulated by the process of normatization
 4. Consensus over the meanings of situational ecology and demography
- B. The degree of embedding of an encounter in categoric units attached to locations in the stratification system, with the effects of this embedding being a positive and additive function of:
1. The visibility of memberships in categoric units
 2. The degree to which membership in categoric units is defined by nominal parameters or graduated parameters that have been converted to quasi-nominal parameters.
 3. The level of consensus over status beliefs by both those who are members and non-members of categoric units.
 4. The degree of differential evaluation contained in status beliefs about memberships in differentiated categoric units.
 5. The degree of consolidation of membership in differentiated categoric units with locations in the division of labor of corporate units.
18. The more individuals can meet transactional needs for trust and facticity through monitoring the behaviors of others without actual face-engagement, while keeping the valence and salience of needs for identity-verification, exchange payoffs, and group inclusion low, the more likely

can they sustain unfocus and use appropriate repair rituals to re-establish unfocus when temporary episodes of focus occur, with the capacity to sustain trust and facticity increasing with:

- A. Embedding of unfocused encounters in corporate units where situational ecology and demography, status markers, role demeanors, and normatization generate clear expectations for behaviors maintaining unfocus.
- B. Embedding of unfocused encounters in categoric units where status beliefs establish clear expectation states for behavioral demeanors maintaining unfocus.
- C. Consistency and congruence between expectations for behavioral demeanors established by embedding and the actual behaviors of others in a situation of unfocus.

Conclusion

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, sociologists have tended to keep the notion of motivation recessive, but in fact, most theories make assumptions about what motivates individuals. Symbolic interactionism stresses the verification of identities (e.g., Stryker 1980; Burke and Stets 2009); exchange theory emphasizes profits in securing resources (Homans 1961/1971); ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) sees needs to have a sense of common reality as a central motivating force; Marxist theory assumes the need to avoid alienation through control of persons' productive power as the driving motive force behind conflict; critical theorizing (Habermas 1973 [1976]) sees the need to avoid domination as the prime motive state among humans; structuration theory (Giddens 1984) posits a need to achieve ontological security as a motive force; and so it goes for all of the theoretical perspectives that constitute sociological theory (see Turner (2003) for a review). Thus, sociologists have not really avoided conceptualizing motivation but, instead, have left the topic implicit. In this chapter, my goal has simply been to take what I see as the most important elements of these implicit theories and, then, make them more explicit and integrate them into one general conceptualization of what drives individuals in focused and unfocused encounters.

For encounters to achieve focus and synchronization, for meso structures to be created and sustained, and for macro sociocultural formations to remain viable, there must be motivational energy driving people to interact and create larger-scale social structures and related cultures. Some of this energy is obviously biological – e.g., having enough food intake to move human

bodies – but much of this energy is a response to pressures from not only micro-level forces but also forces operating at the macro level. The result is individuals mobilize and channel emotional energy to meet these pressures, and in so doing, they built meso and eventually macro sociocultural formations from encounters. Chapter 9 will address some of the dynamics involved in building up these formations, but first we need to examine that last microdynamic force – which like forces in physics – hold encounters together or, at times, break them apart: emotional arousal. Humans are the most emotional animals on earth, and there is a good reason for this: we are evolved apes with few, if any, strong bioprogrammers for group formation; natural selection worked on our hominin ancestors' neuroanatomy to find an indirect way to energize humans toward iterated focused encounters that would allow them to forge stronger bonds and, thereby, create viable corporate unit structures with much higher solidarity than is evident among our closest cousins, the great apes (Turner 2000a). Without this capacity for emotional arousal, all other microdynamic processes would not be forces; and humans would never have evolved or, if we had emerged, we would have gone the way of most species of apes: to extinction.

Chapter 8

Emotional Dynamics in Encounters

Emotions are perhaps as important as culture and language in forging the bonds that make encounters and, ultimately, larger sociocultural formations possible. Virtually every social interaction is emotionally valenced along a negative and positive continuum; and without emotions, individuals would not develop commitments to each other, to culture, and to social structures. And, of course, with the capacity to generate negative emotions, individuals can strike out at others and virtually any social structure. As I have sought to document in a variety of places (Turner 2000a, 2002, 2006, 2007a), the human brain is wired to produce a wide variety of emotions of dramatically varying intensity; and this capacity is the outcome of intense selection pressures on the ancestors of present-day humans to become more social (see TenHouten 2007 for another view).

Humans are not as social as social scientists normally argue (Turner 2000a; Maryanski and Turner 1992); and to the degree that we have hard-wiring for sociality, most of this wiring is for emotional arousal, which indirectly produces bonds among individuals. Indeed, the fragility of encounters is the result of the fact that humans, as evolved apes, must work rather hard compared to most other mammals to create and sustain social bonds, as is evident by the complexity of microdynamic forces examined so far. This last force – emotional arousal – is the underlying mechanism *for all* microdynamics; and as we will see in the next chapter, it is the force that binds people and sociocultural formations together as well as the force that tears social relations apart.

The Nature of Human Emotions

Expanding the Emotional Palate

Before examining emotional dynamics in focused and unfocused encounters, let me outline the basic nature of human emotions. All scholars agree that there are at least four primary emotions, on a continuum of intensity can be labelled: *assertion-anger*, *aversion-fear*, *disappointment-sadness*, and *satisfaction-happiness*. Table 8.1 outlines various hypothesized primary emotions from a wide variety of scholars in different disciplines (Turner 2000a: 68–69; Turner and Stets 2005: 14–15). As a cursory reading of the table documents, additional primary emotions, such as *disgust*, *surprise*, *expectancy*, and a few others, have been hypothesized by various researches (see also Thamm 1992, 2004, 2006), but all agree that variants of *anger*, *fear*, *sadness*, and *disappointment* are universal in humans and, perhaps, in the mammalian line.

As natural selection worked on the neuroanatomy of humans' hominid ancestors, I believe that the first step was for selection to rewire the brain greater cortical and conscious control of emotions so that inappropriate emotions could be regulated, at least to some degree. With some control (by the prefrontal cortex) of emotions that arise in the subcortical areas of the brain (see Turner 2000a), the variety of emotions experienced and expressed could increase. This second step in the rewiring of the hominid brain involved, I believe, extending the range of valences among primary emotions along a wider continuum from low- through medium- to high-intensity. In Table 8.2, I offer my views on this increased variety of the four basic primary emotions. With more emotions to work with, the ancestors of humans and, of course, humans today can communicate in more nuanced ways their emotional dispositions and thus forge bonds of greater complexity and variety.

As enhanced emotionality increased the fitness of hominins, the expanding array of emotions, and the neurology generating this array, could be subject to further selection. From this selection came what I term *first-order elaborations* of primary emotions. Some time ago, Robert Plutchik (1980) made a strong case for this argument, by drawing an analogy to a “color wheel.” Primary emotions are like primary colors and can be mixed to produce many different shades and valences of emotions. While Plutchik's scheme is, in my view, a bit too neat and mechanical, the basic idea is sound. Somehow, the human brain can “mix” primary emotions (only a metaphor, not a hypothesis about the neurology involved, which is currently unknown) to produce new emotional states, or what I denote by the label of *first-order elaborations*. My view is that first-order elaborations involve a greater amount of one emotion somehow mixed with a lesser amount of another primary emotion to

Table 8.1 Representative examples of statements on primary emotions

	Johnson-Laird/ Oatley (1992)	Emde (1980)	Panksepp (1982)	Stroufe (1979)	Turner (1996a)	Trevarthen (1984)	Arnold (1960)	Osgood (1966)	Darwin (1872)	Izard (1977, 1992b)
Happiness	Joy	Pleasure	Happiness	Happiness				Joy quiet pleasure	Pleasure joy affection	Enjoyment
Fear	Fear	Fear	Fear	Fear	Fear	Fight		Fear	Terror	Fear
Anger	Anger	Anger	Anger	Anger	Anger	Fight Defensive Aggression		Anxiety Anger	Anger	Anger Contempt
Sadness	Sadness	Sorrow Loneliness grief	Sadness Surprise	Sadness	Sadness			Sorrow		
Disgust	Surprise Disgust Shame Shyness Distress Guilt Interest							Amazement Disgust	Astonishment	Surprise Disgust Shame Shyness Distress Guilt Interest
	Expectancy	Approach						Interest Expectancy	Pain	
		Inhibition						Boredom		

(continued)

Table 8.1 (continued)

Ekman (1984)	Epstein (1984)	Arieti (1970)	Frommel/O'Brien (1982)	Plutchik (1980)	Scott (1980)	Fehr/Russell (1984)	Gray (1982)	Kemper (1987)	Malatesta/Haviland (1982)
Happiness	Joy Love	Satisfaction	Joy Elation satisfaction	Joy	Pleasure Love	Happiness Love	Hope	Satisfaction	Joy
Fear	Fear	Fear tension	Fear	Fear	Fear Anxiety	Fear	Anxiety	Fear	Fear
Anger	Anger	Rage	Anger	Anger	Anger	Anger	Anger	Anger	Anger
Sadness	Sadness	Unpleasure	Grief resignation	Sadness	Loneliness	Sadness	Sadness	Depression	Sadness
Surprise			Shock						
Disgust				Surprise Disgust					
		Appetite		Anticipation	Curiosity				Interest Pain
				Acceptance					Brownflash Knitbrow

Table 8.2 Variants of primary emotions (Data from Turner 1999a, b, 2002, 2007)

	Low intensity	Moderate intensity	High intensity
Satisfaction-Happiness	Content	Cheerful	Joy
	Sanguine	Buoyant	Bliss
	Serenity	Friendly	Rapture
	Gratified	Amiable	Jubilant
		Enjoyment	Gaiety
			Elation
			Delight
			Love
			Exhilarated
			Terror
Aversion-Fear	Concern	Misgivings	Horror
	Hesitant	Trepidation	High anxiety
	Reluctance	Anxiety	
	Shyness	Scared	
		Alarmed	
		Unnerved	
		Panic	
Assertion-Anger	Annoyed	Displeased	Dislike
	Agitated	Frustrated	Loathing
	Irritated	Belligerent	Disgust
	Vexed	Contentious	Hate
	Perturbed	Hostility	Despise
	Nettled	Ire	Detest
	Rankled	Animosity	Hatred
	Piqued	Offended	Seething
		Consternation	Wrath
			Furious
			Inflamed
			Incensed
			Outrage
Disappointment-Sadness	Discouraged	Dismayed	Sorrow
	Downcast	Disheartened	Heartsick
	Dispirited	Glum	Despondent
		Resigned	Anguished
		Gloomy	Crestfallen
		Woeful	
		Pained	
		Dejected	

produce entirely new emotions that can be felt and expressed with varying degrees of intensity. Table 8.3 summarizes my sense for the emotions produced by this kind of “mixing” of primary emotions.

Table 8.3 First-order Elaborations of Primary Emotions

SATISFACTION-HAPPINESS		
Satisfaction-happiness + <i>aversion-fear</i>	<u>produces</u> →	wonder, hopeful, relief, gratitude, pride, reverence
Satisfaction-happiness + <i>assertion-anger</i>	<u>produces</u> →	vengeance, appeased, calmed, soothed, relish, triumphant, bemused
Satisfaction-happiness + <i>disappointment-sadness</i>	<u>produces</u> →	nostalgia, yearning, hope
AVERSION-FEAR		
Aversion-fear + <i>satisfaction-happiness</i>	<u>produces</u> →	awe, reverence, veneration
Aversion-fear + <i>assertion-anger</i>	<u>produces</u> →	revulsed, repulsed, antagonism, dislike, envy
Aversion-fear + <i>disappointment-sadness</i>	<u>produces</u> →	dread, wariness
ASSERTION-ANGER		
Assertion-anger + <i>satisfaction-happiness</i>	<u>produces</u> →	condescension, mollified, rudeness, placated, righteousness
Assertion-anger + <i>aversion-fear</i>	<u>produces</u> →	abhorrence, jealousy, suspiciousness
Assertion-anger + <i>disappointment-sadness</i>	<u>produces</u> →	bitterness, depression, betrayed
DISAPPOINTMENT-SADNESS		
Disappointment-sadness + <i>satisfaction-happiness</i>	<u>produces</u> →	acceptance, moroseness, solace, melancholy
Disappointment-sadness + <i>aversion-fear</i>	<u>produces</u> →	regret, forlornness, remorseful, misery
Disappointment-sadness + <i>assertion-anger</i>	<u>produces</u> →	aggrieved, discontent, dissatisfied, unfulfilled, boredom, grief, envy, sullenness

A majority of the emotions in the right column of Table 8.3 can be used to promote bonding among persons or to mete out sanctions so that individuals will meet situational expectations. Other emotions, however, are potentially volatile and can lead to violence or, at a minimum, breaches of

micro-level encounters. For example, vengeance is a combination of happiness and anger, with individuals feeling pleasure in using their anger to harm others. Thus, this mixing of emotions into first-order elaborations can be a double-edged sword; first-order elaborations can facilitate bonding among the descendants of low-sociality apes or, alternatively, they can tear social bonds apart, often in very violent ways. People are well aware of the negative potential in emotionally charged bonds, and so they generally act to keep emotional arousal on the positive side, if they can.

Once natural selection re-wired to hominin and, hence, the human brain for first-order elaborations allowing for a greatly enhanced capacity to use and interpret a wider variety of emotions with which to forge social bonds, this new neurological wiring could be subject to additional selection. The result was to produce emotions that are probably unique to humans: *second-order elaborations*, which involve the mixing of three primary emotions, particularly the three negative primary emotions. In the case of hominins, one of the great obstacles to using emotions as the principle mechanism for creating and sustaining social bonds is that three of the four primary emotions are negative and, thus, not very useful in enhancing sociality. My hypothesis (Turner 2000a, 2007a) is that natural selection got around this obstacle by creating the neurological capacity to blend the three negative emotions and, thereby, generate entirely new emotional states, particularly shame, guilt, and alienation. The basic structure of these emotions is listed in Table 8.4.

Shame is a blending of the three negative primary emotions in a particular order of relative magnitude. Shame is composed of a greater amount of disappointment-sadness mixed, in order of intensity, with a lesser amounts of assertion-anger (at self) and aversion-fear (about the consequences to self). Shame arises when individuals feel that they have not met expectations. Shame is an extremely painful emotion because it makes people “feel small” and “inadequate” in the eyes of others who signal to a person that he or she has behaved appropriately or failed to meet expectations. Guilt is also painful but less so than shame, revolving around feeling that one has violated a moral code. Guilt is generated by mixing the three negative emotions but

Table 8.4 The structure of shame and guilt (Data from Turner 1999a, b)

Rank order of primary emotions	Second-order emotions	
	Shame (alienation)	Guilt
1	Disappointment-sadness (at self)	Disappointment-sadness (at self)
2	Assertion-anger (at self) (at others)	Aversion-fear (about consequences to self)
3	Aversion-fear (about consequences to self)	Assertion-anger (at self)

reversing the order of magnitude for anger and fear (see, also, Tangney and Dearing 2002; Tangney et al. 1992, 1996a, b, 1998).

These emotions are, it appears, unique to humans and they solve a number of problems in using emotions to forge tighter social bonds. First, by mixing the three negative emotions, the direct power of each is mitigated. Second, the emerging emotions – shame and guilt – are so painful that individuals will monitor themselves and will be motivated to take corrective actions to bring their behaviors in line with situational expectations and more general moral codes. The result is that much of the burden of monitoring and sanctioning is taken off others and put onto each person, most of whom are highly motivated to avoid shame and guilt, with the consequence that they will behave appropriately. In so doing, others do not need to sanction a person and potentially incur counter-anger from this individual; instead, the person sanctions himself or herself. Shame and guilt are thus key emotions behind social control because they engender self-control among individuals who, at their ape core, are still rather low-sociality animals programmed for weak- rather than strong-ties.

There are other second-order elaborations, such as *alienation*, which has the same basic structure as shame, but with the anger component somewhat stronger and directed outward away from self toward the situation and more inclusive sociocultural formation in which encounters occur. Individuals withdraw from mobilizing much motivational energy, and they generally do so in highly explicit ways that signal to others their emotional state, prompting these others to accept this alienated state or, alternatively, to cut off relations with alienated persons, if they can. Again, even though alienation is not an emotion that promotes sociality, it nonetheless mitigates the power of the three negative primary emotions alone to disrupt social relations, especially the anger component which is directed at social structures and culture rather than at individuals who might “fight back” if confronted, thereby initiating an escalating spiral of reciprocal anger.

Thus, natural selection over the last 5 million years was working to enhance emotionality of hominids and, at the same time, to overcome the problem posed by the fact that most primary emotions are negative. The capacity for satisfaction-happiness had to be enhanced, and the power of sadness, anger, and fear had to be reduced or channeled into emotions like shame and guilt that promote conformity to expectations and moral codes, or alienation that signals to others that attachments are weak without arousing intense forms of anger. Yet, rewiring the subcortical areas of the brain and enhancing the connections between the neo-cortex (especially the frontal and prefrontal cortexes) and the subcortical emotion centers can only go so far; moreover, this rewiring increased the potential for

highly intense negative emotional arousal that not only breaches encounters but that also can lead to extreme violence (Turner 2007c), often on a massive scale.

The Defense of Self

Repression and defense mechanisms. Along with a few other mammals (e.g., dolphins, elephants, and great apes), humans can see themselves as objects in their environment (Gallup 1970, 1979, 1982), and as emphasized in the last chapter, this unique trait among a few highly intelligent mammals was, in the case of late hominids, to be selected upon to the point where humans could form a series of identities that they would seek to verify in all encounters. To fail to verify an identity arouses negative emotions – from anger, sadness, fear, and frustration through righteous anger and anxiety to shame and/or guilt. Identities are also emotionally valenced in themselves with a wide variety of potential emotional states about the nature of self. Thus, identities are emotional-cognitive constructs, and efforts to verify identities lead to the arousal of additional emotion-states. When self is verified, individuals will experience positive emotions, the intensity of which varying with the identity in question, the persons involved, and the nature of the situation in which an encounter occurs. Thus, self is on the line in most encounters, and individuals not only see themselves as objects, they evaluate themselves as they role-make and role-take with others, experiencing a variety of potential positive and negative emotions.

Whether as simple artifact of enhancing humans emotionality during the evolution of a larger neocortex, or as something selected upon because it had fitness enhancing consequences, humans have the capacity to repress and remove from consciousness negative emotions about themselves. There are distinct areas, such as the hippocampus, that have long been known to hold unconscious memories (Le Doux 1996); and more recently, different areas of the prefrontal cortex (the decision-making part of the neo-cortex) appear to be responsible for the cognitive content of an unpleasant experience and the emotions attached to this cognition (Depue et al. 2007). The result is the potential for the arousal of negative emotions about self to set into motion rather complicated dynamics revolving around repression.

As I have argued (Turner 2007a), repression is a kind of master defense mechanisms, with additional defense mechanisms having somewhat varying effects on what happens to the repressed memory and on how individuals behave. Table 8.5 lists what I see as the most important defense mechanisms (Turner 2006: 290). The first column denotes the negative emotions

Table 8.5 Repression, Defense, Transmutation, and Targeting of Emotions

Repressed Emotions of:	Defense Mechanism:	Transmutation to:	Target:
anger, sadness, fear shame, guilt, and alienation	displacement	anger	others, corporate units and categoric units
anger, sadness, fear, shame, guilt, and alienation	projection	little, but some anger	imputation of anger, sadness, fear, shame or guilt to dispositional states of others
anger, sadness, fear, shame, guilt, and alienation	reaction formation	positive emotions	others, corporate units, categoric units
anger, sadness, fear shame, guilt, and alienation	sublimation	positive emotions	tasks in corporate units
anger, sadness, fear shame, guilt, and alienation	attribution	anger	others, corporate units, or categoric units

most likely to be repressed; the second, the actual defense mechanism supplementing the initial repression – i.e., displacement, projection, sublimation, and most importantly, attribution; the third column lists the most likely emotion to emerge, once another emotion is repressed and transmuted to another, less painful (about self) emotion. And, the last column delineates potential targets of the transmuted emotions. These last two columns are very important to sociological analysis of not only encounters, but as we will see in the next chapter, also to the analysis of how events occurring at the micro level of encounters can have effects on the meso and macro realms of social reality.

My view is that once repressed, emotions increase in intensity and, moreover, are transmuted into new emotions that escape cortical censors and become part of the behavioral repertoire of a person. For example, when shame and guilt are repressed, one of the three negative emotions that make up the structure of shame and guilt is often released in role-making. For shame, sadness, anger, or fear can emerge, but my hypothesis (hardly original to me) is that anger is the most likely emotion to emerge, although sadness and anxiety are also quite common emotions to escape the cortical censors. For guilt, sadness, anger, and fear can all arise, but I hypothesize (along with Freud) that it is the fear component that emerges as anxiety. Thus, it is the second emotion in shame and guilt (see Table 8.3) that often

breaks into the consciousness of the person and sets into motion emotionally charged behaviors. Others may sense that deeper emotions are involved, but what they see in the emotional displays accompanying role behaviors is the transmuted emotion rather than the original emotion that was repressed.

These dynamics can lead to severe behavioral pathologies, especially when shame and guilt are repressed. Moreover, because these emotions arising from shame and guilt almost always target external objects, they affect the flow of emotions in encounters and, often, have repercussions for not only the viability of the encounter but also the sociocultural formations in which the encounter is embedded. From a sociological perspective, then, *attribution* is the most important defense mechanism after the initial repression. Attribution is generally not seen as a defense mechanism but I believe that it is the most commonly employed mechanism during repression of unpleasant emotions. Individuals are constantly making inferences about the cause of events, and these inferences become attributions about who or what is responsible for the particular emotional states experienced by a person. I take a somewhat different approach than existing theorizing and research on attribution dynamics (Weiner 1986, 2006), viewing internal attributions as *self-attributions* and external attributions as *targeting* others, situation, corporate, categoric units, and at times, even more macrostructures and their cultures. Thus, as individuals repress negative emotions about self, these emotions are intensified, transmuted, and targeted; and depending upon the emotions and the targeting, the flow of interaction will vary.

Following Edward Lawler's (2001) analysis, positive emotions reveal a *proximal bias*, with individuals making either self-attributions and viewing themselves as the cause of their positive emotional arousal and/or seeing local others in the encounter as responsible. In contrast, negative emotional arousal has a *distal bias*, with individuals making external attributions and blaming more distant others, situations, meso structures and their cultures, or macro structures and their cultures for negative emotional arousal. Depending upon the emotions aroused and transmuted, internal and external attributions will have different consequences for an encounter and the structures in which the encounter is embedded. If self is seen as responsible for actions that cause positive emotional arousal, then emotions along the satisfaction-happiness continuum will be experienced; and if a person had some fear or concern about an outcome (generating positive emotions), then it is likely that this person will also experience pride, a first-order elaboration mixing happiness with a lesser amount of fear. If a person makes a self-attribution for negative emotional arousal, then this person may experience shame which combines the three negative primary emotions; or this person may experience any of the negative primary emotions alone – that

is, sadness about how self has performed, anger at self, and fear about the consequences to self.

If a person makes an external attribution, the most likely emotion is anger directed at a number of potential targets. If others in the situation are viewed as responsible for negative emotional arousal, then a person will experience and express anger at others, unless they are powerful and can fight back; and under these conditions, the anger may be repressed and transmuted into other emotions such as fear/anxiety, sadness/depression, or if reaction formation occurs, into positive emotions about the other. If a person blames the local situation, then *alienation* may arise, especially if negative emotions about self have been repressed although, again, the release of any of the other negative emotions is also a potential outcome. If a person blames members of a categoric unit, then this individual will experience anger and, if possible, express anger at members of this unit and hold *prejudicial beliefs* that serve to stoke the anger. If a person blames the structure and culture of the corporate unit in which negative emotions have been generated, anger at and alienation from the structure and culture of this unit are likely.

At times individuals may even target macrostructures and their cultures; and when this occurs, they will experience and express anger at institutional domains, stratification systems, societies and, potentially, even inter-societal systems. They will also feel alienated from, reduce commitments to, and withdraw legitimacy from these macro-level units. As I will explore shortly, then, a general theory of emotional dynamics will require some principles on the conditions that increase or decrease negative and positive emotional arousal, repression of negative emotions, transmutation of these negative emotions, and targeting of the emotions aroused. For the present, let me stick with the preliminary generalizations above before developing them in more detail.

Defensive strategies. As I have mentioned in previous chapters, individuals do not always go into full-blown repression but, instead, activate a series of defensive strategies to protect self (McCall and Simmons 1978). These strategies are generally short-term and used to bring responses of others into line with efforts to present identities and have these identities verified by others. One strategy of these defensive strategies is *selective perception* in which the gestures of others are read in a way that assures verification of self. Another is *selective interpretation* where the responses of others are interpreted in a manner that confirms self. Still another defensive strategy is to draw upon *short-term credit* in which past efforts to verify self have been successful and to use the positive emotions of the past to ride out an episode of seeming non-verification by others. Another, more severe strategy that will generally breach or terminate interaction is to *disavow the audience* of others who fail to verify self. A strategy more likely to promote social

bonds is to disavow a particular behavior that led to sanctioning and/or non-verification of self and to make amends for this behavior. Another strategy is to switch to a new identity if a previous presentation of self was not accepted. And finally, individuals can simply leave encounters where they consistently fail to experience positive emotions about self.

Most of these strategies only work in the short run because many will arouse anger from others. For example, continually misreading or misinterpreting responses of others will be frustrating to these others; and they will eventually negatively sanction a person who remains so “clueless” or who refuses to understand what people are signaling. When strategies are consistently used, particularly selective interpretation and selective perception, then defensive strategies operate more like a defense mechanism because the reality of what others are communicating is simply not allowed to come into cognitive focus. And like the activation of all defense mechanisms, a repressed emotion like shame will intensify and potentially transmute into new emotions or one of the emotions in a first- or second-order elaboration of primary emotions.

The Folk Notion of Personality

To some extent, the notion that people have a “personality” is a cultural construction because societies vary in how much they believe that each individual has a unique set of characteristics that drives behaviors. At the level of face-to-face interaction, emotional reactions of others are often seen as constituting a syndrome of emotional responses and, hence, a *type* of personality. In fact, personality is mostly attributed to others on the basis of their level and habitual emotional dispositions and reactions. And, these are related to the emotions that have been aroused in past encounters and the extent to which negative emotions have been repressed, transmuted, and only then, expressed. Thus, a chronically sad person will be seen as a personality type (“dour” or some such label); or a person with diffuse anger (perhaps the result of repressed shame) will be type-cast as having a “quick fuse” or a habitually happy individual will be portrayed as “upbeat,” although some may think the happiness is a cover for deep-seated negative emotions that are being repressed (especially in cultures like the west where the tenets of psychoanalysis are built into the culture). The key point here is that, whatever the merits of the concept of personality as a real phenomenon, people will generally assign others to culturally defined categories of personality on the basis of their modal emotional responses.

Thus, just as people role-take, status-take, and culture-take, they also personality-take. They read emotions to facilitate role-taking; indeed, the non-verbal emotional line of conduct is probably more important than the verbal track for effective role-taking. And, if encounters are iterated, individuals are likely to be viewed as a particular type of personality on the basis of their habitual modes of emotional expression. People attribute personality characteristics to others, especially with respect to their emotional dispositions and behaviors, in order to facilitate interaction. If it is possible to predict how people will respond emotionally to situations, then it is easier to interact with them and thus sustain the viability of encounters.

The Language of Emotions

The language of emotions communicated through visual readings of body language evolved among humans' hominid ancestors millions of years before auditory or spoken language (Turner 2000a). In all cultures, there are emotional phonemes that are strung together by a syntax in ways that communicates often very subtle emotional states. Emotions are not like a snapshot (although, even here, we have an incredible capacity to read them) but, instead, more like a movie. Facial and body cues are strong together over strips of time in ways that communicate meanings. Secondly, because this language of emotions evolved first (Turner 2000a), it is still the primary language of face-to-face interaction, with auditory (spoken) language, which evolved much later, an adjunct to body language. We tend to see body language as an adjunct to spoken language, but I think that it is the other way around. People may listen to talk in encounters, but they are paying even more attention to body language. For example, one of the reasons that it is often difficult to remember the name of a person when first introduced is that you initially focus on what your eyes rather than ears are telling you. In essence, you are reading body language for emotional and dispositional cues more than auditory cues giving you a person's name. As I have discovered on too many occasions, it is embarrassing not to remember a name, but it is not surprising because humans, like apes, are visually dominant and are programmed to read gestures for their emotional content before instrumental content. Indeed, those who are good at remembering names have almost always had to train themselves to focus on the auditory sense, forcing it to over-ride the dominant visual modality for the moment when a name is given during an introduction.

While the gestures marking primary emotions are universal (Ekman 1973, 1982, 1984, 1992a, b, c; Ekman et al. 1972), or nearly so, the variations,

first-order elaborations, and second-order elaborations reveal more cultural content and, hence, variability in *how* they are expressed. The neurology behind these emotions is universal; and so, they are not purely cultural constructions – as many sociologists contend (e.g., Gordon 1989, 1990). Rather, they are like spoken language, varying by phonetic and syntactical structures as expressed through vocabularies and grammar. For instance, an American child experiencing shame will lower head and shrink his or her body, whereas a Japanese child will offer a slight smile and a tap to the head. Thus the vocabulary and grammar of the language of emotions varies, but not the emotions themselves, although some societies reveal sociocultural formations that bias the emotions that individuals will experience. When, for example, a society is portrayed as a “shame culture,” this means that the structures and beliefs of this society operate to generate more shame than other types of societies with different cultural beliefs. Shame does not go away in the latter, but instead, is simply less likely to be produced in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units. A society with strict hierarchies of authority in all corporate units is more likely to generate shame systematically and persistently among subordinates than one with less hierarchy because lowering-ranking individuals are always under the thumb and potentially sanctioned by higher-ranking members of corporate units. And, negative sanctions inevitably lead to the arousal of shame by the person being sanctioned, although the exact gestures marking this shame will vary from culture to culture.

The language of emotions varies not only by the culture of different societies but also by subcultures within societies, especially subcultures built around ethnicity, gender, and social class. Men and women express the same emotions somewhat differently, as do members of different ethnic subpopulations, or members of divergent classes. Sometimes the differences are only slight but at other times they are more dramatic. For example, the “soft demeanor” of upper and upper-middle class persons in western cultures stands in contrast to the “harder demeanor” of members of the lower classes. When women use the expressive styles of men, they are often sanctioned as being “too aggressive” or, in word reserved solely for women, as a being a “bitch” (a holdover from past and present patterns of gender discrimination). When American women are sad it is “ok” to cry, whereas for men this is seen as less “manly,” although there are clear signs of change in the grammar of sadness for both men and women.

Like the great apes, with whom we all share a common ancestor, humans have a very fine-tuned capacity to read gestures visually; indeed, our brains are programmed to read face, follow eye and hand movements, and to note body positioning as signs of dispositions to act in certain ways and to

react emotionally (Hare et al. 2001, 2006; Povinelli 2001; Gassaniga and Smylie 1990). This capacity inheres in the primate line, and hence, it could be subject to further selection and refinement during the course of hominid evolution. The result, I believe, is that we can read both large and subtle differences in the language of emotions of subcultures within a society; and as anyone who has traveled to foreign lands knows, we can accomplish a lot through body language in a society where we do not know the auditory language; in fact, it is the body language revealing emotional dispositions that is typically more useful than verbal utterances under these circumstances. It should not be surprising, therefore, that individuals can negotiate encounters that are, in essence, somewhat “multi-lingual” not so much by words and grammar but by emotional syntax. Indeed, the more similar is the language of emotions among individuals in an encounter or, alternatively, the more individuals are multi-lingual in reading emotional cues, the more likely are they to be successful in role-taking and making, status-taking and making, and culture-taking and making; and hence, the more viable is the encounter and the more likely is focus and rhythmic synchronization to be sustained.

Emotional Dynamics in Focused Encounters

Basic Conditions of Emotional Arousal

In all encounters, there are two basic sources of emotional arousal (Turner 2007a): (1) expectations and (2) sanctions. Individuals always have expectation states for what will or should occur within an encounter. These expectations can come from a variety of sources, especially other microdynamic processes revolving around situational ecology and demography, status, roles, culture, and transactional needs. Ecologies, demographics, status locations in corporate and categoric units, relevant levels of culture (values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, norms), roles to be played, and need states all generate expectations. And, the more embedded are these encounters in corporate units within relatively autonomous institutional domains and categoric units in class locations in the stratification system, the more will these expectations be constrained by the structure and culture of meso- and macro-level domains of reality. When these expectations are realized, individuals will experience positive emotions, whereas when they are not met, persons will feel negative emotions, unless repression removes conscious awareness of the emotions.

Individuals are always subject to sanctions, both positive and negative, from others and from their own evaluations of themselves as they role-take with others and generalized others (i.e., cultural ideologies and norms). When persons receive positive sanctions from others or make positive evaluations of their actions in relation to culture, they will experience positive emotions, whereas when they are subject to negative sanctions from others or from themselves, they will feel negative emotions, unless repression lowers their awareness of these negative emotions.

Thus, the level of emotional arousal in an encounter is determined by the degree to which expectation states are met and by the ratio of positive to negative sanctioning of self. The more expectations are realized and the more positive are the sanctions received, the more likely will individuals experience variants of satisfaction-happiness as well as positively valenced first-order elaborations revolving around satisfaction-happiness. Conversely, the less expectations are realized and the more negative are the sanctions received from others or imposed by persons on themselves, the more individuals will experience variants of sadness, anger, and fear as well as first-order and second-order elaborations of these three negative primary emotions.

Individuals are more likely to meet expectations and/or receive positive sanctions when they and others use the same emotional phonemes and syntax, when the encounter is embedded in corporate and categoric units, when corporate units are embedded in a relatively autonomous institutional domain, when categoric units are embedded in clear locations in the stratification system, when the ideologies and norms of meso-level units are clear, and when transactional needs generate expectations that can be realized under these conditions. As positive emotions are aroused, individuals will not only make self-attributions, they typically give off positive emotions to others and, thereby, initiate an interaction ritual in which talk and bodies fall into rhythmic synchronization, thereby increasing the positive emotional entrainment among participants to an encounter (Collins 2004). When the conditions listed above are not in place, however, expectations are less-clear and less likely to be met, causing the arousal of negative emotions that make focus and interaction rituals difficult to sustain. Indeed, the negative emotions can lead to a breach in the encounter and, at the very least, loss of commitment to pick up the encounter again in the future.

These dynamics accelerate with sanctioning. When individuals perceive that they have been sanctioned positively by others, they experience positive emotions and are more likely to positively sanction these others. As a result, the interaction can fall much easier into common focus and rhythmic synchronization, both of which increase emotional entrainment in an escalating cycle of increasing positive emotional energy that will eventually level off

due to fatigue or satiation. Positive sanctioning also increases the likelihood the encounter will be iterated and that it will develop common symbols and what Collins (1975) termed *particularistic cultural capital* that, when invoked, can increase positive sanctioning and emotional entrainment.

Conversely, when individuals feel that they have been subject to negative sanctioning, they become more likely to employ defensive strategies, such as selective perception and interpretation, or if the negative emotions aroused are sufficiently intense, persons may activate full-blown defense mechanisms revolving around repression, intensification, and transmutation of the repressed emotion. Whether repressed or not, the negative emotions will reduce the solidarity among individuals in an encounter, with the likelihood of negative sanctioning and negative emotional arousal increasing under specific conditions, including: participants to an encounter use different emotional phonemes and syntax; embedding of an encounter in mesostructures and their cultures is not clear; cultural symbols invoked by participants are ambiguous or in conflict; transactional needs, especially needs for identity-verification and profitable exchanges of resources, cannot be realized.

The Effects of Attributions on Emotional Arousal

As I noted earlier in reviewing Table 8.4, I see attribution as the most likely defense mechanism in dealing with negative emotions. Individuals typically make attributions for most behavioral outcomes important to them, and so, they will typically attribute both positive and negative emotional outcomes to just a few basic kinds of causal agents: self, others, situation, corporate unit, institutional domain, categoric unit, stratification system, society, and potentially, inter-societal system. As I also noted, positive emotional arousal has a proximal bias, whereas negative emotions will evidence a distal bias in the attributions that people make (Lawler 2001). Positive emotional arousal will be seen as caused by the person and sometimes others in the immediate situation, while negative emotions will tend to be seen as caused by more remote others, situation, or meso units. These biases mean that positive emotions will generally stay local, while negative emotions will be targeted outwardly toward more distant objects outside self and immediate others.

The biasing of attributions has large effects on the nature of emotional arousal; and these effects remain large whether or not repression and transmutation are part of a person's emotional responses. If individuals make self-attributions for positive arousal, they will, as emphasized above, give off positive emotions not only to self but also to others and, at times,

to the situation. If persons make self-attributions for negative emotional arousal – that is, they see the failure to meet expectations and/or receipt of negative sanctions as their own fault – they can experience any of the three negative primary emotions: anger (at self), sadness (about the failure), and fear (about the consequences to self of the failure). If they experience these emotions simultaneously, they will experience shame and, if moral codes are invoked, they will feel guilt. If the shame and guilt are not repressed, individuals are likely to try to make amends to others and generalized others (i.e., moral codes) with the hope that they can meet their expectations and receive positive sanctions. If, however, the shame is repressed, attribution dynamics will determine the emotions that emerge after repression and transmutation. If external attributions are made to others, anger will be the most likely emotion felt by a person repressing shame, but if the other(s) are powerful, fear may become the dominant emotion. If external attributions target corporate units, then the anger component of shame will intensify and target the structure and culture of this unit. Another possibility is that the anger will be re-combined with sadness and fear to generate alienation as an emotional state. If moral codes have been violated and if persons repress guilt, then variants of fear such as anxiety are the most likely emotions to be consciously felt, but it is also possible that a person will also experience sadness and anger (at self).

When categoric units are blamed for the failure to meet expectation and/or for receiving negative sanctions, then persons making these external attributions will feel anger at members of these units and develop status beliefs that are highly prejudicial toward their members. They may also feel fear if members of categoric units are superordinate and have the power to impose their will on persons.

As I will explore in the next chapter, where the effects of micro-level forces on meso and macro level sociocultural formations are examined, attributions can move out of the micro realm and target not just meso-level sociocultural formations but also macro-level formations. Anticipating the key generalizations in the next chapter, if individuals have *consistently* experienced positive emotions as the result of meeting expectations and receiving positive sanctions in encounters embedded in corporate units that, in turn, are embedded in relatively autonomous institutional domains, they will begin to see the corporate units and institutional domains as also partially responsible for their good fortune. They will feel mild positive emotions and bestow legitimacy on the structure and culture of both the corporate unit and institutional domain. And, when persons have experienced positive emotions in encounters across a variety of corporate units nested in diverse institutional domains, they will give diffuse legitimacy to even larger social units,

such as the whole society and particularly its key domains, such as economy and polity, and potentially even an inter-societal system if particular institutional domains are embedded in this system. Yet, because positive emotions tend to circulate locally and proximally, it is necessary for individuals to meet expectations and receive positive sanctions consistently across a variety of corporate units in the full range of institutional domains for positive emotions and attributions to move to more distal institutional domains, societal systems, and potentially inter-societal systems.

Indeed, the basic dilemma of all large-scale societies is how to gain legitimacy, especially since positive emotions circulate locally. Most societies eventually collapse internally or become so weakened that they can be conquered by external powers, often because this roadblock imposed by the proximal bias of positive emotional energy cannot be overcome. It takes a consistent experience of meeting expectations and receiving positive sanctions across a large set of corporate units in different domains to pull these positive emotions from their local circulation to macrostructures and their cultures. Still, these more distal are attributions, the better integrated are societies because they and their constituent institutional domains have been given diffuse legitimacy fueled by positive emotional energy.

In fact, there is a built-in bias inherent in microdynamics against diffuse legitimization of macrostructures and their cultures. Positive emotional energy will typically circulate locally, as I have emphasized, while negative emotional energy will be projected and propelled outward. When attributions for the failure to meet expectations or for the receipt of negative sanctions are external, these attributions often skip over immediate others and the situation. For, to vent anger locally will generally arouse counter-anger that further erodes the ability to meet expectations and that certainly imposes yet another level of anger-driven sanctions by those who are being blamed, and so, it is earlier to make more remote external attributions and avoid counter-sanctions from local others. And, if a person cannot escape the local situation, then alienation, which has much the same structure as shame with the anger component directed outward, is more likely to be emitted because this emotion is less volatile. Indeed, it is a distancing emotion and less likely to arouse counter-anger and more negative sanctioning from others. Thus, if meso-level targets can be found for negative emotional energy, the local encounter will be, to some degree, “protected” and less likely to be breached by circulation of intense negative emotions. Scapegoating of members of categoric units is one way to skip over the local encounter and to vent negative emotions on social categories that generally cannot fight back. Similarly, if persons display anger towards the structure and culture of corporate units, rather than individuals in local

encounters, they can release the intensified emotions in a manner that is safer because it does not arouse the anger of others in the immediate encounter. And, as the converse of what causes legitimization of macrostructures and their cultures emerges when individuals *consistently fail* to meet expectations and experience negative sanctions across encounters in corporate units embedded in a variety of institutional domains. Under these conditions, these individuals will often target institutional domains because they are even more remote than the corporate unit and, hence, much safer targets for negative emotions. The result, of course, is a withdrawal of legitimacy from institutional domains as well as the society and inter-societal system built from these domains.

These outward flowing attributions are intensified among those in lower social classes in the stratification system because they are less likely to have the resources to meet expectations and avoid negative sanctions in resource-giving institutional domains, such as economy, education, polity, and medicine. The negative emotions aroused will not only be directed at the stratification system but, equally significant, these negative emotions will target those institutional domains that have failed to provide members of the lower classes with desired, expected, and needed resources. Over time, expectation states for receiving resources will be lowered, thus diluting the power of this source of emotional arousal, but the power of the negative sanctions will only increase as individuals suffer degradations in encounters within resource-giving institutional domains. The failure to gain resources will be interpreted as a negative sanction, and especially so as others – e.g., teachers, management, health care workers, and the like – in local encounters are perceived to inhibit access to needed resources.

Stratification thus operates as a kind of super-charger on emotional dynamics that inhere in encounters nested in corporate units within institutional domains. Again, since negative emotions directed at local encounters will breach these encounters and invite counter-anger that becomes another level of negative sanctioning from potentially significant others, it is easier and safer for external attributions to jump over local others and situational encounters to meso and macrostructures. If the shame experienced from failures in corporate units within institutional domains – e.g., schools, economy, family, church, medicine, or any other salient domain – is repressed and not fully acknowledged, then diffuse sadness, fear, and anger can all emerge, but the source of these transmuted emotions will remain unclear. For example, gangs in urban areas rarely target their own families, neighborhood schools, or local workplaces – which in most cases are the source of their shame and anger – but instead other gangs. Here, external attributions focus on the evils of rival gangs rather than on institutional domains and their

constituent corporate units; the anger (and perhaps underlying shame) that often fuels the violence of gangs is thus displaced and directed by external attributions that avoid challenging key institutional domains.

Thus, in highly differentiated and stratified societies, defense mechanisms route emotions to different targets. Positive emotions will legitimize local corporate units and encounters in them; and only when there is consistent arousal of positive emotions in encounters in diverse corporate units across a spectrum of differentiated domains will the external attributes be pushed to macrostructures and provide a basis for their legitimization. Again stratification intersects with this flow of positive emotions; those who are middle class (and above) in the system will, in all likelihood, have been able to meet expectations and receive positive sanctions across a sufficiently wide spectrum of domains that they give diffuse legitimacy to these domains. But, as emphasized above, those lower in the stratification system will not have had such experiences and, as a result, they will withdraw legitimacy from macrostructures and their cultures, while trying to preserve relations in local encounters that allow them to meet expectations and receive some positive sanctions. Attribution processes as they intersect with repression thus determine flows of positive and negative emotions within and across levels of social reality, and depending upon the targets lined up in the sights of attribution dynamics, the emotions of individuals will vary, as will their consequences for sociocultural formations at all levels of social reality. These attribution dynamics should draw our attention to the embedding of emotional arousal.

Embedding and Emotional Arousal

Embedding and clarity of expectations. The structures in which focused encounters are embedded have large effects on the emotions that can be aroused. Embedding generally increases the clarity of expectations, and as we have seen for other microdynamic processes, embedding in corporate and categoric units will generally increase the clarity of expectations. As noted in principles 4-A and 4-B in Chap. 2, the clarity of expectations in corporate units increases with the (1) visibility of boundaries of the corporate unit and its entrance and exit rules, (2) explicitness of goals and degree of focus of the unit in meeting these goals, (3) level of differentiation and autonomy of the institutional domain in which a corporate unit is embedded, (4) explicitness of the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in the corporate unit, (5) formality of the structure of a corporate unit, (6)

consistency among ideologies, generalized symbolic media of exchange, and norms governing the operation of a corporate unit, (7) correlation between positions in the division of labor, particularly the vertical division of labor, and memberships in categoric units.

The clarity of expectations attached to categoric units increases with: (1) discreteness of the boundaries or parameters defining membership in a categoric unit, (2) consensus over the status beliefs and relative evaluation of categoric units, (3) embeddedness of categoric units in the stratification system and level of inequality in this system, (4) homogeneity of membership in categoric units, (5) correlation of membership in one categoric unit with other categoric units, especially units of approximately the same level of relative evaluation, and (6) correlation between categoric memberships and locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units within institutional domains, particularly domains distributing highly valued resources.

Embedding and morality of expectations. Embedding of an encounter in mesostructures will increase the clarity of expectations, especially when corporate units, in turn, are nested in relatively autonomous institutional domains and categoric units are defined by locations in the stratification systems. These enhanced effects come from the moral content that is always attached to institutional domains and locations in the stratification system. The culture of macrostructures – that is, values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, status beliefs, symbolic media, and norms – are much more salient and powerful when focused encounters are lodged in mesostructures nested in macrostructures. Morality puts an imperative edge to cultural symbols, making them seem more important and significant – this is, moral. Morality is rarely subtle because it always involves a series of imperative statements about what is right, proper, good, and bad; and for what moral codes lack in subtlety, the make up in clarity and power. And so, the more moral are expectations, the greater will be their clarity and power to determine expectations.

The more moral is the content of expectations, the more likely is guilt to accompany shame when expectations are not realized. Individuals will evaluate themselves as having failed to live up to what is right, proper, appropriate, and good; and while some of this failure may manifest itself in shame, guilt will also be likely to emerge. If the shame and guilt are *not* repressed, these emotions operate as internal social control mechanisms, with individuals seeking to make amends and to live up to the morality contained in situational expectations. Shame and guilt are both an effect and cause of high levels of salience in self and identities, with individuals evaluating themselves in terms of the “generalized others” (Mead 1934) generated by values, ideologies, beliefs, and norms. With identities on the line,

individuals become even more likely to adjust behaviors in order to meet expectations since, as emphasized in the last chapter, this is the most powerful of the transactional need driving all encounters.

If, however, shame and guilt are repressed, then the emotional dynamics shift dramatically. Guilt is most likely to break the fear component out, making individuals feel a diffuse sense of anxiety, although it is also possible that the anger and/or sadness components will surface. Indeed, repressed guilt leads to spikes of emotionality that pull out one or more of the constituent emotions of guilt – at least, this is what I hypothesize to be the case. There is some clinical evidence that anxiety is the most likely emotion to emerge but persons can also be very sad and depressed or diffusely angry and aggressive. If shame is also repressed when failing to live up to moral codes, anger is likely but, when morality is attached to expectations, anxiety can become even more likely, as will depression. If a person behaves incompetently and does not meet expectations containing little moral content, then the shame is generally somewhat less intense and may not be repressed at all or, if repressed, will be most likely to pull out the anger component more frequently than the anxiety or fear and sadness components. But, when there is high moral content, then shamed persons will appear anxious and sad, and if the shame is repressed, I would hypothesize that the anxiety or fear component will be the most common emotion actually experienced by a person, with sadness being the next most likely constituent emotion of guilt to be felt by a person and perceived by others.

Again, the attributions will affect these dynamics and alter, to a degree, the emotions experienced and expressed by persons. If self-attributions are made for not meeting expectations, especially moral ones, then sadness and fear are the most common emotions, driven by anger at self. Even when shame or guilt are repressed, I would argue that sadness and fear are the most likely emotions to be experienced by a person and observed by others. But, if external attributions are made, the anger component of shame is most likely to emerge and target others and/or distal sociocultural formations. With external attributions, the most likely component of guilt is, once again, the fear or anxiety component, with individuals perceiving others or sociocultural formations as “attacking” and otherwise working against self.

Embedding and sanctioning. Just as embedding increases clarity of expectations, so it regulates sanctioning. When expectations are clear and constrained by the structure and culture of corporate and the evaluations of memberships in categoric units, it is easy to know when persons have met or failed to meet expectations and, hence, it is also clear whether sanctions should be positive or negative. When self meets expectations and receives positive sanctions, there will be mild positive emotions; and if a person had

some fears about whether they would receive positive or negative sanctions, he or she may experience first-order elaborations of happiness-fear like pride. As others offer mild positive sanctions revolving around approval, especially when interaction persists for a time and/or is iterated, the dynamics of interaction rituals – that is ritualized openings and closings, common mood and focus of attention, rhythmic synchronization, emotional entrainment, group symbols, and shared culture – will emerge and often increase the rate of mutual positive sanctioning (Collins 2004).

On the more negative side, embedding in which expectations are clear allows for the negative sanctioning of those who fail to meet these expectations. Negative sanctions always generate negative emotional arousal among those sanctioned, but when the expectations violated are clear, this anger cannot as easily, or legitimately be turned back on those who have meted out negative sanctions. And, the more moral were the expectations violated, the greater will be the moral right of others to impose negative sanctions on those who have violated moral codes. In situations where expectations are ambiguous, however, there is more room to counter-sanction the sanctioner.

Individuals who have been sanctioned may employ defensive strategies, such as selective reading or interpreting of the sanctioning behaviors of others, but this only delays the full impact of the sanctions and, in fact, generally arouses additional anger and more severe sanctions. Full-blown activation of defense mechanisms is typically ineffective as well because sanctions are in the immediate present as individuals face each other, making external attributions outside the immediate situation more difficult. In the end, persons have to “face the music,” stifling their anger and using the emotions of shame and guilt to extend apologies and to undertake corrective behaviors. If these behaviors are not forthcoming, then further sanctions will either push persons out of the grouping in which the focused encounters occurs or, alternatively, isolate them on the margins of subsequent encounters, thereby assuring that persons will not meet transactional needs for verifying identities, gaining a profit in exchanges of resources, and feeling a sense of group inclusion. Failure to meet these needs can arouse anger, but this anger cannot easily be expressed and, hence, over the longer run, a person will experience sadness and fear (anxiety) or shame and guilt, which if acknowledge can begin a process of reducing estrangement but, if unacknowledged, will invite more sanctioning and isolation. Embedding thus increases the power of negative sanctions and the likelihood that they will be effective; and so, in contrast to failures to meet expectations, negative sanctions that focus on specific behaviors that have violated expectations, and particularly those imbued with morality, are less likely to result in highly distal external attributions by those sanctioned.

Emotional Arousal in Focused Encounters

In examining all other microdynamic forces – that is, ecology, demography, status, culture, role, and transactional needs – I have emphasized that these generate expectations and the potential for sanctions, thereby arousing emotions. What I have added in this chapter is a more general view of emotions as a microdynamic force in their own right and, as we will see in the next chapter, a critical link among micro, meso, and macro sociocultural formations. As emotions are aroused, they have immediate effects on people's behaviors in encounters, but the process of attribution assures that emotions are targeted, revealing a proximal bias for positive emotions and a distal bias for negative emotions, especially those arising from the failure to meet expectations. Thus, it is always easier to sustain the flow of positive emotions in focused encounters than it is to extend positive emotions and commitments outward to meso and macro sociocultural formations. Conversely, negative emotions often jump over others in local encounters in order to avoid breaches with, and negative sanctions from, these others; and as a result, it becomes more difficult for persons to form commitments and legitimate ever-more macro-level structures, not just because positive emotions stay local but also because negative emotions, especially when repressed and transmuted, become interpersonal predator drones targeting meso- and macro-level structures and their cultures. This biasing is built into humans as biological organisms, but it only becomes evident with the emergence of macrostructures which, in essence, open up a host of new and safer targets for negative emotional energy that can preserve the peace in focused encounters.

As I have emphasized since Chap. 2, embedding has large effects on the arousal and targeting of emotions. On the one hand, embedding increases clarity of expectations and understandings of when and what sanctions can be applied in focused encounters. On the other hand, embedding creates a kind of psychic conduit for negative emotions to travel from focused encounters to the meso and macro realms of social organization, and in so doing, it becomes possible to avoid breaching the encounter. Encounters are always very fragile, often on the brink of breaches when expectations are not realized and when negative sanctions are meted out, but the existence of larger-scale structures and their cultures can clarify expectations so that breaches become less likely to occur, while providing an outlet for negative emotions, especially highly charged and convoluted ones that arise from repression, particularly of shame and guilt. So, as difficult as focused encounters can be in sustaining focus, rhythmic synchronization, emotional entrainment, and solidarity arising from the flow of positive emotions, the outward flow of negative emotions always makes meso- and macro-level

structures vulnerable. However, because these structures are organized and stable over longer reaches of space and time, any given set of negative emotions aroused in local encounters will not have highly disruptive effects on the viability of larger-scale sociocultural formations. For the most part, these structures constrain all microdynamic forces, and in so doing, make focused encounters more viable. Still, as we will explore in the next chapter, negative emotional arousal in encounters can, if sufficiently widespread and persistent, change the dynamics of larger-scale sociocultural formations.

Emotional Dynamics in Unfocused Encounters

To sustain unfocus in encounters, it is essential that parties to such encounters be able to maintain expressive control and, in so doing, present non-threatening behavioral demeanor. Generally, feeling rules emphasize a neutral emotional display, biased toward mild happiness, although more neutral and even somewhat negative displays are acceptable as long as the person communicates with body language that he or she is engaged in a normatively acceptable line of conduct (Goffman 1959, 1963, 1971). Too much negativity in face and body language will breach the unfocused encounter, with individuals forced to look more closely at the intentions of others in order to avoid potential conflict. At times, individuals deliberately breach unfocus, calling attention to themselves with highly expressive talk and body language. Even positively expressive body language will force others to engage in more focus, just to see if they can avoid any further focus. Indeed, as I have emphasized in earlier chapters, overly happy people are often seen as threatening because they disrupt the public order and cause breaches to unfocus. What is true of overly happy persons is doubly the case for unhappy persons and their negative emotions, particularly variants and combinations of anger. People who are angry in public are clearly a threat, forcing others to focus and then get out of their way – which is often the intent of those who publicly display anger (Collins 2008). They have gone into a “power mode” and have gained satisfaction and positive emotional energy from scaring others and forcing them to retreat from their path. Of course, they may also invite counter-anger and thus set off real focus that may disintegrate into physical violence.

Embedding makes it easier to sustain unfocus and to know when others are emitting emotions that are appropriate for the situation. Corporate units always reveal an ecology of space, propos, and use-spaces which all carry meanings about what people can do in public places where unfocused

encounters take place. Corporate units also influence demography, especially how many people from various categoric units and status positions in the division of labor are co-present in space. In connecting status, demography, and space, corporate units inform individuals about the relevant norms to be invoked and used in normatizing and the roles that can be played out by persons. Equally important, embedding in corporate units determines the transactional needs that can be realized in the situation, as well as the needs that cannot be met. Typically, given the nature of unfocused encounters, only the needs for trust and facticity can be realized as individuals move through space. Still, at times, corporate units organize space so that more powerful transactional needs can be met. For example, as I noted in the last chapter, if uniforms are worn, then status is clearly marked, as is group inclusion; and if the corporate unit generates group-identities among its incumbents, successful navigation in space represents a mild affirmation of this group identity. Such affirmation may be a highly valued resource, and so a person may feel that a profit has been made by presenting an identity to others. Moreover, even if identities are not salient, the ability to sustain unfocus when it is required without any breaches is, at a minimum, less costly. Categoric-unit memberships of individuals in unfocused encounters also determines the status beliefs and normative expectations on individuals in different categories, thus constraining the process of normatization, especially feeling rules specifying the emotions that individuals playing roles should feel and express in their demeanor. Furthermore, categoric-unit membership can determine which transactional needs can be salient. As with corporate units, trust and facticity must be achieved for individuals in varying categoric units to feel comfortable in unfocused encounters, but if membership in categoric units is highly salient in a situation, then social-identities may be on the line, requiring non-challenges to these identities being asserted and, perhaps, focus to affirm a particular social-identity as, for example, would be the case with a quiet nod of the head when members of two different categoric units pass. This quiet affirmation can be a highly valued resource, especially if someone was in doubt about the actions of others; and as a result, individuals can gain a highly valued resource: affirmation of self at the high end, and acceptance of self at the low-resource end.

To keep emotions in check and to emit milder emotions that are appropriate, individuals not only take cognizance of the mesostructures and their cultures in which unfocused encounters are embedded, they also normatize the situation and know what rituals are appropriate. These rituals are “at-the-ready” to deal with the potential emotions that can arise when unfocus is broken, thereby forcing individuals to ritually open, repair, and close episodes of focus that occur. Repair rituals always involve an apology-acceptance sequence, which is given and acknowledged with

highly stylized demeanor to be sure that body and talk “speak” the same language. A verbal apology without appropriate deference and soft body demeanor, however, will be seen as disingenuous and often arose as much anger as would be the case where no apology was offered.

The repair is the most important ritual because it manages breaches of unfocus. Yet, after the repair there can be some ambiguity of what to do next. Do people go on their way and resume unfocus? Or, is a brief opening ritual necessary for further explanation for the *faux pas*? How is the apology to be closed off so that unfocus can resume? Answers to these kinds of questions are not always so evident, even in embedded unfocused situations. People will have to “feel their way” in and out of focus, paying very close attention to the emotions evident in the face, body, and verbal intonations of others so as to strike the right amount of engagement and movement to disengagement. Rarely, are there clear norms about how to accomplish this feat; individuals must figure it out on-the-ground. And, this is one of the reasons why breaches in unfocused encounters are avoided, if at all possible, because the norms of focus are typically much more explicit than those on how to move in and out of unfocus. Focus among strangers is never easy, even when they are engaged in a common activity within a corporate unit with an explicit structure and culture. Even under these conditions, individuals must still work to assure others that they are aware of this structure and culture, while moving through openings, repairs, and closings of focusing in normatively prescribed unfocused situations.

Thus, in many ways, unfocused encounters can pose as many dilemmas as focused encounters in displaying the appropriate emotions. Expressive control is essential in sustaining a non-threatening façade of neutrality or positive emotional demeanor; and any accidental focusing of the unfocused encounter will require the right rituals be executed with the right emotional overtones in order to prevent further breaching. Most of the time, individuals are able to bring off *unfocus-to focus-to unfocus* sequences with minimal effort; and yet, when density is high, embedding unclear, and differences in status are great, the table is set for more conflictual relations in public. A bump or cutting someone off becomes an affront to the territories of self of another, often leading to aggression rather than ritualized accommodation.

Elementary Principles on Emotional Dynamics in Encounters

19. The more individuals meet expectations in a focused encounter, especially those revolving around other microdynamic forces, and the more they perceive that they have been positively sanctioned by others and/or are

able to positively sanction themselves in self-evaluations, the more likely will these individuals experience positive emotions and give off positive emotions to others in the encounter, thereby increasing the common mood, focus of attention, rhythmic synchronization, emotional entrainment, and solidarity of the encounter; and conversely, the less individuals meet these expectations and/or perceive that they have received negative sanctions from others or from their own self evaluations, the more likely will they experience and express negative emotions that breach or, at a minimum, decrease the common mood, focus, rhythmic synchronization, positive emotional entrainment, and solidarity of the encounter.

20. The likelihood that individuals will meet expectations and/or receive positive sanctions in a focused encounter is positive function of the clarity of expectations, which in turn is a positive and multiplicative function of:
 - A. Participants in encounters use the same emotional phonemes and syntax.
 - B. Encounters are embedded in corporate units, which is a positive function of the conditions listed under 4-A in Chapter 2.
 - C. Encounters are embedded in categoric units, which is a positive function of the conditions listed under 4-B in Chapter 2.
 - D. Corporate and categoric units are embedded, respectively, in relatively autonomous institutional domains and at relatively clear class locations in the stratification system.
 - E. Cultural symbols of meso-level structures are consistent with each other and embody moral codes, which is a positive function of their embedding in institutional domains and stratification systems.
21. The more individuals experience negative emotions in a focused encounter and the greater the number of identities in play, but especially core-identities, the more likely are they to activate defensive strategies and/or engage in repression of these negative emotions, particularly shame and at times guilt; and the more repressed are negative emotions about self, the more likely will these emotions intensify and become transmuted into one or more of the constituent emotions making up the first- and second-order emotions that have been repressed.
22. The more intense are the negative or positive emotions aroused in focused encounters, the more likely are individuals to make attributions for their emotional experiences, with these attributions increasing with:
 - A. Positive emotional experiences revealing a proximal bias, with individuals most likely to make self-attributions or attributions to others in

- the immediate encounter, with self-attributions producing variants of satisfaction happiness or, if there was some fear about meeting expectations or receiving positive sanctions, first-order elaborations of happiness such as pride; and as individuals make self-attributions or attributions to immediate others, the common mood, focus, rhythmic synchronization, emotional entrainment, and solidarity, and symbolization of the encounter will increase.
- B. Negative emotional experiences evidencing a distal bias that grows stronger with repression, especially repressed negative emotions about self, and thereby increasing the likelihood that individuals will express (1) anger at, or alienation from, the structure and culture of corporate units in which the encounter is embedded, (2) anger at and, prejudicial status beliefs about, members of categoric units, and potentially, (3) anger at, disaffection from, macro-level sociocultural formations.
 - C. Self-attributions for negative emotions causing individuals to experience sadness, fear, and anger at self, which in turn increases the likelihood that these individuals will also experience shame and, if moral codes are salient, guilt as well.
 - D. Negative emotions expressed toward others in the encounter causing these others to express counter-anger as a negative sanction in a potentially spiraling cycle that will breach the encounter and decrease the likelihood that the encounter will be iterated.
 - E. Negative emotions targeting powerful others in an encounter, causing fear to be mixed with anger and, at the same time, increasing the likelihood that these negative emotions will jump over the encounter and target meso and macro sociocultural formations.
 - F. Negative emotional arousal in focused encounters persistently targeting meso and macro sociocultural formations, and especially negative emotions arising from repression, intensification, and transmutation having the greatest potential for change-producing effects in meso and macro sociocultural formations.
 - G. Persistent positive emotions experienced in encounters across a range of institutional domains having the greatest potential for distal attributions, and hence, for having reproductive effects on meso and macro sociocultural formations.
23. The more individuals can sustain expressive control in unfocused encounters through neutral or mildly positive interpersonal demeanor, while seeking to meet only needs for trust and facticity, the more likely

are they to avoid face-engagement and, hence, sustain unfocus, with this capacity to avoid face-engagement increasing with:

- A. Embedding in corporate units specifying the relevance, if any, of status and roles in divisions of labor, culture used in normatization, and meanings associated with the ecology and demography of the situation.
- B. Embedding in categoric units with clear sets of status beliefs about, and expectations for, how members of such units are to behave.
- C. Knowledge of relevant rituals, and the ability to enact ritual openings, repairs, and closings of focus to re-establish unfocus when face-engagements occur.

Conclusion

All microdynamic forces are interrelated, but emotions are perhaps the most pervasive of these forces. Individuals react emotionally any time that they meet or fail to meet expectations or receive positive and negative sanctions. They are particularly attuned to expectations inhering in the dynamics of other forces and to sanctions that are meted out by others, or self-imposed, when responding to the pressures of other microdynamic forces. Reciprocally, emotional responses direct the flow of behaviors of individuals as they respond to these pressures, and when the emotions shift in response to expectations and sanctions, so does the operation of all other microdynamic forces.

The basic elements of all encounters both generate emotions and rely upon them to sustain focus or unfocus. A focused encounter begins with ritual openings, status-taking/making, role-taking/making, culture-taking/making, cognizance of the meanings of the situational ecology and demography as well as with efforts to determine which transactional needs can be met to what degree. As these forces are set into motion, focused encounters will develop more focus, fall into rhythmic synchronization, arouse positive emotions and emotional entrainment among participants, develop common symbols and particularistic cultural capital, and generate social solidarity. Without the arousal of emotions, the encounter will have difficulty sustaining itself, and moreover, it will be less likely to persist over time and to be repeated. If opening rituals go badly, and repairs cannot be immediately effected, then the emotions turn negative and disrupt the operation of all other micro-level forces, which only increases the level of negative emotional energy. In so doing, these escalating negative emotions typically breach the encounter or, at the very least, make it awkward, difficult and unlikely to be iterated.

Similarly, unfocused encounters depend upon the capacity of individuals to avoid excessive emotionality, unless it is normatively called for (as would be the case, for example, at a sporting event or rally, where individuals have a common focus of attention but do not focus on each other). Both positive and negative emotionality can break unfocus, forcing activation of ritual responses to manage emotions so that unfocus can be restored. If rituals prove ineffective in getting individuals through an episode of focus and do not successfully restore unfocus, then unfocused encounters will be breached and, indeed, the public order will be exposed for its fragility in the face of emotional arousal.

Emotions and their management are what keep both focused and unfocused encounters going, or they can break them apart and disrupt the micro-level social order. Since meso and macro sociocultural formations are ultimately built from and sustained by chains of encounters, the power of emotions to maintain or disrupt this micro order is also a power to sustain, legitimate, and reproduce meso and macro sociocultural formations, or alternatively, to change, challenge, and tear these formations down, as I will explore in the next chapter.

Chapter 9

The Micro Basis of the Meso and Macro Social Realms

For the last 50 years, sociological theory has been trying to “solve” the riddle of how to connect theoretically the micro and macro realms of social reality. For many years, I argued that this riddle would solve itself with the development of more formal theorizing across a wide variety of phenomena, ranging from face-to-face interaction through groups, communities, organizations, and social categories to institutions, class systems, societies and inter-societal systems. As I look back on the past four decades, the discipline has made enormous strides in theorizing virtually all phenomena in the social universe. Surprisingly, we continue to beat itself up over the lack of progress in explanatory theory but, in fact, there has been a great deal of theoretical cumulation since, say, the height of Parsonsian theorizing of the 1950s and early 1960s to the present. It is this cumulation that has given me the confidence (some would say “arrogance”) to write a set of volumes like *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*.

There is now a rather large body of theory that can be integrated into a more general and abstract set of scientific principles, and much of this theorizing has solved the problem of how to link the micro, meso, and macro realms conceptually – although we often do not appreciate how close we are to solving this problem. A good example of how far we have come can be found in Edward Lawler’s, Shane Thye’s, and Jeongkoo Yoon’s book, *Social Commitments in a Depersonalized World* (2009), where experimental social psychologists working within the exchange-theoretic tradition develop a general theory of how the macro and micro levels of reality are connected by dynamics of emotions occurring at the micro level. Other such efforts can be found, and in this chapter, I will offer some tentative principles on the question of micro-macro linkage – that is, how do the dynamics of focused and unfocused encounters explain the properties and dynamics of the meso and macro realms? The answer to this question cannot be complete in one chapter; rather, the analyses of macrodynamics and mesodynamics in

Vols. 1 and 3 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* are needed to complete the picture. Still, considerable progress can be made in ways that complement the kind of effort by Lawler and his co-authors.

Lawler et al. (2009: 156–157) summarize the narratives that have dominated discourse on the problem of social order, some emphasizing micro and others macro social processes, but all stressing a growing disconnect in the contemporary world between macrodynamics and microdynamics. The dramatic transformations of the modern (or, if you prefer, postmodern era) occurring at the macro level of social reality are having large, and for many, pathological effects on how individuals more micro-level social relations. Of course, this has been a theme since sociology's classical theorists worried about the pathologies of change and their effects on the well-being of persons and smaller-scale social formations. Marx's views on exploitation and alienation, Durkheim's concern about anomie and egoism, and Simmel's portrayal of the blasé personality created by urbanism, plus many other critical commentaries of early sociology, all embraced this theme. In my view, this disconnect of macro-level forces and the changes that they wrought to persons and the micro realm has always been rather overdrawn, not just in the past but also in the more recent past and today (e.g., Kornhauser 1959; Bell 1960; Habermas 1981 [1984]). I always take a very long evolutionary and historical perspective, and coupled with the fact that some of the basic assumptions of this critique of modernity begin with a wrong view of human nature, I am doubly skeptical of most narratives along these lines. Indeed, as Alexandra Maryanski and I have argued, the dynamic world of today is more compatible with the needs and propensities of evolved apes than at any time since humans left the relative Garden of Eden in hunting and gathering modes of social organization. Yet, even these small-scale band societies composed of a handful of nuclear families represented a "cage" for an evolved ape, but nothing like the cage of unilinear kinship in horticultural and pastoral societies or the cage of power in agrarian societies [see Maryanski and Turner (1992), as well as Turner and Maryanski (2005, 2008a) for the details of this line of argument].

As Lawler and colleagues (2009) point out so well, even as the current era has loosened social control by macrostructures and, thereby, given individuals considerably more freedom to forge their own patterns of relations, individuals still develop emotionally gratifying social relations, if somewhat more focused on family (McPherson et al. 2006), and still reveal strong commitments to macro-level structures and their cultures.

In so doing, they are probably more content than their counterparts in earlier societal formations.¹

As I have emphasized, the micro realm is driven by a small set of well-known forces, and these will always push individuals to forge certain kinds of bonds, if they can; and as they do so, they also reproduce mesostructures and macrostructures and their respective cultures, or potentially change these sociocultural formations. People are not “lost” in sociocultural space between the micro and macro because the forces of the micro and macro realms are constantly generating pressure on persons and corporate actors. The assumptions of critical sociology that somehow macrostructures work against human nature are, as I note above, rather overdrawn; and indeed, present-day macrostructures, for all of their abuses of humanity, are still highly compatible with the inherited genome of our ape ancestors. The natural unit of a great ape is *not* the local group because these are unstable in ape communities; rather the natural unit is the community or home range which can be many square miles and through which apes wander, forming temporary forging parties, only to disband and move on. This is the natural way for apes and the common ancestor that we share with them; and as evolved apes, these behavioral propensities have not vanished in humans. Thus, a world of unfocused encounters within corporate units lodged in macrostructures is not an alien world, but one that is relatively easy for an evolved ape to navigate.

To be sure, humans’ heightened emotionality has increased sociality and solidarity, but these same emotional propensities can make all encounters – unfocused and focused alike – fragile and potentially volatile. Yet, this same emotionality is, as Lawler et al. (2009) argue or as (Collins 1975, 1993, 2004) has persistently emphasized, what generates the social commitments at both micro and macro levels of social reality that, in turn, make large-scale societies viable. Thus, the arousal of positive emotional energy, and the conditions that generate such energy and its converse, negative emotional energy, are the key to theorizing about how micro-level processes make the meso and macro levels more, or less, viable. Low-sociality apes have been reprogrammed by natural selection – as it worked on the hominid neuroanatomy and underlying genotype – to eventually make humans more emotional and, hence, capable of forming stronger bonds, attachments, and commitments that make all levels of social reality possible; and it is these emotional commitments to structures and their cultures that are the key mechanism linking all levels of reality.

¹ This last point is more my view than Lawler’s Thye’s, and Yoon’s.

The Evolution of the Meso and Macro Realms of Reality

Volume 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* outlines a general theory of macrodynamics. This theory focuses on macrodynamic forces – population, production, distribution, regulation, and reproduction – that generate selection pressures² on individuals and corporate units to create new kinds of structures to deal with problems of adaptation. For instance, population growth forces members of populations to increase production and to use power to regulate social relations; or problems of distributing resources inevitably force populations to find new means, such as roads, ports, canals, and markets, for moving people, resources, and information about a population. There is no need to go into the specifics of these dynamics except to make a simple but important point: individuals and eventually corporate actors have had to respond to these kinds of pressures or die. Short of death, people have often watched their society fall apart or be conquered by another society. As individuals have responded to these pressures – perhaps first at the level of encounters and later as members of corporate units – societies have become, by fits and starts, more complex and differentiated. They reveal more autonomous institutional domains with their own cultures and sets of corporate units; these units distribute unequally such resources as money, power and authority, health, learning, knowledge, aesthetics, sacredness/piety, competitiveness, and other generalized symbolic media to members of a population. Thus, almost every encounter occurs within an institutional domain and a location in the stratification system which, respectively, are embedded in societies and inter-societal systems. At some point in the distant history of a population, these macrostructures and their cultures were created as individuals formed corporate units to get things done and, thereby, to meet selection pressures.

Encounters are the building blocks of human social organization. They are the immediate building blocks of meso structures and their cultures, which in turn are the building blocks of institutional domains, and stratification systems, societies, and inter-societal systems. As a result, encounters are

² Selection pressures arise from both macro- and micro-level forces; they represent problems of adaptation that individuals or corporate actors must address, or suffer the disintegrative consequences, whether these be breaches in encounters at the micro level of reality or, for example, failures to produce enough food for a population at the macro level. Societies have evolved by humans' ability to respond to selection pressures that require new kinds of sociocultural formations, but there is never any certainty that these pressures will be effectively met, as the dust-heap of past societies in history documents or as breakdowns in encounters and the meso units in which they are embedded also attest.

capable of initiating sequences of change that reconstruct the social world. Yet, even though encounters are the building blocks of social reality, they are constrained by the meso and macro sociocultural formations that have been built from iterated encounters. It is for this reason that I have emphasized embedding because the structure and culture of meso and macro structures constrains what individuals can do in encounters as they respond to microdynamic and macrodynamic forces. Thus, the valences and constraints imposed by ecology, demography, status orders, role enactments, culture, motive states, and emotions are usually determined by meso-level units, and the macro-level formations in which these units are embedded.

Yet, human groups, communities, organizations, stratification systems, large-scale societies, and inter-societal systems did not always exist. They had to built up over millennia, only to collapse and then be rebuilt by individuals in encounters responding to both macrodynamic and microdynamic forces that are part of humans' "species-being" (and perhaps other animals that organize into super-organic or social organisms ordering relations among individual organisms). We now confront a highly dynamic social universe composed of rapidly changing inter-societal formations linking societies and their institutional domains and, at times, their systems of stratification; and this linkage occurs via the constituent corporate units of institutional domains and, again at times, the classes from which a stratification system is constructed. At the micro level of social reality, the division of labor of corporate units and the parameters marking membership in categorical units – some linked to stratification, others to universal categories like age and sex – have very large effects on what transpires in encounters – as I emphasize in all of the principles offered thus far.

Yet, as the descendants of apes, humans are highly individualistic, mobile, and prone to form weak-over strong-ties. Even as natural selection made hominids and eventually humans more emotional and, later, smarter culture-using animals, the descendents of apes are not likely to be drones or cogs in mesostructural machines. Humans have capacities for agency to change not just the flow of interaction in encounters but also the meso and macrostructural cages of their own creation. They cannot do so willy nilly, but a species that could build the colossal macrostructures and highly organized mesostructures of the present world are capable, under certain conditions, of remaking these sociocultural edifices. Indeed, the evolutionary history of humans has, especially over the last 10,000 years, revolved around building up, changing, and tearing down macro and meso structures; still, the complexity of the social universe has consistently increased in the aftermath of periodic collapses followed by rebuilding of societies and inter-societal systems. Indeed, there is no guarantee that this cycle of rise

and fall of complexity will not occur again in our near future as a species. As societies have gone to war, engaged in economic competition, pursued conversions of other populations to new religions, and spawned commercial and technological competition, the meso-level building blocks of societies have been torn down, altered, rebuilt, or simply altered in significant respects. Still, even though these dynamics are better understood with macro- and meso-level theories, people in encounters are involved because meso-level formations are ultimately constructed from chains of encounters, strung together in time and space. Thus, encounters are never irrelevant in understanding larger-scale social transformations in the social universe.

As human societies have grown and become ever more dynamic and differentiated, an ever increasing amount of interaction among individuals at the micro-level occurs in unfocused encounters. Like bees and ants, we can navigate through large crowds in confined ecological spaces and interact with strangers; we do not rely upon chemical scents to do so, but the principles of unfocused encounters provide insights into how we, like social insects, can create and live in macrostructures. Humans are enormous animals compared to the insects, and yet, we have been able to survive in macrostructures. We have been able to do so because of preadaptations in the genotypes of our ape ancestors. These preadaptations include: (1) the organization of our brains for language³ long before spoken language and culture built around artificial symbols ever evolved, (2) the ability to see self as an object in our environments, (3) the propensity to form weak-ties over strong-ties, (4) the lack of cohesive group structures and the orientation to larger-scale communities as the stable organizing unit, and (5) the ancient wiring of subcortical areas of the brain for emotions that could later be enhanced to overcome the limitations of unstable groups.

There is no need here to go into the details of these preadaptations,⁴ or properties of our ancestors' phenotypes and underlying genotypes that

³This wiring occurred as a consequence of the conversion of the original mammals that ascended the arboreal habitat from olfactory dominance to visual dominance in sense modalities. The neurological capacity for language, then, evolved for reasons having nothing to do with language; this capacity was simply an artifact of converting the brain to visual dominance in how it sees and interprets sensory inputs. See Geschwind (1965a, b, 1970) as well as Geschwind and Damasio (1984).

⁴A pre-adaptation is a structure that evolves under selection pressures having little, if anything, to do with its subsequent functions. For example, as noted above, the capacity for language emerged for reasons other than language production, and hence represented a preadaptation because the structures in the brain generating these linguistic capacities could be subject to further selection at a later date in time, ultimately leading to late hominin and human abilities to use language.

evolved for behavioral functions other than those that they eventually assumed (see Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2005, 2008a; Turner 2000a). What these preadaptations eventually allowed was for humans to interact as strangers in unfocused encounters, to focus interaction in order to accomplish goals, and as a result to build both meso and macro sociocultural formations that could supplement our bodies as “survival machines” for our genes. True, these formations have often been cages, but human needs and our ape ancestry have always placed low-level but persistent pressure to alter meso and macrostructures to be more consistent with our ape ancestry, even as this ape genetic heritage has been dramatically altered by new genetically based capacities for enhanced emotionality, language, and culture. It is these enhancements that allow for humans to be weak-tie and low-sociality animals and, at the same time, to be higher-sociality animals when emotions are jacked up. We can develop strong attachments to others and larger-scale structures and their cultures, and of course, we can become alienated from and rebel against these formations.

Human biological evolution has never stopped, although it has been slowed down at the biological level by the sociocultural survival machines in which we now live. In contrast, sociocultural evolution has gone the opposite direction: it has speeded up not only as a result of responses to macro-level forces (see Vol. 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*) but also as a consequence of the fragility if not volatility of encounters that can change meso-level formations and, over time, macro-level formations as well. Let me turn to how the micro can have these transformative effects.

Commitments to Meso- and Macro-level Social Units

I will begin with a short review of what I consider the best effort over the last 30 years to develop a micro-to-macro theory – the Lawler et al. (2009) book on commitments that I mentioned earlier. Starting from Richard Emerson’s (1962) network-exchange theory, Lawler and his coauthors first developed a theory of emotional arousal in exchange processes⁵; and in this new book, they have applied this theory of emotional arousal in exchange processes to understanding how individuals develop commitments to larger social units,

⁵ See: Lawler 1992, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2006; Lawler and Thye 1999, 2006; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000, 2006, 2008; Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998.

especially given the *proximal bias* that positive emotions engender and the *distal bias* that negative emotions generate in individuals (Lawler 1992, 2001).⁶ Their theory has a clear virtue over the one that I am developing: the parsimony that comes from just one starting point – network exchange theory – and then taking this perspective as far as it will go.

The central argument in their theory is that emotions are the basic mechanism connecting the micro and more macro realms of reality. Emotions are generated in exchange relations, but individuals are also making attributions about the cause(s) of these emotions. There is a relatively small number of basic targets for these attributions about emotional experiences: self, others, local social unit, or more distal social unit. Thus, the conditions that (1) cause positive emotional arousal in encounters at the micro level and (2) push attributions to break the hold of the proximal bias and target more distal social units are the two keys to understanding individuals' commitments to macrostructures and their cultures.

The original application of Emerson's exchange theory by these authors argued that under conditions of *equal power* or mutual interdependence, *the frequency of exchanges* will increase; and as individuals exchange over time and reach agreements on payoffs, even if somewhat unequal, they will develop mild positive emotions, such as *interest*, *excitement*, *pleasure*, and *satisfaction* which, in turn, increase *relational cohesion* and *commitments* to the exchange relationship as manifested by their willingness to give gifts, stay in the exchange, and contribute resources to joint enterprises. The arousal of positive emotions is the driving mechanism for these commitment behaviors within micro-exchange relations; and in the newer and more robust theory, Lawler and his coauthors emphasize that this same mechanism also operates for commitments to more macro-level phenomena.

This extension of the theory inevitably must incorporate additional concepts from other perspectives. The first extension of network-exchange theory involved, as noted above, introducing emotions into the analysis of exchange relations. The original extension emphasized that *frequent exchanges* will produce positive emotions; later, Lawler (2001) emphasized that exchanges involving coordinated task behaviors, or what he termed *productive exchanges*, are the most likely to cause external attributions to social units. This kind of productive exchange increases the (1) *non-separability*

⁶The proximal bias applies to positive emotions that tend to be attributed to the actions of self or immediate others, whereas the distal bias pushes negative emotions away from self and others toward distal targets such as social units. The key question is how to break the hold of the proximal bias by having attributions for experiencing positive emotions target more distal social units.

(of joint task) of individuals so that they cannot act as isolated persons but must contribute to a group outcome where the respective contributions of individuals to this outcome are blurred and (2) sense of *shared responsibility* for outcomes. Several structural conditions are hypothesized to increase these effects of productive exchanges: *density* of network ties, *centrality* of activities and exchanges in these networks, and the *scope* of activities across the network. Another critical condition – *sense of efficacy* – is likely to emerge under the structural conditions of frequent exchanges in joint tasks where individuals coordinate their activities and have a sense of shared responsibility in the outcomes of their actions. Combined, these conditions increase not only emotional arousal but initiate the process of making more distal attributions and, hence, commitments to more remote social units.

Emotional arousal itself can cause more distal attributions, under certain conditions. When positive emotions are communicated in a *complementary* manner – say, the individual experiences *pride* for self-attributions but also makes external attributions to others by expressing *gratitude* for their contributions. These emotions are complementary – positively sanctioning self and others – and thereby increase the flow of positive emotional energy in the encounter. Moreover, when these emotions are *openly and frequently communicated* among members, a kind of dynamic density ensures, revolving around the circulation of positive reinforcers; and as efficacy for each individual increases under conditions of productive exchange and shared responsibility, attributions for experiencing positive emotions can break the power of the proximal bias and be directed toward more distal and more macro-level social units, including whole societies.

The sequencing of these conditions increasing external attributions is not completely clear in the current theory. If we assume that high total power, frequency of exchanges, network density and centrality, scope of activities across the network as well as embeddedness in meso and macro corporate units (to use my terminology) are the basic structural conditions increasing non-separability, shared responsibility, and efficacy and that together these increase the arousal of positive emotions, and vice versa, these outcomes together increase awareness of more distal social units. The result is for individuals to begin targeting more remote social units with attributions for what caused their positive emotional experiences, and as they do so, individuals begin to develop commitments to these units.

The theory also introduces the notion of *identity-verification* as yet another condition that can increase the positive emotional arousal. When efficacy increases under conditions of non-separability and shared responsibility, the role- and group-identities of individuals become more salient, and when these identities are verified, the social unit in which role- and

group-identities are embedded also becomes more salient, thereby making it more likely that individuals will increase their commitments (fueled by positive emotional energy) to this unit – thus, once again, breaking the hold of the proximal bias. Commitments to whole societies – the most macro target of the theory – can occur when the structure and culture of a society systematically generate a sense of “jointness” (non-separability and shared responsibility) in task activities, a feeling of efficacy, and a recognition that role- and group-identities have been verified; and under these conditions, the ensuing arousal of positive emotions causes attributions to move toward this rather distal unit – the whole society or nation. Indeed, Lawler et al. (2009: 156–157) summarize data in contemporary societies that document the widespread commitment of individuals to nations as societal units, thus undermining many of the more recent narratives about the growing disconnect between the micro and macro social worlds.

The converse of these conditions can help explain the lack of such commitments. When there is inequality in the relative power of individuals, this power will be used in ways that reduce the sense of non-separability, shared responsibility, efficacy, and verification of role- and group-identities by those without power which, in turn, may decrease frequency of interaction (or exchange) and thus reduce the arousal of positive emotions. Indeed, if individuals do not perceive that they have made a profit in such exchanges because of the high costs of power-use by superordinates, negative emotions and low commitments, if not alienation from others and social units, will ensue.

In sum, then, the theory argues that whenever there is equality of individuals and non-separability of tasks, coupled with a sense of shared responsibility, efficacy, and identity verification (often generated by network density and scope of activities), positive emotions and commitments to more distal units that are seen as responsible for these emotions become ever more likely. Even if the payoffs in exchanges generate negative emotions (such as shame), this combination of conditions can convert this painful emotion into *collective shame* and, thereby, make it more likely that individuals will remain committed to the group as they work to increase exchange payoffs and experience more positive emotions collectively.

As is clear, I am traveling the same path as Lawler et al. (2009) in viewing positive emotions as the critical mechanism binding people to micro, meso, and macro structures and their cultures. I do not begin with an exchange framework; indeed, my theory is less parsimonious but also a bit more robust, adding additional variables (perhaps too many) to the model. My model would look more like Lawler’s, Thye’s, and Yoon’s if I had only one transactional need – the need for profits in exchanges – but like Lawler et al.,

I would need to introduce at least needs for identity-verification as well as some portrayal of structural conditions increasing exchange profits and identity verification that would in turn increase the likelihood of external attributions to larger-scale social units. Still, the simple starting points of Lawler et al.'s theory – high total power, joint tasks and non-separability of these tasks, shared responsibility for outcomes, individual efficacy, frequency of exchanges, and emotional arousal – produce a very robust theory. I begin with more pieces, but my effort to explain micro-level effects on meso and macro sociocultural formations converges with that offered by Lawler et al. (2009). The fact that our views converge, even though the starting points are very different, gives me hope that sociology is on the right path in linking theoretically the three basic levels of social reality. The micro-macro problem has the potential of being solved in a way that even physics and certainly economics might envy.

Reproduction and Change in Meso- and Macro-level Social Units

The social universe is driven by forces that push for reproduction of social reality at all levels of reality and, at the same time, for its transformation. As I have emphasized, once macro and meso sociocultural formations exist, they constrain what will transpire in encounters, and it is this embedding of encounters within meso and, then, further embedding of these meso units in the macro sociocultural formations that gives social life continuity. Yet, the same embedding becomes a potential conduit for change and transformation arising from the operation of microdynamics. Let me first begin with the micro-level reproduction of the meso and macro realms, and then turn to the transformative effects of encounters.

Reproduction Dynamics in Encounters

As I outlined in the last chapter, positive emotions are the key mechanism that binds social reality together, whereas negative emotional arousal can generate transformative tensions and conflicts. When individuals meet expectations and receive positive sanctions, they experience positive emotions (see Principle 19 in Chapter 8) and are more likely to remain focused or, if need be, unfocused. In so doing, individuals are more likely to sustain and repeat the encounter in the future – thereby contributing to the reproduction

of the meso- and macro-level structures and cultures in which the encounter is embedded. Individuals are most likely to make self-attributions when they experience emotions such as satisfaction, happiness, and pride; and as they do so, they will often make local external attributions to others in the encounter and give off positive emotions like gratitude and happiness. As these emotions circulate in the vortex created by the proximal bias in emotional arousal, elements of what Randall Collins (1975, 2004) has conceptualized as *interaction rituals* ensue: continued common focus of attention, rhythmic synchronization, emotional entrainment, symbolization of the group, formation of particularistic cultural capital, and enhanced solidarity. Yet, this circulation of positive emotional energy will reveal a proximal bias, and thus, the interesting question is how this bias is broken so that individuals will begin to make more distal attributions for their positive feelings and, thereby develop commitments to macro-level sociocultural formations.

Making More Distal Attributions. What, then, would lead individuals to make more external attributions to meso- and macro-level sociocultural formation in the face of proximal pressures restricting the flow of positive emotions. Lawler and his coauthors posit a number of conditions, as I outlined above, and one of them is simple repetition of the encounter. As encounters are repeated, individuals begin to take notice of the social units in which the encounters are embedded and to make attributions to the culture and structure of this unit. The variable of repetition in their model, I believe, is a proxy for microdynamics – that is, meeting transactional needs, especially for identity-verification and profitable exchange payoffs, as well as needs for successful status-taking/making, role-taking/making, and normatization as they all cause the arousal of positive emotions. Thus, for me, the proximal bias begins to be broken as individuals *consistently experience the positive emotions* arising from their ability to meet expectations and receive positive sanctions for successfully navigating the ecology and demography of encounters and, to the extent possible (more in focused, less in unfocused encounters), for successfully meeting transactional needs, particularly for identity-verification and positive exchange payoffs, and for successfully role-taking/making, status-taking/making, and normatizing the encounter. The rapid and persistent circulation of positive emotions begins to sensitize individuals to the sociocultural formations in which these emotions are aroused; and, over time, individuals will increasingly make external attributions to these formations.

Yet, I do not think that these processes alone cause attributions that would legitimate meso-level and macro-level structures and their cultures. The degree of *successive embedding* of encounters in corporate and

categoric units – in, respectively, autonomous domains and locations in the stratification system, and then, in societal and inter-societal systems – accelerates the process of breaking out of the proximal bias and making attributions ever-more external and, hence, macro. Without embedding, microdynamic processes themselves will not easily play out; and indeed, breaches to the encounter become more likely without embedding, thus arousing negative emotions that, to be sure, may cause external attributions to social units but, since these emotions are negative, these attributions will reduce commitments and decrease the viability of social units blamed for negative emotional arousal. Thus, if the meanings of ecology, demography, status, roles, culture, and emotions are *not* clear and understandable, individuals will have to work harder at sustaining encounters and be more likely to experience some negative emotions. Moreover, while embedding increases clarity of expectations, negative emotions will be even more intense when individuals do not live up to these expectations and doubly so if negative sanctioning occurs. And, even without activation of defense mechanisms but more so when they are activated, embedding provides a road map for targeting negative emotions outward, while increasing pressure on individuals to make at least some external attributions to meso and macro sociocultural formations.

The more *consistent* and *persistent* over iterated encounters is the ability of individuals to meet expectations and receive positive sanctions, the more positive are the emotions that are aroused. And, the more *all* microdynamic processes play themselves out in ways that allow individuals to successfully navigate the ecology and demography of the situation, to status take/make, to role-take/make, culture-take/make, to meet transactional needs, and to normatize the situation, the more likely are individuals to meet expectations and receive positive sanctions. As a consequence, attributions for the causes of the positive emotions aroused are likely to become more external, with the individual viewing the mesostructures and their cultures as partly responsible for their positive emotions. And if these mesostructures are embedded in successive layers of macro structure – from institutional domains and stratification systems to societies and inter-societal systems – these attributions are more likely to become more macro.

These processes initially work through both corporate and categoric units at the meso-level of social reality. For corporate units, two important structural conditions are critical to the outward movement of attributions. One is for a corporate unit to be embedded in a relatively autonomous institutional domain, in which the generalized symbolic media, ideologies formed from these media, and norms within a domain are clear and consistent with each other. The other is that these cultural elements constrain the structure and

operation of the division of labor within a given corporate unit. This constraint involves discourse and exchanges in terms of the generalized symbolic medium of an autonomous domain, acceptance of the moral premises in the ideology of the domain, and use of institutional norms to structure the divisions of labor and to normatize the actions of individuals within the division of labor. These structural conditions will almost always increase clarity of expectations and enable microdynamic processes to proceed in ways that arouse positive emotions, with the result that attributions for these positive outcomes become more likely to travel up the successive layers of embedding.

Commitments to, and legitimization of, meso-level and macro-level structures is also shaped by the locations of individuals in divisions of labor and by the resources that they are able to secure by virtue of these locations. In general, higher-status individuals will receive more resources than low-status incumbents in the division of labor of corporate units and will be able to meet transactional needs in ways that arouse more positive emotions than those in lower-status locations. And so, under the structural conditions enumerated above, it is higher-status individuals in the division of labor who are most likely to make positive external attributions to not only the corporate unit but also to the institutional domain in which this unit is embedded and to the culture of the whole society. These same process can also work for lower-status persons if, as Lawler et al. (2009) suggests, they too can (a) experience dignity, efficacy, and autonomy in their status locations and role behaviors, and as I would add, (b) normatize the situation, and thereby, (c) consistently experience positive emotions. Thus, while higher-status individuals are the most likely to make external attribution for their “success,” lower-status persons can as well. And indeed, in societies where those in subordinate positions in divisions of labor can gain what they see as a “fair share” of resources and realize (a), (b), and (c) above, institutional domains, the stratification system, society, and potentially inter-societal system in which all are embedded will be given legitimacy and will become objects of commitment by individuals. Moreover, the cultural values, ideologies, meta-ideologies, and normative systems of macrostructures will be considered not only legitimate but also moral, arousing guilt and shame for persons when they violate them and righteous anger when others violate them, and thus causing individuals to monitor and sanction themselves and others for failures to live up to the imperative expectations inherent in these moral codes.

The Effects of Stratification on Distal Attributions. A highly stratified society will, of course, generate high levels of inequality in the distribution of resources, including the symbolic media of each institutional domain as well as more generalized resources such as prestige, honor, and positive emotions.

Inequalities increase when individuals have limited access to positions in corporate units that distribute valued resources. Whether by prejudice and discrimination or some other force, limiting access either (a) by excluding individuals from corporate units or (b) by restricting their movement to higher-level positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units increases inequalities in the distribution of valued resources. If memberships in categoric units, such as ethnicity, religious affiliation, and gender, are correlated or consolidated with either limited access to domains or to low positions in the corporate units within these domains, then members in these categoric units will receive fewer resources and will be seen as less worthy. Moreover, the meta-ideology legitimating the stratification system will generate stigmatizing status beliefs about those with limited access to resources and, at the same time, valorize beliefs about those who are able to secure resources.

The end result is for those who have access to the valued resources of corporate units across a larger array of institutional domains to experience more consistent positive emotional arousal in encounters compared to those who do not have high degrees of access to domains and/or to upper-level positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units in institutional domains. Thus, the more individuals have access to most if not all institutional domains in a society and to middle- and upper-level positions in the vertical hierarchies of corporate units in these domains, the more likely are they to experience dignity, efficacy, autonomy, prestige, and positive emotions as a result of their access to valued resources and to moral beliefs that valorize their status and role behaviors. As a consequence of their consistent and repeated arousal of positive emotions in these encounters, they are likely to make external attributions that increase their commitments to meta-ideologies legitimating inequalities as well as the status beliefs for those high and low in the system of stratification.

The Effects of Class and Class Factions on Distal Attributions. There is, however, a complication to the above generalizations. As Pierre Bourdieu (1984) has emphasized, there are *factions* or, in essence, subclass divisions within each social class of the larger stratification system. Both classes and class-factions within classes can be identified by inequalities in the distribution of four basic types of *capital*: (1) *economic capital* or money and material objects that can be used to produce goods and services; (2) *social capital* or positions and relations in corporate units and networks that can be used to garner resources; (3) *cultural capital* or interpersonal skills, manners, linguistic styles, educational credentials, tastes, and lifestyles that mark individuals as different and that can be used to gain access to other types of resources; and (4) *symbolic capital* or the use of symbols to

legitimate the possession of varying levels and configurations of the other types of capital. Bourdieu argues that these four types of capital can be turned into one another, as is the case when a person or family with a great deal of economic capital uses this wealth to gain access to social capital or cultural capital and as is the case when those with high levels of social and symbolic capital use these forms of capital to gain economic capital. For my purposes, Bourdieu's conception of stratification as consisting of the unequal distribution of these four types of capital is what complicates the analysis of how stratification, positive emotions, and commitments to macrostructures and their cultures operate.

Overall, the members of what Bourdieu terms the *dominant* or upper class in a society have more of the four forms of capital than all members of middle and lower classes. But, and here is the critical point, *within* this dominant class and all other classes as well, there are *factions* that have varying amounts of capital in somewhat different configurations. The dominant (upper) class is, itself, divided into three factions: the (1) dominant, (2) intermediate, and (3) dominated factions. The dominant faction in the upper class has the most economic capital relative to the other factions; the intermediate faction has less economic capital, but moderate levels of social, cultural, and symbolic capital; and the dominated faction has the least amount of economic capital but high levels (relative to economic capital held by others in this class) of cultural and symbolic capital. The middle and lower (working) classes are divided in the same way into dominant, intermediate, and dominated factions, although the total amount of capital is less than that in the dominant (upper) class.

The significance of factions is that there are inequalities *within* a given class and these inequalities involve varying levels and configurations in the distribution of the four types of capital. This view of the overall class system being divided, almost in a fractal manner, can help explain why, for example, the dominant faction in even the lower classes – say, higher-income blue collar workers – are often more committed to the ideologies legitimating the stratification than are the dominated factions in higher social classes. Relative to others in their class, who represent the key *comparison point* in their evaluations of their shares of resources, they have more economic capital, which means that in the most important resource-distribution institutional domain – the economy – they have had relatively consistent positive emotional arousal. In contrast, even though the intermediate and dominated factions in higher social classes may still receive more money than the dominant faction in a lower class, their comparison point is not with factions in the lower class but, instead, with the dominant faction of their class, with the result that they may feel negative

emotions over their *relative* lack of money compared to the members of the dominant faction in their class. Thus, the arousal of emotions is, as I emphasized in Chap. 7 in the discussion of transactional needs for profitable exchange payoffs, related to individuals' points of comparison or reference points. Thus, while the arousal of positive or negative emotional energy may roughly correlate with class rankings in the stratification system, there is much variation across the factions *within* any given class, with those in the dominant faction of each class the most likely to evidence positive emotional energy over their respective shares of economic capital. The intermediate faction may get just enough economic capital, and coupled with generally robust shares of other forms of capital, they too may experience positive emotional arousal. Even members of the dominated faction, whose members have the lowest shares of economic capital (within their class) may also feel positive emotions, especially if their high levels of cultural and symbolic capital are valued in a society. Yet, it is probably the dominated faction that is the most likely to experience the most negative emotional arousal within a class, and this negative emotional arousal will increase, I suspect, as one moves down the dominated faction of the upper class to the dominated faction of the middle class and, then, to the dominated faction of the lower classes.

Thus, while there is a rough correlation in the distribution of positive emotional energy with class location, there is also considerable variation in the distribution within factions of classes, with the result that varying factions may have different degrees of commitment to institutional domains and the stratification system as well as to the ideologies and meta-ideologies legitimating these macro-level units. Patterns of reproduction and transformation emanating from encounters among individuals in diverse factions will, therefore, vary not only by their general class location in the overall stratification system but also by their specific faction *within* this class. A reasonable hypothesis, then, might be that within any given social class, the dominated faction is the most likely to experience episodes negative emotional arousal in institutional domains and, as a consequence, display the lowest-levels of commitment to macrostructures and their cultures.

Of course, individuals who do not have access to domains and/or higher-level positions in corporate units in these domains must suffer the stigma of status beliefs about their membership in lower class categories and other categoric units whose membership is correlated with lower class incumbency. Under these conditions, these individuals are the less likely to experience positive emotions consistently, with the result that they will lower will their commitments to, and legitimization of, the stratification system as a whole, the meta-ideology legitimating this system, the corporate units

distributing valued resources in domains, and the ideologies of these institutional domains.

It is no coincidence, then, that individuals in (a) valued categoric units, (b) upper-level positions in divisions of labor of corporate units across a wide range of institutional domains and in class locations, and (c) class factions placing them well above the median income for a population are more likely to develop commitments to macro-level social formations because of the consistent positive emotional arousal that they are likely to have experienced in encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units. The more these meso-level units are, in turn, lodged in institutional domains and the stratification systems which are nested within societies and inter-societal systems, the more distal will these commitments to macro-level social units and their cultures become.

When a relatively large proportion of individuals in a society are able to have positive emotional experiences in embedded encounters, as they generally are in advanced industrial and post-industrial societies, commitments to, as well legitimization of, macro-level sociocultural formations are also likely to be strong and often viewed in moral terms. It is for this reason that the data reported by Lawler et al. (2009: 156–157) show relatively strong emotional ties to nation, provinces/counties, and towns/cities among advanced industrial and post-industrial societies. The reason for these stronger ties to larger-scale units stems from the consistent positive emotional experiences that individuals are having in diverse encounters embedded in a wide range of corporate units within most institutional domains and in at least middle-level class categoric units correlated with class memberships in the stratification system. Thus, the hypothesized “distance” between the micro and macro realms of contemporary societies is generally not as great as many critical commentators imply. Embedding of encounters in meso-level sociocultural formations nested in institutional domains and stratification that, in turn, are lodged in societies provide structural conduits and cultural paths for seeing that positive emotional experiences in the micro realm are often made possible by the structure and culture of successively embedded meso and macro social units.

A Note on The Biological Basis of Distal Attributions. As an aside, humans probably have some bioprogrammers for looking *beyond the group* to larger corporate units (organizations and communities), to institutions, to societies, and to inter-societal systems as a “natural” units identification. For, as I have noted, the natural unit of reference for the great apes, with whom we shared an ancestor, is not the group or encounter but, rather the larger community (see Schaller 1963; Maryanski and Turner 1992; Turner and Maryanski 2008a). Positive emotions will circulate and increase the

solidarity at the face-to-face level in small social units like encounters and groups; and yet, as evolved apes, humans also have neurologically based propensities to identify with larger social units. Embedding simply gives these propensities a trail to follow in making external attributions and identifying with, and developing moral commitments to, macrostructures and their cultures. In this manner, one encounter at a time, larger-scale structures are reproduced, thereby giving macro structures and their cultures continuity over time. Coupled with the downward constraints imposed by macro and meso structures on encounters, large-scale social orders can be sustained over relatively long reaches of time, unless external events or new internal selection pressures from the macrodynamic forces overwhelm a population and cause either change or societal and inter-societal collapse (see Vol. 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology: Macrodynamics*).

Transformational Dynamics in Encounters

The converse of the reproductive dynamics operating in encounters can also work to transform macrostructures and culture. When large numbers of individuals cannot experience positive emotions in a wide range of encounters across institutional domains, this lack of positive emotional energy means that transactional needs for identity-verification are not being met, that status-making/taking and role-making/taking, and normatizing have not been successful or easy to effect, and that shares of resources from exchanges in encounters are not measuring up to conceptions of what would constitute a “just share” (thereby causing a failure to meet needs for profitable exchange payoffs). Whether or not the negative emotions aroused are repressed, the outcome is the same: individuals will generally make external attributions for their negative emotional experiences. At times, they may make self-attributions causing them to feel even more negative emotions, such as sadness and shame; the result is that negative arousal directed at self is less transformative and, indeed, may work to reproduce meso and macro sociocultural formations because individuals are not sufficiently aroused by anger to make external attributions that blame meso and macro structures. But, more typically individuals experience anger when they cannot meet expectations or perceive that they have received negative sanctions, and if shame is repressed, the transmuted emotion is intense anger directed outward as part of the defense of self.

Negative Emotions and Social Change. When negative emotions are consistently aroused in encounters within corporate units within institutional

domains, the stress, tension, and breaches in these encounters – if persistent – begin to pose problems in the reproduction of corporate and categoric units as well as the structures and cultures of macro-level sociocultural formations in which they are embedded. These meso and macro formations may simply break down, generating selection pressures for the formation of new structures, or dissatisfaction in encounters may cause those consistently dissatisfied to begin to engage in protest or even collective violence, often forming social movement organizations (a type of corporate unit) to bring about change in either or both institutional domains and systems of stratification as well as the societal formations in which they are embedded. Thus, when large numbers of individuals are consistently frustrated over longer periods of time, their negative emotional arousal puts pressures on meso and macrostructures. It may take years, decades, or even centuries for these negative emotions to effect significant macrostructural change, but they collectively generate selection pressures from regulation (coordination and control) as a macrodynamic force on polity, economy, and other key institutional domains to change or, in the end, suffer the disintegrative consequences.

Additional Sources of Transformational Pressures from Encounters. There are also other processes by which microdynamics can effect change in meso and eventually macro structures and their cultures (Turner 2002: 245–251). One route of change operating at the micro level of the encounter is through the power and prestige of individuals in corporate and categoric units. The more individuals have power and prestige, the more likely are they to be able to initiate change in encounters and, potentially, the meso-level units in which they are embedded. A high-ranking person in the division of labor of a corporate unit can often instigate change in this unit in a series of encounters, which if copied by other units, can eventually lead to broader-based change in an institutional domain, or several domains. Likewise, members of more highly valued categoric units can often push for change not only among members of this unit but also for the benefit of members in devalued categoric units. Similarly, high ranking and visible individuals in devalued units can – as Martin Luther King demonstrated – initiate change in the status beliefs about members in a devalued categoric unit, but equally important about in their rights to access in divisions of labor in corporate units and the institutional domains in which they are embedded operate. Change is particularly likely when categoric units develop leaders and change-oriented ideologies that form the basis for social movement organizations that press for alterations in resource-distributing institutional spheres – often seeking to alter patterns of discrimination in such key institutional domains economy, polity, law, and education.

Another process of change initiated at the micro level of encounters comes from the properties – particularly centrality, density, and scope – of the networks in which encounters occur. The more encounters are connected to each other in a network, and the greater the reach of the network across encounters within or between corporate units, the more effect change in a central encounter will reverberate out across the network. If the change is fueled by emotions, defined in moral terms, and ideologically codified, initial changes in one encounter are likely the cascade across the network. And, if the network itself encompasses more than one corporate unit, the changes will be that much greater, and especially if the central encounter is embedded in a central corporate unit within an institutional domain. Even if network density is not high, a central location can promote efforts at brokering and/or bridging otherwise disconnected cliques or sub-networks; change introduced at central node can move rapidly through each clique and begin to effect change in even lower-density networks (White et al. 1976). Moreover, if the cliques reveal similar patterns of structural equivalence and, moreover, evidence dense ties among nodes in the sub-network, the change is likely to have similar effects on each clique or sub-network, thus accelerating the movement of changes introduced from central nodes connecting sub-densities of structurally equivalent positions.

A related process, emphasized throughout this book, is embeddedness of corporate and categoric units. Encounters at key points (e.g., central, high-ranking) in the divisions of labor of corporate units lodged in institutional domains and responsible for resource distributions defining the stratification system will have larger effects on generating change in institutional domains and stratification systems than will those at marginal points in the division of labor. Similarly, encounters that are essential to sustaining status beliefs, especially those reaffirming differential evaluation of members of categoric units, can also work to change these status beliefs if key individuals act in ways to reduce the reproduction of beliefs about, and expectations for, individuals revealing diffuse status characteristics. These change-oriented efforts to reduce the stigmatizing power of status beliefs are most likely to be initiated in encounters in divisions of labor of corporate units where some degree of intersection has occurred (Blau 1977, 1994), such that members of diverse categoric units interact regularly at a given place in divisions of labor or, alternatively, at different places in the divisions of labor. When, for example, ethnic minorities and non-minorities work together at the same status location in a corporate unit or when these minorities occupy different status locations across the horizontal and hierarchical divisions of labor, encounters at these points of intersections can begin to generate changes, which move along points in the division of labor and often outward along

embedded networks to other corporate units within an institutional domain and even to other institutional domains. If we conceptualize social movements in the United States that, for instance, reduced discrimination in housing, school access, and workplaces, the success of initial intersections of status altered discriminatory status beliefs; and as these cultural beliefs changed, further intersections of status became less problematic, eventually altering the structure of corporate units within a domain and hence the structure of the domain itself. And, as change occurred in one domain, the new ideology of this domain began to diffuse to other domains, thereby altering to some degree not only the structure and culture of ever-more institutional domains but also the culture and structure of the system of stratification and the meta-ideology legitimating this system. As institutional domains and stratification systems were transformed, so was the culture and structure of the society as a whole.

Changes in corporate units, especially central ones, within those institutional domains that Amos Hawley (1986) denoted as performing *key functions*, or those domains (and their constituent corporate units) regulating a society's interactions with its biophysical and sociocultural environments, are likely to have greater effects on social change than those not performing these key functions. Thus, changes introduced from encounters of individuals at critical locations in the divisions of labor of corporate units engaged in, for example, economic and political activities are likely to have greater effects on other institutions and the society as a whole than those in less "key functions" such as kinship and religion. Changes in these key-function domains affect the distribution of power and economic resources; and this change will generally have effects on all other domains. In contrast, changes from encounters in families or religion will generally take much longer to cascade across other domains (unless they have political power, as is the case in kin-based societies or in a political theocracy) than changes introduced in encounters among those at central locations in the economy and polity of a society.

Still another condition affecting the capacity of encounters to induce change is their iteration. It is rare for a one-shot encounter to have large effects, unless it is among critical actors in economy and polity (as would be the case, for instance, with a negotiated treaty among political leaders or a decision to merge two large companies). Rather, change emanating from encounters at the micro level come from iterations where the desire to alter social arrangements become part of the iterated encounter's particularistic capital and symbols. And then, from this cultural base, ideologically driven efforts at change can move out across nodes in networks or across levels of embeddedness among corporate units.

Yet another important condition determining how change can emerge and spread from encounters is the number of individuals in the encounter itself. The larger is the number of participants in an encounter where focus is sustained and iterated, and the more central is the encounter's location in a network or corporate unit within a key institutional domain, the more likely will such encounters have change-producing effects. When large numbers of individuals are experiencing negative emotional energy and attributions begin to blame larger, more inclusive social units, this energy can often be mobilized to generate iterated encounters among larger numbers of individuals that, over time, develop leadership structures and change-oriented ideologies; and the larger the networks in which these encounters occur, the more potential they have for meso- and macro-level social transformations.

Visibility can often influence the power of encounters to change meso and macro structures and their cultures. The more visible to larger numbers of individuals are the leaders of change-producing encounters and the more visible are the actions of members in change-oriented encounters to the general population, the greater are the potential transformative effects of the encounter, especially when iterated. Obviously, in societies with a relatively open mass media system, visibility can reach very high levels and work much more rapidly. For most of human history, visibility was limited to those co-present at a particular location, but media have now made it possible for the actions of individuals – in riots, rallies, civil protests, and other dramatic encounters – to be seen by very large numbers of individuals within and between societies; and hence, the potential for visible encounters to introduce change is much greater than at any time in human history. If these visible encounters occur within institutions engaged in key functions and are located at central locations within institutional domains, they can have dramatic change-producing effects, if only to initially alter changes in beliefs and ideologies that may over time cause slowly accelerating changes in the structure of institutional domains and potentially whole societies.

A last condition is the intensity and valence of the emotional energy being generated in change-oriented encounters. Encounters fueled by negative emotional energy targeting cultural beliefs or key social structures, while at the same time generating (through interaction rituals) positive emotional energy among those pushing for change, have the requisite level of emotional energy. Such encounters are valenced in a ways that generate high solidarity among those pushing for change on clear targets, most typically conditions that are defined by some moral yardstick as “evil.” From their base of ritual solidarity, often codified into highly moralistic ideologies, encounters will be iterated (because they generate positive emotions); and individuals in them will often seek to proselytize others in an

ever-expanding number of encounters. They will enter many diverse types of encounters, pushing their message, and they can be persistent because of the combination of positive and negative emotional energy driving them. Indeed, religious beliefs spread this way, as do calls for revolutionary action, or terrorism against “evil” forces. Thus, positive, solidarity-inducing emotional arousal at the local level of the encounter, coupled with intense negative energy fueling the attribution processes directed outward toward social units, can often become a deadly combination (Turner 2007c, 2010b). This kind of positive emotional arousal in encounters can spread, and rapidly so, when structural and cultural conditions have persistently generated negative emotions in a high proportion of encounters in the daily lives of larger numbers of individuals, with these individuals becoming increasingly receptive to a movement that gives them positive emotional energy to direct their anger outward toward macrostructures and their legitimating cultures. By tapping into the diffuse, negative emotions of select members of the population, attributions for this negative emotional energy can target specific sociocultural formations (and individuals in these formations), while providing a source of positive sanctioning for those who join the “cause.”

As is evident, then, there are many potential sources for social transformation initiated at the micro level of the encounter, particularly focused encounters. Societies would be static without these sources of change, and even very large societies with a great deal of sociocultural inertia and tradition are not immune to the power of the micro realm. This power stems from the twin facts that all social structures are ultimately built from encounters and that encounters are embedded in successive layers of meso and macro sociocultural formations. Encounters are chained together across time and in space, and they are largely responsible for the reproduction of the social universe and, as I have outlined above, potentially for its transformation.

Still, much change is exogenous to encounters coming, for example, from diffusion of new cultural elements (beliefs, ideologies, technologies), from warfare with other societies, from environmental degradation, or from population growth and other demographic processes. Even endogenous change can more accurately be viewed as coming from problems in integrating macro and meso sociocultural formations, from the tensions inherent in inequality and stratification, or from problems inhering in key institutional domains. True, all of these sources of change involve people in encounters, but we are likely to gain more understanding these transformative effects by concentrating on macrodynamic (see Vol. 1 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*) forces as they shape the operation of the mesodynamic realm of social reality (see Vol.3 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*). Still, when negative emotions are

persistently aroused in many diverse encounters among large numbers of persons within corporate and categoric units embedded in macrostructures, selection pressures from the micro realm can become intense, and over a period of time, directly initiate change or create conditions in which large numbers of individuals will be receptive to changes from exogenous sources.

Principles Microdynamic Reproduction and Transformation

24. The more viable are unfocused and focused encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units nested, respectively, inside of institutional domains and stratification systems, the more likely are these encounters to reproduce corporate and categoric units and, by extension, the culture and structure of macro-level social units, with the viability of unfocused encounters being an additive function of the conditions listed above under 3A-H, 6A-I, 8A,B, 12A-D, 15A-C, 18 A-C, 23A-C
25. The more both focused and unfocused encounters allow individuals to move among, or interact directly with, strangers in diverse categoric units and at different places in the divisions of labor in corporate units, the more likely will microdynamic processes reproduce corporate and categoric units and, by extension, the culture and structure of macro-level units.
26. The more iterated encounters embedded within corporate and categoric units lead to consistent positive emotional arousal among their participants, the more likely are individuals to develop commitments to the structure and culture of these mesostructures; and the more individuals experience consistent positive emotional arousal across iterated encounters within diverse corporate and categoric units within clearly differentiated institutional domains with their own norms, ideologies and generalized symbolic media and within differentiated classes and class-factions with their own legitimating ideologies, the greater will be reserves of positive emotional energy and, hence, the more likely will the proximal bias of positive emotions be broken, allowing individuals to develop commitments to the structure and culture of macrostructures and their cultures.
 - A. The more stratified is a society, and the more clear-cut are class divisions and factions within classes, the more likely will the distribution of positive emotional energy among members of a population be correlated with the distribution of power, money, and prestige; and hence, the more likely are those in the upper and middle classes and dominant factions in all classes to experience positive emotional

- arousal in encounters, leading them to develop commitments to the system of stratification and the ideologies legitimating this system.
- B. The more differentiated are institutional domains involved in distributing resources, the more likely are those experiencing positive emotional arousal in these domains to be in the upper and middle classes and/or dominant factions of classes; and hence, the more likely are individuals in these classes and factions to experience positive emotional arousal in encounters, leading them to develop commitments to both the culture and structure of system of stratification and the institutional domains generating this system.
 - C. The more corporate units within institutional domains or class-factions within the stratification system are mobilized for change-oriented action, and the greater has been the consistency of positive emotional arousal and the level of commitments among members in these units, the more likely will these corporate units or factions be successful in change-oriented activities, if they have other necessary material, organization, and symbolic resources.
27. The more iterated encounters embedded within corporate and categoric units lead to consistent negative emotional arousal among their participants, the less likely are individuals to develop commitments to the structure and culture of these meso-level units; and the more individuals experience consistent negative emotional arousal across iterated encounters within diverse corporate and categoric units within clearly differentiated institutional domains and within clearly differentiated classes and class-factions of the stratification system, the less will be their commitments to the structure and culture of macro-level units, and the more likely will their cumulative negative emotional arousal be mobilized in efforts to change the culture and structure of macro-level sociocultural formations.
- A. The more negative emotional arousal in mesostructures within distributive institutional domains is accompanied by consistent positive emotional arousal in non-distributive institutional domains, the less will be the mobilization and change potential of cumulative negative emotional arousal in these mesostructures of institutional domains.
 - B. The more individuals experiencing negative emotional arousal in mesostructures within distributive institutional domains make self-attributions for their failures in these domains, the less will be the mobilization and change potential of cumulative negative emotional arousal.
 - C. The more negative emotional arousal in mesostructures within institutional domains has evoked variants and first-order elaborations of fear, anger, and sadness, the more likely are individuals to have also

- experienced second-order elaboration of these negative emotions, particularly shame and alienation but also guilt if failures in these domains are evaluated in moral terms.
- D. The more individuals have experienced shame in mesostructures within distributive institutional domains, the more likely are they to have repressed this shame, particularly if they have been unable to verify self in roles and/or to receive just shares of resources; and the more repressed is this shame as well as other second-order emotions like guilt and alienation, the more likely will the anger component of these second-order elaborations of negative primary emotions surface and be part of external attributions, thereby increasing the level of anger at the structure and culture of mesostructures and macrostructures.
28. The more individuals have experienced diffuse anger, especially anger emerging from repressed second-order elaborations of negative primary emotions, the more likely will they make external attributions to macrostructures; and the more likely will they begin to experience intense first-order elaborations of anger such as righteous anger and vengeance at these targets of external attribution.
- A. The more the connection between negative emotional arousal and the structures and persons causing this arousal become obscured, the more distal will the targets of external attributions become, and the more intense will the emotions accompanying these attributions be.
- B. The more available are resources – ideological, financial, political – and the more leaders can articulate grievances and use negative ideologies to sustain external attributions directed at macrostructures and the negative emotions accompanying these attributions, the more likely will intense forms of anger like righteous anger and vengeance be channeled into collective violence.
1. The more local networks and the encounters in them can sustain high levels of positive emotional energy for the planning and implementation of violence against enemies portrayed in negative ideologies, the more likely are individuals to experience and act upon their righteous anger and feelings of vengeance.
 2. The more negative emotions can be framed in terms of justice and morality, the more intense will the negative ideologies about the targets of external attributions become, and the more will local networks and iterated encounters in these networks increase the intensity of righteous anger and feelings of vengeance, and the more will the goals of the corporate units formed by these networks be viewed in moral absolutes.

29. The likelihood of social changes arising from the microdynamics of encounters to meso-level and macro-level sociocultural formations is a positive multiplicative function of 26A-D, 27A-D, and 28-A,B above, as well as being a positive and additive function of:
- A. The power and prestige of individuals initiating change in iterated encounters within corporate and categoric units
 - B. The centrality of the encounters initiating change and the density of the overall networks in which change is initiated
 - C. The degree of embeddedness of change-oriented encounters in corporate and categoric units that, in turn, are embedded in relatively autonomous, resource-generating institutional domains
 - D. The degree of embeddedness of change-oriented encounters within institutional domains mediating relations between members of a society and both their biophysical and sociocultural environments
 - E. The rate of iteration, as well as the length of the chains of iteration, of change-oriented encounters
 - F. The number of individuals involved in iterated change-oriented encounters
 - G. The visibility of change-oriented encounters to members of a society, with visibility increasing availability of mass media coverage of events in these encounters
 - H. The level of negative emotional energy directed at distal sociocultural formations, coupled with the level of positive emotional energy circulating among members of change-oriented focused encounters, with this pattern of emotional polarity increasing with the conditions listed in 27A-D and 28-A,B

Conclusion

There is, perhaps, a certain looseness to the above propositions, but they do spell out some of the fundamental conditions under which behaviors in encounters can, as microdynamic processes are set into motion, either work to reproduce or change meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations. The driving force behind both stasis and change at the micro level is a complex set of processes revolving around: the arousal of emotional energy, the valence along a positive-negative continuum of this energy, the attributions about the sources that caused this emotional energy, the structural conditions (embedding, networks), the cultural conditions (ideologies, especially about morality and justice), the properties of individuals (prestige, power), and the

nature of encounters themselves (iteration, visibility). For the present, the theory is incomplete because we need to know more about mesodynamics that set the constraints on what can occur in encounters, that generate many of the conditions for emotional arousal, and that provide the conduits by which this arousal can, over time, either reproduce or change both meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations. Thus, in Vol. 3 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* on mesodynamics, some additional principles on how change that begins in local encounters can eventually cause either stasis or change of sociocultural formations will be needed to complete the picture of how microdynamics can affect mesodynamics and macrodynamics.

For the present, then, we will have to be content to have a general picture of how microdynamics can either operate to sustain meso and macro structures or to initiate larger-scale social transformations. The social world always reveals forces in play that reproduce or transform this world. Change from microdynamics is, for the most part, initiated when larger numbers of individuals experience negative emotional arousal in iterated encounters, causing them to initiate change themselves or make them receptive to change-oriented actions by individuals in other encounters. Reproduction, likewise, is dominant when most individuals in most encounters embedded in meso- and macro-level sociocultural formations are consistently experiencing mild-to-more-moderate positive emotions, causing them to view sociocultural formations as worth preserving and, thereby, as worth their commitment.

We are now at the end of my analysis of microdynamics. The next chapter simply summarizes the twenty-nine principles that I have developed in this book. Obviously, most of these principles are rather complex, but they do denote many critical dynamics of focused and unfocused encounters. By reading them through, and granted this does take time and concentration, a picture of how the micro social universe operates will emerge. If I have missed something, just what I have forgotten or did not know should be clear; if I have made a blunder that contradicts existing data, this too should be clear. The point of stating arguments in highly abstract theoretical principles, even rather long ones, comes from two properties of such principles: (1) the argument, despite its complexity, is relatively unambiguous rather than being immersed into discursive text that can often obfuscate key points and (2) the argument or elements of the argument can, when stated more formally, be assessed in light of other relevant theoretical ideas, existing data, or data to be collected.

I have frequently been criticized for not testing my ideas or providing copious illustrations of the formal theory. As I have emphasized repeatedly and perhaps somewhat defensively is this: when theorists must be researchers

and researches must be theorists, the theories developed will inevitably narrow, filled with scope conditions. Theory ceases to see the forest through the trees, while research remains narrowly focused in ways that imposed barriers against looking at the social universe more broadly. There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with such narrow theories; and indeed, they can produce a great deal of cumulative knowledge. And yet, scope conditions can, when relaxed, and lead to creative new insights as is evident in the book on commitments by Lawler et al. (2009). Still, most focused theories generally draw from one basic theoretical tradition, ignoring others that might make the analysis more robust and, granted, more complex. In my view, rather than slowly extending the reach of one theory through repeated tests, cumulation can work in a different way: by integrating and synthesizing existing theoretical approaches into highly abstract theoretical principles, implicitly backed up by the data generated in each of the diverse theoretical-research traditions that have been synthesized. We do not need very many “grand theorists” and, as is clear, we do not have many. Most of the current general theorists are of my generation and so we may be like the last of the theoretical dinosaurs, choking in an atmosphere polluted by anti-science rhetoric and an unwillingness to break out of the cages imposed by dense networks of individuals working on very narrow theoretical and research problems. Some will applaud the death of grand theory but the discipline should mourn it; sociology will never take its rightful place at the table of science until it pulls its knowledge together into ever-more robust explanations of the dynamics forging the social universe.

The only solution to this current condition in theoretical sociology is, I have long argued to no avail, is an increase in the division of labor between theory and research. When one person must be both, the focus can produce important insights, but these will be narrow and will tend to circulate primarily in relatively dense and closed networks of like-minded thinkers. Ideas under these conditions will have their own proximal bias; what we need is ideas to move out of these intellectual cages and onto a bigger explanatory stage. One route to this is what a number of creative theorists have done: take their idea on the road and see how far they can be pushed to explain more meso- and macro-level phenomena as, for example, Lawler et al. (2009) or Collins (2004, 2008) have done in recent years. The other is to let theorists theorize in sufficiently precise ways so that researchers looking for something to do besides hand out questionnaires or take baby steps in the experimental lab can test the more robust theories, or at least elements of them. Cumulation will occur much more rapidly with the institutionalization of differentiation between theorists and researchers. With more general and integrated theories, sociologists themselves, plus all those who think we

are a trivial discipline, can come to see that we know a great deal more about the micro universe than is generally assumed. The same is true of the macro and meso universe, as well.

Clearly, I could not have everything right in my theory, but the key point is to make the effort to synthesize theories and state the synthesized theory in more formal terms. I am prepared, and indeed, welcome efforts to correct what I have said in these pages; what emerges from these kinds of critical efforts is a better theory that can provide even more useful guidance to researchers. What I am not willing to accept is the now commonplace rejection of scientific theorizing in general, and the particular hostility to grand theorizing. Sociology is not much use to anyone if it does not try to explain how the social world, in all of its manifestations at micro, meso, and macro levels of social organization. And so, while it may take a great deal of patience to read over the twenty-nine, rather complex principles summarized in the next chapter, efforts at developing these kinds of highly abstract principles must be part of sociology's future, not a fossil from its past. Sociology will not be respected, and more importantly, not be very useful to a world with too many problems of organization to not have scientific sociology. A critical and ideologically driven sociology, or a sociology built upon smug anti-science rhetoric, does little for the larger world out there. If sociologists are to be part of the effort to construct better and more humane social formations, we need to know more about the operative dynamics of these formations. The only way this kind of knowledge can be developed is through a willingness to theorize and, for a few, to theorize in the "grand" tradition of sociology's early founders.

Chapter 10

Principles of Microdynamics

In the previous chapters, I develop 29 highly abstract theoretical principles that, I believe, will help explain much of what occurs in the micro realm of social reality. As is evident, I have consistently introduced the properties of the meso and macro realms into these principles on microdynamics; and so, many of the linkages among the three realms of reality are specified theoretically, although these principles on linkages among realms of reality will remain incomplete without reference to the additional principles Vols. 1 and 3 of *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. Together, the three volumes provide a robust theory of the dynamics of human interaction and organization that addresses the long-problematic issue of the linkages among levels of social reality.

I began *Theoretical Principles of Sociology* with the belief that, once actual theoretical principles about each level of social reality were developed, the issue of linkage problem that has plagued theoretical sociology would resolve itself. I was not completely sure that such would be the case, but I now have more confidence in this initial supposition. Still, others will have to evaluate whether or not the theory adequately links the realms of social reality into a coherent theory.

In the principles below, I have used my own vocabulary, but concepts denoted by this vocabulary can be translated into other theoretical vocabularies by those interested in correcting, extending, or testing the theory. The core ideas come from a range of micro-level theories, blended with theories from the meso- and macro-level theories in sociology. Hence, the dynamics portrayed in the principles should seem familiar because they have already been theorized in sociology. My contribution – if any – is to synthesize and integrate diverse theories into one long and perhaps rather complicated set of theoretical principles, but these principles do cover the entire micro-dynamic realm. This realm could be extended by principles on the psychology and biology of persons who, after all, are the actors in encounters; and so, the theory is limited to this extent. Yet, as has been evident, my portrayal of

transactional needs and frequent references to humans as evolved apes brings these two realms into play, but not in any comprehensive way. These two additional realms have important sociological dimensions which, as a discipline, sociology should begin to explore in the future because encounters can only be that much better understood by the analysis of personhood and human biology (and its evolution).

Perhaps I can get caught up in the project, as Herbert Spencer did with his *Synthetic Philosophy* well over a century ago, and add two more volumes to *Theoretical Principles of Sociology*. For the present, I will stop with three volumes, offering these principles below and those in Vols. 1 and 3 as my best effort – at least for the present – to develop a general theory in the spirit of the old “grand theories” in sociology but a theory that, while general and abstract, is still *explanatory theory* rather than philosophical discourse, history of ideas, category building, and other intellectual activities that are often passed off as grand theorizing. The problem with previous grand theorizing in sociology, especially the last great effort with functional theory, is that much of it was not really theory; instead, it was a suggestive system of categories that did not explain social reality with abstract principles like those below (and in Vols. 1 and 3). My theory, in contrast, tries to explain social reality with testable propositions laws or principles. Whatever the substantive merits of the theory as it is arrayed below, it is an explanation of how the micro universe operates.

The Principles of the Microdynamic Realm

Basic Properties and Dynamics in Encounters

1. The viability of a focused encounter is a positive and multiplicative function of its participants’ capacity to:
 - A. Sustain a common visual, cognitive, and emotional focus of attention
 - B. Form an ecological huddle allowing for
 1. Heightened mutual relevance of acts
 2. Eye-to-eye contact, maximizing perception and monitoring
 3. Use of talk and body language
 4. Rhythmic synchronization of talk and bodies
 5. Emotional entrainment
 - C. Use ritual and ceremonial punctuations for opening, closing, entering, exiting, and structuring the interpersonal flow
 - D. Use rituals to repair breaches to the interpersonal flow
 - E. Experience an emergent “we” feeling of solidarity

- F. Symbolize this solidarity with words, phrases, and objects that operate as totems or markers of the solidarity
 - G. Exhibit righteous anger for violations of the symbols marking group solidarity and, for those violating these symbols, demands for ritual apologies
2. The ability of individuals to form and sustain a focused encounters is a function of the conditions listed under 1-A through 1-G above and a positive and additive function of the capacity of participants' capacity to:
- A. Develop common meanings for the ecology of the place, particularly organization of space and the props available for use in space
 - B. Develop common meanings for the demography of the bodies copresent, particularly their numbers, movements, density, and memberships in categoric units.
 - C. Understand each other's relative status and the respective prerogatives of status
 - D. Make viable roles for self and, through role-taking, and determine the roles being presented by others
 - E. Establish normative expectations for:
 - 1. The relevant categoric unit memberships of self and others, the nature of the situation, and the appropriate level of intimacy
 - 2. The relevant frames and procedures for keying and re-keying frames
 - 3. The appropriate forms of talk and non-verbal communication
 - 4. The appropriate rituals to be employed
 - 5. The appropriate emotions to be felt and displayed.
 - F. Meet transactional needs for:
 - 1. Verifying types and levels of identity salient in the situation
 - 2. Making profits in exchanges of resources
 - 3. Sensing group inclusion for self in the interpersonal flow
 - 4. Experiencing trust in others
 - 5. Perceiving facticity
 - G. Experience a high ratio of positive to negative emotions.
3. The viability and ability to execute unfocused encounters is a positive and additive function of individuals' capacities to:
- A. Avoid face-to-face engagement with others
 - B. Develop common meanings for how the ecology of place, particularly organization of space and the props available for use in space, is to be used to avoid focus
 - C. Develop common meanings for how the situational demography, particularly the number, movements, and density of various categories of bodies in space, can be used to avoid focus

- D. Understand how relative status, if relevant in the situation, can be used to avoid focus or, if focus is inevitable, how relative status is to be used to navigate in and out of focus
- E. Use role-making and role-taking to avoid focus or, if focus is inevitable, how role-making and role-taking can be used to navigate in and out of focus
- F. Determine normative expectations appropriate for members of categorical units, treating others as personages in a situation of unfocus, without face-engagement, keying proper frames, engaging in ritual acts sustaining unfocus and managing episodes of focus in unfocused situations, and displaying through demeanor cues neutral and/or low-key positive emotions keeping others from having to focus on behavioral outputs
- G. Understand how transactional needs for verifying identities, receiving profits in exchanges, experiencing group inclusion, developing a sense of trust, and having a sense of facticity must be subordinated to sustaining a lack of focus with others
- H. Understand that emission of high levels of any emotion, whether positive or negative, will often breach unfocused encounters and cause focus

The Embedding of Encounters

4. The more an encounter is embedded in corporate and categorical units, and the more these units are, respectively, embedded in relatively autonomous institutional domains and in class locations in the stratification system of a society or inter-societal system, the more readily will participants in the encounter be able to interpret the meaning of the ecology and demography of the situation, to determine each other's relative status, to role-make and role-take successfully, to normatize the situation from their stocks of knowledge about the culture of corporate and categorical units, to determine how to meet universal motive- or need-states, and to display and feel the appropriate emotions; and conversely, the less embedded is an encounter in corporate and categorical units and, by extension, macro-level sociocultural formations, the more ambiguous are expectations likely to be and, hence, the more effort individuals will expend in determining the meaning of situational ecology and demography, the respective status and roles of participants, the relevant norms of the situation, the means for meeting motive-states, and the appropriate emotions to be felt and displayed.

- A. The more an encounter is embedded in a corporate unit, the greater will be the effects of embedding, with these effects increasing with:
1. Visible boundaries marking a corporate unit off from its environment
 2. Clear entrance and exit rules for entering and leaving the corporate unit
 3. Explicitness of goals organizing the division of labor
 4. Explicitness of both the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor
 5. Formality of the culture and structure of the corporate unit and its division of labor
 6. Degree of correlation of positions in the division of labor with memberships in nominal categoric units, especially correlations with the vertical division of labor
 7. Level of autonomy of the institutional domain in which a corporate unit is embedded
 8. Level of consistency among generalized symbolic media, ideologies, and norms governing an institutional domain and the corporate units in this domain
- B. The more an encounter is embedded in categoric units defined by nominal parameters or by graduated parameters that are converted into quasi-nominal categories, the greater are the effects of embedding on microdynamic processes, with these effects increasing with:
1. Discreteness of the parameters defining the boundaries of categoric unit membership
 2. Consensus over the relative evaluation of members of categoric units and the ideologies and meta-ideologies used to form this evaluation
 3. Correlation of memberships in categoric units with class locations within the stratification system, with this correlation increasing with:
 - a. The degree of inequality of resource distribution by corporate units
 - b. The degree of intra-class homogeneity
 - c. The degree of linearity in the ranking of classes on a scale of moral worth
 - d. The degree to which inter-class mobility is restricted
 4. Correlation of memberships in categoric units with positions in the divisions of labor, especially the vertical division of labor, in diverse corporate units across a wide range of institutional domains
 5. Degree of homogeneity among members in diverse categoric units
 6. Degree of salience of categoric unit memberships in general, with this general salience being an additive function of the conditions listed above

- C. The less an encounter is embedded in categoric units and/or categoric units are of low salience, the greater will be the effects of:
 - 1. Status in the divisions of labor of corporate units on all microdynamic processes in focused encounters
 - 2. Ecology and demography in unfocused encounters
- D. The less are encounters embedded in the divisions of labor of corporate units, the greater will be the effects of memberships in differentially evaluated categoric units on all microdynamic processes in both focused and unfocused encounters

The Ecology and Demography of Encounters

- 5. The more individuals in a focused encounter understand the meaning of situational ecology and demography, the greater will be the potential effects of ecology and demography on a focused encounter, and the more likely will individuals be able to create and sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with understanding of situational ecology and demography increasing with:
 - A. Embedding of the encounter in a corporate unit and, in turn, the degree of embedding of the corporate unit in an institutional domain, with the effects of embedding increasing with:
 - 1. Clarity of status and roles of individuals, with clarity increasing with the formality of the horizontal and vertical divisions of labor in the corporate unit
 - 2. Consensus over the meanings of use-spaces and props, especially when these serve as markers of the relative status and roles of participants, while plugging participants into the culture of the corporate unit and more inclusive institutional domain
 - 3. Availability use-spaces and partitions (a) restricting movements of participants in and out of the encounter, (b) limiting the number of individuals co-present, and (c) determining density of those co-present
 - B. Embedding of an encounter in categoric units linked to locations in the larger system of stratification, with this effect increasing with:
 - 1. Homogeneity among members in categoric units participating in a focused encounter
 - 2. Correlation of categoric units with locations in space and distribution of use-spaces and props in this space, and especially when space, use-spaces, and props can serve as markers of memberships in categoric units

3. Consolidation of members of categoric units with both the horizontal and vertical differentiation of status and roles of corporate units embedded within institutional domains
6. The more individuals understand the meaning of the ecology and demography of a situation, the more they can avoid face-engagement in unfocused encounters and the more likely will they be able to manage episodes of face-engagement when they occur, with avoidance of face-engagement and/or management of episodes of face- engagements increasing with:
 - A. Size of the space and the degree of spacing among individuals
 - B. Speed of movements by individuals through space
 - C. Capacity of individuals to claim territories of self, with this capacity increasing with the clarity of norms over the:
 1. Fixed geographical use-spaces that can be claimed
 2. Egocentric preserves of non-encroachment that can be claimed when moving in space
 3. Personal spaces that can be claimed
 4. Stalls and territories that can be temporarily claimed
 5. Use-spaces that can be occupied for instrumental purposes
 6. Turns in spaces that can be sequentially claimed
 7. Possessional territory and objects identified with, and arrayed around self, to claim distance from others
 8. Informational preserves that can be used to regulate disclosure of facts about self
 9. Conversational preserves that can be invoked to control talk
 - D. Availability of props to mark spaces and activate the salience of norms regulating the claims listed in C above
 - E. Capacity of individuals to provide demeanor cues about:
 1. Appropriateness of their activities at the present time and place so that the need for focus is reduced
 2. Willingness to avoid encroachment on, and hence threat to, others in space that the need to focus is reduced
 3. Ability to regulate conduct without duress and constraints so that the need to focus is reduced
 - F. Knowledge and availability of normatively appropriate repair rituals, revolving around the capacity to:
 1. Give accounts and explanations for transgressions of unfocus
 2. Offer apologies or expressions of embarrassment and regret for actions that break unfocus
 3. Make requests or pre-emptive and redemptive inquiries for possible transgressions of unfocus

- G. Embedding of space, movements in space, props, use-spaces, and territories of self within corporate units within an institutional domain, especially with respect to rules about when and how unfocus is to be sustained, with this effect of embedding increasing with:
1. Clarity of the division of labor
 2. Hierarchy in the division of labor
 3. Correlation of space and props with positions in the division of labor
- H. Embedding in diverse and differentially evaluated categoric units and the clarity of status beliefs about the characteristics of members in these categoric units and expectation states for these members' behaviors, with the clarity of expectation states increasing with:
1. Clarity in the parameters marking categoric unit membership, with nominal parameters generally providing more clarity than graduated parameters
 2. Homogeneity of membership in categoric units, with homogeneity of individuals in a categoric units increasing clarity of expectation states (and conversely, with heterogeneity increasing ambiguity of expectation states among members of diverse categoric units)
 3. Differential evaluation of members in diverse categoric units in space, which will:
 - a. Increase the rate of unfocus and, if focus is inevitable, will increase the potential tension in episodes of focused interaction
 - b. Increase the use of highly ritualized forms of talk and body demeanor to move into focus, and then back to unfocus
 4. Clarity of props denoting memberships in distinctive categoric units and the normative meanings of these props for signaling unfocus
 5. Nature of the activity, with those activities focused on common symbols and totems allowing more latitude to move in and out of unfocus among those observing or participating in these activities
- I. Mediation of movements in space by individuals using communication technologies, serving as markers that invoke norms of unfocused encounters (to not interrupt those engaged in a mediated, and semi-focused encounter)

Status Dynamics in Encounters

7. The more status is salient and relevant in a focused encounter, the more likely will the participants in this encounter be able to create and sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with effects of status being:

- A. A positive function of the stability in the expectation states attached to status, with this stability of expectation states increasing with:
1. Individuals' abilities to meet expectation states associated with status
 2. Consistency among status beliefs generating expectation states
 3. Differentiation of status and the expectation states associated with status
 4. Embeddedness of encounters in the structure and culture of meso-level units, with the effects of embedding increasing with:
 - a. The existence of referential structures, or beliefs about "just" and "fair" payoffs of resources that correspond to inequalities in expectation states on those with different degrees of status
 - b. The existence of status beliefs that both establish and legitimate status differences, with the effects of status beliefs increasing with:
 - (1) Salience of institutional ideologies, as these reflect value premises in a society, to establish expectation states and evaluations associated with status in corporate units
 - (2) Salience of meta-ideologies, composed of the ideologies of those institutional domains distributing resources, to establish expectation states and evaluations of members of categoric units
 - (3) Consistency among ideologies, meta-ideologies, status beliefs, and referential structures used to establish expectation states and evaluations of status
- B. A negative function of instability in the expectation states attached to status, with instability increasing with:
1. Iterations of encounters over time that lower the salience of status, particularly diffuse status characteristics generated by membership in categoric units
 2. Strategizing by individuals to raise their status, which is most effective when:
 - a. Avoiding direct challenges to the rights and prerogatives of higher status persons
 - b. Using indirect strategies of displaying competence and other characteristics needed to raise status
 3. Intersections of differentially evaluated status characteristics, especially the intersection of diffuse status characteristics among memberships in differentially valued categoric units with positions in divisions of labor in corporate units
 4. Ambiguity in persons' status, particularly their diffuse status characteristics associated with categoric unit membership

5. High levels of negative emotional arousal among those in subordinate status positions in corporate units or in devalued categoric units
- C. A positive function of the clarity of status which, in turn, is a positive function of the degree of embedding of the encounter in corporate and categoric units (with embedding increasing clarity under the conditions listed in 4-A and 4-B above), while being a negative function of:
1. The prevalence of status competition and games of micropolitics among individuals with the same or different status
 2. The degree of intersection of diffuse status characteristics for individuals in categoric units with their locations in the vertical and horizontal divisions of labor in corporate units
 3. The rate of iteration of encounters over time, especially with respect to decreasing clarity of diffuse status characteristics from categoric unit memberships and horizontal divisions of labor in corporate units
 4. The pervasiveness of intersections between diffuse status characteristics for individuals in categoric units and locations in the divisions of labor in corporate units across a wide variety of corporate units embedded in diverse institutional domains
- D. A positive function of the degree to which higher status incumbents use their authority and prestige to mark their rank vis-à-vis subordinates
- E. A positive function of the degree of density of network ties among individuals in encounters which, in turn, is a negative function of the size of the encounter and the size of the corporate unit in which the encounter occurs, while potentially being mitigated by the formation of cliques within the lower-density network structures
- F. A positive function of the degree of structural equivalence among individuals within the divisions of labor of corporate units and in categoric units vis-à-vis other locations in the divisions of labor and other categoric units, with structural equivalence increasing when:
1. Corporate units evidence differentiated status positions, especially along a vertical axis of authority and prestige
 2. Categoric units are formed by nominal and quasi-nominal parameters that define status characteristics which are differentially evaluated by status beliefs derived from meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system
 3. Differentially evaluated categoric unit memberships are correlated with locations, especially vertical locations, in the divisions of labor of corporate units across diverse institutional domains
- G. A positive function of the degree to which networks exhibit centrality whereby communication and resources must flow through particular

- status locations in the network, thereby increasing the power and authority of those occupying these central nodes in the network
- H. A positive function of the degree to which status is defined by the relative power and authority of incumbents and the degree to which these differences in power are legitimated by subordinates, with legitimated status differences increasing with (1) the ability of those in authority to meet expectation states derived from institutional ideologies, while decreasing when (2) those with authority (a) fail to meet expectations or live up to institutional ideologies, (b) blame subordinates for their failure to meet expectations, and thereby, (c) arouse negative emotions among subordinates
- I. A positive function of the degree to which status is defined and differentiated by the relative prestige of incumbents, with the ability to garner prestige and deference from others increasing with:
1. Inequalities in the resource shares held by members of categoric units and by incumbents in locations in the division of labor of corporate units
 2. Correlation (or consolidation) of moral worth in categoric units with rank in divisions of labor within corporate units
 3. Intersection of parameters marking categoric unit membership with positions, especially ranked positions, in the divisions of labor within corporate units embedded in diverse institutional domains
8. The more status can be determined using ecological and demographic markers, the greater will be its effects on unfocused encounters, and hence, the more likely will participants be able to sustain unfocus, with the ability to determine status increasing with:
- A. The visibility of markers of status in the divisions of labor of corporate units, with visibility increasing with:
1. Discreteness of boundaries marking corporate units and use-spaces in these units, which increases with:
 - a. The visibility of entrances to and exits from corporate units
 - b. The explicitness of rules governing entrances and exits
 - c. The emission of ritual acts during entrances and exits
 2. The degree to which positions in the divisions of labor within corporate units can be marked by objects and behavioral demeanor
 3. The degree of correlation (consolidation) of positions in the division of labor with differentially valued memberships in diverse categoric units
- B. The visibility of parameters marking categoric unit membership, with visibility of members in categoric units increasing with:

1. Discrete or nominal parameters marking categoric unit membership
2. Categoric memberships that are marked by visible objects, props, and role demeanors
3. Graduated parameters that are converted into visible quasi-nominal parameters
4. Differential evaluation of categoric units, which is a joint function of:
 - a. The degree of correlation of categoric unit memberships with class locations in the stratification system
 - b. The differential evaluation of members of categoric units by status beliefs derived from the meta-ideologies legitimating the stratification system

Role Dynamics in Encounters

9. The more individuals are able to role-make and role-take in focused encounters, the greater will be the effects of roles vis-à-vis other microdynamic processes, and the more likely will participants in the encounter be able to create and sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with the likelihood of active role-making and role-taking increasing with:
 - A. Initial lack of clarity in the status of self and others, with these efforts to use role-making and role-taking to determine status an inverse function of:
 1. Embeddedness in corporate units
 2. Embeddedness in categoric units
 - B. Ambiguity over the relevant elements of culture necessary for normatization
 - C. Success in initial mutual role-taking, with this success in role-taking increasing with:
 1. Consensus over and consistency among conventional gestures and the syntax ordering these gestures
 2. Intensity of transactional needs, especially needs for trust, facticity, and self-verification
 3. Coherence in stocks of knowledge of roles and variants of roles
 4. Embedding of the encounter in corporate and categoric units, with this embedding having larger effects on roles under the conditions listed in 4-A and 4-B above
 5. Success in normatization of the encounter, with normatizing having larger effects on roles under the conditions listed in 14-A-F below

- D. Success in initial role-making of complementary roles among individuals, with this success in role-making increasing with:
1. Success in mutual role-taking among individuals, with this success increasing with the conditions listed under 7-A above
 2. Success in status-taking and status-making, with success in status-making and status-taking increasing under the conditions listed under 7-A, 7-C through 7-G and decreasing with the conditions listed under 7-B above
 3. Strong transactional needs to have identities attached to the roles verified
 4. Reliance on preassembled, generalized, trans-situational roles in role-making
- E. Success in and mutual role-verification of roles, with role-verification increasing with the:
1. Conditions listed under 7-A and 7-C listed above
 2. Mutual ability of persons to determine the salience of identities that are lodged in roles and that direct role-making, with the salience of one or more identities in a role increasing with:
 - a. The level of animation and emotionality with which individuals play
 - b. The level of costs and investments incurred by individuals to play a role
 - c. The extent to which the role is highly evaluated by macro-level ideologies and meta-ideologies
 - d. The degree of power and authority inhering in a role
 - e. The degree to which a role is tied to performances by members of categoric units
 - f. The extent to which a role can be used as a resource to gain access to additional resources
 - g. The degree to which a role is discretionary and chosen by persons
 - h. The extent to which a role is played with a high level of competence
10. The arousal of positive emotions in encounters increases when role-taking, role-making, and role-verification enable status-taking, status-making, and normatizing to be successful, whereas the arousal of negative emotions increases when role-taking, role-making, and role-verification fail to establish the relative status of self and others as well as relevant elements of culture, thereby increasing the likelihood of breaches to the encounter and/or its termination

11. The more an encounter in which negative emotions have been aroused and where breaches have occurred cannot be terminated, the greater will be efforts of individuals to re-role-take, re-role make, and re-verify roles, thereby increasing the salience of roles and making the effect of roles on the behaviors of individuals that much greater
12. The more individuals can monitor, without direct face engagement, the behavioral demeanors of others to determine the roles that these others are playing, the more they can sustain unfocus and avoid potential breaches that can occur when focus occurs, with the capacity to monitor without face engagement increasing with:
 - A. Consensus over the meaning of the properties of situational ecology (configuration of space, use spaces, and props) and the legitimate role behaviors that these properties allow
 - B. Consensus over the meaning of objects adorning others' territories of self and the roles that these objects denote
 - C. Markers of status within the divisions of labor of corporate units and the expectations for roles that are attached to status
 - D. Markers of membership in categoric units and the expectations for roles that are contained in status beliefs about members of differentiated categoric units
13. The more behavioral demeanors of others are consistent with the expectations attached to properties of situational ecology, objects adorning territories of self, markers of status in corporate units and categoric units, and the more these expectations are consistent with what is normatively appropriate in unfocused situations, the more likely is unfocus to be sustained and, if breached momentarily, the more likely will individuals know and use the appropriate repair rituals to return to unfocus

Normalizing Dynamics in Encounters

14. The more a focused encounter can be normalized, the more it can sustain its focus and rhythmic synchronization of talk and body language, with normalization increasing when individuals can culture-make and culture-take and, thereby, successfully:
 - A. Categorize the encounter, with categorization being a multiplicative function of the capacity of individuals to assemble and reconcile expectations for:

1. The relative amounts of work-practical, social, and ceremonial content to be played out
 2. The relative amounts of intimacy to be to be exhibited by individuals
 3. The relevance of diffuse status characteristics arising from categoric unit memberships and status beliefs associated with these memberships
 4. The relevance of status location of individuals in corporate units
 5. The duration and rate of iteration of the encounter which, to varying degrees, will:
 - a. Decrease the salience of diffuse status characteristics
 - b. Decrease the salience of status in corporate units
 - c. Increase the level of intimacy
 - d. Add social content
 - e. Increase the amount of particularistic culture
- B. Frame the encounter, with framing increasing when individuals can use rituals to assemble and reconcile expectations for:
1. Elements of categorization, which is a multiplicative function of the conditions listed under 14-A above
 2. Elements of body, especially distances among, allowable access to, and relevant portions of bodies
 3. Elements of demography, especially membership in categoric units, number of persons co-present, and migrations of persons in and out of the encounter
 4. Elements of ecology, especially the configuration of space, props, use-spaces, and physical boundaries
 5. Cultural elements, especially relevant value premises, ideologies, and norms
 6. Structural elements, especially relevant corporate and categoric units, institutional domains, and dimensions of stratification
 7. Personal elements, especially biography, self-involvement, emotionality, and intimacy
- C. Establish forms of communication in the encounter revolving around talk and body language, with expectations on forms of communication increasing when individuals can use rituals to:
1. Categorize the encounter
 2. Frame the encounter
 3. Shift forms of communication

- D. Invoke and use rituals to open and close the interaction, form and reform the rhythmic flow of interaction, totemize or symbolically represent the interaction and corporate units in which it is embedded, and repair breaches to the interaction
 - E. Regulate the valence and intensity of emotions by developing expectations for the feelings to be experienced and displayed, with the constraints of these feelings rules increasing with:
 1. Categorization of self, other(s), and situation in the encounter
 2. Framing of the encounter
 3. Establishing forms of talk and body language to be used in the encounter
 4. Rituals to structure the flow of interaction in the encounter
 - F. Embedding of the encounter in corporate and categoric units that are, respectively, embedded in a relatively autonomous institutional domain or a clear class location in the system of stratification
15. The more an unfocused encounter can be normatized, the more likely will individuals be able to sustain unfocus and thereby avoid or repair breaches that come with focusing unfocused encounters, with normatization of unfocused encounters increasing with:
- A. Embedding of situational ecology within corporate units and their cultures which, in turn, increases the likelihood that individuals will understand:
 1. The meanings of the spatial configuration in which unfocused encounters occur
 2. The meaning of props and use-spaces within this configuration
 3. The meanings of density and movement individuals within this configuration
 4. The status and roles that might be relevant to the actions of persons within this configuration
 - B. Embedding of demography within corporate and categoric units, which increases the likelihood that individuals will understand:
 1. The status beliefs and expectation states for individuals in categoric units
 2. The expectation states for individuals occupying status positions within the divisions of labor of corporate units and playing roles within these units
 3. The meaning of varying levels of density among individuals within locations in space, especially the density among members of varying categoric units, incumbents in status positions within divisions of labor of corporate units, and individuals playing roles in these units

4. The meaning of movements of individuals through space, especially the movement of members of categoric units, incumbents in status positions in the divisions of labor of corporate units, and individuals playing roles in these units
- C. Capacity of individuals to use appropriate rituals and forms of communication to manage episodes of focus in unfocused situations, which increases with the extent to which the conditions under 15-A and 15-B above are realized

Transactional-Need Dynamics in Encounters

16. The more individuals in a focused encounter can meet transactional needs, in order of their relative magnitude, for verifying identities, for receiving profitable exchange payoffs, for achieving a sense of group inclusion, for establishing a sense of trust, and for achieving a sense of facticity, the more they will be able to create and sustain focus, rhythmic synchronization, and emotional entrainment, and the more will these encounters develop solidarity and symbols marking this solidarity; and conversely, the more transactional needs fail to be met in an encounter, the more likely are the negative emotions aroused to cause breaches and/or efforts to terminate the encounter
- A. The more salient are identities of individuals in a focused encounter, and the more emotions attached to these identities, the more interaction will revolve around identity verification as the primary focus of attention and as a condition for rhythmic synchronization, with the salience of identities, the emotional valencing of these identities, and efforts at their verification increasing when:
1. Core-identities are highly salient and when verification of this core level of identity must be channeled through verification of a social-identity and role-identity
 2. Group-identities, social-identities, and role-identities alone or in combination are highly salient and require active role-making by each person, while requiring active affirmation from others in the encounter
- B. The more individuals can receive profits in exchanges of resources in a focused encounter and experience positive emotions as a result of these profits, the greater will be the focus, rhythmic synchronization, and emotional entrainment among individuals, with profitable exchange payoffs increasing when:

1. Resources available in an encounter can be readily determined
 2. Resources received by each individual are perceived as proportionate to each's relative costs and investments
 3. Resources received meet expectations and cultural definitions of fairness and just shares
 4. Resources received are assessed by common reference point(s) for evaluating relative costs, investments, and just shares
- C. The more individuals in a focused encounter can perceive that they are part of the ongoing flow of interaction in an encounter, the more likely will they reveal mild positive emotions, sustain focus, fall into rhythmic synchronization, and potentially become emotionally entrained, with this sense of group inclusion increasing when expectations for what would constitute group inclusion are clear and when other transactional needs can be realized
- D. The more individuals in a focused encounter sense that others are in synchronization, that their actions are predictable, that they are sincere, and that they are respectful of others, the more likely will they experience trust and mild positive emotions and the more likely are they to be able to sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with this sense of trust increasing when other transactional needs are realized.
- E. The more individuals in a focused encounter can sense that the situation is as it appears, that self and others have common inter-subjective experiences, and that the situation has an obdurate character, the more likely will they experience a sense of facticity and mild positive emotions and the more likely are they to be able to sustain focus and rhythmic synchronization, with this sense of facticity increasing when needs for trust are realized
17. The capacity of individuals to meet any or all transactional needs in a focused encounter is a positive and additive function of:
- A. The degree of embedding of an encounter in corporate units within relatively autonomous institutional domains, with the effects of this embedding being an additive function of:
 1. Ideologies and institutional norms that can guide the process of normatization
 2. Vertical and horizontal divisions of labor making expectation states over status unambiguous
 3. Roles that are attached to the status order and are regulated by the process of normatization
 4. Consensus over the meanings of situational ecology and demography

- B. The degree of embedding of an encounter in categoric units attached to locations in the stratification system, with the effects of this embedding being a positive and additive function of:
 1. The visibility of memberships in categoric units
 2. The degree to which membership in categoric units is defined by nominal parameters or graduated parameters that have been converted to quasi-nominal parameters
 3. The level of consensus over status beliefs by both those who are members and non-members of categoric units
 4. The degree of differential evaluation contained in status beliefs about memberships in differentiated categoric units
 5. The degree of consolidation of membership in differentiated categoric units with locations in the division of labor of corporate units

- 18. The more individuals can meet transactional needs for trust and facticity through monitoring the behaviors of others without actual face-engagement, while keeping the valence and salience of needs for identity-verification, exchange payoffs, and group inclusion low, the more likely can they sustain unfocus and use appropriate repair rituals to re-establish unfocus when temporary episodes of focus occur, with the capacity to sustain trust and facticity increasing with:
 - A. Embedding of unfocused encounters in corporate units where situational ecology and demography, status markers, role demeanors, and normatization generate create clear expectations for behaviors maintaining unfocus
 - B. Embedding of unfocused encounters in categoric units where status beliefs establish clear expectation states for behavioral demeanors maintaining unfocus
 - C. Consistency and congruence between expectations for behavioral demeanors established by embedding and the actual behaviors of others in a situation of unfocus

Emotional Dynamics in Encounters

- 19. The more individuals meet expectations in a focused encounter, especially those revolving around other microdynamic forces, and the more they perceive that they have been positively sanctioned by others and/or are able to positively sanction themselves in self-evaluations, the more

likely will these individuals experience positive emotions and give off positive emotions to others in the encounter, thereby increasing the common mood, focus of attention, rhythmic synchronization, emotional entrainment, and solidarity of the encounter; and conversely, the less individuals meet these expectations and/or perceive that they have received negative sanctions from others or from their own self evaluations, the more likely will they experience and express negative emotions that breach or, at a minimum, decrease the common mood, focus, rhythmic synchronization, positive emotional entrainment, and solidarity of the encounter.

20. The likelihood that individuals will meet expectations and/or receive positive sanctions in a focused encounter is a positive function of the clarity of expectations, with clarity of expectations being a positive and multiplicative function of the degree to which:
 - A. Participants in encounters use the same emotional phonemes and syntax
 - B. Encounters are embedded in corporate units, which is a positive function of the conditions listed under 4-A above
 - C. Encounters are embedded in categoric units, which is a positive function of the conditions listed under 4-B above
 - D. Corporate and categoric units are embedded, respectively, in relatively autonomous institutional domains and at relatively clear class locations in the stratification system
 - E. Cultural symbols of meso-level structures are consistent with each other and embody moral codes, which is a positive function of their embedding in institutional domains and stratification systems
21. The more individuals experience negative emotions in a focused encounter and the greater the number of identities in play, but especially core-identities, the more likely are they to activate defensive strategies and/or engage in repression of these negative emotions, particularly shame and at times guilt; and the more repressed are negative emotions about self, the more likely will these emotions intensify and become transmuted into one or more of the constituent emotions making up the first- and second-order emotions that have been repressed
22. The more intense are the negative or positive emotions aroused in focused encounters, the more likely are individuals to make causal attributions for their emotional experiences, with these attributions increasing with:
 - A. Positive emotional experiences revealing a proximal bias, that increases the likelihood of individuals making self-attributions or close external

- attributions to others in the immediate encounter, with self-attributions producing variants of satisfaction happiness or, if there was some fear about meeting expectations or receiving positive sanctions, first-order elaborations of happiness such as pride; and as individuals make self-attributions or attributions to immediate others, the common mood, focus, rhythmic synchronization, emotional entrainment, solidarity, and symbolization of the encounter will increase
- B. Negative emotional experiences evidencing a distal bias that grows stronger with repression, especially repression of negative emotions about self, and thereby increasing the likelihood that individuals will express (1) anger at, or alienation from, the structure and culture of corporate units in which the encounter is embedded, (2) anger at and, prejudicial status beliefs about, members of categoric units, and potentially, (3) anger at, disaffection from, macro-level sociocultural formations
 - C. Self-attributions for negative emotions causing individuals to experience sadness, fear, and anger at self, which in turn increases the likelihood that these individuals will also experience shame and, if moral codes are salient, guilt as well
 - D. Negative emotions expressed toward others in the encounter causing these others to express counter-anger as a negative sanction in a potentially spiraling cycle that will breach the encounter and decrease the likelihood that the encounter will be iterated
 - E. Negative emotions targeting powerful others in an encounter, causing fear to be mixed with anger and, at the same time, increasing the likelihood that these negative emotions will jump over the encounter and target meso and macro sociocultural formations
 - F. Negative emotional arousal in focused encounters persistently targeting meso and macro sociocultural formations, and especially negative emotions arising from repression, intensification, and transmutation having the greatest potential for change-producing effects in meso and macro sociocultural formations
 - G. Persistent positive emotions experienced in encounters across a range of institutional domains having the greatest potential for distal attributions, and hence, for having reproductive effects on meso and macro sociocultural formations
23. The more individuals can sustain expressive control in unfocused encounters through neutral or mildly positive interpersonal demeanor, while seeking to meet only needs for trust and facticity, the more likely are they to avoid face-engagement and, hence, the more likely are they to sustain unfocus, with this capacity to avoid face-engagement increasing with:

- A. Embedding in corporate units specifying the relevance, if any, of status and roles in divisions of labor, culture used in normatization, and meanings associated with the ecology and demography of the situation
- B. Embedding in categoric units with clear sets of status beliefs about, and expectation states for, how members of such units are to behave
- C. Knowledge of relevant rituals, and the ability to enact ritual openings, repairs, and closings of focus to re-establish unfocus when face-engagements occur

Microdynamics and the Reproduction or Transformation of Meso- and Macro-level Sociocultural Formations

- 24. The more viable are unfocused encounters embedded in corporate and categoric units nested, respectively, inside of institutional domains and stratification systems, the more likely are these encounters to reproduce corporate and categoric units and, by extension, the culture and structure of macro-level social units, with the viability of unfocused encounters being an additive function of the conditions listed above under 3A-H, 6A-I, 8A,B, 12A-C, 15A-C, 18A-C, 23A-C
- 25. The more both focused and unfocused encounters allow individuals to move among, or interact directly with, strangers in diverse categoric units and at different places in the divisions of labor in corporate units, the more likely will microdynamic processes reproduce corporate and categoric units and, by extension, the culture and structure of macro-level units.
- 26. The more iterated encounters embedded within corporate and categoric units lead to consistent positive emotional arousal among their participants, the more likely are individuals to develop commitments to the structure and culture of these mesostructures; and the more individuals experience consistent positive emotional arousal across iterated encounters within diverse corporate and categoric units within clearly differentiated institutional domains with their own norms, ideologies and generalized symbolic media and within differentiated classes and class-factions with their own legitimating ideologies, the greater will be reserves of positive emotional energy and, hence, the more likely will the proximal bias of positive emotions be broken, allowing individuals to develop commitments to the structure and culture of macrostructures and their cultures.

- A. The more stratified is a society, and the more clear-cut are class divisions and factions within classes, the more likely will the distribution of positive emotional energy among members of a population be correlated with the distribution of power, money, and prestige; and hence, the more likely are those in the upper and middle classes and dominant factions in all classes to experience positive emotional arousal in encounters, leading them to develop commitments to the system of stratification and the ideologies legitimating this system.
 - B. The more differentiated are institutional domains involved in distributing resources, the more likely are those experiencing positive emotional arousal in these domains to be in the upper and middle classes and/or dominant factions of classes; and hence, the more likely are individuals in these classes and factions to experience positive emotional arousal in encounters, leading them to develop commitments to both the culture and structure of system of stratification and the institutional domains generating this system.
 - C. The more corporate units within institutional domains or class-factions within the stratification system are mobilized for change-oriented action, and the greater has been the consistency of positive emotional arousal and the level of commitments among members in these units, the more likely will these corporate units or factions be successful in change-oriented activities, if they have other necessary material, organization, and symbolic resources.
27. The more iterated encounters embedded within corporate and categoric units lead to consistent negative emotional arousal among their participants, the less likely are individuals to develop commitments to the structure and culture of these meso-level units; and the more individuals experience consistent negative emotional arousal across iterated encounters within diverse corporate and categoric units within clearly differentiated institutional domains and within clearly differentiated classes and class-factions of the stratification system, the less will be their commitments to the structure and culture of macro-level units, and the more likely will their cumulative negative emotional arousal be mobilized in efforts to change the culture and structure of macro-level sociocultural formations.
- A. The more negative emotional arousal in mesostructures within distributive institutional domains is accompanied by consistent positive emotional arousal in non-distributive institutional domains, the less will be the mobilization and change potential of cumulative

- negative emotional arousal in these mesostructures of institutional domains.
- B. The more individuals experiencing negative emotional arousal in mesostructures within distributive institutional domains make self-attributions for their failures in these domains, the less will be the mobilization and change potential of cumulative negative emotional arousal.
 - C. The more negative emotional arousal in mesostructures within institutional domains has evoked variants and first-order elaborations of fear, anger, and sadness, the more likely are individuals to have also experienced second-order elaboration of these negative emotions, particularly shame and alienation but also guilt if failures in these domains are evaluated in moral terms.
 - D. The more individuals have experienced shame in mesostructures within distributive institutional domains, the more likely are they to have repressed this shame, particularly if they have been unable to verify self in roles and/or to receive just shares of resources; and the more repressed is this shame as well as other second-order emotions like guilt and alienation, the more likely will the anger component of these second-order elaborations of negative primary emotions surface and be part of external attributions, thereby increasing the level of anger at the structure and culture of mesostructures and macrostructures.
28. The more individuals have experienced diffuse anger, especially anger emerging from repressed second-order elaborations of negative primary emotions, the more likely will they make external attributions to macrostructures; and the more likely will they begin to experience intense first-order elaborations of anger such as righteous anger and vengeance at these targets of external attribution.
- A. The more the connection between negative emotional arousal and the structures and persons causing this arousal become obscured, the more distal will the targets of external attributions become, and the more intense will the emotions accompanying these attributions be.
 - B. The more available are resources – ideological, financial, political – and the more leaders can articulate grievances and use negative ideologies to sustain external attributions directed at macrostructures and the negative emotions accompanying these attributions, the more likely will intense forms of anger like righteous anger and vengeance be channeled into collective violence.

1. The more local networks and the encounters in them can sustain high levels of positive emotional energy for the planning and implementation of violence against enemies portrayed in negative ideologies, the more likely are individuals to experience and act upon their righteous anger and feelings of vengeance.
 2. The more negative emotions can be framed in terms of justice and morality, the more intense will the negative ideologies about the targets of external attributions become, and the more will local networks and iterated encounters in these networks increase the intensity of righteous anger and feelings of vengeance, and the more will the goals of the corporate units formed by these networks be viewed in moral absolutes.
29. The likelihood of social changes arising from the microdynamics of encounters to meso-level and macro-level sociocultural formations is a positive multiplicative function of 27D, and 28-A,B above, as well as being a positive and additive function of:
- A. The power and prestige of individuals initiating change in iterated encounters within corporate and categoric units
 - B. The centrality of the encounters initiating change and the density of the overall networks in which change is initiated
 - C. The degree of embeddedness of change-oriented encounters in corporate and categoric units that, in turn, are embedded in relatively autonomous, resource-generating institutional domains
 - D. The degree of embeddedness of change-oriented encounters within institutional domains mediating relations between members of a society and both their biophysical and sociocultural environments
 - E. The rate of iteration, as well as the length of the chains of iteration, of change-oriented encounters
 - F. The number of individuals involved in iterated change-oriented encounters
 - G. The visibility of change-oriented encounters to members of a society, with visibility increasing availability of mass media coverage of events in these encounters
 - H. The level of negative emotional energy directed at distal sociocultural formations, coupled with the level of positive emotional energy circulating among members of change-oriented focused encounters, with this pattern of emotional polarity increasing with the conditions listed in 27D and 28-A,B above

Conclusion

There is little more to say at this point until critics may suggest for making the above principles more parsimonious, at the very least, and more accurate at the most. I am all too aware that the kind of exercise outlined in this book is considered pretentious and naïve by those highly sophisticated philosopher kings in sociology who engage in just about every conceivable intellectual activity except explaining some generic and universal property or properties of the social universe. For them, sociology seems to be endless discourse, meta-analysis, history of ideas, critique of social conditions, and many other non-explanatory pursuits. If this is all that sociology can be, it really should not exist as a discipline. We can fold out tents up and migrate into philosophy, history, or some other new field of study. I say this polemically but I should note that I have learned things even from my harshest critics, but the fundamental critique pervading, perhaps, half of sociology is simply wrong. There is nothing special about the social universe, compared to the biophysical universes; they all reveal generic properties whose underlying dynamics can be explained by formal theories. But, rather than debate this at the level of epistemology, I prefer to demonstrate that laws of human interaction and organization can be developed. To critique the effort because I am wrong on this or that point, miss something important, or need something more is always useful; to critique the effort because it is scientific theorizing is wasted on me and, to turn the tables on critics, is a rather extreme and arrogant position to take. Perhaps there needs to be two sociologies, one devoted to explanatory science, the other to everything else. But, as long as we are in the same tent, then it is important that theories be assessed in terms of how good they are – that is, in how well they explain – rather than in terms of non-scientific criteria and a general pessimism about sociology as an explanatory science.

And so, I welcome criticism leveled against my theory, stated in these twenty-nine principles, that it has ignored key dynamics, that it is not parsimonious, that it is wrong in places, and that it needs improvement and refinement. But, I reject criticism that the effort to develop formal theory about a realm of the social universe is wrong, *per se*. The first kind of criticism should lead the critics to formulate a better theory, whereas the second simply reproduces the solipsism that is so prevalent in sociological theory circles. When sociology abandons science, it has very little to offer a world in desperate need of scientific knowledge about how the social universe operates.

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Author Index

A

Arieti, S., 240
Arnold, M.B., 239

B

Backor, K., 66
Balkwell, J.W., 16
Banich, M.T., 245
Barlow, D.H., 244
Bell, D., 272
Berger, J., 16, 35, 93, 95, 111
Berry, B.J., 57
Blau, P.M., 15, 34, 36, 54, 204, 218, 291
Boehm, C., 110
Boorman, S., 291
Bourdieu, P., 285, 286
Brashears, M.E., 272
Breiger, R.C., 291
Bronson, S.F., 205
Burke, P.J., 21, 133, 196, 234

C

Callero, P.L., 133
Call, J., 252
Carroll, G.R., 57
Cartwright, D., 136
Clark, C., 100, 133, 147
Coleman, J., 204
Collins, R., 8, 14, 19, 24, 58–60, 65, 71, 80, 83,
87, 108, 124, 145, 167, 180, 205, 212,
227, 253, 254, 261, 263, 273, 282, 300
Conner, T.L., 16
Cooley, C.H., 135, 195
Cosmides, L., 205
Covert, M.V., 244
Curran, T., 245

D

Damasio, A., 276
Darwin, C., 239
Dearing, R.L., 244
Depue, B.E., 245
De-Waal, F.b.M., 205
Durkheim, É., 81, 181, 217

E

Ekman, P., 240, 250
Ellsworth, P., 250
Emde, R.N., 239
Emerson, R., 114, 277, 278
Enard, W.M., 174
Epstein, S., 240
Erickson, K.G., 66, 101,
103, 104

F

Fehr, B., 240
Fisek, M.H., 16, 35, 93
Fiske, A., 205
Fletcher, C., 244
Flicker, L., 244
Foschi, M., 93
Freeman, H., 57
Frommel, D.K., 240

G

Gallup, G.G. Jr., 245
Garfinkel, H., 24, 25, 145,
214, 234
Gazzaniga, M.S., 252
Geschwind, N., 276
Giddens, A., 24, 213, 234

Goffman, E., 3, 11, 14, 19, 20, 51, 57–60, 65,
72, 73, 77, 83, 133, 134, 149, 161, 167,
171, 172, 176, 263
Gordon, S.L., 251
Gramzow, R., 244
Grannovetter, M., 34
Gray, J.A., 240
Gregory, S.W. Jr., 175

H

Habermas, J., 212, 234, 272
Hannan, M.T., 57
Harary, F., 136
Hare, B., 252
Haviland, J.M., 240
Hawley, A., 292
Hechter, M., 14, 204
Heider, F., 136
Hochschild, A.R., 20, 183, 184
Hogg, M.A., 21, 199
Homans, G.C., 22, 23, 105,
106, 204
Houser, J.A., 115, 116

I

Izard, C., 239

J

James, W., 195
Jasso, G., 22, 23, 206, 208
Jefferson, G., 180
Johnson, C., 94, 116, 145
Johnson-Laird, P.N., 239

K

Kasarda, J.D., 57
Kelley, H.H., 207
Kemper, T.D., 145, 240
King, Martin Luther, 290
Koffka, K., 136
Kohler, W., 136
Kornhauser, W., 272

L

Lawler, E.J., 51, 145, 215, 247, 254,
271–273, 277, 278, 280–282,
284, 288, 300

Le Doux, J.E., 245
Linton, R., 133
Li, Y.E., 66
Lovaglia, M.J., 115, 116
Luhmann, N., 43, 44, 47

M

Machalek, R., 74
Malatesta, C.Z., 240
Markovsky, B., 206
Marschall, D., 244
Marx, 272
Maryanski, A., 29, 74, 75, 110, 210, 237, 272,
277, 288
McCall, G.J., 196, 248
McPherson, J.M., 57
McPherson, M., 272
Mead, G.H., 17, 133, 134, 152, 161, 164,
195, 259
Miller, J., 57
Miller, R.S., 244
Molm, L., 204
Moreno, J.L., 134
Mullin, B.A., 21

N

Newcomb, T.M., 136
Niedenthal, P.M., 244
Norman, R.Z., 16, 35, 93, 95

O

Oatley, K., 239
O'Brien, C.S., 240
Osgood, C.E., 239

P

Panksepp, J., 239
Park, R.E., 133
Parsons, T., 43, 271
Plutchik, R., 238, 240
Povinelli, D.J., 252

R

Ridgeway, C.L., 35, 48, 66, 94, 95, 101, 103,
104, 106, 116, 145, 183
Roseholtz, S.J., 16, 95
Russell, J.A., 240

S

Sachs, H., 180
 Schaller, G., 288
 Scheff, T.J., 195
 Schegloff, E., 180
 Schutz, A., 16, 58, 133, 138, 145, 163,
 167, 168, 213
 Scott, J.P., 240
 Shibutani, Tamotsu, 68
 Simmel, G., 272
 Simmons, J.L., 196, 248
 Smelser, N.J., 43
 Smith, C., 22
 Smith-Lovin, L., 272
 Smith, R.F., 16, 95
 Smylie, C.S., 252
 Spencer, Herbert, 304
 Sroufe, L.A., 239
 Stets, J.E., 133, 196, 234, 238
 Stryker, S., 21, 133, 196,
 201, 234

T

Tajfel, H., 21, 199
 Tangney, J.P., 244
 TenHouten, W.S., 237
 Terry, D.J., 21
 Thamm, R., 238
 Thibaut, J.W., 207
 Thoits, P.A.
 Thyne, S.R., 51, 215, 271–273, 277, 280, 281,
 284, 288, 300

Tinkler, J.E., 66
 Tomasello, M., 252
 Trevarthen, C., 239
 Turner, J.C., 21, 199
 Turner, J.H., 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 29, 30, 40, 41,
 43, 56, 66, 74, 75, 93, 110, 117, 133,
 134, 136, 138, 139, 145, 163, 167, 168,
 174, 193, 198, 206, 207, 210, 234, 235,
 237–239, 241, 243, 245, 250, 252, 272,
 277, 288, 290, 294
 Turner, R.H., 10, 16, 18, 19, 66, 75, 133, 135,
 136, 138, 139, 148, 168, 193, 198, 201,
 237, 290

W

Wager, P.E., 244
 Wagner, D.G., 93
 Wagner, P.E., 244
 Wallace, V., 250
 Webster, M.A., 93
 Weiner, B., 145, 247
 White, H.C., 291
 White, K.M., 21

Y

Yoon, J., 51, 215, 271–273, 277, 280, 281,
 284, 288, 300

Z

Zelditch, M. Jr., 16, 35, 93, 95

Subject Index

A

Attributions

- biological basis of, 288–289
- as a defense mechanism, 246–248
- distal bias, 247
- effects on social structure, 254–258
- proximal bias, 247
- reproductive effects, 282–284

C

- Categoric unit membership, 98
 - and status dynamics, 98–99
- Categoric units, 5, 38, 122–126
 - and class position, 5, 47, 62, 65, 117, 118, 123–125
 - correlation with corporate units, 38
 - definition of, 30–31
 - properties of, clarity of expectation states in, 37
 - and unfocused encounters, 122–126
- Categorizing
 - in focused encounters, 167–171
- Commitments
 - to social structures, 254–258, 277–281
- Communication
 - bracketing rituals, 177–180
 - in focused encounters, 174–183
 - forming rituals, 180–181
 - repair rituals, 182–183
 - totemizing rituals, 181–182
 - types of rituals, 177
- Contrast-conception, 66
- Corporate units, 5, 31, 119–122
 - definition of, 30
 - properties of, 32
 - types of, 31–32
 - and unfocused encounters, 119–122

Cultural forces, 18–21

- categorizing, 18–19
 - communicating, 19–20
 - feeling rules, 20
 - framing, 19
 - ritualizing, 20–21
- ### Culture, 163–166
- and, normatization, 163–165
 - embedding of key elements, 49

D

- Defense mechanisms, 245–248
- Defensive strategies, 248–249
- Demographic forces, 12–15
 - categoric units, 14
 - density, 13–14
 - number, 12–13
- Diffuse status characteristics, 35, 47, 48

E

- Ecological forces, fronts, lines, 11
- Ecology, meanings of, 58, 64, 67, 68
- Embedding, 97–98, 150–154
 - on emotions, 258–261, 295
 - of encounters, 7
 - in focused encounters, 99–119
 - and need-states, 216–222
 - principles on, 306–308
 - of roles, 150–154
 - of status, 97–98, 108–110
 - in unfocused encounters, 120–124
- Embedding of encounters, 29–56
 - elementary principle of, 51–54
 - in meso and macrostructures, 42, 46
- Emotions
 - and commitments, 258–260

Emotions (*cont.*)

- defense mechanisms, 245
- effects of attributions, 254–258
- embedding and emotions, 258–261
- emotional arousal, 252–254
- and feeling rules, 183–185
- first-order elaborations, 242
- in focused encounters, 252–263
- language of, 250–252
- primary emotions, 238–241
- principles of, 265–268
- principles on, 295–298
- second-order elaborations, 243–245
- structure of shame and guilt, 243
- transformative effects of, 289–290
- types of defense mechanisms, 246
- types of defensive strategies, 248–249
- in unfocused encounters, 263–265
- variants of primary emotions, 241

Exchange

- effects of embedding, 209–210
- justice, 206–207
- as a need-state, 204–210
- profits, 205–206
- resources, 204–205
- resource-seeking, 208–210

Expectations, clarity of, 32–33

Expectation states, 35

F

Focused encounters, 25–26, 59, 68, 99–105

- categorizing in, 167–171
- communication in, 174–176
- ecology of, density of, 61–63, 68
- effects of consolidated parameters, 65
- elementary principle of, 25–27
- embedding of, 61–89
- and emotions, 252–263
- emotions in, 183–185
- framing in, 171–174
- meanings of props, 69
- motivational dynamics, 216–222
- principle on, 89
- principle on status, 126–129
- principles on culture, 188–189
- principles on roles, 156–157
- properties of, 59–61
- props and group memberships, 69–70
- rituals, 176–183
- status dynamics in, 99–119
- use of props, 66–70

Frames/framing, 171–174

- types of frames, 173

G

Generalized symbolic media of exchange, 43

- list of, 44
- properties of, 43–46

I

Identity/Identities

- dynamics relations among, 202–204
- levels of, 197
- as need-state, 191–202
- types of, 196

Institutional domains, 5

L

Looking glass self, 135

M

Meso-level reality, structure of, 46

Micro-level reality, structure of, 48–49

Motivation. *See* Transactional needsMotivational forces. *See* Transactional needs

- exchange profits, needs for, 22
- facticity, needs for, 24
- group inclusion, needs for, 23
- self, verification of, 21
- trust, needs for, 23

NNeed states. *See* Transactional needs

Networks, 111–114

- authority in, 114–116
- centrality, 114
- equivalence in status, 113–114
- in status, 111–114

Normatization, 163

- categorizing, 167–171
- communication, 174–176
- dimensions of, 164
- feeling rules, 183–185
- in focused encounters, 167–185
- framing, 171–174
- levels of culture in, 165–167
- principles on, 188–190
- rituals, 176–183
- in unfocused encounters, 185–187

P

Parameters, 54

- consolidation of, 54, 103, 108, 118–119
- intersection of, 54, 108

- Personality
folk notion of, 249–250
- R**
- Reproduction
and, attributions, 282–284
of social structure, 281–284
- Rituals, 79
in unfocused encounters, 79
- Role dynamics, 133–162
combinational roles, 139–140
complementary roles, 147–148
embedding of roles, 150–154
in focused encounters, 156–157
generalized roles, 140
identity and roles, 143–145
normalizing roles, 148–150
phenomenology of, 136–138
pre-assembled roles, 139
principles on, 158–161
role inventories, 138
role-making, 135–136
role-taking, 134–135
role verification, 137, 142–147
trans-situational roles, 140–142
in unfocused encounters, 156–157
- Role forces, 16–18
- Role/Roles, 133–135
- S**
- Selection pressures, first-order
logistical loads, 29
- Self, 77
territories of, 77–78
- Self/identities
defense of, 245–249
- Social forces, 3, 8
basic societal structures, 8
definitions of, 10
- Social structure
micro basis, 271–277
transformation of, 289–295
- Standards of justice, 96–97
for status, 96
- Status, 93
- Status beliefs, 47, 48, 96
- Status dynamics, 93–132
clarity of status, 100–111
conflict in, 107
consolidation, intersection of parameters,
103, 108, 118–119
embedding and clarity, 101–105, 108–110
in focused encounters, 99–119
networks in, 111–114
prestige and honor, 117–118
principles on, 126–129
status making, 104
status taking, 104–105
in unfocused encounters, 119–126
- Status forces, 15–16
- Status-organizing processes, 93–99
differentiation of, 97
embedding of, 97
evaluations of, 95, 97
expectation states, 95
justice, 96–97
referential structures, 95
status beliefs, 96
- Stratification, 5
classes, 285–287
class factions, 285–288
- T**
- Thematicization, 47, 48
- Theoretical principles
ecology/demography, 308–310
embedding, 306–308
emotions, 321–324
encounters, 304–306
normalizing, 316–319
reproduction/transformation, 324–327
role/roles, 314–316
status, 310–314
transactional needs, 319–321
- Transactional needs
embedding of, 216–222
and exchange payoffs, 204–210
and facticity, 213–216
in focused encounters, 216–222
and group inclusion, 210–212
and identities, 195–204
principles on, 231–234
and trust, 212–213
types of need-states, 194
in unfocused encounters, 222–231
- U**
- Unfocused encounters, 26, 75, 119–126,
157–158
bodies and movements, 76–80
and categoric units, 78
density of, 80–82

Unfocused encounters (*cont.*)

- ecology of, 76–80
- elementary principle of, 26–27
- embedding in, 120–123
- and emotions, 263–265
- motivational dynamics, 222–231
- organization of space, 82–86
- principle of, 89–91
- principle on culture, 188–189
- principle on roles, 158
- principle on status, 129
- and rituals, 79
- status dynamics in, 119–126
- technological mediation, 51–53, 88
- territories of self, 77–78
- use of props, 86–88