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ORIENTAL STUDIES I

GREEK INTO ARABIC

Essays on Islamic Philosophy

by

Richard Walzer

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Table of Contents

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4. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1939), p. 407 ff.
5. Oriens, vol. 6 (1953), p. 91 ff.
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ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

I

The General Background of Islamic Philosophy

1 — *The Problem*

In the present state of our knowledge it would be premature to attempt a definitive history of Islamic philosophy. Too many facts are still unknown, too many works have been neglected for centuries and remained unread and are only gradually being rediscovered in Eastern and Western libraries and edited and studied. There is no agreement among scholars on the best approach to the subject: some try to understand Islamic philosophy as an exclusive achievement of the Arabs and accordingly minimize the importance of that Greek element whose presence throughout they cannot deny; others tend to fix their attention on the Greek sources and do not realize that the Islamic philosophers, although continuing the Greek tradition, can rightly claim to be understood and appreciated in their own setting and according to their own intentions which may be different from those of their Greek predecessors.

Very little has been said about the philosophical significance of Islamic philosophy for our own time. Only a few good interpretations of Arabic philosophical texts are available and accessible to the general reader. It is a promising field of research, but only a small portion of it has been cultivated. Hence nothing more than a very provisional sketch of the main development of Arabic philosophy can be given at the present time.

Islamic philosophy presupposes not only a thousand years of Greek thought about God and self-dependent entities, about nature and man and human conduct and action: its background in time is the amalgamation of this way of life with the Christian religion which had conquered the lands round the Mediterranean during the three centuries preceding the establishment of Islam from the Caspian Sea to the Pyrenees. The unbroken continuity of the Western tradition is based on the fact that the Christians in the Roman Empire did not reject the pagan legacy but made it an essential part of their own syllabus of learning. The understanding of Arabic philosophy is thus intimately linked with the study of Greek philosophy and theology in the early stages of Christianity, the

last centuries of the Roman Empire and the contemporary civilization of Byzantium. The student of Arabic philosophy should therefore be familiar not only with Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and various minor Greek philosophers, but also with thinkers like St. Augustine or John Philoponus who was the first to combine the Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology.

2 — *The Greek Element*

Philosophy is a way of life discovered by the Greeks in the sixth century B.C. and developed by them in successive stages to a wonderfully balanced and harmonious interpretation of man and the universe. It exhausts, if we look at it from a distance, all the approaches to an understanding of the world and of man's position in it, which are possible from the starting-point of an unshakable belief in the power of human reason. The civilization of the Greeks owes much to the earlier civilizations of the Ancient East, of Egypt and Assyria, for example; but their confidence in human reason is something essentially new. Plato, the greatest of all Greek philosophers and the founder of a natural theology whose appeal is still as fresh and impressive as ever, did not overlook the irrational element in man and gave it its proper place as a servant of reason, without setting himself to do violence to human nature and throw it out altogether. Later centuries were less cautious, and conceived rationalism in terms which were too narrow, leading it to destroy itself in scepticism, dogmatism and mysticism. But the tradition of Greek philosophy was never completely interrupted, and while it declined in the West it had a new lease of life in Muslim civilization. Greek poetry was neglected in its homeland and in Byzantium, and almost forgotten in the Latin world, and had to be rediscovered and revalued in the centuries following the Italian Renaissance. Greek philosophy, however, survived and was continuously studied, and the considerable Arabic contribution to this survival is by no means adequately realized in the world of scholarship. Had the Arabic philosophers done nothing apart from saving Greek philosophy from being completely disregarded in the Middle Ages—and they did more—they would deserve the interest of twentieth-century scholars for this reason alone.

When in the seventh century the Arabs conquered Egypt and Syria which were largely hellenized, and the somewhat less completely hellenized Mesopotamia, Greek philosophy had been in existence for a thousand years and more as a continuous tradition of study handed down in well-established schools throughout the Greek-speaking world. The great creative

period of Greek philosophy was long since over and its light had become dim, when it was handed on to the Arabs. It is important for those who aim at understanding the Arabic philosophers in their proper setting to realize what Greek philosophy was like in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. and not rashly to compare Plato and Aristotle with the Muslim philosophers without taking all the later developments into due account and without knowing how Plato and Aristotle were read and explained in the Greek schools with whose late exponents the Muslims became acquainted. The task is, in some respects, difficult, because certain features of the late Greek schools are known to us only from Arabic sources and were considered uninteresting in the later centuries of Byzantine Greek civilization.

3 — *The Hebraic Element*

Jewish thought, out of which Christianity and Islam ultimately developed, is also based on the civilizations of Egypt and Assyria, but it took a quite different turn. According to Jewish thought the authority of the supreme God and revealed knowledge are superior to human reason, and faith in God is considered the only true and certain good—instead of the Greek appreciation of wisdom as the perfection of man. Christianity conquered the Roman Empire in its entirety during the fourth century A.D., whereas Judaism continued as the special religion of the Jewish people. The Koranic conception of faith is, in all its essential features, in harmony with contemporary Jewish and Christian ideas; the exaltation of prophecy and the intuitive attainment of truth through supernatural powers of this kind are of primary importance in Islam, though by no means foreign to Judaism and Christianity. We shall have to specify the stage which Islam, as a religion of this type, had reached by the time when we first hear of Muslims calling themselves "philosophers," (using the Greek word for the new knowledge which, in full consciousness of what they were doing, they imported from a foreign and basically different world).

4 — *Jewish and Christian Attempts at Assimilating Greek Philosophy*

The rise of Arabic philosophy in the first half of the ninth century A.D. did not represent the first invasion of a Hebraic religion by Greek thought. However one has to be fully aware that it is different from previous developments of a similar kind, in view both of the stage reached by

Greek philosophy in the century after Justinian and of the special situation of the Muslim religion, which had to find its bearings in defending itself against Christian and Manichean criticism and attack. But the comparison of the Jewish and the Christian attitudes to Greek philosophy helps towards a better understanding of the somewhat different history of Greek philosophy in the Muslim world. Philo of Alexandria had in the first century A.D. tried to explain the essence of Judaism in terms of contemporary Greek philosophy, which meant for him a not too radical Platonism; but his attempt had been abortive so far as the future development of Judaism was concerned. Nevertheless it helped Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who both used him widely, to build up the foundations of the first Christian philosophy in the third century. Clement and Origen were still free from the impact of Neoplatonism, which became the dominant pagan philosophy from the fourth century onwards and hence increasingly influenced Christian thought as is shown by such writings as those of the man who called himself Dionysius the Areopagite. The syllabus of philosophical learning which became more or less common after A.D. 500 was based on Aristotle's lecture courses, selections from Plato, and Neoplatonic Metaphysics; but the great authorities of the past were studied according to the interpretation of the late Neoplatonic commentators who, basing themselves on earlier commentaries like those of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, tried to make Aristotle a consistent, systematic and dogmatic philosopher. It was not until this date that the actual teaching of pagan philosophy of the Neoplatonic–Aristotelian type was taken over by Christian teachers. This created a new problem or, at any rate, gave increased importance to a problem already understood before, that of the relations between this philosophy and Christian religion and theology. This discussion is, in our tradition, represented by John Philoponus, a monophysite commentator on Aristotle, a philosophical defender of the *formatio mundi* against the Aristotelians, and also a theological writer like a Muslim dialectical theologian (*mutakallim*). It is, at the same time, the historical background of Arabic philosophy which faced the perennial problem of faith and reason, of revealed and natural theology, in a form conditioned by this late development of Greek philosophy as part of a syllabus of Christian learning. This late Greek philosophy was not the same everywhere but varied, however slightly, in different places and at different times; accordingly the development of early Islamic philosophy is by no means uniform either: there was more than one route from Syriac and Egyptian seats of Greek learning within the Muslim Empire to Baghdād, to Persia and all over the steadily extending Islamic world.

II

The Greek Legacy

1 — *Authors transmitted*

The authors studied by the Arabic-speaking Muslim philosophers and, accordingly, translated from Greek or Syriac into Arabic, are those studied in the late Greek schools. This means that the philosophical texts by Greek authors preserved in Arabic translations include a certain number of Greek texts which are otherwise lost through the narrowing interest of the later centuries of Byzantium; on the other hand it is clear that those Greek texts of earlier times which did not appeal to the late Neoplatonic Schools and are for this reason lost in their Greek original cannot be recovered from Arabic translations either. Hence we find, for example, in Arabic versions lost philosophical treatises by Galen or sections of a paraphrase of Plotinus or unknown treatises on Platonic philosophy or Greek commentaries on Aristotle, but are disappointed whenever we look for writings of the pre-Socratics, dialogues of Aristotle, works of early and middle Stoic writers, etc. The value of the Arabic translations for the Greek text of the authors translated is not as negligible as is often assumed, and much can be learned from the Arabic versions about the actual transmission of the various works. The authors best known to the Arabs were Aristotle and his commentators; we know their translations of them relatively well and are able to appreciate their fine understanding of the original arguments, which on the whole comes up to the level of the late Greek schools. Aristotle's *Dialogues*, which had been very popular in the Hellenistic age and had, because of their Platonic colour, appealed to some of the Neoplatonists, were not translated. But almost all the treatises of Aristotle eventually became known, with the exception of the *Politics*, which to all appearance was not studied much in the Greek Schools of the Imperial Age. Hence a thorough knowledge of Aristotle's thought, as the late Neoplatonists understood it, is common to all Arabic philosophers from Al-Kindī in the ninth to Ibn Rushd in the twelfth century, although its application varies in the different philosophical systems established on this base. Aristotle's formal logic was latterly used also by the theological adversaries of the philosophers. In addition, most of the commentaries known to the Greeks were eagerly studied and discussed, and some of them are known to us only through the Arabs. Plato's *Timaeus*, *Republic* and *Laws* were available and were studied. The *Republic* and *Laws* became textbooks of political theory in the school of Al-Fārābī; the *Timaeus* was widely known, but the

detailed history of its study in the Islamic world is still to be written. Philosophers like Al-Rāzī styled themselves Platonists, but their Plato had a definitely Neoplatonic character. Porphyry and Proclus were more than mere names; the Arabs were acquainted with many minor Neoplatonic treatises unknown to us, and the Hermetic writings were read and studied in Arabic versions. The philosophical writings of Galen were better known than anywhere in the later Christian world. Only a small fraction of the works actually translated has been traced, but very full lists are preserved in Arabic works, and their influence can often be inferred from Arabic philosophical books. For example, John Philoponus' arguments against Proclus were taken up by Al-Ghāzalī in his thoroughgoing attack on the philosophers, and Alexander of Aphrodisias' treatise on Fate may well have helped the Muhammadan discussions on determination and free will. Whatever Arabic philosophers tried on their own can only be understood and appreciated if one acquires a thorough knowledge of the terminology and the types of argument used by the Neoplatonic professors of Aristotelian philosophy.

2 — *Translators and Translations*

The Arabic translations of Greek philosophy begin in early 'Abbāsid times (about A.D. 800) and can be followed up until about A.D. 1000. The translators were with very few exceptions Christians, some of them followers of the Orthodox Church, the majority Nestorians or Jacobites. They translated from Syriac versions or, less frequently, from the Greek original. A history of their very interesting literary activity cannot yet be given, but its general outline is clear. The philosopher Al-Kindī (died A.D. 873), for example, had already a large number of translations at his disposal, and Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, written by an unknown Neoplatonist, were expressly translated for his use, as were probably many other works. The translators were patronized and encouraged by the Caliph's court, particularly during the reigns of Al-Ma'mūn (A.D. 813–33) and Al-Mu'taṣim (A.D. 833–42), and came to work in organized teams. The reasons for the attitude of these Caliphs—which came to an end during the reign of Al-Mutawakkil (A.D. 847–61)—are not clear, and one hesitates to believe that either their personal thirst for knowledge or the predominance of the Mu'tazilite movement was responsible for such an outburst of publicly assisted editions of philosophical (and scientific) texts. The earlier translations—among which are those used by Al-Kindī—are less well known. A new standard was established by Al-Kindī's contemporary, the Nestorian Ḥunain Ibn Isḥāq (died after

A.D. 870) and his school, who translated from the Greek into Syriac and Arabic after having, in each case, established a critical text of the work to be translated. Ḥunain's philological methods, which he himself explains in detail, come fully up to the level of contemporary Byzantine scholarship. He found Greek scholarship still alive in Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, and even in the capital, Baghdād itself. Ḥunain's son Isḥāq was particularly concerned with translations of Aristotle, and his versions are very reliable indeed and reveal a very high degree of real understanding. Later philosophers and translators could thus use much better texts than Al-Kindī, who, like all other Muslim philosophers, did not understand Greek or Syriac. A third school of translators, who, however, did not know any Greek, used the Syriac translations of the school of Ḥunain very freely for their Arabic versions and followed the same standards of philological accuracy, discussing variants of earlier Syriac and Arabic versions. They built up a definite syllabus for the study of Aristotle, consisting of translations selected from versions prior to Ḥunain and also versions emanating from his school. They established a regular tradition of instruction in the Aristotelian philosophy, using the best Greek commentaries available to them. The best known representatives of this school are the Nestorian Abū Bishr Mattā, who was a friend of the philosopher Al-Fārābī (A.D. 870–950) and Al-Fārābī's pupil, the Jacobite Christian Yaḥyā Ibn 'Adī(A.D. 893–974). Their wide and subtle knowledge of Greek philosophy was the basis on which Al-Fārābī built. It was also presupposed by the later Spanish philosophers Avempace and Averroës, and the high quality of their comprehension of Greek thought is less astonishing if one keeps this fact in mind. Avicenna knows them but follows—at least partly—a different path.

Thus the Christian translators, assisting the general trend of thought in the first two centuries of the 'Abbāsid Empire, prepare the ground for the rise of Islamic philosophy. What had happened before in Rome, in the time of Cicero and Seneca and again in the century after St. Augustine, and had been attempted, from the fifth century A.D. onwards, in the Christian Syriac civilization, repeated itself, though on a much larger scale, within the orbit of the vigorous and enterprising Islamic culture. Translations of a similar type smoothed the passage of Greek and Islamic thought to mediaeval Jewry, and eventually created in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, for the first time, a Jewish philosophy superior to Philo's unsuccessful attempt. Both Arabic and Hebrew philosophical texts found their way through translations to the schoolmen of the West. Translators are not very conspicuous figures in the history of philosophy, but without their painstaking work the essential links in the continuity of Western

thought would never have been forged, nor would Arabic philosophy in particular ever have come into existence. The function of these translators was not simply to transmit texts. Working partly under the influence of the Arabic theologians, but to a greater extent on their own initiative, they were instrumental in building up a complex and lucid Arabic philosophical terminology and laying the foundations for a philosophical Arabic style. This terminology reproduces the terminology of the late Greek commentators and of the Neoplatonic philosophers which had gone far beyond Aristotle and Plato themselves. This alone is a very great contribution of the Arabs to the history of philosophy; it will only be sufficiently appreciated when a full Arabic–Greek dictionary of philosophical terms has been compiled.

3 — *Some Essential Features of Late Greek Philosophy*

All the Arabic philosophers shared a common background which was neither Platonic nor Aristotelian exclusively, but a mixture of both these elements in varying degrees according to differences of temperament and individual inclinations. To ignore or deny this background called for an originality of which none of them was capable. To grasp the nature of the main features of this framework is essential to an understanding of the individual solutions offered by the Arabic philosophers.

Greek philosophy was accepted by the Arabs, as it had been previously accepted by Greek and Latin Christians, as providing a "natural theology," i.e. a theory of the divine as revealed in the nature of reality and as accessible to human reason. That God's existence can not only be explained by reason and argument, but that it can also be scientifically demonstrated, is a conviction found throughout Greek philosophy, with the exception of the radical Sceptics; it was only slightly affected by the Neoplatonic followers of Iamblichus who asserted that there was supernatural truth in obscure books like the Chaldean Oracles "whom it is unlawful to disbelieve." Otherwise the intuitive knowledge of particularly gifted individuals was either rejected as superstition or considered as subsidiary to philosophical insight, not superior to it. The Muslims had to adjust themselves to these conflicting possibilities in one way or another.

This Greek philosophical religion and the metaphysical theory on which it is based are intimately connected with astronomy, i.e. the eternal order of the stars. This applies to Aristotle as well as to the Neoplatonists who transmitted to the Arabs the world-picture assumed by them all. The First Cause whose existence is proved in this way is identified with God. Aristotle's distinction between the highest God and the star-gods became

more influential in the Neoplatonic age, when the balance of interest definitely shifted from nature and science to the transcendent, and philosophers built up a great hierarchy of supernatural beings on the basis of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. The form in which this metaphysical tradition reached the Arabs was definitely Neoplatonic, i.e. reality was represented as a chain of spiritual forces emanating from the One in timeless cosmic reproduction like the rays from the sun. All mere products were held to be inferior to the First Cause. The First Cause, the One, remained, however, unaltered and undiminished, although it continued in eternal creation. This Neoplatonic theology was accepted by the Christian Neoplatonists, and accordingly we find it, for example, in St. Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. One work, but by no means the only one, through which this Neoplatonic theology reached the Arabs was the pseudo-Aristotelian *De causis*, an epitome of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, somehow transformed by a Christian; its Latin translation is of great historical importance for the history of scholastic philosophy before Aquinas. This type of metaphysics, though varying in detail and developed in different ways, is common to all the Islamic philosophers from Al-Kindī to Ibn-Rushd.

Another feature shared by almost all the Islamic philosophers, but not yet traced in any Greek work, is the description of the active intellect, the νοῦς ποιητικός of Aristotle, as a separate metaphysical entity, a kind of intermediary between the spiritual world above the moon and the human mind, through which both the human mind and the human imagination are linked with the divine. It had, apparently against Aristotle's original but not very clearly expressed idea, been identified by Alexander of Aphrodisias with the First Cause. Some later philosophers mentioned in Pseudo-John Philoponus' commentary on the *De anima*, assumed it to be a semi-divine being in its own right. The Greek original of the theory of the intellect in Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīna, for example, has not yet been found, but there can be no doubt that it is a late and very natural offshoot of Neoplatonic speculation, possibly originating in Alexandria. It is obvious that such a theory presents particular difficulties to adherents of a rigid monotheism. Hence Arabic philosophers identified this active intellect with the Qur'ānic Spirit of Holiness, i.e. Gabriel, the angel of revelation, or with the Kingdom of Heaven, the ultimate abode of immortal souls.

The way in which the problem of immortality confronts philosophers depends upon the general psychological theory to which they adhere. Now Islamic psychology is for the most part based on that of Aristotle as understood in the commentaries of Alexander (third century) and

Themistius (fourth century) and among the Neoplatonists Simplicius and John Philoponus (sixth century). But Aristotle had been very reticent about the soul's ultimate fate after death, and recourse was therefore had to Neoplatonism tempered with Stoicism, as in Al-Fārābī, or arguments from Plotinus, as in the philosophy of Ibn Sīnā. The resurrection of the body, one of the indemonstrable tenets of Islam (and of Christianity as well) created a new difficulty for the Muslim philosophers, in addition to the problem of the immortality of the soul with which the Neoplatonic Aristotelians had been confronted. These and other similar difficulties were partly already felt in the late Greek Schools, partly either became more pressing or were completely new for the Muslims; the different way in which they met these difficulties allows us, in my view, to come to a more satisfactory grouping of the various philosophical schools in Islam.

The problem of supernatural knowledge, ascribed to individuals with prophetic powers, as well as that of the irrational elements in the life of the soul, had from the time of Plato never been neglected by Greek philosophers. In the later part of the Hellenistic period and in the centuries dominated by Neoplatonism it had been more eagerly discussed, and new solutions had been proposed. The reaction of Islamic philosophers differs in each case and again shows a very definite grouping. Al-Kindī accepts the religious interpretation of the contemporary Kalām, Ar-Rāzī rejects all the prophets as impostors, Al-Fārābī subordinates prophecy to philosophy, Avicenna considers prophecy the highest perfection attainable by human beings.

We are still not sufficiently well informed about either the different Greek Schools of Neoplatonism in the sixth century and after, or about the adaptation of their teaching to Christianity in Syriac surroundings, and the general decline of learning all over the Eastern Mediterranean world in this period. The differences between the two great Platonic schools of Alexandria and Athens, the latter of which was closed by Justinian in 529, are evident and repeat themselves in the history of Arabic philosophy. What we might call the classical Greek tradition, which we know from Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius, from Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias, survived in the Neoplatonic philosophical School of Alexandria; there are direct links, guaranteed by Arabic biographical tradition and independent analysis of Arabic philosophical works, between it and the tenth century philosophical school of Baghdād, and thence with Al-Fārābī and through him with Avicenna on the one hand and, above all, with the Spanish Arabic philosophers on the other. The Alexandrian teachers upheld the primacy of reason and viewed the different religions as conveying the one philosophical truth in symbolic form. The school

of Athens was more inclined to rely on faith and "revealed" pagan books, and philosophers like Proclus claimed a direct knowledge provided by supernatural insight beyond philosophical proof. This kind of Greek philosophy could appeal to Christian and Muslim philosophers who were bent on balancing the claims of human reason against the supremacy of Scripture and revelation, and there are, indeed, quite remarkable features which Al-Kindī and these Neoplatonists have in common. We know also independently that the Syriac Nestorian Aristotelians derived their acquaintance with philosophy from centres close to the Athenian School. It is also clear that the Platonic element was stronger in the Athenian School than in the Alexandrian, and this difference is again to be noticed in the corresponding Schools of Islamic philosophy. The Greek background of Ar-Rāzī's thought, who is probably the most original of the early Islamic philosophers, is less easy to discover.

Islamic philosophy is thus a "productive assimilation" of Greek thought by open-minded and far-sighted representatives of a very different tradition and thus a serious attempt to make this foreign element an integral part of the Islamic tradition. It is an interesting and by no means uniform history. The more we learn about the history of mankind, the more we realize that there is no spontaneous generation in history but only a continuous shaping of new "Forms" out of existing "Matter." Islamic philosophy is an interesting example of this process which constitutes the continuity of human civilization.

III

Some Islamic Philosophers

Before embarking upon the discussion of some aspects of Islamic philosophical thought, another difficulty has to be faced. The student of Greek philosophy finds reliable critical editions, modern translations of all the authors preserved and often valuable commentaries in addition. He can without hesitation approach the main questions and discuss the real meaning of the texts with which he is concerned. Most of this preliminary work has still to be done for Arabic philosophical texts, and hence students of Islamic philosophy have to give a great part of their time to this indispensable and by no means secondary work. Fifteen philosophical essays by Al-Kindī have only recently been edited for the first time, most of them from a unique MS. in Istanbul which seems to have come from the library of Ibn Sīnā. Two of them have been translated into Italian. Eleven philosophical treatises of Ar-Rāzī were edited about twelve years

ago; two of these also are available in translation. A certain number of Al-Fārābī's philosophical writings have been edited in Germany, Syria, India, England and Spain; most of these editions are, however, by no means satisfactory and are in urgent need of revision, as are the translations based on them. A critical edition of Ibn Sīnā's main philosophical encyclopaedia *Ash-Shifā* is at last in preparation [1]; most of the existing editions of other philosophical works of his are unsatisfactory, and much is still unedited. Averroës' *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut*, his defence of philosophy against Al-Ghazālī's attack, has been excellently edited, and so have other works of his. Most of Avempace's writings exist only in a unique MS. in Oxford (the Berlin MS. is lost) and only a very small part of it has been edited and studied.

1 — *Ya'qūb Ibn Isḥāq Al-Kindī (died after* A.D. *870)*

It is instructive to compare how different Islamic philosophers characterized their indebtedness to the Greeks and their personal contribution. All of them agree that truth as obtained by philosophy transcends the borders of nations and religions, and that it in no way matters who was the first to discover it—their attitude may after all be compared to that of the founder of Islam, who considered the new religion as the final revelation of religious truth but by no means the first. There would be no philosophy without the Greeks, and whoever ventures to cut himself off from the collective experience of past centuries will never achieve anything as a philosopher or a scientist, since the period of one individual life is much too short. "It is fitting to acknowledge the utmost gratitude to those who have contributed even a little to truth, not to speak of those who have contributed much. . . . We should not be ashamed to acknowledge truth and to assimilate it from whatever source it comes to us, even if it is brought to us by former generations and foreign peoples. For him who seeks the truth there is nothing of higher value than truth itself; it never cheapens or abases him who searches for it, but ennobles and honours him." These proud words are to be found in the preface of the earliest metaphysical work in Arabic, which Al-Kindī dedicated to the reigning Caliph Al-Mu'tasim. Three hundred years later, when the history of Islamic philosophy was approaching its end, Ibn Rushd reaffirmed this

[1] [The Arabic text of the following sections is now available in critical editions: (*a*) by I. Madkour and his collaborators: *Isagoge* (Cairo 1952), *Categories* (Cairo 1959), *Posterior Analytics* (Cairo 1956), *Sophistici Elenchi* (Cairo 1958), *Rhetoric* (Cairo 1954), *Music* (Cairo 1956); (*b*) by F. Rahman: *De anima* (Oxford 1959).]

cosmopolitan attitude as something obvious: to do as Al-Kindī did had become an established practice, and the enthusiasm of the first philosopher had turned into an established routine of teaching.

Al-Kindī was the first to establish this tradition. "My principle," he says, "is first to record in complete quotations all that the Ancients have said on the subject; secondly, to complete what the Ancients have not fully expressed, and this according to the usage of our Arabic language, the customs of our age and our own ability." That implies that he is not only expressing Greek thoughts in Arabic but claims some originality of his own, in connecting this new branch of knowledge with the interpretation of Islam favoured by the Caliphs Al-Ma'mūn and Al-Mu'taṣim, with whom he appears to have been intimately connected. He evidently accepted the Mu'tazilite creed without reserve, but gave it a philosophical substructure. We may understand the Mu'tazilites as champions on the one hand of a reasonable creed against anthropomorphism and literalism, and on the other of an essentially religious standpoint against scepticism and unbelief. Al-Kindī had evidently to defend the line he took against the fideist attitude of theological orthodoxy, which was to raise its head again in his later years.

This attitude of Al-Kindī implied some modification in the traditional Neoplatonic–Aristotelian system, once he acquiesced in some of the main tenets of revealed religion such as the creation of the world out of nothing and the resurrection of the body on the Day of Judgment. Accordingly we find the Neoplatonic world-view introduced into Islam for the first time, but with a very significant proviso. There can be no question of "eternal creation," and one of the basic axioms of Greek philosophy, that nothing can come from nothing, must be abandoned, at least in one place: the highest sphere of the heaven, through which the divine substance is transmitted to the lower strata of the universe and to the seat of human life, which is the earth. The highest sphere had been created from nothing in a single moment of time by the omnipotent will of God, and would not last a moment longer once God had decided on its end. The working of the world according to the Neoplatonic law of emanation was thus made dependent on the religious certainty of the creation of the world from nothing, and so on an act of God, who is beyond and above the laws of nature. The obvious philosophical difficulties which this view implies were overlooked, the desire to reconcile theology and philosophy being too strong; Al-Ghazālī's re-elaboration of theology, which eventually won the day, shows that this trend of thought was probably more in keeping with the very nature of Islam than the attempts of the later philosophical schools. Otherwise Al-Kindī's *Metaphysics* shows no signs of deviation

from the general trend of Neoplatonic Aristotelianism as described above. The divine First Cause is in accordance with Plotinus and his successors defined as the One, above and beyond all the qualities to be found in man, and therefore only to be described in negative terms—as Christian theologians and the Mu'tazilites had also held. Like Ibn Sīnā, Al-Kindī stresses, on the whole, the Platonic element in the late Greek synthesis of Plato and Aristotle. He neglects the Aristotelian forms of demonstration in favour of the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms preferred by the Stoics and by Neoplatonists like Proclus, and is for this reason criticized by Al-Fārābī and his followers. His psychology needs still further study, but its main features are clear. Like Plato he defines the soul as a separable substance, and even transmits an otherwise lost fragment from the *Eudemus*, a dialogue which Aristotle composed in his youth, when he still believed in the immortality of the whole soul as his master had done. At the same time he is acquainted with Aristotle's *De anima*, either the whole work or some summary of it, and accepts his definition of the soul as the entelechy of the body, which establishes body and soul as a single substance. The same inconsistency is repeated in the psychology of Ibn Sīnā, in whose philosophy the Platonic element, and particularly the influence of Plotinus, are stronger than in Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd. There are more parallels of this type between Al-Kindī and Ibn Sīnā—who epitomized a consolatory treatise by Al-Kindī—but it appears premature to state a definite historical connection between Al-Kindī and the most influential of later Islamic philosophers.

Al-Kindī's theory of prophecy was famous, but no trace of his rational explanation of this phenomenon has hitherto been found. That it meant for him the highest perfection attainable to man is, however, beyond doubt. The prophet has divine knowledge through intuition which is decidedly superior to anything human knowledge can ever hope to reach. Hence the Qur'ān, as understood by the Mu'tazilites, conveys a higher truth than philosophy. In the case of the resurrection of the body, for example, Al-Kindī is satisfied with referring to the statement of the prophet, which he explains with dialectical arguments; he appears not to be in the least disturbed that he is unable to give a philosophical demonstration. We may be reminded of Plato, who expressed in mythical form those personal religious convictions of his for which he could not find or had not yet found a demonstration. Revealed truth takes the place of Plato's myth in Al-Kindī's attempt to build up, for the first time, not an Arabic replica of Greek philosophy but Greek philosophy for Muslims. A very striking feature in Al-Kindī's thought, which he shares neither with Al-Fārābī nor with Ibn Sīnā, is his acceptance of astrology as a

science. That the influence of the planets is real was not doubted by the Neoplatonic School of Athens, and we may see in this parallel a new reason for linking Al-Kindī with this particular School. But in his attempt to foretell the probable duration of the Arabic Empire he relies both on the approved method of astrology and on the Qur'ān: science only confirms the odd arithmetical calculation based on the well-known enigmatic letters with which some suras of the Qur'ān begin.

2 — *Abū Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Zakariyyā Ar-Rāzī* (*died* A.D. 923 *or* 932)

Whenever we read a line written by Ar-Rāzī, we feel ourselves in the presence of a superior mind, of a man who is sure of his own value without being conceited, and who does not consider himself to be inferior in philosophy and medicine to his great Greek predecessors whom he admires as his masters. Although Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Hippocrates and Galen can, in his view, not be surpassed, he does not hesitate either to modify their philosophical conclusions if he believes that he knows better, or to add to the store of accumulated medical knowledge what he has found out by his own research and observation. Whenever, for instance, he treats a particular disease he first summarizes everything he can find in Greek and Indian sources, now available in Arabic translations, and in the works of earlier Arabic doctors. He never fails to add his own opinion and his own judgment; he never adheres to authority as such. This applies to his philosophy as well. He claims to fulfil the function of a Socrates and an Hippocrates in his own time, within the orbit of the Arabic-speaking world. He is not impressed by the supernatural powers ascribed to, or claimed by, the Jewish, Christian and Islamic prophets. He points out that they disagree with each other, and that their utterances are self-contradictory. The religions which they have founded had provoked only hostility, war and unhappiness. We feel reminded of the fiercest Greek and Roman adversaries of traditional religion, Epicurus and Lucretius. "Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum." The Platonists and Stoics had accepted traditional religion, though on their own terms, and were for this reason more welcome to Christians and Muslims, whereas Ar-Rāzī's attitude amounts to heresy and comes near to the later Western slogan of "the three great impostors, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad." Like Epicurus, he does not believe that philosophy is only accessible to the select few, as Plato's aristocratic conception of philosophy and its dignity had proclaimed and as most Islamic philosophers, following in Plato's footsteps, unanimously asserted.

Philosophy was open to every human being, it was indeed the only way of salvation. "Whoever makes an effort and busies himself with study and research has set out on the way of truth. Indeed, the souls of men can be purified from the mud and darkness of this world and saved for the world to come only by the study of philosophy. When a man studies it and grasps a part of it, even the smallest part we can think of, he purifies the soul from mud and darkness and assures its salvation. Were all those who have hitherto tended to destroy their souls and neglected philosophical study to give the slightest attention to it, it would be their salvation from this mud and darkness, even if they grasp only a small part of it." He believed in the cathartic power of philosophy, as had Plotinus and Porphyry. A famous Platonic saying comes to mind: "If one mixes a small quantity of pure white with average white, this average becomes more white, more beautiful and more true." Ar-Rāzī may have been deaf and insensitive to the voices of Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. He certainly understood the religious depth by which Platonism, the spiritual religion of the Greeks, is most distinctly and unmistakably characterized. Ar-Rāzī does not believe in the eternity of the world but following some interpreters of the *Timaeus* such as Plutarch and Galen, teaches that the world came into being in time, whereas matter alone is eternal. Although he denies the creation from nothing this comes nearer to the Islamic view and reminds us of the attack made on Proclus by the Christian John Philoponus which was afterwards used by Al-Ghazālī against the Muslim defenders of the eternity of the world. God the creator is described as Omniscient and All-Just, as absolute Knowledge and Justice, but also as absolute Mercy. Man should, according to Plato, make himself like God, in the greatest degree possible to man. Hence the creature nearest to God's favour is the wisest, the justest, the most merciful and compassionate. Philosophy is not mere learning but a way of life, knowing and acting accordingly. All this is not so far from the spirit of Islam.

Ar-Rāzī claims to be a Platonist, and it cannot be denied that Platonic, or rather Neoplatonic, elements dominate his thought, and that his views differ widely from those late Greek systems which the majority of Islamic philosophers followed. Al-Fārābī attacked him in two treatises, notably for this reason. It is, however, if the phrase may be permitted, a very Neoplatonic Platonism, full of elements which remind us of Gnostic speculations; it comprises, on the other hand, certain definite features of the Greek theory of the atomic structure of matter which may have well been combined with the Platonic tradition in the later centuries of the Roman Empire. We are still rather in the dark about the immediate

sources of Ar-Rāzī's philosophical thought. He knew Proclus, for example, well and had translations of him at his disposal. Probably his philosophical knowledge was as all-embracing as his medical knowledge, of which we have better information. Tradition connects him with the pagan Greek school of Ḥarrān which survived there during the first centuries of Islam, and there is no reason to doubt this, although we are unable to verify the report in the present state of our knowledge. There were five eternal principles, not one, as in the other systems: the Creator, the soul of the world, matter, absolute time and absolute space. He was aware that he differed fundamentally from Aristotle, but very deliberately and decidedly he claimed to follow his own way: "But I say. . . ." It would lead us too far to discuss his cosmogony in detail and to follow up its repercussions in later Islamic thought—especially since he has only recently been rediscovered by modern scholarship, and much detailed research has still to be devoted to the remains of his philosophical work. But the greatness of the man cannot be doubted.

Both he and Al-Kindī wrote treatises on popular ethics, based exclusively on Greek material. They are both available in modern translations; and it is obvious which of the two succeeded better in bringing the commonplaces of the Platonic tradition to life. Ar-Rāzī could fill them with his own experience of life, whereas in Al-Kindī we are aware of the arguments but we are not really touched. Both Ar-Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā wrote autobiographies, Ar-Rāzī in self-defence, Ibn Sīnā at the request of a pupil. Ibn Sīnā tells us that he knew everything at the age of eighteen and did not add anything to his knowledge in the course of his later life: it became more mature but it did not grow in bulk. Ar-Rāzī was far from such self-righteousness. "If ever I have come upon a book I have not read," he affirms, in his old age, "or heard tell of a man I have not met, I have not turned aside to any engagement whatever—even though it has been to my great loss—before mastering that book or learning all that that man knew." This is again in keeping with the attitude of the greatest among Greek philosophers, who never tired of learning as long as they lived, as Solon had said in an oft-quoted line: "I grow old constantly learning many things." The greatest Islamic scholar, Abū'r-raihān al-Bīrūnī (died A.D. 1048), famous for his deep and sympathetic understanding of Indian religion and Indian life, seems to have been unique in appreciating Ar-Rāzī's greatness both as a philosopher and as a scientist. Vesalius, the founder of modern anatomy in the sixteenth century, who knew only his medical work, praised him as the last vigorous representative of the Greek tradition in the Middle Ages, whether Eastern or Western. His verdict is not very far from the truth.

3 — *Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī* (*died* A.D. 950)

Al-Kindī was an Arab of noble descent, born in Baṣra. His father had held a high position as governor of Kūfa, and he had spent most of his life at the Caliph's court in Baghdād. Ar-Rāzī was of Persian origin and passed the greater part of his life in his native town of Rayy, near the site of Teheran but spent some time in Baghdād as well. Al-Fārābī was a Turk from Transoxania, who studied first in Khurāsān, then came to live for many years in Baghdād, becoming eventually a pensioner of the famous Ḥamdānid Shi'ite ruler of Aleppo, Saif ad-daula.

Al-Fārābī was bent on assigning to philosophy a dominant position in the Islamic world and was not content to give it the second place as the handmaiden of theology. Nor, on the other hand, was he convinced that Ar-Rāzī's attempt could be successful in the long run and that the Law of Islam and the theology which had developed from it could be excluded from the higher life. His own works show a different approach. Philosophy was not to replace traditional religion altogether but was to assign it its proper position as had been done in the Greek world by Plato, He tried, indeed, to re-interpret the whole of Islam from his own philosophical standpoint, using Greek philosophy as a torch which gave new light to every aspect of Islamic life: dialectical theology, creed and Qur'ān, law, jurisprudence, grammar, aesthetic appreciation of artistic prose and poetry, and above all the organization of the perfect society and the essential qualities of its ruler. If the times were propitious, one universal world-state might come into existence; if not, several religions might exist side by side, and, if this also were impracticable, Islam at least might be reshaped according to the demands of the royal power of philosophy, which was the highest perfection of which man was capable. Yet Al-Fārābī was not a man of action himself, as Plato had been, but rather a thinker who put forward a new scheme to show how things ought to be, living himself in retirement as an ascetic and watching the world with a serenity of mind of his own.

Al-Fārābī did not, like Al-Kindī, claim simply to follow the Greek philosophers. He believed that Greek philosophy was in full decay in Greece, that the "Hellenes," the pagan Greeks, existed no more, but that the surviving works of Plato and Aristotle themselves could guide those who were about to revive it and show the way to restoring its glory in the land of H'Irāq from which, according to late Greek opinion as shared by Al-Fārābī, it had originally come. It has been pointed out how intimately he is connected with the Baghdād school of Christian translators and philosophers, and it is certainly to his credit that he fully understood

the interpretations of Aristotle and Plato which were at his disposal and passed them on to his pupils. But this alone would scarcely have made him a Muslim philosopher. Fortunately he makes his procedure sufficiently clear himself, and in addition he gives four comprehensive surveys of his whole philosophical system which are all available for study and comment.

A more orthodox Aristotelianism than that adopted by Al-Kindī was conjoined in Al-Fārābī with an appreciation of Plato's political theory which enables him to contribute forcefully to the discussion of the qualities by which the successor of the Prophet, the head of the Muslim community, was to be distinguished. If philosophy was the highest achievement of man, he must be a philosopher king. In the use of Plato's *Republic* as a textbook of political theory Al-Fārābī was followed by Ibn Rushd (as also in other important aspects of his thought), but we look in Ibn Rushd's highly polished and admirably worked-out productions in vain for his predecessor's reformatory zeal and original freshness. Ibn Rushd treated the *Republic* in his lecture courses, because Aristotle's *Politics* was not available in Arabic translation and because Al-Fārābī had done so before. Al-Fārābī's interest in Plato arose from genuine Islamic problems of his day, and enabled him to find an original and impressive solution.

An otherwise unknown account of Plato's philosophy which did full justice to the political side of his work, an equally unknown commentary on Plato's *Republic*, and a paraphrase of Plato's *Laws* were used by Al-Fārābī to convey his views on the ideal caliph to Muslim readers. He eliminated almost every element of Plato's logic, physics and metaphysics which he considered superseded by later developments of Greek philosophy, and picked out the arguments which he could use for his purpose. In the same way he included in his first comprehensive work on philosophy a general summary of Aristotle, stopping short at the *Metaphysics*, using here a scheme of ordinary Neoplatonic type, as described above. He made it clear in his programme that he was only selecting those parts of the Platonic and Aristotelian legacy which fitted his own ends. What these ends were is not always absolutely clear, and he leaves it to the intelligent reader of his day to guess the application for himself. He could only express himself this way and is very sparing with direct hints.

Aristotle's logic of demonstration, according to Al-Fārābī, provides the key to the philosophical understanding of the universe which springs from the study of physics and metaphysics. Revealed theology (*Kalām*) is definitely subordinate to this natural theology, and its method corresponds

to Aristotle's dialectic as found in the *Topics*, starting from views generally admitted but not capable of serving as the premises of strictly scientific demonstration. This dialectical theology is in itself Greek, in its structure and in many of its tenets; it is not to be rejected but is definitely of secondary importance. What corresponds to beliefs and views of the crowd in Aristotle are the beliefs and rules, etc., which the orthodox teachers of religion instil into the Muslim's mind, and which are guaranteed by the religious law. Al-Fārābī by no means intends to ban this "legal theology" as such, although he tries to open it to Greek influence as well. But it is certainly very remote from the truth which the philosopher can obtain. "Mythical theology" is represented by the Qur'ān, which appeals to people's imagination as poetry does, and convinces them of truth through arguments in rhetorical form. It is obvious that this scheme could be applied to other religions as well, and Al-Fārābī appears indeed to have had such a wide and universal conception in mind, which is not the less daring because Greek thinkers had expressed similar views before. There is one universal religion, but many forms of symbolic representation of ultimate truth, which may differ from land to land and from nation to nation; they vary in language, in law and custom, in the use of symbols and similitudes. There exists only one true God for the philosophical mind, but He has different names in different religions. Some forms of symbolic representation are near to the truth obtained by philosophical demonstration, others are more remote from it. There are even some truths of which it is legitimate to convince non-philosophers by straightforward fiction. Several "ideal states" of this kind may exist at the same time, all providing the same happiness and the same good life. The ruler of such a state would be able to give due attention to all the different aspects of the life of such a community: he would be king and *imām*, prophet and legislator in one. Before, however, he could begin to philosophize, he would be educated in the customs of his particular religion and instructed in the traditions of the community to which he belonged, just like Plato's philosopher king.

As in Plato's thought, metaphysics, psychology and political theory were intimately connected in Al-Fārābī's scheme of an ideal state. The same order prevailed in the universe, in man and in organized society—in the universe of necessity; in man if he deliberately decided to imitate the hierarchy of the universe in his own soul and to let his mind govern him; in society if the perfect man, the philosopher, did not withdraw into solitude but moulded the community according to his supreme understanding of the working of the divine mind. The world was ruled by the First Being, the First Cause, which was eternal and perfect,

without matter and without form, the absolute One without any other specification or qualification. This had been, in all essentials, the upshot of Al-Kindī's metaphysics as well. Centuries of unquestioned philosophical tradition had given to a highly controversial and hypothetical postulate like this the appearance of self-evidence, and it had been eagerly accepted by Christian theologians and, to a large extent, by their Muslim counterpart, the Mu'tazila. Al-Fārābī's philosophy is connected with the last Alexandrian philosophers, whose thought shows a growth in the influence of Aristotle; hence to the definition of the Godhead as one indivisible substance he adds, probably like his Christian Greek predecessors, that God is thought, thinking and object of thought in one, *nous, noōn, noumenon, 'aql 'āqil ma'qūl*. He then proceeds to explain that this general definition of the First Cause agrees with the special expressions and the attributes of God used in Islamic theology. Similarly his pupil Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī showed that the Christian Trinity was only a symbolic expression of the Aristotelian definition of God. The "secondary substances," the star-gods, corresponded to the angels of revealed theology, and the "active intellect" to the spirit of holiness—as has been explained before. There would be other symbols in other religions, and we know, from Al-Bīrūnī, that Muslim philosophers could even understand and appreciate image worship in other religions as a symbolic form by which man was reminded of the existence of God.

Al-Fārābī's theory of human nature was fully and almost exclusively based on Aristotelian psychology—more than the corresponding section in Ibn Sīnā's great philosophical encyclopaedias, which contain Stoic and Platonic elements not used by Al-Fārābī. The faculties of nutrition (and everything connected with it), of sense perception, of imagination and intellect are described and their hierarchical order within the one and undivided soul is particularly stressed, as a parallel to the order in the universe, and the order to be established in society. The active intellect is understood as a separate metaphysical entity. In the activity of his mind in contemplation, man experiences the most perfect felicity. But this intellectual vision of the divine reality of things does not lead to a mystical union of the soul with the active intellect, whereas Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus had themselves experienced unity with God and considered it the highest state of existence which human beings could reach. Ibn Sīnā was more of a mystic than Al-Fārābī and those who followed him. Al-Fārābī accepted reward and punishment in a future world on the level of traditional religion and believed that the conduct of the common man could be improved in that way; he thought that this must have been in Muhammad's mind when he taught this in the

Qur'ān. But as a philosopher he shared the deep and serious conviction of the Stoics that only the souls of the good enjoy eternal bliss, i.e. the souls of those who have lived a life resembling that of God as far as human beings can, who have lived a spiritual life without doing violence to the human frame. Their souls lose their individuality after death, and then become part of the "active intellect" of the Kingdom of Heaven. The indifferent souls perish with the body, "Wer keinen Namen sich erwarb noch Edles will, gehört den Elementen an." The bad souls survive in utter wretchedness. Avicenna, again, is nearer to Plotinus. He does not restrict immortality to special souls; every soul survives and preserves its individuality.

If a man's imagination is directly connected with the "active intellect," he has prophetic powers, and this is the perfection of this faculty of his soul. As imagination is subordinate to reason, so prophetic powers are associated with philosophy but are by no means superior to it. "Man becomes wise and a philosopher through that which reaches his passive intellect and then his mind works to perfection, and he becomes a prophet through that which reaches his imagination. This man has reached the most perfect rank of human nature and the highest degree of felicity." This is the first characteristic required of the ideal ruler. (Al-Fārābī avoids the words Caliph and *imām*, since his scheme is meant to apply to every community, but he has the Muslims in the forefront of his mind.) Then he must be a good orator and be able to convey to people what he knows and to impress their imagination, and he must be well fitted to guide them to felicity and to those activities by which felicity and happiness are reached. He must also be strong in his body and capable of practising the art of war.

It is impossible in a short survey to give the details of Al-Fārābī's political theory, to point out its relation to the contemporary discussions of the Caliphate in other quarters and to describe his proposals for some less perfect form of government. If a single ideal ruler could not be found and the necessary qualities were only available in separate individuals, they were in that case supposed to rule as a team basing themselves on the law as established by the first ruler. In Islamic terms, the first philosopher-prophet-king-lawgiver can only have been Muhammad himself, although Al-Fārābī nowhere says so. There is a sense of urgency in his sober detached and unrhetorical style which leads us to believe that, for once, the spirit of the Platonic philosophy, though not perhaps its particular doctrines, had been revived in Islamic lands: "If at a given time it happens that philosophy has no share in the government, though every other qualification for rule may be present, the perfect state will

remain rulerless, the actual head of the state will be no true king, and the state will head for destruction; and if no wise man is to be found and associated with the acting head of the state, then after a certain interval the state will undoubtedly perish" (Al-Fārābī). "At last . . . I was driven to affirm, in praise of true philosophy, that only from the standpoint of such philosophy was it possible to take a correct view of public and private right and that, accordingly, the human race would never see the end of trouble until true lovers of wisdom should come to hold political power, or the holders of political power should, by some divine appointment, become true lovers of wisdom" (Plato, 7th Letter).

4 — *Abū 'Alī Al-Ḥusain Ibn 'Abdallāh Ibn Sīnā [Avicenna]* (A.D. 980–1037)

With Ibn Sīnā we enter a new and different period of Islamic philosophy. The philosophers hitherto discussed had all been pioneers. They had been the first, as far as we know, to draw on the translations of Greek authors which had gradually become available; they had each more or less direct contact with certain definite attitudes of late Greek, pagan or Christian philosophy and had, each in his own way, attempted to give Greek philosophy a high place within the civilization of Islam which was then still developing and abundant in scope and possibilities. But the contact with ancient philosophy outside the Islamic world is now over, and a definite tradition of Islamic philosophy is established instead. The philosophers can and actually do develop their arguments in depth and intensity, but they can neither fall back upon the Greek originals—as philosophers did later in the West—nor have recourse to the Syriac, as the bilingual Christian teachers of philosophy in tenth-century Baghdād constantly and successfully do. Ibn Sīnā, who passed all his life in Persia, often in a high political position as minister at different small courts, has become the most influential and most revered of all the early Muslim philosophers. He disliked the Christian philosophers of Baghdād but appreciated a great deal of Al-Fārābī's thought. He was aware of all the past history of Islamic philosophy, as well as of arguments and theories of Greek origin which we find in his works for the first time; he appears to be often in agreement particularly with Al-Kindī, not only in his appreciation of Plotinus but also in not a few other affinities of outlook which may become more apparent in future research; in his theory of prophecy, for example, or his frequent use of the hypothetical syllogism, which is less liked though also used by the

more consistent Aristotelian Al-Fārābī. His very decided Platonism which crowns the Aristotelian substructure also connects him with Al-Kindī and his Greek predecessors and was to assist Western Platonists before Aquinas to express their Augustinian Platonism in philosophical terms. The mystical component in the thought of the "Chief Master" is very noticeable and important, and his long Arabic poem on the descent of the human soul into the body is deservedly famous for its beauty and the deep feeling expressed in it. There appears to be no attempt to reform Islam according to the postulates of philosophy. Influenced partly by Al-Fārābī, partly by Al-Kindī, he tries to reconcile philosophy and religion through allegorical interpretation, whereas Ibn Rushd, following Al-Fārābī more closely, unconditionally upholds the primacy of reason and criticized Avicenna severely for his "inconsistency". Ibn Sīnā is a systematic thinker of the first order. His great and justly famous medical encyclopaedia, the *Qānūn*, is lacking in originality, if compared with Ar-Rāzī, but is deservedly celebrated for its clear and exhaustive and well-classified arrangement of the subject-matter. It was for centuries very popular with Arabic, Persian and Latin doctors alike. The same systematic genius manifests itself in his great philosophical encyclopaedia *ash-shifā* (*sanatio*) in which he deals at length with all the philosophical, mathematical and natural sciences. No complete edition of the original text exists; some sections were translated into Latin. An abbreviation of this great work, the *Najāt* (*salvatio*) is completely known, and was printed together with the *Qānūn*, the second Arabic work ever printed, in Rome in 1593.

It is impossible to deal here with all the aspects of His Excellency the Minister's immensely rich philosophical work, and a short survey of his psychology must be accepted instead of a more comprehensive treatment. He based it, like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd, on Aristotle's *De anima*, but with modifications partly reminding us of Al-Kindī, partly drawn from other ancient sources, and elaborated in his own way. The differences from Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd are evident. Aristotle's definition of the soul is accepted in full, but at the same time the soul is defined as an incorporeal substance. It has been shown in a fine recent study by an Indian scholar, how this inconsistency in Ibn Sīnā's theory—which also leads him to affirm the immortality of the individual soul—grew out of difficulties inherent in Aristotle's psychology which were elaborated by Alexander of Aphrodisias and particularly by Neoplatonic commentators like Simplicius of Athens. This trend of Platonizing Aristotelianism reached the Arabs and is first noticeable in Al-Kindī's scanty remains; Avicenna discussed it most vigourously and with great subtlety. His is also a very elaborate and unique discussion of the inner senses, of internal

perception, which developed the Aristotelian concept of common sense by differentiating the Aristotelian concept of imagination and splitting it up into five different faculties. It is, however, evident that by doing so he reproduced some later Greek theory which is lost in the original. The inner senses seem to have been first discussed in the Porch. Since Avicenna, in accordance with Muslim faith, considered prophecy as the highest and most divine human faculty, he could not be satisfied like Al-Fārābī to consider it as the highest kind of imagination, but had to try to connect it with the intellect. He did so by identifying it with sagacity or quick wit, the "power of hitting the middle term of a syllogism in an imperceptible time," a power of infallibly guessing the truth without the help of imagination. He fitted this power, which we know from Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* and which had subsequently been given greater importance in Stoic thought, into the framework of Neoplatonic metaphysics, making it a recipient of the inspiration coming from the "active intelligence." We cannot say whether he was the first to do that or whether he had a predecessor in late Greek philosophy.

There are other deviations from the scheme adopted by Al-Fārābī, especially in metaphysical theory, which all point to the same shifting of the balance in favour of Plato. Let us realize, without discussing particulars, what this Platonism amounts to. Whenever the modern reader turns from Aristotle to Plato, he does more than feel a mere difference in style, he is aware of a greater, richer personality, of a great artist and a sublime poet. Plato was above all a religious genius of the first order, and Plotinus and those Neoplatonists who were able to understand him felt this religious element in Plato and praised him for this reason as the prince of philosophy. Because they understood this, Ar-Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā are nearer to the inner spirit of Plato's thought than Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd. Aristotle is akin to Plato, and has rightly been associated with him by those Greek philosophers who appealed to the Muslim thinkers. He tried to make the religious experience of Plato, which dominated his mind from the beginning and throughout his life, accessible to the critical understanding. This is the real meaning of his metaphysics as we have come to realize after a period of misunderstanding. His analytical genius, however, was stronger than his constructive power and he did not succeed in building up an edifice of his own which was comparable to the achievement of Plato. Later centuries needed Aristotle as a kind of philosopher of religion, as a help to an adequate understanding of Plato, and were rightly, I believe, convinced that philosophers need both and cannot dispense with either of them. Avicenna's style is abstract, he is deeply steeped in Aristotelianism and cannot do without Aristotle.

He cannot compare with Plato or Plotinus in his philosophical style. But he understood something which is the very essence of Plato's thought, and it may be that for this reason he appealed to religious Muslims—as Plato himself has conveyed religious truth, to people open to religion, at all times. This comes out very well in the poem to which I referred before, about the fate of the human soul:

> "Until, when the hour of its homeward flight draws near,
> And 'tis time for it to return to its ampler sphere,
> It carols with joy, for the veil is raised, and it spies
> Such things as cannot be witnessed by waking eyes.
> On a lofty height doth it warble its songs of praise
> (for even the lowliest being doth knowledge raise).
> And so it returneth, aware of all hidden things
> In the universe, while no stain to its garment clings."
> (Transl. E. G. Browne)

5 — *Ibn Rushd* [*Averroës*] (A.D. 1126–1198)

Ibn Sīnā never wrote a commentary on the lines of the Greek commentaries on Aristotle, many of which were known to the Arabic philosophers and imitated by the Christian teachers of philosophy in tenth-century Baghdād and, to all appearance, by Al-Fārābī. He most probably knew them all but evidently did not feel like adding to them. He tells us in an autobiographical passage, referred to earlier in this chapter, that he had acquired all his enormous knowledge at a very early age, and was, in his later life, concerned mainly with erecting his own philosophical system on these foundations. He was not interested in explaining the original texts in detail but was bent on maturing his own thought, despite the exacting demands of his public career. Recent research has shown that there is a certain development in his thought but no departure from his original position, only an increasingly refined elaboration of his attitude. One can, incidentally, make similar observations in comparing the various works of Al-Fārābī.

Ibn Rushd, who lived in the most remote western corner of the Muslim world, was very different from Ibn Sīnā with whose works he was familiar. The greater part of his literary output consists in commentaries on Aristotle, which he wrote for two of the Almohad rulers. He wrote partly commentaries in the style of Alexander of Aphrodisias, partly very elaborate summaries in the style of Themistius, partly still shorter summaries of a type also favoured by the Greeks. He drew on the similar work of Al-Fārābī, which reached him through intermediaries, the Spanish philosophers Ibn Bājjā (Avempace) and Ibn Ṭufail, the author of a rightly famous philosophical novel *The History of Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān*. Ibn Rushd deserves a place of honour in the long series of commentators

on Aristotle and upholds an important tradition. His commentaries, like those of Al-Fārābī, are with a few exceptions lost in the Arabic original. They evidently found very few readers; the centuries after Ibn Rushd were indifferent or hostile to philosophy. But a great number of his commentaries were translated into Hebrew and Latin and became of great importance for mediaeval Jewish and especially Western Latin Aristotelian studies. For more than three hundred years Western scholars read Aristotle mainly with the help of the commentaries of Averroës, and his judgment is still taken into consideration at the present day. Critical editions of the few Arabic texts preserved have recently begun to appear.

Ibn Rushd's view of philosophy and religion is almost the same as Al-Fārābī's belief in the primacy of reason. The symbols of faith, different in each religion, point to the same truth as does philosophical knowledge, common to philosophers of every creed and every nation, which is based on demonstration and argument. There is no "double truth." Hence Ibn Rushd the philosopher can as a high judge administer religious law according to the Mālikite rite and compose a manual of this law without acting against his general views on philosophy and religion. Al-Fārābī's plan to reform the law with the help of Greek philosophy had long since been abandoned.

It is not surprising that Ibn Rushd, who consistently followed the Alexandrian exegesis of Aristotle, like Al-Fārābī before him, had to disagree with many of Ibn Sīnā's tenets. It is worth mentioning that he blames him also for having made concessions to the theological school of the Ash'arites, which had become the most influential theological school after Al-Fārābī's time. But his debate with Ibn Sīnā and his reaffirmation of a more Aristotelian Neoplatonism, revealing as it may be for the history of Muslim philosophy, is overshadowed by his greatest and most original work entitled *The Incoherence of the Incoherence*, in which he subtly and vigorously defends philosophy against Al-Ghazālī's (1058–1111) determined and able attack entitled *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*. This is certainly a Muslim philosophical work, in so far as it uses the whole arsenal of Aristotelian philosophy for the intense discussion of an issue which could only arise between Muslim parties at variance. Ibn Rushd shows himself a perfect master of Aristotelian philosophy and handles his arguments with admirable skill and accomplished understanding. He discusses all the main problems of Muslim theology and makes a supreme effort to show that only philosophy can give a satisfactory answer to them. The eternity of the world, the Creator and First Cause, the attributes of God, God's knowledge and providence are discussed in this lengthy and exhaustive work. Al-Ghazālī's arguments

are quoted in full and discussed and refuted with a fairness and subtlety which compel our admiration. The search for truth which had made Al-Kindī the first Muslim philosopher is passionately alive in the last great representative of Greek philosophy in mediaeval Islam. We may take it as symbolic that the famous saying "amicus Plato amica veritas sed magis amica veritas" is referred to very frequently in Arabic tradition.

Al-Ghazālī moved on the same level as Ibn Rushd. He was a great theologian who was able to understand his philosophical adversaries and to use all the methods of thought with which men like Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā had provided those Muslims who cared to reason about God and man. Scholars who are competent to judge say, rightly I believe, that his arguments are often better than Ibn Rushd's refutation. Al-Ghazālī had a more intimate feeling for the very essence of Islam and of religion in general, and hence his influence on the future of Islam was more lasting than his adversary's belief in the primacy of reason.

Averroës had been fighting a losing battle, as far as mediaeval Islam is concerned. We read in the work of a younger contemporary, the Persian Suhrawardī al-maqtūl (1155–1191), the description of a dream in which Aristotle appears to him. The Aristotle of the dream praises Plato. Suhrawardī asks him whether there is any Muslim philosopher who has come near to Plato and may be compared to him. He hints at Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Aristotle is not impressed. But when Suhrawardī mentions the first of the "intoxicated" Sufis, the early Persian mystic Abū Yazīd of Bistām (died 875) and a follower of the Gnostic Dhū'n-Nūn the Egyptian (died 861), Aristotle at last gives an affirmative answer: these are true philosophers and true wise men. Plato the mystic is still appreciated, Plato the philosopher and political reformer is forgotten and has no message for Muslims who live in accordance with the religious instincts of the common people and express their attitude to God in an orthodox theology, which used the arguments of ancient stoicism and scepticism, and in Sufic mysticism. Islamic philosophy, based on too narrow a concept of reason, had failed where Greek philosophy had failed before it.

From: *The History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western* (Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London), vol. II, 120–48 (omitting the bibliography).

ON THE LEGACY OF THE CLASSICS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

The main purpose of the following remarks is to remind the reader of a neglected outpost of classical scholarship. Though it is becoming better known, it still lacks recognition and its defenders remain more isolated than is good for them: there are too few cooperators and there is too little discussion and criticism. The days of Scaliger and Reiske who were both classicists and accomplished Arabists seem to have gone for ever, and hence most of the work which is based on Arabic texts is ignored outside the orientalist circle. It may, then, not be useless to mention a few questions connected with the importance which the study of Arabic philosophical texts may have at the present day for classical scholarship.

It is commonly realized that the tradition of philosophy (and science) of which the Arabs got hold between A.D. 800 and 1000 was richer than the Greek-Byzantine tradition of philosophy which reached the West in the days of the great Schoolmen and of Marsilio Ficino. Philosophical and scientific texts less favoured in the later centuries of the Byzantine Empire were still in comparatively easy reach and the Arabic translators made good use of this opportunity.

Only a comparatively small part of the Arabic versions of Greek philosophical texts has survived; not all of those extant have been traced; not all of those traced have been edited and translated into a Western language. A complete survey would be the subject of a monograph. But some recent progress may be indicated. The Arabic text of Aristotle's *Categories* has been known for about 100 years, the *De interpretatione* for more than 40, the *Poetics* for almost 70 years. We have now, in addition, first editions of the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, the *Topics* and the *Sophistici Elenchi* [1], [the *Rhetorics* [2]], the *De anima* [3], the *Metaphysics* [4] and the pseudo-aristotelian work *De plantis* by Nicolaus of Damascus [5]. Manuscripts of the *Physics*, the *De caelo*, the *History of animals*, the works *On the parts of animals* and *On the generation of animals* are in

[1] By 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān Badawī, *Manṭiq Arisṭū* I–III (Cairo 1948–52).
[2] By the same editor (Cairo 1959).]
[3] By the same editor (Cairo 1954).
[4] By M. Bouyges S. J. (Beyrouth 1938–52).
[5] By A. J. Arberry (Cairo 1933/4).

easy reach [1]. Editions of all these treatises are being planned; the editions of the *Meteorology* and of the last four books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* [2] are expected in the not too distant future. The translation of Themistius' paraphrase of the *De anima* is being prepared for publication. The Arabic text of Ps. Plutarch's *Placita Philosophorum* can now be compared with the badly preserved Greek text [3]. To compile a comparative index of philosophical terminology—Greek, Arabic, and Latin—thus appears less difficult now than it did still twenty years ago.

There is no reason to embark on a list of philosophical texts which have survived only in Arabic versions and thus, together with the Egyptian papyri, increase our present knowledge of Greek literature: they are quite well known [4]. I may, however, mention the recent discoveries of lost works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the founder of the medieval tradition of Aristotle reading, on whose commentaries and monographs both Arabic and medieval philosophers so largely depend. They are partly available in print [5] (but not translated into a European language), partly have been very recently traced in Istanbul; they are of great interest for the history of Greek and later philosophy [6].

There exists a group of Arabic philosophical texts which are evidently based on lost Greek works without reproducing them in every detail but which follow the original argument very closely, as far as can be made out by probable guesses. Apart from the few original Greek texts of the great authors who interest us all—a chapter based on Posidonius [7], fragments of Aristotle's *Dialogues* [8], a line of Democritus embedded in an Arabic Galen [9], etc.—the interpretation of this kind of text is most fascinating and attractive. I refer only to a few examples. A Consolatio

[1] Cf. *Orientalia* 20, 1951, pp. 334 ff.; *Philosophical Quart.* 1953, p. 175 ff.

[2] Cf. A. J. Arberry, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 1955, p. 1 ff.

[3] Ed. Badawī (Cairo 1954).

[4] Cf. e.g. *Philosophical Quart.* 1953, p. 175 ff. and *Oriens* 6, 1953, p. 93 ff. [see below, pp.60–113].

[5] Cf. Badawī, *Aristū 'inda-l-'Arab* (Cairo 1947), pp. 251–308 [cf. below p. 62].

[6] F. Rosenthal, From Arabic Books and Manuscripts V, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 75, 1955, pp. 16–18. [Cf. S. Pines, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 1959, pp. 295–99.]

[7] Cf. my New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy, *Class. Quart.* 1949, pp. 82–96 [below, pp. 142–163], A Diatribe of Galen, *Harvard Theological Review* 47, 1954, pp. 243–54 [below, pp. 164–174]. K. Reinhardt, RE. s. v. *Poseidonios* col. 745.

[8] Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele, *Stud. Ital. Filol. Class., N. S.* 14, 1937, pp. 125–37 [below, pp. 38–47]. Fragmenta Graeca in litteris Arabicis I, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1939, pp. 407–22 [below, pp. 48–59]. Sir David Ross, *The works of Aristotle* XII, 1952, pp. 23–6. S. van den Bergh, *Tahafut al-Tahafut* (London 1954) I p. 90; II p. 65.

[9] *Galen on Medical Experience* (London 1944) IX 5. *Vorsokrat.* 3[5] (Berlin 1938), p. 653.

by Al-Kindī can be proved, argument by argument, to reproduce a late Greek original whose author we cannot identify. It was imitated and used by many later Islamic writers [1]. Of greater importance is Al-Fārābī's small work *On Plato's philosophy* [2], although it does not reproduce the Greek original in full and omits the ideal doctrine and the immortality of the soul. It gives an account of all the Platonic dialogues, arranged in an order both systematically and chronologically different from every arrangement hitherto known: starting with the *Major Alcibiades* and finishing with the *Letters*. With the exception of the *Minos*, all the dialogues to be found in the Alexandrian tetralogical edition are mentioned and characterized. The systematic arrangement is, from a historical point of view, certainly, to say the least, naive. The author looks at Plato's thought with the eyes of an average late Greek professor of philosophy and assumes that Plato had planned a closed philosophical system in the same way as he himself would have done it. In a similar way, the Greek historians of mathematics restored the sequence of events according to the requirements of their own time and did not hesitate to assume that facts which had to be first established on logical grounds should also come first chronologically [3]. What is important in this survey of Plato's thought is that it is utterly independent of the late Neoplatonic view and refrains from interpreting the *Parmenides* as a compendium of Plato's Metaphysics and making the *Timaeus* Plato's most outstanding work. On the contrary, it gives Plato's so-called political thought its due position, by emphasizing the conception of the philosopher-king and even appreciating Plato's attempts to realize it here and now. Such interpretations of Plato must have been still alive, or at least available, when the Arabs came in contact with Greek philosophy, and will have inspired Al-Fārābī in his attempt to proclaim the ideal calif as the platonic philosopher-king [4]. He was helped in the impressive revival of Plato's conception of the philosopher-king which he established in Islamic lands by commentaries of the *Republic* [5] and the *Laws* [6] which are also free from Neoplatonic accretions.

[1] H. Ritter and R. Walzer, Studi su al-Kindī II, *Acc. dei Lincei*, Roma 1938, and the additions and corrections by M. Pohlenz (*GGAnz.* 200, 1938, p. 409 ff.).

[2] F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, Alfarabius De Platonis philosophia, *Plato Arabus II* (London 1943).

[3] Cf. O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity* (Princeton 1952), p. 142.

[4] Cf. also my contribution to the "Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique" of 1955, to be published by the Fondation Hardt, Vandœuvres (Genève) [below, pp. 236–252] and the article Aflāṭūn in the second edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden 1955).

[5] Cf. E. Rosenthal's forthcoming edition of Averroes' Commentary on Plato's *Republic* (Cambridge University Press) [published in 1958].

[6] Cf. F. Gabrieli, Alfarabius Compendium Legum Platonis, *Plato Arabus* III (London 1952).

It is obvious that Greek evidence of the teaching of Ethics in the late Greek philosophical schools is rather scanty. Our information about this rather important subject is not at all satisfactory. We know something but not very much from Arius Didymus', the emperor Augustus' court-philosopher's account of Stoic and Peripatetic ethics, as reproduced in the 4th century compiler's Stobaeus work [1]. Plutarch, e.g., obviously presupposed a tradition of this kind but does not reproduce it in any detail when writing his entertaining essays on ethical topics. The Greek commentaries of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which we can read cannot be compared with the learned and well-informed commentaries on the logical, physical and metaphysical treatises which we possess. Strange as it may appear to us, it does not seem that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was a very popular work in late antiquity. Philosophical ethics, we learn from Arabic works, were generally based on the three parts of the soul, the rational, the spirited and the appetitive element. This platonic tripartition of the soul had again been made the basis of ethical thought by men like Posidonius and Galen, and had evidently been generally accepted in average works on ethics in later antiquity. This could be worked out as a system of four main excellences and a large number of subordinate ἀρεταί, as the Stoics had done it, but in a manner more akin to Plato's *Republic*. The Aristotelian definition of excellence as the mean between two extremes could be connected with this scheme, but we also find an Arabic treatise in which long lists of virtues and vices (or rather of bad and good ἤθη) are given without any detailed reference to the afore-mentioned parts of the soul in which they are somehow domiciled. Some sections of these systems certainly go back to the time before Plotinus, and so add to our knowledge of hellenistic ethics, but it requires peculiar discretion to make a clear cut distinction between the different strata [2]. One of the Arabic authors, Miskawaih [3], gives a lively and detailed analysis of human relations based on the φιλία books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, with two significant additions, due probably to the philosophical climate or the Greek author on which Miskawaih drew. The platonic ἔρως, which Aristotle disowned, is re-established in its dignity, and a new type of relation, the friendship between the philosophical teacher and his pupil, is introduced. It is situated between the friendship of God and the philosopher who is able

[1] Ecl. 2, 7 (vol. 2, pp. 37–152 Wachsmuth).

[2] Cf. the article Akhlāq in the second edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

[3] An older contemporary of Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna); he died A.D. 1030. I refer to his ethical treatise *Tahdhīb-al-akhlāq*; an English translation of this text, by A. F. M. Craig, will be published in the near future. [Cf. below p. 220 ff.]

to know him and the friendship between parents and children. The teacher is the spiritual father of the disciple, who may consider him as a mortal god. I can find no exact parallel to these expressions in extant Greek texts, although it corresponds well to what we know of Proclus' school, e.g., who refers to his teacher Syrianus as his father, to Syrianus' teacher Plutarch as his grandfather, and who is called child (τέκνον) by his master. But the expression 'spiritual, πνευματικός', father or child, which becomes so common in the Middle Ages, in the language of Christian holy orders as in politics, and which can be applied to the Pope, seems not to be found in pagan Greek texts, and is due to a Christian, Greek, Syriac or Arabic alteration. The idea itself is ultimately pythagorean, and a beautiful passage from Seneca *De brev. vitae* 15 comes to mind. It is interesting that this concept of the spiritual relationship between teacher and disciple is then made part of the traditional reading of the Aristotelian ethics [1]. To give some other aspect of the quality of these texts, I quote a passage from an ethical treatise by an Arabic Christian Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī [2], in which the Greek colouring is equally unmistakable: Whoever strives to become perfect must also train himself to love every man, to give him his affection, his compassion, his tenderness and his mercy. For mankind is one race, united by the fact that they all are human beings and that the mark of the divine power is in all of them and in each of them, namely the intellectual soul. Man becomes man on the strength of this soul, which is the most noble part in man. Man *is* in reality the intellectual soul, and that intellectual soul is one and the same substance in all men, and all men are in reality one and the same thing, and many only in their individual existence [3]. This is stoic and neoplatonic language in one.

I have hitherto, emphasized the importance of the Arabs for gaining a fuller picture of Greek philosophy. But before I come to say a few words about Classical and Islamic studies in general, I have to consider, though very briefly, a subject which seems to me to be of some relevance in this context: I mean the importance of the Arabic translations for the history of the Greek texts of the works translated and for the text itself. Very little, comparatively, to emphasize this again, has been done for establishing a

[1] A more detailed appreciation of Miskawaih's moral thought and its importance for late Greek ethics is to be found in my article "Some Aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq" to be published in *Scritti in onore di G. Levi della Vida* (Rome 1956) [below, pp. 220–235].

[2] Who lived in Baghdād in the tenth century, cf. the article Akhlāq in the second edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

[3] *Rasā'il al-bulaghā'*, 3rd edition, Cairo 1946, p. 518. [Cf. below, p. 222].

Greek-Arabic vocabulary based on the well known texts, say of Aristotle and Galen, and neoplatonic writings [1]. It would be of interest for the classical scholar, the medievalist and the general historian of philosophy and of the greatest importance for the student of Arabic philosophy. For the time being, no more can be expected than that no text translated from a Greek original still in existence should be published without a full glossary. This is by no means always done. As for the history of the texts it may first be kept in mind that a good translator like Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq established his own Greek text from several MSS first before he started translating [2]. The Arabic texts are certainly as revealing for the text of Greek philosophers or Galen, e.g., as the textual variants provided by the commentators [3]. Like the papyri, they help us to get a more common-sense view of the history of texts in general. Before the importance of the so-called *codices recentiores* was recognized, the study of the translation of the *Poetics*, e.g., was revealing. Similarly, most of the readings to be found in the apparatus of Bekker's edition of Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione* and rightly put into the text in the most recent Oxford edition [4] are independently attested as old readings by the Syriac and Arabic versions. The comparison of the readings of the Arabic versions in the case of unsatisfactorily edited works of Aristotle like the *Topics* and *Sophistici Elenchi*, e.g., may still sometimes be helpful, if only to get out of the quasi-hypnotizing power of the printed word and printed version. On the whole I make bold to say that the text presupposed by the Arabic versions of a Greek text deserves the same attention as an old MS or a variant recorded in a Greek commentator (this applies, I believe, to texts

[1] Cf. for Aristotle's *Categories*: Khalil Georr, *Les Catégories d'Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes* (Beyrouth 1948), pp. 205–50; the *De interpretatione*: J. Pollak, *Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung* (Leipzig 1913), pp. 35–64; the *Metaphysics*: M. Bouyges, *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Série Arabe* 5, 1 (Beyrouth 1952), p. CXCV–CCVII and *Tome* 7 (Beyrouth 1948), pp. 39–305. For Galen's summary of Plato's *Timaeus* P. Kraus and R. Walzer, *Plato Arabus* I (London 1951), pp. 102–18; 41–68.

[2] Cf. G. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-übersetzungen* (Leipzig 1925), p. 4 of the German translation. This is a text with which everybody interested in the history of classical scholarship should be acquainted.

[3] Cf. e.g. the readings presupposed in the Greek text used by the translators of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, listed by M. Bouyges in *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum* (cf. above) p. CLXI–CLXXX. For the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* cf. New Light on the Arabic Translation of Aristotle, *Oriens* 6, 1953, pp. 115 ff. 134 ff. [below, pp. 77–141]. As for Galen, most of this kind of work remains to be done, and it appears to be promising, especially wherever the Greek text is bad. The Arabic version of Ps. Plutarch's *Placita Philosophorum* appears very worth studying.

[4] Ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Oxford 1949).

of Galen as well). This is by no means an established practice. Theophrastus' metaphysical fragment was re-edited, in Oxford, about 25 years ago, by two of the most distinguished workers in this field [1]. Both of them were unaware of the fact that the Arabic text exists in the Bodleian library and had been treated by the late Laudian professor of Arabic, in a paper published in 1892 [2].

It would, perhaps, be a good thing to stop here and to fill in the rest of this paper with the recital of some examples of Greek texts recovered from the Arabic. But I think it may be more to the point to abandon this aspect of Arabic-Greek relations in philosophy altogether and to turn our attention in a different direction.

Islamic philosophy is Greek philosophy, but it is not Greek philosophy studied for scholarly reasons nor for the satisfaction of scholarly curiosity. It is meant primarily to serve the needs of the new religion of Islam: it is an attempt at a Muslim natural theology, and the greatest representatives of this theistic Islamic philosophy went so far as to see the only valid interpretation of Islam in following the ways of the philosophers. This implies that we may also arrive at a modified view of Greek thought by looking at it from a territory which is very near to it, both in time and in space, and yet sufficiently different to make it appear in a new light and to see certain aspects of it, and also certain limitations, better than we are able to do by looking at the Greeks alone or by comparing their achievements with contemporary 20th century thought. Further: it has always been the classical scholar's concern to look not exclusively at the great outstanding works of the Greeks but also to consider their impact on other civilizations, not to speak of the modern world in which our ancestors have lived and in which we live ourselves. It is one of the outstanding features of the great works of the Greeks that they can live also when separated from their native soil, and be assimilated by different nations in different times and widen their outlook on life and their power to master it. This applies to poetry as well, as to philosophy with which we are concerned here. Classical scholars are used to comparing Greece and Rome and to understanding the limitations and the greatness of Greece better while considering the life of the Romans, so intimately connected with and at the same time so different from the Greeks. It has recently become less unusual to find scholars who are prepared to look with equal interest at the Jewish and Christian tradition and at the Greek way of life, and to understand the prophets as well as Plato. They are still

[1] Theophrastus' *Metaphysics*, edd. W. D. Ross and F. H. Fobes (Oxford 1929).

[2] D. S. Margoliouth, Remarks on the Arabic Version of the Metaphysics of Theophrastus *Journ. of the R. Asiatic Society*, 1892, pp. 192 ff.

too rare, if one has in mind the immense task of trying to understand, in historical terms, the double root of our way of life and to find our feet in the troubled times in which we live. Further: the times have passed, I believe, when classical scholars were inclined to look, say, at Cicero as a quarry for lost hellenistic philosophy alone and when they belittled with contempt the philosophical personality of the great Roman humanist, who did not happen to be a Plato but only a πλατωνίζων. We are aware of the difference between Horace and the Lesbian poets, between Vergil and Homer, but nobody in his senses will deny that Horace and Vergil are great poets in their own right. As for the Fathers of the Church, too much has still to be done to ascertain their debt to Greek and Roman pagan philosophers, and the danger of not appreciating their own achievement appears to be less real than the risk of overlooking what they owe to their non-Christian predecessors. Nobody, not even an inveterate classical man, has ever confessed to studying, say, Hippolytus only for the considerable number of fragments of Heraclitus in one of the sections of his work. Hence after having dwelt so long on the importance of the Arab philosophers for a better material understanding of Greek philosophy, I should now be at pains to emphasize that the Arabic thinkers have a just and deserved claim to be understood in their own right, like the Romans and the Greek and Roman Christians of Antiquity. Indeed they have. They may be a quarry for ancient thought, but not only he who loves the Islamic world should raise his voice in protest. The classicist would betray his best interest if he did not wish to see how Islamic philosophers used Greek thought of varying provenience and different quality in an honest and intense effort to come to a deeper understanding of the problems of their own days and their own and different world; in an effort to analyse the problems of religious truth and philosophical understanding; in an attempt to find a synthesis between a religion based on the reason of the heart and making God an immortal man, and the Greek religion of the mind which can ask man to become a mortal God but sees in God a dehumanized principle; in an attempt to give reasons for something which could only appear foolish to the Greeks and the Muslims eventual failure to accomplish it. All this demands not only our respect: because what is valid in human society, that "homo homini res sacra", applies also to our understanding of other ways of human life, and accordingly to civilizations near to our own like Islam and yet so different in many ways [1]. It throws

[1] Cf. e.g. *Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut, translated from the Arabic with Introduction and Notes*, by S. v. d. Bergh, 2 volls., London 1954.—The History of Philosophy, East and West, ch. 32: *Islamic Philosophy* (London 1953) [above, pp. 1–28].

new light on the achievements of the Greeks also, not only on the intermediaries whom we have mainly considered in this paper but on the great philosophers who dominate the Greek scene as well, on Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.

From: *Festschrift Bruno Snell* (C. H. Beck, Munich), 1956, pp. 189–96.

UN FRAMMENTO NUOVO DI ARISTOTELE

Le versioni orientali sono — salvo naturalmente i ritrovamenti papirologici — l'unica fonte dalla quale si può ancora notevolmente arricchire il nostro patrimonio di letteratura greca [1]. Infatti si è già in tal modo riusciti a rintracciare importanti scritti perduti della tarda antichità, sia di filosofia sia di medicina sia di scienza, e spesse volte, conservati nel contesto di questi scritti, passi interessanti di autori classici ancora noti direttamente o attraverso florilegi a quest' epoca tarda. Fra codesti scritti classici di carattere filosofico figuravano anche i dialoghi di Aristotele, cari ai Neoplatonici per diversissime ragioni, talchè non è da meravigliare che se ne incontri un nuovo frammento in uno scritto di carattere psicologico, dovuto alla penna del filosofo arabo al-Kindī (morto dopo l' 870), il quale attinse le sue informazioni filosofiche ai tardi Neoplatonici. Però il traduttore dell'opuscolo Kindiano, G. Furlani [2] — una edizione del testo arabo non è stata finora pubblicata [3], — ha dichiarato spurio quel frammento, ritenendo che esso non appartiene allo scritto dottrinale di Aristotele, intitolato *De anima*, e insistendo sul « sapore schiettamente neoplatonico » della dottrina ivi esposta [4]. Ma resta la possibilità che il frammento appartenesse non allo scritto dottrinale [5] — ad al-Kindī, non pratico della lingua greca, verosimilmente del tutto ignoto, non avendo egli probabilmente avuto neppure notizia della versione araba fattane da Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain nella seconda metà del nono secolo [6] — ma all'omonimo di struttura dialogica, intitolato Εὔδημος ἢ

[1] Cfr. per esempio R. Walzer, Klassische Altertumswissenschaft und Orientalistik, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, 86, 1933, p. 153 sgg.

[2] G. Furlani, Una risāla di al-Kindī sull'anima, *Rivista trimestrale di studi filosofici e religiosi*, vol. 3, 1922, pp. 50–63.

[3] Cf. now the Egyptian edition of the *Rasā'il al-Falsafiyya di Al-Kindī* I, Cairo 1950, pp. 270–80 Abū Rīda.]

[4] L. 1, p. 59 sg.

[5] Esistevano del resto anche brani dello scritto dottrinale che non fanno parte del nostro testo del *De anima*, come recentemente (*Gnomon*, 11, 1935, p. 420) ha mostrato H. Langerbeck (in Temistio, *De anima*, p. 17, 25–35 Heinze).

[6] Cfr. M. Steinschneider, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen*, Leipzig 1897, § 32 (56). [Now published by A. Badawī, *Islamica* 16, Cairo 1954, pp. 1–88.] Egli poteva soltanto conoscere una sinopse della pragmatia di Aristotele, composta oppure tradotta da Iaḥjā ibn al-Biṭrīq. [This is, perhaps, the text published by Aḥmad Fu'ād Al-Ahwānī, *Ibn Roshd etc.*, pp. 125–75. Cf. below, p. 95.]

Περὶ ψυχῆς [1] e citato qualche volta soltanto col secondo titolo [2]. E se il passo non rientra nelle dottrine peripatetiche, in quelle vale a dire dell'ultimo Aristotele, non è da escludere a limine che concordi con dottrine platonizzanti del primo Aristotele che per merito del Jaeger [3] possiamo oggi apprezzare nuovamente nel loro vero significato. Non vorremo però apparir corrivi a giudicare sfavorevolmente l'errore bene spiegabile del nostro predecessore, che ha pubblicato per la prima volta un testo fino allora rimasto sconosciuto, ma vorremo soltanto completare i risultati esposti da lui. Per un nuovo esame del testo ho potuto servirmi della copia di un manoscritto arabo conservato nel *dār al-Kutub al-miṣriyya* del Cairo (*Taimuriyya Falsafa, n.* 55) e a me pervenuta in dono dal dott. Meyerhof. Quel manoscritto mi sembra derivato dal medesimo codice donde fu copiato il Londinense (Mus. Brit., cod. ar. 8069, fol. 9b–12a) adoprato dal prof. Furlani.

Presentiamo dunque prima il frammento in traduzione italiana, corregendolo nello stesso tempo in parte [4]:

« Aristotele racconta il fatto di quel re greco la cui anima fu rapita in estasi [5] e che per molti giorni restò nè vivo nè morto. Quando [6] tornò in sè, istruì la gente intorno alle varie cose del mondo [7] invisibile (o : alle varie specie della scienza [8] dell'invisibile ?) [9] e raccontò quello che aveva veduto, anime, forme e angeli ; e diede le prove di ciò (ossia della verità delle sue affermazioni) predicendo a tutti quanti i suoi famigliari quanto avrebbe vissuto ciascuno di essi. Fattosi l'esperimento di tutto quanto aveva detto, nessuno oltrepassò la misura di vita che egli gli aveva assegnata. Predisse inoltre che si sarebbe aperto un baratro [10] nel paese degli Elei [11] dopo un anno

[1] Fr. 44 R (= 6 Walzer) : ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ ἐπιγραφομένῳ ἢ Περὶ ψυχῆς. Fr. 46 R (= 8 W.) : ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ Περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῷ γεγραμμένῳ διαλόγῳ.

[2] Vedi l'elenco di Diogene Laerzio V 21, nr. 13 (Περὶ ψυχῆς ᾱ) e quello di Esichio, il quale segue più o meno fedelmente quell'autore. Fr. 37 R (= 1 W.) : ὁ Περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογος (Plutarco). Cfr. anche Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto*, II, p. 540 n. 1. [I. Düring, *Aristotle in the biographical tradition*, Göteborg 1957, pp. 42, 83.]

[3] *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*, Berlin 1923, pp. 9–170 (pp. 9–220 della edizione italiana, Firenze 1934). Cfr. le aggiunte del Bignone, *op. cit.*, p. 227 sgg.

[4] I p. 279, 2ff. Abū Rīda.]

[5] *'uriğa bi-nafsihī* = « colpì se stesso » F(urlani).

[6] *kullamā* ms. (« ogni qual volta »), *lammā* (« quando ») corr.

[7] *'ālam* (?). [This change is not necessary, *'ilm al-ghaib* comes from the Qur'ān.]

[8] *'ilm* ms.

[9] « priva della conoscenza dell'invisibile » F.

[10] χάσμα γῆς. Cfr. per esempio Strab, I, 54 c : εἴπερ καὶ χάσματα καὶ καταπόσεις χωρίων καὶ κατοικιῶν ὑπὸ σεισμοῦ γενέσθαι φασί. [Arist.], *De mundo*, 396ᵃ = « un'eclisse » F.

[11] *fī bilād al-Aus* ms., « dubito che la lezione del manoscritto sia giusta » F. — Ritengo che il traduttore siriaco leggesse παρὰ τοῖς Ἠλείοις (cfr. per esempio Xen. Hell. III 2, 24). Sarebbe anche possibile spiegare la parola araba per « nel paese di Ἑλλάς », ma nelle parole seguenti si tratta di un altro paese, non nominato dal traduttore, ma però verosimilmente di un altro paese greco.

e che vi sarebbe stata un'inondazione [1] in un altro luogo dopo due anni : e ogni cosa avvenne secondo egli aveva detto. — Aristotele afferma che la ragione di ciò è che la sua anima apprese quella scienza appunto perchè era stata prossima ad abbandonare il corpo e si era in un certo modo separata da esso, e per questo aveva veduto ciò [2]. Quanto maggiori meraviglie del mondo superiore del ' regno ' [3] avrebbe dunque vedute, se avesse realmente abbandonato il corpo. »

Aristotele presuppone dunque in questo passo l'immortalità dell'anima, parlando inoltre della contemplazione del mondo supremo, che sarebbe concessa alle anime umane svincolatesi dal corpo (l. 15). Che gli angeli del testo arabo (l. 5) corrispondono difatti alle divinità pagane, vien attestato per esempio dalla traduzione araba della parafrasi galeniana del *Timeo* Platonico [4] che sostituisce — sulle orme cioè del testo siriaco oppure già di un testo greco corretto da lettori cristiani [5] — ai θεοὶ θεῶν (41a) gli angeli obbedienti alle parole di Dio. Non si dovrà dunque ricorrere all'angelologia di Porfirio, di Proclo [6], di Iamblico [7], oppure a dottrine

[1] *wa-sail* (*su'ila* ms.) *jakūnu* = « gli fu chiesto se essa sarà dopo due anni in un altro luogo. Il testo è qui in disordine » F. Cfr. per esempio Strab. I, 59 *C* : Βοῦρα δὲ καὶ Ἑλίκη ἡ μὲν ὑπὸ χάσματος ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ κύματος ἠφανίσθη (a, 373), Herakleides Pontikos ap. Strab. VIII 384 (= fr. 12 Voss ; [fr. 46 Wehrli]). Kallisthenes Hell. fr. 19–21 (*F. G. Hist.* 124 Jac.), anzitutto fr. 20 (« multa prodigia »), cfr. Paus. VII, 24, 7–48 ; Ael. *De nat. an.*, XI, 19 ; Philo, *De aet. m.* § 140 ; Arist. *Meteor.* β 8 368[b] 6 sgg. et ap. Sen., *Nat. quaest.*, VII, 5, 4 (cfr. E. Will, *Dissert.* Würzburg 1912, p. 107). — Cfr. inoltre Capelle, Pauly-Wissowa, *Supplementband* IV (1924) s. v. *Erdbebenforschung*. [Cf. F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* 7, Basel 1953, p. 73 f.]

[2] « quell' (altro mondo) » F.

[3] *'aǧā'ib min amri-l-malakūti-l-ā'lā* : « la condizione mirabile degli angeli sublimi » F.

[4] Cfr. Ritter-Walzer, Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *Sitz. Ber. Preuss. Ak., Phil.-hist. Klasse* 1934, p. 818. L'edizione del nuovo testo è in corso di preparazione. [Plato Arabus I, edd. P. Kraus et R. Walzer, London 1951.] L'opuscolo risulta composto dopo il discorso XII del libro Περὶ ἀποδείξεως, del quale ci fornisce un brano sconosciuto. Cfr. I. Mueller, Galens Werk vom wissenschaftlichen Beweis, *Abh. Münch. Ak., Philos.-philol.* Kl. XX, 2. Abt., 1895, p. 403 sgg., il quale non cita nessun frammento di questo discorso (cfr. *ibid.*, p. 474), e dopo il *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, il quale vien due volte citato espressamente (cfr. W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa*, Berlin 1914, pp. 15 sg., 39 e *passim*). Invece l'altro libro di Galeno dedicato al *Timeo* e precisamente quello intitolato Περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος Τιμαίῳ ἰατρικῶς εἰρημένων, i cui frammenti sono nuovamente raccolti da H. O. Schroeder e P. Kahle (Leipzig 1934), è stato composto dopo la parafrasi che faceva parte del terzo libro della sua Πλατωνικῶν διαλόγων σύνοψις (Galeno, *Scripta minora*, II, 122, 13).

[5] Tali ritocchi dommatici, compiuti nell'ambiente giacobita-neoplatonico del secolo VI, si trovano infatti nella cosiddetta *Teologia* di Aristotele (ed. Dieterici, 1882–3), come segnala P. Kraus, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, CXIII (1936), p. 211 Cfr. anche Chalcidio, *In Tim.* 132, p. 195 W. [Cf. below, p. 167, n. 2.]

[6] *In Tim.* I, p. 152, 13 Diehl.

[7] Ap. Stob., *Anthol.* I, pp. 458, 20. 385, 6 Wachsmuth. Vedi anche R. Heinze, *Xenokrates*, Leipzig 1892, p. 112 sgg. ; E. Rohde, *Psyche*, II, p. 387 ; C. Bäumker, *Witelo* (Münster 1908), p. 530 sgg.

simili di Filone Ebreo [1] per rendere il colore greco alle parole che stanno a base del passo di al-Kindī. Vediamo dunque di nuovo il giovane Aristotele interamente dipendente dalle dottrine platoniche riguardo alla vita autonoma dell'anima umana, essendo palese la somiglianza tra questo passo ed uno assai noto del *Fedro* [2]. Basterà accennare soltanto ad alcuni frammenti notissimi dell'*Eudemo*, per comprendere, come questo nuovo passo concordi esattamente col contenuto di quel dialogo. Osserviamo di passaggio che fra gli otto frammenti dell'*Eudemo* a noi finora conosciuti, non meno di sei sono attinti ad autori dell'ultima antichità, cioè a Temistio [3], Proclo [4], Simplicio [5], Giovanni Filopono [6], Elias [7], Olimpiodoro [8]. Non è dunque strano che un altro ci sia conservato da un autore arabo, che nel suo scritto isagogico ai libri di Aristotele [9] si serve di una divisione del *Corpus Aristotelicum* risalente a fonte neoplatonica [10], e nel suo trattato *Sull'arte di scacciare la tristezza* [11] riproduce un originale perduto di Temistio della stessa intonazione platonico-peripatetica.

La storia del re greco rientra nella serie di argomenti dialettici, che adempiono all'ufficio di integrare le deduzioni rigorosamente filosofiche di Aristotele. Ora è noto che egli fa già nei dialoghi largo uso di questo metodo, come sappiamo per esempio dal frammento 39 R (= 3 W.) dell'*Eudemo*, che ci insegna in generale quanto peso Aristotele abbia dato, per la dimostrazione della sopravvivenza dell'anima, alle costumanze del culto, oppure dal frammento 44 (= 6 W.), nel quale ci vien narrato, e precisamente collo stesso scopò, il mito antichissimo di Mida e Sileno visto

[1] Per esempio *De gig.* § 6 (vol. II, p. 43, 8 C.-W.) ; *De somn.*, I, 141 (vol. III, p. 235, 12).

[2] 246[a] sg. Cfr. p. 44.

[3] Fr. 38 R (= 2 W.) ; 45 R (= 7 W.).

[4] Fr. 40 R (= 4 W.) ; 41 R (= 5 W.).

[5] Fr. 45 R (= 7 W.) ; 46 R (= 8 W.).

[6] Fr. 45 R (= 7 W.).

[7] Fr. 39 R (= 3 W.).

[8] Fr. 45 R (= 7 W.).

[9] Cfr. H. Ritter, Schriften Ja'qūb ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī's in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *Archiv Orientalny*, IV (1932, 363 sgg. nr. 16). L'edizione dello scritto, curata da M. Guidi e R. Walzer, verrà pubblicata nelle *Memorie dell'Academia dei Lincei*, 1937 (Studî su al-Kindî, I). [Published 1940.]

[10] Cioè dando la preferenza alle scienze matematiche come oggetti di προπαιδεία ed assegnando alla psicologia un posto particolare fra la fisiologia e la metafisica, poichè tratta (III, 5) sulle cose le quali, non avendo bisogno dei corpi per la loro sussistenza, tuttavia si trovano insieme coi corpi. Cfr. per esempio Olimpiodoro, *Prol.*, p. 8, 38 sgg. ; David, *Prol. phil.* p. 5, 9 sgg. Busse ; Simplicio, *Comm. in Phys.* 1, 15 sgg. Diels ; *De anima* l. 2, 29 sgg. Hayd. (Arist., *De part. an.*, *a* 1, 641[a] 17).

[11] H. Ritter, l.l., nr. 15. L'edizione, curata da H. Ritter e R. Walzer, verrà pubblicata nelle *Memorie dell'Accademia dei Lincei*, 1937 (Studî su al-Kindî, II). [Published 1937.]

nella luce sublime della metafisica platonica, articolo di fede quasi incrollabile del giovane Aristotele nell'epoca del *Protrettico* e dell'*Eudemo* [1]. Una testimonianza interessantissima, perchè prova come Aristotele nel periodo in cui scrisse l'*Eudemo* fondasse la sua credenza nell'immortalità dell'anima anche su esperienze di occultismo. ci vien fornita da Clearco (ap. Procl. *in Remp.* II, 122, 2 sqq. Kroll) [2] il quale inoltre è anche uno dei pochi, che ci diano qualche notizia dell'esistenza della scuola di Aristotele in Asia Minore dopo la morte di Platone [3]. Essa si ricollega bene colla narrazione di al-Kindī: ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἐξιέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ εἰσιέναι δυνατὸν εἰς τὸ σῶμα δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ παρὰ Κλεάρχῳ τῇ ψυχούλκῳ ῥάβδῳ χρησάμενος ἐπὶ τοῦ μειρακίου τοῦ καθεύδοντος καὶ πείσας τὸν δαιμόνιον Ἀριστοτέλη, καθάπερ Κλέαρχος (*FHG* II 323 = fr. 7 Wehrli) ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ὕπνου φησίν, περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς ἄρα χωρίζεται τοῦ σώματος καὶ ὡς εἴσεισιν εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὡς χρῆται αὐτῷ οἷον καταγωγίῳ· τῇ γὰρ ῥάβδῳ πλήξας τὸν παῖδα τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξείλκυσεν, καὶ οἷον ἄγων δι' αὐτῆς πόρρω τοῦ σώματος ἀκίνητον ἐνέδειξε τὸ σῶμα .... τοιγαροῦν ἐκ τούτων πιστεῦσαι τούς τε ἄλλους τῆς τοιαύτης ἱστορίας θεατὰς καὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην χωριστὴν εἶναι τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν. Quel passo di Clearco — che ci attesta dunque di nuovo come Aristotele, in questo periodo platonico talvolta persino più mistico di Platone, rafforzi la sua fede con esempi attinti alla ἱστορίη [4] — fa parte del commento di Proclo Εἰς τὸν ἐν Πολιτείᾳ μῦθον [5]. Ora è evidente che anche la storia riferita da al-Kindī non è altro che una variante del mito platonico di Er — sostituendo una persona nota all'Armeno leggendario — e rientra così nella stessa cerchia di idee. Ricordiamoci inoltre che lo stesso Proclo ci informa espressamente nel suo commento al *Timeo*, come Aristotele abbia imitato il mito della *Repubblica* ἐν τοῖς (cioè Περὶ ψυχῆς) διαλογικοῖς

[1] Cfr. Jaeger, l.l.

[2] J. Bernays, *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit*, Berlin 1866, p. 187; Jeanne Croissant, *Aristote et les Mystères*, Liège-Paris 1932, p. 22; ed. E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (Firenze 1936), vol. I, p. 72, n. 1 e p. 257.

[3] Cfr. Jaeger, l.l., p. 149 della traduzione italiana.

[4] Cfr. Bignone, l.l., vol. II, p. 353 sgg.; I, p. xiii n. 1 (fr. 42–3 R.).

[5] Del resto quel trattato era noto anche al mondo orientale. Leggiamo infatti nel *kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. Flügel, p. 252, 20 (s. v. *Proclo*), secondo August Müller, *Die griechischen Philosophen in der arabischen Überlieferung*, Halle, 1873, p. 35 e n. 44: « Schrift über den Mythos, welchen Plato in seiner Gorgias genannten Schrift erzählt (cfr. Procl. *In Remp.* II, 139, 19), Syrisch, Schrift bestehend in einer Erläuterung des 10. Buches über die Politik, ist Syrisch herausgekommen. » Cfr. Steinschneider, l.l., p. 92 sg.; Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Litteratur*, Bonn 1922, p. 231 n. 13. Del resto, il fatto che la parte sul mito di Er appaia nella tradizione orientale quale scritto indipendente, conferma la tesi di C. Gallavotti (*Rivista di Fil. class.*, 57, 1929, pp. 208 sgg.), sull'eterogeneità dei commenti di Proclo alla *Repubblica*. [Cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, *Glaube der Hellenen* II, Berlin 1932, p. 256.]

parlando ivi della discesa dell'anima e delle sorti (λήξεις) [1]. Altre imitazioni della *Repubblica* si rintracciano, come si sa, nel mito di Sileno (influsso del discorso della vergine Lachesi nello stile) [2], nella trasformazione della similitudine della caverna nel dialogo Περὶ φιλοσοφίας [3] e nell'esempio di Euribate maestro dei furbi che Aristotele usò — nel primo libro del dialogo Περὶ δικαιοσύνης, nel quale emulava la repubblica di Platone — in sostituzione di quello platonico del mitico anello di Gige, variazione cioè che è consona alla sua *forma mentis* volta piuttosto alla storia ed all'osservazione empirica [4]. Anche il paragone di questi passi giova dunque ad accrescere verosimiglianza alla conclusione che si abbia qui a che fare con un frammento dell'*Eudemo* di Aristotele.

Il nome del re greco, non essendo rilevante per il lettore orientale, è purtroppo omesso dal traduttore, come è accaduto in tanti casi simili [5]. Al posto dell'asfissia di dieci giorni subita da Er, morto in battaglia e tornato in vita quando era già sulla pira — che offrirebbe tanti appigli alla critica di uno spirito scettico [6] —, vien messa una miracolosa estasi di molti giorni, certamente ben attestata dalla tradizione utilizzata da Aristotele (come per esempio quei famosi racconti di Aristea ed Epimenide). Il problema della ἀναβίωσις e dell'esperienza soprannaturale sembra sia stato molto discusso nell'ambiente accademico-peripatetico di questi decennî. Infatti presso Eraclide Pontico — la cui affinità con gli scritti del giovane Aristotele vien giustamente messa in luce dal Bignone [7] — Empedotimo vien degnato in modo meraviglioso dell'epifania delle divinità dell'inferno e di πᾶσα ἡ περὶ ψυχῶν ἀλήθεια ἐν αὐτόπτοις θεάμασιν. [8] Clearco invece — essendo in relazione con gli scritti del giovane Aristotele

[1] Fr. 40 R (= 4 W.); Plato, *Rep.* X, 617 d sgg. Cfr. Procl. *In Remp.* II, 97, 19 K.: ὅσα κατατείνει περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου λήξεων....

[2] Fr. 44 R (= 6 W.).

[3] Fr. 12 R (*De phil.* 13 W.).

[4] Fr. 84 R. Cfr. Bignone, l.l., vol. I, p. 222. [Cf. P. Moraux, *A la recherche de l'Aristote perdu*, Louvain-Paris 1957, pp. 59. 142.]

[5] Cfr. per es. Bücheler, *Kleine Schriften*, II (1927), p. 35 sg.

[6] Come mostrano per esempio gli attacchi posteriori dell'Epicureo Colote, cfr. Procl. *In Remp.* II, 116, 19 Kr.: Ζητοῦντος δὲ τοῦ Κωλώτου, πῶς οὐ διεφθάρη τὸ σῶμα σαπὲν ἐν τοσαύταις ἡμέραις τοῦ Ἡρός, καὶ ταῦτα ψυχῆς μὴ παρούσης....

[7] *L'Aristotele perduto* ecc., II 597 sgg. e *passim*.

[8] Procl., *In Remp.* II, 119, 20 Kr.: δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἐμπεδότιμον λόγος, ὃν Ἡρακλείδης ἱστόρησεν ὁ Ποντικός, θηρῶντα μετ' ἄλλων ἐν μεσημβρίᾳ σταθερᾷ κατά τινα χῶρον αὐτὸν ἔρημον ἀπολειφθέντα λέγων τῆς τε τοῦ Πλούτωνος ἐπιφανείας τυχόντα καὶ τῆς Περσεφόνης καταλαμφθῆναι μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ περιθέοντος κύκλῳ τοὺς θεούς, ἰδεῖν δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν τὴν π. ψ. α. ε. α. θ. [fr. 93 Wehrli].—Cfr. Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, II (1932), p. 533 sgg. (Beilage I: *Herakleides Pontikos*, Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου). Per il φῶς vedi Bignone, l.l.

anch'esso [1] — fa cadere Cleonimo (φιλήκοος ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων) in asfissia tridua, dovuta a un lutto gravissimo; durante quel tempo la sua anima separata dal corpo vede l'ultimo destino delle anime umane, giudicate secondo il loro comportamento in terra [2]. Un simile racconto attinto probabilmente a fonte accademico-peripatetica si trova in Plutarco, che nel suo trattato *De sera numinis vindicta* fa cadere Tespesio di Soli dall'alto e lo fa restare asfittico per tre giorni, nei quali la sua anima ha le stesse esperienze sopraterranee [3].

L'anima del re, nel tempo in cui s'era liberata dall'elemento corporeo — essendo egli in uno stato intermedio tra vita e morte —, ha acquistato la facoltà divinatrice e le energie chiaroveggenti, che le concedono la contemplazione « delle anime, delle forme e degli angeli », cioè di tutto ciò che l'anima immortale, secondo la concezione platonica e quella identica dell'Aristotele dell'*Eudemo*, conosce a fondo nella sua esistenza pre- e postumana. Non può esservi dubbio che le « forme » siano le idee platoniche la cui presenza nell'*Eudemo* che ci era esplicitamente assicurata da un passo di Proclo (fr. 41 R. 5 W.: τὰ ἐκεῖ θεάματα) [4], vien così di nuovo confermata. Il « mondo superiore del regno » (l. 15) corrisponderebbe allora al τόπος ὑπερουράνιος di Platone che l'anima umana contempla nella sua vera esistenza, nel suo viaggio celeste [5]. È forse degno di nota come nè Eraclide Pontico nè Clearco nè Plutarco nei loro rispettivi μῦθοι facciano più menzione delle « idee » familiari ancora al giovane Aristotele, ma si contentino di parlare della sorte delle anime dopo la morte, motivo comune a tutti i miti platonizzanti che descrivono il mondo dell'al di là [6]. Idee dunque simili a quelle esposte nel mito finale della *Repubblica* spiegano perchè Aristotele inserisca le anime nella serie delle cose rivelate all'anonimo re Greco. Per gli angeli dobbiamo pensare o alle divinità del

[1] Cfr. sopra, p. 42 e n. 3.

[2] Procl., *In Remp.* II, 113, 26–115, 6 : ὅπου γε καὶ ὁ μαθητὴς Ἀριστοτέλους Κλέαρχος ἱστορίαν τινὰ τοιαύτην πρῶτος παρεδέδωκεν θαυμασίαν.... [= fr. 8 Wehrli.]

[3] Plut., *Mor.* 563 b sgg. (vol. III, p. 432 sgg. Pohlenz [p. 270 de Lacy-Einarson]). Il motivo dell'infortunio come causa dell'allontanarsi transitorio dell'anima non si trova presso gli altri autori e si deve forse alla concezione originale di Plutarco. Per gli eventuali rapporti fra Plutarco e Clearco vedi E. Rohde, *Psyche* II, p. 95. [Cf. also R. Harder, Über Cicero's Somnium Scipionis, *Schriften der Königsberger gelehrten Gesellschaft* 1929, p. 144 f. 138 n. 4 = Kleine Schriften, München 1960, pp. 389 f. p. 381 n. 4.]

[4] Cfr. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 51 (p. 66 sgg. della traduzione italiana).

[5] Cfr. p. 41 n. 2.

[6] Eraclide, cfr. p. 43 n. 8 ; Clearco, l.l. : καὶ τέλος ἀφικέσθαι εἰς τινα χῶρον ἱερὸν τῆς Ἑστίας, ὃν περιέπειν δαιμονίας δυνάμεις ἐν γυναικῶν μορφαῖς ἀπεριηγήτοις.... καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁρᾶν.... ψυχῶν ἐκεῖ κολάσεις τε καὶ κρίσεις καὶ τὰς ἀεὶ καθαιρομένας καὶ τὰς τούτων ἐπισκόπους Εὐμενίδας. Similmente Plutarco.

Fedro oppure a certi δαίμονες, vale a dire a certe divinità inferiori che hanno il loro posto fisso nella dottrina platonica e in quella accademica per esempio di Senocrate [1].

Anche la posizione del nuovo frammento rispetto alla mantica è identica a quella che vien in luce nell'*Eudemo* (fr. 37 R = 1 W) e nel dialogo Περὶ φιλοσοφίας (fr. 10 R = 12a W). Le energie chiaroveggenti, che dormono nel fondo dell'anima, si ridestano durante il sonno in casi di entusiasmo o di malattie e nell'imminenza della morte [2]. Cito un passo noto del *Timeo* platonico, la cui dottrina sembra stia a fondamento di questo passo di Aristotele (71 e): οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔννους ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὕπνον τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως πεδηθεὶς δύναμιν ἢ διὰ νόσον ἢ διά τινα ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας. ἀλλὰ συννοῆσαι μὲν ἔμφρονος τά τε ῥηθέντα ἀναμνησθέντα ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ ὑπὸ τῆς μαντικῆς τε καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅσα ἂν φαντάσματα ὀφθῇ, πάντα λογισμῷ διελέσθαι ὅπῃ τι σημαίνει καὶ ὅτῳ μέλλοντος ἢ παρελθόντος ἢ παρόντος κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ.

Quel re Greco infatti era in grado di vaticinare e preannunziare l'avvenire esattamente, fissando la data della morte di certe persone. Sappiamo da un brano del dialogo Περὶ φιλοσοφίας che Aristotele in un'altra occasione ha addotto Omero come testimone di questa forza mantica dell'anima « poichè questi fece che Patroclo morendo preannunziasse la morte di Ettore, ed Ettore quella di Achille » [3]. Fenomeni naturali, scelti fra τὰ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως che non si prevedono facilmente, come un terremoto, una tromba di acqua (un baratro), furono vaticinati dallo stesso re [4].

È oramai evidente che il passo di al-Kindī riflette un determinato capitolo dell'*Eudemo* di Aristotele, riproducendolo però non nella sua forma originale ma nella riduzione dell'autore neoplatonico da lui utilizzato. Non crederei che questo fatto già interessante in sè sia dovuto a mero caso: bisognerà dunque esaminare anche altre imitazioni orientali della letteratura filosofica greca per vedere se non vi siano rimaste ulteriori tracce di opere perdute di Aristotele [5].

[1] Cfr. p. 40 n. 7 e il passo di Clearco, trascritto nella nota precedente.

[2] Cfr. Jaeger, l.l., 37 sg., 164 sg., 251 n. 2 (trad. it., 49 sg., 213 sgg., 324 n. 1).

[3] Frg. 10 R. (12 a W.). Cfr. Cicerone, *De div.* I 30, 64 : « Divinare autem morientes illo etiam exemplo confirmat Posidonius, quod adfert. Rhodium quendam morientem sex aequales nominasse et dixisse, qui primus eorum, qui secundus, qui deinde deinceps moriturus esset.... (65) Ex quo et illud est Callani, de quo ante dixi (I, 47) et Homerici Hectoris, qui moriens propinquam Achilli mortem denuntiat ». [Cfr. anche L. Bieler, Θεῖος ἀνήρ, I (Wien, 1935), p. 91 sg.]

[4] Cfr. p. 40 n. 1 = Vedi anche Arist., frg. 191 R. (= Vors. 14[4] A 7) Diog. Laert. I 116 (= Vors. 7[7i] A i).

[5] Un notissimo frammento del *Protrettico* (51 R. = 2 W.), attestatoci da alcuni commentatori dell'antichità tarda (Alessandro, Olimpiodoro, Elia, David), si trova anche

Già lo stesso al-Kindī ci fornisce subito una seconda testimonianza per la psicologia del giovane Aristotele informandoci come egli abbia ritenuto l'anima una οὐσία ἁπλῆ. Che Aristotele abbia così definito l'anima nell'*Eudemo* concordando in tal modo tanto con Platone quanto con i Neoplatonici, è cosa ben nota agli studiosi. Basta tener presente il frammento 45 e precisamente nella forma secondaria, attestata da Olimpiodoro: « l'armonia ha qualche cosa di contrapposto, l'anima no, perchè è una sostanza » (mentre la forma originaria presuppone tacitamente questa equazione) [1], e il frammento 36, nel quale Aristotele secondo Simplicio εἶδός τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχήν [2]. Ora la prima sezione dello scritto kindiano comincia con una simile esposizione data nel nome dell'autore [3]: « Io dico che l'anima è semplice, dotata di eccellenza e perfezione e grande in dignità ». Ma un secondo scritto di al-Kindī, che rappresenta un compendio brevissimo di un altro suo scritto sull'anima, attribuisce la stessa dottrina espressamente ad Aristotele (cod. Aya Sofia 4832, fol. 34, b) [4]: « Dice al-Kindī che Aristotele dice dell'anima che essa sia una sostanza semplice le cui azioni si manifestano nei corpi ». Segue una breve sincrisi molto interessante delle dottrine psicologiche di Aristotele e Platone fatta secondo il metodo armonizzante dei Neoplatonici, la quale lasciamo da parte per ora. Notiamo però che questo passo ci mostra un'altra traccia del dialogo *Eudemo* nella filosofia mussulmana, e inoltre che al-Kindī forma il propio pensiero prendendo le mosse da una dottrina genuina del giovane Aristotele [5]. Finora si è creduto opportuno di attribuire una importanza esagerata alla cosidetta Teologia di Aristotele per spiegare

Footnote Continued from Page 45

presso Severus bar Šakkū, un autore siriaco morto nel 1241 ; cfr. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern*, I (Leipzig 1900), p. 194, 16 sgg. : « Es anerkennen aber obgleich notgedrungen die Philosophie selbst ihre Gegner, so meint wenigstens ihnen gegenüber der grosse Aristoteles. Er sagt nämlich in seinem Buche, das *Protreptikos* heisst, so : Εἰ φιλοσοφητέον φιλοσοφητέον καὶ εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφητέον φιλοσοφητέον. Πάντως ἄρα φιλοσοφητέον. Wenn nicht zu philosophieren ist, so haben wir den Grund anzugeben, weshalb nicht zu philosophieren ist, und sie haben die Begründung ohne Zuhilfenahme der Philosophie durchzuführen. » Cfr. inoltre Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto*, I, pp. xv–361 sgg. (Anche questo frammento era noto ad al-Kindī, come risulta dal proemio della sua *Metafisica*, che sarà pubblicata fra poco.) [Cf. now *Rasa'il* I, p. 105 and below, p. 191.]

[1] Cfr. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 43 (tr. it., p. 56).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 44 n. 3 (tr. it., p. 58 n. 2).

[3] Cfr. Furlani, l.l., p. 51.

[4] Cfr. H. Ritter, l.l. (p. 129 n. 10), nr. 19[a]. [Cf. now I, p. 281 Abū Rīda and A.Altmann —S. M. Stern, *Isḥāq Israeli*, Oxford 1958, p. 43.]

[5] Un altra eco dell'*Eudemo* — oppure di un altro dialogo di Aristotele — vorrebbe trovare il Klamroth (p. 431 n. 7 dell'articolo citato, p. 47 n. 3 in Ya'qūbī, *Historiae* I, p. 150, 6 sgg. Houtsma). Mi contento per ora di notare il passo.

il carattere platonizzante dell'Aristotelismo mussulmano. Ma questa teologia non è altro, come si sa, che una parafrasi araba di alcuni capitoli delle *Enneadi* di Plotino, e inoltre C. A. Nallino ha mostrato che correva fra gli Arabi anche un'altra redazione, almeno per quel che riguarda il cap. IV, 8, 1 ascritta a « Platone », confusione questa facilmente spiegabile presso gli Arabi in luogo di « Plotino » [1]. Il carattere particolare della filosofia araba ellenizzante si spiegherà dunque molto meglio, secondo il mio parere, se teniamo più conto dell'influenza ancora viva dei dialoghi di Aristotele presso gli autori della decadenza [2]. E per la stessa ragione possiamo sperare di trovare in veste araba ancora altri passi genuini di scritti perduti del « maestro di color che sanno » [3].

From: *Studi italiani di Filologia Classica*, N.S. vol. XIV (1937), pp. 127–37.

[1] *Oriente Moderno*, 10, 1930, p. 49 sg. Plotino è stato studiato ancora nella scuola di Proclo (cfr. Damascios, II, p. 253, 19 Ruelle e E. R. Dodds nella sua edizione degli *Elementi della Teologia di Proclo*, Oxford 1933, pp. xiii–xiv). Cfr. Prächter, *Orient Lit.-Z.*, 34, 1931, p. 827 e n. 4.

[2] La dottrina kindiana dell'anima definita da οὐσία ἁπλῆ ricorre subito presso al-Fārābī (morto nel 1950) « il secondo maestro » il primo essendo Aristotele. [I do not hold this opinion any more. Also the definition of the soul as simple substance can more easily be understood as neoplatonic.]

[3] Per i titoli dei dialoghi conosciuti ai pinacografi arabi cfr. M. Klamroth, *Über die Auszüge aus griechischen Schriftstellern bei al-Ja'qūbī*. III. Philosophen (*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 41, 1887, p. 441). Quello storico arabo del nono secolo dipende inoltre, come mostrerò altrove, pienamente da al-Kindī, riproducendo la sua terminologia e la sua divisione del *Corpus Aristotelicum* (vedi sopra, pp. 41 n. 10). Sul pinax di Ptolemaios Chennos nella tradizione araba vedi l'analisi importante del Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern*, pp. 93–104. [Cf. now I. Düring, *Aristotle etc.*, pp. 221 and pp. 241 ff.] Il titolo *Eudemo* o Περὶ ψυχῆς non si trova però in questi elenchi, essendo omessa questa particella dell'originale greco per una svista meccanica della tradizione orientale. Bisogna però sempre tener conto del fatto che anche l'elenco più completo di titoli non proverebbe mai nè che gli Arabi abbiano conosciuto questi scritti in traduzione nè che essi fossero informati del loro contenuto. D'altra parte esiste, come abbiamo mostrato, una traduzione indipendente di brani di testi perduti di Aristotele in veste orientale. [The result of this study has been challenged, on insufficient grounds, by F. Cumont in J. Bidez and F. Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés* I, Paris 1938, p. 247.]

ARISTOTLE, GALEN, AND PALLADIUS ON LOVE

H. Ritter has referred again to the Arabic manuscript Tübingen Weisweiler, nr. 81, in *Islam*, 21 (1933), p. 91. It contains the only copy hitherto known of the oldest mystic book on the subject of love, the *k. 'aṭf al-alif al-ma'lūf 'alā' l-lām al ma'ṭūf* of Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Dailamī [1]. The year of al-Dailamī's death has hitherto not been established; he was a pupil and the *rāwī* of the well-known author on mysticism, Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Khafīf (died 371 H. = A.D. 981), therefore probably one of the older contemporaries of Ibn Sīnā (died 428 H. = A.D. 1037). A year ago, Dr. Arberry kindly drew my attention to the fact that this manuscript contained some quotations of ancient authors which could not be traced and which might be worth considering. The opinions of the astronomers, scientists, and متكلمون on love are discussed in the first part of the book; the passage on the scientists (32*b* 7–33*b* 9) is specially interesting, as it offers two hitherto unknown fragments, one of the last century of the Alexandrian-Greek literature, the other very probably of a lost dialogue of Aristotle.

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فهذا قول اصحاب النجوم فى العشق والمحبة وسنذكر رأى الطبيعيين فى ذلك الفصل الثالث فى قول الاطباء فيها .

ذكر فى بعض كتب الاوائل ان تلامذة ارسطاطاليس اجتمعوا اليه ذات يوم ، فقال ارسطاطاليس لهم : بينا انا واقف على اكمة اذا بصرت بشاب واقف على سطح ويقول شعرا معناه من مات عشقا فليمت هكذى لا خير فى عشق بلا موت ، فقال ايسوس تلميذه : ايها الحكيم اخبرنا عن ماهية العشق وعن الذى يتولد منه ، وقال ارسطاطاليس : العشق طمع يتولد فى القلوب فاذا تولد تحرك ونمى ثم تربّى فاذا تربّى اجتمع اليه موادّ الحرص وكلما قوى فى قرار القلب ازداد صاحبه فى الاهتياج واللجاج والطمع والفكر والامانى وذاك الذى يؤدّيه الى الحرص ويبعثه على الطلب حتى يؤديه ذلك الى الغمّ المقلق والسهر الدائم والهيمان والاحزان وفسا‹د› العقل ،

قال صاحب الكتاب هذا الجواب يدل على ان السائل كان طبيعيا فخرج جوابه على مقدار السائل لان ارسطاطاليس

[1] Cf. C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, Erster Supplementband, Leiden 1937, p. 359 (7*b*).

كان الاهيا ، ويجوز ايضا انه كان يرى ان المحبة التى بين المتحابّين والعشق يتولدان جميعا من الطبائع وليس لها فى عالم العقل والنفس شىء .

وسُئل فلاديوس الطبيب عن العشق فقال العشق دآء يتولد فى الدماغ من جَوَلان الفكر وكثرة ذكر الحبيب وادامة النظر اليه ،

وحكى عن جالينوس انه دخل على مريض فحسّ عرقه فوجده يضطرب اضطرابا عريضا ، فبينا هو كذلك اذ دخلت امرأة الى المريض فكلمته ، فلما خرجت قال جالينوس للمريض : اتحب هذه المراة ؟ فامسك المريض عن جوابه ، فقيل له : كيف علمت ؟ فقال : لان عرقه اضطرب اضطرابا عريضا عند ما كلمته فعلمتُ ان لها من قلبه موقعا ،

قال صاحب الكتاب وجدنا كلام اصحاب الطبيعة وان اختلفت اقاويلهم فهو اختلاف اللفظ والمعنى واحد وهو الذى ذكرنا وحكينا عنهم لا يجاوزون هذا الحد فلا فائدة فى تكثير حكاياتهم وذكر اقاويلهم ونذكر الان مقالات المتكلمين فى ذلك الفصل . . .

MS. خرجة اخرجت 25 MS. جالنوس الجالينوس 23 MS. ادامت 22 MS. فز: اق 11

It is said in a certain book of the Ancients that the pupils of *Aristotle* assembled before him one day. And *Aristotle* said to them: "While I was standing on a hill, I saw a youth, who stood on a terrace roof and recited a poem, the meaning of which was: Whoever dies of passionate love, let him die in this manner; there is no good in love without death [1]." Then said his pupil *Issus*: "O philosopher, inform us concerning the essence of love and what is generated from it." And *Aristotle* replied [2]: "Love is an impulse which is generated in the heart; when it is once generated, it moves and grows, afterwards it becomes mature. When it has become mature it is joined by affections of appetite whenever the lover in the depth of his heart increases in his excitement and in his perseverance and in his desire and in his concentrations and in his wishes. And that brings him to cupidity and urges him to demands, until it brings him to disquieting grief and continuous sleeplessness and hopeless passion and sadness and destruction of mind."

[1] [This is an Arabic verse which occurs in a love-story quoted by al-Washshā', *al-Muwashshaḥ*, ed. Brünnow, p. 64 (to which there is a parallel passage in al-Ḥuṣrī, *al-Kitāb al-Maṣūn*, MS Leiden 2593, fol. 54*v*), and al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj al-Dhahab*, vii, 227. Communication by S. M. Stern.]

[2] The definition ascribed here to Aristotle is quoted in a fuller version in the name of Hippocrates in Ḥunain b. Isḥāq's *Nawādir al-Falāsifa*, see the Hebrew version, *Musre ha-Pilosofim*, ed. Löwenthal, p. 35. In Muḥammad b. Dā'ūd al-Iṣfahānī's *Kitāb al-Zahra*, ed. Nykl, p. 17 and in al-Mas'ūdī's *Murūj al-Dhahab*, vi, 377–9 it is said to be "by a physician", while Ibn Abī Ḥajala in his *Dīwān al-Ṣabāba*, p. 11, ascribes it to Pythagoras. Communication by S. M. Stern.]

The author of the book says : This answer indicates that the inquirer was a scientist, but the answer which was given to him is according to the capacity of the inquirer, because Aristotle was a metaphysician. And it may also be that he supposed that love and ἔρως between the two loving persons are generated by the natures (i.e. humours) and have nothing to do with the world of the mind and the soul.

And *Palladius* the physician was asked about love and said: "Love is a disease which is generated in the brain, when the thoughts are allowed to dwell on one subject and the loved person is constantly brought to mind and the gaze is continually fixed on him."

And it was told of *Galen* that he entered into the presence of a sick man and felt his pulse and found that it was beating violently. And while the sick man was in this condition, a woman came and talked to him. And after she had left, *Galen* said to the sick man: Do you love this woman ? And the sick man refused to answer him. Then *Galen* was asked: How did you know ? And he replied: Because his pulse was beating violently during the time she talked to him, thus I learned that she had some place in his heart.

* * *

The passage about Galen shows at once that the authority quoted by al-Dailamī makes use of a reliable tradition and seems well informed upon ancient Greek authors; since it is taken from Galen's commentary on Hippocrates' *Prognostikon*, i, 8, 40–41, cf. *Corp. Med. Graec*,. v, 9, 2 (p. 218, 14): ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι προτροπῆς ἕνεκα τῶν νέων καὶ μᾶλλον ὅσοι μὴ τεθέανται προλεγόμενα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάνθ' ὑφ' ἡμῶν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον δι' ἀγρυπνίαν ἔχουσιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷδέ τινι γεγενημένην. οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἐρασίστρατος ἰδὼν κόρακας ἢ κορώνας πετομένας ἐφώρασε τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦ νεανίσκου, οὐ μὴν οὐδ', ὥς τινες ἔγραψαν, ἐρωτικὸν σφυζουσῶν ἤσθετο τῶν ἀρτηριῶν τοῦ νεανίσκου (οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστι σφυγμὸς ἴδιος ἔρωτος ἐξαίρετος), ἀλλ' ὥσπερ κάμοί ποτε ἐφάνη τῷ καρπῷ μὲν ἐπιβεβληκότι τοῦ νοσοῦντος τὴν χεῖρα, γυναικὸς δέ τινος ὀφθείσης τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν, αὐτίκα μὲν ἀνώμαλός τε καὶ ἄτακτος γενόμενος, ὀλίγῳ δὲ ὕστερον εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐπανελθὼν ἅμα τῷ ἀναχωρῆσαι τὴν ὀφθεῖσαν. ὁ γὰρ οὕτω τρεπόμενος σφυγμὸς κοινὸν ἐνδείκνυται ταραχῶδές τι πάθος ἐν τῇ τοῦ κάμνοντος γεγονέναι ψυχῇ. τὸ δὲ ταραχῶδες τοῦτο διακρίνειν προσήκει διὰ τῶν ἅμα αὐτῷ λεγομένων ἢ ὁρωμένων. καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ λεγομένων τινῶν εἰς ἀνωμαλίαν οἱ σφυγμοὶ τρέπονται, τῶν ἀρρώστων ταραττομένων ἐφ' οἷς ἤκουσαν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἰδίᾳ μοι γέγραπται κατὰ μίαν πραγματείαν, ἡ Περὶ τοῦ προγινώσκειν ἐπιγέγραπται .[1]

[1] Cod. Oxoniensis Laud A. 140, fol. 27*a* 9–*b* 14 :

انما قصدت به حثّ الاحداث على هذا العلم وخاصةً مَن لم يرْأى منهم اتقدم فانظر باشياء هذه الاشيا . وذلك انه ليس انما يمكنك ان تخبر بانه عرض المريض شهر فقط بل قد تقدر ان تقول ان الشهر عرض له بسبب غم . فان ارسسطراطس لم يعلم بان ابن الملك عاشق لانه راى غزّيان وضاغى يطرق ولانه وجد ايضا النبض من ذلك الفتى يدلّ على عشق كما قال قوم (2/b) لكنه انما يستدلّ على ذلك كما استدللت انا عليه مرة وذلك انى ساعة القيت يدى على الزند من المريض عرض له ان ابصر امراة عن فى منزله فاختلف نبضه على المكان وفسد نظامه فلما كان بعد قليل وانصرفت تلك المراة التى راها رجع نبضه الى ما كان عليه بالطبع . وما اختلف من النبض على هذه الصفة فيما يدل عليه شئ واحد عاى وجه علّة تضطرب منها النفس من المريض . وتميز هذه العلة التى تضرب منها النفس وتتعرفها ومعرفتا ينبغى ان تكون من الاشيا التى يستعملها المريض ويراها . وذلك انما تتعلق به قدام المريض فيحدث فى نبضه اختلاف وانما يكون ذلك الاختلاف لاضطراره اما يسمع . الا انى كتبت فى ذلك كتابا خاصيًا عنوانه فى تقدمة المعرفة .

This commentary of Galen existed both in the Syriac versions of Sergius and Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq and in the Arabic translation of 'Īsā ibn Yaḥyā—Ḥunain only translated the *lemmata* of Hippocrates; Klamroth has published this version of Hippocrates in *ZDMG.*, 40 (1886), pp. 204–233 [1]. One manuscript of this Galen translation has so far been discovered [2]. But it can hardly be expected that al-Dailamī owes his knowledge of this passage of Galen directly to this commentary on Hippocrates. Possibly he may have used an anthology such as that of Stobaeus or some medical text of a doxographical character. It was noticed long since that Galen had made a mistake in this passage of his commentary on the *Prognostikon*, as he tells us in the passage from the Περὶ τοῦ προγινώσκειν πρὸς Ἐπιγένην (xiv, 631, Kühn) [3] that he diagnosed the love of a Roman noblewoman for the dancer Pylades from her pulse. He had been inspired to use this method by the famous tradition of Erasistratus and Antiochus' love for his stepmother [4]; this event was probably the origin of the legend of Hippocrates [5] and Perdikkas [6].

* * *

The *terminus post quem* for the compilation, used by al-Dailamī through several connecting links—which probably therefore did not entirely

Footnote Continued from Page 50

This excellent Arabic translation, based on a Greek manuscript about 400 years older than the best preserved one (Vaticanus gr. 1063, s. xiii), has been completely neglected in the new edition of Galen's Commentary by Heeg.

[1] Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, *Über die syrischen und arabischen Galenübersetzungen*, ed. G. Bergsträsser (Leipzig 1925), nr. 91.

[2] Cf. p. 50, n. i and nr. 530 Uri ; H. Diels, *Die Handschriften der antiken Ärzte I* (Abhandlungen der Preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, 1905), p. 108. M. Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher*, Berlin 1893, § 419.

[3] To be found also in Ibn abī Uṣaibi'a, ii, p. 128, 15, Müller.

[4] Cf. J. Ilberg, Aus Galens Praxis, *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum*, etc., 15 (1905), p. 289.

[5] "Soranus", *Vita Hippocratis*, p. 176, 4 Ilberg (Corpus Medicorum Graecorum iv).

[6] The interesting history of this subject in the Greek as well as in the Oriental tradition has been explained by Erwin Rohde in his book on the Greek novel (*Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*, p. 55 ss.), and has been rediscussed by M. Wellmann (*Hermes* 35, 1900, p. 380 s.) and J. Mesk (*Rhein. Mus.* 68, 1913, 366 ss.). Erasistratus' method has often been copied in the history of medicine. The great Arabian physician and philosopher Ibn Sīnā developed the theory and practice of the diagnosis of love from the pulse after the example of Galen and his imitators—such as Stephanus (i p. 74, Dietz) and, perhaps, Palladius—in the latest period of Greek Alexandria. I do not think that these links between Greek and Arabian medicine have been sufficiently emphasized in the lectures of E. G. Browne on *Arabian Medicine* (Cambridge 1921), to which I owe my knowledge of the passage of Avicenna (*ibid.*, p. 84 ss.). [See now also M. Meyerhof and D. Joannides, *La gynécologie et l'obstétrique chez Avicenne et leurs rapports avec celles des Grecs* (Le Caire, Schindler, 1938)].

preserve its proper meaning—can be fixed by the apophthegma of Palladius. W. Bräutigam [1] has proved that Palladius very probably lived in the second half of the sixth century A.D., i.e. the last period of the school of Alexandria, particularly because of the literary form of his Greek commentaries on Hippocrates and Galen. Ibn Buṭlān (died after 455 H. = A.D. 1063), quite a good authority [2], calls him one of the authors of the so-called synopses of the Alexandrians, which I am inclined to consider as a translation of lost Greek-synopses of Galen and not as a work originally composed in Arabic, as long as the contrary has not been proved [3]. Anyhow the extant books of Palladius—the newly-discovered passage must be added to the commentaries edited about a hundred years ago by Dietz [4]—indicate the reliability of a tradition signed by his name. M. Meyerhof believes that Palladius' work might be greatly enriched by a search into the unpublished early Arabian medical literature. Some fragments from Rāzī's *Continens* have long been known [5]. The new fragment of al-Dailamī is to be added to them ; it may have been taken from a medical encyclopaedia similar to those of Oribasius or Paul of Aigina, which incidentally were translated by Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq [6]. Since Euripides'

[1] *De Hippocratis Epidemiarum libri sexti commentatoribus* (Dissert., Koenigsberg 1908), p. 34 ss.

[2] Cf. J. Schacht, Über den Hellenismus in Baghdad and Cairo in 11. Jahrhundert, *ZDMG.*, 90, 1936, p. 526 ss. M. Meyerhof, Une controverse médico-philosophique au Caire en 441 de l'Hégire, 1050 ap. J.-C., *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte*, 19, 1937, p. 29 ss. M. Meyerhof and J. Schacht, The Medico-Philosophical Controversy between ibn Buṭlān and ibn Riḍwān. A contribution to the History of Greek Learning among the Arabs. (*The Egyptian University, The Faculty of Arts, Publication No.* 13, Cairo 1937.)

[3] Cf. M. Meyerhof, Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad, *Sitzungsberichte d. Preuss. Akademie d. Wissensch. Phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1930, xxiii, p. 394 ss. H. Ritter and R. Walzer, Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *Sitzungsberichte d. Preuss. Akademie der Wissensch. Phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1934, xxvi, p. 820 ss. O. Temkin, Geschichte des Hippokratismus im ausgehenden Altertum, *Kyklos*, iv (Leipzig 1932), p. 75 ss. Studies on late Alexandrian medicine I : Alexandrian Commentaries on Galen's De sectis ad introducendos, *Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine*, iii (Baltimore 1935), p. 414, n. 42, and elsewhere. Schacht, *op. cit.*, p. 541, n. 2.

[4] H. Diels, Die Handschriften der antiken Ärzte II, *Abhandlungen d. Preuss. Akademie d. Wissenschaften*, 1906, p. 76. H. Rabe, Aus Rhetorenhandschriften, *Rhein. Mus. f. Philologie*, 64 (1909), p. 561 s. O. Temkin, *Studies on late Alexandrian medicine*, i (cf. n. 3), p. 406 ss.

[5] Lucien Leclerc, *Histoire de la Médecine arabe* (Paris 1876), i, 260 ss. 264. M. Steinschneider, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen* (Leipzig 1897), p. 121 (iii, § 5) *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, etc.*, p. 782 and n. 138.

[6] L. Leclerc, loc. laud., i, 253–6. M. Steinschneider, *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen*, iii, §§ 25, 29. C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, Supplementband i, p. 419 (ar-Rāzī).

Hippolytus it has become a commonplace both in medical and non-medical literature to define ἔρως as a disease [1]. Palladius' theory that the brain is the origin of this illness shows clearly that he at least does not follow Plato's psychological doctrine.

* * *

We are now sufficiently prepared to analyse the passage which contains the theory of Aristotle. It is not clear whence the author of the later Greek anthology, postulated by us, has taken the passage. Evidently he had no access then to the original text of Aristotle, since he speaks of a certain book of the ancients as his source [2]. We shall therefore rather expect a reference than a literal quotation, as in the story of the diagnosis of love by Galen. Further, as the text is unknown and evidently taken from a dialogue, we are obviously entitled to suppose that it comes either from a lost dialogue of Aristotle himself or from a dialogue of an early Peripatetic, in which Aristotle may have been introduced as interlocutor [3], or from a spurious dialogue of the later centuries [4]. The pinacographical tradition provides us with sufficient opportunity. Not only did Aristotle himself write an Ἐρωτικός [5], of the existence of which Arabian tradition is still aware [6], but also contemporaries and pupils, such as Herakleides Pontikos [7], Theophrastus [8], Clearchus [9], dealt with the same subject in monographs.

[1] Cf. e.g. Stobaeus, Floril., iv, 20 H. : Ψόγος Ἀφροδίτης καὶ ὅτι φαῦλον ὁ ἔρως καὶ πόσων εἴη κακῶν γεγονὼς αἴτιος. Avicenna, *Qānūn* (Rome 1953), p. 316.

[2] For *kutub al-awā'il* cf. F. Goldziher, Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften, *Abhandlungen Preuss. Ak. der Wiss.*, 1915, *Phil.-hist. Klasse nr.* 8, p. 3 and *passim.*

[3] R. Hirzel, i, 309.3, 334, 345.5 See now W. Jaeger, *Aristotle : Fundamentals of the History of his Development* (Oxford 1934), p. 116. Greek and Jews, *The Journal of Religion*, 18, 1938, p. 131 ss. H. Lewy, Aristotle and the Jewish sage according to Clearchus of Soli, *The Harvard Theological Review*, 31, 1938, p. 213.

[4] Such as the so-called *Liber De Pomo*, in which Aristotle himself is speaking. Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, The Book of the Apple ascribed to Aristotle, edited in Persian and English, *JRAS.*, 1892, pp. 187–92, 202 ss. M. Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, etc.*, § 144. F. Schirrmacher, *Die letzten Hohenstaufen* (Göttingen 1871), p. 622 ss. [J. Kraemer, Das arabische Original des Liber De Pomo, *Studi Orientalistici in onore di G. Levi della Vida* I, Roma 1956, pp. 484–506.]

[5] Cf. *infra*, p. 57 sq.

[6] Cf. e.g. al-Qifṭī, p. 43, 12, Lippert.

[7] Diog. Laert., v, 87. O. Voss, *De Heraclidis Ponticivita et scriptis* (Dissert., Rostock 1896), pp. 51–4. [fr. 64–6 Wehrli.]

[8] Diog. Laert., v, 43. H. Usener, *Analecta Theophrastea* (Diss., Bonn 1858), p. 3 = *Kleine Schriften*, i (Leipzig-Berlin 1912), p. 53.

[9] *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, ii (Paris 1848), pp. 313–16, Müller. [fr. 21–35 Wehrli]. Cf. E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer*, p. 57 ss.

The fragment cannot be attributed to the *Protreptikos*, the most famous exoteric Aristotelian text in antiquity, because of its form as a dialogue, for the *Protreptikos* consisted of a full-length oration [1]. That Aristotle takes part himself in his dialogues, we know both from two famous quotations of the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας [2] and also in particular from the passage of Cicero in *Epist. ad. Att.*, xiii, 19, 4: "quae autem his temporibus scripsi, Ἀριστοτέλειον morem habent, in quo sermo ita inducitur ceterorum, ut penes ipsum sit principatus" [3]. No other fragment hitherto discovered acquainted us of a real dialogue of Aristotle with some other interlocutor [4]. This fact alone would be enough to indicate the importance of the newly found fragment. In view of the examples of the late Platonic dialogues such as *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Philebus*, it does not seem surprising that the dialogue takes place in the school [5]. The pupil asks: τί ἐστιν ὁ ἔρως καὶ τὶ γεννᾶται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, and the master replies [6], in exactly the same way as Pythagoras and Anaxagoras answer questions about the nature of εὐδαιμονία in the *Protreptikos* [7]. There is no reason to suppose that the name of the pupil (ايسوس) is corrupt; for the name of Palladius, in spite of the fact that he is not a very well known author, has been correctly reproduced by al-Dailamī and by the writer of our manuscript [8]. Now, the name Ἴσος or Ἴσσος is extraordinarily uncommon in Greek literature [9]. Apart from Iliad Λ 101 [10] and Josephus (*Antiquit.*, 10, 8, 6), where the original may be a Hebrew name, it is only to be found in a list of πρόξενοι of Epidauros, from an inscription on the Asclepieion, probably dealing with seventeen successive years of the first half of the third century B.C.[11] Here we find the following names (25): Ἐξακέ(σ)τας Ἴσου [K]νώσιος

[1] W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin 1923), p. 54 s. (= Engl. transl. [above, p. 53, n. 3], p. 55 s.).

[2] Fr. 8–9, Rose (p. 72 s., Walzer), . . . ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγώς.

[3] Cf. fr. 78, Rose (= Cicero, Epist. ad Quintum, fr. 3, 5) : Aristotelem denique, quae de re publica et praestante viro scribat, ipsum loqui.

[4] Quite different is Eudemus, fr. 44, Rose (p. 13, 2, Walzer) : τί τοῦτ'; ἔφη. Κἀκεῖνος ὑπολαβών . . . ἔφη . . .

[5] Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 24 ss. (= Engl. transl., p. 25 ss.).

[6] Cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 29, n. 1 (= Engl. transl., p. 29, n. 1).

[7] *Eth. Eud.*, A 4, 1215*b*, 6 : Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν ὁ Κλαζομένιος ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς ὁ εὐδαιμονέστατος «οὐθείς» ἔφη «ὧν σὺ νομίζεις . . .» *ibid.*, A 5, 1216*a*, 11 : τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρός τινα διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ' ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα. *Protrept.*, 11, p. 49, Walzer (= Iambl., *Protr.* p. 51, 7 Pist.) : Pythagoras, Anaxagoras.

[8] Cf. p. 52, n. 5.

[9] F. Bechtel, *Die historischen Personennamen des Griechischen* (Halle 1917), p. 228.

[10] Athen., ix, 399a, is an epic fragment of the Ἀτρειδῶν Κάθοδος, omitted by Kinkel.

[11] *Inscriptiones Graecae*, iv, 2 (Argolis, secunda editio, ed. F. Hiller von Gärtringen, 1929), nr. 96.

and Ξεναγόρας Ἴσου [K]νώσιος (prius Κνώσιος ex Ἀγώσιος corr.). So Ἴσος is likely to be a Cretan, Knossos being his native town. There is not more than a slight probability that Ἴσος, father of Ἐξακέστας and Ξεναγόρας, is the same as Ἴσος, mentioned by al-Dailamī, and that he may have come not only to Epidauros but also to Athens. But we may infer from the fact that a man of that name is introduced into a dialogue with Aristotle that in reality an Ἴσος was a member of the late Platonic Academy, a period to which most of the Aristotelian dialogues are to be ascribed. Thus we would have to admit the presence of a Cretan within the Academy, a fact transmitted neither by Diogenes Laertius [1] nor by the author of the *Index Academicorum Herculanensis* [2] (though we know, e.g., of the presence of a Chaldaean [3]). Further, we may conclude from Plato's *Laws* that there must have been relations between the mother-country and Crete, and particularly between the Academy and Crete [4]. The rare name of Ἴσος ,in a fragment of Aristotle, adds to this a more concrete argument, and the two probabilities mutually support each other. Incidentally, it is known that Aristotle, Ephorus, Theophrastus are better informed upon Crete than all the earlier authors; it remains uncertain from whence they have derived their knowledge [5].

It is not sure that the unknown verse quoted by Aristotle has really the meaning he suggests [6]. It is possible at least that the poet meant to say that it were best to die in the height of love, because nothing better could be expected afterwards; and that Aristotle has changed the original meaning of the verse in favour of his own opinion, as he often reads his own philosophy into the δόξαι τῶν πολλῶν and into quotations of poets and proverbs [7]. Nothing good at all comes to us from ἔρως; therefore he who is ruined by love and dies from it, is to be called happy. If the verse is understood in this way, it corresponds well with the doctrine developed

[1] *Diog. Laert.*, iii, 31.

[2] *Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis*, ed. S. Mekler (Berlin 1902).

[3] *Ind. Acad. Hercul.*, col. iii, p. 13.

[4] Cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893), vol. ii, p. 25 f. *Plato* i[2] (Berlin 1920), p. 661 s.

[5] Cf. Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* E. Kirsten, *Die Insel Kreta in vier Jahrtausenden* (Die Antike 14, 1938, p. 295 ss.). The *Geschichte Kretas vom Ausgang der minoischen Zeit bis auf die Alexanderzeit*, by the same author (cf. Gnomon, 13, 1937, 514), has not yet been published [cf. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 301, n. 1 (= Engl. transl., p. 286 n. 3)].

[6] One should now bear in mind that the verse—as it has been pointed out above, p. 49, note i—is in reality by an Arab poet, and is substituted for a Greek verse expressing some similar sentiment but not corresponding textually.]

[7] Cf. e.g. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 46 (= Engl. transl., p. 47 s.). H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore 1935), p. 339 ss.

subsequently by Aristotle, in which nothing of Plato's sublimation of ἔρως is to be found. The ἔρως is an ὄρεξις which has its seat in the heart, which is the place of the θυμός in the Platonic theory [1], the locus of the πάθη also in the Aristotelian doctrine [2]. If it increases and becomes strong, it combines with ἐπιθυμία, and from this derive grief, sleeplessness, and folly (λύπη, ἄγρυπνία, ἄνοια) [3]. This devaluation of ἔρως corresponds exactly with the doctrine enunciated by Aristotle in his earliest course on Ethics, the so-called *Eudemian Ethics* (delivered shortly after Plato's death) [4], and also we can infer the same for the *Protreptikos*, his first dialogue [5]. In the later course on Ethics, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he only rather superficially touched on the problem of ἔρως [6]. In the *Eudemian Ethics* the ἔρως is nothing but a πάθος ἀλόγιστον (iii 1, 1229*a* 21). Its σκοπός is only τὸ ἡδύ or τὸ χρήσιμον, never τὸ ἀγαθόν (vii 1, 1235*b* 19; 3, 1238*b* 33; 10, 1243*b* 15 s.; 12, 1245*a* 24 s.): τοῦ γὰρ συζῆν ὀρέγεται ὁ ἐρῶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἧ μάλιστα δεῖ, ἀλλὰ κατ' αἴσθησιν ("for the lover aims at the society of his beloved, but not as ideally as he ought, but in a merely sensuous way"). Ἐρώμενον and ἐπιθυμητόν may be used as synonyms (vii 1, 1235*a* 13 s.), ἐρώμενον and ἀγαθόν *sive* βουλητόν never. It may be that this more extended discussion of ἔρως in the *Eudemian Ethics*—as also various other passages in it to be explained by its closer relationship with the dialogues of Aristotle [7]—shows the influence of the same dialogue, from which the fragment of al-Dailamī is taken, possibly the Ἐρωτικός. Parallels to the theme that ἔρως makes life no longer worth living are also to be found again in a passage of the *Eudemian Ethics*, which has convincingly been ascribed to a dialogue, to the *Protreptikos* [8]. I quote (i 5, 1215*b* 18): πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, δι' ἃ προίενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους, περιωδυνίας, χειμῶνας . . . πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ βίος, ὃν ζῶσιν ἔτι παῖδες ὄντες· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτον ἀνακάμψαι πάλιν οὐδεὶς ἂν ὑπομείνειεν εὖ φρονῶν. ἔτι δὲ πολλὰ τῶν τε μηδεμίαν ἐχόντων [μὲν]

[1] Cf. Tim., 70*a–c*.

[2] Cf. e.g. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, s.v. καρδία, p. 365 i.

[3] Cf. Plutarch, "Οτι οὐ κρίσις ὁ ἔρως ap. Stob., Flor. iv, 20, 67 H. (= vii, 132, 15 ss. Bernard.): οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόσον τὸν ἔρωτα (cf. *supra*, p. 53, n. i), οἱ δὲ ἐπιθυμίαν, οἱ δὲ μανίαν, οἱ δὲ θεῖόν τι κίνημα ψυχῆς καὶ δαιμόνιον, οἱ δὲ ἀντικρυς θεὸν ἀναγορεύουσιν. ὅθεν ὀρθῶς ἐνίοις ἔδοξε τὸ μὲν ἀρχόμενον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι, τὸ δ' ὑπερβάλλον μανίαν κτλ.

[4] Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 237 ss. (= Engl. transl., p. 228 ss.).

[5] Philodem., *Voll. Rhet.* ii, p. 57, col. 41, 12 ss., Sudhaus. E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (Firenze 1936), vol. ii, p. 90 ss.

[6] R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik = Neue philologische Untersuchungen, herausg. von W. Jaeger*, vii (Berlin 1929), p. 241 s.

[7] Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 241 ss. (= Engl. transl., p. 246 ss.).

[8] Jaeger, cf. n. 7. *Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta*, p. 41 W.

ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην, καὶ τῶν ἐχόντων μὲν ἡδονὴν μὴ καλὴν δέ, τοιαῦτ' ἐστιν ὥστε τὸ μὴ εἶναι κρεῖττον εἶναι τοῦ ζῆν . . . ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς μόνον ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρεθεισῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῶν, ἃς τὸ γινώσκειν ἢ βλέπειν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις αἰσθήσεων πορίζει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἂν εἷς προτιμήσειε τὸ ζῆν, μὴ παντελῶς ὢν ἀνδράποδον. "For there are many consequences of life that make men fling away life, as disease, excessive pain, storms . . . Further, the life we lead as children is not desirable, for no one in his senses would consent to return again to this. Further, many incidents involving neither pleasure nor pain or involving pleasure but not of a noble kind are such that, as far as they are concerned, non-existence is preferable to life . . . But further, neither for the pleasure of eating alone or that of sex, if all the other pleasures were removed that knowing or seeing or any other sense provides men with, would a single man value existence, unless he were utterly servile, for it is clear that to the man making this choice there would be no difference between being born a brute and a man" (J. Solomon). It is true that the object of the argumentation in the *Protreptikos* and in the *Eudemian Ethics* is different from the newly-found fragment, but the underlying opinion of the value of ἔρως is quite the same.

Thus we may ascribe the fragment of an Aristotelian dialogue, only preserved by an Arabian author of the tenth century A.D., to the very few remnants of his dialogue Ἐρωτικός, which consisted of one book, according to Diogenes Laertius (nr. 9) and Hesychius (nr. 12), or of three books, following the catalogue of Ptolemy (nr. 14), transmitted by the Arabs (the remark of Athen., xv, 674*b* [= Aristot. fr. 95 Rose] might correspond to this) [1]. But our present information is not sufficient to decide this matter. The fragments of the Ἐρωτικός hitherto known are taken from Plutarch's Ἐρωτικός (cf. 17, 761*d* = fr. 97; ibd. 761*a* = fr. 98 Rose) and from Athenaeus (fr. 95, 96) (to which I should like unhesitatingly to add Aristot., Rhet. i 9, 1368*a* 17 ~ Plutarch, Erot. 21, 767*f*), on Hippolochos, a note Wilamowitz referred to about forty years ago, without being interested in its source: "author Περὶ ἔρωτος" he says [2]. All this is historical material, as well as the passages which A. Mayer wants to add to them from Plutarch [3]. Besides the passage from Athenaeus, ascribed to the Ἐρωτικός by Rose (fr. 96 = Athen. xiii, 564*b*): καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἔφη τοὺς ἐραστὰς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐρωμένων ἀποβλέπειν ἢ τοὺς

[1] V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig 1863), p. 105. J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin 1863), p. 132. [Cf. now I. Düring, *Aristotle etc.*, Göteborg 1957, pp. 42, 83, 223.]

[2] *Hermes* 35, 1900, p. 533.

[3] Aristonstudien, *Philologus*, *Supplementband* 11 (1910), pp. 483–610.

ὀφθαλμούς, ἐν οἷς τὴν αἰδῶ κατοικεῖν ("Aristotle also said that lovers look to no other part of their favourite's body than the eyes which he said were the dwelling-place of the feeling of shame") the newly found fragment represents the only theoretical passage from the 'Ερωτικός of Aristotle hitherto discovered.

We are better informed about Theophrastus' dialogue on ἔρως, although we must be satisfied with the incomplete collection of Wimmer. From Theophrastus we know not only the historical and mythical facts, but also the doctrine of ἔρως, stated by him in his dialogue. A fragment from Athenaeus, combining poetical quotation and his own doctrine developed from it, reminds us of the fragment of al-Dailamī (Athen., xiii, 562*e* = fr. 107, Wimmer): Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τῷ 'Ερωτικῷ Χαιρήμονά φησι τὸν τραγικὸν λέγειν, ὡς τὸν οἶνον τῶν χρωμένων ‹τοῖς τρόποις Grotius› κεράννυσθαι, οὕτως καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα· ὃς μετριάζων μέν ἐστιν εὔχαρις, ἐπιτεινόμενος δὲ καὶ διαταράττων χαλεπώτατος. ("Theophrastus, in his essay 'On Love', quotes the tragic poet Chaeremon as saying that just as wine is mixed to suit the character of the drinkers, so also is Eros; when he comes in moderation, he is gracious, but when he comes too intensely and puts men to utter confusion, he is most hard to bear", Gulick.) Certainly this passage might well have been written by Aristotle himself in his dialogues. Stobaeus, in whose abundant collection of quotations we do not find anything about Aristotle's 'Ερωτικός—I have suggested above that the three quotations of al-Dailamī are derived from a similar anthology—provides us with two sentences by Theophrastus on ἔρως, which Wimmer is probably right in placing among the fragments of his dialogue on this subject, although there is no explicit evidence. Frg. 115 (= Flor. iv, 20, 64 H.) says just the same as Aristotle's doctrine explained before: ἔρως δέ ἐστιν ἀλογίστου τινὸς ἐπιθυμίας ὑπερβολὴ ταχεῖαν μὲν ἔχουσα τὴν πρόσοδον, βραδεῖαν δε τὴν ἀπόλυσιν ("Love is the excess of some irrational desire, which is quickly acquired and slowly got rid of"). Frg. 114 (= Flor. iv, 20, 66 H.) may be derived from a dialogue with a similar *mise en scène* to the newly found fragment of Aristotle, if it does not represent merely the later standard type of the apophthegma of philosophers: Θεόφραστος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος τί ἐστιν ἔρως, 'πάθος' ἔφη 'ψυχῆς σχολαζούσης' ("When Theophrastus the philosopher was asked by someone for a definition of love, he said it was the passion of an idle mind"); a statement well agreeing with the character of a man who believes matrimony to be a disturbance of the peaceful meditation of a philosopher [1].

[1] Hieronymus, *Ad. Jovin.*, i, 47. E. Bickel, *Diatribe in Senecae philosophi fragmenta*, Leipzig 1915, 388, 11 ss.

To speculate how many new passages of the Aristotelian dialogue a new analysis of Plutarch's 'Ερωτικός and a rather urgently needed new discussion of the τόπος περὶ ἔρωτος may give, lies beyond the limits of this present paper.

No complete dialogue of Aristotle was translated into Syriac or Arabic, as far as we know. But all the quotations from the dialogues which existed in later texts of a philosophical or a doxographical character and in anthologies might theoretically also be traced in Arabic literature. I am convinced, therefore, that a systematic examination of published and unpublished Arabic authors may bring to light still other traces of Aristotelian dialogues.

From: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1939, pp. 407–22.

NEW LIGHT ON THE ARABIC TRANSLATIONS OF ARISTOTLE

The Arabic versions of Greek philosophy science and medicine are interesting as a material link between the civilisation of Ancient Greece and the medieval Islamic world and as a stepping stone to the development of Arabic abstract style, which was deeply influenced by the excellent work of the translators, none of whom was a Muslim. The translations were based partly on a direct study of the Greek texts which were available in the libraries of Greek speaking residents, and partly on earlier or contemporary Syriac translations, which represent a continuous tradition in the Syriac Church from about the middle of the fifth century A.D., i.e. more than three hundred years before Arabic translations of philosophical and cognate texts begin to appear in early Abbasid times. As in so many fields of Arabic literature it is embarrassing to realise how little has been done to make the available material known to the community of scholars. This material, it is true, has partly been discovered recently, in the libraries of Eastern centres of learning such as Istanbul and Cairo and some minor places; but many manuscripts have been in European libraries for more than two centuries at least and within easy reach of scholars who cared for them. But the number of these has never been great, and we have to congratulate ourselves that help for the Arabic Aristotle is now coming forth from a new quarter: from two Arabic scholars who have come under the influence of Western philological training, the Syrian Khalil Georr and the Egyptian 'Abdarraḥmān Badawī. I shall try to explain the importance of the material which they publish for the first time and to show how, in my view, the work which they have started so well, despite certain shortcomings, should be continued and coordinated with other studies. I shall deal mainly with Khalil Georr, *Les Catégories d'Aristote dans leurs versions Syro-Arabes. Edition de textes précédée d'une étude historique et critique et suivie d'un vocabulaire technique*, Préface de M. L. Massignon, Institut Français de Damas, Beyrouth 1948, and the translations of Greek

philosophical texts to be found in 'Abdu-r-Rahmān Badawī, *Arisṭū 'inda-l-'Arab* I, Cairo 1947, *Manṭiq Arisṭū* I, Cairo 1948, II, Cairo 1949. I have only been able to examine photostats of the first two pages of the MS of the Prior Analytics and of the first page of the Posterior Analytics. Cf. below p. 134.

I. SURVEY OF THE NEW TEXTS PUBLISHED

The texts published for the first time are these:

I) The marginal notes of the well known Paris MS. of the Categories (Bibliothèque Nationale ar. 2346, anc. fond 882 A), with French translation but without any commentary (Georr pp. 149-182: translation; pp. 361-386: Arabic text).

II) Some hitherto unpublished notes and colophons from the same MS., (Rhetoric: Georr p. 186 f.; Prior Analytics: Georr p. 190 ff.; Porphyry's Isagoge: p. 193 f.; Posterior Analytics: p. 194; Topics: p. 195 ff.; Sophistici Elenchi: p. 198 ff.), which contains all the logical treatises of Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics duly included (Cf. L. Baur, *Dominicus Gundissalinus De divisione philosophiae*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters IV 2-3, Münster 1903, p. 301 n. R. Walzer, *Zur Traditionsgeschichte der aristotelischen Poetik*, Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica N.S. ii, 1934, p. 5 ff. A. J. Arberry, *Al-Fārābī's Canons of Poetry*, Rivista degli Studi Orientali 1938, p. 266 ff.).

III) The Prior Analytics, the Posterior Analytics and the first six books of the Topics with all the marginal notes (Badawī, *Manṭiq Arisṭū* I pp. 101-306: Prior Analytics; pp. 307-465: Posterior Analytics; II pp. 467-672: Topics I-VI. Corrections: I pp. 307-312; II pp. 673-680), without translation and commentary, i.e. only usable for students of Arabic and requiring to be translated and explained to interested outsiders such as classical scholars and students of medieval Latin translations of Greek philosophical and scientific texts [1]).

IV) A section from an otherwise unknown shortened paraphrase of *Metaphysics* Λ, chapters 6-10 (*Arisṭū 'inda l-'Arab* pp. 3-11).

V) Two sections from a shortened text of *Themistius*' commentary on Metaphysics Λ, chapters 1, part of 2, 6-10 (*Arisṭū 'inda l-'Arab* pp. 329-333; pp. 12-21), which is known in part from Bouyges' edition of Ibn Rushd's commentary on Metaphysics A, (pp. 1393, 6. 1394, 1. 1410, 4 ff. 1465. 1492, 3 ff. 1511, 4 ff. 1530, 2. 1635, 4 ff. 1706, 11 ff. Translator

[1] Cf. below p. 110.

Abū Bishr Mattā, cf. *Fihrist* p. 250, 28 ff., Fl. from the Syriac of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain) and from the complete Hebrew translation of the Arabic version published by S. Landauer in 1903 (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* V 5).

VI) Several small treatises by Alexander of Aphrodisias, most of them lost in the Greek original: *Arisṭū*, pp. 251-277; 278-280; 281-2; 283; 284 f. (= Probl. II 15, Scripta Minora II p. 59, 21-60, 31 Bruns); 286-288 (= Probl. II ii, p. 55, 18 ff. Bruns); 289-290; 291-292; 293-294; 295-308 (with notes by Abū Bishr Mattā).

VII) An unknown logical treatise by Themistius (*Arisṭū* pp. 309-324).

The Arabic translators belong to different schools of translation and to different periods, from the days of al-Ma'mūn (A.D. 813-833) down to the end of the 10th century A.D., and are therefore interesting on their own account, for the history of the translation of philosophical terms and the development of abstract style in general. It may also be considered how these different translations are to be linked up with the works of contemporary Muslim philosophers, who depend upon them.

II. PREVIOUS WORK ON TRANSLATIONS FROM THE GREEK

If the new texts are to be fully exploited, it is important to use the experiences gained in a cognate field, I mean the translations of Galen, the study of which was put on a new and more scientific basis by G. Bergsträsser's book *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq und seine Schule*, Leiden 1913, and his edition of the Arabic text of Pseudo-Galen's otherwise lost commentary on Hippocrates De septimanis: Corpus Medicorum Graecorum XI, 2, 1, Leipzig and Berlin 1914. Bergsträsser published the full Arabic text with German translation, Greek parallel passages and a complete index of the numerous Greek words to be found in the Arabic text, whose translator he identified as Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq, who was an older contemporary of Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq and who represents an earlier phase of translating activity. (Cf. below pp. 68 and 78. His translation is not mentioned by Brockelmann in its place.) Unfortunately the editors of the Corpus Medicorum felt themselves unable to continue this tradition, and further Arabic translations of works by Galen, one preserved in one Greek MS., the other two lost in the original, were published in German translation only, without the Arabic text, not to speak of Arabic-Greek and Greek-Arabic glossaries to help the work of those interested in the history of science and philology. (Galenus In Hippocratis Epidemias I-II edd E. Wenkebach – F. Pfaff: Corpus Medicorum Graecorum V 10, 1. Lipsiae et Berolini 1934. — In Hippocr. Epid. VI 1-8 edd. E. Wenkebach – F. Pfaff: Corp. Med. Graec. V 10, 2, 2, Lipsiae et Berolini 1940. Also Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, Supplementum III, Leipzig 1941, which contains the German translation of the Arabic text of Galen Περὶ ἐθῶν and of an unknown fragment of Proclus' Commentary of the Timaeus is unsatisfactory and practically useless for the same reason (cf. Bergsträsser, *Neue Materialien*, p. 11, 2). Two of these texts contain numerous glosses by Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq which are of particular interest for the student of the Arabic translations and the transmission of the understanding of the Greek texts. (Cf. Galen, *On medical experience*, Oxford 1944, p. VII n. 2.) It is regrettable that thus a very good chance for the promotion of these studies has probably been lost for ever; had the editor been encouraged to publish the Arabic text as well so that it could serve as a base for future work, our knowledge in this field, still so limited, would have profited considerably by his work.

Bergsträsser's suggestions have, however, been followed up by himself and by some of his fellow workers and pupils. His *editio princeps* of Ḥunain's *risāla* [1], in which Ḥunain gives detailed information about his Syriac and Arabic translations of 129 books of Galen, is still very little known outside the narrow circle of experts; it is ignored by historians of classical scholarship (although it is accompanied by a German version and a list of the Greek titles of the books referred to), and it has found little interest among general students of Arabic [2]. The new texts to be reviewed add considerably to the evidence to be found in Ḥunain's treatise; we can now compare his highly refined method of critically editing the Greek texts before he embarked on their translation with the practice adhered to by the 10th century philosophical school whose members knew Syriac and Arabic but, almost certainly, no Greek, and we get more information about Arabic and Syriac translators before Ḥunain, which goes—as happened in the case of Galen—far beyond the meagre notices from Arabic biographical works with which we had hitherto to be content.

Bergsträsser himself did not embark on any further editorial work of his own in this field, but some kind of tradition in the edition of texts of this kind grew up under his influence and several forms of suitable

[1] Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, *Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, Abhandl. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XVII 2, Leipzig 1915. — *Neue Materialen zu Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq's Galen-Bibliographie*, Abh. für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XIX 2, Leipzig 1932.

[2] With the exception of F. Rosenthal, *The technique and approach of Muslim scholarship*, Analecta Orientalia 24, Rome 1947, pp. 18, 26 ff., 31 ff. and passim. Cf. also the same author, *Die arabische Autobiographie*, Studia Arabica I, Rome 1937, p. 5 ff.. p. 15 ff.

editorial work were tried out by pupils and fellow workers such as M. Plessner[1], J. Schacht[2], M. Meyerhof[3], P. Kraus[4], F. Rosenthal[5], M. Krause[6] and the present writer[7]. The premature deaths of Bergsträsser in 1933 and of Kraus in 1944 together with the vicissitudes of the war has slowed down this work and cut short much promising development. But the tradition has been carried on, and Georr and Badawī are somehow in contact with it.

No similar continuity has been observed in the study of the Arabic translations of Aristotle. Margoliouth's study of the 'Poetics', begun in 1887 (*Analecta orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam*) and brought to an end by his translation of the Arabic version in 1911 (*The Poetics of Aristotle, translated from Greek into English and from Arabic into Latin, with a revised text, introduction, commentary, glossary and onomasticon*) was appreciated by classical scholars, whereas his treatment of Theophrastus' metaphysical fragment and of Aristotle's Rhetorics (*Remarks on the Arabic version of the Metaphysics of Theophrastus*, Journal Royal Asiatic Society 1892, pp. 192-201; *On the Arabic version of Aristotle's*

[1] M. Plessner, *Der Oikonomikos des Neupythagoreers 'Bryson' und sein Einfluss auf die islamische Wissenschaft*, Orient und Antike (herausg. von G. Bergsträsser und O. Regenbogen) 5, Heidelberg 1928. Cf. H. Ritter in Der Islam 19, 1931, p. 27 ff.

[2] M. Meyerhof-J. Schacht, *Galen, Über die medizinischen Namen*, Abhandl. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissensch., phil.-hist. Klasse 1931, no. 3. Cf. G. Bergsträsser, Orient. Lit. Zeit. 1931, col. 331 ff.

[3] Cf. particularly: *Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des philosophischen und medizinischen Unterrichts bei den Arabern*, Sitzungsber. d. Preuss. Akad., phil.-hist. Klasse 1930 XXIII. — Together with J. Schacht: *The medico-philosophical controversy between Ibn Buṭlān of Baghdad and Ibn Riḍwān of Cairo. A contribution to the history of Greek learning among the Arabs.* The Egyptian University. Faculty of Arts, Publ. no. 13, Cairo 1937. Cf. now also J. Schacht, *Max Meyerhof*, Osiris 9 (1950) pp. 7-32.

[4] Cf. particularly: *Zu ibn al-Muqaffa'*, Rivista degli Studi Orientali 14, 1932, p. 1 ff. — *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, Textes choisies*, Paris-Le Caire 1935. — *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān, Contribution à l'histoire des idées scientifiques dans l'Islam* I: *Le Corpus des écrits Jabiriens*. Mémoires de l'Institut d'Egyptes 44, Cairo 1943. II: *Jābir et la science grecque*, ibid., 45, Cairo 1942. — *Plotin chez les Arabes*, Bulletin de l'Institut d'Égypte, Cairo 1941, p. 293 ff. — Galen, Περὶ ἠθῶν, Majallat Kulliyyāt al-ādāb, Fuād I University, V 1, Cairo 1939; cf. R. Walzer, *New Light on Galen's moral Philosophy*, Class. Quarterly 43, 1949, p. 82 ff. — Together with R. Walzer: *Plato Arabus I, Galen's Summary of Plato's Timaeus*, London 1951.

[5] *Arabische Nachrichten über Zenon den Eleaten*, Orientalia 6, 1937, p. 21 ff. — *Some Pythagorean documents transmitted in Arabic* I-II, Orientalia 10, 1941, pp. 104 ff., pp. 383 ff. — *Aš-šayḫ al-Yūnānī and the Arabic Plotinus source*, Orientalia 21, 1952, p. 461 ff.

[6] His main achivements are in the history of mathematics. Cf. A. Dietrich, *Max Krause in memoriam*, Der Islam 29, 1950, p. 104 ff. Cf. also C. Brockelmann, *GAL* II p. 657 (Nachträge und Berichtigungen).

[7] *Galen's Schrift 'Über die Siebenmonatskinder'*, Rivista degli Studi Orientali 15, 1935, pp. 323 ff.; cf. A. Neugebauer, ibid. 24, 1949, p. 92. — *Galen On Medical Experience. First Edition of the Arabic version, with an English translation and notes*, Oxford 1944.

Rhetoric, Semitic Studies in memory of Alexander Kohut, Berlin 1897, p. 376 ff.) was overlooked. J. Pollack's edition of Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (Abhandlungen f. d. Kunde des Morgenlandes XIII 1, Leipzig 1913), provided with an excellent Greek-Syriac-Arabic-Hebrew-Latin Index of philosophical terms, remained an isolated event. J. Tkatsch's new edition and laborious study of the Poetics (*Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles und die Grundlage der Kritik des griechischen Textes* I, 1928; II, 1932, Akad. d. Wissensch. in Wien, philos.-hist. Klasse) had been prepared in some kind of intellectual desert and had with all its shortcomings less influence than it deserved. (Cf. M. Plessner, Orient. Lit. Z. 1931, p. 1 ff.; G. Bergsträsser, Der Islam 20, 1932, p. 48 ff.; W. Kutsch, Orientalia 6, 1937, p. 68 ff.). A new beginning was made by the stimulating article of Kraus in 1932 (cf. above p. 64 n. 4) and by A. J. Arberry's edition of the book *De plantis* by Nicolaus of Damascus, sometimes wrongly ascribed to Aristotle, whose Greek original is lost. (Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Egyptian University I, 1933, p. 48 ff., II, 1934, p. 72 ff.). But the greatest contribution to the study of the Arabic Aristotle in our time is due to the French Jesuit M. Bouyges who edited two important texts, the Categories (Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum Tome IV, Beyrouth 1932) and the Metaphysics (Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum Tome V 2, Beyrouth 1938; Tome VI, Beyrouth 1942; Tome VII, Beyrouth 1948), which can now be studied in reliable editions of the highest philological standard. (Cf. Orientalia 20, 1951, p. 334 ff.) The serious study of his editions is just beginning, and it will take some time until the results of his conscientious and highly competent effort will be assimilated by students interested in the history of Greek thought in the Islamic world and of Arabic philosophy in its own right. Georr's and Badawī's studies are to be judged in relation to this background.

III. TRANSLATORS MENTIONED IN THE NEW TEXTS

I discuss in this article some of the new information which we gain from the texts published for the first time. The most remarkable result concerns the Christian philosophical school of Baghdad in the 10th and the first half of the 11th century. The Aristotelian studies of this circle whose members knew Arabic and Syriac equally well but who, unlike Theodore abū Qurra and Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, had no knowledge of Greek become clear and so does their method of teaching. The highly refined study of these texts by later philosophers, particularly by those of the Spanish West, appear to be based entirely on their exegetic work, which seems, however, to have surpassed even Ibn Rushd in philological

accuracy and knowledge of textual variants. The name of a man like the Nestorian philosopher and physician Abu'l Khair al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (A.D. 942-after 1017) also known by his *laqab* Ibn al-Khammār [1] ceases to be a mere name, and his achievements as a 'critical editor' of earlier translations and as an understanding commentator can be appreciated and compared with his Arabic, Syriac and Greek predecessors. His attitude to the text and his way of commenting upon it can be traced back, in an unbroken continuity, as far as Alexander of Aphrodisias. He reproduces the lectures of his teacher, the great Jacobite philosopher and pupil of Al-Fārābī: Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī (893-974) (Cf. M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien*, p. 417 ff. [31 ff.]. G. Graf, *Geschichte* II, p. 233 ff. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 228, *Suppl.* I, pp. 370, 956) who appears, from the new text, to have been mainly responsible for establishing a continuous tradition of Aristotle reading in Baghdad. Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār is, however, by no means only dependent on his great predecessor but shows some individual features of his own, comparable to those to be noticed in the commentaries of the late Greek Neoplatonic teachers of Aristoteleanism.

We also get a more precise idea of Yaḥyā's master, the Nestorian Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus (died 940) (Cf. M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien*, p. 415 [29]. G. Graf, *Geschichte* II, p. 153. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 228, *Suppl.* I, p. 370. D. S. Margoliouth, *The Discussion between Abū Bishr Mattā and Abū Saʿīd al Sīrāfī on the merits of Logic and Grammar*, Journ. Royal As. Soc. 1905, pp. 79-129. A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern* p. 211). He is the translator of the Posterior Analytics (Cf. above p. 61: III and below p. 98 ff.), and also of Alexander of Aphrodisias' Commentary on the theological book Λ of the Metaphysics, published in part by Bouyges in 1948, cf. *Fihrist* p. 251, 28 Flügel and Index A, *b* p. (12) no. 30 Bouyges. His share in the notes to be found on the margins of the MS. of the Organon (Cf. below pp. 78, 102) and of the small treatises of Alexander of Aphrodisias (Cf. *Aristū ʿInda ʾl ʿArab*, p. 295 ff.) is considerable.

[1] Cf. M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad* (above p. 64 n. 3), p. 421 (35). G. Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen arabischen Literatur* II (Studi e Testi 133, Vatican City 1947), p. 156 f. C. Brockelmann, *GAL*, 2nd edition I, Leiden 1943, p. 236; Supplement I (Leiden 1937), p. 378. He appears to have been the translator of Porphyry's History of Philosophers (cf. F. Rosenthal, *Arabische Nachrichten etc.*, Orientalia 6, 1937, p. 39, and probably of the fragments of Theophrastus' Meteorology which proved that Epicurus depended on this work of Theophrastus (cf. G. Bergsträsser, *Neue meteorologische Fragmente des Theophrast*, Sitzungsber. der Heidelberger Akad. d. Wissensch. 1918 IX, p. 10). Cf. also Schacht-Meyerhof, *The medico-philosophical Controversy* etc. (above p. 64 n. 3), pp. 87, 103, 109. The treatises preserved in cod. Rāġib 1463 (cf. H. Ritter, *Philologica* III, Der Islam 18, 1929, p. 46 n. 1) deserve to be studied.

We also learn something about his teacher, the physician Abū Yaḥyā (Zakariyyā) al-Marwazī (Cf. M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien*, p. 414 [28] and below p. 100. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, Bonn 1922, p. 232) who appears to have been the founder of this school in Baghdad—which, in its turn, claims a direct connection (justifiably, I believe) with the Greek tradition of Aristotle reading in 6th and 7th century Alexandria (Cf. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien* passim).

Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's school made ample use of the translations, both Arabic and Syriac, which had been made by the Nestorian Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq (d. A.D. 873) (Cf. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 224 ff., *Suppl.* I, 336 ff. G. Graf, *Geschichte* I, p. 122 ff. A. Baumstark, *Gesch. der syr. Lit.*, p. 227 ff.) and his numerous pupils. Among the new texts are the translation of the Topics (Cf. above p 61 : III and below p. 89 n. 1), of some of the treatises of Alexander of Aphrodisias [1] and of the new logical treatise of Themistius (Cf. above p. 62: VII) by Abū ʿUthmān Saʿīd ibn Yaʿqūb ad-Dimashqī (± 900), known also as an eminent physician (Cf. M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien*, p. 424 [38]. G. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq und seine Schule* (above p. 93), p. 25, 76 ff. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 288, *Suppl.* I, p. 369, III, p. 1204). He also is the translator of Pappus' Commentary on Euclid's Elements book X ed. Junge-Thompson (Cambridge Mass. 1930), cf. G. Bergsträsser, Der Islam 21, 1933, pp. 195-222. (Cf. also Miskawaih, *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, Cairo 1317, p. 75. F. Rosenthal, Isis, 1945, 253 f.). Many references to Ḥunain's son Isḥāq's (Cf. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 227, *Suppl.* I, p. 369. G. Graf, *Geschichte* I, p. 129 ff.) lost Syriac translations of the Topics and the Prior Analytics (in collaboration with his father, cf. below p. 82 f.) are found in the margins of the Paris MS., i.e. in Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's edition; Abū Bishr's translation of the Posterior Analytics is totally based on Isḥāq's lost Syriac version. That the Arabic Categories and the De interpretatione are due to Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain is common knowledge, since both these texts have been known for a long time. Isḥāq's translation of the α ἔλαττον of the Metaphysics used by Averroes may now by studied in Bouyges' edition (Cf. below p. 80) and so may his translation of Nicolaus : De plantis (Cf. above p. 65) made in collaboration with the Sabean mathematician Thābit ibn Qurra (d. A.D. 901) (Cf. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 241 ff., *Suppl.* I, p. 384 and the passage from aṣ-Ṣafadī, quoted by F. Rosenthal, below p. 83 n. 1). Most of these facts were, it is true, known

[1] The first treatise Περὶ τῶν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχῶν, *Aristū ʿinda ʾl-ʿArab*, pp. 278-308 is translated by Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Kātib, who also translated the 8th book of the Topics, and appears to have collaborated with Abū ʿUthmān.

from the *Fihrist* of Ibn an-Nadīm (d. about A.D. 990) and from similar bibliographical works. Now they can be checked and compared with the actual evidence of the texts. This makes all the difference.

In the case of the Prior Analytics (above p. 61: III) Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār, Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī and Abū Bishr based their lectures on an Arabic version prior to Ḥunain which they judged to be adequate, and did not attempt a version of their own on the base of Ḥunain's and Isḥāq's more recent Syriac versions which they knew. Its author is, according to a fully convincing guess of P. Kraus (Rivista degli Studi Orientali 14, 1932, p. 3 n. 3) the melkite bishop of Ḥarrān Theodore abū Qurra (probably during the reign of al-Ma'mūn, or even earlier, cf. G. Graf, *Geschichte*, p. 7 ff.. C. H. Becker, *Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung*, Islam-Studien I, p. 432 ff., J. Schacht, *The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford 1950, p. 99. L. Gardet – M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris 1948, p. 201 n. 2); he was a follower of St. John of Damascus whose interest in Aristotle's Logic (to the exclusion of the Posterior Analytics) and in Aristotle's Psychology is known (Cf. e.g. Überweg-Geyer, *Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie*, Berlin 1928, p. 130 f.). His theological writings are partly in Arabic and partly in Greek—a rather isolated case as it seems.

Also a contemporary of his, the Melkite Yaḥyā ibn al-Bitrīq (Cf. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 221, *Suppl.* I, p. 364. G. Graf, *Geschichte* I, p. 32. Cf. below p. 78) is once referred to (Cf. below p. 85): his translation of Pseudo-Galen: De septimanis has been mentioned before. (Cf. above p. 62).

Both these translators are contemporaries of the Jacobite 'Abdulmasīḥ ibn 'Abdallāh ibn Nā'ima, the translator of the paraphrase of Plotinus called the 'Theology of Aristotle' (Cf. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 22, *Suppl.* I. p. 364. G. Graf, *Geschichte* II, p. 228 f. P. Kraus, *Plotin chez les Arabes* [cf. above p. 64 n. 4], p. 267 n. 4, p. 290 ff. Cf. also below p. 82): he worked for Al-Kindī like Asṭāt (Eusthatius ?) (*Fihrist* p. 251, 27 f. Flügel. Cf. below p. 90), whose translation of most of the books of Aristotle's Metaphysics is now available for study in Bouyges' recent edition.

Also older Syriac translations of early Islamic times were still used in the 10th century in the Baghdad philosophical school with which we are concerned. We hear of the translations by the Jacobite Athanasius of Balad (died A.D. 696, cf. Georr p. 26, Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 256 f.) of the Prior Analytics and the Topics (cf. also below p. 82, 83), and of those by his companion, the great Jacob of Edessa (died

A.D. 708) of the Categories [1] and by the Maronite Theophilus of Edessa (died A.D. 785) of the Prior Analytics[2] (cf. below p. 81, 83). The earlier Syriac translations which are used in the recent critical editions of the Greek texts of the Categories, the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας and the Prior Analytics seem not to have been known to them, I mean those due to the Nestorian Prōbhā (middle of the 5th century) [3] and the Jacobite Sergius ar-Ra's'ainī (died A.D. 536) [4]. Also the translations of the same three works by Athanasius of Balad's pupil George, Bishop of the Arabs [5] in Kufa (died A.D. 724) are not referred to by the 10th century philosophers and editors of Baghdad.

The Greek commentators most frequently quoted by name are Simplicius, well known as one of the last teachers in the pagan Platonic Academy at Athens, who went for a short time to Persia after Justinian had closed down the school in 529 (for the Categories) [6] and the Christian Monophysite John Philoponus of Alexandria (for the Posterior Analytics) [7]. An unknown, probably later Alexandrian اللينوس (not = Elias) in whom Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār seems to have been particularly

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[1] Cf. Georr p. 26. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, pp. 248 ff. Georr has edited his Syriac version of the Categories, pp. 253-316, cf. G. Furlani in Rivista degli Studi Orientali 25, 1950, p. 101 ff. Cf. also below p. 81.

[2] Georr p. 30 f. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 341 f. He was in the service of the caliph al-Mahdī, and is credited with a translation of Homer into Syriac, cf. G. Levi della Vida, Journal of the American Oriental Society 70, 1950, p. 186 n. 28.

[3] Cf. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 102. Georr p. 14 f. J. G. E. Hoffmann, *De Hermeneuticis apud Syros Aristoteleis*, Leipzig 1873. A. Baumstark, Zeitschrift für Assyriologie 13, 1898-9, pp. 117 ff. A. Nagy, *Una versione siriaca inedita degli Analitici di Aristotele*, Rendiconti dell' Accademia dei Lincei, serie V, tom. VII, Roma 1898, p. 321 f. — Probhā's translation of Anal. Pr. I 1-7 has been used by Sir David Ross in his recent critical edition of the Greek text (*Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics*, Oxford 1949), cf. Ross pp. 89 ff.

[4] Cf. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 167 ff. Georr p. 17 ff. L. Minio-Paluello has used his translation of the Categories in manuscript in his recent critical edition of the Categories and the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (*Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione*, Oxford 1949), cf. Minio p. XVII. Georr (p. X) promises an edition of his commentary on the Categories. — We know that Sergius' Syriac translations were not appreciated in Ḥunain's school, cf. the index of Bergsträsser's edition of Ḥunain's risāla (mentioned above p. 63. n. 1) s.v. and below p. 72 f.

[5] Cf. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte*, p. 257 f. Georr p. 27 f. — Edition: G. Furlani, *Le Categorie e gli Ermeneutici di Aristotele nella versione syriaca di Giorgio delle Nazioni*, Mem. Acc. Lincei, Cl. Sc. Mor. VI 5, 1, Roma 1933; *Il primo libro dei Primi Analitici di Aristotele nella versione syriaca di Giorgio delle Nazioni*, ibid. VI 5, 3, Roma 1935. Both these versions have been used in the two recent critical editions of the Greek text. Cf. also L. Minio-Paluello, Class. Quart. 1945, p. 63 ff.

[6] Cf. Ibn an-Nadīm, *Fihrist* p. 268, 6 Flügel and below p. 74 ff.

[7] 'Jacobite', *Fihrist* p. 254, 21 F. 249, 13 F. and below p. 100 ff. Cf. also M. Meyerhof, *Johannes Grammatikos (Philoponos) von Alexandrien und die arabische Medizin*, Mitteilungen des Deutschen Instituts für ägyptische Altertumskunde in Cairo 2, 1932, pp. 1 ff.

interested is quoted for the Prior Analytics (cf. below p. 75 ff.). Alexander of Aphrodisias (cf. below p. 72 f., 101, 102)[1], Porphyry and Themistius (cf. below p. 78) are also mentioned. But it is obvious that the Arabic commentators largely used their Greek predecessors, even where they do not actually refer to them.

This is the basis of Aristotle reading in Baghdad, in the 10th and in the beginning of the 11th century.

IV. KHALIL GEORR'S EDITION OF THE CATEGORIES
(cf. above p. 61 : I)

The new texts provide us with so much new information that a more detailed description of the most important material, however incomplete and provisional it may be, seems justified.

The edition of the Categories by Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār is based on Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's autograph ('corrected from it') and, in addition, collated with another copy of the same autograph (Cf. F. Rosenthal, *The Technique etc.*, p. 23), due to another eminent pupil of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, the Jacobite Abū 'Alī 'Īsā ibn Isḥāq ibn Zur'a (942-1008; M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien* p. 422 [36]. G. Graf, *Geschichte* II, p. 252 ff. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 229, Suppl. I, p. 371. Schacht-Meyerhof [above p. 64 n. 3] p. 81. R. Walzer, *Galen On Jews and Christians*, Oxford 1949, p. 91 ff.). He is also mentioned as the translator of Nicolaus' of Damascus five books On the Philosophy of Aristotle (*Fihrist* p. 264, 26 f. Qifṭi p. 246, 4 L.), some fragments of which can now be studied in Bouyges' edition of Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. (Cf. Orientalia 20, 1951, p. 338). Yaḥyā in his turn collated his own copy so closely with Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain's autograph that he also reproduced the pointing and spelling of the original (No. 130 Georr: p. 181 transl., p. 386 text). He mentions, in one place, that Isḥāq wrote *maḍā* with an alif (مضا) and, accordingly, does the same (no. 67 Georr: p. 176, 381. Cf. Bouyges, Bibl. Ar. Schol. IV p. 179). There may have been many more notes of a similar kind which Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār or the scribe of the Paris MS. did not care to copy. Occasionally Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī tries to improve upon Isḥāq's text: cap. 10, 12 b 26 Isḥāq translated ἐναντία by *al-muḍāf* (= τὸ πρός τι), and Yaḥyā corrected this apparent blunder, due to some inattention, into *al-muḍādda* (no. 112 Georr: p. 179, 384). The Paris MS [2] has Isḥāq's reading with Yaḥyā's correction, the Egyptian MS [1] (which is taken from Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's pupil, the great Nestorian author Abū'l Faraj 'Abdallāh ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib's (died A.D. 1043) [2] unpublished commentary of the Categories) has *al-aḍḍād* [3]. Yaḥyā proposed cap. 3, 1b 10 ff. to change the order of words in Isḥāq's translation (which follows the Greek text very closely), but Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār did not accept his master's suggestion although he reports it [4]. In comparison with e.g. the Prior and Posterior Analytics, there are very few references to Syriac variant readings, and it looks as if, in this case, they have not been added by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, who, evidently, was satisfied to have compared Isḥāq's autograph, but by Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār who claims to have himself translated into Arabic the Syriac texts which he quotes. For the sentences cap. 3, 1 b 16 τῶν ἑτέρων γενῶν [5]) καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλληλα τεταγμένων ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει καὶ αἱ διαφοραί Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (no. 50 Georr: p. 174/380) translates the Syriac versions of Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, of Jacob of Edessa (cf. above p. 69 n. 1) and of an otherwise apparently unknown monk Yūbā (Job of Edessa). Ḥunain's version reproduces the Greek almost literally but evidently did not appeal to Isḥāq's sense of Arabic style. The differences observed make us only regret that the late Arabic critic was unable to compare the Greek as well. Cap. 2. 1 a 18 we find in the Arabic instead of ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ a bull who is victorious, cf. 1 a 19. (No. 33 Georr: p. 164/372. Georr gives the Syriac words cf. above — A similar change in Prior Anal. I, 4 26 a 11 ff. Cf. Badawī, *Manṭiq Arisṭū* I, p. 114 n. 4 and below p. 86). The learned 10th century critic tells us on the margin that the Syriac translation (by Ḥunain?) had the same word as the one found in all the Greek manuscripts. A Syriac gloss is quoted in connection with cap. 1.1 a 6 (συνώνυμα) [6]. Isḥāq is blamed, rightly, for having misunderstood the first sentence of the book, probably again by Ibn Suwār (no. 5 Georr: p. 160/369). (It is puzzling, however, to find that Ibn Suwār refers to the Syriac and to the Greek. But he may owe this information to a Greek commentary which he used in Syriac or Arabic translation.)

[1] Cf. *Topics* III 1, p. 533 n. 1 Badawī = Alexander *In Top.* p. 224, 19 Wallies.

[2] p (Bouyges) C (Georr.) Why this confusing change of sigla?

[1] t (Bouyges) P (Georr)!

[2] M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien*, p. 425 (39), G. Graf, *Geschichte* II, p. 105, p. 160. C. Brockelmann, *GAL* I, p. 635, *Suppl.* I, p. 884. Schacht-Meyerhof, *The medico-philosophical controversy*, pp. 14, 43, n. 21, 58, 68. 84, 87 f. Cf. below p. 75.

[3] Thus Bouyges and Georr. Badawī does not mention it in his very careless re-edition of the text (*Manṭiq Arisṭū* pp. 1-56).

[4] No. 49 Georr: p. 173/379. Georr does not translate the Arabic into French but into Greek. This is apt to mislead the non-Orientalist.

[5] To be read ἑτερογενῶν cf. Minio's edition, quoted above p. 69 n. 4.

[6] No. 20 Georr (p. 162/370) 1 a 26 (no. 43 Georr). Isḥāq's Arabic is certainly more adequate than the Syriac quoted.

Isḥāq and Ḥunain both understood Greek, and their links with the best tradition of the Greek texts are hinted at in some marginal notes. The most interesting passage is the following. Isḥāq has cap. 1, 1 a 6-7 the text in the same form as we read it in the most recent critical edition by Minio and as it was, incidentally, read by Simplicius *Categ.* p. 28, 12 Kalbfleisch (ἀναγκαία οὖν ἡ τοῦ κατὰ τοὔνομα προσθήκη), who is everywhere the main source of the Arabic commentary: συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός. After pointing out that the Greek MSS. differ but that the majority of them agree with Isḥāq, Ibn Suwār continues: "The following text exists in some manuscripts (for once I follow Georr's way of giving the Greek text): "Συνώνυμα (ὁμώνυμα: uncorrected printing mistake in Georr's translation) δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός. The copy of Iamblichus" — read ايامليخوس instead of اناملخوس — "does not have the word οὐσία" — Simpl. Cat. p. 34, 27 K.: ὁ δὲ Ἰάμβλιχος ἄνευ τοῦ 'τῆς οὐσίας' — "he also says that the words κατὰ τοὔνομα (الاسم بحسب الذى) do not exist in some manuscripts and that one must supply them in thought, and Syrianus (Cf. below p. 76) agrees with him." — Simpl. Cat. p. 34, 29 K. . ἐπεσημήνατο δὲ ὅτι ἐν ἐνίοις ἀντιγράφοις οὐ φέρεται τὸ 'καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος' καὶ ὅτι προσυπακούειν δεῖ· ἠκολούθησεν δὲ τῇ Ἰαμβλίχου γραφῇ καὶ ὁ Συριανός [1]). — "Alexander's text is like Isḥāq's text but he has dropped the words κατὰ τοὔνομα and says one has to supply them in thought". Simpl. Cat. p. 34, 31 K.: καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ διηνέχθη περὶ τὴν γραφὴν οὕτως γράψας· συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτος. 'προσυπακούειν δὲ' καὶ αὐτὸς 'δεῖ' φησὶν 'τὸ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα' (No. 21 Georr: p. 162 f. / 371). Cf. Minio's apparatus criticus. Cf. also G. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq und seine Schule* p. 45, l. 31). We did not realise before that the most subtle questions of textual criticism as discussed by Simplicius were still fully known ± 1000 in Baghdad. But this is not an isolated example.

In connection with cap. 8, 9 a 23 f. μηδὲν πάσχειν we are told in the margin that one has to supply in thought the words ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων (not ἀπό, as Georr prints it. Cf. no. 85: p. 177/382). We learn from Dr. Minio's edition of the Greek text that the words in question (which modern editions rightly omit) were actually to be found in the Jacobite Sergius' Syriac translation (who studied in Alexandria), in his

[1] This dispenses with Georr's interpretation of the corrupt Arabic word — سوارلس — as 'Severus'.

contemporary the Jacobite John Philoponus' commentary on the passage (p. 146, 24 Busse) and in the 9th century Ambrosianus *n* which is now considered to provide the relatively best evidence of the Greek text of the *Organon* (Cf. Sir David Ross's edition of the Prior and Posterior Analytics p. 89 ff. Cf. below p. 84 ff., 103 ff.) Ḥunain's critical attitude towards the Syriac translators in general and Sergius in particular is well known from Hunain's Galen-*risāla* (Cf. above p. 69 n. 4). Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī and Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār apparently base their commentary on the Categories on Simplicius, and not on John Philoponus (whose commentary was known to the Arabs well, cf. below p. 75.) — whereas they followed the late Alexandrian Jacobite tradition in the case of the Posterior Analytics.

Of linguistic notes, concerning the difference between Greek and Arabic, of which Ḥunain is known to be fond (Cf. e.g. *Galen On medical experience*, cap. XVI), only two are worth mentioning. In connection with cap. 8, 10 b 5 ff.: "Sometimes the man who takes his character from a quality has a name that is not a derivation, as in the case of σπουδαῖος (*mujtahid*) and ἀρετή (*faḍīla*) (Cf. Simpl. Categ. 31, 24: οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς σπουδῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος, παρώνυμος· σπουδαῖος μὲν γὰρ ὁ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων) we are told: "He wants to say (*yaḍhab ilā an*) that it is not customary in the Greek language, as it is in other languages, to derive 'excellent' (*fāḍil*) from excellence (*faḍīla*), but that one says instead of it 'serious' (*mujtahid*)". (No. 96 Georr: p. 178/383 — read *makānahū* instead of *makān*. — Theodore abū Qurra renders σπουδαῖος by *dhū faḍā'il*, *An. Pr.* II 27, 70 a 17, the Ḥunain pupil Abū 'Uthmān ad-Dimashqi, *Top.* V 3, 131 b 2 by *fāḍil*, but over the line we find *mujtahid*, p. 595, 1 Badawī. — This note is only concerned with the word as attribute of persons not of things).

The category ἔχειν 'to have' is rendered by *lahū* in the Arabic version. This involves some incongruencies with normal Arabic usage, as, e.g., in the case of 'having a coat or tunic (cap. 15, 15 b 22)': "He says this (*lahū ṭaub*) according to Greek custom instead of the Arabic way of speech *'alaihi ṭaub'*, and in the same way instead of *'alaihi ḥātam' 'lahū ḥātam'* (no. 130 Georr: p. 181/386). The same difficulty arises two lines below: "a jar is said to 'have' wine, and a corn-measure wheat". Here, the translator had to say even in the context instead of λέγεται 'the Greeks say' and to add that the Arabs must say *fī*. The same is emphasized in a marginal note (no. 131 Georr: p. 181/386).

These are a few passages from the marginal notes published by Georr for the first time which deserve to be singled out for comment. Before I turn to the contents of Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's commentary

on the argument of the Categories or rather what remains of it in the Paris MS, I have to point out that an editor of an Arabic commentary on a Greek philosopher makes his task unnecessarily difficult if he omits to compare cognate Greek texts.

On p. 130, 18 (361, 17) Georr we meet the word *balanṭurā* (بلنطورى) as an example of a meaningless expression (*al-alfāẓ ghair ad-dālla*: λέξεις ἄσημοι). This is since early Stoic thought the stock example for a meaningless word and to be read بْليطورى βλίτυρι, a word which imitated, in the Greek view, the twang of a harp (Cf. e.g. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, Göttingen 1949, I p. 43, II p. 21 ff. *Stoic. Vet. Fragm.* III Diog. Bab. 20 Arnim). Examples of its use are to be found in Greek explanations of the Categories, e.g. in Simplicius, Cat. p. 12, 31; 27, 18, 31; 41, 13; 124; 181 and also in Arabic, e.g. in Galen's work Περὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν ὀνομάτων (cf. above p. 64 n. 2) fol. 84[b] (p. 8 n. 3 of the German translation) and in three other places in the same book. It is always connected (e.g. in the work of Galen just referred to) with another meaningless word, σκίνδαψος, for which Ibn Suwār or some predecessor substituted the well known non-existing fabulous animal *'anqā' mughrib* (instead of Georr's *'anqā-ma'reb*). Other certain emendations, guaranteed by Greek parallels, first found by S. M. Stern-Oxford, are the following ones: 1) p. 152, 6 (363, 6) Georr: *Adrastus*, not *Daristros* (reading ادرسطوس for دارسطرس) of Aphrodisias (saec. II A.D.) called the Catagories Πρὸ τῶν τόπων (Simpl. Cat. p. 16, 1 ff. K), *Plotinus*, not *Pholotius* (reading فلوطينوس for فلوطيوس) Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ ὄντος (Simpl. Cat. p. 16 ff. K) 2) p. 152, 17 ff., p. 363, 11 ff. Georr is almost identical with Simpl., *Cat.* p. 18, 16 ff. (Simplicius is quoted by name to be read سمفليقيوس instead of سميليقيوس [1]): Ἱστορεῖ δὲ ὁ Ἀδραστος (not *Aristos*, reading ادرسطوس for ارسطوس) ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ὅτι φέρεται καὶ ἄλλο τῶν κατηγοριῶν βιβλίον ὡς Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ αὐτὸ ὂν βραχὺ καὶ σύντομον κατὰ τὴν λέξιν καὶ διαιρέσεσιν ὀλίγαις διαφερόμενον, ἀρχὴν δὲ ἔχον 'τῶν ὄντων τὸ μὲν ἔστιν', πλῆθος δὲ στίχων ἑκατέρου τὸ αὐτὸ ἀναγράφει, ὥστε τὸ βραχὺ κατὰ τὴν λέξιν εἶπεν ὡς συντόμως ἑκάστου τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐκτιθεμένων. 3) The man referred to p. 155, 1 p. 364 last line Georr is not *Arkhotus* but again *Archytas* (so in the Arabic text أرخوطس). Simplicius is again mentioned by name p. 169, 30, p. 377, 7; the criticism of Porphyry referred to is to be found Simpl. Cat. p. 48, 33 ff. K.

Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's introduction to the study of the Categories, which leads up to the explanation of single concepts and phrases, is based on a scheme which was commonly used in the late Alexandrian school, not only for Aristotle, but also for other text books, but does not seem to be older than Proclus to whom its definite adoption is ascribed (cf. Elias *In Categ*, p. 107, 24 Busse), cf., e.g., σκοπός (p. 149/361: cf. Simpl. *Cat.* 9, 3 ff. K.), χρήσιμον (p. 151/362; cf. Simpl. 13, 27 ff.), αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς (p. 152/363; cf. Simpl. 15, 26 ff.), εἰ γνήσιον τὸ βιβλίον (p. 152/363; cf. Simpl. 18, 7 ff.), ὑπὸ ποῖον μέρος τῆς φιλοσοφίας (p. 154/364; cf. Simpl. 20, 8 ff.), ἡ εἰς τὰ κεφάλαια διαίρεσις (p. 154/364; cf. Simpl. 18, 22 ff.).

There is nothing to compel us to assume a commentary previous to Simplicius as the Arab commentator's ultimate source, since his references to earlier commentators are all given by Simplicius as well. (Alexander: cf. above. — Porphyry: no. 1 Georr p. 154 / 364, cf. Simpl.

[1] Cf. τὰ ἕπτη, below p. 105 and. e.g., Th. Nöldeke, *Kurzgefasste Syrische Grammatik* § 15. Ibn an-Nadīm spells the name سنبايقيوس, *Fihr.* p. 248, 21 Flügel.

Cat. 173 ff. K; no. 35 Georr p. 168/376, cf. Simpl. Cat. 48, 13 ff. K. — Ammonius no. 4 Georr p. 160/369, cf. Simpl. Cat. 18, 9 ff. K. But certain considerations make it more probable that he used a later Alexandrian commentator of the Categories who in his turn depended on Simplicius, and probably was a Christian. The examples referred to sometimes differ slightly from those used by Simplicius, and the whole commentary is an odd mixture of detailed argument and short notes. A definite answer will not be possible, until the commentary by Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's pupil Abū'l Faraj 'Abdallāh ibn at-Ṭayyib (cf. above p. 71 n. 2)—whose quotations of the Aristotelian text are used in Bouyges' and Georr's edition and completely neglected by Badawī—is published.

For the time being a guess may be ventured. Of sixth and seventh century commentaries on the Categories the following are mentioned by Ibn an-Nadīm (p. 248, 20 f. Fl.): Simplicius, John Philoponus, Stephanus of Alexandria (beginning of saec. VII, cf. H. Usener, *De Stephano Alexandrino*, Kleine Schriften III, p. 247 ff.) and the mysterious اللينوس, who, according to Ibn al-Qifṭī (p. 164, 17 Lippert) commented on the 'four books' on logic, i.e. Isagoge, Categories, De interpretatione, Prior Analytics. Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār seems to have taken a special interest in the work of this otherwise unknown and presumably late Alexandrian commentator, and we learn that he translated the part on the Isagoge and the Categories from Syriac into Arabic and that this commentary had the form of marginal notes (baU I, 323, 20 M.). اللينوس commentary on the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας is quoted in the Paris MS. (cf. the note in the beginning of the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας fol. 179 a اصناف الاقاويل على رأى اللينوس اربعة); it is also referred to in a debate between Ibn Riḍwān and Aṭ-Ṭayyib's pupil Ibn Butlān, where it is emphasized that Aristotle was also criticised in this commentary (Cf. Rosenthal, *The technique* etc. p. 54 n. 10 'Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas' and Meyerhof-Schacht, *The medico-philosophical controversy*, p. 111 translation, p. 75 Arabic text). A note from his commentary on the Prior Analytics is to be found in Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's treatment of the text. (*Manṭiq Arisṭū* p. 103 n. 3 Badawī). His exposition of the Isagoge, in the form of marginal notes commented upon by Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār [1]), was still among the books used by Saladin's court physician Ibn al-Maṭrān (died A.D. 1191) (cf. La revue de l'Académie Arabe de Damas 3 (1923) p. 7 [S. M. Stern]. R. Walzer, *Galen On Jews and Christians* p. 87). I believe then that this Greek commentator—however his name is to be spelled

[1] Cf. now Badawī, *Manṭiq Arisṭū* III, p. 1043 n. 5; p. 1045 n. ; p. 1047 n. 2; p. 1061 n. 2.

(Aelianus? A. Müller in Flügel's edition of the *Fihrist* II p. 114 and following him Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien*, p. 35/421, very unlikely; 'Albinus'; Ibn al-Qiftī p. 35 n. 6 Lippert) was the main authority in Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's lecture course on the Categories. Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's text was its base; but Yaḥyā's commentary, which had been commissioned by Abū Sulaimān al-Manṭiqī and which was based on Alexander's lost Greek commentary (cf. *Fihrist* p. 248, 24 f. F.) is only twice referred to (no. 24: p. 163/371; no. 49: p. 173/379 Georr).

V. ON THE ARABIC VERSION OF THE *DE INTERPRETATIONE*

The marginal notes of the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, a small part of which I studied in a photograph, are still unpublished, but they will be included in a later volume of Badawī's edition. No new evidence for the text has turned up since Pollack's edition. The Paris MS. again depends on Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's text which reproduces Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's copy of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain's autograph, and has, like the Categories, been collated with ibn Zur'a's copy of Yaḥyā. All the Syriac and Arabic translations have changed the order of words of the Greek text in 16a 2 (τί ἐστιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις) giving to 'affirmation' the first place and to 'denial' the second. I wish to point out that this problem was already discussed by the ancient commentators, as we learn from Boethius (*Commentarii in libros Aristotelis* Περὶ ἑρμηνείας II p. 18, 26 ff. Meiser, cf. the Greek commentary by Ammonius p. 16, 31 ff. Busse), and that Syrianus, the master of Proclus (who became head of the Academy in 431/2), was in favour of this reading. Now the first Syriac translator of the 5th century, the Nestorian Prōbhā, a contemporary of Syrianus, has the same reading (cf. J. G. E. Hoffmann, ad locum). It has been suggested, on different grounds, that this translator has close connections with Syrianus (cf. A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern* I, Leipzig 1900, p. 142 ff.). The analysis of Al-Kindī's treatise on the study of Aristotle has also shown that a Syriac tradition in which Al-Kindī was interested was particularly close to the Athenian school and at variance with the philosophical school of Alexandria with which the Christian translators of the 10th century and Al-Farābī appear to be intimately connected (cf. Guidi-Walzer, *Studi su al-Kindi* I, Roma 1940, Memorie dell'Accademia dei Lincei Ser. VI, vol. IV, p. 375-390). Al-Kindī's interest in Plotinus—in Aristotelian disguise—which he shares, as some other features, with Avicenna (cf. Avicenna's commentary, published by Badawī, *Arisṭū 'inda 'l-'Arab* pp. 35-74 and now G. Vajda, *Les notes d'Avicenne sur la Théologie d'Aristote*, Revue Thomiste 1951, pp. 346-406).

also connects him rather with the Athenian than with the Alexandrian tradition. For the time being, these are only guesses though, in my view, likely guesses. They are published in the hope that some other student of Islamic Philosophy may have made similar observations.

VI. BADAWI'S EDITION OF THE PRIOR ANALYTICS

A.

The Arabic of the Prior Analytics yields copious information for the textual and exegetical work of the 10th century Aristotelians. The manuscript is copied from Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's autograph which he composed in A. H. 408 (A.D. 1018). (Cf. p. 228 Badawī and note. Georr [p. 192] reads in the year 409 of Alexander, i.e. A.D. 981, without comment) [1]. He copied, but not without criticism and some additions of his own (cf. below) the autograph of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, who had reached the end of the 7th chapter of the first book on Saturday the 25 Rabī' al-Auwal A. H. 317 = A.D. 929, i.e. when he was 36 years old (p. 132 n. 1 Badawī). We knew already that Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī was neither a doctor like Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār (cf. above p. 66 n. 1) or Abū'l Faraj ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib (who was also secretary of the Katholikos, cf. above p. 71 n. 2), Abū 'Uthmān ad-Dimashqī (cf. above p. 69) or Ar-Rāzī or Avicenna nor a tutor of princes like Al-Kindī, nor a high political dignitary like Avicenna, but earned his livelihood as a distinguished copyist of manuscripts. (Cf. Ibn al-Qiftī p. 361 Lippert; A. Mez, *Renaissance des Islam*, Heidelberg 1922, p. 176). We learn now from one of his notes that his father had already copied philosophical manuscripts which the son consulted and that he had evidently inherited the craft from him (p. 144 n. 5 Badawī). We are also introduced to a learned copyist of Yaḥyā's autograph, Abū Bakr, (p. 127 n. 3, p. 129 n. 4, p. 133 n. 3), whom we can by chance identify as Abū Bakr al-Ādamī al-'Aṭṭār to whom the master addressed a risāla (Ibn al-Qiftī p. 363, 16).

According to Ibn an-Nadīm Abū Bishr Mattā was the first to comment upon the whole of the Prior Analytics in Arabic (p. 249, 10 ff.). Before him his teacher Abū Isḥāq Ibrahīm فوبری who came to Baghdād between 892 and 902 (cf. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien* p. 28/414; *Fihrist* p. 249, 9 f. Georr p. 199 f. A. Baumstark, Aristoteles bei den Syrern I p. 140) commented upon the first three figures, i.e. An. Pr. I 1-7. Abū

[1] If this date is correct — the reading of the MS does not seem absolutely certain — it reproduces a lecture course given by the author in advanced years (he was born in A.D. 942), and if we are to believe the biographical traditions followed by Meyerhof (Von Alexandrien p. 421/35 n. 3) — not in Baghdad but in Khwarizm or Ghazna: which seems very unlikely.

Bishr's commentary was used by his pupil Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī, and he is still four times referred to by name in the Paris MS (p. 156 n. 3; p. 181 n. 1; p. 278 n. 1; p. 301 n. 2). He was not only interested in the argument of Aristotle's lecture courses but also in textual criticism; since however he did not know any Greek (cf. D. S. Margoliouth, *The Discussion* — above p. 66 — p.114), he could only fall back on earlier Arabic, and to a much larger degree, on Syriac translations whose variant readings he translated into Arabic. II 16.64 b 30 καὶ γὰρ εἰ (Arabic *immā* = ἤ) ὅλως μὴ συλλ∂γίζεται + *mimmā qīla*: "Marginal note in the handwriting of the excellent Yaḥyā, God have mercy on him. 'The words *mimmā qīla* are not in the Syriac'" (No specific version is mentioned as so often, cf. below p. 114). Abū Bishr, may he live long (cf. p. 66 and p. 77) says that the addition is wrong (*khaṭa'*), not needed and spoils the meaning." (p. 278 n. 1 Badawī, cf. the equally definite judgment of Yaḥyā b. 'Adī below p. 79). A glance at the Greek text shows that his judgment is correct The tradition thus established was carried on and developed in his school. The only Greek commentator mentioned in the MS — except اللينوس whom Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār may have brought in (p. 103 n. 3; cf. above p. 75) — is Themistius (p. 107 n. 8), and Abū Bishr may depend mainly on him, since we learn from Ibn an-Nadīm (*Fihrist* p. 249, 5 ff. Fl.) that he translated, i.e. from the Syriac, the last three books of his commentary, the Greek of which is lost (Comm. in Arist. Graeca XXIII 3 is spurious). It will then have been Abū Bishr who selected Theodore abū Qurra's Arabic translation as a textbook to be read in the philosophical school, rejected Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation (mentioned, with disapproval p. 112 n. 5, cf. below p. 85) and three other unspecified earlier Arabic translations (p. 141, nr. 2 and 3) and did not embark on a new translation, based on Ḥunain's and Isḥāq's recent Syriac text (cf. below p. 82 f.). To select a pre-Ḥunainian translation as a textbook seems to have been not unusual. The greater part of the Metaphysics was read in Asṭāt's translation (cf. above p. 68), *De caelo* (cf. Ritter-Walzer, *Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken* Si Ber Preuss. Ak. d. W. 1934 XXVI p. 827 (29) n. 6) [1] in Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq's (cf. above p. 68 f.) translation, according to Ibn an-Nadīm (*Fihrist* p. 250, 28 f.), with whom one may compare Averroes, *De caelo* III expos. 35: "Haec intentio (معنى) est difficilis ad intelligendum ex ista translatione quam modo habemus ... nos enim non habemus nisi translationem al-Kindī" (i.e. the translation made for Al-Kindī!) "Translationes autem veriores sunt Isaaci" (cf. A. Nagy,

[1] Catal. Codd. Mss. Orient. Mus. Brit. II, London 1846, p. 203.

Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters II 5, 1897, p. 69; below p. 83 n. 1). The same applies to Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq's translation of the De animalibus (cf. *Fihrist* p. 251, 21 f. and Ritter-Walzer, *Arab. Übers.* p. 805/7 n. 3 and p. 827/29 n. 7, G. Furlani, *Le antiche versioni araba, latina ed ebraica del De part. animal.* Riv. degli Studi Orientali 9, 1921, pp. 237 ff.). Also the Arabic version of Aristotle's Meteorology has survived in Yaḥyā ibn al Biṭrīq's translation (Cf. Gnomon 10, 1934, p. 278 and L. Minio-Paluello, *Note sull' Aristotele Latino Medievale*, Riv. di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 42, 1951, pp. 8 ff. of the offprint). Cf. also Nā'ima's translation of the Sophistici Elenchi, below p. 82.

As far as we can ascertain from the few explicit references, Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī continued and developed his teacher's way of dealing with texts of Aristotle, consulting still other commentaries and additional sources for the Arabic text. Thus we have a long note at the beginning (p. 104 n. 11. The word كقوله is to be added from the MS in l. 5 after الخليفة) where the examples quoted, Homer and the Persian King (الخليفة وهو ملك الملوك) reveal the Greek source, which, however, I have not been able to identify — cf. below p. 102 on Heraclitus). His critical note on the archetype of the text, p. 125 n. 3, is not clear to me: فى نسخة الفاضل اصل الكتاب (read فى) هاهنا غلط من : يحيى. P. 134 n. 5 he puts forward a sensible emendation of what is evidently a slight corruption in Theodore's Arabic text (*aẓunnuhū*, for the expression cf. p 100), which however does not fully restore the original Greek; I 9, 30 a 31: ζῷον μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν (MS الانسان: Yaḥyā) انسان (MS كان: Yaḥyā) فان كل هو حى بالضرورة. P. 141 n. 2 and 3 he discusses hitherto neglected sources of evidence (Cf. below p. 82). Like Abū Bishr he does not withhold his judgment, cf. p. 114 n. 5. (Cf. above p. 78) — the exact reference is to l. 8 Badawī—where he declares: "The words are to be read and not to be thrown out". There is a gloss by Yaḥyā p. 173 n. 3; p. 284 n. 2 (Cf. below p. 88). Pp. 301 n. 3, 302 n. 2, 304 n. 1 Ibn Suwār mentions that he found Syriac explanatory notes on the margin of Yaḥyā's autograph and that he translated them into Arabic. (For Yaḥyā cf. also his criticism of Abū 'Uthmān's translation of the Isagoge which he compares with the 'old' Syriac translations, Georr p. 194 and *Manṭiq Arisṭū* III p. 1052 n. 5).

Before embarking on the analysis of the commentary in the shape given to it by Ibn Suwār (so far as the copyist of the Paris MS has preserved it), this should be emphasized: As interesting as the interpretation of all this new material may be for its own sake, its detailed

treatment can only be justified if we realize that we are entitled to take this kind of commentary as a pattern, I mean that this was the way in which Greek philosophy was taught in the golden age of Islamic civilization, in 9th and 10th and 11th century Baghdad. The Paris MS and the many references in Averroes' larger commentaries are the only remnants of this remarkably high standard of philosophy reading in this time. Cf. e.g. Bibl. Arab. Schol. V 2 (above p. 65) p. [8] ff.: two translations of Metaph. ᾱ ἔλαττον in Leiden MS); p. [15] ff.: Metaph. Γ; *op. cit.* VII p. [60] ff.: Metaph. I; p. (70) ff.: two translations of Metaph. Λ in Leiden MS. and isolated references to different translations by Averroes.

B.

Unfortunately the editor does not inform us whether the notes are written by different hands, we learn only about their place in the MS, either above the word or on the margin (for the abbreviations used cf. Badawī *Manṭiq Arisṭū* p. 6. Pages and lines of Bekker's edition are to be found on the outer margin of Badawī's text but are neither always reliable, nor, for obvious reasons, exactly corresponding). The notes contain explanations or, possibly, corrections of single words or concepts, or comment upon the arguments, or give textual variants, mainly from different Syriac translations. I propose to deal here with the textual variants in the first instance, because they constitute the most striking achievement of the Arabic commentators. The notes connected with single words are sometimes real corrections, sometimes grammatical equivalents (not always correct), sometimes adaptations to later philosophical terminology, and will have to be studied by whoever embarks on a badly-wanted Greek-Arabic and Arabic-Greek glossary of the Prior Analytics, on the basis of a new collation of the MS. Commentary upon the argument is mostly on traditional Greek lines (Cf. e.g. p. 103, 1 where the χρή which is missing in the Greek — Ammonius, In Pr. An. p. 12.6.. λείπει τὸ χρή· Ἀττικὸν δὲ τὸ ἔθος; very characteristically not mentioned by Alexander — had to be added in the Arabic; or, e.g. p. 107 n. 2 and p. 103 n. 3 about the σκοπός of the work. Cf. above p. 74); sometimes it reflects also topical discussion in Arabic circles of the 10th century. (Cf. P. Kraus, *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān* II [cf. above p. 66 n. 4], p. 251 n. 2). It also deserves an analysis in its own right.

Compared with Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq's editorial methods, who, however, was able to use older Syriac translations and manuscripts of the Greek originals alike, Ibn Suwār's procedure appears less daring, slightly undecided but perhaps handicapped by his incapacity to compare the Greek as well as his Syriac and Arabic predecessors. Ḥunain's first step

was always, as he tells us, to collect a number of Greek MSS (which were evidently available then in Islamic lands), to establish a reliable Greek text out of them and only then to embark on a Syriac or Arabic translation. (Cf. *Risāla*, e.g., no. 3). In this he followed the best traditions of Greek scholarship, as practised, e.g., by Galen (whom he knew so well) with regard to Hippocrates — the best evidence is in an otherwise lost work by Galen which Ḥunain translated himself (Corp. Med. Graec. V. 10.2, 2: e.g. p. 233, 17 ff. — cf. above p. 62 and the review by H. Diller, Gnomon 22, 1950, pp. 226 ff. R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, Oxford 1949, p. 83) — and by the commentators on Aristotle, which historians of classical scholarship appreciate so little. (Cf., e.g., the passage from Ammonius, De interpr. p. 8, 24-28 Busse, quoted by Minio, p. XIII of the preface of his critical edition of the Aristotelean text). He was certainly familiar with the practice of earlier Syriac translators in this respect, especially translators of Scripture (Cf. F. Rosenthal, *The Technique* etc. p. 28 ff. and p. 28 n. 3 on Jacob of Edessa) — who laid particular emphasis on the problem of translation, which has scarcely existed for Greek philosophers and physicians (it did, however, exist for Latin versions of Greek philosophy, science, etc.). But it had been very real for translators of the Bible like Origen (Cf. e.g. P. Kahle, *The Cairo Geniza*, London 1947, pp. 159 ff.) and St. Jerome (Cf. K. K. Hulley, *Principles of textual criticism known to St. Jerome*, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 55, 1944, p. 87 ff.). The same applies, though in a minor degree, to the method followed by Syriac translators of theological and profane Greek texts. (For the Syriac translations of Christian authors like Gregory of Nyssa and Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite cf. the very interesting, only too short statement of H. Langerbeck, Gnomon, 22, 1950, p. 377).

Before I deal with Ibn Suwār's textual material in detail, I quote from a long note to be found in his treatment of the Sophistici Elenchi. After mentioning that there are earlier translations, he says: "Since we like to inform ourselves about the share of each of the previous translators, we have written out all the <three versions> which fell into our hands so that they can all be studied and help mutually towards the understanding of the meaning". (Georr p. 199, cf. the last sentence on p. 200

فلأنا أحببنا الوقوف على ما وقع لكل واحد منهم كتبنا جميع النقول التى وقعت
الينا ليقع التأمل لكل واحد منها ويستعان بعضها على بعض فى ادراك المعنى.

Badawī reproduces on p. (30) of his general introduction the colophon which tells us that the first Arabic version copied was by Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī <made from the Syriac of Theophilus of Edessa> (*Fihrist* p.

249. 22 Fl. Cf. above p. 69 n. 2) and transcribed from Yaḥyā's autograph by Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār, that the *second* Arabic translation was by ʿĪsā ibn Zurʿa (Cf. above p. 70) from the Syriac of Athanasius of Balad (Cf. above p. 68) and that again the autograph was copied by Ibn Suwār, that the *third* 'old' (*qadīm*) Arabic translation was attributed to Ibn Nāʿima (cf. above p. 68) and copied by Ibn Suwār from a manuscript in the hand of the great philosopher Al-Fārābī himself. In this extreme case, which reminds us of the ἄ ἔλαττον and the Λ of the Metaphysics in the Leiden MS (Cf. above p. 80) Ibn Suwār has taken up an attitude similar to that followed by H. B. Swete in his Cambridge edition of the Greek Septuagint (*The Old Testament in Greek*, 3 Vols, Cambridge 1887 ff.). He did not provide a definite text, as Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq would have tried to do, but left the choice to the intelligent reader, not having, as in the case of the Categories and the De interpretatione, a translation of the school of Ḥunain at his disposal. He acts similarly in the case of the Prior Analytics, but he does not give the translations referred to in full — Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq (Cf. above p. 68) and three unspecified 'old' translations (p. 141 Badawī) — and refers in many passages to Syriac variant readings which he translates. He very seldom gives his own judgment, and only professes three times to have corrected the text of Theodore from the Syriac, p. 172 n. 2 (II 5) *muṣlaḥ min as-suryānī* (= διορθοῦν) [1], without specification, and so again p. 249 n. 3; p. 216 and n. 1 a lacuna of two lines is filled from the Syriac. That however he acted so consistently throughout, may be inferred from the interesting colophon of the second book of the Topics which seems to imply that at least in this case he relied on Abū Bishr's collation of Syriac MSS. Cf. below p. 102 n. 1). Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's conjecture (p. 134 n. 5. cf. above p. 79) is not put into the text. (In accordance with Greek practice? Cf. P. Maas, *Eusthatios als Conjecturalkritiker*, Byzantinische Zeitschrift 36, 1936, p. 28: „Lesungen, die als Conjecturen anerkannt waren, werden in den Text der Handschriften nicht vor 1300 aufgenommen.") His own judgment is withheld, according to the ruling referred to, but the variant readings mentioned in the notes are, as we shall see, mostly better than the text on which the reading of the book is based. It is a critical method which can be respected, and which is not without parallel in Byzantine philology.

We knew from the *Fihrist* that Ḥunain embarked on a Syriac translation of the Prior Analytics and that Isḥāq finished it. We learn now that Ḥunain stopped at I 14, p. 33 b 14 and that the remaining part was

[1] Cf. e.g. Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* cap. 7. Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. V 28, 15.

done by Isḥāq. (p. 148 n. 2 — cf. Georr p. 192). A man like Ḥunain would certainly have made a new translation on the basis of this Syriac text (cf. above p. 80) but Ibn Suwār and his predecessor did not. The other Syriac translators mentioned by name are Athanasius (Badawī p. 113 n. 4, p. 115 n. 4, p. 116 n. 2, p. 284 n. 2. Cf. the survey below) and Theophilus (p. 105 n. 2, p. 106 n. 3, p. 110 n. 4 p. 111 n. 2, p. 112 n. 1, p. 113 n. 4, p. 115 n. 2, p. 116 n. 2, p. 284 n. 2 and 3. Cf. the survey below), who were liked, as it appears, by Yaḥyā and Ibn Zurʿa respectively.

Ibn Suwār's appreciation of Athanasius is unambiguously negative, as can be seen from his note at the end of the Sophistici Elenchi, which is also in other respects interesting. He says (Cf. Georr, p. 198 f., Badawī p. 30 f.) "The translator who wants to convey the meaning <of the author whom he translates> must understand the language from which he translates, (التى منها ينقل. Georr prints اليها but translates correctly) so that he can think in it (تصوّر) like a native speaker of the language, and he must know how to use the language from which he translates and the language into which he translates. But the monk Athanasius did not understand (فهم, with Georr: قيم Badawī) what Aristotle meant, and hence (فانه Badawī) mistakes have necessarily crept in." Those who based their Arabic translations on Athanasius had to change them, trusting to their better understanding of Aristotle's argument. [1] Theophilus of Edessa is once blamed very severely by Ḥunain (*Risāla* no. 84) for his rotten and bad translation (*tarjama ḫabīṯa radīʾa*) of Galen's Ὑγιεινά, evidently made from one bad Greek MS, neither from more MSS nor from a philologically corrected text.

Most of the Arabic translator's references to 'Syriac translations, of the Prior Analytics are given without the translator's name, and there is no way of ascertaining whether they go back to the Ḥunain-

[1] Cf. F. Rosenthal *Review of Galen On medical experience*, Isis 36, 1945-46, p. 253 f. (quotation from aṣ-Ṣafadī); "There are two methods of translation used by the translators. One is the method of Yuḥannā ibn Biṭrīq, Ibn an-Nāʿima al-Ḥimṣī and others. According to this method the translator renders each Greek word by a single Arabic word of an exactly corresponding meaning, thus establishing the translation of one word after the other, until the whole has been translated.

This method is bad on two counts. (1) There are no corresponding Arabic words for all Greek words; therefore, in this kind of translation many Greek expressions remain as they are. (2) Syntactic peculiarities and constructions are not the same in one language as in the other. Mistakes are also caused by the use of metaphors which are frequently used in all languages.

The other method of translating into Arabic is that of Ḥunain ibn Isḥaq, al-Jawharī and others. According to this method, the translator grasps in his mind the meaning of the whole sentence and then renders it by a corresponding sentence in Arabic, regardless of the congruence or lack of congruence of the individual words. This method is better. *Therefore Ḥunain's books need no revision*, except in the field of mathematics which he did not completely master. Cf. below p. 89 ff.

school or to earlier translations. Since Badawī has not discussed them properly I give a full survey of all of them. (The commentary is by myself, unless the contrary is stated. Some variant Syriac readings, mentioned in Ross's edition (cf. Introd. p. 88 ff.), are also discussed, and so are the few Arabic variants listed by Ibn Suwār. About other MSS of Theodore's translation cf. below p. 89 ff.).

C. [1]

(Th = Theodore abū Qurra)

I 1 (Badawī p. 104 n. 3): The words 24 a 13 μετά — 14 τῷδε are omitted by Th(eodore) but preserved in the *Syriac translations*.

— (p. 105 n. 2): 24 a 19 ἢ μή τινι *om. Theophilus*.

— (p. 104 n. 3. misplaced by Badawī, should be p. 105 n. 5): The "Syriac translations" give a more exact rendering of 24 a 22 διαφέρει — 25 ἔστιν *Th.* is rather free; p. 105, l. 6 I read <اخذ> احد جزئ, with the Syriac and with n. 7, l. 4 (cf. a 23 λῆψις θατέρου μορίου) (n. 7, l. 2 read, with the MS انها instead of انا).

— (p. 105 n. 8): Ḥunain's more exact and elegant translation of 24 a 25 f. οὐδέν — συλλογισμόν is quoted.

— (p. 106 n. 3): 24 a 28 ἢ μή — ἁπλῶς *om. Theophilus*, who probably reproduces a reading καταφάσει ἢ ἀποφάσει a 29.

— (p. 106 n. 5): *Ḥunain's* version, again, corresponds better to the Greek text of 24 a 29 κατάφασις — τρόπον.

— (p. 107 n. 2 l. 13 read with the MS ومنه غير instead of وغير).

— (p. 108 n. 1): 24 b 17 συλλογισμός — 22 ἀναγκαῖον *Th. om.* the words ^{b}20 τό — 21 ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, which are provided by the "S(yriac translations)". *Th.* and *S.* translate τινων ^{b}19 with 'more than one', a MS quoted (wrongly) p. 107 n. 8 gives the exact translation. *Th.* and the MS. read a 20 ταὐτά instead of the correct reading ταῦτα, presupposed by *S.* and, according to p. 107 n. 8. suggested by Themistius. (Cf. above p. 78). Instead of ὅρου ^{b}22 *Th.* translates 'another thing' but *S.* have the equivalent for ὅρου (Badawī prints الى زيادة هو من خارج, but the MS has حد instead of هو — p. 108, 7. I propose to read <اكثر> اشياء and not to charge the translator with the omission.

— (p. 108 n. 5): 24 b 26 τὸ δέ — ^{b}28 ἔστιν *om. Th.* Added in the 'Syriac translations'.

— (p. 108 n. 6): 24 b 28 λέγομεν; above the line, in red ونقول, for وانما يقال: correct.

I 2 (p. 109 n. 1): 25 a 1 *Th.* starts a main clause (وكل مقدمة), the '*Syriac translations*' have ولأن كل .... instead, which corresponds to the Greek beginning ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις. The words ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν are rendered with اما ان تكون مطلقة by *Th.*, but, more appropriately, with ي اما وجودية by *S.* (which, however, pervert the order of the alternatives which follow).

[1] Explanation of the Sigla used for the Greek MSS referred to in this section and in section VII: A = Urbinas 35, saec. IX vel X; B = Marcianus 201, A.D. 995; C = Coislianus 330, saec. XI; d = Laurentianus 72, 5, saec. XI; n = Ambrosianus 490, saec. IX; Al = Alexander in An. Pr. I; Am = Ammonius in An. Pr. I; An = Anonymus in An. Post. II; P = Philoponus in An. Pr. et Post.; T = Themistius in An. Post.; Al^{c} = Alexandri, etc. citatio; Al^{l} = Alexandri etc. lemma.

I 3 (p. 110 n. 4): 25 a 33 εἰ γάρ — 34 ὑπάρχοι *Th.* refers οὐδέ to ἐξ ἀνάγκης, Theophilus ("I found this text in Theophilus' version like that") refers it to τινὶ τῷ B, more appropriately. Both fill up the conditional clauses with some explanatory words.

— (p. 111 n. 2): 25 a 38 τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀναγκαῖον, wrong *Th.* على الاضطرارى وعلى المطلق correct *Theophilus*: والذى ليس من الاضطرارى (Does مطلق presuppose another word in *Th.*'s Greek (?) MS.?).

— (p. 111 n. 4): 25b 4 (a) ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν (b) ἢ τῷ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ ὑπάρχειν: (a) ἀνάγκης + μή A^{a} B^{2} *C d Al George* the Bishop of the Arabs (Athanasius' pupil, cf. above p. 100 n. 5), *Theodore*: *om.* Ross with other Greek MSS and *Prōbhā* b) μή^{1} *om. Th.*; μή^{2} *om. A B'C d Al* and 'in the Syriac' — (I dont't understand p. 111 n. 8).

— (p. iii, l. 12): 25b 7 οὐχ *om. Probha, George* the Bishop. *Th.* does not follow this Syriac tradition.

— (p. 112, n. 1): After 25 ^{b}9 πρότασις *Theophilus* wrongly adds something like καὶ ὁμοίως οὐ κ ἀντιστρέφει. This may also be an, equally wrong, correction of the preceding words (adding a wrong negation) — which may have slipped inadvertently into the text.

— (p. 112 n. 3): *Th.* has misunderstood the meaning of τῷ πεφυκέναι 25 b 14 ('it is natural') and translates 'in the natural things' subordinating it to ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. Ibn Suwār says in the note that the words in question are not 'in the Syriac' (which is certainly to be preferred to his version), but gives in the following note a quite mistaken explanation of Theodore's text without taking the 'Syriac' into account.

— (p. 112, l. 8): 25 b 17 στερητική *om. Probha, George, Th.*

— (p. 112 n. 5): 25 b 17 ἡ δ' ἐν μέρει ἀντιστρέφει „In *Ibn al Biṭrīq*'s translation: 'But the particular (scil. negative premiss) does *not* convert' — he has just slipped". (One of the few definite statements of this kind).

I 4 (p. 113 n. 4): 25 b 26-31. For once, all the Syriac translators considered by Ibn Suwār are quoted. *Ḥunain* agrees with *Theodorus, Theophilus* with *Athanasius* [1] whose text is *not translated*); ^{b}26 ἤδη is omitted by *Th.* and *Ḥunain* (?) but given by *Theophilus* and *Athanasius*; ^{b}27 ὕστερον — 29 συλλογισμόν *Theoph.* (and *Ath.*) change the *order* of the sentences, speaking first about syllogism, then about demonstration — a difference similar to the one to be found in the first sentence of the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, (cf. above p. 76), and which will also be based on a different Greek MS.

— (p. 113 n. 6): 25 a, 37 f.: After τοῦ B' *Athan.* adds a long explanation which perhaps was not meant originally to become part of the text. (Cf. p. 112 n. 1).

— (p. 114, l. 3): 26 a 2 ἀκολουθεῖ *Al.*, Ross: ὑπάρχει *codd. Th.*

— (p. 114 n. 1): „Like this in the other *Syriac translations*" Probably referring to the omission of τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι 26 a 4.

— (p. 114 n. 2): The words 26 a 1 ὥστε — a 8 συλλογισμός are very freely rendered by *Th.*; the words μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου are omitted. The '*Syriac*' gives the missing words and follows the Greek more closely. (Read فلأنه لا يلزم <من> هذه شئ واحد

— (p. 114 n. 3): After 26 a 9 = p. 114, 8 فالحياة — 10 الحجارة "I did not find the section marked by these signs at its beginning and end anywhere in the *Syriac translations*". It is also unknown in the Greek (cf. ad p. 116 n. 1).

[1] Always اثالس in Badawī's text of the Prior Analytics, the correct form in the Preface and in the Topics

I 4 (p. 114 n. 4): Instead of 26 a 11 ... ἐπιστήμη — γραμμή — ἰατρική, τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐπιστήμη — γραμμή — μονάς *Th.* has '*an-nuṭq*' (ἐπιστήμη?) — horse-man' and for the negative relation '*an-nuṭq* — horse-ass'. The '*Syriac*' gives the correct text. (Cf. a similar case in the *Categories* above p. 71).

— (p. 115 n. 1) [1]: 26 a 17 ὁ δ' ἐν μέρει πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον — correctly rendered 'in the *Syriac*'; wrong *Th.* والآخر جزئيا

— (p. 115 n. 2): 26 a 20 ὅταν — 21 ἀδύνατον. *Theophilus* quoted. Both translations are not satisfactory. *Theoph.* adds ἢ στερητικόν after ἔλαττον, *Th.* after ἀδύνατον 'that there is syllogism' — whith is certainly to be supplied in thought.

— (p. 115 n. 4): 26 a 24 οὐκοῦν — 25 ὑπάρχειν. *Theophilus* quoted, 'he agrees with *Athanasius* as far as the meaning goes'. *Th.* omits οὐκοῦν (which is given by *Theoph.*) and misunderstands ἔστι 'is, means' (جائزا ..... كان) which is, at any rate, more adequately rendered by *Theoph.* (كان ..... موجودا)

— (p. 116 n. 1): 26 a 30 ληφθέντος + p. 116, 1 وذلك — 5 (marked by signs in the MS.) 'not in the *Syriac translations*'. The section is also unknown in the Greek. (cf. above (p. 85 ad p. 114 n. 3).

— p. 116 n. 2): 26 a 30 ἐάν — 33 ὄντος. "There is, in this section, great divergence in the '*Syriac translations*'", *Theophilus*, *Athanasius* and *Ḥunain* are quoted; Ross's apparatus criticus and his note, p. 303 are to be compared. *Th.* has changed the order of the Greek sentences, placing οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός at the end of the section — but this is merely stylistic. *Theoph. Athan.* and *Ḥunain* keep it. Apart from other minor stylistic differences, the main variants, which are almost all to be found in Greek MSS. as well, are in the sentence a 32 οὔτε (1) καταφατικοῦ οὔτε (2) ἀποφατικοῦ τοῦ (3) ἀδιορίστου ἢ (4) κατὰ μέρος ὄντος (in Ross's edition which I follow). Theodore — like A. J. Jenkinson in the Oxford translation (vol. I, Oxford 1928. Cf. against this translation, W. D. Ross, Critical Edition p. 303) — makes τοῦ ἑτέρου (scil. the major premiss) the subject which is to be supplied in thought and translates: "And when the other (الأخير, but corrected above the line to الآخر cf. p. 116 n. 3) term is indefinite or (4) particular, whether it is negative or positive, there will be no syllogism." He follows (4) the reading ἢ, also to be found in two old Greek MSS, *A* and *d*, and adopted by Ross. *Theophil.* = *Athan.* and *Ḥunain* have, with *Pṛōbhā* and *George* and all the Greek MSS except *f* (3) οὔτε instead of τοῦ. What *Th.*'s Greek MS. had, is difficult to ascertain in this case as in (1) and (2) where he may have read ἢ — ἢ instead of οὔτε — οὔτε, but this is doubtful. Concerning (4) *Theophilus-Athan.* certainly translate οὔτε, to be found only in d^3 and in *Pṛōbhā* and *George*, whereas *Ḥunain* seems to presuppose τοῦ, to be found in the Greek MS. *C*, the corrected text of *B* and, as it seems, in Alexander: "There will be no syllogism, neither if the particular premiss is positive or negative or indefinite". (a 30 ἔλαττον is rendered with the comparative *aṣghar* by *Theophilus*s, but with *ṣaghir* by *Th.* and *Ḥunain*. For a similar vacillation cf. p. 115 n. 3 [26 a 21 μεῖζον]) Ibn Suwār can certainly not be blamed for not having made his own choice; if a greater philosopher, like Averroes, had come across a similarly rich tradition, he might have been able to.

There are much fewer critical notes in the remaining part of the Prior Analytics.

I 6 (p. 127 l. ii): 28 b 25 οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν read فلا سبيل الى ان نوجد (توجد Badawī).

— (p. 128 n. 6): 29 a 2 ἄγριον; '*Syriac*': *Th.* الماثى = ἔνυδρον (above the line الجرى = θαλάττιον) Greek variant reading.

[1] Wrong reference in Badawī.

I 12 (p. 141 n. 2-4) Only interesting for different technique of translation.

I 13 (p. 143, l. 2): 32 a 25 ἀντικείμενα *n George the Bishop*; ἀντικείμενα + τούτοις *A B C d Th.* (rather τούτῳ لهذا).

I 14 (p. 146, l. 7): 33 a 4 μή *om. n. George* et, ut vid., *Alexander*: habet *Th.* with the other Greek MSS.

— (p. 147 n. 2): 33a 20 ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς περαίνεται τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. The reading περαίνεται is in A^3 *n George* and appears to be rendered by *Th.* (read تنتج for تجب cf. p. 155 n. 2; p. 274, 2, 11 for περαίνεται 66a 23). The *Syriac* presupposes the alternative reading γίνεται (*A B C d*), renders ἀναγκαῖον more correctly with الضرورى (*Th.* renders συμπέρασμα) and adds the same word again, unnecessarily, as attribute to ἀντιστροφῆς.

I 15 (p. 153, l. 1): 34 a 18 ληπτέον, read ينبغى أن يوخذ (يوجد Badawī), and accordingly p. 153 n. 1 (cf. p. 127 l. 11).

— 17 (p. 153 l. 11. 14): 37 b 13 καὶ ὅταν — 16 ἀπόδειξις *om. Th.* (the words may have dropped out of his Greek MS, through Homoioteleuton. Badawī inserts his own translation from the Greek into the text! (p. 153 n. 3).

I 21 (p. 172, l. 17): 39 a 22 τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον στερητικόν *A B C d Theod.* (coni. *Philop.*): τὸ στερητικόν *n Alex. Philop.* Ross (cf. Ross, *Critical Edition* p. 365).

— (p. 173 n. 3): Ibn Suwār rejects an addition by Yaḥyâ ibn 'Adī which he did not find in the '*Syriac*'.

I 23 (p. 177, l. 14): 41 a 3 (Badawī's references to Bekker's pages should have been checked on the proofs). μὴ ληφθέντος read اذا لم يوخذ for يوجد ....

I 25 (p. 185 n. 2): p. 185, l. 12 تكون — 13 فياما (after 42 b 24 τρόπον) are not to be found in *Isḥāq's* translation, and do not exist in the Greek either. (The sign of the note is in the wrong place).

I 35 (p. 208, n. 2): 48 a 37 ἀποδεικτοῦ (ἀποδεικτικοῦ AB'Cdn) ὄντος *Th.*: اذ هو مبرهن. '*Syriac*' وهو مبرهن appears to be indifferent.

I 41 (p. 214 n. 2): 49 b 22 εἰ δὲ καθ' οὗ ἂν τὸ B λέγεται *Th.*: فيان كانت آ تقال على كل ما تقال عليه ب. '*Syriac*' ..... على اى شيء كان ما يقال — nearer to the Greek.

— (p. 214 n. 3): 49 b 25 εἰ μέντοι τὸ A λέγεται καθ' οὗ ἂν τὸ B λέγεται κατὰ παντός.

Th.	'*Syriac*'
فان قيلت آ	فان قيلت <آ>
على الذى على كل تقال ب	على الذى تقال عليه ب كل كله
	فانه اى ان ما يوجد له ب
	يوجد آ لكله

(p. 215, l. 12 ولا — 14): belong to cap. 42.

I 42 (p. 216 and n. 1): p. 82 above.

— (p. 216, l. 4): 50 a 9 τεταγμένον *B n Th.*: τεταγμένα Ross.

I 44 (p. 216, n. 2): 50 a 21 οὐκ ἔστι π ᾶ σ α δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων: The reading πᾶσα (*A B C n* Al.) is in the '*Syriac*' ليس كل قوة, whereas *Th.* may have like George the Bishop (with A^3 B^3 C^3 read μία) ليس قوة للاضداد or even <واحدة> قوة. But the MS of *Th.* may also just have omitted كل.

I 46 (p. 225, n. 1): 52 a 19 ἀπόφασις, on the margin in red add. 'the particular' (الجزئية) "This is not in the 'Syriac' ".

II 9 (Badawī p. 261 n. 5: 61 a 6 ἐν ἑκάστῳ σχήματι *Th.*: فى كل شكل. 'Syriac': <كل> فى واحد من الاشكال

II 16 (p. 278 n. 1): Cf. above p. 70.—A similar wrong addition has crept into the text of Metaph. Λ 7, 1072 a 24 (p. 1588, 2 Bouyges). After ἔστι τοίνυν τι καὶ ὃ κινεῖ the Lemma of Alexander inserts 'since it is not moved'. Neither the 'other version' quoted p. 1591, 6 B. nor the otherwise mistaken translation by Asṭāt, quoted on the margin of the Leyden MS give these words. (Cf. also below p. 108.)

—— (p. 280 n. 1): 65 a 30 after τρίτῳ + 'And equally in the first' *Th.* „Al-Ḥasan: I did not find it in the *Syriac* in Isḥāq's translation".

II 17 (p. 281 n. 3): 65 b 4 ἀναιρεθῇ: اتّصل *Th.* „Al-Ḥasan: In the '*Syriac*' اوتنع" (cf. p. 282, l. 8; p. 283, l. 15), correctly (but rejected by Al-Ḥasan who proposes: بطل).

— (p. 282 n. 2): 65 b 26 ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ A. *Th.* has A B instead, corrected in the '*Syriac*'.

— (p. 283 n. 2): 66 a 9 ἄλλου τιθεμένου + مكانه *Th.* „مكانه is not in the '*Syriac*' ".

— (284 n. 2): 66a 13 εἰ μείζων ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντὸς τῆς ἐκτός. *Th.*: "that the exterior is greater than the interior". "The excellent Yaḥyā: In the *Syriac* "the interior is greater than the exterior". "Al-Ḥasan: In Isḥāq's translation. But *Athanasius* agrees with the Arabic and so does *Theophilus*". A very interesting note.

II 18 (p. 284 n. 3 and 5): 66a 20 (1) εἰ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων (2) οἷον τὸ μὲν Γ διὰ τῶν AB (3) ταῦτα δὲ διὰ τῶν ΔΕΖΗ (4) τούτων τι ἔσται τῶν ἐπάνω ψεῦδος, Only *Isḥāq* translates (4) exactly, *Th.* and *Theophilus* blur the meaning. In (3) the Greek letters ΔΕΖΗ made difficulties (Jenkinson translates DEFG!): *Th.* and *Theophilus* have *dāl, hā zay* (*dāl* MS.: correxi, cf. p. 298, l. 10: 68 b 1 and p. 298 n. 3 — Post. An. p. 391, 6; p. 396, l. 10) *yā* (itacism for H, cf. also Theodorus 44 a 30 b 11 12 19) — but Isḥāq has *dāl, hā, zay* (*dāl* NS.) *hā* [1], i.e. he has the Syriac consonant, which has the place of H in the Syriac and in the old Semitic alphabet (from which the original Greek H was, in its turn, derived) [2].

— (p. 284, l. 12): 66 a 22 λόγος + ψευδής *n. Th.* presupposes the same text as *n*.

II 21 (p. 288 n. 3 and 4): 'My translation' The meaning of these notes is not clear to me.

II 24 (p. 297 n. 2): 69 a 15 ὅταν — Θάτερον *om. Th.* Badawī retranslates the missing words from the Greek but overlooks that Ibn Suwār has noticed the fact as well and translated them from the 'Syriac' in the note. (Cf. above ad p. 116 n. 2). As to be expected, the ancient translation is better than the recent attempt at emendation. (Which Greek text Badawī retranslates II 25, 69 a 25 [cf. p. 298 n. 1] is not clear, ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμη ὅτι διδακτὸν φανερόν can only correspond to فهو بين <ان ال> عام متعلّم.

II 25 (p. 298 n. 3): 69 a 32 EZ — *Th. wāw zay* "So in Yaḥyā's autograph. But I went back to the *Syriac translations* and found *hā zay* (Cf. above, ad p. 284 n. 3 and 5)". Interesting for Ibn Suwār's independence. (Cf. above p. 71).

II 27 (p. 303 n. 3): 70 a 38 διαφορὰς — εἰρημένας. The *Syriac* corresponds better to the Greek.

— (p. 304 n. 6) 70 b 10 after πάθος + لأنّها لا تغير البدن *Th.* "This is not in the '*Syriac*' "

[1] So also Abū Bishr, following Isḥāq, An Post. I 19, 81 b 36 (p. 368, l. 3) I 25, 86 b 1 (p. 391, l. 6) p. 396, 14.

[2] Strange is *wāw* for K (44 a 40, 61); one would expect *yā*, but this already used. Θ is expressed by *tā* An. Post. I 19, 81 b 34.

D.

Apart from the variant readings to be found in different translations, Ibn Suwār puts on record some variant readings which he picked up in other not specified manuscripts of Theodore abū Qurrā's Arabic text. [1]

I give a rapid survey of them, following the order of the Prior Analytics without attempting any classification. Some other variants and attempts at emendation—of uncertain origin—are also mentioned in this section.

I 1 (p. 104 n. 4): 24 a 14 καὶ τί . . . . κατηγορεῖσθαι. One *MS* has المقول فى [2] and يقول فى instead of يحمول على المحمول على. Although both words are possible equivalents for κατηγορεῖν, the old translations (cf. e.g. *Studi su al-Kindī* I, p. 391 = cap. III 1; p. 365 abū-Rīda) Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain (cf. Georr's Index p. 217 and 237 f. and Pollack's Index pp. 40, 52, 62); the school of Abū Bishr (cf. e.g., the 'translations from the Syriac' p. 104 n.3, above p. 84 and Averroes, e.g., prefer حمل in the strict sense of 'predication'. But someone who has a share in the Paris MS preferred مقول cf. p. 104 nn. 5 and 7, and *Th.* is inconsistent himself (24 b 16 it is translated by مقول and الذى يقال عليه المقول. Cf. also Ibn Suwār's note p. 118 n. 3) [3].

— (p. 107 n. 1): 24 b 15 τὰ νῦν is added in red above the line; by whom? From another MS?

— (p. 107 n. 6): 24 b 17 ἢ (*A B C d George Th.*; *om.* Ross, with other Greek MSS) προστιθεμένου ἢ διαιρουμένου ((ἢ δ. secl. Ross p. 290) *Th.* translates, as if he read ἢ προστιθ. τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι (يوجد ولا يوجد: Ba, had omitted the first word, which is however in the Paris MS) ἢ διαιρ. τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, the other *MS* suggests only τοῦ εἶναι after προστιθ. "since it happens either through the division (*Th.* بانقسام: MS. ..... او بانفصالهما او مع نفصالهما) of the two or together with the division of the two" (add. Al-Ḥasan?)

— (p. 107 n. 8 — belongs to p. 108, l. 1 f.): 24 b 18 συλλογισμός — 20 εἶναι *Th.* has here *qiyās* (instead of *sullūjismūs, sullūjismūsāt* 24 a 3 and 24 a 26) [4], but a *MS* has *sullūjismūs*. I believe that this was actually written by *Th.*; and there is evidence which enables us to make this a very likely guess. In the case of ἀπαγωγή ('reduction of one problem to another)' we find II 25, 69 a 20 'induction' (!) [5] in the text but *abāghūjī* above the line (p. 297 n. 4)

[1] No variants from other Arabic MSS are mentioned in the Posterior Analytics which were translated by Abū Bishr himself. But in Abū ʿUthmān ad-Dimasqī's translation of Aristotle's *Topics* I-VI many such variants are to be found, cf. pp. 473, 496, 501, 503, 512, 516, 520, 527, 532, 552, 567, 596, 609 Badawī (cf. above p. 61); similar passages occur in his translations of treatises by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, which also show traces of having been studied in Abū Bishr's and Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī's school, cf. *Aristū ʿinda'l ʿArab* pp. 255, 276, 279, 300, 315 Badawī (cf. above p. 61 f.).

[2] القول Badawī.

[3] Read *al-maqūl* κατηγορούμενον for *al-qaul* I 5, 26 b 36 (p. 118 Badawi).

[4] In both cases corrected to *qiyās*, above the line, cf. p. 104 n. 1-2 and p. 106 n. 1. Cf. also p. 122 n. 2, l. 5 *sūlūjismūs* and al-Ḫwārizmī, *Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm* p. 147, 8 van Vloten.

[5] *istiqrā'*. Elsewhere ἐπαγωγή is rendered by *iltiqāṭ* (p. 183, l. and 15) and even *ḥiss* (p. 289, l. 23).

and the same wrong translation and corresponding correction a 27 (p. 298 n. 2) [1]. In the chapter on 'Objection' (II 26) the Greek word — ἔνστασις — *anṣṭasis* occurs four times 69 a 36; 37; 69 b; (cf. p. 299, l. 3. 4. 5 and the explanatory note p. 299 n. 1) b 29 without any additional explanation in the text [2]. In the chapter on the 'Enthymem', on 'inference from signs' (II 27), we find *anthūmimā* (ἐνθύμημα 70 a 9), three times *aiqūs* (εἰκός 70 a 2, 3, 5) [3] and *taqmaryūn* (τεκμήριον 70 b 4) again without explanation in the text [4]. A few remnants of an originally much wider use of Greek terms are also to be found. e.g. in the 'old' translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics by Asṭāṭ (cf. above p. 68) — which Averroes used—although they appear in a rather corrupt form: Γ 2, 1005 a 13 ἐξ ὑποθέσεως = p. 331, 10 Bouyges بنوع افوساسس (without explanation in the text); 3, 1005 b 14 ἀνυπόθετον = 341, 16 B. بغير اماماسس (without explanation); b 16 ὑπόθεσις = p. 341, 16 ابافوسيس. — All these three passages have been misunderstood by Averroes, who explains ὑπόθεσις as if it were ἀντίφασις [5]. — Δ 3, 1014 a 31 ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς συλλαβῆς p. 497, 13 B. وليس كجزء السلابة, without explanation (cf. the Syriac *sūlābī*, Georr p. 410). With explanation Γ 3, 1005 b 29 ἀντίφασις = p. 346, 11B. الانطيفاسيس التي هي نقيض

A less well studied text like Ps. Galen's commentary on Hippocrates De septimanis (cf. above p. 62) has kept an astonishingly great number of Greek words in the text; Bergsträsser gives a list of thirty words in his edition (op. cit. p. 202; + 15 proper names).

It can be shown only in one case that a Greek word has later taken the place of an Arabic word. (χυλός, cf. op. cit. p. XIV. Cf. Bergsträsser, *Hunain ibn Isḥāq* p. 81, 8. Meyerhof-Schacht, *Über die medizinischen Namen* etc. p. 8 n. 2). Nā'ima's translation of the 'Theology of Aristotle' has preserved ἐντελέχεια (anṭalāšiyā) [6], without explanation [7], and, as in

[1] The translation of ἀπαγωγή = 'reductio ad absurdum' (e.g. 28 a 21) is a different matter.

[2] There is an explanation I 1, 24 a 22: ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ πρότασις *al-muqaddama al-afūdiqīyya* (cf. the Syriac equivalent) <*wa-hiya al-burhāniyya*> — ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πρότασις *al-muqaddama ad-diyāliqīqiyya* <*wa-hiya al-jadaliyya*>. Comparable are the explanations of διαλεκτική, ἀποδεικτική, ἀντίθεσις (*anṭithāsis*), ἀξίωμα (*aksiyūmā*), ὑπόθεσις (*ayūbāthisīs*), ἀπόδειξις (*abūdiksīs*) Anal. Post. I 2, 72 a 10. 12. 17. 20.

[3] 70 a 10 the translator may have read ἐνδόξων instead of εἰκότων — he has من مقدمات محمودة (cf. also 70 a 4) — unless he found it difficult to form the plural of *aiqūs*. For the strange translation of δόξα cf. below p. 94 f.

[4] Cf. also *quqnus* κύκνος 38 a 32, to be found also in Al-Ḥasan's commentary on the Categories no. 49 Georr (pp. 174/381, 6-7, cf. Simpl., Cat. p. 87, 32 K.) and Themistius p. 323, 16 Badawī (cf. above p. 62). But this is a special case. Cf. also γραμματικός (below p. 108) and τάρταρος (below p. 108).

[5] *naqīḍ*. This would not have happened in the 10th century school of Baghdād. Averroes did not know any Syriac not to speak of Greek. Cf. also Bouyges, *Averroès, Métaphysique*, Index E, p. 285.

[6] Cf. also the explanation of the Greek term Alexander of Aphrodisias p. 289, 12 Badawī (above p. 62). This transliteration of X corresponds to Syriac and Coptic usage, cf. E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* I, München 1939, p. 206 f. Avicenna knew the form anṭālāḥiyā, cf. Margoliouth, *Analecta* etc. p. 108. Cf. *Plato Arabus* I, p. 45.

[7] p. 43, 14 Dieterici (definition of the soul):

قالت الفلاسفة انها أنطلاشيا غير انهم انما ذكروا انها انطلا شيا وصورة تمامية بنوع آخر

p. 42, 7: ينبغي ان يفحص من قولهم ان النفس تمام ما و بأى معنى سمّوها انطلاشيا. Cf. Plotin. *Enn.* IV 7, 8[3].1 Bréhier. Cf. below p. 95 f.

Syriac, τάξις (*ṭaqs*) and a verb derived from it, (*ṭaqqasa*) again without explanation [1], and, in a special context νόμος (*nāmūs*) [2]. Soheil Afnan's observations on the Greek words in the Poetics, and the corresponding fluctuations in the MSS of Abū Bishr, used by Avicenna and the scribe of the Paris MS, are interesting in this connection [3].

P. Kraus has drawn attention to some Greek words in the Corpus of Jābir [4].

We are apparently entitled to assume that the terminology of those 'old' translations which continued to be studied was gradually modernised and that the numerous Greek words which had been used in them — as was the custom in Syriac versions from the Greek — were exchanged for freshly coined and, in most cases, higly suitable Arabic terms. It is one of the most fascinating philological tasks, which can be approached now, to study the development of Arabic philosophical terminology and to try to ascertain how it grew out of that rich Arabic literary language which existed before the Arabs met with Greek thought and Greek texts. Only Greeks and Arabs have succeeded in building up a rich abstract language almost without linguistic borrowings from outside, and this is an additional incentive to trying to understand this important achievement of the Arabs.

I 1 (p. 107 n. 8, continued): Also in the case of another variant reading the *MS* may be nearer to the original text of *Th.* For τινων (24 b 18) *Th.* has 'more things than one', whereas *MS* reads just 'things'' (*'ašyā'*, the normal equivalent for the Greek indefinite pronoun (cf. e.g., *Plato Arabus* I p. 119 n.n. 2-3; Georr p. 53). But the rendering of τεθέντων is less appropriate (*ullifa* instead of *wuḍi'a*, sed cf. Badawī p. 108, l. 4, l. 8) and 'not by accident' is added as an explanation of τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, which is correctly translated (cf. above p. 84; ad p. 108 n. 1).

I 3 (p. 111 n. 2) *MS* الاضطرارى المطلق for *Th.* الاضطرارى على المطلق probably nearer to the original of *Th.* (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον). Cf. p 85 ad p. 111 n. 2.

I 5 (p. 119 n. 4): 26 b 39 ἐν τῇ θέσει *fi'l maudū'* *Th.*; above the line (without reference to *MS*) *fi'l waḍ'*.

I 6 (p. 125 n. 1): 28 a 23 καὶ τῷ ἐκθέσθαι *om. Th.* add. 'above the line' presumably rather from a *MS* than from the *Syriac*: wa-bi'l-iftirāḍ. (For ἔκθεσις cf. Ross, op. cit. p. 311).

[1] p. 42, 1 D:

ان الاشياء كانت بلا طفس ثم طفّست بغير مطفس اعنى النفس بل انما انطفست بالبحث والاتفاق.

Cf. Plotin., *Enn.* IV 7.8[4].24 B. — p. 125, 17 f. D. ذا طفس وشرح cf. Enn. IV 7. 3. 9, B. — p. 128, 5 محتاج الى طفس وشرح. Cf. C. Brockelmann, *Lexicon Syriacum*, 2nd edition, Halle/S. 1928, pp. 274 b-275 a.

[2] p. 81, 18 D. بالناموس المضطرّ, cf. *Enn.* IV 8. 7. 20 f. B.: ἀνάγκῃ καὶ νόμῳ. Cf. the interesting note Alexander of Aphrodisias p. 273 n. 6 Badawī, where *šarī'a* is explained, above the line, by *nāmūs* (νόμος); this is comparable to the explanation of *qiyās* by συλλογισμός. Al-Fārābī consistently uses *šarī'a* for the Greek νόμος in his very interesting summary of Plato's Laws (*Plato Arabus* III, ed. F. Gabrieli, London 1952, passim). — Cf. also M. Plessner, Enc. of Islam s.v. *nāmūs*.

[3] *The commentary of Avicenna on Aristotle's Poetics*, JRAS 1947, p. 188 ff. Cf. κλέψυδρα (1451 a 8) and στοιχεῖον (1456 b 20), kept in the Paris MS and translated by Avicenna, and *ṭraghūdiya* (1449 b 23), translated in the Paris MS and kept by Avicenna. Cf. also A. J. Arberry, *Fārābī's Canons of Poetry*, Rivista degli Studi Orientali 16, 1938, p. 266 ff. and below p. 105 (τὰ ἔπη).

[4] Jābir ibn Ḥayyān II p. 54/5 n. 4 (ὑποχίστιδος); p. 67 n. 15 (ὄνυξ); p. 76 n. 3 (ἀνδροδάμας); p. 243 (ἄσαρον); p. 335 (g) (ἐπικρανίδα). Cf. also below p. 96 (φαντασία and, e.g., the consistent use of ἀναλογισμός and ἐπιλογισμός in Galen On medical experience (translator Ḥubaiš). The whole subject deserves a monograph. Cf. also F. Rosenthal above p. 83 n. 1.

I 10 (p. 136 n. 1): 30 b 33 'above the line'. The reading of the text is better.

— (p. 137 n. 2): 30 b 39 ἁπλῶς وحدها *Th.*: على الاطلاق above the line: better (from *Syriac* or *MS*?).

I 11 (p. 141 n. 1): 32 a 5 ζῷον Ross; *C B*[a] coni. *Alexander*, *George* and 'in red above the line' (from *MS* or from *Syriac*): δίπουν *A d n Al Th.*

I 14 (p. 146 n. 1): 33 a 1 εἰ τὸ μὲν A ἐνδέχεται μηδενὶ τῷ B. لا يكن ان يكون .... *Th.*; 'in red above the line' يكن ألاّ (from *MS*?); correct, cf. the following line in the text (33 a 2).

— (p. 146 n. 3): 33 a 14 λέγω δ' οἷον اعنى *Th.*: 'in red above the line' مثل. Both words to be read?

I 15 (p. 150 n. 1): 34 a 4 εἰλημμένων الموجودة *Th.*: 'above the line' المأخوذة (The same confusion above p. 86 f. [127 l. 11, 153 l. 1] p. 28 [177, 14] and passim.

— (p. 150 n. 2): Instead of فأما in the text: 'above the line' فإذا To be accepted instead of Badawī's <ان> فاما

— (p. 153 n. 1): Reading of *MS*. للكل, i.e. الكلّ, not to be preferred to the correct reading of the text. (الكلى).

— (p. 153 n. 5): 34 b 36 τὸ διανοεῖσθαι المفكر *Th.*; 'above the line التفكر; correct (*MS*?).

I 16 (p. 160 n. 2): 36 b 25 διὰ τῶν .... σχημάτων بالمقاييس *Th.*; 'above the line' بالأشكال: correct (*MS*?).

I 19 (p. 167 n. 3): 38 a 26 καὶ τὸ A τῷ μὲν B ἐνδεχέσθω μηδενὶ ..... مثل آ يكن ان; 'above the line in red' ..... فلتكن آ ممكنة الاّ: correct (*MS* or *Syriac*?)

— (p. 168 n. 3): 38 b 21 καταφάσεων Alexander, Ross, 'above the line in red' (*Syriac*?); ἀποφάσεων *Th.*; καταφάσεων καὶ ἀποφάσεων *n*. Very remarkable.

I 22 (p. 175 n. 1): 40 a 25 πρότασις المقدمات *Th.*: 'above the line' المقدمة (*MS*?): correct.

I 25 (p. 183 n. 1): 42 20 ὅρων بأوساط *Th.*; 'above the line' بحدود, (*MS*. or *Syriac*?): correct.

I 27 (p. 188 n. 3): 43 b 6 διαιρετέον ينبغى ان نميز *Th.*: 'below the line' (*MS*. or *Syriac*?) نقسم .....

— (p. 189 n. 1): 43 b 8 δοξαστικῶς. *Th.* has a peculiar translation بالرأى المحمود, *MS*. has the translation common since Ḥunain بالظن (cf. below p. 94 f.).

I 28 (p. 192 n. 1): 44 a 32 B; ى (= H, cf. above p. 88) *Th.*; 'above the line' ب (*MS*?): correct. But there is more confusion in this section (cf. also above p. 88).

I 38 (p. 202, l. 4): 49 a 24 τραγέλαφος read عنز أيل instead of .... غير (cf. below p. 132).

I 41 (p. 215, l. 9): 49 b 39 δείκνυσιν ὁ δευκνύων read يبيّن المبيّن.

I 46 (p. 224 n. 1): 52a 5 οὐ λευκόν ليس بأبيض; 'above the line in red' لا أبيض. Nearer to the Greek?

II 11 (p. 265 n. 1): 61 b 31 συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται; 'on the margin: *Another MS* "will *not* be". A wrong negation of a similar type crept into the following line of *Th.*, read وأما الموضوع فانه [لا] يصحّ = b 32 οὐκ ἀναιρεῖται δ' ἡ ὑπόθεσις.

II 14 (p. 270 n. 21): 63 a 8 παντὶ τῷ B. *Th.* فى كل ب 'on the margin: *MS* فى بعض ب = τινὶ B: again wrong reading.

II 15 (p. 275 n. 1): 64 10 f. *Th.* has *wujūd* corrected 'above the line' to *wujūb* = τὸ καταφατικόν 64 a 12 (I cannot understand Badawī's remark).

II 15 (p. 276 n. 1): *al-qiyās*. No need for the plural 'above the line'.

— (p. 277 n. 1): Probably misunderstood by Badawī. *Th.* translates διὰ τὸ 64 b 11 وذلك أن, a *MS* referred to on the margin suggests من قبل أن as an alternative. Badawī prints وذلك <من قبل> ان

II 16 (p. 278 n. 5): 64 b 38 ὥστ' εὐθὺς ἐξιῶσαι τὸ προκείμενον عليه البرهان يقصد الذى المطلوب. *Th.*; 'on the margin in red, MS' المقصود الذى بطلب البرهان. I wonder how to decide.

II 17 (p. 281 n. 2, cf. above p. 88): 65 b 4 τι شيء *Th.*; 'above the line: *MS*.' بكل شيء: wrong.

— (p. 283 n. 1): 65 b 38 ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ B, بّ *Th.* 'above the line MS' ا بّ: ? (In the same line *dal* is to be corrected to *zay*, cf. above 88).

— (p. 284 n. 1): 66 a 12 οὐδὲν .... ἄτοπον لانه ليس ينكر *Th.*; 'on the margin, in red': *MS* لانه قد يكن: wrong.

— (p. 284 n. 4): *Th.* has l. 10 د ه ه د: 'above the line' د ـ instead of the third and fourth of the four letters in the text. Nothing corresponding in the Greek. (cf. above p. 88).

II 19 (p. 285 n. 1): 66a 26 τῶν συμπερασμάτων النتيجة *Th.*; above the line: '*MS*. التائج: correct.

— (p. 285 n. 2): wrong variant (Δ B instead of B 66 a 40) 'above the line'.

II 21 (p. 290 n. 1): 67 b 18 B; بّ *Th.*; above the line دّ: wrong.

— (p. 291 n. 2): 67b 25 εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός لا بالعرض Th.; above the line 'MS إلاّ بالعرض: correct.

II 22 (p. 291 n. 4): no improvement?

II 23 (p. 294 n. 6): 68 b 12 πίστις ايمان *Th.*; above the line تصدق — rather تصديق, cf. 69 a 4 (cf. above p. 123. [p. 189 n. 1] and R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians* p. 151.

— (p. 295 n. 6): Does not belong here, probably doublet of p. 296.

II 24 (p. 296 n. 4): 69 a 5 Θηβαίοις اهل ثيبية *Th.*; on the margin 'MS ثيبا: correct (Cf. *Th.* 69 a 2, 3, 6).

— (p. 296 n. 5): 69 a 7 Θηβαίους ثيبا ..... *Th.*; above the line ثيبية: wrong, cf. the preceding note.

II 25 (p. 297 n. 4): Cf. above p. 89. Very interesting note.

— (p. 298 n. 2): Cf. the preceding note.

II 27 (p. 304 n. 4): 70 b 9 παθήματα آلام *Th.*: 'above the line تأثيرات (Abū Bishr has this An. Post. I 10, 76 b 15: πάθη and, e.g., Poet. 6, 1449 b 26: الانفعالات وانتاثيرات παθήματα).

E.

To sum up: The Baghdad philosophers of the 10th century showed a remarkable philological skill in adapting Theodore abū Qurra's old Arabic version of the Prior Analytics to their standards of Aristotle reading. Since they could not fall back on the original Greek text, they collated the old translation with those Syriac versions on which they could lay their hands, versions of the 7th and 8th century which were not based on a critical study of several Greek MSS, and a version by Ḥunain and his son who had presumably, as it was their custom, tried to

establish a critical Greek text before they started translating. There are 56 notes which explicitly refer to Syriac versions. They also consulted, though rather sparingly, other 'old' Arabic translations (twice), and they compared different MSS of Theodore's text—it is not specified whether they dated from a period earlier to Abū Bishr's edition (18 times); there are 23 unspecified notes, where one can doubt whether Syriac translations, Arabic translations or other MSS. are referred to. The result is a considerable improvement upon Theodore's text: the translation has become more exact and nearer to the Greek, it has been pruned of many wrong additions and better readings have been introduced in several cases. The classical scholar will be satisfied to realize again how old the variants of our best Greek MSS are, and not only those which we know from the Greek commentators; since we have now an up-to-date critical edition of the Analytics, not much help for the establishment of the Greek original can be expected from the Arabic, as it may be in the case of works of Aristotle which are not yet properly edited.

It is difficult to make sure how far the translation of Theodore was gradually modernised in the course of study by successive generations of scholars and philosophers. It seems very probable that the use of Greek words was discontinued as far as possible and that Arabic terms were used instead of them. This would require a separate study and comparison of the text of other early versions. The analysis of Theodore's style and technique of translation and the compilation of a complete glossary Arabic-Greek—and possibly Syriac—is the next task to be approached. It will have to be based on a new collation of the Paris MS, since Badawī's text is not reliable, unfortunately, and on comparison with medieval Hebrew and Latin translations of the Arabic version.

I should like to select for discussion one particular term which is used by Theodore and by none of the other translators of the Organon, I mean the equivalent for δόξα 'opinion, appearance, view', and for ἔνδοξον 'generally approved, generally admitted, credible'. The later development makes us understand better why it was impossible to cover the various meanings of the Greek word by one and the same Arabic equivalent as Theodore, in general agreement with the practices of the earlier translators, attempted to do.

A generally accepted premiss is called ذائعة by *Abū 'Uthmān* ad-Dimashqī in his translation of the Topics (Cf. above p. 67) and several times explained by مقبولة or مشهورة in Ibn Suwār's notes (cf. e.g. I 1, 100 a 6. 100 b 24 ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων الظاهر فى ذائعة, cf. p. 470 n. 4, 'Syriac' من مقدمات يظنّ بها انها شهورة: Ibn Suwār's (?) comment وليس كذلك. I 10, 104 a 8: cf. p. 483 n. 3; a 13: cf. p. 433 n. 4; I 14, 105 b 2, 41 cf. p. 489 n. 1 and 3 etc.) *Abū Bishr* in his translation of the Posterior Analytics, (Cf. above p. 66) uses مشهورة of an ἔνδοξος 'popularly accepted' premiss I 6, 74 b 22 (explained by مقبولة, p. 329 n. 1) or b 24 مقبولة, or I 19, 81 b 20 مشهورة مقبولة for the superlative. *Asṭāt* (cf. above p. 68) in his translation of the Metaphysics translates B 1, 996 b 24 ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων من الاراء المرضية الشريفة (p. 173, 1 Bouyges), explained by Ibn Rushd ای المشهورة المحمودة (cf. also p. 486, 2 Bouyges). *Theodore* translates ἔνδοξος always by محمود; cf. II 11, 62 a 13, 16. II 27, 70 a 3, 7. 70 b 4 ἐνδοξότατον أحمد. I 1, 24 b 2 λῆψις τοῦ φαινομένου (not translated by Theodore) καὶ ἐνδόξου, with reference to the Topics: استعمال الرأى المحمود كما قد بين فى كتاب طوبيقا 'the assertion of which is apparent and generally admitted' and the explanation given on the margin p. 106 n. 7 والمحمود الظاهر من الاراء ما رآه الناس.

Δόξα denoting 'unqualified opinion' is generally *ra'y* in philosophical and other texts; Ps. Plutarch's Placita Philosophorum, Φυσικῶν δόξαι, e.g., translated by the Melekite Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (cf. G. Graf, *Geschichte* II p. 30 f. C. Brockelmann *GAL* I p. 222 f.; *Suppl.* I p. 365 f.) and now available in two MSS are called الآراء الطبيعية (cf. H. Ritter in: Oriens I, 1948, p. 131. P. Kraus, *Jābir ibn Hayyān* II p. 331 ff.). If δόξα stands for a lower grade of certainty, for 'mere opinion' or 'probability', later translators such as Asṭāt (cf. Metaph. p. 397, 8 f. 403, 9, 983, 6 Bouyges), the school of Ḥunain, Abū Bishr and his successors, Avicenna and Averroes use almost always ظن (Cf. Isḥāq's translation of the Categories and the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, 'Īsā ibn Yaḥyā's version of Galen's paraphrase of the Timaeus [*Plato Arabus* I], Abū 'Uthmān Top. I 1, 100 b 21, 101 a 11 [changing with رأى, I 10, 104 a 13 etc.] Abū Bishr An. Post I 33, 88 b 30 I 18, 81 b 18 κατὰ δόξαν على طريق الظن والرأى المشهور etc.). Only Theodore, the early translator of the Analytics, gives no special equivalent for this meaning of δόξα, but uses the same root which he used in the rendering of ἔνδοξον: I 27, 43 a 39 εἰ μὴ κατὰ δόξαν 'as a matter of opinion' على جهة الرأى المحمود. 43 b 8 δοξαστικῶς 'apparently' بالرأى المحمود (Variant reading, modernised بالظن. Cf. above p. 92, p. 189 n. 1 Bad.) I 30, 46 a 10 ἐκ τῶν κατὰ δόξαν προτάσεων من المقدمات المأخوذة من الرأى المحمود 'from probable premisses'.

The observation of this odd rendering of δόξα enables us to fix the approximate date of an anonymous paraphrase of Aristotle's De anima, recently edited for the first time by Aḥmad Fouād al-Ahwānī from a Spanish MS. (Ibn Rochd, *Talkiṣ kitāb al-Nafs, suivi de quatres textes* 1. *L'union avec l'intellect agent d'Avempace.* 2. *L'union avec l'intellect agent du fils d'Ibn Rochd* (sic!). 3. *Le De anima d'Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain.* 4. *L'intellect de al-Kindi.* Cairo 1950—the treatise which concerns us here, no. 3, is to be found on pp. 125-175 of the volume). Being a translation it has, without any convincing reason, been ascribed to Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain (who is credited with a translation of the complete De anima, whose editio princeps is under preparation by Ahwānī and Father Anawati, O.P.). A few peculiar terms used by the unknown author make it very probable that this is the oldest treatment of Aristotle's Psychology preserved in Arabic. Ἐντελέχεια in the Aristotelian definition of the soul (De an. II 1, 412 a 27) is rendered by تمام (cf. pp. 129, 13. 139, 24, 140, 1, 8, 12, 17, 19, 141, 3, 17, 142, 4, 7, 8 Ahw. etc.) as by Asṭāt Metaph. Θ 3, 1047 b 2 ἐντελεχείᾳ بالتمام (p. 1133, 11 Bouyges) and Λ 5, 1071 a 36 τὸ πρώτον ἐντελεχείᾳ المقدم بالتمام (p. 1549, marg transl. l. 5 and p. 1554, 6 B.[1]) and as — together with the Greek term — by Nā'ima in

[1] Cf. also p. 1103, 10: Θ 1, 1045 b 33, p. 1133, 6: Θ 3, 1048 a 30; p. 1191, 2: Θ 8, 1050 a etc.

his translation of the 'Theology of Aristotle' (cf. above p. 90 n. 7). The Arabic translators evidently relied on the explanation of the term as τελειότης, given by commentators such as Simplicius. (Cf. Phys. p. 414, 22 ff., Diels: μήποτε δὲ τὴν ἐντελέχειαν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ τῆς τελειότητος ἀκούει . . . διὸ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντελέχειαν ὡρίσατο τοῦ . . . ὀργανικοῦ καὶ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος σώματος, οὐκ ὅτι ἐνέργειά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλλ' ὅτι κατ' ἐκείνην ἡ τελειότης αὐτῷ. Cf. also *Plato Arabus* I p. 40 n. 22). The later translation is كمال — cf. Qusṭā ibn Lūqā, De Plac. Phil. IV B 6. (Cf. above p. 95, Kraus, op. cit., p. 332) [1], Abū Bishr in the passage of Metaph. Λ 5 just mentioned (p. 1549, 7 Bouyges أول فى الكمال) or, e.g. Avicenna, *Najāt* p. 158 (Cairo 1938) — or استكمال cf. e.g., Averroes p. 12, 7 Ahwānī. Another indication of a date previous to Ḥunain is the use of طينة for 'matter' (p. 137, 1 Ahw.) which is known from Al-Kindī's Introduction into Aristotle (cf. M. Guidi-R. Walzer, *Studi su al-Kindi* I, Rome 1940, p. 394 n. 5a. Cap. V, 15; VI ll. 44-46 XI ll. 8-9 = p. 370, 14 p.; 375, 14-16; 384, 8 abū Rīda. Cf. also p. 295, 5, 7 and n. 6 abu Rida) and his newly published Definitions (p. 167, 10, 11, 17 abū Rīda) and to be found in al-Jāḥiẓ (Kraus, *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān* II p. 171 n. 1). The Φυσικὴ Ἀκρόασις (cf. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* II 2, 1921, p. 85 n. 1 and e.g., Simpl. Phys. p. 4, 10 Diels: .... 'ἀκρόασις' ὡς εἰς ἀκρίβειαν οὕτως ἠσκημένη ὡς εἰς ἀκρόασιν ἄλλων προτεθεῖσθαι) of Aristotle is called سمع الكيان (p. 135, 14, 133, 8 Ahw.) as again in agreement with Al-Kindī (*Studi su al-Kindi* I p. 392 n. 26 a, p. 382 n. 1, Kraus, *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān* II p. 320, n. 5. Al-Ḫwārizmī, *Mafātiḥ al-ʿulūm* ḅ. 140, 8 ff. v. Vloten) and at variance with later usage (Cf., e.g., p. 437 n. 6 Badawī or *Fihrist* p. 250, 7 F. السماع الطبيعى). Διάνοια 'discursive thinking' فكرة (p. 137, 15 Ahw.) is also to be found in some passages of Asṭāṭ's translation of the Metaphysics (p. 449, 14 B.: Γ 7, 1012 a 2; p. 474, 13: Δ 1, 1013 a 20; p. 697, 8 B: E 1, 1025 b 6) whereas Nāʿima, (pp. 84, 3; p. 100, 13 Dieterici), Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain (Metaph. α 2, 994 b 22 νοεῖν: p. 36, 5 B. Περὶ ἑρμηνείας p. 41 Pollack) and Abū Bishr (An. Post. I 1, 71 a 1 μάθησις διανοητική تعلّم ذهنى, II 19, 100 b 6 ذهن, II 11, 95 a 3 ἀπὸ διανοίας بالروية والذهن) choose ذهن. Φαντασία is وهم in the anonymous paraphrase (p. 136, 19 Ahw. and throughout the chapter) and in the 'Theology of Aristotle' (p. 22, 9; 57, 11 Dieterici) and in the old translation of the Metaphysics (p. 684, 11: φαντασία التصوّر فى الوهم, cf. 12 and 685, 10), whereas Al-Kindī still uses the Greek word fantāsiyā (p. 167, 7, p. 295, 6 abū Rīda 'representative faculty'). Averroes in accordance with later usage (cf., e.g., Al-Fārābī, *Der Musterstaat* p. 34, 19 Dieterici and passim) has تخيّل instead (p. 19 Ahwani. For Avicenna's use of fantāsiya cf. F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, Oxford 1952, p. 78. Cf. *Mafātiḥ al-ʿulūm* p. 139, 1 van Vloten). All this points evidently to an early origin of the paraphrase, possibly before Al-Kindī. The frequent use of الرأى المحمود for δόξα 'opinion' p. 156 ff. Ahwānī adds to the probability of this guess. I only quote one very significant example. Φαντασία is not δόξα μετ' αἰσθήσεως (De anima III 3. 428 a 25) ثم ذكر ان ناسا ظنوا ان الوهم مركب من الحس والرأى المحمود (cf. also p. 130, 23f. 157, 15, 158, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10). Averroes has ظن instead, as to be expected. (p. 20 f. Ahwani) It is not impossible to assume that Theodore abū Qurra's version of the Prior Analytics and the anonymous' version of an ultimately Greek compendium of the De anima were written at approximately the same time, and even by the same author. St. John of Damascus' interest in Aristotelian psychology has been mentioned before. (Cf. above p. 68). The striking use of الرأى المحمود for δόξα is certainly not a sufficiently wide base for such a far reaching conclusion, and more detailed study

[1] Abū ʿUthmān, *Alexander of Aphrodisias*, p. 285, 12 Badawī: الامكان الى التمام والكمال الذى هو صورة الشئ.

of the two texts will be necessary but the possibility cannot be excluded. Ibn an-Nadīm, *Fihrist* p. 251, 15 ff. mentions a talḫīṣ by the Alexandrians—rather by Alexander?—(cf. Ibn al-Qifṭī p. 41, 11 Lipp.) and a summary (*jawāmiʿ*) of this work by Yaḥyā ibn al-Biṭrīq.

The choice of الرأى المحمود for δόξα, cherished by an early translator or two early translators and then abandoned for a more convenient and unambiguous word may be compared with the use of the word عين for οὐσία instead of the later generally accepted Pahlavī جوهر (*gohr* = substance, cf. H. W. Bailey, Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth Century Books, Oxford 1943, p. 89 ff.) by the son of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, in the second half of the 8th century (cf. P. Kraus, Zu *Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ* [cf. above p. 64 n. 4] and C. A. Nallino, *Noterelle su Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ e suo figlio*, Riv. d. Studi Orientali 19, 1933/4, pp. 130 ff. — Raccolta di Scritti VI, Rome 1948, pp. 175 ff. C. Brockelmann *GAL* I p. 158, Suppl. I p. 233 ff. Ibn al-Qiftī p. 35, 14, 36, 2 f.). It remained in use in the theological, mystical and legal texts, (Kraus, *Zu Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ* p. 8 ff. with an important modification by Nallino *Noterelle* p. 133 f. = Reccolta etc. VI p. 179 f.) but did not really suit the Aristotelian meaning of οὐσία. This earliest translation of the Isagoge, the Categories, the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας and part of the Prior Analytics was still known to Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār's contemporary Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Yūsuf al-Ḫwārizmī, the author of the *Mafātiḥ al-ʿulūm*. (Cf. C. Brockelmann *GAL* I p. 282, *Suppl.* I p. 434 f.). The fate of الرأى المحمود has been similar. J. Schacht in his stimulating recent book has referred to some unobserved evidence concerning the legal meaning of *raʾy* which had changed from 'sound opinion' to individual reasoning in the sense of 'unguided, arbitrary opinion' about the lifetime of Theodore abū Qurra. (*The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford 1950, p. 129. Schacht's work is in several respects important for the study of early Arabic philosophy). This would explain that it had to be qualified if it was to correspond to the philosophical meaning of δόξα 'opinion', and why it was eventually rejected when it had acquired a very definite meaning in legal and theological literature. The use of the word in philosophical texts deserves certainly a detailed study.

On p. 99 of his book Schacht has touched upon the influence of Greek rhetoric on early Muhammadan legal science and referred to the same technique of reasoning to be observed in Theodore abū Qurra and his younger contemporary, the great law scholar Ash-Shāfiʿī (767-820). It may be interesting in this connection to observe that Theodore, like the Greeks, could make *fiqh* a part of rhetoric, An. Pr. II 23, 68 b 11 οἱ ῥητορικοί (scil. συλλογισμοί) is translated by المقاييس الخطبية الفقهية [1] والمشورية, i.e. συλλογισμοί or λόγοι ἐπιδεικτικοί, δικανικοί, συμβουλευτικοί (cf., e.g., Aristotle, *Rhetoric* I 3, 1358 b 6 ff.): show-oratory (probably referred to the *Khuṭba*), oratory of the advocate and oratory of the counsellor. Explanatory versions of this kind are not unusual in Theodore's translation, but the translation 'legal procedure' by *fiqh* which we thus get may be quite interesting for anybody who sets out to compare the forms of debate which were used in the Greek courts of law with similar ways of reasoning to be found, say, in the works of Ash-Shāfiʿī. The later Arabic translation is more precise: المشورية, المفاوضة المشاجرة (cf. Averroes' Commentary on the Rhetoric p. 4 ff. Lasinio), Al-Kindī distinguishes المحكومة, المشورة and المحمد والذم المجامع لهما التفريظ (cf. *Studi su al-Kindi* I, cap. IX § 4 = p. 382, 8-10 abū Rīda. Yaʿqūbī, *Historiae* I p. 148, 1-3 Houtsma and Studi etc. p. 379 and n. 1. For the study of Aristotle's Rhetoric in al-Kindī's school cf. Ibn an-Nadīm's [*Fihrist* 250, 2 f. F.] and Ibn al-Qifṭī's [37, 20 f. L.] reference to the autograph of an 'old' translation in the handwriting of Al-Kindī's pupil Aḥmad ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī, cf. F. Rosenthal, American Oriental Series 26, New Haven 1943, p. 51).

[1] Badawī prints والنشورية and tries to explain it by 'eschatoloqique', The correct reading is self-evident.

VII. BADAWĪ'S EDITION OF THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS

A.

The study of the Posterior Analytics (cf. above p. 51 : III) was not liked in the Nestorian Syriac church, since it was likely to provoke a conflict with truth as guaranteed by revelation (cf. M. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad* p. 394/8, p. 206/20—on the authority of Al-Fārābī); hence we know of no Syriac translation of the text before Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain, who either completed or reshaped a version begun by his father (*Fihrist* p. 249, 11–12 Fl.)[1]. This difficulty had not arisen in the case of the Isagoge, the Categories, the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, the Prior Analytics and the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. It looks however as if the Jacobite followers of John Philoponus, the first Christian commentator of Aristotle, had continued to study the important work and that this tradition did not reach Baghdād before the second half of the ninth century, so that its definite introduction into the philosophical syllabus may be due to the 10th century Christian philosophical school of Baghdād to which I had to refer so often in this article. The philosopher Al-Kindī gives a rather detailed account of the Categories, the De interpretatione and the Prior Analytic in his Introduction to Aristotle (cf. *Studi su al-Kindi* I, cap. III 1—4, IX), but has very little to say about the Posterior Analytics, of which he is supposed to have written an Epitome most probably without knowing the original text; he may have used some extract which he found in an Arabic translation or had translated for his use (cf. *Studi su al-Kindī* I, cap. XI and p. 381/7 n. 2). He is actually blamed by Ibn Al-Qifṭī (I suppose on some 10th century authority) for having neglected the method taught in Aristotle's Analytics (p. 368 Lippert), whereas Al-Fārābī is praised for making good this deficiency of his great predecessor (p. 277, 14 ff. Lippert). An analysis of the logical forms employed by Al-Kindī in his treatises confirms the correctness of this judgement. He definitely prefers hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms which had been highly appreciated since Chrysippus' time and been used very frequently by later Greek philosophers and by no means by Stoics only (cf., e.g., H. Mette in: Gnomon 23, 1951, p. 35). Al-Fārābī made more use of Aristotle's categorical syllogism. He was a pupil and friend of the 10th century Christian

[1] They may have been influenced in embarking on this translation by Galen's onesided appreciation of the Posterior Analytics, for which he was blamed by Alexander of Aphrodisias and his Greek and Arabic followers. Both Ḥunain and Isḥāq were very anxious to find a complete text of Galen's Περὶ ἀποδείξεως, which was completely based on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (cf. *Risālā* etc. no. 115 Bergsträsser).

Aristotelians of Baghdad who established the refined study of the Posterior Analytics in the Islamic world and made him familiar with valuable Greek exegesis of Aristotle's theory of demonstration to which they had access in Syriac translation.

The establishment of a sound Arabic text was much easier under these circumstances and did not involve comparison of several Syriac and Arabic translations as in the case of the Prior Analytics (cf. above p. 84 ff.), the Topics (cf. pp. 470, 475, 515, 525, 530, 546, 562, 563, 572, 579, 589, 590, 603, 604, 605, 630, 636, 646, 645, 655, 656 Badawī: 'Syriac' variants — pp. 473, 496, 510, 513, 512, 516, 52c, 527, 532, 552, 567, 596, 609 Badawī: variant readings in other Arabic MSS) and the Sophistici Elenchi (cf. above p. 81 f.). Apart from Abū Bishr who translated Isḥāq's text into Arabic the Paris MS mentions twice a translator Marāyā. He is quoted in connection with I 22, 84 a 16 where the autograph of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī — reproduced with the help of Isḥāq ibn Zur'a's copy by Al-Ḥasan ibn Suwār whose autograph the scribe has copied in his turn (cf. pp. 406, 465 Badawī) — has *muttaṣil*, which conveys the opposite meaning to the reading διαιρετόν to be found in all the Greek MSS which have been examined. We read p. 379 n. 9: "In the Syriac (i.e. of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain)" *munfaṣil*, and the same in Marāyās translation *munfaṣil*, and the same in the commentary of John the Grammarian", cf. John Philoponus p. 260, 12 ff. Wallies. An explanatory note by the same man is to be found p. 443 n. 3 (II 13, 96 b 9).

I cannot identify this translator. But a recent study of the Hebrew and Latin translations of the Posterior Analytics, from which we learn that Ibn Rushd and the contemporary Latin translator of the Aristotelian work Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) knew and used another translation besides the one compiled by Abū Bishr, makes it at any rate possible to connect the work of this anonymous translator with the Marāyā of the Paris MS. We know some large sections of this version, thanks to Dr. Minio-Paluellos' painstaking investigation whose result is beyond doubt (*Note sul Aristotile Latino medievale IV: La tradizione semitico-Latina del testo dei Secondi Analytici*, Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 42, 1951, fasc. II). Unfortunately the evidence at present available does not allow us more than a guess, and we shall have to wait for the critical edition of Gerard's version by Dr. Minio and a full examination of the fourteenth century Hebrew translation and the 16th century Latin translations of Averroes' three different treatments of the Aristotelian work. If Al-Farābī read the Posterior Analytics in his youth with Yuḥannā ibn Ḥailān (cf. Meyerhof, *Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad* pp. 414/28, 405/19) he may well have studied this Arabic text which in its turn may

have been identical with Marāyā's translation of Ishaqs (?) Syriac version (?).

The first commentator of the Posterior Analytics in Islamic lands was Abu Bishr's teacher Abū Yaḥyā al-Marwazī (cf. above p. 67) who wrote however in Syriac (cf. Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's Syriac notes in the Prior Analytics mentioned above p. 79); the first Arabic commentator was the translator Abū Bishr himself. We learn that Abū Yaḥyā commented upon I 13, 78 b 13 "when the middle term is placed outside" in the following way (p. 351 n. 1 Badawī): "According to Alexander he means the second figure. But John Philoponus says: it is not like that, he rather means the remote cause". The Greek original of Alexanders commentary has not come down to us and we may infer from Ibn an-Nadīm (*Fihrist* p. 249, 13 f.) that it was already lost in the ninth century. But Abū Yaḥyā's statement corresponds exactly to John Philoponus p. 174, 4 ff. Wallies): τὴν ἀρχὴν μὲν ὁ 'Αλέξανδρός φησιν ὅτι διὰ τούτων τὸ δεύτερον σχῆμα σημαίνει . . διὸ καὶ ὑπονοήσειεν ἄν τις τὸ 'ἔξω τίθεσθαι' τὸν μέσον ὅρον τοῦτο αὐτῷ σημαίνειν . . ἀλλ' ὡς καὶ ὁ 'Αλέξανδρος προϊών φησιν, 'ἔξω τίθεσθαι' τὸν μέσον λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ 'πορρωτέρω τῆς προσεχοῦς αἰτίας'. The same note shows us also how the passage was understood by late Arabic commentators. „It is clear from Abū Bishr's words that he accepted both interpretations (ان يذهب الى الامرين جميعا)". Al-Ḥasan Ibn Suwār continues: "But I believe (واظنّ, cf. above p. 79) that John Philoponus' statement is the soundest. In his favour are the words of the philosopher: 'Since (read اذ for ان as in the text p. 351 l. 2) he does not give the cause itself (οὐ γὰρ λέγει τὸ αἴτιον *n*: . . . λέγεται . . . . codd., Ross). The excellent Shaikh Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī said to me (cf. also p. 359 n. 5 and below p. 102): What John Philoponus said about this passage is right."

John Philoponus is quoted as an authority in two other places, which are equally instructive. They may again go back to Abū Yaḥyā's Syriac commentary. I 23, 84 b 7 we are reminded that both the isosceles triangle and the scalene triangle have their angles equal to two right angles and find the following note on the margin (p. 381 n. 2): "John Philoponus says: It is in some manuscripts that the three angles are equal to four right angles. He says: If this is true, the exterior angles would be meant. We shall say soon in its proper place (cf. I 24, 85 b 39. II 17, 99 a 19) how this is to be understood." John Philoponus p. 264, 23 ff. W.: "τῶν ἀντιγράφων τὰ μὲν ἔχει δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς τὰ δὲ τέτρασιν . . . . . εἰ δὲ εἴη τέτρασιν ὀρθαῖς . . . . ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς γωνιῶν· δείκνυται γὰρ ὅτι παντὸς σχήματος τῶν πλευρῶν ἐκβαλλομένων αἱ ἐκτὸς γωνίαι τέτρασιν ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι εἰσίν. But δυσίν has prevailed in the Greek tradition as it did in the Arabic.

In the chapter on Opinion I 33, 88 b 32 Aristotle discusses things which are true and real (ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ ὄντα اشياء صادقة موجودة) and yet contingent, so that scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη علم, p. 403 n. 2 اى برهان) evidently does not concern them". The Arabic commentator explains this in the following way (p. 402 n. 10): "It is perhaps to be questioned why he added 'real' to 'true', since things of which one says that they are 'true' are necessarily (لا محالة) 'real'. (1) Alexander says that he added 'real', (2) because truth exists, also about those things which are not real as when we say that the goat stag (cf. above p. 123) does not exist. (3) But John Philoponus says: Alexander did not hit the mark about this, because this is not a matter of opinion but of knowledge. (4) For it is true to say that 'what is not real is <in fact> not real, and it cannot be otherwise." So far this is almost a litteral translation of John Philoponus p. 323, 9 ff. W.: (1) Καὶ ὁ 'Αλέξανδρος ἐξηγούμενος τὸ χωρίον φησὶν ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο προσέθηκε 'καὶ ὄντα', (2) ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές, ὡς ὅταν εἴπω ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τραγέλαφος. (3) ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος (vic. Ammonius) μὴ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγειν τὸν 'Αλέξανδρον· οὐ γὰρ δόξης, φησίν, τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰδέναι ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης. (4) τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν μὲν ἀληθῶς δὲ λεγόμενον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦτο ἀδύνατον ἄλλως ἔχειν. "What one ought to say "continues the Arabic commentator, very appropriately" is that by the word 'real' he indicated the contingent things and that he used as it were a doubling i.e. reinforcing expression (وكانه استعمل القول المضاعف اى المؤكد)".

Another passage where the agreement with John Philoponus is emphasized has been mentioned before (p. 100). The second passage in which Abū Yaḥyā is mentioned by name, a commentary on I 23, 84 b 25 ff. is again inspired by John Philoponus, as a comparison of p. 382 n. 6 with p. 267, 3 f. W. clearly shows: ابو يحيى المروزى فسّر هذا قال: يعنى ان اسطقسات ومبادئ البرهان ليست فقط المقدمات غير ذوات الأوساط بل وتلك الحدود التى الأوساط بينها. وذلك أنه ان كانت المقدمات التى فيها مبادئ فتلك اكبر جدا، كما ان فى الطبيعيات ليس فقط الاربعة الاسطقسات هى المبادئ بل الهيولى والصورة اللتان فيهما (منهما؟) الاسطقسات مركبة.

Εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ὅροι ἀρχαὶ ὅσοι ἀλλήλων ἀμέσως κατηγοροῦνται· εἰσὶ δὲ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱ ἐκ τούτων προτάσεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ τῶν συνθέτων ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ μὲν ὕλη καὶ εἶδος, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς συμπλοκῆς τούτων πρώτως συντεθειμένα σώματα, λέγω δὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα.

Abū Bishr, being himself the translator of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain's Syriac version, did not have to offer any comments on the text in the case of the Posterior Analytics, being unable, like Isḥāq, to compare the Greek original, since he had no Greek [1]. But there are about 15 explanatory notes in his name, of minor importance but showing again how carefully the text is explained (p. 351: cf. above p. 131); p. 353 note 3: I 14, 79 a 20; p. 354 n. 1: I 14, 79 a 25; p. 356 n. 6: I 16, 79 b 24; p. 368 n. 2: I 19, 81b 34; p. 369 n. 2: I 19, 82 a 20; p. 379 n. 2: I 22, 84 a 6; p. 402 n. 6: I 22, 88 b 20; p. 409 n. 4: II 2, 89 b 38; p. 425 n. 5: II 8; p. 459 n. 1: II 13, 97 b 28, p. 453 n. 1: II 14, 98 a 14; p. 454 n. 4: II 16, 98 a 35; p. 460 n. 2: II 17, 99 a 26) [2]. Twice both his and Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī's views are quoted for the same passage, p. 368 n. 2 and p. 369 n. 2. Abū Bishr's notes are to the point and are quite on the level of similar explanatory remarks by Greek commentators but appear to be of no particular interest in themselves. The same verdict applies to most of the eleven notes reported in the name of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (p. 316 n. 3: I 2, 72 a 32; p. 359 n. 5: I 16, 80 a 25 ff., together with a note by Al-Ḥasan; p. 366 n. 3: I 19 81 b 12; p. 368 n. 2: I 19, 81 b 34; p. 369 n. 2: I 19, 82 a 20; p. 371 n.3: I 21, 82 b 8 ff.; p. 408 n. 2: II 1, 89 b 29; p. 419 n. 4: II 5; p. 424 n. 9: II 7, 92 b 36; p. 428 n. 1: II 8, 93 b 5; p. 435 n. 1: II 12). P. 316 n. 3 he gives a much better translation of 72 a 32 οὐχ οἷόν τε — 34 εἰδώς, rendering in addition πιστεύειν by *ṣaddaqa* instead of *'arafa*. [3] The difficult words 89 b 25 εἰς ἀριθμὸν θέντες (cf. Ross, Greek edition p. 610) are explained (p. 408 n. 2) as by John Philoponus p. 336, 29 W.: ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ εἰπεῖν ὅτι εἰσὶ σύνθετα προβλήματα τὰ ζητούμενα εἶπε τὸ 'εἰς ἀριθμὸν θέντες'.

Interesting is his reference to Heraclitus p. 428 n. 1, where he comments upon the explanation of the eclipse of the moon by her rotation (στροφή) or extinction (ἀπόσβεσις): "It may be that he follows in this view of Heraclitus that the stars cease to exist when they set (ان غروب الكواكب فسادها)". The source of this surprising statement is unknown.

[1] Cf. his remarks on the text on the Prior Analytics (above p. 78 ff.) and the interesting Colophon of the second book of the Topics, from which we learn that Top. I-III were compared with a copy of the autograph of Abū 'Uthmān, collated in its time with the Greek, in 298/910, and that corrections from the Syriac due to Abū Bishr's collations were also incorporated in Al-Ḥasan's text: صححها من نسخ نظر فيها على (?) ابو بشر متى فرجع بالخلاف بين النسخ الى السريانى وأصلحه على ما اوجبته النسخ السريانية (p. 532 Bad., p. 196 Georr).

[2] Cf. also Averroes' Great Commentary, Latin edition 1552, fol. 201 r; edition 1562 and 1574, fol. 412 r (quoted by L. Minio-Paluello, *Note sul Aristotile Latino* p. 4 n. 2).

[3] l. 1 of the note read لم يتفق له instead of ايتفوّله (!).

There are only a few explicit remarks in the name of Al-Ḥasan himself p. 351 n. 1 (cf. above p. 100) p. 359 n. 5 (cf. above p. 100) p. 417 n. 8 (cf. below p. 107), but we may safely assume that we can credit him with the very numerous anonymous notes concerned with textual criticism and particularly with the argument which accompany the text of the Posterior Analytics.

I propose to give a survey of these notes, mainly of those which concern the establishment of the text, whether they are explicitly taken from Isḥāq's Syriac text or given as alternative readings or corrections above the line. There are no variant readings which are explicitly attributed to other Arabic manuscripts. Since the Greek editors of this work had no opportunity to compare the Arabic readings which are now published for the first time, a select list of such readings which on the whole confirm Ross' appreciation of *n* is also to be found in this survey. There are also a few obvious corrections of Badawī's Arabic text, picked up at random. The way in which he fills lacunas or supposed lacunas of the text is almost always wrong; a study of the MS. on the spot is needed for everyone who tries to establish this part of his edition on a sound basis, and a complete index verborum. The three other MSS. from Indian libraries to which Brockelmann, *Supplement* I p. 370, refers do most probably not contain the translation of the Posterior Analytics, cf. Minio-Paluello, *Note*, p. 3 note 4. But the fourteenth century Hebrew version of the second book, or rather of the lemmata of Averroes' Great Commentary of the second book will be useful for establishing a more accurate text of Abū Bishr's Arabic translation, since Averroes followed Abū Bishr in this book, cf. Minio-Paluello *Note* p. 16 ff. and particularly p. 20 note 5. Cf. also M. Steinschneider, *Die Hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters*, Berlin 1893, p. 95.

B. [1]

I 1 (p. 310, l. 3): The Ms has ضرورة + أن يكون

— (p. 310, n. 1): 71 a 12 προυπολαμβάνειν أن يتقدّم فيتصوّر: above the line فياخذ ... 'assume': correct? [2].

— (p. 310, n. 8): 71 a 17 πρότερον قديما: above the line من قبل 'previously': correct?

— (p. 310, l. 15): 72 a 19 τὸ καθόλου ὧν *codd.*: ... οὗ *Phil. Them.* Ross: τὰ καθόλου .... Arab.

I 2 (p. 313, n. 1): 71 b 18 συλλογισμόν ἐπιστημονικόν القياس المؤتلف اليقينى: above the line العلم : ?

[1] For the Sigla of the Greek MSS referred to cf. above p. 84 n. 1.

[2] The MS has l. 9 الواحدة instead of الوحدة.

I 2 (p. 313, n. 2): 71 b 19 τῷ ἔχειν αὐτόν بما هو موجود لنا: above the line, in red: من طريق ما هو موجود: ?

— (p. 315) cf. above p. 90, n. 2.

— (p. 316, n. 3) cf. p. 102.

I 3 (p. 317, l. 6-7): 72 a 5 f. I suggest l. 6 لانه for انه (διὰ τὸ), without adding any thing, and in the following line (with the manuscript, according to Badawī) انه ليس بمعرفة οὐ . . . . ἐπιστήμην (n: ἐπιστήμη codd., Ross).

— (p. 317, l. 10): 72 b 8 ὅλως *n*[2] Phil. Ross (p.514): ἄλλως *ABC d n* Arab. (على وجه آخر)

— (p. 318, l. 13): 72 b 22 τὰ ἄμεσα *ABd Phil.* Ross: τὰ μέσα *n*, Arab.

— (p. 318, l. 15): 72 b 24 τινά *ABC Phil. Arab.* Ross: τί *d n*.

— (p. 318, l. 16): 72 b 24 read تتعرف الحدود τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίς ομεν

— (p. 319, n. 2): 72 b 34 οὕτω على هذا القياس: above the line النحو على هذا: ?

— (p. 319, l. 16: 72 b 37 ὅταν γάρ, read متى كان [ان كان] وذللا انه. Cf. p. 320, n. 2.

— (p. 321, n. 2): 73 a 17 οὐδαμῶς, read فلا سبيل with Badawī. Probably in the MS?

I 6 (p. 329, l. 2): 74 b 13 ἀναγκαίων *Phil.*, Ross (p. 528): ἀναγκαῖον *codd., Arab.*

— (p. 329, n. 1): cf. above p. 95.

— (p. 330, l. 13): 75 a 3 ἀναγκαίων *n Phil.*[1] *Arab* Ross: ἀναγκαίου *ABCd*.

I 8 (p. 335, l. 5): 75 b 31 ὁρισμούς *codd.* Ross: ὁρισμοῦ *n Arab.* (تحديد)

— (p. 335, l. 8): 75 b 34 ᾗ μὲν τοιοῦδε *B Phil. Arab.* Ross: αἱ μὲν τούτου (τοῦ n[2]) διότι *n*.

I 10 (p. 338, l. 9): افتضابا ... فهو probably a marginal gloss which slipped into the text (cf. p. 319, l. 16).

— (p. 338, l. 10): 76 a 35 καί[1] Ross (with *n* and other *MSS*): καί τι *Cd Phil. Arab.*

— (p. 339, l. 6): 76 b 5 καὶ γραμμάς *om. Arab.*

— (p. 339, l. 9): 76 b 8 κύβος + κύκλος الدائرة *Arab.*!

— (p. 340, n. 2): 76 b 21 ἀφελεῖν + 'equals remain' *Arab.* (cf. Mure's translation) "These words are not in the Syriac in Isḥāq's translation" and are either an explanatory note by someone or a very pardonable addition to the Greek by Abū Bishr (cf. also Minio-Paluello op. cit. p. 3 n. 1).

— (p. 341, n. 5): 76 b 37 'unless we are prepared to call intelligent listening a form of hypothesis' (Ross p. 541) اللهم إلاّ ان [a]يكون الانسان يسمى [b]السماع اصلا موضوعا: alternative translation in note (from the Syriac?) [a]يقول الانسان [b]أن ما يسمع اصل موضوع εἰ μὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούειν ὑπόθεσίν τις εἶναι φήσει: better.

I 11 (p. 342, l. 12): 77 a 9 ἐπὶ πλειόνων, read الكثير instead of الكبير

— (p. 343, n. 5): 77a 15 ἐδόθη سُلّم: 'above the line, in red' اعطى (stylistic alternative or variant from the Syriac?)

I 12 (p. 345, n. 8): cf. Sir Thomas Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford 1949), p. 33 ff.

— (p. 345, n. 9): Reference to Bryson's and Antiphon's quadrature of the circle as in John Philop. p. 149, 10 ff. W.

— (p. 346, n. 3): 77 b 24-26. The Syriac is evidently more closely following the Greek than Abū Bishr. Brought in by Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī?

Greek	Abū Bishr	'Syriac'
a) καὶ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἀγεωμέτρητον	لا هندسة أما على نحو واحد	وأما نحو واحد غير هندسي
b) τῷ μὴ ἔχειν ὥσπερ τὸ ἄρρυθμον	فمن قبل انها ليست موجودة له بمنزلة عدم الوزن	من حيث هو غير مقنن لها بمنزلة غير اللحن
c) τὸ δ' ἕτερον τῷ φαύλως ἔχειν	وأما بنحو آخر فمن قبل انه مقنن له افتناثا رديئا	وأما بنحو آخر فبانه مقنن لها افتناثا رديئا

I 12 (p. 347, n. 5): 77 b 31 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις (Philop. p. 156, 4 W.: τοῦτέστιν ἐν ταῖς διαλεκτικαῖς συνουσίαις) في الجدلية: above in red الاقناعية 'in dialectical argument'. Cf. ad p. 434 l. 3, below p. 108.[1]

— (p. 347, l. 3: 77 b 32 τὰ ἕπτη (!) الكلام المسمى باليونانية آآفى. evidently in the Syriac transcription (cf. Al-Fārābī, Canons of Poetry p. 269, l. 4 Arberry: افيقى ἐπική. cf. above p. 74 and p. 91, n. 3)[2]

— (p. 348, l. 7 + n. 1): 78a 11 λαμβάνουσι read يُوخذ for يوجد

— (p. 348, n. 4): 78a 14 προσλαμβάνειν, Abū Bishr evidently translates προλαμβάνειν بأنهم يستأنفون ويقتضون, the correct reading is presupposed in the note above the line بأن يقتضب زيادة (taken from the Syriac? or from Marāyā's translation, cf. the similar case discussed above p. 99 f.

I 13 (p. 349, n. 7): 78 a 30 διὰ τὸ μὴ στίλβειν تلمع من قبل انها: above the line in red: لا تلمع. Evident emendation, from the Syriac?

— (p. 350, l. 10): 78 b 7 γίνεται συλλογισμός *n Arab.*: γέγονεν ὁ συλλογισμός *codd.*, Ross.

— (p. 350, l. 14): 78 b 11 αὔξησις *codd.* Ross: αὐξήσεις *n. Arab.*

— (p. 351, l. 2): 78 b 15 λέγεται codd., Ross: λέγει *n. Arab.*

— (p. 351, l. 5); 78 b 17 ἡ ἀπόφασις, read السلب for السبب

— (351, n. 4 b, belonging to p. 352, l. 4-5): 78 b 30-31 'in the Syriac'.

Greek	Abū Bishr	Syriac
οἷον τὸ τοῦ Ἀναχάρσιος	مثال ذلك قول اناخرسس	
ὅτι ἐν Σκύθαις οὐκ εἰσίν αὐλητρίδες *n, Phil. Them., Ross* αὐληταί *A B c d*	أنه ليس فى بلد الصقالبة الغناء وآلاته	أن بلد الصقالبة لا يوجد فيه مغنيات
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄμπελοι	اذ كان ليس قبلهم كروم	وذلك أنه لا يوجد فيه كروم ايضا

[1] Cf. also n. 4; νόησις ذهن, explained by تونم.

[2] Cf. also above p. 88. Concerning Badawī's note (n. 6) cf. Ross p. 547 ad l.

Only the Syriac presupposes 'flute girls', in agreement with *n* and the commentators. But there was no adequate translation for 'flute', although the Arabs had all kinds of flutes (cf., e.g., H. G. Farmer, in *The Legacy of Islam*, Oxford 1931, p. 361), and we have 'singing girls' instead. Abū Bishr has 'singing and its instruments'. Poet. 1, 1447 a 14 he does not translate αὐλητικῆς (اولطيقى). Otherwise, the Syriac, as to be expected, follows the Greek more closely.

I 15 (p. 355, 13): 79 a 38 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Β πρώτως μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἔστω . . . . read فغير ممكن [ان] <الّا> يكون آ موجودة ل بَ اولا [والا] فلتكن cf. above p. 104 (ad p. 319, 16 and p. 338, 9).

— (p. 355, n. 3): 79 b 2 εἰ τὸ Β: Γ (ج) Abū Bishr: above the line in red 'in the Syriac B': correct (also noticed by Badawī).

— (p. 356, l. 9): 79 b 21 ἀτόμως (بغير انقطاع) om. Arab, but presupposed n. 4.

I 18 (p. 365, l. 11): 81 b 4 ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ γένει, read انها موجودة لواحد واحد من الاجناس instead of .... لو أخذ واحد .... (corr. F. Rahman).

I 19 (p. 366, l. 4): 81 b 12 ὁ δὲ στερητικός (scil. ὑπάρχει) read واما السالب فيوجد instead of واما السيب فيوخذ

— (p. 366, n. 3): 81 b 13 τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει واما الاخرى فيوجد فيها انه غير[1] موجود له Abū Bishr. On the margin: 'In the Syriac' فاما الاخرى فغير موجود: nearer to the Greek text but not clearer.

— (p. 367, l. 2): 81 b 21 μὴ ἔστι $A^2B^1n^1$ Ross (p. 567): ἔστι A^2B^2Cdn *Arab Phil.*

— (p. 367, l. 2): 81 b 21 εἶναι A^1C^1 Ross: μὴ B^2dn *Arab.*: μὴ εἶναι A^2C^2.

— (p. 367, l. 9): 81 b 27 λευκός *Phil. Arab.* (*ut vid.*) Ross: λευκόν codd.

— (p. 369, n. 1): 82 a 8 ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα περαίνεται ام ينتهيان بعضها عن بعض Arab. Marginal note: 'in the Syriac' .... ام يغنى : indifferent?

— (p. 369, l. 13): 82 a 18 εἴτ' ἀμφότερα *codd.* Ross: ἐπ' ἀμφότερα A^2n *Phil.*[c] *Arab.*

I 20 (p. 370, l. 12): 82 a 31 αβγ *ABDn Arab.*: αβζ Waitz, Ross.

— (p. 370, l. 13): 82 a 32 λαβεῖν: read يؤخذ for يوجد

I 21 (p. 372, l. 2): 82 b 11 ἄνω *codd.* Ross: κάτω *Phil.*, *fecit n*, *Arab.*

— (p. 372, l. 3): 82 b 12 A n^1 Ross: δ *ABD*: ἄνω n^2 *Phil. Arab.*

— (p. 372, l. 7): 82 b 16 δεύτερος *codd.* Ross: τρίτος *n* [1] *Arab.*

— (p. 373, l. 9): 82 b 32 πεπερασμενάκις *codd* Ross *Arab*: *om.* n^1: πεπερασμένως n^2. *Phil*[c].: πολλάκις Phil. γρ.

I 22 (p. 377, l. 5): 83 b 13 δὴ ὅτι *codd. Arab.* Ross: δῆλον ὅτι *n.*

— (p. 377, n. 5): 83 b 19 κατηγορεῖσθαι + فذلك معلوم: These two words 'are not in the Syriac': correct.

— (p. 379, l. 7): 84 a 11 ἔστι τῶν *Phil. Arab.* Ross: ἐστι αὕτη *AB*: ἔστι *d*: αὕτη *fecit n.*

— (p. 379, l. 10): 84 a 15 ἐνυπάρχει. Read موجود for مأخوذ

— (p. 379, n. 9): cf. above p. 130.

— (p. 379, l. 11): 84 a 17 ἐνυπάρχει. Read موجود for مأجوذ

— (p. 379, l. 11): 84 a 17 ἀριθμοῦ. I suggest العدد for الحدود

[1] فيأخذ MS فيؤخذ Badawī.

I 23 (p. 381, n. 1): 84 b 6 ὅτι οὐκ ἀεὶ (*om.* n^1.) . . . ὑπάρξει فليس وجوده *Arab.*: 'in the Syriac' فليس أبدا وجوده: correct.

— (p. 381, l. 12): 84 b 9 ἕτεροι *codd.* Ross: ἑκάτερον n^1. *Arab.*

— (p. 383, l. 5): 84 b 31 ληπτέον. Read يؤخذ for يوجد

— (p. 383, l. 6): 84 b 33 α*ABD Arab.*: Δ *n* Ross (p. 586).

— (p. 383, l. 7): 84 b 34 λαμβάνεται. Read تؤخذ for يوجد

— (p. 384, l. 1): 85 a 4 μή *codd.* Ross: *om.* *n.*[1] *Arab.*

I 24 (p. 385, l. 3): 85 a 23 ἐπιστάμεθα. Read نعلم for يعلم

— (p. 385, l. 4): 85 a 23 εἰδῶμεν *Bn Arab Them.* Ross: ἴδωμεν *A d.*

— (p. 385, n. 6): 85 a 25 ἄνθρωπος μουσικός: انسان Arab.: 'Syriac انسان موسيقار: correct. For the use of the Syriac form cf. Al-Fārābī, *Canons of Poetry* p. 269, 17 Arberry: الموسيقاريون

— (p. 386, l. 12): 85 b 4 μᾶλλον, i.e. <اكثر> instead of <أقلّ>

I 25 (p. 392, l. 1): 86 b 13 λαβεῖν. Read يؤخذ for يوجد

I 31 (p. 398, l. 8): 88 a 1 νῦν *n*. *Phil.*[1] *Arab.* Ross: *om.* *ABd.*

I 32 (p. 402, l. 6): 88 b 29 μέγεθος *Phil.* Ross: μεγέθους. *ABdn Arab.*

II 1 (p. 408, l. 6): 89 b 29 το[2] *codd.* Ross: τότε τὸ *n Arab.*

II 3 (p. 413, n. 5): 90 b 27 ἢ τὰ πρῶτα ὁρισμοὶ ἔσονται ἀναπόδεικτοι وتكون الاوائل غير متناهية Arab. (corrupt): 'in the Syriac' او تكون تلك الاوائل حدودا غير مبرهنة: correct.

II 5 (p. 417, n. 8): 91 b 15 ἀποδείκνυσιν + كذلك ولا الذى يقيس. This appears to be a marginal note to or a variant reading for كما انه ولا الذى يستقرى (ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ ἐπάγων) which has slipped into the text. „These words are not in the Syriac, and there is in addition no need for them. And I think" (i.e. Al-Ḥasan) „that Abū Bishr has explained it (بينها ?) in his translation".

— (p. 419, n. 1): 91 b 34 καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐδὲν ἄτοπον وهذا غير منكر بوجه من الوجوه 'This is not in the Syriac'. Applies probably to the last three words which are, strictly speaking, not necessary but they bring out the special force of οὐδὲν quite well. [1]

— (p. 419, l. 4): 91 b 36 ὁ ἐκ τῆς διαιρέσεως λέγων τὸν ὁρισμόν الذى يقول الحدّ فى القسمة. Above the line in red من: correct.

— (p. 420, n. 2): 92 a 3 ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἅπας οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός وكل قول هذه حاله هو حد Arab. Above the line in red 'in the Syriac' وكل قول كهذا ليس هو حدّا: correct — οὐκ ἔστιν *d E Phil. Arab.*: οὐκέτι *A B n.*

II 6 (p. 420, l. 5): 91 a 6 καί *om.* *n Arab.*

— (p. 420, l. 9): 92 a 9 γάρ codd. Ross: ἄν *n*: ἄρ' إذاً *Arab* (this is the reading in the ancestor of *n* used by Isḥāq).

— (p. 421, l. 7): 92 a 20 εἰ τὸ κακῷ ἐστι τὸ διαιρετῷ εἶναι I suggest to read: والمختلف (Badawī ان كان معنى الوجود للشرّ (للشى • Badawī) هو أنه المنقسم (للنفس, cf. ll. 9 and 10.

— (p. 421, n. 5): والمختلف: above the line: 'This is not in the Syriac and is not needed here'. It may originally be a gloss (cf. ad p. 417 n. 8) or one of the double translations which Abū Bishr likes (of διαιρετῷ).

[1] Cf. e.g. 94 b 12: p. 432, 10 οὐδὲν διαφέρει ولا فرق بوجه من الوجوه.

II 6 (p. 421, l. 9): 92 a 22 ἀδιαιρετὸν τῷ διαιρετῷ *codd.* Ross: διαιρετὸν τῷ ἀδιαιρέτῳ *d Arab* (isolated case, cf. 424, 10).

— (p. 422, n. 4): 92 a 33 γραμματικός غرماطيقوس, above the line نحوى. Cf. above p. 90, n. 4 and ἀπὸ γενέσεως انفيانا سوس Al-Fārābī, *Canons of Poetry* p. 269, 14, 270, 15 Arberry and below ad p. 433, n. 12.

II 7 (p. 423, l. 6): 92 b 12 φαμέν. Read نقول instead of يقول.

— (p. 423, l. 7): 92 b 13 ὅ τι ἐστίν *Arab*, scripsit Ross: ὅτι ἔστιν *codd.* NB!

— (p. 424, n. 6): 92 b 27 εἴη ἄν *n Phil.* Arab. (قد يكون) Ross: ἦν *ABd* — above the line (قد is not needed): I wonder.

— (p. 424, l. 10): 92 b 31 ὥστε ὅρους ἂν διαλεγοίμεθα πάντες فيوخذ (?) اذن اباجفيا انّا نلفظ بتكلم بالحدود. Badawī (p. 424 n. 8) understands اباجفيا as ἀπαγωγή (cf. above p. 89 f.) and gives an inaccurate version of the Greek. I suggest to read باجمعنا (πάντες) instead.

— (p. 424, l. 10): 92 b 33 ἀπόδειξις *d Arab.* (cf. ad p. 421, 9) Ross: *om. AB*: ἐπιστήμη *B²n*.

II 8 (p. 426, l. 4): 93 a 16 εἰπόντες *codd.* Ross: ἐπιόντες *Phil. Arab.* (ut vid. ... نعود من ... الى)

II 9 (p. 429, l. 2): 93 b 23 τρόπον *B²dn Phil. Them. Arab.*: τόπον *AB*.

— (p. 429, n. 1): 93 b 26 τῆς οὐσίας 'being', not in the technical sense of 'substance': للجوهر *Arab*, above the line للوجود: probably correct.

II 11 (p. 431, n. 2): 93 b 37 τοῦ πολεμεῖσθαι 'Αθηναίους فى حروب اهل اثنية: above the line in red: <فى> أن حورب (cf. 94 b 4, 5) 'that war was waged against the Athenians': correct. (from the Syriac?).

— (p. 431, n. 2): 'Ερετριέων. It is, in general, not advisable to change Greek proper names, which are corrupt in the Arabic, according to the Greek. In addition, I wonder why τ = ط *Arab.* becomes ث in Badawī's emended reading.

— (p. 432, l. 8): 94 b 8 ἕνεκα τίνος *Arab.*, Ross (p. 647): ἕνεκά τινος *codd.*, cf. ad p. 423, l. 7. There is an interesting parallel in Metaph. Λ 7, 1072 a 34, where the older translator Asṭāt, with Ross, understands πῶς ἔχον (بنوع ما), whereas Abū Bishr, with the Greek MSS, Ps.-Alexander and William of Moerbeke take it as an interrogative pronoun (كيف), cf. p. 1598 Bouyges. Λ 6, 1072 a 5 we find the correct reading νοῦς ἐνέργεια in one Greek MS (*Al^p*), William of Moerbeke, Ps.-Alexander and Abū Bishr (العقل هو الفعل), whereas Asṭāt has ἐνεργείᾳ (العقل بالفعل) with the Greek MSS *EJA^b*. (cf. also above p. 88).

— (p. 433, n. 1): 94 b 19 λόγος, above the line 'definition', cf. Mure's translation (presumably from a Greek commentary — cf. p. 456, n. 51: 98 b 23; p. 458, n. 2: 99 a 3).

— (p. 433, l. 12): 94 b 32 ὅτι *Eustr. Them. Arab.* Ross (p. 647): *om. codd.*: NB!

— (p. 433, l. 13): 94 b 33 οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι شيعة فوثاغورس: n. 10: فوثاغورس[1]

— (p. 433, n. 12): 94 b 34 ἐν τῷ ταρτάρῳ طرطاروس above the line الجحيم. Cf. above p. 90 and ad p. 422, n. 4.

— (p. 434, l. 3): 95 a 1 unusual rendering of ὁρμή by قوة presupposes Philoponus' paraphrase of the passage p. 384, 28 W. παρὰ φύσιν δὲ καὶ βιαία κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ μὴ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνούσης φυσικῆς δ υ ν ά μ ε ω ς καὶ ὕλης ἐνδιδομένη. p. 385, 6 W.: κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν δύναμιν (cf. ad p. 347, n. 5). NB!

[1] Cf. *Neue philol. Untersuchungen* 7, Berlin 1929, p. 78.

II 11 (p. 434, l. 6): 95 a 4 ἀνδριάς تمثال.

II 12 (p. 434, l. 6): 95 a 16 τί ἐστιν κρύσταλλος; εἰλήφθω δὴ ὅτι ὕδωρ πεπηγός. I prefer to read ما الجليد ؟ وليوخذ أنه ما<ء> جامد instead of ما <هو> جاحد Badawī.

— (p. 437, l. 9): 95 b 6 ἀδιαίρετα *B²n Phil. Arab.* Ross: διαιρετά *ABd*.

— (p. 439, n. 6): 95 b 36 διὰ τοῦ μέσου فى الاوسط Arab.: above the line بالأوسط: better[1]

II 13 (p. 441, n. 1): 96 a 20 πῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ τί ἐστιν εἰς τοὺς ὅρους ἀποδίδοται; Above the word معنى : الحدود. I suggest to read اما كيف يوفى معنى ما هو <الحدود>.

— (p. 445, n. 7): 96 b 35 αἰτεῖσθαι يصادر *Arab.*, above the line يسأل. The *Arab.* is correct, the note is wrong but presupposes either knowledge of Greek or comparison with an ambiguous Syriac word.

— (p. 448, l. 14): 97 a 36 τό τε πρῶτον κατὰ διαίρεσιν ὅτι .... الاول من القسمة وأن: above the line ... بالقسمة من أن ...: better (from the Syriac?).

— (p. 448, l. 14): 97 a 36 ὅτι ἅπαν ἢ τόδε ἢ τόδε ζῷον أن الكل اما ان يكون حيوانا فلانيا او حيوانا فلانيا <آخر>. Badawī's addition of آخر is completely unjustified.

— (p. 449, l. 2): 97 b 3 εἴη *codd. Arab.* Ross: εἴη τὸ γένος *n*.

— (p. 450, l. 4): 97 b 14 πλείους *Eustr. Phil.* Ross: πλείω codd.: τρία *Arab.*

— (p. 450, l. 8): 97 b 17 εἰ *codd. Arab.* Ross: *om. n*.

— (p. 451, n. 4): 97 b 32 τὸ σαφές الظهور *Arab*, above the line الوضوح: better (from the Syriac?)

II 14 (p. 453, l. 11): 98 a 11 Δ *codd.* Ross: γ *n Arab.*

II 16 (p. 455, 14): 98 b 3 αἰτιατόν *codd. Arab.* Ross: αἴτιον *n¹*.

— (p. 457, l. 1-2): 98 b 25 ff. glosses (in brackets) in the text.

— (p. 457, l. 8): 98 b 33 οὐ *codd. Arab.* Ross: οὐχ *n¹*.

— (p. 457, l. 9): 98 b 34 τοιοσδί *A² Phil. Arab.* (ut vid.): τοῖσδι *B*: τοῖς δεῖ *d n*.

II 17 (p. 458, l. 14): 99 a 9 καί² *codd. Arab.*: κατά *n*.

— (p. 458, l. 14): 99 a 10 γραμμή *n*. Ross: γραμμαί *A B d Phil. Arab.*

— (p. 459, l. 6): 99 a 14 αἴσθησιν الجنس *Arab.*, read الحس!

— (p. 460, l. 2): 99 a 21 μέσον² + τὸ πρῶτον *n. Arab.*: *om. codd.* Ross.

— (p. 460, l. 11): 99 a 33 ᾧ *B Eustr. Arab.* Ross: ὃ *ABdn*.

— (p. 461, l. 7-8): 99 b 2 τὸ Α τῷ Δ ὑπάρχει γάρ *n Arab.*: τὸ Α ὑπάρχει *ABd An. Phil.*: [τὸ Α] ὑπάρχει Ross.

— (p. 461, l. 8): 99 b 2 πᾶσι τοῖς Δ لجميع الدالات. b 3: τὰ Ε هاءات (agst. τό: *n*.)

— (p. 461, l. 17): 99 b 8 ἀλλά *codd. Arab.* Ross: + ἀεί *n*.

II 18 (p. 462, l. 2): 99 b 11 τὸ *A²n An.* Ross: τὰ *Bd Eustr. Phil. Arab.*

II 19 (p. 463, l. 15): 100 a 1 ἔτι *AEPhil. Them.* (*ut vid.*) Ross: ἔν τι *d n* fecit B: τι *An. Arab.* (شىء ما).

— (p. 463, n. 3): 100 a 2 قول λόγος 'forming of a conception' (Ross): above the line حلم, read حكم 'proposition', cf. I. Pollack op. cit. p. 39.

— (p. 464, l. 2): 100 a 6 ἢ ἐκ παντός *AB*, *fecit n*: *om. An. Arab.*

— (p. 464, l. 18): 100 b 5 ἡ *n Eustr. Arab.* Ross: καὶ *ABd*. A gloss has slipped into the Arabic text οὕτω + بالاستقراء (τῇ 'επαγωγῇ).

[1] Cf. e.g. 38 b 19: p. 456, 5 διὰ τοῦ αἰτίου بالعلة; διά c. acc. is لِمَ, cf. e.g., 98 b 20: p. 456, 5.

The contents of this survey may conveniently be summarised in a few words. It is interesting to realise how much could be corrected with the help of Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain's Syriac text and of other unspecified sources of information. I count 33 passages treated in this way Comparison of the readings of the Syriac and Arabic with the variant readings recorded in the apparatus criticus of Sir David Ross' recent edition confirms us in the belief that only a diligent and eclectic study of all the good MSS available will bring us as near as possible to Aristotle's autograph or, at least, to Andronicus' of Rhodes edition. The Arabic agrees with the Ambrosianus *n* in 25 passages. It is however very probable that an ancestor of *n*—which is somehow connected with Isḥāq's text—had not yet been spoiled by some of the bad readings now to be found in the Ambrosianus (cf. ad p. 420, 9). But there are at least 10 passages in which the Arabic text agrees with Philoponus against *n*, 6 of which are accepted as the best readings by Ross, two of them (367, 9, 379, 7) against all the Greek MSS; 10 times Philoponus, *n* and *Arab* agree. I list ten passages where the Arabic has preserved the right reading not to be found in *n* or Philoponus, but it may have been in the relative of *n* which was presumably used by Isḥāq. Once only is a different division of the Greek words proposed by Ross born out by the Arabic (423, 7) and once the change of an indefinite pronoun into an interrogative (432, 8). The most important argument for linking up Isḥāq with Philoponus is the passage p. 434 l. 3, where it is impossible to assume that the Arabic translator, as it occasionally happens (cf., e.g., Plato Arabus I p. 22 ff.), misunderstood an ambiguous Syriac word. All this will, in due course, be important for a future history of Early Islamic Philosophy and its Greek and Syriac background.

ADDITIONS

Ad p. 92. III) Since this article was written, vol. III of *Manṭiq Arisṭū* has been published (Cairo 1952). It contains *Topics VII*, translated by Abū ʿUthmān ad-Dimashqī (pp. 676-689) and VIII, translated by Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Kātib. cf. above p. 67 n. 1 (pp. 690-733); the three translations of the *Sophistici Elenchi*, cf. above p. 81 f. (pp. 736-1018); *Porphyry's Isagoge*, translated by Abū ʿUthmān ad-Dimashqī, cf. above *p.* 75 n. 1 (pp. 1021-1068). Another edition of the Isagoge by Aḥmad Fouād al-Ahwānī was published in Cairo in the same year (together with a Life of Porphyry, in Arabic). Both editors would have been well advised to consult the parallel version to be found in the Bodleian MS Marsh 28 (i.e. Al-Fārābī's commentary on the Isagoge, cf. D. M. Dunlop, *The Existence and Definition of Philosophy, from an Arabic text ascribed to Al-Fārābī*, Iraq 13, 1951, p. 76 ff.) instead of filling the lacunas in the Paris MS. with translations of their own.

p. 97 *n.* 1. Cf. O. Regenbogen in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll s.v. *Theophrastos*, Supplement VII, col. 1408 ff.

p. 112 *f.* Cf. now Badawi, *Manṭiq Arisṭū* III p. 1014 ff. and the interesting note on the 'old translation', presumably by Ibn Nāʿima, p. 740, where he mentions that it is uncertain from which language it was made.

p. 114 *n.* 1. Cf. W. Schwarz, *The meaning of Fidus Interpres in medieval translation*, Journal of Theological Studies 45, 1944, pp. 73 ff.

p. 127. Al-Kindi gives the Aristotelian definition in this way (Definitions, p. 165, 7): النفس تمامية جرم طبيعى ذى آلة قابل للحياة.

p. 61 (1–III). A manuscript containing the *Isagoge*, the *Categories*, the *De interpretatione*, the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* has been traced by Prof. D. S. Rice in Istanbul, Top-Kapu Ahmet III 3362. It has Latin notes (of South Italian origin?) on the margins and some puzzling illuminations.

p. 64 *n.* 3. S. Pines, La 'philosophie orientale' d'Avicenne etc., *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 1952 (1953) pp. 18 ff.

p. 64 *n.* 4. Cf. G. Levi della Vida, *Oriens* 5, 1952, pp. 109 ff., A. J. Festugière–R. M. Tonneau, *Revue des Etudes Grecques* 65, 1952, pp. 97–118, H. Langerbeck, *Gnomon* 25, 1953, pp. 263 ff.

p. 65 *l.* 12. The Arabic text of the *Poetics* (first published by Margoliouth) has been reprinted by A. Badawi [Cairo 1953] together with the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes (first published by Lasinio) and Al-Fārābī's essay Canons of Poetry, first published by A. J. Arberry, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 16, 1938, p.266.

p. 65 *l.* 17. The text of the *De plantis* was reprinted by A. Badawi, *Islamica* 16, Cairo 1954, pp. 243–282. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, Aristotle's Περὶ φυτῶν, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 57, 1957, pp. 75–80.

p. 65 *l.* 23. Vol. V i was posthumously published Beyrouth 1952. Cf. *Orientalia* 26, 1957, pp. 92–94.

p. 66 *n.* 1. Ibn Suwār: cf. B. Lewin, L'idéal antique du philosophe dans la philosophie arabe. Un traité d'éthique du philosophe Baghdadien Ibn Suwār, *Lychnos* 1954–5, pp. 267–284. La notion de muḥdaṯ dans le Kalām et dans la philosophie, *Donum Natalicium H. S. Nyberg Oblatum*, Uppsala 1954, pp. 84–93. S. Pines, *op.cit.* (p. 64 n. 3), p. 15, n. 3; p. 36, n. 1. S. M. Stern, Ibn al-Samḥ, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1956, pp. 31–44. — Theophrastus: Cf. E. Reitzenstein, *Theophrast bei Epikur und Lucrez*, Heidelberg 1924. H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, The Syriac translation of Theophrastus' Meteorology, *Autour d'Aristote*, Louvain 1955, pp. 433–449.

p. 66 *l.* 12. A. Périer, *Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī*, Paris 1920, pp. 77 ff.

p. 66 *l.* 32. He is also the translator of Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De providentia*.

p. 67 *n.* 1. Ibrāhim ibn ʿAbdallāh was a Christian, cf. *Arisṭū ʿinda 'l ʿArab* p. 277 and *Fihrist* p. 252 Flügel.

p. 67 *l.* 23. Cf. S. Pines, La doctrine de l'intellect selon Bakr al-Mawsilī, *Studi Orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida* I, Roma 1956, p. 350 f. Un texte inconnu d'Aristote, *Archives*, 1956 (published 1957), p. 16 f.

p. 67 *l.* 37. Cf. F. Rosenthal, Isḥāq b. Ḥunain's Ta'rīḫ al-aṭibbā', *Oriens* 7, 1954, pp. 55–80.

p. 68 *l.* 26. Cf. D. M. Dunlop, The translations of Al-Biṭrīq and Yaḥyā ibn Al-Biṭrīq, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1959, p. 140 ff.

p. 68 *l.* 32. An English translation of the 'Theology of Aristotle' by G. C. Lewis, based on a new critical text, is now available in the second volume of P. Henry and H. R. Schwyzer's edition of the Greek text of Plotinus, Paris-Bruxelles 1959, cf. Praef, pp. XXVI ff. About the edition of the Arabic text by A. Badawi, *Islamica* 20, Cairo 1955 cf. G. L. Lewis, *Oriens* 10, 1957, pp. 395–399.

Ibn Nā'ima: cf. P. Kraus, *Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa'* (above p. 64, n. 4) p. 8. J. Kraemer, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 106, 1956, p. 264.

Aṣṭāt: rather Uṣṭāth (cf. below p. 119.)

p. 68 *l.* 39. A.D. 686, according to Kraemer, *op.cit.*, p. 265, n. 2.

p. 69 *n.* 2. Cf. P. Kraus, *Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa'*, p. 3.

p. 70 *l.* 15. Cf. C. Haddad, *'Isā b. Zur'a, philosophe arabe et apologiste chrétien du Xe siècle.* Thèse Paris 1952, 366 pp. (typescript).

p. 70 *l.* 30. Three similar references to the spelling of Isḥāq's autograph are to be found on the margins of the Paris MS of the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας foll. 182v 186v. Cf. also the contemporary MS of Al-Fārābī, *Arā ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*, passim.

p. 71 *n.* 2. Cf. S. M. Stern, Ibn al-Ṭayyib's commentary on the Isagoge, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 19, 1957, pp. 419–425. J. Schacht–M. Meyerhof, *Controversy* (cf. above p. 64, n. 3) pp. 58, 63, 87; he was the teacher of Ibn Buṭlān.—A. F. L. Beeston, An important Arabic manuscript in Oxford, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 19, 1953, p. 197 ff.

p. 73 *l.* 28. Cf. Περὶ ἑρμηνείας fol. 171ᵛ 180ᵛ.

p. 74 *l.* 10. Cf. Ammonius, *De interpr.* p. 17, 22 Busse. Boethius, *De interpr.*, Ed. sec. p. 5, 14 Meiser.

p. 74 *n.* 1. Cf. the older form Hifūqrātis for Buqrāṭ in Ibn Māsawaih (Prüfer–Meyerhof, Die Augenheilkunde des Juḥannā b. Māsawaih, *Der Islam* 6, 1916, p. 220).

p. 76 *l.* 22. Ammonios depends on Proclus, cf. *De interpr.*, p. 1, 8 Busse.

p. 77 *l.* 35. About his commentary of the *Sophistici Elenchi* cf. A. Badawi, *Manṭiq Arisṭū*, vol. III, Cairo 1952, p. 851: الى هذا الموضع وجد من تفسير قويرا لهذا الكتاب

p. 79 *l.* 2. Cf. D. J. Allan, Aristotle 'De caelo' and the commentary of Simplicius, *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 2, 1950, pp. 82 ff.

p. 84 ff. Cf. L. Minio-Paluello, Il testo dei Primi Analitici di Aristotele: Le tradizioni antiche Siriaca e Latina, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* 32, 1957, pp. 567–584.

p. 90 ff. The number of Greek words used by Isḥāq b. Ḥunain in his translation of Aristotle's *De anima* (ed. A. Badawi, *Islamica* 16, Cairo 1954, pp. 1–88) is surprising.

p. 95 *l.* 11. Cf. Al-Kindī, below p. 201, n. 3 and Nā'ima (?), *Topics* 165a4 (=p. 752, 1 Badawi) Τῶν ἐνδόξων من جمع فكر محمود

p. 95 *l.* 36. Now published by A. Badawi (cf. above ad p. 90 ff.)

p. 96 *l.* 1. Cf. Al-Kindī, *Definitiones*, p. 165, A.R.: النفس تمامية جرم طبيعي and Aristotle, *De an.* 412a9, 27 تمام for ἐντελέχεια [Isḥāq].

p. 96 *l.* 6. Cf. Alexander Aphr., *De an.*, pp. 16,6. 17,12. 24,1. 103,6,9 Bruns.

p. 97 *l.* 14. Read: «This earliest translation of an epitome of the . . .»

p. 98 *l.* 28. Cf. Ṣā'id al-Andalusī, *Ṭabaqāt al-umam*, p. 52, Cheikho (p. 105 Blachère) and below p. 194, n. 3.

p. 98 *n.* 1. Cf. S. Pines, Razi Critique de Galien, *Actes du Septième Congrès International d'Histoire des Sciences*, Jerusalem 1953, p. 485.

p. 103. The MS mentioned ad p. 61 should be collated.

p. 107 (ad. p. 385, n. 6). The Syriac form also in Ibn Zur'a's translation of the *Sophistici Elenchi*, p. 159, 4 Badawi.

Additions ad p. 61. 111. The Arabic text of the Isagoge-passages missing in the Paris MS can now be consulted in S. M. Stern's article, quoted ad p. 71, n. 2 on pp. 423–425.

ON THE ARABIC VERSIONS OF BOOKS A, α, and Λ OF ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS*

It would be out of place to list in a short paper, written for a special occasion, all the various reasons which may induce classical scholars to take an interest in Islamic philosophy, or to illustrate diverse aspects of the general question by examining a number of miscellaneous topics. I rather prefer to open a discussion of the Greek manuscripts used by the ninth- and tenth-century Arabic translators of Aristotle. That such a study ought to be undertaken is obvious and its usefulness has never been seriously doubted. It was in this light that Professor Margoliouth tackled the translations of Aristotle's *Poetics* [1] and *Rhetoric* [2] and of Theophrastus' metaphysical fragment [3]. But progress has been delayed by the lack of proper editions of the Arabic versions and by the lack of scholars who are used to reading both Greek and Arabic texts and are familiar with textual questions on both sides. Collaboration between classical scholars and orientalists can, in my view, never replace this ambidextrous approach, and it is not surprising that the results of such collaboration have not been encouraging [4].

In the present situation it seems particularly worthwhile and promising to compare some sections of the Arabic text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* with the Greek original. For, by a lucky coincidence, an excellent critical edition of the Arabic version is available at the very moment of the publication of Professor Jaeger's most stimulating minor edition of the Greek text (Oxford, 1957) [5]. The Arabic version, or rather versions, are

[1] *Analecta orientalia ad Poeticam Aristoteleam* (London 1887). *The Poetics of Aristotle, translated from Greek into English and from Arabic into Latin, with a revised text, introduction, commentary, glossary and onomasticon* (London-New York-Toronto 1911).

[2] On the Arabic version of Aristotle's Rhetoric, *Semitic Studies in memory of Alexander Kohut* (Berlin 1897), pp. 376 ff.

[3] Remarks on the Arabic version of the Metaphysics of Theophrastus, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1892, pp. 192 ff. The Arabic version is mentioned neither in Ross-Fobes' critical edition of the "Metaphysical Fragment" (Oxford 1929) nor in Prof. Regenbogen's comprehensive article "Theophrastos von Eresos" (Pauly-Wissowa, Supplement-Band VII).

[4] Cf. my survey of 'Previous Work on translations from the Greek' in *Oriens* 6 (1953), p. 91 ff. [above, p. 60ff].

[5] Cf. *Gnomon* 31, 1959, pp. 586–92.

mainly to be found in the lemmata of Averroës's *Great Commentary*, some are quoted within the context of Averroës' paraphrasis, and in the case of books α and Λ we even have an additional translation copied on the margins of the unique (probably thirteenth century) Arabic MS, now in Leiden. The edition is the work of the late Father Maurice Bouyges, S.J., to whom we owe all the best available critical editions of Arabic philosophical texts [1]. It also contains a very elaborate Arabic-Greek glossary [2] which facilitates the comparison of the Greek and Arabic texts (it is regrettable that other publications of Arabic versions from the Greek, notably the recent first editions of Porphyry's *Isagoge* [3] and Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Topics*, *Sophistici Elenchi* and *De anima* are not provided with indexes of this kind, as are the extant editions of the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione*)[4]. Unfortunately, Bouyges' posthumous Greek-Arabic glossary, his "Répertoire des Mots Grecs" [5] is not as reliable as his Arabic-Greek glossary and has to be used with caution, especially since it is not complete. Bouyges' list of hypothetical Greek readings which the translators may have found in the MSS used by them [6] represents a very small help for the Greek scholar. He almost exclusively mentions their "Sonderfehler" ("separative errors") and does not relate their readings to the principal Greek MSS. Only very few of the passages of A, α and Λ which I propose to list here are mentioned by him at all.

Since this paper is addressed primarily to classical scholars I shall not quote the Arabic evidence in the original but ask to be trusted—although I may well be wrong here and there. Moreover, Father Bouyges' edition is so admirably arranged that every passage of Aristotle (quoted according to Bekker) can be immediately checked. In my references to the Greek text and to Greek MSS I base myself on Jaeger's recent edition and follow the sigla as used by him. It goes without saying that Sir David Ross' larger edition and his sometimes different editorial decision have been taken into due account.

[1] *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum*, V–VII (Beirut 1938–52). Cf. *Orientalia*, 20 (1951), pp. 334 ff.; 26 (1957), pp. 92 ff.

[2] *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum*, VII.

[3] A. Badawi, *Manṭiq Arisṭū*, pp. 1021 ff.

[4] Cf. the article Arisṭuṭālīs in the second edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. I, pp. 630 ff. A comparative index of the logical treatises is being prepared by Dr. S. Afnan in Haifa, and an index of the Arabic version of Themistius' *De anima* by Dr. M. Lyons in Cambridge. Dr. G. Lewis in Oxford has completed a similar index of the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*, comparing it with Plotinus.

[5] *Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum*, V, i, pp. CXCV ff.

[6] Op. cit., V 1, pp. CLXI ff.

I

Before I proceed to a detailed comparison of textual variants, I propose to say a few words about the quality of the Arabic versions of philosophical and cognate Greek texts and of the materials at the disposal of the translators—especially since the evidence, though easily accessible, is not very widely known.

The Arabic authors distinguish between "ancient" and more recent translations, by "ancient" translations meaning those dating before Ḥunain son of Isḥāq (+873) and his large school. We have known for more than thirty years now a small treatise in which Ḥunain discusses more than 120 works of Galen which he had come to know in their Greek original and which he had translated either into Syriac or into Arabic [1]. We have every right to assume that the conditions for translating Aristotle were not very different from those described in the case of Galen, and we can, apart from Ḥunain's special procedure in translating, confidently state that the earlier translators had the same opportunity as Ḥunain to come across Greek manuscripts and to consult educated Greeks living within the orbit of Islam—although we have no similar direct evidence on their behalf.

According to Ḥunain it was possible to collect Greek MSS in all the countries of the Islamic empire which had a Greek urbanised population at the time of the Arab conquest and in which the Greek language had not yet died out in his own day—so that a prospective translator could still learn the language from educated native speakers. He tells us [2] that he went in search of MSS in Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt, and he particularly mentions Alexandria, Damascus (the home of the orthodox Greek patristic writer John of Damascus in the first half of the eighth century), Aleppo [3] and Ḥarrān [4] as places where rare Greek books are likely to be found [5]. He succeeded in obtaining at least one MS of most of the works of Galen of which he knew, although in the case of the

[1] *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, edited and translated into German by G. Bergsträsser (Leipzig 1925).

[2] *Op. cit.*, no. 115.

[3] *Op. cit.*, no. 67. People told him that they had seen a rare MS in Aleppo but although he carefully looked for it there he did not find it.

[4] *Op. cit.*, no. 122 and G. Bergsträsser, *Neue Materialien zu Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq's Galen-Bibliographie* (Leipzig 1932), p. 11. Ḥunain found there a copy of the Περὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ Πλάτωνος Τιμαίῳ ἰατρικῶς εἰρημένων, the greater part of which is nowadays lost (cf. *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum, Supplementum I*, Leipzig-Berlin 1934).

[5] In one case he went in search of a Greek MS of a work by Galen without success but found eventually comfort in the fact that Oribasius (s. IV) somewhere mentions that he had also been unable to trace a MS of the work in question (*op. cit.*, no. 80). The Greek

fifteen books Περὶ ἀποδείξεως, for instance, whose Greek original is now lost, he could nowhere trace a complete manuscript, as he tells us with great regret [1]. But Ḥunain was by no means satisfied to base a translation on only one Greek MS: "At the age of 20 I translated Galen *De sectis* from a very faulty Greek MS (scil. into Syriac). Later when I was about 40 years old my pupil Ḥubaish asked me to correct it after I had brought together a number of Greek MSS. I collated all these MSS so that one single correct manuscript was established, then I collated this (critically established) Greek text with my previous Syriac version and corrected it. This is my usual procedure in all my attempts at translation. After some years I translated it into Arabic." [2] The same is explicitly stated for his Syriac translation of the Περὶ τροφῶν δυνάμεων [3]. He doubts the quality of his translation of the Περὶ οὐσίας τῆς ψυχῆς κατ' Ἀσκληπιάδην since he did it as a young and inexperienced writer and used only one—and moreover a faulty—MS [4]. He encountered particular difficulties in establishing a "good text" of Galen's commentary on Hippocrates' *Epidemics* [5]. We learn thus that Ḥunain and those of his pupils who translated from the Greek into Syriac for Christian and into Arabic for Muslim patrons were both able and accustomed to establish a critical Greek text (in Bekker's eclectic manner) before they started translating. In doing this they most likely imitated what Greek scholars in their days did as well, and this Arabic evidence may thus be used in supporting the not uncommon observation, that our ancient Greek MSS were evidently constantly influencing each other and hence present a "mixed" text as the result of this procedure—a fact which can be studied in Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentaries on Aristotle for instance or in Galen's treatment of textual problems in Hippocrates [6]. The Paris MS of Aristotle's *Organon* shows, in its marginal notes, that the Arabs were still quite aware of the variant readings discussed in the Greek commentaries [7]. We are thus

Footnote Continued from Page 116

text is in fact available and can be read in vol. XIV, p. 311 ff. of Kuehn's edition (Περὶ εὐπορίστων).

[1] *Op. cit.*, no. 115.

[2] *Op. cit.*, no. 3.

[3] *Op. cit.*, no. 74.

[4] *Op. cit.*, no. 108.

[5] *Op. cit.*, no. 95. Cf. also no. 20 (*Methodus medendi*).

[6] Cf. above p. 81. Cf. also Ammonius, *De interpr.* p. 8, 24–28 Busse, a relevant passage, quoted in L. Minio-Paluello's Oxford text of the *De interpretatione* (Oxford 1949), p. XIII. Cf. also H. Diels' discussion of the text of Aristotle's *Physics* (*Abhandlungen* of the Berlin Academy, 1882) and Sir David Ross in his edition of the *Physics* (Oxford 1936), pp. 106 ff.

[7] Cf., for instance, above p. 70 ff. *passim*, pp. 82 f.

entitled to use Arabic translations, at least those produced under the influence of the school of Ḥunain, with the same respect as Greek texts established by late Greek scholars. Ḥunain also tells us how he became acquainted with the way in which the "Ancients" were studying Galen (and we have every right to assume the same for Aristotle and cognate texts). "Our Christian friends", he says, "do the same as the Alexandrian scholars used to do: they read and interpret texts in those places which are called *Uskul* (Syriac *eskole*, Greek σχολή)", i.e. in convent schools which existed in Baghdad itself [1]. These readings probably took place in Syriac but I do not think it impossible that there were still Greek studies of this kind in existence in ninth-century Baghdad. Ibn an-Nadīm, the author of the *Fihrist*, could still visit the Greek quarter round the Greek Church in Baghdad in 988 [2], and some translations from the Greek were still made in the second half of the tenth century. I think it unlikely that Ḥunain had to travel to Byzantium to learn Greek, he could acquire his astonishing mastery of Greek scientific style nearer home.

We can say that most of the Arabic translations made by Ḥunain, by his son Isḥāq and by their immediate pupils are extremely good. They even help us to ascertain the exact meaning of Greek words in the ninth century and thus can be useful for Greek studies proper. The same applies to many translations made by the tenth-century Christian Baghdad teachers of philosophy who had no Greek but often used Syriac translations made by Ḥunain or his pupils—as well as accepting their Arabic versions where they existed. A comparative study of pre-Ḥunainian Arabic translations—some of which were still used in Averroës' days—remains to be made. They appear to be of varying value, and each case has to be judged on its merits. It has been rightly observed, by a fourteenth-century Arabic critic [3], that in some of the older translations "the translator renders each Greek word by a single Arabic word of an exactly corresponding meaning, thus establishing the translation of one word after another, until the whole has been translated. This method is bad on two counts: (1) There are no corresponding Arabic words for all Greek words; therefore, in this kind of translation many Greek expressions remain as they are. (2) Syntactic peculiarities and constructions are not the same in one language as in the other. . . . The other method of translating is that of Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq . . . and others. According to this method, the

[1] *Op. cit.*. p. 18 (p. 15 of the German translation).

[2] Cf. C. A. Nallino *Raccolta di Scritti Editi e Inediti*, vol. V (Rome 1944) p. 125 and nn. 2 and 3.

[3] As-Ṣafadī (died 1363). I owe the reference to this passage to F. Rosenthal. *Isis* 36 (1945–6), p. 253 f. Cf. also above p. 83.

translator grasps in his mind the meaning of the whole sentence used, then renders it into Arabic by a corresponding sentence, regardless of the congruence or lack of congruence of the individual words. This method is better. Therefore Ḥunain's books need no revision. . . ." Every student of these different types of translation will agree with this description of their various ways. It would be a rewarding task to explain the merits, say, of Isḥāq son of Ḥunain's translation of the *Categories* in detail to nonorientalists.

The sections of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to be considered in this paper are due to four different translators. One of them, a certain Asṭāth (or rather Usṭāth = Eustathius), belongs to the pre-Ḥunainian group of translators; he had been commissioned by the philosopher Al-Kindī (who died about A.D. 870) to translate the *Metaphysics* for him [1]. We find his translation of the α and of Λ up to 1072^{b} 16 on the margins of the Leiden MS; it is almost complete, being only mechanically damaged here and there. From $1072^{b}16$–$1076^{a}4$ the lemmata of the commentary of Averroës are given in his translation, as Father Bouyges rightly assumes, and, accordingly, the marginal translation stops. I refer to him as Ar^{u}. Isḥāq son of Ḥunain's (d. 910) [2] version of the α was used by Averroës (it will be referred to as Ar^{1}). The Arabic text of the lemmata of Λ up to $1072^{b}16$ is given in the version of Abū Bishr Mattā (d. 940), one of the leading figures in the tenth-century Baghdad Christian-Arabic school of Aristotelian studies [3]; like most members of this school he did not know Greek and used to translate from previous Syriac translations, often those made in the school of Ḥunain son of Isḥāq; he may, in this particular case, have used Ḥunain's translation of Λ, which is mentioned in Ibn an-Nadīm's *Fihrist*, but this is only a guess which cannot be proved (his translation will be referred to as Ar^{m}). The beginning of A was no longer available in twelfth-century Spain; Averroës' text starts at $987^{a}6$. The translator, Naẓīf, belongs also to the tenth-century group of Baghdad translators, (referred to as Ar^{n}) [4]. As we shall see, all these translators used reasonably good Greek MSS; in the case of Isḥāq and the Syriac source of Mattā we

[1] Ibn an-Nadīm, *Fihrist*, p. 251, 27 Flügel. Cf. above p. 90.

[2] Cf. above pp. 67, 70 ff., 82 f., 99. [Cf. G. Levi della Vida, Bertà di Toscana e il Califfo Muktafi, *Anedotti e Svaghi Arabi e non-Arabi*, Milano-Napoli 1959, pp. 26–44.]

[3] Cf. above pp. 66 f., 77 f., 99, 102 ff.

[4] Cf. S. M. Stern, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1956, p. 32.

[Cf. P. Thillet, Remarques et notes critiques sur les traductions arabes du livre Lambda de la Métaphysique d'Aristote, *Actes du Congrès Budé à Lyon*, 1958. M. Bouyges, La critique textuelle de la Métaphysique d'Aristote et les anciennes versions arabes, *Mélanges de l'Université St. Joseph de Beyrouth* 27, 1947–48, pp. 147–52.]

may assume that the respective translators had made their own Greek text before they started to translate. But Usṭāth and Naẓīf also show a remarkably good understanding of the by no means easy Greek text.

II

Jaeger's edition of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* follows, independently, the pattern established first by Bonitz and elaborated in the editions of Christ, and especially in Sir David Ross' text (published for the first time thirty-four years ago). This means, in the first instance, that it gives due recognition to A^b, a not very diligently copied twelfth-century MS which represents an ancient tradition, as is evident from a comparison of a considerable number of its readings with variants mentioned by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*; the tradition of which it is the only surviving witness may ultimately derive from a different version of Aristotle's original text, possibly an earlier draft of his lecture course. New and independent evidence for readings hitherto found in A^b only would certainly be welcome as additional material for the reconstruction of this branch of the tradition, which became neglected in the later centuries of Byzantium. The remaining Greek MSS all seem to depend on a tradition represented by the tenth-century E and the comparatively recently discovered tenth-century J (which has been fully used both in Ross' and Jaeger's editions). Jaeger makes it seem very probable that these two MSS derive from a common ancestor Π, a late Greek uncial manuscript without breathings and accents which had a number of variant readings recorded on its margin. Readings peculiar to this family (which may, again, go back to a text known to Alexander and, ultimately, to a later version of Aristotle's lecture course) are also followed by the Arabic translators. The value of the Arabic translations is obvious in cases where readings of Π or A^b are not guaranteed as old variants by Alexander or some similar witness; whenever they appear in the Arabic as well we can assume that they are older than A^b and also than Π. Moreover, recent emendations and suggestions are sometimes supported by the Arabs, and variant readings hitherto unknown occasionally appear.

I am quite aware that the evidence presented on the following pages is not exhaustive (quite apart from the fact that it is restricted to only three books of the *Metaphysics*) but I trust that it will be sufficient to prove that my claim is justified and that the Greek text of the *Metaphysics*, as far as it can be reliably ascertained from the Arabic versions, should be used in a future comprehensive critical edition of the text such as

W. Jaeger had planned before 1933 (cf. his Praefatio p. *V*). My remarks are meant as a small contribution to this larger enterprise.

III

I first propose to demonstrate that different Greek MSS were used in different translations of the same portion of the text of the *Metaphysics* and that ambiguous words could be understood in different ways by different translators. (There is, of course, no way of proving whether the various translators just followed one MS at their disposal or whether they had first established a satisfactory Greek text from several MSS, as may well have happened in the school of Ḥunain.)

α1, 993^{b}22 Ross decides (with Brandis) for the reading of Alexander and A^b οὐ τὸ ἀΐδιον, whereas Jaeger prefers to follow a variant mentioned by Alexander and to be found in E, οὐ τὸ αἴτιον καθ' αὑτό. The Arabic translators were acquainted with both these old variants, Ar^u following the tradition represented by Al and A^b, Ar^l siding with $Al_{\gamma\rho}$ and E.—3,995^{a}17 Ar^l agrees with $\Pi A^b Al_{\gamma\rho}$ (τρόπος) against the "citatio" of Alexander and Ar^u (λόγος).

Λ3,1070^{a}18 we find that the reading of all the Greek MSS and of Ps.-Alexander Πλάτων ἔφη is supported by Ar^u, and the genuine Alexander's οἱ τὰ εἴδη τιθέμενοι ἔφασαν by Ar^m (it may well be that Ar^m always reproduces the lemma of the genuine Alexander).—1070^{a}20 Ar^u has γάρ with all the Greek MSS, Ar^m and the genuine Alexander omit it.—1070^{a}19 the uncial writing ΑΛΛΑ is understood as ἄλλα in Ar^u (with Al^p and Ross) but as ἀλλά in Ar^m (with the genuine Alexander and E A^b); there is no trace of ἄλλου J ἀλλ' οὐ Cherniss, Jaeger. (This is not necessarily an argument for the use of different MSS and we have to ask ourselves the same question about the two following variants.)—6,1072^{a}5 Ar^m presupposes the correct reading ἐνέργεια, supported only by Al^p; Ar^u the dative ἐνεργείᾳ to be found also in ΠA^b.—7,1072^{a}34 ΠΩΣ is rightly understood as πώς by Ross but he has a predecessor in Ar^u; Ar^m takes it as the interrogative adverb πῶς, together with Al^p and ΠA^b.—4,1070^{a}33 the accepted reading πάντων is supported by $Ar^u Al^p$ and Π, whereas πάντα is available in Ar^m and A^b.—7, 1072^{a}26 we find κινούμενα in Ar^u and Π but the wrong reading κινούμενον in Ar^m and A^b.—1072^{b}3 δέ Jaeger, Ar^u Π: δή Ross, Ar^m A^b.—1072^{b}24 the omission of εὖ is not a "separative error" of J but probably an ancient variant since the word is missing in Ar^u as well; but Averroës also knew the common reading εὖ ἔχει, "from the manuscript of Alexander" (p. 1615k Bouyges).

IV

I now proceed to list a few passages where variant readings or glosses have been interpolated in all three or one of our Greek manuscripts and where Arabic evidence supports the conclusions of recent editors. A6,987^{b}22 either τὰ εἴδη or τοὺς ἀριθμούς is superfluous and disturbing. Christ and Jaeger have thrown out τοὺς ἀριθμούς as a marginal gloss; it is also omitted by Ar^{a} (cf. Bouyges, *Notice* p. CLXX and Jaeger's apparatus). —Contamination of variants has been claimed by Jaeger (Praefatio p. XIV) in A8,988^{b}25 τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέασι μόνον τῶν δ' ἀσωμάτων οὔ [ὄντων καὶ ἀσωμάτων] E Al^{c}; the bracketed words are not only omitted by A^{b} but by Ar^{n} as well and the text of A^{b} is thus confirmed as an ancient reading.—The case of Γ 2,1004^{a}32 where ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις ἐλέχθη is superfluous is similar: the words to be bracketed do not occur in A^{b} and Ar^{u}, the omission is also mentioned as a variant by a fifteenth-century marginal notation in E (cf. *Hermes* 52,1917, p. 491 and Ross' text).—The words ἡ δ'ἀΐδιος in Λ1, 1069^{a}32 have been bracketed since Freudenthal (*Abh. Berlin* 1885, p. 72) published the genuine Alexander, who knew both readings and had decided against the interpolation. The clause is also missing in Ar^{m} (Ar^{u} is not available) and Themistius (who can partly now be read in Arabic instead of the Hebrew text published by Landauer, cf. 'Abdurraḥmān Badawī, *Arisṭū 'inda-l-'Arab*, Cairo, 1947, p. 331,8).—4,1070^{b}24 [καὶ εἰς ταῦτα διαιρεῖται ἡ ἀρχή] Bonitz, Jaeger: the words are omitted in Ar^{m} but translated in Ar^{u}, which proves that they did not occur in one branch of the ancient tradition. In ^{b}29 the same clause is missing in Al^{p} and A^{b} and in both Arabic translations and deleted by Bonitz, Ross and Jaeger. The evident gloss 8, 1073^{b}33 τοῦτ' ἔστιν . . . τάξιν, first noticed by Christ and omitted in E, has not been translated by Ar^{u}.

The following passages show the Arabs supporting other suggestions of modern editors. A9, 993^{a}5 Bonitz has changed the senseless σμα and μ of the MSS to ζα and δ, following Alexander's paraphrase; this obviously correct reading is also reproduced in Ar^{n}.—Λ2, 1069^{b}32 Ross follows Al^{c} and the Greek MSS in reading οὔ, whereas Jaeger prefers Al^{p} and Bonitz's δ which is presupposed by both Ar^{u} and Ar^{m}.—5, 1071^{a}9 Ross proposes to read ἀμφοῖν στέρησίς τε, οἷον. . . . This reading is presupposed by Ar^{m} (p. 1536,4 Bouyges) and Averroës; Ar^{u} (p. 1537,4 Bouyges) follows the text provided by all the Greek MSS and accepted by Jaeger . . . ἀμφοῖν, στέρησις δὲ οἷον . . .—In 7, 1072^{b}28 the δή proposed by Bonitz instead of the reading δέ in ΠA^{b} is confirmed by Ar^{u} and "the manuscript of Alexander" (p. 1615n Bouyges). Whether Themistius can be referred

to in support of δή (cf. Ross' apparatus) is doubtful but not impossible (cf. A. Badawī, *op. cit.* p. 18, ii).—In 8, 1073^{b}2 Christ proposed to read (with Al^{p}) the indefinite pronoun τις for the interrogative pronoun provided by the MSS; the same is to be found in Ar^{u}.—The reading ἑπτά in 8, 1074^{a}13 is accepted by Bonitz and Ross but Jaeger believes it to be corrupt, referring to Alexander's teacher Sosigenes' doubt "nam ἐννέα desiderari". The text of Ar^{u} (p. 1670 m and note 61 Bouyges) has "seven" but this is changed to "nine" by the same hand in the Leiden MS. It must however be said that the Arabic numerals for 7 سبعة and 9 تسعة look very similar, and that the change may be evidence of the intelligence of the scribe and not necessarily reflect a Greek variant.

V

The main task of the critical editor of the *Metaphysics* is however obviously the judicious choice between the different recognized primary authorities for the actual text. The hitherto neglected Arabic evidence sides sometimes with one, sometimes with another group of witnesses and, accordingly, sometimes supports the editorial decisions and sometimes agrees with the variants rejected. I shall first deal with a number of passages in which the Arabic versions agree with the readings adopted in Jaeger's new text.

(i)

Λ4, 1070^{b}25 Jaeger has retained οὖσα with Π and Ar^{m} Ar^{u} and postulated that something like ‹οὐκ ἔστι στοιχεῖον› has fallen out. A^{b} alone has καὶ οὐσία instead (which is accepted by Ross).—Similarly he bases his attempt at restoring the disturbed clause 7, 1072^{a}24 on the impossible text κινοῦν καὶ μέσον which is to be found in Π and in Ar^{m} and Ar^{u} as well; the scribe of A^{b} and Bessarion (and Bonitz and Ross) have deleted καί. Neither Jaeger nor Ross offer any final solution of the difficulty.

In some passages the Arabic versions support the right transcription of uncial manuscripts. Λ3, 1070^{a}8 the right spelling αὐτῷ is found in more recent MSS and can be inferred from Ar^{m} and Ar^{u}; there is αὑτῷ in Π and ἑαυτῷ in A^{b}.—6, 1071^{b}16 the right breathing and accent in Π, αὕτη, and Ar^{m} and Ar^{u}: αὐτή A^{b}.—9, 1074^{b}36 αὐτῆς J Al^{p} (ἑαυτῆς), Ar^{u}: αὑτῆς E A^{b}.—5, 1071^{a}8 ἐνεργείᾳ Al^{c} Ar^{m} Ar^{u}: ἐνέργεια J A^{b}.—6, 1071^{b}22 the correct nominative ἐνέργεια is to be found in A^{b} and Ar^{m} and Ar^{u}, the dative ἐνεργείᾳ in E J (and in an anonymous Arabic paraphrase, cf. A. Badawī, *Arisṭū 'inda'l'Arab*, p. 4, l. 3 and Bonitz).

Then there is another group of variants of this class which are likely to be pre-Byzantine since they are borne out by Arabic evidence: A6,

$987^{b}6$ ὅρον only A^{b}, proved as ancient reading by Al^{p} and Ar^{n}: λόγον E. —8, $989^{a}26$ εὐλόγως Al^{c} Ar^{p} A^{b} and the fifteenth-century corrector of E (E γρ): ἀλόγως E Ascl Al p. 68,3. The clause $989^{a}26$ ὅλως . . . $^{a}30$ φησιν has been suspected by Jaeger but not definitely marked by the sign [ ] (cf. *Praefatio* p. XVIII) denoting a later addition by Aristotle himself. It is omitted in Al^{p} and A^{b} but preserved in E Ascl and Ar^{n}.—Ar^{i} agrees in α 2, $994^{b}15$ with Al^{p} and A^{b} in reproducing τοῖς οὖσιν against the reading τοιούτοις of Π (and Bonitz).

Λ2, $1069^{b}31$ καὶ ἡ ὕλη Al^{p}ΠAr^{m}: ἡ ὕλη A^{b}. The reading presupposed in Ar^{u} is not unambiguously clear.—4, $1070^{a}36$ ἡ οὐσία Jaeger, Bonitz, $A^{b}Ar^{m}Ar^{u}$J (om. ἡ): οὐσίαι E corr. J^{2}, αἱ οὐσίαι E^{2} Ross.—There is no trace of the variant reading ἥ in 5, $1071^{a}9$ which is mentioned on the margin of E by the scribe himself, καί is to be found in Ar^{m} and Ar^{u} as in Π$A^{b}Al^{c}$.—5, $1071^{a}14$ ἔτι A^{b} Ar^{m} Ar^{u}: εἰ Π, Bonitz.—6, $1071^{b}9$ Ar^{m} and Ar^{u} side with all the MSS in reading ἄρα against γάρ offered as a variant by a later student of E.—$1071^{b}13$: the Arabic *takūnu* (Ar^{m} Ar^{u}) instead of *takun*, more common in such clauses, may be explained as representing rather a Greek ἔσται (J Al^{p}, Bonitz) than ἔστι (E A^{b}). If this equation proves acceptable, the Arabic versions may reflect the two variant readings recorded $1071^{b}17$ ἔσται ΠAl^{c}, possibly presupposed in Ar^{u} (*takūnu*), as against ἔστι A^{b} and Ar^{m} (*takun*).—$1072^{a}1$: there is no confirmation of A^{b}'s omission of ἦν in the Arabic versions; Ar^{m} has it, together with Π; Ar^{u} has unfortunately not translated the words ἦν . . . εἶναι.—7, $1072^{a}29$ διότι A^{b}, corr. Eγρ, Ar^{m} Ar^{u}: δὲ ὅτι Π.—In the important passage $1072^{b}4$ Jaeger follows the reading κινουμένῳ provided by Π and the first hand of A^{b} and confirmed by Ar^{m}; Ar^{u} translates "by its movement" which may point to the same Greek reading: κινούμενον corr. A^{b}, Bonitz (and, as it seems, the anonymous Arabic paraphrase, cf. A. Badawī, *Arisṭū*, etc., p. 6,3): κινούμενα Ross.—$1072^{b}5$ ἄλλως Jaeger with Π Al^{p} and Ar^{m} (Ar^{u} is missing here): καὶ ἄλλως A^{b}, Bonitz, Ross.—The words καὶ ἀΐδιος $1072^{b}30$ which are left out in Pseudo-Alexander's paraphrasis occur also in Ar^{u}.—In 8, $1073^{b}4$ Ar^{u} sides with the manuscript reading φορῶν against σφαιρῶν Al^{c}.—Again, Ar^{u} read ἐπεὶ οὖν in his MS in $1074^{a}6$ against the ὥστε of Al^{c}.—$1074^{a}10$ Ar^{u} supports the reading δή of Π and the first hand of A^{b} against the correction δέ in A^{b} and Bonitz's text.

(ii)

I now give some illustrations of the opposite case, reporting a number of passages where the Arabic text agrees with readings rejected in Jaeger's edition.

The old variant τὸ τῇ γενέσει πρότερον τῇ φύσει ὕστερον in A 7,$989^{a}16$,

to be found in A^{b} and known as a variant to Asclepius and Alexander (p. 66,1) was translated by Ar^{n}.—8,$990^{a}25$ Jaeger and Ross read μέν, following Al^{p}: Bonitz adopted the reading of E μὲν ἕν; A^{b} and Ar^{n} have ἕν.—9,$992^{a}24$ Ar^{n} and A^{b} have φιλοσοφίας instead of σοφίας (E and commentators).

α 2, $994^{b}9$ Jaeger decides for ἐπεί with $A^{b}Al^{c}$, whereas Ross and Bonitz prefer ἔτι, the reading of Π, which is supported by Ar^{i} and Ar^{u}.

Λ1, $1069^{a}22$ Bonitz and Jaeger accept ταῦτα οἷον on the authority of Al^{c}: Ross follows Π and Ar^{m} and Ar^{u} in reading ταῦτα ἀλλά.—2, $1069^{b}23$ Jaeger proposes a brilliant emendation of a desperate line, μέν: Ar^{m} and Ar^{u} have the corrupt reading ἡμῖν in common with Π A^{b}. The Arabs, then, give no support to E γρ: ὁμοῦ, adopted by Bonitz and Ross, which is, evidently, a mistaken guess by an ancient or medieval scholar.—4, $1070^{b}7$ the wrong reading στοιχείων (for στοιχεῖον A^{b}) is not only to be found in Al^{c} and Π but also presupposed in Ar^{m} and Ar^{u}.—$1070^{b}20$ Jaeger decides with A^{b} for the plural χρώμασι; Bonitz's and Ross' preference for the singular χρώματι is supported by Ar^{u} and Ar^{m} as well as Π.—The Arabic translators are often good in the correct interpretation of uncial script as has been shown. But Christ's evident reading ταὐτά in 5, $1071^{a}1$ has not been anticipated by them, both Ar^{m} and Ar^{u} presuppose ταῦτα with the MSS and Al^{c}.—$1071^{a}12$ ὧν alt. Bonitz, Jaeger; codd. and Al^{c}: but καὶ ὧν Ar^{m} Ar^{u} and E γρ: ὧν ἐνίων Ross.—In the difficult clause $1071^{a}24$ Jaeger follows the reading of Π and William of Moerbeke's Latin translation ἤδη τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν. Ross follows a similar line by understanding the reading εἴδη of A^{b} J^{2} ex corr. as εἰ δή (with Rolfes). But the Arabic translations (Ar^{m} and Ar^{u}) understand εἴδη (as Bonitz) or rather τὰ εἴδη (as Al^{c} [one MS] and Christ).—The second πῶς in $1071^{b}2$ is omitted in A^{b} and Ar^{m} (Ar^{u} is not available); it is provided by Π and Al^{p}.—6, $1072^{a}11$ Ar^{p} (p. 1571,1 Bouyges) omits ἀεί with Π.—7, $1072^{a}30$ only Π and Al^{c} have γάρ, A^{b} Eγρ Ar^{m} and Ar^{u} δέ.—$1072^{b}5$ Jaeger's impressive suggestion ἐνεργείᾳ has some slight support in J (ἐνεργεια without accent); Ar^{m} (Ar^{u} is missing) with E A^{b} Al^{c} read the nominative (as Bonitz and Ross do).—8, $1073^{b}4$ φιλοσοφίᾳ is Bonitz's correction (ex Al^{c} p. 702,8 and Them. p. 23,15/26,15 Landauer): Ar^{u} has φιλοσοφίας with all the MSS.—$1074^{a}14$ Ar^{u} follows the reading φορῶν known from Themistius (p. 24,29/28,8) and Simplicius *De caelo* (506,4) whereas the Greek MSS and Al^{c} have σφαιρῶν, which all the recent editors accept.—$1074^{a}16$ Ar^{u} has καὶ τὰς αἰσθητάς with the MSS (and Bonitz): Al^{c}, Goebel and subsequent editors remove the words from the text.—$1074^{a}38$ ἓν μόνον is not omitted in Ar^{u} with Π (and Bonitz) against A^{b}, followed by Ross and Jaeger.

VI

Finally, I should like to call attention to a few variant readings which have no parallel in any Greek MS hitherto collated and which seem to me worth mentioning.

A 5, 987ª28 παρὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρότερον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων the words καὶ τῶν ἄλλων are bracketed as a variant reading by Jaeger (cf. Praefatio p. XIV and *Hermes* 52, p. 491). Ar^{n} read something like καὶ τῶν ὕστερον instead (p. 60,12, Bouyges). One may compare Alexander p. 49,17: τουτέστι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν μετ' ἐκείνους and Sir David Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* I p. 157: "the earlier and the later thinkers before Plato".

Instead of the clause α 2, 994ª22 ἢ (Jaeger, A^{b} E^{2}: μὴ Bonitz, Ross E^{1} J Εγρ Al^{p}) ὡς τόδε λέγεται μετὰ τόδε, οἷον ἐξ Ἰσθμίων Ὀλύμπια—which Jaeger judges to be a gloss added by a copyist familiar with Δ 24, 1023ᵇ5—both Ar^{u} and Ar^{l} have put in a different example which I should like to reconstruct tentatively in the following way (cf. pp. 23,3 and 26,1 and 5 Bouyges): μὴ ὡς τόδε λέγεται μετὰ τόδε, οἷον ἐξ ἀτμίδος ὁμίχλη. For the meaning of the new variant cf. Aristotle, *Meteor.* I 9, or, e.g., Alexander, *Meteor.*, p. 44, 28ff. Hayduck: ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὕδατος μεταβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἐκ τούτου γινομένη ἀναθυμίασις ἀτμίς, ἡ δ' ἐξ ἀέρος γινομένη σύγκρισις καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ὕδωρ νέφος. τὴν δὲ ὁμίχλην φησὶν εἶναι τῆς εἰς ὕδωρ συγκρίσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς τῆς νεφέλης περίττωμα· τὸ γὰρ ὑπολειφθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς νεφέλης ἐν τῇ εἰς ὕδωρ μεταβολῇ ὁμίχλη. γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀτμίδος εἰς νέφος μεταβολῇ ὁμίχλη, τῆς ἀτμίδος μὴ ὁμοίως συγκριθείσης καὶ πιληθείσης. A look at the Arabic text of Δ 24, 1023ᵇ5, to which Jaeger refers, shows that Ar^{u} was quite able to translate Ἴσθμια and Ὀλύμπια adequately. Hence it is very unlikely that Ar^{u} and Ar^{l} read the vulgate text in α 2 and changed it on their own account because their readers could not make sense of the Greek festivals. They have then preserved a genuine Greek variant which fits the context quite well and is not mentioned in any Greek commentary as far as I know. Its very existence may be quoted in support of Jaeger's solution of the textual difficulty of the passage.

A few minor variants in Λ may also be quoted. Instead of the evidently correct second εἶτα in 2, 1069ª21 (A^{b} Al^{p}) Ar^{m} has καί, Ar^{u} agrees with the reading ἡ of Π.—1069ª24 τοιαῦτα οἷον (cf. Jaeger's apparatus) is the reading of Ar^{u}, Ar^{m} has ταῦτα οἷον like the Greek MSS.—3, 1069ᵇ36–1070ª1 Ar^{u} has ὑπό τινος καὶ ἐξ οὗ καὶ εἴς τι, to be compared to A^{b} ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι καὶ ἐξ οὗ. Ar^{m} presupposes ἔκ τινος (or ἐξ οὗ) καὶ εἴς τι. The obviously correct text is Π ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι. Ἐξ οὗ may be an old variant of ὑπό τινος.—In 7, 1072ª24 we find an unwanted explanatory addition κινεῖ ‹οὐ κινούμενον› in Ar^{m} as against κινεῖ in Π A^{b} and Ar^{u}.—Similarly Ar^{m} presupposes in 1072ᵇ4 something like ‹ἐκεῖνα› or ‹ταῦτα› τἄλλα.—Very odd is Ar^{u} ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ αἰσθητῷ for ἡ νόησις in 1072ª30.

VII

The results of this rapid survey of more than one hundred Arabic passages are in no way startling but not without relevance. (I have examined 57 readings of Usṭāth, 5 of Isḥāq, 42 of Mattā, 10 of Naẓīf.) None of the Arabic translators followed one of the two assumed primary authorities (Π and A^{b}) exclusively: on the contrary, they appear to mix readings which we can trace in the two different families available to us and in the Greek commentaries. This is in itself scarcely surprising and agrees with the practice followed by Alexander in his commentary, which contains the only ancient text due to an eminent scholar which we can study in some detail. The Greek MSS used by the translators were certainly written in uncial characters and not yet transcribed. I have pointed out before that we are in no position to decide whether any of the Arabic translators established his own Greek text before he set to work but that this possibility cannot be ruled out. I have tried to find out whether the comparison of the translations with our different Greek textual sources allows us to state whether any of the four Arabic translators shows a stronger leaning towards a particular trend of the Greek tradition. Close scrutiny of the passages discussed above shows that the evidence is almost equally balanced in the case of Ar^{u} and Ar^{m} (Ar^{m} may well reproduce the lemmata of the lost genuine commentary of Alexander); Ar^{n} seems to be nearer A^{b}. Moreover, any definite conclusion would have to be based on a complete collation of both the Arabic and Greek texts; to do this was outside the limited scope of this paper.

The gain on the Greek side is obvious. There appear to be thirteen cases where readings of A^{b} are now confirmed as ancient readings for the first time; seven additional A^{b} readings are also known from Alexander or Pseudo-Alexander, two appear also on the margin of E (E γρ). It is thus no longer possible to suspect that any of these readings are merely late innovations or corruptions. The exact date of the early Byzantine scholarly edition Π is not known ("codex venerabilis labentis antiquitatis temporibus scriptura unciali continua exaratus" Jaeger). But since none of the Arabic versions is derived from this text (as the majority of our Greek MSS is), the results of the comparison of Π with the Arabic versions hold good even if Π were to be dated about 800 and roughly

contemporary with the different Greek MSS used by the Arabic translators (which may also have been considerably older). I count fourteen passages where Arabs agree with Π; there are, in addition, five passages which were hitherto only confirmed by Alexander or Pseudo-Alexander. One reading of J is confirmed by Arabs, two more whose agreement with Alexander had been noticed before; one reading of E, one more confirmed before by Asclepius, three more by Alexander (one as a variant); one of E γρ. Ten readings hitherto known only from Alexander occur in the Arabic as well. In thirteen cases where Π A^b stand against other readings they are supported by Arabic evidence; in three more cases of this type Π A^b and Alexander agree with an Arabic version, in one case E A^b.

I am aware that much more remains to be done and said before any final conclusion can be reached. But there can be no doubt that it will be rewarding if future editors of Aristotle would not disregard the Arabic versions—and the same applies to all the other authors of whom Arabic translations exist. The results may be particularly interesting in the case of texts which have not been well edited or which have not come down to us in good and reliable Greek manuscripts.

This is all small coin. But "is enim auctor est Aristoteles quem vel minimum iuvisse aliquam fortasse laudem mereatur" (Casaubonus).

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ZUR TRADITIONSGESCHICHTE DER ARISTOTELISCHEN POETIK

Die seit wenigen Jahren bequem zugängliche Schrift des berühmten islamischen Aristotelikers Al-Fārābī († 950 n. Chr.) „Über die Teile der Wissenschaften (De scientiis)" [1] führt dazu die Frage erneut zu stellen, woher die längst bekannte, auch von ihm befolgte Zuordnung der Poetik und Rhetorik zum aristotelischen Organon wie die sie rechtfertigende Theorie eigentlich stammt, die uns in arabischer Überlieferung durchgängig begegnet [2]. Man sieht sie heute allgemein als originale Eigentümlichkeit der syrisch-arabischen Aristotelesüberlieferung an. Der Grund hierfür liegt einmal darin, dass vor allem die Eingliederung der Poetik in das Organon der in Bekkers Aristotelesausgabe kanonisierten — noch in der Ausgabe Buhles (1791) und dann wieder in der Didotiana (1848) nicht befolgten — Einteilung der Schriften nach den Gesichtspunkten des θεωρεῖν πράττειν ποιεῖν widerstreitet, die man irrtümlich als die antik-peripatetische schlechthin setzte. Zum anderen führte die Aufdeckung des Sachverhaltes grade in arabischen oder aus dem Arabischen übersetzten Schriften — wobei man dann gelegentlich mit absprechenden Verdikten über diese Verkennung des Wesens der Poetik schnell bei der Hand war — zur Verfestigung dieser irrigen Anschauung. Immischs Verdienst in seinem (Anm. 2) genannten Aufsatz „Zur aristotelischen Poetik" [3] war es, demgegenüber nachdrücklich darauf hinzuweisen, dass eine solche Verbindung der Rhetorik und Poetik mit den im engeren Sinne formal-logischen Schriften des Aristoteles aus der Sache, d. h. aus dem Sinnzusammenhang der aristotelischen Philosophie durchaus gerechtfertigt sei [4]; Tkatsch hat ihm in der Vorrede zu seiner Ausgabe der

[1] Kairiner Ausgabe von 1931; Al-Fārābī, *Catálogo de las Ciencias*, ed. Ángel González Palencia, Madrid 1932 [Recension von P. Kraus, *Der Islam* 22, 1935, p. 82]. In der spanischen Ausgabe findet sich auch der erste Abdruck der guten lateinischen Übersetzung der Schrift durch Gerhard von Cremona († 1187; vgl. Überweg-Geyer, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* II ii, 344) nach cod. lat. Nr. 9335, fol. 143–51, der Pariser Bibliothèque Nationale).

[2] Es genügt auf die bei Gelegenheit der letzten Behandlung der Frage durch O. Immisch (*Philologus*, *N F*, 9, 1896, 20 ff.) genannten Werke hinzuweisen.

[3] Vgl. *Festschrift für Theodor Gomperz*, 1902, 255.

[4] Die Ausschaltung der Rhetorik und Poetik aus dem spätgriechischen und byzantinischen Schulbetrieb erklärt sich ja bekanntlich durch die Verdrängung der Rhetorik durch Hermogenes-Aphthonius und die Zuordnung der Poetik zur Grammatik.

arabischen Poetik entschieden zugestimmt [1], hat im übrigen aber wie es scheint, gleich Immisch daran festgehalten, dass die tatsächliche Verbindung der beiden Pragmatien mit dem Organon, wie sie in der berühmten arabischen Aristoteleshandschrift der Pariser Nationalbibliothek [2] vorliegt, erst orientalischen Ursprunges ist. Ich glaube nicht, dass diese Meinung Bestand haben kann.

Den Gesamtinhalt der Schrift De scientiis des Fārābī möchte ich nicht genauer erörtern, bevor die von islamwissenschaftlicher Seite hierzu vorbereiteten Untersuchungen vorliegen. Er ist auch für die hier verfolgte Frage nicht wichtig. Fārābī behandelt jedenfalls in kurzer summarischer Form nacheinander I. Grammatik II. Logik III. μαθήματα (Arithmetik, Geometrie, Optik, Astronomie, Musik, Metrologie, Mechanik) IV. Physik und Theologie V. Politik. Fiqh. Kalām. Der Abschnitt über die Logik ist folgendermassen gegliedert: 1. Über den σκοπός der Logik ganz im allgemeinen. 2. Über ihren Nutzen (τὸ χρήσιμον). 3. Die ὑποκείμενα der Logik. 4. Die αἰτία τῆς ἐπιγραφῆς. 5. Die acht μέρη der Logik. 6. Die centrale Stellung der Apodeiktik innerhalb des Systems der Logik. Abschnitt 5 beansprucht vorzüglich unser Interesse [3]. „Die Teile der Logik sind acht. Es sind nämlich die Arten des Syllogismos und die Arten der λόγοι, mittels derer die Verification einer Ansicht oder eines gesuchten Gegenstandes erstrebt wird, und die Arten der τέχναι, deren ἔργον es ist, nach ihrer Vollkommenheit(?) den συλλογισμός in der Erörterung anzuwenden, insgesamt fünf: Apodeiktik, Topik, Sophistik, Rhetorik, Poetik." Diese fünf Wissenschaften ergeben, wie anschliessend im Einzelnen dargelegt wird, eine absteigende Reihe von Erkenntnisgewissheiten, vom exactesten Wissen der Apodeiktik zum rein „mythischen" fabulosen Wissen, wie es die Dichtkunst vermittelt — genau entsprechend dem jeder τέχνη eigentümlichen συλλογισμός. Der Apodeiktik eignet vollkommene ἀκρίβεια, während die Topik diesseits der ἐπιστήμη im Bereich der βεβαία δόξα sich bescheidet. Der Gegenstand der Sophistik — die eine etwas ausgedehntene Behandlung erfährt — ist das ψευδές, in schroffstem Gegensatz zu dem durch die Apodeiktik gewonnenen ἀληθές [4]. Die Rhetorik hebt sich der Topik gegenüber dadurch ab, dass sie noch unter dem Niveau der βεβαία

[1] Vgl. F. Tkatsch, *Die arabische Übersetzung der Poetik des Aristoteles und die Grundlage der Kritik des griechischen Textes*, 1. Band, Wien 1928, S. 119.

[2] 882A. Vgl. Tkatsch a. O. S. 141 und dazu M. Plessner, *OLZ.* 34, 1931, S. 12.

[3] S. 21 ff. der Kairiner, S. 23 ff. der Madrider Ausgabe des arabischen Textes, S. 137 ff. der Ausgabe des lateinischen Textes des Gerhard von Cremona.

[4] Die Etymologie des Wortes σοφιστής die Al-Fārābī in diesem Abschnitt gibt (aus σοφία + ιστης = Verfälscher) zeigt deutlich, dass er, wie sein Lehrer Abū Bishr (vgl. Yāqūt, *Irshād* III, pp. 105–24) des Griechischen nicht mächtig war.

δόξα, nur in der Erziehung des πιθανόν, ihre Aufgabe hat. Sie ist — gemäss der Verwendung ganz bestimmter für den Araber verschiedendeutiger Termini durch Fārābī — als Wissenschaft vor allem darum für die islamische Philosophie wichtig, weil sie die Möglichkeit gibt, die Form der Äusserung, welcher sich der Prophet bedient hat und die nur Kraft der Verschiedenheit der Form, nicht aber durch den Inhalt der Erkenntnis von den Ergebnissen der Philosophie abweichen darf, in ein aristotelisierendes System der Philosophie mit einzubeziehen: in die Rhetorik hinein stellt die islamische Philosophie die Religion und die Predigt ihres Stifters.

Es folgt an fünfter Stelle die Poetik. Ich gebe die Hauptgedanken nach der hier vollkommen ausreichenden Übersetzung des Gerhard von Cremona [1]: *et poetici quidem sermones sunt qui componuntur ex rebus quarum proprietas est ut imaginari faciant in re.... eriguntur ergo animae nostrae ex ea (scil. re) et alienant eam, licet certi simus quod in veritate non est sicut imaginatur nobis; facimus ergo in eo quod imaginari nobis faciunt sermones poetici, quamvis sciamus, quod res non est ita sicut esset nostra operatio in eo, si certi essemus quod res esset sicut imaginari nobis facit ille sermo hominis; enim operationes multociens plus sequuntur eius imaginationem quam sequuntur eius opinionem aut ipsius scientiam. Nam saepe est eius scientia aut ipsius opinio contraria eius imaginationi. Quare est eius operatio in re secundum eius imaginationem, non secundum eius opinionem aut ipsius scientiam, sicut accidit nobis cum aspicimus ad imagines repraesentantes nobis rem et ad similes res etc.* Diese Stelle entspricht genau den bisher isolierten Nachrichten über Fārābīs und der Späteren Auffassung der Poetik als Teil des Organon und den ihr eigentümlichen „syllogismus imaginativus". Für Fārābī vergleiche man den bereits von Schmoelders [2] veröffentlichten, 1892 von Dieterici wiederholten Text [3]: „Die Bücher, welche man nach der Lehre vom Beweis lesen muss, sind die, welche zwischen dem richtigen und falschen Beweis unterscheiden. Den gradezu falschen Beweis lernt man aus seinem Werk über die Dichtkunst kennen". Für die Späteren sei an die von Margoliouth hervorgehobene Stelle des Ǧurǧānī (*Ta'rīfāt*, ed. Flügel 132, 18) erinnert [4]: *poesis in sermone technico logicorum syllogismus est compositus ex imaginativis; cui propositum est, ut moveatur animus incutiendo desiderio vel horrore* (folgen Beispiele) ....

[1] a. O. S. 139, Z. 25 ff.

[2] *Documenta philosophiae Arabum*, Bonn, 1836, S. 21. Er hat — im Gegensatz zu Dieterici, dessen Publikationen auch dadurch an Wert verlieren — den wenigen von ihm publicierten derartigen Texten stets die antiken Parallelstellen hinzugefügt.

[3] *Al-Fārābīs philosophische Abhandlungen* (Übersetzung) S. 87, Z. 3 f.

[4] *Analecta Orientalia ad poeticam Aristotelis*, London 1887, 21 f.

Syllogismus vero huiusmodi propositionibus compositus Poesis vocatur. Derartige Nachrichten treten nun aus ihrer Isolierung heraus, nachdem entsprechende Gedankengänge in Fārābīs kurzem Compendium der Logik aufgewiesen sind, das bis auf Weiteres für uns so gut wie am Anfang des arabischen Aristotelismus steht — wenn wir von den zeitlich vorangehenden Übersetzungen der logischen Schriften hier absehen dürfen.

Fārābīs Ausführungen über die acht Teile der Logik enden mit der Aufzählung und Bestimmung der dargelegten fünf Arten des Syllogismus [1]: *et sunt in summa quinque* (scil. artes syllogisticae) *certificatica et erratica et sufficiens* (falsch übersetzt: etwa „die das πιθανόν zuwege bringende) *et imaginativa. Et unicuique harum quinque artium insunt res sibi propriae et insunt eis res aliae in quibus communicant*". An die somit vollzogene Constituierung der achtteiligen Logik schliesst die Aufreihung der acht entsprechenden „Bücher" des Aristoteles: Kategorien Περὶ ἑρμηνείας Analytica priora Analytica posteriora Topik Sophistik Rhetorik Poetik.

Diese Darlegungen der Schrift De scientiis — geschweige denn die Äusserungen aus späterer Zeit — sind nun aber durchaus nicht originale Gedanken des muslimischen Philosophen. Die seit Immischs genannter letzter Behandlung des Problems vollendete Berliner Ausgabe der Aristotelescommentare [2] setzt vielmehr ausser jeden Zweifel, dass sie vollkommen auf der Basis der spätantiken Aristotelesinterpretation ruhen. auch wenn sie mit diesen antiken Elementen gelegentlich in höchst eigentümlicher Weise spezifisch islamische Tendenzen und Fragestellungen verbinden. So entspricht die Gliederung des Logikkapitels bei Fārābī durchgängig einem den alexandrinischen Aristotelescommentatoren völlig vertrauten Schema, so dass zur Kennzeichnung seiner Teile oben bedenkenlos die griechischen Titel statt der arabischen eingesetzt werden konnten [3]. Desgleichen aber ist das ganze von Fārābī des Weiteren entwickelte System der Logik nur ein Niederschlag ausgedehnter Debatten, welche die neuplatonischen Aristotelescommentatoren von Alexandreia über den systematischen Zusammenhang der Schriften des Organon,

[1] a. O. S. 140, Z. 32 ff.

[2] Über ihre Bedeutung für die hier in Rede stehenden Probleme vgl. Usener, *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1892, 1012 ff., besonders 1016 ff. und vor allem Prächter, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 18, 1909, 516–38 [Ferner Prächter, *Philologus* 85, 1930, 97 f.].

[3] Für das spätere Byzanz hat die Fortwirkung dieses alexandrinischen Commentarschemas bekanntlich Prächter verfolgt, vgl. *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 19, 1910, 314 ff. Zur Kennzeichnung der alexandrinischen Commentatorenschule überhaupt sei nur an Prächters Ausführungen *Genethliakon für Robert*, Berlin 1910, 147 ff. (für das im Text berührte Problem vgl. 154) erinnert.

einschliesslich Poetik und Rhetorik führten — Schriften, die sie ihrerseits in der Tradition bereits vereinigt vorfanden.

Aus ihren Äusserungen wird ersichtlich, dass Rhetorik und Poetik zwar nicht vollkommen bedenkenlos als Teile des Organon innerhalb des alexandrinischen Systems der philosophischen Wissenschaften begriffen wurden, dass aber ihre Verbindung mit den einhellig und widerspruchslos zur Logik gerechneten Schriften durchaus möglich und üblich war. So betont Ammonios [1] das Problematische, indem er die Dreiteilung des Syllogismos in apodeiktischen, dialektischen und sophistischen Syllogismos zur Grundlage nimmt und damit sich der peinlichen Notwendigkeit gegenübersieht das Organon auf Analytik, Topik und Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι zu beschränken und sich so zu Aristoteles selbst in Widerspruch zu setzen: τὰς Ῥητορικὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰ Περὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν; βούλεται γὰρ αὐτὰ τῆς λογικῆς εἶναι πραγματείας. Von der von Ammonios befolgten Teilung des Syllogismus aus scheint in der Tat nur die Verbannung der Rhetorik und Poetik aus dem Organon möglich: .... καὶ οὐ παραληψόμεθα τὰς Ῥητορικὰς τέχνας οὐδὲ τὸ Περὶ ποιητικῆς· ἀσυλλόγιστα γὰρ ἐκεῖνα. So bleibt, um die offenbar für Ammonios bereits bindende Tradition zu wahren, nur der Ausweg, von einem andersartigen Ausgangspunkt her den gegebenen Aufbau des Organon zu begreifen, durch Einführung der asyllogistischen Formen der Logik: εἰ δὲ τῆς λογικῆς τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιοῦμεν, διαιροῦμεν οὕτως· τῆς λογικῆς τὸ μέν ἐστι συλλογιστικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀσυλλόγιστον· τοῦ συλλογιστικοῦ τὸ μὲν ἀποδεικτικόν, τὸ δὲ διαλεκτικόν, τὸ δὲ σοφιστικόν· τοῦ ἀσυλλογίστου τὸ μὲν ἔμμετρον, τὸ δὲ ἄμετρον, ἔμμετρον μὲν τὸ Περὶ ποιητικῆς, ἄμετρον δὲ τὸ Περὶ τῶν ῥητορικῶν τεχνῶν [2]. — Bei Olympiodoros [cf. Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Olympiodoros no. 13], dem Schüler des Ammonios [3] finden wir die Analytica Posteriora im Vordergrund. Kategorien Hermeneutik Analytica Priora werden als Hilfswissenschaften der Apodeiktik aufgeführt, Topik Sophistik Rhetorik und Poetik nur als nützlich zur „Reinigung" „Klärung" der rechten Beweismethode: τῶν δὲ λογικῶν συγγραμμάτων τὰ μὲν αὐτὴν τὴν μέθοδον διδάσκει, τὰ δὲ τὰ συμβαλλόμενα πρὸς τὴν μέθοδον, τὰ δὲ ‹τὰ› καθαίροντα τὴν μέθοδον, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ μέθοδος ἡ καλουμένη Ἀποδεικτική, τὰ Ὕστερα καλούμενα ἀναλυτικά, συμβαλλόμενα δὲ πρὸς τὴν μέθοδον αἱ Κατηγορίαι, τὸ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας καὶ τὰ Πρότερα ἀναλυτικά, ἐκκαθαίρουσι δὲ τὴν μέθοδον οἱ Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι καὶ οἱ Τόποι καὶ αἱ Ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι καὶ τὸ Περὶ ποιητικῆς τὸ καλούμενον. Man sucht also die fest gegebene

[1] *In Analytica Priora* = Comm. in Arist. IV 6 ed. Wallies, Berlin 1900, p. 11, 23 ff.

[2] An diese Lösungsmöglichkeit hat Fārābī nicht angeknüpft.

[3] *Prolegomena* = Comment. in Arist. XII 1 ed. Busse, Berlin 1902, S. 8, 4 ff.

Schriftenfolge nach wechselnden Gesichtspunkten immer von neuem zu begreifen. Hier rücken — auch für die Gegner, welche Olympiodoros wenig später (Z. 19 ff.) erwähnt — Rhetorik und Poetik in eine Reihe mit Sophistik und Topik: ἐζήτησαν δέ τινες, πρὸς τί συμβάλλονται οἱ Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι καὶ οἱ Τόποι καὶ αἱ Ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι καὶ τὸ Περὶ ποιητικῆς, καὶ διὰ τί ἐξέθετο ταῦτα ὁ φιλόσοφος. Diesen Gedankengängen Olympiodors sind wir bei Fārābī in Teil 6 seines Logikkapitels begegnet [1]. — Philoponos, der Genosse des Ammonios, lässt eine andere Phase dieser Auseinandersetzungen in der Schule von Alexandreia erkennen, in welcher die Poetik eine nicht ganz deutliche Sonderstellung gegenüber Topik, Sophistik und Rhetorik einnimmt [2]: τῶν δὲ ὀργανικῶν τὰ μέν εἰσι περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν τῆς μεθόδου, ὡς αἱ Κατηγορίαι καὶ τὸ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας καὶ οἱ δύο λόγοι τῶν Πρώτων ἀναλυτικῶν, τὰ δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μεθόδου, ὡς τὰ Ὕστερα ἀναλυτικά, ἐν οἷς περὶ ἀποδείξεως διδάσκει, οἱ δὲ Τόποι καὶ οἱ Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι καὶ αἱ Ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι, καὶ ὥς τινές ‹φασι› τὰ Περὶ ποιητικῆς, αὐτόθέν μὲν εἰς τὴν μέθοδον οὐ συμβάλλονται, ἄλλως δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ συνεργοῦσι πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τὰς μεθόδους ἡμᾶς, καθ' ἃς οἱ παραλογισμοὶ γίνονται, διδάσκοντα. — Der Armenier Elias endlich, der Schüler des Olympiodoros, überliefert eine Fünfgliederung des Syllogismos, in welcher die Zuordnung der Poetik und Rhetorik zum Organon ihre feste Verankerung findet. Den fünf Pragmatien Apodeiktik Topik Rhetorik Sophistik Poetik entspricht je ein zugehöriger Syllogismos [3]. Vorangeht die übliche Teilung des Corpus Aristotelicum in θεωρητικὰ πρακτικὰ λογικὰ ἤτοι ὀργανικά. Dann heisst es, ähnlich den bereits früher angeführten Zeugnissen: τὸ δὲ λογικὸν καὶ αὐτὸ εἰς τρία διαιρεῖται, εἰς τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἤγουν μεθόδου καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ εἰς τὰ ὑποδυόμενα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν πρὸ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεώς εἰσιν αἵ τε Κατηγορίαι καὶ τὸ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας καὶ τὰ Πρότερα ἀναλυτικά, τὰ δὲ αὐτὴν τὴν μέθοδον τῆς ἀποδείξεως διδάσκοντά εἰσι τὰ Δεύτερα ἀναλυτικά, τά δὲ ὑποδυόμενα αὐτὴν τὴν ἀπόδειξίν εἰσι τὰ Τοπικά, αἱ Ῥητορικαὶ τέχναι, οἱ Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι καὶ τὸ Περὶ ποιητικῆς. Wir finden also vorerst dieselbe Gruppierung der vier an die Apodeiktik ausschliessenden Pragmatien wie bei Olympiodor. Die nun folgende Erläuterung und Begründung dieser Einteilung führt jedoch über ihn hinaus: πέντε γάρ εἰσιν εἴδη τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἀποδεικτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς ῥητορικὸς σοφιστικὸς ποιητικός. Jede dieser Arten des Syllogismos stellt einen verschiedenen Gewissheitsgrad der

[1] S. o. 132.

[2] *In Arist. Categ.* = Comm. in Arist. XIII 1 ed. Busse, Berlin 1898, S. 5, 8 ff.

[3] *In Categ. prooem.* = Comm. in Arist. XVIII 1 ed. Busse, Berlin 1900, S. 116, 29 ff. [cf. L. Baur, *Dominicus Gundissalinus*, Münster 1903, p. 301 n.]

durch sie erzielten Erkenntnis dar und ist dadurch als solche sachlich gerechtfertigt: καὶ εἰκότως, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αἱ προτάσεις ὅθεν λαμβάνονται πέντε εἰσίν· ἢ γὰρ πάντῃ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν αἱ προτάσεις καὶ ποιοῦσι τὸν ἀποδεικτικόν, ἢ πάντῃ ψευδεῖς καὶ ποιοῦσι τὸν ποιητικὸν τὸν μυθώδη, ἢ πῇ μὲν ἀληθεῖς πῇ δὲ ψευδεῖς καὶ τοῦτο τριχῶς· ἢ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἀληθεύει ἧττον δὲ ψεύδεται καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν διαλεκτικὸν συλλογισμόν, ἢ πλέον ἔχει τὸ ψεῦδος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν σοφιστικόν, ἢ ἐπίσης ἔχει τὸ ἀληθὲς τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν ῥητορικόν. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass der Aufbau der Logik in der etwa drei Jahrhunderte später verfassten Schrift des Fārābī genau dieser letzten bisher bekannten Wendung der Erörterungen entspricht, die um 600 über den systematischen Aufbau des Organon in der Schule von Alexandreia geführt wurden.

Damit ist nun die unlösliche Verbindung deutlich, in der Fārābīs Logikkapitel und die an ihn anknüpfende islamische Tradition mit der spätalexandrinischen Schuldiscussion steht. Die islamischen Nachrichten geben aber zugleich auch die entsprechenden Überlegungen teilweise ausführlicher wieder als die erhaltenen griechischen Zeugnisse und beweisen so ihrerseits erneut, wie wichtig die frühen Schriften der islamischen Philosophie für die Wiedergewinnung spätantiken philosophischen Gedankengutes sein können.

Dass die islamische Tradition der hellenischen Wissenschaft und Philosophie, wie sie sich in der Abbassidenzeit bildet, grade an die letzte spätantike Phase des alexandrinischen Schulbetriebes anknüpft, ist bekanntlich nicht ohne Beispiel — so wenig man auch ausschliesslich diesen Strang der Überlieferungsgeschichte betonen und die akuten Beziehungen mit Byzanz während des 9. Jahrh. zu gering einschätzen darf. Dem hier verfolgten Zusammenhang vergleichbar erscheint die Σύνοψις von 15-16 Galenischen Werken, die in Alexandria als kanonisch galten und deren Abfassung allgemein jetzt in das Zeitalter des Ammonius gesetzt wird. Über sie fehlt allerdings nun jedes Zeugnis aus griechischer Tradition; aber ein so vorzüglicher Philolog wir Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq in Baghdād († 873) klärt uns über ihr Wesen zur Genüge auf [1]. Aus ihrer weiten Verbreitung in arabischer Übersetzung [2] können wir auch ihre

[1] *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq: Über die syrischen und arabischen Galenübersetzungen*, ed. Bergsträsser, Leipzig 1925, Register s. v. Alexandrien.

[2] Z.B. finden sich allein in Konstantinopel 5 Handschriften dieser Summaria Alexandrinorum. Für die Frage der alexandrinischen Galen-Συνόψεις überhaupt vgl. jetzt vor allem M. Meyerhof, *SB Berlin*, 1930, 394 ff., ferner Temkin, *Gnomon* 9, 1933, 45 ff. [Cf. H. Ritter und R. Walzer, Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *SB Berlin*, 1934, pp. 820–5. R. Walzer, *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 28, 1954, pp. 550–2.]

Bedeutung in der Spätzeit des griechischen Alexandreia rückerschliessen — so wie uns ja auch viel neuplatonisches Gut der letzten Jahrhunderte der Antike in islamischer Überlieferung aufbewahrt ist. Für die Aristotelestradition aber wird die Ausfüllung der Lücke, die vorläufig noch zwischen den alexandrinischen Aristotelescommentaren und dem Werk Al-Fārābīs klafft, das nächste Ziel der Forschung sein müssen — wenn wir von den Übersetzungen selbst einmal absehen. Die von H. Ritter vorbereitete Edition der von ihm im Stambuler Codex Aya Sofya 4832 wieder aufgefundenen Schrift al-Kindīs *Über die Anzahl der Bücher des Aristoteles und was man (davon) zum Studium der Philosophie braucht* [1] erhält in diesem Zusammenhang für die an der Traditionsgeschichte des Aristoteles interessierte klassische Philologie besondere Bedeutung.

From: *Studi italiani di Filologia Classica*, N.S. vol. XI (1934), pp. 5–14.

[1] H. Ritter, Schriften Ia'qūb ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī's in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *Archiv Orientální* 4, Prag 1932, 363 ff. [Cf. below 175 n. 1. 77ff.]

ARABISCHE ARISTOTELESÜBERSETZUNGEN IN ISTANBUL

Ich berichte hier kurz über die arabischen Übersetzungen aristotelischer und pseudoaristotelischer Schriften, auf die mich Hellmut Ritter bei einem vor allem der medizinischen Übersetzungsliteratur gewidmeten längeren Studienaufenthalt in Konstantinopel hinwies. Die Hauptergebnisse dieser Forschungen hoffe ich bald an anderer Stelle veröffentlichen zu können [1].

Codex Yeni-Cami 1179 (jetzt in der Bibliothek der Süleymaniye) — welcher fol. 114b–488a zwölf Bücher der alexandrinischen, auch in anderen Istanbuler Handschriften erhaltenen Galen – Συνόψεις enthält — überliefert in seinem ersten von anderer Hand geschriebenen Teil (ohne Datum, wohl 15.–16. Jh. n. Chr.) philosophische Texte. Er ist bereits von M. Bouyges in seinen *Notes sur les Philosophes arabes connus des Latins au moyen âge* VI[2] kurz beschrieben in den Zusätzen zu seinem *Inventaire des textes arabes d'Averroës*. Aber der entlegene Publikationsort hat die Notiz nicht zur Kenntnis der Altertumswissenschaftler kommen lassen, deren Beachtung sie vor allem verdiente. Denn neben Schriften des Averroës, die für die mittelalterliche Philosophie des Abendlandes wichtig sind, finden sich in der Handschrift vollständige Übersetzungen der aristotelischen Meteorologie und der pseudo-aristotelischen Schrift Περὶ φυτῶν. Die Meteorologie ist von Yaḥyā sive Juḥannā b. al-Biṭrīq, einem der frühesten, noch vor Ḥunain b. Isḥāq in der ersten Hälfte des 9. nachchr. Jh. lebenden christlich-arabischen Schriftsteller übersetzt, wie die Stambuler Hs. in Übereinstimmung mit dem bereits von Steinschneider [3] hervorgezogenen Codex Vaticanus Hebraicus 378 bezeugt. Die vatikanische trotz Steinschneiders Hinweis vernachlässigte Hs. enthält eine andere, wie es nach Stichproben scheint, schlechtere Rezension der Übersetzung in hebräischer Schrift aber arabischer Sprache. Der Charakter der

[1] H. Ritter und R. Walzer, Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 1934, 801–46.]

[2] *Mélanges de l'Université Saint-Joseph* 9, 1924, 43 f. Kurz angezeigt: *OLZ* 1925, 245.

[3] *Die arabischen Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen*, Leipzig 1897, *Philosophie* § 31 (55). Zur Person des Übersetzers ebenda, S. 381 Index s.v. *Bitrik*. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*, Weimar 1898, 1, 203 [2. Aufl., 1, 221 f., Supplement 1, 364] Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq *Über die syrischen und arabischen Galenübersetzungen* ed. Bergsträsser, Leipzig 1925, S. 39.

Übersetzung lässt sich am bequemsten durch die Wiedergabe des Incipit der arabisch-lateinischen Übersetzung erläutern: *Postquam praecessit rememoratio nostra de ⟨rebus⟩ naturalibus primis et stellis omnibus ordinantibus mundum et narravimus dispositionem corporis ultimi et elementi nobilis et enuntiavimus quantitatem elementorum corporeorum et alterationes eorum ad invicem et generationes et corruptiones universales, visum est nobis quod remansit super nos...* [1]. Dagegen halte man den Anfang des griechischen Textes (ed. Fobes, 1919): Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄνω φορὰν διακεκοσμημένων ἄστρων καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν σωματικῶν, πόσα τε καὶ ποῖα, καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς εἴρηται πρότερον. λοιπὸν δ' ἐστί... Eine Ausgabe dieser für die Überlieferungsgeschichte des griechischen Textes wichtigen, für seine Emendation allerdings, wie es scheint, problematischen Schrift ist nun durchaus in den Bereich der Möglichkeit gerückt. Die Istanbuler wie die vatikanische Handschrift sind zudem, in Gegensatz zu der berühmten Pariser Handschrift der Poetik und Rhetorik gut lesbar und nicht mechanisch beschädigt.

Die Schrift *De plantis* in zwei Büchern [2] war bisher nur in der arabisch-lateinischen Übersetzung des Alfred von Sareshel und einer erst auf Grund von ihr gefertigten und darum wertlosen griechischen Übertragung bekannt. Bouyges hat bereits auf den besonderen Wert der in Konstantinopel entdeckten arabischen Handschrift hingewiesen [3]. Der Titel lautet in der Handschrift: Buch des Aristoteles Über die Pflanzen, Erklärung des Nicolaos, Übersetzung des Isḥāq b. Ḥunain — dessen Übersetzung der Kategorien und der Hermeneutik ja seit langem gedruckt vorliegen [4] —, revidiert von Thābit b. Qurra [5]. Die Übersetzung gehört also in die 2. Hälfte des 9. Jh. Der Text des ersten Buches ist auf Grund der erwähnten Handschrift soeben von Prof. Arberry an entlegener Stelle veröffentlicht [6], die Ausgabe des 2. Buches, eine vollkomene Vergleichstabelle der lateinischen und griechischen Version und ein Kommentar ist

[1] Nach cod. *Vat. Lat.* 6747, fol. 155a, auf den mich Monsignore Pelzer freundlichst hinwies. Vgl. F. H. Fobes, *Classical philology* 10, 1915, 297 ff.

[2] Ediert von dem berühmten Historiker der Botanik E. H. F. Meyer, Leipzig 1841.

[3] A.O. 71–89. Bei Überweg-Prächter[12] nicht genannt. (Doch vgl. soeben Regenbogen, *Hermes* 69, 1934, 86 Anm. 2.)

[4] Ed. I. Th. Zenker, Leipzig 1846 — Ed. J. Pollak, *Abh. f. d. Kunde des Morgenlandes*, Bd. 13, 1 (1913). Zur Person des Übersetzers Steinschneider a.O. 393 f. Bergsträsser a.O. 45 (Index). Brockelmann a.O. 1, 206 f. [2. Aufl. 1, 227, *Supplement*, 1, 369].

[5] 836–901. Vgl. Brockelmann a.O. 217 f. [2. Aufl., 1, 241 ff., *Supplement*, 1, 384 ff.]. Steinschneider a.O. 409 f. Meyerhof *SBBerl.* 1930, 412.

[6] *University of Egypt. Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts*, Vol. 1 Part 1 (May 1933), 48–76.

für eines der nächsten Hefte der Zeitschrift in Aussicht gestellt [1]. Damit ist Gelegenheit gegeben, sich dem Studium der lange vernachlässigten Schrift erneut zuzuwenden — zumal ja auch von der Union Académique Internationale eine kritische Ausgabe der lateinischen Übersetzung zu erwarten ist [2].

Wichtig für die Aristotelestradition sind ferner die von Bouyges [3] ausführlicher gekennzeichneten, ebenfalls bisher handschriftlich nicht bekannten Kommentare des grossen muslimischen Aristotelikers zu Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς und zu den Parva Naturalia. Ihre Ausgabe wird von der Mediaeval Academy in Washington im Rahmen des Corpus Commentariorum Averroës in Aristotles vorbereitet [4].

Cod. Fatih 5323 (datiert 716 H. = 1316/7 n. Chr.) enthält einen ausführlichen, durch fortlaufende historische Erzählung verbundenen, natürlich apokryphen Briefwechsel Aristoteles-Alexander. Titel: Das Buch der Zustände und Erzählungen von Alexander und der Erzählung von den Weisen seiner Zeit, das in den Chroniken überliefert wird. Ein Übersetzer ist nicht genannt. Inhalt [5]: 1. Brief des Aristoteles an Philippos über das Erlernen der Philosophie. 2. Einladungsbrief des Philippos an Aristoteles, 3. Antwort des Aristoteles, er solle Alexander nach Athen (!) schicken, 4. Brief des Aristoteles für Alexander, 5. Unterweisung des Alexander durch Aristoteles als er bei ihm weilte, 6. Glückwunsch, den Aristoteles an Alexander bei der Eroberung Skythiens sandte, 7. und er schrieb ihm einen Glückwunsch bei der Eroberung von Amphissa, 8. Brief des Aristoteles nach Asien über die allgemeine (volksfreundliche?) Staatsleitung, 9. Anfrage des Alexander über das Königtum, 10. Brief zur Beantwortung der Anfrage, 11. Anfrage über die Tötung der Adligen, 12. Brief zur Beantwortung, in welchem er ihn davon zurückhält, 13. Glückwunsch zum Beginn der Operationen in Khurāsān (Persien), 14. Der goldene Brief, 15. Der Fürbitte-Brief, 16. Ich sage: manche Philosophen... 17. Sendschreiben über die Ziele des Mutanabbi, welche mit der Weisheit des Aristoteles in Übereinstimmung sind. Von Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan

[1] 2, 219 ff.]

[2] Ebenso wie eine Ausgabe der arabisch-lateinischen Übersetzungen der Meteorologie.

[3] a.O. 43 f.

[4] Vgl. Harry A. Wolfson, Plan for the Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, submitted to the Medaeval Academy of America, *Speculum* 6, 1931, 421–7. [Der lateinische Text der Parva Naturalia, zusammen mit einem Index Latino-Arabico-Hebraicus, in der Ausgabe von A. L. Shields and H. Blumberg, Cambridge, Mass. 1949, zugänglich. Der arabische Text von Averroes Paraphrase der Parva Naturalia ist herausgegeben von A. Badawi, Islamica 16 (Cairo 1954), p. 189–238.]

[5] Nach flüchtiger Einsicht der Hs.

al-Ḥātimī [1]. Es handelt sich also wohl um eine Fälschung nach Art etwa des bei Gellius 9,3 überlieferten Briefes, den Philippos schon bei der Geburt Alexanders über dessen Erziehung an Aristoteles angeblich gesandt habe [2]. Die Handschrift enthält, wenn die Ergebnisse flüchtiger Prüfung näherer Untersuchung standhalten, ihren Wert dadurch, dass sie, soweit ich sehe [3], den einzigen auf uns gekommenen pseudaristotelischen Briefwechsel darstellt und damit erhebliche Bereicherung unseres Wissens um die Geschichte der antiken Aristotelesbiographie verspricht [4].

Eine Version, wie es scheint, der Schrift Περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων [5], übersetzt von einem As'ad b. 'Alī b. 'Uṯmān (welcher in der Vorrede auf seinen voraufgehenden Kommentar zur aristotelischen Logik hinweist), enthält cod. Riza-Paša 1662 (= Université A 534). Auch diese Hs. erfordert noch genaueres Studium [6].

Προβλήματα ἰατρικά sehr zweifelhafter Qualität finden sich cod. Aya Sofja 4801 (9) fol. 107b ff.: „Fragen die man an Aristoteles über die Medizin richtete und die er beantwortete". Folgen 90 Fragen und Antworten. In den gleichen Hs. begegnet auf fol. 74a–77a ein Brief des Platon an Porphyrios als Antwort auf eine von diesem an ihn gerichtete Frage [7].

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[1] † 998, vgl. Brockelmann a.O. 1, 88 [2. Aufl. 1, 88, *Supplement*, 1, 141]. Auf dieses letzte Stück weist bereits hin Rescher, *ZDMG*, 68, 1914, 387 A.5. [Es gehört natürlich nicht zur Briefsammlung.]

[2] Christ-Schmid, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* II 1[6], München 1920, 482 ff. Der literarischen Form nach vergleichbar erscheinen am ehesten die ebenfalls in quasihistorische Erzählung eingebetteten Hippokratesbriefe (Littré, 9, 312 ff.).

[3] Vgl. V. Rose, *Aristoteles pseudepigraphus*, Leipzig 1868, 589–99. Wilhelm Hertz, *Ges Abh.*, Stuttgart-Berlin 1905, 1 ff. Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* 172–4.

[4] Ein sonderbares Fragment ähnlichen Charakters stellt die von Al-Fārābī in seiner rein neuplatonisch gehaltenen Schrift „Die Harmonie zwischen Plato und Aristoteles" zitierte Partie aus einem angeblichen Brief des Aristoteles an Olympias dar, welches bisher keine Beachtung gefunden zu haben scheint (*Al-Fārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen*, übersetzt von F. Dietrici, Leiden 1892, S. 52).

[5] „Die 8 Bücher über das natürliche (!) Hören", vgl. Rose a.O. 279 f. [In Wirklichkeit ist dies die Übersetzung von Περὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀκροάσεως, s. die nächste Anmerkung.]

[6] Diese irrtümliche Bestimmung der Handschrift ist *Forschungen und Fortschritte*, 1934, 392, berichtigt: „Eine kulturhistorische Merkwürdigkeit ist schliesslich die in dem Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts entstammende arabische Übersetzung des von dem in Padua wirkenden makedonischen Griechen Johannes Kuttonios im Jahre 1648 in lateinischer Sprache veröffentlichten Kommentars zur aristotelischen Physik, *Cod. Riza-Paša* 2662 (= Université A 534)".]

[7] Vgl. die bei Diels: Die Handschriften der Antiken Ärzte I (*Abh-Berl.* 1905, 111) S. 47 genannte, nicht gedruckte Schrift Ἱπποκράτους Προς Γαληνὸν αὐτοῦ μαθητὴν περὶ σφυγμῶν καὶ κράσεων ἀνθρωπίνων σωμάτων.

Schliesslich sei noch in diesem Zusammenhang an zwei Istanbuler Handschriften erinnert, auf die bereits Plessner Islamica 4,527 f. hingewiesen hat. Cod. Aya Sofja fol. 1–38b enthält die aristotelische Physiognomik, cod. Aya Sofja 2455 eine Schrift über die platonischen Ideen [1].

From: *Gnomon*, X (1934), pp. 277–80.

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[1] [Über diese, von einem späteren Muslim verfasste, Schrift vgl. P. Kraus, Plotin chez les Arabes, *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte* 23, 1941, p. 279 n. 1. Erstausgabe der Schrift Cairo 1947 (A. Badawī)].

NEW LIGHT ON GALEN'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

(From a recently discovered Arabic source)

I

The first publication of a hitherto lost work on moral philosophy by Galen deserves the attention of scholars interested in the thought of one who was the last great physician of antiquity, who by a peculiar chain of circumstances became the teacher of the Middle Ages in scientific medicine, and who in his own day enjoyed also success as a philosopher. Posterity, it is true, did not regard his philosophical work with the favour it bestowed on his achievements in medicine, and hence a very small number of his philosophical writings has survived to the present day either in the original text or in Arabic translations.

It is one of Galen's fundamental convictions that medical research and therapy must be based on philosophy and that the best physician must also be a philosopher [1]. Hippocrates is, in Galen's view, the prototype of this perfection of medical art, being the first to hold that there could be no medicine without astronomy, which in its turn is based on geometry, and without scientific logical demonstration [2]. But the physician must not only be a "companion of truth", be steeped, that is, in theoretical philosophy; he must show himself at the same time self-controlled and just and immune to the temptations of pleasure and money; he must embody all the different characteristics of the moral life which are by their very nature interdependent [3]. Galen, accordingly, wanted to educate future doctors on these lines, and many of the philosophical works composed may have been meant particularly for them [4].

In his *De libris propriis*, which is a survey of his whole literary output

[1] Cf. the treatise *Quod optimus medicus sit etiam philosophus*, vol. i, pp. 53–63 Kühn = *Scripta minora*, vol. ii, Leipzig 1891, pp. 1–8 Müller.

[2] *Op. cit.*, cap. 1, and, for example, in the newly discovered text *De moribus*, p. 43. 12 Kraus and the quotation of the full text of Galen in Ibn Abi Uṣaibi'a, *Valuable Information on the Classes of Physicians*, i, p. 43. 17 Müller (= p. 18. 15 ff. Kraus). Cf. *De plac. Hippocr. et Platonis*, i, p. 133 f., no. 5 Müller.

[3] *Scr. min.* ii, p. 6. 4 ff. M. (= vol. i, p. 59. 9 ff. Kühn).

[4] A fresh examination of his philosophy, in the light of our improved knowledge of hellenistic and neoplatonic thought, is long overdue.

down to A.D. 192, he enumerates no less than twenty-three items on moral philosophy [1], of which we have preserved in their original text two treatises on self-control and self-education: the *De affectuum dignotione* and the *De peccatorum dignotione* (Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἑκάστῳ παθῶν καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων διαγνώσεως) [2]. The *De moribus* (Περὶ ἠθῶν), an Arabic summary of which was published by my friend the late Paul Kraus [3] in 1939 [4], was of a more scholarly character; it dealt in four books with one of the principal topics of moral philosophy, with character, ἦθος [5]. Unfortunately Kraus published only the Arabic text (27 pp.) with a twenty-four-page preface also written in Arabic, and for this reason his edition has remained entirely unnoticed by Western classical scholars and historians of medicine. I intend to publish a complete translation of the text and to explain its philosophical importance in detail, but in this paper my purpose is no more than to show why it deserves our interest, filling as it does a gap in our knowledge of Greek ethics and elucidating Galen's position in the history of ancient civilization.

The main source of the Arabic text is a unique but on the whole good Egyptian manuscript, probably of the fourteenth or fifteenth century A.D.[6] The summary [7] is based on the translation made by Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq for

[1] Cap. 12 (*Scripta minora*, ii, pp. 121. 5–122. 6 Müller = vol. xix, p. 45. 9–46. 10 Kühn).

[2] Recent edition by W. de Boer in the *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, v. 4. 1. 1, Leipzig and Berlin 1937. This edition of the very corrupt text is far superior to the editions of Kühn (vol. v, pp. 1–103) and Marquardt (*Scripta minora*, i, pp. 1–81). The work was known also to the Arabs, cf. Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq, Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen, *Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, xvii. 2; Leipzig 1925, no. 118 Bergsträsser. For Arabic translations of other ethical treatises by Galen cf. Ḥunain, *op. cit.*, nos. 120, 121; Ibn Abī Uṣaibi'a, *op. cit.* i, p. 87. 1 Müller; Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakarīyā ar-Rāzī, *Opera Philosophica*, i, Cairo 1939, p. 35 Kraus; G. Bergsträsser, *Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq und seine Schule*, Leiden 1913, pp. 24, 70; M. Meyerhof, Autobiographische Bruchstücke Galens aus arabischen Quellen, *Archiv f. Geschichte d. Medizin*, 22, 1939, p. 85 f.

[3] Cf. F. Rosenthal, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 65, 1945, p. 68 f.

[4] *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Egypt*, vol. v. 1, 1937, Sectio Arabica (published Cairo, 1939).

[5] Περὶ ἠθῶν τέτταρα: *De libr. propr.*, p. 121. 10 M. = vol. xix, p. 45. 12 K.

[6] *Codex Taimūr Pāshā* 200. 6 Akhlāq, fols. 191–235. In addition we have a few references to and even some verbal quotations of the full text in later Arabic writers, particularly in Abū 'Alī Miskawaih's (died A.D. 1030) *Kitāb tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, an interesting work on moral philosophy which deserves a special analysis (cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, ii, col. 429).

[7] It was not unusual to compose summaries of Syriac and Arabic translations of Greek works, cf. Ḥunain, *op. cit.*, nos. 10, 57, 72, 92, 95, 102, 104; H. Ritter-R. Walzer, Arabische Übersetzungen griechischer Ärzte in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1934, p. 832 (46).

a famous Muslim mathematician, probably before A.D. 842 [1]. Only a few references to the *De moribus* can be traced in Galen's extant works. One occurs in the *De affectuum dignotione* [2], and the Arabic summary enables us to connect with it at least two more pages of the same work [3]. There is also good reason to assume that the "other works" referred to in chap. 2 of Galen's strongly platonizing treatise *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body* are the four books *De moribus* [4]. Further it emerges from the first chapter of the summary that the *De moribus* depends on the earlier work *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, a concordance of the views of Galen's main authorities among thinkers of the classical period [5]. Since this book was not completed before A.D. 176 [6], the *De moribus* evidently belongs to the later period of Galen's life. But an explicitly dated reference to the death of the Praetorian prefect Tigidius Perennis in A.D. 185 in *De moribus* provides us with better evidence, making it plain that he wrote the *De moribus* at Rome, after completing his fifty-sixth year, between A.D. 185 and 192 [7].

[1] Cf. Ḥunain, *op. cit.*, no. 119; *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. 'Mūsā, banū'. The work, of which there is no trace in later Greek literature, appears to have been rather popular in the Eastern world.

[2] Cap. 6. 1–9 (vol. v, pp. 27. 6, 30. 3 Kühn = p. 19. 8 ff. de Boer).

[3] Cap. 7. 7–17 (vol. v, pp. 37. 4–40, ii. Kühn = p. 25. 15 ff. de Boer), *De moribus*, i, pp. 28. 15–31. 9 Kraus. Cf. below, p. 155f.

[4] Vol. iv, p. 768. 6–14 Kühn = *Scr. min.* ii, pp. 32. 14–33. 4 Müller. For cap. 11 (vol. iv, pp. 814. 8–822 Kühn = *Scr. min.* ii, pp. 73. 3–79) cf. below, p. 160.

[5] p. 26. 6 Kraus: 'I have shown in my book *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* and explained there that there is something in man in which thinking takes place, and something else which is the source of anger, and a third which is the source of appetite'. This work is also one of our principal sources of the moral philosophy of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius, cf. L. Edelstein, The Philosophical System of Posidonius, *American Journal of Philology*, 67, 1936, pp. 286 ff., 305 ff.; K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, München 1921, pp. 263 ff.; K. Pohlenz, Poseidonios, Affektenlehre und Psychologie, *Nachr. d. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen, phil.-hist. Kl.* 1921, pp. 163 ff.; K. Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie*, München 1926, pp. 388 ff. [Cf. now K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios von Apameia*, Stuttgart 1954.]

[6] S. Vogt, *De Galeni in libellum* κατ' ἰητρεῖον *commentariis*, Dissertation, Marburg 1910, p. 3.

[7] p. 23. 7 Kraus. Ibn Abī Uṣaibi'a, *op. cit.*, i, p. 76. 19–23 M.; A. Müller, Zur Geschichte des Commodus, *Hermes*, 18, 1883, pp. 623 ff., also Th. Mommsen, *Gesammelte Schriften*, iv, p. 514 f.; Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, s.v. *Tigidius Perennis*. We can thus fix also the hitherto uncertain relative date of the treatise *De affectuum et peccatorum dignotione* in which the publication of the *De moribus* is presupposed (cf. J. Ilberg, Über die Schriftstellerei des Klaudios (!) Galenus, *Rhein. Mus.* 52 [1897], p. 611) and strengthen the case for a late date (after A.D. 193) of the treatise *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body* (cf. *ibid.* 47, 1892, p. 510; 61, 1896, p. 189).

II

According to Ḥunain's brief account [1] Galen dealt in the *De moribus* with the different ἤθη, their causes (αἰτίαι), signs (σημεῖα), and treatments (θεραπεῖαι) [2]. The summary agrees with this description. The subject is Περὶ ἠθῶν, and Galen keeps to it fairly closely. But he also mentions the "resemblance to God" as the final goal of human life and rejects the unjustified claims of hedonism [3], stressing the importance of connecting contemplative and active life and dwelling with approval upon the Platonic conception of the philosopher-king [4]; he explains the different excellences (ἀρεταί) which result from an adequate education of the inborn ἤθη and neatly distinguishes the noble from the good, the bad from the base, etc. The general background of his eclectic thought is Platonic, while he does not confine himself to rigid argument but intersperses exhortations to the reader in a manner not uncommon in Hellenistic philosophy [5].

The first book contained Galen's general theory of ἦθος and those ἤθη which originate in the spiritual soul, the second concerned the ἤθη deriving from the appetitive soul, and the third the form of training which all three souls require. The fourth book was mainly devoted to ἤθη which are domiciled in the rational soul [6]. I propose to deal in this paper with the introductory part of Book I, which contains the greatest amount of new material.

[1] *Op. cit.*, no. 119.

[2] Seneca, *Epist.* 95. 65: "(Posidonius) . . . ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusdam virtutis; hanc Posidonius ethologian vocat, quidam characterismon appellant signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas reddentem quibus inter se similia discriminentur".

[3] Cf. for example ii, p. 41. 1 Kraus: ". . . man is free and master of his will. And what could be worthier for him . . . than to put his soul in the highest rank of honour. And there is no greater honour ‹of this kind› than the imitation of God within the limits of human capacity. And this goal is reached by disregarding present pleasures and giving preference to the noble".

[4] Cf. for example ii, p. 35. 17 Kraus: "Everybody praises and admires . . . those who dedicate their life-time exclusively to the activities of the rational soul like Socrates, Plato, and others, or, for φιλανθρωπία's sake (cf. N. H. Baynes, *Byzantine Empire* [London 1925], p. 70) to the work of politics and legislation; as Solon and others did for the benefit of mankind, or to philosophy and government alike: these are the best people". No representatives of the third group are recorded in the summary, and one may well doubt whether Galen mentioned any particular philosopher-king in the full text of his work. I can find no exact parallel to this statement, and I am almost sure that it does not represent an original view of Galen's but goes back to some earlier source. [Cf. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* II, Cambridge Mass. 1947, pp. 218 ff. Below, p. 165, n. i.]

[5] The most impressive example is to be found p. 39. 20 ff. Kraus, where the rather pedestrian style of philosophical argumentation rises to the level of literary prose. I shall deal with this section in a special study. [Cf. below, p. 164 ff.]

[6] Ten pages in Kraus's edition of the summary refer to bk. 1, seven to bk. 2, three to bk. 3, seven to bk. 4.

Galen starts with a definition of ἦθος as an inborn irrational disposition of the soul. He emphasizes that differences of ἦθος are due neither to differences of environment nor to differences of education alone but to the inherent nature of men. It is therefore incorrect both to minimize the importance of the inborn qualities as Chrysippus did and to assume that all are equally susceptible of moral and intellectual education, and to hope that an originally bad ἦθος can be entirely uprooted even by continuous moral training. Galen's reasoning is based on Plato's trichotomy of the soul [1], which he restores to its former status. The three "souls", as he calls the Platonic "parts" of the soul, differ by nature in strength and quality in different human beings. The observation of animals and of small children in the first three years of life is used as an argument for this conception of ἦθος, and a variety of "lives" (βίοι) shows itself as the result, the highest being plainly the life of the philosopher guided by his rational soul.

Students of Greek thought will agree that Galen's approach is rather unusual and will note particularly that he is interested in a problem not dealt with satisfactorily by Aristotle; they will realize at the same time that it is very unlikely that he was the first to establish this doctrine of ἦθος. It certainly deserves closer examination and the selection of a few passages for quotation and detailed discussion.

As far as I know, no other Greek work entitled Περὶ ἠθῶν has survived at all. Philodemus, it is true, published an epitome of the Epicurean Zeno's work Περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίων and two sections of it, *On freedom of speech* (παρρησία) and *On anger* (ὀργή), have been recovered from Herculanean papyri [2], but this work seems to have nothing essential in common with Galen's treatment of the subject [3]. Generally speaking, Galen's interest in the irrational background of moral conduct is to be connected with the refined analysis of emotions and of the first inborn traces of human excellence which we note in the early Peripatos and particularly in Stoic philosophy after Chrysippus. His ultimate source must, however, be later than Chrysippus. His work may profitably be compared, for example, with the fifth book of Cicero, *De finibus* [4], and with Plutarch's small treatise

[1] As explained in *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus*.

[2] Philodemus, Περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίων. Φιλοδήμου τῶν κατ' ἐπιτομὴν ἐξειργασμένων περὶ ἠθῶν καὶ βίων ἐκ τῶν Ζήνωνος σχολῶν, ὅ ἐστι περὶ παρρησίας, ed. A. Olivieri, Leipzig, 1914; Philodemi *De ira liber*, ed. C. Wilke, Leipzig 1914.

[3] Cf., however, Aristotle, *Rhet.* II. 2. Galen's work has nothing in common with Theophrastus' Χαρακτῆρες.

[4] We learn, for example, from this book that Antiochus was also interested in the irrational faculties of the soul and liked arguments based on ἐνάργεια, manifest facts and empirical observation. But Antiochus claimed to revive early Peripatetic thought, whereas

On moral virtue [1], although the subject is a different one in these two cases.

The first sentence of the epitome runs as follows: "Character, ἦθος, is that condition of the soul which induces man to perform actions arising out of his soul without reflection and accurate knowledge. Evidence of this is that some people get alarmed and astonished when a terrifying sound suddenly strikes them, and that they smile involuntarily when they see or hear something ridiculous; sometimes they even want to refrain from it but cannot. It is for this reason that philosophers inquire whether ἦθος belongs to the irrational soul alone or whether any part of it is linked with the rational. We shall see quite clearly that all the indications are that our ἤθη are to be assigned to the irrational soul; for what we find here are those movements of the soul which cause us to desire and avoid things, to feel pleasure and pain, etc., and it is precisely this with which our ἤθη are concerned [2]."

Galen's definition of ἦθος as an inborn and irrational condition of the soul comes very near to the definition which Arius Didymus, the court philosopher of Augustus, reports as that adopted by the Academy of his time: "Ἦθος is a quality of the irrational part of the soul which is in its turn accustomed to subordinate itself to reason [3]". Plutarch refers to the same Academic definition in his Aristotelizing treatise *On moral virtue* [4]. Hence we are entitled to connect Galen's work with "Middle Platonism"

Footnote Continued from Page 146.
Galen relies on Plato's views on ἦθος or what he believes to have been Plato's views. Cf. also R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik*, Berlin 1929, pp. 188 ff., 201, 219, 224 n. 2; H. Dirlmeier, Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts, *Philologus, Suppl.-Bd.* 30, Leipzig 1937.

[1] Plutarch, however, presupposes the renewed study of Aristotle's lecture courses inaugurated, during Cicero's lifetime, by the edition of Andronicus of Rhodes. The author on whom Galen depends does not care much more for Aristotle than did Cicero, for example, and may have lived before the time of Andronicus and the school of commentators which followed him.

[2] Miskawaih (cf. above, p. 143, n. 6) appears to refer to the same passage and to have preserved another section of the same argument. He says (p. 25. 17 ff. Cairo edition): "Ἦθος is a condition (διάθεσις) of the soul which induces it to its actions without consideration and reflection. This disposition is divided in two parts. One of them is inborn (φύσει), based on the temperament ‹of the body› (cf. Galen's work referred to above, p. 144, n. 3), like the man whom the smallest thing incites to anger and who is roused by the most unimportant cause, and like the man who is faint-hearted on account of a trifling thing as he who is frightened at the slightest sound which affects his ear or is terrified by news which he hears, and like the man who laughs excessively over the most unimportant thing which excites his admiration, and like the man who is grieved and sad about the most trifling thing which affects him".

[3] Stobaeus, vol. ii, p. 38. 3–15 Wachsmuth.

[4] *De virt. mor.* 4, p. 443 c; 444 b.

and to place it in a philosophical tradition of the Academy which seems to have started with Philo of Larisa and more especially with Cicero's teacher Antiochus of Ascalon.

That this definition of ἦθος is supported by the reference to involuntary reactions of different people [1] in different circumstances helps us further to ascertain to which particular philosopher Galen is ultimately indebted for his surprising approach to the problem. The discussion of obvious facts of this kind is traditional, and only their interpretation varies. Chrysippus, the leading representative of Stoic thought in the second half of the third century B.C., dealt with them at length [2], and he was censured, in the first century B.C., by Panaetius' pupil and successor Posidonius of Rhodes [3] for having held that their causes could not be rationally explained [4]. Posidonius, having attained a new comprehension of the irrational elements in the soul, had explained their causes in his famous work *On emotions*, Περὶ παθῶν. That an argument used in his theory of emotions could also be helpful in a theory of ἦθος is shown by the passage of Galen which we have just examined. We know of this controversy between Chrysippus and Posidonius mainly from Galen's earlier work *De placitis* [5]. It is, at this stage of our argument, at least plausible to assume that the same controversy is the background of the *De moribus*, and that this work derives its *differentia specifica* in the history of "Middle-Platonic" moral philosophy from the influence of Posidonius [6].

The same section of Posidonius' Περὶ παθῶν, quoted by Galen in the *De placitis*, provides us at once with a second parallel between Posidonius and the *De moribus*. Galen says there at the end: "Not only Aristotle or

[1] Cf. above and p. 146, n. 4.

[2] Cf. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* coll. H. v. Arnim, vol. iii, no. 466.

[3] For Posidonius' lifetime cf. F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ii. C, Berlin 1926, p. 154 f.

[4] Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, iv (p. 400. 14 Müller = vol. v, p. 424. 17 Kühn): ὅθεν κἀπειδὰν λέγῃ (ὁ Χρύσιππος) «οὕτω γὰρ καὶ κλαίοντες παύονται καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι κλαίουσιν, ὅταν ὁμοίας τὰ ὑποκείμενα φαντασίας ποιῇ» τὴν αἰτίαν ἐρωτᾷ κἀνταῦθα ὁ Ποσειδώνιος δι' ἣν πολλοὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι πολλάκις κλαίουσιν ἐπισχεῖν μὴ δυνάμενοι τὰ δάκρυα, καὶ ἄλλοι κλαίειν ἔτι βουλόμενοι φθάνουσι παυόμενοι · γίγνεσθαι δέ φησι διὰ τὰς παθητικὰς κινήσεις ἢ σφόδρα ἐγκειμένας ὡς μὴ κρατεῖσθαι πρὸς τῆς βουλήσεως ἢ παντελῶς πεπαυμένας ὡς μήκετ' ἐπεγείρεσθαι δύνασθαι πρὸς αὐτῶν · οὕτω γὰρ ἥ τε τοῦ λόγου μάχη καὶ διαφορὰ πρὸς τὸ πάθος εὐρεθήσεται, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ δυνάμεις ἐναργῶς σωθήσονται, οὐ μὰ Δία, ὡς Χρύσιππός φησι, διά τινας αἰτίας ἀσυλλογίστους τούτων γινομένων ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν παλαιῶν εἰρημένας. Cf. also Strabo 2. 3. 8.

[5] Cf. Edelstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 305 ff. and above, p. 144, n. 5.

[6] This controversy was by no means a mere controversy of two hundred years ago taken up by Galen for some scholarly reasons; the antagonism between the new Platonism and orthodox Stoic thought was still quite alive, and the old dispute helped the present issue.

Plato held this opinion but earlier philosophers as well, particularly Pythagoras, which is what Posidonius maintains when he says that the theory was first stated by the latter, while Plato worked it out thoroughly [1]". Galen's words at the end of the first chapter of the *De moribus*, although considerably shortened by the Arabic epitomist, reveal just the same attitude to different periods in the history of Greek ethics. I quote [2]: "It is for this very reason that the ancient philosophers"—i.e. Pythagoras(?) and Plato—"said that ἤθη belonged to the irrational soul. Aristotle and others hold that the ἤθη are partly linked up with the rational soul but that for the greater part they belong to the irrational. More recent philosophers (νεώτεροι), however, have said that all the ἤθη belong to the rational soul; and they have even gone so far as to connect with it such affections as anger, desire, fear, love, pleasure, and pain. But the evidence shows their view to be untenable." It is παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν καὶ αἴσθησιν, as Plutarch says in the *De virtute morali* [3]. But Plutarch follows Aristotle while rejecting Chrysippus, whereas Galen and Posidonius keep close to Plato.

It is well known that Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' interpretation of πάθη with an emphatic restatement of Plato's tripartition of the soul [4]. Galen based his work *De moribus* on the same tripartition, and tried to arrange his material on this principle [5]. He refers to Plato as his patron [6], but it is, at first sight, surprising that he connects his account of ἦθος too with him. There is no explicit theory of ἦθος to be found in Plato's dialogues; and Hellenistic philosophers knew no more than we do about Plato's private lecture courses. But their attitude was not unlike that of the commentators on Aristotle under the Empire, and they were convinced that Plato had built up a closed and complete philosophical system and had been aware of every problem touched on by later philosophers. They expected him to have answered questions which had not existed for him, and succeeded in discovering passages in the dialogues to provide the necessary answer. They did this, for example, for Plato's famous formulation of the τέλος, which became, at least from the time

[1] Galen, *De plac.* iv, p. 401. 11–15 M. = p. 425. 13–17 K.

[2] p. 26. 1–5 Kraus.

[3] 7, p. 447 a; 10, p. 449 d.

[4] Cf. Galen, *De plac.* iv, p. 397, 1–3 M. = p. 421. 7–9 K.; *op. cit.*, v, p. 405. 5–14 M. = p. 429. 10–430. 2 K.

[5] Cf. above, p. 144, n. 5 and p. 145.

[6] In a passage preserved by Abū Sulaimān as-Sijistānī, cf. p. 22. 2 ff., 8 ff. Kraus. Cf. also Al-Fārābī, *Concordance of Plato and Aristotle* [cf. P. Kraus, Plotin chez les Arabes, *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte*, 23, 1942, p. 269 f.;] *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, pp. 16, 20 (transl. p. 27) Dieterici. Al-Fārābī simply substitutes Plato for Galen.

of Eudorus of Alexandria, the accepted doctrine of the Academy, and was adopted also in the *De moribus* [1]. They studied Plato carefully to construct his theory of the categories, and found him to have recognized two only, substance and relation [2]. The same method could clearly be used in the case of ἦθος; it is quite possible to deduce a theory of ἦθος from numerous passages of the dialogues, and it is plain that this was done from the first century B.C., and taken over by later Platonizing moralists like Galen. We actually find passages where Plato not only presupposes ἦθος as an inborn and unalterable disposition of the soul but explains it as well by referring to the analogy of animals and small children—as Galen does in a more methodical and deliberate way [3]. I refer in particular to a passage from the 12th book of the *Laws*, where he explains that the ἤθη of animals and very small children display courage; "in fact a soul may become courageous by mere native aptitude independently of reason" (ἄνευ γὰρ λόγου καὶ φύσει γίγνεται ἀνδρεία ψυχή) [4]. On the whole the ancients appear to have appreciated the importance of the irrational elements in Plato's thought much better than many of his modern interpreters [5].

It is interesting to remember that the early Peripatos already judged Plato's achievement from the standpoint adopted more consistently by Platonists from the first century B.C. onwards. The author of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia*, a contemporary of Theophrastus and a minor representative of the first generation of Aristotelians [6], gives a short critical history of ethics in the first chapter of his course [7], He says (1. 1, 1182–15): "After Pythagoras came Socrates . . . but even he was not successful. For in making the virtues sciences (ἐπιστῆμαι), he does away with the irrational part of the soul, and is thereby doing away also with both πάθος and ἦθος; so that in this respect he is unsuccessful in his

[1] Eudorus of Alexandria (1st cent. B.C.) ap. Stob. *Anthol.*, vol. ii, pp. 49.8–50.10 Wachsmuth.

[2] Cf. H. Dörrie, Der Platoniker Eudoros von Alexandria, *Hermes*, lxxix (1944), pp. 31 ff.

[3] Cf. *Rep.* 2. 375 c 6 ff., and, for example, *Rep.* 6. 490 c, 496 b and passages concerning the φύσις φιλόσοφος such as 486 b 3, 486 d 10, 487 a 3; *Politicus* 308 e, 310 a. Cf. *Phaedo* 82 b. *De moribus*, p. 28. 4 Kraus: "not every dog and horse can be trained".

[4] *Leges* 12. 963 e; cf. *Laches* 196 e ff.; *Rep.* 4. 430 b; *Epin.* 975 e, and R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik*, Berlin 1929, p. 207 f. But all these passages deal only with φυσικὴ ἀνδρεία.

[5] Cf. E. R. Dodds, Plato and the Irrational, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 65, 1945–47, pp. 16 ff., particularly pp. 18 ff.

[6] Cf. O. Regenbogen in Pauly–Wissowa–Kroll, *Realencyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Supplementband, VII, s.v., Theophrastos, col. 1488. [But cf. now D. J. Allan, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77, 1957, p. 7 ff.]

[7] Cf. R. Walzer *op. cit.*, p. 77.

treatment of the virtues. Next Plato divided the soul into a rational and an irrational part—and in this he was right—assigning appropriate virtues to each." A statement like this may help us to understand better why Galen and his predecessors choose to attack the intellectualism of Chrysippus in the name of Plato.

III

Observation of animals and small children, who either lack reason by definition or whose reason is still undeveloped, provides Galen with additional evidence for assigning ἦθος to the irrational soul. It helps also towards a full and satisfactory understanding of the working of the three souls which shapes the ἦθος of the grown-up man. Galen lays it down as his principle of inquiry always to examine first those ἤθη which can be seen in the behaviour of animals and small children, to facilitate the distinction of pure animal movements from those mixed with some element of opinion and thought. For animals are naturally unable to give priority to the rational soul, and small children are as yet unsusceptible of moral and intellectual training, of the quadrivium, and of logic [1]. But whereas the character of the different species of animals is uniform and constant, human beings as such have various ἤθη by nature, as we learn already from the observation of children in their earliest years.

I shall illustrate Galen's method by two passages from the introductory section of the first book *De moribus*; both appear to be without parallel in extant Greek texts and are therefore of special interest. The first deals with the ἤθη of animals, the second with the gradual development and growth of the child's soul during the first three years of life when it is still exclusively in the care of illiterate nurses.

(*a*) Having based his first argument for the irrational character of ἦθος on the observation of involuntary smiling, crying, etc., Galen continues in the same context (p. 25. 10 ff. Kraus): «"Ηθη as they are observed in small children (βρέφη) and irrational animals show the same thing [2]. We see that some animals are cowardly like the hare and the stag, others brave like the lion and the dog, others cunning like the fox and the monkey; that some associate with man like the dog (συνανθρωπεῖ ὡς οἱ κύνες) [3] and others keep away from man (ἐκποδὼν νέμεται τῶν ἀνθρώπων) [4]

[1] Cf. iv, p. 45. 1 ff. Kraus.

[2] The epitomist appears to have omitted the sections on children and starts at once with the ἤθη of animals.

[3] Porphyry, *De abstinentia*, 3. 9 (p. 199. 8 Nauck).

[4] Porphyry, *op. cit.* (p. 199. 4 Nauck).

like the wolves; some love solitude (are μονότροπα) [1] like the lion and others tend to congregate (are συναγελαστικά) [2] like the horse, while others live in pairs like the stork; some gather their food and keep it for use like the bees and ants [3], while others secure their food from day to day like the pigeon; some like the magpie steal useless objects—for it steals jewels, signet-rings, drachmae, and denarii, and hides them. It is for this reason that the ancient philosophers said that the ἤθη belong to the irrational soul". There is quite a variety of animal ἤθη mentioned, the common factor in all the attitudes surveyed being that they come into existence without deliberation, thought, or instruction and express a permanent ἦθος. Hence it is that the observation of animals yields an argument for Galen's definition of human ἦθος.

There is no similar list of animal ἤθη to be found in extant Greek texts, so far as I have been able to ascertain, and, certainly, animal ἤθη were nowhere else used for a similar argument. There is, however, sufficient evidence for all the single traits mentioned, scattered in cognate texts of the Hellenistic period [4]. The observation of animals goes back a long way in Greek literature [5], but what matters for the understanding of the passage just quoted is the extensive use made of it in moral philosophy. Aristotle's *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, for example, do not use many examples taken from the animal kingdom [6]. Aristotle does not co-ordinate his zoological research and his ethics [7]. The Early Peripatos seems to have gone farther in this direction and to have paid special attention to the character of animals and small children. We infer this from the later books of the *Historia Animalium*, which are now generally assumed to have been composed by Aristotle's pupils [8], from Theophrastus' *Ethics*, and from the titles of his two—lost—monographs Περὶ ζῴων φρονήσεως καὶ ἤθους and Περὶ τῶν ζῴων ὅσα λέγεται φρονεῖν. The beginning of *Hist. Anim.* 8. 1 and the whole of Book 9 are instructive, particularly when the former is compared with the Peripatetic ethics of Arius Didymus in Stobaeus 2, p. 116. 21 ff. Wachsmuth and Cicero, *De fin.* 5. 41 ff., 55.[1] This interest in the characteristics of animals increases in the non-zoological philosophical literature of the Hellenistic age and, accordingly, references to animals are relatively common in later philosophical texts such as Plutarch's *Moralia* or the philosophical writings of Seneca [2]. One expects to find the closest parallels to Galen's argument in the treatises *On the intelligence of animals*, some of which are preserved. But comparison with Philo of Alexandria [3], Plutarch [4], and Porphyry [5] serves only to bring out the individuality of Galen. He neither looks for rudiments of intelligence and virtue in animals—as those authors do—nor uses, like Chrysippus, the rich material at his disposal in order to show that animals are simply irrational while man as a rational being should extirpate from his soul all that he has in common with animals. Galen's conception of the human soul is more adequate, and while demanding the mere control (not the elimination) of its irrational elements he can quote the observation of animals for support, and thus strengthen his case considerably. The same attitude towards animals can be seen in Posidonius [6], and it is very tempting to connect Galen's view with his teaching. We know that Galen appreciated and, within limits, accepted the Περὶ παθῶν of Posidonius, and it becomes now increasingly reasonable to use the new text *De moribus* for a cautious reconstruction of Posidonius' views on ἦθος. The task is rendered difficult by the omission from the Arabic Epitome of all but the commonest Greek names, whereas the *De placitis* gives explicit quotations of Posidonius.

[1] Galen, *De usu part.* i. 2 (vol. iii, p. 2. 5 ff. Kühn = vol. i, p. 1. 13 ff. Helmreich). It is interesting to compare this text with the first chapter of the Περὶ ἠθῶν.

[2] Porphyry, *op. cit.* (p. 200. 23 Nauck).

[3] Cf. Galen, *Quod an. virt.* 7 (vol. iv, p. 792. 17–793. 2 K. = *Scr. min.* ii, pp. 52. 19–53. 2 M.).

[4] Much relevant material has been collected by C. Tappe, *De Philonis libro qui inscribitur* Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἔχειν τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα *quaestiones selectae*, Dissertation Göttingen 1912. [Cf. Clemens Alex., Strom. II pp. 110. 4 ff. 173. 17 Stählin, Olympiodorus, In Phaed. p. 45. 18 ff. Norvin. Elias, Cat. p. 19. 34 Busse.]

[5] Cf. B. Snell, *Die Entdeckung des Geistes, Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen* (Hamburg 1946) pp. 173, 180.

[6] Cf. above, p. 150, n. 4.

[7] One may mention the descriptions of the character of certain animals, referred to also by Galen, which occur in his zoological writings: lion (H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, [Berlin 1870], p. 429^{b}28), hare (*op. cit.*, p. 421^{a}25), stag (*op. cit.*, p. 235^{a}15), dog (*op. cit.*, p. 418^{b}28). Galen, however, draws on much more comprehensive research. Cf. R. Walzer, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

[8] Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, Oxford 1934, p. 352; O. Regenbogen, *op. cit.*, col. 1423.

[1] Cf. Cicero *De fin.* v. 39 ff.; cf. H. Dirlmeier, Zur Ethik des Theophrast, *Philologus*, 90, 1935, p. 248 ff. On Galen's references to plants cf. below, p. 159 and n. 5. The comic poet Philemon is under the influence of a similar doctrine, cf. Stob. *Anthol.*, vol. iii. 2. 26 (p. 183. 13 Hense) = fab. inc. fr. 3 *Com.* iv, p. 32 M.; R. Walzer, Zum Hautontimorumenos des Terenz, *Hermes*, 70, 1935, pp. 197 ff.

[2] Cf., for example, Plutarch, *De invidia et otio* 4; *De tranquillitate animae* 13.

[3] *Alexandros* ἢ Περὶ τοῦ λόγου ἔχειν τὰ ζῷα (Philo ed. Richter, [1828–30], vol. viii: translation from the Armenian). Cf. H. Leisegang, *Philologus*, 92, 1937, pp. 152 ff.; A. D. Nock, *Classical Review*, 57, 1943, p. 78.

[4] *De sollertia animalium*, Πότερα τῶν ζῴων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα.

[5] *De abstinentia*, Περὶ ἀποχῆς ἐμψύχων.

[6] Galen, *De plac.* v. 6 (p. 457. 2–9 M. = p. 476. 11–477. 2 K.). Cf. also *op. cit.* v (p. 438. 1 M. = p. 459. 1 7 K.); iv, p. 400. 5 (= p. 424. 7 K.); vi, p. 490. 1 ff. M. (= p. 505. 1 ff. K.), etc., pp. 133 ff. M.

(*b*) The section in which Galen deals with the moral and mental development of small children starts as follows [1]: "The dispositions (ἕξεις, διαθέσεις) of man's soul which are praiseworthy are called excellences (ἀρεταί) and those which are blameworthy are called vices (κακίαι). These dispositions are of two kinds: the one originating in the soul from deliberation, thought, and discrimination, and called knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) or opinion (δόξα) or view (?), the other arising in the soul without deliberation, and called moral disposition (ἦθος)."

Moral excellence and evil are the result of inborn moral disposition and deliberation, thought, and discrimination. Galen's interest in this chapter is evidently not fixed on the rational but rather on the irrational part of ἀρετή; a summary of his psychology of the mind, which is deeply under Stoic influence, is to be found at the beginning of the fourth book of the *De moribus* [2].

"Some ἤθη manifest themselves in babies as soon as they are born, before the period of deliberation; almost at once they feel pain in the body and discomfort (λύπη) in the soul. These make them cry, because every baby has the faculty of imagining (φαντασία) what accords with it and what is contrary to its fancy, and of loving the agreeable and hating the contrary. This exists also by nature in irrational animals, I mean that they perceive by their senses (αἰσθάνεται) what occurs to their body and that they fancy that part of it is in accordance with them and part of it contrary to them; and that they desire what is agreeable to them and avoid what is contrary [3]."

"Small children of two years often attempt to strike with their hands and feet anyone they believe to be harming them. This indicates that they now have, together with the imagination of what is favourable to them and of what is contrary, the imagination of its efficient causes (αἰτίαι ποιητικαί). With that they have moreover desire for vengeance upon what has harmed them and love for anyone who has removed the source of harm. For then they smile and laugh at their nurses and wish to strike and to bite the person who has harmed them. And this occurrence (συμβεβηκός) is called anger (ὀργή). There occurs with it a burning redness in the eyes, and in the whole face redness, heat, and rush of blood. It is thus evident that the desire for revenge upon one's assailant is not acquired by teaching but is inborn, like the desire of avoiding what gives pain and the desire for what is pleasant. For small children do not

[1] p. 28. 15 Kraus.

[2] p. 45. 3 ff. Kraus.

[3] Cf. also Posidonius ap. Galen, *De plac.* v. (pp. 438. 12–439. 3 M. = p. 460. 10–17 K.); Cicero, *De off.* 1. 105. Cf. below, p. 162, n. 1.

deliberate and form an opinion that revenge upon one who harms them is right but this is in them by nature, like the tendency towards what is pleasant and the avoidance of what is harmful."

"When small children come to their third year, traces (ἴχνη) [1] of shame (αἰδώς) [2] and shamelessness appear in them, and you may see one blushing and not raising his eyes towards the face of one who blames him for some action forbidden him, and rejoicing at praise, while another acts in the opposite way; and this is evident in those who have not yet been educated by blows and fear. And a child who is fond of honour (φιλότιμος) takes pains over any work from which he hopes for praise. And if he is fond of honour by nature and not from fear of any visible thing (αἰσθητόν) nor for the sake of obtaining some visible reward, he will prosper; in the opposite case he will not prosper, and will not be taught nor imbibe moral training."

"One of the further indications of the fact that some small children tend without reflection and deliberate decision to virtue and others to vice is that when one of them is harmed by his playmate, some take pity on him (are ἐλεήμονες) [3] and help him, while others laugh at him and rejoice at his misfortune (are ἐπιχαιρεκάκοι) [4] and perhaps take their share in harming him. And it can be observed that some children will rescue a companion from hardships (being φιλάνθρωποι), while others, on the contrary, push him into dangerous spots and cause him harm and pain. Some are niggardly with their possessions (ἀνελεύθεροι), and some again are envious (φθονεροί) and some not [5]."

Traces of different and even opposed ἤθη appear at this age, and together with their appearance the limitations of all future education. We can supplement the defective summary from a section of the *De affectuum dignotione*, which, however, does not refer to the gradual development of children's character. That the passage actually depends on the *De moribus* is beyond doubt [6] (cap. 7. 9–14: p. 25. 24–7. 5 de Boer): "That human individuals are very different by nature can clearly (ἐναργῶς)

[1] Cf. Arist. *Hist. Anim.* 8. 1. 588ᵃ18: ἔνεστι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πλείστοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἴχνη τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν τρόπων ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φανερωτέρας ἔχει τὰς διαφοράς. 1. 608ᵃ 13 ff. 608ᵇ4. Cicero, *De fin.* 5. 43; R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und Aristotelische Ethik*, p. 200 f. Cf. above, p. 152, n. 8.

[2] Galen wrote a special treatise on shame, in two books, *De libr. propriis* 12 (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 121. 21 M. = vol. xix, p. 46. 4 K.).

[3] *Quod an. virt.* ii (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 75. 13 = p. 817. 4 K.).

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 75. 13 M. = p. 817. 4 K.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 75. 12 M. = p. 817. 3 K.

[6] Cf. above, p. 143, nn. 6 and 7.

be learned from the observation of children who are not yet able to walk (ἐπὶ τῶν παραφερομένων παιδίων). We observe that some are bright and cheerful, others sullen; some always ready to smile, others prepared to cry for insignificant reasons; some have everything in common, others are rapacious; some are violently enraged at trifles and bite and kick and fight their companions with sticks and stones, when they believe themselves to have been harmed; others are forbearing and gentle and neither get angry nor cry unless great harm is done to them. . . . (12) In addition, one may observe that some children are shameless and some bashful, that some have good memories, others bad, and others are forgetful; that some take pains over what they are taught, while others are careless and precipitate, etc. . . ., some are fond of honours, others not (ἀφιλότιμα); some are fond of the noble, others are not (ἀφιλόκαλα)." He concludes: "In the same way we observe that some children are by nature given to falsehood, others to truth, and that children have many other differences of character (πολλὰς ἄλλας ἔχοντα διαφορὰς ἠθῶν)". We note that φύσις and ἦθος are used by Galen almost as synonyms and wonder who first suggested their identity [1].

Galen refers again to the natural differences of character in a chapter of the second book *De moribus*, which differs slightly and adds a new element [2]: "Everyone has by nature the rational, the spirited, and the vegetative soul", since human nature is based on them. They develop gradually. "People's characters differ because the appetites of these three souls may be strong or weak, and their relative strength (μᾶλλον and ἧττον) constitutes the individual ἦθος [2]". The limbs of the human body offer a welcome analogy to what is meant by this statement. "All human bodies are alike in that they have the same limbs, but differ in the strength and weakness of their actions. Some, for example, see and hear well, others are weak-sighted and hard of hearing; some are provided with clear and fluid speech, others stammer and their voice is indistinct; some run quickly, others slowly. Others are between the extremes, some of them closer to them, others more distant from them. In the same way small children already have different dispositions of the soul (διαθέσεις τῆς ψυχῆς i.e. ἤθη) from the time of their birth, such as greed, rage, shame-

[1] It is probable that this philosopher was Theophrastus, who understood δαίμων as φύσις in Heraclitus' famous saying Ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων (fr. 119 Diels), cf. Alexander Aphrod. *De fato* 6 (p. 170. 16 Bruns) and *De anima libri mantissa*, p. 186. 28 B. Theophrastus made this statement in his Καλλισθένης ἢ περὶ πένθους. Cf. O. Regenbogen, *op. cit.*, col. 1484; Eraclito, ed. R. Walzer, Firenze, 1939, p. 149. Cf. also the verses of Eupolis, below, p. 159, n. 2.

[2] p. 38. 10 Kraus.

lessness, and their contraries, sincerity or falsity, intelligence or stupidity, memory or forgetfulness." These words of Galen appear to be a late echo of the ethics of Panaetius, Posidonius' teacher, who dealt so successfully with the moral life of the individual and the average human being, the προκόπτων of the Porch, the τυχὼν ἀνήρ of Aristotle's *Ethics* [1]. I quote from Cicero's *De officiis* I. 107: "Intellegendum etiam est duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est eo quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius qua antecellimus bestiis a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa. ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt, alios videmus velocitate ad cursum alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse aliis venustatem, sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates [2]." There follows a list of ἤθη such as *lepos*, *severitas*, *hilaritas*, *ambitio* with examples from Greek and Roman history; εἴρωνες, *callidi*, *simplices et aperti* are mentioned. "Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque [3], minime tamen vituperandorum." I think the comparison of these two passages allows us, in our search for Galen's spiritual ancestors, to go beyond Posidonius and to connect him also with Panaetius, who was the first to revolt against the logical and conceptual rigidity of the early Porch. We have, however, no reason for thinking that Posidonius did not share his master's view [4].

In the summary of the *De moribus* Galen neither states a parallelism between moral and physical qualities nor explains that ἤθη and other faculties of the soul are conditioned by the "temperaments" of the body, which in its turn is influenced by climatic factors. But it is very likely that Galen dealt with this aspect of the problem in the complete work. As things are at present, we can only refer to the later treatise, *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*, which recapitulates in addition the section of the *De moribus* we have just discussed [5]. He dwells there not only on the view that not every human being has the same hereditary character but stresses particularly the fact that we often observe very wicked babies (μικρὰ παιδία πονηρότατα) [6].

[1] Cf., for example, Cicero, *De off.* i. 46: "quoniam autem vivitur non cum perfectis hominibus planeque sapientibus . . ."

[2] Cf. L. Labowsky, *Die Ethik des Panaitios*, Leipzig 1934, pp. 37 ff., 115 ff.

[3] Cf. p. 155, n. i.

[4] Cf. Cicero, *De off.* iii. 8; L. Edelstein, *op. cit.*, nn. 97–100.

[5] Galen, *Quod an. virt.* 7–8. For Posidonius cf. *De plac.* v, pp. 442. 11–443. 1 M. = p. 464, 4–8; L. Edelstein, *op. cit.*, nn. 83, 86. Cf. above, p. 147, n. 2.

[6] *Scr. min.* ii, p. 75. 6 M. = iv, p. 816. 14 K.

IV

We can now examine the implications of Galen's observation of animals and small children. I quote from the section of the *De moribus* which follows the chapter just considered [1]: "All this is preliminary to moral training (παιδεία). And, in general, there are no actions nor 'accidents' (i.e. emotions, πάθη) nor moral dispositions (ἤθη) in the mature man which did not exist in him in boyhood. This disproves that all 'accidents' come from thought and reflexion; for what comes from thought and reflexion is not 'accident' but is either false or true opinion or else knowledge. But an 'accident' is a movement such as exists in animals too, without reflexion, thought, and deliberate action." The Stoic doctrine is thus definitely rejected. Ἦθη, though irrational, are no more "accidental" than emotions; they are to be found in animals as well and are "naturally" inborn in man though capable of development through training and instruction. Habit may produce a kind of second nature [2].

If ἦθος is then inborn and hereditary, the possibilities of education must be limited. This implies further disagreement with orthodox Stoicism and its optimistic view that early influences and instruction alone form the moral character of man. I quote again from the introductory section of the *De moribus* (p. 30. 21 Kraus): "It is necessary in an adult to look at his actions and their causes. For you find that the cause of some is ἦθος, and of others thought. The cause of what results from nature or habit is ἦθος, but the cause of what springs from reflexion and deliberation is thought. When you have shown by reasoned explanation the falsity of evil opinions, you have uprooted them from the soul. But if they spring from nature or habit, such arguments will break but scarcely uproot them. Ἦθος is conditioned not only by nature but also by constant habit, by what a man establishes in his soul and what he does every day. . . .

[1] p. 30. 1 Kraus.

[2] A more specific statement may be compared with these sentences, to be found in the section on the ἤθη of the spirited soul (p. 33. 5 Kraus): "Courage consists in the avoidance of what is base and ugly (αἰσχρόν) rather than in the avoidance of what is disadvantageous and evil (κακόν). An example of this attitude is the man who prefers death to defeat in war and who endures torture rather than bear false witness against his friend. This was observed in the case of the slaves of Perennis (cf. p. 144, n. 7) and their attitude to their late master; although they had not been educated, they acted like freeborn men; since they were free by nature. This indicates that the love of the noble (φιλοκαλία) exists in some people by nature . . . and refutes what some people assert, namely, that nobility arises solely from corrective education". It had become more or less common in the Hellenistic age to consider a slave as a human being and not merely as a living tool. But to use this view as an argument for this doctrine of ἦθος appears to be unique and without a parallel in our tradition. Should we attribute this interesting innovation to Posidonius?

But the relation between the youth and the old man, so far as it concerns the correction of their ἤθη, is that between the newly planted tree and the same tree when it has reached its perfection. For, in the primary phase, it can be easily inclined in the right direction: while when it has reached its perfection, its direction is difficult and sometimes impossible to alter." Ἦθος is, as Galen puts it in the *De affectuum dignotione* [1], the product of nature (φύσις) and assimilation to one's surroundings (ἡ τοῖς συζῶσιν ὁμοίωσις), and later of training (ἄσκησις) and reason (δόγματα)[2]. Educability corresponds to the different ἤθη which we observe already in small children: "Some of them easily imbibe good education, others derive no benefit from it [3]". We should not, however, despair of education [4]. "If the nature of children draws upon the advantages provided by education, they may become good men when mature, if not, we have at least done our duty. For the management of children is in a way similar to the care we bestow on plants [5]. No planter will ever succeed in making a bramble bush bear grapes [6], because its nature does not admit of such completion (τελείωσις). On the other hand, if you neglect vines which are apt to bear their proper fruit and leave them to nature alone, they will bear either bad fruit or no fruit at all. The same applies to animals: You can train a horse and make it useful for many things; but a bear, even when it appears to have become tame, will never acquire domesticity as a lasting quality; vipers and scorpions will always remain savage and are quite untameable." There is nothing to do but to destroy them, like human beings who are by nature bad beyond remedy [7].

Again we feel tempted to compare this appreciation of individuality with Panaetius' attitude in the first book of Cicero, *De officiis*, where, however, he does not, like Galen, deal exclusively with the subject of ἤθη. There appears to be no fundamental difference between their views, except that Panaetius is more original and more subtle [8].

[1] 7. 8 (p. 25. 22 de Boer = v, p. 37. 12 K.).

[2] Cf. *Scr. min.* ii, p. 74. 11 M. = iv, p. 815. 17 K. Cf. also the quotation from the fifth-century comic poet Eupolis in the same context of Galen 7. 10 (p. 26. 6 de Boer = v, p. 38. 7 K.); it was introduced into philosophical discussion by some previous philosopher (Theophrastus?). Cf. Meineke, *Frgm. Com. Graec.* ii. 1, p. 457; fr. 91, i. 280 Kock. Cf. above, p. 153, n. i.

[3] 7. 14 (p. 27. 6 de Boer = v, p. 39. 13 K.).

[4] 7. 15–17 (p. 27. 7–14 de Boer = v, p. 39. 14–40. 5 K.).

[5] Cf. Plato, *Rep.* 6. 491 d; Cicero, *De fin.* v. 39–40: "earum etiam rerum quas terra gignit educatio quaedam et perfectio est non dissimilis animantium". Cf. above, p. 153, n. i.

[6] Cf. Plutarch, *De tranq. an.* 13 (472 e); St. Luke vi. 44. [B. Snell, *Gnomon* 13, 1937, p. 578.]

[7] Cf. *Scr. min.* ii, p. 74. 1–15 M. = iv, p. 815. 7 ff. K.

[8] Cf. Cicero, *De off.* i. 110, 112.

The main issue behind all these questions is the origin of evil in man. Galen was very much interested in this problem, as we learn from Miskawaih's book on moral philosophy [1] and the eleventh chapter of Galen's treatise *That the faculties of the soul follow the temperaments of the body*. We are allowed to supplement the defective summary from these two works which both presuppose the complete text of the *De moribus*. Miskawaih [2] first mentions the philosophers of the Porch who believe that all are good by nature but are afterwards corrupted by bad surroundings and dominated by bad desires which are unrestrained by appropriate education. Other unspecified people, prior to the Stoics, "believed that men were created from the lowest matter, namely the slime of the world, and they are therefore bad by nature; they become good by education and instruction, but those among them who are very bad cannot be so corrected; those, however, who are not incurably bad can change from bad to good through education from childhood and afterwards through the company of good and excellent men [3]". Galen's opinion—according to Miskawaih—was "that some people are good by nature, some bad, and some midway between the two extremes. Then he rejected the two earlier opinions mentioned, attacking the first one in the following way: 'If all people were good by nature and only became bad by instruction, they would necessarily learn the bad things either from themselves or from others. If they learn them from others, their teachers are bad by nature. Hence not everybody is good by nature. If they learn it from themselves, there is in them either only a faculty (δύναμις) by which they desire the evil, and hence they would be bad by nature; or there is in them, in addition to the faculty by which they desire the evil, another faculty by which they desire the good, but eventually the faculty which desires the evil overpowers and subjugates that which desires the good. And thus again they would be bad by nature [4].' The second view he overthrew by a similar argument. He said: 'If all men were bad by nature, they might learn the good from other people or from themselves'. And we repeat the

[1] Cf. above, p. 143, n. 6; p. 147, n. 2.

[2] pp. 26. 8–27. 18 Cairo edition. Kraus did not see that this section, in Miskawaih's work, is also to be referred to the *De moribus*.

[3] This corresponds roughly to the statements in the *Quod an. virt.* 2 (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 73. 6–12 = iv, p. 814. 10–16 K.); pp. 74. 21–75. 1 M. = iv. 816. 7–10 K. For those philosophers who believe in the original wickedness of mankind cf. p. 76. 7–16 M. = iv. 818. 1–10 K. Miskawaih reports a special theory underlying the views of these philosophers.

[4] Galen expressly states in his later treatise that he does not give all the arguments used against the Stoic theory (*Scr. min.* ii, p. 75. 1 M. = iv, p. 816. 10 K.). The argument referred to by Miskawaih is not to be found elsewhere (but cf. *Scr. min.* ii. 77. 5 ff. M. = iv, p. 819. 2 ff. K.).

first argument in exactly the same way [1]. Having refuted the opinions of these two schools, Galen strengthened his own view with what is clear and evident (τὰ ἐναργῆ). For it is obvious that some few people are good by nature and cannot be corrupted; and that there are many who are bad by nature and cannot become good; and there are others in an intermediate state who are rendered good by the company and the admonitions (ὑποθῆκαι) of the good, but become bad when they associate with the bad and are enticed into evil by them [2]."

It is evident that the Arabic writer of the tenth century and Galen in the treatise referred to draw from the same source; sometimes Miskawaih gives more than Galen, sometimes Galen has preserved arguments and material not included in the Arabic account of the larger work [3]. The main additional information which we find in Galen's small treatise concerns the author of the antistoic argument of the *De moribus*, on which he and Miskawaih depend: it is wrong to assume with Chrysippus that everybody is capable of virtue. It is quite surprising to learn that the philosophers of the Porch explain wickedness as a perversion of the soul due to bad surroundings; for this argument can neither be applied to the first men (πρῶτοι ἄνθρωποι) [4] nor to small children, among whom one plainly meets with some who are very wicked. Posidonius, "the most learned of the Stoics", had already blamed them for neglecting these obvious facts [5]. He did not share their view that wickedness enters the human soul later from outside: "it has a root of its own in our souls from which it starts, sprouts, and grows; the seed of wickedness is in ourselves". Instead of avoiding bad company we ought to follow those able to purify us and to check the growth of wickedness in us [6]. Posidonius expounded this at length in two of his works on moral philosophy, in the work *On emotions* and, in greater detail, in that *On the difference of virtues* [7].

V

It is now evident that Galen's whole theory of ἦθος and its implications is based on Posidonius' restoration of Plato's psychology in the face of Chrysippus' denial of the irrational in man. His theory is coherent in

[1] No argument against this school is preserved in the *Quod an. virt.*

[2] This is a remarkable statement which I should also like to ascribe to Posidonius (cf. below). Plato's view, as expressed in the *Phaedo* (90 a), is much less pessimistic.

[3] Cf. n. 1 and p. 160 n. 2-4

[4] *Scr. min.* ii, p. 75. 2–5 M. = iv, p. 816. 10–13 K., cf. p. 77. 15 M. = 819. 2 f. K.

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 77. 17 M. = iv, p. 819. 13 K.

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 78. 8–15. For the words ῥίζα, σπέρμα cf. above, p. 155, n. 1.

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 78. 2: κατὰ τὴν Περὶ τῶν παθῶν πραγματείαν. Diog. Lacrt. 7. 91: ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγου. *Op. cit.*, p. 78. 4: ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἀρετῶν.

itself, and having established Posidonius' authorship in various cardinal points we are entitled to draw the obvious inference. We could refer Galen's psychology of early childhood to Posidonius even if there were no independent evidence for attributing it to him. But, thanks to Galen's interest in Posidonius' theory of emotion and the long quotations from it in Galen's *De placitis*, we can compare similar observations of children discussed by Posidonius. According to this evidence he was concerned not only with the primitive expressions of desire and ambition in animals and children but also with the gradual development of the human soul [1]. He showed also a special interest in those parts of Plato's *Laws* which deal with early childhood and even with children in the prenatal state, "and composed a kind of summary of Plato's views in the first book of his work *On emotions* [2]". In the same passage, Posidonius stated that man reaches maturity at the age of fourteen. This is in itself not a surprising statement, and it may be traced as far back as a famous poem of Solon [3]. For Posidonius this is the age in which all the three faculties of the soul are fully grown and developed and should now become well balanced [4]. I should like to assume that these lines refer to the same section of Posidonius' work which started with the psychology of early childhood in the first three years of life, which we read in the summary of Galen's *De moribus*.

We can therefore use the whole introductory part of Galen's *De moribus*, altered and changed as it may be, in a future collection of the remains of Posidonius' ethics, and feel tempted to ascribe other startling statements in Galen's new work to the same author, even if there is no equally convincing evidence. We should, however, be careful not to identify Galen and Posidonius too closely. On the whole, there is a long distance between Posidonius, the precursor of Neoplatonism, and Galen, the scientist and metaphysical sceptic. Posidonius was an Aristotelian philosopher dedicated to research of every kind and at the same time a keen and original "theologian", a metaphysician of a high order. He was a philosopher like Cleombrotus the Lacedaemonian whom Plutarch describes in the *De defectu oraculorum* [5]. Galen was, like Strabo, mainly impressed by his capacity

[1] *De plac.* iv (pp. 437. 3–438. 12 M. = v, p. 459. 3–460. 10 K.).

[2] *De plac.* iv (p. 445. 8–12 M. = v, p. 466. 12 K.). For his interest in Plato's *Laws* cf. also Edelstein, *op. cit.*, n. 109.

[3] Solon fr. 2 Diehl, Aetius 5. 23, Galen, *De aff. dign.* 8. 3 (p. 28. 9 de Boer = v, p. 41. 10 K.). Galen received his first philosophical instruction at this age.

[4] *De plac.* iv (pp. 445. 13–446. 7 M. = v, p. 466. 17–467. 8 K.).

[5] 2, p. 410 a: . . . πολλὰ πεπλανημένος . . . οὐ κατ' ἐμπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἀνὴρ φιλοθεάμων καὶ φιλομαθὴς οὐσίαν δ' ἔχων ἱκανὴν καὶ τὸ πλείονα τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν οὐκ ἄξιον πολλοῦ ποιούμενος ἐχρῆτο τῇ σχολῇ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ συνῆγεν ἱστορίαν οἷον ὕλην φιλοσοφίας θεολογίαν ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκάλει τέλος ἐχούσης.

for inquiring into causes, τὸ αἰτιολογικὸν καὶ Ἀριστοτελίζον [1]. There is also a considerable distance in time between Galen and Posidonius, more than two centuries. We do not know very much about the intermediate stages and the development of certain schools of "middle-platonic" moral philosophy under Posidonius' influence. We may say confidently that Galen's Platonism in ethics and his work *De moribus* is strongly influenced by Posidonius, but there is no reason to suppose that he reproduces Posidonius' doctrine in full [2].

It was beyond Galen's intention and capacity to attempt a restoration of the inward spirit of Plato's philosophy as Plotinus did in the third century A.D. He preserved the spirit of Greek science and medicine and represented it through a millenium of European civilization, whose originality was confined to other activities of the human spirit. But he was, rightly, never appreciated as a philosopher of the first order like Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, *i maestri di color che sanno.*

From: *The Classical Quarterly* XLIII, 1949, pp. 82–96.

[1] Strabo 2. 3. 8. Cf. above, p. 148, n. 3.

[2] New fragments from Galen's De moribus were published and discussed by S. M. Stern, *Classical Quarterly, N.S.* VI, 1956, pp. 91–104. He also reminds me of the short quotations in a work by Joseph ibn 'Aqnīn which were first noticed by M. Steinschneider, *Gesammelte Schriften* I (Berlin 1925), p. 56 and which were published by A. S. Halkin, *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 14 (1944), pp. 68–69, 72–73.]

A DIATRIBE OF GALEN

Dedicated to Dr. S. van den Bergh for his seventieth birthday

The Arabic summary of Galen's Περὶ ἠθῶν, a work which appears to have been of some importance for moral philosophy in the early centuries of philosophical speculation in Islam, is the only remnant of this rather comprehensive work of the philosophizing doctor of the century of the Antonines. It is, as happens so often in the case of Galen, a work in which traditional doctrine and statements taken from some great predecessor make themselves more strongly felt than the author's own contribution and his particular intention. Posidonius' restoration of Plato's psychology, as far as ethical speculation is concerned, appears to be the basis of Galen's description of moral character [1]. There is no need to refer to Posidonius if we want to explain why Galen thought it right to insert fables and sermon-like exhortations into his theoretical treatment of a subject of moral philosophy. But it may, nonetheless, be appropriate to remember that Posidonius insisted on the importance of exhortation as well as of description and analysis: moral philosophy is in equal need of both. Seneca Epist. 95, 65: "Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem. . . . sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat. His adicit causarum inquisitionem. . . . Ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusque virtutis: hanc Posidonius ethologiam vocat, quidam characterismon appellant, signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas [2] reddentem quibus inter se similia discriminentur." We should, however, in a work on ἤθη, expect to find neither a *suasio*, a ὑποθετικὸς λόγος, which has its place in a *praeceptio* (διδασκαλικὸς λόγος) nor a *consolatio*, a παραμυθητικὸς λόγος—whose function it is to heal the emotions, but only an *exhortatio*, a προτρεπτικὸς λόγος. This was, as I learn from Professor K. Reinhardt, Posidonius' view. (Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paedag., I, 1, p. 90, 1 Stählin, a passage which elaborates the statement by Seneca, referred to before.) [3] Accordingly Galen used only προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι in his work on ἤθη.

[1] This has been shown in a previous article: New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy (from a recently discovered Arabic source), *Classical Quarterly* 1949, pp. 82–96; cf. p. 84 n. 3 and n. 5. [cf. above pp. 142 ff.]

[2] Cf., e.g., *De moribus* p. 31. 10 Kraus: "I should put down the distinguishing marks (*'alāmāt*) of the ἤθη." Follows the discussion of ὀργή and θυμός and the very interesting description of ἀνδρεία which contains some very unusual features.

[3] Cf. now Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, 43, 1953, col. 768 f.

The summary appears to have preserved one of Galen's *exhortationes* in its entirety. It is to be found at the end of the second book, in which the ἤθη which originate from the appetitive soul are discussed and the difference between a sensuous and a rational life is worked out in detail. The main adversary, although never mentioned by name in the summary, is Epicurus, misunderstood in his intentions as so often in the platonizing philosophy of the Imperial Age, e.g. in Plutarch's philosophical essays. The ultimate source of a great part of the second book is again somewhere in the neighbourhood of Panaetius and Posidonius, as has been shown previously [1]. The protreptic chapter consists of three parts:

(I) A more theoretical discussion of the immortality of the νοῦς, slightly spoiled by Galen's well-known meek scepticism [2] but probably quite consistent in the original which he follows.

(II) A fable, put to illustrate his view more vividly; this fable was previously known in a full quotation of this part of the chapter to be found in Al-Bīrūnī's India and was used by him for purposes of his own, which will be discussed later. E. Sachau, the editor of Al-Bīrūnī's work (published in 1887–8) [3], overlooked the fact that the fable, though in a slightly different and less good recension, is preserved in a metrical version by Babrius (no. 30; imitated by Avianus 23, who may have used a Latin prose paraphrase of the text of Babrius), and, accordingly, the last critical editor of Babrius, O. Crusius (1896), is unaware of the parallel to be found in Galen.

(III) A solemn exhortation, based on an allegorical understanding of

[1] Cf. *Class. Quart.* (above p. 164 n. 1, p. 156 f. and p. 145 n. 4.) The further development of the φιλανθρωπία (cf. S. Tromp de Ruyter, De vocis quae est φιλανθρωπία significatione atque usu, *Mnemosyne* 59, 1932, p. 271 ff.) into a general love of mankind on philosophical grounds deserves a special inquiry. It comes, surprisingly, to the surface in an Arabic work on moral philosophy, based entirely on a lost Greek treatise and written by the Christian Arabic philosopher Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (cf. G. Graf, *Geschichte der christlichen-arabischen Litteratur* II, p. 233 ff.), the pupil of Al-Fārābī (d. A.D. 950) who naturalized the platonic philosopher-king in Arabian lands: *Kitāb tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, Rasā'il al-Bulaghā, 3rd edition, Cairo 1946, p. 517. [Cf. above, p. 33 n. 3. Cf. also G. Downey, Philanthropia in Religion and Statecraft in the 4th. century after Christ, *Historia* 4, 1955, pp. 199–208.]

[2] Cf., e.g., Galen, Quod an. virt. 3 (Scripta Minora II, p. 36. 12): ὅτι δ'ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν τε καὶ μερῶν τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, Πλάτων μὲν φαίνεται πεπεισμένος, ἐγὼ δ'οὔθ'ὡς ἔστιν οὔθ'ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔχω διατείνεσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν ("Plato seems to be convinced that the rational part of the whole soul is immortal, but with respect to his view I am unable to maintain either that it is or that it is not") and Περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῷ δοκούντων, vol. IV, p. 761, 2 ff., Kühn (Cf. *Plato Arabus* I., London 1951, p. 15 and n. 4).

[3] P. 59.10–60.5 of the Arabic text, vol. I p. 123 of the translation (Second edition, London 1910). Al-Bīrūnī completed his work on India about A.D. 1030 at the court of Maḥmūd of Ghazna.

the fable, to live a philosophical life, trying, as Plato demanded, to become similar to God as far as mortal beings can. I give the text of the passage in full (p. 39.20–41.4 Kraus):

(i) Know that the body has been joined to you only in order to serve you as an instrument in the performance of your actions; that the appetitive soul has been given to you for the body's sake only, and the spirited soul in order to embolden you in your fight against the appetitive soul. Now if a man's hands and feet were cut off and those other limbs of his, without which he is able to live and still to remain a human being since his mind and his intellect continue to exist, he would nonetheless remain a human being. In the same way, then, it is possible that a man remains alive and thinking after the loss of all the limbs of his body, having been divested, together with the body, of that soul which nourishes it. Now since you are a human being through your rational soul alone, being able through it to remain alive and thinking and to do without the spirited and appetitive souls—were the rational soul free of both of them, it would have never been entangled in a bad way of life—you should disregard the actions and "accidents" (i.e. emotions, πάθη) connected with these two. And if you, after having become free of both of them together with the body, are still able to reason and to think—according to the best philosophers' statements about the state of man after death—you should know that you will have, after having become free of the body, a life like the gods [1]. But if you are not yet certain that your mind is immortal, then there is nothing easier than to strive that your way of life becomes similar to the life of the gods [2] while you are still alive.

But you may object: "It is impossible to live up to this standard". I should agree to this, since one cannot help eating and drinking; but in the same way as you would become a god [3] if you were able to live without food and drink, you will come near to being a god [4] if you confine yourself to what is indispensable for the life of the body. It is your choice to honour your soul by making yourself similar to the gods [5] or to disrespect your soul by making yourself similar to the beasts.

(ii) It is told that two men came at the same time to an idol-merchant (*bā'i' aṣnām*) and bargained with him for an idol of Hermes. The one wanted to erect it in a temple (*haikal*) [to remind people of Hermes] (*Al-Bīrūnī:* as a memorial of Hermes); the other wanted to erect it on a tomb and thus recall to mind a deceased person. However, they could not come to terms with the merchant that day, and so they postponed the business until the following day. That night the idol-merchant saw in his dream that the idol spoke to him: "O excellent man, I am your work now, I have received through the work of your hands a shape which is thought to be the shape of a god [6]. Now I am no longer called a stone as before: I am now called Hermes [7]. Now it is up to you to make me a memorial either of something imperishable or of something which has already perished."

(iii) This is my word to him who directs his attention to his own soul and cares for it. He is even superior to the idol insofar as nobody else can dispose of his self, for he is free and master of his will. Now what is worthier of him who is thus provided than to put his soul in the highest rank of honour? But there exists no greater

[1] This was certainly to be read in the Greek original. The Arabic translator has "angels" *malā'ika* instead. Cf. below, p. 167 n. 2

[2] "Angels": Arabic version.

[3] "Angel": Arabic version.

[4] "Angel": Arabic version.

[5] "Angels": Arabic version.

[6] "Star": Arabic version and Al-Bīrūnī. Cf. below, p. 167, n. 3.

[7] "Mercury, *'uṭārid*": Al-Bīrūnī (i.e. the name of the star, cf., e.g., Plato Arabus I, ch. IVe).

honour to your soul than to imitate God [1] according to human capacity. This goal is reached by disregarding present pleasures and giving preference to the noble.

Some words in the Arabic text are changes due either to the translator's monotheistic piety [2] or to his ignorance of pagan Greek religion of which he could have only a dim idea transmitted to him by a late Neoplatonic tradition in which the heathen gods were identified with stars [3]. They have been tacitly replaced by the obvious original expressions.

* * *

The Platonic tenor of the exhortation is apparent and scarcely calls for any detailed comment. The survival of the rational part of the soul, as asserted in Plato's Timaeus and by the early Peripatetics, is commonly accepted, with the proviso of the *ekpyrosis* by the philosophers of the Porch also. But the use made of the fable related by Babrius and this fable in itself deserve some attention. It will be convenient to give the version of Babrius in full.

A sculptor had a marble Hermeias [4] for sale. Two men bargained for it, one to use it as a gravestone—a son of his had recently died—the other to dedicate the artefact as a god. It was late and the sculptor had not sold it yet, but he had agreed with them to show it again when they came next morning. The sculptor, having fallen asleep, saw Hermes in the gates of dream saying to him: "Well, you now

[1] "God": Also in the Arabic version. This way of expression was not objectionable to a Muslim mind. Cf., e.g., Al-Kindi's (d. after A.D. 870) reference to the Platonic ὁμοίωσις θεῷ as *tashabbuh bi-l-bāri'* "assimilation to the Creator" (Rasā'il I p. 274.14 Abū Rīda); Miskawaih, *Tahdhīb* (cf. below, p. 171 n. 2), p. 30.14.

[2] Cf. p. 166, n. 1–5 and *Plato Arabus I* (London 1951), pp. 24 f., 48. Gregory of Nyssa, De instit. Christ. p. 70.29 Jaeger: τὸν τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ζήσεσθε βίον and his Christianization of Platonism: Χριστιανισμός ἐστι τῆς θείας φύσεως μίμησις (Cf. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, *Harvard Theological Review* 45, 1952, p. 276, n. 70). Cf. also *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica N.S.* 14, 1937, p. 128 f.; Chalcidius cap. 132–4 (p. 195 ff. Wrobel). Proclus, *Ad Plat. Tim.* 90a (ed. Pfaff, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum Suppl.* 3, 1941, p. 57, l. 15 and note i.) Al-Fārābī, *Siyāsa*,p. 3.11.—F. Cumont, *Lux Perpetua*, Paris 1949, p. 231 and n. 3–8. [Cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge* 14,2 Busse: θεόν in ras. A^1 Boeth. ἄγγελον BCLMa Arabs. 18,23: θεοῦ Boeth. ἀγγέλου καὶ θεοῦ B ἀγγέλου ACLMa Arabs: θεοῦ ἀγγέλου Elias, Isag. p. 61,4 Busse and passim.]

[3] The Christian Jacobite translator of the so-called "Theology of Aristotle" can translate the plotinian θεοί by "stars", "planets", "masters", "masters of the stars", cf. *Plato Arabus* I, p. 48. For the identification of the pagan gods with stars cf. Al-Bīrūnī (below, p. 173 and, e.g., E. Levi della Vida, La traduzione araba delle storie di Orosio, *Miscellanea Galbiati III*, Milano 1951, p. 188f. n. 4: "La religione dei Romani prima del Christianesimo consisteva nel culto degli astri. Così racconta Orosio (!)" (Cf. Ibn al-Qifṭī, p. 10.1 ff. Lippert).

[4] Ἑρμῆς or Ἑρμείας can mean both the herm pillar and the god.

hold my fate in the balance; you will make one thing of me, either a dead man or a god [1]".

Both versions refer to the manufacture of a herm, or a statue of Hermes, i.e. the idol in question is either a sculpture like the Hermes of Praxiteles or a bust of Hermes to be put on the top of a pillar. An entire figure of Hermes the God as a sepulchral statue is still possible in Roman times, and the connection of herm and grave is not uncommon, at least since the beginning of the Hellenistic period [2]. A "Hermes" can indeed either stand for a dead person or represent the living god, and it is not without interest to realize that we have here conclusive evidence from literature for what is apparent from the interpretation of the monuments. Babrius mentions the recent death of a son of one of the prospective buyers and his tomb, to be adorned by the "Hermes", the youthful god as glorified representation of the dead youth (A. D. Nock), but he is silent about the destination of the figure of the god. Galen does not mention the tomb but says that the figure of the god, either a full-sized statue or a herm, is to be erected in a temple, inside the building. But this may be due to the translator who may have misunderstood the Greek τέμενος as "temple", whereas the precincts of a sanctuary were intended. If one wants to stress the possibility that a herm pillar was meant, we may think of a sculpture like the fifth century artist Alcamenes' famous bust of the Hermes of the Gateway which was to be found at the entrance of the sacred precincts of the Acropolis at Athens [3].

1 Γλύψας ἐπώλει λυγδινόν τις Ἑρμείην
τὸν δ' ἠγόραζον ἄνδρες, ὃς μὲν εἰς στήλην
(υἱὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ προσφάτως ἐτεθνήκει)
ὁ δὲ χειροτέχνης ὡς θεὸν καθιδρύσων.
ἦν δ' ὀψέ, χὠ λιθουργὸς οὐκ ἐπεπράκει
συνθέμενος αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ὄρθρον αὖ δεῖξαι
ἐλθοῦσιν. ὁ δὲ λιθουργὸς εἶδεν ὑπνώσας
αὐτὸν τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐν πύλαις ὀνειρείαις,
«εἶεν» λέγοντα, «τἀμὰ νῦν ταλαντεύῃ
ἐν γάρ με, νεκρὸν ἢ θεόν, σὺ ποιήσεις.»

l.4 χειροτέχνης has not yet been satisfactorily explained. If one believes a Greek author of the second century A.D. to be capable of such a clumsy way of expressing himself—and the present writer can certainly not claim to be an expert in Babrius' style—,the second buyer would be an artisan who intends to dedicate a statue of the patron of the artisans, Hermes. But C. Lachmann's and O. Schneider's slight alteration of χειροτέχνης to χειροτέχνημ', as E. Panofsky rightly insists, gives a good sense: "a work of human hands representing a god" and fits in very well with the general character of the fable.

[2] Cf. K. Friis Johansen, *The Attic Grave Reliefs of the Classical Period*, Copenhagen 1951, p. 71 ff. and p. 72, n. 1 and the literature quoted by him.

[3] Cf., e.g., Gisela M. Richter, *The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks*, 3rd edition, New Haven 1950, p. 238 and fig. 628/9 or G. Lippold, Die griechische Plastik, *Handbuch der Archaeologie*, München 1950, p. 186 and Tafel 67.3.

There is no essential difference in the description of the dream of the sculptor who "sees" the god (in Babrius), or, better, the idol itself (in Galen) addressing him. The first part of the speech is only to be found in Galen. It recalls a popular *topos* as old as Epicharmus (fr. 131 Kaibel): ἐκ παντὸς ξύλου κλοιός τε κα γένοιτο κἠκ τωὐτοῦ θεός ("out of any piece of wood the yoke of a plough may be made and out of the same piece, a god") [1]. The original purpose of the fable was perhaps not at all to drive home some moral argument more forcibly but to state a witty paradox and to make the hearer enjoy it. Cf. Horace Serm., I, 8: "Olim truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum, cum faber, incertus scamnum faceretne Priapum, maluit esse deum . . ." Here we have also the reference to the decision of the artist, which is common to Galen and Babrius. But the difficulty in which the sculptor of the Hermes or the herm finds himself entangled is of a particular kind. He has to decide whether the figure which he has already finished shall be erected on a tomb or placed in a sacred precinct. It seems that no particular change is envisaged once the decision has been taken: one might assume than an inscription would have to be added but this assumption is by no means necessary. It does not seem that the features of the figure were to be altered in order to produce a kind of portrait of the deceased [2]. The figure must be the same whatever the ultimate purpose; if not, neither Babrius' poem nor Galen's moralizing reference to the fable can have had any meaning. At any rate, if a witty paradox was ultimately at the base of this fable—which is obviously open to doubt—it is no longer apparent in Babrius' version. He is slightly amused but rather puzzled by the fact that the same artefact can represent an immortal god and at the same time a deceased mortal man and that the artist has the power of decision. It was not difficult to use this story—we do not actually know in what form it reached Galen or his predecessor—for the purpose of philosophical exhortation, by substituting the gods or the divine and eternal first cause of philosophy for the individual god of popular religion, and the world of change, of coming-to-be and passing away, for the dead man of the fable. It is comparable to the Hellenistic and Stoic way of interpreting the great poets of the past in an

Footnote Continued from Page 168

[1] A strange variation of obviously the same motif Apuleius, Apol. 43: "non enim ex omni ligno, ut Pythagoras dicebat, debet Mercurius exculpi". Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 34.245. [Cf. F. Rosenthal, *Orientalia* 27 (1958), p. 51 f. 158, 181 f.]

[2] Cf. K. Friis Johansen, *op. cit.*, p. 70 and p. 148, n. 1. Cf. also L. Curtius, *Interpretationen von sechs griechischen Bildwerken*, Bern 1947, p. 11 f.

allegorical way, to use poetry as an auxiliary to philosophy, which had taken the place of poetry in the minds of educated people. The hand of a philosopher, of the Porch or the Academy, is also to be noticed in a small but significant detail in the fable as reported by Galen. The idol of Hermes is to be a "memorial" of the god: its function is to remind people of his existence. In no other way can image worship be maintained and defended in an enlightened age. The image has no longer any magical powers, but human nature is too weak to do without this symbolic representation of the divine if it is not to forget about it. It may be sufficient to refer to Plutarch's attitude [1] or to a well known passage in Maximus of Tyre's philosophical sermons [2]. The same reasoning applies to the figure on the tomb. It has, according to Galen, no other function than to remind the living of the man who died, and its original meaning is either forgotten or deliberately overlooked.

It will scarcely appear far-fetched to refer in this context to a different yet somehow similar way of expression. I mean the idea of comparing the self-education of the individual, based on the free choice between good and evil, to the sculptor's work. To speak of the shaping of one's personality is as old as Plato's Republic VI 500 d [3]. But the interest in artistic creation as such became more common in the Hellenistic period, and with it, a metaphor of this kind became more obvious for expressing the education and self-education of man [4]. Plotinus who not only revived the traditional terms but used them as if they had never existed before,

[1] De Is. et Osir. 67. 377 f.

[2] II 10, p. 29.9 Hobein: "If a Greek is stirred to the remembrance of God (πρὸς τὴν μνήμην τοῦ θεοῦ) by the art of Phidias, an Egyptian by paying worship to animals, another man by a river, another by fire—I have no anger for their divergences; only let them know, let them love, let them remember (μνημονευέτωσαν)". Cf. L. Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, vol. IV, p. 221. Julian Orat. IV (V Hertlein) p. 170 A f. For a completely different attitude (Iamblichus) cf. P. Kraus, *Jābir ibn Hayyan II*, Cairo 1942, p. 123 ff. and John Philoponus' refutation of Iamblichus, Photius, Bibl. Cod. 215. [Cf. Ps.-Alex., *Metaph.* p. 710, 12–25 Heylbut.]

[3] Ἂν οὖν τις αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;

[4] Plut. Ἐκ τῶν Περὶ ἡσυχίας (vol. VII, p. 119, Bern. = Stob. Flor. IV, cap. XVI, 18): ἡ δὲ ἠρεμία σοφίας οὖσα γυμνάσιον ἠθοποιὸς ἀγαθὴ καὶ πλάττει καὶ μετευθύνει τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς ψυχάς. Gregory of Nyssa, *De professione Christiana*, p. 133.5 Jaeger: τὴν φύσιν ἑαυτῶν τῇ πίστει μορφώσαντες. [Socrates] ap. Stob. *Flor.* III, cap. 1, no. 89: τοῦ βίου καθάπερ ἀγάλματος πάντα τὰ μέρη καλὰ εἶναι δεῖ. Diotogenes ap. Stob. IV p. 265.10 Hense = L. Delatte, *Traités de la Royauté*, p. 39.10: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀρχὰν ἔχων ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν νόμος ἔμψυχος θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρεσχημάτισται.

also gave new life to this now possibly traditional metaphor. I quote one rightly famous passage (I, 6, 9):

> Withdraw into thyself, and see thyself. And if as yet thou see no beauty in thyself, then do as does the maker of an image which will at last be fair: as he strikes off a part and a part planes away, as he makes this smooth and releases that, until he has revealed upon the image its face of beauty; so do thou strip away all excess and make straight all crookedness; whatsoever is yet prisoned in darkness, labour to release it that it may be bright; and cease not from the fashioning of thine own image (μὴ παύσῃ τεκταίνων τὸ σὸν ἄγαλμα) until that day when the glory of virtue as of a god shall flame upon thee and thy eyes shall behold Serenity (σωφροσύνη) established on her stainless pedestal. (Translated by E. R. Dodds.)[1]

But there is no stringent resemblance between the passage from Plotinus and the Hellenistic references on one side and the page of Galen preserved in the Arabic summary on the other. On the contrary, a consideration of their obvious differences makes the peculiar feature of the new text still clearer. Above all, the decision of the sculptor is not mentioned and could not be mentioned by Plotinus. It is bound up with the double significance of the figure of Hermes and its application to a fundamental moral action. There seems to be no parallel to the new text in Greek literature. Is it too rash to assume that this impressive page of Galen derives from the work of a profound mind like Posidonius, whose influence has been discovered in other sections of Galen's work? It is definitely beyond Galen's capacity of remoulding and interpreting Greek tradition—even if the actual wording may be his own [2].

[1] Cf. E. R. Dodds, *Select Passages Illustrating Neo-Platonism*, London 1923, p. 113.

[2] I think it is not out of the way to mention here one other interesting feature from Galen's work *De moribus* which seems not to be mentioned in other Greek works on moral philosophy. In the third book (p. 45 Kraus) Galen did not compare the interplay of the three Platonic "souls" to a charioteer and two winged horses as Plato does in the *Phaedrus* (246 E ff.), but likened them to a hunter, a dog and an unspecified greedy animal who almost form a single whole, so closely are they knitted together. Sometimes the animal succeeds in forcibly carrying the hunter and dog with it. The hunter wants to ascend to a high and very beautiful spot, whereas the animal tries to use his help for the satisfaction of its own greed. The hunter soon realizes that only by resorting to a trick will he increase his own and his dog's strength and permanently keep down the animal. He waits until the animal falls asleep and then starts deceiving it by removing everything which might rouse its appetite. When it wakes up again, it finds only scanty food, just sufficient to relieve it of its hunger. Thus the animal which represents the vegetative or appetitive soul will be definitely weakened, and the hunter and dog, having time to increase their concerted strength, will keep it in its place. There appears to be no parallel to this "parable" (*mithāl*) in extant Greek or Latin texts but the Arabic writer Miskawaih (died A.D. 1030) knows a better version of it, in which the "animal" is the riding beast of the hunter (*Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*, cap. 2, p. 18, 20 ff. of the Cairo edition of 1322/1904). He does not ascribe it to Galen, although he knows his *De moribus* very well (cf. *Class. Quart.* 1949, pp. 83, n. 2 and 93 f.) [above, p. 143 n. 6 and 160 ff.], but to the ἀρχαῖοι (*qudamā*) in general. Miskawaih's

It has been mentioned before [1] that Al-Bīrūnī, the great Muslim interpreter of Indian religion, a contemporary of Avicenna (980–1037), quotes the text of the fable from Galen's work which he knew in an Arabic translation of the ninth century. He did not refer to it because of its protreptic value and does not say a word about the context in which it appears. He rightly states that Galen's work was written during the reign of the Emperor Commodus [2] and, wrongly, assures his reader that the event related had taken place in his time. The quotation is to be found towards the end of the eleventh chapter of his *India* in which he discusses the worship of images as practised by the Hindus and tries to give reasons for this strange attitude of people whom he respects. It is obvious that he, like every Muslim, rejects pictorial representation of the divine, with which he is familiar from Christian and Manichean usage [3]. But his explanation takes up the old Hellenistic idea, accepted also by the Christian Church [4], that the images have no magic power but that

Footnote Continued from Page 171

immediate source may well have been Porphyry or some otherwise unknown author of a manual which depended on him. But the comparison itself must be older than Galen and have been invented by some representative Hellenistic philosopher.—In the first book (p. 21 f. and p. 27. 19 ff. Kraus) Galen likens the relation to be established between the rational and the spirited soul to the relation of a rider to his horse or of a hunter to his dog. There is again an Arabic parallel. Al-Kindī (died after A.D. 870) compares the spirited soul to a dog and ascribes the comparison to Plato (*Rasā'il*, I, p. 274.15 ff. Abū Rīda: the rational soul is likened to a king, the appetitive soul to a pig. Cf. *De moribus*, p. 34.2, 37.1 Kraus, and also Al-Ghazali, *Das Elixier der Glückseligkeit*, transl. by H. Ritter, Jena 1923, p. 31 f.); in another passage of the same psychological treatise he compares the spirited soul to a horse (*op. cit.*, p. 273.11). Al-Kindī's ultimate source in this essay is almost certainly Porphyry (cf. Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele, *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica N.S.* 14, 1937, p. 125 ff. [above, p. 38 ff.] and Proclus, *In Remp.* II, p. 96.10 Kroll). There are no traces of Galen's *De moribus* in Al-Kindī's work, and we are thus again thrown back to the same predecessor of Galen.

Galen, *De placitis Hipp. et Pl.*, p. 455.6 Müller (vol. V, p. 475 K.), cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, col. 738 (Pauly-Wissowa).

A. F. Wensinck, *La pensée de Ghazzālī*, Paris 1940, p. 62 and n. 3.

[1] Cf. above, p. 165 n. 3. Cf. also A. Jeffery, Al-Bīrūnī's Contribution to Comparative Religion, *Al-Bīrūnī Commemoration Volume*, Calcutta 1951, pp. 126–60 passim.

[2] Cf. *Class. Quart.* 1949, p. 83 and n. 10 [above, p. 144 n. 7].

[3] I like to refer, in this context, to some remarks by H. Ritter, to be found in Studies in Islamic Cultural History ed. G. E. von Grünebaum (*The American Anthropologist* 56 *Memoir* no. 76, 1954), p. 22: "Mr. R. drew attention to the almost complete lack of sculpture among the Arabs and their acoustic rather than visual talent, which possibly is a common Semitic characteristic. The Arab resents the idea of representing God in human shape but not of his talking like a human being. As in the Old Testament, the faculty of hearing precedes that of seeing; it is always 'God is hearing and seeing (*samī'un wabaṣīrun*)'."

[4] Cf. St. John Damascene, *Orationes tres adversus eos qui sacras imagines abiciunt*, passim. Prof. Milton Anastos draws my attention to a passage from the Acts of the Second

their true function is to remind the non-philosophical pious man of the existence of the divine. He quotes Indra appearing to a king called Ambarīsha in human shape and saying: "If you are overpowered by human forgetfulness, make to yourself an image like that in which you see me; offer to it perfumes and flowers and make it a memorial of me, so that you may not forget me. If you are in sorrow, think of me; if you speak, speak in my name; if you act, act for me [1]." This is, according to Al-Bīrūnī, the origin of Hindu image worship. It was in this connection that he remembered the fable reported by Galen. It interested him that the figure of Hermes was to be a memorial of the deceased man or a memorial of a god, and nothing else but a memorial, and for this reason alone he quoted Galen. He did not understand Greek religion as it was still alive in Galen's time. He was only aware of a late Neoplatonic-Gnostic type of star-worship with which the Arabs became familiar through the pagan survival of Greek polytheism in Harran, and some odd change in the Arabic version of Galen and in the slightly different text which Al-Bīrūnī quotes are due to this lack of knowledge [2]. The Greek philosophers whom Al-Bīrūnī mentions had, like the late Neoplatonists and Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite, e.g., a negative theology. This is what he says about them: "The ancient Greeks also considered the idols as mediators between themselves and the First Cause, and worshipped them under the name of stars and the highest substance. For they described the First Cause not with positive but only with negative predicates, since they considered it too high to be described by human qualities, and since

Footnote Continued from Page 172

Oecumenical Council of Nicaea (A.D. 787) to be found in J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* 13 (Florence 1767), 44 E–45A: καὶ ὥσπερ παῖδες γνήσιοι πατρός τινὸς ἀποδημήσαντος πρὸς καιρὸν ἀπ' αὐτῶν, πολλῇ τῇ στοργῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς διακείμενοι, κἂν τὴν ῥάβδον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ θεάσωνται κἂν τὴν χλαμύδα, ταῦτα μετὰ δακρύων καταφιλοῦντες ἀσπάζονται · καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα τιμῶντες ἀλλὰ τὸν πατέρα ποθοῦντες καὶ τιμῶντες · οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ πιστοὶ ἅπαντες ὡς μὲν ῥάβδον Χριστοῦ τὸν σταυρὸν προσκυνοῦ ⟨μεν⟩.

There are many similar passages in the same context.

Interesting is St. Bonaventure's defense of religious images. They are admissible "propter simplicium ruditatem propter affectuum tarditatem propter memoriae labilitatem"—In Lib. III Sent. dist. 9, art. 1, qu. 2, quoted by E. Panofsky, *Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism*, Latrobe 1951, p. 31 f.

Avicenna considers formal prayers and other acts of religious observance as reminders, as necessary to "keep people's thought fixed firmly upon the recollection of God . . . without these reminders they will be apt to forget all about it one or two generations after the prophets' death".—*Najāt*, Cairo edition 1938, p. 306.11 ff. 307.6 ff. English translation by A. J. Arberry, *Avicenna on Theology*, London 1951, p. 45 ff.

[1] Cf. Sachau's translation, vol. I, p. 115, and note 30.

[2] Cf. above, p. 167 n. 3.

they wanted to describe it as free from any imperfection, therefore they could not address it in worship [1]." It took humanity a long time until a more adequate understanding of Greek religion, in its originality and overwhelming beauty, became possible.

From: *The Harvard Theological Review*, vol. XLVII (1954), pp. 243–54.

[1] Cf. Sachau's translation, vol. I, p. 123.

NEW STUDIES ON AL-KINDI

The purpose of this paper is to emphasize some distinctive features in Al-Kindī's thought as it is available now for study in Abū Rīda's critical edition of 24 works of different size (vol. I: Cairo 1950; vol. II: Cairo 1953) and in a few other treatises not included in the two volumes published by him [1]. This entails above all defining his attitude to the religious tradition of his own day, which manifests itself in the orthodox interpretation of Islam and in the dialectical theology of the Mu'tazila, and comparing the solution reached by him with the way in which outstanding later Muslim philosophers approached the same problem. This solution, however much it may have been conditioned by the previous work of Christian theologians or religious Neoplatonists, is Al-Kindī's personal achievement and the first attempt to naturalise Greek philosophy in the Islamic world. The philosophy itself, i.e. the system of natural theology which he selects from the different doctrines offered by late Greek philosophy, has much in common with later Arabic philosophers. But it is interesting by no means only because views with which

[1] Definitions: I 2 (pp. 163-179). — Survey of Aristotle's writings: I 12 (pp. 363-384). Also (with Italian translation and commentary) M. Guidi-R. Walzer, *Studi su Al-Kindi I. Uno scritto introduttivo allo studio di Aristotele*, Roma 1940.

Physics: I 4 (pp. 186-192). I 5 (pp. 194-198). I 7 (pp. 214-237). I 8 (pp. 244-261). I 9 (pp. 264-269). II 2 (pp. 40-46). II 3 (pp. 48-53). II 4 (pp. 54-63).

Meteorology: II 5-11 (pp. 64-133).

Psychology: I 10 (pp. 272-281). I 11 (pp. 281 f.). I 12 (pp. 293-311). I 13 (pp. 353-358).

Metaphysics: I 1 (pp. 97-162). I 3 (pp. 182-184). I 6 (pp. 201-207).

Ethics: cf. below p. 202 n. 4. P. Sbath (*Al-Fihris* I, Cairo 1938,p. 113) refers to a manuscript in Aleppo which I have been unable to trace.

Astronomy: F. Rosenthal, Al-Kindī and Ptolemy, *Studi Orientalistici in onore di G. Levi della Vida II*, Roma 1956, pp. 436 ff.

Astrology: cf. below, p. 199.

On the Sayings of Socrates: cf. B. Lewin, *Lychnus* 1954/5, p. 281 n. 1. J. Kraemer, *ZDMG* 106, 1956, p. 294, who announces his forthcoming edition to be published in *Al-Mashriq*.

Medicine: L. Gauthier, *Antécédents Gréco-Arabes de la Psychophysique*, Beyrouth 1939.

we are familiar, for instance, from Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā appear here for the first time in a still less mature form. There are not only insignificant details in his work but very basic tenets of his which were not accepted by his more famous successors and which show him as an independent thinker in his own right and open up a hitherto unknown chapter in the history of Islamic philosophy.

I

The first part of the present study will, after the discussion of some factual evidence (1), proceed to the interpretation of a few texts, foremost (2) a chapter from the *Survey of Aristotle's Writings* (cf. p. 175 n. 1), not adequately dealt with in Professor Guidi's and the present writer's previous treatment of the work (below pp. 177-187). It will be followed (3) by a discussion of Al-Kindī's views on creation and their origin in Christian Aristotelean writings of 6th century Alexandria (below pp. 187-196). Al-Kindī's interpretation of the word *an-najm* in sura 55,5 will then (4) demonstrate in a still different light his conviction that revelation and reason come to identical conclusions, though in different ways (below pp. 196-199), and so will (5) a brief consideration of an astrological treatise (below p. 199 f.). All premature general conclusions will be avoided. A certain coherence of Al-Kindī's thought will it is hoped eventually emerge. But I am quite aware of the dangerous temptation to try to make Al-Kindī more consistent than he may have been and to credit him with an achievement which he may not have been able to perform.

1 — *Al-Kindī and the Mu'tazila (external evidence)*

A first indication that Al-Kindī cannot be completely at variance with the official Mu'tazilite interpretation of Islam which was followed by the Caliphs Al-Ma'mūn and Al-Mu'taṣim is provided by the fact that his fundamental work *On first philosophy* (vol. I pp. 97 ff. Abū Rīda) is addressed to the caliph Al-Mu'taṣim himself (and thus dated between A.D. 833 and 847); it contains among many other things his defence against orthodox criticism of his adherence to philosophy. A treatise *On cause and effect*, an equally important philosophical question, was addressed to Al-Mu'taṣim's predecessor Al-Ma'mūn (cf. *Fihrist* no. 24 Flügel). The preface of the long treatise *Explanation of the proximate cause of coming-to-be and passing away* (I p. 214 ff. Abū Rīda) suggests that it is dedicated to a very exalted person as was the caliph Al-Mu'taṣim. Another treatise (I p. 244 ff.) which gives an example of his way of understanding the Qur'ān, was written for Al-Mu'taṣim's son Ahmad whose tutor he was (F. Rosenthal, Al-Kindī als Litterat,

Orientalia 11, 1942, p. 265 n. 1); so were a treatise on the elements and the spherical body (vol. II p. 48 ff. Abū Rīda), a work on Indian arithmetic in four books (*Fihrist* no. 36; on early Indian influences cf. C. A. Nallino, *Raccolta di scritti* V, Roma 1946, pp. 5, 48 ff., 203 ff.), a work on music (*Fihrist* no. 61; on Al-Kindī's writings on music cf. H. G. Farmer in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1926 p. 91 and R. Lachmann-M. E. C. Hefney, *Veröffentlichungen zur Erforschung der Musik des Ostens* I, Leipzig 1931) and a work on the solution of logogriphs (cod. Aya Sofya 4832, fol. 59 a-64 b, cf. H. Ritter, Schriften Ja'qūb ibn Isḥāq Al-Kindī's in Stambuler Bibliotheken, *Archiv Orientální* 4, 1932, p. 370). There exists an astronomical treatise in a Leiden ms. composed at the request of Al-Mu'taṣim (cf. C. Brockelmann, *GAL Supplement* I p. 374)

2 — *Al-Kindi and the Mu'tazila (internal evidence)*

But it would be rash to build to much on information of this kind, unless it is supported by internal evidence to be found in the texts now available for study. Among them the *Introduction to the study of Aristotle* contains a very instructive chapter about the difference between prophetic and philosophical knowledge (cap. VI Guidi-Walzer: I p. 372, 13 ff. A. R.). After a more or less conventional survey of Aristotle's lecture courses (the 'Dialogues' were never translated into Arabic), some remarks about the scheme of the ten categories and about the quadrivium (cf. Guidi-Walzer, pp. 376-388), we find ourselves, quite unexpectedly, in utterly non-Aristotelian surroundings. "If then a person does not obtain knowledge of quantity and quality, he will lack knowledge of the primary and secondary substances, so that one cannot expect him to have any knowledge of the human sciences (*al-'ulūm al-insāniyya*) which are acquired through research (*ṭalab*) and the effort (*takalluf*) and industry of man—which however falls short, in rank, of the divine knowledge (*al-'ilm al-ilāhī*) which is obtained without research and without the effort and industry of man and in no time".

It is obvious that the sciences qualified as 'human' by Al-Kindī are identical with the syllabus of late Greek philosophy which he is eager to introduce into the Islamic world and which he has just outlined. I note in passing that the primary and secondary, i.e. sensible and immaterial substances are within the *Corpus Aristotelicum* to be found in the *Categories* only (2a 14, cf. Simplicius, *Cat.* p. 75 ff. Kalbfleisch) [1]. The 'divine' knowledge is the knowledge of prophets—we are still in a not specifically Islamic context (VI 2 G.W. = p. 372, 17 A. R.): "like the

[1] Porphyry and Jamblichus are very fond of this division into primary and secondary substances [cf. A.C.L. Lloyd, Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelean logic, *Phronesis* 1, 1956, p. 58 ff.; 150 ff.]

knowledge of the Apostles" (*ar-rusul*: cf. the Qur'anic use and, e.g., A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, Cambridge 1932, p. 5) "by which God has given them a position of their own, a knowledge which is not the outcome of research and effort and study (*baḥth*) and industry in the preparatory sciences (i.e. the quadrivium) and logic and does not require any period of time. It is distinct in being obtained through the Will of God, through the purification (*taṭhīr*) and illumination of their souls so that they are turned towards the Truth (*ināratuhā li-l-ḥaqq*), through Gods support (*ta'yīd*), his assistance (*tashdīd*), his inspiration (*ilhām*) and his messages. For this knowledge is a prerogative of the Apostles (*khāṣṣa li-r-rusul*) which places them above human beings, and among their miraculous prerogatives are the outstanding signs which are granted to them (*āyāt*) and which raise them above the other human beings. Because human beings who are not Apostles (*rusul*) have no way of attaining to either higher knowledge, knowledge of the secondary true substances or knowledge of the primary sensible substances and their accidents, without research and industry through logic and the preparatory sciences as we have said, and without any period of time. But the Apostles (*ar-rusul*) attain to this knowledge through nothing of that kind but through the Will of Him who sends them (مرسلها), without needing any time in reaching the aim of their research or anything else. Hence the minds of men (*al-'uqūl*) draw the evident conclusion that prophetic faculty comes from God, since it exists in them whereas ordinary human beings are unable by their very nature (*bi-ṭab'ihā*) to attain to a similar knowledge, because it is above and beyond the nature <of ordinary human beings> and the devices which they use. Thus they submit themselves in obedience and docility to it and faithfully believe in the truth of the message of the Apostles" [1]

This passage also shows very well the long-windedness of Al-Kindī's style, which may be a particular shortcoming of his due to the difficulties of an early attempt at using abstract technical language in Arabic; it can, however, be understood more adequately if one realises that he

[1] If anyone feels tempted to consider cap. 6 of Al-Kindī's Aristotle *Risāla* as an interpolation, he may compare the following passage in a meteorological treatise (II p. 93, 1 ff. A.R.): وهذا شيء قد عدمه البشر للاسباب التي حددنا بطبائعهم الا من اختصّه الله . . . برسالاته فانه يلهمه ذلك الهاما وينبّه في نفسه بلا اوائل لأن أمره جلّ ثناؤه كما قال الله «إنّما أمره إذا أراد شيئا أن يقول له كُن فيكون» . . . وهذا احد المخوالج [المخواصّ?] التي صيرها الله فرقانا بين الرسل وجميع البشر . . . فان أمرهم أمر إلهي.

wrote for a public which was not sufficiently prepared for what he tried to explain and needed a more elementary exposition than, say, a 6th century A.D. Greek or a contemporary of Averroes or Avicenna. (Al-Kindī likes to emphasize that he adapts his argumentation to the stage of preparedness and knowledge which the addressees of his pamphlets have reached, cf., e.g., vol. I, pp. 149, 17. 201, 15. 293. 311, 2. vol. II, pp. 75.76. 80. 90. 103 A.R.) [1]. We find in the section just translated a very interesting mixture of primarily religious concepts with qualifications which recall age old Greek arguments. The knowledge due to revelation and communicated to men by divinely inspired prophets is fundamentally different from any knowledge acquired through philosophical training and unambiguously superior to it. We find one set of the elements of Al-Kindī's description of prophetic knowledge as early as in Philo's description of the selftaught man (*De fuga* 166; vol. III p. 146 Wendland) which in its turn depends on Hellenistic and earlier sources [2]. The αὐτομαθὴς καὶ αὐτοδίδακτος σοφός is in no need of inquiries, exercises, efforts, methods, arts and sciences: οὐ γὰρ σκέψεσι καὶ μελέταις καὶ πόνοις ἐβελτιώθη, γενόμενος δ' εὐθὺς εὐτρεπισμένην εὗρε σοφίαν ἄνωθεν ὀμβρηθεῖσαν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἧς ἀκράτου σπάσας εἰστιάθη καὶ διετέλεσε μεθύων τὴν μετ' ὀρθότητος λόγου νήφουσαν μέθην (cf. H. Lewy, *Sobria Ebrietas*, Giessen 1929, p. 8 ff.). § 168 μέθοδοι, τέχναι and ἐπιστῆμαι are mentioned: The time factor is also mentioned in the same context (§ 169): τὸ μὲν οὖν διδασκομένον μακροῦ χρόνου δεῖται, τὸ δὲ φύσει ταχύ τε καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἄχρονόν ἐστι. This self-taught knowledge is due to inspiration, ἐνθουσιασμός (*waḥy*) [3] (§ 168): καινὸν γὰρ καὶ κρεῖττον λόγου καὶ θεῖον ὄντως τὸ αὐτομαθὲς γένος, οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνοις ἐπινοίαις ἀλλ' ἐνθέῳ μανίᾳ συνιστάμενον. Al-Kindī had no need to look for this argument in Philo (who was unknown to the Arabs), it will have been quite common in the texts which reached him. For him purification and illumination, κάθαρσις and ἔλλαμψις, are added to the special qualifications of the prophet, terms which were particularly popular in neo-Platonic thought. (For the idea of divine help and cooperation and assistance — συνεργία, συμμαχία — in patristic thought cf. W. Jaeger, *Two rediscovered works*

[1] Cf. also the didactical way in which he teaches elementary philosophical concepts, I p. 244 ff. A.R., or the astrological treatise edited by Loth (cf. below p. 199) which is written بقدر موضعك من النظر and F. Rosenthal, *Studi orientalistici Levi della Vida* II, p. 440.

[2] Cf. e.g. Plato, *Meno* 70a. Aristotle, *Eth. Eud.* II, 1214 a 15-25. Maximus of Tyrus, or. 38 Hobein: εἰ γένοιτό τις θείᾳ μοίρᾳ ἀγαθός. Cf. also the line of Homer (quoted by F. Wehrli, *Museum Helveticum* 1956, p. 10 n. 47), Od. XXII 347: αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἵμας παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν.

[3] Cf. Ps.-Plutarch, *Placita* V 1,4 (p. 172 Badawi) and below p. 182 n. 1.

of ancient Christian litterature Leiden 1954, p. 138). We may also think of the late neo-Platonic distinction (cf. Olympiodorus, *In Phaed.* p. 123, 3 Norvin) between philosophy and priestly art, ἱερατική (which is superior to philosophy), or passages like Proclus, *Theol. Plat.* I 25, p. 61, 39 ff. Portus (quoted in *Plato Latinus* III, London 1953, p. 87). But there is no straight line from Greek pagan thought to the chapter of Al-Kindī we are just considering. It may be more to the point to refer to John Philoponus who described St. Basil as distinguished by θείᾳ τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῃ πάσῃ σοφίᾳ (*De op. m.* p. 2, 18 Reichardt). Here Islamic religious terms are blended with Greek ideas, but those Greek ideas are only subsidiary to religion and are used to explain a religious tenet in a rational way. The will of God—and we shall meet in the quotation from the 36th sura (cf. below p. 210) of the Qur'án and in another text of Al-Kindī the 'command', the *amr* of God as well (cf. below p. 226)—is of a definite religious provenience as it is used here and to recur to the βούλησις θεοῦ in Greek philosophy is of no avail. In addition, Aristotle and Plotinus assert that there is no will of God. There are, obviously, Christian parallels. The word used for the 'signs' which are granted to the prophets and by which their special and distinct knowledge is indicated is *āyāt* 'signs", but these signs are something exceptional which comes near to our word 'miracles' (cf. A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed* Cambridge 1932, p. 224 f.). This attitude of Al-Kindī certainly places him near to the speculative theology of the Mu'tazila and distinguishes him from most of the later outstanding Islamic philosophers, Al-Fārābī, e.g., and Ibn Sīnā who, though in a different way, adhered to the primacy of philosophical reason, not to mention Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī who rejects Moses, Jesus and Muḥammad as impostors. But one may compare Al-Kindī, in this respect, with Al-Ghazzālī, who after having ceased to identify himself with philosophy and having ultimately become a mystic, reaffirmed the exceptional position and superiority of prophecy (cf. e.g., *Munqidh* p. 138, Damascus 1939). This agreement on a very fundamental point (in spite of the obvious differences) is not without interest. Al-Kindī's attempt to introduce Greek philosophy into the Islamic world as the handmaiden of theology may than have been more in keeping with the true Islamic way of life than the attempts of Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd to understand prophecy and revelation in exclusively philosophical terms [1].

The following section brings us immediately face to face with Al-Kindī's interpretation of Scripture and we are very soon no longer concerned with 'the prophets' recognised in the Qur'ān in general (§ 4 G. W. = p. 373, 12 A. R.): "If a person sets out to consider the answers which the Apostles (*ar-rusul*) have given to questions about essential and hidden things, he will find out this: should the philosopher intend to give an answer to these questions employing all the effort which has provided him with knowledge through his prolonged study and application to research and training, we should not find that he could produce a similar answer as brief and clear (فى الوجزة والبيان, cf. below § 6 = p. 374, 2) and simple (فى قرب السبيل) and comprehensive (فى الاحاطة بالمطلوب) as the Prophet (النبىّ) gave to the infidels", in Sura 36, 78-82—now we are suddenly in the middle of a genuine Islamic argument. Al-Kindī insists that an unphilosophical, rhetorical argument of Scripture is superior to any argument which a philosopher may produce. This exalted evaluation of the rhetorical (and argumentative) perfection of the Qur'ān (*I'jāz*) occurs also frequently in the Mu'tazilite exegesis of the Book, and thus again connects Al-Kindī independently with the rationalising Puritan theologians who represented the official interpretation of Islam in his day (cf. I. Goldziher, *Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung*, Leiden 1920, pp. 119 ff. [1]. Cf. John Philoponus, *De Op. Mundi* p. 5, 15 ff.: οὕτω μὲν οὖν (*Tim.* 41[B]) τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἄνθος ὁ Πλάτων. ὅσον δὲ τούτων μεγαλοπρεπέστερα τεθεολόγηκε Μωυσῆς ἄκουε [*Gen.* 1, 3] ..... πόσῳ ταῦτα τῶν Πλάτωνος ὑψηλότερα καὶ θεοπρεπέστερα; and E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, Leipzig-Berlin 1898 p. 521 ff. 526 ff.: 'Künstlerische Vollendung der heiligen Schrift'). The subject matter to be discussed is no trifle but concerns tenets of Islam as fundamental as the creation of the world from nothing, in an instant, and the bodily resurrection of the dead [2]. We shall have to consider later whether he can provide a philosophical answer to the same problems, which corresponds to the statements he is making now on the level of the 'divine science'—let us say from the very outset that the creation from nothing had few adherents among Greek thinkers and the *resurrectio carnis* none.

The lines from the 36th sura to which Al-Kindī refers contain the answer given to the polytheists (*al-mushrikūn*) who refused to believe in the resurrection of the body. A Meccan, according to the traditional

[1] Cf. my article on Al-Fārābī's theory of prophecy and divination, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 57, 1957, p. 142 ff. [cf. below p. 190 f.]

[1] Cf. P. Kraus, Beiträge zur Islamischen Ketzergeschichte, *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, 1934, p. 126. B. Spuler, *Der Islam*, 1956, p. 221 ff.

[2] Cf. the so called ḥadīth of Gabriel (Bukhārī, *Īmān* 37) and L. Gardet, Le problème de la foi et des oeuvres en Islam, *Studia Islamica* 5, 1956, p. 75).

exegesis, brought a bone to Muḥammad and asked him whether Allah could restore it to life: "Who will be able to give life to bones when they have been reduced to dust?" Then God the One, the True (الواحد الحق) gave him the following revelation (أوحى اليه) [1]: "He Who produced them (أنشأهم)[2] originally will give life to them; He is all knowing in every creation. Who from the green tree has given you fire and, lo, from it you produce a flame. Is not He Who has created the heavens and the earth able to create their like? Yes, He is, the Creator the Knower. (82) If He wills a thing, his command reduces itself to uttering the word: Be, and it is (إنما أمْرُهُ إن أراد شيئا أن يقول كُنْ فيكون)". Before we consider his dialectical appreciation of the lucidity of the passage it may be more profitable to look forward at Al-Kindī's explanation of the closing words of the Qur'ān quotation, whose litteral acceptance would entail an anthrophomorphism of the most extreme kind (§ 8/9 = p. 375, 18): Supposing the enemies of Islam find it ridiculous that God utters a word of command like a man, the reply is simply that there is no direct address at all, that the imperative 'be' is to be understood metaphorically. He gives no theological reasons for this statement, but refers to the common Arabic way of speaking (لغة العرب), to the interpretation of the almost mythical personification of the night in the *Mu'allaqa* of Imra'l-Qais (Vv. 45-46 Arnold; pp. 20, 21 Lyall; Ahlwardt, *Sechs Dichter*, p. 148). In these two verses the pre-Islamic poet addresses the night and speaks of it like a human being with a back, a breast and loins. But Al-Kindī explains: "One does not talk to the night nor does one address it, it has neither back nor loins nor breast: the poet was longing for the day and he expressed this longing in a metaphorical way". Thus the creative word *kun* in the *Qur'ān* does not mean that God actually ordered the non-existent world to come to be by addressing it but is only a way of expressing the power of the divine Will in an efficient manner and does not entail that God actually uttered the command. It is not unknown that the Mu'tazilites, faced with cognate problems of interpretation of the Qur'ān, fell back on the interpretation of the old poets developed by contemporary philologists, and among the examples discussed by Goldziher Al-Zamakhshari's treatment of Sura 33, v. 72 is very similar, where God makes offers to lifeless things such as

[1] About the meaning of *waḥy* cf. Al-Farabi, *De divisione scientiarum*, p. 108, 11 ff. Osman Amin. A very different conception of *waḥy* Al-Fārābī, *Musterstaat*, p. 58. 20, Dieterici. Cf. also *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 57, 1957, p. 142 n. 4 [below p. 207 n. 1].

[2] Cf. E. W. Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon*, p. 723, s.v. اخترع

the heaven, the earth and the mountains (*Richtungen*, p. 131). That Al-Kindī consistently followed this Mu'tazilite way of interpreting the Qur'ān with the help of loci probantes from pre-Islamic poets can also be shown from his discussion of the meaning of *sajāda* in a *risāla* to be discussed later in this paper (cf. below p. 198) and may be inferred from no. 177 in the list of his writings (*Fihrist* p. 259, 19 Flügel), among those which are of controversialist character (كتبه الجدليات): Treatise on the Unity of God (a mu'tazilite topic!) with *tafsīrāt*, i.e., most probably, explanation of Qur'ān passages [1]. But in the section of the *Aristotle-risāla* which we are just discussing the fact that Al-Kindī assumes that the creative word 'be' was not spoken by God allows us moreover to connect the philosopher with a specific trend of the Mu'tazila of his own day. He fully agrees with Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir (died 210/825-6), the founder of the Baghdād Mu'tazilite school under Al-Ma'mūn, who is also known for his interesting attempt to spread his instructions by means of popular forms of poetry (cf. recently H. A. R. Gibb, The social significance of the Shu'ūbīya, *Studia Orientalia J. Pedersen Dicata*, Copenhagen 1953, pp. 112 ff., important for the whole background of Al-Kindī). According to the good evidence to be found in Al-Ash'arī's *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn*, p. 510, 13-14 Ritter (cf. also *Oriens* 7, 1954, p. 191) Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir said that creation is God's willing a thing and that the will precedes creation, but he denied the view of his famous predecessor, the well known Baṣrite Mu'tazilite Abū'l-Hudhail who defined creation as will and creative word, and he was consistent in denying that there is a creative speech of God: وكان بشر بن المعتمر يقول خلق الشيء غيره ويجعل الارادة خلقا له وينكر قول الى الهذيل ان الخلق ارادة وقول وكان ينكر القول.

The same view is ascribed to his pupil Abū Mūsā 'Īsā b. Ṣabīḥ al-Murdār (cf. A. S. Tritton, *Muslim Theology*, London 1947, p. 119) [2]. There can thus be little doubt that Al-Kindī's theological convictions,

[1] As opposed to the first treatise in Abū Rīda's edition, Al-Kindī's *First Philosophy*, where the same problem is treated in a philosophical way, cf. Ibn al-Qifṭī p. 368, 12 Lippert: على سبيل اصحاب المنطق.

[2] Cf. al-Ash'arī, *Kitāb al-luma'* 28 McCarthy. For the antecedents of this discussion among Christian theologians cf. John Philoponus, *De op. Mundi* p. 5, 22. Reichardt (on Gen. 1,3 καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεός· γενηθήτω φῶς· καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς): εἰ γὰρ τὸ 'εἶπεν' μὴ φωνήν τινα καὶ ῥημάτων ψόφον νοεῖν δυνατόν . . . . τί ἕτερον διὰ τούτου δηλοῦν ἐθέλει τὸ λόγιον ἢ μόνον τῇ περὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι τῶν ὄντων ὁτιοῦν τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήσει σύνδρομον εὐθὺς ἀκολουθῆσαι τὸ ἔργον; *op. cit.* p. 53 ff.; p. 56,6-57,2.

For the connection of Mu'tazilite and Greek Patristic texts in general cf. also Sir Hamilton Gibb, The Argument from Design. A Mu'tazilite treatise attributed to al-Jāḥiz, *Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume I*, Budapest 1948, p. 150 ff.

as far as 'divine science' is concerned, are those of the Mu'tazila of his day and that his rejection of the divine speech and the interpretation of the verses from Sura 36 as a statement superior to philosophy in clarity and succinctness can be considered as evidence for the early Mu'tazilite Kalām as well. His originality seems, then, to consist in his putting aside the Mu'tazilite atomic theory (cf. *Fihrist* no. 178 = p. 259, 19 Fl. As-Sarahsī II A 13, p. 55 Rosenthal), which was by no means universally accepted by the early Mu'tazilites[1], and substituting a particular version of late Greek philosophy for it. But before embarking on this topic it is now necessary to consider the remaining section of ch. VI of the *Aristotle-risāla*.

Al-Kindī's comment on verses **77-79** is meant to impress the infidel as well, who denies the validity of revelation and the omnipotence of God (*al-kāfir*[2] *bi-qudrati 'llāh*) and not only to strengthen the believers faith—(their *'uqūl an-nayyira aṣ-ṣāfiyya*)[3] by adding arguments of no demonstrative stringency to the Prophet's statement based on higher and unquestioned authority. This kind of Kalām discussion eventually finds support in the methods developed in Aristotle's *Topics* which had already been translated before Al-Ma'mūn's time. (Cf. P. Kraus, Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa', *Riv. Studi Orientali* 14, 1933, p. 12; Al-Kindī, *Aristotle-risāla* III 6 = p. 367, 5 A.-R. and X 2 = p. 382, 1 A.-R., As-Sarahsī p. 54 Rosenthal)[4]. The revival of the decayed bones which originally were created from nothing is quite possible (*mumkin*) since it is, generally speaking, easier to unite again what has been scattered than to produce it (من صنعه) and still less difficult than to create it from nothing. (من ابداعه). For the creator (بارئهم) it is one and the same thing: neither harder nor more difficult; for the power which has created from nothing may bring to life again what it has allowed to perish. Or, to cut the argument short: the bones have on one occasion been brought

[1] The title of Al-Kindī's treatise is كتاب رسالته فى بطلان قول من زعم أن جزئا لا يتجزأ. Cf. S. Pines, *Islamische Atomenlehre*, Berlin 1936, pp. 8, 10, 94 ff. and particularly p. 33: "Die Atomistik ist noch nicht zu einem radikalen Versuch einer adaequaten begrifflichen Formulierung dieses Postulates geworden, zu der sie sich bei den Ash'ariten durch Ausmerzung aller hierauf nicht zugeschnittenen Gedankengänge entwickelt hat".

[2] Cf. L. Gardet, *Studia Islamica* 5, pp. 79 ff., 96 ff.

[3] Cf. the *Qur'ān-Risāla* I, p. 260, 1 A.R.: ذوو العقول البيرة. *'Aql* is a postqur'ānic word.

[4] The seventh century Syriac translation by Athanasius of Balad (d. 686-cf. *Oriens* 6, 1953 p. 114) is still quoted on the margins of the well known 11th century Paris ms. of the Organon. Cf. A. Badawī, *Manṭiq Arisṭū* pp. 530, 563, 636, 682, 685, 686, 703, 719. The Arab translation of the *Sophistici Elenchi* by 'Isā b. Zur'a (*ibid.* p. 736 ff.) is made from the Syriac of Athanasius.

to life when they had not existed previously. The resurrection represents an analogous case: Hence it is possible that the bones become alive again after a period in which they were not alive. (Cf. for this kind of argument John Philoponus, *De op. mundi* p. 76, 13: οὐκ ἀδύνατον ἄρα θεῷ καὶ χωρὶς σώματος ὑποστῆσαι τὸ φῶς. 79, 7: τὸ οὐκ ἀδύνατον τοῦ πράγματος ποικίλως ἐδείχθη).

V. **80**: "Who from the green tree has given you fire etc." is reduced to a general principle, familiar to Greek philosophers since the days of Plato and Aristotle, the generation of contraries (ἐναντία) from contraries. The contrary (*naqīḍ*) is understood in this section as relative non-existence, privation: the transition of the privation into a positive quality, without any intermediate status is produced (جعل) by God; thus fire comes from not-fire, warmth from not-warmth, or, in general terms, everything which becomes and is (هو) becomes from something different which it now lacks and which is contrary to it in the privative sense (لا هو). Potentiality which is at the very centre of Aristotle's theory of becoming is not mentioned in this Mu'tazilite context. To bring it in here would be detrimental to the theological argument which follows and which applies the general principle stated before to the creation of the world from nothing and no-matter—which in its turn explains the minor ἀδύνατον of the resurrection. This argument of Al-Kindī in a Kalām context seems to anticipate the later consistent denial of potentiality in the school of Al-Ash'arī (although it is by no means identical with the Ash'arite theory which is based on the atomic structure of matter which Al-Kindī rejects).

In v. **81** the Prophet provides a further instance that things come to be from something different from what they are at present, by discussing the creation from nothing which according to Al-Kindī was taught in the Qur'ān as the Mu'tazilites understood it. Human beings would require a long time to produce anything as complicated as the world, and the heretic (*al-kāfir*) would base his rejection of the divine creation on doubts of this kind. But the actions of God and men cannot be compared, there is nothing equal to the omnipotence of God in the limited and restricted power of human beings: "It is evident that God does not need any length of time to create it" (لا... يحتاج الى مدّة لابداعه that *ibdā'* has a very distinct and unambiguous meaning for Al-Kindī will be shown presently). "For he makes (جعل) being (هو) from nothing (لا هو cf. above). For He Whose power (*qudra*) reaches so far as to make

(*'amal*) [1] bodies (*ajrām*) [2] from not-bodies (*lā ajrām*) and to produce (*akhraja*) something (*aysa*) from nothing (*laysa*) does not need time for his work since he has the power to create from an absence of matter [3] (فليس يحتاج اذ هو قادر على العمل من لا طينه أن يعمل فى الزمان).

Because whereas man's action cannot concern itself with an absence of matter, the action of Him Who does not need matter for producing anything does not require time (لانه ان كان فعل البشر لا يمكن فى غير طينة [4] فان فعل من لا يحتاج فى فعل ما يفعل الى طينة لا يحتاج الى زمان).

His way of commanding is .... (Al-Kindī repeats the Qur'ān 36, 82) .... that means He has only to will, and the thing He wills is there at once, in the moment He wills it (اى انما يريد ويكون مع ارادته ما اراد)". Follows the section about the metaphorical use of the imperative 'be' (cf. above p. 182 f.).

To use the divine creation of the world as an argument for the possibility of the resurrection of the body was also quite common in Christian theological circles, and it may be sufficient, in this context, to emphasize that the Kalām chapter of Al-Kindī which we are considering has striking parallels in cognate Christian texts or, in other words, that arguments employed by the Christians could serve the *mutakallimūn* in their interpretation of the Qur'ān. I refer merely to Tertullian *De res. carnis* 11 (p. 40, 16 Kroyman): "nunc etsi interest, tamen utrumque mihi adplaudit, sive enim ex nihilo Deus molitus est cuncta, poterit et carnem in nihilum productam exprimere de nihilo: sive de materia modulatus est alia, poterit et carnem quocumque dehaustam evocare de alio. et utique idoneus est reficere qui fecit; quanto plus est fecisse quam refecisse, initium dedisse quam reddidisse, ita restitutionem carnis faciliorem credas institutione". Cf. H. A. Wolfson, Philo on free Will, *Harvard Theological Review* 35, 1942, p. 144. It is also instructive to compare John

[1] عمل cf. I pp. 166,6. 184,9. 179,17 A.-R.

[2] For Al-Kindī's distinction between *jirm* and *jism* cf. I p. 281, 8 ff. A.R.: ان الجرم ما كان الانسان :I p. 294, 6. ن الجواهر المحسوسة الحامل للاعراض التى فى عالم الكون واما الجسم فكالفلك الذى هو الجرم الحى الناى .I p. 120, 4: جرم الكل .I p. 165, 10: ما له ثلثة ابعاض .الجرم.

[3] For *fina*, corresponding to the greek ὕλη, cf. Guidi-Walzer, *Studi su Al-Kindī*, p. 394 n. and I pp. 166, 3. 167, 10, 11, 13, 17. 295. 299. 300. 302 A.R. — S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, Berlin 1936, p. 39 n. 2. P. Kraus, *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān* II, Cairo 1942, p. 171 n. 1. *Oriens* 6, 1953, p. 127. Qusṭā b. Lūqā used the word for rendering the Platonic ἐκμαγεῖον, [Plutarch] *Plac.* I 9 (p. 115 Badawī). Cf. also Miskawaih, *Tahdhib al-Akhlāq* (ed. Cairo, A.H. 1323) p. 11, 30.

[4] فعل: cf. I p. 166, 5. 182 ff. A.R. Cf. below p. 187 f.

of Damascus *De fide orthodoxa* IV 27 (Patr. Graeca vol. 94, col 1220. 1225). A very surprising parallel in 9th century middle-Persian texts may (but there is no valid proof) depend already on Islamic texts like the chapter of Al-Kindī we are considering (cf. H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems in the Ninth Century books*, Oxford 1943, p. 93 ff.).

3a — *Creation from nothing in Al-Kindī's philosophical writings*

It is not surprising that Al-Kindī speaking as a Mu'tazilite theologian should unambiguously adhere to the *creatio ex nihilo* and thus openly contradict one of the almost axiomatic tenets of Greek philosophy, that nothing comes into being from not-being. But how could Al-Kindī the philosopher come to terms with Al-Kindī the Mu'tazilite? Was he not bound to follow Aristotle and Plotinus and to proclaim the eternity of the world — as Al-Fārābī, Avicenna, Averroes and others did—and eternal creation and emanation? But as we shall see, Al-Kindī the philosopher is in full agreement with the religious view, and differs in this very fundamental point from all the later Islamic philosophers. He was, however, not the first thinker to attempt a philosophical explanation of the *creatio ex nihilo* in time and, consequently, to deny the eternity of the world. His theory should not be confounded with Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī's assumption, of a *formatio mundi* from eternal matter, a view which takes up Plato's *Timaeus* as understood by a minority of ancient interpreters such as Aristotle and Plutarch of Chaeronea and Galen (cf. also Ash-Shahrastānī, *K. al-milal*, p. 288, 17 Cureton, on Plato's view of creation: انه ابدع العالم من لا نظام الى نظام).

We shall consider first Al-Kindī's treatment of the term *ibdā'* (cf. above) in his philosophical writings. In his *Definitions* (*Kitāb Al-Ḥudūd wa-rusūmihā*) — a quite important and very instructive treatise which contains definitions of 96 philosophical terms — we read (I p. 165, 11 A.R.): «*Ibdā'* is to make a thing appear out of nothing (اظهار الشىء عن ليس).» A more explicit statement is to be found in the third of the treatises published by Abū Rīda (I p. 182 f.): Different kinds of action (فعل, cf. above p. 214 n. 4) are distinguished "True primary action (الفعل الحقى الاول) is to produce real things from nothing (أيسيات من ليس — for ليس | ايس cf. above p. 214 and Usṭāth, who translated Aristotle's Metaphysics for Al-Kindī, p. 13 Bouyges أيسية: τὸ εἶναι [993 b 31] and p. 1034, 7 الأيس: τὸ ἔστι [1042 b 25]; for أيسية cf. I p. 113, 13 A.R.). This 'action' is

evidently the privilege of God (وهذا الفعل بين انه خاصّة الله تعالى) Who is the end (*ghāya*: τέλος, cf. *Metaphysics* p. 183, 15 Bouyges [996 a 26] together with *tamām*) of all causes; for nobody else but Him can produce these things from nothing (فـان تأييس الأيسيات عن ليس ليس لغيره). And this action is specifically denoted by the term *ibdā'* (وهذا الفعل هو المخصوص باسم الابداع). I note that God being the creator from nothing is frequently called the first agent (*al-fā'il al-awwal*) by Al-Kindī, cf. also I p. 207,11 A.R.

Al-Kindī the philosopher also assumes a creation from nothing in time through a divine creator, and we have sufficient evidence in the treatises known that he was consistent in holding this view. In the longest treatise recovered from the Istanbul ms., the first book of Al-Kindī's *First Philosophy* (cf. above p. 175 n. 1) God is described in purely negative terms as the First and the One (I p. 160, 6 ff. A.R.) in a more rigid and more consistent neo-Platonic manner than can be found in any of the later Muslim philosophers from Al-Fārābī to Averroes—who combined the Aristotelian conception of God as the supreme Mind with the neo-Platonic description in purely negative terms: God is neither soul nor intellect (I p. 160, 8). But God is in addition characterised as the creator of the visible world from nothing (I p. 161, 15 ff.); on Him alone the existence of this visible world depends, and should he withdraw His support it would necessarily cease to be (p. 162, ii): "The One, the Real [1] is then the First, the Creator from nothing Who maintains in existence what He has created from nothing: nothing can exist without His support and power, if it were withdrawn, it would disappear and perish (فالواحد الحق اذا هو الاول المبدع الممسك كل ما ابدع فلا يخلو شيء من امساكه وقوته الّا غار ودثر)." We find the same ideas expressed in the sixth treatise (I 270 A.R.) and in the seventh treatise about the proximate efficient cause of coming-to-be and passing-away (I p. 214, 9 ff. and p. 215, 4 ff.): وهو ... الأنية الحق التى لم تكن ليس ولا تكون ليساً أبدًا لم يزل ولا يزال أيس ابدا وانه الحى الواحد الذى لا يتكثر بتة وانه هو العلّة الاولى التى لا علّة لها الفاعلـة التى لا فاعل لها والمتممة التى لا متمم لها والمؤيس الكل عن ليس والمصير بعضه لبعض أسبابا وعللا. Cf. also I p. 219 [2]. We note that the Creator God of the

[1] الحق, cf. above p. 178.

[2] Cf. I p. 248, 15. I p. 253, 2 f.

philosopher has life (cf. also I p. 252, 16) and that He has a will [1]. We read in the same treatise that the celestial bodies move through the Will of the creator (*bi-irādat al-bārī'* (I, p. 226, 8) and that the world below the moon will last as long as the creator of the world so wills (I p. 231, 12): الى نهاية المدّة التى أراد بارئ الكل للكون. There is some element of emanation in the creative act of God (I p. 162, 1). [2]

There can be no doubt that Al-Kindī, or the Mu'tazilites on whom he may depend in this matter, gave to *ibdā'* this meaning of a temporal creation from nothing. It has, as is well known, no such specific meaning in the Qur'ān (cf., e.g., 6, 101) where the root, like *khalq*, seems simply to denote the creative activity of God. The later philosophers use the term almost unanimously for the Neoplatonic 'eternal creation' from nothing (cf. S. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* II pp. 9, 75) and thus differ fundamentally from Al-Kindī (cf., e.g., Al-Fārābī, *'Uyūn al-Masā'il*, p. 58 Dieterici and L. Gardet, *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne*, Paris 1951, pp. 62 ff., 110). Creation from nothing in time (*ibdā' min lā shay*) is characteristic of the view of the later Mutakallimūn, cf. Averroes, *Tafsīr mā ba'd aṭ-ṭabī'at* p. 1503, 13 Bouyges. Abū Ḥayyān al-Tawḥīdī was quite aware of the peculiar attitude of Al-Kindī when he introduced him as adding *ibdā'* to the traditional four Aristotelian kinds of change (*ḥaraka*), being a *ḥaraka* without substratum, i.e. meaning creation from nothing (*Al-Imtā' wa-l-Mu'ānasa* part III, p. 133 — Dr. S. M. Stern has drawn my attention to this passage). [3]

This creation of the world from nothing implies the non-eternity of the whole world. Hence Al-Kindī, if he was not satistied by proclaiming his religious conviction, had to provide separate proofs that the world could not be eternal but is both generated and corruptible. He dedicated quite a considerable section of the second chapter (*fann*) of his *First Philosophy* to proving that it is impossible to assume that any body can be eternal (لم يزل) and that, accordingly, the universe cannot be eternal (I pp. 114, 10-122). He discusses the same question (in almost identical terms) in the fourth *risāla* (*About the finiteness of the body of the world*: I pp. 186-193 A.R.), in the fifth *risāla* (*About the term 'infinite'*:

[1] Cf. also the definition of *irāda* I p. 168, 7.

[2] فاذن فيض الوحدة من الواحد الحق الاول هو تهوّى كل محسوس وما يلحق المحسوس فيوجد كل واحد منها اذا تهوّى تهويته (بتهويته A.R.?) إياها. But فيض (cf. also I p. 259, 14) need not to be understood philosophically.

[3] Cf., e.g., p. 207, 1: فالجرم اذًا محدث اضطرارا . والمحدَث محدِث المحدِث اذ المحدِث والمحدَث من المضاف فللكل محدِث اضطرارا عن ليس .

I pp. 194-198 A.R.) and especially in the sixth treatise (*About the unity of God and the finiteness of the body of the world*: I pp. 201-207)[1]. Hence (I p. 219, 14 ff.) the 'extreme body', that part of the world between the the moon and the rotating outer sphere of the heavens آخر نهاية جسم الفلك —which is eternal according to Aristotelian and Neoplatonic views—will not experience generation and destruction as long as the time which God has allotted to it lasts (أيّام مدّة زمانه الذى صير الله له; and the same applies obviously to the individual celestial bodies (I p. 220,6), cf. also the eighth treatise (on which below p. 196) I p. 248, 15 and p. 253, 2. The rotating outer sphere neither comes-to-be out of anything else nor does it disintegrate into anything else but is created from nothing (لان الفلك قد تقدم الايضاح أنه غير مكوّن من غيره بل مبتدع ابدا عن ليس وليس بفاسد الى غيره). Accordingly we find the following definition of the sphere (*Definitions* I p. 196, 15 A.R.): «The sphere is matter provided with form and it is not eternal (الفلك عنصر وذو صورة فليس بأزلى).»

3b — *Al-Kindī and John Philoponus*

I shall later (p. 202 ff.) refer to the structure of the world above the moon in Al-Kindī's thought and the way in which the whole universe depends on the 'outer sphere'—another essential difference from Al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd. For the time being, we are only concerned with the fact that both the world above the moon and also the earth and what happens on it are created from nothing and do not last for ever, but will according to divine dispensation dissolve again into nothing. Al-Kindī's argument can be reduced to the assertion that there cannot be infinite time and, since time, body and movement are closely interlocked and interdependent, the world and the movement of the stars etc. must be limited in duration as well. There is an eternal God, and temporal creation for limited periods. If we look for parallels in Arabic philosophy, we find them only in Al-Ghazzālī's concentrated

[1] For '*unṣur* as equivalent of ὕλη 'matter' cf. *Defin.* no. 9 (I p. 166, 31): العنصر طينة كل طينة. no. 32 (I p. 168, 11): لاسطقس وهو عنصر الجسم no. 42 (I 169, 12 ff.). *On first Philosophy* (I pp. 101, 3. 160, 6 f.). Cf. also I pp. 217, 17 ff. 218, 6. 222, 15. 257, 11 ff. etc. — Averroes, *Metaphysics-Commentary* p. 570 (T 16 t), p. 1068 (T ii: ὑλικὴ οὐσία), p. 1167 (T 12 u), p. 1466 (T 14), p. 1480 (T 15 c) Bouyges — mostly in passages translated by Eusthatius (who had been commissioned by Al-Kindī). — Qusṭā b. Lūqā consistently renders ὕλη by '*unṣur* in his translation of Ps. Plutarch's *Placita Philosophorum*, cf., e.g., p. 115, 7 ff. Badawī.—Cf. also Ibn Sīnā, *Najāt*, p. 211, 15 and Averroes, *Metaphysics-Commentary*, p. 257 , 1350-1362 Bouyges.

attack on Al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's philosophies which contain a very subtle and elaborate discussion of the Will of God and a refutation of the eternity and incorruptibility of the world and of time and motion. Al-Kindī does not come up to the level of Al-Ghazzālī — his assertions are more primitive and more dogmatic — but his attitude is substantially the same. It has been claimed, rightly I think, that Al-Ghazzālī was familiar with the late Alexandrian Christian neo-Platonic Aristotelian philosopher John Philoponus (6th century) and his attempt to demonstrate the Christian dogma of the creation of the world from nothing (cf., e.g., Origen, *De principiis* II 1 §§ 4-5) with philosophical arguments, thus attempting to defeat the philosophers on their own ground. His work against Proclus *De aeternitate mundi* [1] and the later work—in six books—against Aristotle (known only from copious quotations to be found in Simplicius' commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* and the *De caelo*) were both known to the Arabs in translation (cf. Ibn an-Nadīm *Fihrist* p. 356, 16-17 Egyptian edition; p. 254, 25-26 Flügel) and mentioned by different authors. I think we have sufficient evidence to show that Al-Kindī was familiar either with John Philoponus actual works or, as I consider more likely, with some summary of his main tenets. It is for general reasons to be considered later almost impossible to assume that he rediscovered the same argument independently, the truth being available in the venerable translations of the Ancients which he is so eager to naturalise in the Islamic world of his day. We know next to nothing about the history and influence of John Philoponus' ideas within the Greek and Syriac world during the 250 and more years by which he is separated from Al-Kindī [2]. In addition Al-Kindī was confronted with a much less sophisticated society and with much less philosophical resistence to his statements than John Philoponus, who challenged some of the most fundamental tenets of Greek philosophy, valued and cherished by most of his non-Christian contemporaries. Simplicius, refuting his work against Aristotle, stigmatises his audacity in attacking the very leaders of philosophy (τοὺς κορυφαίους τῶν φιλοσόφων) as an insolence comparable to the revolt of the giants against the divine rulers of the world (*Phys.* p. 1145, 4 Diels). Al-Kindī has to defend himself against attacks coming from less progressive trends in Islamic life and against the traditionalists

[1]) The Arabic text of the first nine of Proclus' arguments has recently been published by A. Badawi, *Neoplatonici apud Arabes*, Cairo 1955, pp. 34 ff. cf. *Oriens* 10, 1957, p. 393.

[2] Aeneas of Gaza composed before 534 the dialogue *Theophrastus*, against the eternity of the world and the denial of the resurrection of the body (Patr. Graeca 85), and Zacharias of Mitylene attacked, about 530, John Philoponus' pagan teacher Ammonius, son of Hermias in his *Ammonius seu De opificio mundi* (Patr. Graec. 85; cf. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahāfut* II, p. 100).

and to justify his making use of the foreign philosophical legacy (cf. e.g. I p. 103 ff. A.R. and *Oriens* 3, 1950, p. 8 ff.). I quote from John Philoponus' *Refutation of Aristotle*: "There was neither matter nor time nor movement before God created the world (Simplicius, *Phys.* p. 1142, 23: καὶ τὴν ὕλην γὰρ αὐτὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα τῷ παντὶ συνυπέστησεν ὁ θεός, ὥστε οὐ προυπῆρξε τοῦ κόσμου κίνησις). "The world has a beginning and an end, it is neither ἄναρχος nor ἀτελεύτητος. It comes-to-be out of nothing and perishes into nothing (*Phys.* p. 1143, 21): ἐκ τοῦ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄντος γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα καὶ εἰς τὸ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὂν φθείρεται. Such a view contradicts the innate aversion of the Greeks to any 'creatio ex nihilo', which is not only a philosophical common place since the days of Parmenides [1] but also expressed, e.g., in the old etymology of θεοί who are called thus because they had been κόσμῳ θέντες τὰ πάντα πρήγματα (Herodotus II 52). The isolated case of the 5th century B.C. sophist Xeniadas, who is credited with assuming a creation from nothing by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Dogm* 153 (cf. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th edition, no. 81 and E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, 6th edition, I p. 1324 n. 1; 1396 n. 2), does not impair this general impression. Nature, as analysed and understood by Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, and the realm of the Christian God belong to different domains of reality; in the same way Greek philosophy and the Hebrew faith are by no means one and the same thing. The laws which apply to the activity of nature are not laws which can limit the omnipotence of God. John Philoponus does not deny (nor does Al-Kindī, as shown above p. 188) that nature actually produces new things out of previously existing things (Simpl., *Phys.*, p. 1145, 7 ff.); God is different in as far as he can create new things out of nothing (*Phys.*, p. 1145, 9): τὸν θεὸν ταύτῃ διαφέρειν τῆς φύσεως .... καθ' ὅσον αὕτη μὲν ἐξ ὄντων, ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ποιεῖ τὰ γινόμενα. What is valid on the level of nature has no necessary relation to the activity of God (*Phys.*, p. 1150, 21): καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἐξ ὄντων δημιουργεῖ, οὐκ ἤδη καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἀνάγκη. The Greek philosophers failed to do justice to the sovereignty and majesty of God (p. 1145, 15): "If also God creates out of things which exist previously, He will in no way be superior to nature (εἰ καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἐξ ὄντων ποιεῖ, οὐδὲν ἕξει πλέον τῆς φύσεως ὁ θεός) [2]). Everything, except the first cause, is generated, not only matter: only the First is ungenerated (p. 1144, 24 ff.). The existence and duration of the universe depends solely on the Will of God who acts

[1] Cf. e.g. R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, Oxford 1949, p. 26 f. Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* I, 3.

[2] Cf. Simpl., *Phys.*, p. 1150, 23: εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἦν ὁ κόσμος, δῆλον ὡς ἐκ μὴ ὄντων αὐτὸν ἐδημιούργησεν ὁ θεός, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ὁμοίως τῇ φύσει ποιεῖ οὐδὲν διοίσει τῆς φύσεως.

without mediation and in no time (p. 1173, 11 ff.): καὶ εἰ ὁ θεὸς ὁ δημιουργὸς ἄνευ χρονικῆς παρατάσεως παράγει τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὸν κοσμον ἀμέσως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παραγόμενα, καὶ ὅτε φθεῖραι τὸν κόσμον θελήσοι, ἄχρονος ἔσται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡ φθορά. This applies to prime matter as well as to the forms (p. 1177, 22): κἂν γὰρ ἡ φύσις, φησί, μὴ ποιῇ τὴν πρώτην ὕλην, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς ποιεῖ αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐξ ὕλης, ὥστε καὶ φθείρει αὐτὴν ὅταν θελήσῃ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐξ οὗ γέγονεν, ὥσπερ, φησί, καὶ τὸ εἶδος οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος μεθίσταται ἀλλ' εἰς τὸ πάντῃ μὴ ὂν ἐξ οὗ καὶ γέγονεν ἀνατρέχει. We notice, in passing, that Al-Kindī accepts the same division between the realm of God's creative activity, *ibdāʿ*, and the world of nature which follows the laws established by Aristotle and acknowledged by late Peripatetics and Neoplatonists alike (II p. 40, 11 A.R.): «Know that physics is the science of things moving; for nature has been made by God the cause for the cause of all things which move and which come-to rest after motion» (اعلم أن علم الاشياء الطبيعية انما هو علم الاشياء المتحركة لان الطبيعة هى الشىء الذى جعله الله علّة وسببا لعلة جميع المتحركات و‹الساكنات› عن حركة), cf. II p. 41, 6 f. [1]. Detailed study in particular of the metaphysical treatise, the treatise on the proximate cause of coming-to-be and passing-away and the *Qurʾān-Risāla* will show this aspect of Al-Kindī's thought more clearly (cf. below p. 196). At this stage of the inquiry it may be sufficient to emphasize that there exists a close parallel between John Philoponus and Al-Kindī in this respect also. — As to the will of God, it could also be expressed in terms of divine command and unconditional obedience to it, as Galen had already described the Mosaic cosmogony which he could not accept (Cf. *Galen on Jews and Christians*, p. 26). It is thus not surprising that Al-Fārābī, who maintained the eternity of the world produced by an eternal creative emanation, could not share Philoponus' view and found it necessary to write a monograph against his attacks on Aristotle whose results had appealed so much to Al-Kindī (Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa II p. 139, 7): الردّ على يحيى النحوى فيما ردّ به على ارسطوطاليس. He may have used arguments similar to those to be found in Simplicius' refutation of John Philoponus, and one might wish to guess that Al-Fārābī's monograph was still useful to Ibn Rushd when he embarked on his attack on Al-Ghazzālī, who had found it profitable to revive some of Philoponus' arguments in his fight against Al-Fārābī and those like

[1] Cf. *Defin.* no. 91 (I p. 179, 10 ff.): القوة المدبرة للاجسام طبيعية وتسمى. *Astrological Treatise* (p. 273 Loth, cf. below p. 199): بارئ الطبيعة ومنشئ الخليقة.

him [1]. Ibn Rushd knew John Philoponus' arguments against Aristotle either directly or second hand, cf. *Comm. on Metaphysics* p. 1628, 10 ff., against the eternity of the heaven (قد شكّ يحيي النحوى على المشائين فى هذه المسألة شكا شديد الاعتياص) and *ibid.* p. 1498, 5: "The view that God needs no preexisting matter for his creation is common to the speculative theologians of our religion and of Christianity (وهذا هو الرأى المشهور عند المتكلمين من اهل ملتنا ومن اهل ملّة النصرى)". One of them, Johannes Grammaticus Christianus — i.e. John Philoponus — is singled out as an example, for having maintained that the potentialities of things created existed only in God[2], in other words that God created the world from nothing in time (cf. E. Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroisme*, 2nd edition, Paris 1861, p. 109 ff. and S. Van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahāfut* II p. 177). In this particular case Ibn Rushd says himself that he owes his knowledge of John Philoponus' view to Al-Fārābī (p. 1498, 6); he may be referring to the monograph against Philoponus just quoted. It remains puzzling that neither Al-Fārābī nor Ibn Rushd nor Al-Ghazzālī mentions Al-Kindī as a champion for the *creatio ex nihilo* while they are, as it seems, well informed about what is likely to be his ultimate source. It may be that they were well aware of the philosophical shortcomings of the founder of Islamic philosophy, and considered his methods and his way of arguing as too simple and old fashioned (cf. the very severe criticism of Al-Kindī to be found in Ibn al-Qifṭī, *Ta'rīkh al-ḥukamā'*, p. 367, 2-368, 5 Lippert which may well represent the common view of later centuries. Ibn al-Qifṭī may have taken it from Ṣā'id al-Andalusī's *Tabaqāt al-Umam* [p. 52 Cheikho = p. 106 Blachère], or both may depend on the same earlier source) [3].

The similarity between Al-Kindī and John Philoponus is thus definitely striking, although we have to realise all the time that they live in different civilisations and different centuries and that the purpose of their writing is obviously not the same. Neither hesitates to write at

[1] For John Philoponus' influence on Al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut* cf. also Abu 'l-Ḥasan al-Baihaqī (d. A.D. 1170) *Ta'rikh ḥukamā' al-Islām*, as quoted by W. Barthold, *Zapiski Kollegii vostokovedov* V, 1930, p. 12. Cf. S. Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, p. 96 n. 1.

[2] Cf. Yaḥyā b. 'Adī: مقالة فى تبيين ضلالة من يعتقد أن علم البارئ بالامور الممكنة قبل وجودها. A. Périer, *Yaḥyā b. 'Adī*, Paris 1920, pp. 73, 144.

[3] Ṣā'id al-Andalusī blames Al-Kindī for his rejection of the eternity of the world and for using rhetorical and sophistical arguments in establishing his case (ونصر هذا المذهب بحجج غير صحيحة بعضها سوفسطائية وبعضها خطابية). Ibn Al-Qifṭī insists on his neglect of Aristotle's analytical method. Cf. *Oriens* 6, 1953, p. 129 f. [But cf. A. M. Dunlop, *JRAS* 1957, p. 87 ff.].

times as a philosopher and on other occasions to argue on the authority of revealed Scripture. This amounts in the case of John Philoponus to being able to write in the time honoured way of the philosophers and commentators on Plato and Aristotle (who would correspond to the Islamic philosophers) [1] and to master at the same time the systems of thought developed by the Christian patristic authors such as St. Basil or Gregory of Nyssa (who would be similar to the mainly apologist Mutakallimūn). But John Philoponus writes for a highly sophisticated society as a Christian teacher of Greek philosophy, and his first concern (apart from treating the normal teaching syllabus in commentaries some of which we can still read in the original—Arabic versions have not yet been traced) was to demonstrate the truth of the Christian belief in the creation of the world from nothing on the philosophical level. His motive was, certainly, to convince non-Christian philosophers and to show Christians that they could assert their superiority in philosophical terms as well. (For ulterior motives cf. H. D. Saffrey, Le Chrétien Jean Philopone et la survivance de l'école d'Alexandrie, *Rev. Et. Grecques* 67, 1954, pp. 396 ff.). His action may have been quite important for the ultimate survival of pagan Greek thought and the possibility of its being transmitted to the Islamic world. His work against Proclus is dated A.D. 529, the year of the official closure of the Platonic Academy in Athens which was, at the same time, a centre of pagan Greek religion and its interpretation in the spirit of Jamblichus. The book against Aristotle is later, since it refers back to the other. He was evidently blamed by Christian followers of the patristic tradition for adopting an exclusively philosophical line, and thus embarked on his work *De opificio mundi* in which he based himself, following St. Basil, on Moses' account of the creation of the world as guaranteed by revelation. We should like to have his treatise *On resurrection*, a problem for which Al-Kindī could find only a religious answer as we have seen (cf. above p. 181).

Al-Kindī did not address a sophisticated audience which had been imbued with Greek philosophy for centuries. His intention was obviously to give a philosophical substructure to Muslim religious tradition, understood in the way in which the Mu'tazilite theologians interpreted it. This was the 'human' science which he contrasted with the 'divine' science of prophetic revelation; it is his contention, as has been shown, that the findings of philosophy agree with the data of religion. He was not, like John Philoponus, concerned with refuting a rival metaphysical doctrine. He was, on the contrary, one of the first people to introduce metaphysics

[1] His commentary on the *Physics* is dated A.D. 517.

and natural theology into a world in which they had not existed before. His adversaries were, like those of the Mu'tazilites, followers of rival religions, Manichaeans and Christians (cf. Ibn an-Nadīm, *Fihrist* no. 167-168; T. de Boer, Kindi wider die Trinität, *Festschrift Nöldeke*, Giessen 1906 I p. 279 ff; A. Périer, *Petits traités apologétiques de Yaḥyā b. 'Adī*, Paris 1920, Appendix I) and unspecified heretics (*Fihrist* no. 169) — but there were no pagan Greek philosophers to be faced, except, in a sense, the Sabaeans (in whom Al-Kindī seems to have been interested, cf. F. Rosenthal, *Aḥmad b. aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Sarakhsī*, New Haven 1943, p. 17. p. 41 ff. = *Fihrist* p. 318, 14-320, 9 Flügel).

4 — *Al-Kindī on Sūra* 55, 5

But we can give a still more precise description of the way in which Al-Kindī introduced philosophy to his contemporaries. The agreement between Scripture and philosophical truth is, as we have seen, a basic conviction of Al-Kindī: there is no discrepancy between the revealed word and its explanation in rational terms. The eighth *risāla* in Abū Rīda's edition 'Explanation of the worship of the uttermost body and its obedience to God' (الابانة عن سجود الجرم الاقصى وطاعته لله عزّ وجل), dedicated to the caliph's son, is a good specimen of the way in which he demonstrated the validity of this claim. He may have done the same in other now lost treatises (cf. above p. 183), and his pupil As-Sarakhsī appears to have employed the same method (as Al-Bīrūnī reports, cf. F. Rosenthal, *as-Sarakhsī*, p. 51 and 134: يشتهد باى القرآن). Here he applied the Mu'tazilite method of *tafsīr* (cf. above p. 181 ff.), of grammatical and linguistic explanation of the Qur'ān (cf. I. Goldziher, *Richtungen*, p. 186 n. 1; 239 2; 240) which he considered as a work of the utmost perfection (cf. above p. 181) to a line from the 55th Sura (5): "وَٱلنَّجْمُ وَٱلشَّجَرُ يَسْجُدَانِ —The star and the tree do obeisance" (Bell). Al-Kindī is in no doubt about the meaning of *najm* (cf. recently A. Fischer, An-najm Sura 55, 5, *Islamica* 5, 1931, p. 198 ff.), which was already controversial in his days (cf. Ṭabarī *ad locum*, vol. 27, p. 61 below) and followed the best authorities of the old theological tradition, the Mekkan Mujāhid (d. 718 or 720, cf. Goldziher, *Richtungen*, p. 107 f. and passim) and the Basrian Qatāda (d. 735, cf. Goldziher, *Richtungen*, passim) in understanding it as 'stars'; he tacitly rejected the meaning 'herbs' which, among recent scholars, Fischer and Blachère have accepted, and concentrated on the meaning of *sajada* (I p. 245, 10 ff. A. R.). But the Mu'tazilite exegetical method now serves philosophical ends and thus goes beyond the realm

of Kalām; the picture of the Mu'tazila as Al-Kindī's starting point becomes, however, more distinct, although he uses their ways of understanding the Qur'ān for a new and different purpose (I p. 244, 17 ff.): "Verily the word of Muḥammad the truthful (*Muḥammad aṣ-ṣādiq*: cf. I p. 104, 10 *ar-rusul aṣ-ṣādiqa*) and what he transmitted on the authority of God is all given in rational terms and arguments (*bi-l-maqāyīs al-'aqliyya* cf. p. 244, l. 16) [1]. Only those people who are deprived of intelligence (من حرم صورة العقل) and endowed with ignorance (اتحد بصورة الجهل) refuse to accept them". A statement of this kind is in full agreement with the claim of the Mu'tazilite interpreters of the Qur'ān. I quote (from Goldziher, *Richtungen*, p. 136 f.): "Die Vernunft als Quelle der religiösen Erkenntnis, ein Grundsatz den zu allererst die Mu'tazila in die islamische Religionsbetrachtung eingeführt hat (*Kashshāf* I 544). Sie werden in ihren Theorien von kalter (!) Vernünftigkeit geleitet. Selbst die Propheten lassen sie die Wahrheit ihrer göttlichen Sendung dadurch beweisen, dass sie durch Gott zur Ergründung von Vernunftargumenten geleitet worden sind. Dies sei das 'Zeichen (*āya*) von eurem Herrn', das der Prophet nach 3 v. 44 bringt (*Kashshāf* I 148). Die Propheten werden von Gott zur ungläubigen Menschheit gesandt, um die Denkträgen zur Denktätigkeit anzuregen, ebenso — setzt Zamakhsharī (zu 4 v. 163) hinzu — wie du dies auch von den Gelehrten der Gerechtigkeit und Gotteseinheit (den Mu'taziliten) erfährst (*Kashshāf*, I 240) etc." It is inconceivable, Al-Kindī continues, to believe in the apostleship of Muhammad and to accept his message as true (من آمن برسالة محمّد صلّى لله عليه وسلم وصدّقه) and to reject and disapprove the explanations (ما تأوّل) of the interpreters of the Qur'ān. Often people are ignorant of the language of the Qur'ān (يكون ممن جهل اللغة التى اتى بها الرسول) and do not know how to deal properly with lexicographical and grammatical problems in general as well as in Arabic. In the present case this applies particularly to ambiguous words (I p. 245, 4: تشابه الاسماء. 245, 7: تشابه الاسماء). Needless to emphasize that the adequate explanation of the *mutashābihāt* (Sura 3 v. 5 and Zamakhsharī *ad loc.*), of words which admit of different explanations, is again one of the main concerns of Mu'tazilite interpreters of the Qur'ān (cf. Goldziher, *Richtungen*, p. 127 ff., especially for the discussion of *naẓara* which is

[1] مقاييس = συλλογισμοί *Theologie des Aristoteles* p. 100, 16 Dieterici (cf. Plotinus *Enn.* IV 4, 6 line 13).

very similar to Al-Kindī's problem). It is characteristic of the Arabic language that it can use the same word for two diametrically opposed meanings, as for instance *'ādil* which denotes the just man 'who gives the thing its due' (معطى الشيء حقّه) and the unjust man who goes astray. It is worthwhile mentioning that Al-Kindī says that one word is 'used by convention (يُوضَع)' for two opposites, because this, again, agrees with the Mu'tazilite view of the origin of language (cf. P. Kraus, Beiträge zur islamischen Ketzergeschichte, *Riv. Stud. Or.* 14, 1934, p. 127 ff. and 128 n. 2. *Jābir ibn Ḥayyān* II, Cairo 1942, p. 256). The discussion of *sujūd* which follows (I p. 245. 10 ff.) represents an instructive specimen of the way in which one can, by the use of the Mu'tazilite method, prove that the Greek astronomical theology as modified by John Philoponus is expressed clearly in the two words of the Qur'ān under discussion (*najm* and *sajada*). It may, as a very early text of philosophical Qur'ān exegesis, be considered as a valuable piece of evidence in itself and should be compared with the use made of qur'ānic verses by later philosophers. *Sujūd* means, according to Al-Kindī, either 'prostration in prayer as ordained by the religious law' or 'obedience', as can be proved (cf. the parallel from Imra'l-Qais discussed above p. 182 and what has been said there about loci probantes from pre-islamic poetry) from a line of Nābigha (normally quoted with a slightly different reading). The meaning of طاعة 'obedience' is more suitable for the stars since they have no human shape. And at any rate the wording points to a permanent *sujūd* (the pronoun لـ having been omitted), hence 'prostration in prayer' cannot have been intended. The exact meaning of طاعة 'obedience' is now followed up. It can be shown from common speech and lines of poetry, that it may denote the change (تغيير) from deficiency to perfection or, in philosophical terms, from potentiality to actuality. But it can mean also 'compliance with the command of the commander' الانتهاء الى أمر الآمر. Such compliance presupposes responsible decision (*ikhtiyār*- cf. I p. 167, 1 A.R.: إرادة قد تقدّمها روية مع تمييز = προαίρεσις) which is to be found only in beings with rational perfect souls (I p. 246,8: والاختيار لذوى [MS الذى] النامة الانفس اعنى المنطقية). The *sujūd* of the stars (called in the following chapters of the *Risālat al-ashkhāṣ al-'āliyya*, the visible figures in the sky, cf. I p. 220, 5. 224, 15) must be a *ṭā'a* of this kind, not only because the stars have no limbs to perform a religious prostration but because they are beyond the world of change and becoming altogether;

their movements do not change and have not changed through all the many centuries of continuous astronomical observations. Their movements constitute time and the seasons, and on time thus established by the stars all vegetative and animal life and all coming-to-be and passing-away depends. The stars, in fulfilling this function as the proximate cause of every happening in the sublunar world follow one command (I p. 247, 3: أمرًا واحدًا) and thus comply with the will of God (ما أراد بارئها). But the working of the universe, though uniform and unchanging, is by no means eternal. The divine command is followed by the stars as long as God allows them to exist (I p. 247, 3: لا تخرج عنه ما أبقاها بارئها), the world depends on the divine decree and lasts as long as God's inscrutable will permits (I p. 247, 7: الى ما فرض لها من البقاء cf. I p. 257, 7. 259, 9 — A. J. Wensinck, p. 54).

5 — *Astrology and Revelation*

There is another example to demonstrate Al-Kindī's conviction that Scripture and scientific truth arrive at the same results. The counterpart to Scripture is this time represented by astrology, which was considered by Al-Kindī and the tradition with which he is connected as a genuine branch of rational and methodical knowledge (cf. C. A. Nallino, *Raccolta di Scritti etc.* V, Rome 1944, pp. 19 f. 25): but was emphatically rejected by Al-Fārābī (cf. Nallino, *Raccolta* V, p. 23 ff.), Ibn Sīnā (cf. Nallino, p. 28 ff.), Al-Ghazzālī (cf. *ibid.* p. 32), Ibn Rushd (cf. *ibid.* pp. 3. 30) and Ibn Khaldūn (cf. *ibid.* p. 37). The problem is to find out in advance how long the Empire of the Arabs will last (مدّة ملك العرب). The text was published by O. Loth, Al-Kindī als Astrolog, *Morgenl. Forsch. für H. L. Fleischer*, Leipzig 1875, p. 261 ff. (cf. again, Nallino, *Raccolta* V, p. 15 ff.). The answer given by the revealed text and the correct application of the science of astrology are shown to be identical: 693 years exactly. In a way this case, since Al-Kindī deals in it with exact numbers, is most instructive for his general attitude to the problem of faith and reason. As-Sarakhsī, his immediate pupil, reproduces the same argument [1]. The problem in itself was certainly not invented by Al-Kindī, as can easily be inferred from his own treatise. His astrological methods may profitably be compared to a Greek work on the duration of the Muslim Empire written A.D. 775 and unearthed and published by H. Usener,

[1] Cf. F. Rosenthal, *Aḥmad b. aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Sarakhsī*, pp. 122 ff.

De Stephano Alexandrino, available also in his *Kleine Schriften III*, Leipzig-Berlin 1914. pp. 258 ff., 266 ff.

II

In the first part of these studies, Al-Kindī's connection with the Mu'tazilite interpretation of Islam and his conviction that revelation and philosophy attain identical results although in different ways has been described. The fact that a creation from nothing is valid both as an article of faith and as a fundamental tenet of philosophy turns out to be one of the most impressive illustrations of his rather uncommon attitude. The astrological treatise is equally instructive [1]) In both cases Al-Kindī disagrees with all the leading later philosophers, who follow the Neoplatonic doctrine of an eternal creation and reject astrology altogether. Al-Kindī's appreciation of the Kalām is, by implication, repudiated most emphatically by Al-Fārābī [2] who upholds the priority of human reason and understands established religion as an approach to truth through symbols (*mathālāt*) and therefore inferior to philosophical demonstration. It is now proposed to deal with some distinctive features of his philosophical thought, in addition to the points already discussed and thus to prepare the way for giving Al-Kindī his place in the history of Aristotelian Neoplatonism, which had come to dominate in late antiquity and was to prevail in Islamic philosophy. Since it is obvious that our evidence of the different trends in late Greek Neoplatonism is determined by the restricted interest of later Byzantine centuries, it is not always possible to find out or even to guess what Al-Kindī's sources were, even if we were, a priori, to concede that he only reproduced arguments or whole works of ultimately Greek ancestry. It is common knowledge, on the other hand, that a not too small amount of originally Greek thought can only be traced nowadays in Arabic texts either in translation or in books or articles written by Arabic philosophers. Hence we have to use a certain amount of discretion in our inquiry and to be satisfied with probabilities. On the Arabic side it will be useful to compare Al-Kindī consistently with Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.

It is very likely, as has been pointed out (above p. 190 ff.) that Al-Kindī ultimately depended on John Philoponus' attacks on Proclus and

[1] Cf. also Ignaz Goldziher, Stellung der alten Islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften, *Abh. d. preuss. Ak. der Wissensch., Philos. Hist. Klasse* 1915, nr. 8, p. 20 ff.

[2] Cf. his stringent criticism of the Kalām in *De divisione scientiarum* ch. 5, pp. 107, 15-113 (ed. 'Uthmān Amīn, Cairo 1949). Gardet-Anawati, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris 1948, p. 102 ff.

Aristotle while demonstrating that the world was neither ungenerated nor undestructible but created from nothing and to be reduced to nothing. But it seems to be beyond doubt that the differences from orthodox Aristotelianism to be noticed in Al-Kindī's philosophical statements which are not concerned with creation have little in common with the late school of Alexandria—with whose teaching Al-Fārābī seems more closely connected than Al-Kindī. Thus we owe to Al-Kindī a fragment from a Platonising work of Aristotle (I p. 279, 3 ff.), probably the *Eudemus*, embedded in a *risāla* in which he teaches the immortality of the soul in Plato's manner [1]. Similar ideas about immortality are to be found in his 'Consolatio' which represents a good specimen of Platonising later Greek popular philosophy [2]. The survey of Aristotle's writings which we read in the Aristotle *risāla* provides evidence of a similar kind, I mean, it shows a stronger emphasis on the Platonic element in the union of Plato and Aristotle, of whose agreement in essential tenets Al-Kindī is as convinced as Porphyry and Simplicius or Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā—although Aristotle is in his view the greatest philosopher of all (but can be represented as sharing many Platonic tenets without any reservation) [3]. The fact that psychology is not to be considered to be part of the natural sciences as Alexander of Aphrodisias, John Philoponus, Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā and others taught [4] but constitutes a special section within the philosophical syllabus is worth noticing, the reason given being that the soul and its different faculties are intermediate between the material and the spiritual world [5]. A similar appreciation of Aristotle's

[1] Cf. 'Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele', *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica* N.S.,14, 1937, pp. 125-137 (with corrections of the manuscript followed by Abū Rīda). Sir David Ross, *The Works of Aristotle etc.* XII, Oxford 1952, p. 23. For an echo of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in Al-Kindī's *First Philosophy* (I p. 105, 1 ff. A.R.) cf. *Oriens* 3, 1950 p. 9 n. 20 and 21 [cf. above p. 38 ff.].

[2] Cf. H. Ritter-R. Walzer, *Uno scritto morale di al-Kindi* (Roma 1938) and *Oriens* 3, 1950 p. 2 n. 4. A. Spitaler, Die arabische Fassung des Trostbriefes Alexanders an seine Mutter, *Studi orientalistici in onore di G. Levi della Vida*, II, Roma 1956, pp. 493 ff.

[3] Cf. I p. 103, 1: Aristotle is مبرّز اليونانيين فى الفلسفة. Plato and Aristotle agree: cf. the tenth and eleventh treatises of vol. I and I 12, p. 301, 6: فقد قال ذلك ايضا قبلنا افلاطون حكيم اليونانيين and I 13, p. 353, 2: واقتناه وحكاه عنه فيلسوفهم المبرّز ارسطوطاليس فى الاقاويل النفسانيّة على رأى المحمودين من قدماء اليونانيين ومن احدهم أرسطوطاليس ومعلمه افلاطون الحكيم.

[4] But in the part of the Ibn Sīnā's *Kitāb al-inṣāf* which deals with the *De anima* the psychology has its place between Physics and Metaphysics as in Al-Kindī's treatise, cf. A. Badawī, *Arisṭū 'inda l-'Arab* p. 75 and S. Pines, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 1953, p. 13 and n. 2.

[5] Cf. M. Guidi-R. Walzer, Uno scritto introductivo allo studi di Aristotele, *Accademia dei Lincei*, Roma 1940, pp. 378-380.

psychological writings existed in the Athenian Neoplatonic school, as we learn from Simplicius [1], and I should like to maintain my previous contention that Al-Kindī has his ultimate philosophical roots in the Athenian school of Proclus although we cannot, for the time being, determine which the connecting links were and when and where the different trends indicated before were joined together [2]. Al-Kindī's acceptance of astrology places him also in the vicinity of the same Neoplatonic trend [3]. The little we know about Al-Kindī's moral philosophy reveals him again as a Platonist following a scheme of virtues and vices which may have been established by Porphyry and which is very different from the Nicomachean Ethics although it incorporates Aristotle's definition of virtue as the mean between two vices [4]. More support for that assumption can be obtained by discussing Al-Kindī's view of the world above the moon and particularly one feature of his astral theology in which he is at variance with Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd but seems to agree with Avicenna.

Since the days of Plato and Aristotle it is commonly believed by Greek philosophers (the Epicureans only excepted) that the heavenly bodies are animated by divine minds, and their Arabic disciples conform to this view, as is, after all, not surprising. But it could be asked whether the uttermost sphere and the spheres of the planets had some sense-perception as well, and supposing they had, whether they were endowed with all the five senses or only with some of them. Al-Kindī discusses this question in the *Qur'ān-Risāla* to which I referred before (above p. 196 ff.) and decides that the uttermost sphere and the other both solid and transparent spheres (which have intellect and life and selective will, προαίρεσις, *ikhtiyār* [5]) have the two noble senses (*al-ḥissāni ash-sharīfāni*), i.e. sight and hearing, but are not in need of the remaining three: since they do not grow and hence do not feed like mortal living beings, they can do without taste and smell, and since their movement is voluntary and circular and they cannot be acted upon by anything material from the outside, they can dispense with the lower sense of touch as well (Ī p. 253 f. Abū Rīda). A statement of this kind is obviously contrary to Aristotle's view as expressed in the *De caelo* (I 2-3), where only 'intelligences' as separate motive agents of each sphere are recognised, and, hence, more orthodox Aristotelians than Al-Kindī, Al-Fārābī and Averroes for instance, endow the star movers (whom they identify with the 'angels' of Islām [1]) with intellect only [2]. But in his earlier days Aristotle —in all probability in his lost dialogue *On Philosophy*—had put forward the same ideas as Al-Kindī, and following him Stoics and Neo-Platonists give reason and sense-perception to the stars. A late Neoplatonist in Alexandria, Olympiodorus, in his commentary on Plato's *Phaedo* 65a (p. 26, 22 ff. Norvin=Aristotle fr. 24 Ross), is our only (but certain) authority for attributing this view to Aristotle who was in this respect followed by Proclus: καὶ ὁ μὲν Πρόκλος βούλεται τὰ οὐράνια ὄψιν μόνον καὶ ἀκοὴν ἔχειν καθάπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης. [3] We learn from the adjoining section in Olympiodorus' commentary (p. 27, 3-11) that Proclus' late successor Damascius opposed his master, holding that the heavenly bodies have also the other senses. This controversy was evidently still known to the unknown philosopher who established this further link of Al-Kindī with ideas shared by Proclus. It is tempting and not impossible to assume that Al-Kindī's arguments against the claims of the lower senses, taste and smell and touch, ultimately go back to Aristotle's dialogue. Proclus' own arguments are discussed at considerable length in his commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* (vol. II pp. 83-92 Diehl) and may have been traditional in contexts of this kind (cf. also Plotinus IV 3 and Bréhier's edition vol. IV p. 42 ff., 46 ff. Simplicius, *De caelo* p. 463, 1 Heiberg).

It is interesting to realise that Ibn Sīnā, who is on the whole more of a Platonist than Al-Fārābī and Ibn Rushd, appears to have come very near to this opinion of Al-Kindī and almost have shared it in all its essentials: by crediting the heavenly bodies with φαντασία, *takhayyul*

[1] *Phys.* 1,15 ff. Diels. *De an.* 1, 22 ff., 2, 29 ff. 3, 5 Heinze.

[2] Cf. the publication mentioned p. 201 n. 2 and *Oriens* 6, 1953, p. 107 ff.

[3] Cf. e.g. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus. The Elements of Theology*, Oxford 1933, pp. 284, 303 ff.

[4] Cf. R. Walzer, Some aspects of Miskawaih's tahdhīb al-akhlāq, *Studi orientali in onore di G. Levi della Vida* II, Roma 1956, pp. 604-608. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, vol. I s.v. Akhlāḳ II, 3 [cf. below p. 221 ff.].

[5] Cf. above p. 226.

[1] For 'angels' in the place of the Greek θεοί cf. Porphyry, *Isagoge* p. 14, 2. 18, 23 Busse (and apparatus criticus). 'A diatribe of Galen', *Harvard Theological Review*, 47, 1954, p. 247 and nn. 9-10. Al-Fārābī, *as-siyāsat al-madaniyya*, p. 3 (Hyderabad). L. Gardet, *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne*, Paris 1951, pp. 116 ff. S. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahāfut*, II pp. 23, 135, 162.

[2] Cf., e.g., Al-Fārābī, *arā' ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila* 10 (p. 19 f. Dieterici).

[3] I quote the text in Sir David Ross' translation (p. 94 f.) in full: "Proclus would have heavenly bodies possess only sight and hearing, as Aristotle also would; of the senses they have only these, which are those that contribute to well-being, not those that contribute to being, as the other senses do. The poet (Homer) testifies to this, saying: 'Sun, who seest all things and hearest all things (*Il.* 3, 277; *Od.* 12, 323)'—which implies that the heavenly bodies have only sight and hearing. Aristotle adds that these senses, most of all, have knowledge by way of activity rather than of passivity, and are fitter for the unchanging heavenly bodies." Cf. fr. 21 Walzer (Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 2, 42-44): sensus astrorum atque intelligentia .... motus astrorum voluntarius. fr. 26: ..... caeli divinus ille sensus. Cf. A. J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II. Le Dieu Cosmique*, Paris 1949, pp. 248 ff.

he implicitly accepted the view that they have sense-perception of some kind. I quote from Ibn Rushd's criticism of Ibn Sīnā to be found in the *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut* (p. 495 Bouyges, transl. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahāfut* I p. 301): "What al-Ghazzālī mentions here is, to my knowledge, not said by any philosopher except Avicenna, namely that the heavenly bodies have representations, not to speak of the fact that these representations should be infinite (فضلا على أن تتخيل خيلات لا نهاية لها); and Alexander of Aphrodisias explains in his book called *The Principles of the Universe* (ed. Badawī, *Aristū 'inda'l-'Arab*, Cairo 1947, p. 255) that these bodies have no representations, because representations (الخيال) exist only in living beings (في الحيوان) because of their conservation, and these bodies do not fear corruption, and with respect to them representations would be valueless (and likewise sensations وكذلك الحواس). If they had representations they would also have sensations, since sensations are the condition for representations and every being which has representations necessarily has sensations although the reverse is not true"[1]. I should like to think that Avicenna accepted, like Al-Kindī, only the two higher senses and, in addition, that he localised them in the souls of the spheres which in his thought (but not in the system of Al-Fārābī) are distinguished from the separate astral intellects and hence may have representations and sensations of a peculiar kind and obviously some functions different from those allotted to the intellects.

It seems to be likely that the whole question whether the stars have sense-perception can be linked up with the wider issue of divine providence and divine knowledge of the particulars. This applies definitely to Plato and the early Aristotle, as scholars have rightly insisted (cf. D. J. Allan, *The philosophy of Aristotle*, Oxford 1952, p. 24 ff.[2]. The attack on Avicenna in the *Tahāfut at-Tahāfut* occurs in a similar context, and the problem which appears, at first sight, odd and senseless thus becomes more significant and interesting[3].

[1] Cf. also S. van den Bergh, *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes*, Leiden 1924, pp. 109, 118 and notes.

[2] Cf. M. S. Pines, Un fragment inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe, *Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions*, 1955, pp. 387 ff. [cf. also *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 1956 (Paris 1957) p. 25 ff.].

[3] Cf. L. Gardet, *La pensée*, pp. 77 and n. 3.

Addition

Ad. p. 222, n. 3 [and A. Altmann-S. M. Stern, *Isḥāq Israeli. A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the 10th century*, Oxford 1958, passim].

p. 175 *n.* 1. Definitions: cf. A. Altmann-S. M. Stern, *Isaac Israeli*, Oxford 1958, pp. 27–31. S. M. Stern, Notes on Al-Kindī's treatise on definitions, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1959, pp. 32–43.

Ethics: cf. below p. 201, n. 2.

p. 178 *l.* 7. Cf. Altmann-Stern, *op.cit.*, p. 185 f.

p. 179 *n.* 2. Cf. Clem. Al., *Paed.* I 36, 1 and H. Marrou, Recherches sur la tradition Platonicienne, *Entretiens Hardt* 3, 1958, p. 192.

p. 182 *l.* 3. For 'the One, the True' read 'the true One' (Baneth).

p. 182 *n.* 2. Cf. Altmann-Stern, *op.cit.*, p. 72 f.

p. 183 *n.* 2. Cf. Basilius, *Hexameron* II 7 (p. 45B–C Migne).

p. 184 *n.* 3. Read «'Aql is not a qur'ānic word, but it is already frequent in old Arabic poetry».

p. 188 *l.* 22. Read «the real One».

p. 188 *l.* 25. For 'it' read 'they'.

p. 188 *n.* 1. For '188' read '182'.

p. 189 *n.* 3. Cf. Altmann-Stern, *op.cit.*, pp. 69 f., and pp. 70 ff. (Ammonius, *On the opinions of the philosophers.*)

p. 190 *l.* 15. Cf. A. Altmann, A note on the rabbinic doctrine of creation, *Journal of Jewish Studies*, 7, 1956, p. 195 ff. G. Scholem, Schöpfung aus Nichts und Selbstverschränkung Gottes, *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 25, pp. 87–119.

p. 191 *l.* 17. Add note 1a: John Philoponus was 'heretical', but his works were read by the Nestorians and thus reached the Arabs.

p. 191 *l.* 34. Add note 3. Cf. W. Wieland, Die Ewigkeit der Welt (Der Streit zwischen Johannes Philoponus und Simplicius), *Die Gegenwart der Griechen im neueren Denken, Festschrift H. G. Gadamer*, Tübingen 1960, pp. 291–316.

p. 194 *n.* 1. Cf. A. Baumstark, *Geschichte der syrischen Literatur*, Bonn 1922, p. 162.

p. 199 *n.* 1. As-Sarahsī's view is reported by Al-Bīrūnī (who disagrees) in a passage published for the first time by F. Rosenthal, *op.cit.*, pp. 132–134. Cf. also Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddima* III, chapter 54. Cf. G. Vayda, La doctrine astrologique de Juda b. Nissim b. Malka, *Homenaje Millás Vallicrosa*, II, Barcelona 1956, p. 499.

p. 203 *n.* 3. W. Theiler draws my attention to the relevant passage in [John Philoponus], *De an.*, pp. 595, 36 ff. Hayduck, where Alexander's and the Neoplatonist Plutarch's views about the sense-perception of the stars are discussed in great detail, cf. particularly pp. 597, 2–598, 7 and Simplicius, *De an.*, p. 320, 22 ff. Hayduck. Cf. also H. A. Wolfson, Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Averroes, *Hervard Studies in Classical Philology*, 63, 1958, p. 234 and n. 4 (references to Philo and Crescas).

p. 204 *n.* 3. Cf. also R. Walzer, *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* (*Papers Symposium Aristotelicum* 1957), Göteburg 1960, pp. 105–112.

AL-FĀRĀBĪ'S THEORY OF PROPHECY AND DIVINATION

It is the purpose of this paper to draw the attention of classical scholars to an Arabic theory of prophecy and divination which, though known for a long time in the original text and in modern translation, has quite escaped the notice of those interested in the history of late Greek philosophy and its continuation in mediaeval Islam. I mean here by prophecy and divination, like the Arabic author I am going to deal with, all kinds of apparently supernatural knowledge, concerned with the realm of the transcendent as well as with particular events in the future and special happenings at the present time. The possessors of this knowledge are characterized as individuals of a peculiar excitability and a range of imagination which exceeds the normal. Attempts at explaining phenomena of this kind in rational terms were not uncommon in Greek philosophy from Plato's days down to late Neoplatonism. I propose to show that the Arabic theory continues these Greek discussions and to suggest that it represents, at the same time, a facet of Greek thought which has not survived in its original context.

Al-Fārābī (*c.* A.D. 870–950), a well-known Muslim Neoplatonist and Aristotelian of outstanding importance in the history of Islamic philosophy [1], deals at some length with prophecy in his work *The Views of the People* [2] *of the Best State* [3]. Since, in accordance with the Greek tradition, he connects divination and prophecy with an innate faculty of the soul itself, and does not describe it as a state of possession by supernatural powers, his explanation of these phenomena is linked up with his analysis of man and his Neoplatonic-Aristotelian metaphysics. Prophecy is

[1] Cf. e.g. R. Walzer, *The History of Philosophy : East and West*, London 1953, vol. 2, pp. 136 ff. [above, p. 1 ff.]. C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* I, Leiden 1943, pp. 232 ff.

[2] The classical Arabic language has no word for "citizen" πολίτης, and the translators of Greek texts had to face this difficulty. Cf. Sir Hamilton Gibb, The Evolution of Government in Early Islam, *Studia Islamica*, 4, pp. 5–18.

[3] This paper is based on chapters 20–25 and 27 of the work, and more specifically on chapters 24 and 25. The text is available in a not very satisfactory Arabic edition by F. Dieterici, Leiden 1895, in a German translation by the same scholar (*Al-Fārābī, Der Musterstaat*, Leiden 1900) and in a French translation (R. P. Janssen, Youssef Karam et J. Chlala, *Al-Fārābī, Idées des habitants de la cité vertueuse*, Cairo 1949). References to special passages indicate Dieterici's Arabic text and can be easily verified in his German translation.

auxiliary to the rational faculty and as such an indispensable ingredient in man's perfection; divine inspiration (*waḥy*) [1] can be understood as the union of the highest philosophical knowledge with the highest form of prophecy; but the primacy of reason and philosophy is maintained, prophecy being confined to the faculty of imagination, which is given a less humble position than in Aristotle's *De anima*, but still ranked as inferior to philosophy. This evaluation of prophecy comes near to Plato's attitude as expressed in *Tim.* 72a, *Phaedr.* 248d, *Rep.* IX 571c f. and elsewhere (*cf.*, e.g., the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* 414b 2) and may be compared to Aristotle *On philosophy*, fr. 12a Ross; it is a fair guess that Al-Fārābī represents in this respect, as elsewhere, what is ultimately a Hellenistic or Middle Platonic tradition which may have been drawn upon by Porphyry; *cf.* Al-Fārābī's description of the θεία μανία in the *Phaedrus* in his work *De Platonis Philosophia*, 22 (p. 10 f. Rosenthal-Walzer). But the details in his theory presuppose not only Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De anima* [2], but also the Neoplatonic metaphysics of emanation in an unusual variation which was, however, accepted by many Arabic philosophers after Al-Fārābī: the First Cause was at the same time the Plotinian One, the eternal creator of an eternal world, and the Aristotelian divine Mind [3]; and the νοῦς ποιητικός had become a transcendent entity comparable to the Neoplatonic world-νοῦς. Most remarkable is the theory of imagination adopted by Al-Fārābī; its Greek author had probably taken as his basis Aristotle's view of φαντασία as modified by the Stoics but, under Neoplatonic influence, given it a new direction.

[1] Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v., and recently R. Bell, *Introduction to the Qur'ān*, Edinburgh 1953, pp. 31 ff., who shows that *waḥy* and the actual text of the Koran are to be considered as two different things. Cf. also L. Massignon in Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Paris 1950, p. 385. Al-Fārābī fully realized that his philosophical definition of *waḥy* is opposed to the way in which it is understood by tradition and speculative theology, cf. his *De divisione scientiarum*, V, p. 108, ii f. (ed. Osman Amin) and L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris 1948, p. 104 f.

[2] The work was available to Al-Fārābī in a ninth-century Arabic version by Isḥāq, son of Ḥunain (cf. *Supplementum Aristotelicum* II, pp. xiv ff. Bruns) and was commented upon by him in a special work of his own (cf. *Ibn al-Qifṭī*, p. 279, 22 Lippert). Some lost works by Alexander have been discovered in Arabic versions and published (but not translated into a European language) ; some more have been recently traced in Istanbul (cf. *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, München 1956, p. 190). [J. Finnegan S.J., Texte Arabe du Περὶ νοῦ d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, *Mélanges de l'Université St. Joseph* 33, 1956, pp. 159–202.] [Cf. above, p. 30 .]

[3] There is some slight late Greek evidence for this theory, as is shown by S. van den Bergh, *Averroes' Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, vol. II, London 1954, p. 74 ; but we can trace a similar conception of the First Cause back to Middle Platonism, cf. Albinus, *Isagoge* 9 (p. 163, 29 Hermann = IX 3, p. 53 Louis) and 10.

Soul is for Al-Fārābī—as in the Greek philosophical tradition—the principle of life (hence it comprehends a vegetative faculty (θρεπτικὴ δύναμις) and reaches its perfection in reason and disciplined thinking. It is made up of several faculties or powers (δυνάμεις)—"parts" of the soul or different "souls" are tacitly rejected—the vegetative faculty, sense-perception, imagination or representation, and reason; with the exception of the first, each of these faculties is associated with an appropriate desire, a δύναμις ὀρεκτικὴ *vel* ὁρμητική. Imagination—which interests us in the present context as the seat of prophecy and divination—is, in this section of Al-Fārābī's work, characterized as preserving the impressions (τύποι or τυπώσεις) made upon it as a result of the activity of sense-perception and either connecting those images which it preserves with each other or separating them from each other so as to produce either true or false representations of past sense experiences within the soul. These faculties are closely interlocked, so that their distinctly graded order—which corresponds at the same time to their order of generation—can be neither changed nor reversed, each lower faculty being the matter for the one higher in rank, with the exception of the rational faculty, which is the form of all prior forms. The same relationship can be expressed by distinguishing ruling and subordinate powers within the soul and by establishing ruling and subordinate faculties within the province of vegetative life, sense-perception and desire. (The relation between the ruling power of sense-perception—elsewhere known as "common sense"—and imagination is defined in a similar way as by [John Philop.] *De an.* p. 507.16 ff.; S. van den Bergh, *op. cit.*, II, p. 187.) [1]

In the same way Alexander, following Stoic predecessors, had spoken of reason as τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν and can contrast ἡγεμονικόν and ὑπηρετικόν within different faculties of the soul [2]. Thus Al-Fārābī recognizes a ruling vegetative power (p. 35, 2 ff.) and a ruling power of perception (πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, *cf.* Sir David Ross, *Parva Naturalia*, Oxford, 1955, p. 35), identical with common sense (p. 35, 11 ff.), and corresponding

[1] δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι φαντασία ἐστὶ δύναμις δεκτικὴ διὰ μέσης αἰσθήσεως τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν. . . . ἀποροῦσι δὲ εὐθὺς ἐκ θυρῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲν διενήνοχε ἡ φαντασία τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως · καὶ ἡ κοινὴ γὰρ αἴσθησις δύναμίς ἐστι δεκτικὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν διὰ μέσης αἰσθήσεως . . . λέγομεν δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν φαντασία δεκτική ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν διὰ μέσης πάσης αἰσθήσεως, καὶ κοινῆς καὶ μερικῆς, ἡ δὲ κοινὴ αἴσθησις διὰ μέσου τῆς μερικῆς αἰσθήσεως μόνης δεκτική ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν · ὥστε αὕτη ἐστὶ διαφορὰ φαντασίας καὶ κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως.

[2] Cf. Nemesius of Emesa, *De nat. hom.*, p. 177, 3 : τῶν δὲ ψυχικῶν τὰ μέν ἐστι ὑπουργικά τε καὶ δορυφορικά, τὰ δὲ ἀρχικὰ καὶ ἡγεμονικά. W. W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa*, Berlin 1914, p. 21.

subordinate powers [1]. Like Alexander, who in psychology as elsewhere smooths out the apparent discrepancies within the Corpus Aristotelicum, he localizes the ruling vegetative power (p. 35, 2 f. = Alexander, *De an.*, p. 94.18 Bruns), the ruling power of sense-perception (p. 35, 17 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 96, 11 ff.), the imaginative faculty (p. 35, 19 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 97, 11 ff.) and the ruling power of desire (p. 36, 14 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 97, 17) in the heart as primary organ, thereby following Aristotle's views in the *Parva Naturalia* (*cf.* Sir David Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 6 f.) and discarding what Aristotle maintains in the *De anima*. Al-Fārābī differs, however, from Alexander—who in one place wants reason to be located in the heart as well (*op. cit.*, p. 98, 24 ff.)—by not locating the highest faculty of the soul in any bodily organ at all and thus, as in other transcendent aspects of his system, rather agreeing with Plotinus (*Enn.* iv, 3.23) [2]. By thus selecting Aristotle's psychology in the systematic form given to it by Alexander, Al-Fārābī has, from the very beginning, some protection against being misled by the narrow rationalism of most Stoics [3] or the late Neoplatonic mysticism and contempt of the priority of reason, keeping the middle way while approaching the difficult problem of prophecy and divination.

This impression is strengthened when we look at Al-Fārābī's description of the faculty of reason, the highest perfection of which constitutes human happiness. As the divine mind rules the universe, so reason should govern and control the life of man. No human faculty higher than reason can be conceived. The different kinds of reason (νοῦς) which, again, are ordered in terms of matter and form (p. 51 f.) also occur in a series familiar since Alexander of Aphrodisias' days: the material or passive intellect, νοῦς ὑλικός or παθητικός (Al-Fārābī, p. 44; Alex., *De an.*, p. 81, 22 ff.; 85. 10. *Mant.*, p. 106, 19–107, 20), the intellect *in actu*, κατ' ἐνέργειαν (Al-Fārābī, p. 57, 24; Alex., *De an.*, p. 86, 4 ff.), and the acquired intellect, νοῦς ἐπίκτητος (Al-Fārābī, p. 58, 3 = Alex., *De an.*, p. 82, 1). The active

[1] Cf. also Al-Fārābī, pp. 46, 21 ff.

[2] [But cf. Aristotle, *De an. III* 4, 429a 24 ff.] It may, in this context, be relevant to remember that a Neoplatonic commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics E–N could be accepted as the work of Alexander (cf. J. Freudenthal, *Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik*, Berlin 1885, *passim*). Recent research has shown that Proclus could pass for Alexander in Arabic tradition, cf. B. Lewin, Notes sur un texte de Proclus en traduction arabe, *Orientalia Suecana* 4, 1955, pp. 195 ff., and S. Pinès, Une version arabe de trois propositions de Proclus, *Oriens* 8, 1955, pp. 195 ff. That extracts from a paraphrase of Plotinus (the so-called *Theology of Aristotle*) and a work based on Proclus' *Elements of Theology* (the *De causis*) were attributed to Aristotle by the Arabs is well known.

[3] Which was accepted by Philo, *De fuga*, §166 ; *Quis rer. div. heres*, §259. Cf. also H. Leisegang, *Der heilige Geist*, I 1, Leipzig 1919, p. 146.

intellect, νοῦς ποιητικός, is no longer identical with the divine mind (Alex., *De an.*, p. 88 24–91, 6; *cf.* Albinus, *Isag.*, p. 165, 21H.), but is described, as it was by Marinus as reported by Stephanus = [John Philoponus], *De an.*, p. 535, 6, 31 ff., as δαιμόνιός τις ἢ ἀγγελικός, as a transcendent immaterial entity placed next to the sphere of the moon and acting as intermediary between the divine Mind and the human intellect in transmitting the divine emanation to the human soul once it has reached the stage of the acquired intellect [1]. But a union of the human mind with the the active intellect is implicitly (*cf.* p. 46, 10) and explicitly rejected, *cf.* the passage quoted by S. Munk, *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*, Paris, 1859, p. 348, n. 3, and M. Steinschneider, *Al-Fārābī* (St. Petersburg, 1869), p. 102, where this claim is likened to "fabulae vetularum" by Al-Fārābī [2]. Al-Fārābī thus differs in this respect from Plotinus, who is reported by Porphyry (*Life of Plotinus*, 23) to have been capable of the *unio mystica* [3], and the later Neoplatonists of the Athenian school like Proclus—whose ecstatic states produced by theurgy are described by Marinus, *Life of Proclus*, 22 [4]. Hence an explanation of prophecy as the union of the perfect man with the divine mind, as an Islamic mystic would have cherished it [5], was impossible for Al-Fārābī for these reasons also. His roots are in an earlier pre-Plotinian stratum of Greek Platonism which coexisted with the later more extravagant forms of Neoplatonism and from which he draws his particular strength. It is instructive to compare this attitude with his approval of Plato's attitude to politics and his passionate opposition to Plotinus' advice and that of other Neoplatonists that one should withdraw from public life altogether and concentrate on one's individual salvation. He can appreciate Plato's *Timaeus* and also *Republic* and *Laws*, whereas Proclus confesses that he would be happier if Plato had never written the two last-named works [6].

[1] The νοῦς ποιητικός can then be likened to the Angel of Revelation, to Jabrā'īl (cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. *Djabrā'īl* and *Malā'ika*) or to the Qur'ānic Holy Spirit or Trustworthy Spirit (cf. Al-Fārābī, *Siyāsāt*, p. 3).

[2] It is only after death that the souls of those who have reached the utmost perfection join the Active Intellect, which then corresponds to the "Kingdom of Heaven" in Islamic theological language (cf. Al-Fārābī, *Madīna*, p. 58, 18; 59, 3; *Siyāsāt*, p. 3, and *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. *Malakūt* and *Djabarūt*).

[3] Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley 1951, p. 286.

[4] Cf. also E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, p. 291. Al-Fārābī thus differs from Al-Ghazzālī and Maimonides who both accepted ἕνωσις (*ittiḥād*) in the case of exceptional human beings.

[5] Cf. e.g., H. Ritter, *Das Meer der Seele*, Leiden 1955, pp. 499, 575.

[6] Cf. also R. Walzer, Some Aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, *Studi Orientalistici in onore di G. Levi della Vida*, vol. II, Roma 1956. pp, 608 ff. [Cf. below, p. 220 ff.]

Φαντασία, "imagination" or "representation", is intermediate between perception and reason; it not only provides reason with material derived from sense-perception but is also at the service of the rational faculty in other ways. But the Neoplatonists were concerned with the κάτω ὁδός as well, i.e. with the material provided by the rational faculty to "representation" which the latter then translates into the visible and other sensible images which are characteristic of it. They thus continued what were ultimately Aristotelian ideas (*cf. De an.* III, 10, 433b29. 12, 434a30) in a very interesting way; *cf.*, e.g., what the Neoplatonist Plutarch, following Iamblichus, has to say about the double aspect of φαντασία and in particular its higher form (Ps.-John Philop., *De an.* III, p. 515, 12 ff.) [1]. In order to understand Al-Fārābī's theory of divination one must take account of this particular development in the analysis of φαντασία, which may well be older than the fourth century A.D. and again go back to Middle Platonic sources.

Now, imagination is, according to Al-Fārābī, also capable of an activity of its own, which is no longer dependent on the material supplied by the senses and preserved in the memory, and does not consist in combining or separating this material. This activity comes into play mostly in sleep and in dreams but in exceptional cases also in waking life. It is said to be an activity of "imitation", μίμησις, a term with which we are familiar in its meaning of "artistic representation" but which obviously has a wider range. In the case of physical states, then, a more mechanical sort of φαντασία is first to be noticed in which the images of sense impressions

[1] τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν διττὴν οἴεται Πλούταρχος· καὶ τὸ μὲν πέρας αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω, ἤγουν ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς, πέρας ἐστὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πέρας αὐτῆς κορυφή ἐστι τῶν αἰσθήσεων . . . ἡ μὲν οὖν φαντασία . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἀνακαθαίρεται καὶ τὸ ἀτελὲς αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τούτων τελειοῦται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τούτων εἰς ἀλήθειαν καθ' ὅσον πέφυκεν ἔχειν ἀλήθειαν. . . . φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι ὥσπερ εἰσὶ δύο γραμμαὶ καθ' ἓν σημεῖον ἀλλήλων ἁπτόμεναι, οὕτω τὸ ἄνω μέρος τῆς φαντασίας τὸ συναπτόμενον τῷ διανοητικῷ ἐστιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ σημεῖον καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν καὶ ἕτερον, ταὐτὸν μὲν ὡς ἕν, ἕτερον δὲ διότι καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἄνω δύναται λαμβάνεσθαι εὐθείας καὶ μετὰ τῆς κάτω, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία δύναται καὶ ὡς ἓν καὶ ὡς δύο λαμβάνεσθαι, διότι τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τὸ διῃρημένον εἰς ἓν συναθροίζει, τῶν δὲ θείων τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι ἑνιαῖον εἰς τύπους τινὰς καὶ μορφὰς διαφόρους ἀναμάττεται. (Cf. Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll s.v. *Plutarchos von Athen*).

Cf. Proclus, *In Crat.*, 129 (p. 76, 26 Pasquali) : καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία νοῦς ἐστι μορφωτικὸς ἀλλ' οὐ καθαρός. *In Remp.*, I, p. 39, 28 Kroll : Gods appear in human shape as ἐναργῆ σύμβολα of their true being. πᾶς οὖν θεὸς ἀμόρφωτος κἂν αὐτοπτῆται μορφωτικῶς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ μορφὴ ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, μὴ δυναμένου τοῦ αὐτοπτοῦντος ἀμορφώτως ἰδεῖν τὸν ἀμόρφωτον, ἀλλ' ὁρῶντος κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν μορφωτικῶς.

For Iamblichus, cf. Priscianus Lydus, *Metaphr.*, p. 23, 13 ff. Bywater : προσθετέον καὶ τὰ Ἰαμβλίχεια ὡς πάσαις ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς παραπέφυκεν ἡ φαντασία and p. 24, 1 ff. Simplicius, *De an.*, p. 214, 18 ff. Hayduck.

are merely reassorted. But there is also a "mimetic" way of treating the same data or the emotions which go together with them, a "creative" φαντασία. Through this creative φαντασία a kind of access to metaphysical truth with the help of images is open, this being a still higher activity of μίμησις, which manifests itself in translating metaphysical truth into symbols. Examples are given: a wet mixture of the body, an excess of moisture among the temperaments, makes the mimetic capacity of imagination imagine water or swimming, and there are corresponding images produced whenever there is a surplus of the other temperaments of the body. This activity of "representation"—by which a whole class of dreams is explained rationally—may be compared to the activity of reason in so far as it does not reproduce wetness itself; reason grasps the essence of wetness by thinking it, without itself becoming wet. This applies to representation as well, in so far as it cannot go beyond forming a mental image and does not duplicate the experience obtained by the other faculties of the soul. It is inferior to reason, because it can express itself only through imagined sensibles which can never be as true as abstract concepts; hence it can imagine abstract concepts in the form of sensibles (those of sight or hearing, for example) only. The same can be stated for emotions like desire or anger or fear or shame, which occur in the appetitive faculty; they can be preserved in imagination which in such cases acts as a kind of memory; but they can also be produced within that same faculty, without reference to any real happening, through "imitation". Now it was a commonplace among the Greeks that emotions produce certain involuntary bodily reactions, and it is scarcely necessary to give the exact history of this τόπος here: I shall simply refer to Posidonius [1], Plutarch [2] and Plotinus [3]. But if the ultimate aim is to explain prophecy and divination as an activity of φαντασία, it is more important to show the creative power of φαντασία in the case of the emotions and their influence on the body, as an analogy to its higher activities. Purely imagined emotions resulting from μίμησις can produce the same reaction in the body as the real event. Features of sexual intercourse are given as

[1] Plutarch, *De libidine et aegritudine* 6 (*Moralia*, vol. VI, 3, p. 141 Pohlenz): ὅ γέ τοι Ποσειδώνιος τὰ μὲν εἶναι ψυχικὰ (*scil.* τῶν παθῶν), τὰ δὲ σωματικά, καὶ τὰ μὲν οὐ ψυχῆς περὶ ψυχὴν δὲ ‹σωματικά, τὰ δὲ οὐ σώματος, περὶ σῶμα δὲ ψυχικά . . .› . . . ἀνάπαλιν δὲ περὶ σῶμα ψυχικὰ τρόμους καὶ ὠχριάσεις καὶ μεταβολὰς τοῦ εἴδους κατὰ φόβον ἢ λύπην. Cf. K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, München 1921, p. 313, n. 1.

[2] *Quaest. Conv.* V 7. 3. p. 681D: οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι πάσχουσα ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνδιατίθησιν; ἐπίνοιαι γὰρ ἀφροδισίων ἐγείρουσιν αἰδοῖα κτλ. . . . καὶ ὅλως τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιρρώνυσι καὶ ποιεῖ σφοδροτέρας τὰς τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεις.

[3] *Enn.* III 6. 3. l. 6–16 Henry-Schwyzer. Cf. also Priscianus Lydus, *Metaphr.*, p. 25. 1 ff. Bywater.

an example [1]. The same applies to all the other emotions but no examples are given. Some can be found in a passage from Porphyry quoted by Proclus, *In Tim.*, *T*p. 395, 24 Diehl [2]: καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ φαντασία πολλὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παθήματα ἀπεργάζεται παρ' αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐνέργειαν· ἠσχύνθη γάρ τις φαντασθεὶς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἐρυθρὸς ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐφοβήθη δεινοῦ τινος ἔννοιαν λαβὼν καὶ ὠχρὸν τὸ σῶμα ἀπέφηνε. καὶ τὰ μὲν πάθη περὶ τὸ σῶμα, αἴτιον δὲ τούτων τὸ φάντασμα, οὐκ ὥσεσι καὶ μοχλείαις χρησάμενον ἀλλὰ τῷ παρεῖναι μόνον ἐνεργῆσαν. But in the passage of Proclus—and in the Arabic passage of Avicenna referred to above, — n. i —this kind of argument is used as a stepping-stone to the demonstration of the possibility of miracles. Here, on the contrary, it is used in a rationalistic explanation of a seemingly supernatural phenomenon. Finally, in this section, Al-Fārābī quotes the example of a man who gets up in his sleep and hits another man, or gets up and runs away, driven to such actions by the strength of his imagination produced through "imitation". This is again an observation used by Hellenistic philosophers already, though for a different purpose, and preserved, for instance, by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.*, VII, §402 ff.[3] To connect "imitation" in its artistic and its wider meaning with the discussion of φαντασία [4] seems, however, peculiar to the philosophical tradition utilized by Al-Fārābī, and I have not been able to find precise evidence for it in extant Greek texts although it is obviously of Greek origin. Sometimes the claims of φαντασία and μίμησις can be contrasted with each other, as can be seen from a passage in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, VI 19 (p. 118 Kayser), where Phidias and other Greek artists are discussed: φαντασία ταῦτα εἰργάσατο σοφωτέρα μιμήσεως δημιουργός [5]. It has on the whole—since we are now

[1] Cf. above, p. 212 n. 2 and also "the philosophers" as quoted by Al-Ghazzālī in Averroes' *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, p. 513 = vol. I, p. 314 of the English translation by S. van den Bergh, London 1954, and n. 2.

[2] Cf. H. Krause, *Studia Neoplatonica*, Diss. Leipzig 1904, p. 19, and W. Theiler, *Porphyrios und Augustin*, Königsberg 1933, p. 38.

[3] Γίνονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων φαντασίαι ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπαρχόντων. καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαραλλαξίας τὸ ἐπ' ἴσης ταύτας ἐναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὑρίσκεσθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ' ἴσης ταύτας πληκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκολούθους πράξεις ἐπιζεύγνυσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὕπαρ ὁ μὲν διψῶν ἁρυόμενος ποτὸν ἥδεται, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δειμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ἡ μὲν διάχυσίς ἐστι τοῖς διψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ κρήνης πίνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀνάλογον δὲ φόβος τοῖς δειματουμένους (Ψ 101)· ταφὼν γὰρ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεύς—χερσί τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος τ' ὀλοφυδνὸν ἔειπεν κτλ.

[4] The section on φαντασία in Ps.-Longinus, *De subl.* 15, is interesting in this context and deserves to be considered.

[5] Cf. E. Panofsky, *Idea*, Leipzig-Berlin 1924, p. 8 and n. 37. Cf. also B. Schweitzer, Der bildende Künstler und der Begriff des Künstlerischen in der Antike, *Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, 1925, p. 110 f.

sufficiently prepared to approach Al-Fārābī's description of prophecy as produced by μίμησις within the imaginative faculty of the soul—to be stated at this stage of the argument that a few scattered notices about the Platonizing hellenistic and Plotinian theory of art constitute the best parallel to Al-Fārābī's theory of prophecy. It may be sufficient to point to a well-known passage from Cicero's *Orator*, II, 7 ff. (which in its turn is inspired by Plato's *Tim.*, 27d5 ff.): "nec vero ille artifex (*scil.* Phidias) cum faceret Iovis formam aut Minervam contemplabatur aliquem e quo similitudinem duceret sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam quam intuens in eaque defixus ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat. Ut igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens cuius ad cogitatam speciem *imitando* referuntur ea quae sub oculos ipsa non cadunt, sic perfectae eloquentiae speciem animo videmus effigiem auribus quaerimus. Has rerum formas appellat ἰδέας . . . Plato [1]." One may wonder whether the Platonist on whom Cicero here depends (both Antiochus of Ascalon and Posidonius have been mentioned as possible sources) combined μίμησις and φαντασία in a way comparable to Al-Fārābī. To take art and prophecy together may not have been uncommon since the days when Plato treated poetry and prophecy as comparable phenomena in the *Phaedrus*.

Before approaching prophecy and divination, Al-Fārābī says a few more words about the working of φαντασία under normal conditions. Man can also reproduce the data of his reason in sensible form, through "imitation", within his imaginative faculty. It reproduces then the intelligibilia of the highest perfection through the most excellent sensibles, as for example things beautiful to look at. As such objects of intellectual knowledge he mentions the First Cause, the immaterial things, the heavenly order. Defective intelligibilia, on the contrary, would be reproduced by the lowest sensibles, as for instance things ugly to look at [2].

Great prophets and seers are, then, superior people whose φαντασία is particularly powerful and is at the same time provided with material by a particularly powerful intellect which has reached the highest

[1] Cf. W. Theiler, *Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1930, pp. 15 ff. H. Jucker, *Vom Verhältnis der Römer zur bildenden Kunst der Griechen*, Frankfurt 1950, pp. 137 ff. K. Reinhardt, Pauly–Wissowa–Kroll s.v. *Poseidonios*, col. 772. Cf. also above, p. 211 n. 1 and Proclus *In Tim.* I, p. 265, 22: ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦ παραδείγματος ἐφήκει τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ καλὸν ἢ μὴ καλόν, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ ὅμοιον ἢ ἀνόμοιον πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον. λέγεται δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἡ εἰκών, τοῦ μὲν παραδείγματος εἰκών, τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦντος ἔργον καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα.

[2] Is it rash to assume that the Platonic tradition on which Al-Fārābī here ultimately depends interpreted Plato as recognizing ideas of the αἰσχρόν and κακόν? This would be an interesting point. Al-Fārābī himself did not follow Plato's ideal doctrine.

metaphysical knowledge of which human beings are capable. The working of this prophetic φαντασία in all its possible aspects is then described. The Neoplatonic features in Al-Fārābī's analysis of the soul—I mean the active intellect in its importance for both theoretical and practical reason [1] and the flow of emanations which reaches them through this "sun" of the mind—are now, rightly, emphasized. In persons whose temperament, whose bodily constitution, is apt to favour the growth of imagination [2] there will be a further overflow from the rational faculty to the imaginative faculty and that faculty will be connected with the active intellect as well. In this way, the imaginative faculty will become acquainted with both the particulars with which practical reason is concerned and the results of theoretical insight. It will treat this "material" in the same way as the activity of imagination has been described before: it will reproduce the abstract intelligibilia in sensible symbols through "imitation" and will imagine the particulars of the present or of future times sometimes as they actually are or will be and sometimes in symbols. All this, however, concerns only divination by dreams and prophetic powers which become alive in the imaginative faculty during sleep. Aristotle's cautious attitude towards phenomena of this kind seems to be abandoned (it was evidently not appreciated in late Greek philosophy); yet there is more divination of particulars in this state than reproduction of divine insight. That kind of prophecy is more particularly reserved for the waking life of extraordinary individuals, whose number is small and naturally restricted. I quote: "The imaginative faculty may be extremely powerful in an individual and developed to perfection. Then the sensibles which descend upon the imagination from the outside will not overpower it so as to absorb it completely and make it exclusively provide material for the rational faculty in whose service it is. But once there is in the imaginative faculty in spite of its being kept busy by these two activities a considerable surplus enabling it to perform its specific activities: then the state of the imaginative faculty while being kept busy by these two activities is the same in waking life as during sleep, while it is cut off from those two

[1] These two kinds of reason are distinguished in Greek thought since the days of Aristotle and accepted by Alexander and all the late Greek philosophers.

[2] Cf. e.g., Aristotle, *De divin.* 2, 464a32: οἱ δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ διὰ τὸ σφοδρόν, ὥσπερ βάλλοντες πόρρωθεν, εὔστοχοί εἰσιν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεταβλητικὸν ταχὺ τὸ ἐχόμενον φαντάζεται αὐτοῖς. *Eth. Eud.* VIII. 2, 1248a39: οἱ μελαγχολικοὶ καὶ εὐθυόνειροι. [Aristotle] *Probl.* XI 38, 903b20: τὸ τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀκολουθεῖν ταχέως τὸ μελαγχολικὸν εἶναι. XXX 1, 953a 10 ff.: διὰ τί πάντες ὅσοι περιττοὶ γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες ἢ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἢ πολιτικὴν ἢ ποίησιν ἢ τέχνας φαίνονται μελαγχολικοὶ ὄντες κτλ. O. Regenbogen in Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll s.v. *Theophrastos von Eresos* col. 1402 f.

activities [1]." Now most of the intelligibilia which reach this extraordinary powerful imagination from the Active Intellect appear to it in visible form, as a result of its reproductive or "imitative" capacity which has been explained before. Its working in the case of prophetic vision is described in detail, and based on Al-Fārābī's analysis of the soul as to be expected [2]: "The objects of imagination are in their turn impressed on 'common sense'. Their impressions having taken firm hold in 'common sense', the faculty of sight is affected by them, and they are impressed on it. From that state of the faculty of sight arise impressions in the bright air which is near to the eye and permeated by the ray of vision. Once visual images have appeared thus in the air they are again directed back and impressed on the faculty of sight which resides in the eye, and then reflected back to 'common sense' and the faculty of imagination. And since all these processes are continuous, the objects of that kind which the Active Intellect has provided become visible to that man." This experience produces a blissful joy of a unique kind: "When it happens that the imaginative faculty 'imitates' these objects by imagining sensibles of extreme beauty and perfection, then the man who has that sight comes to enjoy overwhelming and wonderful pleasure and sees wonderful things which are in no way whatever to be found among other existing things [3]". A man who thus in waking life has reached the utmost perfection of his imaginative power can be called a man gifted with prophecy (*nubuwwa* [4]), since he is aware of particulars, present and future, and visualizes things divine in symbols of outstanding beauty and perfection. "This is the highest perfection which 'imagination' can reach, and the highest level accessible to man on the strength of this faculty [5]." Thus prophecy is understood in rational terms and, moreover, as "auxiliary to the rational faculty". Philosophy is in a higher place than the different religions and has everywhere the same truth, whereas the religious symbols produced by the imaginative power of sectional prophets vary from land to land. But before I say a few more words about this side of Al-Fārābī's theory I have to deal, however briefly, with the remaining section of the chapter on prophecy.

There are major and minor prophets, and their differences are described in minute detail. Of those prophesying in waking life some may be capable of dealing with particulars only, as they are or in "imitation",

[1] P. 51,14 ff. Dieterici.

[2] P. 51,20 ff. I translate my own forthcoming critical edition of the Arabic text.

[3] P. 52,4 ff. and Plotinus, *Enn.* I 5. 4, l. 15 f. Henry-Schwyzer.

[4] Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. *Nabī*.

[5] P. 52, 11 ff.

others with the "imitation" of immaterial and divine things exclusively. If we transpose this to the philosophical level, Al-Fārābī would consider neither the pure philosopher like Plotinus nor the man of action alone as perfect specimens of the human race but only the man who is both [1]; and that this was really his view becomes perfectly clear in later sections of his work [2]. But apart from this there is a whole host of defective representatives of prophecy, and one would like to know whether Al-Fārābī in reproducing this classification was thinking of definite Islamic examples [3], and which persons or features of Greek life were described in his source, whose loss is really regrettable. Some divine partly in sleep, partly in waking; some imagine all "these things", but do not visualize them. A lower class, again, divine in sleep and communicate their experience in symbolic verbal expression, in allegories, enigmatic language, etc. The Greek ancestor of Al-Fārābī may have dealt with oracles in this context. Far below these two classes are others; some of them receive particulars and visualize them in waking life but do not receive the intelligibilia; some receive the intelligibilia and visualize them in waking life but do not receive particularia; some receive some things and visualize them to the exclusion of others (p. 52, 19). Some (I omit a few lines) receive only some particulars and these are the majority; there is a difference in quality to be noticed among the representatives of this class as well. With this attempt to arrange the different kinds of divination in a systematic order Al-Fārābī again continues a discussion which had been going on in ancient philosophy for a very long time; we find traces of it in Cicero's *De divinatione*, for example, or in Plutarch's essays about the Delphic Oracle or in Iamblichus' *De mysteriis*; but as far as I can see nothing which corresponds exactly to what we read in Al-Fārābī's work. It may also happen, he adds, that the physical constitution of people changes in certain circumstances so that they thus become capable of receiving some of these things from the Active Intellect, sometimes in waking life and sometimes in sleep; in some this capacity lasts for a longer time, in others it is soon lost. There are, in given circumstances, also reactions of the imagination, based on disturbed bodily states, which one should not mistake for true prophecy: the experiences of these people are not true and their fancies do not correspond to any reality nor do they imitate

[1] Cf. New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy, *Classical Quarterly*, 1949, p. 84 and n. 4. [above p. 145 and n. 4]

[2] Cf., e.g. cap. 28.

[3] Cf. p. 216 n. 3 and the well-known pre-Islamic prophets which are recognized: Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v. *Dāwūd, Hūd, Ibrāhīm, Idrīs, Ilyās, Irmiyā, 'Īsā, Isrā'īl, Lūṭ, Mūsā, Nūḥ, Sāliḥ, Shu'aib, Sulaimān, Yūnus*.

any real, actual things: they are to be classified as impostors or madmen [1].

There are then two ways which lead man to metaphysical truth, philosophy and prophecy, there being no doubt about the primacy of reason; what the religious tradition of Islam understood as revelation (*waḥy*) [2] is interpreted by Al-Fārābī in the time-honoured fashion of Greek rationalism as established by Plato. It amounts to a complete new valuation of the religious tradition, through an attempt to understand it in rational terms, using Alexander of Aphrodisias' elaboration of Aristotle's *De anima*, the Stoic analysis of φαντασία as taken over by the Neoplatonists, and the Neoplatonic metaphysics of emanation in a simplified form. We are informed of similar views about poets and artists in extant Greek texts, but there seems to be no trace of a corresponding theory of prophecy which I make bold to assume must have existed as well, at least in Middle Platonic times. There seems, on the other hand, understandably enough, to be no trace of the Greek theories of poetry and art and of the visual representation of gods in Al-Fārābī's book—whereas the comprehension of prophecy was of overriding importance for a Muslim philosopher.

Al-Fārābī's theory of prophecy was only in part acceptable to Avicenna (980–1037). Since the perfect man is for Avicenna identical with the prophet, he cannot be satisfied to confine prophecy to imagination alone and to subordinate it to philosophy. And being himself a philosopher and upholding the primacy of reason like Al-Fārābī (though being nearer to Plotinus than he) he is led to identify the highest grade of philosophy with prophecy. He thus revives the Stoic view that the wise man is the μάντις and ascribes to the prophet an intellectual acuteness (ἀγχίνοια) of the highest order. There is an overflow of that highest knowledge from prophetic reason to imagination, and this prophetic imagination builds up symbols of truth, as Al-Fārābī had maintained. Avicenna's view appears to amount to only a slight shift of emphasis, but one very characteristic of the difference between Al-Fārābī and him. Moreover, since philosophy and Islam are one and the same thing for him and Islam can only be understood in philosophical terms, he describes the prophetic intellect as holy intellect (*'aql qudsī*), thus using an Islamic term which has no counterpart in corresponding Greek texts. This intellect is of higher rank than the acquired intellect [3]. It is not surprising that the religious opposition

[1] Islām knows, e.g., al-Aswad, Musailima, Sadjāḥ, Ṭulaiḥa as false prophets; cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s.v.

[2] Cf. above, p. 207 n. 1.

[3] F. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, Oxford 1952, pp. 35 ff., 93 ff. S. van den Bergh, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 313 ff. and notes.

to Avicenna's theistic philosophy was dissatisfied with this explanation of prophecy. His great critic Al-Ghazzālī (1058–1111), for instance, insists that all the philosophers failed to grasp the true nature of prophecy: it is, for him, something unique, utterly beyond the ken of philosophy and accessible to the immediate experience (γεῦσις *dhauq*) of the mystic only [1].

From : *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1957, pp. 142–8.

[1] Cf. W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali*, London 1953, pp. 63 ff.

SOME ASPECTS OF MISKAWAIH'S TAHDHĪB AL-AKHLĀQ

It is the purpose of the following pages to initiate a discussion about the elements which go to make up Miskawaih's moral philosophy and to define the character of the sources he used in his work *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq* [1]. His own original contribution to moral philosophy is slight; he is rather a philosopher by conviction than an independent critical thinker like Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī. He evidently united materials of quite different origins in the seven chapters of his treatise, and used some discretion in selecting the most convenient texts from the tradition at his disposal and relating that tradition to the moderate Neoplatonic world-view which permeates the whole work. It is, as always in an inquiry of this kind, worth our while to consider at the same time whether an analysis of the sources of the *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq* yields some new information about the teaching of ethics in the late Greek philosophical schools—especially since the available Greek evidence is particularly scanty and unsatisfactory.

The few Greek writers whom Miskawaih mentions by name and quotes, sometimes at considerable length, are all authors who lived in the later centuries of the Roman Empire: Galen (died A.D. 199), the philosopher and physician whose moral philosophy was much better known to the Arabs than to the mediaeval and modern Western tradition (quoted in chapters 2, p. 11,33 and p. 15,32 and 6, p. 61,31) [2]; the Neopythagorean Bryson (of uncertain date), almost unknown in the West, on the right upbringing of children (quoted, with slight alterations in the order of the original text, in chapter 2, p. 19,22–22,14) [3]; the great Neoplatonic scholar Porphyry as a commentator on Aristotle's *Ethics* (quoted in chapter 3, p. 26,6); a popular philosophical treatise by Themistius, whose commentaries on Aristotle were so well known to the Arabs (wrongly quoted in chapter 5, pp. 51,23 ff., 52,12 ff., under the name of Socrates as F. Rosenthal has shown in *Islamic Culture*, 1940, p. 403 f.); anonymous

[1] My references are to the Cairo edition of A. H. 1323.

[2] P. Kraus, *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Egypt*, V, 1, 1939, pp. 25,37. R. Walzer, *Classical Quarterly*, 1949, pp. 85, n. 5, 94 f. [cf. above, p. 147 n. 2, 160 f.]. *Harvard Theological Review*, 1954, p. 251, n. 27 [cf. above, p. 171 n. 2].

[3] M. Plessner, *Der Oikonomikos des Neupythagoreers Bryson*, Heidelberg 1928, *passim*.

late commentaries and summaries of Aristotle's *Ethics* (mentioned at the end of chapter 2, p. 25, 19 f.). The names of Plato and Aristotle occur only within the context of mostly unspecified Greek works and most probably do not go back to the original text unamplified by later comments [1]. But, like so many Arabic writers on philosophy, Miskawaih is more concerned with the ideas he wishes to communicate than with listing his sources meticulously by naming the authors of late antiquity on whom he depends.

Among Arabic philosophers Miskawaih twice mentions Ya'qūb ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī by name, in chapter 6, p. 61,35–62,12 (cf. F. Rosenthal, *Orientalia*, 9, 1940, p. 187 ff.) and chapter 7, p. 71,20 (cf. F. Rosenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 185 and H. Ritter–R. Walzer, *Studi su al-Kindi*, II, Rome 1938, *passim*) but, in my view, he is in al-Kindī's debt to a much greater extent.

The Persian writings referred to by Miskawaih in support of his views are *Kalīla wa-Dimna* (cf. p. 54,29 and p. 19,18) and a work ascribed to Ardashīr (p. 46,33), quoted frequently by other authors as well. But the Persian tradition, in which Miskawaih shows some interest elsewhere (cf. *Ǧāwīdān Khirad* pp. 1–87 Badawī), is only of very slight importance in this work.

Whereas Miskawaih in chapters 3–5 of his treatise reproduces selections from a Neoplatonic commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, he utterly disregards the foundations of Aristotle's *Ethics* in the remainder of his work. He prefers to base his argument on the Platonic trichotomy of the soul into a rational, a spirited and an appetitive faculty or part or soul and on Plato's four cardinal virtues, temperance, valour, justice and wisdom. It was not uncommon in Hellenistic and later Greek ethics to follow this line, and Stoics, Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists may equally be referred to in this connection: Posidonius, Galen, Porphyry (cf. W. W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa*, Berlin 1914, p. 60 ff.), Themistius, Nemesius of Emesa (pp. 93–102 Matthaei; cf. P. Kraus, *Jābir et la Science Grecque*, Cairo 1942, p. 278 ff.) come easily to mind, if one limits oneself to authors who became known to the Arabs. The Aristotelian tradition itself was affected by this trend; apart from an isolated passage in the early peripatetic [2] ethical course known as *Magna Moralia* (1185 *a* 21, cf. R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik*, Berlin 1929, p. 169 f.) we know a treatise of unknown but certainly pre-Neoplatonic authorship, the *De virtutibus et vitiis* (p. 1249 *a* 26 ff. in Bekkers edition, cf. E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III[5], p. 670 f.), which was

[1 Cf. now S. Pines, Un texte inconnu d'Aristote en version Arabe, *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age*, 1956, Paris 1957, pp. 5–43.]

[2 But cf. now D. J. Allan, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1957, p. 7 ff.]

reproduced in full by John of Stobi about 400 A.D. [1]; and, among late Neoplatonic commentators, chapter 7 of the *Prolegomena Philosophiae* of Elias, a sixth-century Christian student of Aristotle from Alexandria, p. 18,26 ff. Busse. This Platonic psychology is accepted by numerous Arabic writers on moral philosophy such as al-Kindī (cf. *Rasā'il*, I, p. 272 ff. Abū Rīda), Qusṭā ibn Lūqā (publ. by P. Sbath in *Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte*, 1941), Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī (in his *Spiritual Medicine*), al-Fārābī's Christian disciple Yaḥyà ibn 'Adī (in his *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, Rasā'il al-Bulaghā*, 3rd edition, Cairo 1946, p. 483 ff.) and Ibn Sīnā (cf. *Maǧmū'at Rasā'il*, Cairo 1326/1908, p. 191 ff.). But, apart from agreeing about the tripartition of the soul, their views on the virtues and their interrelations are not identical. Galen in his Περὶ ἠθῶν, known only from an Arabic summary and Arabic quotations, and ar-Rāzī, for instance, follow Plato in the main lines, and so does Miskawaih in the second chapter where—apart from the section from Bryson—he follows Galen perhaps more closely than P. Kraus and the present writer were prepared to assume in their previous publications [2]. Qusṭā ibn Lūqā and Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (cf. *Encyclopedia of Islām*, 2nd edition *s. v. Akhlāq*) have different methods of their own which deserve some attention. But Miskawaih in the first chapter and Ibn Sīnā—probably following al-Kindī, as far as the extant texts allow us to judge, as will be considered presently—reproduce different and otherwise almost unknown systems of moral philosophy. There are two distinctive features to be noted in Miskawaih's scheme of virtues and vices which put him and those like him in a special class. He connects which each of the four Platonic virtues a considerable number of subordinate virtues—there are six minor virtues assigned to wisdom (*ḥikma*, σοφία, cf. p. 7,31–8,3), twelve assigned to temperance (*'iffa*, σωφροσύνη, cf. p. 8,4–14), nine to valour (*shaǧā'a*, ἀνδρεία, cf. p. 8,15–25), more than eight to justice (*'adāla*, δικαιοσύνη, cf. p. 8,32 ff.); generosity (*sakhā*, ἐλευθερίοτης) which is subordinate to temperance, is added as a special virtue, accompanied by six minor virtues (cf. p. 8,26–31). Similar schemes, though different in detail, are known from Stoic sources (cf. Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, II, p. 60,9 ff. Wachsmuth and the material brought together by H. von Arnim in the 3rd volume of the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, pp. 63–72) and, within the Peripatetic tradition, in the spurious Aristotelian treatise *De virtutibus et vitiis*, just

[1] This treatise was translated from Syriac into Arabic by Abū 'l-Faraǧ 'Abdallāh ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib (cf. C. Brockelmann, *Suppl.*, I, p. 884), a well-known younger contemporary of Miskawaih. [An edition is being prepared by S. Pines.]

[2] Cf. p. 220, n. 2.

mentioned; they may ultimately go back to discussions in the Platonic academy in the second half of the fourth century B.C. (cf. R. Walzer, *op. cit.*, p. 210 ff.). They were evidently accepted and taken over by Neoplatonic authors on moral philosophy who developed them and integrated them with Neoplatonic metaphysics. From them this scheme of the virtues passed on to the Arabs and ultimately to Miskawaih. The vices which correspond to the major and minor virtues are described in accordance with the Aristotelian definition of virtue as the mean between two faulty extremes, and this view is combined with the Platonic and Stoic theories just mentioned, so that we have two vices associated with each virtue [1], and also subordinate vices defined as faulty extremes (cf. p. 10,1 ff.). Miskawaih has given a full list of subordinate vices only in the case of wisdom, and as far as the other subdivisions are concerned has left it to the reader to compile a full list of them on his own (p. 10,17 f.). Such a union of Platonic, Stoic and Peripatetic approaches to the problem of virtue is not unknown in the history of the Peripatus itself and, if the ascription of the relevant passage in Stobaeus to Arius Didymus is correct, occurs even in Hellenistic times. The passage in question is to be found in Stob., *Ecl.*, vol. II, p. 146,15 ff. Wachsmuth: there are the four cardinal virtues, and a number of subordinate virtues, each of which is described as a mean between two specific extremes (cf. R. Walzer, *op. cit.*, p. 118, n. 2 and p. 217 ff.; H. von Arnim, *Areios Didymos' Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik*, Vienna 1926, p. 98 ff.). Hence there are definite precedents for Miskawaih's attitude to be found in ancient Greek texts and not merely to be conjectured, although its immediate source in late Greek thought remains unknown for the time being and no exact parallel to his list of virtues and vices can be shown. There is nothing ultra-Neoplatonic in the Platonizing popular moral philosophy which he displays in the first chapter of his treatise, and a mixture of Platonic, Peripatetic and Stoic elements of this kind is quite customary at this stage of Greek philosophy and should, moreover, not be rejected off hand as a lame eclecticism. One might locate it anywhere, say, in the fourth century A.D.

We are however, I believe, in a position to ascertain how this material reached Miskawaih within the Arabic speaking world. Although al-Kindī's main treatises on moral philosophy (such as the *fī 'l-Akhlāq* [2]) appear to be

[1] This is already familiar in Middle-Platonic tradition about A.D. 150, cf. Albinus, *Isagoge*, 30, p. 184,14 ff., Hermann (p. 149 Louis), whatever its ultimate source may be. [Cf. also Stobaeus, vol. III, p. 66 ff. Hentze; p. 68,7; p. 71,4; p. 71,12: "Neopythagorean".]

[2] It is, however, reported to exist, together with other quite interesting Kindiana, in a private library at Aleppo, cf. P. Sbath, *Al-Fihris*, I, Le Caire 1938, p. 113 (as S. M. Stern advised me). [Its present whereabouts are unknown.]

lost, we can get some idea of his classification of virtues from an, unfortunately defective, section of his *Definitions* (p. 177, 4 ff. Abū Rīda). He evidently followed a tradition similar to that of Miskawaih, although he uses different Arabic terms, combining the four Platonic cardinal virtues and the Aristotelian definition of virtue as a mean between faulty excess and deficiency. It is also very likely that he established subordinate virtues in the same way as Miskawaih did if we agree with Abū Rīda's explanation of the sentence p. 178, 1: وكل واحدة من هذه الثلاث سور للفضا ئل [1]. Ibn Sīnā (cf. above) has probably preserved more of al-Kindī's scheme of the virtues [2].

Chapters 3–5 of Miskawaih's treatise represent a very different trend of late Greek ethics and in their case it may be possible not only to make a probable guess about Miskawaih's immediate Arabic predecessor but also to define his ultimate source among the Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle with the degree of certainty which is obtainable in such matters. It appears to be one unknown to al-Kindī as far as our not very comprehensive evidence allows us to infer.

Miskawaih professes to follow Aristotle and the Peripatetics, and in doing so he emphasizes his dissent from the Stoics and other طبيعيون (φυσικοί) who "made the body a constitutive part of man and considered felicity to be imperfect without the felicity of the body and without good luck" (p. 27,5). But as his main adversaries there appear, to our surprise, Pythagoras, Socrates (to be read for Hippocrates in the Arabic text) [3] and Plato (p. 27,8). Their view is untenable because they limit the virtues and felicity to the soul alone and hold that the virtues alone are sufficient for happiness. Some followers of this school of thought go as far as to deny that there can be any happiness in this world, and hold that felicity can be only reached in the world to come, after death, when the soul is at last free to give itself wholly to the activity of the intellect and to receive divine illumination: a not uncommon Neoplatonic view which is not acceptable as such to Miskawaih. He contrasts it with the view of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who firmly believed that the body is not just an instrument of the soul and that man, accordingly, is composed of body and soul, and that there is a human happiness which man can obtain in this world in full if he strives for it. There is a gradation of different forms

[1] Cf. F. Rosenthal, *Aḥmad b. aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Sarakhsī*, New Haven 1943, p. 43, a passage which may be referred to in support of my guess.

[2] For μεσότης cf. also L. Gardet, *La cité musulmane*, Paris 1954, p. 91, n. 2; R. C. Zaehner, *The teachings of the Magi*, London-New York 1956, p. 83 f.

[3] سقراط > يقراط Cf. also H. Ritter, *Das Meer der Seele*, Leiden 1955, p. 579.

of human happiness, the highest being achieved in the philosopher's life, as it is described in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. There can be no doubt that Miskawaih is mainly concerned with emphasizing the Aristotelian view which he finds to be wrongly neglected in favour of a one sided preference for a future life. His objective is however to reconcile and to harmonize the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian views; he is by no means in favour of an orthodox Aristotelianism, like Alexander of Aphrodisias. Aristotle is an appropriate guide for this world, while Plato is the right guide to prepare oneself for the world to come. Their views are mutually complementary, and a correct reading of Aristotle's *Ethics* must take note of this fact. In this harmonizing philosophy Aristotle becomes Platonic when the metaphysical sphere is reached, whereas in all other aspects the philosopher can and should follow Aristotle and the Peripatetics almost without any qualification.

We find a similar rejection of an exclusively otherworldly definition of happiness in al-Farābī's *Views of the inhabitants of the best State*. There the people of the state which is based on a faulty judgement (*al-madīna aḍ-ḍālla*, p. 63,3 Dieterici) are blamed for establishing felicity as an aim (r. توهم with all the MSS against the reading تظن of the Bodleian MS accepted by Dieterici) to be reached after this earthly life of ours, "but this is not the case" (r. غير with all the MSS against Dieterici's correction غيرت). Still closer to Miskawaih is the passage p. 81,15–22, where certain unspecified people are attacked for maintaining that the connection of soul and body is unnatural, that the real man is the soul and that the connection with the body (r. اليه, l. 16) is harmful for the soul, which does not need either the body or exterior goods for its felicity; those people were in favour of rejecting the body altogether, finding felicity in the afterlife alone. This attitude of al-Fārābī recalls the passages of Miskawaih just referred to so much that one feels tempted to infer that his criticism of Neoplatonists who disregarded Aristotle's *Ethics*—and by implication of all asceticism of an otherworldly type—is to be seen in relation to al-Fārābī whose interest in Aristotle's *Ethics* is known though very little actual evidence of his work on this topic has been found (cf. M. Steinschneider, *al-Fārābī*, St. Petersburg 1896, p. 60 f.). We can assume that Isḥāq ibn Ḥunain's translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* was known to him, and that he became acquainted with Porphyry's otherwise unknown commentary in twelve books, of which Ibn an-Nadīm tells us [1]. Miskawaih's

[1] p. 252,2 Flügel (p. 352,21 Egyptian edition).

insistence on the necessity of giving to Aristotle's *Ethics* a prominent place in the teaching of moral philosophy would fit in well with what is known of Porphyry's attitude to Aristotelian studies, and of his wish to give them a position equal to the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato, because he was convinced of the ultimate identity of the purposes and doctrines of both philosophies; he wrote a work in seven books unfortunately lost Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι τὴν Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους αἵρεσιν [1]. How frequently this interpretation of Plato and Aristotle is to be found in Arabic philosophical texts is well known, and it seems to me obvious also how much the specific synthesis to be found in chapters 3–5 of Miskawaih's treatise resembles al-Fārābī's treatment of the two philosophers in other respects. Miskawaih's criticism of the Stoics, which again is not without parallel in al-Fārābī, is a dead letter for the Arabs, who may have been interested in refuting what was in fact the Stoic view but for whom the label "Stoic" did not mean anything—whereas the rejection of Stoic tenets was still a major issue for Plotinus and Porphyry.

Hence it is tempting to connect Miskawaih's exegesis of Aristotle's *Ethics*, through al-Fārābī, ultimately with Porphyry. Now we find, before the section just considered, a discussion of the *summum bonum* as the fundamental question of ethics which shows obvious resemblances to the survey of Peripatetic Ethics by Arius Didymus (Stob., II, p. 134 ff. Wachsmuth) and the so-called *Divisiones Aristoteleae* (A 21 Mutschmann). At the beginning of this part Porphyry is mentioned by name (p. 26, 6): "This is the good as Aristotle has divided it and as Porphyry and others have described it". It is certainly a permissible guess to connect the whole discussion which follows with Porphyry's exposition of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of which we know from and through Arabic sources only.

Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle in the manner of Porphyry and al-Fārābī, Miskawaih does not only mean to open Neoplatonic thought to a strong Aristotelian influence but also to accommodate Aristotle to the Platonism which is common to all these philosophers. This means that Aristotle is made a more decided Platonist than he actually was, that Platonic convictions replace Aristotle's critical suspension of definite judgement, especially (but by no means exclusively) whenever transcendental matters are touched, such as the question of the afterlife or that of prophetic powers and divine inspiration. Platonic tenets with a slight Neoplatonic colouring are then often superimposed on an Aristotelian substructure. How such an attitude may influence the exegesis of Aristotle's

[1] Cf. Suidas, *s. v.* Πορφύριος. [Cf. A. C. Lloyd, Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic, *Phronesis* 1, 1955, pp. 58 ff.]

Ethics is obviously worth asking. I propose to illustrate this problem by drawing attention to two passages in the fifth chapter of Miskawaih's treatise.

We are confronted, in this chapter, with a survey of all kinds of human relations based on a skilful rearrangement of the topics discussed in book 8 and 9 of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. It would be worthwhile, in a full commentary of the whole work comparable to W. F. Thompson's now outdated annotations of his translation of the *Akhlāq-i-Ǧalālī* (cf. below p. 232) [1], to analyse Miskawaih's procedure in detail. Now every student of the *Nichomachean Ethics* is puzzled by the fact that Aristotle tacitly disowns Plato's divine ἔρως in books 8 and 9 of this course of lectures and mentions relations founded on ἔρως only under the heading of pleasure and gain (cf. VIII, 5, 1157 *a* 3 ff. and the second century commentator Aspasius, p. 168,21 Heylbut; R. Walzer, *JRAS*, 1939, p. 417 ff. [Aristotle], p. 420 ff. [Theophrastus][1a]). The author of the paraphrase of Aristotle followed by Miskawaih dissents from Aristotle on this point. After having described the forms of friendly association based either on pleasure or gain or the good or a combination of two or three of them he adds a passage which has no parallel in the *Nic. Eth.* He points out (p. 45,16) that محبّة, which stands for the Greek φιλία, is a wider concept than صداقة, which as one of the species of محبّة means friendship in a more specific sense; it is love itself, مودّة, and cannot exist between many people as can محبّة. This distinction is not to be found in Aristotle and, accordingly, in the Arabic translation used in Ibn Rushd's school [2] صداقة and محبّة can indiscriminately represent the Greek φιλία. I suppose that the Greek equivalent for Miskawaih's مودّة "affection" is ἀγάπη (cf. also l. 25,26), and that the Arab has thus preserved some trace of a much needed differentiation of the excessively wide Aristotelian term φιλία which can denote every kind of friendly human relationship (cf. *uns* below p. 234). Ἔρως (عشق), Miskawaih continues (p. 45,18), has a still narrower range than مودّة "affection" (ἀγάπη), since it is restricted to two partners and to cases where there is no material gain. It is an excess of محبّة (φιλία), but unlike other excesses it is blameworthy as excessive love

[1] *Practical Philosophy of the Muhammadan People*, London 1839.

[1a] [Cf. above, p. 55 ff., p. 58.]

[2] Cf. A. J. Arberry, The Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic, *Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies*, 17, 1955, p. 1 ff.

of pleasure only, but praiseworthy as excessive love of the good. This rectification of Aristotle (and Theophrastus?) may ultimately go back again to the Stoics (Stob., *Ecl.*, II, p. 65,17 = Stoic vet. fragm., III, 717: τὸν ἐρωτικὸν καὶ διχῇ λέγεσθαι, τὸν μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ποιὸν σπουδαῖον ὄντα, τὸν δὲ κατὰ τὴν κακίαν ἐν ψόγῳ ὡς ἂν ἐρωτομανῆ ὄντα. Cf. *Epicurea*, no. 457 Usener and, e.g., Plato *Leges* V 733 *e* 6). But Plato's divine ἔρως comes, not surprisingly, to a still fuller life in Miskawaih's exposition of Aristotle's *Ethics*. There is, over and above the three kinds of friendly relationship (*maḥabba*), those based on pleasure, gain and the good respectively, a superior grade of friendship in man, based exclusively on the divine substance in him, which grows to its extreme until it becomes pure and perfect ἔρως, similar to the complete absorption of the mystic (ولع). This is the divine friendship of divine men (*al-muta'allihūn*, θεῖοι ἄνδρες) [1] which is not liable to diminution and provides unmixed and pure pleasure of the highest kind. This supreme friendship can exist between good men only and no adverse circumstance can interfere with it. This is common to Neoplatonic thought, in content and in many of the terms used, and to be found in both pagan and Christian authors of late antiquity, in Plotinus (III, 5, VI, 9, V, 8.16 for example) and Gregory of Nyssa (cf. W. Jaeger, *Two rediscovered works of ancient Greek litterature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius*, Leiden 1954, p. 76 and no. 2) as also in Proclus (*In Rem p.*, p. 135, 1, 176,22, 347,21 Kroll. *In Prim. Alc.*, p. 30–37 Westerink, cf. E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 2, p. 883 and n. 4) and Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite (cf. the passages listed by Albert van den Daele, *Indices Pseudo Dionysii*, Louvain 1941, *s. v.* ἔρως). Cf. also Damascius, *Vita Isidori*, §§ 31,38. It is easily understandable that a Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle's theory of φιλία, like Porphyry, should have added these important and essential Platonic tenets to Aristotle's unsatisfactory statements, and that his procedure appealed to Miskawaih for its assertion of the religious content of philosophy. Experts on Islamic mysticism may be able to confirm that passages of this kind can be considered as an important link between Greek thought and later Islamic speculations on عشق.

Another interesting modification concerns the friendship between master and disciple in the transmission of philosophy from one generation to the next. It illustrates what a long way Greek philosophy had travelled

[1] The precise Greek equivalent may well be οἱ ἐνθεούμενοι, cf. W. Jaeger, *Gnomon*, 27, 1955, p. 579. Cf. also Ibn Ǧulǧul, *Les Générations des Médecins et des Sages*, Le Caire 1955, pp. 11,8. 16,13 Fu'ād Sayyid.

from Socrates to the acceptance of philosophers as spiritual authorities (cf. also R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, pp. 19, 41 ff.). In one of the chapters on friendship between unequal partners (*Eth. Nic.*, IX, 1, 1164 *b* 3 ff., cf. *Eth. Eud.*, VII, 10, 1243 *b* 21, Heliodorus, *In Eth. Nic.*, p. 188, 33 ff., 176,22 ff.; Michael, p. 467,21 ff. Heylbut) Aristotle indicates that there is a parallel between the relation of children to their parents, that of men to the gods (the singular 1159 *a* 5) and that of disciples to their masters in philosophy (as distinct from the teaching of sophistry). Following up this point, the commentator used by Miskawaih has established a special class of relations (p. 48,29 ff.) under the heading friendships (محبّات) which are free from انفعالات, from πάθη, and therefore not exposed to any unexpected feelings of pain. Or, to put in terms used by Porphyry and other Neoplatonists, these are friendships on the level of ἀπάθεια, the realm of contemplative virtue, which is superior to the realm of the political four virtues which is controlled by μετριοπάθεια, by moderation of the emotions in the Aristotelian manner, which can, however, not be dispensed with on this level that is covered in the greater part of Aristotle's ethics and also of Miskawaih's (cf. Porphyry, *Sententiae*, § 32, Mombert) [1]. The friendship of man with the divine being—which may be compared to the divine ἔρως mentioned above—is based on knowledge (p. 48,30 ff.), according to a doctrine which recurs often in Greek philosophy, and hence the number of people admitted to this high rank is restricted to those few who reach the level of metaphysicians and are versed in natural theology [2]. It is contemptible to form an image of God in one's soul and identify it with the creator (cf. Damascius, *Life of Isidorus*, 38). No true relationship with God can be established without knowing Him adequately, through philosophy. The relation which exists between parents and children may be compared but "God is the cause of our higher being, of the existence of our mind, whereas our parents are the cause of our physical being". No other kind of friendship rises to the level of these two, except the friendship of the philosophers and their disciples. "Friendship with wise men is higher in rank and more worthy of honour than friendship with one's parents, for wise men have the care of our souls and are the promoters of our real being and assist us in

[1] Cf. *De abstin.*, I, 30 (p. 107,20 Nauck).

[2] Cf. Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam*, 16 (p. 285,14 Nauck): μόνος (*scil.* ὁ σοφός) θεοφιλής. W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1930, p. 130. Cf. also Avicenna's treatise, *On prayer*, and contrast the attitude of the mystic, cf., e.g., H. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 559 ff., 564. [Cf. also S. van den Bergh, The "Love of God" in Ghazali's Vivification of Theology, *Journal of Semitic Studies* 1, 1956, pp. 305–21.]

obtaining felicity in the vicinity of the Lord. Since these blessings are superior to material blessings—as the soul is superior to the body—the friendship of the disciple with the philosopher is nearer to the friendship of man with God." Thus, Miskawaih continues (p. 49,11), the teacher is the disciple's spiritual father (*wālid rūḥānī*), he is for him like God in mortal shape (*rabb basharī*), since he shows him kindness comparable only to God's kindness. He is the cause of our entire intellectual existence and he shapes our spiritual souls (نفوسنا الروحانية). Plato's school was certainly based on the most sublime friendship between master and pupil, but we have no evidence that the relationship between him and his disciples was ever understood in terms of a spiritual kinship between father and son. But it is almost a commonplace within the Neoplatonic school. Syrianus is just referred to as "father" by Proclus without name (ὁ ἡμέτερος πατήρ, cf. e.g. *In Tim.*, II, p. 253,31: III, p. 35,25 Diehl. *In Remp.*, II, p. 318,3 Kroll), Plutarch, by name, as his grandfather (προπάτωρ: *In Parm.*, IV, 6, p. 27), Plutarch, on the other hand, used to call Proclus his "child" (τέκνον: Marinus, *Vita Procli*, cap. 12). L. Edelstein (*The Hippocratic Oath*, Baltimore 1943, p. 43) has shown that this idea is ultimately of Pythagorean origin and has, apart from Hippocrates, *Oath*, 5, referred to Pherecydes and Pythagoras (Diodorus, X, 3,4), Lysis (adoptive father, πατὴρ θετός) and Epaminondas (Diodorus, X, 11, 2, cf. Plutarch, *De genio Socratis*, 13, 583 *c* and Jamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras*, 250). Cf. also Seneca, *De brevitate vitae*, cap. 14–15, where these thoughts are very beautifully expressed [1], and Plutarch's well-known remark on Alexander and Aristotle (Plutarch, *Alexander*, 8,3 [2]). To meet Pythagorean ideas in Neoplatonic circles is what one would expect. One may also, although, I imagine, with less certainty, think of an influence of Hermetic ideas, cf. A.-J. Festugière O. P. *La révélation de Hermès Trismegiste*, I (Paris

[1] ". . . hos in veris officiis morari licet dicamus, qui Zenonem qui Pythagoran cotidie et Democritum ceterosque antistites bonarum artium, qui Aristotelen et Theophrastum volent habere quam familiarissimos . . . quae illum felicitas, quam pulchra senectus manet, qui se in horum clientelam contulit! habebit cum quibus de minimis maximisque rebus deliberet, quos de se cotidie consulat, a quibus audiat verum sine contumelia, laudetur sine adulatione, ad quorum se similitudinem effingat. solemus dicere non fuisse in nostra potestate quos sortiremur parentes forte hominibus datos: nobis vero ad nostrum arbitrium nasci licet. nobilissimorum ingeniorum familiae sunt: elige in quam adscisci velis; non in nomen tantum adoptaberis, sed in ipsa bona . . .". Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Or.*, II, 9.

[2] 'Αριστοτέλην δὲ θαυμάζων ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ ἀγαπῶν οὐχ ἧττον, ὡς αὐτὸς ἔλεγε, τοῦ πατρός, ὡς δι' ἐκεῖνον μὲν ζῶν, διὰ τοῦτον δὲ καλῶς ζῶν. Cf. Diog., *Laert.*, V, 19. [F. Rosenthal, Sayings of the Ancients from Ibn Durayd's Kitāb al-Mujtanā, *Orientalia* 27, 1958, pp. 42, 171 f.]

1950), p. 332. That the teacher of philosophy could be accorded divine honours was certainly unheard of in Plato's time (cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, Second English edition, Oxford 1948, p. 108); but it is characteristic that Aristotle's poem on Plato (Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. 106; cf. Aristoteles, fragm. 673 Rose) could be misunderstood in two Neoplatonic *Lives of Aristotle* as speaking of an altar erected in honour of Plato (pp. 432,439 Rose, *op. cit.*), and this fits our purpose well. Plotinus and Jamblichus can be called θειότατοι, Plato θεῖος, Aristotle δαιμόνιος, and the Neoplatonist Plutarch is praised as saviour in the passage referred to above (cf. E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, V, 2[5], p. 819 n.i.). How common this worship of the authorities has become is shown also by Damascius, *Life of Isidorus*, 36: τῶν μὲν παλαίτατα φιλοσοφησάντων Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα θειάζει ("worships as divine") . . . τῶν νεωστὶ δὲ Πορφύριον καὶ 'Ιάμβλιχον καὶ Συριανὸν καὶ Πρόκλον [1]. This may be sufficient to demonstrate that Miskawaih's description of the philosopher as a divine guide (ἡγεμών or καθηγεμών is also used in Neoplatonic texts [1a]) and father is fully in accordance with general Neoplatonic use and may have been introduced into the exegesis of Aristotle by Porphyry or some later follower of his.

But the use of the words *wālid rūḥānī* (πνευματικὸς πατήρ ?) to mean "spiritual father" has not yet been accounted for, and it is indeed, if I am not mistaken, not to be found in any extant pagan Greek philosophical text [2]. There are two possible explanations. The Greek text may have been changed by a Christian transmitter who understood νοῦς or ψυχή as πνεῦμα in the Christian sense, cf. e.g., St. Basil, *Epistles*, Class II, p. 73 (τέκνον πνευματικόν), or the material collected by F. Dölger, *Der Bulgarenherrscher als geistiger Sohn des byzantinischen Kaisers, Sbornik zum Gedächtnis an Paul Nikov*, Sofia 1939, p. 214 ff. and *Die "Familie der Könige" im Mittelalter*, Historisches Jahrbuch 1940, p. 397 ff [3]. The pope in Rome can be called πνευματικὸς πατήρ (E. Casper, *Geschichte des Papsttums*, 2, 1933, p. 781). But one may also recall that *nafs* and *rūḥ* are almost interchangeable in Arabic (cf., for instance, the article *nafs* in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*). Philosophy as ἰατρικὴ ψυχῆς or ψυχῶν (cf., e.g., Cicero, *Tusc.*, III, 6. Elias, *Prol. Phil.*, p. 9,6,31 Busse. Greg. Nyss., *De Virg.*, p. 333.16 Jaeger [4]) is rendered "spiritual medicine", *ṭibb*

[1] Cf. also Plato, *Republic*, VII, 540 *c*.

[1a] [Cf., e.g., Simplicius, *De caelo*, p. 271,19.462,20 Heiberg. A. E. Raubitschek, *Hesperia* 18, p. 98 ff.]

[2] Where πνευματικός can be understood in a materialist way! Cf. also E. Frank, *Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth*, Oxf. Univ. Press 1945, p. 172.

[3] E. Kantorowicz-Princeton drew my attention to these papers.

[4] [Cf. W. Schmid, *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, München 1956, pp. 123 f.]

rūḥānī by al-Kindī and Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī. Hence an Arabic translator or also a Syriac intermediator may have brought in the term *rūḥ* and thus be responsible for Miskawaih's *wālid rūḥānī*. Whatever the ultimate answer may be, it is interesting to realize that the expression "spiritual father" which we freely use nowadays and with which we are familiar, outside the specific Christian religious sphere, since the days of the Renaissance at least, is to be found in this particular sense for the first time, in a popular philosophical work by an Arab writer about the year 1000 [1].

This study of Miskawaih's ethical treatise has however still wider implications. For the philosophical ideas of late Greek origin which this older contemporary of Ibn Sīnā discusses and explains were quite influential in later Islamic literature, and Miskawaih's work was followed closely in Naṣīr ad-dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī's *Akhlāq-i-Nāṣirī* and Ǧalāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn As'ad ad-Dawwānī's *Akhlāq-i-Ǧalālī*; al-Ghazzālī incorporated the greater part of Miskawaih's treatise in his *Revivification of the Religious Sciences* (cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd edition, *s. v. Akhlāq*). Hence it is particularly interesting to see which kind of Greek philosophical ethics was ultimately acceptable not only to Muslim philosophers but also to Islamic religious thinkers.

In addition, it may not be out of place to add, in conclusion, a few remarks about Miskawaih's inner development and his attitude to the Islamic tradition, as far as we can ascertain it from the study of the *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*. After all, he is not a Greek philosopher but a Muslim who uses the discoveries and the experiences of the Greeks for his own way of life and wants to naturalize the spiritual religion of the Greek philosophers within the world of Islam, as other Muslim philosophers did in their own time and in their own way.

Like so many of his predecessors in the Greek world (cf., e.g., A. D. Nock, *Conversion*, Oxford 1933, p. 164 ff.), Miskawaih is a convert to philosophy. Through philosophy alone man can become perfect and happy, happy in this world and in the world to come. It is the road to salvation (*naǧāt* p. 18,2 = σωτηρία) and the only true education (*adab ḥaqīqī*, p. 18, 3 = ἀληθὴς παιδεία). The upbringing which could guarantee this aim should be based on habituation as offered by the established religious tradition (*adab ash-sharī'a* p. 17,24): this tradition provides truth in religious form, accessible to the child's mind as well as to those who have by the limitations of their nature no access to philosophical understanding

[1] Other parallels from ancient commentaries could be added here, but this is better left for a paper on Aristotle's *Ethics* in Arabic literature.

—it has taken the place of the Greek laws as described in Plato's most voluminous and last work and of the kind of μουσική admitted in his *Republic*. The similarity between Miskawaih's and al-Fārābī's attitudes on this question is obvious. Only a man who has been thus brought up properly can and should embark on the study of philosophical ethics—as Aristotle, for instance, had also pointed out in the second chapter of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1095 *b* 4 ff.) which were well known to Islamic philosophers in Miskawaih's days. Miskawaih seems even (p. 17, 25) to recommend his readers to begin the study of philosophy with ethics as some Platonists (cf. Elias, *In Cat.*, pp. 117,22 ff. Busse and Simplicius, *In Phys.*, p. 5,29 ff. Diels [1]) and, according to a tradition preserved, as it appears, only by al-Fārābī (*Philosoph. Abhandlungen*, p. 52/87 Dieterici), Theophrastus had done, and to proceed afterwards to the quadrivium, to logic and the various sections of theoretical philosophy. Miskawaih himself (p. 17,33 ff.) had been less fortunate than his prospective followers, having been brought up on wicked preislamic poets like Imru'l-Qais and an-Nābigha and hence indulging in a life of sensual pleasure at minor courts; only as a grown up man he had come to appreciate philosophy and succeeded in weaning himself gradually from his previous life by fighting against his bad habits according to the precepts of the moral philosophers (cf. also I. Goldziher in Hastings, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, *s. v. Education, Muslim*, p. 210 *a*). He does not talk about himself from an urge to confess his faults but because he believes that his example will encourage others to exchange beduin morality for philosophy: expertus docet. According to Miskawaih the agreement between the Divine Law and philosophy is absolute, the precepts given by the Prophet and by philosophy are identical, the Divine Law can, without any reservation, be understood as providing the essential preparation for a philosophical life. No modification of the Divine Law according to the principles of philosophy is envisaged, no new legislation based on philosophy attempted, as had been the case in Greek political philosophy. Heretics are characterized as people who abandon Neoplatonic philosophy and the religious tradition as well (cf. p. 15,5). This attitude, naive and unsatisfactory as it may appear in the light of later developments and by comparison with other trends in Islam in Miskawaih's days, is sincere, and Miskawaih does not hesitate to interpret the data of the religious tradition by means of philosophical arguments which may have shocked less rationalist adherents of the Muslim faith. Thus his arguments in favour of communal prayer and the pilgrimage to Mecca are worthy

[1] [Cf. A. Dain, *Mélanges Diès*, Paris 1956, p. 65, l. 1.]

of his Stoic predecessors among the Greeks and may be sketched here as a very striking illustration of his attempt at harmonizing reason and the established Muslim tradition. The analysis of different types of human relations and friendships in chapter 5 has among other things produced the result (p. 46,10 ff.) that there exists a natural social feeling (*uns*) in man which is the cause and principle of all the different friendly associations between men, some εὔνοια φυσική or οἰκείωσις or φυσικὴ κοινωνία. Now since it is essential to cultivate this inborn sense of companionship in man, it has been laid down by the Divine Law that man should practice religious worship in public and assemble in places of religious instruction. "Moreover", Miskawaih continues (p. 46,16), evidently unfolding an idea of his own, "it may have been (لعلّ = ἴσως) in the mind of the Lawgiver to actualize this potential inborn social sense in man by making communal prayer five times a day compulsory and, thus, holding prayer in the district mosques in higher esteem than individual prayer in privacy". He finds a decisive proof that this was really the Lawgiver's intention in the establishment of the Friday service in the main mosque of the city where the community feeling of the whole population can express itself in public worship. He deals in the same way with the two great festivals of the Muslim year when city people together with the inhabitants of the villages and the countryside unite, and with the pilgrimage which brings Muslims from different lands together in mutual affection in the holy city of Mecca. All these injunctions of the Divine Law have only one purpose: to develop this inborn social feeling from a latent state to an active force and to establish a base for the higher forms of friendship and the love of God, which are reserved for the philosophers [1].

There are other striking passages in which Miskawaih insists on the agreement of a theistic philosophy with the basic tenets of Islam. It is not astonishing that the place of Homer and other Greek poets who are so frequently referred to in Greek popular treatises on moral philosophy

[1] There is, however, a startling parallel in Pseudo-Alexander, *In Metaph.*, p. 710,5 ff. Hayduck:

σοφοὶ γὰρ ὄντες (*scil.* οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ παμπάλαιοι) καὶ γινώσκοντες ὅτι αἱ πανηγύρεις καὶ τὰ συμπόσια ἐξημεροῖ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἑνοῖ καὶ φιλεῖν ἀλλήλους καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων ἀποθνῄσκειν ποιεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ συνίστησι τὰς πόλεις, τὸ δὲ μονοῦσθαι ἀποθηριοῖ καὶ διασχίζει καὶ ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλήλους παρασκευάζει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο βουληθέντες συστῆσαι τὰς πανηγύρεις καὶ τὰ συμπόσια, μύθους ἐπλάσαντο, οἷον ὅτι τήμερον ὁ Ζεὺς ἐκ τῆς Ῥέας ἐγεννήθη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ πάντας ἀθροισθῆναι καὶ ἑορτάσαι τὴν γενέθλιον ἡμέραν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ συνεστιαθῆναι. But cf. L. Gardet, *La Cité Musulmane*, Paris 1954, p. 224 ff. and al-Ghazzālī, *Al-Munqidh min aḍ-Ḍalāl*, Damascus 1358/1939, p. 103.

is now taken by verses of the Qur'ān, by sayings of the Prophet, of Abū Bakr (p. 59,7), 'Alī (p. 64,16) Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (p. 58,20) and lines from Arabic poems, which Miskawaih connects with the philosophical arguments inherited from the Greeks. Valour manifests itself not in the virtues of the Homeric heroes, as in Aristotle's *Ethics*, but the fortitude displayed by the warriors engaged in Holy War, who risk their life in defending their religion and their belief in the One God (p. 35,27) [1].

From: *Studi Orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida*, Roma 1956, vol. II, pp. 603–21.

[1] Cf. also pp. 6,8. 8,23. 9,8. 9,16. 10,16. 12,16. 12,31. 13,21. 14,32. 15,5. 15,2. 16.2. 23,8 etc.

PLATONISM IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

It is not customary to talk about Islamic philosophy when scholars meet to discuss questions of classical scholarship. It is not generally realized how closely Islamic philosophy is linked up with Greek thought, and hence we are inclined to underrate its importance for people concerned with the continuity of the ancient legacy in different civilizations and with its adaptation to new circumstances and basically different ways of life. We have become increasingly aware how the legacy of paganism and the heritage from the ancient world were united with the newly established Christian tradition during the later centuries of the Roman Empire, and how this union of Christian and pagan elements in a new Life was transmitted to the Europe of the Middle Ages [1]. In this connection attention is being paid to the Greek civilization of East Rome [2] and to that continuity with the ancient past which was, though to a minor degree, preserved for the Latin speaking nations of the West during the centuries which followed the advent of St. Augustine, Boethius and Gregory the Great. But there is, as far as Greek philosophy, medicine, the exact sciences and mathematics are concerned, a similar conscious continuity in Muslim civilization and in Arabic speaking lands which, I contend, deserves to be seriously investigated not only by the professional students of Arabic but also by those who are interested in the legacy of Greece and in the various possibilities of integrating it with a basically foreign world. The influence of Greek philosophy medicine, etc., is much more widely spread in the mediaeval Islamic world than in the corresponding periods of western Christian civilization. The number of Greek works which became known in Arabic translations before the year A.D. 1000 is immense and surpasses in a very impressive way the amount of Greek books known at that time in Latin. To recall only one well-known example: Cassiodorus (about 529) recommended, in his *Institutiones*, one book by

[1] Cf., recently, W. Jaeger, *Two rediscovered works of ancient Christian literature : Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius*, Leiden 1954.

[2] Cf. Norman H. Baynes, *The Hellenistic Civilization and East Rome*, Oxford 1946, and *The thought-world of East Rome*, Oxford 1947, now reprinted in *Byzantine Studies and other Essays*, London 1955, pp. 1–46.

Galen for study [1]. The Arabs knew, about A.D. 900, 129 medical and philosophical works by Galen [2], and evidence that most of them were not only known but studied is not lacking. With the notable exception of the *Politics* and some works of minor importance all Aristotle's lecture courses were known to them, often in more than one translation. Moreover a number of Greek philosophical and scientific works still read in the Eastern world before 1000 and lost during the later centuries of the gradual decline of Byzantium are nowadays preserved in Arabic translations only [3]. Hence it is no exaggeration to say that, with the exception of the Greek papyri and occasional discoveries of new inscriptions and of some mediaeval Latin and Syriac and Armenian versions of lost works, the Arabic versions—which are still very incompletely known—constitute our only hope of increasing our present knowledge of Greek literature. As for the translation of works whose Greek text has survived, their value must be separately ascertained in each individual case [4]. Equally and in many respects even more important are the more or less original works by Arabic philosophers, the majority of which are neither well known nor adequately studied. They show us not only how well the Arabs understood the technical side of philosophical methods and how they continued and developed the philosophical arguments in their own right but make us realize above all what all those Greek ideas meant to a Muslim and how individual Islamic philosophers came to answer problems of their own day in terms and arguments borrowed from Greek philosophy. The classical scholar may then see his own subject in a mirror in which he is not used to seeing it, and may thus understand the continuous impact of Greek thought on other civilizations in a new light—comparing it for once neither with ancient Roman civilization nor with patristic thought nor with modern philosophy—and I may be allowed to say that this is one

[1] I 31, p. 78, 25 ff. Mynors. But there was some more Galen and Hippocrates known in Latin translations, cf., e.g., H. Diller, *Die Überlieferung der hippokratischen Schrift* Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων, Leipzig 1932, p. 50.

[2] *Ḥunain ibn Ishaq, Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, Arabic Text and German translation by G. Bergsträsser Leipzig 1925. G. Bergsträsser *Neue Materialien zu Ḥunain ibn Ishaq's Galen-Bibliographie* Leipzig 1932. Cf. also M. Meyerhof, *Isis* 8, 1926, p. 685 ff. and in *The Legacy of Islam*, Oxford 1931, pp. 316 ff., 346 ff. This work has been unduly neglected by the historians of classical scholarship and deserves their attention.

[3] There are philosophical works by Galen, various commentators on Aristotle, remnants of a paraphrase of Plotinus, many mathematical and medical texts etc. etc. Cf. R. Walzer, On the Legacy of the Classics in the Islamic World, *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, München 1956, p. 189 ff. [Above, p. 29 ff.]

[4] Cf. my article, New Light on the Arabic translations of Aristotle, *Oriens* 6, 1953, pp. 91–141. [Above, p. 60 ff.]

of the main attractions which Islamic philosophy has in store for those who make bold to transgress the borders of the classical world and to make themselves at home in Arab lands [1].

Plato is known to the Arabs as Aflāṭūn, since no Arabic word can begin with two consonants, and you find under this unexpected heading a survey of what the Arabs knew about him in the 4th fascicle of the second edition of the Encyclopedia of Islam, Leiden 1955, p. 234 ff. Whereas the Latin Middle Ages had to be satisfied with portions of the *Timaeus*, the Arabs knew the complete dialogue in different translations, had access to the full text of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, knew the *Phaedo*, the *Crito* and the Alcibiades-speech from the *Banquet* for example, and probably much more. The Arabic bibliographers list the titles of all the dialogues to be found in the Greek Corpus of Plato's works and since the exploration of the eastern libraries, in spite of the progress made within the last thirty years, is still in its early stages, it is quite possible that translations of the original works will turn up in due course. In addition, summaries of the *Timaeus*, the *Republic*, the *Laws* have been traced and published. The Arabs also knew hellenistic, Galenian and Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato and made wide use of them for purposes of their own [2]. They were, for obvious reasons, very well acquainted with the Neoplatonists, and it may well be said that all the Arabic philosophers were Platonists qua metaphysicians, though by no means all in the same way. It is a not uncommon error to minimize these very considerable differences and thus to misunderstand the individual outlook of different Islamic philosophers.

I am going to illustrate this general statement by describing the way in which some leading Islamic philosophers dealt with traditional problems of ancient Platonism: to wit, the cardinal virtues, the ideal state, divination and prophecy, and the philosophical prayer. It so happens that in all these cases we shall have to consider both the material gain for classical scholarship and the meaning of the Greek tradition for the Muslim philosophers concerned: the Arab Al-Kindī (died after A.D. 870), the Turk Al-Fārābī (died A.D. 950) and the Persian Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980–1037).

[1] Cf. the short account of Islamic Philosophy in *The History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western*, London 1953, chapter 32. [Cf. above, p. 1 ff.]

[2] Cf. J. Lippert, *Studien auf dem Gebiete der griechisch-arabischen Übersetzungslitteratur*, Braunschweig 1894. P. Kraus and R. Walzer, *Galeni Compendium Timaei Platonis* (Plato Arabus I), London 1951. F. Rosenthal and R. Walzer, *Alfarabius De Platonis philosophia* (Plato Arabus II), London 1943. F. Gabrieli, *Alfarabius Compendium Legum Platonis* (Plato Arabus III), London 1952. E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's Republic*, with an English translation, Cambridge 1956.

The selection made is quite arbitrary but it is of course impossible to exhaust the subject even in one highly concentrated paper. Moreover, conditions in this field are still rather fluid: new evidence keeps turning up, and the first thorough interpretation of the evidence now available is often still to be done and can by no means be considered as settled. This makes work in this field very attractive but at the same time very difficult, since the public which takes an interest in Arabic philosophy is relatively small, very little discussion develops and constructive criticism is often sadly missed.

I

As you will agree, our evidence of the teaching of ethics in the late Greek philosophical schools is not particularly abundant, and every addition to our scanty information can only be welcome. The Arabic text of the last four books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, hitherto unknown, has just been discovered by sheer good luck in a Moroccan manuscript, copied by a pupil of the great Averroes himself, and is at present being prepared for publication in England [1]; it is accompanied by a paraphrase of the work by Nicolaus of Damascus, the first commentator on Aristotle after Andronicus of Rhodes, of whose way of interpreting Aristotle we have other evidence exclusively preserved by Arabic authors [2].

I mention this here only in order to demonstrate that the worker in this field can never be sure what kind of unexpected discovery will confront him next. From other Arabic texts, known for a long time but never studied with a view to their Greek sources, we learn that the *Nicomachean Ethics* were not the main text book of Greek ethics, as we should expect from the Western European tradition, and once we have become aware of this, we recall that the Greek commentaries on that work which have survived [3] cannot be compared with the learned and well informed commentaries on the logical, physical and metaphysical treatises, some of which are preserved in Arabic or Hebrew versions only [4]. Philosophical ethics in the Islamic world are mostly based on Plato, who is understood

[1] Cf. A. J. Arberry, The Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic, *Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies* 17, 1955, p. 1 ff.

[2] Cf., for the time being, J. Freudenthal, *Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Berlin 1885, p. 126 ff. A major study on Nicolaus of Damascus in the Syriac and Arabic traditions is being prepared by H. J. Drossart Lulofs.

[3] *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* XIX, XX.

[4] Cf. *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* V, parts 4 and 5. J. Freudenthal, *op. cit.* For the recently discovered Arabic version of Themistius *De anima* cf. M. C. Lyons, An Arabic translation of the Commentary of Themistius etc., *Bulletin of the London School of Oriental and African Studies* 17, 1955, p. 426 ff.

either in Posidonius' or Galen's way, or else they represent a blend of Platonic, Peripatetic and Stoic elements which is not unheard of in Greek tradition but developed in a peculiar way resembling trends of late Greek philosophy. The *Nicomachean Ethics* were studied in a commentary by Porphyry, of whose existence we know only from an Arabic tenth century bibliographical tradition [1]; some traces of this commentary can be discovered in the most influential popular Arabic treatise on ethics, by a certain Miskawaih [2], an older contemporary of Avicenna who once in this context refers to Porphyry by name, in the beginning of the discussion of the summum bonum, but his influence goes deeper: Aristotle appears in Miskawaih's treatise, as we should expect in a philosophy which believes that Plato and Aristotle are mutually complementary and that their systems are substantially identical, as a much more decided Platonist than he actually was, and some of Aristotle's statements are modified accordingly. This view—of the essential identity of Plato's and Aristotle's thought—is, by the way, as common to all the Muslim philosophers (though they differ about it in often significant details), as it is to Porphyry and Simplicius and most later Neoplatonists. To come back to the main topic of this section, we find, then, many Islamic ethical treatises adhering to the Platonic trichotomy of the soul and Plato's four cardinal virtues, as is customary in late authors like Galen, Themistius or Elias' *Prolegomena of Philosophy*; Porphyry seems to have followed a similar line, according to the evidence preserved by John of Stobi [3]. But although all the Islamic writers on ethics follow Plato in the main lines, many have found individual, different ways of their own which may, in their turn, reproduce otherwise lost Greek schemes. Miskawaih, who seems to be in agreement with Al-Kindī and Avicenna, holds a special view on the virtues and their interrelations which is known to us, in the Greek tradition, from an isolated notice in Arius Didymus' Epitome of the Peripatetic Ethics only. It amounts to this: Miskawaih and those like him connect with each of the four cardinal virtues a considerable number of subordinate virtues, a scheme which may ultimately go back to discussions in the old Platonic Academy and is known as the generally accepted Stoic view of considering this subject. There is, however, much difference in detail for which there

[1] Cf. J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, Gand-Leipzig 1913, p. 66*.

[2] Cf. C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur* I², Leiden 1943, p. 342 (*Supplement* 1, Leiden 1937, p. 582). An English translation of the *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq* by A. J. M. Craig will be published in the near future. Cf., for the time being, D. M. Donaldson, *Studies in Muslim Ethics*, London 1953, pp. 121–33.

[3] For detailed references cf. my article : Some aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq, *Studi Orientalistici in onore di G. Levi della Vida*, Roma 1956, vol. II, p. 603 ff. [above, p. 220 ff.].

is no Greek parallel and, moreover, "wisdom" is now identical with Neoplatonic metaphysics. The vices which correspond to the virtues are described in accordance with the Aristotelian definition of the mean (as Albinus and Porphyry had done before), and this Peripatetic doctrine is combined with the Platonic and Stoic theories just mentioned, so that we have two vices associated with each virtue, and also subordinate vices defined as faulty extremes. This theory (which is known to us from Miskawaih, Avicenna, Al-Kindī, Stobaeus) fits in well with the general trend of late Greek philosophy and was probably more influential and more common in late antiquity than we could assume before taking the Arabic tradition into consideration.

Concerning the Neoplatonic commentator in Aristotle's *Ethics* whom Miskawaih uses I should like to draw attention to two very characteristic passages. Every student of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is puzzled by the fact that Aristotle tacitly disowns Plato's divine ἔρως in his discussion of human relations and mentions associations founded on ἔρως only under the heading of pleasure and gain. Miskawaih not only distinguishes between φιλία and ἀγάπη, following, I believe, some Stoic differentiation of the excessively wide Aristotelian term φιλία, but also reintroduces, as the Stoics had done before, the good ἔρως which is praiseworthy as excessive love of the good. This ἔρως can develop into a supreme grade of friendship in man, the divine friendship of θεῖοι ἄνδρες which provides unmixed and pure pleasure of the highest kind; no adverse circumstance can interfere with it. This revival of Plato's ἔρως is well known from Neoplatonic and Christian authors of late antiquity, such as Plotinus and Gregory of Nyssa, Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and had its influence in Arabic thought as well, as we realize now in that Neoplatonic exegesis of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of which they alone have preserved some traces.

The friendship between master and pupil is indicated by Aristotle as an instance of a friendship between unequal partners and compared to the relation of children to their parents and of men to the gods. The commentator used by Miskawaih has followed up this point and established these friendships as a new special class of relations, on the level of ἀπάθεια, that freedom of emotions which is the realm of contemplative virtue, superior to the realm of the "political" four virtues which is controlled by μετριοπάθεια in the Aristotelian manner—a feature which recalls Porphyry again. "God is the cause of our higher being, of the existence of our mind, whereas our parents are the cause of our physical being." Only the friendship between master and disciple in the transmission of philosophy from one generation to the other rises to the level of these two.

I quote: "Friendship with wise men is higher in rank and more worthy of honour than friendship with one's parents, for wise men have the care of our souls and are the promoters of our real being and assist us in obtaining felicity in this life and in the life to come. Since these blessings are superior to material blessings—as the soul is superior to the body—the friendship of the disciple with the philosopher is nearer to the friendship of men with God" (we have now the singular, in the Muslim context). Thus, Miskawaih continues, the teacher is the disciple's spiritual father, he is for him like God in mortal shape. Now we have no evidence, if I am not mistaken, that the relationship between master and pupil was ever understood in terms of a spiritual kinship between father and son either in the Old Academy or in the Peripatus or the Porch, close as the personal relation may have otherwise been. But it is almost a commonplace in the later Neoplatonic school to call one's teacher "father" or to regard one's pupil as one's "child". To meet this ultimately (as I am inclined to believe) Pythagorean idea in Neoplatonic surroundings is in itself not surprising. That the teacher of philosophy could be accorded divine honours, as Miskawaih's text evidently implies, was certainly unheard of in Plato's days but, again, not uncommon among the Neoplatonists who, like the Muslim philosophers, understood philosophy as a way of salvation and hence its representatives as divine guides and authorities deserving of worship as saviours. We find this and similar tenets thus added to the traditional exegesis of Aristotle, by Porphyry or some later Neoplatonist. But the expression "*spiritual* father" cannot be accounted for in this way and it is not to be found in any extant Greek philosophical text (it would literally translated be πνευματικὸς πατήρ). There are two possible explanations: the Greek text, which may have described the spiritual fatherhood without using the term πνεῦμα with its materialistic and Stoic associations could have been changed by a Christian transmitter who understood ψυχή as πνεῦμα in the Pauline sense. But one may also recall that the Arabic terms for ψυχή and πνεῦμα are almost interchangeable, so that an Arabic translator (or a Syriac intermediator) may be responsible for the wording chosen by Miskawaih. Whatever the ultimate answer may be, it is interesting to realize that the expression "spiritual father" which we freely use nowadays and with which we are familiar, even outside the specific Christian religious sphere, is to be found in this peculiar sense for the first time in a popular philosophical work by an Arab Platonist about the year A.D. 1000.

So much about the first aspects of Platonism in Islamic philosophy to be discussed in this paper. It is, after all, though gratifying, not so surprising if we discover Platonic ethics with Neoplatonic colouring, making

use at the same time of advances made in Peripatetic and Stoic thought and uniting different but by no means incompatible elements of different origin, to have been alive, and more popular than we realized, in late antiquity, and taken over by the Arabs. Miskawaih in particular became a kind of standard text in later times. This type of Platonizing ethics appealed to the mind of the Muslims who felt in need of a theistic philosophy of the Platonic or Neoplatonic kind when they set out to rationalize their new religious experience, first in order to defend themselves against the Christian critics of their creed, but soon in order to reassert themselves in terms of philosophy without considering the outside world at all. Since it did not contradict any basic tenet of Islam, it was not discarded when, in the twelfth century, the original religious foundations of Islam were relaid and philosophy, especially metaphysics, physics and psychology, had to be content, more and more, to withdraw from the centre of Islamic life and to occupy a very minor place in the now definitely established Islamic tradition [1].

2

But Plato did not help the Arabs in theoretical and moral philosophy only. They, or certainly some of them, appreciated him as a political philosopher; they by no means, like Plotinus, wanted the philosopher to keep away from practical life altogether, nor were they attracted by Proclus' dislike of the *Republic* and the *Laws* in favour of *Parmenides* and *Timaeus* exclusively. On the contrary, the greatest representative of this trend in Islamic philosophy, Al-Fārābī [2], chose Plato's *Republic* as his textbook of political theory, instead of Aristotle's *Politics*, the only major Aristotelian treatise—with the exception of the *Dialogues*—which was never translated into Arabic. This very fact in itself may suggest that a similar substitution of the *Republic* for Aristotle's *Politics* may have taken place already within the Greek tradition which reached Al-Fārābī and, in fact, we have no ancient Greek commentary on the *Politics* and only one MS older than Moerbeke's s. XIII translation. But, to make this clear from the very outset, reading Plato's *Republic* was not a merely academic exercise in political theory for Al-Fārābī. It was meant as a

[1] For the whole of this section cf. above p. 240, n. 3 and the article *Akhlāq* by Sir Hamilton Gibb and the present writer in the 2nd edition of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

[2] Cf. C. Brockelmann, *op. cit.* 1 p. 232 ff. (Suppl. 1, p. 375). The work by Al-Fārābī on which this section is mainly based is accessible in German and French translation. Cf. F. Dieterici, *Der Musterstaat von Al-Fārābī*, Leiden 1900. R. P. Janssen, Youssef Karam, F. Chlala, *Al-Fārābī, Idées des habitants de la cité vertueuse*, Le Caire 1949. Unfortunately, both translations use the same unsatisfactorily edited Arabic text. Cf. also F. Dieterici, *Die Staatsleitung von Al-Fārābī*, Leiden 1904.

very serious attempt at proposing a radical reform of the Islamic caliphate, in the first place by introducing the idea that organized society must be governed by philosopher-kings, i.e. that the caliph, the successor of the Prophet as a religious and political leader, must conform to the principles laid down in Plato's *Republic*; "if at a given time no philosophy at all is associated with the government, the State must inevitably perish after a certain interval". Words like these have a familiar ring for everybody who recalls Plato's *7th Letter*, Cicero's *De republica*, Eusebius' theory of the Christian emperor [1] or Julian's abortive attempt at restoring paganism with the help of Platonic philosophy. Al-Fārābī's account of Plato's political philosophy is thus interesting not only because we become aware of a continuous study of this aspect of his work even in the days when Plato's and the Neoplatonist's view of the transcendental world prevailed among philosophers; and because we obtain some new material for the history of late Greek Platonism from Arabic texts. The crisis of the caliphate in his own day made Al-Fārābī understand the Platonic dilemma more immediately than a mere scholarly reading of *Republic* and *Laws* could have done, and gives to his sober and detached way of writing a freshness which demonstrates that Greek thought had in fact found a home in Islamic lands,—as Al-Fārābī himself claims, who believed that Greek philosophy had come to an end everywhere else.—It may not be out of place to say a few words about the kind of perfect State (ἀρίστη πολιτεία), which Al-Fārābī has in mind and his conception of the perfect man who ought to be its ruler. The best organized society can be either a city-state, or an *umma*, that is a wider society based on a common religious creed, like Islam or Christianity [2], or the whole inhabited world, ruled by a philosopher-king. Al-Fārābī, who maintains that philosophical reason is superior to the different forms of established religions and is more than a simple handmaiden of theology, has indeed these three possibilities in mind, and clearly envisages, beyond the realm of Islam, a world state under a philosopher-king who is at the same time a prophet and a legislator. This obviously goes beyond the ideas of Plato, who limited his vision to a city state, but it may well have been envisaged by Stoics or Platonists in the Roman Empire; and there is some scanty evidence for that. Al-Fārābī's scheme is, however, not the less daring, because Greek thinkers had expressed similar views before. It is very different from St. Augustine's *Civitas Dei*, who does not envisage a perfect

[1] Cf. N. H. Baynes, Eusebius and the Christian Empire, *Mélanges Bidez*, Brussels 1933, p. 13 ff., reprinted in *Byzantine Studies and Other Essays* (cf. above p. 236, n. 2), p. 168 ff.

[2] Cf., e.g., *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s. v. *umma*.

State here and now, and this may account for the fact that Al-Fārābī's various works on the perfect state were not translated into medieval Latin.

The head of the perfect state must not only be an accomplished philosopher and a prophet and thus be divinely inspired—I shall have to say a word about prophecy presently. He must also be able to translate what he knows into effective speech and thus work on the imagination of his non-philosophical subjects—as Plato himself had explained in *Phaedrus* and *Clitopho*, according to Al-Fārābī [1]. He must, further, have the power to lead people to felicity by teaching them to perform those actions through which felicity is obtained: in other words he should be lawgiver and educator as well. Whereas philosophical truth is the same everywhere, in every city and in every nation, the symbols (created by philosopher prophets) through which this truth is conveyed to the non-philosophical crowd are different, according to different religions and different languages spoken by different nations. And, accordingly, laws and customs vary from land to land, although they are related to one and the same truth. Finally the ruler must be of good physique and be able to shoulder the task of war, when war is forced upon him. ("Musterstaat" chapter 27, towards the end.)

The prospective ruler of the perfect state must be born with twelve excellent physical, moral and intellectual qualities which Al-Fārābī, as he reports himself, took from the first section of the 6th book of Plato's *Republic* and arranged in a more systematic way. He is quite aware that it may happen very rarely that such a man should be born and, in addition, should, on reaching maturity, acquire all the faculties just mentioned. Such a man alone would qualify as ruler of the perfect state. He would qualify as well if he were lacking in prophetic, divinatory power, a faculty located in the imagination which is inferior to the intellect—a statement not surprising in view of the introductory chapter of Plato *Republic* IX, *Tim.* 71 and *Laws* XII 966 D, but which would probably be contradicted by late Neoplatonists of the Athenian school. Both philosopher-prophet and philosopher can act as heads of the perfect society. Inferior in rank is a ruler who was born with the essential twelve qualities referred to before but proved unable to reach the grade of perfection required and thus unable to give laws and establish rules of good conduct in his own right. He will, instead, although he is qualified as a philosopher as well, have to rely on the forms of life established by the rulers of higher rank, but his superior intellectual qualities will enable him to know and remember intimately what they have laid down as law and custom and to

[1] Cf. for this topic and for this section of the paper in general, Plato Arabus II (referred to above, p. 238, n. 2).

conform to this tradition in all his deeds without exception (one feels reminded of the *Politicus*). Whenever there is no precedent recorded he will be in a position to find out new law, in the spirit of the first ruler. He will also be a politician in the narrower sense of the term, being able to deal with situations unthought of by his predecessors and to select ways and means in the service of the well-being of the community. He will, in his turn, have oratorical faculties of convincing people of the validity of the Law and the necessity of his own innovations, and will have the same military qualities as the perfect ruler. The same good government could also be achieved by the union of a philosopher and a politician (Plato in Sicily!) and, should this prove to be impracticable, by a team of persons each of whom would display one of the qualities required (nocturnal council of the *Laws*). But it would be disastrous if there should be a government without philosophy altogether. ("Musterstaat" cap. 28.)

But no Platonist could consider politics in isolation, without referring the universe, the individual man and society to the same principle, and it goes without saying that Al-Fārābī conforms to that rule. The same order which prevails in the universe, where centuries of unquestioned tradition have given to the postulate of the rule of the divine mind the appearance of self-evidence, must apply to man, the μικρὸς κόσμος, who should organize himself on the same pattern, and to society which should be ruled and organized by the perfect man living in conformity with the divine order which guarantees the eternal existence of the whole world. ("Musterstaat" cap. 26–27 passim.)

Al-Fārābī's account of the different possibilities of philosophical government which Plato had envisaged in different works of his own may well go back to an attempt by Hellenistic or later Greek philosophers to give a coherent account of Plato's political theory. We cannot lay hands on the very work he used, but his treatise *On Plato's philosophy* [1] which depends on a Greek pattern and the paraphrase of the *Republic* used by Averroes [2] and certainly known to Al-Fārābī also show the kind of books which existed in late Greek philosophy whose authors, like their Aristotelian opposite numbers, made their authorities more coherent and more systematic than they actually were and had aspired to be.

Al-Fārābī's statement is couched in very abstract terms so that it may be applied to any existing society; all specific Islamic terms are, almost completely, studiously avoided. But he wrote for Arabic, Muslim readers,

[1] Cf. above, p. 245, n. 1.

[2] Cf. above, p. 238, n. 2.

for whom the application of the views expressed must have been obvious, although there was some risk involved in putting it down in writing. We shall not be far off the mark if we understand him in the following terms: Muhammad himself would then be the philosopher-prophet, and the Qur'ān the work in which he transmitted philosophical truth to non-philosophers. It would take the place of poetry in Plato's *Republic* or of the Gospels in Christianity, and would certainly not have an appeal as universal as philosophy. The Divine Law of the Muslims tied traditionally to the Prophet's authority would take the place of Plato's *Laws* which, obviously, were valid for Greeks only. The so-called orthodox four caliphs, the immediate successors of Muhammad, idealized in the later Islamic tradition, would correspond to the philosopher rulers who have no prophetic powers associated with their intellectual supremacy as Neoplatonic metaphysicians. The other possibilities surveyed by Al-Fārābī are probably meant as practical proposals and are by no means as unrealistic as they may appear at first sight. His views had some influence in various quarters and were by no means forgotten [1].

Before I pass to the third and last section of this paper I should add a word about Al-Fārābī's explanation of prophecy—which though subordinate to reason is none the less an indispensable quality of the τέλειος ἄνθρωπος. It would be like carrying coals to Newcastle if I should recall to you the appreciation and acknowledgement of mantic powers by Plato, Aristotle in his earlier works, Stoics and Neoplatonists. Al-Fārābī located them in the imaginative faculty, and its explanation is linked with the analysis of the soul by Alexander of Aphrodisias who brought Aristotle's treatment of the subject in different treatises into some kind of coherent system: he did this by establishing a hierarchic order of the body and the different faculties, each of them being at the same time the matter for a higher faculty and the form for a lower faculty. The highest faculty is the rational which provides structural unity to man and all his various faculties: it is, when it reaches perfection, in contact with the Active Mind, the νοῦς ποιητικός which is in most Arabic philosophical works no longer identical with the First Cause, with God (as it is for Alexander), but has become a separate transcendental entity, comparable to the World Intellect of Plotinus. It mediates between the higher world and the world below the moon. Through it divination can even reach the First Cause and become aware of it in visual and other symbols. The detailed explanation of divination by Al-Fārābī is highly interesting and reproduces, again, a Greek theory for which, as a whole, we have no other evidence. It is based

[1] Sir Thomas W. Arnold, *The Caliphate*, Oxford 1924, p. 121 ff.

on φαντασία, which is analysed in a much more differentiated manner than Aristotle had done, by utilizing the progress made in the Stoic school, and on an elaborate view of μίμησις, coupled with the Neoplatonic theory of emanation [1].

It is obvious that the problem of divination and prophecy assumed a new actuality when the adherents of the three Hebraic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, set about understanding their non-Hellenic religious experience in terms of philosophy. This applies to Islam with particular force since the very fact of Muhammad's prophecy is next to the uniqueness of God the main basis of its creed. For Al-Fārābī divine inspiration [2] comes about through philosophy and divination at once, but divination, located in the inferior faculty of imagination, is only auxiliary to philosophy. Al-Kindī and Avicenna give (though in different ways) to divination a higher place than to reason and their views remind us of what we know of Stoic thought and of the Athenian school of Neoplatonism. But the traditionalist and mystic Muslim critics of philosophy who eventually won the day claimed that no rational explanation of prophecy could ever be adequate, that it is a stage beyond intellect and that it had unlocked the door to a domain of reality to which Greek philosophy (a few Neoplatonists excepted) had not provided the key [3].

3

The Muslim philosophers were, like their immediate Greek predecessors, —to mention this third aspect of Platonism in conclusion—very well aware of the religious element in Plato's thought. In the case of Avicenna it pervades his entire philosophy, so that one can say he interprets the whole of Islam in terms of the Platonic religion of the mind which takes, however, its firm roots in the established forms of Muslim worship and of Muslim law and custom altogether; similarly his Hellenic Neoplatonic counterparts had appreciated and accepted Greek tradition though they looked at it with the philosopher's eye. Philosophy is, for Avicenna, more than a knowledge of truth accumulated in many centuries and by different generations, not only a system of natural theology, a way to understand the world and God in rational terms. Philosophy is for him a religious way of life, or rather the religious way of life, the only religious way of

[1] Cf. my paper on Al-Fārābī's theory of prophecy and divination, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77, 1957, p. 143 ff. [above, p. 206].

[2] Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam* s.v. *waḥy*.

[3] Cf. e.g., W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali*, London 1953, p. 63 ff.

life, and hence Islam must be made to conform to it without risking its basic tenets. I shall try to illustrate this by referring to his short treatise *On prayer* (which can be read in an English version) [1]. Avicenna deals in this treatise with two kinds of prayer: (*a*) the ritual daily prayer, five times a day as regulated by the Qur'ān and the Divine Law, which is incumbent on philosophers and non-philosophers alike and which he considers as an outward symbol of the higher kind of prayer. (We know from his autobiography that he was very strict in observing these forms.) (*b*) the private conversation of man with God which constitutes the last section of the communal prayer and whose importance had increased in the Islamic mystical tradition which had developed independently without contact with philosophy [2]. He gives to this part of the rite a completely new meaning by making it the specific prayer of the philosopher and identifying it with philosophical contemplation, as the final result of intense and protracted philosophical studies. To quote a few sentences: "prayer is the foundation stone of religion—worship is knowledge, that is to be aware of the existence of One Whose being is necessary and absolute—the real nature of prayer is therefore to *know* Almighty God in his Uniqueness, as a being wholly necessary". This prayer is silent, far beyond the world of the senses, it is an inner vision, with the eye of the mind: "Reason's ambition and striving all through life is to purify the sensual impressions and to become aware of the world of intelligible truth. Reasoning is the speech of the angels who have no speech or utterance, reasoning belongs to them especially, which is perception without sensing and communication without words. Man's relation to the Kingdom of Heaven, to the world of the mind, is established by reasoning: speech follows after it. If a man possesses no knowledge of reasoning he is incapable of expressing truth."

It does not need many words to demonstrate that this is another case of an important and profound Greek idea, fully naturalized in the Islamic world and fully understood by the Muslim philosopher who made it his own. We need only to recall Plato's *Laws* [3], or the fact that Aristotle wrote a treatise *On prayer*, a sentence from whose closing section, the only one we have, we owe to that very Plotinian Neoplatonist Simplicius[4]. It must have been concerned with the philosopher's prayer and have

[1] A. J. Arberry, *Avicenna On Theology*, London 1951, p. 50 ff. French translation by A. F. Mehren, *Traités Mystiques . . . d'Avicenne*, 3me fascicule, Leiden 1894, p. 16 ff.

[2] Cf. *Encyclopedia of Islam*, s. v. *ṣalāt*.

[3] Cf., e.g., E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley 1951, p. 219 ff., 222.

[4] W. D. Ross, *Aristoteles Fragmenta Selecta*, Oxford 1955, p. 57. Plato, *Rep.* 509 B. W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, Oxford 1948, pp. 160, 240.

been akin to the well-known statement in the *Eudemian Ethics* that the contemplative life is the true worship of God, that the perfect life is τὸν θεὸν θεραπεύειν καὶ θεωρεῖν, (VIII 3, 1249b20), by becoming similar to God as far as human beings are able to do so—a formula, by the way, which is again quite familiar to the Islamic philosophers. I may refer also to an equally famous saying of Seneca to whom we owe so many impressive formulations of widely accepted philosophical views (*Ep.* 95.47): "deum colit qui novit . . . primus est deorum cultus deos credere. deinde reddere eis maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem sine qua nulla maiestas est. scire illos esse qui praesident mundo . . . satis illos coluit quisquis imitatus est [1]." Galen could also be quoted in this context [2]. More similar still to what we find in Avicenna are statements on prayer and worship of the Divinity to be found in Porphyry's *Letter to his wife Marcella* [3]. Only the philosopher knows how to pray (μόνος εἰδὼς εὔξασθαι). "(16) You will honour God in the best way if you make your mind (τὴν σαυτῆς διάνοιαν) similar to God: ἡ δ' ὁμοίωσις ἔσται διὰ μόνης ἀρετῆς· μόνη γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὴν ψυχὴν ἄνω ἕλκει καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγγενές. The wise man's soul adapts itself to God, always sees God with the mind's eye, it always is with God: ψυχὴ δὲ σοφοῦ ἁρμόζεται πρὸς τὸν θεόν, ἀεὶ θεὸν ὁρᾷ, σύνεστιν ἀεὶ θεῷ. Not the speech of the wise man is appreciated and acknowledged by God but what he does: οὐχ ἡ γλῶττα τοῦ σοφοῦ τίμιον παρὰ θεῷ ἀλλὰ τὰ ἔργα. A wise man gives honour to God even when he is silent: σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνὴρ καὶ σιγῶν θεὸν τιμᾷ, while he is silent he voices truth: μετὰ σιγῆς φθεγγόμενος τὴν ἀλήθειαν. On the other hand, an ignorant man even if he prays and sacrifices defiles God: ἄνθρωπος δὲ ἀμαθὴς καὶ εὐχόμενος καὶ θύων μιαίνει τὸ θεῖον. Only the wise man is a real priest (ἱερεύς), the wise man alone is θεοφιλής (? he loves God and is loved by him). Your mind in you (ὁ ἐν σοὶ νοῦς) should be the temple of God. God enjoys nothing else but a pure mind." But the philosopher, Porphyry emphasizes, will also worship God in the traditional ritual forms though they are of minor importance.

The very close similarities between Porphyry and Avicenna are so obvious that there is no need to describe them in detail. There is, however, no reason why Avicenna should depend for his conception of philosophical prayer on that particular essay by Porphyry which is fortunately available for us. These ideas are quite widespread among Neoplatonists and could have reached him in many ways.

Avicenna understood Islam in Neoplatonic terms though he did not for this reason even contemplate ceasing to be a Muslim. Hence he could—

[1] Cf. W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin 1930, p. 107 ff., 135.

[2] Cf. R. Walzer, *Galen on Jews and Christians*, Oxford 1949, p. 23 f.

[3] Cf. W. Theiler, *op. cit.*, p. 140 ff.

and you may remember what was reported about Al-Fārābī—claim that the silent prayer of the philosopher had been established by the prophet himself. "This is the type of prayer which was incumbent upon our Lord and Founder of our Faith . . . on the night when he was separated from his body and divested of all worldly desire, so that there remained with him no trace of animal passion or the pull of natural wants. He enjoyed converse with God in his soul and intellect, saying: 'O Lord, I have discovered a strange joy this night: grant me the means to perpetuate it and provide for me a way that will always bring me into it'. It was then that God commanded the Prophet to pray, saying: 'O Muhammad, the man at prayer is in secret converse with His Lord'" or, in other words, one part of the ritual prayer has been established with a view to philosophy. "Those who practice only the outer part of prayer experience but a defective portion of that joy; but those who pray in the spirit know that joy in full and abundant measure, and the fuller that measure is, the ampler is their reward."

This attitude of the Neoplatonists and Avicenna has not died with the collapse of the Neoplatonic universe in modern times and continues to live amongst us, since it is deeply rooted in human nature. I need only remind you of the closing section of J. Burckhardt's lecture on "Glück und Unglück in der Weltgeschichte" [1].

I can not claim to have exhausted my subject, and this has also by no means been my intention. I thought it more appropriate to illustrate

[1] *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, Bern 1941, p. 393:

«Könnten wir völlig auf unsere Individualität verzichten und die Geschichte der kommenden Zeit etwa mit ebensoviel Ruhe und Unruhe betrachten, wie wir das Schauspiel der Natur, z. B. eines Seesturmes vom festen Lande aus mitansehen, so würden wir vielleicht eines der grössten Kapitel aus der Geschichte des Geistes bewusst miterleben.

In einer Zeit:

da der täuschende Friede jener dreissig Jahre, in welchen wir aufwuchsen,
längst gründlich dahin ist und eine Reihe neuer Kriege im Anzug zu sein scheint,
da die grössten Kulturvölker in ihren politischen Formen schwanken oder in Übergängen begriffen sind,
da mit der Verbreitung der Bildung und des Verkehrs auch die des Leidenbewusstseins und der Ungeduld sichtlich und rasch zunimmt,
da die sozialen Einrichtungen durchgängig durch Bewegungen der Erde beunruhigt werden — so vieler anderer angehäufter und unerledigter Krisen nicht zu gedenken —
würde es ein wunderbares Schauspiel, freilich aber nicht für zeitgenössische irdische Wesen sein, dem Geist der Menschheit erkennend nachzugehen, der über all diesen Erscheinungen schwebend und doch mit allen verflochten, sich eine neue Wohnung baut. Wer hiervon eine Ahnung hätte, würde des Glückes und Unglückes völlig vergessen und in lauter Sehnsucht nach dieser Erkenntnis dahinleben».

a few examples more fully, and to make out, if possible, a case for classical scholars to take an increased interest in the history of Greek thought in the Islamic world and in the attitude of Islam to the Greek legacy which is so different from the fate of ancient civilization in the Latin world.

From: *Entretiens* (Fondation Hardt, Vandœuvres-Genève) t. III, pp. 203–24.

INDEX